Durisol Phil. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

121106, February 20, 2002

Doctrine: Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529), to wit:

Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. --- Where it is necessary to issue a new
certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the
registered owner against his consent of where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel the surrender of
the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered
owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct
the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person
withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for
any reason the outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court
may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in
lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum
of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

The term "court" in the above-quoted section refers to Courts of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Courts, as provided in Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree.

Even assuming arguendo that the regional trial court had no jurisdiction over the surrender
of duplicate title, petitioner can no longer raise this ground after having actively
participated in the prosecution of the case. A judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged
lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void where the party who has the right to
challenge it failed to do so at the first instance.

In the case at bar, petitioner did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to
respondent DBP’s petition forsurrender of owner’s duplicate certificate. Neither did
petitioner file any motion to dismiss on this ground.

It was only two decades after the institution of the case at bar, when the issue of lack of
jurisdiction was first raised. However, it is already too late since the judgment had already
attained finality, considering that more than four years have elapsed without any action
from petitioner.

FACTS: DBP instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage covering 2 parcels of land

against petitioner. DBP emerged as the highest bidder. But the titles were registered to
Durisol and was never returned to the DBP. Because of this, DBP was unable to register the
property in its name, although, it purchased the properties is the foreclosure sale.
DBP filed a petition in the CFI (now RTC) for the surrender of the owners duplicate titles
covering the foreclosed properties. The RTC rendered summary judgment, ordering
petitioner to surrender the certificates of title which it obtained in lieu of the 2 mother titles.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Petitioner filed for annulment
of judgment with the CA but it was also denied.
Durisol still refused to surrender the titles so the court directed the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to cancel the seven titles and to issue new ones in lieu thereof.[13] Accordingly,
new certificates of title were issued to DBP. DBP later sold the lots to various buyers.
More than four years later, or on September 2, 1994, petitioner instituted before the Court of
Appeals a petition to annul the trial court’s decision dated January 10, 1989 and Resolution
dated April 4, 1990, alleging for the first time that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case because it was only a cadastral court. On January 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals
rendered the now assailed decision dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment.[16]
Petitioner Durisol’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of
merit.[17] Hence this petition.

ISSUE: (1) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new
duplicate owner’s certificate of title; and (2) whether or not petitioner was estopped from
challenging the court’s lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: Denied

The first paragraph of Rule 47, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the ground of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but
an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that
is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest
it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter is conferred by law.[18]

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction.
All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the
jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. But the
regional trial court is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and
land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real property,[19] or specifically land
registration cases, including its incidents such as the issuance of owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the regional trial courts.[20] It has been ruled
that the regional trial courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land,
except forcible entry and illegal detainer.[21]

Respondent DBP, after petitioner’s president unjustly refused to comply with the directive of
the trial court to surrender the seven certificates of title, filed a petition under Section 107 of
the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529), to wit:
Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. --- Where it is necessary to issue a new
certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the
registered owner against his consent of where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
the surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may
order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to
the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner’s duplicate
certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well
as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all
duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate.

The term "court" in the above-quoted section refers to Courts of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Courts, as provided in Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree.

Even assuming arguendo that the regional trial court had no jurisdiction over the surrender
of duplicate title, petitioner can no longer raise this ground after having actively participated
in the prosecution of the case. A judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of
jurisdiction cannot be considered void where the party who has the right to challenge it failed
to do so at the first instance.

In the case at bar, petitioner did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to
respondent DBP’s petition forsurrender of owner’s duplicate certificate. Neither did petitioner
file any motion to dismiss on this ground. On the contrary, petitioner raised the affirmative
defenses of failure to state a cause of action and payment.[22] To be sure, a court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action
are distinct and separate grounds for dismissal of a case.
As stated, petitioner actively participated in the course of the proceedings both in the trial
court and in the appellate court. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner assailed the
merits of the decision without raising any argument pertaining to lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court. When the case was elevated to the IAC and when the case was remanded to the
trial court, petitioner did not allege lack of jurisdiction. In its motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s order directing the issuance of new certificates of title, petitioner again failed to
raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Indeed, it was only two decades after the institution of the case at bar, when the issue of lack
of jurisdiction was first raised. However, it is already too late since the judgment had already
attained finality, considering that more than four years have elapsed without any action from
petitioner.

Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has been
held that while jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the
proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened. Thus:
This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Here, the principle of estoppel lies. Hence, a party may be
estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition
before the Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings.[23

Petitioner argues that the then CFI had no jurisdiction when the case was remanded to it by
the then IAC because as a cadastral court, the CFI had limited jurisdiction. It should be
noted, however, that when the CFI took cognizance of the remanded case, the
distinction between the CFI acting as a land registration court with limited
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a CFI acting as an ordinary court exercising general
jurisdiction, on the other hand, has already been removed with the effectivity of the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The amendment was aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits. The change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring
upon the designated trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
"original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petition."[24]

f. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction

Shariah District Court Montaner v. Shari’ah District Court, G.R. No. 174975, January 20,
2009
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does
not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a
motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over
the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses
set forth in an answer[25] or a motion to dismiss.

In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because
petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the
deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS: On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.[3]
Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montañer-Dalupan are their children.[4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a “Complaint” for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court alleging that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was a Muslim and they
were the first family of the decedent and that Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of
the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr.,
because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount
of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks
to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to
Article 175 of the Family Code.

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims. On MR, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal and allowed
private respondents to adduce further evidence.[18] In its second assailed order dated
September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the
merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.
Hence, the instant case.

Petitioner argues that RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY

LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-
MUSLIMS and it DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER “THE ESTATES AND
PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR.” WHICH IS NOT A
NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED and for non-payment
of docket fees. Petitioner also contends that the MR was defective for lack of notice of
hearing.
ISSUE: WON the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments

and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.[21] The designation given by
parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the
said designation. Rather than rely on “a falsa descriptio or defective caption,” courts are
“guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings.”[22]

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court
as a “Complaint” for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,[23] such
as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim.
The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as
known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent,
which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the
reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of the decedent.[24] These include the following: (1) the prayer for
the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an
administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not
have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion
to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of
the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an
answer[25] or a motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having “a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.[28] Indeed, the “defense of lack of
jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be
deprived of its jurisdiction.”[29]
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.[30] In the case at bar, the
Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has
the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction,
which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after
hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a
Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion
may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil
action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding
as “a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” This
Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased Muslim.[31] In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact
of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs,
which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation
of the estate of the decedent.[32] Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of
Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling
S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
defendant in a civil action[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties,
a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a
special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which
“a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong”[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff
or defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, “by which a party seeks to
establish a status, right, or a particular fact,”[36] has one definite party, who petitions or
applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In
the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any
cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the
decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.[39]

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of
docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding
before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the
basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.
Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court
correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct
assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.[40] If the party filing the case paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the
clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk
of court.[41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction,
because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket
fees.[42] As “every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by
law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law,” the
party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment.[43]
However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.[44]

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket
fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination
of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s
assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the
Shari’a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules
require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice
of hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that “no written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.”[46] However, the
Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions “in order to promote [the] objective of
securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”[47]
Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of
hearing in cases where “a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein.”[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that “no party can even claim a
vested right in technicalities,” and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49]

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to
control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation
simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of
justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception
to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were
not affected.[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due
process,[51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.[52] In
probate proceedings, “what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.”[53] In the case at bar, as
evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel
received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not
denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition
to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to
the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for
the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet
determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions
regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be
raised and settled in the said proceeding.[54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.[55] In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question
of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

g. Concurrent/Confluent/Coordinate Jurisdiction
Supreme Court and Regional Trial Court

Civil actions involving ambassadors, public ministers, consuls

Cases on the constitutionality of treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction (Sec. 5, 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

G.R. No. L-25721 May 26, 1969

MISAEL VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; EDUARDO ROMUALDEZ, as
Secretary of Finance; and RAFAEL SALAS, as Executive Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
 HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, as Mayor of Manila;
GREGORIO EJERCITO, as Assistant Secretary to said Mayor; and ANGEL C. CRUZ
and ROMEO L. KAHAYON, respondents.
(political question n inga case?)

"the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual

foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." It would appear clear, therefore,
that the force of such a presumption would preclude the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, unless there be facts disclosed which would serve to weaken if not to defeat
the presumption of validity. No such facts have even been alleged.

This is not to say that in no case should a writ of preliminary injunction issue. There are
times the exercise of such an authority is appropriate. Thus when there is an invasion of
the preferred freedoms of belief, of expression as well as the cognate rights to freedom of
assembly and association, an affirmative response to a plea for preliminary injunction
would indeed be called for. The primacy of the freedom of the mind is entitled to the
highest respect. This is not such a case

Vera v. Hon. Arca, G.R. No. L-25721, May 26, 1969

FACTS: Respondent Judge Arca issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation
of the Tax Census Act which required every resident of the Philippines over 18 years of age
within the month of February, 1962 and thereafter within the same month every four years to
file with the City of Municipal Treasurer a Sworn Statements of Assets, Income and
Liabilities. Hence, petitioners Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of Finance
and the Executive Secretary filed for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: whether respondent Judge ought to have issued the writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act.
HELD: No
As far back as March 23, 1909, more than 60 years ago, this Court, in the leading case of
Devesa v. Arbes, 21 made the categorical pronouncement that the issuance of an injunction
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, the exercise of which is controlled not so
much by the then applicable sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, now the Rules of Court,
but by the accepted doctrines, one of which is that it should not be granted while the rights
between the parties are undetermined except in extraordinary cases where material and
irreparable injury will be done. For it is an action in equity appropriate only when there can
be no compensation in damages for the injury thus sustained and where no adequate
remedy in law exists. Such a holding reflected the prevailing American doctrine that there is
no power "the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion or more dangerous in a doubtful case," being "the strong
arm of equity, that never ought to be extended," except where the injury is great and
irreparable.

We have remained committed to such an approach since then. Only last year, in Palanan
Lumber & Plywood Co. v. Arranz, 23 we emphasized: "It is not amiss to recall here that time
and again this Court has had occasion to deplore the readiness of some judges to grant and
issue injunctions ex parte against acts of public functionaries, ignoring the presumption of
regularity and validity of official actuations, in disregard of the deference and courtesy due to
a coordinate branch of the government, and with no other guide than the far from impartial
assertions in pleadings of interested parties, which a summary hearing would have shown to
be either dubious or unfounded. The result has been that all too often, the public interest has
been prejudiced through unnecessary delays. It bears repeating here that

preliminary injunctions remain extraordinary remedies that should be dispensed with

circumspection, and that both sides should be first heard whenever possible."

It is true that the evil of ex parte injunction was stressed in the above excerpt. It is equally
true that a reminder was made of the extraordinary character of this remedy "to be
dispensed with circumspection" to avoid its invocation by interested parties whose claims
could be shown "to be either dubious or unfounded." What cannot be sufficiently pointed out
is that a party seeking injunction must show that his right to it must be clear and
unmistakable. 24 The propriety of its issuance, therefore, requires unmistakable proof "that
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows fact
entitling him to such relief."

Independently then of whether or not there has been an unwarranted departure from the
governing principle that the power to issue a preliminary injunction is not to be availed of
indiscriminately, the more specific and pivotal question is whether it could be exercised to
restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act under the circumstances disclosed. The
answer, to repeat, must be in the negative.

In the order granting the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, 26 it
was stated that a hearing on the matter took place on February 19, 1966. Then came a
summary of the legal arguments advanced both by the other respondents as petitioners and
the then Solicitor General, now Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, on behalf of the petitioners
before us, who were the parties proceeded against before the lower court.

It is apparent on the face of such order that respondent Judge took into consideration purely
legal arguments, no evidence being introduced, both for and against the validity of the
challenged statute. Moreover, his attention was invited to the presumption of validity that
every legislative act has in its favor as well as the doctrine that the task of suspending the
operation of the law "is a matter of extreme delicacy because that is an interference with the
official acts not only with the duly elected representatives of the people in Congress but also
of the highest magistrate of the land." 27 Respondent Judge was deaf to the force of such
cogent and persuasive constitutional law doctrines. He issued the preliminary injunction
nonetheless.

It is manifest that respondent Judge did overstep the bounds of discretion that set limits to
the authority he is entitled to exercise in the issuance of the preliminary injunction to restrain
the enforcement of a statute. There can be no dissent from the proposition that where the
action required of a lower court would be tantamount, even if only for a temporary period, to
disregarding the clearly expressed will of the two branches of the government, the need for
caution is greatest. Here, respondent Judge was apparently oblivious to such a need.
It might be said, of course, that the issuance of a preliminary injunction does not have the
impress of finality. After a hearing on the merits, the legislative act could regain its full vigor
and could then be enforced. There is much to be said though in favor of Cooley's approach
in the exercise of what he referred to as the "high prerogative of declaring a legislative
enactment void," a lower court, "conscious of the fallibility of human judgment" being
admonished to manifest the utmost reluctance. 28 That attitude should be displayed even at
the stage of considering whether a preliminary injunction should

issue. Had respondent Judge been of such a frame of mind, he would have arrived at a
more acceptable conclusion. He would have refrained from indulging the other respondents
in their plea for a preliminary injunction.
To borrow from the language of Justice Laurel, he was hardly conscious of the truism "that
a becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position they occupy in the
interrelation
and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." 29 For if note be taken of the
rigorous
requirement of a two- thirds vote for this Court to annul a statute, 30 the confidence
displayed by
respondent Judge in thus restraining the enforcement of the act does indeed appear to be
quite
excessive, under all the circumstances disclosed by the record. Correspondingly, it could be
interpreted
as the failure to observe what Cooley referred to as "due caution and circumspection" and
as well as
"the respect due to the action and judgment of the lawmakers."

It might have been different if at the hearing the attention of respondent Judge was invited to
facts which would overcome the presumption of validity. Even with reference to municipal
ordinances, Justice Malcolm so clearly emphasized that "the presumption is all in favor of
validity." 32 In the recent decision of Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Asso. v. City
Mayor of Manila, 33 we announced the view that as underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation, "the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." It would appear clear, therefore, that the force of such a presumption would
preclude the issuance of a preliminary injunction, unless there be facts disclosed which
would serve to weaken if not to defeat the presumption of validity. No such facts have even
been alleged.

There is much greater reason for a writ of preliminary injunction being set aside in this case
by the grant of the certiorari prayed for. It may serve to deter other inferior tribunals similarly
minded. It may serve to induce the conviction on the part of a lower court judge that it is a
matter of the utmost seriousness to stop the enforcement of an act after it has been enacted
by a bicameral legislative body composed of the House and the Senate and approved by the
President, two of the coordinate branches of the government. The greatest care should thus
be taken before its operation is enjoined. Thereby, it would be manifesting not judicial
timidity but judicial wisdom.
This is not to say that in no case should a writ of preliminary injunction issue. There are
times the exercise of such an authority is appropriate. Thus when there is an invasion of the
preferred freedoms of belief, of expression as well as the cognate rights to freedom of
assembly and association, an affirmative response to a plea for preliminary injunction would
indeed be called for. The primacy of the freedom of the mind is entitled to the highest
respect. This is not such a case, however, and the writ of certiorari must be granted

Mendoza v. Mayor Villas, G.R. No. 187256, February 23, 2011

FACTS: Mendoza won as Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental
Mindoro in the 2007 Barangay Elections. The losing candidate, Thomas Pajanel, filed a
petition for quo warranto with the Municipal Trial Court. The MTC issued a Decision dated
February 23, 2008, disqualifying Mendoza and declaring that Herato was entitled to succeed
him as Punong Barangay with Herato garnering the highest number of votes as a Barangay
Kagawad. Mendoza appealed the MTC Decision to the COMELEC.

The mayor, Villas administered the Oath of Office to Herato. Then, Villas issued
Memorandum No. 2008-03-010 dated March 3, 2008,[6] directing all department heads of
the Municipal Government to act only on documents signed or authorized by Herato.

Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) as to who should exercise the powers of Punong Barangay of
Balatasan given the prevailing controversy.

In a letter dated April 11, 2008,[7] DILG Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero responded to
Mendoza’s inquiry informing Villas that Mendoza should occupy the post of Punong
Barangay as there was no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the MTC Decision dated
February 23, 2008.

The LBP, issued Villas and Mendoza a letter dated April 24, 2008,[9] advising both parties
that the LBP shall not honor any transaction with regard the accounts of Barangay
Balatasan.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Petition dated May 5, 2008 for Mandamus with Damages and
Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action No.
08-10 pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.
Petitioners prayed that the LBP be directed to release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to
them in order to render necessary, basic public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.

Villas and Herato later filed a Motion to Dismiss dated November 7, 2008. In the Motion, a
copy of the COMELEC Resolution disqualifying Mendoza was attached. But Mendoza also
presented a Certification dated February 27, 2009[10] from the COMELEC which stated that
COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY is still pending with the Commission.

In an attempt to clarify the issues on the matter, Mendoza again sought the opinion of the
DILG regarding the controversy. Thus, the DILG issued another letter, denominated as
DILG Opinion No. 5, Series of 2009 dated January 2009,[11] reiterating its stance that the
MTC Decision dated February 23, 2008 has not yet become final and executory.
Nevertheless, the RTC issued the assailed order dated February 2, 2009 dismissing the
petition on the strength of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8, 2008 disqualifying
Mendoza from running in the 2007 elections. As stated, petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated February 2, 2009 was denied in an Order dated March
17, 2009.

From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court.

ISSUE: WON the petition is proper

HELD: No

The instant petition is a direct recourse to this Court from the assailed orders of the RTC.
Notably, petitioners did not cite the rule under the Rules of Court by which the petition was
filed. If the petition is to be treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petition must be dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely.

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform,[12] a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having
been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v.
Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, there are no special and important reasons that petitioners cite to justify their
direct recourse to this Court under Rule 65.

On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under
Rule 45 when only questions of law are raised, as in this case. Thus, the Court ruled in
Barcenas v. Tomas:[13]
Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be appealed to the Supreme Court
through a petition for review by certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts,
whenever authorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact.

This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that it is not a trier of facts; and that, save
for a few exceptional instances, its function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the
factual findings of the lower courts. There is a question of law when doubts or differences
arise as to what law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the
doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final orders or resolutions of an
MTC should be appealed to the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On
the other hand, RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through
either of the following: an ordinary appeal if the case was originally decided by the RTC; or a
petition for review under Rule 42, if the case was decided under the RTC's appellate
jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final
orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

xxxx

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions is
provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.

xxxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45.

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1)
to this Court on questions of law only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA
-- as they in fact did. Unfortunately for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their petition
for review because of serious procedural defects. This action foreclosed their only available
avenue for the review of the factual findings of the RTC. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the Court shall exercise liberality and consider the instant petition as one filed under
Rule 45. In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc.,
[14] citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court noted that it has the discretion to
determine whether a petition was filed under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court:
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been
filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review.

Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed prematurely, it must still be
dismissed for having become moot and academic.
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections,[16] the Court defined a moot
and academic case as follows:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a
rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has transpired that
has rendered this case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. This is because, as
stated in Fernandez v. Commission on Elections,[17] “whatever judgment is reached, the
same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer
be enforced.” Mendoza’s term of office has expired with the conduct of last year’s local
elections. As such, Special Civil Action No. 08-10, where the assailed Orders were issued,
can no longer prosper. Mendoza no longer has any legal standing to further pursue the
case, rendering the instant petition moot and academic.

CREBA v. DAR Secretary, G.R. 183409, June 18, 2010

FACTS: The case is an original petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
CREBA, or the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc., assails the
Memorandum. petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which,
in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to
the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole
nation.

CREBA argues that the memorandums issued by Secretary of Agrarian Reform expanded
the definition of agricultural lands, violates the autonomy of LGUs and the due process and
equal protection clause.

ISSUE: WON the petition is proper

HELD: This petition must be dismissed.

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.[15] In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[16] citing
People v. Cuaresma,[17] this Court made the following pronouncements:

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket.[18] (Emphasis supplied.)

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[19]

This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications,
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction.[20]

Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)
Chavez v. Romulo,[21] on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of [the] United States
of America v. Hon.
Purganan,[22] on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge
QuijanoPadilla,[23] on government contract involving modernization and computerization of
voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora,[24] on status and
existence of a public office; and (e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,[25] on the so-called “Win-
Win Resolution” of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion
to agro-industrial area.[26]

In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due
course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.[27] The present petition should have been initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
 Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature
of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.[28] Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied.)

With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved.

Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this Petition is
still dismissible.

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[29]

The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[30]

Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act,

though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid
with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the
exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.[31] Without jurisdiction means
lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power
to exercise authority.[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[33]

In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned requisites for
the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum
No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.

A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power
to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”[34]

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is

necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom
is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.[35]

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions and not of judicial or quasijudicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative
issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the
parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions.

Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in essence seeks
the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper remedy
for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only
appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the
aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined
only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid
administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact
that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, “never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion.”[36]

At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should
still be dismissed.

Executive Order No. 129-A[37] vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the
CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful implementation of the
CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the DAR to establish and
promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform
implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses.
Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority
to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid
executive order clearly provides that “the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the
mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x.”