Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman

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Carandang v.

Heirs of de Guzman

Rule 3 Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel

Facts:

Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well as


corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity)

The capital stock of MBS was increased and some of this increase was
subscribed by [the spouses Carandang].

[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid
by him.

Thus,[de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the
payment of said total amount.

De Guzman filed a case before the RTC and the trial court rendered in favor of
[de Guzman].

The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having
been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to
comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel . — Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor
or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the
specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs.
The spouses Carandang posits that such failure to comply with the above rule
renders void the decision of the RTC

Issue: Whether the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred


by law and is not subject to the discretion of the parties, 9 jurisdiction over the
person of the parties to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
10 Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or a
failure to object. 11
In the cases cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had
been no valid substitution by the heirs of the deceased party, and therefore
the judgment cannot be made binding upon them. In the case at bar, not only
do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the
court over their persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such
jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their
participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit
espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The
heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the
RTC. DaScHC

Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a


personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby
waive it by silence.
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule
requiring a formal substitution of heirs. The underlying principle
therefore is not really because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional
requirement, but because non-compliance therewith results in the
undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though
not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the
decision rendered therein. 12 Such violation of due process can only be
asserted by the persons whose rights are claimed to have been
violated, namely the heirs to whom the adverse judgment is sought to
be enforced.

In People v. Florendo

"the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the
deceased upon the death of the latter, the principal . . . ." Nevertheless, the
case at bar had already been submitted for decision before the RTC on 4
June 1998, several months before the passing away of de Guzman on 19
February 1999. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of
de Guzman's counsel were conducted before the promulgation of the RTC
Decision. Consequently, de Guzman's counsel cannot be said to have no
authority to appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the death of de
Guzman.
In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express
waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because
there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further
proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's counsel.

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