G.R. No.

L – 18463 October 4, 1922

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. PERFECTO
Malcolm, J.

Facts: On September 7, 1920, Gregorio Perfecto published

an editorial for the newspaper La Nacion, about the
loss of documents in the Senate. The said documents
were records of witness testimonies regarding the
investigation of Oil Companies.
The Philippine Senate deemed the editorial of Mr.
Perfecto to be libelous and in direct violation of
Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, which states,
"Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or by reason of such
performance, provided that the offensive minister or
person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to
him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor,".
Defendant argued whether Article 256 is still in force
with the new American occupation. Defendant was
found guilty in the municipal court and also in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue: W/N Mr. Gregorio Perfecto violated Article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code.
Held: No. It is a general principle that whenever there is
acquisition of new territory, the previous political
relations are totally abrogated, although some laws
from the Spanish Penal Code are still used in force, it
was only done so because of convenience. However,
 with the new American occupation all laws that are
inconsistent with the democratic nature of the new
government are displaced without the need for any
declaration.
Article 256 is a law that is monarchical in nature,
aiming to protect ministers of the crown and persons
of authority as representatives of the king of Spain,
upholding said officials as higher from the general
population and protecting them from contemptuous
or dissatisfied statement from the public. It is
completely against the nature and the spirit of the
American System of Government which states that
every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and
has equal right with every other man.

G.R. No. L – 18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V.
GREGORIO PERFECTO
Malcolm, J.

Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic

of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum
of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issue: 1. W/N there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern.
2. W/N the provisions of MOA-AD is
Constitutional.
Held: 1. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under
a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). The
right to information guarantees the right of the
 people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of
paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that
the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to
the executory nature or commercial character of
the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
2. No. The provisions of the MOA indicate,
among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized
under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies
 powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of
the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in
the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states.

G.R No. 187167 July 16, 2011

MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA
Carpio, J.

Facts: R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime

 baselines of the Philippines. After five decades, RA
9552 was passed, amending RA 3046 to comply with
the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The new law shortened
one baseline optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes
of islands whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the new
law on the ground that: it reduces the Philippine
maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 of the
Constitution and it opens the country’s waters to
maritime passage by all vessels, thus undermining
Philippine sovereignty. Respondents, on the other
hand, defended the new law as the country’s
compliance with the terms of UNCLOS. Respondents
stressed that RA 9522 does not relinquish the
country’s claim over Sabah.
Issue: W/N RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Held: NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of
 decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine
lands along their coasts.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no
role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or
conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use
rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside
UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules
on general international law.

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS EL
MONTE DE PIEDAD
Trent, J.

Facts: On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the

Philippine Islands, which was then under the Spanish
Crown, that devastated lot of civilians. Therefore n
Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief board was
appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to
distribute the money voluntarily contributed by
donors. After a thorough investigation and
consideration, the relief board allotted $365703.50 to
the various sufferer’s name in its resolution.
These were later distributed in accordance with the
above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65,
leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for distribution.
Upon the petition of the governing body of the
Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the
Philippine Government, by order dated the first
month, directed its treasured to turn over Monte de
Piedad the sum of $80,000 of relief fund in its
installment of 20,000 each. These amounts received
on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April
14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession
of Monte de Piedad.
The Attorney General in representation of the
Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000
together with interest, for the benefit of those
persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names
published in the Official Gazette instituted on May,
3, 1912 by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due
trial in the lower court, judgment was entered in
honor of the plaintiff currency, together with legal
interest from February 28, 1912, and cost of cause.
The Monte de Piedad then contended that the present
 Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground
that the obligation of the former was wiped out when
their was a change of sovereignty.
Issue: W/N the government of the Philippine Islands has
capacity to file a suit against the Monte de Piedad
for the recovery of the said amount.
Held: Yes, the government of the Philippine Islands has
capacity to file a suit against the Monte de Piedad.
Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine
Government being the guardian of the “rights of the
people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the
beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a
suit against the appellant. The Philippine
Government is not merely a nominal party that’s
why it can bring and prosecute this action by
exercising its sovereign powers. The supreme court
then held the right of the government to file the case.
Therefore, the government of the Philippines has the
capacity to file a suit against the Monte de Piedad.

GR No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

CABANAS VS. PILAPIL
Fernando, J.

Facts: The disputants in this appeal are the mother and the
uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an
insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased
father. The dispute focuses as to who of them
 should be entitled to act as trustee thereof.
The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian
Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff,
Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the
time the complaint was filed. The defendant,
Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The
deceased insured himself and instituted as
beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as
trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the
proceeds were paid to him.
Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the
child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum.
She filed the bond required by the Civil Code.
Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of
the amount in question by invoking the terms of the
insurance policy.
Issue: W/N the mother is entitled to act as the trustee of a
minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance
policy.
Held: Yes. What is paramount is the welfare of the child.
With the circumstance that the child stays with the
mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack
of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand
the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified
by the assumption, both logical and natural, that
infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is
much less in the case of a mother than in the case of
an uncle. The appealed decision is supported by
another cogent consideration.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that
the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. It may happen,
family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the
natural order of things but the tradition of the
country for a parent to be preferred. it could have
been different if the conflict were between father
and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother
asserting priority. Certainly, the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of
her plea.