Self or Cross-Fertilisation
Self or Cross-Fertilisation
Self or Cross-Fertilisation
i Introduction
1 This chapter explores this issue in the context of one decision by Pre-Trial Chamber i of the
icc and its use of ECtHR legislation: Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, icc-01/04,
Decision on the Application in the Proceedings of vprs 1, vprs 2, vprs 3, vprs 3, vprs 4,
vprs 5 and vprs 6, Pre-Trial Chamber i, 17 January 2006 (‘Situation in the drc’).
2 Reference to icts in this chapter also includes the icc unless otherwise stated.
3 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘International Criminal Tribunals in the Shadow of Strasbourg and Politics of
Cross-Fertilization’ (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 371, 374. For detailed anal-
ysis of this issue see generally William A. Schabas, ‘Synergy or Fragmentation? International
Criminal Law and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 9 Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice 609. See also Antonio Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court
of Human Rights on International Criminal Tribunals—Some Methodological Remarks’ in
Morten Bergsmo (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden, Essays in Hon-
our of Asbjørn Eide (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 19.
4 Julia Geneuss, ‘Obstacles to Cross-fertilisation: The International Criminal Tribunals’ “Unique
Context” and the Flexibility of the European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law’ (2015) 84
Nordic Journal of International Law 404, 405.
5 Discussed in Triestino Mariniello and Paolo Lobba, ‘Editorial: The Cross-fertilisation Rhetoric
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self- or cross-fertilisation? 283
dence constitutes ‘an aspect of good judging’.6 He points out that the ‘mere fact
of citation generally suffices’ to prevent tribunals from criticism.7
However, not every referenced ECtHR case which icts deem relevant and
persuasive necessarily supports their respective decision-making. This chapter
explores this point by critically analysing the 2006 icc Pre-Trial Chamber i’s
(‘ptc i’) interpretation of ‘proceedings’ as enshrined in Article 68(3) of the
Rome Statute.8 On 17 January 2006, ptc i found that, at the icc, victims have
the general right to participate during the investigation of a situation prior
to the naming of a suspect.9 To support its finding, ptc i used a teleological
interpretation methodology for the term ‘proceedings’ and relied on, inter alia,
ECtHR case law including Berger v France and Perez v France.10 The Chamber
argued that the two ECtHR decisions affirmed that victims should be able
to exercise rights independently vis-à-vis the prosecution at the investigation
stage. It furthermore opined that ECtHR jurisprudence applied Article 6(1)
of the European Convention of Human Rights, the right to a fair trial, to
victims at the investigation stage thus also supporting a general right to victim
participation at the investigation stage at the icc.11
The analysis in this chapter suggests that ptc i may not have relied on said
cases to endorse the ECtHR’s legal reasoning with the consequence of cross-
fertilising their decision. Rather, the human rights jurisprudence may have
been referenced in an attempt to add authority to its decision which calls
into existence a victim’s right that, at the icc, is not explicitly provided by
statute and has not been established at the ECtHR level as such. Referencing
unpersuasive ECtHR jurisprudence in an attempt to add validity to a court
decision and perhaps to avoid subsequent criticism may be better described
as self-fertilisation rather than cross-fertilisation rhetoric.12
The icc is a permanent international court and has jurisdiction over per-
sons suspected of the serious international crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes.13 For the first time in the history of international
criminal law, the establishment of the icc and its statutes and regulations
afforded victims participatory rights in proceedings.14 The icc Statute contains
provisions specifically relating to victims’ participatory rights intended to intro-
duce an element of victim recognition into international proceedings.15
external sources including the argument that judges have certain goals in doing so, for
example ‘to see the law reflect their policy preferences’ see Voeten (n 6) 553–554.
13 icc Statute, Article 5.
14 Alexandra H. Guhr, ‘Victim Participation During the Pre-Trial Stage at the International
Criminal Court’ (2008) 8 International Criminal Law Review 109, 110. No provisions for
victim participation (apart from participation as witnesses) were introduced at the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, see Hector Olasolo,
‘Systematic and Casuistic Approaches to the Role of Victims in Criminal Proceedings
Before the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review 513, 513–
514. Victim participation has since been included at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. See in general Jérôme de
Hemptinne, ‘Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings of the Spe-
cial Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 165; James
Bair, ‘From the Numbers Who Died to Those Who Survived: Victim Participation in the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2008) 31 University of Hawaii Law
Review 508.
15 icc Statute, Articles 15(3), 19(3), 68(3). For detailed analysis on international recognition
of victims’ rights see M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’
(2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 203.
The inclusion of victims at the icc is based on the assumption that partic-
ipation can have restorative benefits for victims.16 In addition, SáCouto and
Cleary point out that the drafters of the victim participation regime at the icc
were influenced by the perceived shortfalls of the International Criminal Tri-
bunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Tribunals have generally
been criticised for failing to establish a connection with the affected communi-
ties, creating an overall disconnect with their work, which may also be related
to the lack of victim participation in their proceedings.17 Victim participation
at the icc was therefore considered ‘an essential tool for bringing the Court and
its proceedings closer to the persons who have suffered atrocities’.18
The icc Statute contains three provisions explicitly relating to victim par-
ticipation.19 As per Article 15(3), victims may make representations to the ptc
where the Prosecutor, under his proprio motu powers, requests the authorisa-
tion of an investigation from the Chamber. In addition, Article 19(3) provides
that victims are able to submit observations where the Court’s jurisdiction or
the admissibility of a case is challenged. Lastly, Article 68(3) broadly states that
‘the Court shall permit [victims’] views and concerns to be presented and con-
sidered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court’
where their personal interests are affected and ‘in a manner which is not prej-
udicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused’.20
16 Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘Victims’ Participation in the Investigations of the
International Criminal Court’ (2008) 17 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems
73, 76–77; Guhr (n 14) 110. Moffett explains that the Court nevertheless upholds its core
goal of prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of international crimes, see Luke Mof-
fett, ‘Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victims’ Interests Through Participation at
the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 26 Criminal Law Forum 255, 260, 264. See also
Christine van den Wyngaert ‘Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some Views
and Concerns of An icc Trial Judge’ (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of Interna-
tional Law 475, 476.
17 SáCouto and Cleary, ‘Investigations’ (n 16) 79–81; see also van den Wyngaert (n 16) 477.
18 Gilbert Bitti and Håkan Friman, ‘Participation of Victims in the Proceedings’ in Lee Roy
(eds), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence (Ardsley
2001) 456 as cited in SáCouto and Cleary, ‘Investigations’ (n 16) 82.
19 As per Rule 85(a) of the icc rpe, ‘victim’ means natural persons who have suffered harm
as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and
‘may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their
property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes,
and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian
purposes’.
20 The wording of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute was heavily influenced by Article 6(b) of
In light of Article 68(3), the icc must determine the appropriate stages
of proceedings during which victims’ views and concerns can be presented.
Different icc chambers have concerned themselves with questions relating
to the applicability of Article 68(3). McGonigle Leyh explains in this context
that ‘inconsistent approaches to Article 68(3) determinations as well as to the
appropriate modalities of participation have plagued the Court throughout its
operation’.21
The below examines the first decision relating to victim participation at
the icc handed down by ptc i; a decision whose key issue was to identify
whether victims have a general participation right during the investigation
stage of a situation in light of Article 68(3).22 Ultimately, the analysis seeks
to identify whether ptc i’s reference to ECtHR jurisprudence in this context
can be justified by the cross-fertilisation argument and represents inter-judicial
dialogue or qualifies more as self-fertilisation in an attempt to enhance the
validity of the decision made.
On 17 January 2006, ptc i handed down its decision on whether and to what
extent six victims were able to participate in the investigation of the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (‘drc’) prior to the identification and
naming of an accused.23 Object of the investigation were crimes committed
the 1985 un Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, ga Res, 40/34, un gaor 40th sess, 96th plen mtg, supp no 53, un Doc a/res/40/34
(29 November 1985) annex (‘Declaration’). On Article 6(b) see Brianne M. Leyh, ‘Victim-
Oriented Measures at International Criminal Institutions: Participation and its Pitfalls’
(2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 375, 381.
21 Brianne M. Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceed-
ings (Intersentia 2011) 258.
22 Other pre-trial stages include the preliminary examination phase and the confirmation of
charges phase. Victim participation during these phases is not subject to analysis in this
chapter but has been undertaken by others elsewhere. See eg Leyh, ‘Procedural Justice’
(n 21) 261–267, 273–290.
23 The drc referred the situation to the Prosecutor of the icc in March 2004. On 23 June
2004 the Prosecutor officially decided to commence the first investigation of the icc. The
situation was assigned to ptc i. For detailed analysis of the decision see also Jérôme de
Hemptinne and Francesco Rindi, ‘icc Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to Participate in
the Investigation Phase of Proceedings’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice
342.
during the Second Congo War. The Office of the Prosecutor had elected to
proceed with the investigation into the situation but no arrest warrant or
summons against an individual had been issued yet at that stage. Proceedings
were therefore in the investigation phase of the pre-trial stage.
One of the key questions the Chamber had to decide was whether victims
have the general right to participate during the investigation phase prior to the
naming of a suspect.24 This would only be possible if the investigation stage
falls under ‘proceedings’ in the sense of Article 68(3).25 The term is vague and
therefore requires interpretation. ptc i was the first chamber of the icc called
upon to interpret the term in the context of the victim participation regime.
The Chamber ultimately affirmed that victims had a general participation right
during the investigation of a situation and gave all six victims status to partic-
ipate through their legal representative during this phase. None of the victims
had made an application to participate in any particular pre-trial proceedings,
which is why the Chamber did not decide the specifics of their participatory
role.26 Instead victims were provided with access to all public documents.27
However, ptc i outlined that participation may be possible during specific pro-
ceedings as well as investigations in general.28
24 The other questions discussed by ptc i were whether the applying victims could receive
victim status and how victim participation at the pre-trial stage should look. The general
right to participation goes beyond those specific participation rights enshrined in the icc
Statute including Articles 15(3) and 19(3).
25 McDermott argues that the wording of Article 68(3) excludes victims from presenting
views and concerns at the investigation stage of a situation, see Yvonne McDermott, ‘Some
Are More Equal than Others: Victim Participation in the icc’ (2008) 5 Eyes on the icc 23,
33–34.
26 The decision was described as ‘extremely vague’ regarding the modalities of participation,
see ibid 37.
27 Situation in the drc (n 1), para. 76.
28 Situation in the drc (n 1), 42 (explicitly excluding non-public documents). In practice,
victim participation during the investigation stage in this case has been very limited. The
Legal Representative of victims submitted arguments regarding the Prosecutor’s appli-
cation to appeal the decision (Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, icc-01/04-
105-tEN, Observations of the Legal Representative of vprs 1–6 […], Pre-Trial Chamber i,
27 January 2006) and unsuccessfully requested documents regarding the Prosecutor’s
decision to suspend their investigation concerning other possible charges against Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, icc-01/04-399, Decision
on the Requests of the Legal Representative for Victims vprs 1 to vprs 6 Regarding
‘Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation’, Pre-Trial Chamber i, 26 September
2007).
29 For analysis of the literal and contextual interpretations see de Hemptinne and Rindi
(n 23) 344. For critical discussion of victim-focused teleological reasoning see Darryl
Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 925, 933–938.
30 icc Statute, Article 21(3). In addition any interpretation of an international treaty is
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 unts 331 of 23 May 1969,
entered into force 27 January 1980.
31 Situation in the drc (n 1), para. 51. This statement is only supported by two referenced
ECtHR cases: Berger (n 10) and Perez (n 10).
32 Prosecutor v Katanga, icc-01/04-01/07, Submissions of the Defence of Mr Mathieu Ngud-
jolo in the Context of the Confirmation Hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber i, 28 July 2008, para.
85.
iv Cross-fertilisation Rhetoric
In the past a cross-fertilisation practice between the icc and the ECtHR, mostly
by the icc relying on ECtHR jurisprudence, has developed.33 Many consider
this a positive development essentially preventing the fragmentation of human
rights and promoting holistic human rights standards.34 Although no hierar-
chy between international courts exists in general and ECtHR judgments are
not binding on the icc,35 the icc has frequently applied ECtHR case law in
its decisions often without ‘theorising as to the legal basis for its incorpora-
tion’.36
The below discusses ptc i’s use of ECtHR jurisprudence and seeks to deter-
mine whether the referenced decisions support a right to general victim par-
ticipation at the investigation stage at the icc.
33 Mariniello and Lobba (n 5) 363; Voeten explains that the ECtHR seldom cites other courts
in its judgments, see Voeten (n 6) 549.
34 Mariniello and Lobba (n 5) 364.
35 Nicolas Croquet, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights:
A Mirror of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?’ (2011) 11 Human Rights
Law Review 91, 108.
36 ibid 109.
37 Geneuss (n 4) 418.
38 ibid 417.
a Berger v France
As per the facts of Berger v France, the applicant Mrs Marie-Thérèse Berger, a
French national, lodged a criminal complaint against a company for theft and
fraudulent breach of trust under French criminal law. At the same time she
sought leave to join the proceedings as a civil party seeking damages.40 The
investigating Judge discontinued proceedings, arguing that the actions by the
company did not fall within the ambit of criminal law. The applicant appealed
the decision to discontinue charges unsuccessfully to the Indictment Division
of the Colmar Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation41 prior to lodging
an application against the French Republic with the ECtHR on the basis of
unfairness of criminal proceedings, especially before the Court of Cassation.
The Court of Cassation held that the applicant’s appeal was invalid as it
was not based on any of the limited grounds allowing civil parties to appeal
under Article 575 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. According to this
provision, the civil party can only appeal the judgment of the investigation
division where the prosecutor lodges an appeal, which did not occur here, or, in
another seven narrowly tailored cases explicitly named in the provision, none
of which, so the Court of Cassation argued, applied. The French Government,
as the respondent to the ECtHR proceedings, explained that Article 575 of the
French Code of Criminal Procedure limiting the cases in which a civil party
can appeal did not violate the applicant’s right to access to a court or the
principle of equality-of-arms. It argued that the limitations are justified by
the fact that the civil party cannot be regarded as the prosecution’s opponent
warranting separate and broad appeal rights and that even prosecutors are
only able to appeal where the respective decision affected general rather than
private interests.42
39 ibid 421.
40 In France, civil parties have ample participation rights, are recognised as a party to the
proceedings and are able to claim compensation in this way, see Jacqueline Hodgson,
‘Suspects, Defendants and Victims in the French Criminal Process: The Context of Recent
Reform’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 781, 792–793.
41 The Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible, Berger (n 10), 2–3.
42 Berger (n 10), 6.
While assessing whether the right to a court in light of Article 6(1) of the
echr was impaired, the ECtHR agreed with the French Government that civil
parties should not have an unlimited right to appeal43 and did not find that
the applicant’s right to a court was infringed by the conditions set out in the
French law limiting the right to appeal. The ECtHR pointed out that ‘a civil
party cannot be regarded as either the opponent-or for that matter necessarily
the ally-of the prosecution, their roles and objectives being clearly different’.44
This is why the Court found that the principle of equality-of-arms between the
rights of the prosecutor and the rights of the civil party was not violated by
national legislation limiting the civil party’s right to appeal in comparison to
those of the prosecution.
b Perez v France
As per the facts of Perez v France, the applicant Mrs Paule Perez, a French
national, lodged a criminal complaint of having been assaulted with an offen-
sive weapon, namely a syringe containing traces of diazepam and benzoic acid,
by her two children. During the investigation the applicant had been joined to
the proceedings as a civil party. The investigating Judge ruled that there was
no case to answer due to insufficient evidence. The applicant appealed the
decision to the Indictment Division of the Court of Appeal of Saint-Denis-
de-la-Reunion which ruled her appeal inadmissible due to missing the legal
deadline and failing to sign the notice of appeal. The applicant subsequently
unsuccessfully appealed on points of law to the Criminal Division of the Court
of Cassation, which dismissed her appeal confirming that her original appeal
had been out of time.
Her subsequent application to the ECtHR against the French Republic was
based on the argument that the procedure before the Court of Cassation had
not been fair. She especially enunciated that it was a violation of Article 6 of the
echr that, in its judgment the Court of Cassation, had not re-quoted all the
legislation the applicant had relied on and that the Court did not address all
her grounds of appeal and thus failed to give sufficient reasons for its decision.
The ECtHR held that Article 6 of the echr was applicable to civil party pro-
ceedings in France. It characterised said proceedings as civil parties being able
to enjoy ‘the benefit of being a party to the criminal trial’ being ‘kept informed
of the steps in the proceedings’ being able to ‘file requests for documents’ and
to lodge appeals as well as to obtain compensation from the criminal courts
43 ibid 7.
44 ibid 8.
for the harm suffered.45 The ECtHR held that Article 6 of the echr is appli-
cable even during preliminary investigations where a civil party complaint is
involved but qualified that the decisive factor for the application of Article 6 of
the echr is whether the criminal proceedings affect the civil component. The
Court affirmed the statement made in Berger v France that ‘a civil party could
not be regarded as the opponent of the prosecution, nor necessarily as its ally,
given that their roles and purposes were clearly distinct.’46
Ultimately, the ECtHR found that Article 6 of the echr, the right to a
fair trial, which included submitting any party observations that the party
considered relevant to their case, was not infringed in the case at hand and
that the Court of Cassation had not failed in providing due consideration of
the victim’s arguments and sufficient reasons for its decision.
and objectives and requoted this in Perez, the context of this statement is
important. The ECtHR found in Berger that because civil parties and prose-
cutors have different objectives the equality-of-arms principle is not violated
where civil parties have more limited appeal rights than the prosecution.48 The
statement thus supports limited victims’ rights vis-à-vis the prosecution and
not, as suggested by ptc i, the necessity to create an independent victim par-
ticipation regime.
In addition, the two ECtHR decisions do not refer to victims as having differ-
ent roles and objectives in criminal trials but especially relate to ‘civil parties’.
It is therefore questionable whether this statement by the ECtHR explicitly
relating to civil parties in two specific French cases can be generalised and
transported into the icc context in support of opening up a general partici-
patory right in an entirely different context.49
48 Berger (n 10), 8.
49 Safferling points out that the difference between the procedure to obtain reparations and
the criminal trial itself makes clear that there is no intention to afford victims at the icc
party status during proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused, see
Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (oup 2012) 176.
50 ptc i also referenced decisions from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Situation
in the drc (n 1), para. 53, which are not subject to the analysis in this chapter. Manning
argues, however, that the cited IACtHR decisions are inappropriate to support ptc i’s inter-
pretation, see Jason Manning, ‘On Power, Participation and Authority: The International
Criminal Court’s Initial Appellate Jurisprudence’ (2007) 38 Georgetown Journal of Inter-
national Law 803, 823.
51 Moreira de Azevedo v Portugal, App no 11296/84 (ECtHR, 23 October 1990); Tomasi v France,
App no 12850/87 (ECtHR, 27 August 1992); Acquaviva v France, App No 19248/91 (ECtHR,
In addition, none of the cited ECtHR cases articulates a human right to inde-
pendent victim participation in general and to victim participation at the pre-
trial stage in particular based on Article 6(1) of the echr or any other article
of the Convention. The majority of cited cases set out that in national crim-
inal justice systems which allow for victim participation in order to receive
civil reparations such as, for example, the civil party in France, participat-
ing parties have the right that criminal proceedings are carried out within
a reasonable timeframe.52 Delays in criminal proceedings can therefore con-
stitute a violation of Article 6(1) of the echr. This, however, does not sup-
port the assumption apparently employed by ptc i that Article 6(1) of the
echr creates an independent right to victim participation at the investigation
stage.
The above analysis suggests that the ECtHR case law cited by ptc i does not
support a right to victim participation at the investigation stage as such and
is not persuasive for the interpretation of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute.
The below outlines that, even if such a right could be assumed from the cited
ECtHR jurisprudence, significant differences between the domestic and the
icc criminal justice systems may prohibit a direct transplant of such a right
into the icc setting.
21 November 1995); Selmouni v France, App no 25803/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1999); Calvelli and
Ciglio v Italy, App no 32967/96 (ECtHR, 17 January 2002); Perez v France, App no 47287/99
(ecthr, 12 February 2004); Antunes Rocha v Portugal, App no 64330/01 (ECtHR, 31 May
2005).
52 Manning (n 50) 824; Leyh, ‘Procedural Justice’ (n 21) 269.
53 Neil Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in Joseph
H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (cup
2003) 27, 37; see also Geneuss (n 4) 406.
54 Guhr questions whether the referenced ECtHR decisions are transferable without mod-
ification as they originate on a national level where victim participation has a different
purpose, see Guhr (n 14) 119.
55 Leyh suggests that the transplantation of domestic procedures to the international level
is uneasy due to the ‘unique context in which international criminal courts operate’, see
Leyh, ‘Procedural Justice’ (n 21) 342.
56 Leyh, ‘Victim-oriented Measures’ (n 20) 404–405.
57 Rule 85(a) of the icc rpe requires a causal link between the crime and the consequence(s)
for the victim.
58 Prosecutor v Lubanga, icc-01/04-01/06-2, Warrant of Arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber i, 10 Febru-
ary 2006, 4. The crimes reported by the victims included murder, looting, abduction and
enslavement, torture and unlawful detention, see Situation in the drc (n 1), paras 123, 134,
151, 166, 175, 185.
59 The risk of victim frustration is further discussed in de Hemptinne and Rindi (n 23) 349;
Guhr (n 14) 120.
While all of these issues may denote the necessity to depart from ECtHR
jurisprudence regarding victim participation at the investigation stage, ptc i’s
decision remains silent on potential differences between the domestic and the
icc settings and the translatability of potential human rights of victims under
the echr.
In light of the above, ptc i’s teleological interpretation of Article 68(3)
appears to be insufficiently supported by the referenced ECtHR’s jurispru-
dence.
In its 2008 judgment, the Appeals Chamber reversed the ptc decision on
which the appeal was based and found that the investigation stage as such is
not a judicial proceeding but rather constitutes an inquiry by the Prosecutor
and therefore does not fall within the scope of Article 68(3).62 The Appeals
Chamber outlined that granting victims a general right to participate during
the investigation stage, as done by the ptcs, contravenes the icc Statute by
creating a right that it does not provide.63 It is noteworthy that the Appeals
Chamber did not reference the ECtHR jurisprudence relied upon by ptc i
in regards to victim participation at the investigation stage anywhere in its
decision. The finding of the Appeals Chamber, namely that there is no general
right to victim participation at the pre-trial stage as such, has since been
followed by other chambers including ptc ii.64
vii Conclusion
69 Voeten (n 6) 553.
70 Croquet (n 35) 123.
71 Daniel Sheppard, ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recognized
Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’ (2010) 10 International
Criminal Law Review 43, 49.
72 See Manning (n 50) 824–826, Leyh, ‘Procedural Justice’ (n 21) 269.
73 For criticism on the use of ECtHR jurisprudence in the decision see Manning (n 50)
823–824 (‘The Decision on the Application relies on inapposite jurisprudence from the
European Court of Human Rights’). McDermott describes the interpretation based on
the referenced decisions as ‘erroneous’ because the rights recognised in domestic legal
systems cannot be transplanted into the icc context, mainly due to the larger number
of victims, McDermott (n 25) 35. On the other hand, de Hemptinne and Rindi describe
the interpretation of ptc i as ‘well argued and balanced’ (n 23) 347. Moffett considers
ptc i’s reasoning with regard to victim participation at the pre-trial stage as ‘in line with
the jurisprudence established by the human rights courts’, see Moffett (n 16) 270.
regional and international levels, not all decisions are exclusively motivated by
this desire. In this context, this chapter explored ptc i’s use of ECtHR jurispru-
dence in its 2006 decision on victim participation at the pre-trial stage.
It is doubtful that the cited ECtHR jurisprudence supports an independent
right to victim participation at the pre-trial stage as proposed by ptc i in light
of its teleological interpretation of the icc Statute. ptc i’s decision fails to
explore how Berger and Perez, two cases revolving around the specifics of civil
party rights in the French national criminal justice system, can give rise to an
international human right to victim participation at the icc. The additional
ECtHR jurisprudence cited also does not appear to articulate a human right
to independent victim participation in general and to victim participation at
the pre-trial stage in particular based on Article 6(1) of the echr or any other
article of the Convention.
This chapter therefore addressed the question as to why ptc i cited numer-
ous ECtHR cases whose overall persuasiveness for the interpretation of Arti-
cle 68(3) of the Rome Statute remains questionable. It suggested that perhaps
ptc i relied on said cases in an attempt to add validity and authority to its
decision and to avoid subsequent criticism by referencing Strasbourg jurispru-
dence, which enjoys universal legitimacy.
Where an international court relies on jurisprudence from the ECtHR or
another human rights court in an attempt to add validity to its decision and per-
haps to deflect subsequent criticism rather than to endorse the legal reasoning
of said court, it may be more appropriate to speak of a self-fertilisation than of
a cross-fertilisation practice. Ultimately, it is important to ensure that the cross-
fertilisation approach does not turn into a meaningless exercise potentially
masking other underlying considerations for decision-making rather than fur-
thering inter-judicial dialogue. Such an approach could do more harm than
good to international human rights law.