SP 4 6 0 121aaw
SP 4 6 0 121aaw
SP 4 6 0 121aaw
MLF Label: 4.6 Maintenance Special Requirements DCT Type: SP DCT Specialty: Airworthiness Peer Group: A - Part 121 Air Operators DCT Revision: 27.0 on 12/28/21 (Released)
Summary Information
Purpose (Certificate Holder Responsibility): The CH is responsible to manage the safety of the Maintenance Special Requirements processes within its operation.
The FAA objective is to determine if the CH; (1) Met regulatory requirements, guidance, and safety performance objectives of its
Objective (FAA Responsibility): Maintenance Special Requirements processes, and; (2) Managed safety of the Maintenance Special Requirements processes by
incorporating system safety principles which include safety attributes.
1 Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for Avionics Systems/Programs?
◯ Met regulatory and guidance
requirements
REFERENCES: AC-91-85, AC-120-102, AC-120-28, AC-120-29, AC-120-59, AC-120-94, AC-20-141, 91.227, ◯ Isolated instance(s) when
8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 18 Sec 5, C048, D097, D301, A061, 8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 61 Sec 1, AC-120-76, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch guidance requirements were
10 Sec 1, AC-20-165, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 14 Sec 8, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 14 Sec 9, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 15 Sec 1, 8900.1 not met
Vol 4 Ch 2 Sec 10, 121.1111, 121.1111(b), 121.1111(c), 121.1111(d), 121.1111(e), 121.344, 121.344a, ◯ Several instances when
121.346, 121.359, 121.359(h), 121.359(i), 121.359(k), 121.367, 121.369(b), 121.375, AC-119-1, 8900.1 Vol 6 guidance requirements were
Ch 11 Sec 24, 91 Appendix G, 91.180, 91.413, 91.413(a), 121.343 not met
◯ Regulatory noncompliance
Safety Attribute: Procedures, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017498, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
2 Did the certificate holder's controls effectively mitigate unacceptable levels of risk(s) for the Avionics
◯ Controls were effective
Systems/Programs process?
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
controls were not effective
REFERENCES: 5.53, 5.55, 5.51 ◯ Several instances when
controls were not effective
Safety Attribute: Controls, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
regulatory non-compliance
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:31 AM, ◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017499, Response Details: Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
3 Did the certificate holder's Avionics Systems/Programs process ensure consistency of related processes
◯ Interfaces were effective
between departments and employees (interfaces)?
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
interfaces were ineffective
Safety Attribute: Interfaces, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Several instances when
interfaces were ineffective
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:31 AM, ◯ Systemic or significant issues
◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017500, Response Details: Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
4 Were financial and human resources provided to ensure the safety and quality performance for the Avionics
◯ Management of the process
Systems/Programs process?
was effective
◯ Isolated instance(s) where
REFERENCES: 5.21, 5.23(a), 5.25(a), 5.25(b), 5.25(c) management of the process
was ineffective
Safety Attribute: Responsibility, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Several instances where
management of the process
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:31 AM, was ineffective
◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
QID: 00017501, Response Details: Responsibility ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released regulatory non-compliance
◯ Not Observable
5 Did the person with authority over the certificate holder's Avionics Systems/Programs process effectively
◯ Management of the process
plan, direct, control, or change procedures, and make key determinations, including safety risk acceptance
was effective
decisions?
◯ Isolated instance(s) where
management of the process
6 Were the certificate holder's process measurement(s) used to evaluate the performance of the Avionics
◯ Process measurements were
Systems/Programs process and if necessary, implement corrective action?
effective
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
REFERENCES: 5.71, 5.73, 5.75 process measurements were
not used or ineffective
Safety Attribute: Process Measurement, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Several instances when
process measurements were
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 6 6/28/2021 11:19:31 AM, not used or ineffective
◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
QID: 00017503, Response Details: Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), regulatory non-compliance
Status: Released ◯ Not Observable
7 Did the certificate holder's personnel understand their role and contribute to the safety performance of the
◯ Individuals were
Avionics Systems/Programs process?
knowledgeable
◯ Isolated instances where
REFERENCES: 5.23(a), 5.91, 5.93 knowledge was lacking
◯ Several instances where
Safety Attribute: Safety Ownership, Question Type: Process Observation, knowledge was lacking
◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:30 AM, regulatory non-compliance
◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017504, Response Details: Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
8 Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for Continued Airworthiness and
◯ Met regulatory and guidance
Safety Programs?
requirements
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
REFERENCES: AC-120-102, AC-120-104, AC-120-73, AC-120-93, AC-120-94, AC-120-97, AC-120-98, AC- guidance requirements were
25.1529-1, D097, D105, AC-43-208, 119.51, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 6 Sec 4, 121.1105(b), 121.1105(c), not met
121.1105(d), 121.1105(e), 121.1107(a), 121.1109, 121.1109(c), 121.1111, 121.1111(b), 121.1111(c), ◯ Several instances when
121.1111(d), 121.1111(e), 121.1113, 121.1113(b), 121.1113(c), 121.1113(d), 121.1113(e), 121.1113(f), guidance requirements were
121.1115(b), 121.1115(c), 121.1115(d), 121.1115(e), 121.1115(f), 121.1117(b), 121.1117(c), 121.1117(f), not met
121.1117(h), 121.309(b), 121.369(c), 121.380(a), 121.703, 121.703(a), 121.703(c), 8900.1 Vol 6 Ch 11 Sec ◯ Regulatory noncompliance
23, 8900.1 Vol 6 Ch 11 Sec 24, 25.981, 26.33, 26.35(d), 39.11, 39.7, 91.403(c) ◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017505, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
9 Did the certificate holder's controls effectively mitigate unacceptable levels of risk(s) for the Continued
◯ Controls were effective
Airworthiness and Safety Programs process?
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
controls were not effective
REFERENCES: 5.53, 5.55, 5.51 ◯ Several instances when
controls were not effective
Safety Attribute: Controls, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
regulatory non-compliance
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:28 AM, ◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017506, Response Details: Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
10 Did the certificate holder's Continued Airworthiness and Safety Programs process ensure consistency of
◯ Interfaces were effective
related processes between departments and employees (interfaces)?
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
interfaces were ineffective
Safety Attribute: Interfaces, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Several instances when
interfaces were ineffective
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:28 AM, ◯ Systemic or significant issues
◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017507, Response Details: Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
11 Were financial and human resources provided to ensure the safety and quality performance for the
◯ Management of the process
Continued Airworthiness and Safety Programs process?
was effective
◯ Isolated instance(s) where
REFERENCES: 5.21, 5.23(a), 5.25(a), 5.25(b), 5.25(c) management of the process
was ineffective
12 Did the person with authority over the certificate holder's Continued Airworthiness and Safety Programs
◯ Management of the process
process effectively plan, direct, control, or change procedures, and make key determinations, including
was effective
safety risk acceptance decisions?
◯ Isolated instance(s) where
management of the process
REFERENCES: 5.23(a), 5.23(b), 5.25(c) was ineffective
◯ Several instances where
Safety Attribute: Authority, Question Type: Process Observation, management of the process
was ineffective
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:27 AM, ◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
regulatory non-compliance
QID: 00017509, Response Details: Authority ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released ◯ Not Observable
13 Were the certificate holder's process measurement(s) used to evaluate the performance of the Continued
◯ Process measurements were
Airworthiness and Safety Programs process and if necessary, implement corrective action?
effective
◯ Isolated instance(s) when
REFERENCES: 5.71, 5.73, 5.75 process measurements were
not used or ineffective
Safety Attribute: Process Measurement, Question Type: Process Observation, ◯ Several instances when
process measurements were
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 6 6/28/2021 11:19:27 AM, not used or ineffective
◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
QID: 00017510, Response Details: Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), regulatory non-compliance
Status: Released ◯ Not Observable
14 Did the certificate holder's personnel understand their role and contribute to the safety performance of the
◯ Individuals were
Continued Airworthiness and Safety Programs process?
knowledgeable
◯ Isolated instances where
REFERENCES: 5.23(a), 5.91, 5.93 knowledge was lacking
◯ Several instances where
Safety Attribute: Safety Ownership, Question Type: Process Observation, knowledge was lacking
◯ Systemic, significant issues, or
Scoping Attribute: (FAR PART = "121" ) , Rev. 5 6/28/2021 11:19:27 AM, regulatory non-compliance
◯ Not Observable
QID: 00017511, Response Details: Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW), Status: Released
Response Details List Authority ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
8 Unqualified
9 Other
Response Details List Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
10 Other
Response Details List Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
4 Inconsistent interfaces
5 Poor coordination between departments and employees
6 Failure of interfaces between processes or procedures
7 Other
Response Details List Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Unclear procedure(s)
2 Conflicting procedure(s)
3 Used workaround(s)
4 Skipped process step(s)
9 Undocumented procedure(s)
10 Minor typographical error(s) (i.e. record entries)
11 Information missing
12 Communication failure(s)
Response Details List Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
5 Ineffective audits
6 Failure to detect changes in the operational environment
Response Details List Responsibility ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
9 Other
Response Details List Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 3.0)