The Grain Trade of the Hellenistic World

Author(s): Lionel Casson

Source: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association , 1954,
Vol. 85 (1954), pp. 168-187
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/283474

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/283474?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 168 Lionel Casson [1954

XI.-The Grain Trade of the Hellenistic World

LIONEL CASSON

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Throughout the course of ancient history, the Mediterranean

came to know one type of ship above all others: the plodding mer-
chantmen that carried thousands of sacks of grain from port to port.
They unloaded on the beaches of tiny islands or the battered docks
of minor towns or the spacious wharves of huge ports. At one time
they formed an organized fleet that, surpassing England's East
Indiamen or our China clippers, did not see a peer until the days
of steam. Let us trace the history of this vast effort during one of
the greatest periods of its development.'
For the time before the great changes that followed in the wake
of Alexander, our information is limited chiefly to Athens. Yet it
is enough to reveal a significant part of the basic pattern. In the
5th century B.C. we can observe Athens importing grain from the
three great centers which we shall see were the major sources of
supply during the whole of the Hellenistic period: Sicily, Egypt with
Cyprus and Cyrene, and the Black Sea region.2 A century later,
when our information gets fuller, we can see, too, that the handling
of this commerce was not in Athenian hands. A shipment of grain
generally involved two or three distinct personages: the owner of
the ship (naukleros), the merchant or entrepreneur who raised the
capital to purchase the cargo and rent the cargo space (emporos),
and the banker who supplied him with the funds.3 Often a mer-

1 In addition to those that are standard, the following abbreviations have been
used: Durrbach, Choix = F. Durrbach, Choix d'inscriptions de Delos (Paris 1921);
Heichelheim = F. Heichelheim, s.v. "Sitos" RE Suppl. 6.819-91; Maiuri, Nuov. Sill.
= A. Maiuri, Nuova silloge epigrafica di Rodi e Cos (Florence 1925); Rostovtzeff,
HW = M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World
(Oxford 1941); Roussel = P. Roussel, Delos colonie athenienne, "Bibl. des ecoles
franCaises d'Athenes et de Rome" 111 (Paris 1916); Tarn = W. W. Tarn and G. T.
Griffith, Hellenistic Civilization3 (London 1952).
2 For references to the sources see H. Knorringa, Emporos (Amsterdam 1926)
77-78, 98-101. Knorringa tries to argue (78-79) that Black Sea grain played an
important role in supplying Athens only during the fourth century but this is not the
case; cf. Rostovsteff, CAH 8.563-64, and A. Jard(, Les cereales dans l'antiquitg grecque,
"Bibl. des 6coles frangaises d'Athenes et de Rome" 130 (Paris 1925) 141, note 3.
3 Dem. 32: Demo of Athens, banker; Protus of Athens, shipper; Hegestratus of
Marseilles, shipowner. Dem. 34: Chrysippus, a metic of Athens, and Theodorus, a

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 169

chant owned his own ship,4 thereby reducing the number of per-
sonalities in the transaction to two; often bankers invested spare
capital in the ownership of vessels5 which they then could charter
to merchants. In fourth-century Athens, bankers, merchants and
shipowners in most cases were not native Athenians. This was
common in the ancient world: in the succeeding centuries we shall
see foreign businessmen playing a major role in the commerce of
such centers as Delos and Alexandria.
With the opening of the Hellenistic age, our information, al-
though less detailed, becomes wider in scope. Thanks partly to
some casual references in Polybius and other historians but mostly
to the inscriptions found on Delos and other Aegean islands, we now
have access to the picture beyond the shores of Athens. Of the
numerous modern writers who have attempted to describe the grain
trade of this period, practically all agree on two points: that the
islands of Rhodes and Delos were the twin grain-markets that served
the eastern Mediterranean7 and that in the later part of the Hellen-
istic period the west stepped in to bolster the supply.8 Despite
the almost universal agreement, a complete survey of the problem
will show, I think, that this view is a distortion: Delos' role was
much smaller than she has consistently been given credit for, and
the west was very likely receiving grain rather than shipping it east-
ward in late Hellenistic times. The first steD we must take is to

Phoenician, bankers; Phormio, metic of Athens, shipper; Lampis, shipowner. Dem.

35: Androcles, apparently an Athenian, and Nausicrates of Carystus in Euboea,
bankers; Artemo and Apollodorus, both of Phaselis, shippers; Hyblesius, probably
from Phaselis or Halicarnassus, and Apollonides of Halicarnassus, joint owners of the
ship.
4 E.g., Dionysiodorus and Parmeniscus in Dem. 56 seem to have carried the cargo
involved in the dispute in their own ship. They subsequently chartered others in
addition (56.21).
6 As, for example, the well-known Phormio who inherited Pasion's bank; cf. Dem.
45.64. Some of the bankers were retired emporoi like the defendant in Dem. 33.4.
6 Cf. above, note 3. An emporos or naukl&ros from Pherae (Isoc. 17.20); Apaturius,
nauklgros from Byzantium (Dem. 33). The Athenian naukl&ros in Lysias 6.49 is
almost an exception; cf. Knorringa (above, note 2) 79-80, 89. The honorary decrees
reveal shippers from all quarters: Cyprus (IG II2 283 and 360), Tyre (342), Cyzicus
(401), Miletus? (407), Heraclea (408 and Hesperia 9 [1940] 333), "islanders" (651),
Chios (SEG 3.92).
7 Durrbach, Choix 57-58: "D6los put . . . devenir un des gros entrep6ts de
c6r6ales"; Tarn 264: "a great corn-market"; Rostovtzeff, HW 217: "Delos . . . was
competing with Athens in the grain trade at this time," cf. 231-33, 692; W. A. Laidlaw,
A History of Delos (Oxford 1933) 128: "she was fast becoming an international grain-
market"; Larsen, ESAR 4.350: "a center for the grain trade."
8 See below, note 56.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 170 Lionel Casson [1954

establish the broad outlines of the picture: which areas needed grain
and which supplied it? whose ships carried it? whose bankers sup-
plied the capital? Some of the answers can be given with certitude;
others we can merely suggest.
Who needed the grain? As in the fourth century, Athens was
still a great importer,9 along with certain other areas of Greece.10
To these we must add just about all the Aegean islands" and many
of the large coastal cities of Asia Minor.12 The chief sources were
the same as in the preceding century: Sicily, the Crimea, and Egypt
with its dependencies Cyprus and Cyrene.1" Though the suppliers
always had a favorable balance of trade, many of their customers
could defray at least part of their purchases with exports of their

9 Pontic grain: IG II2 653 (289/8 B.C.), 657 (299/8), 903 (176/5); Egyptian grain:
650 (290/89), 682 (296-91), 845 (ca. 220; cf. REG 51 [1938] 428); Sicilian grain:
SEG 3.92 (3rd B.C.), Athen. 5.209B (time of Hiero II); Macedonian grain: IG II2
654-55 (289/8).
10 Histiaea: IG XI 4.1055 (230-20 B.C.); Oropus: VII 4262 (end of 3rd); Sicyon:
Livy 32.40.9 (197, gift of Attalus of Pergamum); Corinth: Lycurgus, In Leoc. 26
(330, grain from Epirus); Chalcis: IG XII 9.900a,c (mid-2nd). Cf. SEG 9.2 (ca. 330),
grain from Cyrene for numerous places in Greece during a year of shortage.
"Andros: IG XII 5.714 (cf. AM 36 [1911] 1-20; mid-4th to 318). Amorgos:
XII 7.11 (end of 4th or beginning of 3rd); XII 7.40 (2nd). Cos: M. Segre, "Grano
di Thessaglia a Coo," RFIC 62 (1934) 169-93 (ca. 260, Thessalian grain); Herondas
2.16-17 (ca. 270, Phoenician grain); Maiuri, Nuov. Sill. 433 (3rd, Cypriot grain).
los: IG XII 5.1011 (end of 3rd). Mitylene: SIG3 212 (mid-4th, Pontic grain). Samos:
SEG 1.361 (end of 4th); 366 (247/6), cf. E. Ziebarth, "Zum samischen Finanz- und
Getreidewesen," Zeitschrift f. Numismatik 34 (1923-24) 356-63; SIG3 976 (beginning
of 2nd); AM 38 (1913) 51-59 (ca. 100, probably Pontic grain); Samos had a standing
organization for the import of grain. Samothrace: SIG3 502 (228-25, Egyptian and
probably Pontic grain are involved). "Islanders" (found on Moschonesi): IG XII
2.645 (time of Antipater and Polyperchon). The League of the Islands: XII 5.817
(beginning of 2nd). Cf. SEG 9.2 (ca. 330), grain from Cyrene for numerous islands
during a year of shortage.
12 Ephesus: SIG3 354 (ca. 300 B.C.). Heraclea: FHG 3.538 (probably time of
Philadelphus, Egyptian grain). Evidence for other places dates from the imperial
period (cf. ESAR 4.877-79) but there is no reason to think that conditions were very
different during the Hellenistic age.
13 See the previous four notes. Tarn (254, note 7) is wrong in thinking that
Cyprus was not self-sufficient; cf. Andocides 2.20 (ca. 410, fourteen shiploads from
Cyprus to Athens and more to come), OGIS 56.17-18 (239/8, grain from Cyprus to
Egypt during a shortage there) and Maiuri, Nuov. Sill. 433 (3rd, grain from Cyprus
to Cos). There were other suppliers who appear occasionally. Syria and Phoenicia
could send grain to Egypt during one of the latter's rare emergencies (OGIS 56.17-18).
Gifts of grain from Pergamum are recorded (10,000 medimni from Attalus to Sicyon,
Livy 32.40.9; 280,000 from Eumenes II to Rhodes, Polyb. 31.25). For grain from
Macedon see above, note 9, from Epirus see note 10. Even Thessaly apparently could
at times ship out grain (see note 11) although at others she suffered shortages herself
(E-ph. Arch. F19121 61-64, nos. 89-90, ca. 200; IG IX 2.1104, 1st B.C.).

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 171

own: Athens with olive oil, honey, pottery and similar manufac-
tures,14 other parts of Greece with wine,15 Macedon with lumber and
pitch,16 Ionia with wine, oil and wool.17 Rhodes, Samos and Chios
matched the grain they took in with export of wine of all qualities,
the other islands with a miscellany of products: marble from Paros,
fuller's earth from Cimolus,'8 raddle from Ceos,19 cheese from Cyth-
nus and Rhenaea.20 Delos had no exports to offer but she could pay
her way from her harbor receipts and the profits made at her famous
festival, which was as much a commercial fair as a religious oc-
casion."
Of one point we can be absolutely certain: Rhodes was the
greatest figure in the international grain trade of the Hellenistic
world. We first see her importance therein about 330 B.c. At
that time the notorious Cleomenes, whom Alexander had left be-
hind as ruler of Egypt, through some sharp practices artificially
drove up the price of grain on the international market. The im-
portant point is that Rhodes was the center of his operations.22
When Poliorcetes besieged the island in 306/5, Ptolemy Soter of
Egypt, the bulk of whose trade was carried on through Rhodes,
rushed in supplies of grain, as did Cassander and Lysimachus.23
After the disastrous earthquake about the year 227/6 that over-
threw the famous colossus, Hiero II, Seleucus II, Antigonus Doson
and Ptolemy Euergetes all sent extravagant free gifts to help the
island recover.24 The last actually donated well over a million
artabs of grain, better than 30,000 tons, the second largest single
shipment recorded in antiquity. This alone is ample evidence of
Rhodes' commercial importance - a gift of these proportions from

14 Oil: IG I12 1100 (124 A.D., but no doubt true of the earlier period; cf. Rostovtze
HW 744-45). Honey: PCairoZen 59012, 59426 and PMichZen 3, all 3rd B.C.
15 Dem. 35.35.

16 G. Glotz, "L'histoire de Delos d'apres les prix d'une denree," REG 29 (1916)
280-90 (pitch), 290-94 (lumber).
17 References to the sources in Tarn 255-56. For the distribution of Rhodian
wine amphora handles see Rostovtzeff, HW 680 and 1486.
18 PCairoZen 59704.18 (3rd).
19 IG II2 1128 (mid-4th).
20 PCairoZen 59110 (257 B.C.).
21 Strabo 10.5.4.
22 Dem. 56.7-10, 16-17 and Ps. Arist. Oec. 1352A-B.
23 Diod. 20.96.1-3: 300,000 artabs of grain (over 300,000 bushels) from Ptolemy,
10,000 medimni (= 15,000 bushels) of barley from Cassander, 40,000 medimni (= 60,000
bushels) of wheat and 40,000 of barley from Lysimachus.
24 Polvb. 5.88-89.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 172 Lionel Casson [1954

a member of the hardest-fisted, most business-like family known

to the history of the ancient world.
At the heart of Rhodes' commercial importance lay her geo-
graphical position, far better in some respects than that of Delos
which has been so highly praised :25 she lay between two of the three
great suppliers of grain, Egypt and the Crimea, and within easy
distance of many of their best customers, the Cyclades and the
coastal cities of Asia Minor. She had her own bankers with
ample capital for investment in maritime enterprises.26.Even more
important, she was the possessor of a great merchant marine.
Athens was an important commercial city but the ships that
served her were rarely Athenian.27 Corinth, another trade center,
had a celebrated ship-building industry and must have had
a large merchant fleet, but we hear little about it.28 Rhodian vessels
as early as the fourth century B.C. "sail for trade all over the in-
habited earth."29 They are available for charter.30 We find them
in the harbors of Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia and Pamphylia.31 They
were to be seen along the wharves of Syracuse.32 It was to protect
this merchant marine and her financial commitment in maritime
commerce that Rhodes took upon herself the policing of the seas
and pioneered in the creation of a code of maritime law.
Rhodes' geographical position and her merchant marine clarify
the precise place she held in the grain trade. Her ships travelled to
Egypt and the Black Sea, carrying wine from her own vineyards and
those of her neighbors, to return laden with grain. The Egyptian

25 Vessels headed for Italy from Egypt, the Levant or the south coast of Asia Minor
had to go out of their way and travel against unfavorable winds to make Delos. Be-
cause of the wind conditions in the Mediterranean, the course for Italy went south of
Crete; cf. TAPA 81 (1950) 43-51. Moreover, Rhodes-Egypt was one of the few
runs that could be made all year, even in winter (Dem. 56.30). Only the west coast
of Asia Minor was better served by Delos; cf. Strabo 10.5.4.
26 IG XI 4.1055 (= Durrbach, Choix 50, 230-20 B.C.): a Rhodian banker operating
on Delos; Maiuri, Nuov. Sill. 19 (ca. 200): a family of bankers. Cf. Rostovtzeff,
CAH 8.623 for instances of the city itself making substantial loans.
27 See above, notes 3, 6.
28 Cf. Tarn, "The Dedicated Ship of Antigonus Gonatas," JHS 30 (1910) 218-20.
29 Lycurgus, In Leoc. 15 (330 B.C.).
30 Dem. 56.21.
31 Polyaenus 4.6.16 (306 B.C.). They were to be found in whatever ports Seleucus
II held ca. 227/6 (Polyb. 5.89).
32 Hiero II and Gelon granted free port privileges to Rhodian vessels after the
earthquake in ca. 227/6 (Polyb. 5.88, Diod. 26.8).

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 173

traffic was largely in her hands,33 and, though Pontic supplies were
sold to customers all over the Aegean, it is certain that a substantial
portion of them went to Rhodes.34 Part of the grain that came to her
wharves was used to feed her own population and her neighbors
since the islands' farms were largely given over to viticulture, but
much was trans-shipped to Athens, to the cities of coastal Asia
Minor, and to the Aegean islands.35 There is an inscription36
which reveals that at least in the late third century Egypt was
having some difficulty disposing of her surplus, presumably because
of competition with Pontic supplies. Such a situation would ex-
plain the respect that the Ptolemies consistently evinced towards

B3 For Rhodian wine amphora handles found in Egypt see V. Grace, "Standard
Pottery Containers of the Ancient Greek World," Hesperia Suppl. 8 (1949) 183, and
cf. note 17 above.
Diodorus states (20.81): "They (the Rhodians) derived most of their revenues
from merchants who sailed to Egypt; the city, by and large, lived off this kingdom."
The period referred to is 306 B.C. When Cleomenes was indulging in his manipulations
of Egyptian grain ca. 330, he used Rhodes as his center of operations and his agents
chartered Rhodian vessels (Dem. 56.7-10, 21). The huge gifts of grain given the
island by the Ptolemies show eloquently how important they considered it to be.
A papyrus document (PRyl 554, 258 B.C.) has turned up which provides a concrete
illustration of the way in which Rhodes served as a transit point for goods destined
for Egypt; cf. Rostovtzeff's extended discussion of the piece in HW 226-28. On
Delos in the second century B.C., Alexandria maintained an association of warehouse-
men (egdocheis) only, although those of other cities included "merchants, shippers, and
warehousemen" (references cited and discussed by Roussel, 89-93). The clear infer-
ence is that Egypt's cargoes travelled in foreign bottoms, a large number of which
we may safely assume were Rhodian.
34 The Black Sea region imported wine from Rhodes, as we know from the thou-
sands of amphora handles discovered there (references in Rostovtzeff, CAH 8.629,
note 2), and unquestionably sent the island grain in return. The importance of this
region to Rhodes is shown by her immediate reaction to Byzantium's attempt in 220
B.C. to levy a toll on ships passing through the Bosporus (Polyb. 4.47) and her prompt
dispatch about the same time of war materiel to Sinope when the latter was threatened
by Mithridates III of Pontus (Polyb. 4.56); cf. Rostovtzeff, HW 675.
35 Dem. 56: Egyptian grain via Rhodes to Athens; cf. Lycurgus, In Leoc. 18
(grain shippers with cargoes for Athens at Rhodes). SIG3 354 (ca. 300 B.C.): Agath-
ocles, son of Agemon, a Rhodian, supplies grain to Ephesus. The same merchant was
honored by Arcesine on Amorgos, very likely also for help with the grain supply
(IG XII 7.9; cf. E. Ziebarth, "Zur Handelsgeschichte der Insels Rhodos," Melanges
Glotz [Paris 1932] 916). IG XII 5.1010 (3rd B.C.): Ios honors a Rhodian; the fact
that his crown is to be paid for out of whatever funds were left from the amount
allotted for purchase of grain indicates that his services lay in that direction.
36 SIG3 502 (228-25 B.C.): Samothrace requests permission of Euergetes to pur-
chase grain duty-free from the Chersonese or anywhere else it appears advantageous
to do so. Egypt had apparently set a tariff on imports of foreign grain; cf. C. Pr6aux,
L'etconomie royale des Lagides (Brussels 1938) 149.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 174 Lionel Casson [1954

Rhodes. The island's merchants patronized all sources ;37 in a

buyer's market such as the inscription reveals, Egypt's sales could
very well depend on their good will.
It is difficult to see what part can be assigned to Delos in this
picture. She could hardly have been a center for Egyptian grain,
except on a small scale, since the bulk of that trade, as we have seen,
was in Rhodian hands.38 She imported grain from the Black Sea
area for her own needs39 but there is no ground for assuming that
she took in significant quantities for re-export. The customers for
Black Sea grain were Athens and other parts of Greece and of Asia
Minor, and a glance at the map will show how Delos is far from
being well located as a distribution point for these areas. Yet it
has been repeatedly said40 that Delos was a center for the inter-
national grain trade. Let us examine the evidence in detail.
There is always cited an inscription dated in the early part of
the 3rd century B.C., which honors a merchant of Byzantium who
sold the island 500 medimni at a price below the current rate.4"
Alongside this are adduced a number of honorary decrees in favor
of various personages who stem from the Hellespont-Bosporus-
Black Sea area; no reasons for the bestowal of the honor are re-
corded on any.42 These inscriptions tell us at most only the source
of the grain Delos consumed; nothing in them reveals her as a great
distribution point. Five hundred medimni are intended certainly
for the local population; it is the bonus a seller gives to a good
customer. The amount is absurdly small, 750 bushels, probably
enough to feed the inhabitants for just one day. The other honor-
ary decrees if they concern grain at all could very well be for
the same sort of thing, gifts from merchants who sold the island
the grain needed locally. Honorary decrees were cheap in a small
place like Delos; it took almost 2500 medimni to get one at
Ephesus,43 and at least 3000 at Athens.44

37 See above, notes 32-34.

38 See above, note 33. Wind conditions made it practically imperative for any
ship bound from Egypt to Delos to go by way of Rhodes; cf. TAPA 81 (1950) 43-51.
39 Jard6 (above, note 2) 170-71, by acutely showing the effect of events in the
Hellespont and Bosporus upon grain prices on Delos in 282 B.C., revealed thereby that
the island was chiefly supplied from the Black Sea area.
40 See above, note 7.
41 IG XI 4.627 = Durrbach, Choix 46.
42 Listed by Durrbach, Choix, p. 57.
43 See above, note 35.
44IG II2 360 (3000 medimni), 363 (3000), 398 (3000? XXX seems a most likely
restoration in line 13), 408 (at least 4000), 400 (4000 and 8000), 845 (8000).

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 175

A second inscription invariably cited is more illuminating.45 It

was erected on Delos by Histiaea, in northern Euboea, honoring a
certain Rhodian. The city had sent its sitonnai to Delos to purchase
grain and the recipient of the decree, clearly in business on the island,
by lending them the necessary capital, interest-free, had expedited
the transaction. It is curious to find Histiaea sending to Delos
for grain. The nearest source were the shippers in the Hellespont
or, if an international market was preferred, there was Athens. The
clue to the inscription lies in the presence of the Rhodian and the
fact that he lent the city the necessary funds without charging
interest. This well explains, I think, why her sitonnai came all the
way to Delos for their supplies: they got credit there, the cheapest
credit possible, as a matter of fact. And, if we ask why a Rhodian
was willing to lend money without interest, a very reasonable an-
swer can be put forth: the grain was to be shipped in a Rhodian
bottom; one gave up the interest to be gained from capital in favor
of the profit to be made on freight. Moreover, after discharging at
Histiaea the vessel could push on just a bit further to Macedon and
pick up a return cargo of lumber and pitch. The inscription thus
reveals Delos as a grain market, to be sure, but one that was serving
as an adjunct to that of Rhodes.
The third piece of evidence is again an honorary decree, dating
between 239 and 230, in favor of Antigonus Doson's grain-purchas-
ing agent who, the document records, resided at Delos for a con-
siderable period.46 Again we must search for the reason why Doson
preferred to buy at Delos rather than from Hellespontine or Bos-
poran shippers who were located so much nearer. And again, an
answer is forthcoming: Delos was a steady customer for Macedonian
lumber and pitch,47 products which had no sale in the Hellespont-
Bosporus-Black Sea area. Nor is there any reason to believe that
Doson's purchases were very extensive; certainly a half-century or
so earlier, Macedon was giving away grain rather than buying it.48
The harbor of Delos was poor; even today when northerlies blow
the prevailing summer winds - the caiques avoid the site of the
ancient port and put in at a tiny landing place on the opposite shore

45 IG XI 4.1055 (230-20 B.C.) = Durrbach, Choix 50.

46 IG XI 4.666 = Durrbach, Choix 48.
47 Both products were purchased regularly by the temple at Delos; see above,
note 16.

48 IG II2 654-55 (289/8): 7500 medimni to Athens from Audoleon, king of t

Paeonians; Diod. 20.96.1-3: 10,000 to Rhodes from Cassander in 306/5.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 176 Lionel Casson [1954

of the island.49 But because of the festival which gathered pilgrims

from all over, the harbor had been improved by artificial means at
a very early date and was made into the best available in the
Cyclades.50 It could not handle large-sized ships51 but it was no
doubt perfectly adequate for the island trading vessels which prob-
ably were not very different from those that ply the Aegean today.
Delos, then, was a natural choice as center for the trade of the nearby
islands and, since they all were importers of grain, she very likely
became the focus of a local traffic,52 servicing her neighbors' needs
as well as her own. The supplies came to her certainly from the
Black Sea,53 and very probably from Egypt via Rhodes who may
have used her as a more westerly distribution point. So much can
be said for the island's role. To consider it a major center, one
that could compete with Rhodes in its own right, is to distort the
facts.54 Where grain was concerned, Rhodes called the tune.
There is one phase of Delos' activity in the grain trade that I
have not yet taken up, namely her connections with the west. I
have shown above that Sicily supplied grain to the eastern market
and it is a priori likely that some of this was sold to Delos and,
through her, to neighboring islands.55 In 179 B.C. Massinissa gave

49 This was my experience on two occasions when I visited the island. Others
have noted the poorness of the harbor; see Tarn 264, Rostovtzeff, HW 230.
50 J. Paris, "Contributions a l'6tude des ports antiques du monde grec," BCH 40
(1916) 5-30; K. Lehmann-Hartleben, Die antiken Hafenanlagen des Mittelmeeres, Klio
Beiheft 14 (1923) 50-51, 152-61.
51 Hiero II of Syracuse built a great ship about 240 B.c. (see Dittenberger's note
to OGIS 56.17) to serve as a grain carrier but had to give it up because it was too large
for many of the harbors (Athen. 5.206E, 209B). Almost certainly Delos was one such.
62 IG XII 5.817 (ca. 188 B.c.): The League of the Islands honors Timon the Delian
banker (cf. Durrbach, Choix, pp. 86-87) for helping its sit6nai by not charging an agio.
The terms of the sale had been set in Rhodian currency and the merchants wanted a
5 per cent premium for accepting Tenian or some other; cf. Larsen, ESAR 4.360.
53 See above, note 39.
54 Rostovtzeff (HW 676 and 692) states that in the third century B.C. Delos con-
trolled the Black Sea grain trade but lost it to Rhodes when the latter reached the
peak of her prosperity in the first half of the succeeding century. The evidence he
presents boils down to the mention of gifts on the part of Bosporan kings to the temple
at Delos or other participation in the island's religious affairs, plus a handful of third-
century honorary decrees - no specific reason for the bestowal is recorded on any of
them - in favor of natives of the Chersonese, South Russia, Byzantium and other
towns of the Hellespont-Bosporus-Black Sea region (HW 232 and notes 60 and 61,
676 and note 89). Yet there are just as many similar decrees for people who stem
from the same area that belong to the early second century: IG XI 4.778-80 (Byzan-
tium), 813-14 (Olbia), 844 (Chersonese). Moreover, Iarticipation or the absence of
it in Delos' religious activities is no certain evidence for economic relationships.
66 Cf. above, note 51.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 177

Delos a gift of grain and this has been consistently used as evidence
that Numidia now became a major factor in the eastern market and
that Delos was her outlet.56 Here again the economic picture on
closer examination will show a quite different aspect.
The evidence comes from five lines of the Delian temple ac-
counts.57 In January and April of 179 B.C. the sitonnai and, in-
terestingly enough, a Rhodian ambassador (presbeutes) deposited
funds collected from the sale of grain "from Massinissa." The
figures reveal that the shipment came to the modest total of just
about 2800 medimni, or 4200 bushels. Since it was sold at the
incongruously low price of three and four drachmae per medimnus58
it has properly been assumed that the king had given it as a gift.
What was the reason that lay behind it and why was a Rhodian
ambassador involved?
In 204 B.C. the struggle between Rome and Carthage had ended.
The kingdom of Syracuse lost its independence and the grain that
Hiero had formerly placed for sale on the eastern market was now
in Roman hands. A few years later, Numidia appears on the scene
with surpluses to dispose of. In 200 and 198 B.C. Massinissa sent
considerable quantities to feed the Roman armies in Macedon and
Greece.59 In 191 and again in 170 he dispatched large amounts to
the same places.60 These were the factors that led to Massinissa's
gift to Delos. During the Macedonian Wars the king found a
customer for his surplus grain in Rome's armies. However, once
the latter's wartime needs came to an end, since her peacetime re-
quirements were now satisfied by Sicilian grain, Massinissa was
forced to search for new outlets. The most natural move was to
turn to Hiero's old customers: since Sicilian grain had now sup-
planted African in the Roman market, why should the latter not
replace Sicilian in the east? The gift to Delos makes excellent sense
as Massinissa's first move in this direction.6' But, we must re-

56 Heichelheim 855: "tritt im 2. Jhdt. v. Chr. in unseren Nachrichten uberhaupt

das Westmittelmeergebiet als Kornlieferant gegenuiber den alten Markten ausgepragt
hervor"; Rostovtzeff, HW 692: "Massinissa . . . the great new purveyor of corn to
the ancient world," cf. 630 and CAH 8.630; Tarn 254-55.
57 Durrbach, Inscriptions de Dglos 442A, 100-105.
58 The market price was probably in the neighborhood of ten drachmae; cf. Larsen,
ESAR 4.384.
59Livy 31.19.4; 32.27.2.
60 Livy 36.4.8; 43.6.
61 The gift has been described as large (Heichelheim 855; Larsen, ESAR 4.351)
but to do so distorts it and makes one misunderstand its purpose. It was a little gift

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 178 Lionel Casson [1954

member, a Rhodian ambassador is somehow involved. Rostov-

tzeff62 suggests that he played the role of banker. This cannot be
the 2800 medimni were a gift; there was no need for a banker.
But there was a need for something which the Rhodians were the
best fitted to supply, viz. ships, for Numidia had none of her own.63
The most reasonable hypothesis is that the Rhodian conducted the
negotiations in order to ensure that this shipment and future ones
if there turned out to be any would travel in Rhodian bottoms
rather than, say, Carthaginian. Delos was to be the center for
local distribution of Numidian grain as she probably had been for
Sicilian before. And, as before, it was to be carried out under the
watchful eye of Rhodes. We do not know whether Massinissa was
successful or not in his attempt. Save for the shipment in 170 to
the Roman armies in Macedon, there is not a scrap of evidence to
prove the presence of Numidian grain thereafter in the eastern
Mediterranean.64 The indications are rather, as we shall see, that
within a few decades all that the west had to offer fell short of
Rome's growing needs.
The evidence discussed so far belongs to the third century B.C.
and the early part of the second. For the next 130 odd years, from
167/6 when Rome made Delos a free port under Athenian control
to the takinp- over of Egvnt by Augustus. we know Dracticallv

scaled, like the Byzantian merchant's 500 medimni, to a little island's modest needs.
It simply is not to be compared with other royal gifts such as those recorded for Athens:
7500 medimni from the king of the Paeonians in 289/8 (IG JJ2 654), 10,000 from
Lysimachus in 299/8 (IG JJ2 657), 15,000 from Spartocus, the Bosporan ruler, in 289/8
(IG II2 653). Even a private citizen once gave her 8000 (IG JJ2 845, ca. 220) and
Hiero II of Syracuse is rumored to have bestowed 1000 on a single Athenian (Athen.
5.209B). Really large gifts ran into tens of thousands of medimni; see above, notes
13, 23, 24 and Diod. 20.46.4.
62 HW 1485-86, note 95.
63 When Masgaba, the king's own son, visited Rome to congratulate the Senate
on the victory over Perseus, two ships had to be chartered to bring him and his en-
tourage back (Livy 45.14).
64 Rostovtzeff states (HW 1462, note 20) that Numidia exported grain to Delos,
Athens and Rhodes and cites Heichelheim (856) as authority. Heichelheim, however,
merely cites secondary sources (one of which is an earlier work by Rostovtzeff).
Except for Massinissa's gift to Delos there is no ancient evidence to support this state-
ment. We hear nothing of African grain in the east beyond the handful of passages
in Livy that refer to the supplies furnished by Carthage and Numidia for the Roman
armies during the Macedonian wars. Rostovtzeff further cites an inscription from
Istrus (2nd B.C.) that honors a Carthaginian for import of grain. He mentions the
possibility that the merchant in question may not have been dealing in Carthaginian
grain but dismisses it as highly improbable. On the contrary, it is highly probable.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 179

nothing of the history of the grain trade in the east. It was during
this period that Delos became a great entrepot, a truly international
center of trade. In the second half of the second century B.C. and
the early part of the first, the island reached the peak of its pros-
perity. Before this time one anchorage basin, the Sacred Port, had
with various improvements fulfilled all needs; now five others
equipped with moles, quays and warehousing facilities were added.65
Communities of merchants from all quarters settled on the island
permanently. Some impact was felt upon Rhodes almost immedi-
ately. Just twelve years or so after Delos was declared a free port,
a Rhodian embassy appealed to the Roman Senate: their harbor
revenues, they respectfully submitted, had dropped from 1,000,000
to 150,000 drachmae a year (Polyb. 30.31.10-12). Does this mean
that the large part of the eastern grain trade which Rhodes had
controlled so successfully for so long had slipped from her grasp?
A brief analysis of even our scanty information will reveal that
this was not so.
There are a number of certain facts that must be borne in mind
at the outset. For one, Rhodes never became a poor city. Her
continental possessions were taken away and with the loss of reve-
nue from that source (Polyb. 30.31.7) and from the drop in harbor
dues, she no longer had the funds to finance a navy that could
patrol the seas as before, with results known to every schoolboy
who has read the Pro lege Manilia. But when Strabo visited the
city in the time of Augustus he was profoundly impressed by its
well-being (14.2.5) as were many who subsequently wrote of her
(e.g. Dio Chrys. 31.55). Delos, however, did become a ghost town
and very quickly. The nature of her newly found prosperity was
such that it could come to an abrupt end; had she been a key link
in a basic service such as the grain supply this, of course, would not
have been the case.
The wealth of Delos at this time lay in two directions, neither
of which had much to do with grain: in slaves66 and as a trans-
shipment point for the products of Arabia, India and the Far East.
Her harbor was not nearly so good as, for example, that of Rhodes,
but for the cargoes she specialized in this was a minor consideration:
the slavers - fast, light oar-driven pirate vessels could put in

65 Paris (above, note 50) 64-69.

66 Strabo 14.5.2; cf. Roussel 19-20.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 180 Lionel Casson [1954

anywhere, and it took only a modest-sized vessel to carry thousands

of dollars worth of silks, spices and perfumes.11a Very little of this
valuable merchandise was kept on the island; by far the greater
part was destined for forwarding to Rome. The national origin
of the vast numbers of merchants now established on Delos makes
all this abundantly clear.67 There was, first, a great number of
South Italian businessmen.68 Some had settled on the island be-
fore it became a free port and were perhaps instrumental in having
it declared so, but the majority arrived on the scene in the ensuing
decades. They came to Delos in preference to Rhodes for a number
of reasons. Although there were unquestionably shipowners among
the South Italians, those who settled on the sacred island were for
the most part bankers and merchandisers,69 men who preferred the
greater, albeit more speculative, profits of financial maritime adven-
tures to the smaller stabler income to be derived from freight, as
well as the comforts of living on shore to the rigors of life aboard
ship. At Rhodes, a wealthy state where there was ample local
capital available, there was no place for such men. Again, Rhodes
was traditionally hostile to foreigners. And last but by no means
least, a dealer would not be so much hampered by the law in the
frank commercial atmosphere of Delos as he would in the well-
policed city of Rhodes, the giver of maritime law to the world.70
It was the difference between doing business, say, in Tangiers as
against London. So the South Italians came to Delos and made
their fortunes forwarding goods to their homeland.
A second large group of inhabitants on the island came from the
Levant, from Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, and other Syrian ports.7'
Clearly their function was to load at their home ports goods that
had come by camel, or combination of ship and camel, from India
and the Far East and to deliver them to Delos for trans-shipment

66a Venice at the height of her prosperity ca. 1500 needed only 30 to 40 ships for
her inter-regional trade (Frederic C. Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the
Renaissance, Baltimore 1934, 107). The average size was about 250 tons burden;
the largest was not over 440 (ibid. 39-48). In its palmiest days the city imported
a total of 2,500,000 pounds of spices from Alexandria every winter (ibid. 26); it would
take just five 250-tonners to carry the whole shipment.
67 Cf. Larsen, ESAR 4.350; Rostovtzeff, HW 795-98.
68 Roussel 75-84.
69 Roussel 12 and note 7, 75, 82 and note 6; cf. Rostovtzeff, HW 795-98.
70 This was one of Rostovtzeff's typically acute observations (CAH 8.644).
71 Roussel 87-92, 93-94.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 181

to Italy. An Alexandrian community72 did the same for the portion

of this traffic that was routed via the Red Sea, as well as for the
Arabian and Somaliland specialties whose trade the Ptolemies mo-
nopolized. Merchants from Pontus and Bithynia73 were very likely
connected with the commerce in slaves.
What of the grain trade? Probably it was slightly larger than
in the previous century, to take care of the island's swollen popula-
tion. But there is no reason to suppose that the center of this
traffic ever ceased to be Rhodes. She still had her merchant marine
and she still was prosperous; her harbor was still far more suitable
for the larger carriers that were necessary to transport bulky car-
goes. The easiest explanation is that Rhodian bottoms carried
Egyptian and Pontic wheat as well as other products just as they
had for centuries. But, whereas before 166 traders from the Levant
had put in at Rhodes as a convenient stopping place,74 or, for that
matter, as the nearest market, and slave traders had disposed of
their merchandise on her blocks,75 now they bypass her, quite will-
ing to forego her advantages in return for the free harbor privileges
as well as the freer atmosphere of Delos.7' But if traders could
push on past Rhodes to Delos there was no reason why they could
not go the whole hog and push on to Puteoli, since that was be-
coming more and more the ultimate destination of their cargoes,
and cut out the profit of the Delian middlemen. There were
meteorological as well as economic reasons for bypassing Delos:
the prevailing winds in the Aegean, the well-known Etesians, are
northerly; a vessel from the Levant to make Delos had to drive
right into their eye, the worst possible course for a sailing ship. It
was far easier to load cargo aboard a larger craft that could stay at
sea a considerable length of time and, shaping the most direct
course that the wind would permit, sail south of Crete and head for
the straits of Messina.77 So Delos in the course of time lost her
lucrative transient trade while Rhodes, though the removal of the
contributions of the Levantine traders to the total of her harbor
dues had caused it to droD drastically, still maintained her laroe

72 Roussel 92-93.
73 Roussel 88.
74 Cf. PRyl 554 and Rostovtzeff's discussion, HW 226-28.
75 Mysta, the inamorata of Seleucus II, and a batch of prisoners captured by the
Galatians in 240 B.C. wound up at Rhodes (Polyaenus 8.61, Athen. 13.593E).
76 Cf. Rostovtzeff, HW 776-78.
77 Cf. TAPA 81 (1950) 43-51, especially 47.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 182 Lionel Casson [1954

carrying trade and stayed prosperous.78 Delos might have reverted

to the role she played in the third century B.C. and carried on again
as the focal point of local maritime traffic, but circumstances willed
otherwise: in 88 B.C. one of Mithridates' generals ravaged the island
horribly; recovery had just gotten under way when, in 69, a sack
by the pirates delivered the death blow.
Information about the suppliers of grain in this period is very
scanty. Polybius mentions (28.2.17) that in 169 B.C. Rhodes peti-
tioned the Senate for permission to purchase 100,000 medimni
(= 150,000 bushels) of Sicilian grain. The passage thus confirms
the inference we drew earlier that supplies from Sicily were no longer
avaiiable for general sale on the eastern market. At the same time
it makes it clear that some special circumstances must have arisen
to prevent Rhodes from importing from her usual source. These
are not far to seek. In 169, for the first time in over a century
and a half, Egypt had been invaded. Antiochus IV dispersed the
Egyptian army at the frontier, captured the port of Pelusium,
established headquarters at Memphis, and set about laying siege to
Alexandria.79 It is no surprise to find Rhodes casting about else-
where at this moment for grain.
Thus Rhodes, we may be sure, under normal conditions still
drew her supplies from Egypt. As a matter of fact, the latter so
far as one can judge even increased in importance in this period as
a source of grain for the eastern market. Sicily, as we have seen,
had been obliged to withdraw and there is no evidence for Numidia.
The Pontic area because of wars and disturbances was not the rich
source it had been hitherto,80 although some grain certainly was
being shipped out of it. Egypt is thus left as the east's major sup-
plier. This raises a problem that, so far as I know, has never been
formulated by any writer on the subject. Yet it is a basic one,
the solution to which affects seriously the whole political as well as
economic history of the times. In 30 B.C. Egypt, which long before

78 The account in Ferguson's Hellenistic Athens (London 1911) 330-33 which

portrays three ports of the Aegean - Athens, Rhodes, Delos - as succeeding each
other in that order is highly oversimplified.
79 Cf. CAH 8.505-6. E. G. Turner has taken the date of PRyl 583 to mean that
the events connected with Antiochus fall in 170 (Bull. John Ryland's Library 31 [1948]
149-51), but the traditional date is based on incontrovertible evidence. The date of
the papyrus can be explained in other ways; cf. e.g. E. Bikerman, Chronique d'Egypte
54 (1952) 398-99.
80 Strabo 7.4.6.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 183

had been de facto under Rome's control, now becomes officially a

part of the empire and takes her place as one of the key sources of
grain for the capital, a role she held until her seemingly limitless
flow was diverted to Constantinople. Vespasian, in his struggle
with his rivals, made the taking of Egypt and Alexandria one of
his first moves: with these in his grasp he was able to starve Rome
into submission.81 Under Augustus, Egypt provided Rome an-
nually with 5,000,000 bushels, 150,000 tons, an enormous amount
that filled fully one-third of the city's needs82 and required the serv-
ices of a merchant fleet larger probably than any we hear of until
the 19th century. What happened to this grain before Augustus'
annexation, during the time of the Republic? Did any of it go to
Rome in those years?
The implications of the problem are far reaching. If we assume
that during the Republic this much grain - or perhaps somewhat
less, since Augustus thoroughly revamped the slovenly administra-
tion of the later Ptolemies - was kept on the eastern market, the
ineluctable conclusion is that the conversion of Egypt into a Roman
province brought in its wake a tremendous economic dislocation in
both the east and the west. It would mean the loss to the former of
its chief source of supply. And if the Roman Republic had sub-
sisted up to this time solely on Sicilian, Sardinian, and North
African grain - the only suppliers that the ancient sources mention
- then, with the sudden influx of huge amounts from Egypt, there
should conversely be a sudden glut of grain in the west. Yet
clearly this did not happen. The east did not starve. Rome itself
under the emperors appears to have absorbed the grain of Egypt
without diminishing what she drew from her traditional sources of
Republican days, and that despite the fact that the number of
recipients of the corn dole was significantly less under Augustus and
his followers than before.83 It would certainly seem that no pro-
found dislocation had taken place.
If this is so, we are forced to conclude that, even under the
Republic, Rome had been eking out her western supplies with grain
from Egypt - if not the 150,000 tons that Augustus drew from the
81 Tac. Hist. 3.48; 4.52.
82 Aurelius Victor, Brev. 1.6; Josephus, B.J. 2.386.
83 The number rose constantly until it reached 320,000. Caesar in 46 B.c. re-
duced it to 150,000 but Augustus raised it again to 200,000 where it seems to have
more or less stayed; cf. Denis van Berchem, Les distributions de ble et d'argent a1 la
plebe romaine sous l'empire (Geneva 1939) 21, 27-30.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 184 Lionel Casson [1954

new province, then at least an amount sufficiently large so that its

increase led to no wide-scale economic disturbance. In the light
of this, let us review what we know of the commercial relations
between Rome and Egypt down to the time of the latter's an-
nexation.
Economic contact between the two countries may perhaps go
as far back as 273 B.C. In that year Philadelphus sent a commission
to Rome and it has been vigorously argued by some -while others
have preferred to reserve opinion - that the purpose of the embassy
was to discuss trade.84 A recent article very persuasively uses
numismatic evidence to prove that commerce between the two
existed in the third century B.C.85 But we cannot state conclu-
sively that grain played any part; there were a number of other
things that Egypt could export in return for iron or sulphur, the
Italian products she had most need of.86 In 210 B.C. Rome sent
envoys to Egypt to negotiate the purchase of grain (Polyb. 9.44);
this, of course, was during an emergency, in the midst of a terribly
destructive war. The grain was probably delivered, for the Senate
sent a handsome set of presents to Ptolemy Philopator (Livy 27.4).
Immediately after peace was restored, however, supplies in Rome
were so plentiful that Sicilian and Sardinian dealers were letting
cargoes go to the shipowners to pay for the freight (Livy 30.38).
In 191 Ptolemy Epiphanes sent an embassy to Rome offering both
money and grain, but neither was accepted (Livy 36.4). In 168,
hard upon Antiochus IV's voluntary departure from Egypt after
his successful invasion, Ptolemy Philometor sent a cargo of grain to
the Roman troops stationed at Chalcis for the war with Perseus;
the gift was one of Philometor's maneuvers in rounding up allies to
strengthen his hand against his recent conqueror (OGIS 760; cf.
J. Swain, CP 39 [1944] 91 and note 83).
After the battle of Pydna the trade contacts between Egypt and
Rome were close and constant. There were South Italian business-
men in Alexandria, and others in Delos who worked with them,
engaged in the forwarding of Egyptian products to Rome.87 After

84 Tarn, "Ptolemy II," JEA 14 (1928) 251, Rostovtzeff, HW 394-97, both for;
Holleaux, CAH 7.823, reserves judgement. For other references see the article cited
in the next note, pp. 89-91.
85 L. Neatby, "Romano-Egyptian Relations During the Third Century B.C.,"
TAPA 81 (1950) 89-98.
86 Rostovtzeff, HW 396.
87 The references are listed and discussed by Rostovtzeff, HW 920-22.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 185

the famous Popilius Laenas incident, Egypt became in a very real

sense a protectorate of Rome and the effect of this change must
have been felt economically no less than politically. In 80 B.C.
Ptolemy Alexander II willed her to the Roman people88 and from
that moment on she hovered on the brink of annexation.89 She
would have lost her independence a full half-century earlier than
she did were it not for tense struggles that were going on in Rome
itself, involving forces so complex that, in spite of a good deal of
contemporary information, we can only with difficulty trace the
political movements entailed, while the economic are almost com-
pletely beyond our ken.90 Yet one thing is certain: during the
whole of this period ships left Alexandria continuously for the shores
of Italy.91 It has always been assumed that they carried in their
holds either the luxury products that Egypt forwarded from the
Far East, India, and Arabia or the miscellaneous articles that were
manufactured at Alexandria.92 Why not grain as well? The in-
stitution of public distribution of grain and the constant increase in
the list of recipients that followed in its wake had certainly caused
Rome's needs to mount precipitously. The extra freight charges
involved in bolstering her supply with Egyptian grain would not
have stood in her way any more than in 210 B.C. Moreover, the
Ptolemies were dependent upon Rome for their very existence; a
little pressure judiciously applied could easily have secured for her
the best possible price.
88 G. I. Luzzato, Epigrafica giuridica greca e romana, "R. Universita di Roma.
Pubbl. del Istituto di Diritto Romano, dei Diritti dell'Oriente Mediterraneo, e di Storia
del Diritto, 19" (Milan 1942) 203-5. As Luzzato points out, the recently discovered
epigraphical evidence confirming the authenticity of similar wills should dispel all
doubts about the genuineness of this one.
89 Proposed by Crassus in 65 B.C. (cf. Luzzato [above, note 88] 205), by Caesar
in the Rullian Laws of 63.
90Why, for example, was Egypt not annexed before Augustus' time? Pompey
chose not to do it in 63. Caesar proposed it in the same year but permitted Ptolemy
Auletes to be restored in 59 and again in 55, and deliberately refrained from doing it
in 47. It is fascinating, yet completely baffling, to attempt to work out the motives
that lay behind these decisions. Modern writers offer a wide choice of reasons for
the delay at any given time: legal (how could a Roman official play Pharaoh? -
Luzzato), economic (Caesar wanted to save Egypt from the clutches of the Equites -
Syme), political (save Egypt from the clutches of Caesar - Mommsen), and romantic
(Cleopatra's good looks - Frank). The various cross-currents of interest - political,
economic, social - reach a veritable crescendo of complexity in the notorious Auletes
affair of 57-55 B.C. (see below, note 93).
91 Cf. Cic. In Verr. 5.145, 157.
92 Cf. the goods Rabirius Postumus brought back from Alexandria after his year
as dioiketes (Cic. Pro Rab. Post. 40).

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 186 Lionel Casson [1954

A little judicious pressure as a matter of fact might even do

more, it might succeed in lining a few pockets. In the early part of
57 B.C. Ptolemy Auletes, who had been chased off his throne by the
Alexandrian mob, turned up at Rome.93 He was immediately wel-
comed most warmly by Pompey who carried him off to his Alban
villa to install him as house guest there. A very short time later
a scarcity of grain came to pass in the city and, although it seems
to have subsided for a month or so, it reappeared in serious form in
September. To meet it, Pompey was placed in complete control of
Rome's grain supply, with virtually unlimited powers, for a period
of five years.94 Were Ptolemy's presence and the shortage con-
nected? The events - the king's arrival, his welcome by Pompey,
the scarcity, Pompey's appointment as buyer-in-chief of grain
follow suspiciously close on the heels of one another. We are told
that, during 56, Pompey met the immediate emergency with ship-
ments from Sardinia, Sicily and North Africa.95 This is what we
would expect to hear: supplies from those areas could arrive within
a matter of weeks.96 But the very next year at the opening of
spring,97 the grain czar turned his attention to Egypt. He had his
man Gabinius put Auletes back on the throne and, just to make sure
that everything was airtight, he presented the king with a Roman
businessman to serve as Egypt's finance minister. A neater combi-
nation for making a financial killing in Egyptian grain simply cannot
be conceived.
All this, to be sure, is speculative. But there is even a direct
bit of evidence that can be adduced. In describing the conditions

93 A convenient summary of the Auletes affair with references to all the sources
can be found in R. Tyrrell and L. Purser, The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero2 2
(London 1906) xxix-l.
94 The shortage first appeared at the beginning of July 57 (Asconius, In Milon.
38). Cicero reports that it ended abruptly upon his recall from exile (De domo sua
6.14) and that his return to Rome in September was marked by ample supplies of food
(Post red. ad Quir. 8.18). However that may be, just a few days later the shortage
was considered so serious that the Senate passed the resolution that made Pompey
grain czar for five years (Ad Att. 4.1.6-7).
95 Plut. Pompey 50.
96 On 11 April 56 Pompey left for Sardinia (Q.fr. 2.5.3); he had been preceded
by his lieutenant who left in December (Q.fr. 2.1.3). He probably was back in Rome
in September; cf. M. Gelzer, Pompeius (Munich 1949) 164. Had he gone to Egypt
he would have consumed most of the summer sailing season in just getting there and
back; cf. TAPA 81 (1950) 50-51.
97 On 22 May 55 Cicero writes to Atticus (4.10.1): "Puteolis magnus est rumor
Ptolomaeum esse in regno."

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Vol. lxxxv] Grain Trade of Hellenistic World 187

caused in 39 B.C. by Sextus Pompey's blockade, Appian (B.C. 5.67)

says: "Famine now fell upon Rome since neither the merchants of
the east (&wco'w 'iro6pwv) could put to sea for fear of (Sextus) Pompey
and his control of Sicily, nor those of the west because his lieuten-
ants held Sardinia and Corsica, nor those of Africa opposite since
the same forces ruled the seas off those shores, too. There was
consequently a great rise in prices." Who were these "merchants
of the east"? They could only have been shippers of Egyptian
grain.
Let us summarize our findings. From the time of Alexander to
the middle of the second century B.C. the key figure in the grain
trade of the eastern Mediterranean was Rhodes. It was she who
distributed most of the supply from Egypt, and her share of that
from the Black Sea area, to the coastal cities of Asia Minor and the
Aegean islands and Greece. She employed Delos as a convenient
distribution point for shipment to the neighboring islands and as
a more convenient receiving point for grain from the west. Financ-
ing was done with her own capital and much of the grain traveled
in her own bottoms. Athens and Greece, as in the fourth century,
received in addition substantial supplies directly from the Pontus.
From the middle of the second century B.C. to the annexation of
Egypt, Rhodes does not lose her position in the grain trade although
other forms of her commerce suffer. Whereas in the previous period
there had been enough grain available to produce competition at
times, the situation now changes. Sicilian supplies are now diverted
to Rome. Numidian grain attempts to replace it but is soon swal-
lowed up by Rome as well. The amount available from the Black
Sea is somewhat reduced. The burden thus falls upon Egypt. In
the first century B.C., because of the growing needs of the public
distribution of grain, Rome too must seek Egyptian supplies to
such a point that, once annexed, the latter furnishes her with no
less than 150,000 tons a year, a third of her requirements.

This content downloaded from

94.66.37.240 on Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:42:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms