[G.R. No.

229408, November 09, 2020]

CENTRAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. SOLAR
RESOURCES, INC. AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

ANTECEDENTS

Pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated December

15, 1989, the Philippine National Bank sold
to petitioner Central Realty and
Development Corporation (Central) a parcel
of land located in Binondo, Manila covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
10964 with an area of seven thousand three
hundred fifty (7,350) square meters.1 OCT
No. 10964 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 198996 was
issued to Central.2

In May 2010, Dolores V. Molina (Molina)

caused the annotation of a notice of adverse
claim on TCT No. 198996.3 She claimed that
Central sold the property to her sometime in
1993.

On February 4, 2011, Central filed with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a case
entitled In Re: Petition for Cancellation of
Adverse Claim on Transfer of Certificate of
Title No. 198996, Central Realty and
Development Corporation v. Dolores V.
Molina and the Register of Deeds of Manila,
docketed Civil Case No. P-11-726/LRC No.
N-86/LRC REC No. N-60545. Central
disputed the alleged sale of the property to
Molina, claiming that its board of directors
did not actually meet to confirm the alleged
sale.4 The case was raffled to Branch 4.
While the petition pended, Central, on
September 23, 2011, entered into a joint
venture agreement with Federal Land for the
construction of a high rise residential
condominium project on the property. The
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) granted them a permit to construct
and to sell the condominium project.5

Meantime, by Letter dated March 26, 2012,

Molina demanded that Central cause the
issuance of a new title in her name and to
deliver the possession of the property to her,
free from any liens and encumbrances.6 Her
demand though went unheeded.

Consequently, on September 10, 2013, she

filed with RTC-Manila a complaint for
specific performance and declaration of
nullity of real estate mortgage with
injunctive relief entitled Dolores V. Molina,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Rebecca
M. Ubas vs. Central Realty and Development
Corporation and Federal Land, Inc.. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 13-1306267 and
raffled to Branch 6.

On December 18, 2013, Solar purchased the

property from Molina.8

Back to Civil Case No. P-11-726/LRC No. N-

86/LRC REC No. N-60545, Branch 4
rendered its Decision dated April 11, 2014
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
cancel the notice of adverse claim inscribed
on TCT No. 198996. It ruled that Central was
able to prove that it did not sell the property
to any third party. Thus, Molina's adverse
claim had no basis at all and Central
remained to be the owner of the property,
viz.:9

x x x In this case, petitioner Central Realty

has aptly proven that the adverse claim
made as Entry No. 1515 on the subject title
has no leg to stand on. Through
documentary evidence presented and the
testimony of Atty. Serge Mario C. Iyog,
Central Realty has proven that no Deed of
Sale or no conveyance of ownership was
made in favor of any third party. Petitioner
has consistently, up to the present,
exercised acts of ownership and
administration over the subject property as
readily shown by the payment of real
property taxes on the property and entering
into a Joint Venture Agreement with Federal
Land, Inc. (Exhibit "RR").

xxx xxx xxx

Summarily, petitioner has sufficiently

shown that the adverse claim annotated on
the title by Dolores V. Molina under Entry No.
1515 has no basis and should be cancelled.
Subject entry should not burden the
property any further as it is undisputed that
petitioner Central Realty remains to be the
owner of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered,
upon payment of the prescribed fees, to
cancel from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
198996 the Notice of Adverse Claim
inscribed thereon under Entry No. 1515/Vol.
145/T-198996 provided that no document
or transaction registered or pending
registration in his office shall be adverse (sic)
affected thereby.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

On June 9, 2014, Solar annotated its notice

of adverse claim on TCT No. 198996.10
When Molina died in 2014, Solar moved to
be substituted in Civil Case No. 13-130626
as party-plaintiff. The court granted the
motion, albeit,11 the Court of Appeals (CA)
subsequently reversed in its Decision12
dated May 11,2018 in CA-G.R. SP No.
151032, entitled Central Realty and
Development Corporation and Federal Land,
Inc. vs. Hon. Jansen R. Rodriguez, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, and Solar
Resources, Inc.. Solar's subsequent motion
for reconsideration has yet to be resolved by
the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, Central initiated another

petition, this time, seeking the cancellation
of Solar's notice of adverse claim on TCT No.
198996 via In Re: Petition for Cancellation of
Adverse Claim on Transfer of Certificate of
Title No. 198996, Central Realty and
Development Corporation v. Solar Resources,
Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. P-14-0163. The
case went to RTC-Manila, Branch 16.
Central alleged:13

xxx xxx xxx

4. Solar's Adverse Claim must be

immediately cancelled.
4.1 Solar's Adverse Claim is already ripe for
cancellation because the 30-day period has
already lapsed.

4.2 Solar's Adverse Claim is procedurally

defective. It is based on Molina's Adverse
Claim, which has already been cancelled.
Solar's Adverse Claim is in effect Molina's
second adverse claim, which is prohibited
under Section 70 of PD 1529. Furthermore,
the annotation of an adverse claim is
improper since other remedies exist.

4.3 Solar's Adverse Claim is utterly,

completely and absolutely baseless. Several
government agencies have already ruled that
Molina's claim over the Property (the sole
basis of Solar's claim) is false. Records show
that Central Realty is the absolute and
registered true owner of the Property. Since
Solar's Adverse Claim stems only from
Molina's claim, Solar's claim is equally
fraudulent and baseless.
4.4 Solar cannot pretend to be an innocent
purchaser for value. It has long been aware
of the falsity and impropriety of Molina's
claims. The circumstances of the case
demonstrate that Solar and its counsel.
Ponce Enrile and Manalastas Law Offices
("PECABAR"), are in fact, Molina's co-
conspirators in extortion against Central
Realty.

xxx xxx xxx

Solar opposed and refuted Central's

allegations as follows:

1. The lapse of the 30-day period does not

ipso facto result in the cancellation of Solar's
adverse claim.

2. Solar's adverse claim is separate and

distinct from Dolores Molina's adverse claim.

3. Solar has a legitimate claim over the

subject property.
4. The trial court is precluded from resolving
the issue of ownership of the subject
property which is being litigated in a
separate case pending before RTC-Manila,
Branch 6.

5. Solar's adverse claim cannot be cancelled

pending resolution of the separate case
involving the ownership over the property.

Central, thereafter, moved to render

judgment on the pleadings, viz.:14

xxx xxx xxx

2. Solar admitted all the material allegations

of Central Realty in its Petition. Solar's
Opposition and Central Realty's Petition and
Reply demonstrates that Solar made the
following admissions:
 Central Realty's
Solar's
Material
Admission/s
Allegations
(1) Solar purchased Par. 5 of the
the Subject Opposition
Property from states:
Molina. (See Par.
3 of the Petition) xxx "The mere
fact that Solar
purchased the
Subject Property
from Molina
does not render
Solar's adverse
claim as
Molina's second
adverse claim."
xxx
(2) Solar has no Par. 5 of the
other basis for Opposition
its claim other states:
than its
supposed xxx "On the
 purchase of the other hand,
Subject Property Solar's adverse
from Molina. claim is based
(See Par. 3 of the
on the Deed of
Petition) Absolute Sale
dated December
18, 2013
executed by and
between Molina
and Solar." xxx
(3) Central Realty Par. 13 of the
appears as the Opposition
registered owner states:
of the Subject
Property on the "Molina further
face of TCT No. presented Solar
198996. with an owner's
(See Par. 10 of duplicate of TCT
the Petition) No. 198996 and
explained that
Central Realty
prevailed upon
her to leave the
 title under its
name." xxx
(4) Central Realty Implied
has been in full admission for
possession of the Solar's failure to
Subject Property deny or respond
since its to this issue.
purchase from
Philippine
National Bank
("PNB").
(See Pars. 13.1,
44.1, and 59(2)
of the Petition)
(5) As owner and Implied
possessor, admission for
Central Realty Solar's failure to
has been paying deny or respond
the realty taxes to this issue.
over the Subject
Property since
1991, has
leased-out
several portions
thereof, has
mortgaged the
same, and even
entered into a
Joint Venture
Agreement with
Federal Land,
Inc. ("FLI").
(See for Payment
of Realty Taxes -
Pars. 13.2 and
45.4 of the
Petition; Leasing
out the Subject
Property - Par.
13.3 of the
Petition; Mortgag
e of the Subject
Property - Par.
45.2 of the
Petition; Joint
Venture
Agreement with
 FLI - Par. 13.4 of
the Petition.
(6) Molina's Implied
documents have admission for
been declared as Solar's failure to
fake and falsified deny or respond
by the Office of to this issue.
the City
Prosecutor of
Manila. (See Par.
23 of the
Petition)
(7) Molina's title has Implied
been declared as admission for
falsified by the Solar's failure to
National Bureau deny or respond
of Investigation's to this issue.
Questioned
Documents
Division ("NBI-
QDD") and the
Land
Registration
 Authority
("LRA"). (See Par.
25.1 of the
Petition)
(8) The Securities Implied
and Exchange admission for
Commission Solar's failure to
("SEC") has deny or respond
issued several to this issue.
Certificates of
Corporate Filing
stating that
Dolores V.
Molina was
never an officer
or a director of
Central Realty.
(See Par. 20.1 of
the Petition)
(9) Solar never Implied
verified with admission for
Molina or any Solar's failure to
government
 agency or deny or respond
conducted any to this issue.
ocular
inspection to
determine
whether Molina
is the owner of
the Subject
Property.
(See Pars. 44.1
and 44.2 of the
Petition)
(10) Solar's lawyers Implied
are the same admission for
lawyers of Solar's failure to
Molina during deny or respond
the investigation to this issue.
by the NBI-QDD.
(See Pars. 46
and 46.1 of the
Petition)
(11 Solar has been Implied
aware that admission for
 Molina's Solar's failure to
documents have deny or respond
already been to this issue.
declared fake.
(See Par. 45.3,
46, 46.2 of the
Petition)
(12) The Honorable Par. 11 of the
Court has Opposition:
already issued a
Decision dated "As will be
11 April 2014 discussed below,
cancelling this Honorable
Molina's Court's
previous Adverse pronouncement
Claim. (See Par. in the Molina
34 of the adverse claim
Petition) case that Central
Realty is the
rightful owner of
the Subject
Property was
rendered outside
 of its limited
jurisdiction." xxx

xxx xxx xxx

5. This case is ripe for a judgment on the

pleadings because proceedings for the
cancellation of adverse claim are resolved
after a "speedy hearing". Here, a hearing was
already conducted, where Central Realty
proved its compliance on jurisdictional
requirements and Solar asked for time to file
its Opposition. x x x

xxxx

8. Based on the express and implied

admissions, it is clear that what only
remains are mere questions of law that may
be resolved through a judgment on the
pleadings. x x x
Solar then filed its Opposition with Motion to
Dismiss15 on ground of litis pendentia,
thus:

1. Judgment on the pleadings was improper

as Solar raised factual matters, and thus
ostensible issue, to dispute the material
allegations of the Petition, viz.: (1) its adverse
claim is separate and distinct from Dolores
Molina's adverse claim, (2) Solar is an
innocent purchaser for value, (3) Molina
presented to Solar proofs that she had
interest over the property, and (4) the deed
of sale between Molina and Central has not
been declared void or defective.

2. The petition should be dismissed as the

issue of ownership is under litigation in a
separate case pending before Manila RTC-
Branch 6.

Central opposed the motion to dismiss on

the ground that it was filed beyond the
prescribed period and Solar was already
estopped from claiming litis pendentia.

Pending resolution of the parties' respective

motions, Central and Solar caused the
marking of their respective exhibits, viz.:16

Central's Exhibits Solar's Exhibits

A - Certified True Copy of TCT No. 198996
1 - Adverse Claim of Raymundo Alonzo
dated 21 May 2014
B - Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated 21 May
2014 2 - TCT No. 198996 from Registry of
Deed (common exhibit)
C - Deed of Absolute Sale dated 18 December
2013 (provisional marking) 3 - Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 07 September 1993
D - Amended Articles of Incorporation of
Central Realty (provisional marking) 4 -
certified true copy of Secretary's Affidavit
dated 27 August 1993 (common exhibit)
E - Articles of Incorporation of Solar
Resources, Inc. (provisional marking) 5 -
Board Resolution dated 07 September 1993
(common exhibit)
F - Deed of Absolute Sale dated 15 December
1989 between PNB and Central Realty
(provisional marking) 6 - reserved marking
G - Original CTC No. 10964 (provisional
marking) 7 - Letter of Dr. Jose Ventura
dated 07 September 2010 of the City of
Manila
H to H-6 were reserved for certain
documents 8 - Joint Venture Agreement
(common exhibit)
I to I-39 Tax Receipts (provisional marking)
and I-40 on Certification dated 23 February
2011 issued by the Office of the City
Treasurer 9 - Deed of Absolute Sale
between SOLAR and Dolores Molina
J - Contract of Lease dated 13 June 2007
between Central Realty and Mary Go 10 -
reserved marking
K - Joint Venture Agreement dated 23
September 2011 (provisional marking)11 -
certified true copy of the Certification dated
16 November 2012 (provisional marking)
L - Affidavit of Adverse Claim (provisional
marking) 12 - Resolution dated 02 June
2014 issued by RTC-Manila, Branch 6
M - Decision dated 11 April 2014 rendered
by RIC-Manila, Branch 4
R - Molina's Deed of Absolute Sale dated 07
September 1993
S - Molina's Secretary's Affidavit dated 27
August 1993
T - Molina's Board Resolution dated 07
September 1993
U - Molina's Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
198996
V - Resolution dated 25 June 2012 issued by
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila
W - NBI-QDD Report No. 388-1012 (with
sub-markings)
Y - Deed of Absolute Sale between Dolores
Molina and Pedro Yulo
Z - Joint Venture Agreement between
Dolores Molina and Raymundo Alonzo
representing Solar Resources, Inc.
AA - Deed of Absolute Sale between Dolores
Molina and North Lander Real Estate and
Development, Inc. dated 07 October 2012
CC - Certified True Copy of the Resolution
dated 09 June 2014 issued by RTC-Manila,
Branch 6 in Civil Case No. 13-130626
DD - Certification issued by RTC- Manila,
Branch 4 (with submarking)
EE - Minutes of the Meeting dated 29
January 1993
FF - Judicial Affidavit of Atty. Serge Mario
Iyog (with sub markings)
GG - Secretary's Certificate dated 05 August
2014 (provisional marking)
HH - Deed of Release of Property from
Indenture Lien and Cancellation of Mortgage
dated 07 September 2012 (provisional
marking)
II - Judicial Affidavit of Engr. Ernesto Santos
(with sub markings)
JJ -Order dated 21 September 2012
KK - Entry of Appearance filed by Ponce
Enrile Reyes & Manalastas Law Office dated
03 May 2012 and KK-1 Motion for
Reconsideration and
Comment/Manifestation dated 12 May 2014

LL - Development Permit issued by the

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
MM - Building permit issued by the City of
Manila
NN - Judicial Affidavit of Dominic Perez (with
submarking)
OO - OO-7 - Billing Statement (with
submarkings)
PP - PP-4 Official receipts (with submarking)

QQ - Schedule of Outstanding Accounts

from 01 October 2010 to 31 January 2015
(with submarkings)
RR - Judicial Affidavit of Antonio Magbohos
(with submarkings)
SS - Resume of Antonio Magbohos
TT - Letter dated 06 November 2012 (with
submarking)
UU - Order dated 25 July 2012
VV - Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
198996 submitted by CENTRAL to NBI-QDD
(with submarkings)
WW - Oath of Duty of Antonio Magbohos
XX - Entry of Appearance
YY - Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
Central then filed a motion to admit
amended judicial affidavits of its witnesses,
namely, Atty. Segre Mario C. Iyog, Mr.
Antonio R. Magbojos, Engr. Ernesto P.
Santos and Dominic Perez, which the trial
court granted.17

Solar, on the other hand, moved for

additional time to file its judicial affidavits,
which Central opposed. Pending resolution
of its motion, Solar filed the judicial
affidavits of Rebecca M. Ubas and Theodore
R. Sarmiento.18

By Resolution dated February 4, 2016, the

trial court granted Solar's motion and
admitted the judicial affidavits of its
witnesses. Central moved to reconsider.
On May 30, 2016, Branch 16 issued its
assailed Omnibus Resolution,19 thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing

discussions, summary judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint.

Let the Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated 21

May 2014 remain as annotated in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 198996 pending
adjudication of Civil Case No. 13-130626
entitled Dolores V. Molina vs. Central Realty
& Development Corporation for Specific
Performance with Damages and Declaration
of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.

The resolution on the pending Motion for

Reconsideration filed by petitioner CENTRAL
is considered moot and academic.

The Pre-Trial Conference on 15 June 2016 is

hereby ordered cancelled.
SO ORDERED.20

The court ruled that Central's motion for

judgment on the pleadings was improper.
For while Solar admitted the allegations in
the petition, it also raised affirmative
defenses thereto. The court likewise denied
Solar's motion to dismiss on ground of litis
pendentia, there being allegedly no common
cause of action between the petition for
cancellation of adverse claim and the
separate action for specific performance.
Acting as a land registration court, it could
not rule on the issue of ownership which is
the main issue in the latter case.

In the same omnibus resolution, the trial

court also rendered summary judgment in
the case. It held that a full-blown trial was
no longer necessary where the only issue
was the validity of the adverse claim, hence,
there was no need for the court to pass upon
the parties' respective claims of ownership
over the property, the same being the subject
of another case. Based on the recitals in the
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, it found sufficient
basis to sustain the annotation of Solar's
adverse claim, flowing as it did from the deed
of sale it had with Molina.

Central's motion for partial reconsideration

was denied under the assailed Resolution
dated January 3, 2017.21

PRESENT PETITION

Petitioner justifies its direct recourse to the

Court via Rule 45, alleging that it raises pure
questions of law: (1) May the trial court
render summary judgment motu proprio? (2)
Did the trial com1 judiciously act when it
denied to render judgment on the pleadings
despite Solar's supposed admission of all the
material allegations in the petition for
cancellation of Solar's adverse claim? and (3)
Is Solar's adverse claim barred by res
judicata and Presidential Decree No. 1529
(PD 1529)?

As part of the relief sought, petitioner urges

the Court to declare it as the true and lawful
owner of the property in order to finally
dismiss all pending related cases affecting
the subject property, viz.:

1. Civil Case No. 13-130626 (specific

performance case originally filed by Molina)
entitled Solar Resources, Inc. v. Central
Realty & Dev't. Corp. and Federal Land,
pending before RTC-Manila, Branch 6.

2. Civil Case No. 12-129163 entitled North

Lander Real Estate and Development, Inc. v.
Federal Land, Inc., et al. consolidated with
the aforesaid specific performance case.

3. HLURB Case No. REM-100515-

15793/O.P. Case No. 16-K-226 entitled
Solar Resources, Inc. v. Central Realty and
Federal Land.
4. CA-G.R. SP No. 129625 entitled North
Lander Real Estate and Development, Inc. v.
Judge Mislos-Loja, et al..

5. CA-G.R. SP No. 129133 entitled Federal

Land, Inc. v. North Lander Real Estate and
Development, Inc..

Petitioner also prays for injunctive relief to

enjoin Solar and all other persons from
claiming any rights over the property.

In response, Solar faults petitioner's direct

resort to the Court. The issues pertaining to
the dismissal of petitioner's action for
cancellation of Solar's adverse claim,
ownership of the property, propriety of
rendering judgment on the pleadings in the
case, among others, are allegedly not pure
questions of law for the same also involve
questions of fact requiring the evaluation of
evidence which the Court does not do under
Rule 45.
Solar further defends the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court motu
proprio. For the Rules of Court is merely
suppletory in its application to land
registration cases under PO 1529. It likewise
defends the denial of Central's motion for
judgment on the pleadings considering the
fact that it has pleaded affirmative defenses
to Central's petition to cancel its adverse
claim.

Solar asserts its right as the new owner of

the property emanating from the deed of sale
executed by Molina in its favor. Being an
innocent purchaser for value, its adverse
claim is not at all affected by the cancellation
of Molina's adverse claim as its claim over
the property is separate and entirely distinct
from Molina's.

Solar, too, asserts that Central is guilty of

forum shopping as it likewise prays for the
Court to direct other courts and tribunals to
dismiss all pending cases involving the same
property.

The Court formulates the issues for

resolution.

Does the petition raise pure questions of

law? If so, is direct resort to the Court
warranted?

II

What are the legal implications of the

Omnibus Resolution dated May 30, 2016 to
Central's petition for cancellation of Solar's
adverse claim on TCT No. 198996, Solar's
opposition with motion to dismiss, and
Central's motion for judgment on the
pleadings?

III
May the Court in this proceeding make a
declaration of ownership in favor of Central?

RULING

The petition raises pure questions of law

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

provides:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the

Court of Appeals in the cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse patty. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.

(b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the

Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where

only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.

In Heirs of Garcia v. Spouses Burgos,22 the

Court explained that when only questions of
law is raised, the mode of appeal is under
Rule 41 (c) in relation to Rule 45, thus:

The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal

under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is
brought to the CA from the RTC, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, and
resolves questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law. The second mode of appeal,
the petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the
RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is
brought to the Supreme Court and resolves
only questions of law.

There is a question of law when the doubt or

difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts and which does not call
for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-­litigants.
In a case involving a question of law, the
resolution of the issue rests solely on what
the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. On the other hand, a
question of fact exists when a doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsity of
alleged facts. If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or
the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each
other, the issue in that query is factual.23

Was the denial of petitioner's motion for

judgment on the pleadings correct? Is Solar's
action for specific performance barred by res
judicata? Is summary judgment in the case
proper? These are precisely the questions
being raised here. The resolution of these
questions rests solely on what the law or the
rules provides on the given set of
circumstances. In other words, the Court
ought to look only into whether the trial
court correctly applied the law or rules in the
case. These are pure questions of law which
do not require the examination of evidence.
Hence, Central's direct resort to the Court is
justified. When only questions of law remain
to be addressed, a direct recourse to the
Court under Rule 45 is the proper mode of
appeal.24
While Central also raises the issue that Solar
is not an innocent purchaser for value which
is a factual issue beyond the province of this
Cou11 under Rule 45,25 the same, as
correctly noted by the trial court, is deemed
subsumed and pending determination in
Civil Case No. 13-130626 for specific
performance and declaration of nullity of
real estate mortgage with injunctive relief
involving the same parties and subject
matter, and pending before Branch 6.
Precisely, the trial court here avoided ruling
on the issue of ownership or the presence of
good or bad faith in relation to the petition
for cancellation of adverse claim pending
before it as it rightly pronounced that these
issues ought to be threshed out in the said
case pending with Branch 6.

Notably, the only issue to be resolved in a

petition for cancellation of adverse claim is
the propriety of the adverse claim. Torbela v.
Spouses Rosario26 teaches, viz.:
The reason why the law provides for a
hearing where the validity of the adverse
claim is to be threshed out is to afford the
adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard,
providing a venue where the propriety of his
claimed interest can be established or
revoked, all for the purpose of determining
at last the existence of any encumbrance on
the title arising from such adverse claim. x x
x (Emphasis ours)

The Omnibus Resolution dated May 30,

2016 vis-a-vis the parties' respective
pleadings motions and pleadings

We quote anew Central's motion for

judgment on the pleadings, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Solar admitted all the material allegations

of Central Realty in its Petition. Solar's
Opposition and Central Realty's Petition and
Reply demonstrates that Solar made the
following admissions:

Central Realty's Material Allegations

Solar's Admission/s
(1) Solar purchased the Subject Property
from Molina. (See Par. 3 of the Petition)
Par. 5 of the Opposition states:

xxx "The mere fact that Solar purchased the

Subject Property from Molina does not
render Solar's adverse claim as Molina's
second adverse claim." xxx
(2) Solar has no other basis for its claim
other than its supposed purchase of the
Subject Property from Molina. (See Par. 3 of
the Petition) Par. 5 of the Opposition
states:

xxx "On the other hand, Solar's adverse

claim is based on the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 18, 2013 executed by and
between Molina and Solar." xxx
(3) Central Realty appears as the registered
owner of the Subject Property on the face of
TCT No. 198996. (See Par. 10 of the Petition)
Par. 13 of the Opposition states:

"Molina further presented Solar with an

owner's duplicate of TCT No. 198996 and
explained that Central Realty prevailed upon
her to leave the title under its name." xxx
(4) Central Realty has been in full possession
of the Subject Property since its purchase
from Philippine National Bank ("PNB"). (See
Pars. 13.1, 44.1, and 59(2) of the Petition)
Implied admission for Solar's failure to
deny or respond to this issue.
(5) As owner and possessor, Central Realty
has been paying the realty taxes over the
Subject Property since 1991, has leased-out
several portions thereof, has mortgaged the
same, and even entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with Federal Land, Inc. ("FLI").
(See for Payment of Realty Taxes - Pars. 13.2
and 45.4 of the Petition; Leasing out the
Subject Property - Par. 13.3 of the Petition;
Mortgage of the Subject Property - Par. 45.2
of the Petition; Joint Venture Agreement
with FLI - Par. 13.4 of the Petition. Implied
admission for Solar's failure to deny or
respond to this issue.
(6) Molina's documents have been declared
as fake and falsified by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. (See Par. 23 of the
Petition) Implied admission for Solar's
failure to deny or respond to this issue.
(7) Molina's title has been declared as
falsified by the National Bureau of
Investigation's Questioned Documents
Division ("NBI-QDD") and the Land
Registration Authority ("LRA"). (See Par. 25.1
of the Petition) Implied admission for Solar's
failure to deny or respond to this issue.
(8) The Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") has issued several
Certificates of Corporate Filing stating that
Dolores V. Molina was never an officer or a
director of Central Realty. (See Par. 20.1 of
the Petition) Implied admission for Solar's
failure to deny or respond to this issue.
(9) Solar never verified with Molina or any
government agency or conducted any ocular
inspection to determine whether Molina is
the owner of the Subject Property.ℒαwρhi৷
( See Pars. 44.1 and 44.2 of the Petition)
Implied admission for Solar's failure to
deny or respond to this issue.
(10) Solar's lawyers are the same lawyers of
Molina during the investigation by the NBI-
QDD. (See Pars. 46 and 46.1 of the Petition)
Implied admission for Solar's failure to
deny or respond to this issue.
(11) Solar has been aware that Molina's
documents have already been declared fake.
(See Par. 45.3, 46, 46.2 of the Petition)
Implied admission for Solar's failure to
deny or respond to this issue.
(12) The Honorable Court has already
issued a Decision dated 11 April 2014
cancelling Molina's previous Adverse Claim.
(See Par. 34 of the Petition) Par. 11 of the
Opposition:
"As will be discussed below, this Honorable
Court's pronouncement in the Molina
adverse claim case that Central Realty is the
rightful owner of the Subject Property was
rendered outside of its limited jurisdiction."
xxx
xxx xxx xxx

5. This case is ripe for a judgment on the

pleadings because proceedings for the
cancellation of adverse claim are resolved
after a "speedy hearing". Here, a hearing was
already conducted, where Central Realty
proved its compliance on jurisdictional
requirements and Solar asked for time to tile
its Opposition. x x x

xxxx

8. Based on the express and implied

admissions, it is clear that what only
remains are mere questions of law that may
be resolved through a judgment on the
pleadings. x x x
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of
Court defines judgment on pleadings, viz.:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. -

Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. x x x

When the Answer fails to tender any issue,

that is, if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party's
pleadings by admitting the truthfulness
thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at
all, a judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate.27

In fine, where a motion for judgment on the

pleadings is filed, the essential question is
whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on
the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at
all because of the failure of the defending
party's answer to raise an issue. The answer
would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it
does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings
by confessing the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all.28
Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore,
based exclusively upon the allegations
appearing in the pleadings of the parties and
the annexes, if any, without consideration of
any evidence aliunde.29

Here, the trial court did not err when it

denied Central's motion for judgment on the
pleadings citing as ground that Solar
asserted affirmative defenses even though it
practically admitted all the material
allegations in the petition. Indeed, Solar's
opposition which is the functional equivalent
of an answer did tender an issue in
refutation of Central's factual allegations for
cancellation of Solar's annotation of adverse
claim. Thus, the trial court correctly
ordained:

Records show that both parties have

presented different juxtapositioning [sic] of
their opposing allegations in their respective
Petition and Opposition. From the foregoing,
this Court notes that while SOLAR
practically admitted all the material
allegations in the Petition, it nevertheless
asserted affirmative defense such as, among
others:

1) Solar is an innocent purchaser for value;

2) Solar's adverse claim is separate and

distinct from Dolores Molina's adverse claim;
and

3) There is no decision or order from any

competent court declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 7, 1993, in
favor of Molina as void or defective.
As issues arise from these affirmative
defenses, this Court rules that a judgment
on the pleadings is improper and
unwarranted in this case.30

Even then, the trial court, on its own found

another way of disposing of the case on the
merits via summary judgment, viz.:

This Court, however, will render a Summary

Judgment.

Summary Judgment is proper when there is

clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact in the action, and if there is no quest ion
or controversy upon any question of fact. x x
x31

xxx xxx xxx

While respondent SOLAR has raised issues,

those issues do not call for the presentation
of evidence in a full-blown trial considering
that the instant case is confined only as to
the determination of the validity of the
adverse claim and not the declaration of the
rights of the parties over the disputed
property.

Now, the summary judgment.32

xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise the contention of petitioner

CENTRAL that the Affidavit of Adverse Claim
dated 21 May 2014 is but a second adverse
claim of the first Affidavit of Adverse Claim
dated 01 May 2010. This contention is not
tenable.

xxx xxx xxx

A scrutiny of the two (2) Affidavits of Adverse

Claim reveals that they are two (2) entirely
separate adverse claims. The Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated 01 May 2010 is
dependent on the Deed of Sale allegedly
executed between CENTRAL REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
represented by its President. MANUEL G.
ABELLO and DOLORES V. MOLINA while
the Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated 21 May
2014 has its basis on the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 18 December 2013 allegedly
executed between DOLORES V. MOLINA and
SOLAR RESOURCES, INC..33

On this score, we refer to Rule 35 of the

Rules of Court on summary judgment:

SECTION 1. Summary judgment for

claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending
party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions
or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. -

The motion shall be served at least ten (10)
days before the time specified for the hearing.
The adverse party may serve opposing
affidavits, depositions, or admissions at
least three (3) days before the hearing. After
the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to
the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions speak of one common
requisite: a motion for summary judgment
ought to be filed.

Here, the trial court rendered summary

judgment motu proprio, sans any motion
from either of the parties. In Calubaquib v.
Republic,34 the Court set aside the
summary judgment for being rendered
without any motion filed by either of the
parties, thus:

In determining the genuineness of the issues,

and hence the propriety of rendering a
summary judgment, the court is obliged to
carefully study and appraise, not the tenor
or contents of the pleadings, but the facts
alleged under oath by the parties and/or
their witnesses in the affidavits that they
submitted with the motion and the
corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held
that, even if the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, a summary judgment
is proper so long as "the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by
the moving party show that such issues are
not genuine."

The filing of a motion and the conduct of a

hearing on the motion are therefore
important because these enable the court to
determine if the parties' pleadings, affidavits
and exhibits in support of or against, the
motion are sufficient to overcome the
opposing papers and adequately justify the
finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is
clearly meritorious or there is no defense to
the action. The non-observance of the
procedural requirements of filing a motion
and conducting a hearing on the said motion
warrants the setting aside of the summary
judgment. (Emphasis ours)

The assailed summary judgment here ought

to be set aside, as well, for being itself
violative of the rules on summary judgment
and relevant jurisprudence. For not only was
the requisite motion conspicuously absent,
the parties were not even heard on the
propriety of rendering a summary judgment
in the case, thus, violating their right to due
process.

In Diona v. Balangue,35 citing Development

Bank of the Philippines v. Teston,36 the
Court ruled that there was non-observance
of due process when a relief was granted by
the trial court which was not being sought
by the parties, thus:

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief

not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess
of what is being sought by the party. They
cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in
support thereof. Due process considerations
require that judgments must conform to and
be supported by the pleadings and evidence
presented in court. In Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Teston, this Court
expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this
requirement. It is improper to enter an order
which exceeds the scope of relief sought by
the pleadings, absent notice which affords
the opposing party an opportunity to be
heard with respect to the proposed relief.
The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint
must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the award of 5%

monthly interest rate is not supported both
by the allegations in the pleadings and the
evidence on record. The Real Estate
Mortgage executed by the parties does not
include any provision on interest. When
petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC,
she alleged that respondents borrowed from
her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon
at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or pray
for the disputed 5% monthly interest.
Neither did she present evidence nor testified
thereon. Clearly, the RTC's award of 5%
monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks
basis and disregards due process. It violated
the due process requirement because
respondents were not informed of the
possibility that the RTC may award 5%
monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present
controverting evidence as they were made to
believe that the complainant [petitioner] was
seeking for what she merely stated in her
Complaint. (Emphasis supplied)

In Macias v. Macias,37 the Court declared

that there was failure to observe due process
in the course of the proceeding of the case
when the trial court, after denying the
motion to dismiss, immediately proceeded to
allow the presentation of evidence ex parte
and resolved the case with undue haste even
when under the Rules, answer can still be
filed by the other party.

As in Diona and Macias, the trial court here

acted with undue haste, nay, unprocedural
tact, when it lumped altogether, in one single
stroke, its dispositions on the pending
incidents and summary judgment through
its assailed omnibus resolution. None of the
parties sought summary judgment in the
case; nor did they seem to expect it to be
rendered motu proprio and at the time when
several incidents had yet to be resolved by
the court. This equates to denial of due
process resulting in the nullity of the
summary judgment. A decision is void for
lack of due process if, as a result, a party is
deprived of the opportunity of being
heard.38 The rules of procedure are
designed to ensure a fair, orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases; however,
the rules are not meant to allow hasty
judgments at the price of grave injustice.39
True, Section 70 of PD 1529 speaks of
speedy hearing in a petition for cancellation
of adverse claim, thus:

Section 70. Adverse Claim. - Whoever claims

any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to,

and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and a place at which all notices
may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse
claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration. After the
lapse of said period, the annotation of
adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing
of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based
on the same ground shall be registered by
the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any

party in interest may file a petition in the
Court of First Instance where the land is
situated for the cancellation of the adverse
claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of tile validity of
such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If
the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
tire registration thereof shall be ordered
cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after
notice and hearing, shall find that the
adverse claim thus registered was frivolous,
it may fine the claimant in an amount not
less than one thousand pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before
the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the
Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that
effect. (Emphasis ours)

But speedy hearing should not be done with

undue haste, let alone, in violation of due
process and utter disregard of the rules.

The Court has no jurisdiction to declare

petitioner here and now as the lawful owner
of the property.

Petitioner invokes the Court's jurisdiction to

finally settle the long standing issue of
ownership over the property by declaring it
as its true owner. This is for the purpose of
putting a closure to all the pending cases
involving conflicting ownership claims
allegedly emanating from Molina's
dispositions.
The argument utterly lacks basis. As
petitioner itself asserts, various cases are
pending before different courts on conflicting
ownership claims over the property. These
courts have acquired jurisdiction over these
cases and this jurisdiction stays with them
until these cases shall have been finally
terminated. For sure, the Court cannot, by
petitioner's plea, simply wrest this
jurisdiction from the lower courts. For
jurisdiction is vested by law alone.

The petition for cancellation of adverse claim

should be consolidated with the main case
involving the issue of ownership

Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court

allows consolidation of actions involving a
common question of fact or law, thus:

SECTION 1. Consolidation. - When actions

involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters
in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay.

In Deutsche Bank AG v. Court of Appeals,40

the Court Citing Steel Corporation of the
Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.41
laid down the requisites for consolidation of
actions, viz.:

Similarly, jurisprudence has laid down the

requisites for consolidation. In the recent
case of Steel Corporation of the Philippines
v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. the Court held
that "it is a time-honored principle that when
two or more cases involve the same parties
and affect closely related subject matters,
they must be consolidated and jointly tried,
in order to serve the best interests of the
parties and to settle expeditiously the issues
involved. In other words, consolidation is
proper wherever the subject matter involved
and relief demanded in the different suits
make it expedient for the court to determine
all of the issues involved and adjudicate the
rights of the parties by hearing the suits
together."

As heretofore shown, the petition for

cancellation of adverse claim in Civil Case No.
P-14-0163 and Civil Case No. 13-130626
involve closely related issues affecting the
same parties and property. Hence,
consolidation of these cases is proper for
judicious and expedient disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Omnibus Resolution dated
May 30, 2016 and Resolution dated January
3, 2017 in Civil Case No. P-14-0163 are
affirmed except for the summary judgment
borne therein which is reversed and set
aside. The case is ORDERED REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 16
for CONSOLIDATION with Civil Case No. 13-
130626 before the Regional Trial Court-
Manila, Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice,

(Chairperson), Gesmundo, Lopez, and
Rosario,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated as additional member per S.O.

No. 2797 dated November 5, 2020.

1 Rollo, pp. 123-125.

2 Id. at 126-133.

3 Id. at 1206.

4 Id. at 9-11.

5 Id. at 9.
6 Id. at 1206.

7 Id. at 1326-1333.

8 Id. at 1271-1275.

9 Id. at 1122-1124.

10 Id. at 1286.

11 Id. at 1207.

12 Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C.

Cruz and concurred in by Presiding Justice
Romeo F. Braza and Associate Justice
Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, id. at
1577-1586.

13 Id. at 378-408.

14 Id. at 436-444.

15 Id. at 445-458.
16 Id. at 84-86, 92-96.

17 Id. at 97.

18 Id. at 98.

19 Id. at 81-110.

20 Id. at 109-110.

21 Id. at 111-115.

22 G.R. No. 236173, March 4, 2020.

23 Samson v. Gabor, 739 Phil. 429, 437

(2014).

24 Daswani v. Banco De Oro Universal Bank,

765 Phil. 88, 97 (2015).

25 Sps. Peralta v. Heirs of Bernardino

Abalon, 737 Phil. 310, 331 (2014).
26 678 Phil. 1, 51 (2011).

27 Basbas v. Sayson, 671 Phil. 662, 682

(2011).

28 Tan v. De la Vega, 519 Phil. 515, 522

(2006).

29 Philippine National Bank v. Aznar, 664

Phil. 461, 473 (2011).

30 Rollo, p. 103.

31 Id.

32 Id. at 105.

33 Id. at 107-108.

34 Calubaquib v. Republic, 667 Phil. 653,

662-663 (2011).

35 701 Phil. 19, 31-33 (2013).

36 569 Phil. 137 (2008).

37 457 Phil. 463, 470 (2003).

38 Id. at 471.

39 Bahia Shipping Services v. Mosquera,

467 Phil. 766, 768 (2004).

40 683 Phil. 80, 91 (2012).

41 649 Phil. 692 (2010).