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IRANIAN CYBER ARMY 2
Abstract
Iran is a master of asymmetrical military might, using terrorist proxies and less expensive
military equipment to balance out its adversaries' more sophisticated technological forces. Iran's
capacity to acquire or produce cutting-edge technology in practically every industry has been
however, requires just a rudimentary understanding of cyberspace and the capacity to access the
Internet. A cyber capability may be refined over time and enhanced by analyzing how it affects a
target, much like a traditional weapon of war. This paper discusses about IRAN CYBER ARMY
Introduction
Iran has learned the significance of establishing its own cyber capacity after being the target of
destructive cyberattacks in the past. Iran's usage of the internet has changed from being a tool for
internal data repression and management to much more relentless attacks on external targets. To
safeguard and isolate its networks, the government has been creating its own cybersecurity
software and internet infrastructure, it has also been honing its technological cyber capabilities as
a sort of irregular warfare against a stronger conventional U.S. military. In the past, Iran has
revealed in 2010 that the systems in Iran's nuclear centrifuges had been compromised by a
computer virus know as Stuxnet, which had damaged the machines physically and rendered them
inoperable. According to reports, the government of Isarel and United States collaborated to
create the Stuxnet malware. U.S. assets have seen an uptick in the intensity and length of assaults
coming from Iran since the revelation of the Stuxnet worm. Recent occurrences have stoked
Iranian Cyber Army: The Green Movement protests saw the presence of the Iranian Cyber
Army (ICA), which is said to have been formed in the late 2000’s. The ICA is infamous for
vandalsing the websites of Voice of America in 2011, Baidu in 2010, and Twitter in 2009.
Although highly visible, the defacements were not technically advanced and only somewhat
disruptive. The outfit allegedly works for the IRGC and targets Iranian opposition websites. ICA
and other Iranian APT’s appear to use similar methods, equipment, and practices. It's possible
IRANIAN CYBER ARMY 4
that some members of this nationalistic hacker collective eventually joined cybersecurity firms
government. According to Villeneuve et al. (2014), it is normal for patriotic hackers to go from
Dutch Security Firm: In one of security breaches in internet history, an Iranian hacker gained
access to Netherlands security firm Digi Notar and used it to falsely generate encryption
against U.S. banks website in September 2012 significantly interrupted their capacity to offer
any services to their clients. In summary the DDOS assaults made it exceedingly impossible for
the banks hit by the attacks to conduct any kind of online banking. The major American
institution, including Bank of America, Citi group, JP Morgan & Chase, and Wells Fargo were
all victims, many people think that these assaults happened as retribution for the sanctions that
Facebook & Twitter Attack: both Facebook and Twitter. 2009 saw the redirection of Twitter
website users to a page for a group posing as the Iranian Cyber Army. In 2018, Twitter declared
that 2,617 Iranian profiles had been deleted for participating in "malicious behavior." Facebook
said in May 2019 that it has deleted Instagram profiles, Facebook, organizations, and accounts
with ties to Iran. Social media networks might be used to plan cyberattacks even though a lot of
Iran has a strong cyber programme and can carry out cyberattacks on the US. Iran is at least
capable of launching assaults against vital US infrastructure that would temporarily impair it.
The advisory issued in reaction to the American military strike in Baghdad warned of the
possibility of cyber retribution. Furthermore, on this day, multiple American websites were
hacked and vandalized by hackers posing as representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
involvement of the Iranian government in this incident was not confirmed by CISA
globally recognized norms when Iranian cyber operations are consistently evaluated for legality.
Prior to adopting countermeasures, governments should evaluate the intention, breadth, and
Reference(s)
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/IF11406.pdf
Sam Cohen. (2019). Iranian Cyber Capabilities: Assessing the Threat to Israeli Financial and
Security Interests
https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Cyber3.1ENG_3-73-96.pdf
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26913.8.pdf
Zurich. (2019). Iranian Cyber- Activities in the context of regional rivalries and international
tensions
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/
pdfs/20190507_MB_HS_IRN%20V1_rev.pdf
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