Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order

Indonesia’s Ascent
Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order
Edited by
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of New South Wales - PalgraveConnect - 2015-07-25
Christopher B. Roberts
University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Australia
Ahmad D. Habir
Strategic Asia, Indonesia
Leonard C. Sebastian
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
10.1057/9781137397416 - Indonesia's Ascent, Edited by Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian
Editorial matter and selection © Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and
Leonard C. Sebastian 2015
Chapters © Contributors 2015
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identiﬁed
as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndsmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 6XS
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has
companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries
ISBN: 978-1-137-39740-9
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Contents
List of Figures and Table xii
Acknowledgements xiii
Notes on Contributors xv
List of Acronyms and Glossary xviii
1 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual 1
Foundations
Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian
Conceptual foundations: The nature of power and influence 3
in international relations
Book structure 9
Notes 15
Bibliography 19
2 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and 22
Global Role, 1945–75
Sue Thompson
Nationalism, revolution and independence 22
Guided democracy 24
Konfrontasi (Confrontation) 26
The New Order 29
Conclusion 34
Notes 35
Bibliography 38
3 The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All 40
Satish Mishra
Setting the stage: The polity 40
Indonesia and emerging international perspectives on 41
development policy
Indonesia: The economy in the midst of systemic transition 44
Indonesia: Taking the economic pulse 46
Post-election development policy in Indonesia 60
Conclusion 62
Notes 64
Bibliography 66
vii
viii Contents
4 Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National 69

Stability, and Economic Development in Indonesia
Mark S. Williams
Introduction 69
Islam in the republic: National stability and economic 70
development
Islam as a revolutionary force and the discourse of a 76
revisionist state
Democratic stability, economic development, and an Islamic 81
ethics during the SBY era, 2004–14
Conclusion 86
Notes 87
Bibliography 90
5 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and 93
New Challenges
Bob Lowry
Introduction 93
The utility of violence 94
Militant Islam 94
Communism 95
Separatism 96
Aceh 96
Papua 96
Cathartic violence 97
TNI 98
Notes 106
Bibliography 109
6 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis: Implications 112
for Indonesia’s Continued Ascent
Stephen Sherlock
Introduction 112
A decade of democratic achievement 114
Indonesia’s third transition: A time of uncertainty 117
Stalled reform and policy paralysis 118
Failings of the party system and the 2014 election 119
Conclusion 124
Notes 126
Bibliography 128
7 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia: The Pursuit of 130
Strategic Autonomy
Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki
Introduction 130
Contents ix
Indonesia’s ongoing security landscape 130

Indonesia’s core interest and strategic approaches 133
Fundamental trends of Indonesia’s foreign policy 136
Indonesia’s defense policy direction 141
Conclusion 146
Notes 147
Bibliography 150
8 The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values 155
and Identity
Avery Poole
Introduction 155
A ‘more activist’ foreign policy 156
‘Democratic identity’ in foreign policy 157
International role 159
Regional role 160
Public opinion and democracy 163
‘Democratizing’ foreign policy 164
Challenges to the democratic image 165
Economic growth and inequality 167
Post-2014 foreign policy 168
Conclusion 169
Notes 170
Bibliography 173
9 Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New 177
Territory
Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir
Introduction 177
Independent and active foreign policy 179
The roles of the G-20, NAM, and the UN: The Indonesian 180
perspective
Challenges in implementing vision and policy 185
Indonesia and international institutions: Beyond symbolism 187
Notes 188
Bibliography 192
10 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and 195
Potential
Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir
The evolution of political and security relations 196
Causal dynamics: The roles of perceptions, knowledge, and trade 204
Policy implications and the ways forward 208
Notes 210
Bibliography 218
x Contents
11 The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation 224

between Indonesia and Australia?
Mark Beeson and Will Lee
Middle power theory and practice 225
Is Indonesia a middle power? 228
The evolving relationship 230
Competing interests 232
Still strange neighbors? 234
Concluding remarks 236
Notes 237
Bibliography 240
12 Key Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships: Opportunities and 244
Challenges
Yongwook Ryu
Introduction 244
Indonesia–Malaysia relations 245
Indonesia–Singapore relations 250
Indonesia–Vietnam relations 254
Conclusion 259
Notes 260
Bibliography 262
13 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and 264
Extra-Regional Diplomacy
Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih
Indonesia in intra-ASEAN conflict mediation and management 265
Indonesia as an agent of institutional and normative change 269
The global nexus between Indonesia’s ascent and ASEAN 273
Conclusion 277
Notes 279
Bibliography 283
14 Indonesia among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to 287
Indonesia?
See Seng Tan
Introduction 287
Indonesia rising: Domestic and external challenges 289
Relevance of hedging in a time of rebalancing 293
Frameworks for engaging the great powers 295
Multiple paths to Indonesia’s security 297
Conclusion: Indonesia driving and suffering the region? 299
Notes 299
Bibliography 304
Contents xi
15 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, 308

Maritime Security and the Great Powers
Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made
Andi Arsana
Introduction 308
Archipelagic Outlook: The evolution of a concept 309
Archipelagic sea lanes, maritime boundaries, and choke-points 312
How to designate East–West sea lanes 314
Sharing the ocean: Anticipating Indonesia’s completion of 318
maritime boundary delimitation
Maritime security and defense conundrums 322
Conclusion: Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook 324
Notes 327
Bibliography 331
16 ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, 335
and Emerging Power Aspirations
Leonard C. Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts
Notes 345
Bibliography 346
Index 348
4
Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim
Democracy, National Stability, and
Economic Development in Indonesia
Mark S. Williams
Introduction
Conceptualizing Indonesia’s ascent toward great power status in Asia

requires consideration of the role Islam will play in shaping Indonesian
politics. Although the identities of Islam in Indonesia remain as varied as
ever, since the final decade of Suharto’s rule there has been a general
increase in the level of religiosity expressed in the public sphere. How these
dynamics will shape Indonesia’s ascent is a source of concern to some
observers. Some cite the rise of the transnational jihadist movement and
probable Indonesian connections as a threat to both the secular Indonesian
constitution, and to regional and international order.1 Others are more
worried about governments of Muslim majority nations compensating for
economic and political weaknesses through a rhetorical depiction of them-
selves as ‘defenders of the faith’, appealing to crass populist sentiments of
xenophobia, intolerance, and authoritarianism.2 Since the discontent of
the Asian Financial Crisis swept away the institutions of dictatorship, ush-
ering in demokrasi and reformasi, the political culture of Islam in Indonesia
has not embraced the revolutionary Islamic movements that have arisen,
nor has this political culture of Islam acquiesced to the temptation to cloak
aggressive and violent politics of the state in the language of Islam.
During the early 21st century, as well as historically, Islamic ethics and
Islamic identity have instead been embedded within the twin Indonesian
goals of stabilitas nasional (national stability) and pembangunan ekonomi
(economic development). While the political culture of Islam in the
Republic has, for the most part, recognized a resonance between Islam and
the two seminal goals of the state, the continued coexistence of Islam and
the state is not assured indefinitely. Developmental setbacks, financial
volatility, and even trends in global politics have the potential to delegit-
imize an Indonesian government that is cooperative with international
society. Such threats to the development of Indonesia’s economy and its
domestic stability might yet alter prevailing interpretations of Islam among
69
70 Yudhoyono’s Third Way
the major Islamic organizations and parties over the next 20 years, placing
these organizations in tension with the Indonesian government. However,
the early experiences of a democratic Indonesia suggest that Islam will con-
tinue to act as an important social force that is pushing the Republic
toward greater national stability and the development of its economy.
This chapter will first briefly outline some of the dominant trends found
in the political culture of Islam in Indonesia during the late colonial
period, including the experiences of parliamentary democracy during the
1950s, Sukarno’s Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy), and then
the Orde Baru (New Order) of Suharto. After this context is provided, the
chapter will focus on the period of demokrasi and reformasi to show that
while Islam has been invoked by some revolutionary organizations that
espouse social and political change through violent confrontation, and
even by the Indonesian state to justify its own violent actions, the dom-
inant expression of Islam has been both an affirmation of stabilitas nasional
and of pembangunan ekonomi. The political stability of the Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (SBY) administration during the tumultuous years of the early
21st century was, in part, achieved through his appeal to an Islamic ethics
on the social foundations of Indonesia’s economic engagement and upon
national democracy.
Islam in the republic: National stability and economic

development
The Indonesian ‘national revival’ that occurred during the early

20th century in opposition to Dutch colonial rule was deeply connected to
a simultaneous ‘Islamic revival’ that was occurring amongst the abangan
(Indonesian Muslims who accept the relationship between Islam and the
cultural traditions of the archipelago) merchant class, which was discon-
tented over the interference of the colonial state in regional trade.3 In an
attempt to garner legitimacy among the peoples of the archipelago for its
deeply repressive colonial state, the Dutch instituted a putative ‘Ethical
Policy’ whereby a small proportion of the profits extracted from the
exploitative relationship was to be invested into colonial infrastructure and
human capital. What the Dutch did not count on was the rise of social
organizations that further pressured the colonial government through col-
lective action. Organizations dominated by abangan Muslims, desperate to
engage in regional trade without interference from Batavia, included Budi
Utomo (Highest Endeavour), founded in 1908, followed a year later by
Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah (Islamic Commercial Union—SDI). SDI inspired a
number of Islamic–socialist organizations, even the Partai Kommunis
Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party—PKI), which formed in 1924.
SDI became Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union—SI) and had as many as two
million members by 1912, the same year Muhammadiyah (the Way of the
Mark S. Williams 71
Prophet) was founded to inspire Muslims in the archipelago to embrace

modernization as a method of emancipation for the Muslim people of the
world. A number of traditionalist Islamic organizations mobilized to chal-
lenge the message of modernism preached by Muhammadiyah, the
most significant being Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival/Awakening of Religious
Scholars—NU) in 1926.
Although divided on the particulars regarding the role of Muslims in
society, this diverse milieu of Islamic groups was united in a spirit of
national revival. Despite these auspicious developments in Indonesian
organizational capacity, the national revival was unable to cast off Dutch
colonial government. In the aftermath of strikes organized by SI and the
PKI, the Dutch dissolved any pretense to representative government that
the ‘Ethical Policy’ might have begrudgingly recognized. Nationalist and
Islamic organizations did persist; some new ones were founded (Partai Islam
Indonesia—The Indonesian Islamic Party) alongside entirely nationalist
organizations, such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist
Party—PNI). The return to increasing levels of Dutch repressiveness, com-
bined with the contraction of international trade during the Great
Depression, amounted to a crushing destitution throughout the archipel-
ago during the final phase of Dutch rule (1927–42) that preceded the
arrival of the Empire of Japan.
The Japanese occupation (1942–5) represented a profound betrayal for
many Javanese, who anticipated abolition of colonial government under
the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ Instead, a brutal corvée system
corralled Indonesians into supplying the Empire’s war materials. The
Japanese sought not only to rule through direct coercion, but also by some
measure of social consent. Imperial policy involved pressuring Islamic
clerics to declare the Pacific War a jihad (holy war) thereby seeking to co-
opt the Muslims of the archipelago, establishing organizations such as the
Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian
Muslims). Though the council was banned by the Japanese before the war
came to its apocalyptic conclusion, it continued in Indonesia as the polit-
ical party known as Masjumi.
Anticipating their defeat, the Japanese occupation forces permitted polit-
ical mobilization in Java to thwart European and American attempts to
rebuild colonial government. With Japanese consent, the Badan Penyelidik
Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for
Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence—BPUPK) was formed in
March of 1945.4 The BPUPK acted as a forum between the golongan nasional
(national group) in Indonesian society, which included Sukarno and
Muhammad Hatta, and the golongan Islam (Islamic group), represented by
Masjumi and its party chairman Mohammad Natsir. Natsir had pushed for
constitutional inclusions prioritizing the importance of Islam at the BPUPK
conferences, such as eligibility for president being restricted to Muslims,
and an obligation to carry out Sharia. Sukarno and Hatta—abangan

Muslims themselves—harbored deep reservations on the specific inclusion
of Islam in the constitution. Their fear was rooted in the failure of the
strikes of the 1920s and that Islamic discourse might alienate non-Muslims
as well as abangan Muslims with nationalist, socialist, or communist affilia-
tions. The Islamic content was rejected by the Sukarno and Hatta-
controlled Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee
for Indonesian Independence) in August of 1945. Fearful that Muslim
support for an insurgency against the returning Dutch colonizers might
waiver, Sukarno and the Hatta offered establishment of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs (MORA) as a constitutional concession to Muslim groups.5
The most prominent Islamic organization to denounce the new constitu-
tion was Darul Islam (House of Islam—DI). DI, like Masjumi, represented a
coalition of Muslim militias formed by the Japanese to fight the Allied
forces in the event that Java or Sumatra became a theater of operations.
Distrusted by Sukarno and Hatta for their intransigence on Islamic law as
the foundation of government, DI existed outside the emerging Indonesian
body-politic. Alternatively, Masjumi accepted the new constitution, choos-
ing to support the decisions made by Sukarno and Hatta in August of 1945
for the sake of national stability and independence. Natsir even defended
the pancasila—Indonesia’s official creed of a non-sectarian, democratic and
unified nation—by focusing on the congruencies between the text and
Islamic teachings.6 He argued that pancasila’s keadilan sosial (social justice),
global humanism, and deliberative democracy are all in the same spirit as
Islam’s teachings of adala Ijtimaya (social justice), islahu baina’nnas (recon-
ciliation between peoples), and denunciations of istibdad (despotism).
Crucially, pancasila’s first principle of Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa (belief in
one God) was argued by Natsir to reflect the Islamic doctrine of tawhid,
belief in the indivisibility and oneness of God.
After the bloody, but ultimately successful, war for Indonesian indepen-
dence against the Dutch (1945–49), DI carved out a sphere of influence in
West Java, South Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Never achieving reconciliation
with Jakarta over the lack of Islamic law in the constitution, DI was drawn
into protracted conflict with the Indonesian military. Rejecting the revolu-
tionary politics of DI, Natsir steered Masjumi toward a much different set of
politics, one of peaceful engagement in the affairs of the Republic. The
liberal era that followed independence, known as ‘Parliamentary
Democracy’ (1950–57), ushered in a hopeful, if chaotic, era in Indonesia.
Although the Republic struggled to achieve a semblance of economic and
political independence, Natsir campaigned on a platform of national stabil-
ity and engagement with international society to facilitate development. In
‘The Aims of the Masjumi’, Natsir outlined the party’s ‘ideals of Islam’ as
representing a host of social justice issues, such as the abolition of tyranny
and exploitation, and, above all, the abolition of poverty.7 Of particular
Mark S. Williams 73
concern to Natsir was the faction of Indonesians, primarily the PKI, whom
he identified as ‘fanatics’, calling for an end to Indonesia’s relations with
the United States and for revolutionary action domestically and interna-
tionally. Natsir rejected revolutionary politics in favor of working toward a
‘harmonious social relationship’ between classes, and to resolve
political–economic tensions in accordance with the Islamic teaching of
‘mutual understanding between peoples’.8
Natsir’s speech at the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952 defended
a conciliatory approach to international relations during decolonization for
the Islamic world. Instead of deriding Western countries and institutions,
Natsir called upon Muslims to act magnanimously, embracing the ‘peace and
liberty’ of Islam.9 He denied that Western–Islamic tension is inherent to
either party, but argued that it is a product of historical encounters. Muslim
societies, according to Natsir, were suspicious of Western intentions because
of their colonial encounters in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia. The West was described by Natsir as experiencing difficulties
adapting to the profound changes occurring in the composition of an inter-
national society, the western mindset must be relaxed in order to foster con-
ditions for universal self-determination. Natsir expressed optimism that the
Cold War might draw the West and Islamic societies closer together, though
he also cautioned against a union born entirely out of Realpolitik. The West
and Islam must move beyond ‘such weak grounds’, acknowledging both
their commonalities and their differences, and build a new international
framework of respect and cooperation, rather than merely out of fear of the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.
This discourse of national stability and international cooperation struck a
chord with Indonesians during the parliamentary democracy of the 1950s.
Masjumi was appointed more seats than any other single party when the
People’s Representative Council (PRC) was appointed in 1950. Five years
later, when Indonesians went to the polls to elect the PRC, Masjumi
increased this number, finishing with as many seats as frontrunner PNI. It
was during the campaign for the 1955 election that the US State
Department identified Masjumi as the party best positioned to encourage
foreign investment, develop regional trade relations, and transform
Indonesia into ‘an important Asiatic power’.10
Masjumi’s hoped-for influence in government was not tolerated by
Sukarno. Two years after Indonesia’s first election, the PRC was suspended,
replaced by a Dewan Nasional (National Council) appointed by Sukarno
under the pretext of martial law. In May of 1957, parliamentary democracy
was over and the era of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) had
begun. Charging Masjumi, among others, with attempting to ‘build up cap-
italism’ in Indonesia led to the party being banned and a ‘Guided
Economy’ became the order of the day, ostensibly designed to break the
perceived dependencies of the colonial economy.11
While Sukarno set Indonesia on a radicalized course of economic nation-

alism and the divisive and turbulent revolutionary philosophy of romantik,
dialektik, and dynamisme (romanticism, dialectic conflict, and a spirited-
ness), Masjumi, forced out of meaningful government despite popular
support, also underwent a process of radicalization. Following the suspen-
sion of the PRC, Masjumi and Natsir were to develop an ambiguous rela-
tionship with the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of Indonesia—PRRI), an insurgent group
threatening to force the secession of Sumatra and challenging Sukarno’s
rule in the country.12 Masjumi and other prominent Islamic organizations
became increasingly radicalized during Guided Democracy as Sukarno
tightened his alignment with the PNI and, especially, the PKI. Few could
have predicted the extent of the violence that marked the end of Guided
Democracy and the beginning of the New Order between September 1965
and March 1966, and fewer still could have predicted the role Islamic or-
ganizations played in the accompanying brutality.
It was during the purge of the PKI—the scapegoat for the attempted coup
against the military command in Jakarta in 1965—when the army, working
with Islamic militias, killed approximately 500,000 civilians. The killings
defy easy characterization: the violence spiraled out of Java and into Bali,
Sumatra, and Kalimantan. Those targeted included the PKI, the leftists of
the PNI, the Balinese, and ethnic Chinese. A clear dynamic of the purge
involved the targeting of the abangan by the santri—typically urbanized
orthodox Muslims—and the culpability of some of the most important
Islamic organizations in the Republic. Tempted by vague offers to return to
government, as well as the petty and hard-hearted offer of settling old
scores, NU, the Muhammadiyah, and remnants of Masjumi collaborated
with the army in the horrific massacre of their fellow Indonesians.13
Headed by the obscure reserve army general Suharto, the New Order
(1966–98) that replaced Guided Democracy had little intention of allowing
Islamic organizations a direct role in the politics of national government.
However, the New Order regime did not want to alienate Islamic organiza-
tions or to offend Islamic sensibilities the way that Sukarno did. Instead,
Suharto tried to manage a religious dirigisme of state-controlled Islam. It
represented an attempt to extract legitimacy from civil society for the New
Order, as well as a wary act of containment to prevent Islam aligning itself
against the government in Jakarta.
To foment national stability in domestic politics, Suharto relied on two
dominant social forces.14 The first constellation of social forces that the
New Order was built upon has been described as the ukhuwah wathaniyah,
or, ‘national brotherhood’. This included the secular–nationalist fixtures of
Indonesian society and state institutions such as the army, the remnants of
PNI, and the freshly empowered technocrats the New Order deployed to
Mark S. Williams 75
direct economic development. The second constellation of social forces used

by the New Order was the ukhuwwah Islamiyah, the Islamic brotherhood.15
Islamic organizations were tolerated by the state as long as they held the
1945 pancasila as their asas tunggal (sole foundation). Though Partai Golkar,
representing the ukhuwah wathaniyah, easily won majorities in the rigged
parliamentary elections of Suharto’s 30-year reign, the party that always
came in second was the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United
Development Party—PPP), a moderate Islamic party affiliated with NU
until the 1980s. Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, NU, accepted pan-
casila, and the organization’s chairman and future president of Indonesia,
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), much like Natsir before him, defended the
religious basis of pancasila. MORA—the concession to Islamic representa-
tion created by Sukarno and Hatta—was to become a major source of
Islamic support for the New Order, as was the affiliated Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council—MUI). The Islamic Students
Organization, or Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), based in the region of
Yogyakarta, argued on behalf of the regime that political passivity was a
requirement of Sunni Islam. Its proponents even generated one of the
quintessential slogans of the New Order, which still resonates in Indonesia
today: ‘Islam, yes, Partai Islam, no’. In 1969 Suharto also ensured that
Indonesia was a founding member of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), despite the Republic not being an Islamic state. Sensing
an increasing Islamization underway in Indonesia during what was to be
the final decade of the New Order, Suharto enacted a number of laws and
commenced several projects to enhance the role of Islam in society. These
laws covered education, religious courts, charities, headscarves, gambling,
banking, preaching, and the promotion of Islamic festivals.
The religious dirigisme of the New Order was not entirely successful at
co-opting Islam. Established in 1990, the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim
se-Indonesia (ICMI), or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, was
interpreted as being too embedded within the state’s political institutions
to garner much credibility among Muslims.16 Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s
oldest Islamic organization, thought that the continued ban on Masjumi
constituted a serious betrayal of the revolution that swept Sukarno from
power. It maintained a cool détente with the New Order: the regime did not
dare to act aggressively toward Muhammadiyah, and in turn Muhammadiyah
was careful not to antagonize the regime.17 Some observers note that the
chief expression of passive resistance toward the New Order was through
Islamic discourse.18
The twin goals of the New Order—national stability and economic devel-
opment—were substantially achieved by a regime that lasted for three
decades. However, Suharto’s grip on power could not withstand the eco-
nomic catastrophe of the Asian Financial Crisis. In the ensuing political
instability, Indonesia’s Islamic organizations—which had previously been

pacified by the New Order—now mobilized into a revolutionary fervor that
ushered in a new political era for the Republic.
Islam as a revolutionary force and the discourse of a revisionist

state
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) reflected on how the events
surrounding the Asian Financial Crisis posed a palpable ‘ancaman disinte-
grasi’ (threat of disintegration) in the history of the Republic. Constituting
‘terjadi guncangan politik’ (political shocks) and ‘guncangan sosial’ (social
shocks), with the possibility of ‘keamanan dan ketertiban’ (security and
order) becoming totally lost.19 Outside observers similarly forecasted a
possible turn to anarchy as the Republic broke down, prompting one
prominent commentator on Indonesia to declare that the Republic was
potentially ‘in Flames’.20
The general consensus is that the Islamic world began to experience an
‘Islamic revivalism’ by the late 1970s that has continued into the early
21st century, and that the same general trend has been identified in
Indonesia.21 During this time, Suharto tried to convince a skeptical public
on the role of Islam in his policies, as noted above, but he also tried to con-
vince the public of the centrality of Islam in his private life, such as under-
taking the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and adopting the honorific title of
Haji. Regardless of this, Suharto’s religious dirigisme did not enable him to
escape the outpouring of anger and discontent in the spring of 1998, much
of it mobilized by formerly passive Islamic organizations. The heads of NU,
Muhammadiyah, and even MUI and the ICMI demanded Suharto’s resigna-
tion, while protests swept throughout secular and Islamic civil society alike,
with much of the organization occurring at universities and mosques.22
Suharto finally resigned on 20 May and was succeeded by his Vice-
President, B. J. Habibie, who served as President between May of 1998 until
October 1999. Sensing the new salience of Islam in the politics of the
Republic, Habibie approached the 1999 election in a re-branded Golkar that
was to represent a merger between the New Order’s ukhuwah wathaniyah
and the ukhuwwah Islamiyah. Golkar was now to feature a number of leaders
from the Islamic HMI in key roles, and to appeal to an Islamic identity in
addition to Suharto’s historic national identity.23
The months surrounding the Asian Financial Crisis also witnessed a revi-
sionist state attempt to appropriate Islam as a vehicle for justifying mil-
itarism and expansionist policies. In 1999, while fighting against a
secessionist movement in Ambon, an aide to a minister in the Habibie
administration used the pro-Suharto Islamist group Komite Indonesia untuk
Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the
Islamic World—KISDI) to call for a jihad against Christians in the islands.24
Mark S. Williams 77
In East Timor, the revolutionary events on Java encouraged nationalist

leaders once again to push for independence, something that was almost
achieved in the mid-1970s. After the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian
Armed Forces—TNI) were deployed by President Habibie, some of the state
discourse took an Islamist turn, bitterly deriding the predominately animist
and Catholic Timorese. Abilio Soares, the Indonesian governor of East
Timor, ordered the killing of religious community leaders, including priests
and nuns.25 The Indonesian public remained unconvinced of Jakarta’s pro-
paganda to cloak the attacks in East Timor in the language of Islam, and
Habibie was pressured into allowing for a referendum on independence,
thus alienating even his sole remaining supporters, the TNI.
The state’s attempts to co-opt Islam for a revisionist agenda have been
mostly limited to the period immediately following the Asian Financial
Crisis, as the Muslim public have been largely unpersuasive. The greater
threat to Indonesian public safety was the rise of extremist Islamic parties
and organizations. These organizations sought to use violence to achieve
transformation of the nation’s political institutions, or to capitalize on the
emergent political liberalization by attaining electoral victory and rewriting
pancasila to mandate fundamentalist Islamic culture.
One such Islamic organization that attempted to expand its power and
influence over the period of reformasi was Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic
Congregation—JI). The ideological successor to DI, JI was founded in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in the 1990s when Abdullah Sungkar met
with al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin Laden, and made a ‘bay’a’
(pledge of allegiance).26 Inspired by contemporary jihadists such as bin
Laden and al Zawahiri, and especially by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, JI
committed itself to transforming Indonesian society, which the group
derided as wallowing in jahiliyya (the age of ignorance). In seeking to
accomplish this goal, JI created both clandestine cells of jihadists, as well as
a public NGO, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahideen Council of
Indonesia—MMI). Another prominent group formed during the reformasi
period is the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defense Front—FPI), also Islamic
revisionists who disdain the influence of liberalism in the country, and are
intolerant of the Ahmadiyya of Indonesia. JI was responsible for the Bali
bombing of 2002, which claimed over 200 lives, as well as a series of other
much smaller bombings, and FPI has been responsible for thuggish
violence directed at some of the more vulnerable religious and ethnic
minority groups of Java, in addition to attacking socialists and religious
rights activists. Despite the political and economic volatility of the late
1990s and early 2000s, groups such as JI and the FPI were kept to the
margins of Indonesia’s political culture, and proved to be inconsequential
in the coming elections.
Over 50 parties participated in the 1999 parliamentary election:
21 parties won seats in the MPR and five parties in particular won a
significant number of seats. The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan

(Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle—PDIP) secured the most seats
(153), with Golkar claiming 120 seats. The PPP finished third with 58 seats,
while the NU-backed Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening
Party—PKB) and the Muhammadiyah-inspired Partai Amanat Nasional
(National Mandate Party—PAN) won 51 and 34 seats respectively.
The frontrunner in 1999, the PDIP, was headed by Megawati
Sukarnoputri, and was one of the most definitively secular parties compet-
ing for seats. The runner-up, Golkar, had attempted to re-badge itself with
linkages to some of the late New Order Muslim organizations, but
remained a secular party. The most politically successful Islamic parties
appealed to an Islamic ethics of cooperation and development rather than
revolution. The PPP, no longer under the watchful gaze of New Order
dirigisme, became a much more overtly Islamic party under Hamzah Haz.
Although the PPP did publicly question pancasila as the sole foundation of
any recognized organization in Indonesia, it continued to defend pancasila
as the ideological foundation of the state.27 PAN and the PKB rooted their
politics in Islamic ethics, but rarely used a populist version that appealed to
anger or xenophobia.28 Instead, both parties emphasized the central
importance of democracy for the future of the Republic and cautioned
against an overtly Islamicized state. The PKB made special note of tolerance
in Indonesian society and Islam, and PAN warned Indonesian society not
to reject capitalism blindly in response to the Asian Financial Crisis. An
Indonesian branch of the Ikhwan known at the time as the ‘Justice Party’
campaigned on a platform of Sharia: it performed miserably, winning less
than 2 per cent of the popular vote and losing its party status.
The MPR’s election of Abdurrahman Wahid, or, ‘Gus Dur’, as he is popu-
larly known, was secured through an alliance between Golkar and the
Islamic parties, but only lasted from October 1999 to July 2001. As former
chairman of NU and leader of the PKB, Gus Dur brought to the presidency
an understanding of Islam that far surpassed Habibie, Suharto, or Sukarno.
Gus Dur’s political legitimacy was more intrinsically linked to his status as
a Muslim than any of his predecessors since Natsir in the early 1950s. For
two decades Gus Dur had publicly aired his skepticism regarding those who
ascribed social perfection to Sharia. He had become convinced that Sharia
had been corrupted by the political ambitions and interests of Middle
Eastern jurists and had departed from the moral and ethical teachings of
the Quran, justifying heinous institutions such as slavery. Rather than
introducing Sharia into the formal legal institutions of Indonesia, Gus Dur
propounded that the substance of Islam can be integrated into the Republic
through policies of social justice.29
Investigations into Gus Dur’s cabinet—as well as allegations surrounding
unrecovered millions from the National Food Logistics Agency and the rev-
elation of a $2 million campaign donation from the Sultan of Brunei—
Mark S. Williams 79
caused a precipitous decline in legitimacy for his presidency. This loss of

legitimacy quickly swelled into betrayal when Gus Dur demanded that SBY
declare a state of emergency, which SBY prudently refused to do, and SBY
was subsequently fired for his lack of cronyism. After Gus Dur attempted to
dissolve parliament, the MPR enthusiastically passed a vote of impeach-
ment. After a final defiant standoff with parliament, Gus Dur resigned and
left the country for medical treatment in the United States.
Gus Dur’s successor, Megawati, was able to retain the presidency for a
longer period (July 2001–October 2004). However, she was similarly unable
to bring political stability to Indonesia. She earned the confidence of the
MPR primarily through the ‘tenang’ (quiet/soft) style of politics she had
built around herself and the PDIP. However, subsequent events in late 2001
made it a very challenging environment for a quiet style of politics to
govern a Muslim-majority country.
The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the public debate
over the legitimacy of jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda represented a
significant crisis over the political culture of Islam in Indonesia. Megawati
aligned herself very closely with the United States in the immediate after-
math of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (9/11). She was the first
head of state from Southeast Asia to visit Washington and pledged
Indonesian support for what was eventually to be known as the Global War
on Terror. Megawati’s discursive support did nothing to translate into
material support for the Global War on Terror. Furthermore, it did not
appear to affect existing Indonesian public opinion, as US foreign policy
already had a deeply radicalizing effect on Indonesian Muslim extremist
groups. Megawati’s adversarial vice-president, PPP leader Haz, depicted the
9/11 hijackers as martyrs and expressed a sense of joy in the attacks. Not
surprisingly, some Islamist groups, such as the FPI, pronounced fatwas
(decrees) of jihad against the United States. Even the MUI pronounced an
ambiguous fatwa on defending Islamic territory.30 In late 2001, and then
again a year later, the Center for the Study of Islam and Society at the State
Islamic University polled Indonesian public opinion on the extent to
which they supported Islamic government for Indonesia. They also polled
Indonesian society on the extent to which Islamist groups who believe in
the introduction of Sharia should be supported. The polling revealed that
approximately two-thirds of respondents agreed that Islamic government
would be best for Indonesia, and approximately half of the respondents
agreed that Islamist groups (such as JI) attempting to implement Sharia
should be supported.31
It is important to note that this discontent, expressed through Islamic
discourse, was not entirely a reaction against the perceived injustices of the
Bush administration. It also arose from profound disillusionment with the
discernible lack of economic fairness in Indonesian society, and a sense
that the institutions of the state were arrayed against the common people.
The afflictions of ‘Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme’ (Corruption, Collusion,

and Nepotism—KKN) radicalized Indonesia after the Asian Financial Crisis
and caused distrust between Indonesian society and a combination of the
state, multinational corporations, and even world order. During a three-
year period between 2001 and 2003, during which approximately 80 per
cent of respondents identified either high prices or lack of employment as
the largest problems facing society, KKN proved an effective framing of
what was not working during a time of democracy and reform.32 It was this
discontent over KKN that caused Indonesia’s Muslims to turn toward Sharia
as an alternative model rooted in Islamic social justice.33
Despite the rising sentiment of Islamic identity and the trend to express
discontent through an Islamic alternative to the status quo, the PPP, PKB,
and PAN refrained from running an overtly Islamic campaign on Sharia in
2004. These parties instead continued to run on a campaign of Islamic
ethics, including pluralism and social justice. The Islamic parties, however,
did begin to question Indonesia’s relationship with global capitalism and
foreign influences that did not share the same Islamic ethics. The Ikhwan-
inspired Justice Party resurfaced as the newly constituted Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party—PKS); but, having learned its lesson in
1999, it avoided discussion of Sharia and instead focused on the message of
social justice expressed by its Egyptian founder, Hasan al-Banna.
During the years between 2001 and 2004, the most significant Islamic
organizations not only refrained from tapping into the ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ sentiment that was influencing mainstream public debate in
Indonesia, but they actively opposed it. Both Muhammadiyah and NU
worked aggressively to denounce the xenophobia of the FPI and the violent
ideology of JI. NU went furthest in establishing a new organization, the
Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network—JIL), that could speak
directly to alienated Muslim youth. JIL articles from the period recognized
the various injustices the ummah are experiencing around the world, but
urged Indonesians not to allow the policies of the Bush administration to
cause bigotry toward the American public, recognizing that Western and
Islamic traditions overlap significantly. Above all, groups such as JIL
warned Indonesia’s Muslims against betraying Islam itself by accepting the
use of violence against people, or in promoting the overthrow of a state.
The 2004 elections saw Golkar and the PDIP become the two major
parties, followed by the Islamic parties (PPP, PKB, PAN, and the reinvented
PKS). Added to the typical milieu of post-Suharto Indonesian politics was
the Demokrat party, a secular–centrist party headed by SBY that was
founded upon a mixture of progressive conservatism and commitment to
cooperation with the liberal international order. In the first direct elections
for president since reformasi began, SBY and his running mate Jusuf Kalla
won the most votes after the first round of voting in 2004 (33.6 per cent of
the popular vote), and then secured a second-round majority (60.6 per cent
Mark S. Williams 81
of the popular vote). SBY was able to maintain his legitimacy enough to
serve his entire first term (2004–2009) and he won a second term in 2009,
bringing a period of relative political stability to Indonesia not experienced
since the New Order.
Democratic stability, economic development, and an Islamic

ethics during the SBY era, 2004–14
The national stability of the SBY era in Indonesia has been unique in post-
reformasi Indonesia. His first term in office was bookended by two crises
that threatened to radicalize society. First was the insurgency in Iraq
against the US occupation that had escalated into ethnic cleansing and
civil war by February of 2006; and secondly, the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis. During this tumultuous period, the two central goals of the SBY
administration had been ‘pembangunan ekonomi’ and national stability
achievable through ‘benar membangun demokrasi’ (building a strong demo-
cracy).34 Underlying both of these policies has been an appeal to Islamic
ethics, first on international engagement to facilitate economic develop-
ment, and secondly, on the link between the foundations of democracy
and Islam.
SBY’s policies for economic development have been one of engagement
with the international economy. SBY has stated that his administration
had been ‘determined to make foreign direct investments the engine of our
economic growth’ and to make Indonesia into a ‘more active participant in
international cooperation and partnership building’.35 In addition to
encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI), SBY also cooperated exten-
sively with international institutions, such as ASEAN and, especially after
the Global Financial Crisis, the G-20. The public has not been naïve about
Indonesia’s relationship with external market forces after the Asian
Financial Crisis, or more recently with the Global Financial Crisis. In
polling conducted in 2005, over 60 per cent of respondents recorded that
they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with SBY’s policies on devel-
opment, and over 70 per cent of respondents were dissatisfied or very dis-
satisfied with his policies on inflation and employment.36 In 2008 and
again in 2010, over 80 per cent of Indonesians identified inflation or unem-
ployment as the greatest problem facing the country.37 SBY’s message to
Indonesians to convince them of the benefits of integrating with economic
globalization represented an appeal not only to realpolitik, but also to
identity.
The defining benchmark for Indonesian foreign policy is Hatta’s 1948
speech ‘Mendayung di antara Dua Karang’ (Rowing between Two Reefs), in
which he affirms that a republican Indonesia free of colonial control will be
guided in its foreign relations by a framework that is ‘bebas dan aktif’
(independent and active). The context of bebas dan aktif was one of a
commitment to the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch, but also an

assurance that an independent Indonesia would engage peacefully in diplo-
matic relations with international society. The Cold War rivalry was also an
important dimension to the context of bebas dan aktif, with the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acting as the two reefs
threatening to sink Indonesia.38
SBY updated the doctrine of bebas dan aktif for the early 21st century. No
longer should Indonesia fear superpower reefs, but instead, it must navigate
the ‘bergolak’ (turbulent) waters of globalization.39 The volatilities of eco-
nomic globalization are the new challenges to Indonesia’s economic
growth and national stability. Though Indonesia came out of the 2008
Financial Crisis relatively unscathed, this turbulent ocean had an earlier
devastating impact on Indonesian society during the late 1990s. The conse-
quences of another financial crisis will persist as a cause of worry for any
Indonesian government. Indonesia, cautioned SBY, ‘must resist and
prevent the pernicious effects of globalization, which is against our
national interest, which is against our values’.40
SBY argued that Indonesia’s navigation of the turbulent waters of global-
ization is, at least partially, facilitated by virtue of its Islamic values. Foreign
policy is an extension of Indonesia’s ‘kepentingan nasional’ (national inter-
ests), but also its ‘nilai-nilai dasar’ (basic values), ‘prinsip-prinsip’ (principles),
‘falsafah’ (philosophy) and ‘sejarah’ (history).41 Echoing Suharto, SBY
described an Islamic ‘jiwa dan semangat’ (soul and spirit) of the nation that
encourages Indonesia toward foreign relations. Although Indonesia, and
the Islamic world more broadly, is struggling with a ‘challenge of peace’
brought on by globalization, SBY has attempted to instill in Indonesians a
sense of confidence rooted in their religious identity. In a speech to open
an NU-sponsored conference in Jakarta, he posited that the ‘fellowship
through zakat (the obligation of charity as stipulated by the pillars of
Islam), shadaqah (charity for a return or protection), infaq (charity without
any expectation of return), and waqf (donation of land for charitable pur-
poses)’, are evidence that Islamic values can mitigate the injustices and the
inequities that globalization can bring. SBY observed that historically,
Muslims were ‘among the first globalizers’ and declared his belief ‘that
Muslims can learn to be at the forefront of globalism’.42
This expression of Islam as a domain of both international cooperation
and a filter for managing social justice in a context of economic globaliza-
tion is not simply a product of the SBY administration. Suharto tried to
articulate a similar discourse, and so did Masjumi during the period of
Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy. Another prominent example of this
political culture of Islam is found in the ‘Jakarta Declaration Upholding
Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin’, released at the 2004 International Conference
of Islamic Scholars. The document propounded Islam to represent ‘bless-
ings for the universe’ and its ‘norms and teachings oblige all the ummah to
deem peace (salam), justice (adalah), freedom (hurriyyah), moderation
Mark S. Williams 83
(tawassuth), tolerance (tasamuh), balance (tawazun), consultation (shura)

and equity (musawah) as fundamental to our way of life’.43 The majority of
the 21 articles of the declaration stress the importance of international
cooperation, and seven of the articles specifically discuss the economy. One
article includes the obligation of Muslims to ‘work hard’ in the ‘pursuit of
prosperity’ and ‘the obligation to eradicate poverty’. Another article
emphasizes ‘the promotion of Islamic economic practices and international
cooperation so that they can actively participate and effectively compete in
the current and future global economy’.44
The second pillar of national stability during the SBY era has been the
administration’s appeal to the democratic values of the Indonesian people
finally becoming manifest in state institutions. SBY communicated that
democracy represents the ‘kebenaran atas pilihan rakyat kami’ (the truth that is
the choice of people) and its ‘mekarnya’ (flowering) in Indonesia will bring
both ‘kebebasan’ (freedom) and ‘pemenuhan hak-hak asasi manusia’ (the
fulfilment of human rights). Democracy, much like Indonesia’s interdepen-
dence in relation to FDI and the international political economy, is not a
dimension of Indonesian political culture that should be taken for granted.
Indonesia underwent an unsuccessful early experiment with democracy after
independence, and then experienced approximately four decades of author-
itarian rule under which political rights and civil liberties were restricted.
Democracy is not a condition that can inherently provide stabilitas politik
(political stability). Acknowledgment of this sentiment occurs not only in
Indonesian political culture, but also throughout the Global South, SBY
admitted during a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that
‘democracy is meaningless to the eight million human beings who will die’
each year during the early 21st century.45 But he added that democracy,
linked with economic development and ‘good governance’, might be the
most important responsibility that developing countries assume.46 It is an
interdependent relationship between economic development and demo-
cracy in Indonesia that is fundamental to national stability. Degradation of
one will inherently degrade the other and compromise national stability.
Just as Islamic ethics are said to underpin international cooperation to
facilitate economic development, Islamic ethics have been articulated by
SBY to be foundational for the strength of democracy in Indonesia, and the
role of Indonesia as a model to the world of the compatibility between
Islam and democracy.
A number of examples from the SBY administration demonstrate the cen-
trality of democracy as the context for national stability in Indonesia, as
well as a model for the international community.
The success of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in carrying out

democratic elections demonstrates to Western countries and the
international community that the values of democracy, Islam, and
modernity can coexist peacefully and harmoniously.47
This sentiment on the relationship between Islam, democracy and the

modern world is echoed by SBY:
A clash of civilizations is not inevitable. A confluence of civilizations is

entirely possible. For millennia, our archipelago has been home to many
currents of civilization. This is why, in today’s Indonesia, democracy,
Islam and modernity can go hand-in-hand—despite the occasional
threats of extremism.48
There is a political culture in Indonesia that is convinced that the Muslims

of the country can prove to the international community that Islam is
‘toleran dan menyejukkan’ (tolerant and soothing).49 The success of demo-
cracy in Indonesia, as well as its participation in the international political
economy, is understood as having ramifications for the ‘image of Islam’
around the world.50
Indonesian democracy is not only depicted as a symbol of congruity
between the principles of democracy and the political culture of the Islamic
world, but it also equips the Republic to manage economic volatilities
successfully.
Ensuring the social protection of the most vulnerable segments of

society, we also ensure that there are no social upheavals as we take the
blows of any economic crisis. That is the beauty of democracy. A demo-
cracy also provides all the political incentives for a government to
become an institutional partner of the market. That is why in Indonesia
today we have a government that listens to the market, responds to the
market and works with the market.51
Economic growth is best facilitated through democratic governance, and

legitimate democratic governance is instrumental for national stability in
the event of disruptions caused by economic globalization.
While discussing the transformative events of both the Arab Spring and
the financial instability that followed the 2008 Financial Crisis, SBY offered
the following comments to the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC):52
In the wake of these changes and uncertainties, we have only two

options. First, is to close our eyes and ignore or even resist these power-
ful signs of the times. And second, to anticipate them and adapt to them
intelligently with the necessary courage. The events around the world
serve as reminders not only of the changing world, but of the need to
adapt to the forces that are sweeping the 21st century. It reminds us
Mark S. Williams 85
to avoid the lessons of previous centuries where Muslims were relegated

to the sidelines of history as Muslims became complacent of emerging
developments. It reminds us of the need to be forward looking as we
tackle the issues of our time.
Reminding Muslims of the ‘Golden Age’ of Islam that occurred during the
first half of the Abbasid Caliphate, SBY encourages Muslims to adapt to the
trends of the modern world, as Indonesia has sought to do. This requires
Muslim governments to encourage democratization, and to engage with
global markets. Later in the speech, SBY bemoans the lack of economic pro-
duction in Muslim-majority countries and the high levels of indebtedness
that plague many of the OIC member-states. On the demand for political
rights and civil liberties, SBY proclaimed the following:53
Many people in the Muslim world are realizing that they have missed
freedom of expression, participation in governance, and essential social
services. Our governments and legislatures are therefore called upon to
ensure the political empowerment and the economic and social welfare
of our peoples.
The failure to achieve economic development is understood by SBY as

having the potential to degrade national cohesion and even lead to
transnational violence. His fear is that ‘economic insecurity may lead to
cultural insecurity and crisis of identity’.54 Drawing upon the ‘Jakarta
Declaration’ of 2004, SBY reflected the following:55
We must project the teachings of Islam in its truest form; that Islam is a
religion of peace. That Islam is rahmatan lil alamin … But this message is
effective only if we Muslims exercise the Islamic values—the values that
made Islam the world’s most advanced civilization in the 13th century.
This means working in solidarity with all humankind, since we are all
children of the same Divine Providence … This also means forging
unity within the Islamic world … We must earnestly promote a culture
of peace, mutual tolerance and harmony. At the same time, we must
build a culture of social justice, mutual respect and adherence to demo-
cratic values. Ours is a democracy not only because we hold free and fair
elections. Not only because we have a separation of powers as well as
checks and balances. We are a democracy because our people can parti-
cipate in the decision-making processes that affect their lives … We are
pleased that Indonesia has evolved to be a country where Islam, demo-
cracy and modernity can thrive together … The core values of Islam and
those of our diverse cultures have been harnessed to support our
democracy.
Conclusion
Since the national revival of the early 20th century, the politics of Islam in
Indonesia have been associated historically with national stability and eco-
nomic development. SBY continued in this tradition while updating the
political discourse in relation to both economic and national stability. On
the economy, SBY has been pressured by the Asian Financial Crisis and the
Global Financial Crisis to confront the volatilities of the global economic
structure and Indonesia’s exposure to it. His appeal to Islam has been a
means of calling upon an Islamic ethics of international cooperation as
well as a framework of social justice capable of withstanding the instabil-
ities of economic globalization. On national stability, SBY articulated a
vision of Indonesia as a model to the world of the synergy possible between
democracy and Muslim society.
It is a mistake to assume lasting permanence in the role of Islam as a
social force ensuring Indonesia remains an active democratic participant in
international society. Just as Islam is invoked to encourage participation
with the international political economy and to support the democratic
institutions of the Republic, so can developmental setbacks and political
crises potentially radicalize the discourse of Islam in Indonesia. The author-
itarian actions taken by Sukarno against the Islamic pillar of Indonesian
political culture, and the revolutionary actions that overthrew Sukarno,
profoundly radicalized a significant sector of Islamic society. The Asian
Financial Crisis transformed a once politically passive network of Islamic
organizations that had tolerated the New Order for decades into a force
that was instrumental in removing Suharto from office.
There are five critical pressures that have the potential to further the path
of radicalization for the political culture of Islam in Indonesia over the
coming decades. The first is the anger and resentment that KKN creates. It
is an anger that is acute and damaging to Indonesian state–society relations
because it is associated with both Indonesia’s foreign economic relations
and its democratic political system. KKN is connected to the FDI and the
resource extraction sector, which serves international markets. It is also a
product of the political privileges bestowed on a select class that the post-
reformasi institutions have been incapable of severing. KKN must be con-
fronted by the next administration in order to establish its own legitimacy,
and for Indonesia to maintain a peaceful ascent in international society.
The second critical pressure that can radicalize Indonesia’s Muslim com-
munities is the prospect of another financial crisis. Indonesia must continue
to work within the G-20 framework to push for a regulatory framework
that can reduce capital volatilities. Third, there is no greater source of dis-
content in Indonesia than the general malaise of poverty. Indicators have
shown that the proportion of Indonesians subsisting on less than $2 a day
have decreased during the SBY years from over 60 per cent in 2006 to less
Mark S. Williams 87
than 45 per cent in 2011.56 For Indonesia to ascend it must continue to

encourage reductions in absolute poverty without causing increases to
Indonesia’s Gini coefficient. Fourth, inter-island conflict has a destabilizing
effect on the politics of the Republic, and typically contributes to the radi-
calization of Islam, either by means of the government using violence
against non-Muslims in the outer islands, or by Muslim groups against the
government, as is the case in Sumatra. Finally, international crises, such as
the Global War on Terror, have the potential to radicalize Indonesia’s
Muslim groups. It has been estimated in 2013 that JI continues with a
membership of approximately 15,000. Further outbreaks of violence
around the world between Muslims and non-Muslims contribute to the
sentiment that a ‘clash of civilizations’ is occurring. However, so too can
fitna (i.e. conflict between Muslims) – such as the conflicts in Syria, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan – radicalize a country of over 200 million
Muslims, many of whom hold a variety of disparate interpretations
of Islam and divergent expectations concerning Muslim society in the
21st century.
It is clear that the next Indonesian administration will not be able to
master all of the sources that can radicalize the political culture of Islam in
the Republic. However, the ballast of history will do much to ensure that
Islam will continue to act as a social force justifying Indonesia’s engage-
ment with democracy and international society. Perhaps a determination
of the extent to which the political culture of Islam will contribute to
national stability over the next few decades is intrinsic to the question of
whether Indonesia is able to continue its ascent.
Notes
1 Muhammad Sirozi, ‘Indonesian Responses to September 11, 2001’, in Ibrahim
M. Abu-Rabi (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought
(Oxford, 2006), pp. 390–5.
2 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad
(New York, 2004), pp. 119–60.
3 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200 (New York, 2008),
pp. 196–215.
4 Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic
Constitution (Kuala Lumpur, 1979).
5 Moch. Nur Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004 (Tilburg, 2006).
6 Mohammad Natsir, ‘Apakah Pantjasila Bertentangan dengan Adjaran Al-Quran?’
[Is the Pancasila in Conflict with the Teachings of the Quran?], in Joke Moeliono
(ed.) Capita Selecta, II (Jakarta, 1957), pp. 144–50.
7 Mohammad Natsir, ‘The Aims of the Masjumi’, in Herbert Feith and Lance
Castles (eds) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–65 (Ithaca, NY, 1970 [1956]).
8 Ibid., pp. 137–40.
9 Natsir, Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International
Affairs (Ithaca, NY, 1954 [1952]), p. 1.
10 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–7:
Southeast Asia, John P. Glennon (ed.) [cited 10 May 2010]; available from
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195557v22
11 J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–66 (Kuala
Lumpur, 1974), p. 276; Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital
(Winchester, Mass, 1986), pp. 73–4.
12 Jan M. Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics (Kuala Lumpur,
1965), p. 56.
13 B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague, 1971).
14 François Raillon, ‘The New Order and Islam, or the Imbroglio of Faith and
Politics’, Indonesia, vol. 57, 1993, p. 200.
15 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore, 2003), p. 113.
16 William R. Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’,
Journal of Asia Studies, vol. 55, no. 3, 1996, p. 631.
17 Howard M. Federspiel, ‘The Muhammadijah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic
Movement in Indonesia’, Indonesia, vol. 10, 1970, pp. 76–9.
18 Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (New York, 2005), pp. 169–96.
19 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Paparan Presiden RI Mengenai Perkembangan
Tanah Air kepada Kalangan Diplomatik di Indonesia, 15 Februari 2012’ [The
President of the Republic of Indonesia on Developing the Exposure of
Diplomatic Circles in the Indonesian Country, 15 February 2012], Kementerian
Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia]
2012 [cited 10 September 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/
Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=
751&l=id.
20 Theodore Friend, ‘Indonesia in Flames’, Orbis, vol. 42, no. 3, 1998.
21 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York, 1999), pp. 74–6;
Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (New York, 2002), pp. 822–35; Robert
W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, 2000),
pp. 16–18; Robert W. Hefner and Horvatich, Patricia, Islam in an Era of Nation-
States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu, 1997).
22 Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (New York, 2002),
pp. 193–210.
23 Gordon P. Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO, 2009), p. 292.
24 Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 210.
25 John Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom (London, 1999), p. 98.
26 Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 169–71.
27 Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy
(Singapore, 2009), p. 181.
28 An important exception to this was the sentiment expressed by the leadership of
the PPP and the PKB that attacked Megawati’s fitness to govern because of her
sex.
29 Mujiburrahman, ‘Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of
Abdurrahman Wahid’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 10, no. 3, 1999.
30 Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 301.
31 R. William Liddle, ‘New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia’,
Woodrow Wilson International Center: Asia Special Report, vol. 10, p. 5.
Mark S. Williams 89
32 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Public Opinion Survey

Indonesia, 2005 (Jakarta, 2005), p. 16.
33 This argument on support for Sharia and alienation from government that is
perceived as unjust has also been made regarding similar findings in public
opinion collected on the Middle East. Leonard Sebastian, ‘Indonesian State
Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the
Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?’ Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, vol. 16, no .3, pp. 434–5.
34 Yudhoyono, ‘Paparan Presiden RI Mengenai Perkembangan Tanah Air kepada
Kalangan Diplomatik di Indonesia, 15 Februari 2012’ [The President of the
Republic of Indonesia on Developing the Exposure of Diplomatic Circles in the
Indonesian Country, 15 February 2012].
35 Yudhoyono, ‘Gedung Pancasila: Sambutan Acara Foreign Policy Breakfast dalam
Rangka HUT ke-63 Deplu’ [Building Pancasila: Foreign Policy Breakfast for the
63rd Anniversary of the Department of Foreign Affairs], Presiden Republik
Indonesia 2008 [cited 1 June 2009]; available from http://www.presidensby.
info/index.php/pidato/2008/08/19/983.html
36 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Public Opinion Survey
Indonesia, 2005, p. 16.
37 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Jajak Pendapat Pemilu 2010
[Electoral Survey 2010] (Jakarta, 2010), p. 11.
38 Connected to this message of distancing Indonesia from foreign entanglements
was also a domestic dimension. Bebas dan aktif was also certainly a message sent
to elements of Indonesian society, such as the PKI, the PNI, and Masjumi, to not
attempt any revolutionary takeover of the Sukarno-Hatta negotiated balance of
power directed at the Dutch.
39 Yudhoyono, ‘Gedung Pancasila: Sambutan Acara Foreign Policy Breakfast dalam
Rangka HUT ke-63 Deplu’ [Building Pancasila: Foreign Policy Breakfast for the
63rd Anniversary of the Department of Foreign Affairs].
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Shared Responsibility for Common Prosperity:
Statement by H. W. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic
of Indonesia, at the 14th NAM Summit at Havana, 15 September 2006’,
Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic
of Indonesia] 2006 [4 September 2013]; available from http://www.
kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Pre
siden&IDP=264&l=id
43 Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia [Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia] ‘Jakarta
Declaration Upholding Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin’, 2004 [3 September 2013];
available from www.kbri-canberra.org.au/press/press040225jkt.htm
44 Ibid.
45 ‘Shared Responsibility for Common Prosperity: Statement by H. W. Dr. Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 14th NAM
Summit at Havana, 15 September 2006’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik
Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2006 [4 September
2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscription
Display.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=264&l=id
46 Ibid.
47 Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Republic of Indonesia], Diplomasi Indonesia 2010 [Indonesian Diplomacy 2010]
2010, p. 104 [3 September 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/
Forms/AllItems.aspx
48 Yudhoyono, ‘How to Let Islam and the West Live in Harmony’, The Economist:
The World in 2010, 2009 [29 January 2010]; available from http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/14742423?story_id=14742423&d=2010
49 Muhammad Yusuf, ‘KTM OKI di Djibouti: Dari Isu Palestina, Suriah, Hingga
Penistaan Agama’ [The KTM OKI in Djibouti: On the Issues of Palestine, Syria,
and Religious Defamation], Diplomasi Multilateral [Multilateral Diplomacy],
vol. 2, no. 1, 2013, p. 6.
50 Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Indonesia], Diplomasi 2011 [Diplomacy 2011] 2011, p.29 [03 Sept
2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
51 Yudhoyono, ‘Pidato Politik Presiden RI Terpilih untuk Masa Jabatan 2004–2009’
[Political Speech of the President Elect for the 2004–2009 Term], Perpustakaan
Nasional Republik Indonesia [National Library of Indonesia], 2004.
52 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Remarks by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Opening of the Seventh
Conference of the Parliamentary Union of OIC Member States (PUIC),
Palembang, 30 January 2012’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2012 [3 September 2013];
available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?
Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=749&l=id.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 The World Bank, ‘Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a Day (PPP) (% of Population)’
[7 September 2013]; available from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SI.POV.2DAY
Bibliography
Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. ed. (2006) The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic
Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
Anshari, Saifuddin (1979) The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic
Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM).
Boland, B. J. (1971) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff).
Effendy, Bahtiar (2003) Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS).
Esposito, John L. (1999) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford
University Press).
Federspiel, Howard M. (1970) ‘The Muhammadijah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic
Movement in Indonesia’, Indonesia, 10, 57–79.
Feith, Herbert and Castles, Lance, eds (1970) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–65
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Friend, Theodore (1998) ‘Indonesia in Flames’, Orbis, 42: 3, 387–407.
Glennon, John P. ed. (2010) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–7: Southeast
Asia, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195557v22
Hefner, Robert W. (2000) Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia
(Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Mark S. Williams 91
Hefner, Robert W. and Horvatich, Patricia (1997) Islam in an Era of Nation-States:

Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press).
Ichwan, Moch. Nur (2006) Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004 (Tilburg: UvT Press).
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) (2010) Jajak Pendapat Pemilu
2010 [Electoral Survey 2010] (Jakarta: IFES).
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) (2005) Public Opinion Survey
Indonesia, 2005, Survey 2005] (Jakarta: IFES).
Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia [Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia] ‘Jakarta
Declaration Upholding Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin’ 2004 [3 September 2013],
www.kbri–canberra.org.au/press/press040225jkt.htm
of Indonesia], Diplomasi Indonesia 2010 [Indonesian Diplomacy 2010] 2010
[3 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/Forms/AllItems.aspx
of Indonesia], Diplomasi 2011 [Diplomacy 2011] 2011 [3 September 2013],
http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/Forms/AllItems.aspx
Lapidus, Ira (2002) A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge
University Press).
Liddle, William R. (2003) ‘New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia’,
Woodrow Wilson International Center: Asia Special Report, 10, 4–13.
Mackie, J. A. C. (1974) Konfrontasi: The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute, 1963–66 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press).
Means, Gordon P. (2009) Political Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers).
Moeliono, Joke, ed. (1957) Capita Selecta, II (Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis).
Mujiburrahman (1999) ‘Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of
Abdurrahman Wahid’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 10: 3, 339–52. doi:
10.1080/09596419908721191
Natsir, Mohammad (1952) Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National
and International Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program).
Platzdasch, Bernhard (2009) Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy
(Singapore: ISEAS).
Pluvier, Jan M. (1965) Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press).
Porter, Donald J. (2002) Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (New York:
RoutledgeCurzon).
Raillon, François (1993) ‘The New Order and Islam, or the Imbroglio of Faith and
Politics’, Indonesia, 57, 197–217.
Ricklefs, M. C. (2008) A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, 4th ed. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan).
Robison, Richard (1986) Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Winchester, Mass: Allen &
Unwin).
Sebastian, Leonard (2003) ‘Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali
Bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic
Framework?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16: 3, 429–46.
Taylor, John (1999) East Timor: The Price of Freedom (London: Zed Books).
The World Bank (2013) ‘Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a Day (PPP) (% of
Population)’ [7 September 2013]; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.
2DAY
Vickers, Adrian (2005) A History of Modern Indonesia (New York: Cambridge

University Press).
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) ‘Gedung Pancasila: Sambutan Acara Foreign
Policy Breakfast dalam Rangka HUT ke-63 Deplu’ [Building Pancasila: Foreign
Policy Breakfast for the 63rd Anniversary of the Department of Foreign Affairs],
Presiden Republik Indonesia 2008 [cited 1 June 2009]; http://www.presidensby.
info/index.php/pidato/2008/08/19/983.html
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) ‘How to Let Islam and the West Live in
Harmony’, The Economist: The World in 2010 [29 January 2010]; http://www.econ-
omist.com/node/14742423?story_id=14742423&d=2010.
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2004) ‘Pidato Politik Presiden RI Terpilih untuk Masa
Jabatan 2004–2009’ [Political Speech of the President Elect for the 2004–2009
Term], Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia [National Library of Indonesia].
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Paparan Presiden RI mengenai Perkembangan
Tanah Air kepada Kalangan Diplomatik di Indonesia, 15 Februari 2012’ [The
President of the Republic of Indonesia on Developing the Exposure of Diplomatic
Circles in the Indonesian Country, 15 February 2012], Kementerian Luar Negeri,
Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2012 [cited
10 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.
aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=751&l=id
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Remarks by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Opening of the Seventh
Conference of the Parliamentary Union of OIC Member States (PUIC), Palembang,
30 January 2012’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] [3 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/
SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=749&l=id.
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2006) ‘Shared Responsibility for Common Prosperity:
Statement by H. W. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of
Indonesia, at the 14th NAM Summit at Havana, 15 September 2006’, Kementerian
Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia]
[4 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.
aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=264&l=id
Yusuf, Muhammad (2013) ‘KTM OKI di Djibouti: Dari Isu Palestina, Suriah, Hingga
Penistaan Agama’ [The KTM OKI in Djibouti: On the Issues of Palestine, Syria, and
Religious Defamation], Diplomasi Multilateral [Multilateral Diplomacy], 2: 1, 4–6.
Zakaria, Fareed (2004) The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company).
6
Democratic Achievement and Policy
Paralysis: Implications for
Indonesia’s Continued Ascent
Stephen Sherlock
Introduction
Indonesia has experienced an astonishing transformation over the last

15 years. Once among the political laggards of Southeast Asia under the
regime of Suharto, it has turned itself into the best-functioning democracy
in the region. Compared with Malaysia and Thailand’s political logjams
and one-party rule in Cambodia, Vietnam and Singapore, Indonesia is a
home for vigorous and healthy political competition. Indonesia has experi-
enced four peaceful transfers of power in mostly well-organized and
fair elections, and free expression and the media are flourishing; non-
government organizations and social movements such as organized labor
are increasingly prominent. Furthermore, there are signs of growing polit-
ical awareness and assertiveness on the part of the electorate, exhibiting a
number of interesting examples of the use of new media to campaign
around issues and grievances.1
These changes were facilitated and strengthened by major institutional
reforms, including direct presidential election, which helped to clarify the
respective powers of the legislature and the executive. The withdrawal of
the military from national politics was successfully negotiated, and the
introduction of direct election for the heads of regional governments
required the enormous task of transferring administrative authority from
the central government in Jakarta to the regions. Indonesia has undergone
a simultaneous process of central regime change and geographic decentral-
ization of power. Other reforms strengthened mechanisms to enforce the
transparency and accountability of government, and to strengthen the
legal system and legislative review.
The country’s political metamorphosis, along with successive years of
healthy economic growth, has created a new sense of self-confidence, even
assertiveness, among the Indonesian political elite. Indonesia has resumed
a leading role in ASEAN, has become a member of the G-20, and is pushing
for greater prominence in the Islamic world. These developments have
112
Stephen Sherlock 113
drawn international attention to the country and created a feeling that

Indonesia is a new rising power which could, in time, join the ranks of
world leaders. For the world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia’s
profile until now has been remarkably low and, apart from the tourism of
the island of Bali, its international image is virtually non-existent.
International recognition of its achievements is not before time, and a
widening of that awareness beyond political and policy circles is well
overdue. But we are apparently witnessing early signs that ‘this is at last
Indonesia’s moment on the world stage’.2
Amid the general optimism, however, the objective of this paper is to
sound a warning about serious underlying political problems that could
jeopardize the progress of recent years. We should not forget the reality
that countries do not become heavyweights in the global political economy
because of a sound democratic record, but from the brute force of total
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), international trade and finance.
Democratic India was marginalized in global affairs until its economy
began to grow, while China under one-party rule is being talked about as a
new superpower because its economy is beginning to rival that of the
United States. Likewise, Indonesia is gaining respect because projections of
its recent economic growth into the next decade would make it one of the
world’s larger economies.3
This chapter argues, however, that Indonesia today is in danger of losing
momentum because the institutional, political and policy underpinnings of
future growth have been neglected. While the political hardware of a
reformed constitution, democratic competition, rule of law, and institu-
tions of accountability have been firmly established, the software of demo-
cratic institutionalism retains many bugs. The groups of people that cause
these institutions to function have changed very little, and the mentality of
the political class remains locked in the politics of patronage and the divi-
sion of spoils among an entrenched oligarchy. This chapter concentrates
on one particular aspect of weakness in the democratic software: the prob-
lematic role of political parties. Specifically, it asks whether political parties
are equipped to play their role in recruiting a viable choice of presidential
candidates. It concludes that democratic decisionmaking processes in the
parties are being overwhelmed by money politics, dynastic and clan
infighting, and the incapacity to accommodate political and personal dif-
ferences in order to build inclusive internal party coalitions.
The 2014 elections have thrown a spotlight onto a critical weakness of
political parties in Indonesia, and onto the limitations of the process by
which the country transformed itself from autocracy to democracy.
Indonesia has a great deal to show the world about how political change
can be brought about peacefully, and the means by which institutions of
democracy can be established and consolidated in a manner that is inclu-
sive of a divergent range of social, cultural, religious and regional interests.
114 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis
However, there is a danger that the country may also become a salutary
lesson in how the people who take power in a new order can fail to tackle
the prosaic but crucial policy questions—questions that will ensure the eco-
nomic and social stability necessary to underpin a continuing democratic
future.
A decade of democratic achievement
Indonesia’s achievements in democratic reform in the decade following the
fall of the New Order regime were truly impressive and are worthwhile
briefly revisiting. The process was begun almost immediately after Suharto’s
resignation in May 1998 by his successor as President, B. J. Habibie, who
moved to consolidate his shaky legitimacy by freeing up all restrictions on
civil liberties, allowing the formation of new parties, and beginning negoti-
ations with all leading political players towards holding free elections. In a
little over a year, a whole range of new political organizations had emerged,
from parties to non-government organizations and advocacy groups, and
successful elections in June 1999 transformed Indonesia from the stultify-
ing atmosphere of an aging dictatorship to a vibrant if still half-formed
democracy.
One of the first issues raised after the fall of Suharto was the need to
amend or rewrite the Constitution of 1945, upon which the old authoritar-
ian regime had based itself. While there were those who argued that the
Constitution itself was not faulty, only its application, four successive sets
of amendments to the document were effected from 1999 to 2002. The
amendments thoroughly rebuilt the infrastructure of the Indonesian state.
First, the reforms strengthened the power of the legislature, the People’s
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: DPR) in relation to the
previously dominant presidency by explicitly placing the power to make
laws in the DPR’s hands—albeit in a joint process with the executive4—lim-
iting the president’s formal veto powers and barring the president from dis-
solving parliament. Secondly, the reforms explicitly recognized the role of
regional government and provided for the election of regional legislatures
and executive heads. This provided the basis for the huge devolution of
power to the regions and the decentralization of government administra-
tion to the provinces and districts. Many commentators have credited this
process with heading off the growth of separatist forces that briefly
appeared to threaten the unity of the diverse Indonesian archipelago.5
Thirdly, the amendments provided for the creation of new institutions of
accountability and strengthened existing ones. The State Audit Agency
(Badan Permeriksa Keuangan: BPK) already existed in the old version of the
Constitution, but its independence was affirmed by amendments providing
for its selection through parliamentary vote and through specifying its
working relationship with the DPR. The changes at the constitutional level
have been given practical effect by successive administrations, which have

greatly increased the funding for BPK, a key accountability agency that had
been starved of resources as well as powers under the Suharto administration.
A further major reform was the creation of the Constitutional Court,
which was empowered to review the constitutional validity of legislation,
to give rulings on disputes between state institutions, disputes related to
election results, and on the dissolution of political parties. The Court was
also assigned the authority to be the final arbiter on parliamentary
impeachment proceedings against a president. The Constitutional Court
has proved to be a very powerful body, making a range of rulings against
the validity of legislation passed in the DPR that have had far-reaching
implications in areas as diverse as the creation of new provinces in Papua,
electricity policy, and the design of the voting system for parliamentary
elections. In fact, suggestions have been raised that the Court has taken
upon itself an overly interventionist interpretation of its powers, making
decisions that cross far beyond questions of constitutionality into the realm
of policymaking and even usurping the powers of the legislature.6 There is
a danger that executive government will ignore its more activist decisions.7
Most controversial has been the application of the Court’s power to rule on
regional executive election disputes, with its methodology and standards of
evidence being brought into critical question.8 The Court has been severely
embarrassed by charges brought against one its judges in 2013, following
revelations of damning evidence that he had taken bribes to rule in favor of
particular candidates in election disputes.9
The constitutional provision for the establishment of a Judicial
Commission aimed both to create a system of accountability for the
Supreme Court and to protect its independence from the executive.
Following its creation in 2005, however, the role and powers of the
Commission have been the subject of uncertainty and controversy, its
authority suffering a major blow from a 2006 Constitutional Court ruling
that it did not have the power to discipline senior judges.
The empowerment of accountability and transparency mechanisms over
all institutions of government and their officials has also been greatly
enhanced by the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi: KPK) and Ombudsman. The KPK has been
responsible for the investigation, prosecution and imprisonment of a large
number of legislators, office-holders and officials at the national and
regional level—including ministers—and businesspeople for corrupt activ-
ities. The Commission has wielded major blows against the culture of
impunity that reigned among officials of most Indonesian state institutions
and the business interests with which they connive, although the continu-
ing identification of new targets for its investigations indicates that the sys-
temic nature of corruption has not been overturned. The KPK has become
an extremely popular institution in the court of public opinion, a standing
which was important in protecting the body against attempts to under-

mine its effectiveness when amendments to its legislative basis were first
proposed and then abandoned by some legislators in the DPR. The
Ombudsman’s office has not been at the center of the same degree of
media and public attention, but its establishment, first with limited powers
under a Presidential Decree in 2000, and then with greater powers under its
own legislation in 2008, has become a potentially important mechanism
for the redress of public complaints of maladministration, and to empower
citizens against arbitrary decisionmaking by government officials.
Finally, it could be argued that the most consequential reform to the
political architecture in the post-Suharto period was the 2004 introduction
of a process of direct election for the position of President. The first presi-
dential election in the democratic era had taken place on the basis of a
majority vote in the special parliamentary chamber, the People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR-RI), a procedure that led government to
operate as an effectively semi-presidential system whereby the president
had to maintain parliamentary support to remain in office. The election, in
1999, of a president (Abdurrahman Wahid) from a minority party who had
a tumultuous relationship with the politicians in parliament revealed the
inherent weakness of this system and ultimately led to the removal of
Wahid by parliamentary vote in 2001 and his replacement by Megawati
Sukarnoputri. During the confrontation between the two branches of gov-
ernment, the President even attempted to dissolve parliament, a decision
that was of highly questionable constitutionality and which caused local
and international concern about a repeat of the unrest and violence of
1998. The disruption and uncertainty caused by that experience persuaded
the political elite to respond to popular calls for the introduction of direct
popular election for the presidency. The 2004 election, with separate
popular votes for the DPR and the president, led to the election of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).
The result of this change was that Indonesia moved from a hybrid parlia-
mentary–presidential system to a more conventional presidential system.
This provided for greater clarity in the separation of powers between a
reformed presidency and a legislative branch with enhanced authority. The
DPR is now an increasingly assertive center of power in Indonesian politics,
to the apparent surprise and dismay of some observers, a fact that suggests
that many in the Indonesian intellectual and policymaking elite did not
fully understand the implications of the constitutional and legislative
choices made during the reforms of 1999–2004.
In the realm of electoral competition, the introduction of separate elec-
tions for the two branches of government also had profound effects on the
nature of the parties that would contest the elections. Direct presidential
elections created the incentive for aspiring presidential candidates to form
their own parties. Whereas the previous system of parliamentary vote
encouraged candidates to remain loyal to the parties with a proven capa-

city to win legislative seats, there was now the opportunity to strike out
alone with the backing of one’s own political machine. The literature on
presidential system has repeatedly observed the tendency of presidential
systems to proliferate a greater number of parties with weak institutional-
ization and a personalized rather than programmatic character, especially
in new democracies.10 It is no accident that all the parties formed in the
post-2004 period have been formed around the campaign needs of pres-
idential aspirants. Accounting for this commonly observed tendency in the
Indonesian context forms an important part of the background to the
weaknesses in the party system that will be discussed in a later section of
this chapter.
Indonesia’s third transition: A time of uncertainty
Indonesia today is facing its third historic transition since the end of the
Suharto regime in 1998. The first was the transition to democratic elections
in 1999 and the second occurred with the change to a directly elected pres-
idency in 2004. The third transition in 2014 represents the end of the first
entire cycle of a two-term directly elected presidency and the transition to a
new popularly elected administration. The first two post-New Order
Presidents were elected through parliamentary vote, so the 2014 election
brought the first handover of power between two directly elected
Presidents.
In a conventional presidential system with fixed terms such as
Indonesia’s, the constitutional process relies on the political class to
produce the choices for a changeover of leaders according to a strict—and
arbitrary—timetable, rather than allowing it to occur in response to the tide
of political events, as tends to be the case in a parliamentary system such as
in the United Kingdom or Australia. Linz has observed that fixed presiden-
tial terms ‘mean that the political system must produce a capable and
popular leader every four years or so’.11 If the choice of voting citizens is to
be genuinely democratic, the option to choose between leaders ought to be
presented to the voters. This creates expectations that the conduit for the
recruitment process—the party system—will be able to fulfil this role in
consonance with the election cycle.
In Indonesia, the centrality of parties in the process is reinforced by legis-
lation that makes it impossible to enter the presidential race outside the
framework of the party system. In the US case, a highly institutionalized
two-party system with broad coalition parties has evolved over many
decades within the framework of a presidential constitution. The pre-
selection process of the US primaries allows a modicum of public input into
an otherwise internal party mechanism. Even assuming the best intentions
on the part of the political elite, Indonesia has not had sufficient time to
test and refine the political mechanisms of its particular version of presi-
dentialism, nor to nurture the informal practices, unspoken agreements
and conventions that develop with usage and experience. The question is:
how well will the Indonesian party system cope with its role in managing
the transition to the next five- or ten-year cycle?
Stalled reform and policy paralysis
The need for a successful transition of power is especially urgent because, in
political and policy terms, the last few years have not been encouraging.
Despite growing international standing, feelings about the domestic polit-
ical scene in Indonesia are markedly downbeat. The excited talk of reformasi
(reform) has largely evaporated and been replaced by disappointment over
lack of further progress, entrenched corruption, and the continuing stran-
glehold of the self-serving political elite. Recent academic analyses of
Indonesian politics have talked of ‘stagnation’,12 ‘regression’,13 ‘missing …
political accountability’14 and obstruction by ‘anti-reformist elites’.15
To some extent the ebbing tide of euphoria reflects the fact that
Indonesia is now a ‘normal’ country,16 no longer a place of exciting hopes
and fears, but a country where politics has assumed the prosaic reality of
coalition-building,17 division of the spoils of office, and wrangling over
policy differences. In other words, politics as played out in what are
regarded as ‘advanced’ democracies.
The era of political and constitutional reformasi has passed: for this
reason there is a need to shift attention to the stalled progress in imple-
menting policy to address the increasing gamut of urgent national prob-
lems. The SBY administration was marked by policy paralysis and its
apparent incapacity to respond to the long agenda of unfinished business.
Issues on this agenda include: the distorting effects of oil price subsidies on
the state budget and foreign exchange; the dilapidated state of roads, rail,
seaports, and airports; poor-quality government services such as health and
education; unemployment; lack of development in remote regions; envi-
ronmental degradation; and urban pollution and congestion. An especially
alarming development was the indecisive and ineffectual response by the
SBY administration to the rise of religious intolerance and persecution of
minorities, which threatens the pluralist compact on which the stability of
the post-independence Indonesian state has been based.
Many studies have considered the sources of policy paralysis and
deficiency in service delivery in terms of problems caused by decentraliza-
tion, the need for civil service reform and the overhaul of government
administration. Particular blame is usually apportioned to national and
regional parliaments, as well as to ministerial and cabinet decisionmaking
and, of course, to corruption and waste of state resources. It is generally
agreed that the most telling weakness of Indonesian democracy today is a
lack of transparency and accountability in decisionmaking. Politicians

understand that they must be popular if they are to be elected, but act as if
achievement of office confers carte blanche to distribute resources without
accountability. Government officials resent having to make and implement
policy under new levels of scrutiny from the media, the public and the
parliament.
Failings of the party system and the 2014 election
The presidential election of 2014 entailed the previous regime handing

over power to a new set of national leaders; it thereby represented both an
opportunity and a burden of great responsibility. The rest of this chapter is
devoted to the particular question of the capacity of the political elite to
produce new leadership possessing the capacity to grasp the initiative on
the agenda of urgent policy issues.
Observation of the first 15 years of electoral politics reveals a very mixed
picture of the capacity of the parties to foster and produce successive
lineups of candidacy for national leadership. The major problem appears to
be that the parties have a ‘winner takes all’ attitude to party leadership and
to presidential candidacy. The corollary of this is that losing contenders
conclude they have no alternative but to leave and form their own party.
In the first transition of 2004, for example, the eventual winner, SBY, did
not emerge into the first rank of political choices until quite late in the
process. This was in part because his obvious choice of party, PDIP, was
unable to accommodate him without threatening the prospects of the
entrenched leaders of the party, Megawati and her husband Taufik Kiemas.
This led him, apparently reluctantly, to relent to pressure from ex-PDIP
supporters and join forces with the new Democrat Party, which had been
created as a vehicle for SBY’s candidacy.18
A succession of new parties has been formed by presidential candidates
who could not find a place within the existing parties. Hanura was created
by former general Wiranto after he split with Golkar following his weak
performance as Golkar’s presidential candidate in the 2004 election.
Prabowo Subianto had also originally been with Golkar, until he left the
party to form his own party, Gerindra, as a vehicle for his candidacy in the
2009 election. A further ‘presidential’ party established by a former Golkar
leader was added to the list in 2013 with the creation of the National
Democrat Party (Nasdem) by media tycoon Surya Paloh in order to support
his (unrealized) ambitions for the presidency in 2014.
As observed in an earlier section of this chapter, the construction of new
parties around presidential aspirants has been the result of the introduction
in 2004 of direct presidential elections. This has led to the emergence of
what could be described as a ‘two-track’ party system in Indonesia: one
track followed by a group of parties with a more enduring existence and
identity emerging from roots in social groupings or particular historical cir-

cumstances, and a second track formed by parties mainly identified with a
leader aiming to occupy the presidential palace. The first track is repre-
sented by parties such as PDIP, PKB, PPP, Golkar, PAN and PKS: PDIP has its
historical inheritance of Sukarnoism and connections in the ‘imaged com-
munities’ of the abangan (nominal or syncretic Muslims in rural areas) and
wong cilik (little people); PPP, PAN, PKS and PKB have historical and social
roots in particular Islamic communities and subscribe to a variety of ideas
concerning the role of Islam and the state; and Golkar retains electoral
support bases—especially in eastern Indonesia—from its days as the gov-
erning party under Suharto, as well as from an ill-defined but politically
useful ersatz ideology of ‘development’ (pembangunan). The second track is
represented by all the major parties that have been established since 2004—
Democrat, Hanura, Gerindra, and Nasdem—and which are electoral
machines for presidential candidates. The fact that the first track comprises
parties who have had a long-standing presence in both the parliamentary
and presidential arenas of politics means that they could be described as
‘parliamentary-presidential’ parties, while the second track parties can most
appropriately be labeled ‘presidential’ parties.
Whatever their place in the tracks of political party development, the
parties generally maintain a poor record in two important respects: first,
producing credible candidates for national office; and second, maintaining
inclusive and cohesive internal coalitions, both of which are necessary for
attracting winning levels of voter support over a succession of elections. As
will be discussed below, however, the more enduring parliamentary–
presidential parties have sometimes had a better record in achieving these
goals than the more ephemeral presidential parties.
Golkar achieved remarkable success in transforming itself from the polit-
ical machine of a discredited regime to a leading party in the democratic
era. But it was unable to maintain anything like the level of voter support it
reached during the Suharto era, in large part because of the obvious
problem that it could no longer rely on the support of the state apparatus.
But its post-Suharto success has also been greatly limited by the fact that a
succession of leaders—Wiranto, Akbar Tandjung, Jusuf Kalla—seemed
determined to take monopoly control of the party and were unable to work
in effective internal coalition with other prominent leaders. Their instinct
has always been to drive rival figures from the ranks of the leadership, an
approach that damaged the public image of the party and restricted the
breadth of talent and resources on which it could draw. The same approach
has been taken by the current leader and failed presidential aspirant, the
enormously wealthy businessman Aburizal Bakrie, who reportedly spent
huge sums to win the leadership, but who never had a realistic prospect of
election in 2014. This is a clear sign of the fatal weakness in Golkar’s polit-
ical culture: it has produced a leader who can win internal elections
through the power of money, but whose credibility as a vote-winner

among the people is extremely low.
Even a party as apparently youthful as Democrat—having been formed
in 2003 with none of the historical baggage carried by Golkar and PDIP—
has foundered over the task of establishing a post-SBY leadership. The
problem of money politics has overwhelmed all of the figures who were
touted as successors to SBY. The rising stars of the party, Anas
Urbaningram, Muhammad Nazaruddin, Angelina Sondakh, and Andi
Mallarangeng have each been politically destroyed by convictions for
corrupt use of funds for political purposes or by equally damaging allega-
tions. SBY himself seems to have fallen for the fatal temptation of dynastic
politics, pushing his son, Edhie Baskoro, into leading party positions in
apparent disregard for voter perceptions of such practices.
The Islamic parties have been afflicted by their own range of similar
problems. PKB is a sad story of a party with a loyal voter base—adherents of
NU and other traditionalist Muslims in East and Central Java—but which
has been dominated by one extended family and has found it difficult to
resolve the tensions produced by competing ambitions that inevitably arise
in politics. With the death of Abdurrahman Wahid, the party lost its one
dominant national figure. The party repeatedly split, with each splinter
appearing to believe that the party’s electoral base would automatically
adhere to it. In reality, the party’s supporters also divided and, especially in
the 2009 elections, its vote was scattered amongst a number of rival fac-
tions all claiming the party’s original mantle. By rebuilding bridges within
the NU community in the period leading up to the 2014 elections, the
current leadership under Wahid’s nephew, Muhaimin Iskander, recovered a
considerable part of the party’s vote, but it was still well short of the
support it received in 1999.
PAN was strongly identified with its prominent founder, Amien Rais,
who for a short time after the fall of Suharto was seen as a leading presiden-
tial contender. But in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections the party
failed to win a significant slice of the vote—6 per cent and 7 per cent
respectively—and Amien’s presidential bid attracted only 15 per cent, well
behind the leading contenders, SBY and Megawati. The party has survived
Amien’s subsequent retirement from politics, but it has failed to produce
any outstanding national leaders. In fact, the party has become notorious
for its propensity to select celebrity candidates in national and regional
elections, few of whom perform effectively in office.19 PAN’s vote has
remained at about the same level of support over the four elections since
1999.
In the lead up to the 2014 election, the parties that showed at least some
capacity to recruit new prospective national leaders and to allow them to
emerge in the front ranks of the organization were PKS and PDIP. These
two parties are the clearest examples of parties in the first track of the party
system—socially and historically rooted, with some ideological orientation

and an enduring base in parliament. Interestingly, they are at the two ends
of the ideological spectrum that Mietzner has convincingly re-emphasized
is still important in the Indonesian party system.20
PKS is an interesting and unusual case because it has captured a loyal fol-
lowing without the attractions of a charismatic leader. This is usually
regarded as due to internal organizational strength; however, the party did
not acquire this capacity simply by hiring a particularly effective political
consultancy firm, but rather because its social roots are in educated middle-
class, pious, modernist Muslims who learned the arts of political organiza-
tion in Islamic student organizations during the Suharto era. As well as
being influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the party can also
trace a philosophical tradition back to Masjumi, the Islamist party of the
1950s, which was banned under Sukarno and Suharto. During that time
the only possible organized expression of that tradition could be found in
campus organizations ostensibly focused on religious and social issues.
While PDIP, PKB and PAN had both a well-defined social/religious base
and prominent leaders—Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Amien Rais
respectively—PKS has built itself behind stolid figures such as Hidayat Nur
Wahid. The party has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention.21 The lit-
erature has focused on issues such as PKS’s organizational capacity and the
dilemmas the party faces in trying to broaden its base beyond its Islamic
constituency while retaining its core support. Studies of the party have
almost ignored the personal qualities and electoral appeal of its leaders.
The party rose from obscurity in 1999 and continues to argue a relatively
well-articulated view of politics, but its very character as a cadre-based party
limits its capacity to produce a compelling leadership choice in the pres-
idential race. Its strengths in organizational and ideological terms means
that PKS is less likely to suffer the personality based schisms that weaken
other parties, but these features also discourage the emergence of a figure
capable of capturing the wider electorate’s imagination. Moreover, the
party lost its ‘clean’ image after a number of its leaders were revealed to be
involved in corrupt activities. In February 2014 it announced a list of its
potential presidential candidates—DPR party caucus leader Hidayat Nur
Wahid, party chairman Anis Matta, and West Java Governor Ahmad
Heryawan. Reflecting the party’s relatively systematic mode of operation,
the choice was the result of an internal party ballot and reflected a balance
between its various factions. While being long-standing party loyalists,
none of these figures had significant electoral appeal and quickly became
irrelevant as Jokowi and Prabowo emerged as the leading figures in the
2014 campaign.22
In the case of PDIP, its problem with nurturing ranks of new leaders has
been dynastic politics. The figures who gained favor from the dominant
Sukarno clique were members of their own family, such as the uninspiring
Puan Maharani. A new generation of talented potential leaders committed

to the party’s ideals of pluralist nationalism has languished in frustration
behind an immovable front rank that retains the franchise on the dynastic
name. As mentioned, PDIP could not find a place for SBY, the man who
went on to win two elections and, until recently, still seemed to be backing
Megawati as candidate, a person who failed election three times, under
both the indirect and direct electoral systems.
PDIP has been very fortunate that at least one new figure from its ranks
has managed to achieve national prominence largely by his own abilities,
rather than through sponsorship by the party. Joko Widodo—popularly
known as Jokowi—who rose to prominence with his election to the posi-
tion of Governor of Jakarta in September 2012, attracted attention in his
previous position as Mayor of Solo, Surakarta, in Central Java. In that posi-
tion he gained a reputation for non-corrupt, effective government and for
his popularity among the people of the city. In his campaign for the
Governorship of Jakarta he was seen as a fresh uncorrupted figure opposed
to the old circles of entrenched power represented by his main contender,
the incumbent Governor, Fauzi Bowo. With his election as Governor of
Jakarta and his populist, unorthodox style in that office—including pub-
licly embarrassing obstructionist senior bureaucrats—he achieved national
attention and became touted in the media as a presidential candidate. From
early 2013 he began to appear in many polls as one of the leading con-
tenders for public support.
It is notable that despite Jokowi’s nationwide reputation, PDIP took a
long time to accept that he was the party’s only hope of winning in 2014.
Just as SBY’s ascent in 2003–04 was seen by some within PDIP as a threat,
the party was initially divided about whether to support Jokowi’s candidacy
for Jakarta Governor in 2012. Although Megawati reportedly championed
his candidacy, her husband Taufik Kiemas was deeply opposed. From the
time of the 2012 gubernatorial election Taufik was also vocal in his
attempts to disparage any suggestion that Jokowi was an appropriate candi-
date for the 2014 presidential election. He instead advocated Puan
Maharani. Taufik’s influence in the election ceased with his death in June
2013. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s support in opinion polls continued to rise and,
with Megawati’s position languishing in relation to the other main con-
tender, Prabowo, many within the party saw that it had little option but to
back Jokowi. The first clear sign that Megawati was committed to Jokowi
came at the September 2013 national working meeting (Rakernas) of the
party, when she effusively praised Jokowi, declaring he possessed the ‘vibra-
tions’ of her father, President Sukarno.23 Jokowi himself rejected sugges-
tions that he would stand, expressed annoyance at being diverted from
attention to his job as Governor24 and continued to act with great public
deference to Megawati. Many interpreted this as a clear sign that Jokowi
understood the importance of not upsetting the highly sensitive Megawati
by appearing too self-assured about her support for him. The party for
Megawati is a family legacy and could not be endowed on anyone who is
not sufficiently respectful of that fact. It was not until March 2014 that
Megawati finally gave her official support to Jokowi’s candidacy. Her
endorsement both severely limited the time available for the Jokowi team
to build up the momentum of its electoral campaign and handed free
ammunition to Prabowo’s claims that Jokowi was Megawati’s plaything
and a political lightweight.
Conclusion
In the 2014 election the party system failed to put forward a spectrum of
candidates that offers a breadth of choice to the electorate. Until mid-2013,
most polls were topped by Megawati (reflecting the resilience of a core PDIP
social base25), Prabowo (testimony to voter recognition, if not charisma)
and, increasingly as 2013 wore on, by Jokowi. Support levels varied widely
in different polls, indicating their limited reliability, but none of the three
often exceeded 20 per cent. The other possible contenders were deeply
problematic: Bakrie and Surya Paloh were seen as greedy capitalists;
Wiranto a relic of the past; and both Jusuf Kalla’s and Hatta Rajasa’s names
evoked a combination of the two: none registered more than 10 per cent
support in public opinion polls. A few relatively newer figures such as
former Chief of the Constitutional Court and defense minister in the
Abdurrahman Wahid administration, Mahfud MD, state enterprises min-
ister Dahlan Iskan, prominent academic Anies Baswaden, and dynastic
figures such as Puan Maharani, Edhie Baskoro, and SBY’s wife, ‘Ani’
Kristiani Herrawati, never reached beyond single figures.
Jokowi does not carry any negative baggage and has not made any
obvious mistakes as Governor of Jakarta. But his slight political experience
as mayor of a middling provincial city and his short period of service as
Governor of Jakarta does not seem sufficient for a position of such
immense responsibility as President of Indonesia. There has been a strong
sense that Jokowi’s appeal derived from a sense of desperation—in both his
party and in popular opinion—that there was no other viable figure, with
the only alternative being Prabowo. Jokowi will have major problems with
his limited connections and authority within PDIP itself. He holds no
formal office in the party and as president might find it difficult to assert
his control over the dominant figures in the party grouped around
Megawati.
Prabowo represented a very different choice in the sense that he pre-
sented an image of a strong statesman who would lead the government in
a more effective manner than the chaos characterizing the post-Suharto
era, with its corrupt lazy parliament and ill-disciplined cabinet of party
politicians. Prabowo was seen as the very embodiment of disillusionment
and yearning in the wake of the failings of the party politicians, a man who
would return the discipline and decisive leadership supposedly shown
during the old order. Prabowo was the ultimate insider, but his temporary
exile allowed him to play the game of being an outsider who would oppose
the powerful elites, both domestic and foreign. His rise in popularity in the
presidential campaign perhaps had its origin in the same mood that saw
the election of a parliament in which none of the parties were able to
capture the loyalty of a plurality or majority of voters, leaving a fragmented
DPR with ten parties, none of which is likely to provide inspiration or lead-
ership in the legislative branch of government.
The choice that was presented to the voters in 2014 was thus one fresh
but inexperienced neophyte with a difficult relationship with his own party
and a figure from the old regime campaigning on the basis of demagogy
and ultranationalism. After 15 years of democracy, it should be a point of
concern that the party system as a whole could not produce a new genera-
tion of leaders. The only new figure was an inexperienced provincial leader
who was promoted before his time because of the absence of an alternative.
The one encouraging element in this scenario is that the rise of Jokowi
could constitute the beginning of a trend in which national leaders are
recruited from the ranks of provincial executives and/or legislatures.
Significantly, it has been PDIP that has produced more than one such
figure, others including the Governor of Central Java, Ganjar Pranowo, and
the Mayor of Surabaya, Tri Rismaharini, both of whom have achieved
national prominence as PDIP figures in key regional government offices.
This chapter is not alone in raising concerns about the choice of con-
tenders for the 2014 election. But much previous writing has concentrated
on the personal qualities of the leaders. What this chapter has shown is
that the problem is not merely an unfortunate coincidence of personalities,
but rather the product of structural weakness within a party system that
appears incapable of performing the vital role of recruiting a choice of
leaders in whom a majority of the electorate can place its confidence. A
fixed-term presidential system demands that parties produce leaders
according to a precise electoral schedule, but the selection processes within
Indonesian parties necessary to achieve this have been subverted by money
politics, dynastic ambitions, and a systemic neglect of the task of develop-
ing policy alternatives.
The problem with the party system is possibly the most critical example
of the limitations of post-Suharto political reforms. As mentioned above,
the hardware of constitutional and institutional structures are in place and
there is no significant anti-regime or anti-democratic sentiment—inchoate
or organized—but the software of the system is still beset by operational
problems. The people who make institutions work have become very adept
at manipulating the system for short-term and sectional gain, and the old
autocratic players have ‘reorganized’ themselves to survive and prosper in
the new democratic environment.26 Despite institutional reform, the in-

formal rules of the political game as played out under the New Order
regime remain essentially unchanged. The Suharto method was collusive
but also sufficiently inclusive of potential oppositional forces to ensure
they did not openly challenge the status quo.27
Today there is a continuing tendency towards collusive consensus among
the political elite rather than open competition and debate, especially over
questions of policy. As Aspinall has argued, ‘the legacies of a political
transition that kept the old Suharto regime’s ruling elite and patrimonial
governing style largely intact continue to bedevil democratic governance’.28
Coalition-building has been random, ‘promiscuous’, opportunistic, and
determined by division of the spoils of office rather than reflecting coali-
tions of interests committed to policy outcomes.29 During his entire decade
in power, SBY remained determined to govern with all-inclusive coalition
cabinets, regardless of the cost to effective decisionmaking. Ministerial
posts, and the resources attached to them, continue to be treated by min-
isters as their personal fiefdoms. In these circumstances, policy develop-
ment and coordination is extremely difficult and the possibility of reform
of government administration seems remote. And, as has been argued here,
the parties through which the political elite operates have been exceedingly
poor at fostering generational renewal within their own ranks, and thus
have been very slow in producing a spectrum of new leaders from which
the electorate can choose. Unless these tendencies are overcome, the policy
paralysis of the last few years will continue and the economic progress that
has drawn attention to Indonesia’s ascent will stagnate or even regress.
Conditions are nowhere near so dire as to threaten the basis of Indonesian
democracy, but if democratic institutions are seen as failing to deliver pros-
perity and opportunity to a young growing population, there could be
dangers of instability ahead. There are positive lessons and salutary warn-
ings to be taken from the example of Indonesia.
Notes
1 Stephen Sherlock, ‘The parliament in Indonesia’s decade of democratization:
People’s forum or chamber of cronies?’, in E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner (eds)
Problems of Democratisation: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of South
East Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010, p. 171.
2 Anthony Reid, ‘Indonesia’s new prominence in the world’, Indonesia Rising: The
Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore,
2012, p. 1.
3 Joshua Keating, ‘The Indonesian tiger’, Foreign Policy, December 2010.
4 Sherlock, ‘The parliament in Indonesia’s decade of democratisation’, op. cit.
5 David Armstrong, ‘The next Yugoslavia?: The fragmentation of Indonesia’,
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 15, 4, 2004, pp. 783–808.
6 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesian constitutional court decisions in regional head electoral

disputes’, Centre for Democratic Institutions Policy Paper on Political Governance,
No. 1, 2013, Canberra.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Tempo, 27 January–2 February 2014.
10 Juan Linz, ‘The perils of presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy, 1, 1, 1990,
pp. 51–69.
11 Ibid.
12 Dirk Tomsa, ‘Indonesian politics in 2010: The perils of stagnation’, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, 46, 3, 2010, pp. 309–28.
13 Greg Fealy, ‘Indonesian politics in 2011: Democratic regression and Yudhyono’s
regal incumbency’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47, 3, pp. 333–53.
14 Sandra Hamid, ‘Indonesian politics in 2012: Coalitions, accountability and the
future of democracy’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48, 3, pp. 325–45.
15 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: Anti-reformist elites and
civil society resilience’, Democratization, 19, 2, 2012, pp. 209–29.
16 Andrew McIntyre and Doug Ramage, Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country:
Implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2008.
17 Hamid, op. cit., ‘Indonesian politics in 2012’.
18 Jun Honna, ‘Inside the Democrat Party: Power, politics and conflict in
Indonesia’s presidential party’, South East Asia Research, 20, 4, 2012, p. 475.
19 ‘PAN feels heat after two of its celebrity politicians in drug arrests’, Jakarta Post,
28 January 2013.
20 Marcus Mietzner, Money, Power and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian
Indonesia, ASAA & NUS Press, Singapore, 2013, pp. 167–91.
21 Najwa Shihab and Yunuar Nugroho, ‘The ties that bind: Islamisation and
Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 10, 2,
2008, pp. 233–67. Sunny Tanuwidjaja, ‘PKS in post-reformasi Indonesia: Catching
the catch-all and moderation wave’, South East Asian Research, 20, 4, 2012,
pp. 533–49. Michael Buehler, ‘Revisiting the inclusion-moderation thesis in the
context of decentralized institutions: The behaviour of Indonesia’s Prosperous
Justice Party in national and local politics’, Party Politics, November 2012, pp. 1–20.
22 The poor performance of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial
election is an illustration of how difficult it is for one of the party’s established
parliamentary leaders to perform well in the more personality-based direct exec-
utive elections at the national and regional level. With 12 per cent of the vote in
the first round, Hidayat captured the support of only about half of the voters
who identified themselves as PKS supporters (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Exit Poll
Pilgub Jakarta, 2012, p. 35).
23 ‘Megawati: Jokowi punya getaran seperti Bung Karno’ (Megawati: Jokowi has
Sukarno’s vibrations), Kompas Online, 6 September 2013. http://nasional.kompas.
com/read/2013/09/06/1536589/Megawati.Jokowi.Punya.Getaran.seperti.Bung.
Karno
24 ‘Jokowi: Jangan tanya-tanya masalah itu lagi’ (Jokowi: Don’t keep asking about
that issue), Kompas Online, 15 March 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/
2013/03/15/18033254/Jokowi.Jangan.Tanya-tanya.Masalah.Itu.Lagi.
25 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Ideology, money and dynastic leadership: The Indonesian
democratic party of struggle, 1998–2012’, South East Asia Research, 20, 4, 2012,
pp. 511–31.
26 Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of
Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, Routledge Curzon, 2004, London and New York;
Vedi Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia
Perspective, Stanford University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2011.
27 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in
Indonesia, Stanford University Press, 2005.
28 Edward Aspinall, ‘The irony of success’, Journal of Democracy, 21, 2, April 2010,
p. 33–4.
29 Hamid, op. cit., ‘Indonesian politics in 2012’.
Bibliography
Armstrong, David (2004) ‘The Next Yugoslavia?: The Fragmentation of Indonesia’,
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 15, 4, 783–808.
Aspinall, Edward (2005) Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change
in Indonesia, Stanford University Press.
______ (2010) ‘The Irony of Success’, Journal of Democracy, 21, 2, April 2010, pp. 33–4.
Butt, Simon (2013) ‘Indonesian Constitutional Court Decisions in Regional Head
Electoral Disputes’, Centre for Democratic Institutions Policy Paper on Political
Governance, No. 1, Canberra.
Buehler, Michael (2012) ‘Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context
of Decentralised Institutions: The Behaviour of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party
in National and Local Politics’, Party Politics, November, 1–20.
Croissant, Ariel and Merkel, Wolfgang (2004) Political Party Formation in Presidential
and Parliamentary Systems, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Manila.
Fealy, Greg (2011) ‘Indonesian Politics in 2011: Democratic Regression and
Yudhyono’s Regal Incumbency’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47: 3,
333–53.
Hadiz, Vedi (2011) Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia
Perspective, Stanford University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hamid, Sandra (2012) ‘Indonesian Politics in 2012: Coalitions, Accountability and
the Future of Democracy’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48: 3, 325–45.
Honna, Jun (2012) ‘Inside the Democrat Party: Power, Politics and Conflict in
Indonesia’s Presidential Party’, South East Asia Research, 20: 4, 473–89.
Jakarta Post ‘PAN Feels Heat after Two of Its Celebrity Politicians in Drug Arrests’,
28 January 2013.
Keating, Joshua (2010) ‘The Indonesian Tiger’, Foreign Policy, December.
Kompas Online ‘Jokowi: Jangan Tanya-Tanya Masalah Itu Lagi’ (Jokowi: Don’t Keep
Asking about that Issue), 15 March 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/
03/15/18033254/Jokowi.Jangan.Tanya-tanya.Masalah.Itu.Lagi
Kompas Online ‘Megawati: Jokowi Punya Getaran Seperti Bung Karno’ (Megawati:
Jokowi Has Sukarno’s Vibrations), 6 September 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2013/09/06/1536589/Megawati.Jokowi.Punya.Getaran.seperti.Bung.Karno
Lembaga Survei Indonesia (2012) Exit Poll Pilgub Jakarta [Jakarta Gubernatorial
Election Exit Poll], 2012.
Linz, Juan (1990) ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy, 1: 1, 51–69.
McIntyre, Andrew and Ramage, Doug (2008) Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country:
Implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra.
Mietzner, Marcus (2012a) ‘Ideology, Money and Dynastic Leadership: The

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 1998–2012’, South East Asia Research, 20:
4, 511–31.
______ (2012b) ‘Indonesia’s Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Civil
Society Resilience’, Democratization, 19: 2, 209–29.
______ (2013) Money, Power and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian
Indonesia, ASAA & NUS Press, Singapore.
Reid, Anthony (2012) ‘Indonesia’s New Prominence in the World’, Indonesia Rising:
The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies,
Singapore.
Robison, Richard and Hadiz, Vedi (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics
of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, Routledge Curzon, London & New York.
Sherlock, Stephen (2012) ‘Made by Committee and Consensus: Parties and Policy in
the Indonesian Parliament’, South East Asian Research, 20: 4, 511–31.
_____ (2009) ‘SBY’s Consensus Cabinet – Lanjutkan?’ Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Studies, 45: 3, 342–3.
_____ (2010) ‘The Parliament in Indonesia’s Decade of Democratisation: People’s
Forum or Chamber of Cronies?’ in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds)
Problems of Democratisation: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of South East
Asian Studies, Singapore.
Shihab, Najwa and Nugroho, Yunuar (2008) ‘The Ties that Bind: Islamisation and
Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 10: 2,
233–67.
Tanuwidjaja, Sunny (2012) ‘PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Catching the Catch-All
and Moderation Wave’, South East Asian Research, 2: 4, 533–49.
Tomsa, Dirk (2010) ‘Indonesian Politics in 2010: The Perils of Stagnation’, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, 46: 3, 309–28.

Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Indonesia’s Ascent

Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order

List of Figures and Table xii

4 Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National 69

Indonesia’s ongoing security landscape 130

11 The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation 224

15 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, 308

Conceptualizing Indonesia’s ascent toward great power status in Asia

Islam in the republic: National stability and economic

The Indonesian ‘national revival’ that occurred during the early

Prophet) was founded to inspire Muslims in the archipelago to embrace

and an obligation to carry out Sharia. Sukarno and Hatta—abangan

While Sukarno set Indonesia on a radicalized course of economic nation-

direct economic development. The second constellation of social forces used

instability, Indonesia’s Islamic organizations—which had previously been

Islam as a revolutionary force and the discourse of a revisionist

In East Timor, the revolutionary events on Java encouraged nationalist

significant number of seats. The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan

caused a precipitous decline in legitimacy for his presidency. This loss of

The afflictions of ‘Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme’ (Corruption, Collusion,

Democratic stability, economic development, and an Islamic

commitment to the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch, but also an

(tawassuth), tolerance (tasamuh), balance (tawazun), consultation (shura)

The success of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in carrying out

This sentiment on the relationship between Islam, democracy and the

A clash of civilizations is not inevitable. A confluence of civilizations is

There is a political culture in Indonesia that is convinced that the Muslims

Ensuring the social protection of the most vulnerable segments of

Economic growth is best facilitated through democratic governance, and

In the wake of these changes and uncertainties, we have only two

to avoid the lessons of previous centuries where Muslims were relegated

The failure to achieve economic development is understood by SBY as

than 45 per cent in 2011.56 For Indonesia to ascend it must continue to

32 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Public Opinion Survey

47 Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Hefner, Robert W. and Horvatich, Patricia (1997) Islam in an Era of Nation-States:

Vickers, Adrian (2005) A History of Modern Indonesia (New York: Cambridge

Indonesia has experienced an astonishing transformation over the last

drawn international attention to the country and created a feeling that

A decade of democratic achievement

have been given practical effect by successive administrations, which have

which was important in protecting the body against attempts to under-

encouraged candidates to remain loyal to the parties with a proven capa-

Indonesia’s third transition: A time of uncertainty

Stalled reform and policy paralysis

lack of transparency and accountability in decisionmaking. Politicians

The presidential election of 2014 entailed the previous regime handing

identity emerging from roots in social groupings or particular historical cir-

through the power of money, but whose credibility as a vote-winner

system—socially and historically rooted, with some ideological orientation

Puan Maharani. A new generation of talented potential leaders committed

the new democratic environment.26 Despite institutional reform, the in-

6 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesian constitutional court decisions in regional head electoral

Mietzner, Marcus (2012a) ‘Ideology, Money and Dynastic Leadership: The

You might also like