Shilpa Sailesh ..... Petitioner Versus Varun Sreenivasan ..... Respondent

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1118 OF 2014
SHILPA SAILESH ..... PETITIONER
VERSUS
VARUN SREENIVASAN ..... RESPONDENT
WITH
TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 96 OF 2014
AND
TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1481-1482 OF 2014
JUDGMENT
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Charanjeet Kaur
Date: 2023.05.01
Background.
14:05:29 IST
Reason:
T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 & Ors. Page 1 of 61

The issues before this Constitution Bench, as adumbrated
below, arise primarily from the order dated 12.05.2010 passed in
T.P. (C) No. 899 of 2007, Neeti Malviya v. Rakesh Malviya,
wherein a bench of two judges had doubted the view expressed in
Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore1 and Manish Goel v. Rohini
Goel2 that this Court, in exercise of the power under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India, cannot reduce or waive the period of six
months for moving the second motion as stipulated in sub-section
(2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 3. Noticing that
this Court, some High Courts and even family courts in some
States had been dispensing with or reducing the period of six
months for moving the second motion when there was no
possibility whatsoever of the spouses cohabiting, the following
question was referred to a three judges’ bench for a clear ruling
and future guidance:
“(I) Whether the period prescribed in sub-section

(2) of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 can be waived or reduced by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution?”
1 (2002) 10 SCC 194. This decision is rendered by a three judges’ bench.

2 (2010) 4 SCC 393.
3 For Short, ‘Hindu Marriage Act’.

However, the question was never decided, since T.P. (C) No. 899
of 2007 was rendered infructuous as the parties, subsequent to
the order of reference, had dissolved their marriage by mutual
consent.
2. In T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 4, Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun
Sreenivasan, a bench of two judges, vide the order dated
06.04.20155, issued notice to the Attorney General for India for
addressing arguments on the following issues:
“1. The scope and extent of power of this court under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India insofar as
dispensing with the period of notice under Section 13-
B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is concerned.
2. The stand of the Government with regard to

statutory incorporation of irretrievable break-down of
marriage as one of the conditions for grant of divorce.
3. Any other incidental and ancillary issue that may

arise may also be addressed by the learned Attorney
General.”
3. The Attorney General for India, in paragraph 5 of his written
submissions, had suggested two additional questions of law, which
read thus:
4 Tagged with T.P. (Crl) No. 96 of 2014, T.P. (Crl) No. 339 of 2014, T.P. (Crl.) No. 382 of 2014, T.P.
(Crl.) No. 468 of 2014 and T.P. (C) No. 1481 – 1482 of 2014.
5 T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 along with T.P. (Crl.) No. 382 of 2014, T.P. (Crl.) No. 468 of 2014 and T.P.
(C) No. 1481 – 1482 of 2014.

“In view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Court in the
above cases, the view of the Hon’ble Court that
divorce can be granted on the ground of “irretrievable
break-down of marriage” even in the absence of such
ground being contemplated by the Legislature may
require consideration by the Constitution Bench.
Similarly, the issue as to whether the period prescribed

in sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 can be waived or reduced by this
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of
the Constitution also requires consideration by the
Constitution Bench.”
4. T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 20146 was effectively disposed of vide the
order dated 06.05.2015 dissolving the marriage by grant of divorce
by mutual consent with the two judges’ bench exercising
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. However,
in view the conflicting ratio of the judgments of this Court on the
applicability of the power and jurisdiction of this Court under Article
142 of the Constitution of India, the two judges’ bench of this Court
deferred the transfer petition to remain pending for statistical
purposes, and formulated the following questions of law to be
decided by a three judges’ bench:
“4. Notwithstanding the above order passed by us, for

the purposes of statistics the present transfer petitions
shall remain pending as we are of the view that an
issue of some importance needs to be addressed by
the Court in view of the huge number of requests for
exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution
that has confronted this Court consequent to
settlement arrived at by and between the husband and
the wife to seek divorce by mutual consent.
6 Along with T.P.(Crl.) No. 382 of 2014, T.P.(Crl.) No. 468 of 2014 and T.P.(C) No. 1481 – 1482 of
2014.

5. The questions are formulated herein below:
1. “What could be the broad parameters for exercise of

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to
dissolve a marriage between the consenting parties
without referring the parties to the Family Court to wait
for the mandatory period prescribed under Section 13-
B of the Hindu Marriage Act.
2. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction under

Article 142 should not be made at all or whether such
exercise should be left to be determined in the facts of
every case.”
5. Thereafter, vide the order dated 29.06.2016, another bench of two
judges of this Court, on examining the questions formulated in T.P.
(C) No. 1118 of 2014, referred to Article 145(3) of the Constitution
of India, and relying on Pradip Chandra Parija and Others v.
Pramod Chandra Patnaik and Others 7, accepted the submission
made by the Attorney General for India to refer the questions
formulated in T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 for consideration of the
Constitution Bench8. It was left to the discretion of the Constitution
Bench to decide whether it would be inclined to consider the two
questions of law indicated by the Attorney General for India.
7 (2002) 1 SCC 1.
8 We are not examining and commenting on the ratio expounded in Pradip Chandra Parija & Others
(supra).

6. This Constitution Bench, after hearing the parties, vide the order
dated 20.09.2022, had deemed it appropriate to formulate another
question of law, which reads thus:
“We do believe that another question which would

require consideration would be whether the power
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is
inhibited in any manner in a scenario where there is an
irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the opinion of
the Court but one of the parties is not consenting to
the terms.”
7. Accordingly, the following substantial questions of law arise for
consideration before us:
(i) The scope and ambit of power and jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India;

(ii) Secondly, in view of, and depending upon the findings of this
bench on the first question, whether this Court, while hearing a
transfer petition, or in any other proceedings, can exercise
power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in view
of the settlement between the parties, and grant a decree of
divorce by mutual consent dispensing with the period and the
procedure prescribed under Section 13-B of the Hindu
Marriage Act, and also quash and dispose of other/connected
proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 20059, Section 125 of the Code of Criminal

9 For short, ‘Domestic Violence Act’.

Procedure, 197310, or criminal prosecution primarily under
Section 498-A and other provisions of the Indian Penal Code,
186011. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, in
which cases and under what circumstances should this Court
exercise jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India is an ancillary issue to be decided; and
(iii) The third issue, which is of considerable importance, is
whether this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India when there is
complete and irretrievable breakdown of marriage in spite of
the other spouse opposing the prayer.
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.
8. Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India reads:
“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of

Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.—
(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order
as is necessary for doing complete justice in any
cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so
passed or order so made shall be enforceable
throughout the territory of India in such manner as
may be prescribed by or under any law made by
Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so
made, in such manner as the President may by order
prescribe.”
10 For short, ‘Cr.P.C.’.

11 For short, ‘I.P.C.’.

This provision, apparently unique as it does not have any
counterpart in most of the major written constitutions of the
world12, has its origin in and is inspired from the age-old concepts
of justice, equity, and good conscience. Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India, which gives wide and capacious power to the
Supreme Court to do ‘complete justice’ in any ‘cause or matter’ is
significant, as the judgment delivered by this Court ends the
litigation between the parties. Given the expansive amplitude of
power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, the
exercise of power must be legitimate, and clamours for caution,
mindful of the danger that arises from adopting an individualistic
approach as to the exercise of the Constitutional power.
9. Interpreting Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in M. Siddiq
(Dead) Through Legal Representatives (Ram Janmabhumi
Temple Case) v. Mahant Suresh Das and Others13, the
Constitution Bench of this Court has summarised the contours of
the power as:
“1023. …The phrase ‘is necessary for doing complete

justice’ is of a wide amplitude and encompasses a
power of equity which is employed when the strict
application of the law is inadequate to produce a just
outcome. The demands of justice require a close
attention not just to positive law but also to the
12 The Constitutions of Bangladesh and Nepal have provisions similar to Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, suggesting that they have drawn inspiration from Article 142 of the Constitution
of India.
13 (2020) 1 SCC 1.

silences of positive law to find within its interstices, a
solution that is equitable and just. The legal enterprise
is premised on the application of generally worded
laws to the specifics of a case before courts. The
complexities of human history and activity inevitably
lead to unique contests “such as in this case, involving
religion, history and the law — which the law, by its
general nature, is inadequate to deal with. Even where
positive law is clear, the deliberately wide amplitude of
the power under Article 142 empowers a court to pass
an order which accords with justice. For justice is the
foundation which brings home the purpose of any legal
enterprise and on which the legitimacy of the rule of
law rests. The equitable power under Article 142 of the
Constitution brings to fore the intersection between the
general and specific. Courts may find themselves in
situations where the silences of the law need to be
infused with meaning or the rigours of its rough edges
need to be softened for law to retain its humane and
compassionate face...”
Words in the above quotation that ‘the equitable power under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India brings to fore the
intersection between the general and specific’ laws, should be
read as making a reference to the classification of equity by
Professor C.K. Allen14 in two principle forms: (i) a liberal and
humane interpretation of law in general, so far as that is possible
without actual antagonism to the law itself – called equity in
general; and (ii) a liberal and humane modification of the law in
exceptional cases, not coming within the ambit of the general rule
– called particular equity.15 The words ‘cause or matter’ in Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India, which particularise and
14 ‘See – C.K. Allen, Law in the Making (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927).
15 See – Ninad Laud, Rationalising “Complete Justice” under Article 142, (2021) 1 SCC J-30.

empower this Court to do ‘complete justice’ in that ‘cause or
matter’, are relatable to particular equity 16. This is the reason that
it has been held that Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India
turns the maxim ‘equity follows the law’ on its head, as this Article
in the Constitution of India gives legal authority to this Court to
give precedence to equity over law. This power, like all powers
under the Constitution of India, must be contained and regulated,
as it has been held that relief based on equity should not
disregard the substantive mandate of law based on underlying
fundamental general and specific issues of public policy. Subject
to this limitation, this Court, while moulding relief, can go to the
extent of relaxing the application of law to the parties or exempting
the parties altogether from the rigours of the law, in view of the
particular facts and circumstances of the case. 17 In I. C. Golak
Nath and Others v. State of Punjab and Another 18, K. Subba
Rao, CJ., while invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling,
held that the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India
is wide and elastic, and enables this Court to formulate legal
doctrines to meet the ends of justice, and the only limitation
thereon is reason, restraint and injustice. Restraint and deference

16 As this Court interprets the law and adjudicates specific cases, in many a case, it exercises and
applies both equity in general and particular equity. Also see – distinction between ‘cause’ and
‘matter’.
17 See – State (Through Central Bureau of Investigation) v. Kalyan Singh (Former Chief Minister of
Uttar Pradesh) and Others, (2017) 7 SCC 444.
18 AIR 1967 SC 1643.

are facets of the Rule of Law, and when it comes to the separation
of the role and functions of the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary, the exercise of power by this Court to do ‘complete
justice’, being for a ‘cause or matter’, does not interfere with and
encroach on the legislature’s power and function to legislate.
Clearly, when this Court exercises jurisdiction conferred by Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ in a
‘cause or matter’, it acts within the four corners of the Constitution
of India. The power specifically bestowed by the Constitution of
India on the apex court of the country is with a purpose, and
should be considered as integral to the decision in a ‘cause or
matter’. To do ‘complete justice’ is the utmost consideration and
guiding spirit of Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.
10. In Union Carbide Corporation and Others v. Union of India
and Others19, this Court laid specific emphasis on the expression
‘cause or matter’ to observe that ‘cause’ means any action or
criminal proceedings, and ‘matter’ means any proceedings in the
court and not in a ‘cause’. The words ‘cause or matter’, when used
together, cover almost every kind of proceedings in court, whether
civil or criminal, interlocutory or final, before or after judgment.
Having held so, this Court observed thus:
19 (1991) 4 SCC 584.

“83. It is necessary to set at rest certain
misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope
of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution. These issues are matters of serious
public importance. The proposition that a provision in
any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the
public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit
the powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1) is
unsound and erroneous. In both Garg as well
as Antulay cases the point was one of violation of
constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The
observations as to the effect of inconsistency with
statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those
cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned
on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with
Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article
142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are
concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or
482 CrPC or all of them put together. The power under
Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a
different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or
provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso
facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the
constitutional powers under Article 142. Such
prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody
and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into
account the nature and status of the authority or the
court on which conferment of powers — limited in
some appropriate way — is contemplated. The
limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on
any fundamental considerations of public policy. Sri
Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg
case, said that limitation on the powers under Article
142 arising from “inconsistency with express statutory
provisions of substantive law” must really mean and
be understood as some express prohibition contained
in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if
the expression ‘prohibition’ is read in place of
‘provision’ that would perhaps convey the appropriate
idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be
shown to be based on some underlying fundamental
and general issues of public policy and not merely
incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It
will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under
Article 142 are subject to such express statutory
prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory
provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps,

the proper way of expressing the idea is that in
exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing
the needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter,
the apex Court will take note of the express
prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision
based on some fundamental principles of public policy
and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion
accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the
powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what
is or is not ‘complete justice’ of a cause or matter and
in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise
of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of
nullity can arise.”
11. Whether this ratio is in conflict with the earlier decisions 20 of this
Court, including Prem Chand Garg and Another v. The Excise
Commissioner, U.P. and Others21, wherein five judges of the
Constitution Bench had held that this power under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution of India cannot be employed to make an order
plainly inconsistent with the express statutory provision or
substantive law, much less inconsistent with any Constitutional
provisions, was examined by another five judges’ bench of this
Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and
Another22, to observe that there was no conflict of ratios as
elucidated in Union Carbide Corporation (supra) and other
20 A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another, (1988) 2 SCC 602; Delhi Judicial Service Association,
Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others, (1991) 4 SCC 406; and Mohammed Anis v.
Union of India and Others, 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 145. In Mohammed Anis , this Court, while
elucidating and unfolding the aspect of public policy and when it would operate to limit the power of
the Supreme Court, observes that given the nature of power conferred by the Constitution of India on
this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is of a different quality and level,
prohibitions or limitations on provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot ipso facto act as
prohibitions or limitations on the Constitutional power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
The decision observes that mere reference to a larger bench does not prohibit this Court in a given
case from its exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
21 AIR 1963 SC 996.
22 (1998) 4 SCC 409.

cases. It is one thing to state that prohibitions or limitations cannot
come in the way of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1)
of the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ between the
parties in the pending ‘cause or matter’ arising out of that statute,
but quite a different thing to say that, while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court can
altogether ignore the substantive provisions of the statute dealing
with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can
be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in the statute. 23
These observations were in the context of the powers conferred
on the State Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961, which,
at the first instance, is empowered to decide whether an advocate
is guilty of professional misconduct depending on the gravity and
nature of his contumacious conduct. This Court, in Supreme
Court Bar Association (supra), has highlighted that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in contempt, and the jurisdiction
of the State Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961 are
separate and distinct, and are exercisable by following separate
and distinct procedures. The power to punish for contempt of court
vests exclusively with the courts, whereas the power to punish an
advocate for professional misconduct has been vested with the
23 There is also distinction between existence of power, and proper exercise of power in a given
case, which aspect we have subsequently examined in paragraph 20.

concerned State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India. In this
context, we would like to quote the following passages from
Supreme Court Bar Association (supra):
“47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142

of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are
complementary to those powers which are specifically
conferred on the Court by various statutes though are
not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist
independent of the statutes with a view to do complete
justice between the parties. These powers are of very
wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary
powers. This power exists as a separate and
independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the
statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis
for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps
even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process
of litigation and to do complete justice between the
parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual
source of power which this Court may draw upon as
necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so
and in particular to ensure the observance of the due
process of law, to do complete justice between the
parties, while administering justice according to law.
There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to
all other powers and is free from the restraint of
jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the
hands of the Court to prevent “clogging or obstruction
of the stream of justice”. It, however, needs to be
remembered that the powers conferred on the Court
by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be
construed as powers which authorise the Court to
ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing
with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be
used to “supplant” substantive law applicable to the
case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article
142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be
used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier,
by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a
subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly
which cannot be achieved directly. Punishing a
contemner advocate, while dealing with a contempt of
court case by suspending his licence to practice, a
power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar
Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is

also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The
construction of Article 142 must be functionally
informed by the salutary purposes of the article, viz., to
do complete justice between the parties. It cannot be
otherwise. As already noticed in a case of contempt of
court, the contemner and the court cannot be said to
be litigating parties.
48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 142 has the power to make such order as
is necessary for doing complete justice “between the
parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The
very nature of the power must lead the Court to set
limits for itself within which to exercise those powers
and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision
governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the
equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating
parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or
matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of
restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well
recognised and established that this Court has always
been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely
dispute-settling. It is a “problem-solver in the nebulous
areas” but the substantive statutory provisions dealing
with the subject-matter of a given case cannot be
altogether ignored by this Court, while making an
order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional
powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any
statutory provisions but at the same time these powers
are not meant to be exercised when their exercise
may come directly in conflict with what has been
expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly
with the subject.”
12. We must, at this stage, as noticed in Union Carbide Corporation
(supra), draw a distinction between the Constitutional power
exercisable by this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India, and the inherent power of the civil court recognised by
Section 151 of the C.P.C. and the inherent power of the High
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which provisions empower the

civil court in civil cases and the High Court in criminal cases to
pass such orders as may be necessary to meet the ‘ends of
justice’ or to prevent abuse of the process of court. The
expression ‘ends of justice’ refers to the best interest of the public
within the four corners of the law, albeit the courts are not
empowered to act contrary to the procedure on the particular
aspect of law provided in the C.P.C. and the Cr.P.C. Where the
C.P.C. and the Cr.P.C. are silent, the civil court or the High Court, 24
respectively, can pass orders in the interest of the public, for the
simple reason that no legislation is capable of contemplating all
possible circumstances that may arise in future litigation and
consequently provide a procedure for them 25. Thus, the C.P.C. and
the Cr.P.C. should not be read as to limit or otherwise affect the
inherent power of the civil court and the High Court, respectively,
to make such order as is necessary for the ‘ends of justice’, or to
prevent abuse of the process of the court. 26 The Constitutional
power conferred by Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India on

24 For Section 151 C.P.C. see – Jet Ply Wood (P.) Ltd. and Another v. Madhukar Nowlakha and
Others, (2006) 3 SCC 699; and Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney, 1941 SCC OnLine
Cal 247. For Section 482 Cr.P.C. see – Popular Muthiah v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police,
(2006) 7 SCC 296; and Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2001) 8 SCC 570.
25 This statement on legislation is equally true, if not truer, for exercise of power by this Court under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.
26 Earlier judgments of different High Courts in Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh, 2003 SCC OnLine Raj 326;
Nagen Kundu v. Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine Cal 12; and Chhail Das v. State of Haryana, 1974 SCC
OnLine P&H 246, relating to the Cr.P.C., hold that the Cr.P.C. is deemed to be exhaustive when
covered by a provision, but where a case arises which demands exercise of discretion, which is not
within the provisions that the Cr.P.C. specifically provides, it would be reasonable to say that the court
has power to make such order as the ‘ends of justice’ require. Every criminal court, including the
court of a Metropolitan Magistrate, has this power, notwithstanding the specific power conferred
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on the High Court.

this Court is not a replication of the inherent power vested with the
civil court under the C.P.C., and the High Court under the Cr.P.C.
13. Given the aforesaid background and judgments of this Court, the
plenary and conscientious power conferred on this Court under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, seemingly unhindered,
is tempered or bounded by restraint, which must be exercised
based on fundamental considerations of general and specific
public policy. Fundamental general conditions of public policy refer
to the fundamental rights, secularism, federalism, and other basic
features of the Constitution of India. Specific public policy should
be understood as some express pre-eminent prohibition in any
substantive law, and not stipulations and requirements to a
particular statutory scheme. It should not contravene a
fundamental and non-derogable principle at the core of the
statute. Even in the strictest sense 27, it was never doubted or

27 Some jurists have opined that the judgments on the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution of India can be divided into three phases. The first phase till late 1980s is reflected in
the judgments of Prem Chand Garg (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra), which inter alia held that the
directions should not be repugnant to and in violation of specific statutory provision and is limited to
deviation from the rules of procedure. Further, the direction must not infringe the Fundamental Rights
of the individual, which proposition has never been doubted and holds good in phase two and three.
The second phase has its foundation in the ratio of the judgment of the 11-Judge Constitution Bench
of this Court in I. C. Golak Nath (supra), dealing with the doctrine of prospective overruling, which
held that Articles 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court
to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice, the only limitation thereon being reason,
restraint and injustice. In Delhi Judicial Service Association (supra), this Court observes that any
prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional
power of this Court to issue any order or direction to do ‘complete justice’ in any ‘cause’ or ‘matter’.
Finally, the moderated approach has its origin in Union Carbide Corporation (supra), which holds that
this Court, in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of ‘complete justice’ of
a ‘cause’ or ‘matter’, will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision
based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and
discretion accordingly. The judgment of Supreme Court Bar Association (supra), applies cautious and

debated that this Court is empowered under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ without being bound
by the relevant provisions of procedure, if it is satisfied that the
departure from the said procedure is necessary to do ‘complete
justice’ between the parties.28 Difference between procedural and
substantive law in jurisprudential terms is contentious, albeit not
necessary to be examined in depth in the present decision 29, as in
terms of the dictum enunciated by this Court in Union Carbide
Corporation (supra) and Supreme Court Bar Association
(supra), exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution
of India to do ‘complete justice’ in a ‘cause or matter’ is prohibited
only when the exercise is to pass an order which is plainly and
expressly barred by statutory provisions of substantive law based
on fundamental considerations of general or specific public policy.
As explained in Supreme Court Bar Association (supra), the
exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India
being curative in nature, this Court would not ordinarily pass an
balanced approach, to hold that Article 142 being curative in nature and a constitutional power
cannot be controlled by any statutory provision, but this power is not meant to be exercised ignoring
the statutory provisions or directly in conflict with what is expressly provided in the statute. At the
same-time, it observes, that this Court will not ordinarily discard a statutory provision governing the
subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the parties to “iron
out the creases” in a ‘cause or matter’ before it. [See – Rajat Pradhan, Ironing out the Creases: Re-
examining the Contours of Invoking Article 142(1) of the Constitution, (2011) 6 NSLR 1; Ninad Laud,
Rationalising “Complete Justice” under Article 142, (2021) 1 SCC J-30; and Virendra Kumar, Notes
and Comments: Judicial Legislation Under Article 142 of the Constitution: A Pragmatic Prompt for
Proper Legislation by Parliament, 54 JILI (2012) 364]. As observed by us, the ratio as expounded in
Union Carbide Corporation (supra) holds good and applies.
28 See – Prem Chand Garg (supra), paragraph 13.
29 However, this aspect has been, to some extent, examined in paragraphs 16 to 22 and 30 infra.

order ignoring or disregarding a statutory provision governing the
subject, except to balance the equities between conflicting claims
of the litigating parties by ironing out creases in a ‘cause or matter’
before it. In this sense, this Court is not a forum of restricted
jurisdiction when it decides and settles the dispute in a ‘cause or
matter’. While this Court cannot supplant the substantive law by
building a new edifice where none existed earlier, or by ignoring
express substantive statutory law provisions, it is a problem-solver
in the nebulous areas. As long as ‘complete justice’ required by
the ‘cause or matter’ is achieved without violating fundamental
principles of general or specific public policy, the exercise of the
power and discretion under Article 142(1) is valid and as per the
Constitution of India. This is the reason why the power under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India is undefined and
uncatalogued, so as to ensure elasticity to mould relief to suit a
given situation. The fact that the power is conferred only on this
Court is an assurance that it will be used with due restraint and
circumspection.30
Hindu marriage and divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
14. Hindu marriage is traditionally considered to be a sacred union; a
devout relationship that lasts till eternity. The Hindu Marriage Act
30 See – Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. And Another, (1996) 4
SCC 622.

provides the right to approach the court for dissolution of Hindu
marriage by grant of a decree of divorce on the grounds
mentioned in Section 13 thereof. The provisions of the Hindu
Marriage Act have undergone considerable changes over a period
of time. Section 13(1)(i-a) was enacted by the Marriage Laws
(Amendment) Act, 197631 to provide for divorce in cases of cruelty.
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act was introduced for
providing divorce by mutual consent. Explanation was added to
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which relates to restitution of
conjugal rights, stating that where a question of whether there has
been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from society arises, the
burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who
has so withdrawn from the society. The effect of the said
amendment, as noticed below, partially dilutes the rigours of sub-
section (1)(a) to Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which
stipulates that the court, while examining whether any ground for
granting relief exists, should be satisfied that the petitioner is not,
in any way, taking advantage of his/her own wrong or disability for
the purpose of such relief.
15. Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as under:
“13-B. Divorce by mutual consent.—(1) Subject to

the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of
31 Act 68 of 1976, w.e.f. 27.05.1976.

marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to
the district court by both the parties to a marriage
together, whether such marriage was solemnized
before or after the commencement of the Marriage
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the
ground that they have been living separately for a
period of one year or more, that they have not been
able to live together and that they have mutually
agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier

than six months after the date of the presentation of
the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later
than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition
is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on
being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after
making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has
been solemnized and that the averments in the
petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring
the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date
of the decree.”
16. Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act states that a decree of
divorce may be granted on a joint petition by the parties on
fulfilment of the following conditions:
(a) the parties have been living separately for a period of one
year or more before presentation of the petition;
(b) they have not been able to live together; and
(c) they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be
dissolved.
Sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act
provides that after the first motion is passed, the couple/parties
would have to move to the court with the second motion, if the

petition is not withdrawn in the meanwhile, after six months and
not later than eighteen months of the first motion. No action can
be taken by the parties before the lapse of six months since the
first motion. When the second motion is filed, the court is to make
an inquiry, and on satisfaction that the averments made in the
petition are true, a decree of divorce is granted. Clearly, the
legislative intent behind incorporating sub-section (2) to Section
13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act is that the couple/party must have
time to introspect and consider the decision to separate before the
second motion is moved. However, there are cases of exceptional
hardship, where after some years of acrimonious litigation and
prolonged suffering, the parties, with a view to have a fresh start,
jointly pray to the court to dissolve the marriage, and seek waiver
of the need to move the second motion. On account of
irreconcilable differences, allegations and aspersions made
against each other and the family members, and in some cases
multiple litigations including criminal cases, continuation of the
marital relationship is an impossibility. The divorce is inevitable,
and the cooling off period of six months, if at all, breeds misery
and pain, without any gain and benefit. These are cases where
the object and purpose behind sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of
the Hindu Marriage Act to safeguard against hurried and hasty

decisions are not in issue and question, and the procedural
requirement to move the court with the second motion after a gap
of six months acts as an impediment in the settlement. At times,
payment of alimony and permanent lump-sum maintenance gets
delayed, while anxiety and suspicion remain. Here, the procedure
should give way to a larger public and personal interest of the
parties in ending the litigation(s), and the pain and sorrow
effected, by passing a formal decree of divorce, as de-facto the
marriage had ended much earlier.
17. Analysing the provisions of sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the
Hindu Marriage Act, this Court in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen
Kaur32 went into the question of whether the cooling off period of
six months is mandatory or discretionary. It was held that the
cooling off period can be waived by the court where the
proceedings have remained pending for long in the courts, these
being cases of exceptional situations. It was held thus:
“14. The learned Amicus Curiae submitted that waiting

period enshrined under Section 13-B(2) of the Act is
directory and can be waived by the court where
proceedings are pending, in exceptional situations.
This view is supported by the judgments of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini,
Karnataka High Court in Roopa Reddy v. Prabhakar
Reddy, Delhi High Court in Dhanjit Vadra v. Beena
Vadra and Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Dineshkumar Shukla v. Neeta. Contrary view has been
taken by the Kerala High Court in M. Krishna Preetha
32 (2017) 8 SCC 746.

v. Jayan Moorkkanatt. It was submitted that Section
13-B(1) relates to jurisdiction of the court and the
petition is maintainable only if the parties are living
separately for a period of one year or more and if they
have not been able to live together and have agreed
that the marriage be dissolved. Section 13-B(2) is
procedural. He submitted that the discretion to waive
the period is a guided discretion by consideration of
interest of justice where there is no chance of
reconciliation and parties were already separated for a
longer period or contesting proceedings for a period
longer than the period mentioned in Section 13-B(2).
Thus, the court should consider the questions:
(i) How long parties have been married?

(ii) How long litigation is pending?
(iii)How long they have been staying apart?
(iv) Are there any other proceedings between the
parties?
(v) Have the parties attended mediation/
conciliation?
(vi) Have the parties arrived at genuine settlement
which takes care of alimony, custody of child or
any other pending issues between the parties?
xx xx xx
19. Applying the above to the present situation, we are

of the view that where the court dealing with a matter
is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the
statutory period under Section 13-B(2), it can do so
after considering the following:
(i) the statutory period of six months specified in

Section 13-B(2), in addition to the statutory period
of one year under Section 13-B(1) of separation of
parties is already over before the first motion itself;
(ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including

efforts in terms of Order 32-A Rule 3 CPC/Section
23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act
to reunite the parties have failed and there is no
likelihood of success in that direction by any
further efforts;

(iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences
including alimony, custody of child or any other
pending issues between the parties;
(iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
The waiver application can be filed one week after the

first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. If
the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the
waiting period for the second motion will be in the
discretion of the court concerned.”
The time gap is meant to enable the parties to cogitate, analyse
and take a deliberated decision. The object of the cooling off
period is not to stretch the already disintegrated marriage, or to
prolong the agony and misery of the parties when there are no
chances of the marriage working out. Therefore, once every effort
has been made to salvage the marriage and there remains no
possibility of reunion and cohabitation, the court is not powerless
in enabling the parties to avail a better option, which is to grant
divorce. The waiver is not to be given on mere asking, but on the
court being satisfied beyond doubt that the marriage has shattered
beyond repair. The judgment in Amardeep Singh (supra) refers to
several questions that the court would ask before passing an
order one way or the other. However, this judgment proceeds on
the interpretation of Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
and does not examine whether this Court can take on record a
settlement agreement and grant divorce by mutual consent under

Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act in exercise of the power
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.
18. We must acknowledge that this Court has very often entertained
applications/prayers for divorce by mutual consent under Section
13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, and passed a decree of divorce
without relegating or asking the parties to move a joint motion
before the trial court. In such cases, other pending proceedings
between the parties, civil and criminal, are appropriately dealt with
in terms of the settlement, and are decreed, quashed or closed
accordingly. This situation arises when proceedings are pending in
this Court against an interim or a final order passed in a judicial
proceeding, or on a transfer petition being filed before this Court.
The parties may mutually agree to dissolve the marriage, albeit on
many occasions they enter into settlements, often through
mediation or on being prompted by the Court. In matrimonial
matters, settlement, and not litigation, is the preferable mode of
dispute resolution.33
19. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India by this Court in such cases is clearly permissible to do
‘complete justice’ to a ‘cause or matter’. We should accept that
this Court can pass an order or decree which a family court, trial
33 See – Section 89 of the C.P.C. and Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

court or High Court can pass. As per Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India, a decree passed or an order made by this
Court is executable throughout the territory of India. 34 Power of
this Court under Articles 136 and 142(1) of the Constitution of
India will certainly embrace and enswathe this power to do
‘complete justice’, even when the main case/proceeding is
pending before the family court, the trial court or another judicial
forum. A question or issue of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
does not arise. Settlements in matrimonial matters invariably end
multiple legal proceedings, including criminal proceedings in
different courts and at diverse locations. Necessarily, in such
cases, the parties have to move separate applications in multiple
courts, including the jurisdictional High Court, for appropriate relief
and closure, and disposal and/or dismissal of cases. This puts
burden on the courts in the form of listing, paper work, compliance
with formalities, verification etc. Parallelly, parties have to bear the
cost, appear before several forums/courts and the final orders get
delayed causing anxiety and apprehension. In this sense, when
this Court exercises the power under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India, it assists and aids the cause of justice.
34 See – the Supreme Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order, 1954 (C.O.47).

20. However, there is a difference between existence of a power, and
exercise of that power in a given case. Existence of power is
generally a matter of law, whereas exercise of power is a mixed
question of law and facts. Even when the power to pass a decree
of divorce by mutual consent exists and can be exercised by this
Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, when and in
which of the cases the power should be exercised to do ‘complete
justice’ in a ‘cause or matter’ is an issue that has to be determined
independent of existence of the power. This discretion has to be
exercised on the basis of the factual matrix in the particular case,
evaluated on objective criteria and factors, without ignoring the
objective of the statutory provisions. In Amit Kumar v. Suman

35
Beniwal , this Court has held that reading of sub-sections (1)
and (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act envisages a
total waiting period/gap of one and a half years from the date of
separation for the grant of decree of divorce by mutual consent.
Once the condition for waiting period/gap of one and a half year
from the date of separation is fulfilled, it can be safely said that the
parties had time to ponder, reflect and take a conscious decision
on whether they should really put the marriage to end for all times
to come. This period of separation prevents impulsive and
heedless dissolution of marriage, allows tempers to cool down,

35 (2021) SCC Online SC 1270.

anger to dissipate, and gives the spouses time to forgive and
forget. At the same time, when there is complete separation over a
long period and the parties have moved apart and have mutually
agreed to separate, it would be incoherent to perpetuate the
litigation by asking the parties to move the trial court. This Court in
Amit Kumar (supra) has observed that, in addition to referring to
the six factors/questions in Amardeep Singh (supra), this Court
should ascertain whether the parties have freely, on their own
accord, and without any coercion or pressure arrived at a genuine
settlement which took care of the alimony, if any, maintenance and
custody of children, etc.
21. In our opinion, Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act does not
impose any fetters on the powers of this Court to grant a decree of
divorce by mutual consent on a joint application, when the
substantive conditions of the Section are fulfilled and the Court,
after referring to the factors mentioned above, is convinced and of
the opinion that the decree of divorce should be granted.
22. The legislature and the courts treat matrimonial litigations as a
special, if not a unique, category. Public policy underlying the
legislations dealing with family and matrimonial matters is to
encourage mutual settlement, as is clearly stated in Section 89 of

the C.P.C., Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, and Section 9
of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Given that there are multiple
legislations governing different aspects, even if the cause of
dispute is identical or similar, most matrimonial disputes lead to a
miscellany of cases including criminal cases, at times genuine,
and on other occasions initiated because of indignation, hurt,
anger or even misguided advice to teach a lesson. The multiplicity
of litigations can restrict and block solutions, as a settlement has
to be holistic and comprehensive, given that the objective and
purpose is to enable the parties to cohabit and live together, or if
they decide to part ways, to have a new beginning and settle
down to live peacefully. Therefore, in B.S. Joshi and Others v.
State of Haryana and Another36, this Court, notwithstanding that
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. does not permit compounding of an
offence under Section 498A of the I.P.C., has held that the High
Court, exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., may
quash prosecutions even in non-compoundable offences when the
ends of justice so require. This view has been affirmed by the
three judges’ bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and
Another37 and reiterated by another three judges’ bench in
Jitendra Raghuvanshi and Others v. Babita Raghuvanshi and
36 (2003) 4 SCC 675.

37 (2012) 10 SCC 303.

Another38. The reason is that the courts must not encourage
matrimonial litigation, and prolongation of such litigation is
detrimental to both the parties who lose their young age in chasing
multiple litigations. Thus, adopting a hyper-technical view can be
counter-productive as pendency itself causes pain, suffering and
harassment and, consequently, it is the duty of the court to ensure
that matrimonial matters are amicably resolved, thereby bringing
the agony, affliction, and torment to an end. In this regard, the
courts only have to enquire and ensure that the settlement
between the parties is achieved without pressure, force, coercion,
fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence, and that the consent
is indeed sought by free will and choice, and the autonomy of the
parties is not compromised. The latter two decisions in Gian
Singh (supra) and Jitendra Raghuvanshi and Others (supra)
observe that the inherent power on the High Court under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and can be used/wielded to quash
criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice and prevent
abuse of the process of the court, albeit it has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully, and with caution. This Court, in State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others39, has set out
guidelines as to when the High Court may exercise jurisdiction
38 (2013) 4 SCC 58.

39 (2019) 5 SCC 688.

under the inherent powers conferred under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. for quashing non-compoundable offences in terms of
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In view of the above legal position and
discussion, this Court, on the basis of settlement between the
parties, while passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, can
set aside and quash other proceedings and orders, including
criminal cases and First Information Report(s), provided the
conditions, as specified in the aforementioned judgments, are
satisfied.
Grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of

marriage in exercise of jurisdiction and power under Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India.
23. This brings us to the last question of whether this Court, in
exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India,
can grant a decree of divorce when, upon the prayer of one of the
spouses, it is satisfied that there is complete and irretrievable
breakdown of marriage, notwithstanding the opposition to such
prayer by the other spouse?
24. Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, enacted by Act No.
68 of 1976 with effect from 25th May 1976, reads thus:
“13 Divorce.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether

before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on
a petition presented by either the husband or the wife,

be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that
the other party—
xx xx xx
(i-a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage,

treated the petitioner with cruelty; or
xx xx xx"
This provision often has to be read with clause (a) to Section
23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the substantive portion of which
was enacted as a part of the main enactment vide Act No. 25 of
1955, and reads:
“23. Decree in proceedings. — (1) In any proceeding

under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is
satisfied that—
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the
petitioner 40[except in cases where the relief is sought
by him on the ground specified in sub-clause (a), sub-
clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of Section 5]
is not in anyway taking advantage of his or her own
wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and
xx xx xx”
The legal effect of Section 13(1)(i-a) read with Section 23 (1)
(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, it has been interpreted, invokes the
‘fault theory’, an aspect which we shall subsequently examine.
First, we would like to delineate the meaning of the term ‘cruelty’,
which expression has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act.
40 The bracketed portion was enacted vide Act No. 68 of 1976 with effect from 27.05.1976.

25. In N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane41, as early as 1975, a three judges’
bench of this Court, after referring to the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1972, held that the fact is said to be established if it
is proved by a preponderance of probabilities, that is, the court
believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a
prudent man ought to, under the circumstances of a particular
case, act upon the supposition that it exists. Often, the belief
regarding the existence of a fact is founded on balance of
probabilities, that is, the court is to weigh the various probabilities
to discern the preponderance in favour of the existence of a
particular fact. Holding that the proceedings under the Hindu
Marriage Act are civil proceedings, and referring to the provisions
of Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, it was held that the word
‘satisfied’ must connote satisfaction on ‘preponderance of
probabilities’ and not ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. On the
meaning of ‘cruelty’ as a ground for dissolution of marriage,
reference was made to the High Court’s reliance on D. Tolstoy’s
passage in The Law and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes. Therein, ‘cruelty’ has been defined as wilful and
unjustified conduct of such character as to cause danger to life,
limb or health, bodily or mentally, or as to give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of such danger. However, this Court felt that D.

41 (1975) 2 SCC 326.

Tolstoy’s passage, which cites Horton v. Horton42, is not enough
to show that the spouses find life together impossible even if there
results injury to health. Accordingly, this Court elucidated that if the
danger to health arises merely from the fact that the spouses find
it impossible to live together and one of the parties is indifferent
towards the other, the charge of cruelty may perhaps fail.
However, harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career
or the like, would be important considerations in determining
whether the conduct of the defending spouse amounts to cruelty.
The petitioner has to show that the respondent has treated them
with cruelty so as to cause reasonable apprehension in their mind
that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the contesting
spouse. In today’s context, two observations, while a court
enquires into the charge of cruelty, are of some significance. First,
the court should not philosophise on the modalities of married life.
Secondly, whether the charge is proved or not cannot be decided
by applying the principle of whether a reasonable man situated
similarly will behave in a similar manner. What may be cruel to
one may not matter to another, and what may not be cruel to an
individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty
under another set of circumstances. Cruelty is subjective, that is, it
is person, background, and circumstance specific.

42 [1940] P.187.

26. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat43, which was pronounced in 1993, 18
years after the decision in N.G. Dastane (supra), gives a life-like
expansion to the term ‘cruelty’. This case was between a husband
who was practicing as an Advocate, aged about 55 years, and the
wife, who was the Vice President in a public sector undertaking,
aged about 50 years, having two adult children – a doctor by
profession and an MBA degree holder working abroad,
respectively. Allegations of an adulterous course of life, lack of
mental equilibrium and pathologically suspicious character were
made against each other. This Court noticed that the divorce
petition had remained pending for more than eight years, and in
spite of the directions given by this Court, not much progress had
been made. It was highlighted that cruelty contemplated under
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is both mental and
physical, albeit a comprehensive definition of what constitutes
cruelty would be most difficult. Much depends upon the knowledge
and intention of the defending spouse, the nature of their conduct,
the character and physical or mental weakness of the spouses,
etc. The sum total of the reprehensible conduct or departure from
normal standards of conjugal kindness that causes injury to
health, or an apprehension of it, constitutes cruelty. But these
43 (1994) 1 SCC 337.

factors must take into account the temperament and all other
specific circumstances in order to decide that the conduct
complained of is such that a petitioner should not be called to
endure it. It was further elaborated that cruelty, mental or physical,
may be both intentional or unintentional. Matrimonial obligations
and responsibilities vary in degrees. They differ in each household
and to each person, and the cruelty alleged depends upon the
nature of life the parties are accustomed to, or their social and
economic conditions. They may also depend upon the culture and
human values to which the spouses assign significance. There
may be instances of cruelty by unintentional but inexcusable
conduct of the other spouse. Thus, there is a distinction between
intention to commit cruelty and the actual act of cruelty, as
absence of intention may not, in a given case, make any
difference if the act complained of is otherwise regarded as cruel.
Deliberate and wilful intention, therefore, may not matter.
Paragraph 16 of the judgment in V. Bhagat (supra) reads as
under:
“16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be

defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other
party such mental pain and suffering as would make it
not possible for that party to live with the other. In
other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature
that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live
together. The situation must be such that the wronged
party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such

conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is
not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such
as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While
arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the
social status, educational level of the parties, the
society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the
parties ever living together in case they are already
living apart and all other relevant facts and
circumstances which it is neither possible nor
desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one
case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a
matter to be determined in each case having regard to
the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case
of accusations and allegations, regard must also be
had to the context in which they were made.”
The Division Bench of this Court in V. Bhagat (supra) has also
observed that while irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a
ground for divorce, specific circumstances may have to be borne
in mind while ascertaining the type of cruelty contemplated by
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. These observations,
with which we agree, give a different connotation to the ‘fault
theory’, as to dilute the strict legal understanding of the term
‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage
Act. This interpretation is situation, case and person specific.
27. In Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri44, decided in 1997, this
Court was confronted with a situation where the marriage had
fallen apart and the couple had separated in 1983. They did not
have any specific issue, but difference of opinion had cropped up

44 (1997) 4 SCC 226.

between the parties. Further, even after residing separately for
thirteen years, the parties were not agreeable to a divorce by
mutual consent. This was in spite of the fact that the husband had
remarried and had a child. This Court was of the view that
considering the cumulative effect of various factors and the
marriage being dead, no useful purpose, both emotionally and
practically, would be served in postponing the inevitability and
prolonging the agony of the parties or their marriage and,
therefore, the curtain should be rung down. This Court, therefore,
exercised the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India to grant a decree of divorce, though the conduct of the
husband, it was observed, was blameworthy as he had remarried
and conceived a child during the pendency of the proceedings.
This decree of divorce by mutual consent was made conditional
on payment of Rs.10,00,000/- by the husband to the wife. Only on
payment or deposit of the amount in the Court, all proceedings,
including those under Section 494 of the I.P.C., were to stand
terminated.
28. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli45, a three judges’ bench of this
Court referred to the opinion of Lord Denning, L.J. in Kaslefsky v.
Kaslefsky46 that if the door of cruelty were opened too wide, the
45 (2006) 4 SCC 558.
46 (1950) 2 All ER 398.

courts would be granting divorce for incompatibility of
temperament, but this temptation must be resisted, lest the
institution of marriage is imperilled. At the same time, the bench
felt that the concept of legal cruelty has changed according to the
advancement of social concepts and standards of living.
Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied
neglect, indifference on the part of the spouse and allegation of
unchastity are all factors that lead to mental or legal cruelty. While
doing so, this Court affirmed that a set of facts stigmatized as
cruelty in one case may not be so in another, as cruelty largely
depends on the kind of lifestyle the parties are accustomed to or
their social and economic conditions. Similarly, intention, it was
observed, was immaterial as there can be cruelty even by
unintentional conduct. Moreover, mental cruelty is difficult to
establish by direct evidence and is to be deciphered by attending
to the facts and circumstances in which the two partners in
matrimony had been living. On the question of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage, which is not a ground for divorce under
the Hindu Marriage Act, reference was made to the fault theory,
which is hinged on an accusatorial principle of divorce. Excessive
reliance on fault as a ground for divorce, the judges’ opined,
encourages matrimonial offences, increases bitterness and

widens the ongoing rift between the parties. Once serious
endeavours for reconciliation have been made, but it is found that
the separation is inevitable and the damage is irreparable, divorce
should not be withheld. An unworkable marriage, which has
ceased to be effective, is futile and bound to be a source of
greater misery for the parties. The law of divorce built
predominantly on assigning fault fails to serve broken marriages.
Under the fault theory, guilt has to be proven, and therefore, the
courts have to be presented with concrete instances of adverse
human behaviour, thereby maligning the institution of marriage.
Public interest demands that the marriage status should, as far as
possible, be maintained, but where the marriage has been
wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in
recognising the real fact. No spouse can be compelled to resume
life with a consort, and as such, nothing is gained by keeping the
parties tied forever to a marriage which has, in fact, ceased to
exist. In Naveen Kohli (supra), the parties had been living
separately for more than a decade, and civil and criminal
proceedings had been initiated. Therefore, the Court held that the
marriage should be dissolved, as wisdom lies in accepting the
pragmatic reality of life. The Court should take a decision which
would ultimately be conducive to the interest of both the parties.

The Court also directed the payment of Rs.25,00,000/- towards
permanent maintenance to the wife.
29. In 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, in Owens v.
Owens47, had the occasion to analyse and evaluate the fault
theory as a ground for divorce, which requires one spouse to
make allegations on the conduct of the other. The judgment notes
that the courts invariably face a daunting task in finding the truth of
why the marriage has collapsed. Apportioning blame is an
inherently difficult task, given the fact that the court has to find
faults in the conduct of the spouses, expecting them to have
neither heroic virtues nor selfless abnegation. As subjectivity is
involved, the courts find it difficult to evaluate the gravity or
otherwise of the conduct complained of and find the truth. Lord
Wilson, with whom Lord Hodge and Lady Black agreed, had
referred to the three-fold test to interpret Section 1(2)(b) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (of England and Wales) to establish
whether the marriage had been irretrievably broken down in such
a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live
with the respondent; (i) by reference to the allegations of
behaviour in the petition, to determine what the respondent did or
did not do; (ii) to assess the effect which the behaviour had upon
47 (2018) UKSC 41.

the particular petitioner in the light of the latter’s personality and
disposition and of all circumstances in which it occurred; and (iii)
to make an evaluation whether as a result of the respondent’s
behaviour and in the light of its effect on the petitioner, an
expectation that the petitioner should continue to live with the
respondent would be unreasonable48. Lady Hale, in her judgment,
observed that searching and assigning blame is not vital, as the
ground of divorce is based on conduct, and not fault or fact finding
to ascertain the party to be blamed. On the other hand, cumulative
effect of a great number of small incidents indicative of
authoritarian, demeaning and humiliating conduct over a period of
time would constitute a good ground for divorce. Such conduct
can destroy the trust and confidence required to sustain a
marriage. Further, the effect of the spouse’s behaviour, rather than
the behaviour itself, should make it unreasonable to expect the
other spouse to cohabit; this is the question to be answered.
30. We have referred to the judgment in Owens (supra), which
applies the then law in England and Wales, not as a precedent,
but to highlight that even two perfectly gentle and pleasant
individuals having incompatible and clashing personalities can
have a miserable and morose married life. In such cases, fault

48 These tests, with suitable modification, can well be applied in cases under Section 13(1)(i-a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act.

theory in the pure form requiring apportionment of guilt and blame,
is a difficult, if not an impossible task, whereas in practical reality
the situation is appalling and unnerving. The marriage is
irretrievably broken down and dead. We would not read the
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, their underlying intent, and
any fundamental specific issue of public policy, as barring this
Court from dissolving a broken and shattered marriage in exercise
of the Constitutional power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution
of India. If at all, the underlying fundamental issues of public
policy, as explained in the judgments of V. Bhagat (supra), Ashok
Hurra (supra), and Naveen Kohli (supra), support the view that it
would be in the best interest of all, including the individuals
involved, to give legality, in the form of formal divorce, to a dead
marriage, otherwise the litigation(s), resultant sufferance, misery
and torment shall continue. Therefore, apportioning blame and
greater fault may not be the rule to resolve and adjudicate the
dispute in rare and exceptional matrimonial cases, as the rules of
evidence under the Evidence Act are rules of procedure. When
the life-like situation is known indubitably, the essence and
objective behind section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act that
no spouse should be subjected to mental cruelty and live in misery
and pain is established. These rules of procedure must give way

to ‘complete justice’ in a ‘cause or matter’. Fault theory can be
diluted by this Court to do ‘complete justice’ in a particular case,
without breaching the self-imposed restraint applicable when this
Court exercises power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India, as elucidated in the judgments referred to above. 49
31. At this juncture, we would refer to two judgments authored by one
of the members of this bench (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) in Munish
Kakkar v. Nidhi Kakkar50 and Sivasankaran v. Santhimeenal51.
In Munish Kakkar (supra), the parties had been engaged in
multifarious litigations, including divorce proceedings, for almost
two decades. Yet, they opposed divorce by mutual consent. The
respondent - wife was based in Canada, to where she had shifted,
and was statedly taking medication for depression. The appellant -
husband complained of loneliness and lack of co-habitation,
causing mental and physical torture. Several attempts to mediate,
and efforts made by counsellors, psychologists, the panchayat
and even the courts did not yield results. In these circumstances,
this Court exercised the power under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India, recognising the futility of a completely failed
49 Explanation to Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which reads, “Where a question arises
whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving
reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society”, partially mitigates
the rigors to Section 23(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act and, consequently, the fault theory.
50 (2020) 14 SCC 657.
51 2021 SCC OnLine SC 702.

and broken down marriage. While observing that there was no
consent of the respondent - wife for grant of divorce, the Court felt
that there was no willingness on her part either to live with the
appellant - husband. What was left in the marriage were bitter
memories and angst, which increased with the passage of time,
as the respondent - wife was reluctant to let the appellant -
husband live his life by getting a decree of divorce. In view of the
aforesaid position, this Court exercised the power under Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ between
the parties. It was also directed that the appellant - husband would
continue to pay the specified amount per month to the respondent
- wife, which amount could be enhanced or reduced by taking
recourse to appropriate proceedings.
32. In Sivasankaran (supra), the marriage had taken place in
February 2002, and after about a year, divorce proceedings were
initiated and the decree of divorce was passed in 2008 under
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The appellant -
husband had remarried within six days of the passing of the
decree of divorce. The respondent - wife filed an appeal and the
dispute had remained pending till it reached this Court. Attempts
to resolve the dispute through mediation and settlement between
the parties bore no fruit. The respondent - wife was resistant to

accept the decree of divorce, even though she was aware that the
marriage was but only on paper. Observations on the difficulty
faced by women in the form of social acceptance after a decree of
divorce, and also the need to guarantee financial and economic
security were elucidated. However, this Court, relying on the
earlier decisions in Munish Kakkar (supra) and R. Srinivas
Kumar v. R. Shametha52, observed that there was no necessity of
consent by both the parties for exercise of powers under Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage on the
ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, albeit the interest
of the wife is also required to be protected financially so that she
may not have to suffer financially in future and she may not have
to depend upon others. Accordingly, this Court passed a decree of
divorce by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India.
33. Having said so, we wish to clearly state that grant of divorce on
the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by this Court is
not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with
great care and caution, keeping in mind several factors ensuring
that ‘complete justice’ is done to both parties. It is obvious that this
Court should be fully convinced and satisfied that the marriage is
52 (2019) 9 SCC 409.

totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation and,
therefore, dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only
way forward. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to
be factually determined and firmly established. For this, several
factors are to be considered such as the period of time the parties
had cohabited after marriage; when the parties had last cohabited;
the nature of allegations made by the parties against each other
and their family members; the orders passed in the legal
proceedings from time to time, cumulative impact on the personal
relationship; whether, and how many attempts were made to settle
the disputes by intervention of the court or through mediation, and
when the last attempt was made, etc. The period of separation
should be sufficiently long, and anything above six years or more
will be a relevant factor. But these facts have to be evaluated
keeping in view the economic and social status of the parties,
including their educational qualifications, whether the parties have
any children, their age, educational qualification, and whether the
other spouse and children are dependent, in which event how and
in what manner the party seeking divorce intends to take care and
provide for the spouse or the children. Question of custody and
welfare of minor children, provision for fair and adequate alimony
for the wife, and economic rights of the children and other pending

matters, if any, are relevant considerations. We would not like to
codify the factors so as to curtail exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, which is situation
specific. Some of the factors mentioned can be taken as
illustrative, and worthy of consideration.
34. Towards the end, for the sake of completeness and to avoid
confusion and debate on the ratio we have expounded, we would
like to examine a few decisions, in which this Court had refused to
exercise jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India or dispense with the period of six months for moving the
second motion. In Manish Goel (supra), a division bench of this
Court has held that power and jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, though couched in the widest possible terms
and plenary in nature, is discretionary. Thus, extraordinary care
and caution must be exercised, and unless it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist to demonstrate that
substantial and grave injustice has been rendered, this Court
should not review/interfere with the decision appealed against.
Article 136 of the Constitution of India should not be used to short-
circuit the legal procedure prescribed. The power under Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India was summarised to observe

that generally, this Court would not pass an order in contravention
or ignorance of a statutory provision, or merely on sympathetic
grounds. However, the bench did not specifically examine the
question of whether the period prescribed under Section 13-B of
the Hindu Marriage Act is mandatory or directory in nature, and if
directory, whether the same could be dispensed with by the High
Court in exercise of its writ/appellate jurisdiction. 53 Further, the two
judges’ bench did not exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, observing that it was not
a case where there was any obstruction to the stream of justice, or
there was injustice to the parties requiring the court to grant
equitable relief. The contingencies to exercise of power under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India were not established.
35. In Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar54, one of the parties
had withdrawn the consent before the stage of second motion,
and therefore, the decree of divorce could not be passed. The
bench relied on the earlier judgment in Sureshta Devi v. Om
Prakash55, wherein it has been held that in a case of divorce by
mutual consent, a party may withdraw the consent at any stage
53 See – Manish Goel (supra), paragraph 23.

54 (2011) 5 SCC 234.
55 (1991) 2 SCC 25.

before the decree of divorce is passed. This ratio has been
approved by a three judges’ bench in Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay
Pahariya56. Consequently, following these judgments, Hitesh
Bhatnagar (supra) opines that a decree of divorce cannot be
passed as the second motion, which is a requirement in law, was
never moved by both the parties. It is also observed that non-
withdrawal of consent within 18 months, the period stipulated in
sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, has no
bearing as this period of 18 months is specified only to ensure
quick disposal of cases of divorce by mutual consent. Sub-section
(2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act does not specify the
time period for withdrawal of consent. Plea to grant divorce on the
ground of irretrievable breakdown by invoking Article 142 of the
Constitution of India was not entertained, albeit observing that this
can be granted only in situations where the Court is convinced
beyond any doubt that there is absolutely no chance in the
marriage surviving and that it had broken beyond repair.
Nevertheless, the bench deemed it appropriate to state that they
have not finally expressed any opinion on the issue of the power
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India vis-à-vis dissolution
of marriage.
56 (2009) 13 SCC 338.

36. In Shyam Sundar Kohli v. Sushma Kohli alias Satya Devi57, the
bench had refused to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage, but also observed that only in extreme
circumstances would this Court dissolve the marriage on this
ground.
37. In Darshan Gupta v. Radhika Gupta58, the ground of cruelty had
not been established. Thereafter, the two judges’ bench, on
examination of Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, observed
that it is founded on ‘matrimonial offence theory’ or ‘fault theory’,
and as a sequitur, the person who is at fault and commits cruelty
cannot raise the accusing finger on the other spouse on the basis
of those very allegations and seek dissolution of marriage thereon.
This case was peculiar as the person seeking divorce, as per the
findings, was clearly at fault and to be blamed. The plea of
irretrievable breakdown of marriage was raised and rejected as
not postulated in the statutory provisions. Reliance placed on
Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur59, to urge that divorce should
be granted in exercise of power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, was not accepted as the bench could not be

57 (2004) 7 SCC 747.
58 (2013) 9 SCC 1.
59 (2010) 14 SCC 301.

persuaded on the ground and facts of the case to justify exercise
of the power. The bench observed that the concept of justice
varies depending upon the interest of the party. The Hon’ble
judges held that “it is questionable as to whether the relief
sought…on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is
available…”. Thus, in this case, the judgment did not give any firm
opinion and finding on the questions that we have answered with
reference to the jurisdiction and power of this Court under Article
142(1) of the Constitution of India.
38. In Neelam Kumar v. Dayarani60, reference was made to Satish
Sitole v. Ganga,61 wherein the marriage was dissolved in exercise
of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on the
ground of its irretrievable breakdown, but the submission was not
accepted in Neelam Kumar (supra) on the reason that there was
nothing to indicate that the respondent was, in any way,
responsible for the breakdown of marriage. It was observed that in
Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma62, this Court has held that
irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce
under the Hindu Marriage Act. However, Vishnu Dutt Sharma
60 (2010) 13 SCC 298.

61 (2008) 7 SCC 734.
62 (2009) 6 SCC 379.

(supra) did not determinatively enunciate on the jurisdiction under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. The judgment in
Neelam Kumar (supra) acknowledges that in Satish Sitole
(supra), this Court did exercise jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage, as it was in the
interest of the parties. In the facts of Neelam Kumar (supra), the
bench was not inclined to accede to the request of granting
divorce in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142(1) of the
39. The judgment in Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey63
refers to an earlier decision of this Court in Jorden Diengdeh v.
S.S. Chopra64, in which the two judges’ bench had suggested a
complete reform of the law of marriage and for a uniform law
applicable to all, irrespective of religion and caste, as well as the
need to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground
for divorce. Jorden Diengdeh (supra) observes that no purpose
would be served by continuing a marriage that has completely and
signally broken down, but the legislature has not thought it proper
to provide for the said ground. This Court in Savitri Pandey
(supra) held that there could be cases where on facts, the

63 (2002) 2 SCC 73.
64 (1985) 3 SCC 62.

marriage has become dead on account of contributory acts of
commission and omission by the parties, as in the case of V.
Bhagat (supra). At the same time, the bench felt that the sanctity
of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying
parties.
40. In view of our findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that
the decisions of this Court in Manish Goel (supra), Neelam
Kumar (supra), Darshan Gupta (supra), Hitesh Bhatnagar
(supra), Savitri Pandey (supra) and others have to be read down
in the context of the power of this Court given by the Constitution
of India to do ‘complete justice’ in exercise of the jurisdiction under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. In consonance with our
findings on the scope and ambit of the power under Article 142(1)
of the Constitution of India, in the context of matrimonial disputes
arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act, we hold that the power to do
‘complete justice’ is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame,
applicable to petitions for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the
Hindu Marriage Act. As held above, this Court’s power to dissolve
marriage on settlement by passing a decree of divorce by mutual
consent, as well as quash and set aside other proceedings,
including criminal proceedings, remains and can be exercised.

41. Lastly, we must express our opinion on whether a party can
directly canvass before this Court the ground of irretrievable
breakdown by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution. In Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar65, a two judges’ bench
of this Court has rightly held that any such attempt must be
spurned and not accepted, as the parties should not be permitted
to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or
for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before
the High Court, and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage. The reason is that the remedy of a person
aggrieved by the decision of the competent judicial forum is to
approach the superior tribunal/forum for redressal of his/her
grievance. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the
procedure by resorting to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 or
226 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. Secondly,
and more importantly, relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India can be sought to enforce the rights conferred by Part III of
the Constitution of India, and on the proof of infringement thereof.
Judicial orders passed by the court in, or in relation to, the
proceedings pending before it, are not amenable to correction
65 (2010) 4 SCC 460.

under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 66 Therefore, a party
cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India and seek relief of dissolution of marriage directly from this
Court. While we accept the said view, we also clarify that
reference in Poonam (supra) to Manish Goel (supra) and the
observation that it is questionable whether the period of six
months for moving the second motion can be waived has not been
approved by us.
Conclusion.
42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we decide this reference by
answering the questions framed in the following manner:
(i) The scope and ambit of power and jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.
This question as to the power and jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India is answered in
terms of paragraphs 8 to 13, inter alia, holding that this Court can
depart from the procedure as well as the substantive laws, as long
as the decision is exercised based on considerations of
fundamental general and specific public policy. While deciding
whether to exercise discretion, this Court must consider the
66 See – Sahibzada Saiyed Muhammed Amirabbas Abbasi & Others v. State Of Madhya Bharat
(Now Madhya Pradesh) & Others, AIR 1960 SC 768; Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962
SC 1621; and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 1967
SC 1.

substantive provisions as enacted and not ignore the same, albeit
this Court acts as a problem solver by balancing out equities
between the conflicting claims. This power is to be exercised in a
‘cause or matter’.
(ii) In view of, and depending upon the findings of this bench on
the first question, whether this Court, while hearing a transfer
petition, or in any other proceedings, can exercise power
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, in view of the
settlement between the parties, and grant a decree of divorce
by mutual consent dispensing with the period and the
procedure prescribed under Section 13-B of the Hindu
Marriage Act, and also quash and dispose of other/connected
proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, Section 125 of
the Cr.P.C., or criminal prosecution primarily under Section
498-A and other provisions of the I.P.C. If the answer to this
question is in the affirmative, in which cases and under what
circumstances should this Court exercise jurisdiction under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India is an ancillary issue to
be decided.
In view of our findings on the first question, this question has
to be answered in the affirmative, inter alia, holding that this Court,
in view of settlement between the parties, has the discretion to
dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce by mutual
consent, without being bound by the procedural requirement to
move the second motion. This power should be exercised with
care and caution, keeping in mind the factors stated in Amardeep
Singh (supra) and Amit Kumar (supra). This Court can also, in
exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India,

quash and set aside other proceedings and orders, including
criminal proceedings.
(iii) Whether this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power

under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India when there is
complete and irretrievable breakdown of marriage in spite of
the other spouses opposing the prayer?
This question is also answered in the affirmative, inter alia,
holding that this Court, in exercise of power under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution of India, has the discretion to dissolve the
marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown. This
discretionary power is to be exercised to do ‘complete justice’ to
the parties, wherein this Court is satisfied that the facts
established show that the marriage has completely failed and
there is no possibility that the parties will cohabit together, and
continuation of the formal legal relationship is unjustified. The
Court, as a court of equity, is required to also balance the
circumstances and the background in which the party opposing
the dissolution is placed.
43. For the foregoing reasons, Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of
2014, Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 382 of 2014, Transfer
Petition (Criminal) No. 468 of 2014, and Transfer Petition (Civil)
Nos. 1481-1482 of 2014 are disposed of, as vide order dated
06.05.2015, a division bench of this Court has already dissolved

the marriage between the parties by invoking Article 142(1) of the
44. Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 96 and 339 of 2014 may be listed
before the regular bench in the second week of May, 2023 for
appropriate orders and directions.
......................................J.
(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)
......................................J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
......................................J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
......................................J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
......................................J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 01, 2023.

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1118 OF 2014

SHILPA SAILESH ..... PETITIONER

VARUN SREENIVASAN ..... RESPONDENT

TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 96 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 339 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 382 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 468 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1481-1482 OF 2014

T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 & Ors. Page 1 of 61

below, arise primarily from the order dated 12.05.2010 passed in

T.P. (C) No. 899 of 2007, Neeti Malviya v. Rakesh Malviya,

wherein a bench of two judges had doubted the view expressed in

Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore1 and Manish Goel v. Rohini

the Constitution of India, cannot reduce or waive the period of six

months for moving the second motion as stipulated in sub-section

States had been dispensing with or reducing the period of six

months for moving the second motion when there was no

possibility whatsoever of the spouses cohabiting, the following

question was referred to a three judges’ bench for a clear ruling

and future guidance:

“(I) Whether the period prescribed in sub-section

1 (2002) 10 SCC 194. This decision is rendered by a three judges’ bench.

T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 & Ors. Page 2 of 61

of 2007 was rendered infructuous as the parties, subsequent to

the order of reference, had dissolved their marriage by mutual

2. In T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 4, Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun

Sreenivasan, a bench of two judges, vide the order dated

06.04.20155, issued notice to the Attorney General for India for

addressing arguments on the following issues:

“1. The scope and extent of power of this court under

2. The stand of the Government with regard to

3. Any other incidental and ancillary issue that may

3. The Attorney General for India, in paragraph 5 of his written

submissions, had suggested two additional questions of law, which

T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 & Ors. Page 3 of 61

Similarly, the issue as to whether the period prescribed

order dated 06.05.2015 dissolving the marriage by grant of divorce

by mutual consent with the two judges’ bench exercising

jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. However,

in view the conflicting ratio of the judgments of this Court on the

applicability of the power and jurisdiction of this Court under Article

deferred the transfer petition to remain pending for statistical

purposes, and formulated the following questions of law to be

decided by a three judges’ bench:

“4. Notwithstanding the above order passed by us, for

T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 & Ors. Page 4 of 61

1. “What could be the broad parameters for exercise of

2. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction under

5. Thereafter, vide the order dated 29.06.2016, another bench of two

judges of this Court, on examining the questions formulated in T.P.

(C) No. 1118 of 2014, referred to Article 145(3) of the Constitution

of India, and relying on Pradip Chandra Parija and Others v.

Pramod Chandra Patnaik and Others 7, accepted the submission

made by the Attorney General for India to refer the questions

formulated in T.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2014 for consideration of the

Constitution Bench8. It was left to the discretion of the Constitution