Political Psychology

Introduction: Theoretical Foundations of Political Psychology
Oxford Handbooks Online

Introduction: Theoretical Foundations of Political
Psychology
Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy
The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (2 ed.)
Edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy
Print Publication Date: Sep 2013 Subject: Political Science, Political Behavior
Online Publication Date: Dec 2013 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0001
Abstract and Keywords
Political psychology applies what is known about human psychology to the study of
political behavior, focusing on individuals within a specific political system. Topics such as
terrorism, public support for fascism, and ethnocentrism are commonly studied within
political psychology to gain better traction on the perennial question of how well citizens
are equipped to handle their democratic responsibilities. The chapter provides a broad
overview of the field of political psychology and introduces the topics covered in the
Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. The authors discuss the underpinnings of
political behavior in broad psychological approaches such as biopolitics; personality,
cognitive, and affective psychology; and intergroup relations to underscore ways in which
political behavior deviates from the predictions of rational choice theory. In sum, the
authors conclude that psychology provides unique and valuable insight into the dynamics
of elite decision-making and mass politics.
Keywords: political psychology, elite decision-making, political behavior, public opinion, rational choice,
biopolitics, personality, political cognition, political affect, political socialization, intergroup relations
POLITICAL psychology, at the most general level, is an application of what is known about
human psychology to the study of politics. It draws upon theory and research on
biopsychology, neuroscience, personality, psychopathology, evolutionary psychology,
social psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and intergroup
relations. It addresses political elites—their personality, motives, beliefs, and leadership
styles, and their judgments, decisions, and actions in domestic policy, foreign policy,
international conflict, and conflict resolution. It also deals with the dynamics of mass
political behavior: voting, collective action, the influence of political communications,
political socialization and civic education, group-based political behavior, social justice,
and the political incorporation of immigrants.
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Since the publication of the first edition of the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology in
2003, the field of political psychology has grown significantly. Research has been fueled
by a mix of age-old questions and recent world events as social psychologists and political
scientists have turned to psychology to understand the origins of political conservatism
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), the historic election of an African American
president in the United States (Tesler & Sears, 2010), spectacular acts of international
terrorism such as the 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London train bombings and the
September 11 attacks in the United States (Crenshaw, 2000; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, &
Fischhoff, 2003; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003), anti-immigrant sentiment
(Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), the failure of
expert judgment (Tetlock, 2005), and the underpinnings of collective action (Simon &
Klandermans, 2001).
Enlivened interest in the topics addressed by political psychologists goes hand in hand
with a strong and increasingly global organization, the International Society of (p. 2)
Political Psychology (ISPP), and the growing circulation of Political Psychology, its well-
respected journal. The journal has grown in stature in recent years. It ranked 12th in
political science and 19th in social psychology in terms of its two-year impact factor in
the 2011 Journal Citation Reports database, and was ranked even more highly in terms of
its five-year impact (9th in political science and 14th in social psychology in 2011). There
are also vibrant political psychology sections of major national and regional organizations
such as the organized section of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and
the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group.
There is also an increased number of textbooks devoted to the field. Since the first
version of this Handbook several good undergraduate texts devoted solely to political
psychology have been published, including textbooks by Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors,
and Preston (2010), Houghton (2009), Marcus (2012), a reader by Jost and Sidanius
(2004), and a graduate-level text by McDermott (2004) on political psychology and
international relations. Several major presses, including Cambridge, Oxford, and
Routledge, now have book series in political psychology. There is also a steady stream of
monographs published in the field each year, leading to the existence of three annual
book prizes dedicated to political psychology: the Robert E. Lane book prize awarded by
the Political Psychology Section of the American Political Science Association, and the
Alexander George and David O. Sears prizes awarded by the International Society for
Political Psychology.
The current edition of the Handbook takes stock of the past decade’s developments in
political psychology, building closely on the 2003 Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology
(Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003), and more loosely on two previous volumes: Handbook of
Political Psychology (Knutson, 1973) and Political Psychology (Hermann, 1986). In this
second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology widely respected political
scientists and psychologists summarize what psychology has contributed to our
understanding of the political behavior of both political elites and ordinary citizens, and
the insights into basic psychology obtained from research on political behavior. The
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chapters in the Handbook provide an overview of key terms, major theories, and cutting-
edge research within both psychology and political science and will be an essential
reference for scholars and students interested in the intersection of these two fields.
We designed the Handbook to provide a comprehensive and expertly distilled account

ofiresearch in many subfields of political psychology for both the beginning graduate
student and the more advanced scholar who may be new to a specific subfield or topic.
But we should note that the original Handbook will remain a useful reference because it
contains topics and discussions that are omitted from the current volume. Moreover,
political psychology is a diverse and growing subfield and by necessity not all topics could
be included in a single volume. We thought long and hard about a number of chapters
that did not make it into this volume, including neuropolitics, the political psychology of
terrorism, political impression formation, and the political psychology of obedience.
These topics are touched on within different chapters but may constitute distinct
chapters in a future edition of the Handbook.
In compiling this volume, we acknowledge the growing international flavor of

contemporary political psychology, which explores topics as diverse as the dynamics of
(p. 3) American presidential elections, resistance to immigration in a globalized economy,
and the role of emotion and threat in the decisions of political leaders. Where possible,
authors of chapters in this volume have chosen examples of good political psychology
research from around the globe, demonstrating the broad explanatory power of common
psychological forces within different polities. Cognitive biases, authoritarianism,
patriotism, ethnocentrism, and social conformity are not constrained by geographic
boundaries but seem evident throughout the world, albeit in interaction with specific
cultures and political systems.
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1. What Is Political Psychology?

At its core, political psychology concerns the behavior of individuals within a specific
political system. Psychology alone cannot explain the Holocaust, intractable conflicts,
war, or most other behavior of states or collective political actors in complex
environments. Individuals do not act within a vacuum. Their behavior varies with, and
responds to, differences in political institutions, political cultures, leadership styles, and
social norms. As Levy notes in his chapter in this volume, psychology influences foreign
policy behavior primarily through its interaction with specific aspects of the international
system, national governments, and distinct societies. The same logic applies to a wide
range of different phenomena. Consider research on authoritarianism. Do we look to the
behavior of leaders or their followers to understand why citizens in the 1930s and 1940s
followed fascist leaders who persecuted and killed millions of people? Were the atrocities
committed in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia a function of political leadership, the
support (acquiescence) of the public, or both? Some scholars attribute the Holocaust
squarely to the psychology of authoritarian followers (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950); others view it as a function of leadership and the pervasive
human propensity to obey authority (Milgram, 1974); still others view it as the reaction of
authoritarian individuals to social and political discord (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). In the
end it is difficult to believe that someone with authoritarian tendencies will behave in
exactly the same way under a fascist regime as in a liberal democracy.
A complex mix of individual psychology and political context also shapes public reactions
to terrorism. Public support for anti-terrorism policies depends on how a threatened
government reacts, the government’s perceived competence and effectiveness in
combatting terrorism, and a person’s felt vulnerability to a future terrorist event.
External forces such as the strength of government national security policy or terrorist
determination and capabilities vary over time and across contexts, and they influence, in
turn, whether a citizen feels anxious or angry in response to a terrorist event. Powerful
terrorists and a weak government tend to generate anxiety among a threatened
population, whereas a powerful government and weak terrorists will likely generate
feelings of anger. Moreover, not everyone responds to threat in the (p. 4) same way, and
individual psychological dispositions play an added role in determining whether someone
reacts to terrorism with anger or anxiety. In general, a society dominated by feelings of
anger may support aggressive antiterrorism action, whereas a population dominated by
feelings of anxiety may oppose aggressive action that exacerbates the risk of terrorism
(Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Lambert et al., 2010). Neither individual psychology nor
political circumstances alone is likely to fully explain these reactions.
In a more general sense, questions about public reactions to terrorism or an authoritarian

response to fascist rule are closely linked to one of the perennial questions raised by
political psychology: how well are citizens equipped to handle their democratic
responsibilities (Le Cheminant & Parrish, 2011)? Can they deliberate over the issues of
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the day fairly to arrive at a reasoned judgment, or conversely do they succumb to

internecine enmities and fall victim to irrational intolerance? Many of the chapters in this
Handbook grapple with such issues, underscoring the democratic capabilities of the
citizenry while highlighting ways in which leaders and citizens fall short of the
democratic ideal. The question of a citizenry’s democratic competence is addressed very
directly in the chapter by Myers and Mendelberg as they consider the psychology of
political deliberation and the conditions under which it conforms to the democratic ideal
of free, equal, and open dialogue. In reality, both citizens and leaders exhibit distorted
reasoning and a slew of cognitive and emotional biases that are well cataloged in this
volume. Partisan resistance to new information, ethnocentric reactions to immigrants,
automatic and preconscious reactions to a political candidate’s facial features, greater
risk-taking in the face of losses than gains—the list goes on. Many of these same
processes are at work among political leaders for whom partisan loyalties loom large,
threat impairs their ability to deliberate rationally, and emotions such as humiliation and
anger affect their political decisions. In that sense leaders are vulnerable to emotional
and cognitive psychological biases similar to those observed within the electorate.
Yet democratic societies work, more or less, and political psychology has focused in
recent years on individual differences among citizens to explain why a characterization of
the public as biased, ethnocentric, fearful, or any other singular characterization is
erroneous. Individual differences grounded in early socialization, genetic makeup, social
context, and personality generate liberals and conservatives, Social Democrats and
Christian Democrats, tolerant and intolerant individuals, more and less well informed
citizens, and sectarian partisan elites. Politics emerges from such individual differences,
leading to political disagreements that are visible and widely debated within well-
functioning democratic societies. Even if citizens engage in biased reasoning, competing
arguments are pervasive and difficult to avoid completely; the passionate are free to
make their case, and the dispassionate can evaluate their efforts and arguments. The
democratic process may be messy, unsatisfying, and frustrating, but it is inherently
psychological. As scholars we need to know something about both a political system and
human psychology to make sense of it. The interplay of psychology and politics, especially
within democratic processes, is a central theme of this volume and lies at the core of
many of its chapters.
2. Intellectual Underpinnings of Political

(p. 5)
Psychology
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As we noted in the earlier edition of this Handbook, there is no one political psychology
(Sears et al., 2003). Rather, researchers have employed a number of different
psychological theories to study political behavior and attitudes. Some theories are more
appropriate than others for analyzing certain political phenomena, as seen in many of the
chapters in the Handbook. For example, in contemporary political psychology Freudian
psychodynamics is commonly applied to questions concerning the psychology of political
leaders, and discourse theory is applied specifically to the analysis of political rhetoric
and communications. But some of the psychological approaches employed across these
chapters are marshaled to understand diverse political phenomena. For example, the
influence of cognitive and emotional processes on elite and citizen decision-making is
discussed in a number of chapters. Basic aspects of the affective and cognitive system
such as the link between anger and risk seeking or the limits of working memory and
attention have broad ramifications for the study of political behavior across diverse
political topics. To deepen insight into the intellectual underpinnings of political
psychology, we lay out the major classes of psychological theories that have been applied
to the study of political behavior (see also Cottam et al., 2010; Marcus, 2012; Sullivan,
Rahn, & Rudolph, 2002). Each of the broad approaches we discuss contains several
different theories and concepts yet are brought together by their focus on broadly similar
psychological processes and mechanisms.
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2.1. Rational Choice
Over the last five to six decades, rational choice theory has been a major influence on
political science models of both elite and mass political behavior. This is understandable
since democratic theory is predicated on the notion of a well-informed citizenry capable
of handling and digesting information on issues of the day to arrive at well-informed
decisions. As Chong explains in this Handbook, rational choice theory is built on a set of
basic assumptions about human behavior that resemble the requirements for a well-
functioning citizenry: first, individuals have consistent preferences over their goals,
which are often defined as the pursuit of economic self-interest; second, individuals
assign a value or utility to these goals; and third, probabilities are assigned to the
different ways of achieving such goals. This culminates in Chong’s def nition of rational
choice as “choosing the course of action that maximizes one’s expected utility.” If utilities,
or goals, are equated with economic self-interest, as they often are, a rational choice
model predicts that an individual will be motivated to act in ways that are most likely to
pay the highest financial dividend. In politics, this translates into support of candidates
and policies that are most likely to improve voters’ economic bottom line (p. 6) and
benefit them personally. Expectancy-value theory was formalized in psychology as an
early version of the rational choice idea (Edwards, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
As Chong notes in this Handbook, however, pure rationality is something of a fiction when
applied to human behavior. Downs (1957) was the first to identify the paradox of voting, a
major problem for rational choice theory, in which the costs of voting far exceed its
expected benefit to one’s self-interest, suggesting that it is irrational even though
frequently practiced (see also Green & Shapiro, 1994). Since Downs, it has become
increasingly clear that neither leaders nor citizens make entirely rational political
decisions. Nonetheless, in many branches of political science, researchers are only slowly
moving away from a rational model of human behavior. At the forefront of this effort lies
pioneering research by social psychologists on systematic biases in human decision-
making (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
In the Handbook, Stein provides a succinct account of a rationalist approach to threat in

the field of international relations and highlights its inadequacy to fully explain elite
behavior and decision-making. She documents a number of cognitive, motivational, and
emotional biases that distort elite threat perceptions and reactions to threat. Herrmann
attributes elites’ images of other nations, in part, to similar cognitive and emotional
biases; these images shape, in turn, elite responses to the actions and perceived
intentions of other nations in which friend and foe are clearly distinguished. Levy
develops this theme further and summarizes prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) as an alternative to rationalist expected utility as a theory of choice under
conditions of risk. In something of an exception, however, Dyson and ‘t Hart caution
against an excessive focus on cognitive and emotional biases among elite decision-makers
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and argue instead for a more pragmatic view of rationality, which they define as the best
decision possible under current resource constraints.
At the level of mass politics, among the earliest challenges to rational choice were
observations that major political attitudes were in place well before adults began
contemplating the political arena, in studies of political socialization and voting behavior
(see the chapter by Sears and Brown). Later challenges came from Kahneman and
Tversky’s findings on cognitive heuristics and biases, which blossomed into the sub-field
of behavioral decision theory and behavioral economics (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin,
2004), fields that intersect quite closely with political psychology. Behavioral economics
and other well-documented psychologically based deviations from rationality are
discussed at some length in the chapter by Redlawsk and Lau on citizen political decision-
making. Tyler and van der Toorn also note in their chapter that justice considerations
often lead citizens to make political decisions that are at odds with their rational self-
interest.
In conclusion, it is difficult to overstate the importance of rational choice theory as a

foundational basis for democratic theory and a stimulus to political psychology research.
Its emphasis on the structure of information, careful deliberation, and weighting of one’s
interests as essential to the formation of informed positions on political matters continues
to serve as a baseline for much political psychology research. Rational choice theory may
provoke political psychologists to document the ways in which (p. 7) human behavior
fails to conform with its stringent expectations, but even in that role it is highly
influential. Moreover, even to political psychologists the public’s democratic
shortcomings are cause for consternation no matter how well explained psychologically,
suggesting some lingering desire for the normative standard of rational deliberation and
well-informed political decisions.
2.2. Biopolitics
Over the last decade or so, social scientists have begun to view human behavior through
the prism of biology with intriguing results: neuroscience sheds light on information
processing and emotion, evolutionary psychology underscores the biologically adaptive
role of various social behaviors, and behavioral genetics uncovers the heritability of many
social and political behaviors (Hatemi & McDermott, 2011). Political psychology is also
beginning to adopt this perspective, leading to a key focus on biological reasoning and
evidence in several chapters in the volume, and a passing reference to biological
evidence in many others.
At one level an explanation of human behavior grounded in evolutionary thinking seems

entirely consistent with a focus on rationality since human behavior is functional within
evolutionary theory, geared toward enhanced reproductive fitness via the process of
natural selection. In the Handbook, Sidanius and Kurzban outline the basic principles of
evolutionary psychology, examining the adaptive biological and reproductive benefits of
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many social and political behaviors, including cooperation and coordination. But whereas
classic rational choice theory is focused on individual goal seeking and reward,
evolutionary psychology grapples increasingly with the benefits of social and political
behavior to the collective linked to the controversial theory of group selection (Wilson &
Wilson, 2008). In that vein, Sidanius and Kurzban state succinctly and somewhat
provocatively that “adaptations for political psychology are driven by the possibility of
fitness gains through coordinated, cooperative activity with conspecifics.” Such
deviations from individual rationality are of central interest to political psychology.
Evolutionary psychology focuses on attributes of psychology common to all members of

the species, but some questions tackled by biopolitics deal with marked individual
variation in human behavior. Why are some people open to experience and others closed,
or some conscientious and others not? In her chapter, Funk picks up where Sidanius and
Kurzban leave of, providing an overview of major approaches to the study of genetic
influences on political behavior that explain individual differences. She evaluates the
degree to which different facets of political behavior can be traced back to genes and
concludes that genes have extensive influence on political behavior, with heritability
shaping a range of fundamental political orientations and behaviors, including political
ideology, partisan identity, strength of partisanship, and political participation. This work
raises many intriguing questions about the biological mechanisms through which (p. 8)
genes influence political behavior, and Funk notes a number of studies in which political
behavior is traced to specific genetic alleles that govern known biological processes.
Other chapter authors allude in passing to the growing field of biopolitics. Brader and
Marcus discuss developments in the neural understanding of emotions, and Stein
considers similar research in reference to the perception of threat among political elites.
Huddy notes biological evidence in support of the primacy of in-group attachments, the
speed with which in-group and out-group distinctions form in the brain, and the power of
hormones such as oxytocin to generate positive in-group feelings. Kinder considers the
possible genetic bases of racial prejudice. Dyson and ‘t Hart note research in which loss
activates fear centers of the brain, helping to uncover the biological bases of loss
aversion. Attention to the biological bases of political behavior will hopefully reinforce
existing insights into political behavior, and help to identify basic biological pathways that
may be central to an understanding of political psychology.
2.3. Personality and Psychodynamics
Many political psychologists have examined an individual’s personality or character-

ological predispositions to explain the behavior of political leaders and the ideological
choices of citizens. Personality is usually defined as a collection ofirelatively persistent
individual differences that transcend specific situations and contribute to the observed
stability of attitudes and behavior. In the last 10 years, political psychologists have shown
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renewed interest in stable personality traits and their effects on political attitudes and
behavior based, in part, on growing consensus on the basic structure of personality traits.
Psychologists commonly identify five basic clusters of personality characteristics or traits

—neuroticism, openness to experience, extraversion, conscientiousness, and
agreeableness—commonly referred to as the five-factor or Big Five framework of
personality. These dimensions are described in some detail and their links to political
ideology examined in the Handbook by Caprara and Vecchione. The five-factor model has
broad influence in political psychology and is touched on in Handbook chapters by
Feldman, Funk, Taber and Young, Huckfeldt, and colleagues, and Winter. Caprara and
Vecchione go beyond conventional accounts of personality within political psychology,
however, to suggest that personality is broader than just traits and incorporates political
values, such as egalitarianism and the need for security. These basic political values
explain individual differences in political attitudes to an impressive degree, as discussed
in the chapter on ideology by Feldman. Winter takes a similarly broad view of personality
in his chapter on political elites, drawing on social context, personality traits, cognitions,
and motives to analyze individual differences in elite behavior and decision-making.
Sigmund Freud had a great deal of influence on early political psychologists because his
psychoanalysis of specific individuals lent itself well to the analysis of the personalities of
specific political leaders. Harold Lasswell, in his Psychopathology of Politics (1930),
(p. 9) was a pioneer in analyzing the personalities of political activists in terms of the
unconscious conflicts that motivated their political activities. This approach led to
numerous psychobiographies of famous leaders, such as the analysis of Woodrow Wilson
by George & George (1956), or of Martin Luther by Erik Erikson (1958). Post employs an
idiographic approach to perceptively analyze the personality of political leaders from a
psychoanalytic perspective. This idiographic approach to personality and politics can be
contrasted with the nomothetic approach discussed by Carprara and Vecchione, which
statistically places large numbers of people at various positions on specific dimensions of
personality.
Feldman adds an important caveat to the study of personality and politics, underscoring
the critical interplay between personality traits and political systems. As he notes,
political ideology is not simply a proxy for personality. Conservatives may be less open to
experience than liberals, but how personality traits map onto political ideology within a
given political system also depends on the structure of political parties, their number,
strategically adopted issue positions, and additional religious-secular, racial, and other
powerful cleavages within a society. In the end, personality is an important recent
addition to the study of political psychology, but it cannot be considered in isolation from
political context.
2.4. Cognitive and Affective Psychology
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Cognitive psychology and neuroscience have had profound influence on political

psychology through their discovery of key features of the cognitive system: limited
attention and working memory, implicit attitudes that lie outside conscious awareness,
the rapid formation of habitual mental associations, and the interplay of affect and
cognition. In essence, the cognitive system is highly efficient, processing a great deal of
information with relatively little mental exertion. Under appropriate conditions,
individuals can override the human tendency toward fast and efficient decision-making
(Kahneman, 2011). But political decision-making is often beset with biases that privilege
habitual thought and consistency over the careful consideration of new information. This
is not always bad. Indeed, in the realm of consumer and other choices such fast gut-level
decisions are often superior to reasoned thought. But in the realm of politics, reliance on
this form ofireasoning privileges consistency through the process of motivated reasoning
in which disagreeable or challenging information is quickly rejected. This can lead, in
turn, to biased and suboptimal political decisions (Bartels, 1996).
In myriad ways, cognitive psychology has undermined the rational choice model of elite
and public decision-making, and we briefly describe how awareness of each aspect of the
cognitive system has shaped the study of political psychology over the last decade. Much
of this research is dedicated toward understanding how well (or poorly) democratic
citizens function and the degree to which they deviate from the normative ideal of
rational decision-making.
(p. 10) 2.4.1. Cognitive Economy

Clear limits on human information-processing capacity underlie the widespread use of
cognitive heuristics or shortcuts, which can distort the decision-making of elites (Jervis,
1976; Larson, 1985) and members of the public. These limits often lead to what Simon
(1957) refers to as “bounded rationality,” discussed at some length in the Handbook
chapter by Chong.
Levy discusses the impact of cognitive biases on foreign policy decision-making. He

distinguishes between “cold,” cognitive biases and “hot,” affective biases. Cold biases are
based on the application of straight cognitive heuristics such as anchoring, in which prior
probability assessments exert a disproportionate weight and in which the updating of
priors based on new information is slow and inefficient. Hot motivated biases, such as
wishful thinking and cognitive consistency, help to preserve the integrity of one’s belief
system. Such biases in adulthood force an examination of the origins of attitudes and
beliefs that require such vigorous defense, as developed in the chapter on childhood and
adult development by Sears and Brown. Elite reliance on efficient cognitive biases is
further developed in the chapter by Herrmann, in which he discusses the underpinnings
oftenemy images held by one nation’s leaders of another.
Redlawsk and Lau turn to the use of cognitive heuristics among citizens and review work
on behavioral decision theory, contrasting normative models with behavioral descriptions
of how ordinary people make political decisions. Here too the cognitive limits on
rationality lead to a variety of problem-solving strategies that involve cognitive shortcuts.
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The use of mental shortcuts is not necessarily pernicious, however. The chapters by Taber
and Young and by Redlawsk and Lau suggest that the use of cognitive shortcuts for
reasoned political deliberation may not be as bad for mass political decision-making as
once feared (also see Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). Dyson and ‘t Hart make a similar point,
underscoring the benefits of heuristic reasoning for elite decision-makers facing a crisis.
The need for cognitive ef ciency and an awareness of the low priority of politics for many
citizens leads to a particular focus within political psychology on information: citizens’
depth of knowledge, how political information is acquired, and the sources to which
citizens turn to acquire it. In the Handbook, Valentino & Nardis discusses Americans’
relatively low levels of political knowledge. Huckfeldt, Mondak and colleagues explore in
considerable detail the role of everyday conversation partners in conveying political
information (and influence). They specifically discuss the role played by politically expert
discussion partners and find that conversation with such knowledgeable individuals is
reasonably common and influential, even if their arguments are not necessarily held in
high regard. This provides an example of how citizens can reduce the effort involved in
acquiring knowledge by obtaining political information from others within their
immediate social circles.
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(p. 11) 2.4.2. Implicit Attitudes and Automaticity

Conscious cognitive activity is a limited commodity, and decisions are often made, and
opinions influenced, by information outside conscious awareness. In reality, the brain is
largely devoted to monitoring the body, and most of its activity lies outside consciousness,
reserving conscious thought for important higher-level activities. Political psychologists
might regard political decisions as a high-level activity warranting conscious deliberation,
yet political attitudes can be influenced by information of which someone may be
unaware. Taber and Young discuss this phenomenon most fully in their chapter, focusing
on implicit attitudes that exist outside conscious awareness, and the automaticity of
preconscious attitude activation. They characterize implicit attitudes as affective in
nature, fast to take ef ect, and as interacting with explicit attitudes in various ways that
deserve further research scrutiny. Several chapters discuss the widely used Implicit
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Kinder extends this
discussion to implicit racial attitudes, examining their nature and political effects. In their
chapter, Al Ramiah and Hewstone note the influence of implicit attitudes on inter-group
discrimination, including racially discriminatory behavior. Overall, the political influence
of implicit attitudes and automaticity has been examined in a growing number ofiresearch
studies concerned with racial attitudes, candidate choice, and the effects of political
campaign ads.
Valentino and Nardis weave a discussion of preconscious attitudes into their chapter on
political communication, in which they assesses the power of campaign ads, news media
content, and other media coverage to sway the public. They regard preconscious
attitudes as a source of consistency in political belief, concluding that “what we think of
as political deliberation is mostly the post-hoc rationalization of pre-conscious
evaluations.” In other words, preconscious attitudes serve as attitudinal ballast that
prevents someone from being readily persuaded by any one political message; in essence,
contrary information is coded as disagreeable and rejected even before it is consciously
considered. In that sense, preconscious attitude activation serves as a useful
counterweight to persuasive political rhetoric.
The notion of automaticity shares an intellectual link with behaviorist theories that were
much in vogue in the middle half of the 20th century. One version of behaviorist theories
emphasizes the learning of long-lasting habits, which in turn guide later behavior. They
were inspired by the classical conditioning studies of Pavlov, who showed that dogs could
be conditioned to salivate at the sound of a bell if it were always followed by food; by the
instrumental conditioning studies of Watson and Skinner, who showed that animals could
develop complex habits if their behavior proved instrumental to the satisfaction of their
basic needs such as hunger or thirst; and the imitative learning examined by Bandura,
who showed that children would engage in imitative behavior without any involvement of
need satisfaction. Such theories long dominated the analysis of mass political attitudes.
The field of political socialization, as described in the chapter by Sears (p. 12) and Brown,
developed from the assumption that children learned basic political attitudes (such as
party identification and racial prejudice) from their families and friends, and that the
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residues of these early attitudes dominated their later political attitudes in adulthood,
such as their presidential vote preferences, triggering a host of automatic associations
not readily subject to conscious scrutiny.
2.4.3. Spreading Activation and Habitual Association

The process of automaticity is linked to the axiomatic notion, developed by Hebb (1949),
that neurons that fire together, wire together. The simultaneous pairing of two objects in
the environment leads to the firing of their relevant neurons. If this pairing persists, the
brain associates the two objects habitually and recalls the second when primed with the
first in a process of spreading activation. For example, if the word liberal is frequently
associated in popular conversation with loose-living, pot-smoking, intellectual, or
impractical dreamers, or the media depict African Americans in settings that emphasize
their poverty, unemployment, and drug-related crimes, the terms will become connected
mentally. This set of mental associations may lie at the heart of implicit racial, gender,
and other group stereotypes discussed in the Handbook by Donald Kinder.
The existence of habitual associations in the brain results in consistent thought patterns
that link, for example, abortion and liberal-conservative ideology, or positive feelings
about capitalism and support for government fiscal austerity measures. In general, such
associations anchor policy positions and contribute to attitude stability over time,
especially among those who connect policies to stable political attitudes such as political
ideology or other basic values. But habitual mental associations also vary among
individuals; political sophisticates with strongly anchored political beliefs show stronger
habitual mental associations than those with few or weakly held beliefs. The existence of
consistent mental associations helps to explain why reframing a political issue—
discussing a tax cut in terms of reduced government waste rather than growing
inequality, for example—will be effective for citizens for whom the concept of a tax cut is
not anchored by other stable political beliefs, but will be less successful among political
sophisticates.
Understanding the factors or situations in which someone will scrutinize their habitual
mental associations is of critical interest to political psychology and the study of a
democratic citizenry more generally. In their Handbook chapter on political emotion,
Brader and Marcus present evidence that habitual thought is less common when
individuals feel anxious. Under those circumstances, citizens seek out new information,
process it carefully, and are motivated to reach the “right” decision. The distinction
between more and less effortful information processing is captured within dual-process
models that posit both a superficial and more deliberate path to attitude change. The
delineation of conditions under which citizens engage in careful political deliberation and
are open to new information remains of key interest to political psychologists and will
continue to stimulate research in both psychology and political science.
(p. 13) 2.4.4. Interplay of Affect and Cognition
Page 14 of 24
date: 17 April 2018

Contemporary political psychology draws heavily on affective processes. The previous

volume of the Handbook was published at a time when individual information-processing
and research on cognitive biases were popular topics within the study of political
behavior. In the last decade, research on affect and emotion has increased exponentially
in the social sciences, leading to a far more emotional and affect-laden view of political
behavior that is manifestly apparent in the current volume. There was one chapter
devoted to political emotions in the previous version of the Handbook, but few other
chapters devoted much space to the topic. That has changed dramatically in the current
volume, in which it is difficult to find a chapter that does not make at least passing
reference to the role of political emotions in research on citizens or political elites.
In addition to Brader and Marcus’s detailed discussion of political emotions, emotions

surface in numerous ways in this edition of the Handbook. Stein discusses in considerable
detail the influence of emotions on elites’ perceptions of, and responses to, external
threats. She builds on Brader and Marcus’s discussion of the origins and cognitive
consequences of different classes of emotions to explain the likely consequences of fear,
humiliation, and anger for elite decision-making. Levy, Herrmann, and Dyson and ‘t Hart
also touch on the role of emotion within elite decision-making. Positive and negative
affect are integral components of implicit attitudes, as noted by Taber and Young, and in
that sense emotion plays a very central role within modern attitude research in both
psychology and political science. Al Ramiah and Hewstone consider evidence that
members of minority groups react more strongly to negative implicit than explicit
attitudes held by a majority group member, underscoring the power of implicit attitudes
to shape interpersonal encounters. Kinder discusses the importance of affect to the study
of racial prejudice. Huddy underscores the contribution of intergroup emotions to the
development of group cohesion and political action. Bar-Tal and Halperan evaluate the
importance of anger, hatred, fear, and humiliation to the development of intractable
conflicts.
Brader and Marcus review research on political emotions in considerable detail. Their
chapter underscores a fourth crucial aspect of the cognitive system, the intricate
interplay between affect and cognition. Hot cognition underscores the degree to which
motivational and affective states influence decision-making, and is discussed at some
length by Taber and Young. Motivated reasoning serves as a pervasive example of hot
cognition in which individuals are motivated to preserve their beliefs, oppose challenging
or contradictory views, and dismiss the other side’s arguments as far weaker than one’s
own. In essence, it produces rapid (and perhaps preconscious) dismissal of opposing
views. The existence of motivated reasoning generates a paradox, however, when it
comes to political sophisticates, who turn out to be most subject to automaticity and
motivated reasoning. In Chong’s words, “the beliefs of the best informed may reflect an
ideologically distorted perspective rather than the objective state of the world,” raising
real questions about the rational basis of public opinion. If those with the information
Page 15 of 24
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needed to make (p. 14) a fully informed decision are also the most biased in their
reasoning, rational deliberation seems like an unattainable political ideal.
2.5. Intergroup Relations
In tandem with a growing interest in biology and emotions, contemporary political

psychology is also increasingly focused on collective behavior and theories of intergroup
relations as explanations for political behavior. The previous version of this Handbook
contained four chapters linked to intergroup relations focusing on in-group identity,
collective action, group prejudice, and intractable group conflict. In the current volume,
the chapters explicitly devoted to intergroup relations have been expanded to additionally
include conflict management, interpersonal social influence, small-group deliberation,
immigration and multiculturalism, and discrimination. Moreover, the growing focus over
the last 10 years on group-based political behavior is entwined with other changes that
have occurred within the field of political psychology. Intergroup research is increasingly
international in focus, drawing on common frameworks such as social identity theory to
explain political behavior in numerous regions of the world. It also builds on an
integrated model of affect and cognition, with affect playing an especially important role
in motivating collective action and driving responses to societal and personal threat.
The field of intergroup relations does not embody a single theoretical approach; rather it
draws on diverse psychological theories. But it is fair to say that many, if not most,
analyses of collective behavior deviate from a rational choice account of human behavior.
For instance, Sidanius and Kurzban note the power of collectives within human evolution
and conclude that the need to cooperate is a basic and functional aspect of human society
(even if not always completely rational for an individual). Early research on intergroup
relations, conducted in the 1950s and 1960s, stressed the biased and emotional nature of
out-group animosity, especially toward Jews and Negroes (Allport, 1954). Much attention
was paid to the childhood socialization of prejudice and stereotyping, as indicated in the
chapter by Sears and Brown. Research on the authoritarian personality, a highly
influential study of prejudice, emphasized the importance of interrelated and emotionally
motivated aspects of personality such as authoritarian submission and authoritarian
aggression in the development of racial prejudice and anti-Semitism (Adorno et al., 1950).
More recent research on racial prejudice and intergroup relations has drawn on a mix of
cognitive and affective factors to account for political group conflict, cohesion, and
conformity. The limitations of the cognitive system, as discussed in numerous chapters of
the Handbook, lead to the formation of simplistic group stereotypes that shape intergroup
political behavior, as noted by Kinder, influence enemy images, as discussed by
Herrmann, and affect the process of conflict resolution, as described by Fisher and
colleagues. Group identities are linked to powerful emotions that generate anger and
hatred and play a central role in accounts of international and domestic politics in (p. 15)
Page 16 of 24
date: 17 April 2018

Handbook chapters by Stein, Huddy, Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, and Bar-Tal and
Halperan.
Some accounts of intergroup behavior, such as realistic conflict theory, are consistent
with rational choice and are often pitted against symbolic accounts of group political
cohesion and conflict. Huddy highlights the distinction between social identity theory,
which stresses social prestige and intergroup respect as motives for intergroup behavior
(Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and realistic interest theories, which place emphasis
on shared material interests and conflict over tangible resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo &
Tuan, 2006; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). A similar distinction
between realistic and affective responses to members of an out-group surfaces in
research on racial attitudes in Kinder’s discussion of prejudice and Green and Staerklé’s
chapter on immigration and multiculturalism. On balance, there is greater support for
symbolic than realistic sources of political group cohesion and conflict.
Threat plays a special role in the political life of a collective. It can galvanize and unify an
in-group while leading to vilification of an out-group, and is thus particularly potent
politically. Threat is widely discussed in Handbook chapters dealing with the political
psychology of mass politics, including Huddy’s chapter on in-group identities, Green and
Staerklé’s consideration of immigration and multiculturalism, Kinder’s overview of racial
prejudice, and Bar-Tal and Halperan’s overview of intractable conflicts. The concept of
threat has long dominated research on conflict within international relations, as noted at
some length by Stein. Research on both mass and elite politics assesses the rationality of
threat reactions and generally rejects that interpretation, at least in broad stroke. Highly
distorted subjective judgments often influence elites’ perception of threat, as noted in
chapters by Levy, Stein, and Herrmann. Moreover, economic threats are typically less
politically potent than cultural and other less tangible noneconomic threats in mass
politics, as discussed in chapters by Huddy, Kinder, and Green and Staerklé.
Finally, humans’ impressive capacity for cooperation, a topic discussed at length by

Sidanius and Kurzban, leads us back to consider the political psychology of a collective.
Tyler and van der Toorn consider the origins of societal justice in social and moral values
that can govern cooperation and societal defection. They mention a provocative argument
advanced by social psychologist Donald Campbell that values such as humanitarianism
have arisen over time through social evolution as a way to curb more base instincts linked
to self-interest. This raises an important consideration about the key role of social norms
in political psychology. As social animals, humans are profoundly affected by social
norms. Those norms are often learned early and well in the socialization process, as
indicated by Sears and Brown. Such norms hold the potential for good as well as evil.
Indeed some even argue that life in modern democratic societies is remarkably
peaceable, that international violence is now at an all-time low, and that the horrors that
were commonplace in the past, such as the widespread use of torture, are now widely
condemned (Pinker, 2011). The globalization of economic life reffects international
cooperation on a scale unimaginable in times past.
Page 17 of 24
date: 17 April 2018

Have the scales tipped toward a more humane and cooperative world? Such a claim
would undoubtedly be disputed by scholars of indigenous oppression, economic (p. 16)
inequality, and other societal ills. Nonetheless, research on values and social justice
opens political psychology to the positive forces of cooperation, tolerance, and respect on
which modern democratic societies pivot. Adherence to a norm of cooperation may not be
rational for an individual (if defined as the pursuit of self-interest) but can have clear
advantages to human groups. The positive forces in human society are touched on only
lightly in this Handbook but may come to play a larger role in future political psychology
research (see Aspinwall & Satudinger, 2002; Monroe, 1996).
Page 18 of 24
date: 17 April 2018

3. Organization of This Volume

We begin this volume with a section on broad psychological theories. This section
includes basic psychological theories that concern personality, early childhood and adult
development, rational choice, decision-making, the study of emotion, evolutionary
psychology, genetics, and political rhetoric. Then we move to the substantive focus of
different areas of political psychological research, which tend to cut across theoretical
approaches. We start with elite behavior, first in the area of international relations and
then in the area of domestic politics. The next section focuses on mass political behavior,
including an analysis of political reasoning, political ideology, social justice, social
influence, political communications, and political deliberation. The final section considers
collective behavior, including identities, social movements, racial prejudice, migration
and multiculturalism, discrimination, and intractable conflict.
We characterize political psychology as the application of psychology to politics, but we

would like to see greater two-way communication between disciplines. Indeed, the study
of political psychology provides potential insight into basic psychology, as is clear from
the chapters in this volume. For example, Feldman discusses at some length the
multidimensional nature of political ideology and conservatism that is at odds with their
popular unidimensional conception in social psychology. Numerous chapters underscore
the complexity of political sophistication, which cannot simply be equated with expertise
and the efficient assimilation of new information but focuses instead on strong political
biases, powerful partisan identities, and extensive motivated reasoning. While processes
such as motivated reasoning are well known in psychology, they deserve even greater
research attention within political psychology because of their political heft. Although
many political psychologists, including authors in this volume, are drawn from the
disciplines of psychology and political science, they also include historians, sociologists,
anthropologists, psychiatrists, communications researchers, educators, and lawyers.
Before closing, we also want to refer the interested reader to several other recent
volumes with different goals from our own but with somewhat similar titles. This
Handbook is intended as a comprehensive statement of the current state of knowledge in
political psychology. There are several other volumes in the Oxford Handbooks series that
touch on similar aspects of political behavior but take a less explicitly psychological
approach. (p. 17) Handbooks edited by Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (The
Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, 2007) and Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs
(The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media, 2011) discuss topics
such as political socialization, political communication, trust, and political emotions. The
current volume goes more deeply into original psychological research, includes authors
from both psychology and political science, and is unique in combining research on both
elite and mass politics. The three handbooks provide excellent complementary reviews of
political behavior research.
Page 19 of 24
date: 17 April 2018

One other recent volume presents an interesting collection of individual research in

political psychology. Borgida, Federico, and Sullivan edited The Psychology of Democratic
Citizenship (2009), with chapters devoted to citizens’ democratic capabilities. The volume
includes scholars presenting their own research on political knowledge, persuasion,
group identity, political tolerance, and the media. Topics and approaches overlap with
those in the current Handbook but describe a single research enterprise rather than
review a body of work, and are less singularly focused on psychological research and
theory. Howard Lavine is the editor of the four-volume set Political Psychology (2010). The
series includes reprints of classic articles in political psychology and is organized into
four broad themes: theoretical approaches, public opinion, international relations, and
intergroup relations. This series serves as an important reference work for students and
scholars who wish to become acquainted with canonical writing and research studies in
political psychology.
The current Handbook is a companion to these volumes in political psychology and

political behavior that has a somewhat different purpose. This Handbook is the place to
go to find out what is currently known about the many different fields in the umbrella
topic of political psychology and learn more about psychology, political science, and their
vibrant intersection.
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Page 23 of 24
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Leonie Huddy
Leonie Huddy is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Survey
Research at Stony Brook University. She has written numerous articles and book
chapters on political psychology, with a focus on the politics of intergroup relations.
Huddy’s research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, she is editor
of the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, past editor of the journal, Political
Psychology, past-president of the International Society for Political Psychology, and
serves on the American National Election Studies (ANES) Board of overseers and
numerous editorial boards in political science.
David O. Sears
David O. Sears is a Distinguished Professor of Psychology and Political Science at the

University of California, Los Angeles. He is a co-author of Obama’s Race: The 2008
Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America (2010) and The Diversity Challenge
(2008). He received his Ph.D. in Psychology from Yale University, and is a former
president of the International Society for Political Psychology, and a former Dean of
Social Sciences at UCLA.
Jack S. Levy
Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers

University. He is past-president of the International Studies Association and of the
Peace Science Society. Levy studies the causes of interstate war and foreign policy
decision-making, including prospect theory, misperception and war, intelligence
failure, learning from history, and time horizons. His most recent books include
Causes of War (2010) and The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation, and Transformation
(2011), each co-authored with William R. Thompson.
Page 24 of 24
date: 17 April 2018

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Introduction: Theoretical Foundations of Political Psychology

Oxford Handbooks Online

Abstract and Keywords

date: 17 April 2018

date: 17 April 2018

We designed the Handbook to provide a comprehensive and expertly distilled account

In compiling this volume, we acknowledge the growing international flavor of

date: 17 April 2018

1. What Is Political Psychology?

In a more general sense, questions about public reactions to terrorism or an authoritarian

date: 17 April 2018

the day fairly to arrive at a reasoned judgment, or conversely do they succumb to

2. Intellectual Underpinnings of Political

date: 17 April 2018

date: 17 April 2018

2.1. Rational Choice

In the Handbook, Stein provides a succinct account of a rationalist approach to threat in

date: 17 April 2018

In conclusion, it is difficult to overstate the importance of rational choice theory as a

At one level an explanation of human behavior grounded in evolutionary thinking seems

date: 17 April 2018

Evolutionary psychology focuses on attributes of psychology common to all members of

2.3. Personality and Psychodynamics

Many political psychologists have examined an individual’s personality or character-

date: 17 April 2018

Psychologists commonly identify five basic clusters of personality characteristics or traits

2.4. Cognitive and Affective Psychology

date: 17 April 2018

Cognitive psychology and neuroscience have had profound influence on political

(p. 10) 2.4.1. Cognitive Economy

Levy discusses the impact of cognitive biases on foreign policy decision-making. He

date: 17 April 2018

date: 17 April 2018

(p. 11) 2.4.2. Implicit Attitudes and Automaticity

date: 17 April 2018

2.4.3. Spreading Activation and Habitual Association

(p. 13) 2.4.4. Interplay of Affect and Cognition

date: 17 April 2018

Contemporary political psychology draws heavily on affective processes. The previous

In addition to Brader and Marcus’s detailed discussion of political emotions, emotions

date: 17 April 2018

2.5. Intergroup Relations

In tandem with a growing interest in biology and emotions, contemporary political

date: 17 April 2018

Finally, humans’ impressive capacity for cooperation, a topic discussed at length by

date: 17 April 2018

date: 17 April 2018

3. Organization of This Volume

We characterize political psychology as the application of psychology to politics, but we

date: 17 April 2018

One other recent volume presents an interesting collection of individual research in

The current Handbook is a companion to these volumes in political psychology and

Aspinwall, L. G., & Staudinger, U. (Eds.). (2002). A psychology of human strengths:

Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformedvoters: Information effects in presidential elections.

date: 17 April 2018

political psychology (2nd ed.). New York: Psychology Press.

Edwards, W. (1954). The theory of decision-making. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 380–417.

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual

Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York: Wiley.