Profiles in Leadership 2022 2

1941–2021
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Foreword
The individuals who have held the highest office The profiles depict the 27 leaders in the context of
in the Central Intelligence Agency are an eclectic their times, describing their triumphs and setbacks,
group. They include two Rhodes Scholars and a col- not in isolation but as elements in a larger drama of
lege dropout, captains of industry, and career public domestic politics and foreign affairs. Their stories
servants, as well as Agency veterans and newcomers are inspiring, sometimes sobering, and always fasci-
to the field of intelligence. Seventy-five years after nating. They also feature, of course, the controversy
the Agency was founded, there is still no established that seems endemic to the sensitive and challenging
road to the top. work of intelligence.
This is just one of the many themes presented in this Taken together, these profiles offer an illuminating
revealing look at the 27 leaders who have directed account drawn from the full unclassified record. It is
the CIA and its forerunners from 1941 through to- written in broad strokes but with enough detail to
day. The publication opens with a profile of Major spark the kind of informed debate that has always
General William J. Donovan—the legendary intelli- been a hallmark of the CIA. Since its inception, the
gence chief who ran the Office of Strategic Services, Agency has been rooted in a culture of inquiry and
a precursor of the CIA during World War II—and constant self-examination. This work stands as a
those of two other intelligence pioneers who, like fine example of that honorable tradition.
Donovan, never served at the CIA but helped lay
the groundwork for its foundation. The publication
then traces the careers of the Directors of Central
Intelligence until that title was replaced in 2005 with
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, after
the establishment of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
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Table of Contents
8 Directors Timeline 66 Stansfield Turner

Admiral, US Navy
10 William J. Donovan,
Major General, US Army 70 William J. Casey
14 Sidney W. Souers 76 William H. Webster
Rear Admiral, US Naval Reserve
80 Robert M. Gates
18 Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
84 R. James Woolsey
Lieutenant General, US Army
88 John M. Deutch
22 Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, US Navy 92 George J. Tenet
26 Walter Bedell Smith 98 Porter J. Goss

General, US Army 102 Michael V. Hayden
30 Allen W. Dulles General, US Air Force
36 John A. McCone 106 Leon E. Panetta
40 William F. Raborn Jr. 110 David H. Petraeus

Vice Admiral, US Navy (Ret.) General, US Army (Ret.)
44 Richard M. Helms 114 John O. Brennan
50 James R. Schlesinger 120 Michael R. Pompeo
54 William E. Colby 126 Gina Haspel
60 George H. W. Bush 132 William J. Burns
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D i r e ct o r s T i m e l i n e
1940 1960
William J. Donovan1
Major General, US Army William F. Raborn Jr.4
Jul 11, 1941 – Jun 13, 1942 (COI) Vice Admiral, US Navy
Jun 13, 1942 – Oct 1, 1945 (OSS) DCI, Apr28, 1965 – Jun 30, 1966
Sidney W. Souers2
Rear Admiral, US Naval Reserve Richard M. Helms
DCI, Jan 23, 1946 – Jun 10, 1946 (CIG) DCI, Jun 30, 1966 – Feb 2, 1973
Hoyt S. Vandenberg2
Lieutenant General, US Army James R. Schlesinger
DCI, Jun 10, 1946 – May 1, 1947 (CIG) DCI, Feb 2, 1973 – Jul 2, 1973
1950 1970
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter 3
Rear Admiral, US Navy William E. Colby

DCI, May 1, 1947 – Oct 7, 1950 DCI, Sep 4, 1973 – Jan 30, 1976
Walter Bedell Smith

General, US Army (Army Air Forces) George H.W. Bush
DCI, Oct 7, 1950 – Feb 9, 1953 DCI, Jan 30, 1976 – Jan 20, 1977
Stansfield Turner5
Allen W. Dulles Admiral, US Navy
DCI, Feb 26, 1953 – Nov 29, 1961 DCI, Mar 9, 1977 – Jan 20, 1981
1960 John A. McCone 1980

William J. Casey
DCI, Nov 29, 1961 – Apr 28, 1965 DCI, Jan 28, 1981 – Jan 29, 1987
1 2
President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Donovan to the position of Coordinator Before the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA on September 18, 1947, the Direc-
of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941, creating the nation’s first peacetime, non- tor of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as a member of the National Intelligence Authority
departmental intelligence organization. On June 13, 1942, COI was then and head of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by authority of a Presidential Directive of
superseded by the Office of Strategic Services, which had a mandate to collect and analyze January 22, 1946.
strategic information and conduct counterintelligence operations during World War II. 3
The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, which replaced the CIG on
. September 18, 1947.
1980 2010
William H. Webster Leon E. Panetta

DCI, May 26, 1987 – Aug 31, 1991 D/CIA, Feb 13, 2009 – Jun 30, 2011
Robert M. Gates David H. Petraeus8

DCI, Nov 6, 1991 – Jan 20, 1993
General, US Army
D/CIA, Sep 6, 2011 – Nov 9, 2012
R. James Woolsey
DCI, Feb 5, 1993 – Jan 10, 1995
John O. Brennan
D/CIA, Mar 8, 2013 – Jan 23, 2017
1990 2020
John M. Deutch
DCI, May 10, 1995 – Dec 15, 1996
Michael R. Pompeo
D/CIA, Jan 23, 2017 – Apr 26, 2018
George J. Tenet
DCI, Jul 11, 1997 – Jul 11, 2004
Gina Haspel
Porter J. Goss6 D/CIA, May 18, 2018 – Jan 20, 2021
DCI, Sep 24, 2004 – Apr 21, 2005
D/CIA, Apr 21, 2005 – May 26, 2006
Michael V. Hayden7
2000 General, US Air Force
2021 William J. Burns
D/CIA, May 30, 2006 – Feb 13, 2009 D/CIA, Mar 1, 2021 – Present
4 7
Raborn retired from the US Navy on September 1, 1963. Hayden retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008, while serving as D/CIA.
5 8
Turner retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978, while serving as DCI. Petraeus retired from the US Army on August 31, 2011.
6
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 abolished the position
of DCI and created the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA).
8/9
William
Joseph
Donovan
Major General, US Army
Tenure:
Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941— June 13, 1942
Director, Office of Strategic Services, June 13, 1942—October 1, 1945
Presidents Served:
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman
Appointed:
• July 11, 1941, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Coordinator of zInformation
• June 13, 1942, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Director of Strategic Services
Born:
January 1, 1883, Buffalo, New York
E du c a t i o n :
Attended Niagara College, 1903; Columbia University, B.A., 1905;
Columbia University Law School, LL.B., 1907
Career Highlights:
• Served with New York National Guard on Mexican border, 1916, and with 165th
Infantry (69th New York) Regiment in World War I; awarded Medal of Honor in
1923 for bravery in 1918 Second Battle of the Marne
• Assistant US Attorney General, 1924-29
• Practiced law in New York, 1929-41
• Republican nominee for Governor of New York, 1932
• Placed on active duty and appointed Brigadier General in US Army, 1943
• Promoted to Major General, 1944
• Released from US Army, 1946
• Practiced law in New York, 1946-53
• Ambassador to Thailand, 1953-54
D i e d : February 8, 1959
10 / 11
As US involvement in World War II appeared the Second Battle of the Marne in September 1918.
increasingly likely, President Franklin D. Roosevelt He was also awarded the Distinguished Service
recognized that America urgently needed to piece Cross and two Purple Hearts.
together the fragmented intelligence organizations
across the US Government to bring focus, context, In 1940, with Britain standing alone against Nazi
and clarity to the information reaching the White Germany, President Roosevelt asked Donovan, his
House. To lead the effort, he turned to William J. former classmate at Columbia Law School, to trav-
Donovan—one of the most decorated US soldiers el to England to determine whether Britain would
in World War I—asking him in July 1941 to begin be able to withstand the Nazi onslaught. Donovan
laying the groundwork for what would become reported that the British could stand firm if given
America’s first centralized intelligence organization. enough aid. While conducting his inquiry, Donovan
developed a deep appreciation of British intelligence
Donovan’s military experience and keen interest in operations, which heightened his interest in estab-
intelligence and foreign affairs made him uniquely lishing an American intelligence organization mod-
qualified for the job. During World War I, Donovan eled on the British system.
led the 165th Regiment of the US Army, gaining the
nickname “Wild Bill” for putting his men through President Roosevelt, impressed by Donovan’s
grueling training drills to prepare them for battle. views on intelligence, asked him to take the lead in
He was wounded in action three times and earned centralizing the nation’s intelligence efforts. On
the Medal of Honor for bravery under fire during July 11, 1941, he named Donovan to the position
of Coordinator of Information (COI) to direct a
small civilian intelligence unit that consolidated in-
formation collected abroad for review by the Pres-
ident. Within months, America’s entry into World
War II prompted a reassessment of the COI, and in
June 1942 the bulk of its mission was transferred to
a new intelligence organization, the Office of Stra-
tegic Services (OSS).
Donovan became Director of the OSS, envisioning

it as a strategic intelligence center encompassing col-
lection, research and analysis, counterintelligence,
and paramilitary activities. Throughout World War
II, the OSS engaged in espionage and sabotage op-
erations in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa,
and East Asia. Donovan’s vision for the OSS formed
the basis for the future CIA and it shaped the role,
“Wild Bill” Donovan’s favorite picture of himself, taken in
September 1918. structure, and doctrine of America’s foreign intelli-
“All major powers except the United States have had
for a long time past permanent worldwide
i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e s , r e p o r t i n g d i r e ct l y t o t h e h i g h -
est echelons of their Governments. Prior to the present
war, the United States had no foreign secret intelli-
gence service. It never has had and does not now have a
coordinated intelligence system.”
- OSS Director Donovan to President Harry Truman, August 25, 1945,

quoted in For the President’s Eyes Only (1995) by Christopher Andrew
gence effort for decades to come. Four Directors of

Central Intelligence (DCIs)—Allen Dulles, Richard
Helms, William Colby, and William Casey—were
OSS veterans.
By war’s end, Donovan was promoted to Major

General. He received the Distinguished Service
Medal, the highest American military decoration for
outstanding noncombat service. Although Donovan
cautioned against it, President Truman disbanded
the OSS in September 1945, folding some of its com-
ponents into the War and State Departments.
Donovan died on February 8, 1959, at the age of

76. President Eisenhower called him “the last hero,”
and Donovan remains an inspiration to the men
and women of the CIA. Although he never directed
the agency that was based on his ideas and initial-
ly staffed in large part by people he personally led, Major General William J. Donovan preferred to be in the field
Major General William Donovan embodied the meeting with his officers instead of working behind a desk in
Washington. It was said that if the American flag were raised and
creativity, courage, and can-do spirit that are the lowered every time Donovan came and went from OSS Headquar-
ters, a Color Guard would have to be on hand 24 hours a day.
hallmarks of the CIA. Its officers regard him as the
founder of both their agency and the American in-
telligence profession.
12 / 13
Sidney
Willia m
Souers
Rear Admiral, US Naval Reserve
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group,
January 23, 1946—June 10, 1946
President Served:
Harry S. Truman
Appointed:
January 23, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in on that date
D e p ut y D i r e c t o r :
Kingman Douglass, March 2, 1946, through the remainder of Souers’s tenure
Born:
March 30, 1892, Dayton, Ohio
E du c a t i o n :
Attended Purdue University; Miami University (Ohio), B.A., 1914
Career Highlights:
• Commissioned Lieutenant Commander, US Naval Reserve, 1929
• Volunteered for active duty, 1940
• Promoted to Rear Admiral and named Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, 1945
• Relieved from active duty, 1946
• Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 1947-50
D i e d : January 14, 1973
14 / 15
As America took on a vastly expanded overseas role in ligence summary for Truman by consolidating
the wake of World War II, President Harry Tru- reports and cables from other government depart-
man grew frustrated with the cables, dispatches, ments. The CIG’s first Daily Summary was produced
and reports piling up at the White House and on February 15, 1946, and a Weekly Summary was
requested a systematic process for reviewing the added on June 7, 1946. As the President’s demands
information. In response, his administration estab- for intelligence increased, the group began con-
lished a small interdepartmental organization called ducting interdepartmental studies across intelli-
the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which was gence elements.
charged with consolidating intelligence reports into
daily summaries for the President. When Souers left the CIG in June 1946, he submit-
ted a progress report stating that the CIG was ready
President Truman chose Rear Admiral Sidney to expand its mission into new areas, such as col-
Souers, the Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence at lecting foreign intelligence by clandestine methods,
the end of World War II, to lead the CIG, making producing intelligence studies of foreign countries,
Souers the first person to hold the title of Director of and engaging in basic research and analysis. The
Central Intelligence (DCI). Souers, a wealthy busi- CIG also needed to grow its professional and cleri-
nessman, wanted to return home after the war but cal staff, which numbered approximately 100 when
accepted the job reluctantly, saying that he would Souers departed. Despite Souers’s begrudging accep-
serve no more than six months. At the swearing-in tance of the post of DCI, he succeeded in establish-
ceremony in January 1946, Truman added some ing the framework for what would become the CIA.
levity to the proceedings by presenting Souers
with a black hat, black cloak, and wooden dagger,
declaring him “Director of Centralized Snooping.”
When asked not long after his appointment what
he wanted to do, Souers responded, “I want to go
home.”
The CIG was staffed and funded by the State, War,

and Navy Departments because it was not receiving
separate congressional appropriations. Souers’s role
was to enable the CIG to gain more control over
intelligence collection and analysis because it had
no capacity to collect information from agents in the
field or to produce intelligence estimates.
Truman regarded the CIG as his personal intelli-

gence service and became an avid consumer of its
work. The CIG provided a comprehensive intel-
President Truman awards the Distinguished Service Medal to Rear Admiral Sidney Souers on December 1, 1952. (Photo courtesy of the
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)
“The e v a l u a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t a n e x a ct s c i e n c e a n d
every safeguard should be imposed to prevent any one de-
p a r t m e n t f r o m h a v i n g t h e o p p o r tu n i t y t o i n t e r p r e t i n f o r m a -
t i o n i n s uc h a w a y a s t o m a k e i t s e e m t o s u p p o r t p r e v i o u s l y
a cc e p t e d p o l i c i e s o r p r e c o n c e i v e d o p i n i o n s . ”
- Rear Admiral Sidney Souers’s letter to presidential aide Clark
Clifford before his appointment as DCI, December 27, 1945
16 / 17
Hoyt
Sanford
Vandenb e r g
L i e ut e n a n t G e n e r a l , U S A r m y ( A r m y A i r F o r c e s )
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group,
June 10, 1946—May 1, 1947
President Served:
Harry S. Truman
Appointed:
June 7, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in, June 10, 1946
D e p ut y D i r e c t o r s :
• Kingman Douglass, until July 11, 1946
• No deputy director from July 11, 1946 until January 20, 1947
• Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, US Army, January 20, 1947, through
remainder of Vandenberg’s tenure
Born:
January 24, 1899, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
E du c a t i o n :
US Military Academy, B.S., 1923; attended Army War College, 1939
Career Highlights:
• Pilot, flight commander, flying instructor in Army Air Corps, 1924-36
• Commanded 9th Air Force in Europe during World War II
• Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department General Staff, 1946
• Appointed Vice Chief of Staff of US Air Force with rank of general, 1947
• Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 1948-53
• Retired from Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953
D i e d : April 2, 1954
18 / 19
Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg (standing second from the left) commanded the 9th Air Force in Europe during World War II.
Commanding General of First Army and future DCI Walter Bedell Smith is standing to the left of Vandenberg, and (future US President)
General Dwight D. Eisenhower is seated in the center.
During the summer of 1946, US military forces new organization.

quickly demobilized, and many military components
were transferred to civilian government entities. Vandenberg was hesitant to accept the Director
Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, who suc- of Central Intelligence position, hoping instead to
ceeded Rear Admiral Sidney Souers as Director of the secure a leadership role in what would become the
CIG, moved aggressively to claim some of the com- US Air Force. Nevertheless, Souers persuaded him to
ponents for the CIG, obtaining the Foreign Broad- accept the DCI position, saying it was a wiser career
cast Information Service and the intelligence por- move and would help him build relationships with
tion of the Manhattan Project, the program that senior officials.
produced the atomic bomb. The acquisitions helped
Vandenberg carve out a more significant role for the Vandenberg reformed the CIG by creating new roles
and responsibilities and by seeking additional au- leased on July 23, 1946, the estimate concluded that
thorities. He established four major offices during his Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not have the capabili-
short tenure: the Office ty or desire to wage war
of Special Operations, against the Western
responsible for cla- “Strategic and national powers.
ndestine collection; policy intelligence is that
the Office of Reports Vandenberg wanted
composite intelligence,
and Estimates (ORE), the CIG to become a
interdepartmental in
which conducted re- permanent organiza-
c h a r a ct e r , w h i c h i s r e q u i r e d b y tion with additional
search and analysis; the
Office of Collection and the President a n d o t h e r high authority to collect for-
Dissemination, which o ff i c e r s a n d s t a ff t o a s s i s t eign intelligence and
coordinated the flow conduct independent
them in determining policies
of intelligence; and the research and analy-
w i t h r e s p e ct t o n a t i o n a l p l a n -
Office of Operations, sis. To achieve this, he
n i n g a n d s e cu r i t y i n p e a c e a n d advocated the establish-
which collected un-
classified information i n war and for the advancement ment of a new organi-
from open sources. Co- o f b r o a d n a t i o n a l p o l i c y .” zation, the CIA, which
vert action—operations would be independent
designed to conceal - DCI Hoyt Vandenberg’s proposed from the Department
a US role—remained definition of intelligence for the Central of State and the mili-
Intelligence Group, approved by tary. This required leg-
outside the CIG’s port-
the National Intelligence Authority on
folio. The CIG also islation, and Vanden-
February 12, 1947
received increased berg—the nephew of a
funding and person- prominent Republican
nel authorizations, Senator—had the con-
which permitted Vandenberg to grow the organi- tacts to foster the necessary political support. On
zation to some 1,800 officers by the end of 1946, re- July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National
ducing the group’s dependence on government de- Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA and over-
partments. hauling the country’s outdated national security
structure. The Act was not approved until shortly
When President Truman asked the CIG to provide after Vandenberg left the CIG, but his efforts were
an assessment of the strength and capabilities of the pivotal in securing its passage and establishing CIA.
Soviet Union, Vandenberg oversaw the production
of the CIG’s first intelligence estimate, ORE-1, the
predecessor of the CIA’s (later the National Intelli-
gence Council’s) National Intelligence Estimate. Re-
20 / 21
Roscoe
Henry
H i l l e n k o e tt e r
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Tenure:
• Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group,
May 1, 1947—November 23, 1947
• Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
November 24, 1947—October 7, 1950
President Served:
Harry S. Truman
Appointed:
• April 30, 1947, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in, May 1, 1947
• Reappointed under the National Security Act by President Truman,
November 24, 1947; confirmed by the US Senate on December 8, 1947
• Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, US Army, until March 9, 1949
• No deputy director for remainder of Hillenkoetter’s term
Born:
May 8, 1897, St. Louis, Missouri
E du c a t i o n :
US Naval Academy, B.S., 1919
Career Highlights:
• Assistant Naval Attaché, France: 1933-35, 1938-40, 1940-41
(Vichy regime), and 1946-47
• Officer in Charge of Intelligence, on the staff of Commander in Chief, Pacific
Ocean Area (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz), 1942-43
• Promoted to Rear Admiral, 1946
• Commander, Cruiser Division 1, Cruiser–Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet, 1950-51
• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1956
• Inspector General of the Navy, 1956
• Retired from the Navy, 1957
D i e d : June 18, 1982
22 / 23
The CIA was created on July 26, 1947, as part of a senior officer of his crew to survive the Japanese
broad reorganization of the nation’s intelligence attack on December 7, 1941. As the United States
structure. The new system, which was mandated by entered World War II, Hillenkoetter became the
the National Security Act of 1947, established the officer in charge of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet
CIA to coordinate intelligence collection and anal- Staff. In the spring of 1947, President Truman asked
ysis across the US Government. The act also created him to become DCI.
the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the
President on national security and foreign policy Eight months into Hillenkoetter’s tenure as DCI, the
matters. With this new arrangement in place, the NSC created a survey group to review the intel-
Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral ligence system’s progress since World War II and to
Roscoe Hillenkoetter, was directed to oversee the determine how the NSC should oversee the CIA’s
development of the CIA. activities. The NSC Survey Group—of which future
DCI Allen Dulles was a member—submitted a report
Hillenkoetter was a career naval officer who served to the NSC that was highly critical of Hillenkoetter
as an assistant naval attaché in Vichy, France, in and the CIA, identifying a failure to coordinate
1940-41. Later assigned to the battleship USS West the efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC) and
Virginia at Pearl Harbor, Hillenkoetter was the most a lack of organizational structure as key problems.
DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter (pictured top left) attends a National Security Council meeting with President Harry Truman on August 19,
1948. (Photo courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)
“The s e r v i c e s h a v e a t e n d e n c y t o r e f l e ct t h e i r o w n i n -
terests in their intelligence estimates. For this rea-
son, C IA strives to maintain in its estimates
a n o b j e ct i v e , b a l a n c e d , v i e w a n d t o k e e p US national
s e cu r i t y , r a t h e r t h a n d e p a r t m e n t a l i n t e r e s t s , a s t h e
dominant consideration.”
- DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter in a 1950 letter to President Truman,

quoted in The Agency (1986) by John Ranelagh
The NSC directed Hillenkoetter to reform the CIA interagency effort. Despite the focus on commu-
based on the report’s suggestions, but Hillenkoetter nist expansion, however, the IC failed to provide
was unable to implement the requested changes, in sufficient warning about North Korea’s invasion of
large measure because of resistance from other fed- South Korea in June 1950, a major intelligence fail-
eral agencies. ure that contributed to Hillenkoetter’s departure as
DCI later that year.
A major concern during Hillenkoetter’s tenure was
the spread of communist regimes, which led him
to establish an interagency committee to prepare
intelligence estimates on East Bloc capabilities—the
first time that such estimates were conducted as an
24 / 25
Walter
Bedell
Smith
General, US Army
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, October 7, 1950—February 9, 1953
President Served:
Harry S. Truman
Appointed:
August 21, 1950, by President Harry S. Truman; confirmed by the
US Senate, August 28, 1950; sworn in, October 7, 1950
• William H. Jackson, October 7, 1950—August 3, 1951
• Allen W. Dulles, August 23, 1951, through remainder of Smith’s tenure (served as
Acting Director, February 9—26, 1953)
Born:
October 5, 1895, Indianapolis, Indiana
E du c a t i o n :
Attended Butler University; Army Command and General Staff School, 1935;
Army War College, 1937
Career Highlights:
• Commissioned into US Army, 1917; served in France in World War I; received
regular commission, 1920
• Served during World War II as General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, first in Eu-
ropean Theater, 1942; then for Allied Forces in North Africa and Mediterranean,
1942-43; and during 1944-45 at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces
• Promoted to Lieutenant General, 1944
• Ambassador to Soviet Union, 1946-49
• Commanding General of First Army, 1949-50
• Retired from US Army, 1953
• Under Secretary of State, 1953-54
D i e d : August 6, 1961
26 / 27
Often referred to as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s In 1950, after the CIA’s failure to warn of the out-
“hatchet man,” General Walter Bedell Smith was break of the Korean War, President Truman asked
described by many as “even-tempered”—he was Smith to take over as DCI. Smith moved quickly to
always angry. At his first staff meeting as Director make changes and quell infighting among Agency
of Central Intelligence, Smith opened by saying, officers, using a report submitted a year earlier by
“It’s interesting to see all you fellows here. It will the National Security Council Survey Group—of
be all the more interesting to see how many of you which future DCI Allen Dulles was a member—as a
are here a few months from now.” Although Smith blueprint for reforming the Agency.
could be brusque, his great skill as an administrator
and his renown as a formidably talented Washing- Smith divided the Agency’s main activities into
ton insider made him one of the CIA’s most success- three directorates: one for espionage and covert
ful directors. actions, one for analysis, and one for administrative
functions. The Directorate for Administration was
At a young age, Smith, nicknamed “Beetle,” envi- formed in 1950 to centralize support elements such
sioned himself as a soldier fighting on the front lines. as finance, logistics, medical services, and security.
His upbringing emphasized the family’s record of Smith later consolidated the offices responsible for
serving in every American war since the Revolution. covert action and intelligence collection into
Smith received a high school education but never the Directorate of Plans—a predecessor of today’s
graduated from college. In 1911, at the age of 16,
he enlisted in the Indiana National Guard and was
promoted quickly to company sergeant, later serv-
ing as an officer in World War I. He was wounded
by shrapnel on his second day in combat in France
and was sent back to Washington, where he worked
on the War Department General Staff in the newly
established Bureau of Military Intelligence.
As World War II began, Smith was promoted to

work for Army Chief of Staff General George C.
Marshall. Smith was known for his organizational
skills and became a key aide to Marshall. Smith later
became General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Chief of
Staff in Europe, where he negotiated and signed the
terms of surrender with Italy in 1943 and Germany
in 1945. After the war, President Truman appointed
Smith Ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he
served until 1949. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith.
Directorate of Operations (DO). In January 1952, with this one.” The Bulletin evolved into the Presi-
the Directorate of Intelligence (DI)—today known dent’s Daily Brief, a report the President continues to
as the Directorate of Analysis (DA)—was formed to receive today. Smith also established the practice of
conduct basic, current, and estimative analysis. The providing intelligence briefings to presidential can-
DI also performed a liai- didates and presidents-elect.
son function, collecting
information from other “ T h e D i r e ct o r o f To improve analysis, Smith
intelligences services Central Intelligence is recruited Harvard professor
including the Department William Langer—a veteran
one of those jobs where
of State, the Armed Forces of the Office of Strategic Ser-
one can never be right,
Security Agency—a prede- vices, the predecessor of the
cessor of today’s National
as the American people CIA—to organize the Office
Security Agency—and e x p e ct t h e i n cu m b e n t of National Estimates. Langer
Army, Navy, and Air t o p r e d i ct w i t h a ccu - persuaded another OSS vet-
Force intelligence agen- eran, Sherman Kent, to leave
racy just what Stalin
cies. Smith also appointed his teaching position at Yale
is likely to do three
the Agency’s first inspec- and join him in Washington
months from today as his deputy. Langer and Kent
tor general to increase
accountability within the at 5:30 a.m. and, of developed a process to produce
organization. course, that is beyond national estimates by reaching
out to all the intelligence agen-
the realm of h u m a n i n -
Smith continued the prac- cies to ensure that estimates
fallibility.”
tice of sending a daily were fully coordinated. Smith
intelligence brief to the personally reviewed the esti-
President and established - General Walter Bedell Smith, August mates before sending them to
regular Friday briefings 1950 before becoming DCI, quoted in the President.
The CIA and American Democracy (1989)
at the White House. He
by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
also launched the Current Smith saw himself as a man-
Intelligence Bulletin and the ager not only of the CIA but
Current Intelligence Weekly of the entire Intelligence Com-
Review to provide Presi- munity. He is remembered as
dent Truman and senior policymakers a customized being one of the most effective DCIs because of his
review of the intelligence collection and analysis ability to lead and to revolutionize how intelligence
conducted at the CIA. After Truman received the was gathered, processed, analyzed, and dissemi-
first Bulletin, he wrote, “Dear Bedell, I have been nated.
reading the intelligence bulletin and I am highly
impressed with it. I believe you have hit the jackpot
28 / 29
Allen
Welsh
Dulles
Tenure:
• Acting Director of Central Intelligence, February 9—26, 1953
• Director of Central Intelligence, February 26, 1953—November 29, 1961
Presidents Served:
Dwight D. Eisenhower
John F. Kennedy
Appointed:
• February 9, 1953, by President Dwight D. Eisenhower; confirmed by the US Sen-
ate, February 23, 1953; sworn in, February 26, 1953
• Asked by President-elect John F. Kennedy to continue as Director of
Central Intelligence, November 10, 1960
General Charles Pearre Cabell, US Air Force, April 23, 1953, through remainder of
Dulles’s tenure
Born:
April 7, 1893, Watertown, New York
E du c a t i o n :
Princeton University, B.A., 1914, M.A., 1916; The George Washington Univer-
sity, LL.B., 1926
Career Highlights:
• US Diplomatic Service, Department of State, 1916-26
• Practiced law in New York, 1926-42 and 1946-50
• Head of Office of Strategic Services post in Bern, Switzerland, 1942-45
• Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 1951
• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1951-53
• Private pursuits including writing several books
• Served on President’s Commission on the Assassination
of President Kennedy, 1963-64
30 / 31
Allen Welsh Dulles once said that “intelligence is
probably the least understood and most misrepre-
sented of professions.” Dulles, the longest-serving
DCI, had perhaps the most intimate knowledge of
how intelligence is perceived and how it influences
policy.
Dulles’s early life and career afforded him a unique

opportunity to build impressive experience in
world affairs. Many of Dulles’s relatives were
prominent government officials; in fact, his older
brother, John Foster Dulles, was President Dwight
Allen Dulles (center) and Richard Helms (far right) pose with
D. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State. Dulles began
colleagues in an OSS-era photograph. (Photo courtesy of the Helms
his government career in the Foreign Service in Family Collection)
1916. His first tour was in Vienna, Austria, as Dulles of plans by a German opposition group to
third secretary, and his next assignment was at the assassinate Hitler. Dulles was also a key player in
US Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, where he was Operation Sunrise, facilitating the surrender of
introduced to espionage operations. When Dulles German forces in northern Italy on May 1, 1945.
arrived in Vienna, the first secretary said, “I guess After the war, Dulles served as the OSS station
the best thing for you to do is take charge of intelli- chief in Berlin for six months and then returned to
gence. Keep your ears open. This place is swarming the United States to practice law.
with spies.” Dulles advanced in the State Depart-
ment, but he eventually resigned and joined John Dulles was widely recognized as one of the nation’s
Foster Dulles’s law firm in New York City. Despite leading experts on intelligence and was consulted
becoming a partner at the law firm in 1930, Dulles about developing the CIA by President Harry Tru-
kept his hand in international relations. man and the NSC. In 1948, the NSC asked him to
work with a team to review the intelligence system’s
In 1942, Dulles joined the OSS, after having been progress since World War II. The report, dissem-
selected by General William Donovan to run intel- inated in 1949, criticized DCI Hillenkoetter for
ligence operations in Switzerland. Dulles had also failing to coordinate the Intelligence Community’s
been offered a position in London, but he chose efforts. When Walter Bedell Smith became DCI
Switzerland, calling it “a less glamorous post, but in 1950, he reportedly called Dulles and said, “You
one where I felt my past experience would serve me made your comments and now come down and run
in good stead.” Dulles recruited and ran agents like the place.” Smith named Dulles the Deputy Director
Fritz Kolbe, a German diplomat who identified Nazi for Plans, responsible for running the Agency’s clan-
spies for the United States, and Hans Bernd Gisevius destine operations; Smith promoted Dulles to Dep-
of the German Consulate in Zurich, who informed uty Director of Central Intelligence in 1951.
As President Eisenhower took office, Dulles was minds” campaigns to motivate those under commu-
concerned about the lack of intelligence on Soviet nist rule to take action against their governments.
intentions and capabilities and feared Washington Dulles increased the use of Radio Free Europe and
could face another strategic surprise like the attack Radio Liberty, created by CIA in 1950 and 1953
on Pearl Harbor. Eisenhower appointed Dulles DCI respectively, to support the free flow of information
in 1953 and authorized him to lead the effort to con- behind the Iron Curtain.
front communist expansion through covert means.
He also asked him to keep a close eye on Soviet To assess the number of strategic bombers and mis-
actions and intentions regarding the United States. siles in the Soviet arsenal, the CIA needed to devise
a way to look behind the Iron Curtain. Dulles advo-
Dulles launched a range of covert operations, includ- cated partnering with Lockheed to develop several
ing the overthrow of leftist leaders in Iran and Gua- reconnaissance projects, including high-altitude
temala who were viewed as potential Soviet allies. In aircraft—such as the U-2, A-12 OXCART, and the
February 1955, the completion of the Berlin Tun- CORONA satellite imagery programs. The U-2
nel allowed American and British intelligence units enabled the CIA to scrutinize Soviet capabilities
to tap the telephone lines of the USSR’s military in from 70,000 feet, leading to discoveries that dispelled
East Berlin. The CIA also organized “hearts-and- concerns within the US Government of a “bomber
The U-2, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, was one of the first espionage planes developed by the CIA during DCI Allen Dulles’s
tenure.
32 / 33
Construction of the Original Headquarters Building (OHB); OHB’s cornerstone was laid by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on
November 3, 1959.
gap” or “missile gap.” This intelligence led to the cancellation of defense programs that were
intended to counter those perceived gaps, ultimately saving the government billions of dollars.
Perhaps Dulles’s most tangible legacy is the CIA headquaters compound in Northern Vir-
ginia. In the 1940s and 50s, the Agency occupied several temporary buildings along the Mall
in Washington, DC. DCI Smith rec-
ognized the need for a new building,
and Dulles pushed for a new head- “It h a s t r ut h fu l l y b e e n s a i d t h a t
quarters once he became DCI. Ini-
intelligence is our first line of
tially, he considered tearing down
defense.”
the old Heurich Brewery—on the site
- Allen Dulles’s statement regarding the proposed
that now houses the Kennedy Cen-
National Security Act of 1947, April 25, 1947
ter—to build the CIA Headquarters.
However, President Eisenhower
opposed the location because he felt
Washington lacked the space to accommodate another government agency. Dulles presented
The Original Headquarters Building was completed in March 1961.
an alternative location—Langley, a former peach orchard near the town of

McLean, Virginia—and Eisenhower accepted. Construction on the Original
Headquarters Building (OHB) started in late 1958 and was completed in the
fall of 1961, near the end of Dulles’s term; Dulles never occupied the DCI’s
OHB office.
Dulles’s tenure also had its share of missteps. He was criticized for neglecting
analysis and leadership of the IC while focusing on covert action operations
and for the abortive efforts to destabilize the Castro regime in Cuba. The
Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba in April 1961 effectively ended Dulles’s career as
DCI; he left office seven months later.
Nonetheless, Dulles is remembered as a giant in the field of intelligence

who, perhaps more than anyone, helped turn the CIA into the global intel-
ligence service it is today. In the main entrance of the CIA Headquarters a
memorial to Dulles bears an inscription that sums up his many contribu-
tions to the Agency: “His monument is around you.”
34 / 35
John
Alex
McCo n e
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, November 29, 1961—April 28, 1965
Presidents Served:
John F. Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
Appointed:
September 27, 1961, by President John F. Kennedy; sworn in as recess appoin-
tee, November 29, 1961; confirmed by the US Senate, January 31, 1962; sworn in,
February 13, 1962
• General Charles Pearre Cabell, US Air Force, until January 31, 1962
• Lieutenant General Marshall A. Carter, US Army, April 3, 1962, through remain-
der of McCone’s tenure
Born:
January 4, 1902, San Francisco, California
E du c a t i o n :
University of California, Berkeley, B.S., 1922
Career Highlights:
• Private pursuits in corporate business
• Member of President’s Air Policy Commission, 1947-48
• Deputy Secretary of Defense, March-November 1948
• Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-51
• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1958-61
• Member of public committees investigating race relations and inner-
city poverty in California, 1965-67
• Member of President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft
Commission), 1983
• Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1987
D i e d : February 14, 1991
36 / 37
The sixth DCI, John McCone, had a reputation contracts with oil companies and produced Liberty
for being dynamic, hard-driving, and brilliant. Ray cargo ships during World War II.
Cline, McCone’s second Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, observed that “his sharp, penetrating queries After the war, McCone turned to government ser-
kept everyone in the Central Intelligence Agency on vice, first as Undersecretary of the Air Force and
his toes, and he had little patience with imprecision, later as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
inefficiency, or slowness in producing results.” from 1958 to 1961. He gained experience dealing
with a variety of agencies, including the CIA.
McCone’s drive started at a young age. His father
died in 1920, when McCone was a junior in college. Following the Bay of Pigs failure, President John
McCone helped support his family and paid his col- F. Kennedy turned to McCone to lead the Agency.
lege tuition by working summers in shipyards and When McCone was sworn in as DCI, Kennedy
iron mills. After graduating with honors from the shook McCone’s hand and told him that he was “now
University of California at Berkeley, McCone rapidly living on the bull’s eye, and I welcome you to that
worked his way to a management position in the steel spot.”
industry, joining Consolidated Steel and becoming a
general sales manager at age 29. He saved the com- President Kennedy regarded McCone as an adviser
pany from bankruptcy by striking a deal with an old and expanded his advisory duties beyond those of
school friend, Stephen Bechtel, and was promoted to his predecessors, asking McCone to help formulate
executive vice president at age 31. McCone joined the Kennedy Administration’s national security pol-
forces with Bechtel in 1937 and established the Bech- icy. McCone was aware of the danger of politicizing
tel-McCone Corporation, which won enormous intelligence judgments, saying, “You have to be very,
Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles photographed in Cuba. DCI John McCone served as a close adviser to President John F.
Kennedy.
very careful . . . that your views on the policy are not duced for the White House. McCone revamped the
affecting the purity of your intelligence . . . and you product to suit Johnson’s interests and habits, cul-
have to be awfully sure that nobody suspects that it minating in the President’s Daily Brief. Nonetheless,
is.” McCone realized his prominent role as adviser to the
President was waning. The decisive break was over
In August 1962, imagery from Vietnam. McCone argued
U-2 flights over Cuba captured that deploying ground forces
the distinctive six-point star “ S ucc e s s fu l warning is was a mistake and that grad-
pattern indicative of Soviet sur- essentially a two-fold ual escalation of the bombing
face-to-air missile (SAM) sites. process; if warning campaign would not work.
McCone—recently remarried i s t o b e e ff e ct i v e , n o t He did not hesitate to voice
after the death of his wife a year only must the alert his opinions on Vietnam,
earlier—had departed for his b e g i v e n , b ut t h e c o n - which increasingly distanced
honeymoon but was informed sumer of intelligence him from Johnson. McCone
of these developments through m u s t a cc e p t t h e f a ct resigned on April 28, 1965
a series of messages dubbed t h a t h e h a s i n f a ct b e e n and returned to the private
the “honeymoon cables.” warned.” sector. He died of cardiac
McCone was the only senior - DCI John McCone in 1962, quotation in arrest at his home in Pebble
US Government official who CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection
Beach, California, on Febru-
argued that Moscow intended ary 14, 1991, at the age of 89.
to deploy nuclear missiles
in Cuba. During those famous 13 days in October, Today, McCone is known as one of the CIA’s great-
McCone advised the President, asserting that Wash- est directors and was named as one of the Agency’s
ington should give Moscow a deadline for removing Trailblazers in 2011. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., historian
the missiles before taking additional measures. After and adviser to President Kennedy, wrote one of the
relying on the Agency’s technical skills to bolster that first assessments of McCone as DCI in early 1965:
assessment, McCone created the Directorate of Sci- “McCone was a cautious, realistic and self-effacing
ence and Technology less than a year later to central- director who repaired morale within the Agency,
ize the Agency’s technological capabilities. instituted measures to keep the CIA and himself out
of the newspapers . . . restored its relations with the
After President Kennedy’s assassination on Novem-
State Department and Congress . . . declined to allow
ber 22, 1963, McCone reported to a new boss, Pres-
his own views to prejudice the intelligence estimates
ident Lyndon B. Johnson. Whereas Kennedy had
. . . and showed a fair-mindedness which shamed
been fascinated with espionage and covert action,
some of us who had objected to his appointment.”
Johnson knew little about intelligence and was indif-
ferent toward the CIA. It became clear that Johnson
was not reading the daily publications the CIA pro-
38 / 39
William
Francis
Raborn J r .
Vice Admiral, US Navy (Retired)
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965—June 30, 1966
President Served:
Lyndon B. Johnson
Appointed:
April 11, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson; confirmed by the US Senate on
April 22, 1965; sworn in, April 28, 1965
Richard M. Helms, April 28, 1965 – June 30, 1966
Born:
June 8, 1905, Decatur, Texas
E du c a t i o n :
US Naval Academy, B.S., 1928; attended Naval War College, 1952
Career Highlights:
• Director, US Navy Special Projects Office, 1955-62
• Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development), 1962-63
• Retired from US Navy, 1963
• Private industry, 1963-65
D i e d : March 6, 1990
40 / 41
DCI William Raborn (left) and DDCI Richard Helms (right) pose for a photograph with President Lyndon B. Johnson.
William Raborn’s 14-month tenure as DCI was Center at CIA Headquarters to receive around-
dominated by increasing US involvement in Viet- the-clock updates on the rebellion. Revamping the
nam and concern over the potential spread of com- center’s mission would prove to be the most last-
munism in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Raborn ing legacy of Raborn’s relatively brief tenure. He
had extensive military and technical expertise but assigned senior officers to weekend duty in the
was inexperienced in foreign affairs. Raborn was Operations Center to ensure that emergencies
best known for directing the Navy’s Special Projects were managed effectively; though implementation
Office, where he completed the Polaris subma- changed over time, the policy of staffing the center
rine-launched missile program three years ahead with senior duty officers continues today.
of schedule. He quickly won the confidence of Con-
gress when President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed The Dominican crisis gradually receded, and
him as DCI. Raborn turned his attention to other matters. He
established a Vietnam Task Force to further con-
On April 28, 1965, the day Raborn was sworn in, solidate and focus the Agency’s diverse operations
a rebellion under way in the Dominican Republic in the volatile Southeast Asia region. Additionally,
raised concern about a possible communist takeover. he created a China community coordinator posi-
As the US Government intervened, Raborn spent tion to produce better intelligence on China after
most of his time working with the Operations its test of an atomic weapon in late 1964.
CIA developed the highly secret A-12 OXCART as the U-2’s successor, intended to meet the nation’s need for a very fast, high-flying
reconnaissance aircraft that could avoid Soviet air defenses.
Overhead reconnaissance programs were a point of contention during

the mid-1960s, especially because of their cost and the difficulty of
“Let me assure coordinating CIA and Air Force interests. Revolutionary technology
had been developed and was now operational, including the CORONA
you—and I say
satellite and the OXCART (the A-12)—a supersonic, high-altitude
this with
plane designed to avoid radar detection and equipped with a high-res-
the strongest olution camera. Although 12 planes were ready for use in November
c o n v i ct i o n a n d 1965, they were never fully deployed during Raborn’s tenure because
emphasis—US in- of conflicts over the need for imagery and the risks associated with
telligence agen-
flights over hostile countries. The Agency gained greater control
over reconnaissance programs when Raborn signed an agreement—
cies do not make
initially negotiated by DCI McCone—to further define the roles and
policy.”
responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The
- DCI William Raborn testimony agreement resulted in formal recognition that the DCI would deter-
in February 1966 before the Com- mine the intelligence requirements that would drive NRO’s research
mittee on Armed Services, quoted and development programs.
in Michael Krepon, Strategic
Stalemate (1985)
Raborn never became a close national security adviser to President
Johnson. As Raborn left the DCI position, the Agency was the target
of increasing public criticism over its activities in Vietnam.
42 / 43
Richard
McGarra h
Helms
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, June 30, 1966—February 2, 1973
Presidents Served:
Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard Nixon
Appointed:
June 18, 1966, by President Lyndon B. Johnson; confirmed by the
US Senate, June 28, 1966; sworn in, June 30, 1966
• Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, US Navy, October 13, 1966 – February 1, 1969
• Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr., US Marine Corps,
May 7, 1969—December 31, 1971
• Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, May 2, 1972, through re-
mainder of Helms’s tenure
Born:
March 30, 1913, St. Davids, Pennsylvania
E du c a t i o n :
Williams College, B.A., 1935
Career Highlights:
• Journalist
• Commissioned into US Naval Reserve, 1942
• Served with Office of Strategic Services and its successors, 1943-47
• Various posts at CIA
• Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 1962-65
• Ambassador to Iran, 1973-77
• Private consultant
D i e d : October 22, 2002
44 / 45
Richard Helms’s tenure as Director of Central Intelli- rally at Nurenburg.
gence came at the height of the Vietnam War, a time
that presented the Agency with a difficult mission in During World War II, Helms joined the US Navy
the field and a tough political environment in Wash- Reserve as a lieutenant, eventually transferring in
ington. 1943 to the OSS, where he worked in the Morale Oper-
ations Branch producing false data known as “black”
propaganda. In early 1945, Helms deployed to London
for his first overseas assignment in the OSS, working
under and sharing a flat with another future DCI,
William Casey. Helms helped set up resistance net-
works and worked to infiltrate German lines. In
August 1945, under the leadership of future DCI
Allen Dulles, Helms was transferred to Berlin, where
he tracked down remaining Nazi sympathizers and
monitored the Soviet military. He then returned to
Washington and began working for the new Central
Intelligence Group, which became the CIA in 1947.
At the CIA, Helms was assigned to the Office of Spe-

cial Operations, which collected foreign intelligence.
He became the office’s Chief of Operations before his
promotion in 1962 to lead the Directorate of Plans,
handling espionage and covert action.
Richard Helms was the first career Agency officer to lead the CIA.
Helms grew up in a suburb of Philadelphia in a com- As McCone departed the Agency, he recommended
munity described by his brother as “conventional Helms or Ray Cline, also a CIA officer, for the DCI
upper-middle class: well educated, well traveled, position. President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose
interested in good schools and sports, and with a Vice Admiral William F. Raborn Jr. and appointed
social life centering around the country club.” Helms Helms as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
spent two of his high school years attending the President Johnson believed Helms needed more
prestigious Institute LeRosey in Switzerland and the Washington experience before becoming DCI.
Realgymnasium in Freiburg, Germany, becoming
fluent in both French and German. Upon gradua- Helms assumed the position of DCI in 1966,
tion from Williams College in 1935, Helms became becoming the first career Agency officer to lead the
a journalist, covering the 1936 Summer Olympics— CIA. He learned of the appointment shortly before
dubbed the “Hitler Games”—in Berlin. Helms even President Johnson held a press conference to
managed to interview Adolf Hitler just after the Nazi announce the news. As DCI, Helms opted for a
DCI Richard Helms meets with President Lyndon B. Johnson at the White House. (Photo courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
moderate approach to reform, sensing that drastic January 1968, for example, the Agency did not issue
changes would be counterproductive while the adequate warnings that the communist forces of
Agency weathered the turbulence of the Vietnam North Vietnam were preparing to launch a wave of
War. major attacks in the South, in what became known
as the Tet Offensive. That same year, the CIA failed
The first major CIA success under Helms came in to warn of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czecho-
1967, when the Agency correctly assessed that Israel slovakia despite having intelligence about a military
could prevail in the Six-Day War without US sup- buildup on the Czech border.
port. President Johnson soon began inviting Helms
to “Tuesday lunches,” where senior policymakers Helms was criticized within the Agency for politi-
met informally to discuss international affairs. In cizing Intelligence Community estimates, especially
1970, the Agency further enhanced its reputation for what some saw as his removal of judgments that
under Helms by correctly assessing that a US inva- displeased the Pentagon. Helms disagreed with the
sion of Cambodia would destabilize Cambodia and assertion; when CIA analysts produced assessments
widen the war throughout Southeast Asia. on the Vietnam War suggesting that US policy was
not working, Helms did not alter them or limit their
Helms also experienced failure during his tenure. In distribution.
46 / 47
As DCI, Helms focused on serving the President, Plumbers,” a group set up during the Nixon Admin-
leaving leadership of the Agency’s day-to-day func- istration to stop the “leaking” of national security
tions to his deputies. He found that supporting the information to the media. The “Plumbers” later
President was at times difficult, especially during carried out the Watergate break-in at the Demo-
the Nixon Administration, when he had to compete cratic National Committee headquarters in 1972.
with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger
for influence on intelligence matters. Kissinger, in Near the end of Helms’s tenure, the Agency drew
effect, served as President Richard Nixon’s senior criticism from Congress and an American public
intelligence officer. growing increasingly distrustful of the US Gov-
ernment. During this time, Helms tried to protect
Under Helms’s leadership, the CIA spied on Ameri- the Agency’s reputation. In his only public speech
can antiwar protesters at the direction of Presidents as DCI, he said, “The nation must to a degree take
Johnson and Nixon, both of whom believed the it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted
protestors were receiving foreign support. Helms to her service.”
believed he would be fired if he did not carry out
the Presidents’ requests. Helms also allowed the In November 1972, President Nixon asked for the
Agency to supply equipment to the “White House resignation of all agency directors, federal depart-
DCI Richard Helms attended “Tuesday lunches” with President Lyndon B. Johnson and other senior policymakers to discuss
international affairs. (Photo courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
“The secret intelligence world of any country must be-
have as a type of family. Its members have only each

o t h e r o n w h o m t o l e a n . T h o s e o n t h e o ut s i d e e i t h e r
don’t know them or don’t like them. Those above them
s e e k t h e i r l o y a l t y , t h e i r c o m p e t e n c e , b ut h a s t e n t o
distance themselves when something goes wrong.”
ment heads, and presidential appointees. Helms In 1983, President Ronald Reagan awarded Helms the
declined, believing the move would cause the DCI National Security Medal, which Helms considered
position to become politicized. President Nixon “an exoneration.” Helms died of bone cancer on
eventually forced Helms out in 1973. October 22, 2002 and was buried with full military
honors at Arlington National Cemetery.
President Nixon later nominated Helms to be
Ambassador to Iran, hoping to take advantage Helms dedicated his career to enabling the work
of Helms’s good relations with the ruling Shah— of an agency he so greatly admired. He remained
Helms’s former schoolmate at Le Rosey. During the DCI for seven years under difficult conditions.
Helms’s public confirmation hearings in 1973, sena- Despite evolving threats from around the world and
tors asked him if the CIA—at the behest of President administrations that were at odds with the Agency,
Nixon—had tried to overthrow the government of Helms continued to deliver essential intelligence to
Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1970. Since policymakers during a time of great uncertainty.
the operation was still secret, Helms responded that
the CIA was not involved. As a result, Helms was
convicted of misinforming Congress. Helms later
stated, “If I was to live up to my oath and fulfill
my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,
I could not reveal covert ops to people unauthorized
to learn about them.”
48 / 49
James
Rodney
Schlesi n g e r
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, February 2, 1973—July 2, 1973
President Served:
Richard Nixon
Appointed:
• December 21, 1972, by President Richard M. Nixon; confirmed by the
• US Senate, January 23, 1973; sworn in, February 2, 1973
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, through remainder
of Schlesinger’s tenure (served as Acting Director, July 2, 1973—
September 4, 1973)
Born:
February 15, 1929, New York, New York
E du c a t i o n :
Harvard University, B.A., 1950; M.A., 1952; Ph.D., 1956
Career Highlights:
• Assistant and Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 1955-63
• RAND Corporation: Senior Staff Member, 1963-67, and Director
of Strategic Studies, 1967-69
• Assistant Director and Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969-70
• Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970-71
• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1971-73
• Secretary of Defense, 1973-75
• Assistant to President-elect Jimmy Carter, 1976
• Secretary of Energy, 1977-79
• Private consultant
D i e d : March 27, 2014
50 / 51
James Schlesinger is sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence alongside President Richard Nixon on February 2, 1973.
President Richard Nixon’s second term brought taught at the University of Virginia and worked
major personnel changes throughout the US Gov- in various corporate and government positions.
ernment. In 1972, President Nixon asked for the res- In 1970, as the Assistant Director of the Office of
ignation of all his agency directors, federal depart- Management and Budget with responsibility for
ment heads, and presidential appointees. Eager to international programs, he was asked by President
reform the CIA, Nixon asked DCI Richard Helms Nixon to identify ways to improve the quality of US
to step down and replaced him in 1973 with James intelligence. Working with the National Security
Schlesinger, who had recently written an extensive Council, Schlesinger suggested improvements that
study on reforming the Intelligence Community, ranged from conservative to radical. The study was
which by then consisted of the CIA, National Secu- controversial, and it changed how the DCI position
rity Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Depart- was perceived and how the IC was managed. It also
ment of State, National Reconnaissance Office, Fed- led President Nixon to streamline and strengthen
eral Bureau of Investigation, and the four military intelligence collection throughout the IC.
services’ intelligence components. Schlesinger used
the study as a guidebook of sorts during his five- Once selected as DCI, Schlesinger wasted no
month tenure, implementing many of its recom- time putting his reform plans into place. One of
mendations. his most significant reforms was to designate the
DCI as the head of the IC, reserving the leadership
Before becoming DCI, Schlesinger, who held a role of the CIA for the Deputy Director of Cen-
doctorate in economics from Harvard University, tral Intelligence. This change affected all future
DCIs, allowing them to oversee the preparation be seen as a violation of the Agency’s charter. The
of the IC’s budget, establish intelligence require- responses covered activities going back as far as the
ments, and ensure the quality of products across 1950s and resulted in a nearly 700-page internal doc-
the IC. ument coined the “Family Jewels.” Public disclosure
of some of its contents in 1974 caused a major con-
Believing that the CIA’s structure was ineffective, troversy and prompted inquiries into CIA activities
Schlesinger made orga- by a presidential com-
nizational changes and mission and two con-
cut the CIA’s workforce “Intelligence is inherently
gressional committees.
by nearly 7 percent. He a d i ff i cu l t b u s i n e s s . (The report was released
focused in particular on Intelligence is not only to the public in 2007.)
reductions in the Direc- s u p p o s e d t o g a t h e r f a ct s , The CIA’s relationship
torate of Plans, which many of which others are with Congress deteri-
Schlesinger renamed orated further as other
eager to conceal or
the Directorate of Oper- questionable operations
disguise. It i s a l s o e x p e ct e d
ations. By contrast, surfaced, ranging from
to provide a coherent
Schlesinger expanded assassination plots to
the workforce of the p i ctu r e t h a t h e l p s t o
espionage against US
Directorate of Science p r e p a r e u s f o r futu r e citizens.
and Technology, believ- developments.”
ing that technical collec-
- Statement of former DCI James
tion had been used insuf- Indeed, Schlesinger’s
Schlesinger before the National Com-
ficiently. Schlesinger mission on Terrorist Attacks Upon tenure was a time of
also thought the quality the United States, October 14, 2003 controversy both inside
of the CIA’s intelligence and outside the CIA,
was uneven and not but it included many
commensurate with the reforms that shaped the
cost of producing it. To help guide further reforms, intelligence business for years to come. Schlesinger
he established the Center for the Study of Intelli- departed the Agency upon being appointed by Presi-
gence within the Agency to act as an internal “think dent Nixon as Secretary of Defense.
tank,” capturing insights of historical importance.
When the media connected the CIA to the Water-

gate scandal in May 1973, Schlesinger took steps to
end the CIA’s participation in activities that might
appear legally or ethically suspect. He ordered the
CIA officers to report any Agency activity that could
52 / 53
Willia m
Egan
Colby
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973—January 30, 1976
Presidents Served:
Richard Nixon
Gerald Ford
Appointed:
May 10, 1973, by President Richard Nixon; confirmed by the US Senate,
August 1, 1973; sworn in, September 4, 1973
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, through remainder of Colby’s
tenure
Born:
January 4, 1920, St. Paul, Minnesota
E du c a t i o n :
Princeton University, B.A., 1940; Columbia University, LL.B., 1947
Career Highlights:
• 2nd Lieutenant, US Army, 1941
• Office of Strategic Services, 1943-45
• Attorney in private practice, New York, 1947-49; with National Labor Relations
Board, Washington, DC, 1949-50
• Various operational posts in CIA, 1950-62
• Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, CIA, 1962-67
• Assigned to Agency for International Development as Director of Civil Opera-
tions and Rural Development Support (CORDS), Saigon (with rank of ambassa-
dor; on leave from CIA), 1968-71
• Executive Director-Comptroller, 1972-73
• Deputy Director for Operations, 1973
• Post-CIA pursuits included practicing law, work on public policy issues,
and writing books
D i e d : April 27, 1996
54 / 55
William Colby was appointed Director of Central where he finished law school in 1947 and became
Intelligence at a time when the CIA was under great an associate attorney at William J. Donovan’s New
scrutiny from Congress and the public. Because he York City law firm. In 1949, Colby moved to Wash-
was an Agency insider, many believed that Colby ington, DC, and worked at the National Labor Rela-
would resist demands for greater oversight and tions Board, gaining experience in government liti-
transparency. Instead, Colby embraced transpar- gation.
ency, asking the Agency to be more open with
Congress. He also sought to better use resources to In 1951, Colby began his career at the CIA, where
ensure that both intelligence analysis and collection he was given increasingly important field assign-
were treated as core missions. ments. In 1962, he returned to Washington to lead
the CIA’s Far East Division. While overseas in
Colby’s father worked with the US Army, and the 1968, Colby supervised a highly controversial
family moved frequently during Colby’s childhood. initiative—called the Phoenix Program—designed to
The longest period the young Colby spent in one eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure at the village
location was three years in Burlington, Vermont, level. The initiative was labeled an assassination
where his father was an ROTC instructor at the program by critics.
University of Vermont. Colby graduated from
Princeton University in 1940 and then studied law Colby returned to Washington in 1971, becoming
at Columbia University. In August 1941, Colby the Executive Director Comptroller in 1972 and
put his pursuit of a law degree on hold; he enlisted then the Deputy Director for Operations. On May
in the Army to serve in World War II and was 10, 1973, President Richard Nixon nominated Colby
assigned the rank of second lieutenant. to succeed Schlesinger as DCI.
Following various assignments in the Army— Colby became the Director at a tumultuous time.
including parachute training—Colby joined the The Vietnam War was escalating, a majority of
Office of Strategic Services in 1943 and organized
and directed resistance forces in France during
World War II. He later led Operation Rype—a clev-
erly conceived ski-parachute operation—in Norway
to prevent German troops from returning home to
combat the Allied forces there. In carrying out that
mission, Colby and his team skied across the Norwe-
gian countryside sabotaging railroads and destroying
bridges. Colby was awarded the Bronze Star medal,
the French Croix de Guerre and the Silver Star for his
service during World War II.
William Colby supervising the Phoenix Program in South
Vietnam in January 1969, prior to serving as Director of Central
After the war, Colby returned to the United States, Intelligence.
DCI William Colby (bottom left) attends a National Security Council meeting along with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger,
President Gerald Ford, and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
Americans said they had an overall distrust of the part because they were not expecting another conflict
US Government, and the Watergate investiga- so soon after the 1967 Six-Day War; other factors
tion was inflaming public opposition to the Nixon included inadequate technical collection against the
Administration. Meanwhile, the CIA was struggling Arab forces and signals intelligence that—although
to maintain its influence inside the White House, abundant—still failed to reveal Egyptian invasion
where Henry Kissinger was asserting himself as the plans. Moreover, Colby had recently dissolved one
President’s main intelligence adviser. Colby, by con- of the Agency’s key forecasting groups, the Board
trast, was seen more as a senior staffer and did not of National Estimates, which he planned to replace
have the same access to the President that previous with a new group of senior officers that would be
directors had enjoyed. more responsive to policymakers’ needs.
As Colby began his tenure, the onset of the Yom Later in Colby’s tenure, Congress began to take
Kippur War—also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli an aggressive look at the Agency because of dis-
War—caught the US Government by surprise and closures by New York Times journalist Seymour
became the first intelligence failure to occur on Col- Hersh. In December 1974, Hersh revealed some
by’s watch. The war surprised intelligence analysts in of the controversial CIA operations that had
56 / 57
been compiled in the Agency’s so-called “Family
Jewels” report, which had been prepared under
Colby’s predecessor. Although the operations took
place before Colby’s directorship, Colby handled the
aftermath. He responded by revealing the existence
of other activities and programs that had been hid-
den from Congress, believing that transparency was
the best way to rebuild the Agency’s trust on Capitol
Hill.
President Gerald Ford established a commis-

sion headed by Vice President Nelson Rocke-
feller to investigate the Agency’s questionable
activities. Both houses of Congress launched inves-
tigations of their own, with the Senate’s “Church
Committee” focusing on covert action and the
House’s “Pike Committee” examining analytic
failures.1 The result was additional congressional
oversight, which at one point required the CIA to
report to eight congressional committees.
Despite the increased oversight from Congress,

press leaks, and the lack of support from the Nixon
and Ford administrations, Colby still managed to
leave a lasting mark on the CIA, positioning the
Agency to handle the intelligence requirements of
the future. Although Colby was heavily involved
in operations throughout his career, he recognized
that the Agency would benefit from devoting more
resources and attention to other aspects of its mis-
sion, such as analysis. In so doing, he helped the
Agency shift from what was perceived as a one-di-
mensional, operations-focused organization to a
broadly diversified intelligence service.
1The formal name of the Church Committee was the United

States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The formal name
of the Pike Committee was the US House Select Committee on
Intelligence.
“Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy
f i e l d o ut s i d e t h e l a w . This year’s excitement
has made clear that the rule of law applies to
all parts of the American Government, including
intelligence ... Its secrets will be understood
t o b e n e c e s s a r y o n e s f o r t h e p r o t e ct i o n o f o u r
democracy in tomorrow’s world, not covers for mis-
take or misdeed ... The costs of the past
y e a r w e r e h i g h , b ut t h e y w i l l b e e x c e e d e d b y t h e v a l -
ue of this strengthening of what was already the best
intelligence service in the world.”
Colby stepped down as DCI on January 30, 1976 and resumed his law
practice. He drowned in a boating accident on April 27, 1996, possibly
after collapsing from a heart attack. He was buried with military honors at
Arlington National Cemetery.
Colby’s tenure was a transitional period for the Agency. Many CIA
officers and former DCIs were frustrated by Colby’s admissions to Congress
of controversial operations. But even some of Colby’s most fervent critics
later began to change their minds about his leadership of the CIA. Accord-
ing to Colby’s book, Honorable Men, Henry Kissinger took Colby aside in the
Oval Office in late 1975 and said, “Bill, I feel required to say this to you. For
the longest time I believed that what you were doing was wrong, that what
you should have done was to cry havoc over the investigations in the name
of national security. But I have come around to believe that your strategy
was really correct.”
58 / 59
George
Herbert
Walker B u s h
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, January 30, 1976—January 20, 1977
President Served:
Gerald Ford
Appointed:
November 3, 1975, by President Gerald R. Ford; confirmed by the US
Senate, January 27, 1976; sworn in, January 30, 1976
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, until July 2, 1976
E. Henry Knoche, from July 3, 1976 through remainder of Bush’s tenure (served
as Acting Director, January 20, 1977—March 9, 1977)
Born:
June 12, 1924, Milton, Massachusetts
E du c a t i o n :
Yale University, B.A., 1948
Career Highlights:
• Volunteered for active duty, US Navy, 1942
• Served in World War II as naval aviator in the Pacific
• Member of Congress, 7th District, Texas, 1966-71
• Ambassador to the United Nations, 1971-72
• Chairman, Republican National Committee, 1973-74
• Chief, US Liaison Office, People’s Republic of China, 1974-75
• Private business and politics
• Vice President of the United States, 1981-89
• President of the United States, 1989-93
• Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 2011
• Founded the George Bush Presidential Library & Museum and George Bush
School of Government and Public Service, both located at Texas A&M University
D i e d : November 30, 2018
60 / 61
Thirteen years before becoming the President of the Torpedo Squadron (VT-51) based on the USS San
United States, George H. W. Bush was appointed Jacinto. During a mission over the Pacific, Bush’s
the 11th Director of Central Intelligence. Many plane was hit by Japanese antiaircraft fire, but he
believed leading the CIA would mark an end to his completed his mission before bailing out. He was the
political career. Instead, Bush became the only US only member of his crew to survive. During World
President to have previously held the position of War II, Bush flew 58 combat missions and received
DCI, which gave him a unique perspective on both the Distinguished Flying Cross, three Air Medals
providing and receiving intelligence. and the Presidential Unit Citation that was awarded
to the crew of USS San Jacinto.
Discharged from the Navy in September 1945, Bush

enrolled in an accelerated program at Yale Univer-
sity, where he excelled in both academics and sports.
He was the captain of the baseball team and played
in the first two College World Series. After graduat-
ing in 1948, Bush and his family moved to Midland,
Texas, where he started his career in the oil indus-
try as a sales clerk with Dresser Industries. In 1951,
Bush started Bush-Overby Oil Development and
later cofounded Zapata Petroleum. In 1954, Bush
was named president of Zapata Offshore Company
and moved it to Houston, Texas.
Bush’s focus later turned to public service; in 1966,

he became the first Republican to represent Hous-
ton in Congress, where he served two terms. He
also made two unsuccessful bids for a US senate
DCI George H. W. Bush in his office at CIA Headquarters. (Photo
courtesy of the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library) seat from Texas. Throughout his political career,
Bush received a series of high-level appointments,
Bush’s father, Prescott Bush, was a Republican Sen- including US Ambassador to the United Nations,
ator from Connecticut who played an important Chairman of the Republican National Committee,
role in introducing Bush to public service. Bush was and chief of the US Liaison Office in the People’s
accepted into Yale University, but following the Republic of China, with the rank of ambassador.
attack on Pearl Harbor, he enlisted in the US Navy When Gerald Ford became President in 1974, he
on his 18th birthday. After completing a 10-month considered nominating Bush to be Vice President,
training course, Bush received his wings, becoming but Ford ultimately chose New York Governor Nel-
the youngest pilot in the Navy. He was assigned to son Rockefeller instead.
DCI George H. W. Bush greets President Gerald Ford upon his arrival at CIA Headquarters.
On November 1, 1975, while serving as Ambassador Bush’s tenure at the CIA lasted just less than a year,
in Beijing, Bush received a telegram from President but he worked swiftly to raise morale internally and
Ford’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, request- to restore the Agency’s reputation with the public.
ing that Bush accept the position of DCI. Bush later He also recognized that congressional support was
recalled, “Almost every friend I had in politics felt critical to the CIA’s success, and he worked with the
this would be the dead end, the absolute end of any Senate and House of Representatives to establish per-
politics in the future for me. And I kind of thought manent intelligence oversight committees. On May
that maybe that was true. That happily proved to be 19, 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
wrong.” was established, followed by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence on July 14, 1977—
Bush began his tenure on January 30, 1976. Though shortly after Bush departed the Agency.
an outsider, Bush quickly restored morale, using his
political influence to restore the Agency’s access to To sharpen the Agency’s analysis, Bush also helped
the White House. He also allayed fears within the pioneer a new analytic technique known as “Team A
Agency that he would use his position to support his /Team B.” In 1976, he agreed to an exercise that pitted
political agenda, and he demonstrated his commit- a team of working-level Intelligence Community
ment to the Agency by solving problems rather than analysts (Team A) against one from the President’s
overhauling the organization. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Team B)—a
62 / 63
group that provides advice to the President concern- Bush is remembered as one of the CIA’s most popu-
ing the quality and adequacy of intelligence. Both lar directors. The first DCI who had served in Con-
teams were asked to conduct analysis of Soviet stra- gress, he had the political influence and authority
tegic capabilities based on the same classified data. to mold the Agency into an entirely different orga-
The exercise compared nization, but he chose not
the analyses of the two to do so. Instead, he focused
teams, generating new on protecting the objectivity
“It’s hard for people in
insights and provocative and independence of the CIA.
a f r e e s o c i e t y t o a cc e p t
debate. The Agency con- Bush nevertheless realized
t h e f a ct t h a t c o v e r t
tinues to use the “Team that the Agency needed to
a ct i o n i s o ft e n
A/Team B” technique to become more forthright with
better identify assump- necessary for a world information in order to earn
tions, biases, and alterna- power to survive. the respect of Congress and
tive views. An American President the American public.
faced with a potential
After leaving the CIA On April 26, 1999, the CIA
threat to national se-
at the end of the Ford named its headquarters com-
cu r i t y s h o u l d h a v e s o m e
Administration, Bush pound “The George Bush
became President Ronald alternative Center for Intelligence” in
Reagan’s Vice President between doing nothing honor of Bush’s contributions
in 1981. He brought with and waiting for a to the field of intelligence
him a deep appreciation crisis to blow up in our and to the Agency. At the
for the President’s Daily face. The answer is co- dedication ceremony, then
Brief and read it avidly Director George Tenet read
v e r t a ct i o n — b ut i t h a s
throughout his vice a message from President Bill
t o b e c o n d uct e d a l o n g
presidency. When Bush Clinton that paid tribute to
s t r i ct l y l e g a l g u i d e -
became the 41st US Bush’s achievements, “When
President in 1989, he lines.” you assumed your duties as
made a CIA briefing his Director of Central Intelli-
- Vice President George H. W.
first order of daily busi- Bush, Looking Forward (1987) gence in January 1976, the
ness in the Oval Office. nation had just endured one
of the most tumultuous peri-
“The reason I like to get intelligence from you folks ods in its history. Many Americans had lost faith in
is that I know you tell it like you see it,” he said. “You government. Many asked whether the CIA should
have no policy axe to grind and you are absolutely continue to exist. As Director, you accomplished
discreet.” a great deal. You restored morale and discipline to
the Agency while publicly emphasizing the value
On April 26, 1999, the CIA named its Headquarters compound the
“George Bush Center for Intelligence” in honor of George H.W. Bush’s
contributions to the field of intelligence and to the Agency.
of intelligence to the nation’s security. You also

restored America’s trust in the CIA and the rest of
the Intelligence Community.”
Bush died on November 30, 2018 at his home in

Houston, Texas. He was 94 years old: the lon-
gest-lived US President at the time of his passing.
On April 26, 1999, DCI George Tenet honored George H. W. Bush

at a ceremony to officially change the name of the Headquarters
compound to the “George Bush Center for Intelligence.”
64 / 65
Stansfi e l d
Turner
Admiral, US Navy
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, March 9, 1977—January 20, 1981
President Served:
Jimmy Carter
Appointed:
February 8, 1977, by President Jimmy Carter; confirmed by the US Senate,
February 24, 1977; sworn in, March 9, 1977
• E. Henry Knoche, until August 1, 1977
• Frank C. Carlucci, from February 10, 1978 through remainder
of Turner’s tenure
Born:
December 1, 1923, Highland Park, Illinois
E du c a t i o n :
Attended Amherst College, 1941-43; US Naval Academy, B.S., 1946
(Class of 1947); Rhodes Scholar, Exeter College, Oxford University,
B.A., 1950, M.A., 1954
Career Highlights:
• Commissioned in the US Navy, 1946
• Director, Systems Analysis Division, Office of Chief
of Naval Operations, 1971-72
• President, US Naval War College, 1972-74
• Commander, US Second Fleet, 1974-75
• Promoted to Admiral, 1975
• Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO), 1975-77
• Retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978 while serving as Director of
Central Intelligence
• Author, professor, corporate director, and senior research scholar
66 / 67
The CIA had five directors during the 1970s. The was that the DCI lacked the authority to fully man-
last Director of the turbulent decade was Admiral age the IC. In response to Turner’s urging, Presi-
Stansfield Turner, picked by President Jimmy Carter dent Carter gave him additional authority to han-
to succeed George H. W. Bush. Turner sought to dle requests from policymakers, produce analysis,
create a more integrated Intelligence Community, and manage the overall intelligence budget.
reshaping some of the Agency’s traditional roles.
Familiar issues, like the spread of communism, and Turner’s solution for improving the management
new ones, like the Islamic fundamentalist move- of the IC was a “three-vice-president” model. Turn-
ment, were the pivotal intelligence problems of er believed that assigning three senior managers to
Turner’s tenure. The Iranian Revolution in early oversee resource collection, analysis, and resource
1979 surprised the US Government and introduced management would make the IC more efficient and
new and unfamiliar political movements that were a improve its long-range planning. But his experi-
source of deep concern. ment ran into trouble almost immediately when he
brought in Navy colleagues to fill the three manager
positions, alienating many career CIA officers. Turn-
er intended to create a lean management structure;
instead, his system only added to the bureaucracy.
The top-level structure ultimately did not work.
Turner considered the CIA’s operational side to be

overstaffed and made deep cuts to its personnel, which
led to low morale. Both Turner and President Carter
believed that satellite imagery could provide the
bulk of intelligence collection and that human intel-
ligence would be needed only to fill the gaps. The
Directorate of Operations was reduced to half of
DCI Stansfield Turner greets President Jimmy Carter upon his what it was at its peak during the Johnson Adminis-
arrival at CIA Headquarters.
tration as technical intelligence gained prominence.
Turner was a career naval officer and former class- On the analytical side of the CIA, Turner promoted
mate of President Carter’s at the US Naval Acad- more innovative analytic techniques on a wider
emy. He was an analyst at heart and an experienced range of intelligence issues and even involved
leader who liked to challenge the ideas of those himself in preparing the annual estimate of Soviet
around him in order to spur action and debate. offensive strategic nuclear forces. According to the
Early on, Turner immersed himself in studies and IC Staff’s Chief Budget Officer at the time, Turner
briefings on the structure of the IC, seeking ways would approve any budget increase that promised
to improve its organization. One of his conclusions to improve analysis. The IC Staff was convened to
“America’s intelligence system is unlike any other. It an-
swers the special neeeds of a democratic superpower
with worldwide interests; it is relatively young,
as is our nation; it benefits from the technological
genius of American industry; and it is peopled by Ameri-

cans of every stripe who share the patriotism,
the high moral standards, and the decency for which
Americans are known.”
oversee the integration and performance of the IC. nian students and militants who supported the revo-
lution. Several attempts to rescue the hostages were
In 1978, Turner faced new restrictions on the CIA made, some of which were costly and disastrous. In
when President Carter signed Executive Order (EO) December 1979, a second challenge emerged when
12036, which banned domestic espionage oper- the Soviet Union—at the behest of the pro-So-
ations and mandated that the National Security viet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)—
Council provide closer review of covert action. New invaded Afghanistan, beginning a long fight against
legislation also required the CIA to give the newly the mujahideen—Afghan resistance fighters who
established House Permanent Select Committee on opposed communism and rebelled against DRA and
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Soviet troops.
Intelligence prior notification of “significant” covert
action operations. Turner’s efforts to create a more integrated IC were
frustrated by counterintelligence issues and a chang-
In 1979, two challenges in the Middle East and ing political landscape in the Middle East. A major
South Asia caught the CIA by surprise. In February, effort to integrate the IC would not be made again
the Iranian Revolution, arising from an Islamic fun- until the early 2000s.
damentalist movement, took root with unexpected
speed. The CIA lacked intelligence sources in the
region to provide information on exiled opposition
leader Ayatollah Khomenei and on popular attitudes
toward the Shah’s government. In November 1979,
the US Embassy in Tehran was taken over by Ira-
68 / 69
Willia m
Joseph
Casey
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 1981—January 29, 1987
President Served:
Ronald Reagan
Appointed:
January 20, 1981, by President Ronald Reagan; confirmed by the Senate, Janu-
ary 27, 1981; sworn in, January 28, 1981
• Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, US Navy, February 12, 1981—June 10, 1982
• John N. McMahon, June 10, 1982—March 29, 1986
• Robert M. Gates, April 18, 1986 through remainder of Casey’s tenure (served as
Acting Director, December 18, 1986—May 26, 1987)
Born:
March 13, 1913, New York, New York
E du c a t i o n :
Fordham University, B.S., 1934; St. John’s University, LL.B., 1937
Career Highlights:
• Lawyer, writer, and businessman
• Commissioned into US Naval Reserve, 1943
• Joined Office of Strategic Services, 1943
• Chief of Special Intelligence Branch in European Theater of Operations, 1944-45
• Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971-73
• Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1973-74
• President and Chairman, US Export-Import Bank, 1974-76
• Member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1976-77
• Campaign manager for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, 1980
D i e d : May 6, 1987
70 / 71
William Casey came to the CIA determined to After the war, Casey became a successful venture
improve the Agency’s access to the President, reen- capitalist—founding, directing, or financing about
ergize its workforce, and sharpen its focus on defeat- 30 businesses. One former associate stated, “Bill
ing Soviet expansion efforts. Casey’s time as DCI Casey had the two absolutely essential traits of a
was not without controversy, but he took risks to venture capitalist. He could pick horses and jockeys.
confront the great challenges of his tenure. He could spot a promising company, an idea, an
invention, and he could judge if the people running
Casey graduated from Fordham University in 1934 it were any good.”
and earned his law degree from St. John’s University
in 1937. He finished law school in just two years—a Casey lost a 1966 congressional race but went on
year ahead of schedule—even though he was also to hold several senior positions in politics and gov-
working full time as a social worker. In 1943, Casey ernment, including Chairman of the Securities and
was commissioned into the US Navy Reserve and Exchange Commission, President and Chairman of
joined the Office of Strategic Services as a lieutenant the US Export-Import Bank, member of the Pres-
commander. OSS Director William J. Donovan ident’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and
appointed Casey chief of espionage operations in campaign manager for presidential candidate Ron-
the European Theater, where he was responsible for ald Reagan. Casey’s effective management of the
coordinating more than 100 teams for deployment campaign prompted President Reagan to appoint
into Germany. Casey was awarded the Bronze Star him as DCI.
for his service during the war.
Casey brought influence and prestige to the Agency
as a result of his relationship with President Reagan.
Casey’s leadership helped restore the CIA’s promi-
nent role in the national security arena. He became
the first DCI to receive cabinet rank, giving him a
stake in policy decisions and unprecedented politi-
cal influence. The move conflicted with what many
saw as the CIA’s traditional role of informing policy
rather than making it.
Casey and President Reagan shared the belief that

Soviet expansion posed a grave threat to US inter-
ests and that any softening of Western opposition to
communism was a mistake; they were determined
to curtail Soviet influence. Casey, who believed cen-
William Casey (left) was commissioned into the US Naval Reserve tralized intelligence was necessary to win the Cold
in 1943 and served in the Office of Strategic Services. In 1944-45,
Casey was Chief of the Special Intelligence Branch for the Euro- War, persuaded President Reagan to give him a free
pean Theater. (Photo courtesy of Bernadette Casey-Smith) hand in revitalizing the Agency. He rebuilt the CIA’s
William Casey (far left) attends a meeting in the Oval Office with President Gerald Ford and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Casey
served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1976-77.
operations division—which had been downsized nies to expand production and depress the price of
under DCI Turner—hiring a significant number of gold, another key Soviet export.
new officers and growing the Intelligence Commu-
nity’s budget, which had been declining for years. Under Casey, the CIA also took a more aggressive
The larger budget funded the construction of a new approach to fighting terrorism. On April 18, 1983,
building at CIA Headquarters in Langley. a truck-bombing at the US Embassy in Beirut killed
seven CIA officers—marking one of the greatest
Many observers credit Casey with forming a strategy losses of Agency lives in a single incident. In 1986,
to end the Cold War and implementing the “Reagan Casey established the CIA’s Counterterrorist Cen-
Doctrine,” the new policy of confronting commu- ter—the first Agency unit in which operators and
nist forces in the Third World by backing oppo- analysts worked side by side—with the mission of
sition elements. Casey was creative in identifying disrupting and defeating terrorists and expanding
opportunities to end the Cold War. For example, the Agency’s counterterrorism efforts.
he persuaded Saudi Arabia to increase oil pro-
duction to force down the price of crude oil, an Despite success in fighting the Cold War and
important source of revenue for the Soviets. Casey building CIA capabilities, Casey’s tenure was not
also convinced South African gold-mining compa- without controversy. He bristled at the idea of
72 / 73
DCI William Casey’s close relationship with President Ronald Reagan helped restore
CIA’s prominent role in the national security arena.
oversight, and his relationship with Congress was strained. The ulti-
mate unraveling of Casey’s tenure occurred during the effort to fund
opposition fighters in Nicaragua through arms sales to Iran, in what
came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair. The initiative, which
violated the US embargo on arms sales to Iran, prompted fierce criti-
cism from Congress. Casey suffered two seizures just as the congres-
sional hearings were under way in December 1986 and never returned
to his position as DCI. He died on May 6, 1987, at age 74.
“The Estimates are my Estimates. I’m a l i tt l e b i t l o o s e r a b o ut t h a t
w h e n i t c o m e s t o p utt i n g i n o t h e r v i e w s . B ut they’re my Estimates.

I’m responsible for drawing the conclusions and presenting them.
B ut I feel I have a concomitant obligation to the user to see that
any well-substantiated alternative view is also laid on the ta-
ble.”
- DCI William Casey, October 1985, quoted
in The Agency (1986) by John Ranelagh
Exterior of the New Headquarters Building (NHB). DCI William Casey helped increase the Agency’s budget, which funded the construc-
tion of NHB. The building was completed in March 1991.
Casey was respected by Agency personnel for revitalizing operations

and analysis. He implemented a strategy to defeat Soviet expansion and
carved a more significant role for the CIA in US security policy. Presi-
dent Reagan paid tribute to Casey by stating, “His nation and all those
who love freedom honor today the name and memory of Bill Casey.
In addition to crediting him with rebuilding America’s intelligence
capability, history will note the brilliance of his mind and strategic
vision, his passionate commitment to the cause of freedom, and his
unhesitating willingness to make personal sacrifices for the sake of
that cause and his country.”
74 / 75
William
Hedgcoc k
Webster
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, May 26, 1987—August 31, 1991
Presidents Served:
Ronald Reagan
George H. W. Bush
Appointed:
• March 3, 1987, by President Ronald Reagan; confirmed by the US Senate,
May 19, 1987; sworn in, May 26, 1987
• Requested by President-elect George H.W. Bush to continue as Director
of Central Intelligence, December 6, 1988
• Robert M. Gates, until March 20, 1989
• Richard J. Kerr, from March 20, 1989, through remainder of Webster’s tenure
(served as Acting Director, September 1, 1991—November 6, 1991)
Born:
March 6, 1924, St. Louis, Missouri
E du c a t i o n :
Amherst College, A.B., 1947; Washington University Law School, J.D., 1949
Career Highlights:
• Lieutenant in US Navy, World War II (1943-46) and Korean War (1951-52)
• Private law practice, 1949-59 and 1961-70
• US Attorney for Missouri’s Eastern District, 1960-61
• Judge, US District Court for Missouri’s Eastern District, 1970-73
• Judge, US District Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, 1973-78
• Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1978-87
• Private law practice
76 / 77
DCI William Webster (right) briefs President George H. W. Bush in the Oval Office along with Robert Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs. (Photo courtesy of the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library)
The late 1980s brought major change to the inter- because he believed doing so would allow him to
national political scene and to the CIA’s approach maintain an objective stance when providing intelli-
to national security. During DCI William Webster’s gence judgments. Webster’s desire to isolate the DCI
tenure, the Berlin Wall came down after nearly 30 from policymaking may have reflected his experi-
years, ending the post-World-War-II division of ence as a federal judge and as a Director of the Fed-
Europe and leading to the dissolution of the Soviet eral Bureau of Investigation.
Union. The fall of communism prompted the CIA
to reevaluate its mission to ensure that it remained Under Webster’s leadership, the CIA’s Inspector
relevant to US national security. Webster wanted General (IG) evaluated the performance of the IC
to change the image of the Agency as a “runaway” Staff, which oversaw the integration and perfor-
organization and direct it toward new challenges, mance of the IC. The study concluded that the Staff
such as nuclear proliferation, counternarcotics, and was carrying out a useful mission but was unfocused
counterterrorism. and lacked impact. The study also found that recent
DCIs were detached from the rest of the IC and seg-
As DCI, Webster improved cooperation across the regated from the Staff. Webster approved most of
Intelligence Community and repaired the Agency’s the IG’s recommendations, which included devel-
reputation after the Iran-Contra scandal. Webster oping a mission statement and creating a leaner IC
had a reputation for integrity, and upon becoming Staff. He also tried to strengthen ties within the IC
DCI, he asked President Ronald Reagan to restore by hosting conferences and initiating biweekly lun-
the position to its traditional noncabinet status cheons with heads of intelligence agencies.
As the new decade progressed, Webster recognized the intelligence. Diplomatic efforts failed to secure
that redefining intelligence objectives was critical an Iraqi withdrawal, and Operation Desert Storm
to the Agency’s ability to confront new threats. began in January 1991.
Webster created two more interdisciplinary cen-
ters—for counterintelligence and counternar- The US-led coalition bombed Iraqi positions for
cotics—adding to the six weeks, and a dis-
Counterterrorism “The a ct i v i t i e s i n w h i c h w e crepancy emerged
Center established by between CIA and US
engage must be consistent
DCI William Casey. military tank-kill esti-
with our foreign mission and
The centers enabled mates. The destruc-
collectors and ana- our own laws, and they must tion of Iraqi tanks was
lysts to span regional r e f l e ct w h a t t h e American critical to the plans
boundaries by focusing of General Norman
p e o p l e e x p e ct o f u s . We must
on an issue instead of a Schwarzkopf—the
find ways to get that message
specific country. Commander of US
known and understood. The Central Command
Webster also tightened American public is very and Coalition Forces
internal review pro- for the Gulf War—
responsive when it believes
cesses for covert action and Schwarzkopf was
that there is some order
initiatives in response frustrated by the lack
to the Iran-Contra in this elusive world of of a coordinated esti-
Affair. A government cloak and dagger.” mate for the number
review of the scan- of tanks eliminated.
dal concluded that the An estimate produced
Agency as an institution - DCI William Webster, remarks at the Intelligence by Army intelligence
was not involved, but Community Attorney’s Conference, Williams- components—indi-
burg, Virginia, May 11, 1988
Webster nonetheless cating a weaker Iraqi
instituted guidelines for army—was ultimately
covert action to guard against similar problems. used. The Bush Administration lost confidence
in Webster, resulting in his departure from the
The Persian Gulf War presented the US Govern- Agency.
ment with a new set of national security concerns.
In August 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein led Webster had a detached management style, but he
his forces into Kuwait City, seizing 10 percent of the improved the Agency’s credibility, helped unify the
world’s proved oil reserves. The Agency increased IC, and transitioned the CIA to the emerging chal-
collection and analysis on Iraq to support Presi- lenges of the post-Cold War era.
dent George H. W. Bush, who eagerly consumed
78 / 79
Robert
Michae l
Gates
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, November 6, 1991—January 20, 1993
President Served:
George H. W. Bush
Appointed:
May 14, 1991, by President George Bush; confirmed by the US Senate,
November 5, 1991; sworn in, November 6, 1991
• Richard J. Kerr, until March 2, 1992
• Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, April 9, 1992 through remainder of
Gates’s tenure (served as Acting Director, January 20, 1993—February 5, 1993)
Born:
September 25, 1943, Wichita, Kansas
E du c a t i o n :
College of William and Mary, B.A., 1965; Indiana University, M.A., 1966;
Georgetown University, Ph.D., 1974
Career Highlights:
• Intelligence analyst, CIA, 1966-74
• National Security Council Staff, 1974-79
• Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, CIA, 1981-82
• Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1982-86
• Chairman, National Intelligence Council, 1983-86
• Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1989;
Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs,1989-91
• Author
• Interim Dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public
Service, Texas A&M University 1999-2001
• President, Texas A&M University, 2002-06
• Chancellor of the College of William and Mary, 2012–present
80 / 81
Robert Gates became the first DCI to come from of the controversy surrounding the Iran-Con-
the Agency’s analytic arm, the Directorate of Intel- tra Affair; Gates had been the Deputy Director
ligence (now the Directorate of Analysis). In addi- of Central Intelligence during the scandal. When
tion to having 25 years of analytical experience, President George H. W. Bush nominated Gates to
Gates had earned a reputation as a knowledgeable the DCI position a second time, Gates faced oppo-
and insightful voice on national security during his sition from former CIA analysts who believed he
tours at the National Security Council. He had also had forced intelligence estimates to conform to his
worked successfully with leaders throughout Wash- own views. Gates was eventually confirmed, and he
ington, developing a broad understanding of how asserted his commitment to unbiased and objective
government worked. intelligence analysis.
During his confirmation hearing, Gates signaled

his intention to take advantage of the opportunity
presented by the dissolution of the Soviet Union to
reassess the role, mission, priorities, and structure of
US intelligence. While still at the NSC, Gates began
a review of national security policy, asking policy-
makers to provide a comprehensive list of the key
countries and intelligence questions for the United
States through 2005. “This effort will allow us to
correlate resources and requirements we can or can-
not meet at different budget levels—in essence, to let
the customer decide what to do without at differ-
ent budget levels,” Gates explained. In March 1992,
President Bush signed National Security Directive
(NSD) 67, which formalized the review and pro-
vided a list of requirements through 2005, dividing
them into four levels of priority. The directive
served as a guide for the Intelligence Community
during Gates’s tenure as DCI.
Deputy Director of CIA Robert Gates speaks at a ceremony
dedicating the William J. Donovan statue located in the CIA
In his first month as DCI, Gates established task
Headquarters lobby on October 28, 1988.
forces to study ways to improve organization and
process. He immediately commissioned 14 task
Gates had a difficult confirmation process. Orig- forces, adding 10 more four months later. They were
inally nominated to succeed DCI William Casey assigned topics ranging from imagery to human
in 1987, Gates withdrew his nomination because
intelligence to National Intelligence Estimates. The
work of the task forces resulted in many organizational changes, includ-
ing the creation of an Office of Military Affairs, the restructuring of
the National Reconnaissance Office—as well as public acknowledge-
ment of its existence—and the establishment of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency, which eventually became the National Geospa-
tial-Intelligence Agency.
In addition, Gates disbanded the IC Staff, which had overseen the integra-
tion and performance of the IC, and divided its responsibilities between
the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the newly created Commu-
nity Management Staff (CMS). CMS—established based on the studies
that DCI William Webster had initiated—handled resource matters; the
NIC dealt with substantive matters. Gates believed that this distribution
of duties allowed him to better fulfill his community management
responsibilities.
The whirlwind changes that Gates brought to the Agency included

increased accessibility and openness to the media and public. Gates
understood that intelligence must match the needs of its customers,
including the public. He modified declassification standards so the pub-
lic could access CIA records of historical significance. Gates resigned
when it became clear that President-elect Bill Clinton wanted to select
his own DCI. Thirteen years later, Gates returned to public service as
Secretary of Defense, once again helping to defend the country he had
long served.
82 / 83
R.
James
Wool s e y
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, February 5, 1993—January 10, 1995
President Served:
William J. Clinton
Appointed:
January 21, 1993, by President William J. Clinton; confirmed by the
US Senate, February 3, 1993; sworn in, February 5, 1993
Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, April 9, 1992, through remainder of
Woolsey’s tenure (served as Acting Director, January 10, 1995—May 10, 1995)
Born:
September 21, 1941, Tulsa, Oklahoma
E du c a t i o n :
Stanford University, B.A., 1963; Rhodes Scholar, St. John’s College, Oxford
University, B.A., 1965, M.A., 1970; Yale University, LL.B., 1968
Career Highlights:
• Captain, US Army, 1968-70; Program Analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
1968-70
• Adviser with US Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I),
Helsinki and Vienna, 1969-70
• National Security Council Staff, 1970
• General Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 1970-73
• Private law practice, 1973-77, 1979-89, 1991-93
• Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977-79
• Delegate-at-Large, US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
and Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), Geneva, 1983-86
• President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, 1983-84; President’s Commission on
Defense Management, 1985-86; President’s Commission on Federal Ethics Law
Reform, 1989
• Ambassador and US Representative, negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe, 1989-91
• Private Consultant
84 / 85
Advancements in communications technology in review the IC’s security systems as new technolo-
the 1990s changed how the CIA managed the Intel- gies emerged. The commission concluded that the
ligence Community, established security standards, US Government’s security systems were inadequate
and collected foreign intelligence. At the same to identify top-tier threats and that security stan-
time, the CIA was adjusting to a declining intelli- dards varied widely across the IC. It recommended
gence budget in the post-Cold War environment. improving personnel security and allocating more
resources to protecting information management
After his election in 1992, President Bill Clinton systems. Woolsey developed policies and practices
chose Jim Woolsey as Director of Central Intel- aimed at fostering an exchange of information
ligence, based on recommendations from foreign among intelligence and law enforcement elements,
policy advisers. Clinton did not know Woolsey per- which he believed were critically important to US
sonally, and the two never developed a relationship. national security.
Woolsey brought impressive experience in national
security, including service as Undersecretary of the A new communications system called Intelink—
Navy in the Carter Administration and as an ambas- which had recently been developed to unify elec-
sador in Europe negotiating arms control limita- tronic communications throughout the Intelli-
tions on nonnuclear forces at the end of the Cold gence Community—also drew criticism. Linking
War. Woolsey continued DCI Robert Gates’s efforts members of the IC electronically made sense from
to integrate the IC while also taking on new issues, a community management viewpoint, but security
such as improving the CIA’s relationship with law concerns—stemming from the Aldrich Ames case—
enforcement and redefining security standards. led some to question the new system and the ease
with which sensitive information could be shared.
In 1994, a CIA officer, Aldrich Ames, was arrested
on charges of spying for the Soviet Union. An inves- The Clinton Administration’s effort to return Hai-
tigation revealed that Ames had been passing infor- ti’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Ber-
mation to the KGB—the Soviet Union’s external trand Aristide, to power also created controversy
intelligence agency—since 1985, initially motivated during Woolsey’s tenure. In September 1991, Haiti’s
by money. Ames gave the KGB enough information security forces, with the broad support of the civil-
to compromise at least 100 US operations and the ian elite, removed the newly elected Aristide from
identities of CIA assets, at least 10 of whom were power. The resulting violence against Aristide’s sup-
executed. Woolsey reprimanded Ames’s supervi- porters caused many Haitians to flee their country.
sors, but Congress criticized the punishment as Both the George H. W. Bush and Clinton admin-
inadequate. istrations tried to restore Aristide to power over a
three-year period.
The Ames case highlighted the need to redefine
security standards across the IC. Woolsey worked The CIA’s analysis on Aristide was criticized by
with senior officials in the Clinton Administra- some policymakers and members of Congress as
tion to establish a Joint Security Commission to inaccurate and policy prescriptive. This became a
President Bill Clinton and DCI R. James Woolsey meet at the White House. (Photo courtesy of the William J. Clinton Presidential Library)
major point of contention among the Agency, the Improved security and IC integration were major
Clinton Administration, and Capitol Hill, and it sig- themes during Woolsey’s tenure. But Woolsey
nificantly impaired Woolsey’s relationships with the struggled to carry out many of his initiatives, in large
White House and Congress. part because he never established a close relation-
ship with President Clinton.
86 / 87
John
Mark
D e utc h
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, May 10, 1995—December 15, 1996
President Served:
William J. Clinton
Appointed:
March 19, 1995, by President William J. Clinton; confirmed by the
US Senate, May 9, 1995; sworn in, May 10, 1995
Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, until July 3, 1995
George J. Tenet, July 3, 1995, through remainder of Deutch’s tenure
(served as Acting Director, December 15, 1996—July 11, 1997)
Born:
July 27, 1938, Brussels, Belgium
E du c a t i o n :
Amherst College, B.A., 1960; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
B.S., 1961, Ph.D., 1965
Career Highlights:
• Became US citizen, 1945
• Systems Analyst, Department of Defense, 1961-65
• Assistant Professor of Chemistry, Princeton University, 1966-69
• MIT faculty, 1970-77 and 1980-93: Professor of Chemistry, Chairman
of Chemistry Department, Dean of Science, Provost
• Director of Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy
Technology, and Under Secretary, US Department of Energy, 1977-80
• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1993-94
• Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1994-95
• MIT Professor
88 / 89
The shift in roles and responsibilities that occurred in having a lasting effect on the CIA’s organization.
throughout the Intelligence Community after the Deutch aided in the establishment of the National
Cold War proved difficult to manage. Sharing in- Imagery and Mapping Agency—now the National
formation had become critical to addressing intel- Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—first recommend-
ligence questions that spanned geographic and bu- ed by DCI Robert Gates. Deutch created the posi-
reaucratic boundaries, but many resisted this new tion of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
approach to national security. Military Support to improve coordination with the
military. He also created the first formal program
President Bill Clinton appointed John Deutch to encouraging employees to take positions in other IC
serve as his second DCI because of Deutch’s knowl- agencies, strengthening personnel development.
edge of national intelligence issues gained while
serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Deutch’s The DCI’s role as manager of the IC proved to be
Department of Defense (DOD) background left a contentious matter during Deutch’s tenure. The
many concerned that Deutch’s loyalties would be intelligence committees in Congress wanted a more
split during a time when the Agency was compet- powerful DCI, while the defense committees want-
ing with DOD for more authority and shrinking ed a more powerful secretary of defense. Unless
resources. Congress revised the National Security Act of 1947,
DOD would have a decisive advantage because of its
Deutch’s decision to bring in personal aides and se- control over most of the intelligence budget. This
nior officers from outside the CIA to assume top po- essentially prevented the DCI from effectively man-
sitions created internal resentment, yet he succeeded aging the entire IC.
DCI John Deutch (right, foreground) and DDCI George Tenet (left) accompany President Bill Clinton as he departs the main entrance of
CIA Headquarters. (Photo courtesy of the William J. Clinton Presidential Library)
“I Americans understand
believe most the need to keep
secrets. Where Americans want to be reassured
i s t h a t t h e o b j e ct i v e s m a k e s e n s e a n d t h a t i t ’ s d o n e
e ff e ct i v e l y a n d r e s p o n s i b l y . I don’t think the American

p e o p l e o b j e ct t o k e e p i n g s e c r e t s . They want us to make
sure that our operations are consistent with Ameri-

c a n v a l u e s a n d t h a t t h e y ’ r e c a r r i e d o ut i n a r e s p o n s i b l e
way.”
On March 2, 1995, President Clinton issued Pres- warning unit within the Counterterrorism Cen-
idential Directive, PDD-35, which grouped intel- ter—to provide warning on possible terrorist attacks
ligence topics into tiers based on their importance against the United States. Officers from across the
to the President and policymakers. George Tenet, IC filled the positions to review intelligence from all
then Senior Director for Intelligence Programs sources.
at the National Security Council, championed
PDD-35. When Tenet became Deputy Direc- In December 1996, after President Clinton’s re-elec-
tor of Central Intelligence in July 1995, he and tion, Deutch resigned as DCI. Despite his short
Deutch initially planned to focus the Agency’s tenure, he accomplished some important changes
efforts on “hard targets,” where collection was within the Agency. He also made an effort, just as
most difficult. Many feared that targets of lesser other directors had, to integrate the Community,
importance would have reduced resources; that but the DCI’s role in leading the IC remained uncer-
concern eventually led Tenet and Deutch to settle tain.
on the concept of “global coverage,” which aimed
to strike a balance among intelligence priorities.
President Clinton also urged the IC to intensify its

efforts against terrorism as the threat continued
to grow. As a result, Deutch created a Terrorism
Warning Group—a dedicated national-level threat
90 / 91
Georg e
John
Tenet
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, July 11, 1997—July 11, 2004
Presidents Served:
William J. Clinton
George W. Bush
Appointed:
March 19, 1997, by President William J. Clinton; confirmed by the Senate,
July 10, 1997; sworn in, July 11, 1997
General John A. Gordon, US Air Force, October 31, 1997—October 18, 2000
John E. McLaughlin, October 19, 2000, through remainder of Tenet’s
tenure (served as Acting Director, July 11, 2004—September 24, 2004)
Born:
January 5, 1953, Flushing, New York
E du c a t i o n :
Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, B.S.F.S., 1976; Columbia
University, School of International Affairs, M.I.A., 1978
Career Highlights:
• Legislative Assistant, Legislative Director, office of Senator H. John Heinz III,
1982-85
• Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 1985-88
• Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 1988-93
• Member of President-elect Clinton’s national security transition team,
1992-93
• Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence
Programs, National Security Council, 1993-95
• Visiting Professor at Georgetown University
92 / 93
The CIA faced an unprecedented challenge after the reporting requirements, to create a statutory inspec-
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Knowing tor general for the CIA, and to reorganize the Intel-
that intelligence would be essential to American ligence Community. In 1992, Tenet was a member
success in the campaign against al-Qa‘ida, Agency of President Bill Clinton’s national security transi-
leaders immediately began developing a blueprint tion team and later served as Special Assistant to the
for collecting intelligence and conducting oper- President. In 1993, he was named Senior Director
ations against the terrorist group and its Afghan for intelligence programs at the National Security
allies, the Taliban. Guiding the Agency during this Council; he was named Deputy Director of Central
demanding time was DCI George Tenet, whose Intelligence in July 1995. Two years later, he was
years of intelligence experience helped instill public appointed DCI.
confidence in the Agency’s ability to conquer the
challenges ahead. The challenges Tenet faced as DCI were far differ-
ent from those of his predecessors. Tenet’s mission
was to revitalize the Agency, which had experienced
a 25-percent decline in personnel from its Cold War
peak, while also managing the continued integra-
tion of the IC. Moreover, Tenet came to office as
the technology revolution of the 1990s was cre-
ating new opportunities for technical collection.
Longstanding, familiar targets were also changing
rapidly, forcing the Agency to upgrade its human
intelligence.
On September 29, 2001, three days after the first CIA team en-
tered Afghanistan, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush, and DCI
George Tenet held a meeting at Camp David (clockwise, from
Early in his tenure, Tenet placed particular empha-
bottom left). sis on addressing the increased threat of terrorism.
He expanded and revitalized the Agency’s Coun-
Tenet began his career in public service in 1982 in terterrorism Center (CTC), adding new officers
the office of former Senator H. John Heinz III of and taking steps to further integrate the analysts,
Pennsylvania, where he served as a legislative assis- operations officers, and technical experts who were
tant and legislative director. In 1985, Tenet became working there.
a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and was involved with monitoring On October 12, 2000, the Navy destroyer USS Cole
arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union was attacked in the port of Aden, Yemen, by a small
and the United States. In 1988, Tenet was appointed boat carrying suicide bombers. Al-Qa‘ida operatives
Staff Director of SSCI, coordinating the staff sup- were identified as the perpetrators. Soon thereaf-
port to the committee’s oversight and legislative ter, Tenet asked CTC to develop a comprehensive
activities. He worked to strengthen covert action plan to address terrorism; it was called the “Blue
This scorched and tattered American flag recovered from the debris of Ground Zero was given to DCI George Tenet, who hung it in his
office at CIA Headquarters. The flag serves as a constant reminder of the strength and durability of the nation we serve.
Sky” report.The paper outlined the Agency’s ideal sive covert action program that will carry the fight
strategy for fighting terrorism, assuming no to the enemy, particularly al-Qa‘ida and its Taliban
resource or policy limitations. CTC recommended protectors.”
disrupting al-Qa‘ida networks in Afghanistan and
providing support for the Northern Alliance in an The CIA created a seven-person team that landed
effort to combat al-Qa‘ida’s host, the Taliban. The in Afghanistan on September 26, 2001; it linked up
plan highlighted the need to employ a multifaceted with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Tali-
approach to fighting terrorism, but it was not imme- ban and deny al-Qa‘ida its safe haven. By mid-No-
diately implemented because of policy constraints vember of that year, all of Afghanistan had fallen
and insufficient resources. to US and Northern Alliance forces. Usama bin
Ladin’s mountain hideout of Tora Bora was cleared
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the George on December 22, 2001, but he escaped, marking the
W. Bush Administration called on the CIA to close of the first phase of Operation Enduring Free-
develop a plan to respond to the attacks. Agency dom.
leaders used the “Blue Sky” report as their guide. As
quoted in Tenet’s book, At the Center of the Storm, The Agency’s close relationship with President
Tenet explained to President George W. Bush, Bush and senior policymakers after 9/11 moved
“We’re prepared to launch in short order an aggres- the CIA into a pivotal role in national security deci-
94 / 95
DCI George Tenet (left) and President George W. Bush (right) admire George H. W. Bush’s portrait on display in the Directors Gallery at
CIA Headquarters.
“This is a time for all of us to come together, to bring all
our talents to bear in a steely determination
t o d o w h a t w e a r e c a l l e d t o d o — p r o t e ct o u r f e l l o w
citizens.
It is our tu r n a g a i n t o s t e p u p t o t h e
challenge, and to meet it as we meet all challenges: with
commitment and courage. P ut some spirit in
y o u r s t e p , s q u a r e y o u r s h o u l d e r s , f o cu s y o u r e y e s .
We have a job to do.”
- DCI George Tenet’s message to CIA employees on September 12, 2001
sion making. Tenet promoted the CIA’s capabilities Tenet’s tenure—the second longest in the Agen-
and carved a larger role for the Agency through cy’s history—ended on July 11, 2004. The CIA, like
increased funding and personnel. America, had changed as a result of the attacks that
had occurred on 9/11. Tenet led the Agency to
Tenet led the Agency through one of its darkest adapt, to continue seeking the truth, and to make
periods, as it faced withering criticism for failing the tough decisions to protect our country.
to detect and prevent the 9/11 plot. Later, the fail-
ure to find evidence of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam
Hussein brought increased scrutiny on the Agency
and Tenet. The purported presence of WMD had
formed the basis of the case to invade Iraq.
96 / 97
Porter
Johnsto n
Goss
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, September 24, 2004—April 21, 2005
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, April 21, 2005—May 26, 2006
President Served:
George W. Bush
Appointed:
August 10, 2004, by President George W. Bush; confirmed by the Senate, Sep-
tember 22, 2004; sworn in, September 24, 2004
John E. McLaughlin, until November 12, 2004
No deputy director from November 12, 2004 to July 15, 2005
Vice Admiral Albert M. Calland III, US Navy, July 15, 2005—July 23, 2006
Born:
November 1938, Waterbury, Connecticut
E du c a t i o n :
Yale University, B.A., 1960
Career Highlights:
• US Army intelligence officer, 1960-62
• Clandestine Service Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, 1962-72
• Small-business owner, newspaper founder; member of the city council
and mayor, Sanibel, Florida, 1974-83
• Commissioner, Lee County (Florida) Commission, 1983-88;
Chairman, 1985-86
• Member of Congress, 14th District, Florida, 1989-2004
• Chair, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1997-2004
• Co-chair, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before
and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
98 / 99
In the years following 9/11, management of the Goss brought in personal staff from outside the
Intelligence Community came to the forefront. Agency to assume senior positions at the CIA.
Integrating intelligence capabilities had become CIA officers—especially veterans—were not eager
a critical priority. Just as Pearl Harbor led to the to accept outsiders, and some clashed with Goss’s
creation of the CIA, 9/11 prompted the US Gov- advisers. Several senior officers departed, includ-
ernment to reassess the effectiveness of the intelli- ing Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John
gence structure. McLaughlin and Director of Operations Stephen
Kappes (who later returned to serve as Deputy
President George W. Bush nominated Porter Goss Director under Director Michael Hayden).
to be the Director of Central Intelligence follow-
ing DCI George Tenet’s resignation in July 2004. Goss’s tenure marked the beginning of a time of
Goss’s career in intelligence began when he served rapid growth for the CIA. President Bush asked him
as a US Army intelligence officer at age 22. Two to increase CIA personnel across all directorates by
years later, Goss began working for the CIA as a as much as 50 percent: new analysts, case officers,
case officer, mainly in Latin America. He left the engineers, and foreign-language-proficient offi-
Agency in 1972 when cers joined the ranks.
a serious illness forced Goss also emphasized
his resignation. Goss “There i s n o c o n t r a d i ct i o n
research and develop-
moved to Florida, between intelligence and ment to identify new
founded a newspaper, freedom. America must approaches to combat-
and became active in acquire the secrets of its ing terrorism.
local politics. In 1989 enemies if it is to remain
he was elected to the On December 17, 2004,
free, and our skill and
US House of Represen- President Bush signed
dedication in that calling
tatives, where he served the Intelligence Reform
are second to none.”
15 years. Throughout and Terrorist Preven-
Goss’s time in Con- - DCI Porter Goss remarks at tion Act (IRTPA) to
gress, he consistently the Ronald Reagan Presiden- institute the changes
tial Library, March 2, 2005
defended the CIA. He recommended by the
chaired the House Per- 9/11 Commission. The
manent Select Committee on Intelligence for much goal of the Act was to narrow the divide between
of his time on the Hill. After 9/11, he helped lead foreign and domestic intelligence organizations, to
the joint congressional inquiry into IC activities, create more effective management of the entire IC,
seeking to identify gaps in America’s defense. Some and to promote intelligence sharing between orga-
members of Congress expressed concerns that Goss nizations. The Act split the duties of the DCI and
was too politically partisan to lead the Agency, but in abolished that position; it created the positions of
August 2004 he was confirmed as DCI. the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to take
Director Porter Goss (right) greets President George W. Bush as he arrives at CIA Headquarters.
over the management of the IC and the Director of Agency officers understood the need for reforms
the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) to manage after 9/11, many perceived the new structure as a
the Agency’s functions. Thus, Porter Goss became loss of prestige for the CIA. Goss negotiated the
the last DCI and the first D/CIA. new, and, at times, difficult construct of a D/CIA
and DNI. In 2006, he decided to move on to other
The D/CIA also assumed responsibility for over- projects and resigned as D/CIA.
seeing the collection of human intelligence abroad
by IC agencies and, under the guidance of the DNI,
to coordinate the relationships between US intelli-
gence agencies and their foreign counterparts. The
new legislation also established the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center—later renamed the National
Counterterrorism Center—to integrate IC analysis
of terrorist threats and to develop strategic opera-
tional plans pertaining to counterterrorism.
The reactions to the changes were mixed. Although
100 / 101
Michael
Vincent
Hayden
General, US Air Force
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 2006—February 13, 2009
Presidents Served:
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Appointed:
May 8, 2006, by President George W. Bush; confirmed by the US Senate,
May 26, 2006; sworn in, May 30, 2006
Stephen R. Kappes, July 24, 2006, through remainder of Hayden’s tenure
Born:
March 17, 1945, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
E du c a t i o n :
Duquesne University, B.A., 1967; M.A., 1969
Career Highlights:
• Air Force intelligence officer, 1970-84
• Air Attaché in Bulgaria, 1984-86
• Political-Military Affairs Officer, Air Force Headquarters, 1986-89
• Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, 1989-
91
• Chief, Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, 1991-93
• Director of Intelligence, US European Command, 1993-95
• Commander, Air Intelligence Agency, and Director, Joint Command
and Control Warfare Center, 1996-97
• Deputy Chief of Staff, UN Command and US Forces Korea, 1997-99
• Director, National Security Agency, 1999-2005
• Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, 2005-06
• Retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008 while serving as Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency
• Visiting Professor at George Mason University
102 / 103
In 2004, President George W. Bush signed the Intelligence—but Hayden made a relatively smooth
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention transition, perhaps because of his long and distin-
Act mandating a major reorganization of the guished career in intelligence. Beginning in 1970,
Intelligence Community. The law stipulated that Hayden served as an Air Force intelligence officer
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for 14 years and later became the Director of the
would no longer oversee the coordination of the National Security Agency (NSA), where he served
IC or provide daily briefings to the President. This for six years—the longest tenure of any director in
role was given to the new position of Director of that agency’s history.
National Intelligence, leaving the CIA to focus on
foreign intelligence collection, analysis, and covert Agency officers welcomed Hayden’s management
action. style, which promoted integration of the Agency’s
directorates without interfering with their internal
operations. Hayden further unified the workforce
by developing a Strategic Intent—with the theme of
“One Agency, One Community”—that focused on
integration, leadership, and building a 21st-century
infrastructure. As part of that plan, Hayden central-
ized communications to the workforce by develop-
ing an internal director’s website that provided a
central repository for his speeches and workforce
messages. The website also allowed officers to sub-
mit comments directly to him.
Hayden believed in investing in the workforce,

promoting diversity, and encouraging officers to
engage in joint-duty assignments that gave them
experience in other elements of the IC. When he
left the CIA, Hayden explained to his successor,
General Michael Hayden is sworn in as Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency on May 30, 2006. (Photo courtesy of the George
Leon Panetta, “You’re inheriting the best leader-
W. Bush Presidential Library) ship team in the federal government. If you give
them half a chance, they will not let you fail, the
After the departure of Porter Goss, the task of man- way they would not let me fail.” Hayden’s leader-
aging the CIA during this transition went to Air ship team included the Deputy Director of the CIA,
Force General Michael Hayden, who was appointed Stephen Kappes—a former Director of Operations
D/CIA by President Bush in May 2006. The selec- whom Hayden asked to return after his resignation
tion of an active-duty military officer for the Agen- during DCI Porter Goss’s tenure—and the Asso-
cy’s chief worried some—as did General Hayden’s ciate Deputy Director of the CIA, Michael Morell.
previous assignment as Deputy Director of National
“Our n a t i o n o w e s t h e m a t r e m e n d o u s d e b t o f g r a t i tu d e . We
will repay it. We will repay it by living the values they
demonstrated: loyalty, integrity, excellent service—these
are the things that must and will guide our work.”
- D/CIA Michael Hayden, remarks at the CIA Memorial Ceremony, May 21,
2007
Hayden inherited controversial issues tied to coun-

terterrorism, notably the CIA’s detention and inter-
rogation program for terrorist suspects. While
Hayden understood the internal and public debates
surrounding the program, he also believed that there
were risks in ending it, and he discussed those views
candidly with the public at the time.
Hayden also thought that educating the public about

the Agency’s mission was important. For example,
he advocated the public disclosure of the role that
While serving as D/CIA, Michael Hayden signs papers retiring intelligence had played in detecting a nuclear reactor
from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008.
in Syria, arguing that the story would help Ameri-
cans appreciate the value of CIA’s contributions to
national security.
Hayden hoped to remain D/CIA after the 2008

presidential election, but President Barack Obama
replaced him with Leon Panetta. The turmoil that
had surrounded the Agency in the years after 9/11
quieted during Hayden’s tenure. He understood
that the CIA had seen enough change, and he
became a strong advocate for the Agency’s mission
and its people.
104 / 105
L e o n
E d w a r d
P a n e tt a
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, February 13, 2009—June 30, 2011
President Served:
Barack Obama
Appointed:
January 9, 2009, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the
US Senate, February 12, 2009; sworn in, February 13, 2009
• Stephen R. Kappes, until May 5, 2010
• Michael J. Morell, May 6, 2010, through remainder of Panetta’s tenure (served as
Acting Director, June 30, 2011—September 6, 2011)
Born:
June 28, 1938, Monterey, California
E du c a t i o n :
Santa Clara University, B.A., 1960; Santa Clara University Law School, LL.B.,
1963
Career Highlights:
• Volunteered for active duty as 2nd Lieutenant, US Army, 1964
• Legislative assistant, US Senate, 1966-69
• Special Assistant to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
and Director, Office of Civil Rights, 1969-70
• Executive Assistant to New York City Mayor John Lindsay, 1970-71
• Private law practice, 1971-77
• Member of Congress, 16th District, California, 1977-93
• Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1993-94
• White House Chief of Staff, 1994-97
• Co-Director, Panetta Institute for Public Policy, 1998-2009, 2013-present
106 / 107
The theme of change rippled throughout the gov- Panetta was elected to the US House of Representa-
ernment as Barack Obama took office as the 44th tives and served 16 years as a member of Congress
President of the United States. The new President from northern California. Elected to a ninth term,
moved quickly to fill the job of Director of the Cen- Panetta relinquished his seat in 1993 when Pres-
tral Intelligence Agency, nominating Leon Panetta, ident Bill Clinton selected him to be the Director
a choice that initially drew skepticism because of of the Office of Management and Budget. A year
Panetta’s lack of experience in the intelligence field. later, President Clinton asked Panetta to become
Concerns quickly evapo- the White House Chief
rated as Panetta won of Staff, a position he
the loyalty of the
“What happened yesterday is the
held until the end of
Agency workforce, historic moment for C IA . Clinton’s first term.
smoothed relations This is going to be a moment in In 1997, Panetta
with Congress, and history that will be remembered and his wife, Syl-
established himself as forever. It is a pivotal moment via, cofounded the
a key member of the that will forever change
nonpartisan Panetta
President’s national Institute for Pub-
the war on terrorism, and it
security team. lic Policy. Panetta
w i l l g i v e u s t h e o p p o r tu n i t y
resigned from the
Panetta, the son of to not only operationally
Institute after a
Italian immigrants, d e f e a t t h e m , b ut t o p e r m a n e n t l y decade there to begin
decided at an early defeat al-Qa‘ida.” his tenure at the CIA
age to commit his in February 2009.
- D/CIA Leon Panetta, address to the
life to public service. workforce on May 2, 2011, the day
He served in the US Usama bin Ladin was killed Panetta empha-
Army from 1964 to sized strengthening
1966 and then became a legislative assistant to US “global coverage”—expanding the CIA’s ability to
Senator Thomas Henry Kuchel (R-CA). In 1969, anticipate and respond to events across the world—
Panetta joined the Nixon Administration as the even while pressing the Agency to remain aggres-
Director of the Office of Civil Rights. When the sive in its effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
administration instituted the so-called “Southern al-Qa‘ida. The campaign against al-Qa‘ida was not
strategy” in an effort to reduce civil rights enforce- without sacrifice: on December 30, 2009, seven
ment, putting pressure on Panetta to back off from CIA officers were killed and several others injured
enforcing the US Supreme Court’s decision in Brown in a suicide bombing in Khowst Province, Afghani-
v. Board of Education, Panetta resisted and lost his stan. The day after the attacks, Panetta said, “Those
job. Reflecting upon this experience, Panetta said, “I who fell yesterday were far from home and close to
don’t think you are a good public servant unless you the enemy, doing the hard work that must be done
are protecting what you believe in. If you compro- to protect our country from terrorism. We owe
mise, then you’re not worth much.”
D/CIA Leon Panetta stands next to President Barack Obama in front of the Memorial Wall located in the main lobby of CIA Headquar-
ters during a visit to CIA Headquarters on April 20, 2009.
them our deepest gratitude, and we pledge to them ence that would allow the Agency to respond with
and their families that we will never cease fighting speed and agility to events anywhere in the world.
for the cause to which they dedicated their lives—a Beginning in December 2010, this need for agility
safer America.” became especially acute, as a wave of revolutionary
demonstrations starting in Tunisia rippled through
Not long after the tragedy at Khowst, the CIA devel- the Arab world in what became known as the Arab
oped promising leads in its search for al-Qa‘ida’s Spring. The tumult forced the CIA to quickly real-
founder, Usama bin Ladin, and on May 2, 2011, bin locate resources to ensure that the President and
Ladin was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Nearly a policymakers remained informed about the rapidly
decade after the attacks of September 11 revealed changing political landscape in the Middle East.
the need for government organizations to work
across bureaucratic lines, the operation showcased Panetta led the Agency during a time of profound
the benefits of close collaboration among intelli- loss and great achievement. He had never been an
gence agencies, as well as between the CIA and the operations officer or an analyst at the CIA, but he
military. nevertheless championed the Agency’s mission and
had a deep appreciation for the needs of the men and
In his strategy for the Agency through 2015, Panetta women he led. In June 2011, President Obama ap-
emphasized the importance of a diverse workforce, pointed Panetta as Secretary of Defense to replace
the need to bolster foreign-language capabilities, Robert Gates, who was retiring.
and the imperative of maintaining a global pres-
108 / 109
David
Howell
Petraeu s
General, US Army (Retired)
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
September 6, 2011—November 9, 2012
President Served:
Barack Obama
Appointed:
April 28, 2011, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the US Senate, June
30, 2011; sworn in, September 6, 2011
Michael J. Morell through remainder of Petraeus’s tenure
(served as Acting Director, November 9, 2012—March 8, 2013)
Born:
November 7, 1952, Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York
E du c a t i o n :
US Military Academy, B.S., 1974; Princeton University, M.P.A, 1985; Ph.D., 1987
Career Highlights:
• Commissioned into US Army, 1974
• Chief of Operations of the UN Force, Haiti, 1995
• Executive Assistant for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997-99
• Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, 2000-01
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization,
Force and Deputy Commander of the US Joint Counterterrorism
Task Force, Bosnia, 2001-02
• Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, 2002-04
(Including Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-04)
• Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and NATO
Training Mission–Iraq, 2004-05
• Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, 2005-07 and
Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2007-08
• Commander, US Central Command, 2008-10
• Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force Commander, US
Forces–Afghanistan, 2010-11
110 / 111
D/CIA David Petraeus addresses Agency officers at CIA Family Day on September 24, 2011.
David Petraeus was sworn in as Director of the Central Intel-

ligence Agency five days before the 10th anniversary of 9/11.
During his 14-month tenure, the Agency remained focused
on the long campaign against al-Qai‘da, but it also stepped up
global coverage to address an increasingly diverse set of chal-
lenges to the nation’s security, especially those arising from the
political turmoil in the Arab World.
Petraeus served in the US Army for 37 years, beginning with

his graduation as a “distinguished cadet” from the United States
Military Academy in 1974. In the decade following the 9/11 at-
tacks, Petraeus held six consecutive general officer commands,
five of which were in combat. In addition to being in the van-
guard of the fight to Baghdad in 2003, he also led the “surge”
of troops into Iraq that began in 2007. He then became the
head of the US Central Command and later took charge of the
NATO International Security Assistance Force and US forces
in Afghanistan, his final military assignment before leading the CIA. He
retired from the Army to take the position of D/CIA.
As D/CIA, Petraeus developed several initiatives to prepare the next

generation of Agency leaders, creating the chief of corporate learning
position and launching the Director’s Scholars Program, designed to
help promising officers attend
graduate school and improve
“I have found through hard experience
the CIA’s overall mission perfor-
that, for any organization, there is mance. Petraeus also focused on
n o s u b s t i tut e f o r c o n t i n u a l l y l e a r n i n g , improving the CIA’s technology
infrastructure and upgrading op-
adapting, and improving.”
erational tradecraft to ensure that
- D/CIA David Petraeus, announcement
Agency officers were equipped
to the workforce on December 21, 2011
to take advantage of the latest
changes in technology.
In 2012, the CIA celebrated its 65th anniversary and the 50th anniver-
sary of the Original Headquarters Building (OHB). In January 2012,
during a ceremony commemorating the OHB anniversary, Petraeus re-
ferred to the Biblical quotation that is fixed in stone in the OHB lobby.
“It is in these marble walls,” he said, “that our Agency honors its past and
proclaims its fundamental mission in words borrowed from the Gospel
according to John: ‘And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall
make you free.’”
On September 11, 2012, militants attacked the US consulate and a near-

by annex in Benghazi, Libya, killing four Americans, including the US
Ambassador to Libya. This event prompted a series of reviews and in-
vestigations by the US Government near the end of Petraeus’s tenure.
Petraeus encouraged a spirit of innovation across the Agency, and his

leadership skills, relationships with foreign leaders, and understanding
of international affairs ensured that the CIA had a prominent seat at the
table whenever the President faced important decisions on national se-
curity. Petraeus resigned abruptly in November 2012 after his involve-
ment in an extramarital affair was revealed.
112 / 113
John
Owen
Brenn a n
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, March 8, 2013—
January 20, 2017
President Served:
Barack Obama
Appointed:
January 7, 2013, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the US Senate,
March 6, 2013; sworn in, March 8, 2013
• Michael J. Morell until August 9, 2013
• Avril Haines, August 9, 2013—January 10, 2015
• Morgan Muir (acting), January 12, 2015—February 9, 2015
• David S. Cohen, February 9, 2015—January 20, 2017
Born:
September 22, 1955, North Bergen, New Jersey
E du c a t i o n :
Fordham University, B.A., 1977; University of Texas at Austin, M.A., 1980
Career Highlights:
• Joined CIA as a Middle East analyst, 1980
• Various posts in CIA, 1980-99
• Chief of Staff, Director of CIA, 1999-2001
• Deputy Executive Director, CIA, 2001-03
• Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 2003-04
• Interim Director, National Counterterrorism Center, 2004-05
• President and CEO, The Analysis Corporation, 2005-08
• White House Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, 2009-13
114 / 115
In January 2013, President Barack Obama appointed Center and then as interim Director of the Nation-
former CIA officer John Brennan as Director of the al Counterterrorism Center. After leaving govern-
Central Intelligence Agency. Brennan had served as ment service for private industry from 2005 to 2008,
a national security advisor to candidate Obama in he returned to serve in the Obama White House.
the 2008 presidential campaign. After his election,
Obama had nominated him to be his first D/CIA. As D/CIA, Brennan was sometimes forced to ad-
However, Brennan withdrew his name from con- dress issues that predated his tenure as Director. For
sideration at that time example, he tried to
because of his role as a walk a fine line be-
senior Agency execu- “It i s i n cu m b e n t o n u s n o t tween defending the
tive during the George only to anticipate the Agency from criti-
W. Bush administration cism of the RDI pro-
c h a n g e s t h a t l i e a h e a d b ut
and controversies sur- gram—most nota-
also to adjust our
rounding the retention, bly from the Senate
detention, and inter- t r a d e c r a ft , c a p a b i l i t i e s , Select Committee
rogation of terrorism priorities, and work on Intelligence—and
suspects in the years condemning the
p r o c e s s e s a cc o r d i n g l y a n d
following the attacks program’s excesses,
to leverage optimally
of September 11, 2001. promising to learn
After Brennan served the tremendous talent and from past mistakes,
instead as White House energy that reside within and vowing never to
Assistant to the President repeat them. In ad-
our workforce.”
for Homeland Security dition, he defended
- D/CIA John Brennan’s message to CIA employees on the Agency’s use of
and Counterterrorism
March 18, 2013
for three years, Obama lethal force against
nominated him to be- terrorism suspects
come D/CIA; the US Senate confirmed his nomina- while suggesting that CIA’s drone program should
tion by a 63–34 vote in March 2013. be scaled back or phased out and that the Depart-
ment of Defense take over responsibility for it.
Brennan was only the second career intelli-
gence analyst, after Robert Gates, to serve as DCI No subject was more internally controversial,
(now D/CIA). With an education in Middle East however, than Brennan’s vision for reorganiz-
studies and the Arabic language, he served for two ing the Agency. He reportedly had been thinking
decades as a Middle East analyst and analytic man- about making changes to CIA’s structure for many
ager at the Agency before rising to senior admin- years. As D/CIA, he saw a growing number and
istrative positions at CIA and, from 2003 to 2005, complexity of national security challenges and an
as Director first of the Terrorist Threat Integration Agency hamstrung by functional and geographic
John Brennan’s swearing-in as CIA Director. Source: Associated Press
boundaries, insufficient adaptation of technology, the most far–reaching reorganization of CIA since
subcultures that emphasized individual director- the early 1950s—what he called a “Blueprint for the
ates over enterprise-wide missions, unintegrated Future.”
business practices, and uneven talent management.
These issues, along with the absence of single points Brennan’s reorganization, which he referred to as
of contact on many subjects and concerns about “modernization,” created 10 regional and topical
maintaining CIA’s relevance, made Brennan ready to mission centers separate from Agency directorates,
pursue change. In 2014, he commissioned a 90-day remodeled recruiting and training offices, and es-
study group to take a holistic look across the Agen- tablished the new Directorate of Digital Innovation
cy and make recommendations for ways to make it (DDI). Modeled loosely on the Agency’s Counter-
more agile, efficient, and integrated. Two years into terrorism Center and task forces that had integrat-
his tenure, on 6 March 2015, Brennan announced ed officers from across directorates to great effect,
116 / 117
the mission centers merged the functions of the
Agency’s now five directorates—Operations (pre-
viously the National Clandestine Service), Analysis
(previously Intelligence), Science and Technology,
Support, and Digital Innovation—into integrated
teams led by leaders with the newly created title of
“assistant to the director” who would be responsible
for all Agency operations and analysis in their re-
gional or topical areas. The new DDI inherited the
task of managing and coordinating CIA’s integration
of digital and cyber capabilities across all mission
areas. Under this new model, the four directorates
that predated modernization joined with the DDI in
managing the overall development of officers, tra-
decraft, and strategic perspectives of their respective
specialties.
Like the creation of the ODNI and other Intelligence

Community reforms from the previous decade, the
reactions to the changes at CIA were mixed. Some John Brennan at the LBJ Presidential Library, October 24, 2018.
Source: Associated Press
senior operations officers viewed modernization as
an analysts’ power grab, and a number of operations
officers retired early in protest. Others in the Agency
welcomed the new structure and believed the mis-
sion centers would do what they were intended to
do: improve CIA’s agility and flexibility and elimi-
nate, or at least mitigate, old turf battles.
Brennan stepped down as D/CIA with the transition

from the Obama administration to that of Donald
Trump on January 20, 2017. Breaking with tradi-
tion, while still in office, he made several public com-
ments denouncing some of President-elect Trump’s
criticisms of CIA and the Intelligence Community.
Brennan remained a staunch defender of the Agency
and the Community after leaving office.
This page is intentionally left blank.
118 / 119
Michael
Richard
Pompeo
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, January 23, 2017—April 26, 2018
President Served:
Donald Trump
Appointed:
November 18, 2016 by President-elect Donald Trump; confirmed by the
US Senate and sworn in January 23, 2017
Gina Haspel, February 2, 2017 through remainder of Pompeo’s tenure
Born:
December 30, 1963, in Orange, California
E du c a t i o n :
United States Military Academy, B.S., 1986; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1994
Career Highlights:
• US Army cavalry officer, 1986-91
• Private law practice, 1994-98
• Private business, 1998-2011
• Member of Congress, 4th District, Kansas, 2011-17
• Secretary of State, 2018-21
120 / 121
Director Pompeo in the cockpit of a B-29 at Joint Base Andrews in September 2017. The World War II-era plane was participating in one
of its first air shows following a 15+-year restoration partly supported by Pompeo’s former Kansas aerospace firm. Both CIA and the US Air
Force celebrated their 70th anniversaries that month.
The election of President Donald Trump shook the contrast to the lengthy intelligence careers of both
nation’s political landscape, and Trump chose an- his predecessor and successor, Pompeo’s background
other strong partisan, Mike Pompeo, as his first D/ in the field was limited to service on the House Per-
CIA. Though not without controversy, Pompeo lev- manent Select Committee on Intelligence. Nonethe-
eraged his standing with the President to maintain less, his keen intellect and strong work ethic enabled
CIA access and influence at the White House and to him to quickly gain command of the issues and play
help the Agency ride out the political storms during an activist role as D/CIA.
this turbulent period.
Pompeo arrived just as a strained relationship be-
Pompeo graduated first in his class at the US Mili- tween the new President and CIA was taking shape.
tary Academy at West Point in 1986. Following five President Trump took particular issue with the In-
years of US Army service, he went on to earn a law telligence Community Assessment regarding Rus-
degree from Harvard, where he edited the Harvard sian interference in the 2016 election—which led
Law Review. Pompeo worked briefly for a top Wash- him to disparage the intelligence profession and its
ington, DC, law firm and then led businesses in the employees. His controversial speech at CIA Head-
aerospace and oil sectors for a dozen years in Kansas. quarters the day after his inauguration only fanned
In 2010, Pompeo won the first of four elections to the flames further. The election uproar and Russian
the US House of Representatives, from which he re- relations more broadly were among the top chal-
signed in January 2017 to join the Trump cabinet. In lenges on Pompeo’s watch, during which he walked
a fine line. As a foreign policy hawk, he supported
pressuring Moscow and keeping it in the spotlight,
in contrast to the President’s softer stance.
Pompeo assumed a larger political role than was cus-

tomary for a CIA Director. He frequently spoke out
on issues of key importance to him, such as the nucle-
ar accord with Iran, which he and the President both
“I will defend you every opposed. His political affinity with Trump afforded
him extensive face time at the White House, and he
step of the way. I’ll
could be a forceful advocate for particular courses of
s p e a k t h e t r ut h e v e r y
action. President Trump described Pompeo as a kin-
day to anyone who
dred spirit, saying, “We’re always on the same wave-
asks for it and, frank-
length.” This connection led to Pompeo’s inclusion
ly, to some who won’t. in policy discussions; the assumption of additional
We have an obligation responsibilities as a de facto presidential advisor; and
t o — w i t h o ut f e a r o r special assignments such as helping arrange what
would become a series of summits with North Kore-
asking for any favor—
an leader Kim Jong Un. Although Pompeo’s proxim-
deliver excellence and
ity to power helped ensure that Agency views usu-
t h e t h e t r ut h . ”
ally received an airing, it also engendered questions
- D/CIA Michael R. Pompeo
from the workforce about possible politicization
inaugural workforce ad-
dress at CIA Headquarters, and his defense of analytic bottom lines. In the end,
25 January 2017 Pompeo’s close alignment with the President helped
shield the Agency and paved the way for CIA to re-
turn to a more traditional, out-of-the-headlines role
in succeeding years.
Internally at Langley, Pompeo espoused a focus on

core activities and an aggressive approach. He laud-
ed in his first address to the workforce “doers” and
“people of action” as personified by legendary Army
Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and George
S. Patton. He called for increased intelligence col-
lection and covert action and sought authority to
boost the Agency’s ability to engage in drone strikes
throughout the world. The D/CIA valued organi-
122 / 123
zational flexibility to adapt to changing priorities.
Increased policymaker attention, combined with
Pompeo’s strong interest in two key hotspots—Iran
and North Korea—led to a tweaking of the Agen-
cy’s new mission center construct, creating Agen-
cy-wide centers dedicated to leveraging more re-
sources against these hard targets. Pompeo elevated
the status of the Counterintelligence Mission Cen-
ter and singled out China, Russia, counterterrorism,
and cyber security as additional top priorities on his
watch. He promoted the devolution of power and a
decentralized bureaucracy, claiming after a year in
office to have pushed down to lower levels nearly
half of the decisionmaking that formerly was the
purview of the Director.
Overall, Pompeo endeavored to strike a balance

between partisan service to the President and lead-
ership of a nonpartisan Agency. Though largely an
outsider in the intelligence arena, his insider status
at the White House, where he was one of the few
top figures to remain in the President’s good graces
throughout his tenure, helped protect the Agency
from interference while also setting the stage for
the next phase of his own career. In April 2018,
Pompeo turned over the reins to Deputy Director
Gina Haspel and became the nation’s 69th Secretary
of State, the only individual to have served in both
positions.
124 / 125
Gina
Cheri
Haspe l
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, May 21, 2018—
January 20, 2021
President Served:
Donald Trump
Appointed:
April 27, 2018 by President Donald Trump; sworn in May 21, 2019
• Elizabeth Kimber (acting), May 22—August 6, 2018
• Vaughn Bishop, August 6, 2018 —January 19, 2021
Born:
October 1, 1956 in Ashland, Kentucky
E du c a t i o n :
University of Louisville, B.A., 1978
Career Highlights:
• Career Trainee, Directorate of Operations, 1985-87
• Case Officer, Directorate of Operations, 1987-89
• Language training, 1989-90
• Headquarters and field positions, Directorate of Operations, 1990-95
• Language and other training, 1995–96
• Senior headquarters and field positions, Directorate of Operations, 1996-2001
• Senior manager in Counterterrorism Center (CTC), 2001-03
• Deputy Chief, National Resources Division, 2004-05
• Chief of Staff, Directorate of Operations, 2005-08
• Chief of Station, various locations, 2008-12
• Deputy Director, National Clandestine Service (NCS) for foreign
intelligence and covert action, 2012
• Deputy Director, NCS, 2012-14
• Chief of Station, Directorate of Operations Europe Division, 2014-17
• Deputy Director of CIA, 2017-18
126 / 127
Gina Haspel was sworn in as D/CIA on 21 May where she graduated in May 1978 with a Bachelor
2018. She was the 23rd Director of the Agency and of Arts in languages and journalism. She married an
the first woman to hold this position. Haspel was a Army officer, Jeff Haspel, in 1976 (they divorced in
career CIA officer, and her elevation from Deputy 1985).
Director to Director was seen as reassuring by many
in the Agency during a period of strained relation- After college, Haspel worked as a civilian library
ships with the White House and Congress. coordinator and ran the language laboratory for the
10th Special Forces Group at Fort Devens, Mas-
Haspel was born Gina Cheri Walker in Ashland, sachusetts, from 1980 to 1981. She studied for a
Kentucky, on 1 October 1956. She was the oldest of paralegal certificate from Northeastern University,
five children. Her father served in the US Air Force, which she received in 1982, and worked as a parale-
so she lived overseas and completed high school gal until CIA hired her in 1985 as a “reports officer”
in the United Kingdom. She initially wanted to at- (today’s collection management officer) specializing
tend West Point after graduation, but the academy in the Soviet Union. She completed operations cer-
was not yet accepting female cadets. Instead, she tification; her first field assignment was from 1987
returned to Kentucky and studied at the Universi- to 1989 in Africa, followed by several positions in
ty of Kentucky for three years and then transferred Europe and Central Eurasia from 1990 to 1996.
for her senior year to the University of Louisville, From 1996 to 1998, Haspel served as station chief
in a country in Central Asia. From 2001 to 2003, she
was a deputy group chief in the Counterterrorism
Center and from 2004 to 2005 was a deputy chief of
a division in the Directorate of Operations. At Head-
quarters she also served as the deputy director of the
National Clandestine Service for foreign intelligence
and covert action and chief of staff for the director of
the National Clandestine Service.
In 2013, D/CIA John Brennan named Haspel as Act-

ing Director of the National Clandestine Service.
However, she was not appointed to the position
permanently and returned to a field assignment.
On February 2, 2017, President Donald Trump ap-
pointed Haspel Deputy Director of the CIA, the sec-
ond female to hold that job, under D/CIA Michael
Pompeo. After Pompeo resigned to become Secre-
Pompeo and DD/CIA Gina Haspel exit the Bubble. tary of State, Haspel became acting director in April
2018 and was nominated to become the director of
The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approves Gina Haspel’s nomination as D/CIA. Source: NPR News.
the CIA. She was confirmed on May 17, 2018.

“I stand on the shoulders of
As the first female Director, it was natural for the
heroines who never sought
press to spotlight Haspel’s appointment, but she
p u b l i c a cc l a i m b ut maintained a low profile. She prioritized keep-
served as inspirations to the ing CIA officers focused on the mission and out
g e n e r a t i o n s t h a t c a m e a ft e r
of the highly charged political debates that seized
the nation. At her swearing-in ceremony, Haspel
them.”
acknowledged that she did not believe she would
- Gina Haspel at her swearing in ceremony. have become D/CIA without the legacy of cour-
age and dedication that generations of women in
the World War II Office of Strategic Services and
the Agency had displayed. She acknowledged at this
ceremony and other public appearances that CIA’s
diversity representation was improving but always
128 / 129
added that its recruitment process could be better she was particularly proud of the joint CIA–US Spe-
in terms of diversity. Haspel contributed to this ef- cial Operations Command mission that took down
fort in speaking engagements at her alma mater, the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State
University of Louisville, and Auburn University, of Iraq and the Levant, in October 2019.
where she encouraged women to consider CIA as a
career. During part of her tenure, women occupied Haspel faced one of her most daunting challeng-
the top positions in all five CIA directorates: Oper- es late in her tenure, when the outbreak of the
ations, Analysis, Support, Science and Technology, COVID-19 pandemic occurred. Agency leaders
and Digital Innovation. had difficulty balancing actions to protect employ-
ees across the globe while maintaining collection,
Haspel was often asked what intelligence issues analysis, and covert action programs in regions with
caused her the most concern. Her answers regularly lockdowns, large-scale outbreaks, and inadequate
included Iran, China, terrorism, and cyber security. health care. Haspel’s desire to protect her people and
During her speech at Auburn, she also emphasized willingness to be flexible and creative in response
the deadly role that international narcotics traf- to the pandemic resulted in relatively low infection
ficking played in creating the opioid addiction that rates and few deaths among Agency employees. The
plagued American society. She increased the re- workforce was largely vaccinated and reconstituted
sources devoted to the CIA Counternarcotics Center when Haspel retired from CIA in January 2021 and
in response to this threat. was succeeded by Ambassador William Burns.
During her tenure, Haspel focused on maintaining

positive relationships with the White House, oth-
er members of the Intelligence Community, and
Congress; building on the modernization program
started under Brennan; expanding diversity and in-
clusion efforts at CIA; and maintaining partnerships
with private industry, foreign liaison, and other fed-
eral agencies. She believed the chain-of-command
should run from the director straight to the head of
the mission center and pressed the mission center
leaders to more fully integrate their DS&T and DDI
colleagues and for decisions to be made at the low-
est possible level. Haspel streamlined preparations
for meetings both in limiting the number of people
involved and in insisting that briefing papers be lim-
ited to the top 10 issues. As D/CIA and an officer
involved in counterterrorism missions for decades,
130 / 131
Willia m
Joseph
Burns
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, March 19, 2021—Present
President Served:
Joseph Biden
Appointed:
January 11, 2021 by President Joseph Biden; confirmed by the US Senate,
March 18, 2021; sworn in, March 19, 2021
David S. Cohen
Born:
April 11, 1956, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
E du c a t i o n :
LaSalle University, B.A., 1978; Oxford University, M.Phil., 1980; D.Phil., 1981
Career Highlights:
• Entered US Foreign Service, 1982
• Consular and Political Officer, US Embassy, Amman, 1982-84
• Staff Assistant, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, US Department of
State, 1984-85; Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State, 1985-86
• Staff, Near East and South Asia Directorate, National Security Council, 1986–88;
Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council,
1988-89
• Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, 1989–92;
Acting Director, 1992-93
• Political Counselor, US Embassy, Moscow, 1994-96
• Executive Secretary, US Department of State, 1996-98
• Ambassador to Jordan, 1998-2001
• Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 2001-05
• Ambassador to Russia, 2005-08
• Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 2008-11
• Deputy Secretary of State, 2011-14
• President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015-21
132 / 133
“I’ve known C IA for many years as a place that doesn’t just ad-
m i r e p r o b l e m s , b ut f i n d s w a y s t o f i x o r o v e r c o m e t h e m ; a p l a c e
where courage and ingenuity are the hallmarks of operations
a n d c o l l e ct i o n ; a p l a c e w h e r e a n a l y s t s t e l l p o l i c y m a k e r s w h a t
they need to hear, not what they want to hear; a place marked
b y a p a s s i o n f o r s t a y i n g a h e a d o f t h e cu r v e i n s c i e n c e a n d t e c h -
nology, and digital innovation; a place where people take care
of one another. That’s the C IA I am so proud to lead.”
- D/CIA Bill Burns

134 / 135

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1941–2021

8 Directors Timeline 66 Stansfield Turner

26 Walter Bedell Smith 98 Porter J. Goss

36 John A. McCone 106 Leon E. Panetta

40 William F. Raborn Jr. 110 David H. Petraeus

44 Richard M. Helms 114 John O. Brennan

50 James R. Schlesinger 120 Michael R. Pompeo

54 William E. Colby 126 Gina Haspel

60 George H. W. Bush 132 William J. Burns

Rear Admiral, US Navy William E. Colby

Walter Bedell Smith

1960 John A. McCone 1980

William H. Webster Leon E. Panetta

Robert M. Gates David H. Petraeus8

Donovan became Director of the OSS, envisioning

for a long time past permanent worldwide

est echelons of their Governments. Prior to the present

war, the United States had no foreign secret intelli-

coordinated intelligence system.”

- OSS Director Donovan to President Harry Truman, August 25, 1945,

gence effort for decades to come. Four Directors of

By war’s end, Donovan was promoted to Major

Donovan died on February 8, 1959, at the age of

D i e d : January 14, 1973

The CIG was staffed and funded by the State, War,

Truman regarded the CIG as his personal intelli-

every safeguard should be imposed to prevent any one de-

January 24, 1899, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

During the summer of 1946, US military forces new organization.

D i e d : June 18, 1982

terests in their intelligence estimates. For this rea-

son, C IA strives to maintain in its estimates

- DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter in a 1950 letter to President Truman,

As World War II began, Smith was promoted to

D i e d : January 28, 1969

Dulles’s early life and career afforded him a unique

an alternative location—Langley, a former peach orchard near the town of

Nonetheless, Dulles is remembered as a giant in the field of intelligence

D i e d : February 14, 1991

Overhead reconnaissance programs were a point of contention during

D i e d : October 22, 2002

At the CIA, Helms was assigned to the Office of Spe-

have as a type of family. Its members have only each

don’t know them or don’t like them. Those above them

distance themselves when something goes wrong.”

D i e d : March 27, 2014

When the media connected the CIA to the Water-

President Gerald Ford established a commis-

Despite the increased oversight from Congress,

1The formal name of the Church Committee was the United

f i e l d o ut s i d e t h e l a w . This year’s excitement

has made clear that the rule of law applies to

all parts of the American Government, including

intelligence ... Its secrets will be understood

democracy in tomorrow’s world, not covers for mis-

take or misdeed ... The costs of the past

ue of this strengthening of what was already the best

intelligence service in the world.”

Discharged from the Navy in September 1945, Bush