Panchapadika of Padmapada (English Translation)
Panchapadika of Padmapada (English Translation)
Panchapadika of Padmapada (English Translation)
OF
PADMAPADA
(Translated into English)
by
Rajasevasakta
D. VENKATARAMIAH, B.A., L.T.
Formerly Mysore Educational Service
ORIENTAL INSTITUTE
BARODA
1948
GAEKWAD'S ORIENTAL SERIES
General Editor :
Rajyaratna, Jnanajyoti
No. CVII
Price: Rs. 17
FOREWORD
The famous Vedanta polemical work, PancapadikS. of
Padmapadacarya in English translation is now presented to all
lovers of Indian Philosophy as No. CVII of the Gaekwad's Oriental
Series. The publication of this work is a melancholy story
since the esteemed translator, the late Rajasevasakta Sri. D.
Venkataramiah, died as soon as arrangements were made to print
his book at the Bangalore Press, Bangalore. Before his death he
was very anxious to have the book printed, and always reminded
us that delay might kill him. The work was first entrusted under
Government orders to the Sadhana Press, Baroda, but this press,
hardpressed with work, could not make any headway even after
a lapse of full one year. Thereafter, Mr. Venkataramiah him-
self fixed the Bangalore Press for printing his work, and this
printer within a short time set up nearly a hundred galleys in type.
These galleys were sent to the editor without delay, but by that
time Mr. Venkataramiah was too ill to revise the proofs. That
illness proved to be his last illness and he expired on Friday, 13th
June 1947, at the ripe old age of 81, and thus India lost a great
scholar, a profound philosopher and above all, a gentleman of
very high qualities and character. We were associated with
Mr. Venkataramiah for the last ten years or more, and we shall
ever remember with appreciation and admiration his great
desire to help us in difficulties, his remarkable promptitude in
disposing of business and the uniform courtesy that was inherent
in him.
The late Mr. Venkataramiah was conscious that he was old
and that hemay collapse at any time. In order that the printing of
the work may not suffer in any way, he requested his friend and
associate, Mr. D. V. Gundappa, a well-known political, literary
and social worker of Mysore, to examine the proofs of the
Pancapadika in case anything happened to him. But alas the !
worst happened, and the author passed away leaving the heavy
responsibility of printing this complicated work to others. Those
were the days of intense political excitement and activity in the
State of Mysore, as throughout the rest of India and
;
General Editor.
(in Kannada) :
"
May this be for Sri Rama's acceptance (jSri !
1
The identity of Mancjanamisra with Suresvara has been of late
questioned. — See Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri's Introduction to Brahma-
siddhi of Mandana.
in obedience to the master's call he stepped across the
Ganges on
whose bosom miraculously sprang up lotuses to serve as his foot-
hold; (hence the name Padmapada).
Samkara though he was convinced of the competency of
Suresvara to interpret the Advaitic doctrine in its purity, yielded
to the importunities of those who discredited SureSvara. He
consequently Sanandana (the ascetic name of
commissioned
Padmapada) to write the sub-commentary (Nibandhana) but
assigned to Suresvara the composition of Vartikas on the
Brhadaranyaka and Taittiriya Upanisads bringing out in full the
essentials of the Advaita system. From these Vartikas and also
from his Naiskarmyasiddhi, an independent work with its powerfull
advocacy of knowledge dissociated from ritual as the only means
of freedom, we see how groundless was the charge of those fellow-
disciples who suspected Suresvara's bias to the Karma doctrine.
Padmapada's commentary on the Bhasya is known as the
Tika, 1 the first part being styled the Pancapadika, the rest Vrtti.
From internal evidence it is perceived that Padmapada in all
probability wrote his gloss on the entireBhasya but what is left
to us is only the Tika relating to the Bhasya on Badarayana-
SGtras, 1. i. 1-4. 2
After completing his work Padmapada sought permission
from the master, it is said, to travel south on a pilgrimage to
Ramesvaram and though warned against the dangers incidental
to such a long journey, he wrested Samkara's consent and pro-
ceeded on his travels taking his work with him. On his way he
reached his uncle's house. This uncle of his who was a staunch
follower of Prabhakara —the famous exponent of the ritualistic
doctrine of one school of Purvamlmamsa —naturally felt aggrieved
at the attack made
Pancapadika on the Prabhakara teaching
in the
but without revealing his mind complimented his nephew on his
1
Ramananda in his commentary on Samkara-bhasya Sri Venka- —
—
Bombay p. 13, quotes the passage from p. 4 of PP.
teswara Press,
3TR-^T faTOTgw RWerfafa —which he calls the Tika.
2
References to the Vrtti found in Pancapadika are:
p. 29— aron: t&T?§*raira<nfarrat fagra* surefewrar:
V. S. II. ii. 18-32.
„ 30— jprrererw aT^Fqi^cfaTrfa amterai wt ^jrflraw:
„ 75— ^qrwaai 3 <T5T <t5t affawr fcrctafawiro: srolftran*:
„ 88— ffinfo i%^i% iiswGfa ^qr?nftras«rftir— v s l m 26 ff - - - » -
erudition. Padmapada left his work with him exhorting him to
keep it safe till his return from Ramesvaram. The uncle knew,
he could not controvert the Pancapadika view by arguments and
resolved therefore to destroy the work as otherwise he felt sure that
his school of thought would stand discredited. To escape censure
he set fire to his own house and with it perished the Pancapadika. 1
Returning to his master who had by then travelled south to
Kerala, Padmapada in great distress related how his work had
been destroyed by fire in his uncle's house. Samkara consoled
him by dictating the TIka on the first five padas (i.e., four sections
of the first chapter and the fifth section of the second chapter)
verbatim as he had heard that portion read to him while they were
in Srngeri (S.D., p. 505). Since the TIka on the first five padas
was restored and the work still bears the name Pancapadika it is
difficult to account for the loss of all but the gloss on 1. 1-4.
Vidyaranya is silent on the point and even so early as the time
of Prakasatman (950 A.D.) the author of the Vivarana, the work
appears to have suffered this further mutilation.
Being the earliest commentary on Samkara-bhasya the
Pancapadika even in its abridged form deserves a careful study by
every student of Advaita philosophy. It sets forth the funda-
mental doctrines of the system, in particular that bearing on
superimposition or adhyasa which is pivotal to the Vedantic non-
dualism as taught by Samkara. We have in it an epistemological
discussion of high value to students of modern philosophy.
Samkara's exposition of adhyasa is brief, though lucid, as all his
writings are but the elaboration and the rebuttal of other schools
were left to Padmapada. The rival doctrines of the Naiyayikas,
the Bhattas, the Prabhakaras, the Vijnanavadins and the
Madhyamikas of the Budhistic school are all subjected to a search-
ing examination and refuted with great argumentative skill. This
expositionof adhyasa-bhasya occupies nearly half the present
work. We shall give below a brief outline of this and other allied
problems discussed in the Pancapadika. 2
1
Vidyaranya says that he is not quite sure of the authenticity of
but that he is relying only on report. S.D., p. 495, SI. 16.
this incident 1
2
The first four Sutras, on the Bhasya of which, Padmapada has
commented may be regarded as embracing the essentials of the
philosophy of Advaita. I have accordingly thought fit to include
a brief discussion of the more fundamental doctrines of the system.
XVI
II
—
own sphere, and the empirical life samsara, does not forego its
— —
consist of parts savayava and therefore would be non-eternal.
According to Prabhakara the ego itself is the integral self and
that in every cognition there are three elements, *
tripu^i '
—the
knower, the knowing and the known, where the act of knowing
reveals not only the known {i.e., the object) but also the knower. 1
Press.
3Trj?i *r£rft
—Though
«qW?Rg HKmtflfa
atman is inert,
^^4—
says Prabhakara
P- 34
it
fT.,
is
Nirnayasagara
karta and not
karma as held by the Bhattas.
Vacaspati refutes the Prabhakara view that the object and the self
are both inert and that the light of consciousness (Samvit) having the
self (atman) as its locus illumines the object. He points out that it is
not inevitable that the self and the object should be illuminated
merely on the ground that consciousness is self-luminous. The argument
that consciousness being occasioned by the presence of the self and
the object (swkti and swr) raust illumine them is met by the
like the Samkyas hold that it cannot and that what-
Others
ever known or knowable is ipso facto different from the self.
is
The advaitin's analysis is the same except for the fact that he
explains the not-self element as an appearance of or superimposed
on the self. The reason for declaring the not-self as illusory—
mithya is that it is in every respect opposed to the self and that
4
'
theories can cogently account for the unitary cognition that arises
in an error-situation and its subsequent conative activity. We
must therefore admit that the serpent in the rope or the silver in
the nacre comes under a unique category. It is neither absolutely
real nor absolutely unreal. It is anirvacanlya, i.e., non-determi-
nable.
In conformity with his doctrine of error the advaitin recog-
nises three orders of existence —paramarthika, absolutely real,
vyavaharika —real for practical life, and pratibhasika —real only
till the illusion lasts. Brahman the sole reality, pure conscious-
ness, pure bliss, relationless, timeless, or the presupposition of all
our thoughts and the ground of the objective world comes under
the first order, the every-day world of our experience under the
When the sense of sight for example comes into contact with a
chair that is out there in space a certain modification takes place
in the internal organ and this modally transformed antahkarana,
termed vrtti, flows towards the object (chair)
and assumes its
shape, just as when from a canal the water
irrigating a garden
takes the shape whatever it be of the trench around each tree.
Caitanya or consciousness, it must be remembered, is all-pervad-
ing and as such the chair-defined consciousness when the veiling
ajnana is removed by the vrtti, becomes one with the vrtti-defined
consciousness and we have the manifestation of the chair. 1 We
may notice here the contrast between this theory and its Western
counterpart. Here in a sense it is the subject that goes to the
object in order to apprehend it but the reverse is the process as
maintained by Western psychologists. The activity is from the
object side. When an object is perceived say a pot, the light-
waves proceeding from it impinge on the eye and an image is
formed on the retina followed by the stimulation of certain brain
centres and we perceive the prototype, viz., the pot. But the
incompleteness of the theory becomes evident when we try to
understand how the inverted image of the object that is formed
on the retina enables us to perceive the tangible upright object
out in the open. The inadequacy of this explanation has been
realised in the west and several theories have been advanced to
solve the riddle. We have the representative or copy theory
1
«|5Wft5*srorRr: ^if^K: raERISBRT «m<miSF3?T: % *i«5igra»iu-
The mental psychoses passing through the eye and other sense-
organs assume the form of sense-objects and these manifestations arc
objects of atman's consciousness.
(photo theory) of the School of Locke according to which mate-
rial things are not perceived as such but only their representations
1
For a account of the theory of perception the chapter on
fuller
'Perceptual Thinking' in Macdougall's work, An Outline of Psychology
may with advantage be consulted. He approves of what he calls the
'psychic stimulus' theory according to which the crude sensations are
considered as goods to the mind put forth as stimulating powers. It is
admitted he says, that the mind supplies from its own resources
something very essential over and above the sensory qualities with which
it responds to sense-stimulations.
2
Advaita Paribhdsa, p. 291, Verikatesvara Press, Bombay.
whether the presented object quenches thirst. If it does it is
prama, otherwise bhrama. This is the instrumental value of truth.
We may add by the way that this conception of truth much re-
sembles the one held by some western thinkers. The Advaitin
as we have noted above adopts a different course. Whether a
particular knowledge is contradicted or not is the test for determin-
ing the logical character of that knowledge. If it is not contra-
dicted by the rest of relevant experience it has truth-value, other-
wise it is false. Thus coherence or non-contradiction which
expresses the nature of truth, also serves as the test of truth".
Ill
1
Samkara, be noted, is positive about the objective
it is to
character of our experience. His epistemological realism is unmistak-
able. He argues that it is irrational to deny the reality (of whatever
degree) of what any knowledge actually presents. It is as he aptly
puts it, like denying the feeling of satisfaction after one has had
a square meal.— VS., II. ii. 28 f
world originates, by which it is sustained and in which it dissolves,
is Brahman '. This aphorism is formulated on the creation
sruti,
**
From which all these beings are born, by which being
born, they live, and in which they merge when departing."
Tait. Up. III. 8. But this definition is incompatible with a being
that beyond any determination (Yato vaco nivartante aprapya
is
*
Satyam, Jnanam, Anandam Brahma ', is meant to define Brahman
—
negatively that Brahman is the opposite of what is false, insenti-
ent, or afflicted (asad, jao!a, dur^kha, vilaksana). But this negative
definition ought not to be so regarded as leading to the conception
of Brahman as a mere blank, a nullity sunya. The terms —
It is tafasthalaksana where the attributes differentiate the thing
1
In the second aphorism what is intended to impress is the
essential nature of Brahman by its definition per accidens. The basic
text
Brahman's
for the ta^asthalaksana
essential nature,
is ^ 31
is
i£JTlft ^tir *rra%
substantiated
etc., and
^ep$q*5$rtJi by 3rra?3!afr*
^foTOTfa H?"% STI^ff, 3TR*^T snmft 5fafol, 3TH^ 5RR^rW**Tfor,
Tait. Up., hi. vi. 1.
elaborated.
supposed, that the effect (viz., the world) is real like the cause
(viz.,Brahman). Such an interpretation is opposed to the very
fundamental doctrine of Advaita. A superimposed object (snake)
may be viewed as one with its substrate (rope) inasmuch as the
latter is the sustaining factor of the former. The cause is no
more than its substratum (V.S. II. i. 16). If as Bradley maintains
the phenomena without committing suicide, as he would put it,
should find asylum in the absolute, the charge would be that they
would inquinate the absolute with all their defects. Hence to
meet this charge Bradley adds that in the final stage of absorption
the phenomena undergo a thorough transmutation and become
sublimated. How is this effected ? To this question his only
answer is somehow
'
'. The advaitic view is that the appearances
do not affect Brahman
at all. They only exist for a jlva and when
any jlva attains freedom they cease to exist for him. 1
Thus far it has been shown in what sense Brahman is the
efficient as well as the material cause of the universe. Of the
several ancient Indian theories of causation we may mention the
'satkarya vada' of the Samkhya realists who maintain that
Prakrti or Pradhana evolves into the world-spectacle. No
intelligent cause in its commonly accepted sense is admitted of
world-creation in the system. What is only implicit in the primal
cause —Prakrti,
becomes explicit through the elaborate process of
evolution. It may be mentioned that the satkaryavada is also
adhered to by the Advaitin but then it should be remembered that
maya and not Brahman is the source of the universe. The world
which emerges from maya is as real as that maya. Hence it can
be represented as the parinama of maya or as it is sometimes
described as prakrti. The point to be carefully noted is that it is
1
After examining the several objections raised against the doctrine
of creation Samkara points out that the main object of the Vedanta
is not the elaboration of the theory of creation but the teaching of the
ment in the cause and the effect is no more than such a causal
1
rearrangement. Another well-known theory is that, of the
ancient writer, Bhartrprapaiica who upholds what is known as
the *
bhedabhedavada '
— according to which reality may be
regarded as identity-in-difference. Not only is this principle
applicabe to the relation between Brahman and jiva but also to
the physical world. Bhartrprapaiica favours the evolution theory
of creation, the heterogeneous mass of the objects of sense being
regarded as the transformation of the homogeneous Brahman.
This view very much resembles the Samkhya satkaryavada except
for the fact that Brahman and not Prakrti is the primal cause.
This question of causal order involved in our understanding of
the objective world has given rise to different schools of thought
in the west, a discussion of which seems uncalled for here. So
acute a thinker as Bradley in the third chapter of his celebrated
work —Appearance and Reality —has shown the untenability
of relations such as are ordinarily understood to exist between
cause and effect, thing and attribute, and so on. In his collected
Essays, Vol. what he observes, " Relational thinking is
II, this is
1
For a detailed refutation of the asatkarya theory see S. Bha.,
II. 1. 18.
postulation of a theory that will satisfactorily explain the relation
between cause and effect, a problem the inherent difficulties of
which can be surmounted only on the Advaita postula'e of the
world-phenomenality. The world is only an appearance (vivarta)
having as its substrate Brahman, the sole ontological reality.
IV
It has been stated that both definition and proof are indispen-
sable in the determination of an object. Brahman being the
object of inquiry, its nature can be ascertained by the adduction of
laksana and pramana. We have shown that the second Vedanta
aphorism points to the definition per accidens (tatasthalaksana)
Brahman.
as well as to the definition proprium (svarupalaksana) of
We have now to make sure of the pramana on which the existence
of Brahman as defined above is based. It is on the authority of
Scripture (Sruti) that the existence of lSvara (Brahman) who
creates the world, sustainsit and finally ends it, is adduced. The
third Vedanta Sutra (Sastrayonitvat) is explained as bearing two
senses (VI and VII sections of the Pancapadika). The first brings
home the omniscience of Tsvara since He is the author of the all-
comprehensive Veda. This interpretation merely amplifies the
idea already contained in the statement that Brahman is the source
of the universe. Without therefore dwelling on it further we
pass on to the seventh Varnaka which refers to the point we pro-
pose to discuss in this section. What is emphasised here is the
view that the Upanisads are the only valid means (pramana) by
which the Supreme Reality could be established and by no other
pramana. 1 Brahman is to be known only from the Vedanta. A
question pertinent to the topic under consideration may well arise
—
here is there no room then for reasoning and is the teaching
entirely dogmatic? No doubt it is from the discussion of the
Scriptural texts that Brahman as the Creator, etc., of the world
is established. In the Karmakanda, however, the authoritarian
character of the Veda is absolute. Obligatory and prohibitive
injunctions laid down therein demand implicit acceptance and
the visaya of the knowledge (jiiana) arising from the text That *
Thou art *
stands both these tests. The validity of such knowledge
V
All systems of Indian philosophy admit that the highest
human endeavour finds its culmination in the attainment of
immortality-moksa. But what is moksa ? It is freedom from
bondage. If ignorance— avidya (or maya) is responsible for man's
separation from God, if it veils from him his identity with the
sole reality and presents the spectacle of a universe in which he
1
The normal characteristic of jfiana as such is validity (Pramatva).
It is intrinsic to it, not extrinsic. In 'this is pot' (3W3?:)thc know-
ledge is perceptive. The elements required for its generation (Utpatti)
are, sense-contact, presence of light and so forth. These very elements
give rise to its validity also. This is svatastva of pramiinya in regard
to utpatti (^cTrfl *3cT*c«j). Now to consider the question of validity
in respect of apprehension (jnapti), say, from the Advaita point of
view: that which reveals knowledge is the witnessing self (Saksin)
and that itself also reveals the validity of the knowledge. This is
that the liberated soul does not lose its individuality even in release 1
1
Bheda or differencefundamental to Dvaita. Each thing is
is
1
In the Dualistic metaphysics liberation or mukti is of four
kinds: (i) Sayujya (union), (ii) Siirfipya (similarity in appearance),
(iii) in the same region), (iv) Samlpya (nearness of
Salokya (residence
the Lord). meant the being clothed as it were, by Tsvara,
By (i) is
so that the liberated soul moves with Tsvara's feet, gives with T«vara's
hands and so on; by (ii) the liberated soul becomes four-armed
(caturbhuja), wears the conch and disc (Samkha and Cakra); by (iii)
the liberated soul dwells with the Lord in the same region which
embraces both heaven and earth —it is said that there arc such souls,
only they are not visible; by (iv) remianing always near God, like
Brahma. LaksmI alone, besides Visnu, is ever liberated Nityamukta. —
Among human beings there are muktiyogyas those who are fit for —
liberation, nityasamsarins— those fated to dwell always in the world
of mixed joy and sorrow, tamoyogyas those fated to dwell in joyless—
regions. The world consists of all the three. The Gods are duplicate-
dwelling, here and in heaven. While those who come under the first
category have hopes of redemption, the other two have none.. Their
lot indeed is cheerless. It is difficult to understand how the all-mercifiu?
Lord could relegate a section of humanity (tamoyogyas) to eternal
perdition.
More than once has Samkara called attention to the fact that
there are different degrees of reality — the reality of Brahman
which is absolute (paramarthikasatta), of the world, which is
1
The propositional import is a judgment which is either an
affirmation or negation of relation. But the knowledge of Brahman
is supra- relational and is of the nature of intuition.
2
In commenting on Kafha Up., 11. iii. 5, Samkara points out that
at best one can get only a blurred view of Reality in worlds other
than our own and that for a clear insight one has to endeavour while
yet on earth— erffll^icT^iTW %%* 52P. W: ^
freedom takes away all and empties
stimulus to moral endeavour
ethics of its content. No
doubt compared to a dream
this life is
Reality not having arisen. It is only in this sense that the dream
analogy has to be understood. There is no thought of reducing
man's life on earth to a vacuum. 2
VI
We conclude this resume of Advaitic monism propounded
will
by Padmapada, with a brief description of Jivanmukti or freedom
in the embodied state, a doctrine which is cardinal to the Advaita.
The Sruti is knowledge of Brahman enables one
explicit that the
to attain freedom from the bonds of samsara here and now * atra —
Brahma samasnute '—(Katha Up. II. iii. 14). The Pancapadika
also is clear on the point (see IX. Varnaka) as it maintains that
the liberated person has to wait only till the fall of his physical
body to be merged in the Supreme. 3 We find a large number of
Raman uja refuse to take the word in its literal sense and regard
it as but a figurative expression. Among the modern scholars
again the conception of *
jivanmukti ' is not countenanced by
some on other grounds. In an interesting symposium (cf.
.
, — *
2
See Jivanmuktiviveka, Anandasrama Edn., pp. 30-32; according
to Vidyaranya videhamukti is the immediate result of the rise
Introduction xiii
Abbreviations xlv
First 1 Superimposition 1
SUPERIMPOSITION
1.1. [Page 1] (Samkara's) Comment —beginning with "the
notions comprised in the object (yusmat) and the ego (asmat)"
and ending with " 1 am this, this is mine such is how men behave"
:
having the very purport conveyed in the comment " with the object
of getting rid of this (erroneous idea) which is the cause of misery,
and thereby arriving knowledge of the oneness of the self
at the
with the Absolute, the study of the whole of the Vedanta is
—
begun ", explains that both the vi.aya (subject-matter) and the
prayojana (purpose), of the sastra {viz., the Vedanta sutras) are
suggested by implication in the first sutra (viz., athato Brahma-
jijiiasa).
1
And this (i.e., how the subject-matter visaya, and the fruit
resulting from its study are indicated in the first sutra), we will
state more clearly when commenting upon the bhasya "Therefore
—
is Brahman to be inquired into (vide Varnaka III, p. 66).
1
The Bhasya on the Vedanta sutras beginning with 3**T^9?^
'the notions of the object and the subject' and ending with ^gffcfiTsq
#$o^«R[T?;
— on the part of man a natural procedure', explicitly
'it is
states the objection against the view of the illusory character of the
entire world of sense and the answer thereto. There is no reference here
to the subject-matter and the purpose of Vedantic study as stated in
the first sutra. But yet as the Bhasyakara concludes this section on
illusion, with the statement that the study of the Vedanta texts is begun
with a view to getting rid of all the ills of life, and to acquiring the
knowledge of the identity of the individual self with Brahman
a?SiH4ift: *%WW ^Wsrfasnafa'Tfft *$ \$\*m anw^r, it becomes
evident that the exposition of illusion, ararrcwiwr, has its affinity with
the first aphorism and is not discordant with it. Padmapada makes
this point clear. The aphorism serving as the introduction to the
first
implied (artha't) and not explicit in the first sutra. The word $fcf in
5Wfl^<n ^jJ^TcT $fcf may be construed in two ways: (i) because the first
sutra suggests both the subject-matter and the fruit, the prefatory com-
ment being its elucidation also mentions them; (ii) the prefatory
comment itself explains that the first sutra is intended to denote both
visaya and prayojana.
2 pan(;apAdi,k,A of padmapAda [J.
3
man \ where the self is identified with the body or the senses,
*
ahamidam '—I am this (i.e., the body, etc.), mamedam ' '
a
The objection is as to the need for the commentary elucidating
illusion— adhyasa bhasya. Ft has been shown that the first sutra itself
points out, though by implication, the subject-matter of. the sastra
and the purpose of its study; and these are the identity of the individual
with the universal self and the riddance of the miseries of life. When
visaya and prayojana are indicated in the sutra and rendered explicit
in the bhasya, there is little justification for elaborating the nature of
illusion and its effects.
1. 4] SUPERIMPOSITION 3
3
When it is known that liberation is the prayojana of the vicara-
Sastra {i.e., Vedanta sutras), it is also known by implication that the
in the sutra itself and as such it must be understood that the bha§ya
merely elucidates it.
4
3Tcf: 3tSK&T§[i¥T —This is to meet the objection that the conclud-
ing comment 3T¥lI^|af: af l«rrc 3mW^%3n5rfaTfR *# ep^T arrWrf
sufficiently brings out the purpose of the Vedanta sastra and that it
does not require further elucidation. The idea of the opponent here
is that the oneness of the individual soul with Brahman might be
admitted and not the unreality of the world. Such a view was held
by many VedSntins like Bhartiprapanca, (and though later than
Samkara) Bhaskara and Yadava who were all Brahma-parinama-
vadins, but not Brahma-vivarta-vadins.
4 PAnVAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [1.5
with Brahman, comes after, and not before athato Brahmajijnasa). '
(i.e., II. iii-29) and what the first sutra suggests by implication, 7
STSIff^T, 'That thou art', and 'I am Brahman', which unmistakably point
to unity, would be as meaningless as the following nonsense ve/sc:-
1
distasteful, viz., men becoming enlightened 9 and it is common ;
and ending with " the mutual identity of their attributes also
is absolutely untenable " (amounts to mangalacarana benedic- —
tion). Its meaning is that the entity which is free from all evil
10
whence could arise accidents causing obstruction ? Hence the
revered Bhasyakara (is to be regarded as) the foremost in the
maintenance of the orthodox tradition.
III. 8. (Now follows the bhasya text) ["It is evident —
that the mutual identity of the object (visaya) and the subject
(visayl), which are as opposite in character as darkness and light,
is what is impossible to support] ". (Here these questions appear
pertinent:) Which is this opposition? Of what nature is the
mutual identity (indistinguishability) held to be? On account of the
—
untenability of which is the comparison * like darkness and light
*
10
Though is no explicit offer of prayer and the
there bha§ya
starts with the topic of superimposition, Samkara, it is clear, has in
mind the pure Consciousness, the sole Reality. As such, it cannot be
said that he has not sought divine benediction.
11
The point is that in one and the same place, contrary to the
definition given above, there is light as well as darkness. In a dimly-lit
room, unlike in a well-lit place, things are dimly seen. In so far as they
are seen, they indicate the presence of light, but in so far as they
are dimly seen, they indicate the presence of darkness.
12
The analogy of light and darkness, says the Siddhantin, is
adduced to mark mutual opposition not on the ground of residence
i n a common locus tiglTOCT, but on that of identity 3WI. There
is no tadatmya relation between light and darkness as we find, say,
in jfiti and vyakti, i.e., between the universal and the particular,
IV. 10] SUPER IMPOSITION 7
thou *
evident the notion
the sense (laksanatah) of being mani-
' in
is in
13
The question is raised why illusory identity relation should
not exist between the self and the not-self as in the case of mother-
of-pearl and silver though real identity may be barred. The p.p.
answer begins with "^RrerraflL".
14
f%%: awffasPJW^TRk For this expression cf. PdtaSijala Yoga-
sutra, IV. 22.
16 What the purvapaksin wishes to show is that there is no
transference —adhyasa, even in the notion 'I am a man'. The identity
between the T and the 'Thou' notions is only apparent due to the
fact that the latter manifests itself through the cit or consciousness,"
8 PAN^APADIKA OF PADMAPADA [V. 13
16
When a deaf man says 'I cannot hear' there is no tadatmya
between the self and the sense of hearing, but there is tadatmya
between the self and hearing which is the property of the auditory
sense.
17
Atman in its pristine state is attributeless, but in the empirical
sphere, attributes like existence, consciousness and bliss are spoken of
as belonging to atman. psychoses that atman
It is in the different
appears as endowed with different attributes; cf. Bhamaii, p. 156; also
V.P.S., p. 12.
18
Lokavyavahara is explained as superimposition in the form of
'I' and 'mine'. Superimposition is beginningless (naisargikah) judged
from its character as a continuous stream; but in its individual character
V. 14] SUPERIMPOSITION $
material cause.'
21
^^TfWT^fcflRIrttorerF? IT5 q'k^l^T^. Because it ends in
referring to one and the same act, viz., the act of superimposition.
22
What the author says is that the contextual meaning is to be
ascertained from the paragraph as a whole the thesis with which it —
starts and the conclusion arrived at (upakrama and upasamhara). Here
the conclusion makes no mention of temporal succession or of dis-
tinction of one act from another. Hence the termination 'ktva' should
be regarded as an expletive and merely in order to give it signifi- ;
knowledge (bhrantijnana).
(b) ci=r 3TfRwg% *nsn*nw3r?FR w<i\ fa»^cg% *rfarqircfa%
W<1 II V.P., 11.
The mention of mithya would mean illusory knowledge, and the
'
'
24 What the author means is that avidya in its nature as primal cause
is beginningless, but as a specific adhyasa it is a product of precedent
illusory knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction in the statements
naimittika and naisargika. Hence, says V, that positive nescience
*fWFW$W has atman as its locus. That nescience exists is proved
both by inference as indicated by the word 'avagyam' and by percep-
tion as indicated by the word 'this' esa. And this avidya is present
wherever there is caitanya.
25 But as a matter of fact 'shell-silver' and 'rope-serpent'
are
apprehended. Hence presumption, (aWN frT) also establishes nescience.
The superimposition of ego on pure consciousness or of silver on nacre
—
comprising false object arthadhyasa, and false knowledge—jnana-
dhyasa, necessitates the postulation of some material cause therefor,
which must also be erroneous mithya. —
26
Having postulated a single primary nescience which has atman
as its ground —
asraya, it is pointed out that its objects (visaya) are
not insentient objects like pot, etc. Otherwise with the knowledge
of pot, etc., the primal nescience must disappear, but it does not till the
final release —moksa. Then how is the non-cognition of pot to be
accounted for? It is because of the absence of vrtti or psychosis
(pramanavaikalyat) that there arises no perceptive knowledge of the
same.
27
What is sought to be proved is that nescience does not veil things
other than atman. In case avidya which has its ground in atman veils
non-sentient objects, then, since objects cannot manifest themselves
without the desrtuction of the obscuring veil, the primal ignorance
relating to atman would disappear with the rise of the knowledge of
objects. Even though avidya exists in atman at all times— past, present
12 PAn£APADIKA OF PADMAPADA [VI. 16
something other than its nature, like the ego notion, etc. and in ;
and '
mine *
is beginningless (because the hctu, viz., avidya is
in the '
aham — ego
and that ihere is no additional part (seen in
'
31
The aham-ego is a complex of cit and acit — sentience and
insentience. Why the author regards the ego-superimposition *flE¥Kl*3KT
as the initiative adhyasa, is because it is the starting point of all the
karyadhyasas, the effect-series (V, p. 17). Though the superimposition
of nescience on consciousness which is pure, integral, bliss entire, and
witness of ajnana (i.e., it reveals ignorance) is bcginningless, the aham-
karadhySsa is spoken of as the beginning in the effect-series —karya-
dhyasa.
32
In all cases of superimposition, two apprehensions are involved;
but in the ego-concept, the opponent says, there is only one and
hence superimposition is absent. The answer is that even in this con-
cept two notions are present, the one real, the other transferred, similar
to 'this' and the 'silver' in 'This is silver'.
14 PAN^APADIKA OF PADMAPADA [VIII. 19
33
«fi?*a.55ftfifcrw V. Omitted in A.K.S. Edition, p. 135.
34
Why the study of the Vedanta sastra should be undertaken
is stated. The knowledge one gets from such study destroys the ills of
life as a result of the intuitive perception of identity. —V, p. 18.
35 What the objector means is that when superimposition is
and *
Thou ') it (sublation) is not perceived. Hence the definition
of adhyasa (superimposition), having (first) been stated the nature
of the notions (of *
I ' and *
mine ') has to be described as falling
36
under that definition.
21. Well, even then what is pertinent to the present context
is the proof of the existence of an object illustrative of that defini-
tion and nothing more. Where the reality of a thing is not
vouched for by a valid means of knowledge, there alone can doubt
as to its existence arise. If it did, there would then be the necessity
of a distinct statement of probability for its (doubt's) removal. 37
22. True, it is even so. Though a particular object becomes
manifest to knowledge (in the origination of which knowledge) no
blemish of any kind is perceived even if attempted to be sought,
it is within one's experience that the knowledge of that object is
the opponent the adhyasa of anatman, the inert, on atman does not
exist. It is a case of bhranti. His main point is that the ingredients
necessary for adhyasa are lacking. Atman is not perceived as identical
(<Tr^Tc*T) with what is superimposed, like the shell-silver. It cannot
(viz., *
what is it that meant by adhyasa ? '). Here, when it is
is
k
said '
paratra ' ( in s.ome other object ') it becomes evident by
justified on the ground of usage, for the termination ghafi ', '
40
S^ftreT—Here the word 'smrti' is taken in the sense of what
is recollected, being its derivative meaning, 'WJcT $1% *lfcT:. Now
grammar requires that 'ktin' termination (in ^fcT:) which is included
in the 'ghan' group should be affixed to roots to form derivatives in
all cases except the nominative and only when their sense is conven-
tional—ru<Jhi, WW (ai^ft: 1 *K% tffi!^—Panini, III. 3-19). But the
word 'smrti' is construed here against common convention and yet
the termination 'ktin' is affixed. The justification is that it follows
usage, stfpprircit*.
18 PAxgAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [!X. 24
idam rajatam '). Then how do you account for its similarity
(rupa) with recollection ? Because it arises through having the
past pramana as its origin. The origination of the knowledge
which illumines an object (viz., the presented silver) with which
there is no sense-contact is impossible unless that origination
be through that (i.e., samskara) arising from the pramana which
in the past occasioned the knowledge relating to that object, viz.,
43
silver.
41
The persistence of past impressions samskaras, is essential —
both for memory-recall and for illusory perception. Hence the use
of the phrase —purvadrsta, which implies that unless past impressions
are revived, neither memory nor illusion is possible. But in the case
of illusion it is not the very object of past experience that manifests
itself but one belonging to that jati.
42
The point is that in shell-silver not only is the object silver
illusory, but also its knowledge; we have both arthSdhyasa or vi§aya-
dhyasa and jnanadhyasa. The former is defined as, 'superimposition
is that thing similar to the remembered thing which appears as the
use of the expression " (I perceive) a single tree " when two trees
which are at a distance (are seen). 46
26. How could (one may urge) it be recollection (when there
is absence of memory-reviving impressions— samskara) in the case
of a boy who has never tasted (anything) bitter, but who owing to
bilious disorder feels the bitter taste in that which is sweet ?
—
Here is the answer: because of its (i.e., of bitter) experience
in some other birth. If it were not so, the fact of not having
previously experienced being on a par (with what is experienced)
would (naturally) lead to the question why should not an abso* —
46
lutely non-existent seventh taste be felt? Hence the bile itself
the perceived and the revived is the cause of pravrtti, i.e., activity as
evidenced in one's going to take the silver. In a 'bhrama' situation,
there are four elements—jnana, iccha, krti, sabda. Prabhakara main-
tains that the first is always valid while the other three arc false.
46
Only six kinds of taste are admitted sadrasa: pungent %%, —
— —
sour—3TT*?5, saline *wr«r, bitter ft^, sweet Wgl, astringent~-Wf,
20 pan<;apAdikA of PADMAPADA [X. 26
(which is the dosa) is the cause of the inability to feel the sweet
taste,of the recollection of the bitter taste, and of the obscura-
tion of that recollection. (How is it known that the dosa has
such potency ?) The nature of the cause is ascertained from the
effect. (We must infer that a dosa causes only this and not that
on the evidence of the result— karya). Hence it must be under-
stood that, in all cases where the cognition of something differ-
ent from the one with which the sense is in contact arises, the
explanation is that there has been a revival of memory and its
obscuration. 47
47
The akhyativada or the doctrine of non-apprehension is criti-
distinct words arc uttered and the objects 'idam' and 'rajatam' appear
as distincts; and as such the cognition— 'this is silver' will not be then
cognition of things undifferentiated. Hence the definition of akhyati
fails. Again difference (H^) may mean the object itself or its quality
(wlr) ; e.g., <re^ may be either T3 itself or a quality of 15. It
cannot be the first, for then the cognition 'this is silver' will cease
to be a case of akhyati; for the 'bheda' say, of silver, is perceived along
with the object, viz., 'idam'.
Now the third alternative, viz., that akhyati means 'what is
object,
22 PANgAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XI. 27
Hence memory manifests the object pure and simple and not
60
as associated with the (past) knowledge.
In like manner, in the recall of meanings from words, the
association of (past) cognition is not perceived, for then cogni-
tion alsowould be regarded as word-meaning (i.e., a word instead
of denoting an object would also denote knowledge which on
the face of it is absurd). 51
Likewise the recollection having a desired spot as its content
4 ;
80
The akhyativadin again urges that the remembered object— ^2:
is evidently associated with the recollection-' the pot that was cognised'
(?mr *&•) and as such it could not be said that the recollected object
is devoid of association with past experience. The answer is that the
recollection taking the form ?13T *&< does arise, but that does not
' '
not in itself seen to be associated with any special form like any
other object 52 (whose existence is always to be inferred e.g., virtue,
infer
which is form *'. The word
indeed devoid anakaraof '
*8 '
?n ' *&*<*: W& ; m
T.D., vide S.B., p. 35.
24 PANgAPADlKA OF PADMAPADA [XII. 31
thing (silver) when the contact (of the eye) is with something other
(shell) is not to be classed under memory; but it is illusion.
means that the silver manifests itself as being identical with the
presented object. Then these questions have to be answered — (1) Is it
that the manifestation isof one object and the substrate (ground) is
of another? or (ii) Does one thing manifest itself as another? or
(iii) Does the cognition an object that has transformed itself
relate to
into another (the shell changing its nature to silver)? It cannot be
the first for it is opposed to experience. (Note the PP. text «*'%# flfit
on page 8.) Moreover, the silver-cognition must have only silver as its
ground (alambana) and not shell.
XII. 32] SUPERIMPOSITION 25
notion, *
this is milk '. But here both these are perceived (v/'z.,
*
this is not silver \ ' this is shell '). Again if the shell has
transformed itself into silver just as milk into curds, then even
after thedisappearance of (ocular or other) defect, it should
remain as such only {i.e., unchanged).
34. {Anyathakhyativadin): Well, is it not seen that the
lotus-bud changes into the blossom and remains as such so long
as its cause —
the light of the sun, remains and with its dis-
of the bud form), let the after-cognition arise in the form (the '
shell which hitherto was silver) has resumed its former state'
and let there be no notion of the sublation (of silver).
35. {Atmakhyativadin): It may again be thought that the
itbe from which that (the silver manifestation) arises, that cogni-
tion anyhow will not have that (silver) as its object, because of
the difference in time, owing to the cognition being prior and
in fact the cognition resulting from vitiated causes only that has
that (the silver) as its object (and not the right cognition
samlclnajnana).
Akhyativadin : Not so. Even a separate cognition, if it is
object of past experience and is free from the obscuration (of the
cognition that it was an object of past experience) \* 6
Akhyativadin-. Then what is the solution of the manifesta-
tion of silver when the sense-contact is (only) with the shell ?67
38. Anir vacant yakhy at ivadin : This is the solution — It is
unit cognition only, (arising) from the sense allied with the mental
impressions.
56
Cf. Pataftjala Yoga Sutra, I. i-ii. It cannot be said that it is
59
—
Coming under the category of memory partly. This
*3fcTT*t
phrase used to point out that mental impressions which are the
is
Hence (in the light of what has been said) since the manifested
silver is the object of cognition (illusory), there is no going counter
60
to experience. Hence the *
silver *
is the product (i.e., trans-
formation) of maya. 61 Were it real it would have been appre-
hended by all, since the real silver (relatively paramarthika) does
80
Jn3*TWr%(te:—The of illusory cognition as expounded
doctrine
here does not offend experience. According to the Akhyativadins, two
—
cognitions are posited perceptive and recollective (silver). If the
cognition of 'silver' is recollective, its experience as presented becomes
inexplicable. According to the Anyathakhyativadins, the relation
between the 'this' and the 'silver-in-thc-shop* is false, but this is
against experience since in the perception of silver on the spot the
relation is actual. « According to the atmakhyativadins of the Yogacara
school, it is not possible to account for the external manifestation of
silver when it is but a transformation of internal consciousness.
Objection: Well; how, on your (referring to the siddhantin) own
theory either, can you avoid inconsistency when it is argued that the
false silver appears as real ?
Answer: Though the 'silver' is distinct from the real silver, it is
is
the
the
silver' arises.
Objection; But then when you admit illusory reality, why do
you characterise it as anirvacaniya —
inexplicable ?
Answer: As contrasted with the pre-eminent reality of Brahman,
the reality assigned to the sensible world and illusion is inexplicable
since neither existence nor non-existence can be attributed to either.
•t ajrf; —Because of the unsatisfactory character of the explana-
tions offered by other systems. In the akhyati doctrine, we have to
premise two cognitions, memory as regards the silver-cognition and
XIII. 43] SUPERIMPOS1TION 31
the object perceived, and the experience of past births in special cases.
In the anyathakhyati doctrine, wc have to presume the existence
elsewhere of an object apprehended on the spot, the competency of
the senses to grasp things existing elsewhere beyond their ken, extra-
ordinary potency to aberrations, and perceptibility of a relation that
is false, viz., that between the 'this' and the 'silver'.
63
itself was false only \ And such cognition would be inappro-
priate if (the shell-silver) is admitted to exist in its real nature in
some form (as would be (inappro-
the mart-silver) such as it
priate) to negate the shell with which the sense is in contact and
(as it would be inappropriate to negate) cognition where its
object is regarded as a nullity, (the Buddhist idealists admit jnana
alone as real, but regard its content as non est).
M
•2
In addition to the evidence of arthapatti pramana by which
it was shown that the illusoriness of the 'shell-silver' could be
accounted for in no other way than by ascribing the maya-origin to
it, perceptive evidence is here adduced in its support. In the negative
cognition 'this is not silver', maya-mayatva is perceptive for the silver
manifests itself in the substratum (the 'this') as the counter-correlate
of abhava (negation). Where the silver manifests itself but docs not
actually exist must be the off-spring of maya.
it
The sublation is expressed in the words *%5 WP3(\ The use of the
word fcpafa immediately following is to emphasise that erroneousness.
•* After sublation, the awakened consciousness takes the form
'what I saw was not silver, but was only a product of maya'; but it
should not be so to the NaiySyika who, maintaining anyathakhyati, has
%
to say 'this is not silver', but, it is that silver' referring to what exists
in the shop; who has to say
as also to the Buddhist Vijnanavadin
"the external which the silver appears is a false substratum;
'this' in
the silver is only a form of internal consciousness"; and so on. But
common experience is otherwise and expresses itself thus—" this is
not silver, it is magic, it is neither here, nor there". The sublation
XIV. 44] SUPER1MPOSITION 33
when in reality one is seeking another (say, silver) or (ii) the destruc-
tion of its (false object) capacity to provoke action; or (iii) the
discrimination of what was not previously discriminated; or (iv) cogni-
tion of mutual negation, i.e., cognition that this is not the 'silver'
and vice or (v) the cognition in the known-substratum (say
versa;
the shell) that the silver is the counter-correlate of the negation; or
(vi) eradication of ignorance (ajnana). The first five are objections;
the sixth is the siddhanta. (i) is untenable; in the case of an ascetic
there no action and hence no dissuation from it though he too
is
and samskara, whose offspring the dream is. Here the adhi$thana
is the caitanya (consciousness) delimited by egoity (ahamkara) or the
internal is indefensible.
•8 etc.— If the intimate relation with the pure unconditioned
3j;q%n,
consciousness is not admitted, the world would remain a blank.
Consciousness delimited by the ego is internal and so cannot discover
the outside world, nor the object-limited consciousness, for if it were
36 PAnQAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XV. 49
darkness does not become visible except in contact with the light
of a lamp so here. —
As
for the appearance of objectivity (of objects in
48.
dreams) as distinct (from the ego) even in the waking state, it
must be (regarded as but) the display of maya. 69 Because the
whole of the universe stands on the single basis of consciousness
and because that consciousness is void of parts and as such there
could be no distinction of space (as internal and external loci),
distinct from the internal consciousness, the experience 'that the pot
is perceived by me' would be untenable. All knowledge is for the
self: the cognition arises as 'the pot is seen by me'. Hence both in
dream and waking it is the saksicaitanya the inner witness, that is —
the substratum of all cognitions.
69 nwfojftffi:—How, it may be asked, if all objects have the
same consciousness —substratum, could the dream cognitions which
take both the forms as 'I am king' and 'this is a mansion' be explained.
The explanation is to be sought in the manner in which the dormant
mental impressions are revived. That we should have the experience
3?t *T«FJ: as also 3T9" ^l^: is to be attributed to the samskaras which
repeat themselves so that when once the form of a cognition is
senses grasp either of these in the external world so that these cannot
serve as the substratum of superimposition. Hence this alternative
suggested in the text is only by way of concession 3ftWtfT^:. V, p.35. —
All space is internally perceived, for mind cannot comprehend any-
thing outside without the aid of the external senses— T^^^fa:.
71
JfWwIjc^T^cr— Meditate on names as Brahman— cf. ChQnd. Up.,
VII. i. 5. So far the objection that the definition of superimposition
is non-pervasive 3T 5 *nfo —
has been met. Now the opponent urges
XV. 50] SUPERIMPOSITION 37
admits that the lak§ya, viz., superimposition is absent and not that
the superimposition of Brahman on names conforms to the definition.
38 PAnCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVI. 5
73
XVI. 52. By the phrase — [*
tam ke cit '], "some (define it),"
etc., he (the Bhasyakara) discusses the doctrines of other schools
with a view to clarifying his own doctrine. How? Thsy main-
tain that superimposition means the ascription to nacre, etc., of
the qualities of something which is quite distinct from it, v/z.,
75
W? 5. 3TR«ffci. Here mtfaw means 8T*tt3*f<?*t$. That the
negation of nacre is admitted by the upholder of the
'the silver' is
'
the silver ' in knowledge manifest themselves each serving as
the locus of the other.
This isjejune. There (in the seed-sprout series) the sprout
is produced from a particular seed, but that seed is not produced
from that very sprout; (on the contrary) from a different sprout.
Here, however, we have a particular knowledge in which a particular
'
silver manifests itself; between these two only, there is mutual
'
because the seed and sprout form an infinite series, for neither on
grounds of apprehension nor of reason will the akanksa (the longing
to find what the material cause is) be dispelled. On this again, if
it be questioned how (it could be proved that of the two seed and —
—
sprout the one is instrumental in producing the other), the
answer is that it is proved by actual experience (i.e., by perception)
and there enquiry should stop however far it may have gone.
Otherwise, (i.e., if he does not accept empirical truth) the enquiry,
relying on the infinite cause-series, will find no resting-place (ana-
vastha) and cannot extricate itself from the fallacy of infinite
regress (i.e., regress of the unverified type
— 'andhaparampara').
58. Again, nowhere does the knowledge of negation arise
in the form of mere
4
No ' without reference to some terminus. 77
77
arfa xf • . • • Another reason that illusion cannot be void of a
locus. No negative statement can be made without reference to a locus.
XVII. 59] SUPERIMPOSITION 41
Where the knowledge of the mere absence of the serpent (in the
form not serpent ') arises either from inference or from the word
*
and because it is so, only the object that is before one's eye re-
mains as (i.e., to be regarded as) the terminus. Even in the case
of pradhana (which is regarded by the Samkhyas as the cause
*
'
of the Universe), etc., the negation of (the existence of) the triad
of the gunas, etc., in the cause of the universe has indeed a known
terminus. 78
59. Or (it may be stated that) this (illusory knowledge)
has as its locus the universal witness (i.e., the Eternal Seer). And
in the case of the illusory knowledge of the dark hairy mass, when
that (hairy mass) is negated it is only the (intimate) relation that
it has with knowledge (bodha) that is negated and not knowledge
(as such). Hence the negation of all things has that (the Witness)
as its terminus. Therefore since negation so far as it (the Witness)
is concerned is non est, and since in itself no attributes are per-
ceived (the Saksin in its nature, is pure, but it is the upadhis or
limiting adjuncts that confer qualities on it), all negation must
the ultimate reality to the Vedantin and when these are negated it
does not mean that no substratum is left behind. The substratum,
viz., the cause of the universe is there, but only its determinations are
negated. VPS., p. 42 remarks thus: ^ifa *TRTI%ftfita£*3l3re*TT3r 3T^
arfaBrc^fasj ^n^ — What
sought to be established is that in no case,
is
79 meant
Here by SHrTtfTfl is sfCRf^rafasUtf, immediate perception.
What is absolutely non-existent does not manifest itself. *A non-
80
The world of appearance is not a mere blank sunya; but is —
an inexplicable entity capable of being postulated neither as existent
nor as non-existent.
81 The question is irrelevant since all schools of thought have
to adm't that things cease to exist af'er they are destroyed. There is
83
The objection may be raised on the ground that the negation
of an apprehensible object, in a particular spot, becomes cogent only
when its existence elsewhere is postulated. But as a matter of fact
when a pot is destroyed in anyplace, there arises no need to presume
its existence in some other place. The Vivarana (page 39) points out
that the Naiyayikas also do not admit the existence elsewhere of the
negated false relation which false relation according to them produces
the illusory knowledge. The negative knowledge causes the total
extinction of the relation. Similarly with the other schools.
81
rTTC'JTr^T
fli?fl5 : —
This should be taken as a separate state-
ment and answer to the objection that the negation of silver in
in
—
the nacre the 'this', as also elsewhere, say, the shop, etc., must result
in the total negation of silver and that its apprehension is impossible
in the 'nacre —
silver' context. The answer is that the apprehension
is intelligible on the ground that the silver even as a false object
88
It is to exclude cases of genuine recollection that \smrtirupa'
is in-
appropriate.
—
This is our answer The use of the word suktika is justified * '
4
the use of (the termination) vat (in rajatavat) is justified on '
the ground that the non-silver (viz., shell or mother of pearl) with
which there is sense-contact, manifests itself as if inseparably related
We speak of even the illusoriness of the
to the illusory silver. 89
silver, becauseproduced by adventitious defects and because
it is
89
After the negative knowledge arises, there is no other way of
explaining the object of this knowledge (viz., the silver) except by
regarding it as illusory. It is in illustration of this that Samkara
gives these two examples
— 'it is the shell only that manifests itself
as silver', 'it is the single moon that appears as if having a second'.
The shell-silver points to the definition
— 'paratra paravabhasah', and
'vati' termination points to what is defined — the superim- false
position
90
arFFjppftq— Accidental defect as distinguished from «WTf^«fnr
—beginningless defect, which produces the anvrw^RT — the silver found
in the mart; but this is due to occasional sensory and other defects.
In other words, this is not regarded as illusory, because it is different
from the silver that is absolutely real, for there is none such.
91 If the silver is illusory, its property, viz., the 'thisness' —WTT
will also be illusory so that illusion would have no real substratum.
To this objection PP. answers <T*f arsfagTRc^ , etc.
46 PANgAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXI. 67
*
I-notion ' (asmadartha). By adducing
instance of the the
double-moon, what is pointed out is that the manifestation of
difference between jiva (individual soul) and Is vara and between
soul and soul is not of the nature (of cit). 93 (Like the single moon,
there is only one caitanya and yet ignorance creates difference
;
92
The ego-notion (ahampratyaya) contains two elements the —
sentient —
and the insentient a complex of the self and the not-self
citacidgranthi. The illustration of the shell-silver is to bring home
the superimposition of acit on the cit. On the shell is superimposed
what is not-shell; so also what is not-atman is superimposed on
atman. The term 'yu§matpratyaya' has as its object what is not
'asmatpratyayavisaya'. The egoity comes under the category of the
'thou-notion* since, for its manifestation, it is dependent on cit
intelligence, and as such it is not identical with cit which is the 'not-
this' entity in the ego-notion. Hence it (egoity) is to be regarded
as superimposed on the cit.
98
The shell-silver illusion is known as 'nirupadhikadhyasa' and
the double-moon illusion as 'sopSdhikadhyasa'. The first disappears
the moment the right knowledge comes; but the second, in spite of
knowledge to the contrary persists as long as the adventitious cause
(upadhi) lasts. The superimposition of
the ego on cit is an instance
of nirupadhikadhyasa and the superimposition of duality on cit is
sopadhikadhyasa.
XXL 68] SUPERIMPOSITION 47
this (the world) stands revealed' (Mund. Up., II. ii-2; Katha Up.,
II. ii-15), and since it is from the pure sentience itself that the
revelation of all this is made possible.
69. Siddhdntin : This is to be said (in reply) that even here
(i.e., in Brahman) there dosa (perversion) constituted by
exists the
avidya (beginningless ignorance), which is hostile to knowledge,
and which veils the luminosity (of Brahman). 96
Purvapaksin How is this known? (i.e., from which pramana ?)
:
94
The saksin is self-proven
—
'svatahsiddha* and its knowledge
is therefore dependent upon no external cause; but in the case of the
shell its 'thisness'is vouched for by the sense of sight.
95
There is no point, says the opponent, in asserting that Brahman
remains unknown. Adhyasa is on the Jlva which is the substratum
and not on Brahman; and jlva is ever manifest.
99
The epithet 'agrahana' means 'grahanavirodhi.' Avidya, though
obscuring the Absolute is dissolvable by the non-discursive cognition
ST^o^HjrctlT^R. That avidya exists has been established on the
evidence of perception, inference and perceptive-presumption
dr§tSrthapatti. Now the evidence of Sruti and of Srutarthapatti is
adduced in support.
48 PAnQAPADLKA OF PADMAPADA [XXI. 70
'*
Wholly immersed in ignorance (anrta) (Chand. Up., VIII. iii-2);
"
without cognising his identity with Isvara he sorrows, lost in
delusion ' (Mund. Up., III. i-2), and the rest. Likewise Srutartha-
patti also exists (as evidence of avidya). In all the Srutis it is the
vidya (knowledge) of Brahman that is set forth as the means of
release.Hence by presumptive evidence this becomes clear
that thebondage of ignorance, which is of the nature of non-
comprehension of the individual's identity with Brahman, exists
congenitally. 97
70. Well, was it not said that Jlva is non-distinct from
Brahman ?
97
The 'bandha' or bondage, if it should be removed by knowledge
avidya and not for the elucidation of the nature of Brahman which
is self-luminous. Now ajiiana is vouched for by the inner witness
saksin, and not either by the sruti or arthapatti. The function of the
latter is to show that avidya which is manifested by the Saksin is an
entity distinct from non-existence— 3Wreta«3<HH5U cf. sufasjT *!* spifo-
as in *
I am man V 01
Purvapaksin: This is only a metaphorical usage and not
102
illusory.
Siddhantin : How this is not a case of metaphor the Bhasya-
kara (Samkara) himself will explain (in the sequel).
74. Piirvapaksin: If the ego-cognition (ahampratyaya) has
the same substrate as the body, then the existence of atman as
independent of the body becomes untenable, since there is no
other notion having as its objet (atman as apart from the body)
and since even Scriptures and inference if opposed to it (i.e., the
and inference will be valid. Hence the fact that the ego-cognition
(ahampratyaya) denotes atman as its content, as distinct from the
body, etc., has to be admitted by those who uphold the doctrine
of atman (viz., that it is a distinct entity). 105 Otherwise there
would be no valid means to prove the existence of atman. There-
fore the ascription of manusyatva *
(i.e., identifying ego with
' ' '
'man*, etc., as in *
I am man') is to be understood in a figurative
sense.
103
The opponent view that agama and inference might
rejects the
establish an independent atman even though perceptive evidence is
absent, since perception is the fundamental prarrtana and any other
pramana going counter to it is valueless.
104
Atman is pure consciousness as denoted by 3T£, and *?«J^<3
is an erroneous ascription. Hence the cognition 'I am man'. is not
prama, but bhrama. And the illusory perception is not hostile to
inference and Scriptures which enjoin distinction between the body and
the soul. Where perception is non-illusory, there alone neither inference
nor Scripture can brush it aside. Now inference to the effect that
atman an entity distinct from the body is based on the invariable
is
106
According to the Mimamsakas, the varna s ararofa are constant,
unique and .all-pervading— ftg. They have no real association with
—
vowel-lengths short or long, but appear in intimate relation (cT^lcRW?)
with them through adhySsa. Even so is the view of the SiddhSntins.
XXII. 79] SUPERIMPOSITION 53
to its object (viz., atman distinct from the body) is also observed
only as its object. Hence, that the ego-notion has its own object,
(viz., atman) is non-hostile to the object constituted by the body,
109
etc. Hence by reasoning though the distinction of the objects
(viz., and body) is clarified, it only shows its object (i.e., atman
soul
undifferentiated from the body) and as such, reason has merely ;
107
The opponent concedes illusion in the case of short and long
sounds of 'a' since in his view, perceptive cognition anubhava (i.e., —
what is directly apprehended by the inner Witness saksin), when —
assisted by reasoning, brings home merely that akara is distinct from
'hrasva' and not that 'hrasva* is distinct from 'akara'. But in the
ego-notion both elements (body and atman) are distinctly perceived.
Hence there is no room for superimposition.
108
The apparent non-difference between things which are actually
known to be different must be taken only in a figurat ve sense, and to
say that it is to be understood otherwise is nothing but sophistry, says
the antagonist.
109 The ego not only embraces the soul, but owing to the begin-
ningless nescience takes the body also within its compass. When it is
perceived that the ego-notion has corporeality as its object through
4
of '
I ' and Mine '
to the body, etc. Hence even after the differ-
entiation of objects is effected by reasoning, the ego-notion does
not in any way differ from its previous state. Therefore the
*
notion '
I am man ' is at no time to be regarded as gauna *
110
(figurative) but is illusion only).
81. Such being the case, the individual soul (Jlva) which is
110
If the ego-notion is scrutinised, the distinction between atman
and the bodily aggregate which together constitute its content vi§aya, —
becomes clear. The piirvapaks/in therefore urges that the knowledge
of their identity must be regarded as figurative. But the Siddhantin
points out that illusion is immediate to perceptive cognition and it
cannot be sublated by the mediate cognition (parok§a) which alone is
given in inference (yukti).
111
This presupposes an objection. In
cases of superimposition all
the substrate —3nwJT superimposed forms the
as well as -the thing
content—f%W1 of the illusory cognition. There should be three causes
to produce the cognition of the superimposed and the substrate
TQWtifaftq, and the cognition in such a situation should be single. But
these conditions do not obtain in the ego-superimposition 3?ff KU —
**rrer. Atman is by
(substrate) nature non-objective— arf^T and
XXIII. 82] SUPERIMPOSITION 55
tive cognition, say of pot, the cognition of the ego is of the nature
of the Witness itself. The Witness is eternal and not a product
therefore of the triad of causes. Hence the objector avers that the
*I* notion — STipcTT is not a case of superimposition.
It is answered thus —what the unit-cognition embracing two
contents means is that the substrate should not be the content of
a cognition distinct from that which has the superimposed as its
content. Here in the ahamkaradhyasa the cognition of the super-
imposed is the content of the witnessing consciousness. Superimposi-
tion having been established we must see how far the definition of
superimposition is satisfied. Of atman we know the general feature
flRF^rer, viz., Q<{ and f%^ but the specific feature— I%W?T remains
unknown, i.e., its —
supreme bliss *jpnsR{. Hence atman serves as the
substrate —arfawr. As such the svarupalaksana, the essential nature,
viz., "U5T <KI**TWI is established. Even as regards cJ2^a$nJT —qualifi-
cation per accident, of the three necessary —
elements dosa and adhi-
$thanajnana have been disposed of. Now by the phrase, «HTl^c3lf^
it will be shown that samskara, the residual impression, is the third
cause of the ego-superimposition— ^fHT^RT *jsfe....<|^^hr3|wr-
fl^RSF^^ ?q^r^??^....^Rra?W?# ^ both these are established since
;
*
subject which constitutes the inner-self, which is not the this *
sense
4
(antahkarana). And that (ahamitipratyaya —th? notion,
viz., embraces both the this and the * not this elements
1 *) * ' '
112
A new topic begins from here. So far the definition of
superimposition has been discussed and its cogency pointed out.
Now is taken up the Bhasya dealing with the probability of super-
imposition — fl*TF«RT*TT«r.
113
Atman though not the object in a primary sense is so in
a secondary sense—4iT There must be two requisites
or sSra^lffa.
in a thing that is an object fan?, viz., its being something other
than luminosity and the dispelling of doubt regarding its existence
brought about by luminosity. Now atman possesses the second, for
no one doubts his own self, and not the first, for atman is self-
luminous. Hence it is visaya in a secondary sense. It may therefore
become the substrate for superimposition.
XXIV. 85] SUPERIMPOSITION 57
*
How ? The knower (pramata), the known (prameya object),
'
—
and knowing (pramiti-jnana) are all immediately perceptive (i.e.,
of direct experience). The prameya is perceptive (in its nature)
as objectivity. As for pramatr and pramiti, they are altogether
perceptive only (i.e., directly experienced) but not as object.
Pramiti is experience (anubhava), self-luminous and is the result
of pramana (valid means of knowledge). Through its (pramiti)
instrumentality the other (pramatr as well as prameya) manifests
itself. Pramana however represents the function (or activity) of
the pramata and always something inferred on the basis of the
is
result (i.e., with the phala serving as the middle term). Hence
in the statement
— * I know this (ahamidam janami)', the cognitive
function of the pramata relates to the object and not to atman.
Atman however reveals itself as *
aham *
(ego) both in the phala
(jnana) and vi§aya (pot, cot, etc.), by the sole reason of the cog-
nition of the object (vi§aya).
86. Bhatta : It should not be supposed that the ego-notion
arises because of the object perceived, on the other hand the ego-
notion is indeed different, having atman only as its visaya. And
in that (ego-notion), objectivity (prameyatva) of atman is secured
in its and subjectivity (pramatrtva)
feature as substance (dravya)
in its feature asknower (jnarttva). Thus, because the ego-notion
reveals the subject and the object, atman is both the cogniser and
the cognised. Hence it (atman) combines both the features
*
the this and the not this
* * '
—
the object-part since it comes under
114 word
The Bha?yakara uses the '
asmatpratyaya ' in the sense
of antahkarana. Atman becomes vyavaharayogya, i.e.,
mirroring in it
116
If atman as grahaka —
knower, is regarded as prameya object, —
then falling under the category of the 'this notion' it becomes non-
atman but if it is not regarded as prameya it loses its self-revelatory
character and it cannot be proved to be the substratum asraya of —
jfiana.
Ui The factors involved in any empirical cognitive situation are
the cogniser —
pramata or atman, the cognised prameya, the cognition —
— pramiti, and the valid means of cognition pramana: Now the —
Prabhakaras maintain that the first three are always perceptively
cognised (ftsn<RWl:). The Samkhyas, Naiyayikas and Vai£e$ikas
maintain that the cogniser is always inferred (V., p. 49). The Sautran-
tika Buddhists on the other hand hold the cognised to be always
inferred. The subjectivist Buddhists, viz., Vijfianavadins deny the
externality of objects so that for them objects are perceptively cognised
not as objects as such, but as being indistinguishable from cognitions
(ffaRrfiwRWT). The Bhafta Mlmamsakas have their own theory.
They agree with the Nyaya-VaiSesikas that atman (pramata)Js inferred
but the process is different. They say that when an object is cognised
there arises in that object what is styled 'prakatya* or knownness,
from which serving as the hetu, atman is inferred, whereas for the
Naiyayikas the cognition (vyavasaya) leads to after cognition (anuvya-
vasaya) in which atman is presented. It must also be noted that atman
of the Bhajfas is part-sentient and part-insentient,
XXV. 89] SUPERIMPOSITION 59
that also (i.e., anubhava together with atman) manifests itself being
of the nature of consciousness, or (Hi) whether that only {i.e.,
anubhava) manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness
while atman is of the nature of insentience. The first alternative
is untenable for it (experience, i.e., jfiana) resulting from pramana
were insentient it would result in the world remaining totally
un revealed.
Purvapaksin: It is not so. The pramata (the cogniser,
atman) being of the nature of consciousness manifests, with its
aid (i.e., of anubhava), the object as the 'this' and itself (atmanam)
as the '
not-this ' like light (which illumines objects as well
as its own self) so that there occurs no non-revelation of the
world.
Siddhantin: That cannot be. It does not appear to be
reasonable to hold that (atman) being itself of the nature of
consciousness illumines (others and its own self) through the
benevolent instrumentality of anubhava (visayanubhava —the
experience of the object) which is inert (jada). Moreover, if atman
is said to manifest like light, both the object and its own self with
the help of pramanaphala (i.e., anubhava) then the act of mani-
festation (cetanakriya) will be interminable. 117
89. As regards the second alternative atman also (like anu-
bhava) would of its own accord manifest itself ; and why should
itneed the aid of the object-experience ? If it be urged that in
spite of its partaking of the nature of consciousness atman is not
self-revealing, a reason must be adduced for this discrimination
(i.e., for conceding the right of self-revelation to anubhava only.
The implication is, there is no hetu). It is not intelligible that
117
The point is that if anubhava through whose co-operation
the manifestation takes place should produce the prakasanakriya (i.e.,
anubhava before manifesting), this also being the inert product of the
inert anubhava would produce another prakasanakriya as the first one
did, and so on without end, leading to infinite regress.
60 PAffCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXV. 90
118
The third view, viz., that atman is jacla and anubhava is
pointed out, will force one to take refuge in the Vedantic doctrine that
atman is consciousness and self-luminous. Anubhava (jnana) must
be eihter dravya —substance (Samkhya)
or karma (Bhafta) or guna
quality (Prabhakara and Nyayavaisesika). If it is substance its dimen-
sion must be either minute==anu or middling madhyama or infinite=
ananta. If jiiana is minute it can like a glow-worm light up just
a spot on an object, say, a pot. But in 'ghatajnana* the whole pot is
revealed. If middling, jnana composed of parts would have to depend
on the parts for its generation as a pot depends upon the kapalas.
But jiiana is partless. —
If infinite mahatparimana, then it would
reveal everywhere its substratum, viz., the Stman but it does not.
Jnana cannot be karma since it ill-assorts with what is of the nature
of luminosity (viz., apprehension). Jnana then must be admitted to
be guna=quality. Since it is self-luminous its asraya or substratum,
viz., atman must also be self-luminous like light, i.e., not depending
on any extraneous aid for its luminosity. Being its very quality jnana
cannot be said to originate in its substratum. Hence if atman
possesses the property of luminosity, it amounts to Stman itself being
self-luminous.
"• In the cognitions — this is blue, this is yellow, the distinctions
(atman) would reveal itself as ' aham even in sleep because of '
the fact that it is not different from the intelligence principle (i.e.,
the luminous caitanya or inner witness). If you should concede
that it is so (i.e., that aham is manifest in sleep) we say it cannot
be. For then one would remember (on waking, his consciousness
of the ego) just as one remembers to-day one's yesterday's ego-
consciousness. If it be argued that it is not remembered because
*
of the absence of mental impressions (samskara) due to the 'aham
being indestructible, then yesterday's ego-consciousness also
would not be remembered. 125
124
Prabhakara's contention is that in deep sleep there does exist
the 'ahamkara' which the bhokta, but
its non-manifestation as ego
is
isowing to the lack of external objects. The latter part of the sentence
— tadabhava, etc., is in answer to the query that if the existence
of 'aham' in sleep is conceded why it does not appear as such.
128
3T^«fT%«f *fa»H7PT 3T*T!*l^—-Remembrance (smrti) is dependent
:
128
sleep) no experience other than that of atman occurs.
Siddhantin: True, it does exist (viz., the recollection in the
form I slept happily ')
*
but that recollection is not produced
;
wise heaviness. 128 Hence in the light of the above, this ego-
,2S
It is to be noted here that Padmapada in refuting the doctrine
of Prabhakara, viz., that ahamkara itself is atman, has advanced the
view that in sleep there is neither sukhanubhava experience of —
—
pleasure, nor ajfiananubhava experience of nescience, but that one
—
has only the experience of duhkhabhava absence of pain and of
—
jnanabhava absence of knowledge; this, however, should not be
mistaken for the siddhanta-view. Padmapada's object is merely to
point out that this conclusion is inevitable from the opponent's view-
point, for Prabhakara in reality is wholly opposed to the view that
in sleep happiness exists; but here he posits a view which is directly
hostile to his doctrine (VPS., p. 59). In su§upti there cannot be the
experience of the absence of pain or of knowledge, for every negation
— abhava presupposes the knowledge of a counter-correlate prati- —
yogin, but what one really experiences is the happiness of one's
—
nature svarupasukha and the positive nescience. The unshrouded
witnessing consciousness itself constitutes that experience, i.e., imme-
diate perception. Even in the waking state such experience (of pleasure)
does exist but like a light exposed to wind it is neither steady nor
constant owing to illusory distractions. No
doubt on waking one may
—
say 'without pain I slept, nothing was cognised by me'. But then
it is not from memory that absence of pain and absence of knowledge
—
are recalled; it is only by presumptive reasoning arthapatti, because
we cannot account for the recollection of the sleep-experience of
happiness and ajnana, except by presuming the absence of pain and to
jiiana in sleep.
The recollection of ajnana, happiness, and witnessing-conscious-
ness, the three elements rendered explicit when one says
—'sukhamaham
—
asvapsam nakincidavedisam I slept happily, I knew nothing', is
rendered possible by the fact that in sleep the experience of nescience,
etc., is not through pure consciousness but through the saksin delimited
188
ffWWl—Names and both forms; are anirvacanlya —indefin-
hence avidya
able, is so designated.
—
3^5?rr?cf — remains
Undifferentiated avidya in pralaya but not
name and form which are its differentiations.
—Removable by vidya—knowledge;
grfa^n not found in
mukti.
mq\ — Because magician
it causes like a the manifestations of
names and forms in that which is sccondless —the Abso-
lute.
5jp%— ward
This is atomic
to off the theory of creation held
by the Naiyayikas.
— Because
aro^ur supreme it veils the Bliss.
— Because not
ajoq^R by it is perceived the senses.
—
<T??: It hides Brahman.
its substratum, viz.,
dissolution in it.
—
srfai It might and
is ISvara's so controlled by him, unlike
the Pradhana of the Samkhyas which is independent of
Purusa.
*?i[l?l!fr —Because like sleep it is the cause of the emergence of
the world even after the world-dissolution.
ft?r —Dream; because it is the cause of plurality as in dream.
W$l — Indestructible, because it cannot be effaced except by
jnana.
9TT«l>rer— Because it is the cause of akasa. From this the
non-eternality of the elemental ether —bhutakasa is indi-
cated.
68 PANCAPADIJtA OF PADMAPADA [XXVI. 97
i.e., since it is only one of the evolutes of its ground (viz., Pradhana)
131
The Samkhyas take exception to the Siddhanta-view that
ahamkara is a transformation of avidya which has consciousness as
its substratum. In the Samkhya-system the prakrti or pradhana
independently of purusa, the conscious subject, evolves itself into mahat
or buddhi which in turn posits ahamkara as its evolute.
136 3T7l$?T!ClfrTSRPT'. —
Here 'ahamkrti' is used in the sense of
saksin; arfftfa ff fa: vw ^farT s mtf 3?ff fa; —
it is in relation to the
inner witness that the word 'aham* is use'd. Hence the phrase means,
divested of all association with the inner witness. Avidya may be
regarded either as the §akti (prowess) of the saksin, i.e., its property
or as that which is superimposed on it (=$f^RT). The Samkhya counte-
nances neither of these views.
%i <T*kra*Trcr<T —
If the inert pradhana independently of caitanya is
admitted as evolving ahamkara then the appropriate expression would
be 'this is bhokta-— snjoyer* and not 'I ambhokta*. The latter is
possible only on the basis of the relatedness of ahamkara with the
witness.
XXVII. 98] SUP.ERIMPOSITION 69
of the *
and consciousness, is termed by the Vedanta-
not-this *
illusory ?
Thisis the explanation If the ocular rays impinging on the
:
that shines red and not that the crystal (appears red).
Siddhantin: Then whiteness also would shine in the crystal
(because the crystal is not seen as red). But if it be said that it is
—
obstructed (apasaritam lit. driven out) by the lustre then how
could it being colourless, become an object of sight? And the
ocular perception of the crystal (as red) cannot be attributed to
its relation with a coloured substance (viz., prabha): For then
the same thing would have to be said of air (when it is in conjunc-
tion with a coloured substance); nor again could it be averred
that due to the lustre, redness is produced in it (crystal)
(actually)
for then the crystalwould continue to shine red even subsequent
(to the removal of japakusuma).
100. It has been argued so far assuming the lustre (of
japakusuma). The lustre of the ruby, etc., shines before us even
—
without its substratum (i.e., the lustre is perceived though the
ruby is not within sight); the same is not the case with the
japakusuma. This being so, just as in the crystal there exists the
illusory relation of the upadhi (viz., japakusuma), in atman there
exists the illusory relation of ahamkara; hence on account of the
(erroneous) relation of these dual forms (cit and acit —
the intelli-
gence and the inert) it becomes as it were a knot (granthi) so that
ahamkara is spoken of as granthi (i.e., a tangle of the conscious
and unconscious elements).
XXVIII. 101. There (i.e., in the crystal-red cognition) because
the crystal (which is covered by upadhi) an inert substance the
is
140
activity, (i.e., of the psychosis of the internal organ) relating to
it, manifests by its potency. Hence (because its manifestation
itself
has its experience through the vrtti of that (viz., of the external
world such as the body, senses, etc.), and that alone (viz., the
ahamkara) is the object of the nature of the this'. '
140
The Naiyayikas regard atman
as unconscious and maintain
that consciousness by the action of the external
is induced in it
—
world on it this is jnanavyapara constituted by the objects coming
into contact with the senses, the latter with the mind and the mind
in turn with atman. Then only does atman reveal the objects. The
Siddhanta-view is atman being self-luminous does not always
that
require cognitive activity for revealing objects; where there is imme-
diate relation between the luminous self and the object there the object
is revealed at once as in the case of ahamkara. In the perception of
external objects like pot, however, there is a gap and to bridge it the
vrtti rupavyapara is required.
141
In ordinary usage (vyavaharatah) no doubt (e.g., in aham
bhokta) the ahamkara points to the 'not-this' but in its essential feature
(laksanatah) it points to the 'this*. Because ahamkara is the visaya
of cit, it is jatfa — inert.
wa 3^ Trsr-3Tfn ;W3rs^s?l ;n^f ; frqrf^fTOHWi'arft*. The contrast
between the cognition of ahamkara and of the objective world is
this that while ajnana intervenes as regards the former the vrtti
intervenes as regards the latter. Because the mediacy of the vritti is
absent and only ajnana intervenes some people conclude that ahamkara
denotes atman and as such is not to be characterised as the 'this',
72 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXIX. 104
ance as distincts (the one as different from the other), and appear-
ance as contrawise (i.e., the object and the reflection appearing
opposite to each other). 143
XXIX. 104. How is (one to know) that it is the same as
that ? Because of the cognition of the essentially identical object.
For instance, with whatsoever individual trait Devadatta is found
when he is outside (the house) with the same trait he will be found
even when he has entered the house in the same manner (Deva- ;
datta) even when (reflected) in the mirror (is identical with Deva-
datta that is outside). And that (cognition of identity, i.e.,
and the mirrpr its material cause. What the Siddhantin wants to show
is that if identity is not admitted would amount
it to regarding the
image as a transformation — parinama of the mirror.
XXIX. 105] SUPERIMPOSITION 73
105-6. And
ought not to be thought that the analogy of
it
mirror which has changed into the shape of the object owing
to the fact that the object has been in its neighbourhood for long,
would remain till one's life-time in the same state even when that
(object) has disappeared; but it is not perceived as such. If,
another analogy may be brought to the fore —however it is pointed
out that the lotus bud whose transformation into a blossom is
effected by the sun's light, closes again into the form of the bud
at the same time as the light vanishes even though that light has
remained with should be borne in mind) that what
it long, (it
constituted the cause of the earliest bud (i.e., the very first bud
as it shoots forth), v/z., the activity (active process) of the earth-
and-water-components of the lotus operates also when again
reverting to the bud-state. When that ceases, the faded-flower
is not seen to again close into the bud. In the case of the mirror
on the other hand there exists no such cause as brought about
its former state (purvarupa). 148
148
The seal-analogy is inappropriate because the size of the seal
and that of impress are the same, but the sizes of the object and the
image may vary. Again there is no contact here as in the case of
the seal and the material on which it is imprinted.
146
As it existed before changing into the reflected image; there
is not present the activity of the mechanic who made the mirror
for it to assume its former even state as in the case of the
lotus-bud.
74 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA PCXIX. 107
107. Here (the opponent of the doctrine that the object and
the image are identical) says —
let it be conceded that there is
147
What means is that though the image may
the purvapaksin
not be a separate object an erroneous cognition like that of the
it is
silver in the shell. The Pancapadika on the contrary maintains that the
image is real since it does not differ in essence from its proto-type.
148
The contention is that the shell-silver analogy does not hold
good in the case of the object-reflection-cognition. In the case of shell-
silver, silver as such is negated and 'this is not silver' is the form
mahavakya —'That thou art*. Unless the 'thou', viz., the individual
soul is sublated there no liberation. Hence, he maintains that the
is
parts being in one place and certain others elsewhere, but the face
though not such supposed to occupy a double loci.
is
153 The objection
may be stated thus: Just as in our experience
the reflection of Devadatta's face in water cannot cognise its identity
with the proto-type, even so the jlva cannot cognise its identity with
Brahman. The answer is that the analogy does not hold good, for
Devadatta's face is inert while jlva is not. Even supposing that
—
Devadatta's reflection is sentient the view held by the Carvakas, the
reflection, it must be pointed out, is sullied by the inertness of the
mirror and as such it cannot cognise its identity, with the face. But
as a matter of fact Devadatta's body that is reflected is inert only.
XXX. 113] SUPERIMPOSITION 77
164
the right knowledge appertaining only to him. Devadatta
who understands his identity (lit. non-separateness) with the
reflection untouched by the defects belonging to it. 155 And
is
neither is the reflection sublated merely by the right knowledge,
because the cause of reflection, viz., mirror is real (i.e., in a relative
sense —laukikaparamarthika). 156
im ^ —This
answer to the objection that the know-
f^ sfifoj: is in
ledge dispelling ignorance has to arise in Brahman as it does in the
case of, say, Devadatta, since both stand in the position of bimba. The
illusion, the Siddhantin urges, belongs to jiva and not to Brahman.
Error pertains to jiva and as such it can be eradicated only by the
right knowledge of jiva. But Brahman is free from ignorance.
165
^f sn^ft, etc. —The question is raised whether Brahman
cognises its identity with the reflection, viz., jiva or not. In the
former alternative Brahman would be subject to transmigration like
jiva, in the latter it ceases to be omniscient. The reply is that though
Devadatta is convinced of his identity with the reflection he knows
that the characteristics of the reflection do not belong to him, even so
Brahman though aware of its identity with jiva is untouched by its
transmigratory character; for Brahman is eternally free and being
omniscient knows that samsara is illusory.
166
As regards the reflection in the mirror though the knowledge
of its identity with the original arises the reflection is not sublated;
hence doubt arises whether illusion will be destroyed even after the
rise of the knowledge of unity. But there is a fundamental difference
between the ordinary relational knowledge which has no power to
—
destroy the upadhi the mirror; and the knowledge of the oneness
of Brahman with atman, which when it destroys the mist covering
Brahman destroys all upadhis, internal sense included, root and branch.
This is in answer to the objection raised to start with vide ^3 %$W,
etc., above.
157 If
of the essence of consciousness f^«^Hc%, where is
jiva is —
the need, it may
be asked, for study and reflection. But though
jiva is in reality consciousness itself like Brahman, since it is under
the blinding darkness of ignorance, study and contemplation are
78 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXI. 115
(crystal). In the rope on the other hand there arises only the
serpent-notion and neither the idea of relation nor of non-rela-
tion. 160 From (examples such as) these, the non-relational
character of atman as vouched for in the Scriptural tests, viz.,
" Atman is unattached, for it does not attach itself ", Brh. Up.,
4-4, 22 ;
" This person is unattached ", etc., is not clearly brought
out. With this in view the example of ether-in-the-pot (is
160
no question of either relation or non-relation
In the rope-serpent
arises for the object of cognition is single, whereas in the case of
crystal-red, etc., there are two cognitions and yet through nescience
their non-identity is not perceived. None of the three examples
given above brings out indubitably the non-relatedness (asangata) of
atman. Hence the jar-space (ghafakasa) illustration, where it is obvious
that the akasa confined within the jar has no connection with the
jar. Only the non-relatedness of the individual soul is exemplified
and not its nature.
161
The space in the jar can acquire none of the following
properties when disassociated from the limiting condition, viz., the
—bheda—distinction between jar-ether and cauldron-ether, say;
jar:
rQpa —as of small contour; karya — serving as a receptacle; samakhya
—having a name as jar-ether.
162
One may well doubt the need for Scriptural evidence when the
illustrations adduced here are adequate to bring home the real nature
of atman. The mirror-reflection illustration points to the singleness
ekatva; the crystal-red and the rope-serpent illustrations point to the
unchangeability —avikaritva; and the jar-ether illustration to show is
4
not this ' ; but still when (associated) with the ego-notion
( asmatpratyaya) becomes fit for vyavahara, so that in a
it
say, reaching the village) produced in the karta (i.e., the man
who is proceeding to it) by the action (of going). 164 The inner
165
The caitanya being everywhere shrouded by avidya is incapable
of revealing objects but whatever form the internal organ assumes by
its contact with objects that very form the caitanya also takes. In
other words the caitanya particularised by the internal organ which is
in contact with an object, manifests that object— *fagr*cT:wn- W?
It is like theassuming the form of a square when a four-
fire
which means that the vrtti has reached the object, viz., pot
^MrrawEteH — 3TJTT:**<JTffTT5*rT7Kor flf|aq[; 5T*RI%3TlScT etc., srwrfer-
specific aspect.
167
When the same consciousness is conditioned by the internal
organ as well as by the object, how is it, it may be asked, that the
—
term pramata cogniser, is restricted to the consciousness conditioned
by the internal organ? The answei is that in the absence of vrtti
psychosis, cognisability cannot be ascribed to atman and vrtti is the
modal change of the internal organ. Hence the consciousness condi-
tioned by the internal organ and functioning as vrtti alone can
become the pramata, and not consciousness particularised by 'pot'
for the latter is void of vrtti.
168
The objection may be raised that since the consciousness
conditioned by the object and the consciousness conditioned by the
internal organ are identical, the cognition of the object visayanubhava —
need not be the phala. The answer is that there is no room for
confusion since the upadhis are distinct. The phalatva results when
the consciousness is conditioned by the object and pramatrtva when the
consciousness is conditioned by the internal organ.
169
sfcr-^Sl fawfiTW^lflFT?!*. —
The phala is the cit as
reflected in the jar through the agency of the vrtti or kSrya. The
point is that in the cognition of an object the cit of the vrtti and the
cit of the jar become identical and hence both the vrtti and anubhava
affirms, that it must be informed by the cit before any such appre-
hension is possible —
K, p 71.
171
The awareness of the object is restricted to the person whose
mental modification in the form of vrtti has impinged upon that very
object. The sphere of experience therefore is limited to the particular
self. This is 'purusaniyama'. The sphere of objectivity visayaniyama —
is likewise limited. In neither case can the charge of overpervasiveness
be maintained.
172
It has been maintained that the identity of the cit as reflected
in the internal organ and the cit as circumscribed by the object, say
pot, brought about by the vrtti is the cause of the object-cognition.
If so, urges the critic, it is not different from the Buddhist doctrine,
viz., that the internal vijiiana externalises itself in the so-called object-
cognition and that the object as such has no independent status. The
idealist vijnanavadin and the nihilist madhyamika are both comprised
in the term 'mahayanist'. But here the vijfianav5din is meant as he
alone holds the view that objects are but thought-forms (jfianakara).
84 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXIII. 123
the external object) one excluding the other. But it does not so
(reveal itself).
Moreover, even by them (the Vijnanavadins) is it admitted
that as distinct from the consciousness of the blue there is a sepa-
rate cognitive entity (vikalpa) of the nature of internal conscious-
ness (lit. that which is internally manifest as aham ') which is '
turned away from (i.e., unrelated to) the external (like pot, etc.),
which is characterised by immediacy and which ends in its own
173
self. And the blue (object) it is evident is experienced as dis-
tinctfrom that which is pratyak (i.e., the ego-consciousness), and
as the this ', which is of the nature of an object of cognition.
'
Hence it is obvious that there are two entities which are of the
nature of the apprehender and the apprehended and which are
mutually exclusive.
123. VijMnavadin. —No, it is not so; since both (i.e., the
ego-consciousness and the blue) are self-cognising how could
there arise the distinction between the object and the subject
(i.e., and the cognised) ?
the cogniser
Siddliantin: How then (do you account for) the distinct
manifestation of the cogniser and cognised as evidenced in (the
statement) I know this
*
—
ahamidam janami ?
'
' '
173
cttfa, etc. —The Yogacara also admits determinate knowledge;
in the proposition 'I perceive blue' &i •»"«* q«3H%, — the blue manifests
itself as object and the 'I-consciousness' (alayavijnana) manifests itself
(the ego-consciousness), *
idam ' (* this ' consciousness), and
—
*janami' (cognition of cognition, jnanavisayaka-jnana) they
are mutually exclusive determinate cognitions.
Siddhdntin: How then (do you account for) this know-
ledge of the (prior-posterior) relation between them when there
is not even so much as a mutual exchange of glances {i.e., when
ing nature, there would arise the relation with the blue which '
'
is also enduring, as the result of the activity (of vijnana), and then
there would be the immediate cognition also of ' blue *, etc.,
dependent upon that activity; but they are not enduring. 175
174
The twopast cognitions
— 'aham' and 'idam' are there as
impressions —vasanas and the cognition —'janami' conjunction with in
the vasanas produces a distinct unit-cognition which assumes the form
*I know —ahamidam janami'. Hence without the necessity of any
this
relation a single cognition does This the yogacara-answer to
arise. is
—
the abjection that in the obsence of relation the cognition 'ahamidam
janami', is inexplicable. The yogacara 'does not admit any relation
outside the terms'.
175
The identity of vijnana and object is not, says the Yogacara,
attempted to be proved on the testimony of experience but on the fact
that cognisability (grahyatva) itself is dependent on the identity. No
relation could be brought about between entities which last no more
than a moment. Vijnana and blue are both momentary and unless
they endure for a time, the activity of vijnana and of object essential
for subject-object contact is impossible and as such grahyatva would
be impossible too. Hence objects must be regarded as but thought-
forms. The relation between thought and object is adventitious and
this cannot arise between entities which are momentary. Hence the
relation between vijnana and the external object can only be one of
non-difference.
86 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXIII. 124
a fact or not.
Vijnanavadin : There is distinctness, but it is not perceived
owing to extreme similarity (between momentary cognitions which
are in reality distincts).
Siddhantin : If the distinctness (bheda) is regarded as of the
very nature of jnana (samvit) and if there is not its manifestation
then the whole universe would be an absolute blank. 176
Again the postulation of similarity to account for the mani-
festationof unit-cognition (tadrupa=aikyarupa) is opposed to
pramana and is unsupported by any pramana.
Purvapaksin: Since the unit-cognition is illusory, it is not
opposed to pramana; nor is it unsupported by pramana for
illusion is impossible without a cause. 177
176
qinr-ar^fafct, etc. —Now begins the discussion regarding the
continuous existence of atman which the Vedantin establishes on the
—
strength of recognition pratyabhijna, while the Buddhist avers it is
momentary. between one cognition and another is
If distinctness
admitted we must know whetherit is revealed by another jnana or
pramS, for identity and similarity are inconsistent. On the other hand
the notion of identity in what are really distincts cannot be explained
except on the basis of similarity.
XXXIII. 125] SUPERIMPOSITION 87
178
Only when recognition is invalid and is bhrama could we
postulate similarity by arthapatti-pramana to account for the unit-
cognition but in the case of recognition it is self-established as all jiiana
is. It is only invalidity that is to be established ab extra, ^ntffan
cognition is self-certifying. The Buddhistic view is just the opposite
validity is established ab extra while invalidity is self-proven —svatah
siddha.
179
It is the illusoriness of the unit-cognition of what are distinct
momentary cognitions that necessitates the presumption of similarity
and as such, similarity cannot be said to be self-established. What
is insisted on by the Bauddha is that the ever-recurring vijnanas
themselves constitute atman and the identity-notion we have of them
as given in pratyabhijna or recognition is illusory and explicable on
the assumption of intimate resemblance between one vijnana and
another. The Vedfintin on the contrary maintains that pratyabhijfia
88 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXIII. 126
the very object (that was seen before). And certainly there is
nency is the mark of an object, say a pot, why it should not bring
about to-day what it is going to bring about to-morrow since it retains
its identity; for example it must all at once exhaust its capacity to
184
The Buddhist explains causal efficiency as the giving rise by
one cognition, i.e., moment, to another moment. In this view the
Siddhantin says the definition fails; for in a cognition-series one
cognition does not reveal another since cognitions in their very nature
are self-luminous. In other words there is no subject-object or cogniser-
cognition relation faroraraftw*: or JWl^sfrwi*:. The Buddhist
rejoins that though in the same series such revelation is not possible
it is possible in a different series so that the validity of the definition
is not vitiated; e.g., when Maitra cognises Caitra's cognition by some
indicative marks, it is evident that Caitra's cognition is the visaya
(sreir^) of Maitra's cognition which is the cogniser (5HB1TO). Hence
^ifispifriiaii^ of Caitra's cognition. The Siddhantin points out that
this is a case of inference and not of perception where alone the entity,
say pot, is the cause of pot-cognition for the pot is an object of
perception, whereas in inference (3T3W) say of fire, it is not percep-
—
the jlva individual soul) produces IsVara's own knowledge
directly (i.e., as non-different from it with all its affections). For
then it (the knowledge of the All-knowing) would become identical
188
in nature with that of the jivas (struggling) in the world. In case
its nature is not that, it ceases to be its object (i.e., if the cognition
the cognition of the existence (of the cause it does not make it ;
next momentary existent. But this definition breaks down in the case
of the last moment —^WT, for this consciousness moment is succeed-
ed by moksa or annihilation of the series.
188
g^sTMSWiprT:— In the doctrine of the B^uddhas the moments
are similar and as cause and effect they belong to the same series
fl^cTH since both the last moment and Isvara's cognition arc pure,
;
being of the same nature, and in the relation of cause and effect,
Isvara's cognition also must belong to the same series. Hence the
so-called final moment will not be the liberation moment. Mukti in
the Buddhistic doctrine is the diremption of the moment-series.
189
* =3"
sIM^nfe—It was
hitherto assumed that the Buddhist
meant by mukti the termination of the ego-series in question, but that
is not the only view of 'mukti' in Buddhism. There was another
conception of it according to which 'mukti' is merging in cosmic
vijnana or sarvajnajnana as the PP. puts it. It is to point out that
even on this view of 'mukti' the Buddhistic position is not tenable
that the text adds * ^ «ifrft3nf5 '—see V., and TD. also 01 P., p. 219,
'
ciency of the nature of jnana resulting from itself (i.e., the first
1,8
The Bauddha throws the Siddhantin on the horns of a dilemma;
the Siddhiintin seeks refuge in experience.The Bauddha urges that
reason is of superior cognitive value and points out a case where
experience is palpably in the wrong. In 3?t **3 MJ experience vouches
:
for the bodily identity of 5tman, reasoning negates it. The Siddhantin
however argues that we cannot ignore the truth as ascertained from
—
repeated facts of experience the highest tribunal in one's search after
truth. When the effect is patent we must admit that the hetutva, the
potency of being the cause, resides in the cause.
In the satkhySti doctrine the pot exists in clay and is rendered
manifest later. But why, it may be asked, is it subsequent in its
appearance ? The answer is that such is our experience and no logic
can explain it. It is unexplainable. Hence the generalisation that the
cause-effeQt is something that cannot be accounted for; it is anirva-
canlya.
XXXIII. 131] SUPERIMPOSITION 95
194
1*3 1*13 —The Purvapaksin is here supposed to be a follower
of the Vaisesika-school (vide TD.). doubtful if the Vaisesika
It is
regress.
i»5 an^?«Blft —
In the case of sensory cognition what is required
is merely the vicinity of the auxiliaries such as, say, in regard to
visual perception, light, object, etc. No change is effected in the eye,
the organ of sight. There is no interval of time between the opening
of the eye and the perception of the object. On this analogy it is argued
that the viSesa which produces the sprout requires only the vicinity of
the auxiliaries; it does not need the seed-cum-visesa. There is thus,
observes the purvapaksin, no infinite regress.
96 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXIII. 132
196 ^t fej^ntenin —
The Siddhantin's argument runs as follows:
though the seed is permanent it needs the subsidiaries for the origination
of the karya and as they come to exist in succession and are not
always there, it is not permanently that the karya is produced but
only casually (^Ti^p). The query then would be, what is it that has
occasioned the coming together of the karana, viz., the seed and the
subsidiaries —#
S$|*'*n^T3T: \ If you posit a karana for sannihitatva
(coming together) this karana cannot be either the basal cause, viz.,
the seed or the subsidiaries, for if so being both permanent, karya
would always be effectuated. It must therefore be adventitious
(agantuka) but then the question will be how was this agantuka caused
and so on indefinitely.
XXX11I. 132] SUPERIMPOSITION 97
(We admit, say the Bauddhas, that karya requires the proximity
of the auxiliary, but not their cause-effect relation).
Siddhantin: The fault lies in this that while admitting the
relation of positive and negative concomitance . (niyama) you
reject the cause-effect relation (nirapeksatvam). To explain
if the relation of something with something else is one of positive-
negative concomitance, that relation (it is evident) has arisen
because of the cause-effect relation. If it were not so the niyama
(viz., the positive-negative, anvaya-vyatireka-sambandha) would
197
$n%U*f , etc.—The Siddhantin tries to hoist him with his own
petard. The seed cannot produce, say the sprout-instant at the very
moment of its own admitted that the cause, has its
existence for it is
Nor again could it be said that the effect is produced in the second
instant for then it would mean that even in the absence of the cause
the preceding moment has disappeared the effect is produced. If—
the effect could come into existence in the second moment without
the cause, it may do so in perpetuity.
This objection met by the Bauddha in the following words:
is
Srf&R^J 3? 3j^T mm: *? «f g^ra ^KT.. The cause, says he, must imme-
diately precede the origination of the effect and not exist anywhere
and at any time. Hence the effect cannot come into being at any
time except at the instant immediately preceded by the cause-instant.
Hence is obviated the occurrence of the effect at all times,
98 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXIII. 133
198
Even if permanency of objects is admitted it makes no differ-
ence. The objection that the seed in the barn also may produce the
sprout does not hold good since the aid of subsidiaries is required
whether the seed be permanent or momentary.
199 ci^H—The invariable concomitance of the auxiliaries with the
the object of valid cognition (in general) is the hetu in the origi-
nation of its cognition is unsupported by any pram an a.
Let there be no further elaboration of this incidental topic;
in its proper context when examining the Buddhistic doctrine,
203
we shall enlarge it with greater precision.
since like a mirror which reflecting the image becomes the cause
(hetu) of the cognition of the image, the 'ahamkara \ because it
contains the consciousness element, manifests (i.e., becomes the
hetu of the cognition of) the cit (consciousness). Hence, because
it assumes as it were the nature of object (visayatvat), the entity
4
which is not the this \ which is consciousness, and which is
(no other than) * atman-entity * is by courtesy described as the
object of asmatpratyaya * (ahamkaragranthi). 205 And that (atman)
'
203
s«rff!<t, etc. —What is pertinent to the present context is the
—
examination of the nature of the ego affTfR^F'TI'T^W, but incidentally
the Buddhistic doctrine of flux came in for review. The Prabhakara,
Naiyayika, and Vaisesika regard the ego itself as atman, while the
Vedantin holds that it is distinct from atman pure consciousness. —
201 —
3?ffK3F*n The ego-complex indistinguishable from conscious-
ness, srerc:, H#R%-3TW593^rsi%l%fcr sr^R:—The ego-complex is known
313J1RHT —The pure atman —SJ5, but when conditioned, the same
atman engaged the manifoldin all —mental and activities
bodily,
qsft, *fhRF— Atman becomes agent when identifying itself with
the conative aspect of the mind and is the enjoyer when
identifying itself with the pleasure-modality of the mind,
102 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XXXV. 136
210
«C ^ ^HRfal— It
argued that atman's existence may be
is
appear different from what they are) as adhyasa, since that aspect
of it viz., viksepa is pertinent to the context. Again by terming
it avidya, its fitness for sublation by vidya alone, has to be rendered
error men carry on their empirical activities from eternity has '
who deep slumber since in that state one is free from the
is in
4
erroneous notions of 1 ' and mine in the body and the senses,
*
'
such as the arm, etc., have to be taken. The term body (deha) ' '
etc., and not merely to the physical body; for it is evident that
I am the body
4
the usage does not take the form (but rather '
*
I am man '). Activity of every kind presumes that the conscious
principle (caitanya) has a locus (identical with that of) a parti-
cular genus, as exemplified in the usage, " 1 who am a man,
know ", " I, who am a deity, know ", and that this is a matter
of immediate, intuitive experience is self-evident. It cannot be
(maintained) that any empirical activity (as evidenced by the
employment of expressions) like the knower, (knowing and what
is known), is possible on the basis of the relation of overlordship
either by the bodily configuration or by the eye, etc., organically
connected therewith, based on the relation of possession; for
then such activity would be possible even through the servant,
etc., possessing a human body. 218
144. Some one else says: The — relation of the body (lit.
the aggregate of the bodily organs and the senses) with the self
is one of (subordination) being directed by one's will, and the
relation of the self again with the body is one of (controller),
directing the body at its own will. From that (takes place) every
activity of the self as the knowing subject, etc., involving action,
means of action and the result (phala). For example, with the
desire to stand one stands up; and also with the desire to sit one
sits down. But there is no such thing (i.e., this kind of relation
that of controller and controlled) in the case of servants, etc.
Hence the absence of vyavahara there involving the knowing —
218 If the relation between the self and the body be not one of
(false) identitybut only one of master and servant we might as well
admit that the empirical activities of the self of the master are
dependent upon the body of the servant. There is relation of owner-
—
ship in either case an unwelcome contingency.
XXXVIJI.I45] SUPERIMPOSJTION 109
subject, etc., —
is not wrong, because there is no direct dependence
of action upon the will. 219
145. Siddhdntin: What you say is not convincing to one
who sets any value by experience; to explain it is self-evident —
that our experience takes the form I am man and not my
' ' *
man \ 220 If you argue that this is only a figurative use, all that
can be said is your honour alone (i.e., your bare assertion only)
is the pramana here. Moreover even desire is a specific modal
change (of the inner sense) and how can that (desire) be of atman
which is changeless (lit. not subject to any transformation) unless
it be through the ego which is atman as (erroneously) related to
218 4
If the master-servant relation does not fit in' says the purva-
paksin, 'let the relation be one of controller and controlled,
duality. In the case of visual sense, etc., it isonly when they are
afflicted by some disease that what they reveal invalid but when
is
derived from the sastras that the self is not the body, should be
spoken of as no better than animals in their cognitional activities. It
is to be noted that sastraik knowledge is indirect paroksa, and as —
—
such it cannot negate superimposition adhyasa, which is mediate
aparoksa. What is immediately cognised can be annulled only by
another cognition which is also immediate. What is intended to be
impressed is that activity in general, be it of animals or even of the
educated men, presupposes superimposition.
ii2 pancapAdikA of padmapAda [xxxtx. 149
228
The materialist CarvSka questions the Bhasyakara's statement
that when one pursues an action for the sake of an unseen phala
one must have a knowledge of atman apart from the body, for the
Scriptural injunctions (he says)may acquire the status of pramana
even in the absence of heaven and a dweller therein.
(i) ^^TI^II —
Injunction relating to interested action— kamya-
karma, performed for a reward phala. —
(ii) sfafo^r^'Tl — Injunction relating to obligatory duties — nitya-
karma, as sun-rise and sun-set prayers, sacrifices on new and full-moon
days, autumnal rites, etc.
8
114 PANCAPAD1KA OF PADMAPADA [XL. 153
means a state of supreme happiness and joy and that also may
eventuate in one's life-time as a reward for the performance of
Jyotisjoma, e tc. As for (ii) and (iii) the Mlmamsakas hold the view
that Nitya and Naimittika duties yield no reward, but that one will
be committing sin if one neglects them. As for (iv) evil deeds may be
expiated in this only since the affliction they bring also relates to
life
228 —
33&3II, etc. This is partial agreement. Though sastraic
duties can be undertaken without reference to the other world,
Samkara bearing in mind the true doctrine as expourded in the
Devatadhikarana (V. S., I. iii. 26-33) where the validity of mantra
and arthavada is admitted, has made the statement that an entity
distinct from the body and related to the other world exists. What
is however pertinent to the context is the adduction of proof for the
existence of illusion.
229 —
^5?RW, etc. If the postulation of atman as distinct from the
body was necessary for the carrying out of the Vedic mandates Jaimini
would have framed a sutra for that purpose but such postulation is
unnecessary to enforce the fulfilment of a mandate. Hence Jaimini's
omission. But Sahara has expounded the nature of atman when
commenting on the Vtn sutra known as the 'autpattika sutra' on the
—
strength of the 'anapeksatva hetu' that the Veda as a whole requires
no other pramana for its validity. The Upanisads forming part of the
Veda must necessarily be valid and they reveal the nature of atman
—
an existent entity ^sim 9?qg[ beyond the sutra, apart from the
;
sutra.
116 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XL. 154
vayadhikarana —
V.S., I. 1-4.
'
And there svarga the bliss of
which is to be enjoyed in a world other than ours is (as good as)
proved to exist. And all that is pertinent to svarga can never
become significant without different from the aggre-
an enjoyer
gate of the body and the senses (being premised). And its proof
{i.e., atmasiddhi) does not depend solely on the Scriptures. [Page
34] A statement relating to a thing which when fit for cognition
by a different pramana is unsupported by such pramana or is
contradicted by it would become as invalid as the statement that
stones float. Hence (Badarayana) has devoted his sole attention
to the demonstrability of that (i.e., atman as described in the
Upanisad.
155. It is true that validity would belong (to the injunctions
relating to the performance of ritualistic duties)
even without
that (i.e., without the necessity of atman as distinguished from
the body being established). But that (validity) does exist (in
regard to existent objects like svarga). And when Vedic passages
relating to existent objects are valid, the Vedic utterances relating
to phala (i.e., the reward accruing from the performance of sacri-
fices) will have no validity without it (i.e., unless the self as dis-
tinct from the body is substantiated). Knowing this the Bhasya-
kara (6amkara) says, [" as regards the duties enjoined by the
Scriptures on the person qualified, it is true no doubt that an
intelligent man who undertakes them does so not without knowing
beforehand that atman is distinct from the body and is related
to the other world "].
who under the spell of avidya ".] (This means) that prior to the
is
231
(a) zmzm*rf\w-m* *m*3%3fafa gfeft uifcqw.
When one is no longer subject to hunger and thirst the idea
that one is under the obligation to do any specific duty ceases.
232
*r 5 ^ Wif^r wsRfc— Having
finished studies under a ^preceptor,
in the celebate state —
one should perform the ceremony known
srfl^ra,
of the notion of what is denoted by the thou (i.e., the this ') in * ' *
'
not-this ', (i.e., in what is denoted by the not-thou '). Hence *
which is the object (visaya and not visayl); but it is not pure
consciousness only, as in the case of the superimposition of the
inner sense (on atman) where there is no interposition of an addi-
tional superimposition (except ajnana); even so *
the attributes
of the body such as leanness, etc.,' (are superimposed on the
self) ; alike the superimposition of the thing possessing attributes
(dharminopi, v/z., the body, etc., which are the locus of leanness,
etc.). The use of the word *
dharma '
is to indicate that the super-
imposition of the body, only as associated with attributes like
is
*
manhood ' (being a man), etc., and not to denote (association
with others as illustrated in) * I am body \ And based on that
{viz., the superimposition of attributes —dharmadhyasa) distinct
(lit. such and such) rules relating to distinct actions are enjoined
by the Scripture. Even so, the attributes of the senses such as
*
—
and non-intelligence tangle cidacidgranthi) which is (as it were)
the main pillar of the dancing-hall of the life-cycle (samsara). Its
(antahkarana) operations are the innumerable modal changes
r
(psychoses) in the shape o desire, resolve, agency, etc., on account
of which (transformations) the creature from Brahman down to
an immobile object (like plants) wander again and again, for-
lorn, as if with a blazing head. And the whole of that (modal
change of the inner sense, as desire, aversion, etc.) the conscious-
ness entity (cidvastu) manifests directly, without the intervention
(of another vrtti), itself remaining unattached, undergoing no
change, and (therefore) being void of (the desire) to own or disown
(anything). And that (i.e., the consciousness entity) only, is spoken
of as the inner self (pratyak) since it appears as if shining inwards
in the direction, opposite to that of the body, etc., which have
acquired the character of externality being designated by the
*
this \ 238 The term '
atman ' itself (is justified on the ground
that it is so) in its own nature (i.e., not in a figurative sense).
163. Having superimposed (the nonsentient) on that (the
self), again, the superimposition of that, viz., the inner self on
the nonsentient is effected. If the superimposition were only
237
ft ^ 9$JTR*rR^, etc. — Since
maintained that the self and
it is
238 \y
c a( j m it that atman as conditioned by the internal organ only
is superimposed on the senses, etc.; but then in the bhasya text
3?'cT:<RTifeg, the mention of the word 3?rfc beginning with (the internal
sense), would imply that the pure atman alone is superimposed on the
senses, etc. Hence there is contradiction. As a matter of fact there
is no contradiction, for in such a situation it is only the senses that
prompt the self to action and not the internal sense. Hence though
the internal sense remains as the conditioning agent g^ifa the —
bhasya states that the pure self is superimposed on the senses, etc.,
because the internal sense is ineffective in producing action in atman.
vide VPS., p. 65.
239 ^rT: 1l$\ 31 ^ faf^T^ —
In whatever manner atman is super-
imposed on the internal sense, in the same manner it is superimposed
on the senses, etc. It means that the nature of atman in both is
unaltered. Nor is there any change even when the superimposition of
the conditioned atman is effected. No doubt atman in its pure state,
i.e., conditioned only by nescience, is superimposed in the internal
the cause that there results the total destruction of that which is
the effect of that cause (viz., the karya in the shape of agency,
enjoyment, etc.).
Brahma '
anando Brahma ') and that the means of attaining
;
'
itmust be stated that (the study of the Vedanta) is fo; the attain-
ment of the highest happiness; how then is this said that it is
for the eradication of the cause that brings on the evil (of metem-
psychosis) ? It may however be urged that the Scriptures also
declare that the eradication of the evil together with its cause is
k
the end (phala) of Brahmavidya, as witness, the knower of atman
steps across sorrow (which is evil) when he sees the other,
' ;
'
the adored, the Lord and His greatness, he becomes freed from
sorrow' (Mund. Up., III. i-2; Svet. Up., IV. 7 respectively). If
so both should be mentioned (as phala), because of the declaration
of the Scriptures and of their serving as the highest human end.
172. Siddhantin: It is needless to state (both). How?
From the Bhasya *
for the attainment of the knowledge of the
unity of the self (we gather) that the subject-matter of the
Vedanta sastra is atman's, i.e., jiva's identity with Brahman.
From this (i.e. t because this unity is the visaya of the sastra) the
jiva's attainment of the nature of Brahman which is identical with
Bliss, itself becomes the visaya (for whatever is the subject-matter
must be the subject of investigation). [Page 38] And it (the
—
cated separately (the end prayojanatva of anandavapti) in case
(it had not partaken of the nature of the visaya). On the other
hand, the eradication of evil with its root-cause falls outside the
content of the sastra which is (no other than) the unity of the
self with Brahman. 246
173. Purvapaksin: If so, even the eradication of the cause
of evil need find no separate mention, the reason being that in
all the Vedantic texts the identity of the individual soul (jlva)
with Brahman is enunciated only after expounding the nature of
Brahman since the (latter) is beyond the range of the empirical
means of knowledge. To explain —
All the texts beginning with
:
'
my dear, this (world) was verily being " (sat i.e., the object of
—
sadbuddhi mere existence) in the beginning (i.e., before the
—
world came into existence Chund. Up., VI. 2-1) and ending with
*
All this (the entire universe) is of the essence of that (viz., the
Being, sat) that being) is Reality, that is atman "
; { (Chand. —
Up., VI. 16-3), should be construed as a single sentence intended
4
to show that what is denoted by the word that ( tat in *
' '
4
tatvamasi ') points to an entity which is of the nature of the
sublation of the entire universe. Because of this (viz., that all
these sentences cohere and point to the world-sublated Brahman),
4
the import of the thou (in tatvamasi ') coalescing with the import
'
246
It is true that both the eradication of the cause of world-
misery and the attainment of bliss constitute the phala. Still, because
it is necessary that the identity should be stated as the visaya and
because that itself is of the essence of bliss, the phala, viz., the attain-
ment of bliss is secured by arthapatti, by the mention of visaya; the
Bhasyakara, to avoid prolixity, has refrained from stating it. The
other* phala, viz., the eradication of the cause of evil is not of the
nature of visaya and therefore finds a separate mention.
XLVI. 175] SUPERIMPOSITION 129
247
When
not prefaced by a negative how could the mahavakyas
cTff *{fa etc., negate erroneous knowledge ? Now, when
and 3T? ^prfo,
negating the illusory cognition of silver in nacre the statement takes
the negative form %^ V^i^i. Again negation means the negation of
something that is the counter-correlate and this must be mentioned.
In the Vedantic statements noted above there is no mention of the
world which is the counter-correlate of negation. On these grounds,
says the opponent, the mahavakyas cannot be said to involve the
notion of the prior negation of the world.
248
The elimination of error is effected by the cognition of the
positive entity, viz., nacre in the stock example, or by the apprehension
of the absence of the superimposed object, viz., silver. When the
illusory knowledge alone is to be got rid of and there is no idea of
getting at the knowledge of the object on which superimposition has
taken place there is the need of the negative but not when the know-
ledge of the locus is sought.
130 PAnCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XLVI. 176
by the act) with the space above without at that very time effecting
its (the other pan) contact with the space below. not And it is
(to be supposed) that the effort of the hand, etc., which serves as
the cause in the raising is also the cause of the lowering, for such
a view does not obtain currency and it is against all experience.
176. Similarly in regard to the object that is apprehended
under the spell of illusion, the cognitive activity arising from
sabda (viz., mahavakya) which illuminates the Reality underlying
that object comprehends the notions 'I am Brahman*,
4
I am
—
not agent ; it is like our having the notions * this is nacre *,
*
—
*
this is not silver \ 249 Hence '
this is nacre *
is a non-desiderative
sentence and *
this is not silver *
is an explanatory (or repetitive)
sentence. 260
177. For this reason only, when the word denoting a verbal
idea constitutes a sentence, from the mere knowledge of the
action (as indicated by the verb) the knowledge of all its acces-
sories (of necessity) results. Therefore, the exegetists (the
Mimamsakas) aver that the other words in a sentence (apart from
the verb) are meant either for exclusion or explanation.
261
And
249
The question is how could the cognition of the elimination of
evil —3?fW arise specific mention
without its in the §astra. The
answer is that when Brahma-knowledge arises the deremption of evil
is inevitable on the analogy of the scale-pan; there is no separate
effort needed for the eradication of the conflicts of life; the effort to
realise the Supreme cannot but bring about the disappearence of evil.
The notions of I am Brahman', 'I am not agent*, etc. 3?![ agar, ^If
* —
35cU rise together, just as when the presented object is perceived to be
nacre, the falsity of silver becomes apparent.
Note that the order of ^t 3*TT and 3Sn^ should be reversed,
because the notion of *nf 3*n results only from arthapatti subsequent
to the identity-knowledge.
aw 3?f?nC!^T|f^T^ —The sentence 'this is nacre' conveys in
itself the full sense whereas 'this is not silver* is implicated in 'this is
so they
—
say "The mandate, perform the sacrifice" (instructing
action reveals the substance and deity also) because its full import
is possible only when the knowledge of the group including the
substance, the deity and action arises.
[Page 39] Others, " We expound the nature
however, say
—
of Yajna as consisting of the substance, the deity and the gift
(to the God). 282
Question: How (is it that the substance and the deity are
known by implication and not directly denoted (by the verb
yaj)?
Answer: The manifestation of the substance and of the
deity by the root * yaj which by its denotative power expresses
'
only the sacrificial act without being the cause of their cognition
is effectuated by implication. Even in the sublation of perceptive
cognition the process is the same, for the sublation cannot be the
object of sense-contact. 253
sentence is the verb and the others either indicate 'exclusion' or are
use of the dative case also is with the object of showing that the
destruction of evil results from the potency of the knowledge
(of unity) and it is not (that the study of Vedanta) is undertaken
:
254
for that purpose viz., the destruction of evil. (But it need not
be doubted that because the Brahman-knowledge and not the
eradication of evil is the phala of the Vedanta Sastra the eradica-
tion of evil is by no means the fruition of the $astra). (And the
— —
eradication of evil) the phala may be regarded as resulting
(though indirectly) from man's desire only (for everyone ardently
wishes to be free from the ills of life).
XLVII. 179. Purvapaksin It is not that vidya (the know-
:
of Brahman as in 3Tf 5Tfjiftjr the cognition, 'I am not agenf' — sfif ttJ,
arises by implication, since there is no contact between the eye and the
negation —^FW. It is for this reason that the commentator makes a
specific statement regarding the destruction of evil as it has to be
ascertained by presumption — and cannot be directly under-
3?*TT<?r%
The answer is that the study of the Vedanta Sastra is for arriving
at the indubitable knowledge of the unity of atman and thereby and
not directly, getting rid of evils of recurrent births. And this riddance
iswelcomed by all.
2M * f| fasu *ran$^, etc.— Objection is taken to the use of the
word 5ifciqi% in 3TicJNcf ftgisfcTC^ for attaining the knowledge of
XLVII. 180] SUPERIMPOSITION 133
sakti and visaya (viz., the identity of Brahman and the individual
soul) is ascertained. 256
181. Purvapaksin : Well, if so (the Vedanta) since it requires
tarka to establish the certitude of what it imports becomes invalid
having lost its character of non-dependence (on extraneous aid).
—
removal of obstacles pratibandhakanivrtti. To avoid the diver-
gence between the statement of the Paiicfipadika and its explana-
tion by himself PrakaSatman, the author of the Vivarana, under-
stands by tarka, suddhacitta. There is nothing out of the way
here because tarka has been interpreted secondarily as citta (r/.
Tatvadlpana) because citta serves virtually the seme purpose that
the purified mind does.
Let us suppose that * tatvamasi' yields only mediate knowledge,
(ii)
to the illusory ascription of the notion of man (to the pure being
as in *
I am man—manusyoham *). 2&a
known as not identical with the aggregate) let that (the persistence
of the tangle) exist, as avidya (in the shape of samsara) is not seen
to have disappeared; but here however (in the cognition of
identity with Brahman) when the Brahma-cognition has dawned
having dispelled the taint of illusion, how could it remain without
arresting the current {i.e., the continuous succession of complexes)
of the notions of enjoyer, etc., generated by nescience ? It is indeed
evident that the cognition of the Supreme by the individual cannot
come about before destroying the ignorance that shrouds it {viz.,
ego-complex (viz., the body, etc.) which has that (viz., avidya)
as its cause. 280
Siddhantin: No. Even from mental impressions there results
the continuance of avidya like the continuance of fear (after its
cause has disappeared; e.g., the fear of serpent even with the
knowledge of the rope in the rope-serpent illusion). To explain
even though removed by the knowledge of the real, fear persists
on account of the mental impression and becomes the cause of
trembling, etc. Similarly avidya (agrahana) also through its
samskara (mental traces left behind) continues and becomes the
progenitor of ahamkaragranthi or ego-complex. As such there
is nothing that offends reason.
XLIX. 185. Purvapaksin: Well, not all the Vedantic
texts proceed to expound vidya (i.e., the knowledge of Reality);
a part of the Vedanta is understood as expounding a variety of
260
*g sr^TJTr^aiNR, etc.— The contention is that when the
knowledge of unity rises the primal nescience must vanish and the
human frame too which is its product must perish. This raises the
question of the status of jlvanmukta, i.e., of the person who has
attained freedom while yet in this life, here and now. The text
explains it on the basis of residual mental impressions. The Vivarana
explains the word samskara to mean a small residue of avidya. And
of the several explanations given in this connection, the one which
appears more satisfactory than the rest is that the jlvanmukta has
overcome all karma except the prarabdha which has begun to yield
fruit in this life and to that extent he may be said to be bound from
our point of view though his mental purity is such that he lives and
moves in this world unperturbed by the joys and sorrows and all the
passing shows of life cf. Bhagavadgita, Chap. 2, where a full descrip-
tion of Sthitahprajfia or jlvanmukta is given.
261
^RJi^frsriuftq?^ ^ ^
T '^ anw%. All Vedantic texts
r
proceed with the single aim of inculcating the knowledge of the unity
of the self. This statement of the commentator is criticised on the
ground that a section of the Vedanta deals with 'meditation'. For
instance we have, wftllTOtorain, e.g., ^fw\%HW*\ ^sffUTrercr, etc.,t
composed (by Badarayana) for pointing out this fact (viz., that
266
The critic first sutra what is stated is that
points out that in the
meaning of the Vedanta has to be undertaken for
the inquiry into the
the knowledge of Brahman and that there is no mention of either the
subject of the discourse —visaya, or the benefit accruing—prayojana.
He therefore queries know how the commentator
to right in is
as such it must set forth both visaya and prayojana like all introductions.
LI. 191] SUPERIMPOSITION 141
sutra "].
191. This is what it (the above bhasya) means: Of the
Vedanta-mimamsa sastra (i.e., the Vedanta-aphorisms) this is
that this sutra is the first (in the series) and because it is an
aphorism, having stated that visaya, prayojana and bondage of
the nature of avidya, necessitated for securing those (two, viz.,
1
The starts with the assumption that Jaimini in his
criticism
aphoristic treatiseon the Karmakang'a has dealt with the whole body
of the Veda in which is comprised the Vedanta or the Upanisad section
as well, and that therefore there is no justification for a separate work
by Badarayana. The first Varnaka (section), it will be remembered,
started with the contention that the Brahman-inquiry was unnecessary
since it lacked both visaya (subject-matter) and prayojana (benefit)
and concluded by pointing out the need for such inquiry as both
visaya and prayojana did exist. The second Varnaka starts with the
purvapaksa that the previous Sastra, viz., the ritualistic treatise by
Jaimini has anticipated what Badarayana has said and that as such
there is no point in composing the Vedanta Sutras. The SiddhSntin
maintains that there has been no such anticipation and that in
consequence a fresh inquiry is justifiable.
* are "mmi —
One class of critics justify Brahma-jijnasa apart from
Dharma-jijnasa, on the ground that some of the Vedantic texts like
'Sadeva saumya idam agra asit' are not mandatory in character
though Jaimini has shown that the entire Veda enjoins action
kSryapara. And this might lead the unwary to conclude that no
further inquiry is desirable as without a Vidhi Vedanta is purposeless.
It is to obviate such a conclusion being drawn, that Brahma-jijn5sa
commence a Brahman.
separate investigation into the nature of
—
Now the question is which is here the additional aiamka ? That
Vidhi or Vedic injunction is authoritative as a valid means of
knowledge was shown (by Jaimini) when formulating (the Sutra),
*
codanalaksano artho Dharmah ' (vide Vol. LXXXIX, p. 17, :
to be inquired into
" — there, no doubt grammar (smrti) warrants
the use of the terminations *
tavya \ etc. (as in drastavyah) in the
sense of Vidhi, on the ground that there is no distinction (between
the '
tavya termination and liii when expressing a mandate).
5. Even then it is only that *
tavya ' termination which
denotes the root-meaning (as in gantavyah) that is competent to
direct the person to undertake an act since primacy (there) is in
relation to action, but if it is used with the emphasis on the object
(i.e., on that which is in the objective relation), there it cannot
enjoin the act that is adjectival (gunabhuta, i.e., subordinate) to
the object as related to some other karya (phala, viz., moksa).
And be supposed that) the injunction (as expressed in 'atma va
if (it
are drastavyah) refers to the ' atisaya produced in the object '
3
In the mandate 'athato Brahma-jijiiasa' the jnana-kriya (act of
meditation, jnana taken to mean dhyana or meditation) cannot be
enjoined either for an independent phala, say, moksa for it stops with
pointing to atman as the object of meditation, or for the purpose
of generating some new feature in atman which is in the objective
atman is incapable of any such modification.
relation to the vidhi, for
The functions of when operating on a substance dravya, it
a kriya, —
may be noted, 3*?i%—producing, (ii) 3?itk— getting, (iii)
are: (i)
suppose that the Vedanta texts carry no (direct) import with them
and that as such the study-completion-bath should follow imme-
diately after the inquiry into what constitutes Dharma. (To
point out that such a view is wrong) this, viz., '
Then therefore is
Brahman is begun (i.e., Badarayana
the inquiry into the nature of '
(na snatavyam.) 6
III. 8. No doubt the objective relation is denoted (in the
vakya) but yet from the tavya termination the vidhi (a niyoga)
' '
8
$n% 5HH. • -* WV&WJc-The ceremonial bath known as 'sama-
•
vartana karma' has to follow immediately after the pupil finishes his
study of the Veda and is about to quit his preceptor's house. The
question is whether mastery in the Purva-Mimamsa marks the close of
the study necessitating the 'bath' or whether it has to be followed by
the study of Uttara-Mimamsa and the 'bath' postponed. The
arambhavadin holds the latter view. In the Sastra Dipikd of Partha-
sarathi Misra, the discussion on the 'bath' centres round the question
whether residence in the preceptor's house has to be terminated
immediately after the pupil has acquired the ability to merely chant his
branch of the Veda or to be prolonged for inquiry into its sense
arthajnana. The Siddhanta is in favour of the latter, vide LXXX,
p. 1 ff., G.O.S.).
146 PAftCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [IV. 10
7
The anarambhavadin's contention is that as a result of the
mandate relating to mat-making something is actually produced but
no such result is possible from the mandate, say, 'atman is to be
—
seen 3TTc*?l 3it SS 52r. and as such the niyoga is purposeless.
' The
answer is that the phala here is the disappearance of the' nescience
that contaminates one's self, so that the niyoga has a supreme
purpose to serve (vide TD.).
8 —
Sankarsakantfa This consists of the last four chapters in
Jaimini's Dharma-sutras, from the 13th to the 16th. Some hold that
these are by a different author and that Jaimini's authorship is
limited to twelve chapters only. Notice that the critic here is different
from the one referred to as 'aisr^faj.' in Section II, who premising
—
that an additional doubt 3?(%^r 5Tf exists justifies Badarayana in
f
V.12. —
Anarambhavadin. Here this will be said: The
(Vedanta Sastra) need not be commenced for the subject has
already been dealt with. How? The reason first stated for
commencing (the Vedanta Sutras) was that from the tavya '
— one should study one's branch of the Veda are injunctive in '
phala. One who desires the phala should undertake the meditation,
and the anusfhana, i.e., engaging in the act of meditation must be
prompted by niyoga. Hence jnana (meditation) becomes niyoga-
visaya or the object of a mandate. It may be noticed that the
arambhavadin like his opponent admits the entire Veda including
Vedanta as enjoining karya. The justification he finds for the new
Sastra is that the karya of the nature of Brahmajnana has not received
any treatment in the Purvamlmamsa.
10
The arambhavadin's argument is that only under a particular
condition (i.e., in bhavartha or root-meaning) the 'tavya' termination
denotes niyoga and not always, but the advocate of anarambha
non-commencement, points out that the 'tavya' ending always denotes
karya and because Jaimini has intimated the adhyayana vidhi in the
first sutra he has, it should be inferred, admitted the jnanavidhi also.
an oblation —
the objective case fl^. is changed into the instrumental
tf^TT to shift the emphasis from SJ to til (^flfa) since the homa-
samskara in relation to
anarambhavadin, anWRgTltfta
^
ser ves no purpose. So also, says the
should be construed as 'arciisn
3"<?f^fVcr
*
so that the emphasis will be on Upasana and not on atman.
This mode of construing would obviate the objection that atman
cannot be the vi$aya of a vidhi, being eternal and changeless. Hence
no need for Sastrarambha as the objection that there is no mandate,
is absent.
148 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [V. 12
—
Arambhavadin. Even that is not (pertinent). We have said
that the knowledge pertaining to the self (i.e., atman-cognition)
is eternally established. 12
Andrambhavadin. —Even
of that (atmajnana) which is eter-
nally existent concentration repetition) styled upasana (medi-
(lit.
12
rT^f? ^ —The arambhavadin again argues that atman cannot
but be construed in the objective relation; otherwise the doubt
persists whether jnana which has not an object or visaya can be
enjoined. For the removal of that doubt Sastrarambha is necessary.
13
ffW<*R<T^— What the anarambhavadin means is that though
atman cannot be in the objective relation since it is impossible to
effect any change in the changeless it is by meditation as enjoined by
vidhi only that abhyudaya or salvation results. It is the restrictive
all the three states V). Hence there is no rule that meditation which
here means the stream of atman-cognitions should be secured by
niyamavidhi. There is no room for an alternative.
15
When the restrictive injunction is shown to be inapplicable the
anarambhavadin advances the parisamkhyavidhi or 'exclusive specifi-
cation' as being appropriate in the present context. Where more than
one alternative has simulatneous scope the mandate restricts the choice
to one of them by excluding the rest; e.g., we have trie injunction
'q^ q^HsTf *r^?r'
— 'five five-nailed animals may be eaten', excluding the
eating of five-nailed animals other than the specified ones. Similarly
when one not engaged in his usual avocations one has leisure which
is
"Tr4^I%%: —
The operation of parisamkhya is at those times which are
different from the ones in which a man is occupied in the struggle for
existence. TD.
18
If one had some general conception of the transcendental
Brahman injunction to acquire the knowledge of such Brahman would
be feasible as in the case of actually experienced cognitive entities.
But no such injunction of knowledge would be appropriate in regard
to Brahman of which there is not even a vague notion.
17
f% fafaTT—The anarambhavadin questions whether that atma-
jfiana is private to the person seeking liberation or is the property of
another. If private it is already there and so there is no need for
vidhi; if not private, i.e., when
not the property of the agent
it is
but its office is not confined to that alone. When it is there (i.e.,
the vidhivakya or mandatory statement (denoting karya) whatever
things are cognised, are each one of them to be regarded as having
been denoted by it (viz., the vidhi); for example, when colour is
presented to the eye, it starts functioning, but it is not the colour
only that is the object of sight ; on the other hand the substance
also along with the colour. Similarly here (i.e., in the mandatory
statement having Kriya as its content) the essence of Reality
(Vastutatva -the pure Brahman) also is the visaya. 18
17. Anarambhavadin. How is that?—
Arambhavadin. -This is how (from —
the Upanisad text)
*
what all this (meaning thereby, the universe) is, that is atman *
(Brh. Up., IV. 5), it is not intended to teach that atman is of the
18
The contradiction lies in this that the Veda is said to denote
action and yet to reveal the eternally established entity, viz., Brahman.
It is resolved by maintaining that when a Vidhi prompts action it must
reveal all that is pertinent to the karya such as the visaya, etc. It
follows therefore that though Upanisadic texts are related to
the
action (upasana) they also reveal the Pure Brahman, the Reality.
Vidhi therefore is pertinent. The distinguishing feature of this third
view is that in addition to the pratipatti-vidhi it conjoins Stma-svarupa-
jnana to atmopasana.
VII. 18] VEDANTA—NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI 151
the word atman denotes the sentient agent who is the enjoyer,
and because he is the one to be mandated there is need for the
mandate (niyoga).
—
(even then) the non-atman (that is the insentient) nature of the
world will not be eradicated. 26 It is like the injunction *
Let these
flour-balls be modelled into lions '
where even after the injunction
is carried out, the nature of the flour is not effaced. And (it has
also to be noted that) the auxiliaries (itikartavyata) have not been
indicated, so that the injunction-statement desiderating the auxi-
liaries would go in vain. 27
the question —
^TSflr t*r$j: 'which is that root?' the anarambhavadin
means that no root will fit in.
26 4
The root kr' 'krtih', — to make, may be understood since it
or mandate. 29 Would you ask From what is that jnana derived '
80 3*rT
*T*5T5—The arambhavadin advances the analogy of mantras
or hymns which when recited at the time of sacrifice recall to mind
the substance —dravya, and the deity —devata, connected with the
sacrifice. The utility consists in their serving as aids to sect ring
apurva from the yaga. It may be said that dravya and devata are
recalled to mind even by the Brahmana vakyas; but the niyamavidhi
enjoins that they should be brought to mind only through the
mantras and not through the Brahmana if apurva should result; even
so atmajnana though it has arisen even in the absence of the injunctive
word, is again enjoined by a vidhi for it is only this mandated jnana
that yields salvation —
moksa, and not the one understood otherwise.
31 —
Wl*m^m?i f%*TPT3J: Here is pointed out when and under
what circumstances the mantra-analogy is appropriate. The vidhi
known as prayogavidhi which enjoins the order in which the subsi-
diaries —angas, of a sacrifice have to be performed operates in regard
to the mantras. The rule is that if no prayogavidhi is expressly
stated, one has to be understood. The injunction of performance
therefore impels one to acquire that meaning of the mantra which is
helpful in securing apurva, to the exclusion of its sense acquired when
learning to recite the Veda.
32
What the arambhavadin means is that even in the atmajnana
context the prayoga injunction is operative. The originative injunction,
%^I**T: 3TTWHR fsft?l is to be understood and that desiderates *iti-
kartavyata' or the mode of performance and this is afforded by the
Vidhi in the same context relating to atmajnana associated with
a beneficent result, viz., *'seek atman in atman having cultivated such
virtues as peace of mind, self-control, etc."
%?!'&: 5T*TTI%%: sqffs? 3?rc*^R f ^—
This is the viniyogavidhi.
Hence the originative injunction has become viniyogavidhi and it
denotes the relation between atmajnana which is angT and sama,
dama, etc., which are angas. The viniyogavidhi in turn becomes the
adhikaravidhi which is thus expressed in full fllSRW: %^rei^r- —
Then becomes prayogavidhi. The man desirous of freedom shall
it
33
^3 *?'%3— Here is pointed out the difference between the mantra
and the Vcdanta-vakya. The mantra merely gives rise to the apiirva-
producing jnana, whether that jnana has a valid visaya (object) or not.
There is no need that there must be the objective counterpart of what
it denotes; e.g., when the mandate relates to meditation, say, on
nature of this all and that cognition (vijnana) is not the object
of a vidhi; and it is so because its object (visaya) is not ascer-
tained by anything ab extra. But if it should be the object of a
mandate (vidhi) then it loses its capacity to make known a pra-
meya. And neither could both (i.e., vidhivisayatva and prameya-
bodhakatva) manifest themselves at the same time for it would
result in one and the same vakya denoting opposite senses
(vairiipyaprasarigat). 38
X. —
Arambhavadin. If it be so (i.e., if it be thought
27.
that it is a blemish for the same sentence to convey senses which
contradict one another) then the mandate, wherever it occurs,
relating to auxiliary duties would be to no purpose. 37
—
Anarambhavddin. It will not be purposeless. (There can be
gunavidhana.) Where (e.g., in the sentence, he sprinkles rice *) '
that which stands in the objective relation (viz., rice) to the auxi-
liary karma {viz., sprinkling) is ascertained from a distinct
pramana, there karma (viz., sprinkling) which brings about as
its result any one of the following originations, etc.,—enjoined
where however the visaya that is in the objective relation to jfiana
(as in idam sarvam, etc."') is not ascertained from a distinct
*
—
jnana the primacy pradhanya, is of Brahman; again the subsidiary
nature —gunatva, of Brahman is indicated because Brahman is adjec-
tival (visesana) to jfianawhich is enjoined (for apurva); (ii) because
Brahman is the object sought (prameya) it is to be achieved Upadeya; —
and in relation to vidhi (jnatavyah) Brahman is something existing to
—
which the vidhi points uddesya; (iii) because it is prameya some- —
—
thing vouched for by a pramana Brahman which is unknown is made
known —ajnatajnapya, i.e., vidheyatva; again since jfiana of Brahman
is enjoined, Brahman which is already known is merely recalled
anuvSdyatvam V.P., 117.
37 gor«Rjfaf snfe—The mandates '
$[&{ wfcT '—he sprinkles the
rice-grains with water, (sfrC^ffcT —he
pounds the rice, which are
—
subsidiary acts 3<n^$ serving a main yaga, would lose their significance
since such mandatory sentences bear conflicting ideas. Now in
pftf^ta; aiSTTcT because some other pramana, viz., perception vouches
for the existence of rice it acquires «T3^W^ the quality of being
restated, but because some adrsfa (unseen good) is generated in it by
the sprinkling of water it acquires the opposite quality, viz., fa^ft^
again in relation to ROT the rice is the main, SP7R; but in relation
to yaga, ^ifffa^RTcT it is subsidiary SJT; so also it acquires
3Tf^3F«r or something that is to be accomplished by an act, viz.,
vrihi); for had it been so, there would be justification for the
injunction of knowledge relating to it (Brahman) for the purpose
38
—
T ^ tf y$ fl*?'3ra» etc. The arambhavadin argues that there are
two cognitions in the present context as well:
(i) one arising from that part of the statement, viz., 'idam
knowledge.
39
The arambhavadin,avoid the triad of opposites, regards the
statement
—'satyam, jnanam,toanantam, Brahma' as a laudatory sentence
—
being auxiliary to the mandatory vakya 'idam sarvam yadayamatma
jfifitavyaV-
160 pancapAdikA OF PADMAPADA [XI. 30
secondlessness. 40 Then
what purpose (when thus the nature
for
of atman is revealed by satyam jnanam, etc.) should one obtain
*
the phala generated by making it (the satyam, etc.' vakya) subsi- '
—
Anarambhavadin. (We ask) by what instrument of know-
ledge is that jnana which is enjoined for the acquisition of that
experience produced ? As for perception, etc., they are powerless
to generate such experience (lit. the Brahmajnana beyond the
lies
40
The anarambhavadin regards that statements such as ^
sTRJR'ct W® are unlike what are distinctly arthavadas like m$
&fa$T Vrtt, s i nce i ts own sense constitutes the highest phala it needs
no association with a mandatory sentence which imports a phala.
41 The arambhavadin contends that by verbal cognition,
i.e., by
—
the denotative power of words satyam, etc., we only comprehend
what was uncomprehended; e.g., the nature of Brahman unknown
hitherto becomes known on hearing the words satyam, jnanam, etc.
But we cannot stop here. We have to get rid of all illusory cognitions
and the mental traces they have left behind. And this is not possible
by Sabdajnana. It is the immediate intuitive knowledge of Brahman
that can bring about such a result. Hence the need for vidhi for
effecting saksatkara or immediate perception a result which the
— —
knowledge of the import of the vakya 'satyam, jnanam, anantam,
Brahma', is incompetent to produce.
XI. 31] VEDANTA—NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI 161
has already been said that since its sole purpose is to point to
prameya (Brahman) there is no ground to regard it as the valid
object (prameya) of a vidhi.
31. Arambhavadin. —Well, we maintain that the vidhi (man-
date) is to the effect that the same jnana should be meditated upon
42
continuously.
—
Anarambhavddin. How could it {i.e. the Vidhi relating to
jnanasamtana) result in the absence of either of the verbal roots
signifying upasana (upasti) or dhyana (dhyayati) which express
the cognition series ? Nor can it be urged that its own series is
implied in a secondary sense in the word jnana itself, since there
exists no inseparable connection such as invariable concomitance
(sahacarya)43 etc. And further the intuitive and immediate
,
42
One who is competent otherwise gets a fairly correct compre-
hension of the Vedic passages the commits to memory and vidhi is
out of place here. The arambhavadin admits this but says, that the
vidhi is for nididhyasana, i.e., it lays down that one who longs to
achieve freedom has to meditate constantly upon the jnana which
results from adhyayana.
48 The contention is when jnana
that is enjoined its series may
in But no secondary sense is
a secondary sense be understood.
possible since there exists none of the grounds to justify it. The
—
grounds are invariable association tflfW^, simularity 31?^, oppo- —
sition —
fcfte, etc. Here jnana or cognition is the primary sense
srapnir, —
and cognition-current SWT^q, is the secondary sense
s$1W and there is nothing to suggest their invariable relation.
- u srrfr anan3K3I4n3W fTO! —'Let meditation be enjoined as in
1
fSrf^TTfaflfn ' says the objector, 'yet meditation
does not bring
about the realisation of the Supreme' for meditation is excluded from
the category of pramana or valid instrument of cognition.
U
162 PAnCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XII. 33
and when jiianabhyasa which is the hetu is also known the person
himself begins to act (i.e., practices contemplation). 45
XII. The example however, which you have adduced,
33.
viz., that channels dug for the purpose of irrigating crops (inci-
such as *TWt but also to the order in which they are to be performed.
The anarambhavadin however points out that the padarthas only, i.e.,
*
forest \ fi0
Or the recollective knowledge would, on the occa-
sion of performance, (anus|hanakala) suggest the padarthas
(prayajadi) in the order of remembrance (i.e., in the way each
yaga is recollected). However it be, there does exist a jnana
(of krama) distinct from the jnanas arising severally from each
of the padarthas (samit, ida, etc.). And that (distinct cognition
of order) which is desiderated and which immediately presents
itself is obtained by prayogavacana (injunction of performance),
60
—
3 T^T %5rf%5Tlfa*rT Sequence-krama, implies space and time as
being inevitable for its existence. Tt is the same whether we use the
word krama or say that things take place in a certain sequence of time.
A group of trees growing together in a particular region come under
the designation of 'forest'. The very term 'forest' implies an assem-
blage of trees as limited by a particular region (i.e., limitation of
space).
XIII. 36] VEDANTA-NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI 1 65
51
In perception the eye gets into contact with form ar.d sub-
stance separately, hence can point to both; but the denotativeness
it
—
find him in his house, ergo, he is out this is in illustration of
drstarthapatti. Devadatta, we are told, is fat but does not eat by
day, the implication is that he eats by night—this is in illustration of
166 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XIV. 38
stands as its object, very like the case of meditation on the 'speech-
cow,' vak-dhenu), because the text when it does not (according
to you) really mean that (viz., the atman -identity of this-all)
and when such identity-knowledge is also opposed to percep-
tion, etc., it becomes incapable of determining the sense as denoted
(by the phrase —idam, etc.). Hence it is mere fancy to suppose
that the Veda whose object is to denote action establishes the
nature of reality (vastutatva).
XIV. 38. Therefore atman is only that which is rendered
explicit by the ego-notion (ahampratyaya) and of that (atman)
there exists no other form (rupantaram, i.e., the entity character-
ised by world-negation —
nisprapancasvarupam) which is super-
sensuous and determined (only) by verbal testimony, for sabda
is not competent to reveal such an entity. When this is so the
words 'Brahman', antaryamin ', etc., found in the texts:
'
" This self (atman) is Brahman (ayamatma Brahma) ", " This
person is your atman, indweller, immortal (esa te atma antaryam-
yamrtah) " somehow (i.e., figuratively) find this significance in
atman as rendered explicit in the ego-notion. Hence it is but
*
right to conclude that the text :
'
that is atman, that thou art
(enjoins meditation on atman in association with the qualities
which either actually exist or are imagined, which (meditation)
yields the fruit of moksa (freedom from bondage).
39. Hence since the import of the (whole) Veda is to incul-
cate action (karya or karma) and since it (karma) has been in all
its aspects investigated (in the Purva-Mimamsa) what else is there
84 trq sricr,
etc. —Brahman, antaryamin,
etc., denote only atman as
revealed in the ego-notion —
and not any Higher Being: for
a?fsi3?q"
one who maintains that Uttara-Mlmamsa need not be commenced
jiva or individual soul alone exists and apart from it there is no
Suddha or the pure self.
—
35^1^ Somehow, either etymologically or figuratively, *far and
not by conventional usage—^fe existing qualities like ^W%:
mahatva, magnitude, etc.
55 ^T^rswnm«mft^R—
"What appears to be a valid means of
knowledge, i.e., the common sense view, and this is termed loka.
Dharma is not altogether a novel conception; in its general nature it
thus :
" It is not that Dharma means only what is of the nature
of agnihotra, etc.; no occasion for inquiring
therefore there is
that the Purvakanda deals with Dharma only and not the entire
68
Veda ?)
Arambhaxadin. —This is how it is determined. Now Dharma
is understood in its general sense by what passes muster with the
people but when conflicting views exist regarding its nature and
its pramana, even agnihotra, etc., as the meaning of
(validating)
the Veda become fit for inquiry. Because inquiry into that also
(i.e., whether Dharma means agnihotra, etc., or something else)
68 cjrf, spn^— From the use of the word 'Dharma' how do you
infer that Vedantic inquiry Because the words 'atha'
is excluded?
and 'atah' are used, the Sutra means the inquiry into Vedartha only
and not Dharma. There is sequence between adhyayana and Vedartha-
vicara and not between adhyayana and Dharmavicara. This is
Purvapaksa aw-sn^ waHRTSFflt s??T:-*!J*ITTO i%*n%<raT?*.
5
59
3RJJ*: —
The first Sutra of Jaimini makes it clear that the
nature of Dharma has to be investigated, for Dharma in its general
sense conducive to man's highest good but its special sense admits
is
that (Jaimini) of the view that not the whole of the Veda finds
is
the same word (as contains the mandatory suffix —yajeta *) and
which is much nearer (spatially than svarga, etc.); it is to express
this idea that the word codana is used. 60
— r^sTiT of Dharma,
and only by implication— 5H*TT?l%, with the
pramana (i.e., means of knowledge by which Dharma is
the valid
cognized); the latter thinks that the postulation of pramana is primary,
and definition is by implication. However it be, both schools admit
that the second Sutra states not only the definition of Dharma but
also the validating pramana which is the Veda. The question then
will be, why was the Sutra been worded as ^n^ragronsqj and not W
as ir3^<nrs«n *w.
60 The
advocate of the view that a separate treatise dealing with
an existent entity unassociated with karya need not be begun assigns
a different reason for the use of the word codana in the second sutra
and rejects the view that it is meant to exclude that portion of the
Veda which is uncommented upon by Jaimini In W^WI T^R! the '
'
46. Arambhavadin. —
That is jejune. The vidhi relating to
adhyayana mandate enjoining the getting by rote one's
(i.e., the
branch of the Veda) setting about to induce the pupil (manavaka)
to master the Vedic text finds itself incapable of inducing him
without first showing that adhyayana is the means of attaining
the highest good, for the vidhi fails to fulfil its purpose (viz., that
of prompting one to action) when the highest human end is not
evident even Hence it is not for that (i.e., for de-
if remotely.
noting purusartha) that the word codana is used for that may be
secured even by the use of the word Veda. 61 Moreover the use
of the word Veda alone is appropriate since it leaves no room for
doubt, but the use of the word codana surely generates doubt
*
'
61
%^JT^RlfT —Even if worded as %^«5$r<ifts*ft
the sutra had been '
VT*?: '
the purpose, viz., that a mandate before it prompts one to
action must hold out the highest bliss as the reward — could have been
served. For the vidhi in general, as in the example '
^i^RTS^cTs^: i
demands for its fulfilment, svarga, etc., as its guerdon. The question,
therefore, has to be answered, why has Jaimini specifically used the
term codana ?
•8 fwrracsf!^— Codana
'c5i%sfq or mandate may he either
scriptural or empirical (i.e., mandate emanating from men). Empirical
statements also may point to Dharma which of course is against ihe
doctrine and as such doubt arises as to which to take. Moreover
Upanisadic statements which relate to an existing entity dissociated
from action may have to be regarded as not falling within the scope
of Vedic mandates. Hence the use of the word 'codana' is detri-
mental to the opponent's position.
63
*3T*T q^ffa^r' —
The Purvapaksin's rejoinder is that codana
cannot possibly refer to empirical mandates since in VIII-27, Jaimini
has used the word Veda specifically. The sutra runs thus: %3?«r%
*?)%3>$fafa. It is obvious from the use of the word Veda that
scriptural injunctions alone and not empirical, are to be taken. The
Vedadhikarana is the last in the Tarkapada of Purva-Mlmamsa of
Jaimini. The meaning of the sutra is as follows: tr% some, viz., the
172 PAtfCAPADiKA OF PADMAPADA [XVII. 48
—
Arambhavadin. This is as the proverb goes " Licking the :
S.B., p. 6). " The utterance of the words which are implied in
the meanings, is with the object of enjoining some action "
Jaimini Sutra, I. vii~25.
" The Veda is meant to inculcate duty (hence whatever por-
tion means something other than that is devoid of purpose."
Jai. Sut. I. ii-1).
ing out that the entire Veda inculcates karma. How ? (it may
be asked); on completing the Vedadhyayana (i.e., memorising the
Naiyayikas, etc., (say that) W^l^ the Vedas (are of man's creation),
sn%WflC the reason for this view is that there is mention of names
like Kafhaka and Kalapaka pointing to authors.
64 3f*Bt3T^ sj^ffoi
W<lr-To assert that because Jaimini has used the
word Veda in I. viii. 27, codana in I. 2 must mean Veda is to belittle
Jaimini's intelligence. If he meant that the whole of the Veda was
action-related, mm, the right place to use the word Veda would be
I. 2 which is the Laksana sutra and he would not postpone its
employment to the VIII adhikarana.
XVII.49] VEDANTA—NOT ANTICIPATFD BY JAIMINI 173
text of one's branch of the Veda) one comes across the authori-
tative statement enjoining the ceremonial bath(which should
therefore follow immediately) so that one entertains the impression
that the Veda (apart from its committal to memory) carries no
sense; then (to eradicate such an impression the Bhasyakara,
viz.,
—
Sahara says) " We will transgress this mandate. If we
do not transgress it we would be rendering the Veda meaningless
when (actually) it is frought with meaning. 65 The knowledge of
karma is indeed its obvious fruit, 68 so that it is clear that what is
pointed out is that the Veda does really possess a meaning and
not that there exists no other meaning {i.e., other than karma).
That statement (i.e., dfstohi. etc.) is made to dispel the notion
that the Veda is unrelated to artha (sense) and not to disprove
that anything apart from karma (viz., Brahman) is to be found in
the Veda.
The word karma denotes Dharma only (like agnihotra)
because it is something to be achieved by effort and because the
person who undertakes to acquire the knowledge of Dharma seeks
to know if the Veda is significative, i.e., whether there is any mean-
ing yielded by the Veda or not and whether it is possible to under-
stand that significance as being (identical with) Dharma. 67 Hence
(to conclude) the Bhasyakara (Sahara) should not be deemed as
holding the opinion that the knowledge of karma alone is the
fruit of the Veda.
cannot be taken to mean 'void of sense' for all the Mlmamsakas are
agreed that the Veda in its entirety is significant. Now that the
anarambhavadin might urge that if it should mean 'purposeless'
fassrzfriTST it would be unacceptable to the arambhavadin also so —
far, the resum£ of the view held by one who advocates the non-
commencement of the Uttara-Mlmamsa Sastra.
89 The word 3Rfon could be interpreted in two ways: (i) having
no meaning whatever. This is unacceptable both to the opponent
and the Siddhantin; (ii) serving no purpose. The Siddhantin admits
purposelessness only with reference to such statements, i.e., arthavadas,
as are non-significant without their association with mandatory state-
ments—vidhivakyas—*/. Jai. Sut., I. ii. 1.
XVIII. 52] VEDANTA—NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI 175
Jyotistoma).
XVIII. 52. Some however account differ-
(Prabhakaras)
ently for commencing the Sastra codanalaksano artho
{viz.,
70
The Bhatta School justifies the commencement of the Mimamsa
Sastra on the ground that doubt arises as to whether agnistoma, etc.,
are Dharma
or caityavandana; to resolve such a doubt and to prove
that agnistoma, etc., are alone Dharma that the Mimamsa Sastra has
to be begun. The Prabhakaras on the other hand aver that doubts
as to the special significance of the Vedic passages arise and to
resolve these doubts the Sastra has to be begun and not for refuting
the opinions held by the heretical schools regarding the nature of
Dharma. The first Sutra in consequence would mean It is incumbent —
on one to inquire into the meaning of the Veda and not It is incumbent —
on one to inquire into the meaning of Dharma as the Bhaftas
maintain.
176 PA^CAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVIII. 54
the name what the codana denotes pointing thus to the rela-
for
tion of the name and the named, such a course would clash with
the beginning of the Sastra (Dharmavicara), would lead nowhere,
and would be quite arbitrary.
55. [Page 51] But still if it be maintained that the word
1
Dharma somehow means Vedartha only, then it would amount
'
to saying that Vedartha is what the codana defines and not what
arthavada denotes; and this would lead to the conclusion that
like the second adhyaya and the sequel of Jaimini sutras this
inquiry (i.e., of the first adhyaya) is in relation to the meaning
(artha) of the Veda whose validity has been previously established. 74
*
Tatra,' i.e., if the validity has been established in the first sutra
itself: *
anantaram i.e., again, the attempt to prove the validity
(as Jaimini does in sutra V
',
* anupalabdhe
—
arthe tat pramanam
Badarayanasya, etc.) would be out of place as also useless would
be (the statement of Sabarasvamin)
—
Vrttam pramanalaksanam'
'
;
was undertaken for inquiry, and inquired into, but not that part
of the Veda whose object it is to inquire into the existing entity.
That being so, this (first sutra of Uttara MImamsa, v/z., athato
Brahmajijnasa
— * then therefore the inquiry into Brahman ', is
4
1
Samkara comments on the word atha' found in the first sutra
3?Tl<fr SSlfasiKU in the following words: <T5Tt*rei*5 an^a^i: m
faf mm 3Rf«R»T$rqr<k—Now the first Varnaka dealt with the topic
under inquiry, viz., identity of the individual with Brahman and also
the benefit resulting from the knowledge of the identity, viz., the
removal of the ills of life; the second, with the topic whether the
contents of the Uttara Mimamsa are, or are not subsumed under the
Purva Mimamsa. The present section discusses the question whether
there is any indication in the first Sutra as to the person competent
to pursue the inquiry —
adhikarin. The word 'atha' means 'immediate
—
conclusion' anantarya, implying that Brahman-inquiry is preceded by
something. The question is what is that something? It is the
—
preliminary discipline moral and spiritual. The antecedent require-
ments for Brahmajijnasa are known as Sadhana-catusfaya or the four
essential means, viz., discrimination between what is eternal and what
is ephemeral—f^nsr^EgfsRSF:, aversion from the enjoyment of
objects here and hereafter—SSTg^'E^mWTT:,
acquisition of
mental peace, etc.—5W*Tlf^ra*raq<*., and longing for
self-restraint,
—
liberation *jg§$<^. The word *atha' cannot mean 'commencement'
as some suppose since 'desire—jijnasa jnatumiccha —
desire to know' —
isnot a thing to be commenced. The point to be noticed is that
we must be able to ascertain from the Sutra who the person is that
is fit for the study of the Ststra and this is evident from the word
'atha*.
180 pancapAdikA of PADMA1?ADA [J. 2
2
In Brahmajijnasa —Brahmajnanecchfi — it is iccha or desire that
is the leading element and not Brahman or Brahmajnana; for 'iccha
kartavya ' is meaningless. Hence atha cannot mean Commencement '.
'
'
'
sense, adhikarartha fits in (with the word atha) ; indeed the word
jijnasa means Sastra signifying vicara or inquiry. As such, it
and the idea (sabdabodha) also conveyed by it. Hence, i.e., since
a cogent sense can be had from the constituent parts of the word
jijnasa what the Bhasyakara (Samkara) has said, viz., that Brahma-
jijnasa is not what can be commenced is perfectly justifiable.
5
?T'«faJTft, etc. —The opponent thus argues: the word jijnasa
means jnana is that which we long for, and such
desire for jfiana;
jfiana cannot result without inquiry. Hence vicara being the means
is implicit in the word jijftasii. It comes to this therefore that the
word 'atha' is appropriately used to mean 'commencement' since
it may relate either to Brahman or Brahmajnana or inquiry, all of
which are dealt with in the Sastra. How then is the statement
'anadhikaryatvat' reasonable?
6
The phrase Brahmajijnasa points to Brahman, cognition of
Brahman, and the desire to know Brahman. Emphasis (5JI*JF^) is
of two kinds: word-emphasis (si^Sim^) and meaning-emphasis
(sitfsr-jl'Zr). Now Brahman and its cognition come under artha-
pradhanya and 'desire to know', under sabdapradhanya„ On the
basis of s\ibdapradhanya. desire (^Si) is therefore the principal
element and Brahman and Brahman-cognition are attributive (visesanas)
and therefore subordinate. The purvapaksin admits that on the basis
of sabdapradhanya the Sutra denotes 'desire' and as such becomes
purposeless since 'desire' cannot be 'commenced'; but then he urges
that on the basis of arthapradhanya Brahman and its cognition would
be primary and so fit for 'commencement' (3ffaT*P3r*n<J.^). Hence
he maintains that the word 'atha' means 'commencement* and not
'consecution '— 3?*<TtfM f^riTfltfasi 5i*^t 30T?^S<^55$f*R SPTF^ SffRT-
This sentence has to be split up into two: (i) «i4«*9n*R SW^If ^cT-
—
Answer. This will be said (to meet your objection) Since —
it would result in the non-undertaking (the study) of the (Brahma-
Sastra is to be commenced. 8
—
Answer. No, there is no possibility of the desire to acquire
the knowledge of Brahman arising. 9 The Scripture declares that
with the acquisition of Brahmajnana one is isolated even from
•
the mind, with the result that there will be no contact with any
of the sense-objects. And that (cessation of contact) puts an
end to every grade of happiness, declared in the Sruti. (Tait. Up.
Ananda Valli) beginning with that of the world-sovereign and
culminating in that of Brahmaloka, each succeeding happiness
excelling the previous one (nay, putting an end also to) the means
by which such happiness is attained. Hence the world turns
away from Brahmajnana in aversion. Why will one covet it?
9. Objection.—Well, the state of bliss also is attained by
Brahmajnana and as such one strives after it.
—
Answer. That is not so. Brahmananda (i.e., the joy that
one experiences by Brahmajnana) never having been experienced
before, is powerless to mitigate the longing for that happiness
which has been experienced; had Brahmananda been potent,
it could have prompted one to acquire Brahmajnana abandoning
the other.
Objection.
10. —
Well, we know that Brahmajnana yields
also what is of the nature of supreme satisfaction; hence what
does the man, who is satisfied, desire, for all desire springs (by
reason of) dissatisfaction ? To this effect is the (corroboration of)
§ruti
— * whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is atman ' (Brh.
Up., IV. 4-6); also of Smrti— * nothing higher than the attain-
ment of atman is known ' *
O, Bharata, knowing this {i.e.,
;
creation was not thus; (i.e., did not provide for) 'capacity for
constant enjoyment, non-satiation, and indestructibility of the
objects of enjoyment'. And they adduce in illustration a verse
sung by the sensualist, viz., " O, Gautama, one would rather long
for the life of a jackal in a desolate forest but never would one
desire liberation which is the negation of all objects of enjoyment."
III. 11. Objection. —
Let not desire for Brahma-knowledge
arise (independently of vidhi). Because of its (Brahman) being
(a part of) the very import of the Veda, it is incumbent on one to
acquire Brahma-knowledge. 10 (If it should be urged that vidhi
10 It
was pointed out that there would be no competent agent
in case theword 'atha' is not interpreted as meaning anantarya. The
pQrvapaksin tries to show that the adhjkarin can be had from the
III. 1
1] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 185
Objection. —
Even that will not suit because it is seen that ;
evident that the study of the whole content of the Veda is enjoined
(on all the three castes).
13. Purvapaksin. —The Adhyayana mandate has not stated
the adhikarin (i.e., the person competent to study Veda; the
hence an adhikarin has to be understood, and the knowledge of
the meaning, it is evident, supervenes the acquisition of the mastery
over the words. (This is urged to meet the argument that one
competent and then the vidhi wilt be fruitful). Hence (since the
adhyayanavidhi is out of the question) no apprehension of the
meaning will result as drstaphala (direct experience) from the
vidhi (because such a result is not patent).
V. 15. Pitrvaoaksin. — If that be so (i.e., if as the result of
acquiring mastery of the Vedic text the meaning is not under-
stood) since the phala is not mentioned in the mandatory sentence
and since you do not admit that arthavabodha (understanding of
15
£srftM»ft3 —This is the Purvapaksin's answer to the objec-
tion that even if we admit that the adhyayanavidhi itself points to
the adhikarin, one desirous of acquiring the sense of the memor-
viz.,
a Brahmana in his eighth year ' is the one relating to the preceptor,
then the neophyte (manavaka or the boy just initiated) will not
be under obligation to carry out the mandate. And in one whom
the mandate does not bind, there results no effort to study one's
2f: fel^i, etc., there is no vidhi relating to instruction since the vakya
entitled) in addition (to those common to all the three castes, viz.,
*
Those of the three (castes) who after the prescribed time remain
without going through the purificatory ritual, who are deprived
of holy association with the Savitri, (and who are therefore) out-
castes becomefit objects of reproach by the faithful (aryas the —
respectable). With such unregenerate men no Brahmana, even
when in distress, should at any time or place enter into authorised
(by sastra) ritualistic or marital relationship. The purification
(viz., Upanayana) is for (fitting the pupil) for his Vedic study so
that the Vedic study also is obligatory (as Upanayana is). To this
effect is the condemnatory passage
—
Those who have forsaken
*
the obligatory duties, abandoned Vedic study and have not main-
tained the ritualistic fire are (as good as) pursuing the dharma
of a Sudra (for none of these is enjoined on the fourth caste).
'
in its operation and binding always on all (i.e., the first three
castes). 20 No doubt the desire to perform karma is greatly
mitigated when appropriate means such as some one (fit to under-
take the karma), some aid (needed for karma), some place, some
20
The Piirvapaksin might urge that it was immaterial whether
nityatva —
obligatoriness to initiate and instruct the pupil results from
—
vastu or Sabda. The difference is pointed out in the one-case it is
—
dependent on the vastu, the object of desire, in the other on Vedic
authority. The order of precedence is reversed. The scope of Vedic
authority cannot be restricted; not so of desire. If obligatoriness should
follow desire it is adhyapana may become anitya
possible that
optional, since all those competent to undertake the teaching many
not be willing to do so. But Sabda is peremptory and as such the
desire (iccha) derived from a sense of obligation cannot but be nitya.
VII. 21] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 191
21
time a fit place and fit
(i.e., time) are not available. Hence the
undertaking of karma (i.e., adhyapana) prompted by a vidhi that
is nitya, becomes nitya similarly, so that the irreconcilability of
ed is the way to the higher worlds (i.e., the father goes to Heaven
through the instrumentality of a worthy son); therefore he
instructs him.' Hence since the duty of rearing a progeny is
21
3ftf%3?Tfc*i%sfa—This is in answer to the objection that
when appropriate means are not available the desire to undertake
instruction ceases to be obligatory even though the imparting of
instruction is an enjoined act. The Siddhantin admits that the desire
springs when the required means such as the right time, the right
place, etc., are available but he urges that even in the absence of all
these auxiliaries adhyapana
will be undertaken as far as it lies in his
power, Vedic injunction for fear of disobeying an enjoined
if there is
there is none who fails to study the Veda and remains a degraded
Brahmana (lit. one who can only point to a Brahmana relative
himself having fallen low)." Chand. Up., VI. i-1. [Page 56]
When it is so you have to explain how what is obligatory (nitya)
could be brought about by the non-obligatory vidhi relating to
preceptorship.
25. And
it should also be noted that when the preceptor
28
l&ITOt. —indirect suggestion. It is thus defined: —^'Wf?ri^K%
*?fcT cT^4*n vJ*6 aiSI^. We have this indirect implication when a word
used in a different context is explicative of the point under considera-
tion. —
The Chandogya passage %^%^r 3ST *fwm, etc., is intended to
extol Divine Knowledge—srSTfTR but it indirectly points to Brahma-
carya, in that the boy should go to a preceptor for Vedic study.
Brahmacarya means Vedic chanting preceded by the initiation ceremony.
2? 3Tr=# stcT, etc. —
It may be argued that when theprec eptor is
28
tute, nor is adhikara feasible either. The adhikarin (/.«., the
functionary, the sacrificer entitled to enjoy the fruit resulting from
the sacrifice), it is right to state, will, in order that he may make
good one auxiliary (ingredient) when
his qualification substitute
another fails and thus secures
title (adhikara). It is then
his
28
*% 3Tfa$RT sifcri>*faft strt^R:—This is in answer to the
contention that the manavaka (pupil) by seeking another preceptor
may bring about the fulfilment of preceptorship to his first acarya
on the strength of what is known as 'pratinidhinyaya*. If in the per-
formance of obligatory karma an accessory, say rice is absent, it is
enjoined that some other ingredient say wild rice nlvara may be — —
substituted. But, says the Siddhantin, that the 'representative theory'
pratinidhinyaya, does not apply here. It is only when the adhikarin
is alive that he can substitute another. Even if the pupil should
select a substitute, the substitute will not succeed in establishing his
—
own preceptorship *nw*3>R: with the result that neither acaryatva
of the first teacher nor of the representative will eventuate.
29
In 'initiate a Brahmana in his eighth year and teach him to
chant the Veda—-3rasr«f sTTSmg^^fftT rW^iqtftft there is no vidhi
regarding initiation and tuition which are the duties pertaining to the
acarya but it relates to the manavaka who should go to the preceptor
STT*H and get tuition under him 3?^*?^. —
30 The
Purvapaksin argues thus: the word 3Wjt?T consists of '
'
the root tfta and the causative sense. Hence the word should mean
causing the pupil to come to him (acarya). Now the acarya is gunakarta
or anxiliary functionary while the pupil is pradhanakarta or the principal
functionary. If the word '
SWfffi ' is interpreted as the Siddhantin does
(sqir^tfo) what the vidhi (lin) enjoins has to be transferred from its
and which is a distinct word (as contrasted with the root yaj ') *
comes after the root which denotes the action of the principal
agent and because it (viz., yajana denoted by nic ' is not what '
81
The mandatory '
UPTOlti Iffi^' would ordinarily
sentence,
mean of the person desirous of owning a
'officiate at the sacrifice
village'. The vidhi, it must be noted, always relates to something that
is unknown and not to what is already known. Here the sacrificer is
not unaware of 'village' but is ignorant only of the means and
consequently the vidhi prescribes a certain yaga for the attainment of
the object in view. The new element is the yaga, and 'village' which is
already known is merely referred to. Hence ' 3T3WT/ is to be taken as
'
ifaC the causative force being ignored. On this analogy 'upanayita'
has to be taken, says the siddhantin, in the sense of 'upagacchet'
the pupil should go to the teacher for instruction.
82
—
ire^t' Here is another criticism; in ' 2JH5TO/ we have the
'
— —
causative termination nic from which the activity of the subordinate
functionary, viz., the officiating priest is indicated, and the root yaj —
from which the activity of the principal functionary, the agent
yajamfina, is indicated. And it is right therefore that the one (yajana)
is treated as a restatement and the other (yaga) as a mandate. But
in 3TOfar ', which is a single word only the activity of the subordinate
'
as mandated —vidheya.
196 PANCAPA.DIKA OF PADMAPADA [IX. 28
—
the sabdasakti primary significance and from rational usage '
—
amounts only to this that to make oneself an acarya one should
get some (pupil) to one's vicinity and impart Vedic instruction
•to him. And all this (i.e., initiation and instruction) having been
established from a different pramana (i.e., distinct from scriptural
—
testimony v/z., perception or inference) as meant for a Brah-
mana's vocation, need not here be enjoined.
Purvapaksin.—There (i.e., in adhyapayet) the question natu-
rally will be '
whom shall he teach ? ' When there is such specific
33
$m\m'
UPWW
faqr*r: '—The opponent argues that the pupil
cannot come under the injunction because the vyapara which is what
is enjoined —
vidheya, is absent in him. He is not the one that is
enjoined. The action connected with the initiation upanayana, be- —
longs to the preceptor. Hence the text 'initiate a Brahmana in his
eighth year' is intended to impose the duty on the preceptor and not
on the pupil. The siddhantin might concede the absence of niyoga
in so far as upanayana
concerned but not as regards adhyayana
is
34
The opponent argues that even conceding the absence of injunc-
tion regarding initiation and instruction there can be no injunction
—
regarding the pupil's going to the preceptor upagamana, and Vedic
—
study adhyayana. The injunction in 'upanayita, etc.', though not
with reference to the preceptor is with reference to the Brahmana
pupil who is eight years old. This is gunuMdhi or injunction of the
accessory. It speci es that he should be a Brahmana and of eight
years of age.
35 Since adhyapana is established by the necessity of earning a
livelihood, it will in upanayita and adhyapa-
be evident that the vidhi
ylta should relate to asfavarsatva and Brahmanatva, but then there
will be sentence-split if these two —
astavarsatva and Brahmanatva
which are the vidheyas, are to be related to the bhiivana, viz.,
upanayana or adhyapana each of which is anyathasiddha.
36 —
3P*m It is a rule that in any complete sentence the activity
of the subject 35^! is perceived and not of that which is in th c
objective relation. The manavaka is in the objective relation; your
contention that the activity of the manavaka is enjoined, is untenable.
198 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [X. 31
yields the sense he will not be aware of it before (he gets it up)
and therefore since the knowledge of the Vedic import cannot be
regarded as prompting him to undertake the study (it must be
concluded that) he actively engages in the study because he is
aware of the existence of a mandate enjoining such study as his
obligatory duty, and this he does of his own will (i.e., neither with
any desire to know the sense for he is ignorant that the Veda is
pregnant with sense nor prompted by a preceptor). Hence the
import of the sentence— Initiate a Brahmana
' in his eighth year
(astavarsam Brahmanam upnayita) is that a Brahmana lad in his
eighth year should go to a preceptor, just as the mandate *
cause a
yaga to be performed by one who longs to own a village ' (grama-
kamam yajayet ') has to be interpreted as '
let one who desires
to own a village perform a yaga ' (gramakamo yajeta).
X. 31. Purvapaksin. —Even then the agency is not deter-
mined. 38
37
'Nayati' has a double object of which the principal object is
fir T*T
E
and the pupil. Adhikara is used to mean either the hetu bring-
ing about the connection between the injunction and the person
enjoined, or the connection as between the prompter and the
prompted, or active effort. None of these three is applicable here.
It may be urged that the specification of one's being a Brahmana and
of eight years old— fltfpic? and 3re^fer serves as the hetu of the
required connection. But these two attributes can relate separately
only, to the principal element in the sentence, v/z., the verbal idea
STRRRii^, or what the verbal part of the suffix in upanayfta, etc.,
40
&1\kn — In 2?%cT the vidhi for mandate is furnished by the
'ta' termination and its object or visaya, by the meaning of the root
2F»r which is yaga and under upadeya (what is signified) should be
included also its attributive, the kartrkaraka or that which stands in
any case-relation or words qualifying it. The subject of the sentence
the pupil — is the kartrkaraka both in 'upagamana' and 'adhyayana'
and 'astavarsatva' and 'Brahmanatva' are the qualifying adjuncts of
the kartrkaraka. Hence falling under the category of upadeya the —
—
opponent says these adjuncts cannot be the hetu of the adhikarin
of either the Vedic study arsrafffa^T or approaching the preceptor—
S^TTORfaRT. The attributes of karta cannot be the attributes of
bhokta.
200 PANCAP^DIKA OF PADMAPADA [X. 32
the agent (karta) is also the adhikarin (one entitled to obtain the
fruit of action). 41
32. Again here in the act of initiation the boy who comes
under the particular caste and age is not the upadeya, i.e., not
kartrkaraka but it is upanayana only that is enjoined having him
in view; for (it is a rule that) purification —samskara is enjoined
for the sake of that which is to be purified. 42 Hence age and
caste are both limiting adjuncts of the pupil that is to be purified
(samskarya) and as such these distinguishing (avacchedaka)
—
the agent 3>ciT, the object to be achieved W&, and the means
WW. The phala is the acquisition of the meaning 31*n3«nsr and the —
karana is adhyayana. By elimination the eight-year old Brahmana
pupil becomes the karta. But according to the general rule that the
fruit accrues only to the karta—^rrePfi** sr|tR!*\ Jai. Sut., 4th Chapter
—the attributes of the karta, w>., being a Brahmana and eight years
old,become the hetu of phalasvamita being — entitled to the fruit.
'
vlna), the Bhasyakara (Samkara) has rightly said, the word then '
*
immediate consecution it must be rendered explicit on what
'
46
flcsricfHrsmn—The sequence that the opponent means by 'tat'
here is mere sequence, such for e.g., as 'b' following 'a* in the
alphabet, while for the Siddhantin it means causal sequence. Note
that the opponent has accepted anantarya' as the meaning of 'atha'
*
and is now
differentiating one kind of it from another.
47 Three alternative meanings
of 'atha' were advanced by way of
Purvapaksa:-—(i) commencement of a new topic, (ii) auspiciousness,
and (iii) something distinct from a prior topic. All these have been
shown to be wrong either because they cannot be construed properly
with the sentence— 'atha to Brahmajijfiasa', or they are not logical.
204 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XIII. 40
but which at the same time is, not potent by itself to capacitate
*
atha
is
'
stated in another
standing for imme-
diate means
consecution after acquiring the knowledge of
*
48 No doubt
in the absence of Vcdic study the inquiry into
Brahman out of the question but then not all those who have
is
mastered their branch of the Veda will undertake the inquiry into
Brahman for they are lacking in the urge for freedom. Hence mere
adhyayana does not capacitate one for higher knowledge.
49 ^JfWreisFrRH, etc —
The contention is that inquiry into the
-
meaning of the Veda comprising both the Purva and Uttara Mlmamsa
is necessary since moksa involves knowledge—jnana, and jfiana results
—
of Brahman (i) the performance of rituals in a graduated series; or
(ii) enjoyment of the desired objects acquiring mental purity (in succes-
sion); and (iii) mental purity, by following the injunctions laid down
in the Scriptures.
Xllf. 42] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 205
words atha and atah were explained in the first sutra of the
'
'
' '
first adhyaya only (i.e., the MImamsa sutra); the word 'atha'
is intended to mean that after the inquiry into Dharma which is
50
The word 'samskara' used in the text has been explained in the
Vivarana in this two-fold way. We shall need this distinction in
following the coming discussion of this part.
6i
*i*rer5$tqT5i5rcjf^ w?l*?:—From the insertion of 'atha' in the
first sutra a certain maxim — nyaya, is indicated and on the basis of that
nyaya we understand that one who studies the Veda must know its
sense. The nyaya in question is that when two alternatives are
possible the seen should be preferred to the unseen—S% to fl*refcT
3TOCTw5^rhti: 3??an*2R^. Vedic study may be regarded as meant
for attaining svarga or for understanding the import; the latter sense
is to be preferred being the seen result, to the former which is unseen.
*
serve no purpose in Brahma-vicara. Hence the word atha*
S5!
cf^qfosjtgqapirT 3?qi%eR2nrt— is another reading. The two
nyayas establishing the eternity of the relation between the word and
its sense and the non-human origin of the Veda are authoritative for
required (in the Uttara-mTmamsa) are not like the Vedic study
(which is a precondition of the inquiry of both Dharma and
Brahman) —the hetu exclusively of inquiry into Brahman. Hence
the word '
atha *
subsequence ' to mimamsa in
does not mean *
one (say, smoke) leads to the knowledge of the other (fire); but
even that is absent here, since no relation between Dharma and
Brahman could be ascertained.
47. Hence the karma (alone remains).
possibility of utilising
Accordingly what was said by them also (v/z., by those
this is
commentators)— " the word atha standing for *
immediate
'
*
6* 3ft*n«n£rvfcr —
It has been pointed out that the import of the
Vedic texts is dharma or karma, />., ritual. And the determination of
dharma can in no way serve as a preliminary either for inquiry into
Brahman or for ascertaining Brahman's real nature. It may be noted
that three other alternative explanations of the word 'atha' have been
ruled out, viz. —
(i) subsequent to Vedic study — waiWRTC
(ii) subsequent to knowing the Purvamlmamsa nyayas
wnTO»NI5RTC
(iii) subsequent to knowing the particular nyayas—^TT^g^R??!?,
v/z., reason to show that Vedic study is meant for the
55
Here begins the discussion of the second of the three items
referred to above,viz., samskara in the sense of phala. We shall pre-
sently meet with the discussion relating to the second meaning, viz.,
mental purity.
66
*TlWw?*lTft—cf. Tait. Up., II, 8th anuvaka .—There, grades
of bliss are enumerated, beginning with the universal sovereignty arid
culminating in the bliss of Hiranyagarbhaloka. It must be noted
ledge of karma.
XV. 52. Purvapaksin. —Let then the antecedent existence
of karmas 1>y reason of their purificatory function be admitted.
In support thereof are the following quoted He who has gone :
— '
87 The
point to be noticed in this quotation is that the vairagya
of Hiranyagarbha is congenital and not the result of phalabhoga as
the purvapaksin seeks to make out.
u
210 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XV. 51
through the forty purificatory rituals and possesses the eight self-
regarding virtues, attains union (with the Absolute) ; 68 * By the
performance of mahayajnas, and yajnas, the person becomes fit
for Brahma-knowledge " ; " knowledge arises in men by reason
of the destruction of sinful karma; just as (the aspirants) perceive
their own selves in the inner sense resembling a (purified) mirror "
these are the smrtis. " They (the aspirants) desire to know
(Brahman) through sacrifice, charity, meditation and temper-
ance " ; " By the performance 6f any one of the yagas or of
Darvlhomas one's mind will get rid of all impurities " these are —
the Srutis. And the Sutrakara (Vyasa) also says, " Hence it is
that karma pertaining to (each) asrama is needed " " There is ;
68
tf^TSNT — —Saraskara
etc. is either the removal of impurities
qmmvn or the generation of some quality 301ml*. We have the —
text,
*
'The yogins engage in karma without attachment, for the purifi-
cation of the Self" —Gita, V. 11, pointing to the eradication of sin by
the performance of karma. is also well known that apurva is
It
5T%ST— Brh., IV. iv. 22. The BrShmanas long to know such a Being
by the repetition of the Vedas, by sacrifices, .by offerings, by penance,
by fasting.
9?^«f?L—The illustration is to show that karma is needed as a means
60 —
^iTPTWror The discharging of one's debts, viz., pitr-rna;
this can be discharged by begetting sons; rs>rna, manu§ya-rna by —
Vedic study; deva-rna by yajna. —
61 a^rg^S —
«n*KJ3' In the nyaya-sutras, i.e., both dharma-siitras
and vedanta-stitras, only the nyayas or interpretational rules are inti-
mated and not the order or krama. Its direct indication is the
function of Sruti. The sutras are concerned with merely laying down
the ny5yas.
212 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVII. 57
accomplished all at the same time and as such the order of succes-
sion being unavoidable, the word ' atha might intimate the
'
heart, etc. (of the sacrificial animal) since such order is intended
like that there isno order intended here, because there exists no
proof for assuming the inquiry into Dharma and the inquiry into
Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and auxiliary or
the relation of qualification conferred on a person for a parti-
cular act."
XVII. 57. Purvapaksin. — It (the order of succession) may
also be thus —just as svarga is the specific single reward (phala)
for the six yagas consisting of Agneya, etc., similarly inquiry into
Dharma as well as Brahman has svarga as the single reward (for
both) and hence requiring as such inquiries do a certain order,
(we have to take) atha ' as intended to determine it. Or just as
'
82
i(«h*35>T<*?f ^f5fU£—-etc. The intimation of order would be appro-
priate if the agent in both cases were identical. What the Siddhantin
points out is that between Dharmajijnasa and Brahmajijfiasa there
obtains neither the relation of principal and subordinate 3w$*fasw**, —
e.g., between the prayaja and DarSapurnamasa sacrifice; nor the
relation of several auxiliaries and one principal $mwi ** ^\\ t^»-
which is dependent upon man's action and whose very being (viz.,
the act of religious duty) is absent at the time of inquiry into its
nature. Here on the other hand Brahman which is eternally
accomplished and which is not dependent on man's effort is the
object of inquiry.
214 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVII. 60
Vedic texts also '], (the two inquiries differ) This is another —
difference in regard to the objects of inquiry depending upon the
difference in the pramanas (i.e., pramanavakyas or authoritative
texts). The codana (Vedic injunction) relating to Dharma no
doubt prompts one to action, but finding itself incapable of
prompting in the case of an absent visaya the object to be
achieved, instructs one in the visaya also. The pramana (text)
relating to Brahman on the other hand, is confined only to the
instruction (jnapanamatra) and the man is not prompted to exert
to achieve it. Knowledge indeed arises in conformity with the
object and in conformity with the pramana, and does not conform
to man's desire. How could there be any prompting? When,
for example, there is proximity between the sense and the object,
cognition is produced in the man by the perceptive sense owing
to proximity and the man is not enjoined (to acquire it). It is
*
Brahmacodana is used with the object of denoting pramana 63
*
(i.e., valid means of proof relating to Brahman) and not with the
—
idea of denoting prerana incitement to action or niyoga and this
(the Bhasyakara) states :-—[" That codana which defines Dharma
intimates the knowledge of its own subject (of Dharma) to the
person while at the same time enjoining action on him; codana
relating to Brahman on the other hand merely instructs the person
(in the knowledge of Brahman and does not urge him to action)
the person not enjoined (to exert) for instruction, because instruc-
is
•3 This is added because the same word codana has been inter-
preted 'as injunction —prerana, in the previous portion dealing with
Dharma.
XVIII. 62] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 215
61
RWlfcrewSsjftRre:, etc—The Piirvapaksin concedes that the
word 'atha* may not import subsequence to (i) Vedic study 9***PR —
(ii) inquiry into Dharma —vw^rar, (Hi) knowledge of what consti-
tutes karma—*»«?l^ft vT, (iv) performance of ritualistic duties vftgBffl,
but urges that it may mean subsequence to something within ordinary
experience and not necessarily subsequence to the antecedents here
specified. The answer is that the Vedantic inquiry must follow only
after acquiring the qualifications prescribed in the Scriptures them-
selves. And these qualifications are known as sadhanacatustaya and
they are
(0 R3Tlft3T^cjfa%3>:, discrimination of what eternal and
what is transient— cf. ^i^% Ai m^\ sTr!*,
is
v?$m 3?*pr
g<"Ti%cfl $\%\ sfrm. Chand. Up., VIII. i-vi.
00 ^^^^^^J^^TT:—avertion to the enjoyment of the
fruit of one's action here and hereafter cf. *?R*R*fJ
3>WT i$k fsR *R%,—Brh. Up., II. iv. 5. This enjoins
renunciation of everything that is not Atman.
(iii) ^irwr^Tvwtfq^
—tranquillity;
3T*T
«f«l— faith.
These are known as sadhanasafka cf. Brh. Up., IV. iv. 23.
Purvapaksin. —Let
be so but a thing that is a product and
it ;
immortal ".
68. Hence it is not that even men of discretion invariably
renounce the pleasures of sense. Nor again does desire for
liberation arise on the strength of a being that is immutable and
eternal (for there is no probability of identity with the inner wit-
ness); and because of its absence (viz.. renunciation as well as
desire for liberation), no one cultivates tranquillity, self-control,
etc. ; for which reason (i.e., Jiva and Brahman being opposite in
nature) the jiva's (bhokta's) tadatmya with that (Brahman) is
improbable, nor does (i.e., since Brahman is all-pervading) jiva's
reaching that —kujastha—(desire for liberation on the support
of Ktitastha) arise. 70 Though sorrows have ceased (in the state of
moksaj, since there is no enjoyment of (positive) pleasure that
purusartha (i.e., the human end)
not irreproachable. (There-
is
for Vedantic study all covetings for non-eternal things cease and the
truth that Brahman alone is eternal while the rest however exalted
is ephemeral, becomes apparent in conformity with the nyaya
Hv&ftii cl^ftsin —
whatever is a product is perishable.
* 5HT%:—(T.D.).
Because of the improbability of the identity of the 'individual soul
with Brahman there arises no effort for the Vedantic inquiry by those
who long for the knowledge of identity—TTTCT <T^lfH: TcT: Trfr ?!^- —
WTfH: 3TcTs *3<ni^fr «T 5ffl%: And because there is no samyoga relation
between the jiva and Brahman there arises no effort for inquiry
^3U*r«€*ftqwr, approachability.
XVIII. 70] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 219
71 5
—
*r*3^ S5rtfn«H?T5Tmrcr Now there are two Vedic texts which
seem to conflict with each other. The Purvapaksin depends on
'
f I ^T5*?fa3nf*R: while the Siddhantin on cra^Tf wMmw «5!«:
3T$p2f '
'
tfterMT«re«ij*pr 3^Ti%m $m
$for%—Chand. Up., VIII. i. 6. The position
of the Siddhantin is however stronger than that of the objector because
the text he relies upon, has the support of the logical inference that —
which is a product is non-eternal 1 c^T^-rRfasiij[. — The other text
therefore occupies a subordinate position being regarded as laudatory
in character —arf^i^. TSsFrasjfTl-sqifH^siI*! —supported by concomit-
ance— s^rfo.
220 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XX. 71
Brahman-inquiry) the view that the word " atha " involves the
necessary antecedence of inquiry into Dharma is on the aforesaid
grounds refuted by implication (arthat, i.e., by arthapatti-pramana).
XX. 71. [The phrase ' Brahmajijnasa has to be construed '
as '
—
Brahmano jijnasa ') desire for the knowledge of Brahman.
If the word * Brahman ' in ' Brahmajijnasa * is construed with
'
inquiry ' —
vicara, which is the secondary sense (antarnlta, lit.
inner sense) of jijnasa then indeed the ' dependent determinative
compound Tatpurusa samasa ') would be preceded by a word
'
72
aT'^ofRTfa^rcT'^, etc. —The question may well be raised why
preference is given to the objective geniiive compound when the dative
compound is equally applicable. In the Purvamimamsa the word
Dharmajijnasa has been dissolved also into 'dharmaya jijnasa' (vide
Sabarabhasya, p. 9). The answer is that Samkara accepts the primary
sense of jijnasa, viz., the desire to know, and not the secondary sense,
viz., vicara or inquiry. icchaNow desire —
being desiderative demands —
a word Hence 'Brahman' in 'Brahmajijnasa'
in the objective relation.
is to be regarded as the object of desire. Hence also the need for
dissolving the compound as Brahmano jijnasa and taking it as genitive-
objective. When the desire to know relates to Brahman, the prayojana
or fruit has to be stated. But it must be noted that whatever is the
object of desire viz., Brahman, that itself is the prayojana viz.,
Brahmajnana.
In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be
distinct but not so in the case of verbs denoting desire. On the other
hand if the secondary sense, viz., Brahman becomes
vicara is accepted
the prayojana and the Vedanta, karma. The prayojana being thus
prominent the compound may be dissolved into Brahmane jijnasa.
XX. 73] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 221
the individual soul (jlva), since if jlva is taken as the agent (in the
Vedantic inquiry) the attributive (viz., jlva agency) would serve
no purpose (for there can be no inquiry apart from jiva) ; if it is
taken as the object (of jijnasa), because it is ever present (i.e.,
inquiry) nor does (Brahman) mean the Veda (lit. the assemblage
;
for final release). All this (i.e., the objection raised and its rebuttal)
need not be undertaken, says Samkara (in the following words)
[" It is therefore not to be imagined that the word Brahman may
denote some other sense such as the Brahmana caste, etc."]
73. [The genitive in the word Brahmanah is used in the
accusative sense.] In another commentary however the genitive
the Veda, but that does not suit here. In the first sutra of Ptirva-
mlmamsa Jaimini has shown that karma or ritualistic act is what the
Vedic texts mean and that karma is productive of good. In the fifth
sutra known as autpattika sutra he has pointed out that the validity
of the Veda as a means of knowledge is unexceptional. Hence it would
be mere reiteration to accept that sense (vide the present writer's
English Translation of Sastra Dipika in the Gaekwad Oriental Series).
222 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XX. 74
thus:
— "Even sesasasthi
if *
accepted the objective relation
*
is
of the common word (i.e., the word which denotes either the
objective relation or other) and accepting a different sense, again
try to cognise through its means the desired sense. Hence says
(the Bhasyakara) —
[" But this way (of interpreting) would amount
which is as good as saying that the king is going with his retinue/]
Because the attainment of Brahman is the highest human end
therefore it is most desired object that is
the to be attained by
knowledge. Hence (its being the most desired object) since effort
(by way of study —sravana, etc.) is for its attainment it (Brahman)
is the most pre-eminent, and when that which is pre-eminent is
—
attains the Supreme (Tait. Up. Brahmavalll i) and who as such
desires to know (Brahman), (the Rsi Varuna) first expounding
the nature of Brahman in (the words), Whence these beings
— surely
*
are born, etc., instructs (his son Bhrgu) thus that seek thou to
'
—
know; (that is Brahman); Tait. Up. Bhrguvalll i) " which is —
a mandate enjoining that Brahman is to be known directly as the
object. And this that (Varuna taught and Bhrgu learnt) is
aphoristically expressed by the present Sutra " Then therefore
—
is the inquiry into Brahman." Hence if (Brahmanah) is taken
as the objective genitive the sutra which as the name suggests
strings together the reasonings (necessary to determine the import
of the srutis, will be conformable to it (sruti). Otherwise not
being conformable to, the laksya {i.e., the srutis which* the sutras
— laksana, expound) the Sutra ceases to be coherent (lit. becomes
disconnected with the Sruti). This the Bhasyakara expresses thus
[' This interpretation is in agreement with the Scripture '] —
74
So meaning of the radical Brahman has been explicated;
far the
now begins the inquiry into the meaning of the genitive termination
in 'Brahmanah'. The text commencing with 5r$°T %fa wAm q#r and
ending with *r gW^frfT^nft is taken up with maintaining the objective
sense of the genetive termination as against ^?^^ whose proper sphere
is to denote 'relations such as obtain between persons or things
denoted by nouns'. While the upholder of the Sesasasthl has to bring
the objective relation indirectly by presumptive evidence arthapatti —
the Siddhantin by maintaining karmani sasthl shows that all the rela-
tions expressed by the genetive in its primary sense cannot be implied
in the objective sense. Pramana is pramajanaka, yukti or tarka is
pramapanugrahaka, i.e., supportive of a pramana by pointing to the
probability of the conclusion to which it leads.
XXI. 78] THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT 225
brief statement which is expanded in, [" Whence, surely, are all
these beings born, etc."
— — srutis such as these, (again) '
Desire to
know that ', * That is Brahman ', directly represent Brahman as
the object of the desire of knowledge;and it is only when the
genitive case taken to denote the object that the sutra will con-
is
may signify even what is mediate (paroksa) and has not yet been
verified by one's own experience. It arises as stated before in
immediate comprehension
—'akhr.nda\rttijf.ara —3miyi^*T, and as
such the desire for the direct knowledge of Brahman constitutes the
—
import of the sutra statement. It is thus subsequent to the attain-
ment of the four disciplinary aids —sadhanacatust-aya —there arises the
desire for the direct and immediate comprehension of Brahman'. Now
it is urged that the prescription of inquiry— agifasimr %t\°%] is needless
(it is to attain the immediate
since the very excellence of the desire
knowledge of Brahman than which there is nothing more excellent)
prompts one to begin the inquiry and that as such the first sutra is
a mere restatement —
anuvada. To meet this objection what it is that
is to be done has to be stated. Since jftana is declared in the 6ruti
as the desired object it follows that the means to such jnana is also
desired. —
But mere desire s^ssr cannot be the means for the acqui-
sition of the direct knowledge of Brahman: it is the inquiry into the
Vedanta which must follow the desire and precede jf.ana. Hence the
word jijnasa should by secondary significance he taken to mean inquiry
into Vedanta. To point out the import of the proposition thus arrived
at the Bhasya proceeds with the words riwrf m \m%^\fCm^H In .
77
(inquiry). The obligation to undertake the other (viz., jijnasa
or inquiry) which follows it (v/z., the fourfold discipline) and is
77
«Bl*aTFr^fa;gT3n: —Because the desire for freedom together -with
the other three requisites constituting sadhanacatustaya must precede
vicara, it is to be regarded as occasioning the latter. The causality of
the fourfold discipline follows from arthapatti pramana but that of
inquiry —faw from the direct statement.
78 sn^rw? — may be said that the explanation of individual
=3, etc. It
words comprised in the first sutra, v/z., atha, aUh, Brarman (as
objective genitive), jna, and *san' termination, is quite adequate to
convey the import of the sentence and that in consequence the state-
ment f^^TSfJ fafafnfef^R is needless. But it must be borne in
'
'
'
mind that the discrete meanings of words fail to convey the import of
the sentence and as such it must be expressly stated. ciw?i-3i;|3^-
—
=5r3?^m**rcn because of the existence of the four essential elements;
5r§i-5r§ifg4WR-5r^ 7fWT? liRrT— for the intuitive perception of Brahman;
, ?
1
rPJJJTsfel, etc. —The purvapaksin urges that since doubt arises as
to whether there any relevant subject — visaya for the
is Uttara-
mlmamsa §astra to discuss, we are in perplexity and as sush he thinks
that the study of the §astra need not be undertaken. His point is
tion since both visaya and prayojana are implied in the mandate regard-
ing inquiry, viz., 'atman is to be perceived, heard about, and meditated
upon\—Brh. Up., IV. v. 6.
8 The Sruti quoted, 3?ic*H T&, etc., is not an injunction in reality.
6
Jf yzmll wnwwi&^izuvi —
nor even in a secondary sense is there
any connection between the Vedanta and Brahman.
• This is an answer to the objection that the absence of relation is
the contention that the triad (viz., visaya, sambandha, and prayo-
jana) is absent. 7
Purvapaksin. —Well,
the sastra (Vedanta sutras) is the work
of one whose acumen and unimpeachable trustworthiness
critical
7
Simkara emphatic about Brahman's beirg known. Then the
is
ascertained. Hence there is scope for inquiry and the treatise under-
taking such inquiry has all the three prerequisi es subject-matter or —
visnya, purpose or prayojana, and relation or sambandha.
8 f«ppr«TR*ffliq?n£—Without being identical with the visaya.
3T^^afaqi^3WT3?n3TT*zi^— it is not a fit subject for exposition, i.e.,
there exists no proper relation between the work and the subject it
proposes to expound. In fine the subject-matter should be special
to it. What the purvapaksin means is that when the phala is stated,
ipso facto, the visaya and sambandha become known and there is no
need for their specific mention.
232 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [II. 7
take the study of this (sastra) only. Hence (i.e., to obviate such
dubiousness) a visaya that stands out distinct from the rest has to
be stated ; it is like this—when it is said that this (viz., the killing
of the demon by name NIvatakavaca) is the visaya of Arjuna
(i.e., what is by him) we understand that the
to be accomplished
visaya (the killing) something not possible for another (in other
is
not possible of attainment from any other than from the one
intended, —
and relation sambandha being (one of expounder
and expounded), all these differ from one another (and therefore
have to be stated separately).
10
It may be argued that relation —
fl# vJ, apart from the subject
of inquiry—hw, need not be mentioned since visaya cannot remain
isolated but must imply relation. But it has to be pointed out that by
visaya we mean what is possible of being expounded only by the
Sastra of which it is the visiya and by none other; sambandha on the
other hand emphasises its (visaya) inseparable relation, with the Sastra
or in other words negates its non-relation— af^ii^W-S^. Hence both
visaya and sambandha should be explicitly stated. Two illustrations
are given in the text to show that mere mention of visaya without
sambandha would lead to an irrelevant conclusion. (i) A person —
wishing to acquire knowledge of the correct use of language, when he
is not engaged in the study of grammar may proceed to the study
the query whether Brahman was known or not known and urged
that inquiry was out of place in either case), having discarded, on
the ground of the conflicting views (held by different schools of
thought), the absolute knowability or absolute unknowability (of
Brahman, the Bhasyakara) has shown the possibility of explain-
ing the nature of Brahman, as also the impossibility of establish-
ing it by any means other than (the vicarasastra) and thereby has
justified the tenability of both visaya and sambandha. And when
it is stated [that the inquiry having the highest beatitude as its
11
fT5T —
The opponent's contention is that though
frarfTTf^n&FcFT:
visiya, prayojana and sambandha are indispensable for inducing the
study of any Sastra, they cannot be shown to exist here on the postu-
lation of either alternative, i.e., whether Brahman is known or is not
known. If known, visiya and prayojana are absent, if unknown,
sambandha as well as prayojana is absent. In answer, the Bhasyakara
says that neither alternative is right in entirety and that Brahman is an
entity that can be expounded. He thus maintains the tenability
of all the three essential requisites for the commencement of the
Sastra,
III. 10] IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY ? 235
which are aids to the paddy grains in putting forth the sprout
have not also the sprout as their product (karya). Therefore it
is indubitable that the vedanta sastra alone is means of the know-
ledge of Brahman and that the inquiry (mlmamsa) fulfils the func-
tion of itikartavyata (i.e., steps into the place of itikartavyata)
and yet it (the vicara) has Brahman only as its visaya. It is not
that the wood-cutter's action (vyapara) of the nature of raising and
bringing down (the axe) having the axe as its visaya has not also
12
^-J 5f5I ^!»cH«Tt fan? —The inconsistency pointed out here is
that the three essentials spoken of, can justly pertain to Vedanta only
and not to the Uttaramlmamsa (Vedanta sutras). The function of the
latter is to interpret the Upanisads by adducing pertinent texts and
cogent reasoning. It is interpretational and has only an instrumental
value.
13
The prayojana Vedanta is Brahmasaksatkara or
in the case of
the direct realisation of Brahman. The study of Vedanta sutras by
eradicating all doubts and wrong notions strengthens the conviction
of identity got from the pregnant texts like 'That thou art*. Thus the
sfltras have an indirect value. A parallel may be cited. The study of
works dealing with dharma (ritual) and artha (wealth) helps one to
attain happiness indirectly through obtaining 'svarga' or wealth as the
study of the one or the other.
is
14
The Vedas enjoin
the performance of yagas of which the
principal ones are Agneya, etc., and the auxiliary ones are the five
prayajas. Without the latter the desired end will not eventuate.
Similarly, Vedanta is the direct means of Brahma-realisation, but the
study of the Uttaramlmamsa is an essential auxiliary to the right
understanding of vedanta.
^fe^icisf cfi —Procedure of performance.
236 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [III. 11
the tree as its visaya because it is meant for that purpose (i.e.,
for splitting the tree), and because (the action of) the instrument
(viz., the axe) is the intermediate step (by which the required object
is gained). Otherwise (i.e., if the objective relation of the tree
via the axe is not admitted) the agent's action would be in one
locus (viz., the axe) and the result (of such action) in another,
(viz., the tree) so that each would be subsisting in a different
substratum (and this goes counter to common experience).
11. Purvapaksin. — [Page 69] This is to be said —
your
illustration is inappropriate. It is only where (i.e., in which object)
the phala (end in view) itself does not eventuate without the aid
of something else, that something also has that object as its visaya. 15
But here on the contrary even apart from the mlmamsa (the
Uttaramlmamsa sastra) the sentence (the vedantic text) conveys
the sense requiring only (on the part of the hearer) a knowledge
of the primary significance of words, its recollection and the
revival in the mind of the meaning, and it (sentence) does not need
any other aid. 16
12. Siddhantin. —Well, the inquiry (mlmamsa) by removing
alldoubts and erroneous notions becomes the means of determin-
ing the sense (of the Vedantic texts) and because the determined
(viz., Brahman that is demonstrated) is the principal (visaya) of
this determination (nirnaya) the entity that is demonstrated
becomes the object of the hetu (viz., vicara) of the nirnaya also. 17
15 The phala —
the being split in twain, has the tree as its locus and
it cannot be brought about except by the upward and downward
movement of the axe. Hence the axe is directly the visaya of the
movement and the tree indirectly. Here however, says the opponent,
—
even without inquiry the phala Brahman-cognition takes place in the
locus, viz., Brahman; as such it is not the visaya of inquiry vicara. —
18
In order that the Uttaramlmamsa may be considered indispens-
able like the fore-offerings in a ritual there must be Vedic sanction
which, the purvapaksin says is absent. Nor is the inquiry indispens-
able since one who has a fair knowledge of the language can construe
the sense of the Upanisadic passages with the aid of accessories such as
—
expectancy— afrai^T, juxtaposition fl%fa and compatibility 3l«mr, —
knowledge of the relation of the word with its object 5Ti*^^f. etc.
17
The siddhantin admits that even without inquiry, the Upanisadic
passages can be understood with the knowledge of grammar and
idiom, but the vicara is intended to clarify the text by dispelling doubts
and difficulties that may arise at the time of comprehending its import.
III. 13] IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY ? 237
13. —
Purvapaktin. Your argument is unsound. Where indeed
on the hearing of a sentence more than one cognition arises irres-
pective of inquiry there one (of them only) must be regarded as
having been truly produced by the sentence, because a proposition
once stated is by rule capable of conveying only one meaning;
the rest on the other hand are due to one's having observed the
same words used in different contexts. (But then what purpose
does the inquiry serve?) There (i.e., where different cognitions
arise) when the inquiry is carried on in conformity with the signi-
ficative potencies of words as commonly accepted, one gets to
know that one particular jfiana is truly produced by the words
(composing the Vedantic text) and then one comes to the conclu-
sion that its (jfiana) visaya is the meaning of the Vedic (text in
question) and as such one discards the rest, but (it is to be noted
that) by no means does the sastra (Uttaramimamsa) function in
the production of the determining jnana, (here, the jnana by which
the Ultimate is comprehended). For instance though the eye
has come into contact (with a tree) it may create doubt owing to
a certain cause, whether it is a tree or a man, or it may create
(owing to some other cause) the erroneous notion that it is a man
and subsequently on the strength of other causes it produces the
indubitable right knowledge. But this is not analogous. It is
fests itself at the very time its import (i.e., of the proposition or
will enable one to perceive what exactly the vedanta texts import.
Hence the vicara performing this function of removing wrong notions
is by way of figure spoken of as bestowing on §abda the capacity to
determine the sense. Vi ara is not the direct means in the deter-
mination' of the sense. In this way, vicara should be understood as
having Brahman as its visaya.
IV. 16] IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY ? 239
being revealed by any means (other than the sastra). And this trial
is found together and also separately in one and the same context. 21
Let not the topic be prolonged.
IV. 16. The Bhasyakara, by the statement [' Brahman, we
maintain, is known', etc.] has shown that universal experience
vouches for the existence of Brahman and that as such having
discarded the view that Brahman is unknown he has maintained
that because the nature of expounded Brahman is possible of being
(by the sastra) there exists the expounder and ex- relation (of
pounded, pratipadya-pratipadaka sambandha between the sastra
and visaya, viz.. Brahman). (It may be asked) * how'. 22 As for
20
falW? . . . . The first sutra has no doubt intimated the
—prayojana, yet the relation between the Uttaramlmamsa sastra
fruit
and the prayojana has not found a definite mention as one of expounder
and expounded — Hence the relation has to be
sjicRtSIJJicNl^sfa'q'.
specifically stated.
21
t^c5rc«*»3r *r*!>?T fa*T*fi ^ <rr^R>. Here Brahman is visaya,
liberation is prayojana, the one (Sastra) being the expounder and the
other (Brahman) expounded, is the relation, sambandha— thus these
can be expressed as distinct. Similarly Brahman-knowledge is the
prayojana, relationship appertains to that only since it is expounded by
the work, 3rl*ifrri*?T and finally that itself is the content— fwr since
itcannot be established by any pramana other than that, viz., sabda.
Thus these can be expressed in their aggregate character.
22
^j'-fnj,?—The purvapaksin finds fault with the assertion 9T1% —
^131—Brahman beyond perception's range being void of colour
is
and shape; nor can it be the content of inference for the latter
presupposes perception; nor again is the Veda capable of revealing
240 PASCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [IV. 17
the word Brahman (we say, that it is not used in the sutra (ctheto
Brahmajijnasa) in any one of the senses— (Brahmana) caste,
individual soul, the creator (lit. one who is seated on the lotus) >
meaning solely on the ground that it is used (in the Sruti and
sutra). 23
17. Pitrvapaksin. —
That is jejune. A word does not pro-
duce immediately the knowledge of a thing not previously compre-
hended as does the eye, etc. (if otherwise, i.e., if the word could
produce such cognition) we would be in a position to know by
the mere use of the word the meaning of a thing which was neither
comprehended before nor avouched by any other pramana. And
even (the meanings of) entities like svarga, etc., are not deter-
mined by the mere use of the words.
18. Siddhantin. —
We will answer. Suppose in some sen-
tence with the exception of a single word the meaning of other
words is well-known, we put this question do you abandon that —
(v/z., the well-known import) because of the offence of non-
—
propositional import snsvfar for isolated words can only recall their
primary sense. Supposing the meaning of the proposition arises when
the word Brahman is found as a part of the sentence, it may mean
Brahmana caste, Hiranyagarbha, etc., and we may fail to determine
its real sense here.
83
The objection is that the word Brahman cannot," as supposed
by the siddhantin, convey a non-empirical sense 3T^!l%^ because the —
primary significance of Vedic words is in conformity with that of
secular words. Words bear the same meaning whether found in sacred
or profane literature. The Siddhantin answers that not the whole of
the Vedic usage is in conformity with secular usage.
J V.
19] IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY ? 241
24
—
ftlH What 'nigama' denotes is that when the root-meaning
of a word composed of the root and the termination, is in harmony with
the context that meaning alone should be regarded as the one denoted
by the entire word. In the bhasya—fjptafi^Kqfig'Wi?fc— it is clearly
stated that from the etymology of the word Brahman 'brh' to be —
great, the all-pervading Brahman alone is meant. From that root-
meaning, fa*m we also understand what the chief attributes of
Brahman are, viz., eternal purity, eternal knowledge and eternal
freedom.
85
fafoffrrcj, 5RTT: —The word 'Brahman' is found in association
with other words constituting a sentence and the sentence-import will
be incoherent unless 'Brahman' is taken in a specific sense. Here
Nigama comes to our aid. When from its root-meaning Brahman is
understood to mean all-embracing, there the vakya, fl^I ^nswpFd will m
yield a coherent sense. Eternal existence, knowledge and limitlessness
cannot be attributed to Brahman if it should be particular caste,
Hiranyagarbha, etc.
10
242 PAnCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [IV. 20
26
The purvapaksa is that where the conventional sense of a word
say,Brahman ill-assorts with the meanings of other words in whose
company it appears in a propositional statement, nigama solves the
difficulty on the basis of arthapatti; but the siddhanta ignores the
conventional sense, for in the case of Brahman no conventional sense
is possible being incapable of corroboration by any other pramana.
It is its association with words of definite significance that necessitates
us to resort to the root-meaning, nigama. The word srijt is used
twice; the first means and the second, ^1%.
snTCT^FT^CTrftsingT?:
27
cTcr** 3>1*5$<T, etc. —
What alpatva means is the limitation caused
by place, time and object. The absence of limitation constitutes the
unsurpassed greatness of Brahman. Such greatness is denoted by the
very word Brahman provided it is not used with any qualifying adjunct
or in any specific context.
*>T3f>?T points to the limitation caused by time; FTFcTTO^fr, etc.,
28
This is the idealistic standpoint. The word 'Brahman' points
to psrfeetion or absoluteness in every respect since there is no reason
nated the ego (aham) in the world. Hence as the idea conveyed
by the ego is known to be Brahman only there is no room for
*
'
(between the sastra and Brahman or viz., one of exponent and ex-
—
pounded, pratipadaka pratipadya) is also thereby proved to
exist.
*
aggregate including the head is meant. By the word mere *
*
matra ' what is pointed out is that there is no independent intelli-
gence distinct from the body nor is intelligence (caitanya) attri-
butive to something other (than the body) but that intelligence
is no other than what is comprised in the four elements which
have evolved into the contexture of the body. 30 By the word
*
atman ' is meant that which is denoted by the ego-notion— aham-
pratyaya 31 by the word prakrtah is meant those whose minds
;
' '
are untutored for lack of Sastraic instruction, that is, those who
without deliberation act merely on what appeals to their senses.
The Lokayatikas (materialists) are well known, as the upholders
of the reality of (only) four elements.
VII. 30. [Likewise others (think) that the sense-organs only
endowed with intelligence constitute atman.] On the ground
that theie arises no knowledge of colour, etc., in the absence of
the sense-organs ranging from the eye to the mind even though
the body exists they believe that to them (i.e., the senses) only
in their individual capacity is intelligence attributable and also
30
The Samkhyas and the Vedantins admit that caitanya is an
independent entity. The Naiyayikas say that it is attributive to Stman
which is distinct from the body. Both these views are animadverted
against by the miterialists. Intelligence according to them is not
a separate category but is involved in the four elements.
31 In the context relating to the different views
regarding the mean-
ing of the ego-notion the word atman should be taken to mean the
content of the ego-notion— ar^srsrerawr.
VII. 31] IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY ? 247
that they are the content of the ego-notion. Further (they are
of the view that each sense) in turn subserves the other on the
analogy of a number of suitors. 32 As such the ego-notion is
perceived as the substratum of the qualities pertaining to the senses,
for instance (we say) *
I am deaf, *
I am dumb \ etc.
31. [Others are of opinion that the *
mind '
alone is atman]
and is the content of the ego-notion. [Page 73] And pointing
to the fact that in the state of dream though the ten senses are
quiescent the mind by itself in the place of the ego (aham) gene-
rates all activities they assert (that what is denoted by *
aham *
is
the mind).
32. [Others maintain that the self is a mere momentary
idea —vijnana.] The word *
matra —mere ' is intended to denote
that apart from what the three letters, *
a, h, m (in aham) '
express
(viz., vijnana) nothing else is manifest as otherwise, i.e., if anything
else were manifest it could have been conceived as the object
denoted by the ego-notion. Hence these others hold the view
that vijnana itself which is liable to destruction by its very nature,
which arises in ceaseless succession, which is the abode of all life's
activities (lit. all that constitutes life's iourney), and with reference
to which the other theory, as contradicting experience, stands
condemned, rightly constitutes the ego (aham self). —
33 [Others maintain that the ego-notion is the void (sunya).]
In the state of deep slumber there isnot the least trace of vijnana
(consciousness); the ego-notion is perceived to arise (immediately
after waking) from sheer accident, and absolute reality cannot be
asserted of that which has arisen without a cause and is (therefore)
accidental so that these others declare that the ego manifests only
non-existence or the void. 33
32
When a number of suitors are in search of a wife, when one
succeeds, the others withdraw. Similarly when the perceptive sense
is active the other senses are quiescent; when the tactile sense is
prominent and so on. This is in answer to the
active the others are not
objection that there would be conflict and confusion when cognising
the objects of sense if each sense was independent of the rest. The
VPS., p. 181, explains the passage somewhat differently. When there
are several men in a family at the marriage of each the others are
mere accessories—^! ^$1 W. *i% ^f*rf Jjwnt ^w.m^ fspffi aF^rgqasr-
VIII 34. [Others hold that there exists one who is distinct
from the body, who is the migratory soul, agent and enjoyer (of
the fruit of action).] Nowhere (they urge) is the capacity for enjoy-
ment perceived in a thing that is not denoted by the ego; that
which is the enjoyer (bhokta, /.e., a ham)
must be of a permanent
nature because of its being the object of recognition and no cause
is known marking the limit of what is permanent hence (atman ;
34
is) an enduring entity. Because enjoyment is incompatible with
what does not suffer change, because change is the result of action,
and agency (kartrtva) can be attributed only to that with \\hich
action is in intimate relation, because a transmieratory life, is
How impossible?
Primary—pradhanya, should be ascribed to the enjoyer as
against the object of enjoyment.
Well, even in enjoyment aggregation is perceived as in the
case of man and wife.
The reasoning is vapid, because it is a matter of doubt if
the elements) could be secondary to the rest since all of them are
on a par, (aggregation) is out of the question as between these
elements which are of the nature of karya (the four elements are ;
is only the enjoyer; with this (assertion) some come to the fore-
holding that action is incompatible with the nature of that same
entity described above as being distinct from the body, etc.; not
always is the ego-notion (ahampratyaya) in association with action
and expressed as *
I know ' and * I enjoy \ Hence this
I act \ *
(cetana); and because all things are for its sake, enjoyership
(bhoktrtva) is of the nature of cetana (intelligence). Hence
they maintain that it is but right to regard atman as enjoyer
only. 38
39.[Some maintain that there exists a Being who is dis-
tinct from that (the individual soul), who is the Lord, omnicient
and omnipotent.] Different from that, />., from that which is
distinct from the body, etc., and is the object of the ego-notion
(viz., the Jiva). is the One who is the Ruler of all and as such is
37
Agency *<¥?, implies association with action, and action
means movement or change. Because atman is all-pervading and
impartite there can neither be movement nor change in.it. It may be
urged that agency pertaining to the intellect may be appropriated by
atman, but that is out of the question since according to the Samkhyas
there is no super-imposi'ion. They hold the akhyati doctrine like
the Prabhakaras. The second reason for atman's not being the agent
is that its association with action strays —«2f]*R?fa (vide text).
38
cT^^HTc^TO —In the system of Samkhyas the self is mere
experiment vm\. The prakrti which evolves into the manifold is
intended for the benefit of cetana, the sentient principle termed puri'§a.
Contrast this with the Vedanta doctrine in which the experient is not
the pure consciousness. Bhoktrtva there means the awareness of
pleasure and pain and this awareness is of consciousness conditioned
by avidyjl.
It may in passing be noted that investigation into the nature of
the individual self —
?#q*^T& has been so far made. Next begins the
inquiry into the nature of IsVara —cl^i*}.
252 PANCAPADUtA OF PADMAPADA (IX. 39
39
StRtft'm JHSisfa —
The existence of a supreme Being is attempted
to be proved by some schools thus:
(i) The Vai&isikas: The universe with all its variety is the
work of a Being whose knowledge should be such as
would enable him to comprehend the means with which
He creates and the purpose for which He creates. The
analogy is that of an architect who designs a mansion.
They argue that a single supreme Being, the All-wise must
be the creator of the universe,
(ii) The Yogins Our limited knowledge, and prowess must
:
means ISvara who is not the content of the ego-notion and is not
atman 740
This is the reply— Since what is undertaken to show is the
differing connotations of Brahman (it is found necessary to deter-
—
mine the nature of Brahman whether it is identical with pratya-
gatman which is what the ego-notion denotes, and in this connec-
tion the view held by some that Isvara is distinct from pratya-
gatman has to be stated, for they hold that Brahman is Isvara).
Even though the opposing views regarding the ego-notion are
pointed out it is as good as showing the opposing views regarding
the nature of Brahman, indirectly. The reason is this, that no
purpose is served by (merely) directing attention to the differing
views held regarding the object denoted by the ego. Hence the
appropriateness of that (v/'z., the Bhasya statement asti
— *
41
If Isvara be an entity distinct from the individual soul he
would suffer limitation caused by the jiva standing apart ^piHb ?. 5
invariable concomitance of fire with smoke and come out with the
poser, let smoke be there without the fire; it amounts to this that smoke
cannot be produced by fire, which is reductio ad absurdum. Tarka is
a powerful instrument in the hands of a reasoner.
X. 42] IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY? 255
taken up. 43
42. due
[In these circumstances if a person should, without
investigation, accept someone (among the contending doctrines)
he will be debarred from the highest bliss (liberation), nay, he
will court disaster.] (The Pancapadika proceeds to explain this
— —
bhasya passage) tatra, (when there exist such diverse views),
evam sthite — (it being so), mumuksuh— (one desirous of the high-
est beatitude through the knowledge of Brahman), avicarya
(neglecting the study of this §astra, the Vedanta), pravartate
(if he should follow anyone of the doctrines that precede the last
one), tada— (then), moksasya samyak jnanaphalatvat—(since
Freedom is the outcome of true knowledge), tasya ca atathabhavat,
— (since the knowledge embraced in the opposing views is not the
45
into the meaning of the Vedanta-texts is begun. With what end
44
—
«n*R .... 3?fr^cT The desire for the knowledge of Brahman—
WflfJR^r is discussed as a preliminary; it is the inquiry into the
Vedanta that is intended and it begins from the second sutra. The
aphorist is not so much concerned with Brahmajnana, for one who is
equipped with the fourfold discipline does begin the inquiry into
Brahman and that need not be enjoined.
46 The first sutra directly enjoins the inquiry into Brahman. The
phrase 'Brahmajijnasa' means desire for the knowledge of Brahman.
But since injunction is incompatible with desire, jijnasa should be taken
in a secondary sense to denote something that can be accomplished
and is fit to be enjoined, —
and that is, inquiry vicara. It is therefore *
evident that the sutra meant to inculcate inquiry only and the
is
in view and with what means (is this inquiry associated) ? Here
is the answer—it has as its auxiliary, logic that is not hostile to it
(Vedanta) and the highest beatitude (moksa or freedom) is its
end (prayojana). To explain— tad virodhi, taih —to the
etc.,
from the primary significance of the phrase so that the duty to under-
take the vicara is derived from arthapatti pramana and not from
Sabda. * Jijrlasa kartavya', amounts to 'vicaralj kartavyalj*.
17
VARNAKA V
DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN
1. 1. fit has been stated that the knowledge of Brahman
is to be desired.] The meaning of this Bhasya is, " This sastra
is to be studied by one who is desirous of acquiring the knowledge
—
of Brahman " so it is said. 1 When this statement was made
then only laksana—definition of Brahman, pramana—valid means
of knowledge, yuktih—conformable sadhana— aids logic, to reali-
sation and prayojana— these must be understood) the
fruit, all (it
1
awfarfisn —The desire to know Brahman. This is the sense
that is patent on hearing the phrase. But neither jfiana nor iccha (desire)
which are its two elements is fit to be enjoined. Hence jijnasa should
— —
be taken to mean inquiry vicara in its secondary sense, and the
sutra should be construed as 'inquiry should be undertaken for
acquiring the knowledge of Brahman.
2
Inquiry into Brahman includes lak$ana, pramana, yukti, sadhana
and phala. Here Brahma-la ksana or the definition of Brahman has
first to be stated as without it the elucidation of the other four is not
possible.
3 agTOrfMnT —
The attributive compound (bahuvrlhi samasa) is of
—
two kinds tadguna and atadguna-samvijfiana. In the first the attri-
butive element also gets into the predicative relation along with the
aggregate (samastapada); in the second it enters into no such relation.
For example take ' «5WR»d| %45Ti?TT«Rr —bring Devadatta with the long
ear'; here «*3Rj<ft —long-eared, the attribute of the aggregate, 'one
I. 3] DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 259
arising, the Bhasyakara says [" That the origination (of the world)
as being the first in the series is based on the authority of the Vedic
text and also on the way a thing develops"]. The Vedic text
which proceeds to describe that very Brahman which has been
defined in this sutra has therein, origination as first mentioned;
hence its primacy (in the sutra). This is evident from the nature
—
of things also no object exists after having come to an end, nor
existing is it born; nor does it suffer destruction with its very
origination for the doctrine of the momentariness has already
been refuted. 4 Hence having originated, and having existed it
who has the long ear' is related to the predicate (vidheya), anaya
(bring). But in 'fasrg %^TTOW3r— bring Devadatta of the brindled cow',
we have the atadguna-samvijnana; for in the compound, 'citragum'
(the brindled cow) is not in relation with the predicate — anaya. Where
the meaning of the parts (gunavayava) is in attributive relation, we have
Uadguna-samvijfiana ' but if it is only upadhi or upalaksana we have
atadguna-samvijnana. The compound 'janmadi' is tadguna variety.
i.e., an integral part of the aggregate. Hence the Bhasyakara says that
janmadi tagduna-samvijnana bahuvrihi.
is
4
5T^II^ etc. —
Objection is taken to the order mentioned here.
The word beginning implies a state in which the world did not exist.
But the world has not started from any point of time. The objection
loses its ground when confronted with the Sruti—q#T 31 f*Iu% q^nft
260 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMArADA [I. 4
5
A pronoun —I^IIT name implies stands for all nouns
as the
unless its scope is limited either by the context or by its association with
some limiting adjuncts. Here the pronoun 'this' %i is used in its
unrestricted sense. qfifol:-srrw? *3i«r:,,
of the objective world,
jwm^wsr-—all that is given in any pramana, i.e., all prameyas—
all orjscts of knowledge.
• 2T<T %}^ t
etc. —
The pronoun *y a t"h' should in the present context
relate to Brahman only but the bha§ya says that it denotes cause
(*T?T $RT *niw{*r.), the object being that from the ablative we must
understand that Brahman is both the material and the instrumental
cause, for the word karana is a general term.
II. 5] DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 2C1
*
visesalaksana ' or descriptive definition. Of these the laksana
here pointing as it does to the attributive adjuncts of the world
stands outside only, of (Brahman) and yet denotes Brahman by
indirect characterisation and not by the description (of its nature). 7
Hence as distinct (from its characterisation as the source of the
origination, subsistence, and dissolution of the world) Brahman's
descriptive definition has to be stated. (This svarupalaksana is
This bh5sva therefore points out that the origin, etc., of the world
is to be regarded not as the definition of Brahman, but only as being the
cause of the world-origination, etc. Even there causaticn so far
as the Absolute is concerned 'tatisthalaksana'
or 'upalaksana*
is
like the misty emanations which resemble smoke and yet do not
suggest the presence of fire.
The answer is that it is ta{asthalaksena only and is illusory and
as such it cannot bring about the annulment of the defined laksya, —
viz.. Brahman.
262 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [II. 7
be mentally conceived.] —
One of limited vision cannot even con-
ceive of the manner in which the external world is designed as
10
3^fa<T3rSJ**F? =* ^IrT—What is the definition of the real
nature—•'SWWT of Brahman whose indicative definition, fl2**r«5$m,
has been given in the aphorism '*FJTrsi«J w.\ The svarupalaksana must
be given as otherwise the Sarakhyapradhana might claim equal
status in the creation of the world. The svarupalaksana is the
visesalaksana or the specific definition which excludes without excep-
tion all that is not Brahman. To one who has not seen the moon
we may call his attention to the celestial entity by pointing to the
branch of a tree above which it shines: this is the indicative definition
but then among the celestial bodies wc have innumerable stars and to
exclude them the svarupalaksana must be given, viz., the moon is the
celestial body which emits abundant light. Now the svarupalaksana
is given by Samkara in the bhasya—•" ^
3i9T<(-OTfT%: ^WnfltWRf that
omniscient, omnipotent cause from which the world takes its birth
etc., — that is Brahman". Here the word 'sarvajnatva omniscience' —
is the svarupalaksana of Brahman. Pradhana, atoms and other
supposed causes of the world cannot be said to possess sarvajnatva. The
sarvajnatva should be understood in the sense of svaprakagatva self- —
refulgence. Knowledge is the essence of Brahman and not its property.
264 PASCAPADIKA OF PADMArADA fill. 9
ing to which Brahman only has evolved into the world-form. The
word * vivarta * is used to refute that view. The vivartavada maintains
that the world is but a mmifestation —
vivarta of Brahman and not
its evolute. We
have vivarta when a thing without losing its essence
appears as something else, e.g., the shell appearing as silver; we have
pariniTia when a thing loses its identity and is changed to- something
new, e.g., clay 'appearing as a pot.
The evolution-hypothesis is objected to on the following
grounds:
(i) Relying on the creation-Srutis if we admit the world-evolution,
•Brahman's very nature, viz., partlessness, homogeneity,
vastness, etc., would be destroyed.
III. 10] DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 265
stone, etc., and its gradual desiccation ; as regards the earth even,
we infer its origin and dissolution because we see its parts being
joined and parted— samyoga and vibhaga which point to their
(origin and dissolution). Even now it is perceived in particular
instances (say lumps of clay) that their origin and destruction are
due to samyoga and vibhaga (conjunction and disjunction). And
the origin and destruction of air, ether, time, quarter (' dis ') must
be admitted on the principle to be enunciated in the sutra 14 —
" yavadvikaram tu vibhago lokavat " ( as is seen in the world, —
things which are disparate (like pot, dish, etc., are the vikaras of,
i.e., produced from something, say clay. So also vayu, akasa, —
etc., being disparate, i.e., distinct from one another must neces-
15
^^-3?TI^TqF;^^lf5i^^fj^Rq^^,^3^RqJ?Il!%:. A single
pronouncement to indicate two ideas is *tantra\ a separate pronounce-
ment is avrtti. Badarayana has framed the sutra with this object in
view, viz., that the origin, etc., of the world is due to Brahman
(Tsvara) and that this world cannot come into existence from any
entity other than Brahman. For us repetition (avrtti) of the sutra
twice is necessary to arrive at this dual significance, the first denoting
the laksana and the second excluding any other entity like Pradhana.
For a fuller description of 'tantra' see the present writer's translation
of Sastra Dlpika (Tarkapada) — Gackwad's Oriental Series, Vol. 89.
p. 229.
16
Hiranyagarbha though a highly evolved being belongs to the
category of the jlvas. His powers are therefore limited. In the yoga
system Hiranyagarbha is regarded as the cause of the world.- This
view finds support in the agamas. The Samkhyas attribute the origin
of the world to Pradhana or Prakrti constituted by the three gunas,
the Vai'Sesikas to the atoms and the Naiyayikas infer ISvara as the
primal source of the Universe.
V. 15] DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 267
be held that all the events of life (vyavahara) are accidental then
no law or order would prevail anywhere.
14. Nor is the creation self-posited (i.e., without an external
cause) since it is perceived that specific places, times and causes
are utilised producing the things needed). 18
(for [Page 79]
What the term svabhava means is the non-requirement of any
* '
17
3?^I5rir3^: —The
Bauddhas uphold the doctrine of a void or
Sunya. them originate from non-existence.
All effects according to
We do not know the previous state of pot; hence that state must be
SOnya. RW^c^, srffcR^WlWI^—lacking in the very quality
of existence. Hence non-existence cannot even be conceived as the
cause of the sensible world. 3<TH?*n ^T-areftfa sftm^^— vide A. S.,
p. 271.
18
^*T!^rr: —The
svabhavavada denies the existence of an over-
* *
and others who maintain that Isvara is the cause of the world,
and who assert the statements—* That from which these beings
are born, (that by which when born they live, that into which they
enter after death— that, be desirous of knowing; that is Brahman
— Tait. Up., III. 1) —
the meaning of which is implied in the
aphorism " That from which the origination, etc..'* amount to the
formal syllogistic reasoning (pararthanumana). 19
16. [Well, even here (i.e., the second sutra) the same
anumana as leading independently to the correct sense of the
Upanisadic passage referred to) is expressed], just as a particular
kind of smoke has its origin in fire lit up with *
agaru '
(fragrant
aloe-wood) so has world of unique (variety and) design, as
this
is q-^rarsgiiCT
—
Inference is of two kinds —
svartha and parSrtha.
former means intended for oneself and the latter intended
Literally, the
for another. In pararthanumana we employ a formal argument to
convince another. This necessitates the employment of alf the five
members of the syllogism vide TSA., p. 283 ff.
Those who maintain that Isvara as the Creator of the world could
be established by argument only, without requiring any Scriptural
authority e.nploy the following inferential process:
Every (^w) is the product of one who is cognizant of its
effect
nature (W*) of the mitsrials of its composition (3Tl?«5r), its auxili-
f
as inference, etc.
17. ['* While there are Vedantic passages (declaring the
source of the origin, etc., of the world ")] inference also as long
as it does not contradict the scriptural texts becomes the right
means of knowledge and as such is not discarded, because
scripture itself approves of argumentation as an (indispensable)
aid. To explain:
— * Atman is to be heard and thought on (B.h.,
II. iv-5) —just as from this Sruti, sravana (inquiry into the texts)
is stated to be the means in the acquisition of Brahma-knowledge,
even so is manana or yukti restated premising it to be the indu-
bitable
Sruti
—"means of the cognition
One learned and
of Brahman. Likewise another
reflecting, etc.", " A person having a
teacher to instruct him obtains knowledge " (Ch nd. Up., VI. —
xiv, 2) declares that human reasoning aids Scripture. When the
confirmation of the knowledge obtained (from Vedanta) is secured
for his pupils by the teacher's adducing instances from '
the crystal,
etc.,' which are in conformity with Sruti, then that is restated in
the text
— * the person having a teacher obtains knowledge.'
VI. 18. [" Not as in the case of inquiry into the nature of
Dharma duty)]— from this, the reason for the employ-
(religious
ment of argumentation is stated. Sruti (in * Srutyadayah ') is
the word(sabda) which (in the elucidation of meaning) requires
no other word. From the word ' adi \ are to be understood
linga, vakya, etc., being the different forms of the word (sabda-
prakaras).* 1 It is not that they only (viz., the six pramanas) are
2J
fe^'SN^g —
Owing to some defect we perceive the double
Moon; this is immediate illusion and it can be eradicated only by the
VI. 21] DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 271
24
(in the case of Brahman as in that of Dharma).
21. This is inappropriate in regard to an existing entity since
it would result in the negation of its very nature. For instance,
the alternative notion that arises in a single object, viz., whether
it is a pollard or a man will not be a valid cognition as is that of
the oblation of an alternative ingredient (in a sacrifice); as re-
gards the final truth it is the single notion — this is a pollard only
(that can stand the test) because the knowledge of an accomplished
thing (siddhavastu) is dependent on the nature of the thing and
it is not that the thing is dependent on the knowledge. If it were
so, even the notion of shell-silver would be like that would (i.e.,
—
woman as fire this is meditation on what is other than itself,
viz., woman and yet the knowledge of that meditation is right
two With
sutras are intended to bring out the nature of
this object is given, the illustration
—" BhrgurvaiBrahman.
Varunih '\ 27
27
qttf %^T^T3RRU£—The pQrvapaksin argues that the Vedantic
texts containing the word 'Brahman' cannot be the laksya of the
sutras owing to the unknowability of Brahman. The answer is given
in the statement—%lf ^^js^RF^IRI^. It may be expanded thus:
Do you hold that Brahman in its special nature is unknown or in its
general nature ? If the first, we do not contend it for we admit that
we are ignorant of the specific nature of Brahman, and that without
inquiry we cannot know Brahman as the Real TO, as Knowledge— —
*JR, as Bliss —
3TR'^, as the Inner Soul TOTR*?! and as secondless—
aril^for. If you say that Brahman is not knowable even in its general
nature we do not agree with you. Brahman in its literal sense of vast-
ness is known. Hence on that basis we get to know its specific nature
from the juxtaposition of other words, viz., satya, jnana, etc., so that
—
statements like— TO 9R*n«F^ *W, become competent to expound the
nature of Brahman. The Vivarana answers another objection: It is
this: — If we follow the order of words as found in the tex/— Tait. Up..
II. 1 to be memorised (viz., TO, W^,
etc.,) we fail to get at the
singular number and because the purpose (of the text Yato va —
imani) is to denote only that (viz., ekatva), the distinctive cause,
viz., that the Being whence the world originated is all-knowing
and all-potent, is by presumption (arthapatti) understood from
the text itself (viz., yato va, etc.). Again (we have) the text ** That,
have the desire Bhrguvalli) " this is a
to understand, (Tait. —
restatement —anuvada
having reference to what has gone before.
(It is followed by the statement), " That is Brahman " because ;
1
3re*rrr. —Regarding the all-knowingness of Brahman,
*&lfc t9 :
(Yajnavalkya)
8
5T'^# *ran% —If be stated that the Veda is a mere utterance of
it
Isvara, then He would not be omniscient for we see that the Vedic
teacher even to-day repeats the Veda as ever before but he is not
all-wise. Or if it be stated that ISvara has composed the Veda having
previously thought out its sense then the Veda would be of human
origin and lose its character as the unfailing valid means of knowledge.
This is the purvapaksa and the PP. meets the objection in these words
f W<l t etc.
278 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [II.
4
Here is pointed out the difference between the unalterableness of
the Veda and of Brahman. The Veda is not eternal since it belongs
to the world-order, nor is it unoriginated. vivarta or manifestation
It is
of Brahman like the silver in the shell. Without Brahman there could
be no universe as without rope there would be no serpent. Its
eternality coexists in its similarity as regards the verbal order from
cycle to cycle. The Sruti also vouches for its origin frotn Isvara
sr*? *r^r *&** fr^cf t^.
5
To avoid the human origin of theVeda it is stated. that the Veda
is the manifestation or vivarta of Brahman and as such Brahman
is the vivartopadanakarana of the world like the rope in the rope-
serpent illusion. Then the Paninian example is out of place. Not being
the author in the sense that Panini is, Brahman cannot be said to
possess transcendental knowledge.
6
The phenomenal world is differentiated by names and forms.
Brahman is the ground of their existence and manifestation *?*TT^Tcr. —
As the material cause Brahman possesses vastly superior knowledge as
compared with the object world (fJTSfT*) and the world of names
(JTWSTT^), which latter includes the Veda. Hence answering the query
the PP. says— rT*N snWTTO ^rc^r%%^R*r^!?L
7
Because names and forms which constitute the world derive
their being and manifestation from Brahman it is wrong to suppose
that the origination of the world proceeds from non-existence as
maintained by the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists.
— —
Answer. It is true on the strength of this (third sutra) that
;
owing to the absence of any reference to the Vedic text (in the
second sutra) it would lead to the supposition that inference only
was intimated for establishing the nature of Brahman.
1
The third sutra *
^rr^^Ti^rc^nr:* admits of a double inter-
pretation. The compound may be resolved either as frrercr #n%: -
STWPfrft:, <TST Wf :, STTSWIRc^ <T**Tra;—-that which is the origin (of
;
is that the Sastra beginning with the Rgveda is the pramana or the
valid means, of proving Brahman's existence. It is through Scriptures
apart from reasoning that Brahman known as the cause of the origin,
is
etc., of the world. The sutra therefore may be taken as enunciating the
pramana for establishing Brahman.
280 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [1. 42
cause of the Veda does not result from the single Sutra as framed
'
1
From
the second sutra the indicative definition (definition per
accidens) —
of Brahman <T£Wf$r<T, v/z., that it is the cause of the
origination, etc., of the world, as also the determinative definition
(definition per se) of Brahman that it is consciousness, and bliss, is
stated. The third sutra sets forth that the Vedanta is the valid means
of establishing Brahman so defined. Here the doubt arises how Brahman
could be established on verbal testimony (Sastrapramana), since Brahman
isan existing entity (Siddhavastu). The evidential character of verbal
testimony, is impugned on the authority of Jaimini Sutra I. ii. 1. —
This is the Mlmamsa demurrer. The point of the objection is that
the entire Veda including the Vedanta has action as its visaya (content)
and the Vedanta if it should reveal only an existing entity is valueless.
<lftl%B<TOjft""BTH3o ifo, Hf^rfcf 53?^r«r ^31%. An existent object
has reference to time — past, present or future, or it may mean a thing
that is not the product of action —ar^?T^.
1
arflvtottRfc—Statements made by men have often to be tested by
other pram&nas to ascertain their validity, but since the Veda is non-
personal in origin its validity is absolute, requiring no corroborative
evidence.
282 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [1.
—
Hence (the Bhasya) [' nowhere has the significance of the Vedic
statements been seen or found to be intelligible except in so far
as they are associated with an injunction (either directly or
remotely)].
4. Moreover, in regard to an object which is not given in
perception, etc., sabda as a whole, (when not injunctive) fails
3
Even of independent pramanas we find that one
in the case
contradicts the other. A
picture that presents an even surface *WTT —
to the touch, appears as consisting of depressions and elevations to
visual perception. Hence the invalidity of visual cognition. Even so
the Vedanta text which declares the identity of Brahman with the
individual soul is contradicted by what is given in perception (experi-
ence), viz., that the body (parak) which is subject to birth, growth and
destruction is identical with the inner being (pratyak individual soul)
— —
as witness the usage— 3Tf u^f I am man The Sruti intimates the
:
' '.
identity of jiva with Brahman while pratyak sa, that of jiva with the
body—TD.
4
f%^ srersnsjftqfa, —An
aggregate of words not injunctive
etc.
in character cannot denote an object which is not given by some
pramana other than sabda because of the absence of relation between
such an aggregate and the object it signifies. It is a known fact that
without the cognition of relation there arises no knowledge of the
import of a proposition 3n*3*ta. — As such the Vedanta ceases to be
a valid means of conveying knowledge (Pramana). This is known as
WsfcT7T^^r*rT*P5F? BTSTRirorn, —
invalidity due to the failure to convey
sense. The other two cases of invalidity are 3Tfa*rcTT*T#m3K^<? that —
which makes known the known, and 5rit4M31rErra*TW<tt*J4 that —
which intimates what serves no useful purpose. A valid means of
I. 5] VEDANTA—INTIMATES AN EXISTENT ENTITY 283
therefore, that (we hear) the nauseating utterance of some that the
Vedanta portions are the " barren tracts of Veda ".
5. Now what the commentator (Samkara) has stated (when
adverting to the Mimamsa view), namely, that if for fear of there
being difference in the contexts, the Vedanta texts are not accepted
as supplementary to the ritualistic injunctions by revealing the
nature of the agent (in the ritualistic act) and of the deity (invoked
in the ritual), they may denote the act of meditation explicit in
their own vakyas (sentences) — that does not stand to reason. 5
Even though the Vedanta portion is (admitted to be) supple-
mentary to injunctions of meditation, owing to lack of corro-
borative evidence, a Being endowed with omniscience, etc., as
the cause of the world-creation cannot be established.
6. [Page 84] It is true (says the upholder of the latter view)
when on the basis of inference is understood some world-cause
undifferentiated by any attribute, qualifications are superimposed
on it (i.e., the world-cause) and from such (attribution) the injunc-
tion of meditation will be found to be justifiable. 6 In fine what
not sublated, and what denotes something that will serve a purpose.
* TrST. *?r«reJi\or —Samkara states the Mimamsaka's alter-
native argument in support of his view that the Vedantic texts import
meditation. He would argue thus — you (referring to the Vedantin)
If
say that the two contexts —the Piirvamlmamsa, one of and the ritual
UttaramTmamsa, one of knowledge, are distinct and as such neither
agent nor deity should here be the topic, I maintain that Vedanta texts
subserve meditation mentioned in those very texts.
^Tiwra, etc. —Statements contained in the Vedanta portion as
contrasted with those of the karmakanda. should be noted that It
congruent
—
samanvaya * which means that as regards their
*
e.g., the world is a product, it must have a cause), that some specifically
undetermined cause, is the source of the world. We merely superimpose
on that karana qualities which are not there for the purpose of
meditation. Hence the Vedanta may be admitted as relating to the
meditation of Brahman thus superimposed. Such an entity does not
require corroboration from other pramanas.
7
vm =* cTST ^iWwfarf^ifc—This sentence has dropped out of the
text. It means that the fruit of meditation should be presumed to be
that which is stated in the laudatory passages. The Siddhantin points
out that the Vedanta passages like * Existence, knowledge and bliss
constitute Brahman* do not contain any word denoting meditation nor
do those passages occur in a meditation context. Hence, he argues,
that they have no connection with meditation and are not supplementary
to injunctions of meditation. He adds that notwithstanding, they
are purposeful, since the knowledge of atraan—WWIR —purporting
from those texts is itself the phala.
—
The purvapaksin's answer is this on the basis of injunction relat-
ing to Vedic study—vawrfafa. The Vedantic texts like 'Existence,
Knowledge, etc.,* are studied. Therefore they should point to a
prayojana as the ritualistic texts do. It is evident that mere knowledge
of atman does not confer the desired reward, viz., immoratality
3f«iflc4. The statements of the Vedanta denoting existing objects would
the subject ^
(Brahman). The probandum %^l*rT^rreri?5[cri2m has
to be understood. rf^"W?c^Tf^3i% ^IW, in Brahman possessing omni-
science, omnipotence, etc., HWTORfc— Samanvaya ' means relation,
*
—
Probandum. Is revealed in the Ved§nta~^i y^TWc3l?<T<iralT.
—
Probans. Because the Vedanta has Brahman as its purport
—
the sentence (prakrstaprakasas candrah) where the meaning con-
veyed is the same as when designated by the single term candra \
identity between Devadatta qualified by that place and that time with
Devadatta qualified by this place and this time, we have to admit the
identity of Devadatta on the basis of upalaksana qualification per —
accidens. The differences of time and place are not attributive since
they are not an integral part of Devadatta. Their function has ceased
with pointing to Devadatta as such. Hence «tsar \^^' is a mere
identity-judgment. On this analogy we have to construe the Vedantic
statement, 'That thou art' <Tt*RI%. The word 'thou'— c# should be
stripped of its associations like limited knowledge fofr^jic? and the —
word 'that' — tT<t of its associations like 'non-immediacy' fltl^f; —
then 'thou' in its —
secondary sense of S&l cogniser, and 'that* in its
secondary significance of 'Brahman' will both denote the identical
being. It should be noted that the sentence 'That thou art' restates
the identity (anuvada) of the individual soul with the Absolute, since
while clarifying the meanings of the words jiva and Brahman, it
How could then, the relation of the nature of kriya and karaka
which are distinct (entities) exist in 'Satyam Jnanamanantam
Brahma*.
IV. 9. (Hence) he (Samkara) adduces as illustrations state-
ments like *
Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning
(Chand., VI. ii-1) which are of that description (i.e., non-relational
in character :
cf. above-padanam parasparanavacchinnanam, etc.).
Purvapaksin. —Well, validity should be pointed out from
those texts only which have been adduced, as illustrations under
the aphorism relating to the creation, etc. (of the world); what
then (is the purpose of adducing different illustrations)?
It is true;
Siddhdntin. —
the commentator however has some
object in view. There (in commenting on the second aphorism),
the idea being that a definition of Brahman should be given, such
sentences as based upon accidental features of Brahman, were
adduced in illustration (i.e., definition per accidens); here, on the
other hand since the Vedantic texts like * That thou art find their '
and the wish to convey the sense, were there when he understood
the potency for the first time, but they are of no avail in producing
that knowledge (i.e., the potency). Hence at the time the import
of words is being grasped, the potency of sabda as manifesting
an object presented by another pramana is not cognised; but
like the visual sense, etc., sabda generates cognition without
desiderating anything else and in conformity with the acquired
significance of the words. As such the fact of the prameya being
the object of perception, etc., serves no purpose (i.e., is irrelevant)
in sabda conveying its sense.
V. 12. And further how could any suspicion of non-
validity arise as regards Sabda (scriptural testimony) which is of
non-personal origin and which like the eyes desiderates nothing
else in the generation of knowledge ?
—
Purvapaksin. Well, the reason for doubt has been already
stated: it is the invalidity of the visual cognition of the height
and depressions seen in a picture (say of a landscape) which is
apprehended by the tactile sense, because it (the visual cognition)
is uncorroborated by it.
—
Siddhantin. That statement of yours is untenable because
as an instrument of knowledge this (sabda) is free from defect,
and as regards that (viz., the visual organ) there. is its absence
(i.e., the absence of adus^akaranatva —non-defective instrumenta-
lity). To explain — as for Sabda, it is free from defect since it is of
impersonal origin.
13. As regards the prameya (the object of cognition) again,
there exists no pramana (anvaya vyatireka) to show that it serves
as the cause of jnana (i.e., the cognition of the prepositional
VI. 14J VEDANTA—INTIMATES AN EXISTENT ENTITY 291
12
»T iN*rfa, etc. —Neither of these two, viz., action being the content
of the Veda, and the validity of only mandatory statements, can be
established by anything different from either of these two. If to avoid
the fault of mutual dependence the Purvapaksin should urge that
on the authority of Jaimini Sutras the Veda as a whole intimates
action without presupposing the validity of mandatory statements,
we may confront him with the equally authoritative statement of
292 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [VI. 14
13
As such what the Veda intimates, that is its meaning. Hence
just as the mandatory section by intimating karya, has karya
(action) as its content, the Vedanta section also, by intimating
the unity of the self, becomes fit to have that (v/z., the unity of
the individual self and the absolute) as its content (artha). [Page
86] For credibility is the outcome of cognition and as for cogni-
tion, it is the same as regards both karya (action) and the unity
of the self. Even in the case of perception, etc., what sets the
stamp of authoritativeness is that something not known before
14
is revealed by them.
suppose that the statements relating to the unity of the Self have
only their own (literal) sense to intimate. 1 *
gold, etc., kept in one's hand). Evil also he wishes to get rid of
in two ways (i.e., under the following circumstances) —where a
thing can be actually avoided (sadhya), e.g., (falling into) a pit,
etc., or where something though avoided (parihrta) is attempted
to be avoided as when —he attempts through delusion to avoid
rope, etc., apprehended as serpent, etc. There (i.e., of these two
kinds of purusartha) when a man's is of the nature of some-
object
thing that is fit to be achieved or fit to be avoided, injunction and
prohibition are of significance since its achievement is dependent
on the knowledge of the means (to be adopted). As regards the
other two (viz., that which is possessed and that from which one
is really freed), since it is only the delusion that is the
estranging element nothing other than its removal, is desired
as one's highest object. And as for its removal, it is accom-
plished by the knowledge of Reality and in no other way.
Achieved even thus (i.e., by the instrumentality of knowledge)
meant it may be
admitted that the knowledge imparted (3R^te) is the
hetu of pramanya. But as regards the Veda the study of which is
enjoined by the mandate, * one should learn one's branch of the Veda '
it must denote some purposeful activity which can be achieved only by
either engaging in action or desisting from it. Hence it mjust be
admitted that the Vedic statements have for their content either incite-
ment to action or dissuasion from it. Authoritativeness of the Veda
therefore depends upon pravartaktava and not bodhakatva. The
Vedarthas as forming an integral part of the Veda cannot therefore
have an existing entity devoid of association with action, as its
content.
294 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [VI. 14
18
gcHT ^nvR^lfL—Not only is the destruction of nescience a
purusartha but it is the highest. Hence the attribution of excellence to
what is accomplished by knowledge as contrasted wjth what is
accomplished by action. The latter involves much physical labour,
while the former removes all the miseries that beset man. Hence the
Vedanta holds out purusartha without enjoining any action and as such
the contention that because the Vedanta has for its content an existing
entity it is purposeless, is vitiated by the fallacy of svarupasiddha, i.e.,
where the hetu is absent in the subject (paksa).
It is on the ground of purposelessness that the Mlmamsaka
17
1
—
3#T Kumarila Bhatta admits that in empirical usage, words
have the potency to intimate their sense having come into compatible
relation with other words; e.g., in *re»M«T*?
—
'bring the pot', the word
' '
'*&' is potent to reveal its meaning having got into relation witn the
objective termination '3**?'. It is not incumbent that the sense should
be karya only. The other requisites are its corroborationby a different
pramana, say, perception—pramanantarasamvada and serviceableness—
prayojanavatva. His contention is that if the Vedanta intimates only
an existent entity it loses its claim to be a valid means of knowledge
as there is no pramanantarasamvada; neither perception nor any other
pramana can vouch for the existence of such an entity as Brahman.
The Veda is apauruseya and as such there is no scope for ordinary
pramanas here.
In this section is examined the doctrine of Vrttikara (with whom
Prabhakara agrees) who urges that *§abdavada' whether empirical or
Vedic must intimate as its import what is inseparably related to action.
It must be noted that in his attempt to disprove that the Scriptures
reveal the existence of Brahman, Bhatta virtually disbelieves in the
existence of Brahman. The Vrttikara on the other hand admits as the
Vedantin does, that Brahman is revealed by the Sastra but maintains
that without association, with some action no statement whether empi-
rical or Vedic is significant.
296 PA#CA?ADIKA OF PADMAPADA [II. 3
2
dvoMjwr srcre^T^f^ft—The Vrttikara's contention that the
Vedanta passages have as their purport the enjoining of either a conti-
nuous recalling of the Brahma-cognition arising from the compre-
hension of the pertinent texts or the enjoining of meditation as vouched
for from the statement 'nididhyasitavyah' has been rebutted. Now
he shifts the ground and asserts that a distinct type of jnana is produced
by meditation and that the aspirant is enjoined to acquire that jnana.
The question then will be which is the content of that jnana and
which'is the means by which it is to be acquired ? The means, it may
be said, is prescribed in Brh. UP., IV. i v. 22; then the objection is
that the Vedic injunction related to. this particular jnana and not to
that of identity which latter is what the Vrttikara is trying to maintain.
Mantfana, a Vedantin of old, was a staunch advocate of such a view.
For a concise but clear exposition of the different views held
on the subject—vide 'Introduction to N.S.', p. 22 ff.
298 PANCAPADTKA OF PADMAPADA [II. 4
'
with the object of darsana '
(immediate perception —saksatkara),
meditation which has darsana as its fruit is enjoined as vouched
for by the word ' nididhyasitavyah '.
Siddhantin. — It has already been said that an injunction
having a perceivable end will not be such without (at least) having
a probable phala (vide, ante). [Page 88] Nowhere indeed has
meditation been found to be the cause of the immediate percep-
tion of the object of meditation. Even admitting that the
immediate perception of the object of meditation results from
meditation, what evidence is there that the object of meditation
is real (i.e., of that character, viz., identity of the Jiva with
Brahman)? The dhyeya or the object of contemplation may
be something imaginary. As for sabda (verbal testimony), it
stops at decreeing meditation as the means of securing saksatkara
and does not teach that the dhyeya is an actuality (i.e., it
cannot also have the additional function of denoting real identity
3
«f^*n«re ^rf^c^riSre—This reference to V.S., I. Hi. 26
points to Padmapada's commentary (?) beyond I. i., i— 4. Mantras and
arthavadas become finally significant only in relation to injunctive
statements; yet they convey their own sense inasmuch as they, for
example, denote the corporeality of Gods—Wilfairf , etc. Similarly,
says the purvapaksjn, Vedic passages may bear a double sense the —
Vidhi primarily is with reference to the unique jfiana but secondarily
to the unity of atman and Brahman— 5TUic*W.
300 PAffCAPADIJC^ OF PADMAP/lDA [IV. 7
not return again (Chand., IV. xv-6; VIII. xv-1 Brh., VI. ii-15)
' ;
7
?wm W —
I%1, etc. The point to be decided is whether disem-
bodiedness— 3?3T?!fcc* which is moksa, is natural and pristine or
occasional, brought on by some external agency. It is to be noted
that between the body and the self there exists no real connection.
Hence non-cmbodiedness is natural and cmbodiedness is but illusory.
And the cognition of such illusory relation cannot be removed by
acts lijce meditation nor is modification by medication possible in the
case of atman which is disembodied and immutable (vide V.P., 254).
V. 10] IS BRAHMAN THE OBJECT OF MEDITATION? 303
moksa which, like the forgotten gold kept in one's own hand, is
concealed only by illusion, if moksa of the nature of some specific
pleasure capable of being enjoyed, be conceived as resulting from
a meditative act having Brahman as its content, very like yaga,
etc.,performed to propitiate a deity, then this (moksa) also would
become identically one among those very pleasures which are
the fruit of yaga and are subject to gradation (i.e., different degrees
of pleasure). Then moksa would partake of the nature of non-
eternality as may be inferred from the maxim (viz., yat krtakam
—
tadanityam whatever is a product, that is inconstant), which
—
has the support of the corroborative text " as here on earth,
objects of enjoyment earned by works are destroyed, even so,
there, objects of enjoyment earned by merit are destroyed "
(Chand., VIII. 1-6). And it is not so admitted by those who
advocate moksa. Hence the teaching of Brahman cannot reason-
ably be regarded as auxiliary to duty {i.e., the enjoined medita-
tion) — this is the conclusion.
V. 10. The statement again, that it is not proper to refute
by logic the eternality (of moksa) apprehended from the text,
*
He does not return to mundane life' (Chand., VIII. 15-1) is —
wrong. From the use of the present tense (avartate) the need for
pramana to substantiate its being so (i.e., moksa effected by medi-
tation being eternal) is evident (for na ca punaravartate is
;
'
'
ceed by it) return not to this world of man caught in samsara (the
wheel of and death) "—Chand., IV. 15-5; here the qualifying
life
words *
here —iha '
*
—
and this imam point to non-reversion in *
there is no action (of the same agent) intervening there the act ;
—
darkness " Chand., VII. 26-2, point merely to the removal of
darkness, that is, the illusory knowledge which intercepts libera-
tion ; and (they do not point to) liberation as the result of action.
VI. 14. From this also (v/z., that the removal of nescience
from the knowledge of reality and not from meditation) is con-
—
firmed other rationalistic thinkers (Gautama-Nyayasutra, I. i-2)
also point out that liberation which is no other than the absence
of misery follows immediately on the removal of wrong know-
ledge. [" And the removal of wrong knowledge reults from the
knowledge of the identity of Brahman and atman "] ; not from
action.
Purvapak$in. —How is this known?
Siddhantin. — Indra
' by his mayik powers assumes many
forms' (Brh. Up., II. v-19), from this text it is only perceived that
VII. 15] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION? 305
6
f*il HPIlftr: 3WI &cT; pSr-TOw:, from the root (ffc
-fWl%.
It is the potency of primal nescience with which the Supreme
projects the world-spectacle with all its variety, and this nescience
can disappear only with the rise of Brahmajnana.
306 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [VIII. 17
of the identity of the self and Brahman would, without any cause
and most arbitrarily, be imagined to refer to sampat, etc. And
it would be suppressing one's own actual experience of the fruit
that like the cognition arising from perception, etc., it has as its
content the object {i.e., Brahman) in its mere essence, which is
unrelated (as content) either to (the act of) eschewing or possessing.
19. When that is so, how could Brahman, after its knowledge
has arisen, be construed as being in the objective relation ? How
could its cognition {i.e., the knowledge of Brahman from verbal
testimony) either, be the content of injunction seeing that it brings
on (without any injunction) the fruit of self-realization ? Hence
it is illusory only — this cognition of difference {i.e., the multiplex
9
The Purvapaksin disputes the claim that Brahman and the
individual soul are in reality one. He says that the so-called identity
may be explained in one of the four ways: (i) sampat, fancied identi-
fication; (ii) adhyasa —
superimposition; (iii) kriyayoga—connection of
things viewed as identical with some special activity as in the passage
*air is the absorber; breath is indeed the absorber' (Chapd. Up., IV.
iii. i-3); jiva is Vibhu and hence it acquires the meaning of the root
'brh' in Brahman; (iv) Samskara —ceremonial purification, just as in
yaga the ghee is purified by the look of the sacrificer's wife, so the self
of the man who meditates on Brahman is purified by the cognition of
its being identical with Brahman.
IX. 20] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION ? 307
par with) raising the devil in the act of exorcising it— in repudiating
Brahman's association with action (in general) you have repudi-
ated its knowing (i.e.,
association as content of even the act of
the act of meditation); and thereby only, is, for sure, repudiated
its —
(Brahman's) source also the sastra, and this is expressed in
the bhasya) ;
[" if Brahman is not the content (of speech, mind,
etc.), the sastra cannot possibly be the source of Brahman "].
21. Siddhantin. —Here is the answer: ["No, your conten-
tion is baseless, because (the object of the sastra is to repudiate
all distinctions which are) the creation of nescience ".] Tndeed the
sastra is the valid means in the knowledge of Brahman as the
empirical sentence, '
This is that ' is (in the recognition, say, of
Devadatta). 10
4
To explain : In the sentence This is that \ by
10
3tTTST ff susqfa^uf^, etc.—The Scripture bears evidence to the
identity of Brahman-atman on the analogy of the empirical statement,
'this is that man*. In the sentence, *
flfSW 3^tT: '
it is admitted by all
which relate to the past and the present, which are subversive of the
non-difference between Devadatta seen before and seen now. It is
the removal of the cause of distinction, viz., space and time, non-
distinction is . cognised. Similarly (the individual) —the meaning
of the word *
Thou *
also believing himself to be of the nature of
the individuated ego, cognises, on (hearing the text) That thou *
art ' his oneness with what the word That stands for (v/z.,
*
'
by the notions of the known, the knower and the knowledge, the
result of the ' This aspect of ego-consciousness, which is sub-
*
lated by the implicit capacity (of that which is the object of the
final psychosis, v/z., Brahman or the not-this element). Even that
(viz., the conditioned not-this element) when the limiting adjunct
(v/z., notion of knower, etc.), is destroyed as the result of the
destruction of nescience parts at the very moment with its aspect
(as the conditioned) and attains (its pristine state) free from all
determinations. Hence though all -at once the quartet of knower,
etc., (object of knowledge, act of knowing and means of know-
11
The fruit of verbal testimony (v/z., Mahavakya) is the final
psychosis— TO?fl% in which is reflected the pure consciousness
(Brahman) and this Brahman as conditioned thus has the capacity
(3T*n?rJ to destroy the obscuring avidyS and even while avidy§ which
is the hetu of the notions of the knower, etc., is eradicated Brahman
and ending with (" Therefore here {i.e., as regards moksa) not even
in the slightest degree is it (liberation) connected with action apart
from its sole connection with knowledge "], what is pointed out
is that for one who having abandoned the conception of liberation
as identical with the eternally liberated atman which results from
the removal of nescience, imagines its (liberation) connection with
action —even to him —there can be no such possibility (of release
being connected with action). 'How ? ' (it may be asked). When
liberation is regarded as something to be produced or modified,
there no doubt it is reasonable to hold that it admits of associa-
tion with action but then was pointed out from the bhasya,
it
" No, the fruit of action on the one hand and the fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman on the other hand are quite distinct, etc.,"
that non-eternality would certainly follow.
23. order to obviate (the contingence of) non-
But, in
eternality, if be said that what already exists only (and not the
it
—
No; even in the illusory world, since Brah-
Siddhantin.
man's connection with the manifested world is absent, there is
nothing to differentiate (between the state of Brahman in two
regions and as such Sarvagatatva or all-pervadingness is not
annulled).
18
wr ffaiwffa: (PP.); the other reading is 'EtaRqffa:. Here
the first reading is followed. What the purvapaksin urges we take
(if
the second reading) is that ubiquitousness— fl^ffic^ of Brahman
mentioned above is only figurative, since Brahman is described as
—
occupying a region higher than the Heavens Chand. Up., III. xviii-7.
Hence both readings make good sense.
310 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [X. 24
—
Purvapaksin. Well, (we say), that Brahman is by no means
connected with the illusorily-manifested world and does not exist
in the illusorily-manifested region (but resides in a distinct region).
Hence the need for action for its attainment.
Siddhantin. —Well then (we ask), *
Does that attainment
tantamount to the jlva's becoming identical with it (Brahman) or
to its existence there (i.e., in the Brahma-region) in its own state
(i.e., without losing its identity)? If the first alternative, then,
it (jlva's) individual nature is destroyed. If on the other hand
it is the second, since conjunction must end in disjunction return
(from that bourn is inevitable). 14 And the Sruti text, viz., " He
does not return hither again ", denoting an action (i.e., returning)
relating to the present time desiderates another valid means
(pramana) to substantiate that it is so (i.e., that the liberated
person does not return) and as such does not itself become pra-
mana in this behalf. 15
24. Nor is it maintainable that release is something to be
purified for neither the addition of any excellence nor the removal
of any taint is possible there. It may be urged that the purifica-
tion is what exists (viz., Brahmabhava)
for the manifestation of
as in the case of a mirror (whose natural brightness becomes
manfest by the act of rubbing). This again does not hold good,
for the self is void of action. Again it (the self) is not the content
of (i.e., related to) action having its abode in something different,
since it is the inward being (and is therefore unrelated to anything
extraneous).
14
—
kj^ri^t: if the jlva becomes one with Brahman, the Dvaitin
must admit that its distinguishing features admitted by him, viz., its
atomic size, its agency, etc., would perish. If on the other the jlva
should retain its identity in heaven then in accordance with the rule
that samyoga must end in viprayoga, the jlva's association with
Brahman must be followed by dissociation: Hence the non-eternality
of liberation.
16 ^rRRrc^TRj.— It is patent that simultaneous attainment
- of the
Higher Region and return to mundane life is an impossible notion and
need not therefore be denied. Hence the Sruti * * ^ 3^l^cT% is only '
result of action which is other than the set of four beginning with
origination (the others being apti, vikara and samskara). To
conclude, Release is possible of attainment only by knowledge,
and not by action. 16
XI. 27. —
Purvapaksin. Well, by you, (quoting the bhasya)
" nor again, as being the object of the act of knowing, can
Brahman be related to action'* (Cf., Kena Up., I. 3); it was
asserted that Brahman was not the content of knowledge even
(vide, ante).
Siddhantin.--Yes, it is true, (Brahman's) objective relation
to knowledge was condemned, but it was not said that knowledge
served absolutely no purpose. And in fact in that context only
the way it fulfils its purpose was pointed out in the bhasya (" No, :
18
Even in the case of inference and verbal testimony knowledge
arises from pramana— linga or probans in the case of inference, and
sabda or scriptural testimony, in the case of kriya like jyotistoma or
Brahman, an accomplished entity. No codana or injunction is needed
for jnaiia. We may include arthapatti, upamana and anupalabdhi.
XI. 30] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION? 313
thought over and meditated upon look like injunctions, because '
*
great drum, etc./ (the dundubhi drowns every other sound)
*
'
19
affi:. . . . $03?*refor —The objection may be raised that reasoning
cannot go counter to such Vedic 'Atman is to be seen' which
texts as
But this objection is void. The Vedic
are clearly injunctive in character.
texts serve as valid means of knowledge where their application is
appropriate and not where they are not. If their validity is accepted
and no exceptions are permitted then validity
as infallible in all cases
has to be admitted even of the statement, 'Prajapati disembowled his
—
own entrails' such statements are to be taken as only laudatory in
—
character. Even so the texts 'atman is to be seen, etc.,' are intended
to extol the knowledge of the self. They have no validity of their own.
Imperative statements referring to the knowledge of Brahman are to
be regarded as ineffective as a razor when used against a stone.
20
The illustration of the drum is intended to show that all
mind-begotten (^T^r) cognitions are dissolved in the cognition of the
*
substrate, Wz., Brahman (Brh. Up., IV. V. 8); 'from which these beings
are born, born from which they live by it, that into which when deceased
they enter (Tait. Up., III. i)," this is noted to show that nothing exists
314 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XL 32
apart from Brahman; "all changes are mere verbal distinctions, a mere
name, the real thing is only, 'clay'," (Chand. Up., VI. 4). This
points to the unreality of the manifested world of sense.
21
srawijft* *£f5TrTi£T%lcT ^ w ^ —Atman's being the object of desire;
:
geneous unity). Hence only it is, that the attribute o£ its being
comprehended from the Upanisads and not from any other (is
23
^fa %f%^!j|:, etc. — It is admitted that liberation is the thing
sought for (vidheya) and on reflection it is found that the text (§abda),
"Existence, knowledge and bliss," is the pramana for knowing Brahman
without requiring any specific injunction. This point was rendered
explicit in the second Varnaka. That the Vedanta has the sole
evidential value in the elucidation of Brahman was pointed out in the
first Varnaka. The contention that the Vedanta portion of the Veda
was proved to be untenable
inculcates vidhi like the ritualistic portion
by discussing the nature of Brahman, of knowledge, and of liberation.
It was pointed that considered in whatever way vidhi is* out of the
question.
Now in the present context the discussion turns on the view held
by both the objectors, that the Veda if it should denote anything other
than injunction or something supplementary to it, would cease to be
the Veda;
XII. 36] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION ? 317
is not this, is not this " where the word atman * is used. And *
24
fcf^ —The
objection against accepting the transcendent Brahman
is unknown entity no predication is possible. If the subject
that being an
(ST^l) were known then we could predicate non-duality, supreme
knowledge and bliss, of that subject. But we have no knowledge of
Brahman. Hence, says the purvapaksin, such knowledge as is vouched
for in the Upanisads must be illusory. The answer is furnished in the
Sruti, "That self is not this, is not this"~Brh. Up., III. ix. 26. Here
the pronouns *r: and t^: denote the inner self (atman) which is
implied in the ego-notion. And this inner atman is itself Brahman
so that the predicates (fatfc?) of non-duality, etc., relating to a known
subject can be ascribed.
"1^ i^ro^Rft *rshrR*re35rcrin<Ir--We have to suppose here an
alternative —Does there exist one who is the denier of atman or does
he not exist ? In the first alternative the contingence of *atman's being
the very self of the denier cannot be escaped; the denier exists, and
existence — sattfi is itself Stman. One cannot will away one's own
existence. In the second alternative, since there exists no denier, the
act of denying itself exists not. Then how could the non-existence of
atman be asserted ?
318 PAflCAPADlKA OF PADMAPADA [XI1J. 38
26
5T ^!^[Frc?r*p4 trf, etc. —
It is not essential that the significative
so the verbal cognition (5Tl«^t^) of the word 'go' cow, may first —
be comprehended as associated with the act, say, of bringing and then
its denotation of the unassociated object, viz., the mere existent 'cow*
39. Siddhantin. —
We will answer: Neither what the apho-
rist (Jaimini) and the commentator (Sahara) mean, nor the empi-
28
cTsnnr, etc.—v.: *g xgvtfi mwk mfwh k^v&mfiisfo sHforenfaft ;
as other words (not importing action only) get unto relation with
its meaning (viz., an animal with the characteristic marks of cow).
—
Hence (to avoid indetermination avyavastha) it is but right
that the cognition (that arises from go ') should be the same
'
meal as his share", the import is evident even though they con-
tain no word expressive of action. As for the contention that its
of men well conversant with the purport of the Sastra (it must be
supposed that they point to that part of the Sastra which consists
of injunctions and prohibitions)"]. It is because from the
preceding *
tantra ' (i.e., sastra, viz., Purvamlmamsa) this matter
(viz., the nature of the self, an existent entity) has not been under-
30
" ^5 a^crrcr toi«h wa"!^: "—Jai. Sut., Chap. I, xxv. "The
utterance of the words which are implied in the meanings is with the
object of an action (i.e., for the purpose of enjoining an action) because
the meanings of words in ' s^iftsi JR
^rwifr sRrT ', are the pramana
for the vakyartha, viz., Dharma serving as the means
yaga which is the
to svarga". Here it is definitely stated that the uords ha\e their sigrifi-
cative potency only when in conjunction with a word denoting action.
This is the contention of the opponent vide S.D., G.O.S.* 89, p. 217.
31
Sahara's use of the expression '^uiqsrcRj^' is justified on the
ground that Dharma with which the topic is concerned is something
to be achieved by action. The consecutive expression of words is enly
to denote the relation of the meanings they imply, and not for eluci-
dating their meanings as associated with action.
XIV. 45] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION ? 323
that the view held by Katyayana that the root asa with the '
'
*
lat termination (is always there even though not expressed) is
'
fruit-yielding trees \ This is the king's man ', where the import
*
that even here the sentences should be completed as These fruit- '
yielding trees are ', ' He, the king's man is '. But the sentence (as it
stands) determines the relation only (between the terms) as may be
expressed thus
— * These trees in fruit \ '
This man of the king '.
tity with Brahman of that which denoted by the word 'Thou' (in
is
*That thou art'). There is no importation here of the verb 'asti' (is)
even though it forms the integral part of the thing itself; much less
scope surely for it (viz., the existential act, in the case of) what is
beyond it; as such verb denoting external acts, are far removed. 32
82
^g^PSW^ft —What is essential to the thing: without being
or existence the thing is non est. But in the vSkyartha (propositional
21 a
324 PAftCAPADJKA OF PADMAPADA [XV. 47
import) of 'That thou art' even the act of 'being' (3Ti%i%qT) is void
of connection with the other terms of the proposition- 3^HRi%*?r.
The other variety of kriya is that which is related to something external
and not involved in the thing itself; e.g., act of eating, etc. There is
no room here for verbs denoting external acts such as the act of medi-
tation—aqwrctar.
XV. 50] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION ? 325
tence is conjoined with the negative particle not because the '
'
other senses of the termination (' tavya ' here * like vidhi,
nimantrana, amantrana, adhlsta, samprasna and abhyanujna
33
are absent {i.e., out of the place) here. Hence {i.e., since the
4
not goes with istasadhana, i.e., contributoriness to a (desired
'
33
%?|JIR, etc. —So far, the explanation of the negaMve sentence
'a Brahmana is not to be killed' rested on the assi mpticn that the
negative particle is conjoined with the rare, ai>c3T, viz., 'hanana
(killing), was pointed out that its purport was only the negation
and it
other senses of 'tavya' such as vidhi, etc., do not fit in here, because
there is none other than the person who is the niyojya, i.e., the
niyojaka, the one from whom vidhi, etc., proceed is absent here just
as in the case of perception, inference, etc. vide Panini, 3-3-161 for
34
cWifa afclfa^JTR, etc.—Prabhakara 's contention is that the
apurva, the unseen potency is what the termination 'ta\ya' (or lin)
indicates and that as such it is not possible to deny that the negative
sentence has apurva as its import. Now the question is whether in
ordinary usage niyoga or apurva is known from the terminat on or that :
the way it has been explained before. Such being the case even
though it is understood that the usage of elders should alone be
followed in construing a sentence, Brahman known from the
*
(Vedantic) texts is not like Dharma, known from codana *
and that as such the sentence (' That thou art ', etc.,) cannot be
said to end by merely referring to (the pure and unrelated
Brahman).
Here is the answer :
—
[" Not of the person who has under-
less succession of blind men (one trying to lead the other). And
even if the relation of the self with the body be accepted as due
to karma then one's love of one's body could only be figurative
as it is in the case of the bodies of one's sons, etc. Because experi-
ence contradicts it, because of the absence of similarity with any
the act of knowing) with the body of one's sons, etc. (i.e., the
father is not the knower in the act of the son's knowing), resi-
dually,we must conclude that the relation of the body with the
due to avidya. And when that (viz., avidya) is sublated
self is
and as a consequence its connection (i.e. of the body with the %
perception, etc. 35
Even granting that the entity (viz., Brahman) having been
previously established by a different text, becomes the object of
an action, it should be pointed out that none of the four kinds
of effects admitted to be produced in what serves as the object of
an action, is possible there (i.e., in Brahman). 36
If liberation resembling svarga as the fruit of meditation with
(Brahman) as its object be premised (by you, referring to the
MImamsakas) on the analogy of sacrifices offered to a deity then
there arises the contingency of its (liberation) impermanence very
like that (viz., Svarga).
From who knows Brahman becomes Brahman
statements like '
crosses (the bounds of) sorrow it is evident that the fruit of atman-
'
Sampat is a fanciful combination, e.g., Brh. Up., III. i-9; .Chand. Up.,
III. 18—1, etc.
38
5W*F3?:WTOTfa %® JT WW. fogsr^ I%faf^trorflTO cffi[ (*Sl)
;
arfow ?%i When Brahman transcends the realm of logic how can it
become the subject of meditation which is essentially volitional in
character ?
XVII. 16] IS BRAHMAN OBJECT OF MEDITATION? 331
'•
3T*ru% 3f^l1*SW?gicIL—The case vidhi is again urged on
for
the ground that in the Vedanta internal means shculd te enjoined as
external means are enjoined in the Purvamlmamsa. Acticn is either
bodily or vocal or mental and of these Jaimini has elaborately dkcussed
the first two and the third which is mental relating to meditation is
etc., grounded therein (i.e., having the real self as their substratum)
following, scriptural injunctions enjoining action and bodily
enjoyments (both) depending as they do upon their postulation
(viz., of the figurative and the illusory self) would at no time
Hence whence could there be agency and enjoyment for the self?
If the ordinary usage of expressions like I am the knowing *
40
In concluding the bhasya on the fourth suftra Samkara quotes
three stanzas (see the conspectus) attributed to one Sundara-pantfya.
CONSPECTUS
FIRST VARISAKA
(N.B. References are to the Edition, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series 1891.)
I Section
From g^W^ to g^sTRRHrfr ^fafcl, ffcT * f\m I
Paragraphs. —
1. From g«wwi to Jfl^fW*?: I
2. i
3J5H5 ,, *Tf^*T i
3. »» S^TrT
4. !» a*n =^I«?
5. »» *%*%<% „ f !% JT m: I
11 Section
From ^^ to *TJ«I?6U;: I
Paragraphs. —
6. From *3 ^ to mid I
111 Section
From £rs4 ftu*T: to 3TRRTtf^*??qir?; i
Pratika. —
Paragraphs. —
8 . From ^$4 \%iw. to %ftewn I
9. ,, W&& ,, 3T3T%7ffm^JTc€r?^ I
Note.— Portions of the Bhasya not commented upon but subsumed under the
particular section are enclosed within brackets.
22
334 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
IV Section
From ?re*fon«?fr to 3^ %&$• 1
Pratlka.—
Paragraphs. —
10. From ?rerfi«iwft to ssn^jfafwn 1
V Section
From vw-qz to <T3<?r^R %<&$: 1
Paragraphs. —
13. From W^# to *?3^Tf fa^TWJTR ^^: 1
VI Section
From *P? 3?T: to * fa^ct 1
Paragraph. —
16. From W $*: to * m**m I
CONSPECTUS 335
VII Section
From 3T'3fcqsro?«* to $*Rnfl*ifciR*T zwism i
Paragraphs. —
17. From «F$r«fiwf%fir to ^fawim: l
VIII Section
Topic. —This points out the necessity in the present case for defining
adhyasa and showing its probability as well, before proceeding
to its establishment.
Paragraphs. —
19. From 3Uf to I%^TT:
Paragraphs —
23. From Zg&ih to ^ tr^ wn^isrei^:
Paragraphs. —
25. From m* 3?!f to arwra*:
26. „ srg aOTTOTfecT „ 3$m
336 pancapAdikA of padmapAda
XI Section
From 3^?^ to 3?^Tfl:
Paragraphs. —
27. From 3^?% to src<rcwftftr
28. „ 3TP* =3
28. „ snft
XII Section
From *^ flier to **jftwi n<* wtmz.
Topic— Rebuttal of anyathakhyati and of atmakhyati by the
akhyativadin.
Paragraphs. —
31. From =fN flfcr to * *n<*.
32. »»
aw cT«n^Tr5r*riH# n *fa T^r: smro^
33. n 3T«r 3j%\*r ,, 3T5rm%cT
42. »» SS3 ,, ^
43. *> *TRWIW& 3 „ frowwr
XIV Section
From *«J * sqR^M to JT T^fcf fa^c*
Tb/wc. —Objection that the definition of Illusion does not apply
to the dream illustration is met.
CONSPECTUS 337
Paragraphs. —
44. From *% * s^q^fjj^ to ^^^RJTf^^'^r^T^
45. „ ar^ft
46. ,, st^# „ and tw
47. „ ^^:
48. „ q: 3*:
XV Section
From WW cTit to 'jjrcsrcwre ^fct
Pratika. —
ct? fcfamffera^^f
vW^^WR^T
** \ fir i
^ 3 q^r wm%: cr«hr faitta-
$r% 1 fleklfa 3 3T'q«J| *FqW**n«<rf ST
Paragraphs. —
52. From H %f^ to 5% *5*fr
Paragraphs. —
56. From <Tsr **jr%^q to q^^^cT
57. „ W ftwrfa^lS^ ^:„ STrawstaflfaffiftr
XVIII Section
From *g *wM to qj^m cT*?lc*U*£fi
is refuted.
Paragraphs. —
60. From sT3«4q%5 to arawwrlOTTO
61. „ WiT^rr ,, <rw?rc??r*jTR <u§rr%
XIX Section
Topic. —The object of using the two words 'Smrtirupa' and 'purva-
drstavabhasa' is explained.
Paragraphs. —
62. From *&& to 3rantfc*fiR^fiJJ.
'
63. ,, qir# rii^ „ *5$p>T*re3
XX. Section
From cT«n ^ to *% V%$
Topic. — Elucidation
of the two illustrations of shell-silver and
double-moon given in the Bhasya and of their respective signi-
ficance to Advaita. Here is clinching of the matter by refer-
ence to common experience.
Pratika. —
Paragraphs. —
64. From m\ ^ £l% to *3RT^*TfecT %fo
65. „ ^3 * gi%^r „ *s*4
-66. „ CTgfa$r*w?R „ sftsftrcm
CONSPECTUS 339
XXI Section
Paragraphs. —
67. From *3 f'W to ff^Kri^
agraphs —
73. From w4 g*: to wmni x& ^fa
74. , , JP^falcT „ ^3«Rqi^J?T5T:
75. , 3^cT „ fgrftff*^:
76. ,
, am 3=r: „ ^R^IcT
77. , fa3rcfmw«n .. 3^ :
Pratika —
Paragraphs. —
82. From WSWamn 5WT to raroraraWrfafir
83. „ wi^Jrh
84. „ T5*?t
XXIV. SECTION'
86. ,, Jfrj TW
87. „ sfaj^H
XXV Sfction
Paragraphs. —
88. From S^ct to ^a-q^fqR^R^Oijr^q:
XXVI. Section
From flJ^RT to *5ti|ftw
Paragraphs. —
95. From %^m to arerfoftsn
96. „ cTCH: „ f*TO
97. „ jt %4 ,, 3llt%*Tl
XXVII Section
From %'A 3^: t o 9T**IKr% mzfa
Topic. —On the analogy of the illusorincss of the red-crystal, the
illusory character of the ego a complex of atman and the —
internal organ is demonstrated.
Paragraphs. —
98. From ?M 5*: to wfasTSWjfe
99. Jf
i?3 a?r*3nrTwfa ,, cT^r^rJTH^r^
100. „ ar*3'war ,, nf**rftfr| tfiqff
XXVIII Section
From ^ sref^mc. to w^m sitw&l
Topic. —The 'this' in the ego (afijuit) is illumined by the 'not-
this' part of the ego. By usage (sictffcTcT) the ego is identified
with atman, or the *not-this' (3T«K?T), by its characteristic
feature (*5$rom :
) v /z., being illumined by the 'not-this'
(*R*U*T) it is of the 'this' nature (5WT). As such the
double nature of the ego is evident. Again from the illustra-
tion of the image and the proto-type it is pointed out that
the 'not-this' is identical with Brahman.
Paragraphs —
101. From ?m ^st?;?!^ to «^VlWRil?[ few.
102. „ 3m<Ti* n q ^faffcr
103. „ ^5^: „ ^m*i
XXIX Section
From W 3^f: to ^l\ If **T
Topic. —Points out the identity of the image and the proto-type in
contradistinction to what obtains in shell-silver. The ego-
complex in this respect is not parallel to the shell-silver since
it is not sublated entirely.
342 PAtfCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
Paragraphs. —
104. From W JpT: to ?l«k a^fclgcT
105. „ 1133 „ * =* <t*JT wwfa
106. „ q: 3*: „ iTvnmi^iim
107. „ 3TWT5 „ acs&n^
108. „ ^3 „ wewsrtr%«ra.
109. „ f%=* „ isrfafir
HO. ., ^ „ * TO*****
111. „ SCTJST: „ *r^i % «t
XXX Section
From *T«| %$m to *si*T*rg^*r%
Topic—It contended that if the individual soul is regarded as
is
Paragraphs. —
112. From *g *$* to ^S% (?fa)
113. „ TO fc „ fawn^WW
114. „ 5T3<T5T „ *33j«<fg5!Ilft!
XXXI Section
From *3 35WT to mg^Rc*T?l
XXXII Section
From crN^f^ to T?rj*?*r<* ^ stut^t
Paragraphs. —
119. From trfo'HjW to =^T'W 3^g<^
120. „ sirarwRfo „ 5?g«??T
121. „ ^^ „ *F3*f4*r ^ hhw
XXXIII Section
From ^g sfratf^fwTlfa to fo%*wi 5W«ra«?JW:
Topic— (i) From the statement ^s^rqrif^f^TS^ %?F3rfa*&*I?t
it is urged that the object and cognition becoming
identical, there is affinity with the vijnanavada of Buddhistic
Philosophy. The Siddhantin points out that the two are poles
asunder, since the one (object) varies while the other (cognition)
is constant.
(ii) Rebutting the doctrine of momentariness the eternal
nature of knowledge is demonstrated.
(iii) Practical efficiency is proved to be possible without
the presupposition of momentariness.
344 PAftCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
Paragraphs —
122. From *g JlW^ to «3TIfJ fa^
123. „ %cT?t „ * =3 **nfw?r%
124. „ vfei „ 5^T^ifi%i%:
125. „ W\\*<1 „ y$*,l *?T
126. „ 3T«iT15% „ *fkfi&*:
127. „ 3T4 *F%<T „ ^T^q^T5T'^l%
128. „ 3^% „ *mti\m\
129. „ VR^: „ zfemn
130. „ q^5 JF4RT „ 3R;T 3R*W
131. „ 3?*t mil ,, wwmwwm
132. „ 3T4 *Trt $TF&™qr „ 5f fattf T^W-
133. „ rr^«r „ 5Rnfa<T:
134. „ 5Tg5n3^rf^3 „ srosrfa^rar:
XXXIV
From <T># 3Tf it?jt^si to *fl«lrt
XXXV Section
From T%3 to 91**1 wffnr:
arrCisrcsn* 5r^Tf?na%5;: »
Paragraph. —
136. From (%W to WvmmW-
XXXVI Section
From *3 * frfo<rT*i$r*n5r to cr*n ^fa«n*:
7Vywc. — Here PP. comments on the Bhasya beginning with
* ^RJTfcr frw end of zftW-W.. On the analogy of
to the
the common notion that the akasa is blue, etc., though it is not
presented, the need for objective presentation is denied in the
case of the ground of superimposition.
CONSPECTUS 345
Pratika.—
5TI?»n«qw: I
Paragraph. —
137. From Tg * fTRWTSWHT to a*TT ^fa'STR:
XXXVII Section
From *g TOr^lR to sifajr 3$RT
To/wc. — Here PP. comments on the Bhasya beginning with
cT*T# «Stf*r to the end of 3fojJ?T5FTTfq * #T*fei. What is rendered
explicit is that nescience, />., its aspect as a projecting entity
isthe cause of the manifold ills of life; and that the qualities
of the superimposed object do not in the least affect the sub-
strate.
Pratika.—
ffarorowaira 7i$5?n 3rfa%ra *f*i% i <rfs%%* *r ^3-
wqw^rctf frsrwg: i (<t## sm) ^ w*ircr: ci<?»crc $M g«rc
Paragraph. —
138. From *3 aflfamj. to 3fa%t% *F2&
139. „ cT%q%^ ,, 3^<T
140. „ qstf „ CftcT
XVIII Section
From i^ <TR<t to *T iTqRPfNta:
Topic. — Superimposition of the non-self on the self is established
on the basis of inference. The knowledge of things through
pramanas is not possible to a knowing agent pramata, without —
the presupposition of adhyasa.
The following Bhasya is commented upon :
Pratika.—
XXXIX Section
Pratika.—
Paragraphs.—
150. „ *g niqi^r^T^:
XL Section
Pratika.—
CONSPECTUS 347
Paragraphs. —
151. From t$ m^srersn^ft to arf^ftwf^ ?fa
XLI Section
Topic. —The doubt raised in the previous section is cleared.
Pratlka.—
Paragraphs. —
156. From ?T*nfa * TO^clNf to ^sfafcT
XLII Section
Pratlka.—
Paragraphs. —
159. From tpr ar«rrcRnEflin to ssmrarWfcisnft
160. „ ^g * gsrafrnqt „ gtq*fan<arrer:
Paragraphs. —
162. From trswfsreifrsrfafcr to m^q^ftrT^q^lfl: cT^n^ST
163. „ ?f =q 3^»TFcflW „ * ft ^sg^qvf jttjt
XLIV Section
From tprownfc to ft Hl^RT.
Topic— Conclusion of the Bhasya on superimposition to which,
to start with, objection was taken and which was met by defining
it and proving its existence by adducing pertinent pramanas.
Pratika. — t
Paragraphs. —
165. From v$mm\h* to 5Rlfa«BWf:
166. „ jrg ^^rif^: „ Rsfrael
167. „ favanuSTWT ffa „ RTOrofr
XLV Section
From vi cirrc. to *ifa frr^i^i^3?q5rrni% fcim-.
Pratika. —
Paragraphs. —
168. From tr<f ai^ to 3ff^%^t ^cT:
169. „ ^^ts^w
170. „ mi $*:
XLVI Sfction
Paragraphs.-
176. , sW „ ^^rrrfq^rg^?^:
Paragraphs.—
Paragraphs.—
XLIX Section
Pratika.—
Paragraphs. —
185. From *$ * *flf JRTOT: to <3T%cT
Pratika. —
Paragraphs. —
187. From *% anrdftlCTn?iVft to arftrewftfa
Pratika. —
Paragraphs. —
189. From g*J^% tffcT to f%WF faf$S:
I Section
From T%|fr to 3?¥9fa$rcFfWrarf^i%
IT Section
From 3m #n%^r to * 5nrT5q!%$Tfam3T:
Paragraphs. —
3. From 3?5T %fa^ to f£R*TI%
4. }} snnft „ mi$<
5. yy cWfa „ m?wfa*i
6. yy 5?cT: — 3?lc*nJT „ ft^cfacftm
7. )> itfmi „ JT ^TcTsqfJT^TVrHT?T:
Ill Section
From ^fllfHsnfwfa to HSTfff^T
Topic. — What this section when the emphasis
means is that even
is on the object (accusative) an injunction the imperative
in
Paragraphs, —
8. From OT?fa«nWtsft to T?^ %]^rl
9. vgan „ t3H?T
IV Section
From zwX g5TtaJ?TC*T5% to *n*roiwwifafcr
Paragraphs. —
10. From vfil g**# to stfr^TIcTH
V Section
From 3?^l«*cr to 5Fp5c*T3WT^ *&£&{
Topic. —The mlmamsaka who maintains that the sastra need not
be begun, in contradistinction to the two Vedantins who on
different grounds advocate its commencement, avers that no
additional problem arises which would justify the undertaking
of the Uttaramimamsa.
Paragraphs. —
12. From arti'wm to faferi:
13. „ *«$ ^ftwtfa „ ^cf: *wtor *T^f^
14. „ 2T?3*: „ ftfrfcn
15. >i ^fa *?TRrc „ 5R3«^
VI Section
From 3r?t*ra to %^\m fafa:
Paragraphs. —
16. From 3TC* flcT to f%W:
17. „ WtlK „ *B?«3raf fafa:
VII Section
From ft 5Rft!t fcspfr to ftfaTOs?? H%<t
Paragraphs. —
18. From f% Scfft to SUTM^?^
VIII Section
Paragraphs. —
21. From OTfa to 3R*fo WQL
22. „ 3PT ?lcT«*r: „ fa^rfP^flW
IX Section
From $*: %h?tW\ to l^rsraffTct
Paragraphs. —
23. From 3*: *f$«rcWI t0 $™* :
Paragraphs. —
30. From 3W 3^: to frf^H
Paragraphs, —
33. From ^3*= to tf^ctofWJt
34. q^^RJj; „ q*3cTTW*#mw%
35. qrgsr: „ <w l^qr
XIII Section
From 3Uf *?T >£x*JH§^q; to *HR*r t^
Topic. — "Let not the'idam sarvam, etc.', says the
sentence
—
arambhavadin, "denote its sense prameya, let it denote only
the injunction, the former being ascertained from presumptive
evidence 'srutyarthapatti'." The rejoinder is that this violates
all of interpretation.
rules To abandon what the sentence
actually gives, viz., the world pervasion of atman— prameya,
Paragraphs. —
40. From <fxq^ to T ^sJcHWftB:
41. „ <r*u ft „ iWsrt ^
42. „ i£i*nsrji[?i „ *t*m
43 „ cTc**?^ „ 9ft SfT%:
XVI Section
From 2Tc3^s? to ^iTOi^nftc^g^
Topic—In the aphorism—-^mitl srffaflftfr the emphasis is laid
first
Paragraphs. —
44. From ^S^fol to ***&
45. „ ig ^rapnusoisr „ iwrasjfofir
Paragraphs. —
48. From c!5 *& fe to 5l%fl*£
XVIII Section
From *^n %fal to f^rcfrSfa^wVarai^T
Paragraphs. —
52. From T^fa %i%^ to *rwrt«T 5^
53. „ asnfa „ tff^wrw
54. „ <r«n ^tarcirfo qm. „ 3?ft%?t
I Section
From tl5f 3T*TO*5: to 3?;rfa$jferT^fr
Paragraphs.—
1. From asrWET^: tO 3T5liW4^I?C
6- „ *3 ?T ^ „ zf*faw.min%m
Pratika. —
?T5rr«r?jl5^ 3*ff=rW4: TIT/WW, SIII^RM:, ^W13TfIWRr 3R1«T-
II Section
From fl-:%^N to wfcRfq *ftaV<T
Paragraphs. —
7. From 5p%**lfo to ^^TT«r?BR ^m
8. „ ?T33^R stft«R „ f^T^ 5f?r%:
9. 9f
^Tum^m^ „ sl^fa 5T^<T
10. „ *3 qi^H^mifr „ ^jfa^fo »ffcrJtfcT
III Section
From ^n H5l to H^^Wi^H*-
Topic. —The pQrvapaksjn contends that the agent can be secured
without 'atha' being construed as 'subsequence'. The inquiry
into the meaning of the Veda is prompted by the injunction of
Vedic study, viz., ^i^RfS^frs^: and since Vedauta also is
a part of the Veda the inquiry into its meaning is also prompt-
ed by the same vidhi or injunction; so that whoever is the fit
agent in the Vedic study SHI^R is also the agent in the
Vedantic inquiry. The knowledge of the Vedic import is
the fruit of bt^W and such knowledge cannot be had with-
out inquiry. It cannot be said that the memorising of the
bare text is the fruit, for that serves no purpose. Hence the
word 'atha' must mean commencement of a new topic and
not immediate consecution.
Paragraphs. —
11. From m«R to ^5533^ X& 3WTTO?:
12. „ 3fft ^
13. „ *3
IV Section
From 3?^m to apfaifalRlfc:
rebutting this view points out that the injunction to Vedic study
is obligatory, TO3T whereas that relating to the teaching,
3T^rq^ is optional. How can what is optional entail the
performance of the obligatory? Therefore the injunction to
Vedic study of itself prompts one to undertake the study and
does not depend upon the injunction to instruct.
Paragraphs. —
15. From ^# to a? v-*rc> srmr
16. „ 3T5r%f%^§: „ 5f£3iwt%
17. „ tf^WSPT* „ SfcT Ir^T**
VI Section
From *3 vi wmfalWlfalfa®: to 5I^I'WRWg TT?Pf ,
and it does not amount to sin if one does not follow the
profession of teaching. Hence the injunction relating to it is
VII Section
From Tjjj fag: to -t^'taw STHTS^jsra
Topic. —In
statements like "cause the yaga to be performed by
one who desires td own a village, 3?W$t4 ansfttj, " since we
have a causative verb we perceive two functionaries the —
active agent, and the subordinate agent. But in such cases
the injunction relates to the active or the principal agent since
the subordinate functionary, the officiating priest acts only
with the object of eking out a livelihood and not under Sastraic
obligation.
True, but in the statement 'initiate a Brahman', ^WI-
gwfaf, there is no causative termination so that there is no
364 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
double function. It is only of the preceptor—the prayojaka-
karta. Hence, says the advocate of adhyapanavidhi implying
adhyayana, that the injunction cannot relate to the pupil
Paragraphs. —
26. From 3T#% to atfw^
27. „ %% 5^: „ l???: %^cT52fWicr
IX Section
From 3^RT to qzfafa «r«TT
Paragraphs. —
28. From 3^fa to f*rtafa?r%
29. „ srg utootwhw „ TW^ffi: JKfpffi
X Section
From 5FOT*rfa to wm^cTCrfcfcT
Paragraphs.—
31. From H^wfa to grafts:
32. „ ft ^ „ TOiife^%
33. „ a^f „ fAvnttiifcrn
XI Section
From ig %* to fa* rcnsgr?w
Topic. —The vrittikara
quotes Sahara in support of the view that
the injunction of Vedic study itself serves to prompt inquiry
and opines that the understanding of the sense is the fruit of
Vedic study. The Siddhantin admits that Sahara intends that
the knowledge of the sense is the fruit of Vedic study but says
that it is only in reference to a particular context (i.e., obli-
gatory duties and also optional duties according to the
Vivarana). The person who has studied the Veda with its
Paragraphs. —
36. From tfffSOTfa to snftniiurf f%
37. „ 5fg „ fofofcf *y?m
38. „ 3r3j% „ «!T5RraW<tolfMcr
24
366 PAftCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
Pratika.—
XIII Section
Paragraphs. —
39. From sfcT ^r to 5ito%
40. „ *?P«iTirr«PR*3 „ *?M:
Pratika.—
XIV Section
From sffof to m\ * ^^\m^^\^i^i
Topic—When the word 'atha* is understood to mean * subse-
—
quence 3TH^4, the question naturally arises which are the
other possible precedent conditions following which 3TW& —
Brahman-inquiry should begin ? These antecedents may be
1. Jaimini's 1,000 nyayas with which to determine the
meaning of the Vedic texts.
Paragraphs. —
41. rom TfN? to srsifasrci! sr% #
42. „ 9T5TH „ 3Tft5!Tq:
44. „ *KS* :
„ <T5WIS*RT^:
45. „ ^31: sn^TO „ 3T«RT»^:
46. „ *> 5^ :
„ flsr^rsf^Wl^
47. „ am*. 35§<nigq3t«T: „ 5WToimrai^.
48. „ OT Prefer „ 5ruf*r?iraf differ
Pratlka.—
XV Section
From *T*5<ff? to 5T5TNlT*nqqTlftfa
Topic— Mental purity, says is attained by the
the Purvapaksin,
performance of karma and then only is one fit for Brahman-
inquiry. The answer is that it may have been accomplished
in a previous birth so that Karmavabodha {i.e., Karmanusthana)
in the present life is not a necessary precondition of Brahman-
Paragraphs. —
55. From a?«nfa Soffit to WET f frf
56. „ cT^3^ » fa^rctfiftfr
Pratika. —
XVII Section
From awrft w<l to 5r$ifanrar?i%^ f%
Topic. —The six yagas constituting Darsapurnamasa yield in the
aggregate a single result — <fi«5, necessitating as such a single
performer— 3k!F, who has per force to observe definite order
in the performance of these yagas. Again, krama or order
is to be observed in studying the twelve chapters of the Purva-
mimamsa for the phala is one; similarly in studying the four
chapters of the Uttaramimamsa. On these two analogies it
Paragraphs. —
Pratika.—
XVIII Section
agraphs. —
62. From s^Tcr to 5iif%fticr
63. „ rWFflL
64. „ an^RFftg^
XIX Section
From 3fcJ:3T^I \fti: to I^Ftf '^R* ftllfosfo
the question, for one will not desist from performing rites such
—
as the quarterly ^r§*lfer since they yield everlasting happiness^
Moreover it is unintelligible that with the object of attaining
the one changeless Being ^ZW one would like to renounce
this world and the next, for in the state of that eternal Being
though there is absence of pain and suffering, there is no
positive happiness. That state cannot be taken as the highest
—
end of man TlflJJW*?. Hence though karmaphala is not
unmixed good it will be sought for.
This arrangement is met by the observation that the fruit
of quarterly rites is impermanent as declared in the Scriptures
rightly understood, and supported by reasoning. The text
'the knower of Brahman attains the Supreme' —&9fftl3Hfr% TOL
reveals that the attainment of the Eternal Brahman is the
highest human end and other texts bring horn© the blissful
nature— ^TW^^T of Brahman. Hence one who cultivates
the qualities embraced in the four-fold discipline necessarily
enters upon Brahman-inquiry.
Paragraphs. —
67. From 3ra:^T %&$*• to «?^IT?t
68. „ 3i?f: „ am:?n^:
69. „ m „ 93^53:
70. „ 3F35?: „ fimfazft
Pratika. —
XX Section
From 3fpft faf 1ST 3TSli%Rn to ^T% qtft
Topic. —Three points are made clear in this section: — (1) the
compound Brahmajijnasa be dissolved as Brahmano+
is to
jijnasa and not as Brahmane-fjijnasa; (2) the meaning of the
word Brahman; (3) the word Brahmajijnasa involves an
objective genetive and not a genetive of possession. It is also
Paragraphs. —
71. From 351% fasHSf to ^f&T:
72. „ 5T$ST«^ „ attSlfo^faRI
73. „ WT ficT „ 3Tf%?5TI%%
74. „ 3H:3rTO(farcn5 „ Rqi«: ^Tff%r%
Pratika.
Paragraphs. —
78. From ^fo^r to STSTT?t3*«rfa3rf:
79. „ cT^cTri: „ **rfag*ns
80. „ <rcsrTfl[. „ 3>facT **fa
Pratlka.—
nm (fa)f>*m%<r«rn.
VARtfAKA IV
I Section
From cTcSsrsfo to S*'*T *
Topic. —The
Purvapaksin argues that if Brahman is an already
known entity there would be neither Visaya for inquiry nor
prayojana for it, if unknown, Visaya may be there but neither
prayojana nor sambandha. The dilemma, he says, cannot be
avoided.
Paragraphs.—
1. From *T?g5T: to stflsPW^T&H^
Pratlka.—
II Section
From 3tt% ™*%® to |fa =*r sultan
Topic. — In the portion of the Bhasya beginning with *
Brahman is
Paragraphs. —
3. From 3TT% <\m<t to fttk* sunfta
4. „ *&n „ «n*F3H
5. „ tjwfo „ TOW! 5iqi5R^
6. „ *reri „ S33TSctsi
7. „ s^isfa „ firfil forow^wSwsnft
8. „ Sift ^ „ *% ^ n^anm
Section
From *3 *w %5i5*nsnn to iRWrfcl fttata
Paragraphs. —
9. From *% W %5RTRt to ^WRUH:
10. >> ^ifcn^taf
11. }> TOrrT
12. „ *5
13. >> &R 3RH
14. „ «rtr5*fa
15. )> <re%s
IV Section
From arffcRTWKU to w*faWlg»wnf5fa
Topic. —Brahman's existence, the Bhasyakara shows, is not en-
tirely unknown, and that there thus being scope for inquiry,
the relation between the Sastra and the vi§aya is established.
The purvapaksin contends that the Veda does not vouch for
—
the existence of Brahman the Supreme reality, since the word
Brahman occurring there admits of various connotations and
further that it is only a complete sentence that can be a valid,
Paragraphs. —
16. From 3TfoT flre^STOlf^TT to aWRffoRT
17. „ sfcl^ mm „ t^iti^t fas-*
V Section
From sT^rofa to foprcN^ft *wwfa
Topic— It may be said that the tracing the etymological meaning
of the word 'Brahman' may give us an idea of its nature; but
it cannot vouch for its reality or existence, for a single word by
itself cannot constitute a pramana. True; and that is the
reason for the present inquiry into what has been empirically
envisaged but not fully established. The existence of Brahman,
it is further pointed out is vouched for by the fact that Brahman
(iii) *rft aft «i% srti arrctiCTT ai%5T^i ?rat *Rrar%r% artsrjnwf
VI Section
From SSTOffasnWl R 5T3TO to ^T^r^CT^lftsT: 51%?:
stated here.
Paragraphs. —
27. From SSWffafcT to ^F^Tfa imffa:
28. „ forfetaftf ^fcT „ afcTTW * fcT
29. „ wr ft „ 3%^r:
VII Section
From ^# sftrewra to ?sn> «rflrc%
Paragraphs.—
30. From TprftfopiliMta to *&\$i ^Tift
31. „ *W*PT „ *^ :
Pratika.—
VIII Section
Paragraphs. —
34. From 3?!%T \%}f% to Wfc*!gq?frfogTW£
35. „ %v cT*q „ f?^«Rl^
36. „ 3T^mt „ g*WRT<rq%:
37. „ 3T^H^2? „ artR^qmq JT'f '!f
Pratika.—
IX Section
From W<fer %^5 * q$m%\ to srsi^riSfaq: W1<1
Paragraphs. —
38. From ^T%3 %# to 3^ H**t?%
39. „ affcr <r*n%fa»: „ totcht^?*.
40. „ anwTstfry „ arfa^i: sirat.
Pratika. —
(i) *TT%kT %^? T ^^%
(ii) erfa <rafafaR $W flfo S&rfai: %ft %fcwt
Paragraphs. —
41 . From V$ *5#T fwsrtftw: to st^fa^m:
42. „ ?T5HftreHi „ sigriigiJh'nftfcr
Pratika.—
(i) tT# sr?tr fotfrpren: 3%5n^m^mRr^wiwiT: w%-
(ii) rrsrrfl^ 3?ffrii%i: afcrraRtfr fftarerosrfrt^ia 3^4 w<r..
(iii) cTW38iT%!n#?'4 i«g4)«i ^<Rf*iiwftefar cr^rcifa <i#t-
VARtfAKA V
I Section
From WW %^tt%^4 to JTT^R^sfafcT
Paragraphs. —
1. From 5W faflfo^J^ to sr^rejsram 51%
2. „ 3 l%*ft „ wm*i:
3. „ 5F*[ft: >> *TO:
4. „ erSrenft „ #q%
Pratlka.—
II Section
From 3TO SFTfl: to TOTOHt ^ ^^%.
Topic. —The Bha§ya beginning with 'of this world differentiated by
names and forms' up to Brahman, has to be understood*
'
that is
7. „ 9w^- „ ^vm
Pratika. —
(i) aw WK-. ; (ii) srw?rwrf «u$*w
(iii) ^B^t^Tfrigw
(iv) sftft^^TWRW^fo^f^fSTW
(v) *R^T c?Tf%'?l?:^Fn^T¥T
Paragraphs. —
9. From 5T^%ror to OTJf^W^WJ,
10. „ 5T3«r^ „ % fcf *J?n£:
1! •
» ^ $& » ^ W 3P*?l%;n3&T
Pratika. —
(i) a^Wwft (HIwfoFWtf Br^f 3T^T*?fo: \ fcT SFiTfeTRWRrRf
IV Section
From T 3^fatt<P'r£rem%TT to 3KPC<m*Tfcr T%^qr
Paragraphs. —
12. From * WtR to SWRfarjflfa m?W{
13. „ 3T%cT5Tmi^L „ fr^fllS^fepssTrt
V Section
From t$cT^rr?j»TFTftrfcr to gw l^^^r
Topic— The reasoning referred to above is put forward by
rationalists like the Logicians as the independent proof for
believing in the existence ofBrahman and in its omnipotence,
etc., and they represent the Scriptural passages cited in this
connection as but clothing that reasoning in words for the
sake of communicating it to others. The Vedanta sutra how-
ever is really meant not to indicate the rational basis for the
belief in question, but to show that a knowledge of Brahman
as described is the result of properly interpreting all the rele-
vant Scriptural passages—that such Brahman is their concordant
teaching. But it is not that argumentation has no place in
it. Scripture itself recognises the need of logic for re-inforcing
the sense ascertained from the Vedic study.
Paragraphs. —
15. From t^rigqHmfcT to %m 3^cT:
16. „ sffanrfr „ 5wroT*-?rcft&N
17 „ *m 3 ^i^t^s » gw %^^
25
382 PANCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
Pratika.—
(ii) fa^FTCflR:
(iii) srfcrfrft a^r sqyaren^ (^T^rf^r)
(iv) 5T %^^|Tspr$l»?a*RI<folrJ settoih,
(v) ^swi^fr (f| ^^if?r f%*JT&%, «*raF2n4ffor**n>3»*-
HRf^lffr ft)
(vi) srwtf^isffwfcwmT^fottfT
(vii) fl?g %5i*ci«iw33 (*R<ft 3F*?Tf^rc"R[fc3 ^j^t^t^V
Paragraphs. —
18. From if sfeww to aratatftfWra:
19. „ ?T3 „ ¥&& W*W
20. „ «* „ sraa^T*
21. „ JT^^fa „ %rTC^
Pratika.—
(i) * irtfarsraRnfar
isone and not many. Hence it is only the Vedanta that is the
valid means of knowing Brahman. This may seem to exclude
reasoning altogether; but it does not, for reasoning is intended
to support Scriptural teaching much as arthavadas are admitted
to do in the case of ritual. Vedanta texts bearing on 'Tafastha
lak§ana, e.g., 'From which all these beings are born', and
'svarupalaksana', e.g., 'From Bliss alone all these beings are
born, etc.', are quoted.
Paragraphs. —
22. From an*: qfcfK*?T% to 3Tft>*Rf*r(cr
Paragraphs. —
1. From STTSRfRc^ to cNWTcf:
II Section
From ?T^ *f% to * 3Ttfcf: 5n§*rfcl<*.
Topic. —If it is argued that since the Veda owns Isvara's author-
ship its validity ceases to be absolute and becomes dependent,
it isanswered that the Veda does not originate in time but it is
beginningless like Brahman himself. If it be said that Brahman,
being absolutely changeless, cannot be the source of the Veda,
the answer is that He is its cause in the sense in which Brahman
is the cause of the manifold of sense, or as the rope is of the
Pratika. —
I Section
From spfjpT: to W!%5KR:
Topic. —The criticism here relates to the authoritativeness of
Vedanta; since all Veda should be denotative of action,
Vedanta which merely points to an existing entity loses its
character as an independent means of valid knowledge. Further
it is a matter of common knowledge that an existing entity is
Paragraphs. —
1. From m&i: to 3?l%qifer^
4. „ ft =3 „ OTf%5*K:
Pratika.—
'
S£T: I ?T ^ qftfrg^3^q<%sfq 3»3?3rTfti*WR* ST^: ;
'
?TtWI%
(ST. W"*) ffa 5WTOTWW *nW<TWI5WWWR?IT<l. I *?§
ctwi^t^ mm wmwmwtmi 1)
II Section
From 3[cg;wW^ft*r to 3Tr*ferf^R
Paragraphs. —
5 . From Teg*: to *T dhfcSll^fofe:
6. „ ws „ w^tfteifaa^:
III Section
From WtJ tfJFSRTcj; to W*f:
Topic. — First the general sense of the aphorism is given and then
the phrase 'samanvayat' is explained. The purport of the
aphorism is that Brahman is to be understood from the Vedanta
for all the texts are in agreement in elucidating the non-rela-
tional or Brahman as such— akhandartha. That the
entity
major (*^I3I^) 'That thou art' imports the unrelated
text
Brahman is rendered explicit on the analogy of 'This is that
Devadatta' and that the subsidiary text 3RT*<KWT 'existence^
knowledge, bliss, is Brahman' also imports the relationless
Brahman is rendered explicit on the analogy of 'the brightest
shining body is the moon' afssa^rcr: ^F5 Hence such :.
Paragraphs. —
7 From <rg tfJF^R!^ to 5nfaqf^Biw?n«Fr
8. „ ^PTfasjrfc >>
^''^
IV Sfction
From cT*mV*lR to 5T^9? ft*R3i5R sqgsaft
—
are these things born, etc., the Bhasyakara should have shown
that those illustrative passages themselves import the non-
relational Brahman why for this purpose,
3T^°3"3?J ; instead,
should he have adduced passages like fli^T, etc. 'Exist- W&
ence alone, my dear, there was in the beginning ? This objec-
tion is met by the observation that there the idea was to give
merely the definition per accidens of Brahman. Here how-
ever it is intended to show the non-separateness of Brah-
man from jlva. Hence the necessity to deduce statements appro-
priate to such a purpose.
V Section
From arfa ^ to arra«raro«Tfts%5*rwiwn?t
Paragraphs. —
12. From *m^ to awNfa<«lK$B:
13. „ 5WW 3*: „ *n*?F2n?t
VI Secition
From *3 frfaWTFTfor to ^STTfolS m*l'- 5nWSOT!«E*H
Paragraphs. —
14. From *3 ETfa*IW!f to *r^re*m*m«Tcr
15. „ aris 3^R ssiwtor „ * gw
16. „ w%m „ wwsmw*ti{
VAR^AKA IX
I Section
From srsrm t0 aepgrfr 52^:
Topic. —There is a class of critics who
hold that Vedic statements
though having an existing entity as their content are valid only
as being auxiliary to karya. Brahman therefore established
though it be on the strength of Verbal testimony, is the object
of meditation which is enjoined. That words acquire validity
only when their import is action-related, is based on the follow-
ing grounds: — (i) In our common experience it is perceived
that the significance of words is cognised by the learner only
when it either urges one to action or dissuades one from it;
(ii) if Brahman, the existing entity is intimated no purpose
is served since even with that knowledge there results no
cessation of the metempsychosis; (iii) if Brahma-knowledge
were the sole means of liberation there would be no need for
injunctions on meditation OTWnfafa. Hence though there is
distinction between the subject-matter of inquiry in the two
sastras, atman is denoted as the content of meditation enjoined
in texts like 'He is to be sought out— SF^q. This is the
view of the Vrttikara.
Paragraphs. —
1. From smm to cfcq^cTJ
Pratika.—
(i) areift 3r3Rfa§5% — (*rcifa mmvwm% sw, <r*nfa ai%«?F%-
II Section
From arirarT to RuWt
7b/?/c. — All possible ways in which Brahma-knowledge can be
made, the subject-matter of meditative prescription are consi-
dered and dismissed as unsatisfactory in one way or another.
The Siddhantin points out that the Vrttikara who advocates
Brahmajnana as subsidiary to Niyoga cannot advance any
pramana to substantiate niyoga. The reason is that there is
no Vidheya to determine the niyoga, i.e., the thing of which
it is predicated. The knowledge relating to Brahman may
result either from Sabda or bhavana (dhyana) or saksatkara,
in none of which niyoga is permissible. As regards verbal
knowledge one who studies the Scriptures acquires it without
the necessity of any Niyoga provided one has a fair compe-
tence in the idiom and .syntax of the language. There is no
good enjoining bhavana for it does not yield the desired result.
If like svarga the phala of bhavana or recollective series
(^ifcftfaR) is eschatological then it desiderates karma and
Paragraphs. —
3. From 3T37^?<r to *r$r * *$<*.
III Section
Paragraphs. —
5. From *?c<FT: to frvjRW&f^
6. „ snvwrafa „ 3rrer5Wt<Tc# wn *
IV Section
From aT*n<3f*T to fcgq^W
Topic. —Some others hold the view that Brahman and the indivi-
dual soul are distinct, ascribe to Brahman all-pervadingness
as well as residence in a specific region (heaven) and believe
that from the enjoined meditation on the assumed identity
of the self and Brahman as expressed in 3Tf *JSITr%T, the fruit
of release is secured like the fruit of Svarga from Yaga. If
that be so, Release being the Karya of Upasana would be
evanescent like enjoyment in Svarga. Also texts declaring the
disembodiedness of Release as vouched for in 3rar<kHCJf^
would be set at nought.
Paragraphs. —
7. From 3?*m3r*r to tasrwnftft
9. „ asflfa „ t^TOOT:
CONSPECTUS 395
Pratika. —
$T%:
— " * f I SSRlW «cT: ftraifa^RqflcRl^T " ffcT W^lftET
6*fR^w3^r% 1 "areittf «n«r s<i * fsRifsrar ^m:" (si.^r. *-i v<i)
Paragraphs. —
10. From a^JST: to !TTircfa ^T SRlfftm
11. „ «rfo ^ „ ^RW:
12. „ w\ „ fasm
13. „ f%^ „ tii? ^ i%^mn
Pratika. —
(i) 'ms* afe *w7T [(g^. \-\-%) 'tftas% =m*r Wrfa
'
<m ^\ *Tf : *6: 3fr^ TT^c^gq^cT: '
(fcn. v»)] ^WWI: ^qi
(iv) '
<t£ iftawiro a*ro: TTt ^?wfa v*mww<$w- '
VI Section
From 53*fo^fH to ?icr t*^
Topic, —That the dispelling of ignorance results in salvation finds
corroboration in rationalistic systems like the Nyaya. That
system conceives moksa as resulting from the eradication of
pain, birth, effort, blemish (as likes and dislikes), and false
knowledge, the destruction of the subsequent effecting the
destruction of the one immediately preceding (Gautama's
second aphorism); according to the Bauddhas also freedom
consists in the emergence of the final moment of pure conscious-
ness (in the consciousness series) resulting from the eradication
of illusory notions as the outcome of constant reflection on
truth (tatvajnana). But it should be noted that the Vedantic
conception of moksa is by no means the same as that of these
two schools. The analogy holds good only in so far as they
hold that false knowledge is dispelled by the knowledge of
tatvajnana whatever be its nature. Such dispelling of igno-
rance is through right knowledge which in the present case
is that Brahman and atman are not distinct.
Paragraphs. —
14. From 5^^ to f icT *l**fo
Pratika.—
'sn^wi mh %
(fjF^F. y-m, \) sfoMj sTi^f^i^oii^^
VII Section
From 3Wlfa to an^Staftsr"^
Topic, —The opponent maintains that the Vedantic texts adduced
to establish the identity of jlva and Brahman are in reality
meant to enjoin meditation on Brahman which is an entity
distinct from jlva, which meditation may be any one of th$
398 PAtfCAPADTKA OF PADMAPADA
followingvarieties: Sampat, adhyasa, kriyayoga, nimitta,
samskaratmaka Brahmadrsti in jiva: (for an explanation of
these terms, vide P.P.).
Paragraphs. —
15. From 3?*TTft to **W>OTrrura *fa
16. „ 3T^I^3 „ 3?R^^I%^q^
VIII Section
Paragraphs. —
17. From anfmiJ* to S75%T
18. „ cT9?T^ „ 3n:gqTRT5a?H
19. „ fftKflfo „ fa*n
Pratika. —
i% crff srai^rif^anmf^qq^iiR^a^F5n i
qrojisr to*-
IX Section
From ?rg fafcT%3[Hfi# to *fl$r*T 3TT5teR«lSta:
Paragraphs. —
20. From *g fafefaarnri to 3Tg'TTfrTRT% %%%
21. „ amrfRI „ arfSterafro:
Pratika.—
X. Section
26a
400 PANCAPADIKA of padmapAda
Paragraphs. —
22. From TO rpW Jfltf: to ^Jlf^l«$oT
XI Section
From «T«| ^ sHWifo to fl^rer? srsm 51%
Paragraphs. —
27. From J?3 =*T frrcwtf? to w«i*r
28. „ *nmi „ z\%m\*{
29. „ %W*k „ =T fa^SITOST:
30. „ 3?<T: vm*\v\\ 8?|>T „ 55^£r
31. „ mi ^ ***<n ?tw „ argwr:
32. „ 35: 3/T: „ fa^T =3 *n^
33. „ 3?ft ^ „ afarrairr,
Pratika.—
(i) ^ ?r *m mttt i%qr i * i kmw\<i : (fmi ft *w m
(?r. 3T.
V^-1) ?fa WTII53 I
V^IJT
f^cT* q^TR JTRfl cWift 3^
^r ^qiHfT^^I^^^^T ?JR
5Wl<ii fT ^ITSM %cjo? ^HT^FW
arcga^sra^ * 3\^m*^ Tift swt^jj,
i <ran*ffRg&sfa \ '
XII Section
From *KN %£p?T§: to R?U%?r<T
Topic. —The purvapaksa (Prabhakara) is that no part of the
Scriptures is denotative of mere existent things. The Veda
serves as a valid means of knowledge only because it is through-
out injunctive in character; otherwise it would cease to be a
pramana. Vcdic statements become significant in relation to
action, not otherwise. The Siddhanta makes it clear that
distinct from the ego which is associated with action there
exists the Saksiu, the inner witness which, because it is revealed
by no pramana, other than scriptural testimony danaot be
related to action. That witness is not illusory like the nacre-
silver; it is never sublated. Nor can one will it away for it is
one's own atman and to will away oneself is impossible, for
one who does so is himself the 5tman. Nor finally is its des-
truction conceivable for the instruments of destruction cannot
affect it. Rather it marks the limit at which all destruction
ceases. It is the goal of everything the Ultima Thule cf. y — —
Paragraphs. — *
Pratika.—
^^ %f%^T§ '•
XIII Section
Paragraphs.—
41. From W^ to fa^fl^R w scftefr
Pratika —
%r£ I ^ ^i ?:1
I fwfesft tolR^^fWTgt<|«Tl%£re l l%*TT&-
cWfRSH I
)
XV Section
Paragraphs*—
" "
mwqfa I cTSRffjr W^l^THI^ltff^JR *HI<fo * &3&f:
^11^3 JUtf^JT*! H^Wfifc, 3?=^ SSnqfalRnftwr: | ^WcJ^I^-
7tl'gqTWW^lfol^*W^?9IW*irc *S53f I
^^— $&WT-
ft^ga^JT'cftiT ^JTrng^wH*?**?^ win " sh^iti ^gjtfft "sufc
ifcfa, ffi*. Tftf <m ^ft?* *R fl<? f % ^^l^SRSft 5RF3RS?
I
XVI Section
From ^cg^TRq to 'J^JT^IcgTR^
Topic. — The observation has been made that the Vedanta import-
ing the nature of the accomplished something serves no purpose
seeing that one who gets to know 1
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Pratika.—
(i) arfa ^Tf : i
S S— Contd.
Sabda, 47, 128, 130, 132, 146, 151, Sovereignty, 208
157, 160, 165, 168, 190, 237, 290, Space, 163
296, 297, 298, 301 Sprout, '.0, 71, 96, 98, 235
Sabdabodha, 319, 322 Sruti, 47, 49, 67, 127, 240, 262, 267,
Sabda-sakti, 318 269, 311
Sabara, 115, 172, 173, 177, 180, 319, Step, 207
322 Study, 228
Sabarasvamin, 177 Subject, 57, 58,84, 119, 122
Sacrifice, 117, 118, 189, 194, 329 Sublation, 74
Sacrificer, 180, 194 Subsequence, 207, 211, 217
Sakti, 319 Subsistence, 258
Saktu, 147, 185 Substance, 131
Saktu-homa, 144 Succeeding time, 89
Samit, 163 Succession, 179, 213, 214
Samkhya, 41,68,250 Sudra, 189
Samnyasa, 211 Suitors, 247
Samsara, 135, 180,213,303 Sun, 75
Samskara, 137 Sun-spots, 16
Sanatkumara, 304 Sunyavada, 267
Sapphire, 104 Super-human power, 137
Sariraka, 323 Superimposition, 1
Satiation, 208 Supreme, 136, 161, 219, 224
Satra, 186 Supreme Bliss, 276
Satisfaction, 184 Supreme Ruler, 254
Savitri, 189 Supreme self, 140
Scale-pan, 129 Supreme spirit, 298
Scripture, 47, 269, 307 Susruta, 232, 234
Seed, 40, 96 Sustention, 313
Seed-sprout, 78 Sutra, 279
Self, 1, 2, 7, 78, 112, 114, 148,292, Svarga, 116, 137, 167, 170, 187, 212,
309, 328, 332 A 235, 240, 262, 302, 309, 329
Self-certainty, 133 Svetakctu, 193
Self-contradiction, 103 Syllogisms, 269
Self-hood, 123
Self-indulgence, 209
Self-luminous, 50, 104
Self-realisation, 306, 308 Tadatmya, 109
Self-restraint, 215 Tantra, 322
Self-revealing, 145 Tanunapat, 163
Self-validity, 206 Tarka, 133, 134, 135
Sense-activity, 64 Teacher, 269
Sense-contact, 27, 34 Teaching, 189
Sense-objects, 184 Therapeutics, 232
Sensory-knowledge, 45 Thinker, 252
Sequence, 163,203 Thought-energy, 68
Serpent, 41,42,43, 137,327 Time, 163, 265
Sesamum, 249 Timira, 46
Shell, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 39, 44, 129 Transformation, 103
Shell-silver, 15, 23, 25, 31, 32, 45, 74, Tree, 19, 62, 231, 236
76, 271
Sight, 150, 164
Silver, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30,
32, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 74, 122, 129, Ultimate, 226, 237
130,317 Undesired, 295
Similarity, 87 Universe, 36, 41, 128, 150, 260,281,
Sin, 201, 202 300
Sleep, 65 Universal, 6
Smoke, 207, 268 Unknown, 230
Smrti, 49, 67 Unreality, 29
Solvent, 2, 3 Unseen, 217
Son, 191, 192, 193 Upadesa, 181
Sorrow. 33, 282 Upanayana, 118, 189, 190, 191, 193,
Soul, 3, 46, 240, 255 196, 197, 200, 201
414 PA&CAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA
U— Contd. V— Contd.
Upanisad, 116, 127, 150, 187, 205 Vyakaraoa, 241
Upasana, 137, 144, 148, 161, 314 Vyavahara, 109
Uttara Mlmamsa, 178 Vyasa, 210
W
VSkya, 133 Waking state, 35, 148
Validity, 116 Wealth, 190
Vamadeva, 304 White cow, 319
Varuna, 224, 275 Will, 37, 295
Vayu, 265 Wisdom, 244
Veda, 117, 151, 154, 161, 164,
166, Woman, 272
167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174,
175, Word, 152, 186, 236, 237, 238, 240,
176, J 77, 178, 189,
184, 185, 187, 244, 289, 290, 295, 300, 320, 323,
193, 197, 204, 206, 217, 218, 221, 330
278, 281, 291, 292, 296, 308, 316, Work, 303
318, 323, 330 World, 59, 93, 129, 139, 153, 165, 216,
Vedartha, 176, 177 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265,
Vaisesika, 268 266, 267, 269, 272, 277, 288
Vaisyasfoma, 186 World-cause, 276, 280, 323, 327
Vidhi, 149, 151, 160 World-creation, 283
Vidya, 42, 105, 132, 137 World-cycle, 243
Vijfmna, 98 World-negation, 166
Vijfianavadin, 38, 61, 84, 99 World-order, 277
Viksepa, 105 World-sovereign, 184
Village, 84. 145, 194, 195, 198, 262
Vina, 202
Virtues, 217 Yajfta, 131
Visaya, 141 Yajana, 189
Visvajit, 153 Yajnavalkya, 314
ViSvajidyaga, 187 Yaska, 264
Visvatomukha, 279 Yoga, 111
ViSvadevas, 305 Yogins, 252