Evidence Part 1-14

VOL.
328, MARCH 27, 2000 749

Ong Chia vs. Republic
*
G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal

Offer of Evidence; Judgments; The rule on formal offer of evidence
(Rule 132, §34) is clearly not applicable to a petition for
naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not
covered by the rule on res judicata.—Petitioner failed to note Rule
143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—These rules shall
not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence
(Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied
by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is “practicable
and convenient.” That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in
fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
of the same documents.
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the rule prohibiting
the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.
—Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the
trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason
for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with
the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Public Documents; Where a party fails to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast
doubt on the authenticity of documents which have been executed
under oath, the court may rely on them.—The Court notes that
these documents—namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner’s marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him
and his wife, and petitioner’s income tax returns—are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They
are thus reliable. Sinoe petitioner failed to make a satisfactory
showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
Naturalization; Statutory Construction; It is settled that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.—
The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this
case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the
effect of petitioner’s failure to include the address “J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo” in his petition, in accordance with §7, CA. No. 473. This
address appears on petitioner’s Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex
A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he
failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that
since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This
is allegedly because the publication effectively
751
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 751
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement,

i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the
opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another. It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his
present and former places of residence. This provision and the
rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioner’s argument of “substantial compliance” with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Algarra, Mutia & Trinidad Law Offices for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional2 Trial Court,
Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.
In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel “Angking.” Since then, he has
stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and
eventually started his own business, married a Filipina,
with whom he
__________________
1 Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C.

Paras and Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez.
2 Presided by Judge Rodolfo C. Soledad.
752

had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed

a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under
CA. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating
his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the
disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated—
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under
the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special
Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General,
Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not
acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986
revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his

qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being
asked by the court whether the State intended to present
any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself

which is rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-
versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so,
on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner
really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And
for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to
counteract or refute the testimony of 3the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the

petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to
state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2)
failed to state all his former places of residence in violation
of CA. No. 473, §7;
___________________
3 TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Emphasis added)

753
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 753

(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable

manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in
violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient
or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to
support his4
petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence.
Annexed to the State’s appellant’s brief was a copy of a
1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the
Special 5 Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No.
031767, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his
name of “Ong Chia,” he had likewise been known since
childhood as “Loreto Chia Ong.” As petitioner, however,
failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization,
6
it was contended that his petition
7
must
fail. The state also annexed income tax returns allegedly
filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net
income could hardly support himself and his family. To
prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married
twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in
church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife
without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were
married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to
present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The
State also
8
annexed a copy of9 petitioner’s 1977 marriage
contract and a JointAffidavit executed by petitioner and
his wife. These documents show that when petitioner
married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no
marriage license had been required in accordance with Art.
76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona
Villaruel had been living together as husband
_________________
4 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.

5 Annex B; Id., pp. 129-138.
6 Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.
7 Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4; Id., pp. 144-157.
8 Annex D; Id., p. 139.
9 Annex E; Id., p. 140.
754

and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,

according to the State, belies his claim that when he
started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.
The State also argued that, as 10shown by petitioner’s
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner resided at
“J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo,” but he did not include said
address in his petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial
court and denied petitioner’s application for naturalization.
It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases,
the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the11
lower court and brought up for the first
time on appeal. The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,

petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present petition for
naturalization his other name, “LORETO CHIA ONG,” which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of
Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in
the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor . . . This is a mandatory
requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by
those other names to come forward and inform the authorities of
any legal objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for
naturalization that he formerly resided in “J.M. Basa St., Iloilo”
and “Alimodian, Iloilo.” Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requires the applicant to state in his petition “his present
and former places of residence.” This requirement is mandatory
and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the
petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is
to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity
to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner
is depriving the public and said
_________________
10 Annex A; Records, p. 16.
11 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted.
755
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 755

agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the

law
...
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and

irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his wife for several
years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the “applicant’s 8-year cohabitation with
his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and
irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law,”
and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization
...
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia’s alleged annual income in 1961 of

P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is
not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return
“because he is not liable for income tax yet” confirms that his
income is low . . . “It is not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It
must be shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses
as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid
one’s becoming the object of charity or public charge.” . . . Now
that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife
are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The
monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant
cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like
bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious . . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of

errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE
COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY
SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
756

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN
HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS
PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND
IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner’s principal contention is that the appellate court

erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief and, on the
basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court’s-
decision. Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are
12
mere “scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value,” so it was argued, because under Rule
132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention
13
has no merit. Petitioner failed to note
Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and

election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of

evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said
rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is “practicable and convenient.” That is not
the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented
by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to
be the more practical
________________
12 Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.

13 Now found under Rule 1, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
757
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 757

and convenient course of action considering that decisions

in naturalization
14
proceedings are not covered by the rule on
res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment
does not preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the
same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the
State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to
object against their authenticity, effectively depriving15 him
of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We
are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the 16opposite party the chance
to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate
court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals, thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN

Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under
LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization . . . is 031767 while the case
number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776.
Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be
considered
17
by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal.
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is

trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That
“SCN Case No. 031767,” a copy of which was annexed to
the petition, is the
___________________
14 Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).

15 Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.
16 See Peninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma, 194 SCRA 667 (1991).
17 Appellee’s Brief, p. 13; CA Rollo; p. 184.
758

18
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet
of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also
docketed as “SCN Case No. 031767.” Other than this,
petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity
of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents—
namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner’s
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and
his wife, and petitioner’s income tax returns—are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath.
They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may
cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our
conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying
upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been
enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues
raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner’s
failure to include the address “J.M. Basa St., Iloilo” in his
petition, in accordance with §7, CA. No. 473. This address
appears on petitioner’s Immigrant Certificate of Residence,
a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of
his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that
he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues
that since the Immigrant Certificate 19
of Residence
containing it had been fully published, with the petition
and the other annexes, such 20
publication constitutes
substantial compliance with §7. This is allegedly because
the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to
be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating
agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent
_______________
18 Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that

the petition be dismissed as petitioner failed to meet the requirements
under LOI 491 because his income is insufficient for his support and that
of his family and also because he failed to show that he believes in the
principles underlying the Constitution.
19 In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.
20 Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.
759
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 759

suppression of information regarding any possible

misbehavior on his part in any community
21
where he may
have lived at one time or another. It is settled, however,
that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed
22
in favor of the government and against
the applicant. As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, §7
clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall
set forth in
23
the petition his present and former places of
residence. This provision and the rule of strict application
of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s
argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground
alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De

Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—A former citizen who opts to reacquire

Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the
Revised Naturalization Law is duty bound to follow the
procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not for him to
decide and to select the requirements which he believes are
applicable to his case and discard those which he believes
are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. (Republic vs.
De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994])
An applicant for naturalization may only take his oath
of allegiance after the Solicitor General finds that within
the period of two years from the date the decision granting
citi-
____________________
21 Watt v. Republic, supra.

22 Chan Chen v. Republic, 109 Phil. 940 (1960), citing Co Quing v.
Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958) and Co. v. Republic, 108 Phil. 265 (1960).
23 Comment, p. 23; Rollo, p. 110.
760

People vs. Mamalias
zenship is promulgated, the applicant has complied with

the conditions set out in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 530.
(Hermo vs. Dela Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2022 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

G.R. No. 186228. March 15, 2010.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, accused-
appellant.
Miranda Rights; Rights of Suspects; Bantay Bayan; Words

and Phrases; A “bantay bayan” is a group of male residents living
in an area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community.—Following the rationale behind the ruling in
Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “bantay
bayan” may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In
People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 382 SCRA 714 (2002), this
Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a “bantay bayan,”
that is, “a group of male residents living in [the] area organized
for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.” Also, it may be worthy to
consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309
issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized “to serve as
implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council
at the Barangay level.” The composition of the Committee
includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman;
(2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at
least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-
Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non
Government Organization Representative well-known in
his community.
Same; Same; Same; Barangay-based volunteer organization
in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,”
are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay
level; Any inquiry a bantay bayan makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned, and an extrajudicial confession taken from a
suspect by such bantay bayan without a counsel is inadmissible in
evidence.—This Court is,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
549
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 549

People vs. Lauga
therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations

in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay
bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We,
therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which
was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Evidence; Witnesses; Inconsistencies which refer to minor,
trivial or inconsequential circumstances strengthen the credibility
of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have
been coached or rehearsed.—The testimony of AAA does not run
contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help
of a “bantay bayan.” Their respective testimonies differ only as to
when the help was sought for, which this Court could well
attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version
of AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the
incident. At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding
that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity
of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor,
trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such
testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
Same; Same; The Court is not dissuaded from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of
feuds, resentment or revenge.—Appellant’s contention that AAA
charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is
likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving
full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives
of feuds, resentment or revenge. As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals: Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not
strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a
charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon
them and their families but also bring their fathers into the
gallows of death. The Supreme
550

People vs. Lauga
Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to

charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal
and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private
parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact
committed. No person, much less a woman, could attain such
height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she
owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving
and lasting gratefulness. Even when consumed with revenge, it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail
for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family
including herself to a lifetime of shame. It is highly improbable for
[AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose
morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her
own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight
since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.
Same; Rape; Qualified Rape; Penalties; Elements.—Having
established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We
now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 to the
case at bar. The law provides, in part, that rape is committed,
among others, “[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman” “through force, threat or intimidation.” The death
penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, “[w]hen the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent.”
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PEREZ, J.:

Before Us for final review is the trial court’s conviction
of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old
daughter.
551
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 551

People vs. Lauga

Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v.
Cabalquinto,1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information
tending to establish or compromise her identity, including
those of her immediate family or household members, are
not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts

In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the
appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE
allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening,

at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd
design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with
his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.”3

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.4 During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the
correctness of the findings indicated in the medical
certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that
AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged
offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of
the appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the
prosecution, namely: victim AAA;6 her brother BBB;7
_______________
1 G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.

2 Records, p. 27.
3 Id.
4 Id., at p. 32.
5 Id., at p. 36.
6 TSN, 12 November 2001.
7 TSN, 11 March 2002.
552

People vs. Lauga
and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a “bantay bayan” in the

barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone
at home.9 AAA’s father, the appellant, was having a
drinking spree at the neighbor’s place.10 Her mother
decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has
the habit of mauling AAA’s mother.11 Her only brother
BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke
AAA up;13 removed his pants, slid inside the blanket
covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;14
warned her not to shout for help while threatening her
with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed
above her head.16 He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss
her repeatedly, and “inserted his penis inside her vagina.”17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18
Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late.19
BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to
their maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father.21 Upon reaching
their grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother
and uncle of the incident,22
_______________
8 TSN, 5 June 2003.

9 TSN, 12 November 2001, p. 4.
10 Id., at p. 5.
11 Id., at p. 4.
12 Id., at pp. 4-5.
13 Id., at p. 5; TSN, 11 March 2002, p. 4.
14 Id., at p. 6.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 7.
18 Id., at p. 8; TSN, 11 March 2002, pp. 4-5.
19 TSN, 12 November 2001, p. 10.
20 Id., at pp. 8-9.
21 Id., at p. 9.
22 Id., at pp. 11-12.
553
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 553

People vs. Lauga
after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy

Banting.23
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house
wearing only his underwear.24 He invited appellant to the
police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he
was unable to control himself.26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical
examination.27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal
Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical
Certificate, which reads:
“hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated

hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2° to an
alleged raping incident”28

On the other hand, only appellant testified for the
defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-
motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife
in front of their children after engaging in a heated
argument,29 and beats the children as a disciplinary
measure.30 He went further to narrate how his day was on
the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food
prepared for him at lunchtime.31 Shortly after, AAA
arrived.32 She
_______________
23 Id., at p. 12; TSN, 11 March 2002, p. 6.

24 Id., at p. 13.
25 Id., at p. 15.
26 Id., at p. 13.
27 Records, p. 5.
28 Id.
29 TSN, 12 November 2001, pp. 6-8.
30 Id., at p. 10.
31 Id., at pp. 12-13.
32 Id., at p. 13.
554

People vs. Lauga
answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that

he kicked her hard on her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again
around 3 o’clock in the afternoon.35 Finding nobody at
home,36 he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37Later in
the evening, he was awakened by the members of the
“Bantay Bayan” headed by Moises Boy Banting.38 They
asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.39 He
later learned that he was under detention because AAA
charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision41 in
Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape
qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.42 It also ordered
him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of
P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court
was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS44 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The
appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for
parole and it increased
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 13-14.

34 Id., at p. 15.
35 Id., at p. 16.
36 Id.
37 Id., at p. 17.
38 Id., at p. 18.
39 Id., at p. 19.
40 Id., at p. 21.
41 Penned by Judge Pelagio B. Estopia. Records, pp. 95-104.
42 Id., at p. 104.
43 Id.
44 Id., at p. 79.
45 Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez with Associate
Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez, concurring. CA Rollo, pp.
56-79.
555
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 555

People vs. Lauga
both the civil indemnity and moral damages from

P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due
course to the appellant’s notice of appeal.47 This Court
required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs,48 but both manifested that they will
no longer file supplemental pleadings.49
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is
that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,50 because: (1) there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother
BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy
Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3) AAA’s
accusation was ill-motivated.53

Our Ruling

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his
alleged confession with a “bantay bayan” and the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an
Extrajudicial Confession before
a “Bantay Bayan”
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to

Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was
_______________
46 Id.
47 Id., at p. 92.
48 Rollo, p. 31.
49 Id., at pp. 40-43 and 46-48.
50 Id., at p. 17.
51 Id., at p. 18.
52 Id., at pp. 18-19.
53 Id., at pp. 19-21.
556

People vs. Lauga
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a

lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the
scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article
III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In
Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman
and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court
distinguished. Thus:
“Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay

Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section
12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was
brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001,
she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that
destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her.
Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was
made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter—
admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of
her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant,
given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x
x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not
_______________
54 Id., at pp. 18-19.

55 G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 294.
5656 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
57 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
557
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 557

People vs. Lauga
apply to those not elicited through questioning by the

police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at
bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one
of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].”58 (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan,
this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “bantay
bayan” may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had
the occasion to mention the nature of a “bantay bayan,”
that is, “a group of male residents living in [the] area
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x
PNP.”60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to
Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11
November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized “to serve as
implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order
Council at the Barangay level.”61 The composition of the
Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least
three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-
Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non
Government Organization Representative well-
known in his community.62
_______________
58 People v. Malngan, supra note 55 at 324-325.

59 432 Phil. 471; 382 SCRA 714 (2002).
60 Id., at p. 476; p. 718.
61 Executive Order No. 309, Sec. 1(g), as amended, quoted in
Memorandum Circular No. 2008-114 dated 17 July 2008 of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government.
62 Id.
558

People vs. Lauga

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as
in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly
on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of
appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible
in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely
from the assailed extrajudicial confession but “from the
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.”63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution

Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies

of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB
accompanied her to the house of their grandmother.
Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to
look for a “bantay bayan.” On the other hand, BBB testified
that he brought her sister to the house of their “bantay
bayan” after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues
that “where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot
_______________
63 Rollo, p. 19.
64 420 Phil. 50; 368 SCRA 43 (2001).
559
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 559

People vs. Lauga
stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both

must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction.”65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at
bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply
stand together because:
“On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not

have possibly seen the hacking incident since he had accompanied
Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the
testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly
witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente at that
time.”

Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to
that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a
“bantay bayan.” Their respective testimonies differ only as
to when the help was sought for, which this Court could
well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a
shortcut version of AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a
detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding
that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the
veracity of the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which
refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances
even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they
erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or
rehearsed.67
Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of rape
only because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by
motives of feuds,
_______________
65 Id., at pp. 59-60; p. 51.

66 Rollo, p. 17.
67 People v. Villadares, 406 Phil. 530, 540; 354 SCRA 86, 96 (2001),
citing People v. Gargar, 360 Phil. 729, 741; 300 SCRA 542, 553 (1998).
560
People vs. Lauga
resentment or revenge.68 As correctly pointed out by the

Court of Appeals:
“Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough

to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would
not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their
families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.69
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for
a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to
the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her
private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact
committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such
height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she
owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving
and lasting gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail
for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family
including herself to a lifetime of shame.72 It is highly improbable
for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose
morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her
own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight
since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.”73
_______________
68 People v. Aycardo, G.R. No. 168299, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 523,
535-536.
69 Rollo, p. 19, citing People v. Mascariñas, 432 Phil. 96, 102; 382
SCRA 349, 354 (2002), further citing People v. Tabugoca, 349 Phil. 236,
253; 285 SCRA 312, 327 (1998).
70 Id., citing People v. Sangil, Sr., 342 Phil. 499, 508-509; 276 SCRA
532, 541-542 (1997), further citing People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441, 13
November 1992, 215 SCRA 694, 704.
71 Id., at pp. 19-20, citing People v. Sangil, Sr., Id., at p. 509; p. 542.
72 Id., at p. 20, citing People v. Melivo, 323 Phil. 412, 428; 253 SCRA
347, 362 (1996).
73 Id., citing People v. Sangil, Sr., supra note 70 at 509; p. 542.
561
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 561

People vs. Lauga
Elements of Rape

Having established the credibility of the witnesses for
the prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the
Anti-Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed,
among others, “[b]y a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman” “through force, threat or
intimidation.”75 The death penalty shall be imposed if it is
committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances,
which include, “[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent.”76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA
detailing how she was raped, culminating with the
penetration of appellant’s penis into her vagina, suffices to
prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a
woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was committed.77
Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of
force or intimidation is not essential when the accused is
the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral
ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and
intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened
by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed
above AAA’s head.80
_______________
74 Republic Act No. 8353.

75 Id., Article 266-A, Paragraph 1(a).
76 Id., Article 266-B.
77 People v. Jacob, G.R. No. 177151, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 191,
207.
78 People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 168102, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 124,
135.
79 Rollo, pp. 20-21.
80 TSN, 11 March 2002, p. 6.
562

People vs. Lauga

It may be added that the self-serving defense of
appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that,
“alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with
suspicion because it is easy to fabricate.”81 “Alibi and denial
must be supported by strong corroborative evidence in
order to merit credibility.”82 Moreover, for the defense of
alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements—
(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense
was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene at the time of its commission.83 Appellant
failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship with the offender in the instant case has
likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying
circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information,
stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference,
and testified to by both parties in their respective
testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding
upon this Court because they are judicial admissions
within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
“Sec. 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or

written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.”
_______________
81 People v. Jacob, supra note 77 at 203.

82 Id.
83 People v. Aycardo, supra note 68 at 534.
563
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 563

People vs. Lauga
Penalty

Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and

damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to
the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with
any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim
is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto84 and
P75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of
exemplary damages should have been increased from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering
that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant
would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.87 We
further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on
appellant’s non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 clearly provides that “persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
the law, shall not be eligible for parole.”
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-
MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
_______________
84 People v. Sia, G.R. No. 174059, 27 February 2009, 580 SCRA 364,
367-368.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.

564
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Abad,

JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Failure of the NBI agents to inform the suspect
of her right to counsel during custodial investigation
attains significance only if the person under investigation
makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel and
which is then sought to be admitted against the accused
during the trial—in such case, the tainted confession
obtained in violation is inadmissible in evidence against
the accused. (Eugenio vs. People, 549 SCRA 433 [2008])
The mantle of protection afforded by Art. III, Sec. 12 of
the Constitution covers the period from the time a person is
taken into custody for the investigation of his possible
participation in the commission of a crime or from the time
he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
offense although not yet in custody. (People vs. Reyes, 581
SCRA 691 [2009])
——o0o——


Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario,

Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—Simulation is defined as “the declaration of a

fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the
parties, in order to produce, for the purposes of deception,
the appearances of a juridical act which does not exist or is
different from that which was really executed.” (Mendezona
vs. Ozamiz, 376 SCRA 482 [2002])
When the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. (Santos vs. Lumbao,
519 SCRA 408 [2007])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 160795. June 27, 2008.*
CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA
TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA
CUASO, respondents.
Provisional Remedies; Injunctions; To be entitled to the

injunctive writ, there must be a showing that the invasion of the
right is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is
clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to issue in order to prevent
serious damage.—The denial was based on sound legal principles.
It is axiomatic that to be enti-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
155
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 155
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco
tled to the injunctive writ, one must show that there exists a right
to be protected which is directly threatened by the act sought to
be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the
invasion of the right is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to issue in order to
prevent serious damage.
Same; Same; Preliminary Injunctions; The applicants for the
issuance of writ of injunction must possess clear and unmistakable
legal right that merits protection through the writ of preliminary
injunction.—In the Cuasos’ case, their right to injunctive relief
had not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. They failed
to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of
their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ. Indeed,
the enforcement of the writ of execution, which would demolish
the Cuasos’ perimeter fence, is manifestly prejudicial to their
interest. However, they possess no clear and unmistakable legal
right that merits protection through the writ of preliminary
injunction. Their right to maintain the said fence had been
declared inferior to the Tanjangcos’ right to the demolition of the
fence, after the CA judgment had become final and executory as to
the Cuasos.
Appeals; It is a fundamental principle that a party who does
not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any
affirmative relief; An appellee who is not an appellant may assign
errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment,
but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.—While it is
true that this Court noted the Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum filed by the Cuasos, such notation was made only
insofar as Corinthian made them respondents in this petition.
This Court cannot grant to the Cuasos any affirmative relief as
they did not file a petition questioning the CA ruling.
Consequently, the Decision of the CA holding that the Cuasos
acted in bad faith and that the perimeter fence may now be
demolished cannot be put in issue by the Cuasos. It is a
fundamental principle that a party who does not appeal, or file a
petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relief. An
appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief
where his purpose is to maintain the judgment, but he cannot
seek modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative
relief unless
156
he has also appealed. This applies to C.B. Paraz and Engr. De

Dios who likewise failed to assail the aforementioned CA
Decision.
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Evidence; Damages; In every tort case
filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by
a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.—The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In every tort case filed
under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
Same; Same; Negligence; Test to Determine Negligence; Words
and Phrases; “Negligent Act,” Defined—A negligent act is an
inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of
ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation
involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a
force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more
careful manner. The test to determine the existence of negligence
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect,
adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a
man of ordinary
157
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 157
intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to

that standard.
Same; Same; It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision
association of any liability arising from the erection of a perimeter
fence which encroached upon another person’s lot when, by its very
own Manual of Rules and Regulations, it imposes its authority
over all its members to the end that “no new construction can be
started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the
appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid.”—By its
Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that
Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building
plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going
construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in
insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the
construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of
dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or
equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very
own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end
that “no new construction can be started unless the plans are
approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and
pre-construction fees are paid.” Moreover, Corinthian can impose
sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the
inspection is merely a “table inspection” and, therefore, should
exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the
supposed inspection is merely a “table inspection” and the
approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the
purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith
would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations
could be disregarded. Corinthian’s imprimatur on the
construction of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall over the property of the
Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order.
Lease; Judicial Notice; The reasonable amount of rent may not
be determined by judicial notice but by supporting evidence, such
as (1) the realty assessment of the land, (2) the increase in realty
taxes, and (3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity.—Our
ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag, 400 SCRA 494 (2003) is
instructive: Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5,
1997], petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of
the reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order
to determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In
that case, however, this Court relied on the CA’s factual findings,
which were based on
158
the evidence presented before the trial court. In determining

reasonable rent, the RTC therein took account of the following
factors: 1) the realty assessment of the land, 2) the increase in
realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity.
Clearly, the trial court relied, not on mere judicial notice, but on
the evidence presented before it. Indeed, courts may fix the
reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a
disputed property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming
that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely
on their own appreciation of land values without considering any
evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable
amount of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence
adduced by the parties. In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258,
January 18, 2002], the trial court awarded rent to the defendants
in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared
that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by
mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence: x x x A court
cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The
court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or
which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the court must “allow the parties to be
heard thereon.” Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the
rental value of the premises in question without supporting
evidence.

Court of Appeals.
Ongkiko, Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for
petitioner.
Feria, Feria, La’O, Tantoco for respondents Sps.
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco.
Ponce Enrile, Reyes & Manalastas for respondents
Sps. Frank and Teresita Cuaso.
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-53.
159
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 159

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the

reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated
January 31, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43217, which reversed
and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, dated March 30, 1993.
The Antecedents:
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa
Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and
2829615 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the
other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso
(the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the
Tanjangcos’ lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a
relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the
business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying,
conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision’s
developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the
Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the
said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance with the
approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the
Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of
C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder,
their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69
by 87 square meters.
_______________
2 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (now retired), with

Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (now retired) and Danilo B. Pine
(now retired), concurring; id., at pp. 56-108.
3 Particularly docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2706; id., at pp. 172-199.
4 Rollo, pp. 148-149.
5 Id., at p. 150.
6 Id., at pp. 119-139.
160

No amicable settlement was reached between the

parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos
demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and
refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a
suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with
Damages.7
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8
against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The
Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to
ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to
Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate
relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The
Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying
their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr.
De Dios’ integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that
had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty,
they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute
with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that
Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages
that they might incur as a result of such construction.
On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos’ perimeter
wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square
meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in
good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and
the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the
land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision. In the
event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to
purchase the said portion, the perimeter wall should be
demolished at the latter’s expense. The RTC also ordered
the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00
commencing from the time of the filing of the complaint.
The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 143-147.

8 Id., at pp. 153-164.
161
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 161

negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries

of Cuasos’ lot when it constructed the house. It, thus,
ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney’s fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos.
The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De
Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
The Tanjangcos filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 of
the said RTC Decision which the RTC, however, denied in
its Order10 dated June 28, 1993.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the
Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed to the CA.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-
grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April
5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to
exercise the rights granted under Articles 449, 450, 451
and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right to
demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall
after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for
the preservation of the encroached area. The Cuasos were
ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use,
enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the
time they vacate the property considering the location and
category of the same. They were, likewise, ordered to pay
the Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00
as exemplary damages, and P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The CA also imposed six percent (6%) interest per annum
on all the awards. The Cuasos’ appeal against the
Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of
merit. On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B.
Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in
performing their respective duties and so they were
ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of
fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts
that the Cuasos
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 200-207.

10 Id., at p. 208.
162

shall eventually pay under the decision, also with interest

of six percent (6%) per annum.
Only Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of
the CA Decision within the 15-day reglementary period. No
motion for reconsideration was filed by the Cuasos, C.B.
Paraz and/or Engr. De Dios.
About six (6) months later, or on August 12, 2003, the
Cuasos filed a Comment/Manifestation12 praying that they
be allowed to adopt Corinthian’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Resolution13 dated November 14, 2003, the CA
denied Corinthian’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Corinthian filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution, and
impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents being the
third-party plaintiffs in the RTC.
This Court gave due course to Corinthian’s petition and
required the parties to submit their respective
memorandum.14 In compliance, the Cuasos submitted their
Memorandum15 and Supplement to Memorandum,16 which
were both noted by this Court in its Resolutions dated
January 10, 200517 and February 2, 2005,18 respectively.
In the meantime, the Tanjangcos moved for partial entry
of judgment of the CA Decision which was granted by the
CA in its Resolution19 dated May 26, 2006, directing the
issuance of
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 209-216.

12 Id., at pp. 225-227.
13 Id., at pp. 110-115.
14 Resolution dated September 15, 2004; id., at p. 308.
15 Rollo, pp. 310-325.
16 Id., at pp. 419-433.
17 Id., at p. 450.
18 Id., at p. 452.
19 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (now retired), with
Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Mariflor Punzalan-
Castillo, concurring; id., at pp. 457-460.
163
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 163
an Entry of Judgment and a Certification that its Decision

dated January 31 2003 has become final and executory
with respect to the Cuasos, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios
for their failure to file an appeal assailing the said Decision
before this Court.
The Tanjangcos then moved for the execution of the
judgment against the Cuasos, specifically the demolition of
the perimeter fence,20 which was also granted by the RTC
in its Order21 dated December 18, 2006.
Other than the filing of an Opposition22 and a Motion for
Reconsideration23 before the RTC, the Cuasos prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction before this Court to enjoin the
demolition of the perimeter fence. They averred that the
premature demolition of the alleged encroaching perimeter
wall and other improvements will cause grave and
irreparable damage to them, because what is sought to be
demolished is part of their residence. They claimed that no
amount of money will compensate for the damage they
stand to suffer should any demolition subsequently prove
to be wrongful. They argued that before any execution can
be carried out, it is necessary to first determine whether or
not Corinthian was negligent in approving the building
plan and whether or not it acted in good faith in doing so.
Such determination, according to the Cuasos, will in turn
determine whether or not they were in good faith in
constructing the house.24
The Tanjangcos opposed the Cuasos’ application for
TRO. They countered that the only pending matter with
this Court is the appeal by Corinthian; hence, the
implementation of the January 31, 2003 Decision of the CA
against the Cuasos will
_______________
20 Motion for Execution dated July 10, 2006; id., at pp. 493-501.
21 Rollo, pp. 509-511.
22 Id., at pp. 502-508.
23 Id., at pp. 517-529.
24 Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated May 4, 2007; id., at pp. 465-491.
164

not preempt the outcome of the said pending incidents.

Also, any action taken by this Court on Corinthian’s
petition would not benefit the Cuasos for they did not
appeal the adverse decision against them. Accordingly,
they cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court by
reason or on account of the appeal taken by Corinthian.
The appeal, they added, is personal to Corinthian. Finally,
they argued that the Cuasos are now estopped from
questioning the enforcement of the CA Decision since they
issued a manager’s check to pay the money judgment.25
In this Court’s Resolution dated July 18, 2007, we
denied the Cuasos’ application for TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction for lack of merit.
The denial was based on sound legal principles. It is
axiomatic that to be entitled to the injunctive writ, one
must show that there exists a right to be protected which is
directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of
the right is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to issue in
order to prevent serious damage.26
In the Cuasos’ case, their right to injunctive relief had
not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. They
failed to show proof that there is material and substantial
invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an
injunctive writ. Indeed, the enforcement of the writ of
execution, which would demolish the Cuasos’ perimeter
fence, is manifestly prejudicial to their interest. However,
they possess no clear and unmistakable legal right that
merits protection through the writ
_______________
25 Opposition dated May 17, 2007; id., at pp. 556-574.

26 Almeida v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159124, January 17, 2005, 448
SCRA 681, 694.
165
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 165

of preliminary injunction.27 Their right to maintain the

said fence had been declared inferior to the Tanjangcos’
right to the demolition of the fence, after the CA judgment
had become final and executory as to the Cuasos.
It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the
ruling of the CA. This failure to contest the CA decision
before this Court was fatal to their cause. It had the effect
of an admission that they indeed acted in bad faith, as they
accepted the CA ruling. The decision of the CA, therefore,
became binding and final as to them.28 As a matter of fact,
the CA already issued a partial entry of judgment against
the Cuasos.
An injunction to stay a final and executory decision is
unavailing except only after a showing that facts and
circumstances exist which would render execution unjust
or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the
parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown
by the facts earlier narrated.29
_______________
27 Philippine School of Business Administration-Quezon City v.

Tolentino-Genilo, G.R. No. 159277, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 442,
448.
28 In Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 368
Phil. 36, 50; 308 SCRA 559, 573 (1999), citing Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko, 27 SCRA 418, 424 (1969) and
Singapore Airlines Limited v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 143, 148 (1995),
this Court held: The decision of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals not having been appealed by the insurer (MIGC) of the Toyota
Tamaraw, the same is now final as far as that entity is concerned, and
may not be modified by this Court. Failure of any parties to appeal the
judgment as against him makes such judgment final and executory. By
the same token, an appeal by one party from such judgment does not
inure to the benefit of the other party who had not appealed nor can it be
deemed to be an appeal of such other party from the judgment against
him.
29 Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light
Co., Inc., 431 Phil. 324, 333; 381 SCRA 582, 590 (2002).
166

While it is true that this Court noted the Memorandum

and Supplemental Memorandum filed by the Cuasos, such
notation was made only insofar as Corinthian made them
respondents in this petition. This Court cannot grant to the
Cuasos any affirmative relief as they did not file a petition
questioning the CA ruling. Consequently, the Decision of
the CA holding that the Cuasos acted in bad faith and that
the perimeter fence may now be demolished cannot be put
in issue by the Cuasos. It is a fundamental principle that a
party who does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is
not entitled to any affirmative relief.30 An appellee who is
not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment, but he cannot seek
modification or reversal of the judgment or claim
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.31 This
applies to C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios who likewise failed
to assail the aforementioned CA Decision.
With this matter put to rest, we now go to the main
issues raised by Corinthian, the sole petitioner in this case,
to wit:
“a) Whether or not there is legal basis for the Court of

Appeals to hold petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc.
liable to pay 5% of the judgment money to Sps. Tanjangco on
account of the encroachment made by Sps. Cuaso[; and]
b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to
increase unilaterally and without proof the amount prayed for in
the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the
use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon, to
P10,000.00.”32
_______________
30 Alauya, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 443 Phil.

893, 907; 395 SCRA 742, 752-753 (2003).
31 Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
385 Phil. 956, 976; 329 SCRA 314, 334 (2000).
32 Corinthian’s Memorandum dated December 6, 2004,
Rollo, pp. 384-385.
167
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 167

Corinthian claims that the approval of the building plan

of the Cuasos was not tainted with negligence as it did not
approve the survey relocation plan but merely the
architectural, structural and sanitary plans for Cuasos’
house; that the purpose of the said approval is not to
ensure that the house to be erected on a particular lot is
constructed within its boundaries but only to ensure
compliance with the Manual of Rules and Regulations; that
while Corinthian conducts actual site inspections, the
inspection and approval of the building plans are limited to
“table inspection” only; that the survey relocation plan was
never submitted for Corinthian’s approval; that the
acceptance of the builder’s bond did not make Corinthian
automatically liable for the encroachment and for damages;
and that Corinthian approved the building plan with the
good faith and due diligence required under the
circumstances. It, thus, concludes that it cannot be held
liable to pay five percent (5%) of the money judgment to the
Tanjangcos on account of the encroachment made by the
Cuasos. Likewise, it finds no legal basis for the CA to
unilaterally increase the amount of the adjudged rent from
P2,000.00 to P10,000.00 which was not prayed for by the
Tanjangcos in their complaint and in the absence of
evidence adduced by the parties.33
On the other hand, the Tanjangcos stand by the ruling
of the CA and opine that Corinthian was negligent in
approving the building plan of the Cuasos. They submit
that Corinthian’s claim that it merely conducts “table
inspections” of buildings further bolsters their argument
that Corinthian was negligent in conveniently and
unilaterally restricting and limiting the coverage of its
approval, contrary to its own Manual of Rules and
Regulations; that the acceptance of a builder’s bond does
not automatically make Corinthian liable but the same
affirms the fact that a homeowner can hold it liable for the
consequences of the approval of a building plan;
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 363-407.
168

and that Corinthian, by regularly demanding and accepting

membership dues, must be wary of its responsibility to
protect the rights and interests of its members. Lastly, the
Tanjangcos contend that a court can take judicial notice of
the general increase in the rentals of real estate, as in this
case, where the CA considered the value of their lot in the
“posh-and-swank” Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the
fact that they were deprived of it for almost two decades.
The Tanjangcos pray that this Court sustain the ruling of
the CA.34
The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has

to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.35
Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos
encroached on Lot 69 owned by the Tanjangcos by 87
square meters as duly found by both the RTC and the CA
in accordance with the evidence on record. As a result, the
Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been deprived of the
use of that portion of their lot encroached upon. Thus, the
primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether
Corinthian was negligent
_______________
34 Tanjangcos’ Memorandum dated November 29, 2004; id., at pp. 331-

361.
35 Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November
25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 242.
169
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 169

under the circumstances and, if so, whether such

negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the
Tanjangcos.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely
carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may
be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable
risk to another because of the expectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A
negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person
in the actor’s position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of
harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it
in a more careful manner.36
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinary person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines
liability according to that standard.37
By this test, we find Corinthian negligent.
While the issue of Corinthian’s alleged negligence is
factual in character,38 a review by this Court is proper
because the CA’s factual findings differ from those of the
RTC’s.39 Thus,
_______________
36 Capili v. Cardaña, G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006, 506 SCRA

569, 575, citing 65 C.J.S. §1(14), p. 462.
37 Fernando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92087, May 8, 1992, 208
SCRA 714, 718, citing Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, 813 (1918).
38 Pestaño v. Sumayang, 400 Phil. 740, 749; 346 SCRA 870, 878 (2000).
39 Manila Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 338, 354;
361 SCRA 35, 49-50 (2001).
170

after a meticulous review of the evidence on record, we hold

that the CA committed no reversible error when it deviated
from the findings of fact of the RTC. The CA’s findings and
conclusions are substantiated by the evidence on record
and are more in accord with law and reason. Indeed, it is
clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual
of Rules and Regulations, thereby resulting in the
encroachment on the Tanjangcos’ property.
We agree with the CA when it aptly held:
“Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or
excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos’
building plans was only limited to a so-called “table inspection;”
and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate
is to put a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized
solely for the defendants Cuasos. It is also the subdivision of the
plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos—and of all others who have their
dwelling units or abodes therein. Pertinently, its Manual of Rules
and Regulations stipulates in Section 3 thereof (under the
heading Construction), thus:
A. Rules and Regulations
No new construction can be started unless the building
plans are approved by the Association and the
appropriate Builder’s cash bond and pre-construction fees
are paid. The Association will not allow the entry of
construction materials and process identification cards for
workers if the above conditions are not complied with.
Likewise, all renovations, repairs, additions and
improvements to a finished house except electrical wiring,
will have to be approved by the Association. Water service
connection of a homeowner who undertakes construction
work without prior approval of the Association will be cut-
off in addition to the sanctions previously mentioned.
It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and
Regulations applies to all—or it does not apply at all. To borrow a
popular expression, what is sauce for the gander is sauce for the
goose—or ought to be. To put it matter-of-factly and bluntly, thus,
its so-called “table inspection” approval of the Cuasos’ building
plans is no less of
171
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 171

an approval, as approvals come and go. And since it is an

approval tainted with negligence, the necessary and inevitable
consequences which law and justice attach to such negligence
must, as a matter of law and justice, also necessarily attach to
Corinthian.
And then again third party defendant-appellee Corinthian
Garden required the posting of a builder’s cash bond (Exh. “5”-
Corinthian) from the defendants-appellants Cuasos and the third-
party defendant C.B. Paraz Construction to secure the
performance of their undertaking. Surely, Corinthian does not
imply that while it may take the benefits from the Builder’s cash
bond, it may, Pilate-like, wash its hands of any responsibility or
liability that would or might arise from the construction or
building of the structure for which the cash bond was in the first
place posted. That is not only unjust and immoral, but downright
unchristian and iniquitous.
Under the same parity of reasoning, the payment by the
appellants-Cuasos to the appellee Corinthian of pre-construction
and membership fees in the Association must necessarily entail
the creation of certain obligations on the part of Corinthian. For
duties and responsibilities always go hand in hand with rights
and privileges. That is the law of life — and that is the law of
every civilized society. It is an axiom of equity that he who
receives the benefits must share the burdens.”40
By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable

to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in
the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of
periodic inspections of on-going construction projects
within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring
compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the
construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the
subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the
Cuasos.41 It is not just or equitable to relieve
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 104-105 (Citations omitted).

41 Art. IV, Section 3(d) of Corinthian’s Manual of Rules and
Regulations provides:
All on-going construction shall be subject to inspection of the
Association’s representative for the purpose of determining compliance to
the approved plans. It shall be considered a violation if the contractor/lot
owner does not permit entry of the Association repre-
172

Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it

imposes its authority over all its members to the end that
“no new construction can be started unless the plans are
approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond
and pre-construction fees are paid.” Moreover, Corinthian
can impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the
proposition that the inspection is merely a “table
inspection” and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from
liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed
inspection is merely a “table inspection” and the approval
granted to every member is a mere formality, then the
purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance
therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed
for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian’s
imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos’ perimeter
wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the
Cuasos that everything was in order.
In sum, Corinthian’s failure to prevent the
encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into
Tanjangcos’ property—despite the inspection conducted—
constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to
the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
On the second issue, our ruling in Spouses Badillo v.
Tayag42 is instructive:
“Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997],

petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the
reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to
de-
_______________
sentative doing inspection works. Such violation will be subject to the sanctions
available to the Association such as (a) denial of entry of construction materials (b)
renovation of ID’s of construction workers and (c) cutting-off of water service. The
schedule of inspection shall be as follows:
A. For original construction

x x x
2. When the perimeter walls are being constructed.
x x x
42 448 Phil. 606, 623; 400 SCRA 494, 507-508 (2003).
173
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 173

termine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In that

case, however, this Court relied on the CA’s factual findings,
which were based on the evidence presented before the trial court.
In determining reasonable rent, the RTC therein took account of
the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the land, 2) the
increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in
the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on mere judicial
notice, but on the evidence presented before it.
Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the
use and occupation of a disputed property. However, petitioners
herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount
of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values
without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court
may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its
action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002, 374
SCRA 107], the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a
forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that
the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere
judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual
matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking
such judicial notice, the court must “allow the parties to be
heard thereon.” Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the
rental value of the premises in question without supporting
evidence.”
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because

evidence is required for a court to determine the proper
rental value. But contrary to Corinthian’s arguments, both
the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the
Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and
use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the
RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented
below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao,43 we
considered the increase in the award of
_______________
43 407 Phil. 309, 323; 355 SCRA 29, 42 (2001).
174

rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of

each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the
petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of
their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were
deprived of possession and use of their property for more
than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we
find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by
the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—It is a basic procedural postulate that a

preliminary injunction, which necessarily includes a
temporary restraining order, should not be used to transfer
the possession or control of a thing to a party who did not
have such possession or control at the inception of the case.
(Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 392 [2000])
A writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
upon showing of an actual existing right to be protected
during the pendency of the principal action. (Lim vs. Court
of Appeals, 482 SCRA 326 [2006])
——o0o——

VOL. 517, MARCH 7, 2007 657
Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, Jr.
*
G.R. No. 156052. March 7, 2007.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR

ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA,
JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,
respondent.
Mandamus; A petition for mandamus may be filed when any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station.—Under Rule 65,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that
is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
petitioner should have a well-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
658
defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act
and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do
the act required to be done.
Same; Locus Standi; When a mandamus proceeding concerns
a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people
who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the
real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.—We have ruled in previous cases that when a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents
of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of
the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of
petitioners to institute this proceeding.
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; The mayor,

as the chief executive of the city, has the duty to enforce ordinances
as long as they have not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts—it is his ministerial duty to do so.—The
Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As
the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It
is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202
SCRA 779 (1991), we stated the reason for this: These officers
cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to
the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
Same; Same; Terrorism; No reason exists to delay the

implementation of a protective measure designed to protect the
residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.—Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the
Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror
of the September 11, 2001 attack
659
VOL. 517, MARCH 7, 2007 659

on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.
The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila
from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of
a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists
why such a protective measure should be delayed.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Mandamus.
Samson S. Alcantara and Ed Vincent S. Albano for
petitioners.
Office of the City Legal Officer for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
1
In this original petition for mandamus, petitioners Social
Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang2
Panlungsod of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent 3
mayor
approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became4
effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.
_______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2 Entitled “Ordinance Reclassifying the Land Use of [Those] Portions of
Land Bounded by the Pasig River In The North[,] PNR Railroad Track in
the East, Beata St. in the South, Palumpong St. in the Southwest and
Estero De Pandacan in the West, PNR Railroad in the Northwest Area,
Estero of Pandacan in the Northeast, Pasig River in the Southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the Southwest; the Area of Punta, Sta. Ana Bounded by
the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St.[,] Mayo 28 St. and the F. Manalo
Street from Industrial II to Commercial I.”
3 Rollo, p. 12.
4 Id., p. 6.
660

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police

power delegated to local government units, a principle
described as the power inherent in a government to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,5
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.
This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
“SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning

and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas,
the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River
in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the
south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan
in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana
bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St.,
and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other
businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from
the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and
desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.”
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein

from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among
the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
“Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.
_______________
5 Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor, 336 Phil. 375; 269

SCRA 393 (1997), citing Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestlé Philippines,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 88710–13, 19 December 1990, 192 SCRA 396.
661
VOL. 517, MARCH 7, 2007 661

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the

Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
6
6
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which
they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.”
Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the
following:
Section 1.—Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL

COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a
program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall
include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning
process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG
spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. x x
x
Section 2.—Consistent with the scale-down program
mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint
operations and management, including the operation of common,
integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international
and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations
of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be
limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and
conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL
COMPANIES.
Section 3.—The development and maintenance of the safety
and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken
from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the
surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the
OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand,

committed to do the following:
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 16–18. This MOU modified the Memorandum of Agreement

(MOA) executed on October 12, 2001 by the oil companies and the DOE.
This MOA called for close coordination among the parties with a view of
formulating appropriate measures to arrive at the best possible option to
ensure, maintain and at the same time harmonize the interests of both
government and the oil companies; Id., p. 36.
662

Section 1.—The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council
this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of
implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2.—The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent
with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL
COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal
requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint
operations and the scale down program.
Section 3.—The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the
OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4.—The CITY OF MANILA and the national
government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and
shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or
encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang7 Panlungsod ratified the MOU in

Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective
8
only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30,9
2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30,
2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.
_______________
7 Entitled “Resolution Ratifying the Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) Entered into by and Among the Department of Energy, the City of
Manila, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation on 26 June 2002, and Known as Document No. 60,
Page No. 12, Book No. 1, Series of 2002 in the Notarial Registry of Atty.
Neil Lanson Salcedo, Notary Public for and in the City of Manila”; Id., p.
36.
8 Id.
9 Entitled “Resolution Extending the Validity of Resolution 97, Series of
2002, to April 30, 2003, Thereby Authorizing his Honor Mayor Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., to Issue Special Business Permits to Caltex Phil., Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation Situated within
the Pandacan Oil Terminal Covering the said Period”; Id., p. 38.
663
VOL. 517, MARCH 7, 2007 663

Resolution No.1013, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of

the ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for
mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate
11
removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce

Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the12 resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory

legal duty, under Section 13 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of
the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has 14
been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.
However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance
and MOU are not
_______________
10 Id.
11 Id., p. 9.
12 Id., p. 15.
13 It states:
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation.—x x x

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the city mayor shall:
x x x x x x x x x
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city x x x x
14 Rollo, pp. 28 and 144.
664

inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not
amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains
valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not
in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing
it. He maintains that the MOU should be15 considered as a
mere guideline for its full implementation.
16
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus
is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is
already imposed on the respondent and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must
be the clear and imperative
17
duty of respondent to do the act
required to be done.
_______________
15 Id., pp. 31 and 146–147.

16 The full text reads:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent. x x x x.
17 University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100588,

7 March 1994, 230 SCRA 761, 771, citations omitted.
665
VOL. 517, MARCH 7, 2007 665

“Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel

compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of
mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to
adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to
secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right
18
to the relief sought is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.”
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal
right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS
states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila.
The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are
allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in
previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns
a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties19
in interest and they need not
show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the
city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of
petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes
upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all
laws 20and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 as long as it
_______________
18 BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Manikan, G.R. No. 148789, 16

January 2003, 395 SCRA 373, 375, citing Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, 389
Phil. 200; 333 SCRA 680 (2000).
19 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 1075; 370 SCRA 394 (2001);
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119, 29 May 1987, 150
SCRA 530, 536; Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, 136
SCRA 27, 36.
20 Supra note 13.
666

has not been

21
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice. It is22 his ministerial
duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the
reason for this:
“These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground

of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest23 to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.”
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by

respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful,
unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second
issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and
Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the
Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms
of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027,
the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the
City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing
that legally
24
hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance
No. 8027.
_______________
21 Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992, 212

SCRA 739, 747. According to respondent, the oil companies separately
filed actions for annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 which are now pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branches 39 and 42; Rollo, p.
143.
22 G.R. No. 96859, 15 October 1991, 202 SCRA 779.
23 Id., p. 795, citing Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818 (1922) and
Burton v. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.
24 According to respondent, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued
in the action filed by the oil companies to annul Ordi
667
VOL. 517, MARCH 7, 2007 667

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the

Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the
horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation
25
that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure
should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City
of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Garcia, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, Hon. Jose L. Atienza directed to

immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Note.—Persons who stand to lose their sources of

livelihood, a property right which is zealously protected by
the Constitution, have a direct and substantial interest in a
controversy which confers on them the requisite standing.
(Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminal Co.,
Inc., 402 SCRA 612 [2003])
——o0o——
_______________
nance No. 8027 (see note 21, supra); Rollo, p. 143. This presumably has
already lapsed.
25 This was alleged by petitioners and not refuted by respondent; Id.,
pp. 7 and 118.
668

SO ORDERED.

Azcuna** and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—The minimum requirement of due process in

termination proceedings, which must be complied with
even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of
notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the
grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side of
the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the
management’s decision to terminate. (Skippers United
Pacific, Inc. vs. Maguad, 498 SCRA 639 [2006])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 174154. October 17, 2008.*
JESUS CUENCO, petitioner, vs. TALISAY TOURIST

SPORTS COMPLEX, INCORPORATED AND MATIAS B.
AZNAR III, respondents.
Pre-Trial; Stipulation of Facts; Judicial Admissions; The

stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial
admissions—the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as
embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon
them.—Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 4.
Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. A party may make judicial admissions
in (1) the pleadings, (2)
_______________
** Per Special order No. 521, dated 29 September 2008, signed by Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, designating Associate Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna to replace
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who is on official leave.
* THIRD DIVISION.
617
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 617
Cuenco vs. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, Incorporated
during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or

stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The
stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial
admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further
proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the
admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no
admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the
pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and
conclusive upon them.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Estoppel; Words and Phrases;
The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt
therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-
making; An act performed by counsel within the scope of a “general
or implied authority” is regarded as an act of the client which
renders respondents in estoppel, by which is meant that an
admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making
it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.—Respondents did not deny the admission made by their
counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through
palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is
incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-
trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may
not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making.
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be
rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act
performed by counsel within the scope of a “general or implied
authority” is regarded as an act of the client which renders
respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission
or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
Damages; Interests; Interest cannot be recovered upon
unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty.—Under Article 2213 of the
Civil Code, “interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.” In the instant case, the claim of
petitioner is unliquidated or cannot be established with
reasonable certainty upon his filing of the case in the RTC. This is
because of the contending claims of the parties, specifically, the
claim of petitioner for the return of the P500,000.00 deposit vis-à-
vis the claim of respondents on the arrears in rentals and on the
damage to the premises. It is only now that the amount that
should be returned is ascertained, i.e., P500,000.00 less the two-
months arrears in rentals amounting to P195,833.34, the sum of
which will earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time the case was filed in the RTC on October 21,
1998. Upon
618
finality of this decision, the rate of interest shall be twelve percent

(12%) per annum from such finality until full satisfaction.
Corporation Law; Obligations incurred by the directors,
officers and agents of a corporation while acting as corporate
agents, are not their personal liability but the direct accountability
of the corporation they represent.—Concerning the solidary
liability of respondents, we hold that respondent Matias Aznar III
is not solidarily liable with respondent company. His function as
the President of the company does not make him personally liable
for the obligations of the latter. A corporation, being a juridical
entity, may act only through its directors, officers and employees.
Obligations incurred by them while acting as corporate agents,
are not their personal liability but the direct accountability of the
corporation they represent.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Federico C. Cabilao, Jr. for petitioner.
Godwin Denzil B. Manginsay and Ethel D. Soria for
respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
dated April 18, 2005 and the Resolution dated August 15,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
65773.
The Facts
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On May 25, 1992, petitioner leased from respondents for
a period of two (2) years, from May 8, 1992 to May 8, 1994,
the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, to be operated as a
cockpit. The lease was extended for another four (4) years,
or until May 8, 1998.
619
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 619

Under the Contract of Lease,1 it was stipulated that

petitioner shall, like a good father of the family, maintain
in good condition the furniture, chattels and all other
equipment and shall, at all times, keep the leased premises
clean and sanitary. For this purpose, petitioner would
allow the respondent’s building supervisor or his
authorized representative to make a regular spot
inspection of the leased premises to see to it that these
stipulations are strictly implemented.2 Any damage caused
to the furniture, chattels, equipment and parts of the
leased premises shall be the responsibility of petitioner to
repair and compensate.3 Furthermore, petitioner would
give a deposit equivalent to six (6) months rental to answer
for whatever damages may be caused to the premises
during the period of the lease.4
Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company
conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property.
Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was
eventually awarded to another bidder, Mr. Rex Cuaqui
Salud.5 Thereafter, petitioner wrote four (4) demand letters
to respondents.
The first letter, dated June 8, 1998, reads:
Dear Mr. Aznar:

I was so disheartened that after going through with the supposed
public bidding, haggling with the terms and conditions of a new
lease agreement and after full compliance of ALL your
requirements and the handshakes signifying the clinching of the
deal, the contract was awarded to another party. Though I believe
I deserve a renewal, I had to accept your decision with a heavy
heart.
It is now my desire to be released quickly from whatever liability
or responsibility under our previous contract. Repair works on
some damaged portions were already done. Based on our
contract, par. 5 thereof, it is
_______________
1 Records, pp. 6-9.

2 Paragraph 4 of the Contract of Lease, id., at p. 7.
3 Paragraph 5 of the Contract of Lease, id.
4 Paragraph 11 of the Contract of Lease, id.
5 The new lessee’s name appears in other parts of the records as Wakee/Wacky
Salud.
620

my understanding that I am answerable to all damages

caused to furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments
and minor parts of the leased premises. Once cleared, I
want the return of my deposit of P500,000.00.
Kindly send your inspector to determine by actual ocular
inspection if the restoration work is to your satisfaction.
Very truly yours,
JESUS C. CUENCO
[signed]6
Obviously, the letter was not answered, because on June

17, 1998 petitioner found it necessary to write respondents
a second letter reiterating his request for the return of the
deposit. The second demand letter reads:
Dear Mr. Aznar:

It has been more than a week since my letter dated 8 June 1998
requesting the return of my deposit of P500,000.00. I would
assume your representative had already conducted an ocular
inspection and you were satisfied on the restoration works made
on the premises. As I’ve stated in my said letter, I want to be
released as soon as possible.
I need to know immediately if I still have other things to
comply with as pre-condition for the release of the deposit.
As far as I know, I have already done my part.
Very truly yours,
JESUS C. CUENCO
[signed]7
With still no response from respondents, petitioner, on

August 14, 1998, sent a third demand letter which read:
Dear Mr. Aznar:

I am surprised by the unreasonable delay in the release of my
deposit of P500,000.00 in spite of my full compliance as to repair
works on minor damage to the premises during my term as lessee.
Twice I requested in writing for the immediate release of
my deposit but until now it
_______________
6 Records, p. 10. (Emphasis supplied.)
7 Id., at p. 11. (Emphasis supplied.)
621
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 621

remains unheeded. And the so-called “inventory” which

your lawyer Atty. Algoso8 promised to give has not been
given. Frankly, I am doubtful of the accuracy of said
inventory, if any, considering the full blast major
renovation now being conducted on the complex by the
new concessionaire. I think it’s about time we close the last
chapter of the book, in a manner of speaking, so we can proceed in
our separate distinct ways.
I reiterate my request to please release right now my deposit of
P500,000.00.
Very truly yours,
JESUS C. CUENCO
[signed]9
Finally, on August 18, 1998, petitioner, thru his counsel,

wrote respondents a final demand letter as follows:
Dear Mr. Aznar:

For ignoring the two letters of my client Mr. Jesus C. Cuenco,
dated June 8 and 17, 1998 regarding his request for the return of
his deposit in the sum of P500, 000.00, he has decided to endorse
the matter to this office for appropriate action.
It appears that when Mr. Cuenco leased the cockpit complex he
was required to put up a deposit to answer for damages that may
be caused to furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments and
minor repairs on the leased premises. When the lease expired
and he failed to get a renewal, Mr. Cuenco in fulfillment of
his obligation under the contract caused the repair of
minor damage to the premises after which your attention
was invited to get your reaction to the restoration work.
And since he did not receive any objection, it can be safely
premised that the restoration was to the lessor’s
satisfaction.
Mr. Cuenco informed me that the new concessionaire has
undertaken a full blast major renovation of the complex. Under
this condition and in the absence of an accurate inventory
conducted in the presence of both parties, it would be doubly
difficult, if not impossible, to charge Mr. Cuenco of any
_______________
8 Atty. Algoso is the in-house counsel of the respondents.

9 Records, p. 12. (Emphasis supplied.)
622

violation of his undertaking especially as to deficiency in the

furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments in the premises.
In view of all the foregoing, it is consequently demanded that you
return to Mr. Cuenco the aforesaid sum of P500,000.00 within
THREE (3) DAYS from notice hereof; otherwise, he may be
constrained to seek judicial relief for the return of the deposit plus
interest, damages and attorney’s fees.
Your compliance is enjoined.
Very truly yours, At my instance:
FEDERICO C. CABILAO (signed) JESUS C. CUENCO (signed)
Counsel for Mr. Jesus C. Cuenco10
As all of his demand letters remained unheeded, on

October 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of
money, damages and attorney’s fees. He maintained that
respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount
of the deposit without any justifiable reason.12
In their Answer,13 respondents countered that petitioner
caused physical damage to some portions of the leased
premises and the cost of repair and replacement of
materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.14 They also
averred that respondent Matias B. Aznar III (Aznar)
cannot be sued personally under the contract of lease since
a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from
its officers and stockholders, and there was no allegation
that Aznar, who is the President of the corporation, signed
the contract in his personal capacity.15
On March 8, 1999, the RTC issued a Pre-trial Order,16
the pertinent portions of which reads:
“The following facts were admitted by the [respondents]:
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 13-14.

11 Id., at pp. 1-14.
12 Id., at p. 3.
13 Id., at pp. 17-22.
14 Id., at p. 18.
15 Id., at p. 19.
16 Issued by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes; id., at p. 34.
623
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 623
1. There is no inventory of damages up to this time;

2. [Petitioner] deposited the amount of P500,000.00;
3. [Petitioner] sends (sic) several letters of demand to
[respondents] but said letters were not answered.
4. There was a renovation of the Talisay Tourist Sports
Complex with a qualification that the renovation is only 10% of
the whole amount.
The main issues in this case are as follows:
1. Whether or not [petitioner] is entitled to the return of the
deposit of P500,000.00, with interest;
2. Whether or not some portions of the complex sustained
physical damage during the operation of the same by the
[petitioner].”17
On May 24, 1999, the RTC issued an Order18 admitting

the exhibits of petitioner, consisting of the contract of lease
dated May 4, 1994 and the four (4) demand letters.
On July 29, 1999, an Order19 was issued by the same
court formally admitting the respondents’ following
exhibits: the lease contract, inventory of the leased
property as of June 4, 1998, inventory of the sports complex
dated June 24, 1995, ocular inspection report dated
January 15, 1998 and various receipts mostly in the name
of Southwestern University incurred in different months of
1998.
On August 11, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision20 in
favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

[petitioner] and against the [respondents], directing the latter
jointly and severally to return to [petitioner] the sum of
P500,000.00, representing the deposit mentioned in the
Complaint, plus 3% interest per month from August 18, 1998
until full payment thereof.
The latter are, likewise, directed to pay [petitioner] the sum of
P15,000.00 as and for litigation expenses.
With costs against the [respondents].
_______________
17 Id.
18 Id., at p. 40.
19 Id., at p. 58.
20 Penned by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes; id., at pp. 59-68.
624

SO ORDERED.”21
The RTC ratiocinated that respondents’ failure to reply

to the letters of petitioner raises a presumption that
petitioner has complied with his end of the contract. The
lower court gave credence to the testimony of respondents’
witness, Ateniso Coronado (Coronado), the property
custodian of the respondents, that the sports complex was
repaired and renovated by the new lessee. The court also
considered the admission of respondents’ counsel during
the pre-trial that no inventory of the property was
conducted on the leased premises. The RTC debunked the
inventory presented by the respondents during trial as a
mere afterthought to bolster their claim against
petitioner.22
Respondents appealed. On April 18, 2005, the CA
rendered a Decision23 reversing and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, dated August 11,
1999, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
finding this case in favor of defendants-appellants Talisay
Tourists Sports Complex and Matias Aznar III. Consequently,
Civil Case No. CEB-22847 for sum of money, damages, and
attorney’s fees involving herein parties, as well as all other claims
and counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of factual and
legal basis.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”24
The CA ruled in favor of respondents on the basis of: (1)

Coronado’s testimony that petitioner continued to hold
cockfights two months after the expiration of the lease
contract which was not refuted by petitioner; (2) the
summary of repairs made on the
_______________
21 Records, p. 68.
22 Id., at pp. 59-68.
23 Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate
Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 36-42.
24 Id., at p. 41.
625
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 625

property showing that respondents spent the amount of

P573,710.17 immediately prior to the expiration of the
lease contract and shortly thereafter; and (3) the new lessor
incurred expenses amounting to over P3 million when he
shouldered the rest of the repair and renovation of the
subject property.25
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raised the following issues for resolution of

the Court: (1) whether a judicial admission is conclusive
and binding upon a party making the admission; and (2)
whether such judicial admission was properly rejected by
the CA.26
On the other hand, respondents posed the following: (1)
whether the findings of the CA that the cockpit sustained
damage during the period of the lease was rendered not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Court; (2) whether the CA committed an error of law in
ruling that petitioner is not entitled for the return of the
deposit.27
The ultimate question we must resolve is whether
petitioner is entitled to the return of the amount deposited.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. Respondents failed to present

sufficient proof to warrant the retention of the full amount
of the deposit given by petitioner.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and as a rule,
does not weigh anew the evidence presented by the parties.
However, the instant case is one of the exceptions to the
rule because of the conflicting decisions of the RTC and the
CA based on contradictory factual findings. Thus, we have
reviewed the records in order to arrive at a judicious
resolution of the case at bench.
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 39-41.

26 Id., at p. 286.
27 Id., at pp. 264-265.
626

Petitioner questions the CA’s finding that there was

damage caused the premises while the lease was still in
force. Such finding could only have been based on alleged
inventory of the property conducted by the respondents.
Petitioner takes exception to this evidence because of the
earlier judicial admission made by respondents’ counsel
that no inventory was conducted and, accordingly, any
evidence adduced by the respondents contrary to or
inconsistent with the judicial admission should be rejected.
Indeed, at the pre-trial conference, respondents’ counsel
made an admission that no inventory was made on the
leased premises, at least up to that time. This admission
was confirmed in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial
court on March 8, 1999 after the lease expired on May 8,
1998.
Yet, on July 1, 1999, respondents’ witness Coronado
testified, as follows:
ATTY. VASQUEZ:
Q Why do you know the defendants?
A Because Talisay Sports Complex is owned by Aznar Brothers Realty
Corporation of which I am employed as (sic) in charge of the realty
department.
Q How about Matias Aznar III, the defendant here?
A He is the Chairman of the Board.
Q Board of what?
A Of the Aznar Brothers Realty Corporation.
Q Is he the Chairman of Talisay Tourist Sports Complex?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that you are in charge of the realty department, what
is your function with respect to the properties of Talisay
Tourist and Sports Complex?
A I am the in-charge of the administration and overseeing of the
complex owned by Talisay Sports Complex.
Q When you said that you are in charge of the administration and
overseeing of the complex, what does it includes (sic)?
A It includes collection of rentals of complex and routine
inspection to determine that there are missing or damage of
(sic) the properties.
627
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 627
Q How long have you been employed with the Aznar Brothers
Realty Company?
A 25 years.
x x x x
Q In your earlier testimony, you said that part of your function is
to conduct routine inspection of the complex. Now, was there a
routine inspection conducted during the period of the lease
contract between plaintiff and the defendant?
A Yes, we conducted inspection sometime in January 1998.
Q For what purpose was that inspection?
A The purpose is to determine if there are damage sustained by the
complex.
Q And what was the result of the inspection.
A There were missing and destroyed fixtures and physical damage
sustained by the complex.
x x x x
COURT
x x x x
Q W[h]y did you not take photographs of the damage sustained
by the complex?
A We did not take pictures, Your Honor, because in fact their
personnel were in our presence (sic) during the inspection,
they were accompanied by us, because we can not conduct
inspection without the presence of the personnel of Jesus
Cuenco, Your Honor, the lessee.
Q Did the personnel of Jesus Cuenco sign any paper
acknowledging receipt of any report?
A There was no refusal, but we did not initiate to let them sign
and confirm.
COURT
Q So, we have to rely on your testimony?
A Yes, sir.28
_______________
28 TSN, July 1, 1999, pp. 4-8. (Emphasis supplied.)
628

Obviously, it was on Coronado’s testimony, as well as on

the documentary evidence29 of an alleged property
inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its
conclusion that the amount of damage sustained by the
leased premises while in the possession of petitioner
exceeded the amount of petitioner’s deposit. This
contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents’
counsel which should have been binding on the
respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or

written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.”
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings,

(2) during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding.30 The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a
case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial
admissions require no further proof and may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions
were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions
were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-
trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and
conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their
counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made
through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts
is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts.
The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters
dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of
decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory
pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worth-
_______________
29 Exhibits “2,” “2-B,” “2-C” and “2-D.”

30 Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, June 16, 2006, 491
SCRA 49.
629
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 629

less.31 Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within

the scope of a “general or implied authority” is regarded as
an act of the client which renders respondents in estoppel.
By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is
conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.32
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by
their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA
committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight
to respondents’ evidence contradictory to the judicial
admission.
The appellate court’s findings that the damage in the
premises exceeded the amount of the deposit is further
sought to be justified, thus:
“Verily, a perusal of the summary of repairs amounting to

P573,710.17 claimed to have been made by appellants over the
property at about that time immediately prior to the expiration of
the lease contract and shortly thereafter, would show that the
repairs pertained to repairs on the drainage, sewage, immediate
premises and structure of the complex. We find the same highly
credible and meritorious considering that as earlier admitted by
appellee, the repairs he made were minor and were confined only
to certain portions of the complex, although substantial repairs
were done on the cockhouses only, and that said repairs were
done because of a coming big time derby and not to satisfy the
provisions of the lease contract. Also, by implication, appellee is
stating that the new lessor incurred expenses amounting to over
P3 million when he shouldered the rest of the repair and
renovation of the complex after the term of lease of appellee.”33
Yet, upon perusal of the receipts presented by

respondents, we found that majority of the receipts are
under the name of South-
_______________
31 Ramos v. Dizon, G.R. No. 137247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 17, 34.
32 Yujuico v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 164282, October 12, 2005, 472
SCRA 463.
33 Rollo, p. 40.
630

western University. In their Memorandum,34 respondents

aver that Southwestern University and respondent
corporation are sister companies.35 Even if true, this
matter is of no consequence because respondent company
and Southwestern University have distinct and separate
legal personalities, and Southwestern University is not a
party to this case. Thus, we cannot just accept respondents’
argument that the receipts paid in the name of
Southwestern University should be credited to respondent
company. In any event, they were not able to prove that
those receipts were in fact used for the repair or
maintenance of the respondents’ complex.
Furthermore, respondents are not entitled the full
amount of the deposit because the repair and renovation of
the sports complex after the expiration of petitioner’s lease
were undertaken not by respondents but by the new lessee.
This can be gleaned from Coronado’s testimony on cross-
examination, viz.:
Q You do not know. Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that the new lessee was
Wacky Salud?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was sometime of July or August of 1998?
A They were about to conduct three months repair of the complex?
Q So, Mr. Wacky Salud conducted, did you say repair or renovation? Is it
renovation or repair?
A There was a renovation and repair.
Q Renovation including repair?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q In other words, after the expiration of the contract of Mr. Cuenco,
Wacky Salud took over?
A Yes, he took over that repair and renovation were no longer included in
this presentation, that is at his own expense.
Q Precisely. In other words, some repairs were made by Mr. Salud and
not by Aznar Brothers Realty?
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 258-278.
35 Id., at p. 272.
631
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 631

A Yes, sir.36
Finally, the Court observes that the inventories

presented by respondents were not countersigned by
petitioner or were they presented to the latter prior to the
filing of the case in the RTC. Thus, we are more inclined to
agree with the trial court that the “inventory was made as
an afterthought,”37 in a vain attempt of the respondents to
establish their case.
However, Coronado’s testimony that petitioner extended
the operation of the sports complex for a period of two
months after the expiration of the lease without the
respondents’ authority and without the payment of rentals,
remains unrebutted. Enlightening is the following
testimony:
Q I observed here in No. 16 of your summary, two months arrears
rentals, June to July, how come? The contract was supposed to expire
May 1998?
A Yes, because it had happened on this extension of the lease because
they are still occupying until July after the expiration of the contract.
COURT
Q You mean to say that they still use the complex for the purpose for
which it was intended, which is for cockfighting?
WITNESS
A Yes, they are still doing their usual operation.
ATTY. VASQUEZ
Q You mean to say that there were still cockfighting held in the complex
even after May 1998?
A Yes, sir.38
This two (2) months over-stay of petitioner in the leased

premises should be charged against the deposit. Because
there was no renewal of the lease contract, it is understood
that the continued use
_______________
36 TSN, July 1, 1999, pp. 19-30.

37 Rollo, p. 90.
38 TSN, July 1, 1999, pp. 17-18.
632

of the premises is on a monthly basis with the rental in the

amount previously agreed upon by the parties, in
accordance with Articles 167039 and 168740 of the Civil
Code.
In the Contract of Lease of petitioner and respondent
company, it was agreed that the rental to be paid shall be
the following:
“WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is the owner of the Talisay
Tourist Sports Complex, Inc. located at Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu;
WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY has expressed his desire to
lease said complex (cockpit) and the FIRST PARTY have agreed
to lease/let the same to the SECOND PARTY subject to the
following term and condition, to wit:
1. In consideration of this lease, the SECOND PARTY agrees
to pay the FIRST PARTY a lump sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) representing advance rental for the first year, the
same to be paid on May 8, 1994. Thereafter, the rental shall be as
follows:
Second year - P1,050,000.00 or P87,500.00/month
Third year - 1,100,000.00 or P91,666.67/month
Fourth year - 1,175,000.00 or P97,916.67/month41
_______________
39 Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the
lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously
been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the
period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles
1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
40 Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from
month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though
a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts
may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the
premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise
determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over
six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period
after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.
41 Records, p. 6.
633
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 633

Thus, by way of rental for the two-month overstay, the

amount of P195,833.34 should be deducted from the
amount of deposit paid by petitioner to respondent
company.
As to petitioner’s claim of interest of three percent (3%)
per month on the amount due him, the same is without
legal basis. We note that no amount of interest was
previously agreed upon by the parties in the contract of
lease.
Under Article 2213 of the Civil Code, “interest cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except
when the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty.” In the instant case, the claim of petitioner is
unliquidated or cannot be established with reasonable
certainty upon his filing of the case in the RTC. This is
because of the contending claims of the parties, specifically,
the claim of petitioner for the return of the P500,000.00
deposit vis-a-vis the claim of respondents on the arrears in
rentals and on the damage to the premises. It is only now
that the amount that should be returned is ascertained,
i.e., P500,000.00 less the two-months arrears in rentals
amounting to P195,833.34, the sum of which will earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum42
from the time the case was filed in the RTC on October 21,
1998.43 Upon finality of this decision, the rate of interest
shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality
until full satisfaction. The foregoing interest rate is based
on the guidelines set by the Court in Eastern Shipping
Lines v. CA, viz.:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law,

contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be
_______________
42 Civil Code, Art. 2209.

If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.
43 Civil Code, Art. 2212.
Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded,
although the obligation may be silent upon this point.
634

held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on

“Damages” of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure
of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the
concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate
of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount of finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.”44
Concerning the solidary liability of respondents, we hold

that respondent Matias Aznar III is not solidarily liable
with respondent company. His function as the President of
the company does not make him personally liable for the
obligations of the latter. A corporation, being a juridical
entity, may act only through its direc-
_______________
44 G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 79.
635
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 635

tors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by them
while acting as corporate agents, are not their personal
liability but the direct accountability of the corporation
they represent.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. CEB-22847 is hereby REINSTATED with the following
modifications:
(1) Talisay Sports Complex, Inc. is solely liable to
return the amount of the deposit after deducting the
amount of the two-months arrears in rentals; and
(2) The rate of legal interest to be paid is SIX
PERCENT (6%) on the amount due computed from October
21, 1998, and TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, thereon
upon finality of this decision until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.

**
Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition partly granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

That of RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-22847 reinstated with
modifications.
Note.—A stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal

case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial
admissions, hence, binding upon the parties. (Alano vs.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 269 [1997])
——o0o——
_______________
45 Siemens Philippines, Inc. v. Enrico A. Domingo, G.R. No. 150488,

July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 86.
** Additional member replacing Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes per
Special Order No. 521 dated September 29, 2008.

G.R. No. 157594. March 9, 2010.*
TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC.,

petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondent.
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; It is axiomatic in

pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised in
a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in
previous pleadings; The first and fundamental concern of the rules
of procedure is to secure a just determination of every action.—It is
axiomatic
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
527
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 527

Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised

in a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in
previous pleadings. The Court cannot simply grant the plea of the
CIR that the procedural rules be relaxed based on the general
averment of the interest of substantive justice. It should not be
forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of
procedure is to secure a just determination of every action.
Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by
the rules. While in certain instances, the Court allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, it never intends to forge
a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in
proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.
Same; Same; Pre-trial; Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion
call for the speedy disposition of cases; It was made mandatory
under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997.—
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition
of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the
subsequent amendments in 1997. It has been hailed as “the most
important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century.”
Same; Same; Same; Admission; The admission having been
made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission; An admission made by a party in
the course of the proceedings does not require proof.—The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial
by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a
judicial admission especially when the opposing party relied upon
the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings does not require proof.

Court of Appeals.
528

Agan & Montenegro Law Offices for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, petitioner Toshiba Information
Equipment (Philippines), Inc. (Toshiba) seeks the reversal
and setting aside of (1) the Decision2 dated August 29, 2002
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63047, which
found that Toshiba was not entitled to the credit/refund of
its unutilized input Value-Added Tax (VAT) payments
attributable to its export sales, because it was a tax-exempt
entity and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions;
and (2) the Resolution3 dated February 19, 2003 of the
appellate court in the same case, which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of Toshiba. The herein assailed
judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the Decision4 dated October 16, 2000 of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 5762 granting the claim
for credit/refund of Toshiba in the amount of P1,385,282.08.
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in
the business of manufacturing and exporting of electric
machinery, equipment systems, accessories, parts,
components, materials and goods of all kinds, including
those relating to office automation and information
technology and all types of computer hardware and
software, such as but not limited to
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 11-32.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate
Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, concurring;
Rollo, pp. 35- 52.
3 Id., at pp. 54-55.
4 Penned by Associate Judge Amancio Q. Saga with Presiding Judge
Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Judge Ramon O. De Veyra, concurring;
Rollo, pp. 83-92.
529
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 529

HDD-CD-ROM and personal computer printed circuit

board.5 It is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export
enterprise in the Laguna Technopark, Inc., as evidenced by
Certificate of Registration No. 95-99 dated September 27,
1995.6 It is also registered with Regional District Office No.
57 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in San Pedro,
Laguna, as a VAT-taxpayer with Taxpayer Identification
No. (TIN) 004-739-137.7
In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of
1997,8 filed on April 14, 1997 and July 21, 1997,
respectively, Toshiba declared input VAT payments on its
domestic purchases of taxable goods and services in the
aggregate sum of P3,875,139.65,9 with no zero-rated sales.
Toshiba subsequently submitted to the BIR on July 23,
1997 its amended VAT returns for the first and second
quarters of 1997,10 reporting the same amount of input
VAT payments but, this time, with zero-rated sales totaling
P7,494,677,000.00.11
On March 30, 1999, Toshiba filed with the One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
of the Department of Finance (DOF One-Stop Shop) two
separate applications for tax credit/refund12 of its
unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of 1997 in
the total amount of P3,685,446.73.13
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 12.
6 Exhibit “A,” Folder of Exhibits “A-I” of Toshiba.
7 Records, p. 7.
8 Exhibits “B” and “C,” Folder of Exhibits “A-I” of Toshiba.
9 Toshiba declared P3,320,034.44 and P555,105.21 of input VAT
payments for the first and second quarters or 1997, respectively.
10 Exhibits “B-1” and “C-1,” Folder of Exhibits “A-I” of Toshiba.
11 Toshiba reported P2,083,305,000.00 and P5,411,372,000.00 of zero-
rated sales for the first and second quarters of 1997, respectively.
12 Records, pp. 10-13.
13 Toshiba claimed in its applications for refund/credit P3,268,682.34
and P416,764.39 of local input VAT for the first and second quarters of
1997, respectively.
530


The next day, on March 31, 1999, Toshiba likewise filed
with the CTA a Petition for Review14 to toll the running of
the two-year prescriptive period under Section 230 of the
Tax Code of 1977,15 as amended.16 In said Petition,
docketed as CTA Case No. 5762, Toshiba prayed that—
“[A]fter due hearing, judgment be rendered ordering [herein

respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)] to refund or
issue to [Toshiba] a tax refund/tax credit certificate in the amount
of P3,875,139.65 representing unutilized input taxes paid on its
pur-
_______________

15 Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the Tax Code of 1997,
took effect only on January 1, 1998. Prior to said date, Presidential Decree
No. 1158, otherwise known as the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, was in
effect. According to Section 230 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended:
Sec. 230. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.—No
suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under
protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun
after the expiration of two years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause
that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund
or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which
payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been
erroneously paid. (Emphasis ours.)
16 As amended by Republic Act No. 7716, bearing the title “An Act
Restructuring the Value Added Tax (VAT) System, Widening its Tax Base
and Enhancing its Administration and for These Purposes Amending and
Repealing the Relevant Provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code,
As Amended, and For Other Purposes.”
531
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 531

chase of taxable goods and services for the period January 1 to

June 30, 1997.”17

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) opposed
the claim for tax refund/credit of Toshiba, setting up the
following special and affirmative defenses in his Answer18
—
5. [Toshiba’s] alleged claim for refund/tax credit is subject to
administrative routinary investigation/examination by [CIR’s]
Bureau;
6. [Toshiba] failed miserably to show that the total amount of
P3,875,139.65 claimed as VAT input taxes, were erroneously or
illegally collected, or that the same are properly documented;
7. Taxes paid and collected are presumed to have been made
in accordance with law; hence, not refundable;
8. In an action for tax refund, the burden is on the taxpayer
to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden
is fatal to the claim for refund;
9. It is incumbent upon [Toshiba] to show that it has complied
with the provisions of Section 204 in relation to Section 229 of the
Tax Code;
10. Well-established is the rule that claims for refund/tax
credit are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer as it
partakes the nature of exemption from tax.19

Upon being advised by the CTA,20 Toshiba and the CIR
filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues,21 wherein the
opposing parties “agreed and admitted” that—
1. [Toshiba] is a duly registered value-added tax entity in

accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended.
_______________
17 Records, p. 5.
18 Id., at pp. 20-22.
19 Id., at p. 21.
20 Id., at p. 33.
21 Id., at pp. 34-35.
532

2. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on

its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the
Tax Code, as amended.
3. [Toshiba] filed its quarterly VAT returns for the first two
quarters of 1997 within the legally prescribed period.
xxxx
7. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax
on its export sales.
8. [Toshiba] has duly filed the instant Petition for Review
within the two-year prescriptive period prescribed by then Section
230 of the Tax Code.22

In the same pleading, Toshiba and the CIR jointly
submitted the following issues for determination by the
CTA—
Whether or not [Toshiba] has incurred input taxes in the amount

of P3,875,139.65 for the period January 1 to June 30, 1997 which
are directly attributable to its export sales[.]
Whether or not the input taxes incurred by [Toshiba] for the
period January 1 to June 30, 1997 have not been carried over to
the succeeding quarters[.]
Whether or not input taxes incurred by [Toshiba] for the first two
quarters of 1997 have not been offset against any output tax[.]
Whether or not input taxes incurred by [Toshiba] for the first two
quarters of 1997 are properly substantiated by official receipts
and invoices.23

During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented
documentary evidence in support of its claim for tax
credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any evidence
at all.
With both parties waiving the right to submit their
respective memoranda, the CTA rendered its Decision in
CTA Case No. 5762 on October 16, 2000 favoring Toshiba.
According to the CTA, the CIR himself admitted that the
export sales of
_______________
22 Id.
23 Id., at p. 35.
533
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 533

Toshiba were subject to zero percent (0%) VAT based on

Section 100(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended.
Toshiba could then claim tax credit or refund of input VAT
paid on its purchases of goods, properties, or services,
directly attributable to such zero-rated sales, in accordance
with Section 4.102-2 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95. The
CTA, though, reduced the amount to be credited or
refunded to Toshiba to P1,385,292.02.
The dispositive portion of the October 16, 2000 Decision
of the CTA fully reads—
“WHEREFORE, [Toshiba’s] claim for refund of unutilized

input VAT payments is hereby GRANTED but in a reduced
amount of P1,385,282.08 computed as follows:
1st Quarter 2nd Total

Quarter

Amount of claimed
input taxes filed with

the DOF One Stop P3,268,682.34 P416,764.39 P3,685,446.73

Shop Center
Less: 1)
Input taxes not
properly
supported by
VAT invoices
and official
receipts
a. Per SGV’s

verification
(Exh. I)
P 242,491.45 P154,391.13 P 396,882.58

b. Per this

court’s further

verification P1,852,437.65 P35,108.00 P1,887,545.65

(Annex A)

2) 1998 4th

qtr. Output

VAT Liability

applied against

the claimed 15,736.42

input taxes 15,736.42

Subtotal

P2,110,665.52 P189,499.13 P2,300,164.65

Amount Refundable P1,158,016.82 P227,265.26 P1,385,282.08

Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ORDERED

to REFUND to [Toshiba] or in the alternative, ISSUE a TAX
CREDIT CERTIFICATE in the amount of P1,385,282.08
representing unutilized input taxes paid by [Toshiba] on its
purchases of taxable goods and services for the period January 1
to June 30, 1997.”24
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 91-92.
534

Both Toshiba and the CIR sought reconsideration of the
foregoing CTA Decision.
Toshiba asserted in its Motion for Reconsideration25 that
it had presented proper substantiation for the
P1,887,545.65 input VAT disallowed by the CTA.The CIR,
on the other hand, argued in his Motion for
Reconsideration26 that Toshiba was not entitled to the
credit/refund of its input VAT payments because as a
PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba
was not subject to VAT. The CIR invoked the following
statutory and regulatory provisions—
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 791627

SECTION 24. Exemption from Taxes Under the National
Internal Revenue Code.—Any provision of existing laws, rules and
regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and
national, shall be imposed on business establishments operating
within the ECOZONE. In lieu of paying taxes, five percent (5%) of
the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within
the ECOZONE shall be remitted to the national government. x x
x.
Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions.—The following shall be
exempt from the value-added tax:
xxxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except
those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491,
and 1950, and non-electric cooperatives under Republic Act No.
6938, or international agreements to which the Philippines is a
signatory.
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 99-100.

26 Id., at pp. 89-95.
27 Otherwise known as The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8748.
535
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 535

Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95
SEC. 4.103-1. Exemptions.—(A) In general.—An exemption
means that the sale of goods or properties and/or services and the
use or lease of properties is not subject to VAT (output tax) and
the seller is not allowed any tax credit on VAT (input tax)
previously paid.
The person making the exempt sale of goods, properties or
services shall not bill any output tax to his customers because the
said transaction is not subject to VAT. On the other hand, a VAT-
registered purchaser of VAT-exempt goods, properties or services
which are exempt from VAT is not entitled to any input tax on
such purchase despite the issuance of a VAT invoice or receipt.”

The CIR contended that under Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 7916, a special law, all businesses and
establishments within the ECOZONE were to remit to the
government five percent (5%) of their gross income earned
within the zone, in lieu of all taxes, including VAT. This
placed Toshiba within the ambit of Section 103(q) of the
Tax Code of 1977, as amended, which exempted from VAT
the transactions that were exempted under special laws.
Following Section 4.103-1(A) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-
95, the VAT-exemption of Toshiba meant that its sale of
goods was not subject to output VAT and Toshiba as seller
was not allowed any tax credit on the input VAT it had
previously paid.
On January 17, 2001, the CTA issued a Resolution28
denying both Motions for Reconsideration of Toshiba and
the CIR.
The CTA took note that the pieces of evidence referred
to by Toshiba in its Motion for Reconsideration were
insufficient substantiation, being mere schedules of input
VAT payments it had purportedly paid for the first and
second quarters of 1997. While the CTA gives credence to
the report of its commissioned certified public accountant
(CPA), it does not ren-
_______________
28 Signed by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Judges

Amancio Q. Saga and Ramon O. de Veyra. Rollo, pp. 103-106.
536

der its decision based on the findings of the said CPA alone.
The CTA has its own CPA and the tax court itself conducts
an investigation/examination of the documents presented.
The CTA stood by its earlier disallowance of the amount of
P1,887,545.65 as tax credit/refund because it was not
supported by VAT invoices and/or official receipts.
The CTA refused to consider the argument that Toshiba
was not entitled to a tax credit/refund under Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 7916 because it was only raised by the
CIR for the first time in his Motion for Reconsideration.
Also, contrary to the assertions of the CIR, the CTA held
that Section 23, and not Section 24, of Republic Act No.
7916, applied to Toshiba. According to Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7916—
“SECTION 23. Fiscal Incentives.—Business establishments

operating within the ECOZONES shall be entitled to the fiscal
incentives as provided for under Presidential Decree No. 66, the
law creating the Export Processing Zone Authority, or those
provided under Book VI of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987.
Furthermore, tax credits for exporters using local materials as
inputs shall enjoy the benefits provided for in the Export
Development Act of 1994.”

Among the fiscal incentives granted to PEZA-registered
enterprises by the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 was
the income tax holiday, to wit—
“Art. 39. Incentives to Registered Enterprises.—All registered

enterprises shall be granted the following incentives to the extent
engaged in a preferred area of investment:
(a) Income Tax Holiday.—
(1) For six (6) years from commercial operation for pioneer
firms and four (4) years for non-pioneer firms, new registered
firms shall be fully exempt from income taxes levied by the
national government. Subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by the
537
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 537

Board, the income tax exemption will be extended for another
year in each of the following cases:
(i) The project meets the prescribed ratio of capital equipment
to number of workers set by the Board;
(ii) Utilization of indigenous raw materials at rates set by the
Board;
(iii) The net foreign exchange savings or earnings amount to
at least US$500,000.00 annually during the first three (3) years of
operation.
The preceding paragraph notwithstanding, no registered
pioneer firm may avail of this incentive for a period exceeding
eight (8) years.
(2) For a period of three (3) years from commercial operation,
registered expanding firms shall be entitled to an exemption from
income taxes levied by the National Government proportionate to
their expansion under such terms and conditions as the Board
may determine: Provided, however, That during the period within
which this incentive is availed of by the expanding firm it shall
not be entitled to additional deduction for incremental labor
expense.
(3) The provision of Article 7(14) notwithstanding, registered
firms shall not be entitled to any extension of this incentive.”

The CTA pointed out that Toshiba availed itself of the
income tax holiday under the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1987, so Toshiba was exempt only from income tax but
not from other taxes such as VAT. As a result, Toshiba was
liable for output VAT on its export sales, but at zero
percent (0%) rate, and entitled to the credit/refund of the
input VAT paid on its purchases of goods and services
relative to such zero-rated export sales.
Unsatisfied, the CIR filed a Petition for Review29 with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63047.
In its Decision dated August 29, 2002, the Court of
Appeals granted the appeal of the CIR, and reversed and
set aside the
_______________
29 Rollo, pp. 107-118.
538

Decision dated October 16, 2000 and the Resolution dated
January 17, 2001 of the CTA. The appellate court ruled
that Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged
unused input VAT payments because it was a tax-exempt
entity under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916. As a
PEZA-registered corporation, Toshiba was liable for
remitting to the national government the five percent (5%)
preferential rate on its gross income earned within the
ECOZONE, in lieu of all other national and local taxes,
including VAT.
The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the export
sales of Toshiba were VAT-exempt, not zero-rated,
transactions. The appellate court found that the Answer
filed by the CIR in CTA Case No. 5762 did not contain any
admission that the export sales of Toshiba were zero-rated
transactions under Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code of
1977, as amended. At the least, what was admitted by the
CIR in said Answer was that the Tax Code provisions cited
in the Petition for Review of Toshiba in CTA Case No. 5762
were correct. As to the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues
filed by the parties in CTA Case No. 5762, which stated
that Toshiba was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its
export sales, the appellate court declared that the CIR
signed the said pleading through palpable mistake. This
palpable mistake in the stipulation of facts should not be
taken against the CIR, for to do otherwise would result in
suppressing the truth through falsehood. In addition, the
State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors
of its officials or agents.
Given that Toshiba was a tax-exempt entity under
Republic Act No. 7916, a special law, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the export sales of Toshiba were VAT-
exempt transactions under Section 109(q) of the Tax Code
of 1997, formerly Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977.
Therefore, Toshiba could not claim refund of its input VAT
payments on its domestic purchases of goods and services.
The Court of Appeals decreed at the end of its August
29, 2002 Decision—
539
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 539

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of

the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 5762, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered
finding [Toshiba], being a tax exempt entity under R.A. No. 7916,
not entitled to refund the VAT payments made in its domestic
purchases of goods and services.30

Toshiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration31 of the
aforementioned Decision, anchored on the following
arguments: (a) the CIR never raised as an issue before the
CTA that Toshiba was tax-exempt under Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 7916; (b) Section 24 of Republic Act No.
7916, subjecting the gross income earned by a PEZA-
registered enterprise within the ECOZONE to a
preferential rate of five percent (5%), in lieu of all taxes, did
not apply to Toshiba, which availed itself of the income tax
holiday under Section 23 of the same statute; (c) the
conclusion of the CTA that the export sales of Toshiba were
zero-rated was supported by substantial evidence, other
than the admission of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Issues; and (d) the judgment of the CTA granting
the refund of the input VAT payments was supported by
substantial evidence and should not have been set aside by
the Court of Appeals.
In a Resolution dated February 19, 2003, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Toshiba
since the arguments presented therein were mere
reiterations of those already passed upon and found to be
without merit by the appellate court in its earlier Decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, mentioned that it was
incorrect for Toshiba to say that the issue of the
applicability of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916 was
only raised for the first time on appeal before the appellate
court. The said issue was adequately raised by the CIR in
his Motion for Reconsideration before the CTA, and was
even ruled upon by the tax court.
_______________
30 Id., at p. 52.
31 Id., at pp. 147-163.
540


Hence, Toshiba filed the instant Petition for Review
with the following assignment of errors—
5.1 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

WHEN IT RULED THAT [TOSHIBA], BEING A PEZA-
REGISTERED ENTERPRISE, IS EXEMPT FROM VAT UNDER
SECTION 24 OF R.A. 7916, AND FURTHER HOLDING THAT
[TOSHIBA’S] EXPORT SALES ARE EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 109 OF THE TAX CODE.
WHEN IT FAILED TO DISMISS OUTRIGHT AND GAVE DUE
COURSE TO [CIR’S] PETITION NOTWITHSTANDING [CIR’S]
FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY RAISE IN ISSUE DURING THE
TRIAL IN THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS THE
APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 24 OF R.A. 7916 TO
[TOSHIBA’S] CLAIM FOR REFUND.
WHEN [IT] RULED THAT THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS’
FINDINGS, WITH REGARD [TOSHIBA’S] EXPORT SALES
BEING ZERO RATED SALES FOR VAT PURPOSES, WERE
BASED MERELY ON THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY [CIR’S]
COUNSEL AND NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS GRANTING [TOSHIBA’S] CLAIM FOR
REFUND[;]32
and the following prayer—
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioner TOSHIBA

INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC. most respectfully
prays that the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision of the CTA in CTA Case No. 5762,
be set aside and further prays that a new one be rendered
AFFIRMING AND UPHOLDING the Decision of the CTA
promulgated on October 16, 2000 in CTA Case No. 5762.
Other reliefs, which the Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable under the circumstances, are likewise prayed for.”33
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 17-18.

33 Id., at p. 30.
541
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 541

The Petition is impressed with merit.
The CIR did not timely raise before

the CTA the issues on the VAT-
exemptions of Toshiba and its export

sales.
Upon the failure of the CIR to timely plead and prove

before the CTA the defenses or objections that Toshiba was
VAT-exempt under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916,
and that its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions
under Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended,
the CIR is deemed to have waived the same.
During the pendency of CTA Case No. 5762, the
proceedings before the CTA were governed by the Rules of
the Court of Tax Appeals,34 while the Rules of Court were
applied suppletorily.35
_______________
34 The RCTA was promulgated on September 10, 1955, following the
enactment on June 16, 1954 of Republic Act No. 1125, otherwise known as
An Act Creating the Court of Appeals. Republic Act No. 9282, which was
enacted on March 30, 2004, amended Republic Act No. 1125 by expanding
the jurisdiction of the CTA, elevating the same to the level of a collegiate
court with special jurisdiction, and enlarging its membership. Accordingly,
the Court approved on November 25, 2005 the Revised Rules of the Court
of Tax Appeals (RRCTA). Thereafter, Republic Act No. 9503, which was
enacted on June 12, 2008, further amended Republic Act No. 1125 by
enlarging the organization structure of the CTA. As a result, the Court
approved on September 16, 2008 the amendments to the 2005 RRCTA.
35 Rule 16 of the RCTA is reproduced in full below:
RULE 16
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE
SECTION 1. The provisions of the Rules of Court applicable
to proceedings before the Courts of First Instance shall, insofar as
they may not be inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1125 and of these rules, be applicable
542


Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
“SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses

and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations,
the court shall dismiss the claim.”

The CIR did not argue straight away in his Answer in
CTA Case No. 5762 that Toshiba had no right to the
credit/refund of its input VAT payments because the latter
was VAT-exempt and its export sales were VAT-exempt
transactions. The Pre-Trial Brief36 of the CIR was equally
bereft of such allegations or arguments. The CIR passed up
the opportunity to prove the supposed VAT-exemptions of
Toshiba and its export sales when the CIR chose not to
present any evidence at all during the trial before the
CTA.37 He missed another opportunity to present the said
issues before the CTA when he waived the submission of a
Memorandum.38 The CIR had waited until the CTA already
rendered its Decision dated October 16, 2000 in CTA Case
No. 5762, which granted the claim for credit/refund of
Toshiba, before asserting in his Motion for Reconsideration
that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and its export sales were
VAT-exempt transactions.
_______________
to cases pending before this Court, except that, in any case pending
before it, the Court may, in the exercise of its discretion, fix a
shorter period for the filing of pleadings and papers.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of First Instance became the
Regional Trial Court.
37 Resolution dated May 10, 2000, signed by Presiding Judge Ernesto
D. Acosta and Associate Judges Amancio Q. Saga and Ramon O. de Veyra;
Id., at p. 72.
38 Rollo, p. 85.
543
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 543


The CIR did not offer any explanation as to why he did
not argue the VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export
sales before and during the trial held by the CTA, only
doing so in his Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse
CTA judgment. Surely, said defenses or objections were
already available to the CIR when the CIR filed his Answer
to the Petition for Review of Toshiba in CTA Case No.
5762.
It is axiomatic in pleadings and practice that no new
issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due
diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings.39
The Court cannot simply grant the plea of the CIR that the
procedural rules be relaxed based on the general averment
of the interest of substantive justice. It should not be
forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the
rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of every
action.40 Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain
instances, the Court allows a relaxation in the application
of the rules, it never intends to forge a weapon for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper
cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration
of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised
to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these
rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the
pursuit of justice.41
_______________
39 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 117, 128; 303 SCRA
495, 505 (1999).
40 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A. Soriano Corporation, 334
Phil. 965, 972; 267 SCRA 313, 319 (1997).
41 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738, 744-745;
458 SCRA 441, 450 (2005).
544

The CIR judicially admitted that

Toshiba was VAT-registered and
its
export sales were subject to VAT at
zero percent (0%) rate.
More importantly, the arguments of the CIR that

Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latter’s export sales were
VAT-exempt transactions are inconsistent with the explicit
admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba was a registered
VAT entity and that it was subject to zero percent (0%)
VAT on its export sales.
The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by
Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised to do so by the
CTA at the end of the pre-trial conference held on June 23,
1999.42 The approval of the Joint Stipulation by the CTA,
in its Resolution43 dated July 12, 1999, marked the
culmination of the pre-trial process in CTA Case No.
5762.Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary
under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory
under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in
1997. It has been hailed as “the most important procedural
innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth
century.”44
The nature and purpose of a pre-trial have been laid
down in Rule 18, Section 2 of the Rules of Court:
“SECTION 2. Nature and purpose.—The pre-trial is

mandatory. The court shall consider:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a
submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
_______________
42 Records, p. 33.
43 Signed by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Judges
Amancio Q. Saga and Ramon O. De Veyra, Id., at p. 36.
44 Tiu v. Middleton, 369 Phil. 829, 835; 310 SCRA 580, 586 (1999).
545
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 545

(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary
proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or
summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid
ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the
proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of
the action.” (Emphasis ours.)

The admission having been made in a stipulation of
facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission.45 Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a
judicial admission especially when the opposing party
relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with
further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission
made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not
require proof.46
In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted
by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint
Stipulation are that Toshiba “is a duly registered value-
added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax
Code, as
_______________
45 SCC Chemicals Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 514, 522-

523; 353 SCRA 70, 77 (2001).
46 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1097, 1113; 258 SCRA 446, 459
(1996).
546

amended[,]”47 that “is subject to zero percent (0%) value-
added tax on its export sales in accordance with then
Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.”48 The
CIR was bound by these admissions, which he could not
eventually contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of
the CTA Decision dated October 16, 2000, by arguing that
Toshiba was actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export
sales were VAT-exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba
could not have been subject to VAT and exempt from
VAT at the same time. Similarly, the export sales of
Toshiba could not have been subject to zero percent
(0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as well.
The CIR cannot escape the binding

effect of his judicial admissions.

The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it
ruled in its Decision dated August 29, 2002 that the CIR
could not be bound by his admissions in the Joint
Stipulation because (1) the said admissions were “made
through palpable mistake”49 which, if countenanced,
“would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice”;50 and
(2) the State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes of
its officials or agents. This ruling of the Court of Appeals is
rooted in its conclusion that a “palpable mistake” had been
committed by the CIR in the signing of the Joint
Stipulation. However, this Court finds no evidence of the
commission of a mistake, much more, of a palpable one.
The CIR does not deny that his counsel, Atty. Joselito F.
Biazon, Revenue Attorney II of the BIR, signed the Joint
Stipulation, together with the counsel of Toshiba, Atty.
Patricia B. Bisda. Considering the presumption of
regularity
_______________
47 Records, p. 34.
48 Id.
49 Rollo, p. 49.
50 Id., at p. 51.
547
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 547

in the performance of official duty,51 Atty. Biazon is
presumed to have read, studied, and understood the
contents of the Joint Stipulation before he signed the same.
It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the contrary.
Yet, the Court observes that the CIR himself never
alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA
Decision dated October 16, 2000, nor in his Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals, that Atty. Biazon
committed a mistake in signing the Joint Stipulation. Since
the CIR did not make such an allegation, neither did he
present any proof in support thereof. The CIR began to
aver the existence of a palpable mistake only after the
Court of Appeals made such a declaration in its Decision
dated August 29, 2002.
Despite the absence of allegation and evidence by the
CIR, the Court of Appeals, on its own, concluded that the
admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation were due to
a palpable mistake based on the following deduction—
“Scrutinizing the Answer filed by [the CIR], we rule that the

Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues signed by [the CIR] was
made through palpable mistake. Quoting paragraph 4 of its
Answer, [the CIR] states:
“4. He ADMITS the allegations contained in paragraph
5 of the petition only insofar as the cited provisions of Tax
Code is concerned, but SPECIFICALLY DENIES the rest of
the allegations therein for being mere opinions, arguments
or gratuitous assertions on the part of [Toshiba] and/or
because they are mere erroneous conclusions or
interpretations of the quoted law involved, the truth of the
matter being those stated hereunder
x x x x”
And paragraph 5 of the petition for review filed by [Toshiba]
before the CTA states:
_______________
51 Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court.
548

“5. Petitioner is subject to zero percent (0%) value-

added tax on its export sales in accordance with then
Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code x x x.
x x x x”
As we see it, nothing in said Answer did [the CIR] admit that
the export sales of [Toshiba] were indeed zero-rated transactions.
At the least, what was admitted only by [the CIR] concerning
paragraph 4 of his Answer, is the fact that the provisions of the
Tax Code, as cited by [Toshiba] in its petition for review filed
before the CTA were correct.”52

The Court of Appeals provided no explanation as to why
the admissions of the CIR in his Answer in CTA Case No.
5762 deserved more weight and credence than those he
made in the Joint Stipulation. The appellate court failed to
appreciate that the CIR, through counsel, Atty. Biazon,
also signed the Joint Stipulation; and that absent evidence
to the contrary, Atty. Biazon is presumed to have signed
the Joint Stipulation willingly and knowingly, in the
regular performance of his official duties. Additionally, the
Joint Stipulation53 of Toshiba and the CIR was a more
recent pleading than the Answer54 of the CIR. It was
submitted by the parties after the pre-trial conference held
by the CTA, and subsequently approved by the tax court. If
there was any discrepancy between the admissions of the
CIR in his Answer and in the Joint Stipulation, the more
logical and reasonable explanation would be that the CIR
changed his mind or conceded some points to Toshiba
during the pre-trial conference which immediately
preceded the execution of the Joint Stipulation. To
automatically construe that the discrepancy was the result
of a palpable mistake is a wide leap which this Court is not
prepared to take without substantial basis.
_______________
52 Rollo, pp. 49-50.

53 Filed by the parties on July 7, 1999.
54 Filed by the CIR on May 11, 1999.
549
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 549

The judicial admissions of the CIR in

the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsi-
cally false, wrong, or illegal, and are
consistent with the ruling on the VAT
treatment of PEZA-registered enter-

prises in the previous Toshiba case.

There is no basis for believing that to bind the CIR to his
judicial admissions in the Joint Stipulation—that Toshiba
was a VAT-registered entity and its export sales were zero-
rated VAT transactions—would result in “falsehood,
unfairness and injustice.” The judicial admissions of the
CIR are not intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal. On the
contrary, they are consistent with the ruling of this Court
in a previous case involving the same parties,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toshiba Information
Equipment (Phils.) Inc.55 (Toshiba case), explaining the
VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises.
In the Toshiba case, Toshiba sought the refund of its
unutilized input VAT on its purchase of capital goods
and services for the first and second quarters of 1996,
based on Section 106(b) of the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended.56 In the Petition at bar, Toshiba is claiming
refund of its unutilized input VAT on its local purchase
of goods and services which are attributable to its
export sales for the first and second quarters of 1997,
pursuant to Section 106(a), in rela-
_______________
55 G.R. No. 150154, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 211, 230-231.

56 SEC. 106. Refunds or tax credits of creditable input tax.—
xxxx
(b) Capital goods.—A VAT-registered person may apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of input taxes paid on capital
goods imported or locally purchased, to the extent that such input taxes
have not been applied against output taxes. The application may be made
only within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
importation or purchase was made.
550

tion to Section 100(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Tax Code of 1977, as

amended, which read—
“SEC. 106. Refunds or tax credits of creditable input tax.—(a)

Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated, may, within two (2) years after the close of
the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input
tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against
output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales
under Section 100(a)(2)(A)(i),(ii) and (b) and Section 102(b)(1) and
(2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof has
been duly accounted for in accordance with the regulations of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where
the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale
and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties of
services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid
cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the
transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of
the volume sales.
SEC. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties.—
(a) Rate and base of tax.—x x x
xxxx
(2) The following sales by VAT-registered persons shall be
subject to 0%:
Export sales.—The term “export sales” means:
(i) The sale and actual shipment of goods from the Philippines
to a foreign country, irrespective of any shipping arrangement
that may be agreed upon which may influence or determine the
transfer of ownership of the goods so exported and paid for in
acceptable foreign currency or its equivalent in goods or services,
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipnas (BSP).”

Despite the difference in the legal bases for the claims
for credit/refund in the Toshiba case and the case at bar,
the CIR raised the very same defense or objection in both—
that Toshiba and its transactions were VAT-exempt.
Hence, the rul-
551
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 551

ing of the Court in the former case is relevant to the

present case.
At the outset, the Court establishes that there is a basic
distinction in the VAT-exemption of a person and the VAT-
exemption of a transaction—
“It would seem that petitioner CIR failed to differentiate
between VAT-exempt transactions from VAT-exempt entities. In
the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate
Technology (Philippines), this Court already made such
distinction—
An exempt transaction, on the one hand, involves goods
or services which, by their nature, are specifically listed in
and expressly exempted from the VAT under the Tax Code,
without regard to the tax status—VAT-exempt or not—of
the party to the transaction…
An exempt party, on the other hand, is a person or entity
granted VAT exemption under the Tax Code, a special law
or an international agreement to which the Philippines is a
signatory, and by virtue of which its taxable transactions
become exempt from VAT x x x.”57

In effect, the CIR is opposing the claim for credit/refund
of input VAT of Toshiba on two grounds: (1) that Toshiba
was a VAT-exempt entity; and (2) that its export sales were
VAT-exempt transactions.
It is now a settled rule that based on the Cross Border
Doctrine, PEZA-registered enterprises, such as Toshiba,
are VAT-exempt and no VAT can be passed on to them. The
Court explained in the Toshiba case that—
PEZA-registered enterprise, which would necessarily be located

within ECOZONES, are VAT-exempt entities, not because of
Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended, which imposes the
five percent
_______________
57 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toshiba Information

Equipment (Phils.) Inc., supra note 55 at 222-223, citing Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), 491 Phil. 317, 335;
451 SCRA 132, 145 (2005).
552

(5%) preferential tax rate on gross income of PEZA-registered

enterprises, in lieu of all taxes; but, rather, because of Section 8 of
the same statute which establishes the fiction that ECOZONES
are foreign territory.
xxxx
The Philippine VAT system adheres to the Cross Border
Doctrine, according to which, no VAT shall be imposed to form
part of the cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the
territorial border of the taxing authority. Hence, actual export of
goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country must
be free of VAT; while, those destined for use or consumption
within the Philippines shall be imposed with ten percent (10%)
VAT.
Applying said doctrine to the sale of goods, properties, and
services to and from the ECOZONES, the BIR issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 74-99, on 15 October 1999. Of
particular interest to the present Petition is Section 3 thereof,
which reads—
SECTION 3. Tax Treatment of Sales Made by a
VAT Registered Supplier from the Customs Territory,
to a PEZA Registered Enterprise.—
(1) If the Buyer is a PEZA registered enterprise which
is subject to the 5% special tax regime, in lieu of all taxes,
except real property tax, pursuant to R.A. No. 7916, as
amended:
(a) Sale of goods (i.e., merchandise).—This shall
be treated as indirect export hence, considered subject to
zero percent (0%) VAT, pursuant to Sec. 106(A)(2)(a)(5),
NIRC and Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 7916, in relation to ART. 77(2)
of the Omnibus Investments Code.
(b) Sale of service.—This shall be treated subject to
zero percent (0%) VAT under the “cross border doctrine” of
the VAT System, pursuant to VAT Ruling No. 032-98 dated
Nov. 5, 1998.
(2) If Buyer is a PEZA registered enterprise which is
not embraced by the 5% special tax regime, hence, subject
to taxes under the NIRC, e.g., Service Establishments
which are subject to taxes under the NIRC rather than the
5% special tax regime:
(a) Sale of goods (i.e., merchandise).—This shall be
treated as indirect export hence, considered subject to zero
per-
553
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 553

cent (0%) VAT, pursuant to Sec. 106(A)(2)(a)(5), NIRC and

Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 7916 in relation to ART. 77(2) of the
Omnibus Investments Code.
(b) Sale of Service.—This shall be treated subject to
zero percent (0%) VAT under the “cross border doctrine” of
the VAT System, pursuant to VAT Ruling No. 032-98 dated
Nov. 5, 1998.
(3) In the final analysis, any sale of goods, property or
services made by a VAT registered supplier from the
Customs Territory to any registered enterprise operating in
the ecozone, regardless of the class or type of the latter’s
PEZA registration, is actually qualified and thus legally
entitled to the zero percent (0%) VAT. Accordingly, all sales
of goods or property to such enterprise made by a VAT
registered supplier from the Customs Territory shall be
treated subject to 0% VAT, pursuant to Sec. 106(A)(2)(a)(5),
NIRC, in relation to ART. 77(2) of the Omnibus
Investments Code, while all sales of services to the said
enterprises, made by VAT registered suppliers from the
Customs Territory, shall be treated effectively subject to the
0% VAT, pursuant to Section 108(B)(3), NIRC, in relation to
the provisions of R.A. No. 7916 and the “Cross Border
Doctrine” of the VAT system.
This Circular shall serve as a sufficient basis to entitle
such supplier of goods, property or services to the benefit of
the zero percent (0%) VAT for sales made to the
aforementioned ECOZONE enterprises and shall serve as
sufficient compliance to the requirement for prior approval
of zero-rating imposed by Revenue Regulations No. 7-95
effective as of the date of the issuance of this Circular.
Indubitably, no output VAT may be passed on to an ECOZONE
enterprise since it is a VAT-exempt entity. x x x.”58

The Court, nevertheless, noted in the Toshiba case that
the rule which considers any sale by a supplier from the
Customs Territory to a PEZA-registered enterprise as
export sale, which should not be burdened by output VAT,
was only
_______________
58 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toshiba Information

Equipment (Phils.) Inc., Id., at pp. 223-226.
554

clearly established on October 15, 1999, upon the
issuance by the BIR of RMC No. 74-99. Prior to October
15, 1999, whether a PEZA-registered enterprise was
exempt or subject to VAT depended on the type of fiscal
incentives availed of by the said enterprise.59 The old rule,
then followed by the BIR, and recognized and affirmed by
the CTA, the Court of Appeals, and this Court, was
described as follows—
“According to the old rule, Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7916, as

amended, gives the PEZA-registered enterprise the option to
choose between two sets of fiscal incentives: (a) The five percent
(5%) preferential tax rate on its gross income under Rep. Act No.
7916, as amended; and (b) the income tax holiday provided under
Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987, as amended.
The five percent (5%) preferential tax rate on gross income
under Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended, is in lieu of all taxes.
Except for real property taxes, no other national or local tax may
be imposed on a PEZA-registered enterprise availing of this
particular fiscal incentive, not even an indirect tax like VAT.
Alternatively, Book VI of Exec. Order No. 226, as amended,
grants income tax holiday to registered pioneer and non-pioneer
enterprises for six-year and four-year periods, respectively. Those
availing of this incentive are exempt only from income tax, but
shall be subject to all other taxes, including the ten percent (10%)
VAT.
This old rule clearly did not take into consideration the Cross
Border Doctrine essential to the VAT system or the fiction of the
ECOZONE as a foreign territory. It relied totally on the choice of
fiscal incentives of the PEZA-registered enterprise. Again, for
emphasis, the old VAT rule for PEZA-registered enterprises was
based on their choice of fiscal incentives: (1) If the PEZA-
registered enterprise chose the five percent (5%) preferential tax
on its gross income, in lieu of all taxes, as provided by Rep. Act
No. 7916, as amended, then it would be VAT-exempt; (2) If the
PEZA-registered enterprise availed of the income tax holiday
under Exec. Order No. 226, as amended, it shall be subject to VAT
at ten percent (10%). Such distinction was abolished by RMC No.
74-99, which categorically de-
_______________
59 Id., at pp. 229-230.
555
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 555

clared that all sales of goods, properties, and services made by a

VAT-registered supplier from the Customs Territory to an
ECOZONE enterprise shall be subject to VAT, at zero percent
(0%) rate, regardless of the latter’s type or class of PEZA
registration; and, thus, affirming the nature of a PEZA-registered
or an ECOZONE enterprise as a VAT-exempt entity.”60

To recall, Toshiba is herein claiming the refund of
unutilized input VAT payments on its local purchases of
goods and services attributable to its export sales for the
first and second quarters of 1997. Such export sales
took place before October 15, 1999, when the old rule on
the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises still
applied. Under this old rule, it was not only possible, but
even acceptable, for Toshiba, availing itself of the income
tax holiday option under Section 23 of Republic Act No.
7916, in relation to Section 39 of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987, to be subject to VAT, both indirectly (as
purchaser to whom the seller shifts the VAT burden) and
directly (as seller whose sales were subject to VAT, either
at ten percent [10%] or zero percent [0%]).
A VAT-registered seller of goods and/or services who
made zero-rated sales can claim tax credit or refund of the
input VAT paid on its purchases of goods, properties, or
services relative to such zero-rated sales, in accordance
with Section 4.102-2 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95,
which provides—
“Sec. 4.102-2. Zero-rating.—(a) In general.—A zero-rated sale

by a VAT-registered person, which is a taxable transaction for
VAT purposes, shall not result in any output tax. However, the
input tax on his purchases of goods, properties or services related
to such zero-rated sale shall be available as tax credit or refund in
accordance with these regulations.”

The BIR, as late as July 15, 2003, when it issued RMC
No. 42-2003, accepted applications for credit/refund of
input VAT on purchases prior to RMC No. 74-99, filed by
PEZA-
_______________
60 Id., at pp. 230-231.
556
registered enterprises which availed themselves of the

income tax holiday. The BIR answered Question Q-5(1) of
RMC No. 42-2003 in this wise—
Q-5: Under Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 74-99,

purchases by PEZA-registered firms automatically qualify
as zero-rated without seeking prior approval from the BIR
effective October 1999.
1) Will the OSS-DOF Center still accept applications from
PEZA-registered claimants who were allegedly billed
VAT by their suppliers before and during the effectivity of
the RMC by issuing VAT invoices/receipts?
xxxx
A-5(1): If the PEZA-registered enterprise is paying the 5%
preferential tax in lieu of all other taxes, the said PEZA-
registered taxpayer cannot claim TCC or refund for the
VAT paid on purchases. However, if the taxpayer is
availing of the income tax holiday, it can claim VAT
credit provided:
a. The taxpayer-claimant is VAT-registered;
b. Purchases are evidenced by VAT invoices or
receipts, whichever is applicable, with shifted VAT
to the purchaser prior to the implementation of
RMC No. 74-99; and
c. The supplier issues a sworn statement under
penalties of perjury that it shifted the VAT and
declared the sales to the PEZA-registered purchaser
as taxable sales in its VAT returns.
For invoices/receipts issued upon the effectivity of RMC No. 74-99, the
claims for input VAT by PEZA-registered companies, regardless of the
type or class of PEZA-registration, should be denied.” (Emphases ours.)

Consequently, the CIR cannot herein insist that all
PEZA-registered enterprises are VAT-exempt in every
instance. RMC No. 42-2003 contains an express
acknowledgement by the BIR that prior to RMC No. 74-99,
there were PEZA-
557
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 557

registered enterprises liable for VAT and entitled to

credit/refund of input VAT paid under certain conditions.
This Court already rejected in the Toshiba case the
argument that sale transactions of a PEZA-registered
enterprise were VAT-exempt under Section 103(q) of the
Tax Code of 1977, as amended, ratiocinating that—
“Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, relied

upon by petitioner CIR, relates to VAT-exempt transactions.
These are transactions exempted from VAT by special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Since such transactions are not subject to VAT, the sellers cannot
pass on any output VAT to the purchasers of goods, properties, or
services, and they may not claim tax credit/refund of the input
VAT they had paid thereon.
Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, cannot
apply to transactions of respondent Toshiba because although the
said section recognizes that transactions covered by special laws
may be exempt from VAT, the very same section provides that
those falling under Presidential Decree No. 66 are not.
Presidential Decree No. 66, creating the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA), is the precursor of Rep. Act No.
7916, as amended, under which the EPZA evolved into the
PEZA. Consequently, the exception of Presidential Decree
No. 66 from Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended, extends likewise to Rep. Act No. 7916, as
amended.”61 (Emphasis ours.)
In light of the judicial admissions of

Toshiba, the CTA correctly confined
itself to the other factual issues submit-

ted for resolution by the parties.
In accord with the admitted facts—that Toshiba was a

VAT-registered entity and that its export sales were zero-
rated transactions—the stated issues in the Joint
Stipulation were limited to other factual matters,
particularly, on the
_______________
61 Id., at p. 223.
558

compliance by Toshiba with the rest of the requirements

for credit/refund of input VAT on zero-rated transactions.
Thus, during trial, Toshiba concentrated on presenting
evidence to establish that it incurred P3,875,139.65 of
input VAT for the first and second quarters of 1997 which
were directly attributable to its export sales; that said
amount of input VAT were not carried over to the
succeeding quarters; that said amount of input VAT has
not been applied or offset against any output VAT liability;
and that said amount of input VAT was properly
substantiated by official receipts and invoices.
After what truly appears to be an exhaustive review of
the evidence presented by Toshiba, the CTA made the
following findings—
(1) The amended quarterly VAT returns of Toshiba for
1997 showed that it made no other sales, except zero-rated
export sales, for the entire year, in the sum of
P2,083,305,000.00 for the first quarter and
P5,411,372,000.00 for the second quarter. That being the
case, all input VAT allegedly incurred by Toshiba for the
first two quarters of 1997, in the amount of P3,875,139.65,
was directly attributable to its zero-rated sales for the
same period.
(2) Toshiba did carry-over the P3,875,139.65 input
VAT it reportedly incurred during the first two quarters of
1997 to succeeding quarters, until the first quarter of 1999.
Despite the carry-over of the subject input VAT of
P3,875,139.65, the claim of Toshiba was not affected
because it later on deducted the said amount as “VAT
Refund/TCC Claimed” from its total available input VAT of
P6,841,468.17 for the first quarter of 1999.
(3) Still, the CTA could not allow the credit/refund of
the total input VAT of P3,875,139.65 being claimed by
Toshiba because not all of said amount was actually
incurred by the company and duly substantiated by
invoices and official receipts. From the P3,875,139.65
claim, the CTA deducted the amounts of (a) P189,692.92,
which was in excess of the P3,685,446.23 input VAT
Toshiba originally claimed in its
559
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 559

application for credit/refund filed with the DOF One-Stop
Shop; (b) P396,882.58, which SGV & Co., the
commissioned CPA, disallowed for being improperly
substantiated, i.e., supported only by provisional
acknowledgement receipts, or by documents other than
official receipts, or not supported by TIN or TIN VAT or by
any document at all; (c) P1,887,545.65, which the CTA
itself verified as not being substantiated in accordance with
Section 4.104-562 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, in
relation to Sections 10863 and 23864 of the Tax Code of
_______________
62 SECTION 4.104-5. Substantiation of claims for input tax credit.—

(a) Input taxes shall be allowed only if the domestic purchase of goods,
properties or services is made in the course of trade or business. The input
tax should be supported by an invoice or receipt showing the information
as required under Sections 108(a) and 237 of the Code. Input tax on
purchases of real property should be supported by a copy of the public
instrument, i.e., deed of absolute sale, deed of conditional sale,
contract/agreement to sell, etc., together with the VAT receipt issued by
the seller.
A cash register machine tape issued to a VAT-registered buyer by a
VAT-registered seller from a machine duly registered with the BIR in lieu
of the regular sales invoice, shall constitute valid proof of substantiation of
tax credit only if the name and TIN of the purchaser is indicated in the
receipt and authenticated by a duly authorized representative of the
seller.
(b) Input tax on importations shall be supported with the import
entry or other equivalent document showing actual payment of VAT on
the imported goods.
(c) Presumptive input tax shall be supported by an inventory of goods
as shown in a detailed list to be submitted to the BIR.
(d) Input tax on “deemed sale” transactions shall be substantiated
with the required invoices.
(e) Input tax from payments made to non-residents shall be supported
by a copy of the VAT declaration/return filed by the resident
licensee/lessee in behalf of the non-resident licensor/lessor evidencing
remittance of the VAT due.
63 SEC. 108. Invoicing and accounting requirements for VAT-
registered persons.—(a) Invoicing requirements.—A VAT-registered person
shall, for every sale, issue an invoice or receipt. In addition to
560

_______________
the information required under Section 238, the following information

shall be indicated in the invoice or receipt:
(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by
his taxpayer’s identification number (TIN); and
(2) The total amount which the purchaser pays or is obligated to pay
to the seller with the indication that such amount includes the value-
added tax.
(b) Accounting requirements.—Notwithstanding the provision of
Section 223, all persons subject to the value-added tax under Sections 100
and 102 shall, in addition to the regular accounting records required,
maintain a subsidiary sales journal and subsidiary purchase journal on
which the daily sales and purchases are recorded. The subsidiary journals
shall contain such information as may be required by the Secretary of
Finance.
64 SEC. 238. Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices.—All
persons subject to an internal revenue tax shall, for each sale or transfer
of merchandise or for services rendered valued at P25.00 or more, issue
duly registered receipts or sales or commercial invoices, prepared at least
in duplicate, showing the date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and
description of merchandise or nature of service: Provided, however, That
in the case of sales, receipts or transfers in the amount of P100.00 or
more, or, regardless of amount, where the sale or transfer is made by a
person liable to value-added tax to another person also liable to value-
added tax; or where the receipt is issued to cover payment made as
rentals, commissions, compensations or fees, receipts or invoices shall be
issued which shall show the name, business style, if any, and address of
the purchaser, customer, or client: Provided, further, That where the
purchaser is a VAT-registered person, in addition to the information
herein required the invoice or receipt shall further show the taxpayer’s
identification number of the purchaser.
The original of each receipt or invoice shall be issued to the purchaser,
customer or client at the time the transaction is effected, who, if engaged
in business or in the exercise of profession, shall keep and preserve the
same in his place of business for a period of 3 years from the close of the
taxable year in which such invoice or receipt was issued while the
duplicate shall be kept and preserved by the issuer, also in his place of
business for a like period.
The Commissioner may, in meritorious cases exempt any person
subject to an internal revenue tax from compliance with the provisions of
this section.
561
VOL. 614, March 9, 2010 561

1977, as amended; and (d) P15,736.42, which Toshiba

already applied to its output VAT liability for the fourth
quarter of 1998.
(4) Ultimately, Toshiba was entitled to the
credit/refund of unutilized input VAT payments
attributable to its zero-rated sales in the amounts of
P1,158,016.82 and P227,265.26, for the first and second
quarters of 1997, respectively, or in the total amount of
P1,385,282.08.
Since the aforementioned findings of fact of the CTA are
borne by substantial evidence on record, unrefuted by the
CIR, and untouched by the Court of Appeals, they are given
utmost respect by this Court.
The Court will not lightly set aside the conclusions
reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its
functions, is dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax
problems and has accordingly developed an expertise on
the subject unless there has been an abuse or improvident
exercise of authority.65 In Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc.
(now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,66 this Court more explicitly pronounced
—
“Jurisprudence has consistently shown that this Court accords

the findings of fact by the CTA with the highest respect. In Sea-
Land Service Inc. v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 122605, 30 April
2001, 357 SCRA 441, 445-446], this Court recognizes that the
Court of Tax Appeals, which by the very nature of its function is
dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax problems, has
necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, and its
conclusions will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse
or improvident exercise of authority. Such findings can only be
disturbed on appeal if they are
_______________
65 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Cebu Toyo Corporation, 491

Phil. 625, 640; 451 SCRA 447, 463 (2005).
66 G.R. No. 150764, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 126, 135-136.
562

not supported by substantial evidence or there is a showing of
gross error or abuse on the part of the Tax Court. In the absence
of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court must
presume that the CTA rendered a decision which is valid in every
respect.”

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated August 29,
2002 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63047 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated October 16, 2000
of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 5762 is
REINSTATED. Respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is ORDERED to REFUND or, in the alternative,
to ISSUE a TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of
petitioner Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. in
the amount of P1,385,282.08, representing the latter’s
unutilized input VAT payments for the first and second
quarters of 1997. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Bersamin

and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution reversed and set aside, that of

CTA reinstated.
Note.—Pre-trial is not a mere technicality in court

proceeding for it is essential in the simplification and the
speedy disposition of disputes. (RN Development
Corporation vs. A.I.I. System, Inc., 555 SCRA 513 [2008])
——o0o——

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Reyes
*
G.R. No. 157177. February 11, 2008.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs.

JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES,
respondents.
Appeals; As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when

affirmed by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court, as long as
they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial
evidence; Exceptions.—The issue raises a factual question. The
Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the
lower courts. As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when
affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by
the record or are based on substantial evidence. Such rule
however is not absolute, but is subject to well-established
exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of
the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7)
when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. We hold that this case falls under exception
Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
Actions; Evidence; Quantum of Proof; Burden of Proof; In civil

cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater
weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it.
—It is a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
207
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 207
basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his
own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by
law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence
which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which
is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it
means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that
of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side
than on the other.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Where the trial judge did not hear the
testimonies himself, he would not be in a better position than the
Supreme Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of
their demeanor.—For a better perspective on the calibration of the
evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had
heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who
penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies
himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a
better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. Hence, to arrive at the
truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses’
testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record.
Same; Same; Same; Banks and Banking; Great evidentiary

weight is given to the teller’s tape, considering that it is inserted
into the bank’s computer terminal, which records the teller’s daily
transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is no
showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove
the bank’s claim.—The teller’s tape definitely establishes the fact
of respondent Jesusa’s original intention to withdraw the amount
of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her
savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her new
Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her
savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the amount of
P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller
account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller’s tape,
considering that it is inserted into the bank’s computer terminal,
which records the teller’s daily transactions in the ordinary course
of business, and there is no showing that the same had been
purposely manipulated to prove petitioner’s claim.
Same; Same; Same; Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent

manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trust-
208
worthy evidence—where the physical evidence on record runs

counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the
Court has consistently ruled that the physical evidence should
prevail; To uphold the declaration of the Court of Appeals that it is
unlikely for the bank depositor and her daughter to concoct a false
story against a banking institution is to give weight to conjectures
and surmises, which the Court cannot countenance.—Physical
evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on
many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in
ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record
runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical evidence should
prevail. In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is
unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a false
story against a banking institution is to give weight to conjectures
and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Benedicto, Verzosa, Gealogo, Burkley and Associates
for petitioner.
Teresita Gandioco Oledan for respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
1
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision of
the Court of Appeals
2
(CA) dated October 29, 2002 as well
as its Resolution dated February 12, 2003, which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of
_______________
1 CA Rollo, pp. 109-117; penned by Justice Renato C. Dacudao,

concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Danilo B. Pine;
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 47862.
2 Id., at p. 133.
209
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 209

3
Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453, requiring
Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses
Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the
amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly
summarized by the trial court, to wit:
“On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes

together with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote
Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the
ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit
amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be
raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nica-
sio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and
in charge of the new accounts and time deposits characteristically
described as having homosexual inclinations. They were
entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table occupied by
a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM
account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall
be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank
which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will
be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal
slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in
good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct
amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan
Reyes was filling up the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller,
Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed
the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate
P200,000.00.
_______________
3 Entitled Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes v. Bank of Philippine

Islands.
210

Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of

P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure two (2)
into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying
the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two
bun-dles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to
Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of
plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and
brought the same to the teller’s booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her
duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48
reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing
December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller
card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United
States (Exhs. “T,” “U”- “U-1”) and returned to Manila on January
31, 1991 (Exhs. “V”-“V-1”).
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her
statement of account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM
account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank
manager assured her that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of
her employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI
with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer
cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be
updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the
deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the
back portion thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff
and when the latter saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip
was validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the
matter will be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the
bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer de-
211
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 211

manding return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest (Exhs.

“B” and “C”). The same was received by defendant on July 25,
1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff
to sit down and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be
submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test.
Plaintiff filed this instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philip-
pine Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund
transfer in the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings
account to the express teller account she opened on December 7,
1990 (Exhs. “3” to “3-C”), however, it was the only amount she
deposited and no additional cash deposit of P100,000.00 was
made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00
but the balance in her account was not sufficient and could not
accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the
amount to be withdrawn from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with
plaintiff’s signature superimposed on said corrections; that the
original copy of the deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00
to P100,000.00, however, instead of plaintiff signing the same, the
clerk-in-charge of the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the
alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes had already left without
signing the deposit slip. The documents were subsequently
machine validated for the amount of P100,000.00 (Exhs. “2” and
“4”).
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved
with the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as
contained in the bank’s teller tape (Exhs.”1” to “1-C”).
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero
Capati to a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with flying
colors (Exhs. “5” to “5-C”), indicative of the fact that he was not
lying when he said that there really was no cash transaction
involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank
on December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged that they even
went to the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim
would not be given
212

credit (Exh. “6”) considering4 that no such transaction was really

made on December 7, 1990.”
5
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision upholding
the versions of respondents, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of

the plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against
defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14%

per annum from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
6
4. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney’s fees.”
The RTC found that petitioner’s claim that respondent

Jesusa deposited only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00
was hazy; that what should control was the deposit slip
issued by the bank to respondent, for there was no chance
by which respondent could write the amount of
P200,000.00 without petitioner’s employee noticing it and
making the necessary corrections; that it was deplorable to
note that it was when respondent Jesusa’s bankbook was
submitted to be updated after the lapse of several months
when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was corrected;
that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that a
deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a
thing belonging to another with the obligation of safely
keeping it and of returning the same; that under Article
1972, the depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely and
to return it when required to the depositor or to his heirs
and successors or to the person who may have been
designated in the contract.
_______________
4 Records, pp. 220-222.

5 Id., at pp. 219-225; per Judge Gil P. Fernandez, Sr.
6 Id., at pp. 224-225.
213
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 213

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a

Decision dated October 29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision
with modification as follows:
“Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the

missing P100,000.00 can stand some modification. The interest
thereon should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12, 1991,
the last day of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-
appellees’ counsel under the first demand letter dated May 6,
1991 (Exhibit “B”), or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when
defendant-appellant received said letter. Interest is demandable
when the obligation consist in the payment of money and the
debtor incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages
to a reasonable sum of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable
action. The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The absence of malice and bad faith, as in
this case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney’s fees to a
reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case has
not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the
judgment appealed7
from is in all other respects AFFIRMED.
Without costs.”
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the

CA held that the RTC correctly gave credence to the
testimonies of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the
effect that aside from the fund transfer of P100,000.00 from
Jesusa’s savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit
of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it
is unlikely for these two to concoct a story of falsification
against
_______________
7 CA Rollo, pp. 116-117.
214

a banking institution of the stature of petitioner if their

claims were not true; that the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with
the fact that it was not machine-validated and the original
copy altered by the bank’s clerk from P200,000.00 to
P100,000.00 with the altered amount “validated,” is
indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee
Cicero Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood
her ground and categorically denied having any knowledge
of the alteration therein made; that petitioner must
account for the missing P100,000.00 because it was the
author of the loss; that banks are engaged in business
imbued with public interest and are under strict obligation
to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing with its clients, in
seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by them
received are properly accounted for and duly posted in their
ledgers.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding

BPI liable for the amount of P100,000.00
representing an alleged additional deposit of
respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion by resolving the issue
based on a conjecture and ignoring physical
evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion,
being as it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable
to respondents for the payment of interest at the
rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion,
being as it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable
for moral damages and attorney’s fees at the
reduced amounts
8
of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively.
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
215
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 215

The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in

sustaining the RTC’s finding that respondent Jesusa made
an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened
Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a
trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only
errors 9of law that may have been committed by the lower
courts. As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court
when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they
are borne10 out by the record or are based on substantial
evidence. Such rule however is not absolute, but is subject
to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings
of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and those
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appel-lant
and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the absence of11evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record. We hold that this case falls
under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to
resolve the factual issue.
_______________
9 Id.
10 Prudential Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, 474
SCRA 485, 491.
11 Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112550, February 5, 2001, 351 SCRA
145.
216

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must

prove his own affirmative 12
allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must 13
establish his case by
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in
opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it
means that the testimony of one side is more believable
than that of the other side, and that14
the probability of truth
is on one side than on the other.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the
guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence,
thus:
“SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.—In

civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.”
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence

on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had
heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same
judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the
testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court
would not be in a better position than this Court to assess
the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
_______________
12 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1.

13 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Sec. 1.
14 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 1052, 1061; 383 SCRA 471, 480
(2002), citing Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734; 284 SCRA 673
(1998).
217
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 217

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the

transcripts of the witnesses’ testimonies and examined the
pieces of evidence on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and
evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents
failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence
that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of
P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that
at the outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was
opening an Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that
she was going to withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from
her savings account to her new account, and that she had
an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions
are not borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably,15
it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip
for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of respondent
Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer
of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the
Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent
Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange that
she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the
first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her
savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa’s claim that she signed the
withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated
therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a
businesswoman in the regular course 16
of business and
taking ordinary care of her concerns, would make sure
that she would check the amount written on the
withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. Significantly,
we note that the space provided for her signature is very
near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words
and figures are written; thus,
_______________
15 Records, p. 21, Exhibit “4.”

16 Rule 131, Sec. 3(d).
218

she could not have failed to notice that the amount of

P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to
transfer the amount of P200,000.00 from her savings
account to her new Express Teller account was further
established by the teller’s tape presented as petitioner’s
evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros,
the teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa’s
transactions. 17
The teller’s tape, Exhibit “1” unequivocally shows the
fol-lowing data:
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299

151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
18
***200000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
PB BALANCE ERROR
BAL. 229,257.64
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
TOD
151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145
***2000.00
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
_______________
17 Records, p. 154, Exhibit “1.”
18 Exhibit “1-c.”
219
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 219

***22917.00
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
19
***100000.00
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
20
***100000.00 ***100000.00
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
***2000.00
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
19 Exhibit “1-b.”
20 Exhibit “1-a.”
220

The first column shows the exact time of the transactions;

the second column shows the date of the transactions; the
third column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth
column shows the teller’s code; and the fifth column shows
the client’s account number. The teller’s tape reflected
various transactions involving different accounts on
December 7, 1990 which included respondent Jesusa’s
Savings Account No. 233243388 and her new Express
Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that respondent
Jesusa’s initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not
P100,000.00, from her Savings Account No. 233324299 was
begun at 3 o’clock, 12 minutes and 45 seconds as shown in
Exhibit “1-c.”
In explaining the entries in the teller’s tape, Torneros
testified that when she was processing respondent Jesusa’s
withdrawal in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer 21
rejected the transaction because there was a discrepancy;
thus, the word “BIG AMOUNT” appeared on the tape. “Big
amount”22means that the amount was so big for her to
approve, so she keyed in the amount again and overrode
the transaction to be able to process the withdrawal
23
using
an officer’s override with the latter’s approval. The letter
“J” appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to show
that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again
the amount of P200,000.00 at 3 o’clock 13 minutes and 9
seconds; however, her computer rejected the transaction,
because the balance she keyed 24
in based on respondent
Jesusa’s passbook was wrong; thus appeared the phrase
“balance error” on the tape, and the computer produced the
balance of P229,257.64,
25
and so she keyed in the withdrawal
of P200,000.00. Since it was a big amount, she again had
to override it, so she could process the amount. However,
the withdrawal was again rejected for the
_______________
21 TSN, May 4, 1993, p. 10.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 15.
25 Id., at p. 16.
221
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 221

26
reason “TOD, overdraft,” which meant that the amount to
be withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that
there was a debited amount of P30,935.16 reflected in
respondent Jesusa’s passbook,27
reducing the available
balance to only P198,322.48.
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told 28
him of
the insufficiency of respondent Jesusa’s balance. Capati
then motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller’s cage; and
when she was already in front of the teller’s cage, Torneros
told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because
of overdraft; thus, respondent
29
Jesusa decided to just
withdraw P100,000.00.
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with
the superimposition of the figure “1” on the figure “2” and
the change of the word “two” to “one” to show that the
withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa’s savings
account was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa
herself signed the alterations.
The teller’s tape showed that the withdrawal of the
amount of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3
o’clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big
amount, there was a need to override it again, and the
withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o’clock 18
minutes and 27 seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was
deposited to respondent Jesusa’s new Express Teller
Account No. 235076748.
The teller’s tape definitely establishes the fact of
respondent Jesusa’s original intention to withdraw the
amount of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims,
from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial
deposit to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency
of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund
transfer of the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings
account to her new
_______________
26 Id., at p. 20.
27 Records, p. 73, Exhibit “D-2.”
28 TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 19.
29 Id.
222

Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to

the teller’s tape, considering that it is inserted into the
bank’s computer terminal, which records the teller’s daily
transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there
is no showing that the same had been purposely
manipulated to prove petitioner’s claim.
Respondent Jesusa’s bare claim, although corroborated
by her daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00
cash in addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not
established by physical
30
evidence. While the duplicate copy
of the deposit slip was in the amount of P200,000.00 and
bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy
failed to show that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00.
An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not
contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific
denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the
testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros’s explanation of why the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the amount of
P200,000.00 bore the teller’s stamp mark is convincing and
consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business.
She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with
him a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed by
respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip for
P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa’s name for her new
Express Teller account, and the latter’s
31
savings passbook
reflecting
32
a balance of P249,657.64 as of November 19,
1990. Thus, at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to
be sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by fund
transfer. Capati then got her teller’s stamp mark, stamped
it on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave 33the
duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original copy of
the deposit
_______________
30 Records, p. 6, Exhibits “A” and “7.”

31 Records, p. 73; Exhibits “D-2” and “D-2 a”; the entry shows
P243,657.64.
32 TSN, April 27, 1993, pp. 10-12.
33 Records, p. 22. Exhibits “W,” “W-1,” “2” and “2-A.”
223
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 223

34
slip was left in her cage. However, as Torneros started
processing the transaction, it turned out that respondent
Jesusa’s balance was insufficient to accommodate the
P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the
withdrawal slip and had already left the teller’s counter
thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller’s cage,
Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit
35
slip and
the latter told her, “Ok naman iyan,” and Capati
superimposed the figures “1” on “2” on the deposit slip to
reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00 for respondent
Jesusa’s new Express Teller account and signed the
alteration. Torneros then machine-validated the 36deposit
slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, which
bore Torneros’s stamp mark and which was given to
respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her
transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original
copy of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit
slip was signed by Capati and not by respondent Jesusa
herself was a violation of the 37bank’s policy requiring the
depositor to sign the correction, nevertheless, we find that
respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by
preponderance of evidence that indeed there was an
additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited to the new
Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation
of truth, 38
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally
upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where
the physical evidence on record runs counter to the
testimonial evi-
_______________
34 TSN, April 27, 1993, pp. 10-12.

35 TSN, May 4, 1993, p. 28.
36 TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 20.
37 TSN Nov. 10, 1992, pp 59-60.
38 See Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118441-42, January 18, 2000,
322 SCRA 25, 31, citing People v. Uycoque, G.R. No. 107495, July 31,
1995, 246 SCRA 769 (1995).
224

dence of the prosecution witnesses, we 39consistently rule

that the physical evidence should prevail.
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is
unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct
a false story against a banking institution is to give weight
to conjectures and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by
preponderance of evidence.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the
other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as
its Resolution dated February 12, 2003 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner,
is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Corona**, Nachura

and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—Elements and matters which could be readily

verified cannot be cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by
assumptions or mere conjectures. (People vs. Cartuano, Jr.,
255 SCRA 403 [1996])
Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to
the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
conclusions as to physical evidence should prevail—greater
credence is
_______________
39 Id., citing People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102366, October 3, 1997, 280
SCRA 160.
** In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484
dated January 11, 2008.
225
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 11, 2008 225

Caña vs. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines
given to physical evidence as evidence of the highest order

because it speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses. (People vs. Lavapie, 354 SCRA 351 [2001])
——o0o——

VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 167
People vs. Malimit
*
G.R. No. 109775. November 14, 1996.

JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias “MANOLO,”
accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Police Blotters; Where entries in the

police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of a witness, the presentation of the
police blotter as evidence is not indispensable.—Next, appellant
derided the nonpresentation by the prosecution of the police
blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right
away by Batin to the crime. We do not believe, however, that it
was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of
the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-
presentation in court fatal to the prosecution’s case. Entries in the
police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such,
its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if
appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he
should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station
and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach
Batin’s credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant
cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something
which appellant himself should have done.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Judicial Notice; The non-disclosure
by a witness to the police officers of the accused’s identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely
against human
____________________________
* THIRD DIVISION.
168
People vs. Malimit
experience—the natural reticence of most people to get involved in

criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors is of judicial
notice.—Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin
identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the
lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone
does not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure
by the witness to the police officers of appellant’s identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely
against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most
people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate
neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.
Same; Same; Same; It is the established rule of evidence that
the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the
appellate court; Exceptions.—At any rate, the consistent teaching
of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with
regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the
highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the
established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to
the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the
trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the
witness’ demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And
although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when
patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored
by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are
clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right Against Self-
Incrimination; The right against self-incrimination is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the accused’s own
lips, against his will, admission of his guilt and does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating
statement but an object evidence.—We are not persuaded. The
right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as
put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, “x x x is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him x x x.” It is simply a prohibition against
legal process to extract from the [accused]’s own lips, against his
will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating
statement but an object evidence.
169
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 169
People vs. Malimit
Same; Same; Same; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial

Confessions; “Miranda Rights”; Infractions of the so-called
“Miranda rights” render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation—the
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.—
These are the socalled “Miranda rights” so oftenly disregarded by
our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained
or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly,
appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to
have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the
custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of
these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions.
Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malaki’s wallet, identification card, residence
certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts
relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish
the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the
night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate
and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; There can be a verdict
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime; Requisites
for Conviction.—Our close scrutiny of the record reveals
otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the
exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In
order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict,
the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
170
People vs. Malimit
Same; Same; Alibi; As the defense of alibi is weak in view of

the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses, it becomes weaker by reason of the unexplained failure
of the defense to present any corroboration.—On the other hand,
appellant’s version of the story does not inspire belief. He
maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together
with his wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a
gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain Maui
Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did not bother to
call appellant’s wife to the witness stand to corroborate
appellant’s alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui
Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant
in the said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this
assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive
identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, it
becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense
to present any corroboration.
Same; Same; Robbery with Homicide; Proof that the accused
is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid
presumption that he stole the same.—Appellant’s insistence that
he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance while gathering shells
along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the
crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone,
hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was,
as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if
indeed he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance. No inference
can be drawn from appellant’s purported apprehension other than
the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime.
Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property
gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San

Juan, Southern Leyte, Br. 26.

171
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 171
People vs. Malimit
FRANCISCO, J.:
1
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and
convicted 2 of the special complex crime 3of robbery with
homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) without subsidiary 4
imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost.
In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging
that the trial court committed the following errors, to wit:
“I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE
CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR
ALLEGED ‘KNOWLEDGE’ OF THE CRIME MORE THAN FIVE
MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE

THE WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO 5 PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.”
____________________________
1 Information dated 28 November 1991; Record, p. 10.

2 Punishable under Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code.
3 Regional Trial Court, Southern Leyte, Branch 26.
4 RTC decision dated 18 January 1993; Rollo, pp. 57-67.
5 Rollo, p. 44.
172
People vs. Malimit
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the

appellee in its Brief, and duly supported by the evidence on
record:
“On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, [Onofre]
Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki’s houseboy Edilberto
Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at
the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199
(sic), p. 14).
“Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the
store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice
farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house,
approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from
Malaki’s store (Ibid., p. 24).
“Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the
kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer
(Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the
store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of
the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss,
bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor ‘struggling for
his life’ (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.).
“Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from
the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or ‘Manolo’) rushing
out through the front door of Malaki’s store with a blood-stained
bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming
from a pressure lamp (‘petromax’) inside the store, Rondon clearly
recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
“Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside
the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief
conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house
of Malaki’s brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of
the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy,
went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki
in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed
that the store’s drawer was opened and ransacked and the 6
wallet
of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17).”
____________________________
6 Rollo, pp. 79-81.
173
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 173

People vs. Malimit
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the
credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and
Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in
revealing what they knew about the incident. He posits
that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was
only on September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged
him as the culprit.
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant
haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated
the appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17,
1991.7 The aforementioned date however, was merely the
date when 8
Rondon and Batin executed their respective
affidavits, narrating that they saw the appellant on the
night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood
and rushing out of Malaki’s store. As to appellant’s claim of
delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are
ample testimonial evidence negating appellant’s
protestation, to wit: (1)) after having discovered the
commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately
looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki’s brother-in-law, and
informed him that appellant was the 9only person they saw
running away from the crime scene; (2) Beloy and Batin
reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their
barangay where Batin declared that 10it was appellant who
robbed Malaki on that fateful night; and (3) Batin again
made a11 similar statement later at the Silago Police
Station.
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the
prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if
appellant
12
was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the
crime. We do
____________________________
7 Exhibit “2-B,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 5; Exhibit “3-B,” Bill of Exhibits, p.

6.
8 Exhibit “2,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 5; Exhibit “3,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 6.
9 TSN, Eutiquio Beloy, May 22, 1992, p. 10.
10 TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, p. 19.
11 Id., pp. 20-21.
12 Brief for the Appellant, p. 8; Rollo, p. 51.
174

People vs. Malimit
not believe, however, that it was necessary for the
prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the
aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-
presentation in court fatal to the prosecution’s case.
Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative
evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he
identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime
before the Silago police. As such, 13
its presentation as
evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if appellant
believed that he was not identified therein, then he should
have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station
and utilized the same as controverting
14
evidence to impeach
Batin’s credibility as witness. Having failed to do so,
appellant cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for
something which appellant himself should have done.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin
identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or
after the lapse of five months from commission of the
crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony less
credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police
officers of appellant’s identity immediately after the
occurrence 15of the crime is not entirely against human
experience. In fact the natural reticence of most people to
get involved in criminal prosecutions against
____________________________
13 See People v. Comia, 236 SCRA 185 (1994); See also People v.
Watson, 278 Ala. 425, 178 So. 2d 819, 821 (1965).
14 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 11. Impeachment of the adverse
party’s witness.—A witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
has made at some other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (Italics ours)
15 People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 (1985); See also People v. Danico,
208 SCRA 472 (1992), and People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
175
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 175

People vs. Malimit
16 17
immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.
At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is
that the findings of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses are given weight and 18
the highest
degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the
established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best
performed by the trial court which can weigh said
testimony in the light of19 the witness’ demeanor, conduct
and attitude at the trial. And although the rule admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies
in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial
court, or (2) when the conclusions
20
arrived at are clearly
unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates
21
that the admission as evidence of Malaki’s wallet together 22
with its contents, viz., (1)23 Malaki’s residence certificate;
24
(2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates
his
____________________________
16 The house of Malaki is just 80 meters away from appellant’s house;

while the house of witness Rondon is 150 meters away from Malaki’s
house.
17 People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 118315, June 20, 1996; People v. Sabellano,
198 SCRA 196 (1991); People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
18 People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 (1994); People v. Nimo, 227 SCRA
69 (1993); People v. de la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 (1993); People v.
Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 (1993); People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991);
People v. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125 (1985).
19 See People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 (1994); People v. Ocampo, 226
SCRA 1 (1993); People v. Juma, 220 SCRA 432 (1993); People v. Bañez,
214 SCRA 109 (1992) citing People v. Abrogar, 73 SCRA 466 (1979).
20 See People v. Gumahin, 21 SCRA 729 (1967); People v. Secapuri, et
al., 16 SCRA 199 (1966).
21 Exhibit “A.”
22 Exhibit “A-1.”
176

People vs. Malimit
25
right against self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant
sought for their exclusion because during the custodial
investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating
policemen the place where he hid Malaki’s wallet, he was
not informed of his constitutional rights.
We are not persuaded. The right against self-
incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds
no application in this case. This right,
26
as put by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Holt vs. United States, “x x x is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him x x x.” It is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the [accused]’s
27
own
lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not
apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object
evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us
in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
“If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his
[physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his
physical control in whatever form exercised, then, it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with
all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by
forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender
of the evidential articles—a clear reductio ad absurdum.In other
words, it is not merely compulsion that28 is the kernel of the
privilege, *** but testimonial compulsion.”
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the

questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision of
the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz:
____________________________
25 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself.
26 218 U.S. 245.
27 U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145, 152.
28 4 Wigmore 2263.
177
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 177

People vs. Malimit
“(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x x x x x x x.
“(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(Italics ours.)
x x x x x x x x x”
These are the so-called “Miranda rights” so oftenly

disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions
thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant
29
to the issue and is not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in
the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant
was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have
his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the
custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written
waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional
prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts
do not affect the admissibility of Malaki’s wallet,
identification card, residence certificate and keys for the
purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime.
Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it
was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the
robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and
keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to
Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these
pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not
detract from appellant’s culpability considering the
existence of other evidence and circumstances
____________________________
29 Rule 128, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court.
178

People vs. Malimit
establishing appellant’s identity and guilt as perpetrator of

the crime charged.
We, now come to appellant’s third assignment of error
where he demurs on the prosecution’s evidence, contending
that they are insufficient to sustain his conviction.
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time
and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused,
to the 30exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the
crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these
essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is 31such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, there were at least five (5)
circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events
which by their “concordant combination and cumulative
effect,” satisfy
32
the requirements for the conviction of the
appellant, specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon
and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a
bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki’s33
store
seconds prior to their discovery 34of the crime; (2) Malaki
sustained multiple stab wounds and he died of “cardiac
arrest, secondary to
____________________________
30 People v. Adriano, 226 SCRA 131, 135 (1993), citing People v.

Galendez, 210 SCRA 360 (1992); See People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16
(1993); People v. Briones, 219 SCRA 134 (1993); People v. Ocampo, 218
SCRA 609 (1993); People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 (1991); People v.
Ganohon, 196 SCRA 431 (1991); People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942).
31 Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
32 People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16, 28 (1993).
33 TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, pp. 15, 18, 23; TSN, Florencio
Rondon, May 22, 1992, pp. 20-22, 31.
34 Exhibit “C-1,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 3.
179
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 179

People vs. Malimit
35
severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds”;
(3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6,
1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki’s
wallet underneath
36
a stone at the seashore in Barangay
Hingatungan; (4) appellant himself admitted in his
testimony that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several 37
policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki’s wallet;
and (5) appellant’s flight and his subsequent disappearance
38
from Hingatungan immediately after the incident.
On the other hand, appellant’s version of the story does
not inspire belief. He maintains that on that fateful night
he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that
they had just arrived from a gambling spree allegedly in
the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly,
however, the defense did not bother to call appellant’s wife
to the witness stand to corroborate appellant’s alibi.
Neither did it present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any
other person who may have seen the appellant in the said
place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this
assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the
positive identification
39
of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses, it becomes weaker because of the unexplained 40
failure of the defense to present any corroboration.
Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when
the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant must
likewise demonstrate that he could not have been
physically present at
____________________________
35 Exhibit ‘B-1,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 1; See also Exhibit “C,” Bill of

Exhibits, p. 3.
36 TSN, Elmer Ladica, June 9, 1992, pp. 4-5.
37 TSN, Jose Malimit, September 23, 1994, pp. 8-9.
38 TSN, Florencio Rondon, May 22, 1992, p. 22; TSN, Edilberto Batin,
June 9, 1992, p. 22.
39 People v. John Jenn Porras, G.R. Nos. 114263-64, March 29, 1996;
People v. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 (1995), citing People v. Claudio, 216
SCRA 647 (1992); People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993).
40 People v. Malonzo, 212 SCRA 85 (1992); People v. Paciente, 210 SCRA
87 (1992); See People v. Lazo, 198 SCRA 274 (1991).
180

People vs. Malimit
the place of 41the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its

commission. In this case, appellant himself admitted that
his house was just 42
about eighty (80) meters away from the
house of Malaki. It was, therefore, not impossible for him
to have been physically present at the place of the
commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate
this possibility was ever adduced by him at the trial.
Appellant’s insistence that he merely found Malaki’s
wallet by chance while gathering shells along the seashore,
and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which
reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly
inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was,
as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the
crime if indeed he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance.
No inference can be drawn from appellant’s purported
apprehension other than the logical conclusion that
appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that
appellant is in possession of a stolen property
43
gives rise to
a valid presumption that he stole the same.
In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the
occasion of robbery, appellant was correctly convicted by
the trial court of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and

Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed in toto.
____________________________
41 People v. John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo, G.R. 114263-64,

March 29, 1996; People v. Manero, Jr., 218 SCRA 89 (1993), citing People
v. Pugal, 215 SCRA 247 (1992).
42 TSN, Jose Malimit, July 2, 1992, p. 10.
43 People v. Alhambra, 233 SCRA 604, 613 (1994).
181
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 181

Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals
Note.—The rule is settled that once the primary source

(the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from
it is also inadmissible. (People vs. Sequiño, 264 SCRA 79
[1996])
——o0o——
Note.—The law specifically makes the officers,
employees or other officers or persons responsible for the
offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such
corporation and/or board of directors, officers, or other
officials or employees responsible for the offense. (Ching vs.
Secretary of Justice, 481 SCRA 609 [2006])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 178196. August 6, 2008.*

RUDY BUDUHAN y BULLAN and ROBERT BUDUHAN y
BULLAN, defendants-appellants.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Evidence; As between statements

made during the preliminary investigation of the case and the
testimony of a witness in open court, the latter deserves more
credence.—As between statements made during the preliminary
investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in open
court, the latter deserves more credence. Preliminary
investigations are commonly fairly summary or truncated in
nature, being designed simply for the determination, not of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, but of probable cause prior to the filing
of an information in court. It is the statements of a witness in
open court which deserve careful consideration.
Same; Same; Same; The rule that requires a sufficient
foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of
inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common
sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness.—The
rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before
introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is
founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the
character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary
inquiries, which enable him to explain the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
338
People vs. Buduhan
statements referred to and to show that they were made by

mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his
testimony.
Same; Robbery; Elements to warrant conviction for the crime
of robbery with homicide.—To warrant conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide, one that is primarily classified as a crime
against property and not against persons, the prosecution has to
firmly establish the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property with the use of violence or intimidation against the
person; (2) the property thus taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime
of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, is
committed.
Same; Same; In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the
intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery.—In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the
intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would
supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are
killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide. The original design must have been
robbery; and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to
the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be
perpetrated with a view to consummate, the robbery. The taking
of the property should not be merely an afterthought, which arose
subsequently to the killing.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Animus lucrandi or intent
to gain is an internal act, which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender.—The intent to gain may already be
presumed in this case. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an
internal act, which can be established through the overt acts of
the offender. The unlawful act of the taking of Larry’s watch at
gunpoint after the declaration of a hold-up already speaks well
enough for itself. No other intent may be gleaned from the acts of
the appellant’s group at that moment other than to divest Larry
of his personal property.
Same; Evidence; Conspiracy; The same degree of proof necessary to
prove the crime is required to support a finding of criminal
conspiracy.—There is conspiracy when two or more persons come
to
339
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 339
People vs. Buduhan
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to

commit it. The same degree of proof necessary to prove the crime
is required to support a finding of criminal conspiracy. Direct
proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which
demonstrates their unity of design and objective is sufficient.
Same; Same; Alibi; It is elemental that for alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met.—The defense
of appellants of alibi is at best weak when faced with the positive
identification of the appellants by the prosecution’s principal
witness. It is elemental that for alibi to prosper, the requirements
of time and place must be strictly met. This means that the
accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the
time of the commission of the offense but he must also
demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at that time. In the present case, there
was absolutely no claim of any fact that would show that it was
well nigh impossible for appellants to be present at the locus
criminis. In fact, they all testified that they were going towards
the vicinity of the area of the shooting incident when the police
apprehended them.
Same; Arrests; As aptly stated in People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA
67 (1997), granting arguendo that appellants were illegally
arrested, such arrest did not invest these eyewitness accounts with
constitutional infirmity as “fruits of the poisonous tree.”—The
persistent claim of appellants of the illegality of their warrantless
arrest, due to the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the
arresting officers, deserves scant consideration. As aptly stated in
People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67 (1997), granting arguendo that
appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these
eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as “fruits of the
poisonous tree.” Considering that their conviction could be
secured on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open
court, which are not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no
reason to further belabor the matter.
Same; Robbery; It bears stressing that in the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to
rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.—The
two courts below committed a mistake, however, in convicting the
appellants separately of the crime of Homicide for the death of
340
People vs. Buduhan
Romualde Almeron. It bears stressing that in the special complex

crime of Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the
felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere
accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide
is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 December 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01940, which affirmed with modifications the Decision2
dated 24 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Maddela, Quirino, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. 38-18,
finding accused-appellants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and
Rudy Buduhan y Bullan guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide with respect to the deceased
Larry Erese, and of the crime of homicide with respect to
the deceased Romualde Almeron. The Court of Appeals
ordered the payment of moral damages to the heirs of said
victims, in addition to the award already given by the trial
court.
On 26 August 1998, an Information3 was filed against
Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna, Boyet
Ginyang and 3 John Does before the RTC of Maddela,
Quirino,
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices
Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. concurring;
Rollo, pp. 3-13.
2 Penned by Judge Menrado V. Corpuz; CA Rollo, pp. 27-41.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 13-14.
341
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People vs. Buduhan
for the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated

Homicide. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 38-18, the
accusatory portion of the information provides:
“That on or about 10:40 o’clock in the evening of July 24, 1998

in Poblacion Norte, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, four of them are armed and after first
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and
with force and violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob ROMUALDE ALMERON of his wallet and
wrist watch and LARRY ERESE of his wrist watch to the damage
and prejudice of the said ROMUALDE ALMERON and LARRY
ERESE;
That on the occasion of the Robbery, the said accused, armed
with firearms of different caliber and after first conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shoot and fire upon
ROMUALDE ALMERON, LARRY ERESE and ORLANDO
PASCUA resulting to their instanteneous (sic) death and the
injuries to the persons of FERNANDO PERA and GILBERT
CORTEZ.”
On 20 October 1998, the accused filed a Motion to

Quash4 the above information, alleging that the court did
not legally acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The
accused contended they were neither caught in flagrante
delicto, nor did the police have personal knowledge of the
commission of the offense at the time when their
warrantless arrests were effected.5
_______________
4 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 73-74.

5 Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 5 provides the instances when a
warrantless arrest may be lawfully made, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
342

People vs. Buduhan
In an Order dated 25 August 1999, the RTC denied the

above motion on the ground that the assertion of lack of
personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers
regarding the commission of the crime is a matter of
defense, which should be properly taken up during the
trial.6
When arraigned on 12 January 2000, the accused Rudy
Buduhan, Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang, with the
assistance of their counsel de oficio, entered their pleas of
“Not Guilty” to the crime charged.7 With respect to accused
Boy Guinhicna, counsel for the accused informed the trial
court of his death and thus moved for the dismissal of the
charges against him.8
On the same date, the pre-trial conference was
terminated and both parties agreed on the following
stipulation of facts, namely:
1. That the incident transpired at about 10:40 in the evening

of July 24, 1998;
2. That the incident happened at Poblacion Norte, Maddela,
Quirino;
3. That no firearm has been confiscated from any of the
accused.9
_______________
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
6 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 94-95.
7 Id., at p. 116.
8 Id., at p. 114.
9 Id.
343
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People vs. Buduhan
Upon the submission of accused Boy Guinhicna’s

Certificate of Death,10 the RTC dismissed the case against
him on 14 February 2000.11 Thereafter, trial of the case
ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1)
Cherry Rose Salazar, an employee of the establishment
where the crime was committed;12 (2) Senior Police Officer
1 (SPO1) Leo Saquing, a police officer at the Maddela
Police Station who investigated the crime committed;13 (3)
Dr. Fernando T. Melegrito, the medical examiner who
conducted the autopsies on the bodies of the victims;14 (4)
Myrna Almeron, the widow of the victim Romualde
Almeron;15 and (5) Laurentino Erese, Sr., the father of the
victim Larry Erese.16
The defense, on the other hand, presented: (1) appellant
Robert Buduhan;17 (2) accused Boyet Ginyang;18 (3) Police
Inspector Ma. Leonora Chua-Camarao, a Forensic Chemist
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
at Camp Crame, Quezon City;19 (4) appellant Rudy
Buduhan;20 and (5) Reynaldo Gumiho, an eyewitness who
was allegedly present at the scene of the crime shortly
before the incident in question occurred.21
The People’s version of the incident as narrated by its
principal witness, Cherry Rose Salazar (Cherry Rose), is as
follows:
_______________
10 Id., at p. 89.
11 Id., at p. 125.
12 TSN, 14 February 2000.
13 TSN, 12 April 2000.
16 Id.
17 TSN, 23 May 2002.
18 TSN, 19 June 2002.
19 TSN, 9 July 2002.
20 TSN, 23 August 2002.
21 TSN, 10 January 2003.
344

People vs. Buduhan
On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest

relations officer at the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and a
videoke bar in Maddela, Quirino.22 At about 9:00 to 10:00
p.m., there were only two groups of men inside the
beerhouse.23 The group that went there first was that of
the appellants,24 which was composed of Robert Buduhan,
who was wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano,25 Rudy
Buduhan, who was wearing a red T-shirt,26 a man wearing
a blue T-shirt,27 and another man wearing a blue T-shirt
with a black jacket.28 The second group was composed of
Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe)
and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding).
At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the
group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and poked a
gun at Larry.29 Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-
shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose’s Manager
Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the
counter.30 The man in blue poked a gun at Romualde and
announced a hold-up.31 Larry then handed over his
wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from
Robert’s group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde,
which caused them to fall down.32 Abe and Nanding ran
out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and
Cherry Rose hid below the table.33
SPO1 Leo T. Saquing34 testified that on 24 July 1998, at
11:00 p.m., he and SPO4 Alex M. Gumayagay were detailed
_______________
22 TSN, 14 February 2000, p. 7.

23 Id., at p. 24.
24 Id., at p. 35.
25 Exhibit “A” for the prosecution.
26 TSN, 14 February 2000, p. 13.
27 Id., at p. 11.
28 Id., at p. 12.
29 Id., at p. 9.
30 Id., at pp. 11, 39.
31 Id., at p. 14.
32 Id., at p. 17.
33 Id., at pp. 17-18.
34 TSN, 12 April 2000, pp. 3-16.
345
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People vs. Buduhan
as duty investigators at the Maddela Police Station when

Eddie Ancheta, a fireman, reported to them a shooting
incident at the RML Canteen in Barangay Poblacion Norte,
Maddela, Quirino. SPO1 Saquing and SPO4 Gumayagay
then proceeded to the said place. About 50 meters from the
scene of the crime, they encountered four male individuals
who were running away therefrom.35 The policemen
immediately halted the men and asked them where they
came from. When they could not respond properly and gave
different answers, the policemen apprehended them and
brought them to the Maddela Police Station for questioning
and identification.36 Afterwards, the policemen went back
to the RML Canteen to conduct an investigation therein.37
Later that night, the witnesses38 of the shooting incident
went to the police station and they positively pointed to the
four persons, later identified as Robert Buduhan, Rudy
Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna and Boyet Ginyang, as the
assailants in the said incident.39
Dr. Fernando Melegrito,40 the Chief of Hospital at the
Maddela Hospital, testified that he conducted the autopsies
on the bodies of the victims Romualde Almeron, Larry
Erese and Orlando Pascua.41 With respect to Romualde,
Dr. Melegrito found that the former sustained a gunshot
wound 1/2 x
_______________
35 Joint Affidavit of SPO3 Alex M. Gumayagay and SPO1 Leo T.

Saquing, Exhibit “M” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 15.
36 Id., at pp. 4-5.
37 Id., at p. 16.
38 Cherry Rose Salazar, Maureen Pasion and Marveloza Lopez. (TSN,
12 April 2000, p. 15.)
39 TSN, 12 April 2000, p. 5.
40 TSN, 15 February 2000, pp. 4-5.
41 The circumstances of Orlando Pascua’s death were not testified to by
any of the witnesses for the prosecution during the trial. It was during the
preliminary investigation of the case before the sala of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Judge Moises M. Pardo when Maureen Pasion, an employee
of the RML Canteen, narrated how the assailants shot Orlando Pascua.
(Records, Vol. 1, pp. 46-49). The prosecution no longer presented said
witness.
346

People vs. Buduhan
1/2 centimeter in diameter, one inch above the right nipple,

perforating the fourth rib of the right chest, penetrating
the superior aspect of the right lung, the aorta of the heart,
the midportion of the left lung and exited through the back,
two inches below the lower portion of the left scapular
region.42 These findings were also contained in Romualde
Almeron’s Autopsy Report.43 From the nature of the
wound, Dr. Melegrito concluded that the victim was near
and was in front of the assailant when he was fatally shot.
As regards Larry Erese, Dr. Melegrito testified that said
victim sustained a gunshot wound 1/2 x 1/2 centimeter in
diameter in the sternal region of the chest, between the
third left and right rib, perforating the arch of the aorta of
the heart and penetrating the subcutaneous tissue of the
left lower back at the level of the seventh rib, where a slug
(bullet)44 was extracted.45 These findings were likewise
contained in Larry Erese’s Autopsy Report.46
Concerning the victim Orlando Pascua, Dr. Melegrito
testified that the gunshot wound that the former sustained
resulted into a massive disruption of the lung.47 As
presented in Pascua’s Autopsy Report,48 the gunshot
wound was 1 x 1 inch in diameter, perforating the
midportion of the fourth rib of the left chest, lacerating the
three-fourth (3/4) portion of the left lung, and penetrating
the subcutaneous tissues of the left back at the level of the
third and fourth ribs, then the fourth and fifth ribs where
pellets were extracted therein.
Myrna Almeron49 testified that as a result of the
untimely death of her husband Romualde Almeron, which
fact was
_______________
42 TSN, 15 February 2000, p. 4.

43 Exhibit “D” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 59.
44 Exhibit “F” for the Prosecution.
45 TSN, 15 February 2000, p. 5.
46 Exhibit “E” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 60.
47 TSN, 15 February 2000, p. 6.
48 Exhibit “G” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 122.
49 TSN, 16 February 2000, pp. 6-9.
347
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 347
People vs. Buduhan
evidenced by a Death Certificate,50 she incurred expenses

for funeral services in the amount of P38,000.00 and
expenses during her husband’s wake in the amount of
P25,000.00. She also claimed that during the night of the
shooting incident, Romualde brought with him the amount
of P50,000.00 in his wallet, but the same was no longer
recovered. Among these figures, however, Myrna Almeron
was only able to present a receipt for the expenses for
funeral services51 and only in the amount of P26,000.00.
Laurentino Erese testified that during the wake of his
deceased son, whose death was evidenced by a Death
Certificate,52 he incurred funeral expenses for Larry in the
amount of P18,000.00.53 From the wake to the first death
anniversary, the total expenses were claimed to be more or
less P100,000.00.54 However, only the receipt for the above
funeral services55 was offered.
The prosecution did not present the other surviving
victims in the shooting incident, namely Gilbert Cortez and
Fernando Pera. The latter were fearful of reprisals from
unknown individuals. No evidence was likewise adduced on
their behalf. Also, the other employees who worked as
guest relations officers in the RML Canteen and who
likewise witnessed the incident were said to have
absconded already.56
For the defense, appellant Robert Buduhan57 testified
that on the evening of 24 July 1998, he was at their
boarding house in Poblacion, Maddela, Quirino, together
with Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang, and Boy Guinhicna.
The group drank one bottle of San Miguel Gin, and then
went to sleep.
_______________
50 Exhibit “I” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 2, p. 339.

51 Exhibit “J” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 2, p. 340.
52 Exhibit “K,” id., at p. 341.
53 TSN, 16 February 2000, p. 18.
54 Id., at p. 17.
55 Exhibit “L” for the Prosecution.
56 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 205-206.
57 TSN, 23 May 2002, pp. 7-26.
348

People vs. Buduhan
Unknown to him and Guinhicna, Rudy and Ginyang still

went out to continue their drinking sessions. While he was
sleeping, Ginyang arrived and woke him up. Ginyang told
him that they had to go to the beerhouse where he
(Ginyang) and Rudy had been to because something might
have happened to Rudy, as there was a fight there. Robert,
Ginyang and Guinhicna then proceeded to look for Rudy.
On their way there, at the junction of the National
Highway, they encountered some policemen who asked
them where they were headed. When Robert said that they
were looking for Rudy, the policemen told them to board
the police vehicle and the group was given a ride. As it
turned out, Robert’s group was taken to the Municipal Jail
of Maddela where they were detained. The policemen went
out to look for Rudy and they likewise put him in jail. The
following day, the policemen confiscated the shirts worn by
the group. They were also taken to Santiago City where
paraffin tests were conducted. On the evening of 26 July
1998, the policemen went to the jail with three ladies who
were asked to identify Robert’s group. The ladies, however,
did not recognize Robert and his companions.
Boyet Ginyang58 testified that on 24 July 1998, at 10:00
p.m., he and Rudy went to a beerhouse in Maddela,
Quirino. After ordering some drinks and chatting, they
suddenly heard gunshots from the outside. Looking
towards the direction of the sound, he saw somebody fall to
the ground and at that point, he and Rudy ran to get away
from the place. While running towards their boarding
house, Rudy was stopped by an unknown armed person in
a white T-shirt. When Ginyang reached the boarding
house, he roused appellant Robert and Guinhicna from
their sleep and asked them to go with him and search for
Rudy. Upon reaching the junction at the National
Highway, they were halted by a man who asked where they
were heading. After hearing their story, the man said they
should wait for a vehicle that would help them look for
_______________
58 TSN, 19 June 2002, pp. 8-20.
349
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People vs. Buduhan
Rudy. When the vehicle arrived, he and the others were
brought to the municipal jail. Thereafter, Rudy was
likewise picked up by the police and detained with the
group. On the morning of 25 July 1998, three ladies were
brought to the municipal jail to identify his group, but the
former did not recognize them. On the morning of 26 July
1998, Ginyang and his three companions were brought to
Santiago City where they were made to undergo paraffin
testing. Afterwards, the group was brought back to the
municipal jail in Maddela, Quirino. Ginyang also testified
that the policemen took the shirts they wore on the night of
24 July 1998, but he could not remember when they did.
Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao59
testified that she was the one who conducted the
examination proper of the paraffin casts taken from Robert
Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang and Boy
Guinhicna. She likewise brought before the trial court the
original Letter Request60 of the Maddela Police Station for
the conduct of paraffin casting; the Letter of Request61
addressed to the Officer-in-Charge the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Region 2 for the conduct of paraffin
examination; and the paraffin casts of subjects Rudy,
Ginyang, Guinhicna and Robert.62 Police Inspector Chua-
Camarao explained that the purpose of conducting a
paraffin test was to determine the presence of gunpowder
residue in the hands of a person through extraction using
paraffin wax. The process involves two stages: first, the
paraffin casting, in which the hands of the subject are
covered with paraffin wax to extract gunpowder residue;
and second, the paraffin examination per se, which refers to
the actual chemical examination to determine whether or
not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted. For the
second stage, the method used
_______________
59 TSN, 9 July 2002, pp. 6-12.

60 Exhibit “2” for the Defense, CA Rollo, p. 92.
61 Exhibit “2-A” for the Defense, Records, Vol. 2, p. 312.
62 Exhibits “2-B,” “2-C,” “2-D,” and “2-E,” respectively, Records, Vol. 2,
pp. 313-327.
350

People vs. Buduhan
is the diphenyl amine test, wherein the diphenyl amine
agent is poured on the paraffin casts of the subject’s hands.
In this test, a positive result occurs when blue specks are
produced in the paraffin casts, which then indicates the
presence of gunpowder residue. When no such reaction
takes place, the result is negative.
The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that
Police Inspector Chua-Camarao conducted were contained
in Physical Science Report No. C-25-9863 which yielded a
negative result for all the four accused. Nonetheless, the
forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely
a corroborative evidence, neither proving nor disproving
that a person did indeed fire a gun. The positive or
negative results of the test can be influenced by certain
factors, such as the wearing of gloves by the subject,
perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity,
humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the
firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.64
Appellant Rudy Buduhan testified that at past 10:00
p.m. of 24 July 1998, he and Ginyang went to a beerhouse.
Shortly after ordering their drinks, they heard gunshots,
and a person seated near the door fell. They then ran
towards the road.65 While running, an armed man wearing
a white T-shirt held him, while Ginyang was able to get
away.66 After a while, the police arrived and they took him
to the Maddela police station where he was jailed along
with Robert, Ginyang and Guinhicna.67 The rest of his
testimony merely corroborated the testimonies of Robert
and Ginyang.
Reynaldo Gumiho (Reynaldo)68 testified that on the
evening of 24 July 1998, he was in Poblacion, Maddela,
Quirino, for a
_______________
63 Exhibit “1” for the Defense, Records, Vol. 1, p. 310.

64 TSN, 9 July 2002, pp. 13-16.
65 TSN, 23 August 2002, p. 7.
66 TSN, 9 July 2002, pp. 8-9.
67 Id., at pp. 10-11.
68 TSN, 10 January 2003, pp. 3-10.
351
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People vs. Buduhan
business transaction involving the sale of a 6x6 truck with
a certain alias Boy. At about 8:00 p.m., Reynaldo and Boy
proceeded to a beerhouse in Maddela. After settling with
their drinks, Reynaldo heard a group of five men near their
table who were conversing and he recognized from the
accent of their voices that they were from Lagawe (Ifugao).
One of the men then told him that they should leave after
finishing their drinks because the former were looking for
someone who killed their relative. Reynaldo disclosed that
he recognized one of the persons whom he usually saw in
Lagawe, and that the group was composed of relatively tall
people who were mostly wearing jackets. Not long after,
Reynaldo and Boy left the beerhouse so as not to get
involved in any trouble. Two days after he left Maddela,
Reynaldo learned of the shooting incident in the beerhouse.
In a Decision dated 24 July 2003, the trial court found
appellants guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court renders

judgment as follows:
1) Finding accused Robert and Rudy, both surnamed
Buduhan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide (Par. 1 Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code) with respect to the deceased Larry Erese and
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2) As to the victim Romualde Almeron, the court also finds
them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide (Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code) and sentences each of them to the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of Prision Mayor as minimum
to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum;
However, they shall be entitled to a deduction of their
preventive imprisonment from the term of their sentences in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 6127.
3) To pay jointly the heirs of Larry Erese the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as exemplary damages,
P18,000 as actual expenses and P5,000 as temperate damages;
and
352

People vs. Buduhan
the heirs of Mr. Almeron: P50,000 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as

exemplary damages, P38,000.00 as actual expenses and P5,000.00
as temperate damages.
With costs against them.
However, with respect to accused Boyet Ginyang, the court
ACQUITS him of the offense charged since the prosecution had
failed to overcome, with the required quantum of evidence, the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Consequently, the Chief
of the BJMP, Cabarroguis, Quirino, is hereby ordered to
immediately release him from confinement unless being held for
some other lawful cause; and to make a report hereon within
three (3) days from receipt hereof.”69
On 1 August 2003, the appellants filed a Notice of

Appeal70 raising questions of law and facts.
On 7 June 2004, the Court initially resolved to accept
the appeal, docketed as G.R. No. 159843,71 and required
the appellants to file their Brief.72
However, on 5 October 2005, we resolved to transfer the
case to the Court of Appeals in view of our ruling in People
v. Mateo.73 The case was then docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01940.
_______________
69 CA Rollo, pp. 40-41.

70 Id., at p. 42.
71 Id., at p. 44.
72 Id., at p. 46.
73 In the said case, we ruled thus:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by
the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where
life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his
guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the
evaluation of the facts
353
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 353

People vs. Buduhan
On 29 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its

decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 24, 2003

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maddela, Quirino, Branch
38, in Civil Case No. 39-18, is hereby MODIFIED only in that, in
addition to the award already given by the trial court, in
consonance with current jurisprudence, the heirs of ERESE are
also entitled to moral damages of P50,000 and in addition to the
award already given by the trial court, the heirs of ALMERON
are also entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated
September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004,
this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of
the Court of Appeals.”74
From the Court of Appeals, the case was then elevated

to this Court for automatic review. In a Resolution75 dated
5 September 2007, we required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30
days from notice.
In a Manifestation76 filed on 30 October 2007, the
People informed the Court that it will no longer file a
supplemental
_______________
can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of

Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals
should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire
records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition. (G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640,
656). (Emphasis ours).
74 Rollo, pp. 12-13.

75 Id., at p. 18.
76 Id., at pp. 19-21.
354

People vs. Buduhan
brief, as the arguments raised by appellants had already

been discussed in the brief77 filed before the Court of
Appeals.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their supplemental
brief on 28 November 2007.
As a final plea for their innocence, appellants ask this
Court to consider the following assignment of errors:
I.
IN GIVING COMPLETE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE
THE PRESENCE OF FACTS TAINTING THE CREDIBILITY OF
THE WITNESS.
II.
IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE APPELLANTS,
WHICH WAS CORROBORATED BY THE FINDINGS OF THE
FORENSIC CHEMIST.
III.
IN FAILING TO MAKE A DIRECT RULING ON THE MOTION
OF THE ACCUSED TO QUASH THE INFORMATION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED WITHOUT
A WARRANT OF ARREST IS ILLEGAL AS THERE WAS NO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
REGARDING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
To state differently, appellants argue that their guilt

was not proven beyond reasonable doubt in view of the trial
court’s error in the appreciation of the evidence for and
against them. They fault the trial court’s over-reliance on
the testimony of the prosecution’s main witness and its
failure to consider the glaring inconsistencies in Cherry
Rose’s previous accounts of the shooting incident.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible
witness in view of the conflicting answers she gave in her
sworn
_______________
77 CA Rollo, pp. 103-119.
355
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 355

People vs. Buduhan
statement before the police,78 in the preliminary

investigation of the case and in her testimony in open
court. They contend that the trial court failed to scrutinize
the entirety of the statements made by Cherry Rose vis-à-
vis the shooting incident.
Appellants called attention to the fact that during the
preliminary investigation of the case, Cherry Rose stated
that a man wearing a white Giordano T-shirt shot Larry
after Larry handed his wristwatch.79 Thereafter, when
Cherry Rose was asked whom she saw wearing a white
Giordano T-shirt, she pointed to Boy Guinhicna.80 With
respect to appellant Robert Buduhan, Cherry Rose
identified him as the one who shot Orlando Pascua.81
In the testimony of Cherry Rose in open court, however,
she identified appellant Robert as the man who was
wearing a white Giordano T-shirt and who shot Larry
Erese.82
Also, in Cherry Rose’s sworn statement before the police,
she narrated that the group of the appellants, consisting of
five persons, was already inside the RML Canteen before
the shooting incident occured.83 However, in her direct
examination, Cherry Rose stated that appellant Robert had
only three other companions.84
Finally, in the preliminary investigation, appellants
pointed out that Cherry Rose unhesitatingly admitted that
_______________
78 Exhibit “C-C2” for the Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, pp. 10-12.

79 Minutes of the Preliminary Investigation, Records, Vol. 1, p. 43.
80 Id., at p. 44.
81 Id., at p. 45.
82 TSN, 14 February 2000, pp. 9, 15.
83 Sworn Statement of Cherry Rose Salazar, Exhibits “C-C2” for the
Prosecution, Records, Vol. 1, p. 11.
84 TSN, 14 February 2000, p. 10.
356

People vs. Buduhan
Larry Erese was her intimate boyfriend and that was why
she embraced him after the latter was shot.85
In her cross-examination, however, Cherry Rose stated
that Larry was only a customer and not her boyfriend.86
When questioned about her prior statement about this fact
given during the preliminary investigation, Cherry Rose
changed her answer and said that Larry was indeed her
boyfriend.87
Taking all these circumstances into account, appellants
argue that, judging from the conflicting statements of
Cherry Rose, the identification of the accused is highly
doubtful.
We are not persuaded.
As between statements made during the preliminary
investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in
open court, the latter deserves more credence. Preliminary
investigations are commonly fairly summary or truncated
in nature, being designed simply for the determination, not
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but of probable cause
prior to the filing of an information in court. It is the
statements of a witness in open court which deserve careful
consideration.88
In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements by a
witness, is revealing:
“Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of

inconsistent statements.—Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to
him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing they must be
_______________
85 Minutes of the Preliminary Investigation, Records, Vol. 1, pp. 43-44.

86 TSN, 14 February 2000, p. 29.
87 Id., at pp. 30-33.
88 People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 96469, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 22, 28-29.
357
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 357

People vs. Buduhan
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning

them.”
The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first

laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements
of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential
to protect the character of a witness. His memory is
refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enable him to
explain the statements referred to and to show that they
were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy
between them and his testimony.89
In the present case, the statements made by Cherry
Rose during the preliminary investigation with respect to
the identities of the accused were not related to her during
the trial. Indeed, it is only during the appeal of this case
that appellants pointed out the supposed inconsistencies in
Cherry Rose’s identification of the appellants in order to
destroy her credibility as a witness. No opportunity was
ever afforded her to provide an explanation. Without such
explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left with no
basis to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the
rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is
given by a witness in reconciling her conflicting
declarations that she should be deemed impeached.90
In this regard, what the defense brought to Cherry
Rose’s attention during the trial were her contradictory
statements about her romantic relationship with Larry
Erese. As a result of this confrontation, Cherry Rose
changed her answer. We rule, however, that this
inconsistency relates only to an insignificant aspect of the
case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.
Inasmuch as the abovestated mandatory procedural
requirements were not complied with, the credibility of
Cherry
_______________
89 People v. De Guzman, 351 Phil. 587, 596; 288 SCRA 346, 354 (1998).
90 Id., at pp. 596-597; p. 355.
358

People vs. Buduhan
Rose as a witness stands unimpeached. As found by the

trial court, the testimony of Cherry Rose was
straightforward throughout. The appellants were not able
to adduce any reason or motive for her to bear false witness
against them. As a matter of fact, Cherry Rose testified
during cross-examination that she did not personally know
appellant Robert, and that she had first seen him only
during the night when the shooting incident took place.91
As the trial judge who penned the assailed decision did
not hear the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution,92 the rule granting finality to the factual
findings of trial courts does not find applicability to the
instant case.93
After a careful review of the entire records of this case,
the Court finds no reason to disagree with the factual
findings of the trial court that all the elements of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide were present and proved in this
case.
Robbery with Homicide is penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,94 which provides:
“Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of

persons—Penalties.—Any person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.”
_______________
91 TSN, 14 February 2000, pp. 35-36.

92 The Honorable Theresa Dela Torre-Yadao heard the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies before the Honorable Menrado V. Corpuz took over
and eventually penned the decision.
93 See People v. Navarro, 357 Phil. 1010, 1024; 297 SCRA 331, 342-343
(1998).
94 As amended by paragraph 1 of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659
(An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as Amended, Other
Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes).
359
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People vs. Buduhan
To warrant conviction for the crime of robbery with

homicide, one that is primarily classified as a crime against
property and not against persons, the prosecution has to
firmly establish the following elements: (1) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against the person; (2) the property thus taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the robbery or
by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein
used in a generic sense, is committed.95
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of
the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would
supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more
persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.96
The original design must have been robbery; and the
homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the
robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be
perpetrated with a view to consummate, the robbery. The
taking of the property should not be merely an
afterthought, which arose subsequently to the killing.97
With respect to the elements of the crime, the following
excerpts from the direct testimony of Cherry Rose clearly
illustrates the same, viz.:
_______________
95 People v. Lara, G.R. No. 171449, 23 October 2006, 505 SCRA 137,
154, citing People v. Del Rosario, 411 Phil. 676, 685; 359 SCRA 166, 173-
174 (2001).
96 People v. Cabbab, Jr., G.R. No. 173479, 12 July 2007, 527 SCRA 589,
604, citing People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA
384, 403.
97 People v. Lara, supra note 95, citing People v. Consejero, 404 Phil.
914, 932-933; 352 SCRA 276, 291 (2001).
360

People vs. Buduhan
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS—

Q: At that night of July 24, 1998 at around 10:40 in the evening, what
were you doing at RML Canteen?
A: I was entertaining a costumer sir. (nakatable)
x x x x
Q: Who was that person who requested you to entertain him?
A: Larry Erese sir.
Q: Do you recall if this Larry Erese have a companions (sic) that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Name them?
A: Abe at Nanding sir.
Q: That night while you were entertaining them, this three (3) what
transpired next?
A: An Ifugao approached us sir and he poke a gun at Larry Erese sir.
Q: And what did Larry Erese do when a gun was poke at him?
A: He gave his wrist watch sir.
Q: To whom did Larry Erese gave his wrist watch?
A: To the Ifugao who poke a gun at him sir.
x x x x
Q: Will you please go around and see if he is inside the courtroom and
point at him?
A: The witness is pointing to a man [seated] at the back bench of the
court and when asked about his name he answered Robert Buduhan.
x x x x
Q: What was the attire of Robert Buduhan at that time?
A: White T-shirt sir.
Q: Can you name or can you recall any particular description of that T-
shirt worn by Robert Buduhan at that time?
x x x x
A: It was marked with Giordano sir.
x x x x
361
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 361

People vs. Buduhan
Q: When Robert Buduhan approached Larry Erese and Larry Erese gave
his wrist watch, do you recall if Robert Buduhan have a companions
(sic) at that time?
A: There was sir.
Q: How many of them?
A: Four (4) sir.
x x x x
Q: Where are these companions of Robert Buduhan at the time Robert
Buduhan poke a gun at Larry Erese?
A: The other one was there to my Manager [Romualde] Eddie Almeron
sir.
Q: What was the attire of this person who approached Eddie Almeron,
your Manager?
A: He was in blue sir.
x x x x
Q: He wore blue T-shirt?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: What about the other two (2) companions of Robert Buduhan where
are they?
A: They were inside sir.
Q: The first of the two (2) what is the attire?
A: Color red sir.
Q: What about the last one?
A: He was in blue T-shirt and with black jacket sir.
x x x x
Q: The person in red T-shirt whom you claim the companion of Robert
Buduhan, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: Stand and point at him?
A: Witness pointed one of the accused sitting infront and when asked
about his name he answered Rudy Buduhan.
x x x x
Q: You mention about a person wearing blue T-shirt who approached
your Manager Eddie Almeron. What did he do first before he
approached your Manager if [any]?
362

People vs. Buduhan
A: He poke a gun at our Manager sir.

Q: What did he tell to you (sic) Manager if any while poking a gun?
A: Holdup sir.
Q: Are they simultaneous in approaching Larry Erese and Eddie
Almeron, this person in blue T-shirt and the accused Robert Buduhan?
A: No, sir. Robert Buduhan approached first.
Q: And then the person in blue T-shirt likewise approached Eddie
Almeron?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: What transpired first before Larry Erese gave his wrist watch. The
announcement of holdup or the giving of his wrist watch?
A: The announcement of the holdup comes first sir.
Q: When Larry Erese gave his watch to Robert Buduhan with Robert
Buduhan poking a gun at Larry Erese, what transpired next?
A: They fired sir.
Q: Who fired?
A: All of them sir.
x x x x
Q: You mentioned a while ago that Robert Buduhan poke a gun at Larry
Erese?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know the caliber of the gun?
A: It looks like a 38 but it is long sir.
Q: You likewise mention that the person in blue T-shirt poke a gun at
Eddie Almeron?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the person in red?
A: It looks like an armalite sir.
Q: What about the person in blue T-shirt with black jacket?
A: Armalite sir.
363
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People vs. Buduhan
Q: When Rudy Buduhan fired his gun was there any person who was hit?
A: There was sir.
Q: Name that person?
A: Larry Erese sir.
Q: When the person in blue T-shirt who was poking a gun at Eddie
Almeron fired his gun was there any person who was hit?
A: There was sir.
Q: Who was that person who was hit?
A: Eddie Almeron sir.
x x x x
Q: How far is Robert Buduhan from Larry Erese when Robert Buduhan
fired his gun?
A: He was arms like sir.
Q: You mention also about a person in blue T-shirt fired a gun at Eddie
Almeron. How far was he from Eddie Almeron when he fired his gun?
A: The witness pointed to a place in the courtroom.
x x x x
COURT—
About 2 to 3 meters?
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS—
Yes, 2 to 3 meters.
x x x x
Q: Do you know what happened to Larry Erese?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he now?
A: He was dead already sir.
Q: What about Eddie Almeron. Do you know what happened to him?
A: He was also dead sir.98
_______________
98 TSN, 14 February 2000, pp. 8-18.
364

People vs. Buduhan
Quite obvious from the foregoing testimony is that the

act of appellant Robert and his companion in blue T-shirt of
poking their guns towards Larry and Romualde,
respectively, and the announcement of a hold-up were what
caused Larry to give his watch to Robert. At this point,
there already occurred the taking of personal property that
belonged to another person, which was committed with
violence or intimidation against persons.
Likewise, the intent to gain may already be presumed in
this case. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal
act, which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender.99 The unlawful act of the taking of Larry’s watch
at gunpoint after the declaration of a hold-up already
speaks well enough for itself. No other intent may be
gleaned from the acts of the appellant’s group at that
moment other than to divest Larry of his personal
property.
The appellants acted in conspiracy in perpetrating the
crimes charged. As found by the trial court, conspiracy was
proved by the concurrence of the following facts: that the
four men were together when they entered the RML
canteen; that they occupied the same table; that they were
all armed during that time; that while the robbery was in
progress, neither Rudy nor the one in blue T-shirt with
black jacket prevented the robbery or the killing of the
victims; that all four fired their firearms when the robbery
was going on and that they fled all together and were seen
running by the police before they were intercepted just a
few meters from the scene of the crime.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. The same degree of proof necessary to
prove the crime is required to support a finding of criminal
conspiracy.
_______________
99 People v. Gavina, 332 Phil. 488, 495; 264 SCRA 450, 456 (1996).
365
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People vs. Buduhan
Direct proof, however, is not essential to show

conspiracy.100 Proof of concerted action before, during and
after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design
and objective is sufficient.101
As the fatal shooting of both Larry Erese and Romualde
Almeron happened on the occasion of the robbery and was
subsequent thereto, both of the appellants must be held
liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide on two
counts.
The defense of appellants of alibi is at best weak when
faced with the positive identification of the appellants by
the prosecution’s principal witness. It is elemental that for
alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must
be strictly met. This means that the accused must not only
prove his presence at another place at the time of the
commission of the offense but he must also demonstrate
that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at that time.102 In the present case, there
was absolutely no claim of any fact that would show that it
was well nigh impossible for appellants to be present at the
locus criminis. In fact, they all testified that they were
going towards the vicinity of the area of the shooting
incident when the police apprehended them.
The testimonies of Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang
were also markedly inconsistent on the material date as to
when the witnesses in the shooting incident identified
them. Robert Buduhan testified that the three lady
witnesses came to identify them at the municipal jail on
the evening of 26 July 1998.103 However, in the direct
examination of Boyet Ginyang, he testified that said
witnesses arrived on the morn-
_______________
100 People v. Ponce, 395 Phil. 563, 571-572; 341 SCRA 352, 359 (2000).
101 Id.
102 People v. Fuertes, 357 Phil. 603, 612-613; 296 SCRA 602, 612
(1998).
103 TSN, 23 May 2002, p. 20.
366

People vs. Buduhan
ing of 25 July 1998.104 This fact only tends to lend suspicion

to their already weak alibi.
Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings
of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the paraffin tests
conducted in order to exculpate themselves. The said
witness herself promptly stated that paraffin test results
are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by
any party, and they are not conclusive with respect to the
issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a gun.
As previously mentioned, the positive and negative results
of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors
affecting the conditions surrounding the use of the firearm,
namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration
of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity,
climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or
the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.
Lastly, the persistent claim of appellants of the illegality
of their warrantless arrest, due to the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, deserves
scant consideration. As aptly stated in People v. Salazar,105
granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested,
such arrest did not invest these eyewitness accounts with
constitutional infirmity as “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
Considering that their conviction could be secured on the
strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court,
which are not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no
reason to further belabor the matter.
A determination of the appropriate imposable penalties
is now in order.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
reclusion perpetua to death. In accordance with Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a
penalty com-
_______________
104 TSN, 19 June 2002, p. 15.

105 342 Phil. 745; 277 SCRA 67, 85 (1997).
367
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 367

People vs. Buduhan
posed of two indivisible penalties, and there are neither

mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals thus correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the charge for the death of Orlando Pascua
and the injuries sustained by Fernando Pera and Gilbert
Cortez, the trial court aptly held that the prosecution failed
to substantiate the same. No witnesses were presented to
testify as to the circumstances leading to the said incidents,
and neither were they proved to be caused by the criminal
actions of the appellants.
The two courts below committed a mistake, however, in
convicting the appellants separately of the crime of
Homicide for the death of Romualde Almeron. It bears
stressing that in the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is
immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident,
or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide.106
As to the award of damages, we hold that the heirs of
Larry Erese and Romualde Almeron are each entitled to
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. This
award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to
the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.107
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ grant of moral
damages in this case even in the absence of proof for the
entitle-
_______________
106 People v. Jabiniao, Jr., G.R. No. 179499, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA
769, 783.
107 People v. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698, 720; 425 SCRA 654, 673 (2004).
368

People vs. Buduhan
ment to the same. As borne out by human nature and

experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow,
torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing.108 The heirs of Erese
and Almeron are thus entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 each.
On the award of actual damages, we hold that the heirs
of Larry Erese are entitled to the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00, in lieu of the lower amount of
P18,000 that was substantiated by a receipt. In People v.
Villanueva,109 we have laid down the rule that when actual
damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less
than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for
P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages
proven exceeds P25,000.00, then temperate damages may
no longer be awarded. Actual damages based on the
receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.
However, with respect to the award of the amount of
P38,000.00 to the heirs of Romualde Almeron, the same is
incorrect since the receipt presented therefor covers only
the amount of P26,000.00. The award of actual damages
should be reduced accordingly. The grant of temperate
damages to the heirs of Almeron is thus deleted.
The award of exemplary damages is likewise deleted, as
the presence of any aggravating circumstance was neither
alleged nor proved in this case.110
_______________
108 People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 839; 393 SCRA 488, 503 (2002),
cited in People v. Rubiso, 447 Phil. 374, 383; 399 SCRA 267, 275 (2003).
109 456 Phil. 14, 29; 408 SCRA 571, 581-582 (2003).
110 Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part
of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.
369
VOL. 561, AUGUST 6, 2008 369

People vs. Buduhan
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated

29 December 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 01940 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. For the death of Larry Erese, appellants
Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y
Bullan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Robbery with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. For the death of Romualde Almeron,
appellants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy
Buduhan y Bullan are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced each to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
3. Appellants shall be entitled to a deduction of
their preventive imprisonment from the term of their
sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127.
4. Appellants are ordered to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of Larry Erese as follows: (a)
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
5. Appellants are ordered to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of Romualde Almeron as
follows: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P26,000.00 as
actual damages.
6. For reasons herein stated, appellants are
ACQUITTED of the separate crime of Homicide for
the death of Romualde Almeron.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
_______________
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be
paid to the offended party.

People vs. Brecinio
*
G.R. No. 138534. March 17, 2004.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SPO1

VIRGILIO G. BRECINIO, appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The

factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of the trial judge
in the appreciation of testimonial evidence.—We reiterate the
familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight,
given the clear advantage of the trial judge (an
_______________
25 Rule 45, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
* THIRD DIVISION.
617
VOL. 425, MARCH 17, 2004 617
People vs. Brecinio
opportunity not available to the appellate court) in the

appreciation of testimonial evidence. The trial judge personally
hears the witnesses and observes their deportment and manner of
testifying. Although the rule admits of certain exceptions, we find
no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absence of improper motive makes
testimony worthy of full faith and credence.—When there is no
evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witness to testify falsely against an accused or implicate him in
the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists and the testimony is worthy of full faith
and credence.
Same; Same; Same; Paraffin Test; A negative paraffin result
is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.—Time
and again, we have held that a negative paraffin result is not
conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. Stated
otherwise, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for
nitrates, as when the culprit is wearing gloves or he washes his
hands afterwards.
Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; The
accused must have deliberately and consciously adopted a means
of execution without risk to himself.—For treachery to be
considered, the accused must have deliberately and consciously
adopted a means of execution that rendered the person attacked
with no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even frontal attack can be
treacherous when unexpected and the unarmed victim is in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it.—The testimonies of the two
eyewitnesses, co-inmates of the victim, showed that the
suddenness and mode of attack adopted by the appellant placed
not only the victim but also all of them in such a situation where
it was not possible for them to resist the attack or defend
themselves. Even frontal attack can be treacherous when
unexpected and the unarmed victim is in no position to repel the
attack or avoid it.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender;
The fact that appellant did not resist arrest or deny his criminal
act did not constitute voluntary surrender.—The fact that
appellant did not resist arrest or deny his criminal act did not
constitute voluntary surrender. A surrender, to be voluntary,
must be spontaneous and must clearly indicate the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities.
Here, the appellant, after shooting the victim, was immediately
disarmed and placed under arrest. There was, therefore no
voluntary surrender to speak of because the appellant was in fact
arrested.
618

People vs. Brecinio
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sta.

Cruz, Laguna, Br. 28.

The Solicitor General for appellee.
Pablito A. Carpio for appellant.
CORONA, J.:
1
This is an appeal from the decision dated October 15, 1998,
of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch
28, in Criminal Case No. SC-6476, finding herein
appellant, SPO1 Virgilio G. Brecinio, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of
one Alberto Pagtananan.
Appellant Brecinio was originally charged with homicide
thru reckless imprudence in the Municipal Trial Court of
Pagsanjan, Laguna2 by the PNP Chief of Police of
Pagsanjan, Laguna. However, upon intervention of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and after a re-
investigation conducted by the Office of the Laguna
Provincial Prosecutor,
3
the charge against the appellant was
upgraded to murder:
“That on the 30th day of June 1996, more or less 6:00 o’clock in
the evening, inside the Municipal Jail, Municipality of Pagsanjan,
Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, while conveniently armed
with a service firearm Colt Caliber .45 with SN 531333, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ALBERTO
PAGTANANAN, a jail inmate, who was then caught unaware and
was hit on the upper quadrant medical clavicular line, resulting
in his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.
“That the crime was committed with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
“Contrary to law.”
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Fernando M. Paclibon, Jr., Rollo, pp. 38-48.

2 Original Records, p. 17.
3 Rollo, p. 18.
619
VOL. 425, MARCH 17, 2004 619

People vs. Brecinio
Arraigned on4
May 21, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charge.
The version of the prosecution revolved basically around5
the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses,
6
Robinson Arbilo
and Filomeno Mapalad, Jr., 7 with supplementary
testimonies from Dr. Levy Abad, the municipal 8 health
officer of Pagsanjan, Laguna, Dr. Arsenio de Roma of the
Laguna Provincial Hospital who examined the victim and 9
declared him dead on arrival, Atty. Rogelio 10G. Munar of
the NBI and Elpidia Pagtananan-Barcelona, the sister of
the victim.
Robinson Arbilo testified that, at around 5:00 p.m., on
June 30, 1996, he was with inmates Sammy Bolanos,
Rafael Morales, Edwin Maceda, Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. and
victim Alberto Pagtananan inside the Pagsanjan municipal
jail, cell no. 1, when appellant SPO1 Virgilio Brecinio, who
was drunk, arrived. Appellant entered their cell and asked
for their names, and the reasons for their detention. After
answering, each of them received a blow in the stomach
from the appellant for no apparent reason. Thereafter,
appellant ordered them to bring out all their belongings
from their cell. While doing so, they were hit with whatever
object the former could get hold of.
Appellant proceeded to the comfort room and, as he
emerged therefrom, he saw the victim Alberto Pagtananan
also coming out. Appellant confronted the victim and asked
him where he came from. The victim answered that he had
just urinated. Apparently not believing him, appellant
accused the victim of “hiding” and “making a fool of him.”
The victim innocently replied “Hindi naman po.” Irritated
by the answer, appellant berated the victim and when the
latter looked at him, he asked, “Ba’t ang sama mong
tumingin?” The victim did not reply. Appellant punched the
victim in the stomach but still the latter said nothing.
_______________
4 Original Records, p. 105.

5 TSN, June 18, 1997.
6 TSN, June 24, 1997.
7 TSN, July 9, 1997.
8 TSN, July 31, 1997.
9 TSN, September 11, 1997.
10 TSN, July 10, 1997.
620

People vs. Brecinio
Appellant pulled out his .45 caliber pistol tucked on his
right waist and fired it twice in succession. The first shot
was directed upward; the second downward. The inmates
inside the cell were all cowering in fear and were huddled
together in one corner of the bed, covering their ears.
Witness Arbilo who was merely one-and-a-half meters in
front of the appellant then saw the latter aim his gun at
the victim and fire the third shot, hitting the victim in the
stomach. Seeing the victim lying prostrate on the ground,
the inmates lifted and laid him on the bed. At that
juncture, appellant, who was standing in front of the
inmates, reholstered his gun on his waist and ordered them
to get water for the victim. SPO1 Bayani Montessur then
arrived and ordered the victim to be brought to a nearby
hospital but the latter was declared dead on arrival.
Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. corroborated the testimony of
Robinson Arbilo. From a distance of only three meters
behind the appellant, he saw the latter fire the third shot
at the victim. He also declared that there was no truth to
the statement in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 30,
1996 that the appellant slipped on the floor, causing the
gun to fall and fire accidentally, hitting Pagtananan in the
stomach. SPO1 Montessur, a colleague of appellant,
prepared the said affidavit and, after getting his name and
address, forced him to sign it. He signed the affidavit out of
fear of the appellant who threatened to kill him if he did
not cooperate.
After his release from detention, Mapalad went to the
NBI and gave his statement on what actually transpired.
Dr. Levy Abad, municipal health officer of Pagsanjan,
Laguna, conducted the post-mortem examination on the
body of the victim. He found that the victim sustained one
gunshot wound in the stomach and that the cause of death
was shock and severe internal hemorrhage.
Atty. Rogelio G. Munar, Ballistician V and Chief of the
Firearm Investigation Division of the NBI, testified on
Report No. 411-10-796 submitted by his subordinate,
Ireneo Ordiano, who could not testify in court as he had
suffered a mild stroke and still encountered difficulty in
speaking. He testified on the result of the ballistics
examination which revealed that the slug recovered from
the body of the victim Alberto Pagtananan was a .45 caliber
copperjacketed bullet.
Elpidia P. Barcelona, the sister of the victim, testified on
the expenses incurred by their family as a result of her
brother’s death.
621
VOL. 425, MARCH 17, 2004 621
People vs. Brecinio
According to her, the family spent P25,000 for the funeral

services and food served during the wake, P10,000 for the
coffin and P50,000 for transportation expenses in going to
the NBI, plus other expenses.
Contrary to the prosecution’s version, appellant claimed
that the shooting was accidental. He declared that he had
just gone out of the comfort room and was about to tuck his
.45 caliber pistol in its holster on his waist when he slipped
on the wet floor, causing the gun to drop and fire. After
picking up the gun, Eric Garcia, an inmate, called his
attention to the fact that one of the inmates had been hit.
He immediately went to the detention cell and saw the
victim, Alberto Pagtananan, lying down with a wound in
his stomach. He called Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. and ordered
him to bring the victim to the hospital. He was not able to
go with the group as he was immediately placed under
arrest.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his pistol
was in good condition and was always loaded and cocked.
Appellant also testified that when his gun fired, it hit the
cement wall. Appellant further testified that, in order to
assuage the feelings of the victim’s relatives, his wife sent a
cavan of rice, coffee and sugar. They also tried to amicably
settle the case
11
with the family of the victim but were
turned down.
NBI forensic chemist Emilia Andro-Rosaldes was also
presented by the defense to testify on the result of the
paraffin examination conducted on the appellant on July 2,
1996, two days after the alleged shooting incident. She
testified that it was Mrs. Gemma Orbeta who made the
paraffin cast on the appellant and her only participation
was the examination of the paraffin cast taken from the
appellant. According to her, there are four factors that can
affect the presence of gun powder residue in the hands of a
person who fires a gun, namely, the length of the barrel of
the gun, the wind velocity, the direction of the shot(s) and
the type and caliber of ammunition. She also declared that
the application of paraffin wax to make the paraffin cast
can remove gunpowder residue. She did not know whether
paraffin wax had been applied on the 12hands of the
appellant before the paraffin cast was made.
_______________
11 TSN, February 24, 1998.

12 TSN, October 30, 1997.
622

People vs. Brecinio
The trial court, after weighing the evidence presented by

both sides, gave no credence to the version of the appellant.
On October 15, 1998, a decision was rendered, convicting
appellant of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion
read:
“WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING

CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds the accused SPO1
VIRGILIO BRECINIO y GASTON GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of MURDER, defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by the Death Penalty Law, but
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of the
deceased-victim ALBERTO PAGTANANAN the sum of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and the sum of P25,000.00
as expenses during the wake and to pay the costs of the instant
suit.
“The accused shall further suffer the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
“So ordered.”
Hence, this appeal. Appellant alleges that the trial court

erred in convicting him of murder and that, if an offense
was indeed committed, it was only reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
A careful evaluation of the records shows that the court
a quo was correct in finding appellant guilty of killing the
victim.
We reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that
the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage
of the trial judge (an opportunity not available to the
appellate court) in the appreciation of testimonial evidence.
The trial judge personally hears the witnesses and observes
their deportment and manner of testifying. Although the
rule admits of certain exceptions,
13
we find no reason to hold
otherwise in the present case.
As found by the trial court—and we agree—both
prosecution witnesses were credible. They gave a steadfast
and credible narration of what they witnessed in a manner
reflective of a candid and unrehearsed testimony. Robinson
Arbilo, who stood only one-and-a-half meters in front of the
assailant, was very direct, clear and
_______________
13 People vs. Moralde, 395 SCRA 286 (2003).
623
VOL. 425, MARCH 17, 2004 623

People vs. Brecinio
spontaneous in describing how the appellant shot the

victim. His testimony was:
TRIAL PROSECUTION:
Q What happened next when you heard that second shot?
A I saw that Brecinio poked his gun on Pagtananan and
fired it.
Q Tell us your relative position from Pagtananan when
you saw Brecinio poked his gun at him and fired?
A We were all seated on the bed, sir.
Q On your side, who is the person on your left side?
A Edwin Maceda, sir.
Q On your right side?
A Nobody because I was seated near the wall, sir.
Q Who was at the left side of Edwin Maceda?
A Sammy Bolanos, sir.
Q How about the person on the left side of Sammy
Bolanos?
A Alberto Pagtananan, sir.
Q And on the left side of Alberto Pagtananan?
A Rafael Morales, sir.
Q Were you able to actually see Brecinio poked (sic) a gun
where Pagtananan was sitting at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Tell us how you were able to see Brecinio poked (sic)
that particular gun to Pagtananan
A I was seated in a stooping position my hands in both
ears but I was looking at Brecinio, sir.
Q What happened next when you saw Brecinio poking a
gun at Pagtananan and according to you heard a gun
fire?
14
A Pagtananan sl[u]mped on the floor, sir.
Filomeno Mapalad, Jr., who was merely three meters

behind the appellant, also gave a positive, straightforward
and unequivocal account of what happened. The pertinent
portion of his testimony was:
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q And what happened next when Brecinio went outside
while Pagtananan went inside the comfort room?
_______________
14 TSN, June 18, 1997, pp. 11-12.
624

People vs. Brecinio
A Brecinio went out from the comfort room and proceeded

inside the cell.
Q And when he was already inside the cell what happened
next?
A It was on that occasion when Pagtananan went out
coming from the comfort room.
Q And what happened next after Pagtananan went
outside coming from the comfort room?
A Brecinio got mad at Pagtananan, sir.
Q How did you come to know that Brecinio got mad at
Pagtananan?
A Brecinio said the words, “Niloloko mo ba ako?”
Q And was there any reply from Pagtananan?
A No reply, sir.
Q And what happened when Pagtananan did not reply on
the comment of Brecinio?
A Brecinio pulled out a gun from his waist, sir.
Q And what did he do with that gun that he pulled from
his waist?
A He fired it, sir.
Q Towards what direction?
A Upward direction, sir.
Q And after firing that first shot towards that upward
direction, what else did he do?
A He fired again downwards, sir
Q To whom was that second shot aimed or pointed?
A Downwards direction, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How about the third shot?
A It was aimed at Pagtananan, sir?
Q And what is the position of Pagtananan at that time?
A He was just seated, sir.
Q How did you come to know that that third shot was
aimed and pointed to Pagtananan?
15
A I saw it, sir.
_______________
15 TSN, June 24, 1997, pp. 12-13.
625
VOL. 425, MARCH 17, 2004 625

People vs. Brecinio
The appellant, in an attempt to impugn the credibility of

prosecution witness Filomeno Mapalad, Jr., harps on the
latter’s recantation of his affidavit supporting the defense’s
“accident” theory.
We find that Mapalad’s recantation was satisfactorily
explained. He testified that he was threatened by the
appellant. As a detainee, he was completely vulnerable to
the threats of the appellant, a police officer and presumably
his jailer. He therefore signed the said affidavit (supporting
appellant’s “accident” version) as he was ordered to do.
However, immediately after his release from detention, he
went to the NBI and narrated what really transpired. He
stood firm in his testimony about the direct involvement of
the appellant.
In this connection, the defense never showed that
Mapalad was motivated by any ill-motive in implicating
the appellant in the crime. When there is no evidence of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to
testify falsely against an accused or implicate him in the
commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists
16
and the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.
Likewise, while the paraffin test was negative, such fact
alone did not ipso facto prove that the appellant was
innocent. Time and again, we have held that a negative
paraffin result is not conclusive proof that a person has not
fired a gun. Stated otherwise, it is possible to fire a gun and
yet be negative for nitrates, as when the culprit
17
is wearing
gloves or he washes his hands afterwards.
Since appellant submitted himself for paraffin testing only
twodays after the shooting, it was likely he had already
washed hishands thoroughly, thus removing all traces of
nitrates therefrom.
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of
treachery which qualified the offense to murder. For
treachery to be considered, the accused must have
deliberately and consciously adopted a means of execution
that rendered the person attacked
18
with no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate.
As described by the prosecution, the victim and his co-
detainees were inside the cell when appellant, who was
drunk, manhandled
_______________
16 People vs. Belaong, 389 SCRA 337 [2002].

17 People vs. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95, 122 [2000], citing People vs.
Pasiliao, 215 SCRA 163, 173 [1992].
18 People vs. Geguira, 328 SCRA 11, 34 [2000].
626

People vs. Brecinio
them and suddenly fired three successive shots. It was the

third shot that killed the victim. The testimonies of the two
eyewitnesses, co-inmates of the victim, showed that the
suddenness and mode of attack adopted by the appellant
placed not only the victim but also all of them in such a
situation where it was not possible for them to resist the
attack or defend themselves. Even frontal attack can be
treacherous when unexpected and the unarmed 19
victim is in
no position to repel the attack or avoid it.
However, this Court finds that the trial court erred in
considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
The fact that appellant did not resist arrest or deny his
criminal act did not constitute voluntary surrender. A
surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must
clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the appellant,
after shooting the victim, was immediately disarmed and
placed under arrest. There was, therefore no voluntary
surrender20 to speak of because the appellant was in fact
arrested.
We hold that the trial court did not err in convicting the
appellant of murder. The penalty therefor under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659
(The Heinous Crimes Law) is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed in accordance with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
We sustain the award by the trial court of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000, pursuant 21
to
prevailing jurisprudence and the policy of the Court. As to
actual damages, we have ruled that, when actual damages
supported by receipts amount 22to less than P25,000 (as in
this case where only P10,000 was duly receipted), the
award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu
of actual damages. Moral damages cannot be awarded
because no evidence, testimonial or 23otherwise, was
presented by the prosecution to support it.
_______________
19 People vs. Dimailig, 332 SCRA 340, 352 (2000).

20 People vs. Rebamontan, 305 SCRA 609, 623 (1999).
21 People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 139177, August 11, 2003.
22 Exhibit “K,” Rollo, p. 186.
23 People vs. Villanueva, supra.
627
VOL. 425, MARCH 17, 2004 627

People vs. Alicnas
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 15,

1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. SC-6476, finding SPO1
Virgilio G. Brecinio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity
and P25,000 as temperate damages to the heirs of Alberto
Pagtananan.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio-

Morales, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.—Where treachery was not alleged in the

information, it cannot be used to qualify the killing to
murder. (People vs. Toyco, Sr., 349 SCRA 385 [2001])
——o0o——

Sison vs. People
*
G.R. Nos. 108280-83. November 16, 1995.
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD

DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
*
G.R. Nos. 114931-33. November 16, 1995.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ANNIE FERRER, accused. ROMEO SISON, NILO
PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and
JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
Evidence; Witnesses; The fact that a witness was

argumentative and evasive is not enough reason to reject his
testimony if he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all
throughout his testimony.—The records show that Sumilang was
admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand
for being argumentative and evasive. This is
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
59
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 59
Sison vs. People
not enough reason to reject Sumilang’s testimony for he did not

exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On
the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial
court despite his evasiveness at some instances.
Same; Same; Except for compelling reasons, the Supreme
Court cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of
witnesses.—Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the
way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the
witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal
and non-verbal dimensions of a witness’ testimony.
Same; Same; The mistake of a witness in identifying another
person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness—an honest mistake is not inconsistent with
a truthful testimony.—Banculo’s mistake in identifying another
person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness. It does not make his whole testimony a
falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful
testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons
with imperfect senses. In the court’s discretion, therefore, the
testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but
disbelieved with respect to the others.
Same; Photographs; The rule in this jurisdiction is that
photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced.—The rule in this
jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,
must be identified by the photographer as to its production and
testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.
The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime.
Same; Same; The photographer is not the only witness who
can identify the pictures he has taken—they can also be identified
by any other competent witness who can testify to their exactness
and accuracy.—The photographer, however, is not the only
witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The
correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the
object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be
identi-
60
Sison vs. People
fied by the photographer or by any other competent witness who

can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
Same; Same; Even if the person who took the photographs was
not presented to identify them, the use of said photographs by some
of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime
is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.—The
objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not
presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-
participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and
accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence
thereat.
Same; Same; Even if the pictures did not record two of the
accused hitting the victim, they were unequivocally identified by
witnesses—their denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.—Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he,
although afflicted with hernia, is shown merely running after the
victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the
pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs
does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the
entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments
thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo
hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang
and Banculo. Appellants’ denials and alibis cannot overcome their
eyeball identification.
Criminal Law; Death in a Tumultuous Affray; Elements.—
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be
established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons
quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Tumultuous Affray”
Explained.—A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel
occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and
tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the
61
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 61
Sison vs. People
author thereof cannot be ascertained.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no confusion and
tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor is there a reciprocal aggression
where one distinct group picks on one defenseless individual and
attacks him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks
and blows on him.—The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be
called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police
dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while
later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as
loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on
him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray,
nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of Superior
Strength; The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on
a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.—As the lower
courts found, the victim’s assailants were numerous by as much
as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they
hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and
excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape
and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden
to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him
mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There
was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against
the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his
attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not
defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself.
Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued
beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for
mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost
unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior
strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person being attacked.—Treachery as a qualifying
circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is
no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and
consciously chosen to ensure the assailants’ safety from any
defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo
was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the
fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt
62
Sison vs. People
or because he allegedly flashed the “Laban” sign against the

rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court
well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the
rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was
overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of
the person being attacked.
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated where the attack against the
victim was sudden and spontaneous.—The qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the
information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against
Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging
animosity against the so-called “Coryistas.” It was not preceded
by cool thought and reflection.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; There is conspiracy where, at the
time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions
impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted
effort to bring about the death of the victim.—We find however the
existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of
purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death
of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing
as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. Each of the conspirators is liable
for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
Same; Same; Damages; The reckless disregard for a young
person’s life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three
small children warrant an increase in moral damages from
P30,000.00 to P100,000.00.—The trial court awarded the heirs of
Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the
time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years old
and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. The reckless disregard for such a young person’s life and
the anguish wrought on his widow and three small children,
warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded
for the death of the victim.
PETITION for review on certiorari and AUTOMATIC

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
63
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Sison vs. People

The Solicitor-General for respondents in G.R. Nos.
108280-83 and for plaintiff-appellee in G.R. Nos. 114931-
33.
M.M. Lazaro and Associates and Lazaro Law Firm
for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 108280-83 and for accused-
appellants in G.R. Nos. 114931-33.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political

polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
This was the time when the newly-installed government of
President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged
in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by “Marcos
loyalists,” supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups
sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted
in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known “Coryista.”
From August to October 1986, several informations were
filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos
loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo.
Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos
y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No.
86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe
and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790
against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case
No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and
Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y
Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007
and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega
as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to
the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued
accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses,
including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at
the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the
prosecution likewise presented documen-
64

Sison vs. People
tary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the

incident and various photographs taken during the
mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a
rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos
loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally
but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite
this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the
scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega,
both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited
prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar
Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western
Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their
permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist
leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty.
Lozano turned towards his group and said “Gulpihin ninyo
ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators.”Atty. Nuega added
“Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!”The police then pushed the
crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them.
The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought
back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd
fled towards1
Maria Orosa Street and the situation later
stabilized.
At about 4:00 P.M., a small group of loyalists converged
at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There,
they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and
supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
fountain. They approached her and informed her of their
dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them “Gulpihin
ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!”Then she continued jogging
around the fountain chanting “Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa
rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin
ang mga nakadilaw!”The loyalists replied “Bugbugin!”A
few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police.
Somebody then shouted “Kailangang gumanti tayo
ngayon!”A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a
cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in
yellow, the color of the “Coryistas.” Renato
________________
1 TSN of April 20, 1988, pp. 7-10.
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Sison vs. People
2
took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a
yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting
“Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!”The man in the yellow t-
shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos
loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and
mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the
group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him
with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his
body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the
Luneta, rush to Salcedo’s aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the
maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with
stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag
which Sumilang showed to Salcedo’s attackers. They
backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow
Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos
emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed
Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also
boxed Salcedo twice3 on the head and kicked him even as he
was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel4
Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.
Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo 5
on his nape,
shouting: “Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!” Sumilang tried to
pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again.
Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and
kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused
Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and6
when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him.
Sumilang saw accused Gerry 7
Neri approach the victim but
did not notice what he did.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his
attackers and wipe8 off the blood from his face. He sat on
some cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas
Boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar
_______________
2 TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 22-23.

3 Exhibits “NN” and “SS”; Records, pp. 295, 296-A.
4 Exhibit “LL”; Records, p. 298.
5 Exhibits “OO” and “PP”; Records, pp. 296-A, 297.
6 Exhibit “E”; Records, p. 254.
7 TSN of December 1, 1987, pp. 17-39.
8 Exhibit “QQ”; Records, p. 302.
66

Sison vs. People
pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo

pleaded for his life exclaiming “Maawa na kayo sa akin.
Tulungan
9
ninyo ako.”He cried: “Pulis, pulis. Wala bang
pulis?”
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and
continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed
and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and
with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So
they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he
died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.”
He sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated
wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following
post-mortem findings:
“Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.

Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal
region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0
cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose;
4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular
region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm.,
upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal
region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior
cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive. Other visceral organs,
congested.
Stomach,
10
about ½ filled with grayish brown food materials and
fluid.”
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and

several press people, both local and foreign. The press took
pictures and a video of the event which became front-page
news the following day, capturing national and
international atten-
________________
9 Exhibit “X-5”; Records, p. 329.

10 Exhibit “B”; Records, p. 249.
67
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 67

Sison vs. People
tion. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital

Regional Command and the Western Police District to
investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim,
then Police Chief, for persons who could 11
give information
leading to the arrest of the killers. Several persons,
including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo,
cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their
identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their
participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their
respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he
was not in12 any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution because
13
on July 27, 1986, he was in his house
in Quezon City. Gerry Nery claimed that14he was at the
Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. Romeo Sison,
a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near
the Luneta15 waiting for some pictures to be developed at
that time. He claimed to be afflicted with hernia
impairing his mobility;
16
he cannot run normally nor do
things forcefully. Richard de los Santos admits he was at
the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting
17
17
Salcedo. He said that he merely watched the mauling
which explains
18
why his face appeared in some of the
photographs. Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar
admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the
Ako’y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on
that fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being
mauled and
19
like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident. His face was in the pictures because he shouted
to the maulers to stop hitting
________________
11 Exhibit “4”; Records, p. 319.

12 TSN of September 26, 1988, pp. 5-6.
13 Id., p. 15.
14 Id., pp. 83, 90.
15 TSN of Oct. 3, 1988, pp. 33, 53.
16 Id., pp. 40, 47-48; Exhibit “2”; Records, p. 227.
17 TSN of November 9, 1988, p. 25.
18 Id., pp. 25-27.
19 TSN of November 14, 1988, pp. 5-7.
68

Sison vs. People
20
Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the
maulers because
21
he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however
ignored him.
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega
and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a
decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as
principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery
and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of
reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted
as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused
and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando
Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the

aforementioned cases as follows:
In ‘People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery.’ Criminal
1. Case No. 86-47322,the Court finds that the Prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits
them of said charge;
2. In ‘People versus Romeo Sison, et al.,’ Criminal Case No.
86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals for the crime of Murder, defined, in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes
on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal,
as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In ‘People versus Richard de los Santos,’ Criminal Case
No. 86-47790,the Court finds the Accused Richard de los
Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the
crime of Murder defined in
________________
20 Id.,pp. 7-8; Records, pp. 297, 299.

21 TSN of November 14, 1988, pp. 10-11.
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VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 69

Sison vs. People
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no

other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby
imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum,
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as
Maximum;
4. In ‘People versus Joselito Tamayo,’ Criminal Case No. 86-
48538,the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of ‘Murder’
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum,
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum;
5. In ‘People versus Rolando Fernandez,’ Criminal Case No.
86-48931,the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said
charge;
6. In ‘People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.,’ Criminal Case No.
86-49007,the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In ‘People versus Annie Ferrer,’ Criminal Case No. 86-
49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate
penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los

Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen
Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-
half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo
Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had
been under detention during the pendency of these cases shall be
credited to them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by
and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to
release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando
Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained for
another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has
become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused
Joel
70

Sison vs. People
Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused
22
Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled.”
23
23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1992,
modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie
Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused,
except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The
appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo
of homicide because the information against him did not
allege the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby

MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y

Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of
being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has

been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said cases are
now hereby
24
certified to the Honorable Supreme Court for
review.”
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was
not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33
was certi-
________________
22 Records, pp. 426-428; Decision, pp. 59-61.

23 CA-G.R. CR Nos. 10501-10502, 10130-10131.
24 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 114931-33, pp. 654-655; Decision, Court of Appeals,
pp. 48-49.
71
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 71

Sison vs. People
fied to us for automatic review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the
following errors:
“I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE
ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT
THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME
FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II

IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL,
SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE

ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE
ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT,
THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV

IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG
THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.

IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER
AND NOT25DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY.”
_______________
25 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 114931-33, pp. 15-16; Petition, pp. 5-6.
72
Sison vs. People
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
“I

IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, AND NON-SEQUITUR
CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE
VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

ADMITTING EXHIBITS “D,” “G,” “O,” “P,” “V,” TO “V-48,” T TO
“W-13,” ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III

IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE
CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV

IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER,
NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS26 THE FACTUAL GROUNDS
SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT.”
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in

sustaining the testimonies of the two prosecution
eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo,
because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve
any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these
two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after
a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo
even submitted three sworn statements to
_______________
26 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, p. 207; Additional Brief for Appellants, p.

2.
73
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 73
Sison vs. People
the police geared at providing a new or improved version of

the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly
identified a detention27
prisoner in another case as accused
Rolando Fernandez. Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and
unresponsive 28prompting the trial court to reprimand him
several times.
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified
because of the reward announced by General Lim, much
less that both or either of them ever received such reward
from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows
that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and
submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours
after the 29
mauling, even before announcement of any
reward. He informed the police that he would cooperate
with them
30
and identify Salcedo’s assailants if he saw them
again.
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements
does not make them and his testimony incredible. The
sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who
were apprehended
31
during the investigation of Salcedo’s
death.
The records show that Sumilang was admonished
several times by the trial court on32the witness stand for
being argumentative and evasive. This is not enough
reason to reject Sumilang’s testimony for he did not exhibit
this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On
the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by
the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances.
Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way
trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the
Witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the
verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness’ testimony.
_______________
27 TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 32-33.

28 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, pp. 44, 67, 77; Petition, pp. 34, 57, 67.
29 Exhibit “I,” Records, p. 258.
30 TSN of March 7, 1988, pp. 50-51, 77-78.
31 Exhibits “L,” “M,” and “N”; Records, pp. 262-265.
32 TSN of December 1, 1987, p. 70; TSN of March 14, 1988, pp. 9, 29-30.
74
Sison vs. People
Banculo’s mistake in identifying another person as one of

the accused
33
does not make him an entirely untrustworthy
witness.
It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An
honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful
testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from
persons with imperfect senses. In the court’s discretion,
therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed34 as to
some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others.
We sustain the appellate and trial court’s findings that
the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate each other on all
important and relevant details of the principal occurrence.
Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with each
other and their narration of the events are supported by
the medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim
had various wounds on his body which could have35been
inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. The
contusions and abrasions found could have been 36
caused by
punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. The fatal
injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures
in Salcedo’s skull which may have been caused by contact
with a hard and blunt object
37
such as fistblows, kicks and a
blunt wooden instrument.
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked
and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo 38was
pummelled by his assailants with stones in their hands.
Appellants also contend that although the appellate
court correctly disregarded Exhibits “D,” “G,” and “P,” it
erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits “O,” “V,”
“V-1” to “V-48,” “W,”
_______________
33 TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 32-33.

34 People v. Caneja, 235 SCRA 328 [1994]; Lagunsad v. Court of
Appeals, 229 SCRA 596 [1994]; People v. Dulay, 217 SCRA 103 [1993].
35 TSN of February 13, 1987, pp. 55-56.
36 Id., pp. 48-49.
37 Id., pp. 42-44.
38 Exhibit “I”; Records, p. 258.
75
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 75
Sison vs. People
39
“W-1” to “W-13.” Exhibit “O” is the Joint Affidavit of Pat.
Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence operatives
who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal
operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit “O” as his
sworn statement and40 in fact gave testimony corroborating
the contents thereof. Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely
reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to.
Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If
appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they
should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits “V,” “V-1” to “V-48” are photographs taken of
the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta—starting
from a grassy portion to the pavement 41
at the Rizal
Monument and along Roxas 42
Boulevard, —as he was being
chased by 43 his assailants and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. Exhibits “W,” “W-1” to “W-13” are photographs
of Salcedo and the mauling published in local 44
newspapers
and magazines
45
such as the Philippine Star, 46 Mr. and Ms.
Magazine,47
Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the
Malaya. The admissibility of these photographs is being
questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by
the person or persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when
presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified48 as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The value
of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the
________________
39 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, pp. 220-221; Additional Brief for

Appellants, pp. 15-16.
40 TSN of April 20, 1988, pp. 4-15; Exhibit “O”; Records, pp. 276-278.
41 Exhibits “V,” “V-1” to “V-23;” Records, pp. 292-301.
42 Exhibit “V-25”; Records, p. 302.
43 Exhibits “V-24,” “V-26,” and “V-28”; Records, pp. 302-304.
44 Exhibits “W” and “W-6”; Records, pp. 313 and 319.
45 Exhibit “W-2”; Records, pp. 314-315.
46 Exhibit “W-1”; Records, p. 316.
48 City of Manila v. Cabangis, 10 Phil. 151 [1908]; 4 Martin, Revised
Rules on Evidence, 61 [1989].
76
Sison vs. People
49
original, and its admissibility is determined by its 50
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
The photographer, however, is not the 51
only witness who
can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of
the photograph as a faithful representation of the object
portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after Which the court52 can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore,
can be identified by the photographer or by any other
competent53 witness who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy.
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the
photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through
counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected54 to their
admissibility for lack of proper identification. However,
when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove
Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry
Nery used Exhibits “V,” “V-1” to “V-48” to prove that his
clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore 55could
not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The
photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo
and accused Gerry Nery as part of the defense exhibits.
And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the
other accused per understanding with their respective
counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At
subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs
to cross-examine
56
all the accused who took the witness
stand. No objection was made by
________________
49 The Chamberlayne Trial Evidence, p. 617 cited in 4 Martin, supra;

Tan v. Sun Insurance, 51 Phil. 212 [1927].
50 1 Underhill, A Treatise on the Law on Criminal Evidence, 216-217
[1956].
51 Underhill, supra; VII Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, Part 1, 107 [1973].
52 Francisco, supra.
53 City of Manila v. Cabangis, supra; cf. Vda. de Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978].
54 TSN of July 29, 1988, p. 33.
55 TSN of September 26, 1988, pp. 2-3, 5-6.
56 Id.,pp. 114-123; TSN of November 9, 1988, pp. 42-50.
77
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 77

Sison vs. People
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro

appeared at the third hearing 57 and interposed a continuing
objection to their admissibility.
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the
photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who
took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule
that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to
show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an
admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the
photographs are faithful representations of the mauling
incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los
Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves58
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused’s
testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants,
namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
could be readily seen in various belligerent
59
poses lunging
or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Romeo
Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with 60
hernia, is shown merely running after the victim.
Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the
pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the
photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did
not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but
only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record
Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they 61
were unequivocally
identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants’ denials
and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding
the existence of conspiracy among the principal accused
and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength,
_________________
57 TSN of November 9, 1988, p. 35.

58 Id., pp. 38-50; TSN of November 14, 1988, pp. 6-10, 10-13.
59 Exhibits “V-1,” “V-2,” “V-8,” “V-9,” “V-12,” “V-13,” “V-15” to “V-18.”
61 Exhibits “E” and “L,” “K” and “F”; Records, pp. 254 and 262, 255 and
260; TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 25-26; TSN of December 1, 1987, pp. 23-26.
78
Sison vs. People
not death in tumultuous affray.

Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of
the Revised Penal Code as follows:
“Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray.—When, while

several persons, not composing groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be
identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical
injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those
who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.”
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1)

there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons
quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of
the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed
the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who
inflicted serious
62
physical injuries or who used violence can
be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs
between several persons and they engage in a confused and
tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is
killed or wounded
63
and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a
quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the
police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided
eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It
was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct
group identified as loyalists picked on one
_______________
62 II Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 436 [1993].

63 United States v. Tandoc, 40 Phil. 954, 957 [1920].
79
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 79

Sison vs. People
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking

turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There
was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor
was there64
a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the
incident.
As the lower courts found, the victim’s 65
assailants were
numerous by as much as fifty in number and were armed
with stones with which they hit the victim. They took
advantage of their superior strength and excessive force
and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free
himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to
the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him
mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground.
There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop
himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from
his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him
relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he
find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him
from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but
they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness.
The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be
appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof that the
attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen
to ensure the assailants’ safety from any defense the victim
could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden
and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact
that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he
allegedly flashed the “Laban” sign against the rallyists,
taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court
well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the
temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he,
unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the
slightest 66provocation on the part of the person being
attacked.
________________
64 People v. Ribadajo, 142 SCRA 637 [1986].

65 Exhibit “E,” Records, p. 253.
66 People v. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469 [1994]; People v. Buela, 227 SCRA
534 [1993]; People v. Alcantara, 206 SCRA 662 [1992].
80

Sison vs. People
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was

alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo.
Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case
because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and
spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the
so-called “Coryistas.” It was not preceded by cool thought
and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among
appellants. At the time they were committing the crime,
their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among
them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of
Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a
showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted 67
the
fatal wound is not required to sustain a convic-tion. Each
of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of68 their
participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00
as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time
he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years
old and was set to
69
leave on August 4, 1986 for employment
in Saudi Arabia. The reckless disregard for such a young
person’s life and the anguish
70
wrought on his widow and
three small children, warrant an increase in moral
damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of
P50,000.00
71
must also be awarded for the death of the
victim.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar,

Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
without any aggravating or
_______________
67 People v. Galit, 230 SCRA 486 [1994]; People v. Pandiano, 232 S CRA
619 [1994].
68 People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994]; People v. Labre, 239 SCRA
159 [1994]; People v. Magalang, 217 SCRA 571 [1993].
69 TSN of June 25, 1987, pp. 12-15.
70 TSN of June 25, 1987, pp. 10-13.
71 Civil Code, Article 2206; People v. Dasig, 221 SCRA 550 [1993].
81
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 81

Sison vs. People
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby

sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor
as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo
the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
4. Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Regalado and Mendoza,

JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., On leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Inconsistency regarding the identity of the

assailant is not just a lapse of memory on a trivial point
but a glaring inconsistency in a material factor which
affects the credibility of a witness. (People vs. Pidia, 249
SCRA 687 [1995])
——o0o——
82

VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 25
Jose vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000.
ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS

LINES (MCL), represented by its General Manager MR.
DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his
father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and
MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; It is well-settled that a question of

fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the
particular contention.—It is well-settled that a question of fact is
to be determined by the evidence offered to support the particular
contention. In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on
photographs, identified in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the
position of the two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand,
private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to
the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded
their lane.
Same; Same; Where the physical evidence on record ran
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
physical evidence should prevail.—The trial court was justified in
relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham’s
testimony which was obviously biased and unsupported by any
other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent
manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape
where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this
Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical
evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez, where
the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical
evidence should prevail.
Civil Law; Negligence; Before the presumption of the
employer’s negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be
established; Failure to prove the employee’s negligence during the
trial is fatal to proving the employer’s vicarious liability .—Before
the presumption of the em-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
26
ployer’s negligence in the selection and supervision of its

employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be
established. While the allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee’s
negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer’s
vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to prove
their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who,
in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising
from the same incident.

Court of Appeals.

Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for
petitioners.
Solgrandioso A. David, Jr. for the Macarubos.
Reynaldo T. Garcia for Rommel Abraham.
MENDOZA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
ordering petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons
and damage to property as a result of a vehicular accident.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL)
is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter
referred to as Bus 203) with plate number NVR-III-TB-PIL
and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the Metro
Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the
Government Service Insurance System.
________________
1 Per Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, concurred in by Justices

Oscar M. Herrera and Ruben T. Reyes.
27
VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 27

On February 22, 1985, at around six o’clock in the morning,

Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided
with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on
MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while
the Ford Escort was headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela
on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left
side of the Ford Escort’s hood was severely damaged while
its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private
respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. The
driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and
Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo
lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to
recover and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he
became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In
addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and
multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be
hospitalized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by
his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85
for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes
Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed
their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL
alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party
complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of
the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was
negligent and that he was the “authorized driver” of
Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim
for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. Civil
Case No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428V-86 were
consolidated and later tried jointly. The facts, as found by
the trial court, are as follows:
In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that
during the night previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at
6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party.
There was therefore, no sleep for them, notwithstanding
testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be
totally dis-
28

counted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John
were enroute home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the car
encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its
cross-joint was detached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor
and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to
early dawn and the car started to run only after five o’clock in the
morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a party still on their
bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until
the car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible
accident. The accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical
and mental condition of the driver John Macarubo was as
expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore
control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed
sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle.
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exhs. 1, 2 and 3)
will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not
in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo
was positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the
MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the
bus that was overtaking at the time, the car would have been
thrown farther away from the point of the impact.
The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of
MCL over their drivers, and its exercise of due diligence in seeing
to it that no recklessness is committed by its employees, drivers
especially, from the unrebutted testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles
especially the point of the impact. From these damages as shown
by the picture, it can be clearly deduced which vehicle did the
bumping. It was the car driven by John Macarubo
2
that hit the
MCL which was on its right and correct lane.
Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered

judgment on September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil
cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party
complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to
pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for
lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
________________
2 RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 32.
29
VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 29

Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party

defendant Juanita Macarubo then appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, on December 21, 1994, rendered a decision
reversing the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that the
trial court erred in disregarding Rommel Abraham’s
uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to the
fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred
in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which had been taken
an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the
positions of the vehicles could have been changed; (3) that
the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was
overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened
and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4)
that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its driver Armando Jose. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and

the defendants-appellees MCL and Armando Jose are adjudged to
pay jointly and severally:
1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto
Abraham:
(a) P37,576.47 as actual damages;

(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P15,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(e) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
2. The heirs of John Macarubo:
(a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;

(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Costs against the appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners

MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues which boil down
to the question whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that
of
30

the Ford Escort who was at fault for the collision of the two
vehicles.
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be
determined by the evidence
3
offered to support the
particular contention. In the proceedings below,
petitioners relied mainly on photographs, identified in
evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of the two
vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private
respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to
the effect that the4 collision took place because Bus 203
invaded their lane.
________________
3 See Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498 (1992).

4 Quoted below are pertinent portions of Rommel Abraham’s testimony
during direct examination:
ATTY. SINENENG:
Q —While you were at BBB, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in the morning of
February 22, 1985 at 6 o’clock, do you recall if there was anything
unusual that happen[ed]?
ROMMEL ABRAHAM:
A —Yes, we ha[d] an accident [with an] MCL bus, sir.
Q —Please tell the Court what was the accident?
A —We were bumped by the MCL bus which was overtaking a passenger
jeepney, sir.
Q —At that time that you were inside the car who was driving the car?
A —John Macarubo, sir.
Q —What happened when you were bumped by MCL bus?
A —We lost consciousness, sir.
Q —How did you know it was an MCL bus that bumped you?
A —Before we were bumped I was able to see the bus, sir.
Q —In what part of the car were you hit at the time you were bumped by
the MCL bus?
A —Right side beside the driver seat, sir.
Q —You mean at the front side?
A —Yes, sir.
Q —What part of your car was bumped by the MCL bus?
A —The front part of the car, sir.
31
VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 31

The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs

rather than on Rommel Abraham’s testimony which was
obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence.
Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation
of truth, 5and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where
the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this
Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon
physical 6evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v.
Vasquez, where the physical evidence on record ran
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses,
7
we ruled that the physical evidence should
prevail.
In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown
in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line
inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes
after the collision, disputes Abraham’s self-serving
testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203
invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that
the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed
happened. Contrary to Abraham’s testimony, the
photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203
________________
Q —Approximately how far was the car you were riding from the bus
when you first saw the bus coming?
A —About 3 meters, sir.
Q —And in what part of the street [was] your car travelling at that time?
A —Right lane, sir.
Q —Right lane of the street?
A —Yes, sir.
Q —How about the bus that bumped you where was it travelling?
A —Inside our lane, sir.
Q —You mean the bus is in your lane?
A —Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 5-7, March 31, 1987)
5 People v. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769 (1995).

6 280 SCRA 160 (1997).
7 Id., at 175.
32

was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort
which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three
photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on
the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203’s
lane. As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the
portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took
place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line
separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph
shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from
the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel
thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was
overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on
the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.
Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another
vehicle when 8
the collision happened. It was filled with
passengers, and it was considerably heavier and larger
than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking another vehicle,
it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its
speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its
momentum so that the impact of the collision would have
thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a
considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1,
however, shows that the Ford Escort’s smashed hood was
only about one or two meters from Bus 203’s damaged left
front. If there had been a great impact, such as would be
the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the
two vehicles should have ended up far from each other.
In discrediting the physical evidence, the appellate court
made the following observations:
We cannot believe that it was the car which overtook another

vehicle and proceeded to the lane occupied by the bus. There was
a traffic jam on the “bus lane” while traffic was light on the “car
lane.” Indeed, we find it inconceivable that the car, occupying the
lane without 9
any traffic, would overtake and traverse a heavy
traffic lane. (Italics supplied.)
________________
8 TSN of Constancia Gerolada, p. 13, Dec. 1, 1988.

9 CA Decision; Rollo, p. 39.
33
VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 33

This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the

Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on the
opposite lane occupied by Bus 203.
Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on
February 21, 1985, the night before the accident, he and
John Macarubo went to a friend’s
10
house in La Loma where
they stayed until 11 p.m. Abraham’s explanation as to
why they did not reach Valenzuela until six o’clock in the
morning of the next day when the accident happened
indicates that the Ford Escort careened and slammed
against Bus 20311
because of a mechanical defect. Abraham
told the court:
ATTY. RESPICIO:
Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnel’s place
where did you go?
ROMMEL ABRAHAM
A: We proceeded in going home, sir.
Q: You were on your way home?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You
met the accident at about 6:00 o’clock the next day, 6:00
o’clock in the morning the next day, did it take you long
to reach BBB?
A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd
Avenue, sir.
Q: What kind of trouble?
A: The cross-joint were detached, sir.
Q: Are you familiar with cars?
A: A little, sir.
COURT:
Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint
problem?
A: About 12:00 o’clock perhaps, sir.
________________
10 TSN, pp. 11-12, May 19, 1987.

11 Id., pp. 13-16 (Emphasis added).
34

Q: What happened to the cross joint?

A: It was cut, ma’am .
Q: You were able to repair that cross-joint 12:00 o’clock
and you were able to run and reached this place of
accident at 6:00 o’clock?
A: No, we we’re not able to get spare parts, ma’am .
Q: Why were you able to reach this place at 6:00 o’clock?
A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their
house, ma’am.
Q: House of Macarubo?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: So you were able to repair the car?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: What time were you able to repair the car?
A: Around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, sir.
Q: You were able to replace the cross-joint or what?
A: Ginawaan ng paraan, ma’am.
Q: How?
A: The cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go
home, ma’am.
Q: No spare parts was replaced?
A: No, ma’am.
Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford

Escort’s rear cross-joint was cut/detached. This mechanism
controls the movement of the rear tires. Since trouble in
the cross-joint affects a car’s maneuverability, the matter
should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem.
In this case, when asked if they were able to repair the
cross-joint, Abraham said “Ginawaan ng paraan, ma’am,”
by simply welding them just so they could reach home. His
testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily
repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs made
thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable
Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact,
the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not have
been overtaking another vehicle,
35
VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 35

it actually strayed into the bus’ lane because of the

defective cross-joint, causing its driver to lose control of the
vehicle.
The appellate court refused to give credence to the
physical evidence on the ground that the photographs were
taken an hour after the collision and that within such span
of time the bus could have been moved because there was
no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident.
This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203’s
conductress, testified that, immediately after the collision,
she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the
injured driver and 12
passenger of the Ford Escort to the
Fatima Hospital. This fact is not disputed by private
respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant’s brief in
the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the accident
allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows
Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort’s lane. However,
the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was
ever presented in evidence in the trial court or that
Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to
testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under
Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot
consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.
Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to
make a satisfactory showing that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the13
selection and supervision
of its bus driver, Armando Jose. Under the circumstances
of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is not required.
The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
________________
12 TSN, p. 7, Dec. 1, 1988.

13 CA Decision; Rollo, p. 41.
36

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable

not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
....
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
....
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the

presumption of negligence
14
of their employees. As held in
Poblete v. Fabros:
[I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually

formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed negligence,
in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior,
where the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to
be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the
last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides
that the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the
employers prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657; Balica vs.
Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co., 30 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited.
Therefore, before the presumption of the employer’s

negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be
established. While the allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict
under
________________
14 93 SCRA 200, 204 (1979).
37
VOL. 322, JANUARY 18, 2000 37

Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the

employee’s negligence during the trial is fatal to proving
the employer’s vicarious liability. In this case, private
respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence
against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in
the case15 for criminal negligence arising from the same
incident.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate
court erred in holding petitioners liable to private
respondents. The next question then is whether, as the
trial court held, private respondent Juanita Macarubo is
liable to petitioners.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons
specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others.
The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo
is one of those specified persons who are vicariously liable
for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.
In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita
Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car
and16that John Macarubo was the “authorized driver” of the
car. Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the
son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita
Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the
negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John
Macarubo was “the authorized driver” of the Ford Escort is
not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of
Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the
“authorized driver” of the car simply means that he drove
the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo.
Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita
Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she
is in any way liable for John Macarubo’s negligence under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its
burden, MCL’s third-party complaint should be dismissed.
________________
15 See MCL’s Comment to the Manifestation and Motion by the

Macarubos; Records, p. 273.
16 Records, p. 42.
38

People vs. Ong
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and the complaints filed in Civil Cases Nos.
2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86 against Manila Central Bus
Lines and Armando Jose, as well as the third-party
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita
Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De

Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, complaints and third-party

complaint dismissed.
Note.—The liability of the registered owner of a public

service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages
arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary,
direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver.
(Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
273 SCRA 562 [1997])
——o0o——

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VOL.

328, MARCH 27, 2000 749

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal

Ong Chia vs. Republic

Ong Chia vs. Republic

satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement,

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1 Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C.

752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the

3 TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Emphasis added)

VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 753

(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable

4 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.

754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,

VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 755

agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia’s alleged annual income in 1961 of

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED

756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT

Petitioner’s principal contention is that the appellate court

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of

12 Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.

VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 757

and convenient course of action considering that decisions

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is

14 Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).

758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

18 Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that

VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 759

suppression of information regarding any possible

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—A former citizen who opts to reacquire

21 Watt v. Republic, supra.

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

zenship is promulgated, the applicant has complied with

© Copyright 2022 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Miranda Rights; Rights of Suspects; Bantay Bayan; Words

VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 549

therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 551

“That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening,