Rule 128 – General Provisions

Ong Chia vs. Republic

G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000

Facts: Ong Chia to was born on January 1, 1923 in China. In 1932, as a 9-year old boy, he arrived at the
port of Manila on board the vessel ―Angking.‖ Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children.
On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA 473
(Revised Naturalization Law). The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the OSG, appealed contending that Ong: (1) failed to state all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence; (3)
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Annexed
to the State‘s appellant‘s brief were various pieces of documentary evidence. The CA reversed the trial
court and denied Ong‘s application for naturalization. Hence, this petition.

Ong‘s principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant‘s brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal
of the trial court‘s-decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
―scraps of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,‖ so it was argued, because under Rule 132, Sec. 34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Issue: Whether or not the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant‘s
brief, not having been presented and formally offered as evidence are devoid of any evidentiary value?

Held: No. Ong failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that ―these rules shall not
apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.‖

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence now being invoked by Ong is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is ―practicable and convenient.‖ That is
not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal,
in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.

1|Evidence
 Zulueta vs. CA
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Dr. Martin‘s secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband‘s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin‘s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed
against her husband. Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta. The trial court rendered judgment for Dr. Martin, declaring him ―the
capital/exclusive owner of the subject properties and ordered Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin. A WPI earlier issued was made final and Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from ―using or submitting/admitting as evidence‖ the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the CA affirmed said decision. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the subject documents are admissible in evidence.

Held: No. The constitutional injunction declaring ―the privacy of communication and correspondence to
be inviolable‖ is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband‘s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a ―lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.‖ Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible ―for any purpose in any proceeding.‖

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.

2|Evidence
 People vs. Yatar
G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004

Facts: Joel Yatar alias ―Kawit‖ was charged with Rape with Homicide committed upon the person of 17-
year-old Kathylyn Uba. DNA tests were conducted, and based on which DNA evidence was produced.

Issue (1): Whether or not the DNA evidence should not be admitted as the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution?

Held: No. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The
right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence. Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It
must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted
in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Issue (2): Whether or not the DNA tests conducted are unconstitutional on the ground that resort
thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law?

Held: No. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-
post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.

3|Evidence
 Tating vs. Marcella
G.R. No. 155208, March 27, 2007

Facts: In 1969, Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating sold the a lot located in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental to
her granddaughter, Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the
real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land
remained in possession of Daniela. In, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to
transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging
the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered
that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena
cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died in 1988 leaving her children as her
heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented
by Nena. Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she
executed in 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful
shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicably proved futile.

The private respondents Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
RTC against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her
favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration
in favor of the heirs of Daniela. The RTC and the CA, giving weight on Daniela‘s sworn statement, ruled
in favor of the private respondents declaring the document of sale executed between Daniela and Nena
as null and void.

Issue: Whether or not Daniela‘s sworn statement should be given probative value?

Held: No. The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility
of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant‘s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.

Here, the Court finds that both the RTC and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead,
the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela‘s sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale between her and Nena was simulated and that, as a consequence, a
trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale
in favor of Nena. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the defendant. Aside from Daniela‘s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other
documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish
that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with Nena.

4|Evidence
 People vs. Salafranca
G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012

Facts: Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny
Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the RTC. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed
by the CA. Salafranca has come to the SC on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who had incriminated him, one of which was Rodolfo Estaño, the uncle of the victim. It
appears from the testimony of Estaño that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to
seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his
nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked
Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had been Salafranca; that
at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estaño to
advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of
the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead.

Issue: Whether or not the ante-mortem declaration of Bolonan is admissible in evidence.

Held: Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the
conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a
dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both. The Court notes Estaño‘s testimony on the
utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing
incident. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of
the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before
his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of
the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: ( a) that the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant‘s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; ( c) that the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder,
or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño,
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a
few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample
authority for the view that the declarant‘s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarant‘s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent
to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in
this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he
gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his
stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and
thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

5|Evidence
 SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. CA
G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001

Facts: SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House, Inc., (SIHI). To secure the payment of the
loan, Arrieta and Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly
and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured.
SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment
was made. SIHI filed a case for a sum of money against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the RTC. In its
answer, SCC asserted SIHI‘s lack of cause of action. SSC contended that the promissory note upon which
SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of
consideration. The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an
effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached. The case then proceeded to trial on the
sole issue of whether or not SCC, Arrieta, and Halili were liable to SIHI and to what extent was the
liability. SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice.
SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI
and the case was deemed submitted for decision. The RTC promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. On
appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from. Hence, this petition.

SSC contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose
competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified
to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Secs. 36 and 48, Rule 130 and it
was manifest error for the CA to have ruled otherwise.

Issue: Whether or not testimonies of SIHI‘s witnesses are hearsay and should not be admitted?

Held: No. SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and
counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, SSC was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness
offered by SIHI to prove its case. SSC now charges the CA with committing an error of law when it failed
to disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the ―hearsay rule‖ contained in Sec.
36, Rule 130. SSC‘s reliance on Sec. 36, Rule 130 is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded
and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in
the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-
examine may be waived.

The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. SSC was
afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party‘s witness. SSC
repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the CA when
it sustained the trial court‘s finding that SSC had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party‘s
witness. It is now too late for SSC to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence. Nor was the assailed
testimony hearsay. The witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew
of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Sec. 36, Rule 130 as to the admissibility of his
testimony were satisfied.

6|Evidence
Rule 129 – What Need Not Be Proved

LBP vs. Banal

G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004

Facts: Sps. Vicente and Leonidas Banal are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural
land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares
was compulsorily acquired by the DAR pursuant to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988), as amended. In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR A.O. No. 6, s. 1992, as amended
by DAR A.O. No. 11, s. 1994, Landbank, made a valuation of the property in the total amount of
P173,918.55. Sps. Banal rejected the said valuation. Thus, pursuant to Sec. 16(d) of RA 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the PARAD to determine the
valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank‘s valuation.
Sps. Banal then filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation. Impleaded as
respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. On the same day after the scheduled pre-trial, the court
issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In its Decision, the trial court computed the just compensation for a total of P703,137,
which is beyond the spouses valuation of P623,000. In determining the valuation of the land, the trial
court based the same on the facts established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No.
6679, ―Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.‖). On appeal, the trial court‘s decision was affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC properly took judicial notice of the average production figures in the case
pending before it and applied the same to this case?

Held: No. The RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents‘ property is P703,137.00, merely
took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied
the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the
parties. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge. They may only do so ―in the absence of objection‖ and ―with the knowledge of the
opposing party,‖ which are not obtaining here.

Furthermore, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Sec. 3, Rule 129 is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a
certain matter, thus: ―Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.‖ The RTC failed to observe these provisions.

7|Evidence
 People vs. Kulais
G.R. Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998

Facts: Five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and three Informations for kidnapping were filed
before the RTC against Jailon Kulais eleven others. The trial court found Kulais guilty of five counts of
kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer. It also found him guilty
of two counts of slight illegal detention. Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial
court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was
the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was
allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano,
he contends that the latter‘s testimony should not be used against him.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt.
Feliciano?

Held: No. True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard
and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the
accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

Having said that, the Court notes, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lt. Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against Kulais. Hence,
Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made
by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by Kulais‘ counsel. At best, then,
the trial court‘s mention of Lt. Feliciano‘s testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the
outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Kulais.

8|Evidence
 Laureano vs. CA
G.R. No. 114776, February 2, 2000

Facts: Menandro Laureano, then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL) through its Area Manager in Manila. SAL wrote to
Laureano, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two
years. Laureano accepted the offer and commenced working. After passing the 6-month probation
period, Laureano‘s appointment was confirmed. Later, SAL offered Laureano an extension of his 2-year
contract to 5 years, which the latter accepted. During his service, Laureano committed several infractions,
for which he was later on cleared after undergoing training courses. Later on, SAL, hit by a recession,
initiated costcutting measures. Seventeen expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of
SAL‘s requirement. Consequently, SAL informed its expatriate pilots including Laureano of the situation
and advised them to take advance leaves. Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, SAL
decided to terminate its excess personnel. It did not, however, immediately terminate it‘s A-300 pilots. It
reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots
reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, Laureano was not one of the twelve. Hence,
Laureano‘s employment was terminated.

Laureano instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the LA. SAL moved to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, Laureano filed the
instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services. Again, SAL filed a motion to
dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and
(2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. SAL contends that the complaint is
for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment
―thus it is the LA and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction‖ and that, since Laureano was employed in
Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
SAL postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. The court a
quo denied SAL‘s motion to dismiss, and later ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL timely appealed before the
CA and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages. The CA set aside
the decision of the trial court, and ruled that the action for damages due to illegal termination has already
prescribed.

Issue: Which between Philippine law or Singapore law should be applied?

Held: Philippine law. The Court will determine whether the termination of Laureano, is legal under the
Philippine Laws because of SAL‘s failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case.
The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL that claims the applicability
of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. SAL has failed to do so. Therefore, the
Philippine law should be applied. The CA acquired jurisdiction when SAL filed its appeal before said court.
On this matter, the CA was correct when it barred SAL below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.

9|Evidence
 Maquiling vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013

Facts: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under RA
9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2008. On the same day an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. In 2009 Arnado
again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the
2010 elections.

Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy. Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration indicating
the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado‘s US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating
that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009. Balua likewise
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel
Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010.

In the meantime, the day of the election came and Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and
was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Casan
Macode Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case.

When the matter was brought before the SC, Arnado was declared as disqualified to run. With Arnado‘s
disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates. In this MR of said Decision, Arnado cites Sec. 349 of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he
was divested of his American citizenship.

Issue: Whether or not the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States should be applied?

Held: No. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be ―evidenced by an official publication thereof.‖ Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Sec. 40(d) of the LGC calls for application in
the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not
only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law
and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado‘s disqualification to run for any local
elective position.

10 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Baharan
G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

Facts: On the evening of February 14, 2005, while an RRCG bus was plying its usual route, the bus
conductor (Elmer Andales) noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the
bus, so Andales obliged and let them in. Andales immediately became wary of the two men because of
their suspicious acts. Later, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. The bus driver gave in and
allowed them to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After
a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or
looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating
the whole incident.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Angelo Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine‘s Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Gamal Baharan likewise admitted his
role in the bombing incident. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and
confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali (later discharged as state witness), and Rohmat were arrested,
while the other accused remain at-large. On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge, Asali pled guilty. Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty
to both charges. In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their ―not guilty‖ pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder,
considering that they pled ―guilty‖ to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. They manifested their readiness for re-arraignment, then pled guilty to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder. They were convicted of the crimes charged.

Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had
changed their plea from ―not guilty‖ to ―guilty.‖

Issue: Whether or not the case should be remanded due to the insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea?

Held: No. Prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions
of guilt—one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both
accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the ―searching inquiry‖ in
this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused‘s plea of guilt was
not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.

11 | E v i d e n c e
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011

Facts: The Republic, through the PCGG, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 0009) against the
respondents (the Marcoses, et al.) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages before the Sandiganbayan. The Republic alleged that the respondents illegally manipulated the
purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for
themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents
Sps. Marcos. Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa, son of
the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.
0009. Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130. The
present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

In that case, in the PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors
was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein
another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were
elected. Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
TRO/WPI with the SB (Civil Case No.0130), seeking to nullify the Orders of the PCGG, directing Africa
―to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on
the sequestered shares in the special stockholders‘ meeting, from representing himself as a director,
officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating in the management of ETPI.‖

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the SB, alleging that since the
PCGG had been ―illegally ‗exercising‘ the rights of stockholders of ETPI,‖ especially in the election of the
members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the ―calling and holding
of ETPI annual stockholders meeting under the court‘s control and supervision and prescribed
guidelines.‖ The SB favored Africa‘s motion.

The PCGG assailed this resolution before the SC via a petition for certiorari (PCGG‘s petition). The SC
enjoined the SB from implementing its assailed resolution. In the meantime, the SB ordered the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as
the main case and the former merely an incident.

During the pendency of PCGG‘s petition, the PCGG filed a ―Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold
Special Stockholders‘ Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing ETPI‘s Authorized Capital Stock‖ ( Urgent
Petition). The SB included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130. In the proceedings to
resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of
ETPI) was taken—at the petitioner‘s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the
respondents—by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) in London, England so as to
prove the ownership issue in favor of the Republic and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for
sequestration of ETPI‘s Class A stock in support of the Urgent Petition.‖ The notice also states that the
Republic shall use the Bane deposition ―in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009.‖ On the
scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.

Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March
17, 1997 that the first pretrial conference was scheduled and concluded. At the trial of Civil Case No.
0009, the Republic filed a Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition, which the SB denied for the reason
that said deponent is not available for crosse-xamination by the respondents. Later, the
Republic filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice. The Republic asserts that Civil Case
No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a
―child‖ of the ―parent‖ case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted
in any of the ―children‖ cases should be considered as evidence in the ―parent‖ case.

Issue: Whether or not the Bane deposition (taken in Civil Case No. 0130) should be taken judicial notice
of or admitted as part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009?

Held: No. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a
court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on
convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily
capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial
notice, inter alia, of ―the official acts of the… judicial departments of the Philippines,‖ or gives the court

12 | E v i d e n c e
the discretion to take judicial notice of matters ―ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.‖ On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and
the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter
involved.

Here, after the Republic filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were
also heard through their corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.
This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives at the court‘s direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice;
neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather,
the Republic approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating
whatever evidence offered in any of the ―children‖ cases—Civil Case 0130—as evidence in the ―parent‖
case—Civil Case 0009—or ―of the whole family of cases.‖ To the Republic, the supposed relationship of
these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.

The Court strongly disagrees. First, the supporting cases the Republic cited are inapplicable either
because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the
courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the Republic‘s
proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the
present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If
we follow the logic of the Republic‘s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by
indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent
and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the
Republic, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the
relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.

13 | E v i d e n c e
 Ligtas vs. People
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

Facts: Monico Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft. According to the prosecution witnesses,
Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation in Southern Leyte. Efren Cabero, the plantation‘s
administrator, and several men, including Modesto Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon
Pacate‘s instructions. Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the
plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by 3 unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would
be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Pacate and the
police. Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the condition of the
plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca were harvested by Ligtas. Ligtas and Pacate confronted
each other before the Sogod Police Station. Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he
was the plantation owner. According to Ligtas, he is a tenant of Pacate and her late husband.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the DARAB. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the
Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. While records are bereft as to when the
DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the
DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and CA and without any objection on
the part of the People of the Philippines. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the
elements of theft. Ligtas‘ defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor
was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Pacate duly corroborated by any witness. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision. It declared that Ligtas‘ reliance on the DARAB Decision ―declaring him as a
bona fide tenant of the land is irrelevant in the case at bar.‖

Issue: Whether or not the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by Pacate, is
conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft?

Held: It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or
even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge. The DARAB‘s findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant are
immaterial to the criminal case for theft. The records are bereft as to whether private complainant
appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality. It is
also established that private complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings.
Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. The Court
cannot collaterally review the DARAB‘s findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that
tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.

14 | E v i d e n c e
Rule 130 – Rules of Admissibility

Salas vs. Matusalem

G.R. No. 185734, July 3, 2013

Facts: Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas. Annabelle
claimed that Narciso is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. Narciso, already 56 years old at the
time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Narciso
rented an apartment where Annabelle stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child,
including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when Annabelle refused the
offer of Narciso‘s family to take the child from her, Narciso abandoned Annabelle and her child and left
them to the mercy of relatives and friends.

Narciso in his answer described Annabelle as a woman of loose morals. Annabelle introduced herself to
Narciso whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant. Narciso denied paternity of the child
Christian; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the
expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent‘s chicanery and deceit designed to
―scandalize‖ him in exchange for financial favor. At the trial, Annabelle and her witness Grace Murillo (the
owner of the apartment unit Narciso rented) testified. Annabelle also presented several pieces of
evidence, e.g., Certificate of Live Birth, Baptismal Certificate, pictures, Statement of Account, and
handwritten notes.

Issue: Whether or not Annabelle‘s pieces of evidence sufficiently proved that her son is the illegitimate
child of Narciso?

Held: No. A Certificate of Live Birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate
be taken as recognition in a public instrument nor does it have probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian also indicating Narciso as the father, while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child‘s paternity.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity. Exhibits showing Narciso and Annabelle inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where Annabelle
herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that Narciso is the father of her child
notwithstanding Narciso‘s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondent‘s child as an act of charity. As to the handwritten notes of Narciso and Annabelle showing
their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian‘s filiation to Narciso as they were not signed by Narciso and contained no statement of
admission by Narciso that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do
not qualify under Art. 172(2) vis-à-vis Art. 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

The testimonies of Annabelle and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian, Narciso‘s
financial support while Annabelle lived in Murillo‘s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said
apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate as ―overwhelming evidence, documentary
and testimonial.‖ A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.

15 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Mercury Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 212171, September 7, 2016

Facts: Mercury Dela Cruz alias ―Deday‖ was found by the RTC guilty of illegal sale of shabu under Sec. 5,
Art. II of RA 9165. The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of SPO2 Alejandro Batobalanos, PO1
Angsgar Babyboy Reales, and PO1 Leopoldo Bullido who conducted the buy-bust operation against the
Deday, and rejected the self-serving defenses of denial and alibi of Deday and her live-in partner. The
RTC noted that the categorical affirmation of Deday and her live-in partner that the arresting officers did
not demand anything from them in exchange for the Deday‘s liberty created the presumption that the
arresting officers were performing their official functions regularly. On intermediate appellate review, the
CA affirmed in toto the RTC‘s ruling. The CA agreed with the RTC in giving weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, and held that the arresting officers complied with the proper procedure in the
custody and disposition of the seized drugs. Hence, this appeal. Deday contends that the drugs were
marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at the police station and that there was no
physical inventory made on the seized item nor was it photographed, we find the same untenable.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution had established the unbroken chain of custody over the seized
drugs?

Held: Yes. The alleged non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution‘s case
because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs. Sec. 21(a), Art. II of the IRR of RA 9165, outlined the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of the seized dangerous drugs: ―The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.‖

The last part of the aforequoted issuance provided the exception to the strict compliance with the
requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of
custody in the handling of evidence, ―substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling
of the seized item‖ is sufficient. Even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
requirements under Sec. 21, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized
inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present
through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized
from the accused by the arresting officers; turned over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the
laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For
as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural
requirements provided for in Sec. 21 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected.

Here, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was satisfactorily
explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a commotion erupted when Deday resisted
and shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion eventually gave Deday the
opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting officers further alleged that the people who gathered
around them were already aggressive prompting them to decide to immediately proceed to the police
station for their safety.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Deday bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their
duties. Deday in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact,
Deday did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her
defense on denial and alibi.

16 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Manuel Dela Rosa
G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017

Facts: In an Information, Manuel dela Rosa was charged with the crime of illegal sale of marijuana. The
prosecution presented IO1 Briguel, PCI Alviar and IO1 Echavaria as its witnesses. A confidential informant
reported to PCI Ojastro of the PDEA IV-B Office located at Filipiniana Complex, Calapan City, that Manuel
Dela Rosa was selling marijuana at White Beach, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. On the planned buy-
bust operation, IO1 Briguel was designated as poseur-buyer. IO1 Jabano and IO1 Echavaria were
assigned as arresting officers. The team left for Puerto Galera at around 1:00 AM of March 29, 2009. IO1
Briguel, however, testified that they arrived at Puerto Galera on March 30, 2009. At about 3:00 PM of
that day, IO1 Briguel and the informant proceeded to the Island Tattoo shop while the other operatives
positioned themselves in the area.

Arriving thereat, the informant introduced IO1 Briguel to Dela Rosa. IO1 Briguel asked Dela Rosa, a
tattoo artist, to put a henna tattoo on his right shoulder. As Dela Rosa was doing the tattoo, IO1 Briguel
asked him: ―Manny, pwede bang umiskor?‖ to which he replied: ―Meron.‖ IO1 Briguel told Dela Rosa that
he was going to buy P300 worth of drugs, and handed the marked money to Dela Rosa, who, in turn,
handed to IO1 Briguel folded dried banana leaves containing suspected dried marijuana leaves. Thus,
IO1 Briguel made the prearranged signal. Immediately, IO1 Jabano and IO1 Echavaria arrived and
arrested Dela Rosa. IO1 Briguel frisked him and the marked money was recovered from him.

Subsequently, Dela Rosa was boarded into the service vehicle of the PDEA to avoid any commotion.
While inside the vehicle, IO1 Briguel marked the seized marijuana with his initials and the date of the
arrest. He then testified that he placed the suspect dried marijuana leaves in his pocket. The team then
proceeded back to the PDEA IV-B Office at Calapan City, which was 54km away from Puerto Galera.
There, IO1 Briguel conducted the Inventory, which was witnessed by Brgy. Captain Vergara and media
representative Nebrejo. Photographs were likewise taken during the marking and inventory. IOI Briguel
then brought the suspected marijuana and the Request for Laboratory Examination to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Regional Office in Calapan City for forensic examination. Based on the Chemistry Report
prepared by PCI Alviar, the specimen weighed 0.682 gram and it tested positive for marijuana.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found Dela Rosa guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or not the apprehending team complied with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR?

Held: No. [Summary: There are several errors in the prosecution of the case. There were inconsistent
dates on the conduct of the alleged buy-bust operation because of the conflicting statements and
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses. Likewise, the requirement under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not
complied with because a representative of the DOJ was not present at the time of the inventory of the
seized item. Further, the inventory was done 54km away from the place of seizure. No justifiable reason
was provided for the noncompliance with Sec. 21. The apprehending officers also failed to properly
safekeep the seized item because they did not place it in a secured container. Finally, the forensic
chemist did not give a consistent statement as to who received the seized item and that the crime
laboratory‘s arrangement made it possible for other personnel to contaminate the evidence. Accordingly,
the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were
preserved.]

The identity of the dangerous drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of sale are present, the fact that the dangerous drug illegally sold is the same drug offered in
court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain
a guilty verdict. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation
in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.

In the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, the apprehending team is now required to conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the presence of the accused
or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official, and (3) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. Here, as the alleged crime was committed on March 29, 2009, then the
provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR shall apply.

17 | E v i d e n c e
The apprehending team did not comply with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR. The records of the
case show that the physical inventory of the confiscated drug and the photographs of the same where
only done in the presence of Dela Rosa, Brgy. Captain Vergara and media representative Nebrejo.
Clearly, a representative of the DOJ, as required, was not present during the inventory of the seized item.
More importantly, the apprehending team did not immediately conduct the physical inventory and the
taking of the photographs at the time the suspected drug was confiscated or at the nearest police
station. Instead, they travelled 54km from Puerto Galera, the place of the seizure, to Calapan City before
they conducted the inventory of the seized drug.

The prosecution failed to provide a justifiable ground for the noncompliance of Sec. 21 of RA
9165. As a rule, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under Sec. 21 is required because of
the illegal drug‘s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise. The exception found in the IRR of
RA 9165 comes into play when strict compliance with the prescribed procedures are not observed. This
saving clause, however, applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses,
and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears
the burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug
that was confiscated from the accused during his arrest.

Here, the prosecution failed to recognize its procedural lapses and give a justifiable ground for the non-
compliance with Sec. 21. Particularly, they were not able to explain the absence of a representative of
the DOJ and the distant conduct of the inventory of the seized item. As can be gleaned from the
witnesses‘ testimony, the excuses they proffered to justify the distant conduct of the inventory 54km
away from the place of seizure, are: (1) it was the team leader‘s discretion to conduct the inventory in
Calapan City; (2) to avoid commotion at the place of seizure; and (3) they could not secure the witnesses
required by law in the said place. These excuses are unmeritorious.

First, Sec. 21 of the IRR is clear that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place of the seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team.
Here, the apprehending team did not even bother to look for the nearest police station at the place of
seizure to conduct the inventory. Instead, they leisurely took their time and travelled 54km away from
the said place to secure an inventory of the seized item.

Second, there is no need to travel 54km away from Puerto Galera simply to avoid a commotion. The
apprehending team had 8 hours to prepare before the operation was conducted and they could have
easily identified the nearest police station in Puerto Galera for the inventory of the seized item. Certainly,
the PDEA office in Calapan City is not the nearest police station in Puerto Galera.

Third, even when they travelled 54km to their office, they still failed to complete all the witnesses needed
during the inventory. It was impractical for the media representative, DOJ representative and the elected
official to travel from Puerto Galera all the way to Calapan City to simply witness the inventory. Indeed,
the inventory could have been done at the nearest police station in Puerto Galera and the required
witnesses could have conveniently attended thereat.

The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item
was preserved. In the first link of the chain of custody, the apprehending officer acquires possession of
the suspected drug from the offender at the time of the arrest. The apprehending officer is required to
mark the seized items—to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence—and it should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. Here, the marking was not done at the place of the
seizure; rather it was done at the vehicle. While there may be exceptions to the immediate marking of
the seized item, even a less stringent application of the requirement would not suffice in sustaining a
conviction in this case.

Aside from marking, the seized items should be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type
and quantity of these items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or
container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the
chain of custody. The purpose of placing the seized item in an envelope or an evidence bag is to ensure
that the item is secured from tampering, especially when the seized item is susceptible to alteration or
damage. Here, the seized marijuana was simply wrapped in a dried banana leaf; while the marking was
merely written on a strip of paper that was attached to the seized item. Evidently, the confiscated
marijuana was not placed in a secured container. From IO1 Briguel‘s testimony, it can be observed that

18 | E v i d e n c e
when he seized the marijuana wrapped in dried banana leaves, he simply placed the said item inside his
pocket without securing it in a sealed container. Evidently, due to the poor packaging of the item, it is
susceptible to tampering or alteration.

Further, there are also irregularities in the third link of the chain of custody. In the said link, there must
be a delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs
arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of
the substance. Here, while IO1 Briguel claims that he delivered the confiscated item to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Calapan City, it was not clear who received the confiscated drug thereat.

Likewise, the arrangement of the PNP Crime Laboratory therein is problematic based on the testimony of
PCI Alviar. PCI Alviar admitted that the room where the drugs are inspected had a double deck bed
where the personnel and the policemen would sleep when there is a police operation. These persons can
enter the forensic room and there is a possibility they could contaminate the evidence. Surely, the
reliability of the seized drugs cannot be preserved when there are various persons in the forensic room
who are not even connected with the crime laboratory. The testimony of PCI Alviar falls short of the
requirement that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug must be preserved.

19 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Sanchez
G.R. No. 231383, March 7, 2018

Facts: Two Informations were filed before the RTC charging Joey Sanchez with the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The prosecution alleged that, with the help of a confidential
informant, the members of the PDEA and the PNP organized a buy-bust operation against a certain alias
―Totoy‖ (Sanchez), who was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade at the Bacnotan Public Market, La
Union. PDEA IO1 Raymund Tabuyo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust team proceeded
to the target area. Thereat, IO1 Tabuyo was able to meet Sanchez, who, after receiving the marked
money, handed over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the former.
After IO1 Tabuyo examined the contents of the plastic sachet, he executed the prearranged signal, thus
prompting the other members of the buy-bust team to rush to the scene and arrest Sanchez. The buy-
bust team searched Sanchez and found two other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline
substance. The buy-bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before
proceeding to their office for documentation purposes. Thereat, the team was met with representatives
from the DOJ and the media, both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory. The seized plastic sachets
were then taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed that their contents are indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

For his part, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and offered his version of what
transpired on the day he was arrested. He narrated that he was in front of the public market collecting
bets for jueteng, when two men unknown to him suddenly approached him and gave their numbers; and
that when they were about to pay, they handcuffed and arrested him for allegedly selling drugs. Sanchez
then insisted that when he was frisked, the men were only able to find money from the bets he collected
and that they only made it appear that they recovered sachets containing shabu from him.

The RTC found Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC found that the
buy-bust team validly arrested Sanchez who was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the poseur-
buyer; and that after his arrest, the arresting officers discovered two more sachets, also containing
shabu, from his pocket. Further, the RTC found that the arresting officers followed the procedures in
conducting buy-bust operation, and that the evidence were preserved as the chain of custody thereof
was not broken. Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Sanchez
were properly preserved?

Held: No. The arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly
seized from Sanchez. While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and the media were present
during the conduct of the inventory as evidenced by their signatures on the Certificate of Inventory, a
more careful scrutiny of the records shows that the buy-bust team conducted the marking, inventory, and
photography where the arrest was made, and merely made the aforesaid representatives sign the
Certificate of Inventory upon the buy-bust team‘s arrival at their office. Moreover, the said procedures
were not done in the presence of any elected public official. During trial, IO1 Tabuyo admitted to these
procedural mishaps.

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and
the media during the actual conduct of inventory and photography to ensure that the chain of custody
rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence which could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations
where a justifiable reason for noncompliance is explained. Here, despite the nonobservance of the
witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the prosecution.

Discussion: Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under
the said Section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized,
or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from
confiscation for examination. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the
media or the DOJ, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the seized
drugs, the evils of switching, ‗planting‘ or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly

20 | E v i d e n c e
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the said
drugs that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements
of Sec. 21 may not always be possible. In fact, the IRR of RA 9165—which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640—provides that the said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless
seizure, and that noncompliance with the requirements of Sec. 21—under justifiable grounds—
will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply
with the procedure laid out in Sec. 21 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over
the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. For the above saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. The justifiable ground for noncompliance
must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist.

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for ―a sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy
excuse.‖ Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for noncompliance. These considerations arise from the
fact that these officers are ordinarily given sufficient time—beginning from the moment they have
received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest—to prepare for a
buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing fully well
that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165.
As such, the apprehending officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their
noncompliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to
comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions
were reasonable.

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance
with the procedure set forth in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the
initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said
procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the
liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raise, or even threshed out in
the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the
records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if
not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the
appellate court‘s bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction

21 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Oliva
G.R. No. 234156, January 7, 2019

Facts: The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group (SAIDSOTG), received a
report regarding the sale of dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu" in Brgy. Cembo, Makati City and its
nearby areas. As such, a buy-bust operation was planned and after coordination with the PDEA, a buy-
bust team was formed wherein PO3 Luisito Marcelo was designated as the poseur-buyer and given a
P500 bill as marked money, and PO1 Darwin Catabay as back-up. Thereafter, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the exact location of "Manu" after it was confirmed by the confidential informant.

When they arrived at the target area, the confidential informant pointed to Emmanuel Oliva as "Manu,"
the seller of dangerous drugs; thus, PO3 Marcelo and the confidential informant approached Oliva. PO3
Marcelo was introduced by the confidential informant to Oliva as a buyer who wanted to buy P500 worth
of shabu, PO3 Marcelo handed Oliva the marked money after the latter demanded payment. Oliva then
showed PO3 Marcelo 4 transparent plastic sachets with white crystalline substance and asked the latter
to choose one. Meanwhile, 2 other persons, Bernardo Barangot and Mark Manalastas were also at the
target area to buy shabu. Barangot and Manalastas, and PO3 Marcelo each took one sachet from the four
sachets that Oliva showed.

Upon receiving the dangerous drug, PO3 Marcelo signaled his back-up that the transaction has been
completed. Subsequently, PO3 Marcelo grabbed Oliva and Barangot and, thereafter, PO1 Catabay
appeared and arrested Manalastas. The police officers conducted a body search on Oliva and it yielded
another sachet containing white crystalline substance, the marked money and two (2) more pieces of
P500 bills. Eventually, Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were arrested and brought to the barangay hall
where an inventory was conducted and on the basis thereof, an inventory report was prepared. The
confiscated items were then marked and photographed, and a request for laboratory examination was
accomplished and the seized items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The substance found
inside the sachets were all tested positive for the presence of shabu.

Thus, an Information for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 was filed against Oliva. Also, in three
Informations, Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were separately charged with violation of Sec. 11 of the
said law. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against
them. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish
the key elements for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, and that the bare denials of the
accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the police officers. It also held that the failure of
the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and take the
photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items
seized. Hence, the present appeal.

The accused argue that the arresting officers failed to immediately conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, their representative or counsel, a
representative of the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who are required to sign the
copies of the inventory.

Issue: Whether or not the apprehending team sufficiently complied with Sec. 21 and its IRR?

Held: No. Under the original provision (RA 9165) of Sec. 21, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs,
the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physically inventory and photograph of
the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ,
and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. Now, the amendatory law (RA 10640) mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected
public official, and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media who shall
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Here, the absence of a representative of the NPS or the media during the inventory of the seized items
was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the TSN does not yield any testimony from
the arresting officers as to the reason why there was no representative from the DOJ or the media. The
only one present to witness the inventory and the marking was an elected official, Brgy. Captain Evelyn
Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show that any attempt was made to secure the presence of
the required witness.

22 | E v i d e n c e
It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain
requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following:
(1) media representatives are not available at that time, especially if it is done in more remote areas;
(2) police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were
about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas;
(3) police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the NPS;
(4) police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be
undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC in the timely
delivery of prisoners were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Sec. 21.
(5) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(6) the elected officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended;
(7) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for noncompliance with the
procedure laid down in Sec. 21, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto
in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and
justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law. Its failure to follow the mandated
procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on
evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but
also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to
preserve the integrity of the seized item. A stricter adherence to Sec. 21 is required where the quantity of
illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration.

Discussion: To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 specifies: ―The apprehending
team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.‖

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 21(a) of the IRR of RA 9165 provides: ―The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.‖

On July 15, 2014, RA 10640 was approved to amend RA 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially
incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus: ―The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That non-compliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items.‖

23 | E v i d e n c e
Documentary Evidence

St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Construction Corporation

G.R. No. 217426, December 4, 2017

Facts: LWV Construction Corporation, engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for
deployment to Saudi Arabia, referred prospective applicant Jonathan Raguindin to St. Martin Polyclinic,
Inc. (SMPI) for a pre-deployment medical examination. SMPI cleared Raguindin and found him ―fit for
employment.‖ Based on the foregoing, LWV deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, when
Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia, he
tested positive for Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), which results were reflected in a Certification. An HCV
Confirmatory Test Report likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding, thereby
leading to Raguindin‘s repatriation to the Philippines.

Claiming that SMPI was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that Raguindin is ―fit for
employment‖ when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was positive for HCV, LWV filed
a Complaint for sum of money and damages against SMPI before the MeTC. The MeTC rendered
judgment in favor of LWV. Aggrieved, SMPI appealed to the RTC contending that LWV failed to comply
with the requirements on the authentication and proof of documents under Sec. 24, Rule 132,
considering that LWV‘s evidence, particularly the Certification issued by the General Care Dispensary and
the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health, are foreign documents issued in Saudi
Arabia. The RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC‘s Decision.

Issue: Whether or not LWV failed to comply with the requirements on the authentication and proof of
documents under Sec. 24, Rule 132?

Held: Yes. The fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been properly established
since the courts a quo, erred in admitting and giving probative weight to the Certification of the General
Care Dispensary, which was written in an unofficial language. Sec. 33, Rule 132 states that: ―Documentary
evidence in an unofficial language.— Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as
evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.‖

A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English words, the
majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided by LWV, the
same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be given probative value,
and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the due execution and authenticity
of the said certification were not proven in accordance with Sec. 20, Rule 132: ―Proof of private document.—
Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker;
(c) Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.‖

Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within the classes of public
documents under Sec. 19, Rule 132— and hence, must be considered as private. It has been settled that
an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value. In
addition, since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established
as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is
presented in court to show his qualifications. It is precluded because the party against whom it is
presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements
or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other
party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to
present the author of the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative value, as in
this case.

Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia should have
also been excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered a public document, being an
alleged written official act of an official body of a foreign country, the same was not duly authenticated in
accordance with Sec. 24, Rule 132. While LWV provided a translation thereof from the National
Commission on Muslim Filipinos, Bureau of External Relations, Office of the President, the same was not
accompanied by a certificate of the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Saudi Arabia,
where the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

24 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Vibar
G.R. No. 215790, March 12, 2018

Facts: Mauricio Vibar was charged with the Crime of Rape committed against his very own daughter,
AAA. The prosecution‘s evidence established that while AAA was cooking lunch outside their nipa hut in
Camarines Norte, Vibar came and asked her to get his gloves from inside the house. When AAA refused
to do so, he carried her inside and laid her on the floor, removed her shorts and panty, zipped open his
pants, placed himself on top of her, and made push and pull movements. During this time, AAA felt
Vibar‘s penis enter her vagina causing her pain. That same day, AAA reported the incident to the police.
After executing an affidavit at the police station, she appeared before the judge of the MCTC for
preliminary investigation. AAA‘s first complaint for rape, however, was dismissed because she refused to
speak during that time. Later, AAA was constantly harassed by Vibar; he would touch her breast and kiss
her. This prompted her to file anew the complaint for rape against her father. The RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, found Vibar guilty of rape. Hence, this appeal.

Vibar claims that he received a letter from AAA wherein the latter explained that she was merely coerced
to refile the complaint for rape and she very much regretted doing so. He stated the while it was not AAA
herself who gave the letter, he was sure that it was AAA who wrote it because no one else by AAA‘s
name would call her ―papa‖ and that he was familiar with her handwriting.

Issue: Whether or not Vibar properly authenticated the ―letter‖ he allegedly received from AAA?

Held: No. Sec. 20, Rule 132 provides that in order for any private document offered as authentic to be
admitted as evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (1) by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (2) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker. The authentication of private document before it is received in evidence is vital because
during such process, a witness positively identifies that the document is genuine and has been duly
executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under
duress.

A plain reading of Vibar‘s testimony immediately reveals that he miserably failed to comply with the
authentication requirement set forth under the Rules. Neither was there any witness who could testify
that the alleged letter was voluntarily and personally made by AAA nor was there any document from
which her handwriting could have been compared. Curiously, the person who purportedly handed to
Vibar AAA‘s letter was not presented in court to testify as to the genuineness of the document. Vibar
merely relies on his self-serving testimony that he was sure that the letter was AAA‘s doing. Such hollow
assurance, however, in no way proves that AAA had indeed voluntarily executed the said document. He
could have easily fabricated the letter and feigned that it was made. As such, AAA‘s professed letter is
but a mere scrap of paper with no evidentiary value for lack of proper authentication.

25 | E v i d e n c e
Best Evidence Rule

MCMP Construction vs. Monark

G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

Facts: MCMP Construction Corporation leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation for
various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract. Thus, Monark delivered five
(5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP, evidenced by invoices as well as Documents
Acknowledgment Receipts, received and signed by representatives of MCMP, Jorge Samonte and Rose
Takahashi. Despite the lapse of the 30-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP failed to pay the rental
fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount due, partial payments were made. Further
demands went unheeded. As of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of P1,282,481.83. Thus,
Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC.

In its Answer, MCMP alleged in defense that the complaint was premature as Monark has refused to give
a detailed breakdown of its claims. MCMP further averred that it had an agreement with Monark that it
would not be charged for the whole time that the leased equipment was in its possession but rather only
for the actual time that the equipment was used although still on the project site. MCMP, however,
admitted that this agreement was not contained in the Contract.

During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino, its Senior Account Manager.
Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark, while
the other was given to MCMP. He further testified that Monark‘s copy had been lost and that diligent
efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which
he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to search for the original copy.
Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to
produce the same.

Issue: Whether or not the presentation of secondary evidence was properly allowed?

Held: Yes. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Sec. 3 of Rule 130 which provides:
―Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.‖

Relative thereto, Secs. 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of a lost document. Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.

Here, the above requisites are present. Based on the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in
the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no
avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted.

MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered
into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to
produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and
retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP‘s failure to present the same and even explain its
failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Sec. 6 of
Rule 130, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Sec. 3(e) of Rule
131 that ―evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.‖

26 | E v i d e n c e
 Loon vs. Power Master
G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013

Facts: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the
petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in vario us PLDT offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the
petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against the respondents. The petitioners alleged in their
complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave,
and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll
sheets. The petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action.
They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original
complaint. Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the LA except in the
preliminary mandatory conference. However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor
proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the pendency of the case.

The LA partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. It awarded the petitioners salary differential, service
incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. However, the LA denied the petitioners‘ claims for
backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays. Both parties appealed the LA‘s ruling with the NLRC.
The petitioners disputed the LA‘s denial of some of their claims. Meanwhile, the respondents questioned
the LA‘s ruling on the ground that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. They also
claimed that they paid the petitioners the amounts claimed. As proofs, they attached photocopied
and computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. Later, the
respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized
copies of list of employees with ATM cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the
amounts allegedly deposited in the employees‘ ATM cards. Later, the petitioners filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records
because it allegedly suffered from infirmities, among others, the attached documentary evidence on the
supplemental appeal bore the petitioners‘ forged signatures.

The NLRC reversed the LA ruling and ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds
of serious misconduct and willful disobedience. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the photocopied documents should be admitted in evidence?

Held: No. The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the
respondents‘ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the
earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners‘ claim that the
respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in evidence
and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals,
especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents‘ failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced.

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC‘s proposition that ―it is of common knowledge that
there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures.‖ The NLRC cannot take judicial
notice that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners
themselves disown the signatures in the respondents‘ assailed documentary evidence. The NLRC‘s
position is unwarranted and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.

27 | E v i d e n c e
 Dimaguila vs. Monteiro
G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

Facts: Sps. Monteiro, et al., filed a complaint against the Dimaguilas, together with the Borlaza. The
complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house
and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna. Sps. Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale
executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other
defendants countered that there was no co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the
subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between
her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its
southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that
they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they
were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

Sps. Monteiro later amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the
recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other
defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. Only Sps. Monteiro were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants. In amending their complaint, Sps. Montiero
adopted the Dimaguilas‘ admission in their original answer that the subject property had already been
partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, and that during
their lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion
and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them as well as
their heirs and successors-in-interest.

Sps. Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had
divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves; that Pedro‘s share pertains to the 1/3 of
the southern-half immediately adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of
Vitaliano; that Pedro‘s share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan
(Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the share of Pedro, they
discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

During the trial, Sps. Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro, who testified that
Perfecto was his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto‘s death, he had two properties, one of
which was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and
Pedro. Pedro was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their
rights over the subject property to Sonia.

Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro‘s son, Francisco, and was asked if she was interested in
purchasing Pedro‘s 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na Bato, and that he showed her a
deed of extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax
declaration of the property to prove that the property had already been partitioned between the two
brothers.

Engineer Baltazar Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Sps. Monteiro to survey the
property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject property, subdivided the lot
into two and came up with a survey plan.

Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy
of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners. Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the
DENR, testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land,
including cadastral maps from the region.

Issue: Whether or not the cadastral map and the list of claimants presented by Sps. Monteiro should not
be admitted in evidence the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule?

Held: No. Sec. 3(d) of Rule 130 provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a
public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Sec. 7 of the same Rule
provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Sec. 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

28 | E v i d e n c e
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area
covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of
the Municipal Assessor‘s Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a
DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving
cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public
records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Sec. 44 of Rule 130 similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the
duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral
surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral
surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as
entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are
exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

29 | E v i d e n c e
 Republic vs. Mupas
G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

Facts: PIATCO argues that its non-submission of original documents before the trial court is justified
under Sec. 3(c), Rule 130. It points out that a party need not submit the original when it consists of
numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole. PIATCO insists
that the lower courts erred in not giving probative value to the report prepared by Reyes Tacandong &
Co., an auditing firm, validating PIATCO‘s computation of attendant costs. Significantly, Reyes
Tacandong & Co. failed to state that it examined the original documents in validating
PIATCO‘s computation of attendant costs.

Issue: Whether or not the report prepared by Reyes Tacandong & Co for PIATCO‘s attendant costs may
be given probative value?

Held: No. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. As exceptions to
the best evidence rule, Sec. 3, Rule 130 provides that non-original documents may be produced in
court in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the original cannot be
produced by the party who offers the evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.

The Court agrees with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and voluminous invoices, official
receipts, and other relevant documents before the trial court to prove the attendant costs that it incurred
in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The trial court may admit a summary of voluminous original
documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party has shown that the underlying writings are
numerous and that an in-court examination of these documents would be inconvenient. In other
words, Sec. 3(c), Rule 130 does away with the item-by-item court identification and
authentication of voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome and tedious for the
parties and the court.

However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous documents,

the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original documents on
which the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source documents being
summarized are also admissible if presented in court. In concrete terms, the source documents
must be shown to be original, and not secondary. Furthermore, the source documents must
likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that the correctness of the summary of the voluminous
records may be tested on cross-examination and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type
proceedings, a proper foundation for the introduction of a summary may be established through the
―testimony of the person who is responsible for the summary‘s preparation, or the person who supervised
the preparation of the summary.‖

The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary of numerous documents is, in
strict terms, hearsay evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a party to present a
summary of numerous documents and immediately admit and give probative value to such summary
without sufficiently laying these foundations. If the source documents of the summary are non-original,
the trial court would commit a grave error in admitting and/or giving probative value to the summary of
nonoriginal documents; the evidence admitted would be double hearsay.

Furthermore, when a party invokes Sec. 3(c), Rule 130, he does not similarly invoke Sec. 3 (a), (b),
and/or (d), Rule 130. He does not likewise claim that the original documents have been lost or destroyed.
The party merely asserts that the numerous documents cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and that the fact sought to be established from these documents is only the general result of the
whole.

30 | E v i d e n c e
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 130, he
asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous documents, whose
originals are available to the adverse party for inspection. He does not ask permission from
the trial court to present in evidence the numerous non-original documents. Otherwise, the
very purpose of Sec. 3(c), Rule 130 would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-original
documents would be identified, authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a tedious and protracted
litigation. Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must
first establish that the presentation of photocopies is justified under Sec. 3(a), (b), and/or
(d), Rule 130. He must establish the presence of all the elements under these provisions.

In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of nonoriginal documents must first prove the
following elements before secondary evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production
in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. To conclude otherwise is to allow the party to circumvent the best evidence
rule and the requirements under Sec. 3(a), (b), and (d), Rule 130 by merely invoking Sec. 3(c), Rule 130.

Here, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated December 14, 2010, the photocopies of numerous
documents, and the validation of PIATCO‘s computation of attendant costs prepared by Reyes
Tacandong & Co., among others. PIATCO justifies the non-presentment of original documents pursuant
to Sec. 3(c), Rule 130. PIATCO failed to establish its attendant costs. PIATCO failed to establish
that the photocopied documents fall under Sec. 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130. These photocopied
documents are hearsay evidence. They are mere scraps of paper and have no weight as basis for the
attendant costs of the NAIA-IPT III.

The Court likewise cannot give weight to the summary prepared by Reyes Tacandong & Co.
for being double hearsay. Reyes Tacandong & Co., whose letter was addressed to PIATCO and not to
the trial court, did not state in its report that it examined the original documents allegedly proving
attendant costs. Moreover, Reyes Tacandong & Co stated it does not ―express any assurance on the
attendant costs.‖

31 | E v i d e n c e
 Robinol vs. Bassig
A.C. No. 11836, November 21, 2017

Facts: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edilberto Bassig for violation of Code of Professional
Responsibility and Lawyer‘s Oath. In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Carlina Robiñol alleged that
Atty. Bassig rented a house from her in Brgy. Tanong, Marikina City. Said lease, without any written
contract, was for a period of two years, or from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. Upon the start of the
lease agreement, it was agreed that Atty. Bassig will pay a one month advance and another one month
deposit, both of which are equivalent of one month rental payment. However, he did not comply with the
same. Atty. Bassig instead paid the monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13, 2010. Atty. Bassig then
paid his rents belatedly from July 2010 to January 2012. However, after said period, he stopped making
any payment.

Robiñol alleged that the last payment in the amount of P17,000.00, for two months‘ rent was made in
July 2012, but no receipt was issued upon Atty. Bassig‘s instruction. Atty. Bassig told Robiñol that he will
be receiving a big amount from his client and that he will thereafter pay the remaining unpaid rent.
Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him to stay in the
premises. However, when Typhoon Habagat struck Marikina City, Atty. Bassig left the house because of
the heavy flood. When he left, he neither informed Robiñol of his intended destination nor satisfied his
unsettled obligation. The evidence of Robiñol consists of photocopies of the promissory note.

When the situation in Marikina City got better, Atty. Bassig still failed to return to his rented house. Later
on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig‘s daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig was living with her.
Robiñol then went to the said house and demanded payment from Atty. Bassig. As a consequence, he
executed a promissory note, undertaking to pay the amount of P127,500.00 on installment basis.
However, Atty. Bassig reneged on his obligation.

Issue: Whether or not the photocopies of the subject promissory note are admissible in evidence?

Held: No. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the proper
evidentiary threshold is substantial evidence. Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For
one, the evidence submitted were inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing payment of
Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig were photocopies of
the original.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable. Sec. 5, Rule 130 states: ―When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.‖ Before a
party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must
prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.

Here, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for the admission of said
photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any
evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from
Robiñol.

32 | E v i d e n c e
Parol Evidence Rule

Leoveras vs. Valdez

G.R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011

Facts: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners—¾ and ¼ pro-indiviso,
respectively—of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan. Sta. Maria sold her share to
Benigna Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the back of the OCT. When Benigna died, she willed her
¾ share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas (each owned ½ of Benigna‘s ¾).
Alejandra‘s heirs sold their predecessor‘s ½ share to Casimero Valdez, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Also, Josefa sold her own ½ share (subject property) to Valdez and Modesto Leovera, as
evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed). On even date, Valdez and Leoveras
executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property.

Valdez and Leoveras executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property. The parties took
possession of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for taxation
purposes. Valdez asked the Register of Deeds on the requirements for the transfer of title over the
portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, he learned that Leoveras had already
obtained in his name two TCTs. The RD informed Valdez that they could not find the record of the OCT;
instead, the RD furnished Valdez with Leoveras‘ documents, including the Benigna Deed.

Valdez filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Leoveras, seeking
the reconveyance of the disputed property, on the ground that Leoveras is entitled only to the 3,020 sqm
identified in the parties‘ Agreement. Valdez sought the nullification of Leoveras‘ titles by contesting the
authenticity of Leoveras‘ documents. Particularly, Valdez assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting
Benigna‘s death certificate. Valdez argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports
to convey 4,024 sqm to Leoveras, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Valdez failed to preponderantly prove that the Benigna
Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to nullify Leoveras‘ titles. On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit.
The CA gave weight to Benigna‘s death certificate which shows the impossibility of Benigna‘s execution of
the deed in 1969.

Before the SC, Leoveras admitted that the Benigna Deed is ―fabricated‖ but hastens to add that it
was only designed (i) to affirm the ―true intent and agreement‖ of the parties on the extent of their
ownership, as shown by their actual physical possession, and (ii) as a ―convenient tool‖ to facilitate the
transfer of title to his name. Leoveras does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of the
documents, particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the
true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties‘ true
intention. Leoveras‘ argument calls to fore the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.

Issue: Whether or not Leoveras may be allowed to present parol evidence?

Held: Yes. Under the Parol Evidence Rule, when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the
written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can
be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing
is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence
modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading,
as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by
reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting
of the minds of the parties.

At the trial, Leoveras attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by
presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and
confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was Leoveras‘ staunch assertion
that Valdez co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties‘ true intention.

In the present petition, however, Leoveras made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is
fabricated, thereby completely bolstering Valdez‘s cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed
property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is

33 | E v i d e n c e
embodied in the Benigna Deed, Leoveras‘ admission, coupled with Valdez‘s denial of his purported
signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock
of Leoveras‘ defense.

Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in Leoveras‘ share the disputed property, Leoveras
obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his application for the transfer of
title of his rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that
supposedly corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement) that supports the petitioner‘s claim that the
partition of the subject property is based on the parties‘ actual possession.

Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based on Valdez‘s alleged failure to prove the spuriousness of
the documents submitted by Leoveras to the Register of Deeds. However, by admitting the presentation
of a false deed in securing his title, Leoveras rendered moot the issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed
and relieved Valdez of the burden of proving its falsity as a ground to nullify Leoveras‘ titles.

34 | E v i d e n c e
 Paras vs. Kimwa Construction
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015

Facts: Sps. Lucia and Bonifacio Paras alleged that sometime in December 1994, Lucia was approached
by Kimwa Construction expressing its interest to purchase gravel and sand from her. Kimwa allegedly
asked that it be ―assured‖ of 40,000m3 worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her concession area
was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit expires. Thus, she emphasized
that she would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa ―provided the 40,000m3 would be
withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before May 15, 1995.‖ Kimwa then assured Lucia that it
would take only 2-3 months for it to completely haul the 40,000m3 of aggregates. Convinced of Kimwa‘s
assurances, Lucia and Kimwa entered into the ―Agreement for Supply of Aggregates.‖ Sps. Paras added
that within a few days, Kimwa was able to extract and haul 10,000m3 of aggregates. However, after
extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly transferred to the concession area of a certain
Remedios dela Torre in violation of their Agreement. They then addressed demand letters to Kimwa. As
these went unheeded, Sps. Paras filed a Complaint for breach of contract with damages.

In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000m 3 of aggregates from Lucia. It
argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000m3 represented only an upper limit or the maximum
quantity that it could haul. It likewise claimed that it neither made any commitment to haul 40,000m 3 of
aggregates before May 15, 1995 nor represented that the hauling of this quantity could be completed in
2-3 months. It denied that the hauling of 10,000m3 of aggregates was completed in a matter of days and
countered that it took weeks to do so. It also denied transferring to the concession area of Dela Torre.
Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties‘ true intent that 40,000m3 was a maximum
limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that
Sps. Paras were barred from introducing evidence to show that the parties had agreed differently.

Issue: Whether or not Sps. Paras may introduce parol evidence?

Held: Yes. Sec. 9, Rule 130, provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of
documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing. Per this rule,
reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed, forbids any addition to, or contradiction
of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. This is merely a
general rule. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by
the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited to
the party initiating an action. If the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned
in the complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to
prove the true agreement of the parties. Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of
evidence, a party‘s failure to timely object is deemed waiver and parol evidence may then be entertained.
In sum, two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any
of the four exceptions has been put in issue in a party‘s pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of
the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.

Sps. Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the
Agreement, as well as the Agreement‘s failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, Kimwa,
through its Answer, also responded to Sps. Paras‘ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional
case allowing admission of parol evidence. It is true that Sps. Paras‘ Complaint does not specifically state
words and phrases such as ―mistake,‖ ―imperfection,‖ or ―failure to express the true intent of the parties.‖
Nevertheless, it is evident that the crux of Sps. Paras‘ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement
―entered into… on December 6, 1994 or thereabouts‖ was founded on the parties‘ supposed
understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of Kimwa must be hauled by May 15,
1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of Lucia Paras‘ permitted area. This
assertion is the very foundation of Sps. Paras‘ having come to court for relief.

Considering how the Agreement‘s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the parties‘ true
intent was successfully put in issue in Sps. Paras‘ Complaint (and even responded to by Kimwa in its
Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Sec. 9. Accordingly, the testimonial
and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by Sps. Paras, which attest to these supposed
flaws and what they aver to have been the parties‘ true intent, may be admitted and considered.

35 | E v i d e n c e
 PNB vs. Pasimio
G.R. No. 205590, September 2, 2015

Facts: Ligaya Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages before the
RTC. She alleged having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of
P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both investment placements have matured; and when
she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige. In its Answer
with Counterclaim, with annexes, PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement for the amount aforestated.
But it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having
already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank. Pasimio denied obtaining
any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain
documents which turned out to be the Loan Documents, she professed not understanding what they
really meant. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete
state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager, Teresita Gregorio, and Customer
Relations Officer, Gloria Miranda, led her to believe that what she was signing were related to new high-
yielding PNB products.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate
that Pasimio had proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from
PNB. As a corollary, the trial court held that there was no evidence snowing the release by PNB of the
loan proceeds to Pasimio.

Issue: Whether or not parol evidence rule applies?

Held: No. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing. Under this
rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a written document,
except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement and
puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the
written agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents embodying the
loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.

36 | E v i d e n c e
 Mancol vs. DBP
G.R. No. 204289, November 22, 2017

Facts: DBP scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale over a residential lot with a two-storey
building located at Navarro St., Calbayog City. In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. executed a SPA
appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr., to represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the
subject property. Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis. DBP then issued an O.R. in the name
of Mancol, Jr. paid by Mancol, Sr., for the initial payment for the purchase price of the subject property.
During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the
transfer of title of the lot in Mancol, Jr.‘s name, including the payment of CGT; and (2) to get rid of the
occupants of the subject property. Mancol, Jr. paid the balance, as evidenced by an O.R. Thereafter, DBP
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in Mancol, Jr.‘s favor. Mancol, Jr. made a deposit with DBP for the
payment of the CGT and DST. DBP acknowledged the deposit and issued an O.R.

Later, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to Mancol, Jr. all the
pertinent documents of the sale and issued a Manager‘s Check. Mancol, Jr. demanded from DBP to
comply with its verbal undertaking. He returned the MC and all pertinent documents affecting the sale of
the subject property to DBP. But DBP disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and reminded Mancol,
Jr. that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot in
Mancol, Jr.‘s name.

Mancol, Jr. filed a Complaint for damages for breach of contract against DBP before the RTC. He prayed
that DBP be found to have breached its obligation with Mancol, Jr.; that DBP be held liable to pay the
aggregate amount of P160,700.88 and surcharges which may be imposed by the BIR at the time of
payment; that DBP be ordered to pay damages and attorney‘s fees; and that DBP be ordered to return
the MC. In its Answer with Counter-Claim, DBP alleged that the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated
no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to eject the occupants thereon. By way
of counterclaim, DBP averred that Mancol, Jr. grossly violated the terms and conditions of the agreement
of sale.

Later on, however, the RTC issued an Order declaring DBP in default by reason of its counsel‘s failure to
appear during the pretrial and to file its pretrial brief. Trial ensued. During the trial, Rodel Villanueva
testified that he was the one commissioned or ordered by a certain Atty. Mar De Asis of DBP, to go to
BIR-Catbalogan, and to bring several documents: a check, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, and
the deed of sale. Mancol, Sr. testified that he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated
Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First -Come First Served Basis on behalf of his son,
by virtue of the SPA. He stated that after the execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP
verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause the vacation of
the occupants of the house and lot. Although he admitted that the verbal agreement contradicted the
negotiated rules and agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of Mancol‘s should be given probative value to establish the
alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale contract?

Held: No. The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by
the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided,
that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the exceptions in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule
130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, as
with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party‘s failure to timely object is deemed a
waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.

Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP, Mancol invoked the fourth
exception under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement, by offering the testimonies of
Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection against the said
testimonies during the trial since DBP was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection of
the parol evidence rule. This notwithstanding, the admissibility of the testimonial evidence
as an exception to the parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight.
Admissibility of evidence should not be confounded with its probative value. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.

37 | E v i d e n c e
Moreover, Villanueva‘s testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence. Villanueva had no
personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal agreement between Mancol and DBP. In fact, there
was no such verbal agreement. As admitted by Mancol, the alleged verbal agreement was entered into
between DBP and Mancol, Sr., by virtue of the SPA. Villanueva has no personal knowledge of such fact.
The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.‘s testimony. Although the records show that by
virtue of an SPA executed by Mancol, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase, including the
Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First Come First Served Basis, and that
he made the initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of evidence to prove that indeed, he personally
entered into a verbal agreement with DBP.

38 | E v i d e n c e
Electronic Evidence

Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa

G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003

Facts: A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by petitioners against respondents
alleging that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the Lot located at Darong, Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren. In 1965, Francisco
Comorposa who was working in the land of Noel Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination of
his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of Marcos,
Comorposa approached the late Marcos‘ son, Adolfo, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian
consideration, Adolfo allowed Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos. Hence, his nipa hut was carried
by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Comorposa occupied
a portion of Marcos Saez‘ property without paying any rental. Comorposa left for Hawaii, USA. He was
succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying
the premises through petitioners‘ tolerance. A formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate
the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and
valid ownership and possession of the premises by prescription, and that the Regional Director of the
DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they
were the rightful claimants and possessors and were, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners but the RTC, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision.
Affirming the RTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. It held that—
although not yet final—the Order issued by the regional executive director of the DENR remained in full
force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR‘s
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey
was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR
officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales, Jr.

Issue: Whether or not CENR Certification may be admitted in evidence, although it bears signature of
the CENR officer which is a mere facsimile?

Held: Yes. In Garvida, the Court held: ―A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental
area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current.‖

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they
are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR
Officer Jose Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The
one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order. If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims,
then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either
verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former‘s
direct control and supervision.

39 | E v i d e n c e
 Torres vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 193531, December 6, 2011

Facts: Ellery March Torres, a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of PAGCOR, was allegedly involved in a
scheme of padding the credit meter readings of the slot machines of PAGCOR. Torres was served with a
Memorandum of Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and
regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is dismissal. He denied
any involvement or participation in the scheme, and asked for a formal investigation. Instead, on August
4, 2007 he received a letter dismissing him from the service. On September 14, 2007, Torres filed
with the CSC a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. Aside from
these claims, he alleged that he tried to persuade PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of
reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 sent through a facsimile transmission. However, no resolution was
issued on his letter reconsideration, thus, the filing of the complaint.

PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged that Torres failed to perfect an appeal within the period and
manner provided by the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law (Uniform
Rules). The CSC, treating Torres‘ complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR‘s decision dismissing Torres
from the service, issued Resolution denying Torres‘ appeal.

Issue (1): Whether or not the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period?

Held: Yes. Pursuant to the Uniform Rules, which are applicable to this case, a MR may either be filed by
mail or personal delivery. When a MR was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date
shown by the postmark on the envelope, which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other
hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper
office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a MR or an appeal
therefrom.

Here, Torres received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the MR should
have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However,
records do not show that Torres had filed his MR. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of Torres‘s
letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.

Even assuming that Torres indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a
facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by
Torres in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules. The MR may be filed only
in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery. A facsimile or fax transmission is a process
involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy,
one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of
electric current. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

Issue (2): Whether or not a facsimile is as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act?

Held: No. The terms ―electronic data message‖ and ―electronic document,‖ as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original
under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.‖

Therefore, the dismissal of petitioner‘s appeal was proper. Torres filed with the CSC a complaint against
PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits on
September 14, 2007. The CSC treated the complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR‘s dismissal of Torres.
Torres had 15 days from receipt of the letter of dismissal to file his appeal. However, at the time Torres
filed his complaint with the CSC, which was considered as Torres‘ appeal, 41 days had already elapsed
from the time he received his letter of dismissal on August 4, 2007; hence, the CSC correctly found that it
has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since petitioner‘s dismissal had already attained finality. Torres‘
dismissal from the service became final and executory after he failed to file his MR or appeal in the
manner and within the period provided for under the Uniform Rules.

40 | E v i d e n c e
 Ang vs. Republic (CA)
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

Facts: Rustan Ang was charged before the RTC of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act (RA 9262). The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud and
Rustan were classmates. Rustan and Irish became ―on-and-off‖ sweethearts. When Irish learned
afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish
broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince
her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed
her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Later
on, Irish received through MMS a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish‘s face
superimposed on the figure. The sender‘s cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan used.
One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: ―Madali lang ikalat yun,
my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.‖

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found Rustan guilty of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal before the
SC. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Sec.
1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7- 01-SC).

Issue: Whether or not the subject picture is an electronic document under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence?

Held: No. Firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings (wrong).

41 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Enojas
G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014

Facts: Noel Enojas and several other were charged with murder before the RTC. PO2 Eduardo Gregorio,
Jr. testified that he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan were patrolling when they spotted a taxi that was
suspiciously parked. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as Enojas, for
his documents. They invited Enojas to the police station. Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers
and left his taxi behind. When they stopped, PO2 Pangilinan came upon two suspected robbers and shot
it out with them. Someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio came around and
fired at the suspected robbers. PO2 Gregorio also radioed for help and for an ambulance. Later, Enojas
had fled with the armed men. The police searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that
Enojas left behind. PO3 Joel Cambi was instructed to monitor its incoming messages.

PO3 Cambi testified that they monitored the messages in Enojas‘ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas,
communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted
in the arrest of Enojas and some of his co-accused. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the
mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.

The accused filed a trial memorandum for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an
acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were
inadmissible, not having been properly identified. However, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found the
accused guilty of the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or not the text messages are admissible in evidence?

Held: Yes. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court‘s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages
are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order
to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.

42 | E v i d e n c e
 Syhunliong vs. Rivera
G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014

Facts: Ramon Syhunliong and Teresita Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in
a criminal case for libel. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation and
likewise owns interests in construction, restaurant and hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera
used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF.

About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be
effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the
same year to complete the turnover of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas, who succeeded
her. Sometime in April 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries,
benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check
representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong. On April
6, 2006, Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFF‘s official cellular phones held by
Lumapas: ―I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I
don‘t deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras. Sana yung pagsimba
niya, alam niya real meaning.‖ Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:
―Kailangan release niya lahat nang makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to the last date na nandyan
ako para di na kami abot sa labor.‖

Subsequently, Rivera filed before the NLRC a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13 th to
16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund. Pending the resolution of the aforecited labor
case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel.

Rivera claims that the text message she sent to Lumapas was in the nature of a qualified privileged
communication, it being merely an expression of her legitimate grievances over the delay in the release
of her unpaid salaries and other entitlements.

Issue: Whether or not the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a
qualified privileged communication?

Held: Yes. The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any
subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under
Art. 354, No. 1, RPC, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication
had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is
addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has
the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice.

Here, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter‘s claims for payment
of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the subject text message her
grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person who could help expedite the release
of Rivera‘s claims. Thus, Rivera‘s text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged
communication since she was speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message
beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.

43 | E v i d e n c e
 Bartolome vs. Maranan
A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014

Facts: A sworn affidavit-complaint was filed by Ella Bartolome against Rosalie Maranan, Court
Stenographer III of RTC, Br. 20, Imus, Cavite, charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Bartolome alleged that Maranan asked money
from her in the amount of P200,000, which was later reduced to P160,000, to facilitate the filing of her
case for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that Maranan undertook to have the case decided in
her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case. To put an end to
Maranan‘s extortion activities, Bartolome decided to report the matter to the police authorities. During
the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station, Maranan was apprehended
inside the premises of the RTC, Br. 20 in the act of receiving the money from Bartolome.

In support of her allegations, Bartolome attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed electronic
communications (text messages) between her and Maranan; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History
form given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of
marriage; a copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that Maranan was apprehended during the
entrapment operation; and a VCD containing the video taken during the entrapment operation.

Issue: Whether or not the text messages may be classified as ephemeral electronic communications?

Held: Yes. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain
conditions. ―Ephemeral electronic communication‖ refers to telephone conversations, text messages,
chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the
evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof.

Here, there is no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the
present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has
personal knowledge of these text messages, identified Maranan as the sender through cell phone number
09175775982. Maranan herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS
messaging and that the cell phone number reflected in Bartolome‘s cell phone from which the text
messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cell phone number during the entrapment
operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted.

Bartolome submitted 2 copies of the VCD23 containing pictures taken during the entrapment conducted
by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009. Under Sec. 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio,
photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be
shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the
person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

The Court viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. Bartolome herself
certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her complaint against Maranan. It is also well
to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these rules shall be liberally construed to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.

44 | E v i d e n c e
 BBB vs. AAA
G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015

Facts: BBB and AAA allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA
was then a medical student and was raising her first child born from a previous relationship, a boy named
CCC, with the help of her parents. During the relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more children namely,
DDD and EEE. To legalize their relationship, BBB and AAA married in civil rights and thereafter, the birth
certificates of the children, was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said
marriage. The relationship was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and heated
arguments.

AAA alleges that their heated arguments were often due to BBB‘s incessant womanizing. When
confronted about it, BBB, instead of denying the same, would even curse AAA. The breaking point for
AAA came when, BBB‘s alleged mistress, a woman by the name of FFF, insulted and humiliated AAA in
public, in the presence of BBB himself, who, according to AAA, did nothing to stop the same. Extremely
hurt, AAA decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at a friend‘s house.
She however went back to the conjugal home with DDD and EEE after some time, leaving her son CCC at
her friend‘s house. What made matters worse, according to AAA, was the apparent biases of BBB in favor
of DDD and EEE. That despite his promise to treat CCC as his own, BBB would still treat the latter
differently from the two kids, putting CCC at a disadvantage. AAA, cites as example the instances when,
BBB would buy food and toys for DDD and EEE only, buying nothing for CCC. While living separately from
BBB, AAA discovered that BBB was not paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they were
occupying, forcing AAA to move out. AAA was likewise compelled to find work to support the family, after
BBB has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family. According to AAA, the amounts
given by BBB were not sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing her to request for loans from
friends. AAA likewise feels threatened after discovering that BBB was stalking her and/or their children.
AAA alleges that she found out that BBB has sought the help of one GGG, a friend of BBB who lives
within the same compound where AAA lives, to go through the guard‘s logbook to monitor their every
move, i.e., who visits them, what time AAA leaves and returns back home, etc.

Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an application for the
issuance of a TPO with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC, which
was granted.

BBB posits that the text messages offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists
as to their admissibility.

Issue: Whether or not the text messages were properly admitted in evidence without authentication?

Held: Yes. Any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and
academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages. Here, BBB argues
that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by him and
FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the
pleadings filed with the Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed
to him by AAA.

In the Appellant‘s Brief filed before the CA, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA.
However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as
evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cell phone number from which the
text messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an
interpretation of the rules of evidence, the Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had
admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for the Court to consider those messages as
inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB‘s arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and
he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already
apparent.

45 | E v i d e n c e
 Astorga and Repol Law Offices vs. Villanueva
A.M. No. P-09-2668, February 24, 2015

Facts: This administrative Complaint was filed by Astorga and Repol Law Offices (ARLO) against
Alexander Villanueva, Sheriff IV of Br. 60 of the RTC, Makati City. ARLO charged Sheriff Villanueva with
―willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct in office due to graft and corruption or extortion. ARLO
represented FGU Insurance Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed against NEC Cargo Services,
Inc. The Complaint was filed before the RTC of Makati City and raffled to Br. 66. A decision was rendered
in favor of FGU. NEC and Albert Tamayo, a third party defendant-appellant, appealed the Decision before
the CA, but the appeal was denied. The Resolution later became final and executory. The Writ of
Execution was then issued. An Order was also issued granting ARLO‘s Motion to Appoint Special Sheriff.
Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to execute the Decision.

Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold Lugares (representing ARLO) started coordinating with each other for
the execution of the Decision. They agreed to meet ―to discuss the service of the Notices of Garnishment.
During the meeting, Sheriff Villanueva allegedly demanded P8,000 to execute the Decision. He allegedly
stated: ―Sayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung wala naman tayong makokolekta‖ and ―E wala pang 50%
ang magagarnish natin diyan eh.‖ Atty. Lugares informed Sheriff Villanueva that this was part of his job,
and he should not demand money from him. Sheriff Villanueva allegedly lowered the price to P5,000.

On the day scheduled to serve the Notices of Garnishment, Atty. Lugares sent a text message to Sheriff
Villanueva to remind him of their appointment. He replied, ―Dala mo ba mga colors?‖ Atty. Lugares asked
Sheriff Villanueva what he meant by ―colors.‖ He replied, ―Hauz pa po, nagcoffee breakfast lng, un legal
fees kako kung dala mo?‖ Atty. Lugares told Sheriff Villanueva to proceed with the meeting. He replied,
―Bka puede bukas nlng sir, nag insist ang mga tga ChinaTrust mamya.‖

Atty. Lugares insisted that they proceed with the garnishment since it was Sheriff Villanueva who set the
appointment. Sheriff Villanueva replied: ―Patawagin mo nga c atty. Astorga dto sa mobil phone ko para
magconfirm tau sa legal fees.‖ Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent this text message to Atty. Lugares:
―Padala mo nlng khit lunch time un legal fees, khit kmi na bhala magpaserve nina shf. Flora.‖9 Atty.
Lugares then assumed that since Sheriff Villanueva was not given the amount of P5,000 he demanded,
the issuance of the Notices of Garnishment did not take place.

Issue: Whether or not text messages were properly admitted in evidence?

Held: Yes. In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were
admitted as evidence and given probative value by the Court. In those cases, the Court considered the
content of the text messages and the identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to
prove the commission of administrative offenses.

Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his cellular phone. He attached
photographs of the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they were received. He
submitted respondent‘s calling card that contained the same phone number seen in the text messages.
Through this calling card, he was able to prove that respondent was the source of the text messages.
Respondent denied meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never denied sending the text messages to him.

The content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances within which they were made
constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability. The presentation of text
messages that Atty. Lugares sent to respondent is not necessary.

Respondent‘s text messages sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to implement the Writ
of Execution. The contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his manifest refusal to properly
implement the Writ of Execution.

46 | E v i d e n c e
Testimonial Evidence; Disqualification

Marcos vs. Heirs of Navarro

G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013

Facts: Sps. Navarro left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot)
located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro
Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein. Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that
respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.

Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a
handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that
Andres, Sr.‘s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed
of donation before the RTC.

After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC
did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez‘s report is a worthless
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant. The RTC granted respondents‘ motion
and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez‘s supposed testimony would
be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no
need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her
testimony is not yet needed.

Issue: Whether or not PO2 Alvarez was properly disqualified as a witness?

Held: No. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Sec. 20, Rule 130 provides: ―Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.‖ Specific rules of witness
disqualification are provided under Secs. 21 to 24, Rule 130. Sec. 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of
mental incapacity or immaturity. Sec. 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Sec. 23 disqualifies
a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Sec. 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of
privileged communication. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the
operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to
others. There is no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since
she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents‘ motion to disqualify
her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for
disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of
her testimony.

Moreover, Sec. 49, Rule 130 is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence,
to wit: ―The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.‖ Thus, the Court disagrees with the RTC that
PO2 Alvarez‘s testimony would be hearsay. Under Sec. 49, Rule 130, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an
expert opinion. True, the use of the word ―may‖ in Sec. 49, Rule 130 signifies that the use of opinion of
an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Jurisprudence is also replete
with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.
However, it is also recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering
the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents. More important, analysis of the
questioned signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.

In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. She has the qualifications of
witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an
expert witness to be received as evidence. The value of PO2 Alvarez‘s expert opinion cannot be
determined if PO2 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.

47 | E v i d e n c e
Testimonial Evidence; Mental Incapacity

People vs. Golimlim

G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004

Facts: Evelyn Canchela, is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on
to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her sister Jovita Guban
and her husband Salvador Golimlim alias Badong. Sometime, Jovita left the house, leaving Evelyn with
Golimlim. Taking advantage of the situation, Golimlim instructed Evelyn to sleep, and soon after she had
laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a
knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, Golimlim fell asleep. When Jovita
arrived, Evelyn told her about what Golimlim did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe her.

Lorna Hachero, Evelyn‘s half-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch
Evelyn and allow her to stay in her (Lorna) house. Lorna obliged. A week after, Lorna suspected that her
sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor. Lorna‘s
suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus
asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that Golimlim had sexual intercourse
with her while holding a knife. A criminal complaint for rape was the filed against Golimlim. Golimlim, on
being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true ―because her mind is not normal,‖ she
having ―mentioned many other names of men who had sexual intercourse with her.‖

The RTC convicted Golimlim as charged. Hence, the present appeal, where Golimlim argues that Evelyn‘s
testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as to his
criminal culpability.

Issue: Whether or not Evelyn, being a mental retardate, is disqualified to become a witness?

Held: No. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her
testimony bereft of truth. Secs. 20 and 21, Rule 130 provide: ―SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.—
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses…
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. —The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.‖

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental
condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness,
no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the
latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. It cannot then be
gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or
she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be sure, modern rules
on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. The remedy of
excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and
primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.

From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn‘s credibility. To
be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness. By the
account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol
Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation
with an IQ of 46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her. Evelyn could
give spontaneous and consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions
which do not inhibit her from answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in
court, upon examination by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the
proceedings, on Dr. Belmonte‘s suggestion, how she was raped and that it was Golimlim who did it.

Golimlim‘s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as
her rapist.

48 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Golidan
G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018

Facts: Three separate Informations were filed before the RTC against Eduardo Golidan, Francis
Nacionales, Teddy Ogsila, and a certain "John Doe," for rape with homicide, murder, and frustrated
murder of Elizabeth Leo, Namuel Aniban, and Cherry Mae Bantiway, respectively. Cherry Mae was the
lone eyewitness to the crimes. Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., a medical doctor specializing in neuro-
surgery and the treatment of injuries or illnesses of the central nervous system, was presented as a
prosecution witness regarding the frustrated murder case involving Cherry Mae.

Dr. Divina Martin Hernandez, a neurologist, was presented as a prosecution witness to show Cherry Mae's
competence to testify in court and on what the latter would be able to recall regarding the incident where
she herself was a victim. She said that Cherry Mae was brought to her office by an aunt and a social
worker for her to examine Cherry Mae's ability and adequacy to testify in court. Dr. Hernandez said that
cerebral palsy is a disease of the brain characterized by non-progressive motor impairment and that
persons afflicted with this disease usually walk with an abnormality, but they are fairly intelligent, can
perceive and· make known their perception. Dr. Hernandez conducted a neurological examination of
Cherry Mae consisting of an evaluation of her capacity to talk and to identify common objects, a cerebral
function test, an examination of her cranial nerves, and an examination of her motor and sensory system
and other cerebral functions. Dr. Hernandez said that "Cherry Mae can talk but with much difficulty; she
has only the tendency to say the last syllables of words; she could express with very much difficulty
although it takes her a long time to say the words; she can identify common objects in the clinic; she can
identify people around her like her social worker and she was able to recognize me.

Cherry Mae was called to testify in court, but because of her inability to communicate and move her
muscles, the RTC ordered the DSWD, the Baguio General Hospital, and the Sacred Heart Hospital of the
St. Louis University, through their respective psychiatric departments, to provide the RTC with a list of
their experts from among whom the parties shall choose someone to assist Cherry Mae in her testimony.
In open court, Cherry Mae identified appellants Ogsila, Nacionales, and Golidan from a line up composed
of 10 persons, as the ones who entered their house on the day of the incident. Cherry Mae pointed to
Nacionales as the one who struck her and Elizabeth Leo, and to Ogsila as the one who struck one-year-
old Namuel Aniban. When asked who went on top of Elizabeth Leo, Cherry Mae pointed to Golidan.

Issue: Whether or not Cherry Mae is a competent witness?

Held: Yes. Cherry Mae is a competent witness although she is suffering from cerebral palsy. Any child
can be a competent witness if he/she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his/her perception
to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he/she is examined. Even if Cherry Mae has
cerebral palsy, she can still perceive and make known her perception, as per Dr. Hernandez's explanation
in her testimony.

On the allegation that Cherry Mae is mentally retarded as opined by Dr. Hernandez, this is insufficient
reason to disqualify a witness, for a mental retardate who has the ability to make perceptions known to
others can still be a competent witness. Regarding the allegations that Cherry Mae was not able to
identify them in the initial stages of the investigation, at the time of these initial confrontations at the
hospital and at the police station, Cherry Mae had just survived from the incident where there were brutal
killings and where she herself had sustained a fatal wound on her head. As such, the condition of the
child, being already afflicted with cerebral palsy, was aggravated by the head injuries inflicted on her, not
to mention the state of shock and fear she might have been experiencing at that time. Thus, the
purported non-identification by child of the appellants at the initial stages of the investigation is of no
moment and is not fatal to the prosecution's case. There sufficient basis to consider the testimony of
Cherry Mae, unique though it may have been because of her condition, to be valid. The trial court invited
expert witnesses to testify on the nature of cerebral palsy and the capacity of one who has it, specifically
Cherry Mae, to perceive events surrounding her and to express them. The trial court was able to see
consistency in the child's testimony, specifically in her positive identification of the appellants. The failure
to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily impair the credibility
of a witness.

The Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, became effective on December 15,
2000. The first three sections of this Rule provide as follows:
Sec. 1. Applicability of the Rule. - Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child
witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal
proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.
Sec. 2. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will allow children to
give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings,
and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.

49 | E v i d e n c e
Sec. 3. Construction of the Rule. - This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child and
to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.

The lower court had already decided this case as of August 18, 1999, so this Rule was not applied during
trial. However, the Court is discussing its relevant provisions because of the flexibility given to the courts
in examining child witnesses under this Rule.

Discussion: That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under
the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

Sec. 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the
hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or
attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites
and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined
by the court in light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of
reliability of the child witness.

The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. Under Secs. 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, child
witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all
stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice. If the child is too young to
understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension
of the consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because
they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from
which to draw upon in making· sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have
a limited vocabulary.

50 | E v i d e n c e
Testimonial Evidence; Marital Disqualification

Alvarez vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005

Facts: Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in a criminal case for arson pending before the RTC.
The accused is Maximo Alvarez, the husband of Esperanza Alvarez. The private prosecutor called
Esperanza to the witness stand as the first witness against Maximo. Maximo and his counsel raised no
objection. Esperanza testified that Maximo poured a gasoline in the house owned by his sister-in-law
Susan Ramirez. Later, the house was set on fire, knowing fully well that it was occupied by Susan, the
members of the family as well as Esperanza, the estranged wife of Maximo. Later, Maximo filed a motion
to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 on marital disqualification. The
trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza from further testifying and deleting her
testimony from the records.

Issue: Whether or not Esperanza can testify against her husband in the criminal case?

Held: Yes. Sec. 22, Rule 130 provides: ―Disqualification by reason of marriage.—During their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter‘s
direct descendants or ascendants.‖ The reasons given for the rule are:
(1) There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
(2) If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
(3) The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
(4) Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule
itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

Another, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes
within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to
Maximo, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act in setting fire
to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact
with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of
marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had
the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between Maximo and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto
almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between Maximo and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to
protect.

51 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Castañeda
G.R. No. L-46306, February 27, 1979

Facts: On the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria Manaloto, Benjamin Manaloto was charged
before the CFI, presided by Judge Mariano Castañeda, Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document. Benjamin allegedly forged the signature of his spouse Victoria in a deed of sale executed by
Benjamin wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano
Lacsamana making it appear that Victoria gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth
she did not.

At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to
disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify
on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a ―criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other.‖ Notwithstanding such opposition, the Judge granted the
motion, disqualifying Victoria from testifying for or against her husband.

Issue: Whether or not Victoria can testify against her husband in the criminal case?

Held: Yes. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime
committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife. The act complained of as constituting the
crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife‘s signature in a deed of
sale. Clearly, it is the husband‘s breach of his wife‘s confidence which gave rise to the offense charged.
And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too
broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION, to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against
the other.

In one case, the Court held that the rape committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their
daughter was a crime committed by the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime
committed by the accused in that case was not his wife but their daughter, the Court, nevertheless,
applied the exception for the reason that said criminal act ―positively undermined the connubial
relationship.‖

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the
person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition,
which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken
collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the maritial and domestic
relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony
to be preserved nor peace and tranquillity which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such
a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing
but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no
reason to apply the maritial disqualification rule.

52 | E v i d e n c e
Testimonial Evidence; Dead Man‘s Statute

Razon vs. IAC

G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005

Facts: In his complaint, Vicente Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique Razon and E. Razon, Inc., et
al., be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan
Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. In their answer, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name
of stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by Enrique; that said shares are subject to
the agreement between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and
remained in the possession of Enrique. They also alleged that neither the late Chuidian nor the Vicente
had paid any amount whatsoever for the shares of stock in question.

The evidence of the plaintiff, Vicente, shows that he is the administrator of the intestate estate of Juan
Chuidian in Special Proceedings before the CFI. Enrique organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of
bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of Enrique, et al.
The stock certificate for 1,500 shares of stock of the corporation was issued in the name of Juan
Chuidian. On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Chuidian and after him, Vicente, were
elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and were paid compensation as
directors. From the time the certificate of stock was issued, Enrique had not questioned the ownership by
Juan Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of
stock over the said shares cancelled. The certificate of stock was in the possession of Enrique who
refused to deliver said shares to Vicente, until the same was surrendered by Enrique and deposited in a
safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce. Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc.,
Enrique distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal
incorporators to some friends including Juan Chuidian. The Stock Certificate covering 1,500 shares of
stock upon instruction of the late Chuidian was personally delivered by Chuidian to the Corporate
Secretary who was himself an associate of the Chuidian Law Office. Since then, Enrique was in
possession of said stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian. By agreement, the stock
certificates were delivered for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the parties as confirmed
by the trial court. Thus, the 1,500 shares of stock under the Stock Certificate were delivered by the late
Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in
the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (Enrique) was the owner of the said shares
of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal
incorporators/stockholders

Enrique assails the IAC‘s decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man‘s statute rule. According
to him, the ―dead man‘s statute‖ rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the Vicentes, as
plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and
the deceased Juan Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in Enrique
unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that Enrique was subjected to a rigid cross examination
regarding such testimony.

Issue: Whether or not the rule on dead man‘s statute applies in this case?

Held: No. Sec. 20(a) Rule 130 (now Sec. 23) states: ―Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship—The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein
enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind. …‖

The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his
properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many
would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or
refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to ‗guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to
the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.‘

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate
of the deceased person.

53 | E v i d e n c e
Here, the testimony excluded by the IAC is that of Enrique to the effect that the late Chuidian, and
Enrique agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are
actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Chuidian to recover
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that
the testimony of Enrique is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

Furthermore, the records show that Vicente never objected to the testimony of Enrique as regards the
true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. Enrique‘s testimony was subject to cross-
examination by Vicente‘s counsel. Hence, granting that Enrique‘s testimony is within the prohibition of
Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, Vicente is deemed to have waived the rule.

54 | E v i d e n c e
 Sunga-Chan vs. Chua
G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001

Facts: Lamberto Chua filed a complaint against petitioners Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Cecilia Sunga,
daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto Sunga for ―Winding Up of Partnership Affairs,
Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with WPA‖ with the RTC. Chau alleged that
he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane LPG in Manila. For
business convenience, Chua and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their
partnership, Shellite Gas Appliance Center, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Chua
allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced
P100,000 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided
between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy. As
compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager‘s fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and
Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other remuneration from
the business.

Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business, its business operation went quite well and was
profitable. While Jacinto furnished Chua with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth
of Shellite, Chua however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated and
undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.

Upon Jacinto‘s death, his surviving wife, Cecilia and particularly his daughter, Lilibeth, took over the
operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without Chua‘s consent. Despite
Chua‘s repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Lilibeth allegedly continued
the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.

Chua claimed that after Lilibeth ran out of alibis and reasons to evade Chua‘s demands, she disbursed out
of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000 and partially paid the same to Chua. Lilibeth allegedly
informed Chua that the P200,000 represented partial payment of the latter‘s share in the partnership,
with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of
the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with their
duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to the damage and
prejudice of Chua.

Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending that they are not liable for
partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney‘s fees, that Chua does
not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney‘s fees and expenses of litigation.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled in favor of Chua. Petitioners argue in the absence of any written
document to show such partnership between Chua and Jacinto, these courts were proscribed from
hearing the testimonies of Chua and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years
after Jacinto‘s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the ―Dead Man‘s Statute‖ or
―Survivorship Rule‖ under Sec. 23, Rule 130.

Issue: Whether or not the ―Dead Man‘s Statute‖ applies so as to render inadmissible Chua‘s testimony
and that of his witness, Josephine.

Held: No. The ―Dead Man‘s Statute‖ provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But
before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary
that:
(1) The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
(2) The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person
or a person of unsound mind;
(3) The subject matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;
(4) His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.

55 | E v i d e n c e
Two reasons forestall the application of the ―Dead Man‘s Statute‖ to this case. First, petitioners filed a
compulsory counterclaim against Chua in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the ―Dead Man‘s
Statute.‖ When it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein Chua, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to
defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, Chua is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been
brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the ―Dead Man‘s Statute‖ for the simple reason that
she is not ―a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.‖
Records show that Chua offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between Chua and Jacinto. Petitioners‘ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not
make her an assignor because the term ―assignor‖ of a party means ―assignor of a cause of action which
has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.‖ Plainly then,
Josephine is merely a witness of Chua, the latter being the party plaintiff.

56 | E v i d e n c e
 Bordalba vs. CA
G.R. No. 112443, January 25, 2002

Facts: The lot which is the subject matter of this case is part of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue
City, originally owned by the late Sps. Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition was executed covering
said land. Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme‘s house, which his
family occupied since 1945. Sometime, Elena Jayme, Teresita Bordalba, filed with the RTC an application
for the registration of a lot.

Elena alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land owned by her late
parents, Sps. Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She
further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor with her
permission. Consequently, Nicanor and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition contending that said
application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.

Subsequently, Bordalba filed with the Bureau of Lands an application, seeking the issuance of a Free
Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother, Elena. Bordalba was
successfully granted Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over said lot. Thereafter, Bordalba
caused the subdivision and titling of the subject Lot, into 6 lots, as well as the disposition of two parcels
thereof.

Upon learning of the same, the Heirs of Nicanor filed with the RTC a complaint against Bordalba, et al.
The Heirs prayed that FP and OCT, as well as TCTs secured be declared void and ordered cancelled. They
also prayed that they be adjudged owners of the subject lot.

Bordalba, on the other hand, averred that the subject Lot was acquired by her through purchase from
her mother, who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In her answer,
Bordalba traced her mother‘s ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition
presented by the Heirs, and claimed that Nicanor and Candida Flores occupied a portion of the Lot by
mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination, Bordalba admitted that the properties of the late
Sps. Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence
of said Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said
Deed to be the signature of her mother.

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies given by the witnesses for the Heirs of Nicanor which touched on
matters occurring prior to the death of Bordalba‘s mother violated the dead man‘s statute?

Held: No. The dead man‘s statute finds no application in the present case. The dead man‘s statute
does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his
knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness. Since the claim of private respondents
and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the
questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

57 | E v i d e n c e
Testimonial Evidence; Privileged Communication

Chan vs. Chan

G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

Facts: Josielene Lara Chan filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity her marriage to
Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their
children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited
drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and
rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their
marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse
when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the
case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to
his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried
a physician‘s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from ―methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.‖
Following up on this point, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny‘s medical records when he was there confined. The
request was accompanied by a motion to ―be allowed to submit in evidence‖ the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene‘s motion. It also denied her MR,
prompting her to file a certiorari petition before the CA. CA denied Josielene‘s petition. It ruled that, if
courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance
that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential.
The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He
attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
confinement.

Issue (1): Whether or not denial of the request for disclosure of hospital records was proper the ground
that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication?

Held: Yes. Sec. 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence reads: ―Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.—The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (c)
A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.‖

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient‘s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter‘s reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him
access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate
all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his
own health at great risk.

The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as
the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the
physician‘s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern
the patient‘s health problems. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene‘s request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny‘s hospital records. It is when those records are
produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in
evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Sec. 24(c), Rule 130 quoted above is about non-disclosure of
privileged matters.

58 | E v i d e n c e
Issue (2): Whether or not the prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates,
and pertinent hospital records?

Held: Yes. Sec. 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician ―cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined‖ regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does
not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient‘s illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient‘s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient‘s records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while
dealing with the patient, without the latter‘s prior consent.

Issue (2): Whether or not Johnny waived the privileged character of the hospital records?

Held: No. Sec. 17, Rule 132 provides: ―When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible.—When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one
party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.‖

Trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented
the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into
requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would
again be premature.

59 | E v i d e n c e
 Lacurom vs. Jacoba
A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

Facts: This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Judge Ubaldino Lacurom, Pairing Judge,
RTC of Cabanatuan City, Br. 30, against respondents Sps. Atty. Ellis Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba. Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro Veneracion in a civil case for
unlawful detainer against Federico Barrientos. The MTC of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor
of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the RTC. The case was raffled to Br. 30 where Judge Lacurom
was sitting as pairing judge. Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered
in favor of Veneracion. Veneracion's counsel filed a MR (with Request for Inhibition) dated 30 July 2001.
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a
fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. Atty. Olivia signed the motion on
behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

Judge Lacurom ordered Atty. Olivia to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in
contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001
motion. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Atty. Olivia claimed that "His Honor knows
beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did
not actually or actively participate in this case." Atty. Olivia disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent
to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that
is rightfully due all courts of justice." Nevertheless, Atty. Olivia expressed willingness to apologize "for
whatever mistake they may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when they may have
'stepped on the line and gone out of bounds'." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous
phrases stricken off the record. Judge Lacurom found Atty. Olivia a guilty of contempt and penalized her
with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.

Judge Lacurom issued another order, this time directing Atty. Ellis to explain why he should not be held
in contempt. Atty. Ellis complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied
that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Atty. Olivia‘s statements implicating him,
Atty. Ellis invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding
Atty. Ellis guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500. Later, Judge Lacurom
filed the present complaint against respondents.

Issue: Whether or not Velasco-Jacoba's statement pointing Jacoba as the author of the motion is
inadmissible in evidence under the marital privilege rule?

Held: No. The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant
to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

60 | E v i d e n c e
 Samala vs. Valencia
A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007

Facts: A complaint for Disbarment was filed by Clarita Samala against Atty. Luciano Valencia on the
ground of serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties. In Civil Case No. 95-105-
MK, filed in the RTC Br. 272, Marikina City, entitled ―Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez‖ for nonpayment
of rentals, Atty. Valencia, while being the counsel for Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants
Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. In
Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the MeTC, Br. 75, Marikina City, entitled ―Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J.
Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband‖ for ejectment, Atty. Valencia represented Valdez against
Bustamante—one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the
RTC, Br. 272, Marikina City (SCA Case No. 99-341-MK). In his decision, Presiding Judge Reuben dela Cruz
warned Atty. Valencia to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil
Case No. 95-105-MK. But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Br. 273, Marikina City, entitled
―Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City,‖ Atty. Valencia, as counsel
for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of TCT against
Alba, Atty. Valencia‘s former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. Records
further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, Atty. Valencia admitted that in Civil Case No.
95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga albeit
he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. Atty. Valencia also admitted that
he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and
her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled ―Valdez and Alba v.
Bustamante and her husband,‖ because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of
the property and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. But, while claiming that
respondent did not represent Alba, Atty. Valencia, however, avers that he already severed his
representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. Thus, the filing of Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK against Alba.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client?

Held: No. The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney‘s duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity
and to maintain inviolate the client‘s confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination
of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. An attorney owes loyalty to his
client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and
client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from
accepting professional employment from the client‘s adversary either in the same case or in a different
but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client
when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. The reason for the rule is that the
client‘s confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.

Here, Atty. Valencia‘s averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the
latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with Samala, is
unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new
client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that
he filed a case entitled ―Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband,‖ is a clear indication that Atty.
Valencia is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Atty. Valencia cannot just
claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing
Sec. 26, Rule 138 wherein the written consent of his client is required.

Atty. Valencia is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that ―a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated.‖ The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client‘s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the
strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Atty. Valencia‘s representation of Valdez and Alba against
Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of
conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from the Court. Atty. Valencia may have
withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, but the same
will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil
Case No. 2000-657-MK.

61 | E v i d e n c e
 Almonte vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by the Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief
accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce ―all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence,
such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988‖ and to enjoin him from enforcing his
orders. Petitioner Jose Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor Perez is Chief of
the EIIB‘s Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have
been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. The
Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits
filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that
petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces
tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of
the Records Section of the EIIB, Rivera, to produce before the investigator ―all documents relating to
Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of
the EIIB for 1988.‖ Hence, this petition. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the
ground that ―knowledge of EIIB‘s documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla… will
necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the
whole of its being‖ and this could ―destroy the EIIB.‖

Issue: Whether or not petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services
and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified?

Held: Yes. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of
such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen,
even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. There are, in
addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government‘s privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. With respect to the privilege based on
state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows: ―Judicial control over the evidence in
a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may
automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It
may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge
alone, in chambers. In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the court should
probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing
of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where
necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail.‖

On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his
conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President
against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

Here, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB‘s function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding ―illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting.‖ Consequently, while in
cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case
that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB
as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support
their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the ―only

62 | E v i d e n c e
item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential‖ is that which refers to the ―purchase of
information and payment of rewards.‖

It should be noted that the regulation requires that ―reasonable records‖ be kept justifying the
confidential or privileged character of the information relating to informers. There are no such reasonable
records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential.

The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the
documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the
confidential nature of the EIIB‘s functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for
its funds to theproper authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings made from certain ite ms in
the agency and alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947
personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their
claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA and found by it
to be regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the
government which by constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public
office.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled
by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He and his Deputies are designated
by the Constitution ―protectors of the people‖ and as such they are required by it ―to act promptly on
complaints in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation.‖
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while
there might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by
petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact
ceased. The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the
EIIB, while the covert missions to which they might have been deployed might either have been
accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the Ombudsman‘s duty to investigate the complaint that
there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials
and put to illegal use, remains.

63 | E v i d e n c e
 Neri vs. Senate Committees
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

Facts: DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People‘s
Republic of China. In connection with this, Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, on Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security initiated investigations on the
NBN-ZTE deal. The Senate Committees sent out invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials
involved in the NBN Project. Romulo Neri, the then Director General of NEDA, was among those invited.
He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However,
he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates. On
September 26, Neri testified before the Committees for 11 hours and he disclosed that COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize
the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the
alleged bribe?

Respondent Committees then issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear
and testify on November 20, 2007. However, ES Eduarto Ermita requested the Senate Committees to
dispense with Neri‘s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The questions fall under
conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered
executive privilege. Because of Neri‘s non-appearance, Senate Committees cited him in contempt. Neri
then filed for a TRO seeking to restrain the implementation of the contempt order.

Issue (1): Whether or not the communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive
privilege?

Held: Yes. There are three elements of presidential communications privilege: (1) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; (2) the
communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President;
and (3) the presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People‘s Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

As to the third element, a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest.
In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution.
Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome
only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are
enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner
that preserves the essential functions of each Branch. Here, the record is bereft of any categorical

64 | E v i d e n c e
explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the
three questions in the enactment of a law.

Issue (2): Whether or not the claim is properly invoked by the President?

Held: Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their
confidentiality.

The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than
enough compliance.

The second requirement, existence of precise and certain reason, was sufficiently satisfied because the
executive privilege is being invoked on the ground that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People‘s Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.

Discussion: Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is

founded on the President‘s generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is said to be
necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those
who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
There are two kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege
and, the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and
that the President believes should remain confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.

Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege

applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to
decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential
communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative
process privilege.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

65 | E v i d e n c e
Admissions

Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.

G.R. No. 181508, October 2, 2013

Facts: Pedro Constantino, Sr., ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of
land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes situated in Bulacan.
Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his 6 children, including Pedro Constantino, Jr., the
grandfather of the respondents; and Santiago Constantino, who was survived by his 5 children which
includes petitioner Oscar Constantino. Respondents Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan, great
grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint against petitioners Oscar,
Maxima and Casimira, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as
―Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,‖ Tax Declarations (TD) and reinstatement of the TD in the name of
Pedro Sr. It was alleged that petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over the whole parcel of land
owned by the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon
verification, respondents learned that a TD in the name of Oscar and his cousin Maxima was unlawfully
issued, which in effect canceled the TD in the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the new
TD was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious document denominated as
―Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,‖ wherein the petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole and
only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that subsequently, the subject land was divided equally
between petitioners Oscar and Maxima resulting in the issuance of a TD in the name of Oscar, for the
half portion of the lot, and the other half in the name of Maxima covered by another TD. The share of
Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister, Casimira in whose name a new TD was issued.

The petitioners, on the other hand, averred that Pedro Sr., upon his death, left several parcels of land.
The petitioners claimed that the document ―Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman‖ pertaining to the subject
lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and
among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr. Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have
no cause of action against them considering that the respondents‘ lawful share over the estate of Pedro
Sr., had already been transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent Asuncion), Arcadio
Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed, respondents adjudicated
unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land with an area of 192 sq m by
misrepresenting that they were ―the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed that in
the manner similar to the assailed ―Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,‖ they asserted their rights and
ownership over the subject lot without damage to the respondents.

A pre-trial conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as well
as identification of the issues to be litigated. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Hence this petition. Petitioners assert that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as
―Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman‖ which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an underlying
agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr. and grandmother of
respondents. The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the lot subject matter of the
―Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver‖ executed in 1968 as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the
estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected such agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her
heirs, herein respondents, were not disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said parcel of
land; thus, the heirs of Pedro Jr. were said to have acquiesced to the ―Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman‖ and the underlying agreement and therefore they have no recourse or reason to question it
taking cue from the doctrine of in pari delicto.

Issue (1): Whether or not respondents are ―privies‖ to Laquindanum?

Held: Yes. The Court cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be
attributed to them or that they are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-interest, and the
other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not signatories to said
agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect to them. Respondents argued and set forth as an issue
during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or privies to such an arrangement. It
is not disputed, however, that respondents are successors-in-interest of Laquindanum, one of the
signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver who was also allegedly in agreement with the
petitioners.

By the term ―privies‖ is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not
literally parties to the said action. Privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee,

66 | E v i d e n c e
donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their
respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is
one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one who takes by
conveyance.‖ In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are in the same
position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents‘ situation
is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in one case where the Court held: As such,
he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the
proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an
indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the judgment against his
predecessor.

Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to
respondents who merely succeeded Maria.

Issue (2): Whether or not the subject land is part of the estate of Pedro, Sr.?

Held: Yes. The respondents, through stipulations, admitted this during the pre-trial conference. Judicial
admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one
of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Sec. 7, Rule 18, which mandates that
the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and
limiting the issues to be tried. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties
and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial
admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may
not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from
the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.

The Court is aware that the last paragraph of Sec. 7, Rule 18 serves as a caveat for the rule of
conclusiveness of judicial admissions — for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the course
of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the pre-trial can still be taken up. In
addition, Sec. 4, Rule 129, provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding
conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two
exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is
shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission.

However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While
denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the lot, Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a
vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr. The denial is simply a self-
serving declaration unsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive the stipulations made during the
pre-trial conference. Consequently, respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which
they based their right over the property subject matter thereof.

67 | E v i d e n c e
 Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 6, 2016

Facts: Petitioners (Sen. Revilla, et al.) are all charged as coconspirators for their respective participations
in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in
the total amount of P517,000,000. The charges are contained in two complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint
for Plunder filed by the NBI and Atty. Levito Baligod; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman, both before the
Ombudsman.

Among others, Sen. Ramon Revilla, Jr., as Senator of the Republic, was implicated for authorizing the
illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of
fraudulent NGOs created and controlled by Napoles‘ JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation in relation to
―ghost‖ PDAF-funded projects, and for receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his
―commission‖ or ―kickback.;‖ and Richard Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times
material to this case, for processing the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla‘s PDAF,22
and for personally receiving his own ―commission‖ or ―kickback‖ from the diverted funds;23

The Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Sen. Revilla faults the
Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence
of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistleblowers‘ testimonies who
purportedly were his coconspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alios acta rule.

Issue: Whether or not whistleblowers‘ testimonies are inadmissible based on the res inter alios acta rule?

Held: No. In Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court had ruled that the testimonies of the same
whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were
also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that technical
rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation. The Court was
unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter. Absent any countervailing
reason, the rule on stare decisis mandates a similar application of the foregoing ruling to this case.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers‘ statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on
independently relevant statements. ―Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.‖ Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the
whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co accused in
the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore,
the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation
and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla‘s PDAF, should
be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

68 | E v i d e n c e
 Pamplona vs. Cueto
G.R. No. 204735, February 19, 2018

Facts: A Complaint was filed by Sps. Lilia and Vedasto Cueto against Sps. Cipriano and Bibiana Pamplona
for specific performance, conveyance, consignation and damages before the RTC. It was alleged, inter
alia, that: Sps. Pamplona are the registered owners of a Lot situated in Batangas City. Lilia and Sps.
Pamplona mutually agreed that the former would buy and the latter would sell on installment, the
aforementioned immovable including the house standing thereon payable on a monthly. The agreement
was verbal considering that Lilia and Sps. Pamplona are sisters and brother-in-law, respectively, and
completely trusted each other. However, a notebook with the personal inscription of Bibiana was sent to
Lilia at the latter‘s address in Italy, affirming their oral agreement and wherein the list of all the
remittances would be entered. On even date, Sps. Pamplona voluntarily transferred the peaceful
possession of the subject property to Lilia and from the date of the agreement, the latter had remitted to
the former her monthly installments, leaving a balance of US$11,000. Lilia allowed her son Rolando (or
Roilan) Cueto to reside at the subject property as Lilia had to leave for abroad due to her employment in
Italy. Since then, Lilia through her son, has religiously paid the annual realty taxes on the premises,
including electric and water bills.

Sps. Pamplona then filed before the MTC a case for unlawful detainer against Rolando and his wife Liza.
Being indigent, Sps. Rolando and Liza failed to defend themselves resulting in a judgment by default and
they were finally evicted. Lilia learned of the eviction case when she returned home from Italy. She
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, and registered the same with the land records. A written tender
of payment of US$11,000 was sent to Sps. Pamplona, which Bibiana refused to receive. In this unlawful
detainer case, Roilan failed to raise as a defense the existence of the contract to sell between Bibiana and
Lilia.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of Roilan to raise as a defense in the unlawful detainer suit against him
the existence of the contract to sell between Bibiana and Lilia is an admission by silence on the part of
Lilia?

Held: No. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. As an exception to the rule, the act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing may be admitted as
evidence against a party who fails to refute or reject it. This is known as admission by silence, and is
covered by Sec. 32, Rule 130, which provides: ―An act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against
him.‖

For an act or declaration to be admissible against a party as an admission by silence, the following
requirements must be present, namely:
(a) the party must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the other person;
(b) he must have had the opportunity to deny it;
(c) he must have understood the act or declaration;
(d) he must have an interest to object as he would naturally have done if the act or declaration was
not true;
(e) the facts are within his knowledge; and
(f) the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue.

The first two requirements are lacking in the case of Lilia. She was not shown to have heard or seen the
admissions by Vedasto and Roilan that were in writing because she was then abroad. Also, she was not
shown to have had the opportunity to deny their written admissions simply because she was not a party
to the written admissions. The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing only
when the party to be thereby bound was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant.
Without such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that although the party would
have immediately reacted had the statements been orally made in his presence, such prompt response
can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.

In the context of the norms set by jurisprudence for the application of the rule on admission by silence,
Lilia could not be properly held to have admitted by her silence her lack of interest in the property. On
the contrary, the records reveal otherwise. Upon her return to the country, she communicated with
Bibiana on the terms of payment, and immediately took steps to preserve her interest in the property by
annotating the adverse claim in the land records, and by commencing this suit against the petitioners.
Such affirmative acts definitively belied any claim of her being silent in the face of the assault to her
interest.

69 | E v i d e n c e
 Ocampo vs. Ocampo
G.R. No. 227894, July 5, 2017

Facts: Jose Ocampo and Ricardo Ocampo are full-blooded brothers being sons of the late Basilio
Ocampo and Juliana Sunglao. The present case arose from a complaint filed by Ricardo against Jose for
partition and annulment of TCT. In the complaint, Ricardo alleged that he and Jose are co-owners of the
subject property, which was a conjugal property left by their parents, consisting of a 150-square meter
lot and the improvements thereon located in Sampaloc, Manila. The subject property was originally
registered in their parents‘ names. Ricardo claimed that Jose and his wife, Andrea Mejia Ocampo,
conspired in falsifying his signature on a notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Waiver (―ESW‖), and
effecting the transfer of the property in the name of Jose under a TCT. Based on a finding by the NBI
that Ricardo‘s signature was forged, an Information was filed against Jose, the notary public, and two
others. Ricardo requested for partition of the property, but Jose refused to do so and secretly mortgaged
the property.

Jose and his wife moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but it was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, they filed their Answer with Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defense of
prescription. The trial court then dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Ricardo filed a
MR and other supplemental pleadings, but they were denied by the trial court. Ricardo thus elevated the
matter to the CA, which declared the RTC‘s Order null and void. Thus, the RTC set the case for pretrial.
After trial, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled in favor of Ricardo. Hence, this petition.

Based on Ricardo‘s submission before the trial court, both Jose and Ricardo were residing at the subject
property at the time the complaint was filed. This was unqualifiedly admitted by petitioner in his
Amended Answer and no denial was interposed therefrom.

Issue: Whether or not Jose‘s failure to refute Ricardo‘s possession of the subject property may be
deemed as a judicial admission?

Held: Yes. A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by
verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. A judicial
admission conclusively binds the party making it and he cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to
or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted, unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.

70 | E v i d e n c e
Confessions

People vs. Dacanay

G.R. No. 216064, November 7, 2016

Facts: In an Information filed with the RTC, Antonio Dacanay was charged with the crime of Parricide for
killing his wife, Norma. Norma was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of
their home by their son, Quinn, who was then coming home from school. Quinn likewise observed that
the rest of the house was in disarray, with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if
suggesting that a robbery had just taken place. At that time, Antonio had already left for work after
having allegedly left the house at around six in the morning. Quinn then rushed to the house of his aunt,
one Beth Bautista, to tell her about the fate of Norma, and then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio,
which was only ten (10) minutes away from their house. Thereafter, both Quinn and Antonio proceeded
back to their house and were met by some police officers who were then already conducting an
investigation on the incident.

PO3 Jay Santos went to Antonio‘s workplace at PHIMCO Industries, Inc. to invite Antonio to the precinct.
Antonio acceded to such request and, after fetching Quinn from school, they all proceeded to the police
station. When they arrived at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio Nastor, Jr. and some members of
the media were present. While at the precinct, Nastor informed PO3 Santos that Antonio was already
willing to confess to killing Norma. Accordingly, PO3 Santos proceeded to contact a lawyer from PAO. In
the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain
silent. However, despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio nonetheless confessed to the crime
before the media representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos. Notably, the
reporters, Jun Adsuara and Nestor Etoile, were presented by the prosecution during trial, wherein both
testified that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime without any intimidation or coercion
exerted on his person.

Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible on the ground that it was given under a
―coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.‖ To support his claim, Antonio underscores the fact that
he was inside a detention cell with two or three other detainees when he allegedly confessed to the crime
before the media.

Issue: Whether or not Antonio‘s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence?

Held: Yes. At the outset, Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant‘s Brief that he was not under
custodial investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession. Hence, Antonio‘s reliance on
constitutional safeguards is misplaced as much as it is unfounded. At this juncture, it bears stressing that
during the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by the news reporters, there was no
indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity who could have possibly exerted
undue pressure or influence. As recounted by both reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily
narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid and straightforward manner, ―with no trace of fear,
intimidation or coercion in him.‖

A confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police
authorities, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. The fact that
the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a detention cell does not by itself render
such confession inadmissible, contrary to what Antonio would like the Court to believe, especially since
the same was given freely and spontaneously.

As a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of corpus

delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt. In this connection, extrajudicial confessions are presumed
voluntary until the contrary is proved. Hence, considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption
of voluntariness regarding the authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife, Norma,
the Court finds Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide.

71 | E v i d e n c e
 Pfleider vs. People
G.R. No. 208001, June 19, 2017
(Discussions on Confession are in the Dissenting Opinion)

Facts: An Information for Murder against P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) and Ryan Bautista was filed
before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause against Pfleider. The prosecution
filed a MR praying for the reinstatement of the case, but the Court denied the said motion. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was therefore filed with the CA. The petition was grounded on grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since (a) the questioned resolution and order: (i)
discarded and ignored vital evidence and the authority of the public prosecutor in determining the
existence of probable cause; (ii) excluded the extrajudicial confession executed by Pfleider‘s co-accused,
Bautista, despite the presumed voluntariness and due execution thereof; and (iii) failed to give weight
and consideration to other vital pieces of evidence evincing trustworthiness of Bautista‘s extrajudicial
confession and establishing petitioner‘s complicity; and (b) the manifest presence of probable cause
supports the charge of murder as against Pfleider. The CA set aside the Resolution and Order of the RTC,
and directed the reinstatement of the Information for Murder against Pfleider. Pfleider filed a MR on the
CA‘s decision. People, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest.
In a Resolution, the CA resolved, among others, to Note the OSG‘s Motion for the Issuance of a Warrant
of Arrest. The CA, in a Resolution, denied the MR for lack of merit, there being no legal and factual basis
for the Court to depart from its earlier ruling reinstating the Criminal Case for Murder against Pfleider.
Hence, the present Petition. The SC, in a Resolution, resolved ―to deny the petition and affirm the ruling
of the CA for failure to show any reversible error committed by it when it held that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case against Pfleider despite the presence of probable cause
linking him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged against him.‖ Thus, Pfleider filed a MR. In a
Resolution, the Court resolved to ―grant the MR and set aside the earlier Resolution, reinstate the petition
and to require the OSG to comment thereon.‖ The OSG filed its Comment, while Pfleider filed his Reply.
Basically, what Pfleider and People want from the Court is for it to review the facts and to finally
determine whether a probable cause really exists in the case against Pfleider for murder.

Held: Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with the SC. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case
may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. A close examination of the
arguments presented by both parties would show that the present case does not fall under any of the
exceptions.

It must be emphasized that the SC is not a trier of facts. The determination of probable cause is and will
always entail a review of the facts of the case. The CA, in finding probable cause, did not exactly delve
into the facts of the case but raised questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said
facts. It ruled that, ―Questions remain as to why, among all people, Bautista would implicate Pfleider as
the inducer and why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime.‖ From this query, the CA
has raised doubt. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure: ―In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of the complaint of
information.‖

Here, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause, outrightly dismissed the case.
The contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well noted and from the very provision of the Rules of
Court, the remedy, in case of doubt, is for the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Court finds it appropriate to remand the case to the
trial court for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination of probable cause based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
Pfleider should have been granted insofar as his prayer to set aside the Decision and Resolution, both of
the CA; and for the Court to order that this case be remanded to the RTC for the judicial determination of
probable cause and the proper disposition of the same case. However, in view of the demise of Pfleider,
which effectively extinguished his criminal liability, this case had been rendered moot and academic.
Thus, the criminal action against him should just be dismissed, and deemed closed and terminated
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.

Discussion (Dissenting Opinion): The proposition of the prosecution that an extrajudicial confession
may be admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts is unavailing. The application of the rule that
an extrajudicial confession may be accepted as corroborative evidence necessarily implies that there must
be other direct or circumstantial evidence. In the absence of any other evidence, then there will be
nothing for the extrajudicial confession to corroborate.

72 | E v i d e n c e
 Frontreras vs. People
G.R. No. 190583, December 7, 2015

Facts: Maria Paz Frontreras was the Vault Custodian of the 685 Old Balara, Tandang Sora, Quezon City
branch of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop. She was tasked to safe keep all the pawned items and jewelry
inside the branch vault. Likewise employed in the same branch were Teresita Salazar and Jeannelyn
Carpon who served as Branch Manager and District Manager, respectively. Salazar was responsible for
the overall operation of the Old Balara branch and was also tasked to handle the appraisal of pawned
items and the recording of such transactions. Carpon, on the other hand, supervised the overall
operations of the branches within her district ensuring that they are operating within the objectives,
procedures, and policies of Cebuana; she also monitored the district bank account and handled the
appraisal of pawned items and the recording of cash.

A surprise audit was conducted at the Old Balara branch by Cebuana‘s internal auditors, Mila Escartin and
Cynthia Talampas. The audit revealed that 156 pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of P1,250,800
were missing. A cash shortage of P848.60 was likewise discovered. When Frontreras was asked to explain
the discrepancy, she told Escartin that she would reduce her explanation into writing. The next day, an
audit report was sent to Marcelino Finolan, Area Manager of Cebuana. Upon receipt of the audit report,
Finolan immediately proceeded to the Old Balara branch to conduct an investigation. He called Escartin
and the petitioner for a meeting during which Frontreras handed over several pawn tickets while Escartin
gave him a handwritten letter made by Frontreras, which reads in part:―Yung iba pong item ay mga
tubos na at nakatago lang po ang papel. Nagsimula po ito noong buwan ng Hulyo. Dala na rin po ng
matinding pangangailangan sa pera. Ito lamang po ang tangi kong mailalahad at iyan din po ang
katotohanan.‖

Issue: Whether or not Frontreras may be held guilty for the crime of qualified theft based on such letter?

Held: Yes. The tenor of the foregoing declaration and the circumstances of Frontreras at the time she
wrote and signed it, all militate against her bare allegation that she was threatened with an
administrative case unless she admits her transgression. Frontreras wrote and signed the confession
letter spontaneously. When Escartin asked her if there are any problems in the Old Balara branch,
Frontreras answered that she will write down her explanation and will submit it to Escartin. Frontreras
also told Talampas that if she will escape, she will just be afraid that someone will go after her and that
she will just face the consequences. Talampas then saw Frontreras make and sign the confession letter.
When Finolan went to the Old Balara branch for further investigation, Escartin handed her the confession
letter from Frontreras.

The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be
known to Frontreras. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one‘s job in an administrative case is less
cumbersome than risking one‘s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus
implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her
job. Frontreras‘ declarations to Talampas show that she fully understood the consequences of her
confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus,
negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an administrative sanction.

A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a
high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth
and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a
condition vividly present in this case. Frontreras‘ extrajudicial written confession coupled with several
circumstantial evidence all point to her as the perpetrator of the unlawful taking.

73 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Opinano
G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017

Facts: Diony Opiniano, Romaldo Lumayag, and Jerry Dela Cruz were charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide committed upon the persons and property of Sps. Eladio and Leonor Santos. At the time of
the incident, PO2 Rodolfo Paule and SPO1 Eduardo Roderno were traversing C-3 Road aboard a police-
marked vehicle when they noticed a man carrying a heavy-looking bag. When they approached him, the
man ran away. After a brief chase, the man was cornered. PO2 Paule noticed that he was nervous and
sweating. His right leg was stained with blood and his right waistline was bulging with an object, which
turned out to be a double bladed 9-inch mini kris. He did not answer when asked about the bloodstain on
his leg. They brought him to the police station where he identified himself as Dela Cruz. The bag yielded
three reams of cigarettes, a lighter, some coins, and a blue denim wallet with cash. PO2 Paule also
noticed that the P500 bill in the wallet was stained with fresh blood. Upon further interrogation, Dela Cruz
verbally confessed that he and his companions, whom he later revealed as ―Ango‖ or Lumayag, and
Opiniano, ―had just killed and robbed an old couple.‖ He was supposed to bring the contents of the bag
to his cohorts in the illegal settlers‘ area in Malabon. During crossexamination, PO2 Paule affirmed that
Dela Cruz was not aided by a lawyer, nor was his confession reduced into writing. PO2 Paule further
testified that when they informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter remained silent. Opiniano
and Lumayag were later on apprehended. The three were convicted of the crime charged. Only Opiniano
appealed the RTC‘s decision, which the CA affirmed. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Dela Cruz‘s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence?

Held: No. Dela Cruz‘s extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver
of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence.
It is undisputed that Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into
writing. Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not
say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to
have a competent and independent counsel. Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution states that ―these rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.‖ Dela Cruz was merely told of his
Constitutional rights, but he was never asked whether he understood what he was told or whether he
wanted to exercise or avail himself of such rights. Nonetheless, even without Dela Cruz‘s extrajudicial
confession, Opiniano‘s conviction still stands.

74 | E v i d e n c e
 Cruz vs. People
G.R. No. 206437, November 22, 2017

Facts: In an Information, Leandro Cruz, Emmanuel Manahan, Alric Jervoso (petitioners), and Alvin
Pardilla (at large) were charged with Qualified Theft committed upon their employer, Prestige Brands.
The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged. It held that the prosecution proved that petitioners
committed grave abuse of confidence when they stole items belonging to Prestige Brands. It added that
petitioners enjoyed trust and confidence of Prestige Brands because they were given access to company
stocks, which they took out for delivery to clients. It ratiocinated that while no one witnessed the actual
taking of said items, the written admissions of Jervoso and Cruz were admissible in evidence. These
admissions, according to the RTC, were part of res gestae because they were spontaneous reactions to
the confrontation, and were not mere afterthought. It added that while Manahan did not submit any
written confession, it appeared that he shared in the proceeds of the stolen items, which was indicative
of conspiracy and connivance. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s Decision. It also gave credence to the
admission of petitioners that they stole from Prestige Brands. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the written confessions made by Cruz, Jervoso and Pardilla are admissible in
evidence?

Held: No. The Court is not unmindful of the presumption of voluntariness of a confession. However, the
confessant may overcome such presumption provided, that he or she substantiates that one‘s admission
was not true and the confession was unwillingly given. There must be external manifestations to prove
that the confession was not voluntary. These external manifestations included institution of a criminal
action against the alleged intimidators for maltreatment, and evidence of compulsion, duress or violence
on the confessant. Undeniably, these external manifestations are present here.

To note, a day after the execution of their confessions regarding the supposed theft of Prestige Brands‘
personal properties, Cruz and Jervoso promptly reported the matter to the Makati police. They even filed
a case for grave coercion, grave threats, and incriminating innocent persons, against Prestige Brands.
Furthermore, petitioners also narrated the details on how they were threatened and intimidated prior to
and during the execution of said confessions. In the case of Jervoso, he averred that Mayor Atienza
talked to him at Baywalk in Roxas Boulevard and asked him to cooperate or else he (Jervoso) would be
liable. On the other hand, Cruz and Jervoso stated that NBI employees (Lontoc and Atty. Simon)
intimidated them into signing said confession. They narrated with particularity that on November 22,
2003, they were forced to stay up to 11:15 p.m. in their office to translate into Filipino and into their
handwriting the typewritten confession they earlier executed. In the case of Manahan, he also affirmed
that Dadlani intimidated him into signing a confession by mentioning to him his (Dadlani) friends in the
media, and his connections to Mayor Atienza and the NBI. Although Manahan refused to make a written
admission, he confirmed the intimidation made by Dadlani against him.

The Court also observes that although the aforesaid confessions were individually executed by Cruz,
Jervoso and Pardilla, they were in fact similarly worded, except as to the name of the confessant. Even
the translations of these confessions into Filipino executed by Cruz and Jervoso were also similarly
worded, except as to the names and signatures of the persons executing them. Notably, these
confessions did not contain specific details as regards any item unlawfully taken. Indeed, an indication of
voluntariness is the disclosure of the details in the confession which details are only known to the
declarant. For lack of necessary details in their statements, the Court holds that the same did not
establish any unlawful taking of the personal properties of Prestige Brands.

To add, Cruz and Jervoso vehemently denied that their statements contained a jurat. The prosecution did
not, however, address this matter. This is so even if it may conveniently present the Notary Public before
whom petitioners and Pardilla purportedly appeared and voluntarily and intelligently sworn to the truth of
their statements. Such is the case if indeed petitioners presented these statements before a Notary
Public.

Without the supposed confessions discussed above, there is no other evidence that would establish that
petitioners committed theft against Prestige Brands.

75 | E v i d e n c e
Conduct and Character

People vs. Santos

G.R. Nos. 100225-26, May 11, 1993

Facts: Raul Santos was charged with, and was convicted of, the crimes of murder with the use of
unlicensed firearms upon the person of Alberto Bautista and frustrated murder upon the person of
Glicerio Cupcupin. Santos questions the trial court for admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo
Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case where Santos was also charged with the murder of one
Daniel Nuguera which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were
ambushed, i.e., at the corner of Yangco St. and Estrella St., Malabon, Metro Manila. When the
prosecution first presented the sworn statement of Guerrero in order to show criminal propensity on the
part of Santos, the defense objected to admission of such sworn statement; the trial court sustained the
objection and rejected the evidence for the purpose it was initially offered.

Issue: Whether or not the affidavit of Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case where Santos was
also charged with the murder, was properly admitted in evidence?

Held: Yes. The trial court admitted the same as falling within one or more of the exceptions set out in
Sec. 34, Rule 130, which reads: ―Similar Acts as Evidence.—Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the
like.‖

The Guerrero affidavit was admitted for the limited purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme,
and more specifically, that Santos knew that the particular corner of two particular streets in Malabon
was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Santos also had waived the hearsay character
of this evidence by failure seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit; it is too late in that day
to raise the hearsay rule in Santos‘ memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented their
respective cases and had made their respective offers of evidence. Finally, and in any case, the exclusion
of the Guerrero affidavit would not result in any change in the result reached by the trial court. For that
result is essentially and adequately based upon the positive identification of Santos as one of the gunmen
by Bautista and Bohol.

76 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Nardo
G.R. No. 133888, March 1, 2001

Facts: Alfredo Nardo was charged with, and was convicted of, the crime of rape. The victim, Lorielyn, is
the eldest daughter of Nardo, who was then 14 years old. During the trial, when asked to comment on
the victim, Atty. Santer Gonzales, the employer of Nardo, described her (Lorielyn) as one capable of
telling a lie. He narrated that once, she went to his farm to collect the amount of P50 as daily wage of
her grandfather, but she gave only P35 to her mother. Elizabeth, Lorielyn‘s mother, testified that Lorielyn
asked permission to attend a holy retreat, but Elizabeth found out from the school that there was no such
retreat. Lorielyn lied on another occasion, when she told Bonifacia Nieva that her grandfather was sick so
she can borrow money. Nieva testified that her daughter was a classmate of Lorielyn. Once, Lorielyn
visited her saying that she was sent by Elizabeth to borrow money because her grandfather was sick.
Nieva gave Lorielyn P200. Later, when she went to see Elizabeth to collect payment, she found out that
Lorielyn‘s grandfather did not get sick. Lorielyn admitted to her that she lied about it to be able to borrow
money. Nardo argues that Lorielyn‘s conduct after the alleged rape, where she stayed in the house with
her father and continued to do her daily chores, creates a doubt on the veracity of the charge. Nardo‘s
proposition is derived from Lorielyn‘s perfunctory yes-or-no answers to the leading questions propounded
to her on cross-examination.

Issue (1): Whether or not the instances where Lorielyn supposedly lied is admissible to prove that she
did the same or a similar thing at another time?

Held: No. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions
were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents‘ permission to leave
the house. However, Rule 130, Sec. 34, provides that: ―Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like.‖ While lying may constitute a habit, the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the
moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one‘s own father
of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

Issue (2): Whether or not Lorielyn‘s conduct after the rape, during which she continued to perform her
tasks and lived with her father in their house, negates the commission of rape?

Held: No. Rather than sustain this argument, the Court relies instead on the observations of the Social
Welfare Officer, whom the Court finds to be an impartial witness, in this wise: Per observation, Lorielyn is
a shy and silent type person. She talked in a very small voice and during the interview she only talks
when being asked. She also appears to be very sad and have been staring blankly.

77 | E v i d e n c e
 Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002

Facts: Felipe Alejaga filed with a Free Patent Application covering a parcel of land located in Roxas City.
When the application was executed under oath, Efren Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his
investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office (DLO), Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas.
The DLO approved the application and the issuance of a Free Patent to the applicant. The patent was
also ordered to be issued and the patent was forwarded to the Register of Deeds for registration and
issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, the OCT-FP was issued to Alejaga. Later,
the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the DLO for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of Alejaga. Isagani Cartagena,
Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau (LMB) submitted his Report.
The Chief, Legal Division, LMB, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil
proceeding for the cancellation of the OCT-FP in the name of Alejaga. In the meantime, Alejaga. obtained
a loan with PNB secured by a real estate mortgage. The promissory note of Alejaga. was annotated at
the back of the title.

The government through the OSG instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and
Reversion against Alejaga. covering Free Patent Application of the subject parcel of land. While the case
is pending hearing, Alejaga. died. He was substituted by his Heirs. The RTC declared that the approval of
Free Patent Application and issuance of OCT-FP in the name of Felipe Alejaga was by means of fraud
hence, null and void ab initio. In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that the Republic failed to prove its
allegation that Alejaga had obtained the OCT-FP through fraud and misrepresentation. The CA brushed
aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena‘s testimony that Land Inspector Efren Recio had not conducted an
investigation on the free patent application of Alejaga. Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not Cartagena‘s testimony is hearsay and must not be admitted?

Held: No. The report of Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly
admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Cartagena‘s statement on Recio‘s alleged admission may be considered as ―independently relevant.‖ A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person—the latter‘s knowledge, belief, or good or
bad faith and the former‘s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating
the hearsay rule.

Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may
be considered as independently relevant.

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness
by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually
made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.

Since Cartagena‘s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

78 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence

Patula vs. People

G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

Facts: Anna Lerima Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in the RTC. The
Prosecution‘s first witness was Lamberto Go. The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen
Guivencan. In the course of Guivencan‘s direct-examination, Patula‘s counsel interposed a continuing
objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were
hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. With
that, Patula‘s counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to
be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
The Prosecution then formally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by
petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by
Patula, and Guivencan‘s so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies. After the Prosecution rested
its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention
to do so, and instead rested its case. The Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective
memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.

The RTC, stating that inasmuch as Patula had opted ―not to present evidence for her defense‖ the
Prosecution‘s evidence remained ―unrefuted and uncontroverted,‖ rendered its decision finding Patula
guilty of estafa. Patula contends that said judgment ―blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the
rules on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all
private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance with Sec.
20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution‘s pieces of evidence are admissible?

Held: No. Reference is made to Sec. 36 of Rule 130, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A
witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because
her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but
from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts
in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in
court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends
not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to
the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court
as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the
truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the
assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter
asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For
example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the
complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief,
but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character
but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made,
to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to
which the hearsay rule applies.

Sec. 36, Rule 130 is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should
be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party
to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth
in a dispute while also safeguarding a party‘s right to cross-examine her adversary‘s witness, the Rules of
Court offers two solutions.

79 | E v i d e n c e
The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court
under oath or affirmation. Sec. 1, Rule 132 formalizes this solution, viz.: ―Examination to be done in open
court.—The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally.‖

The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse
party. Sec. 6, Rule 132 ensures this solution thusly: ―Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue.‖

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases,
i.e., Section 14(2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: ―In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall… enjoy the right… to meet the witnesses face to face…,‖ the rule
requiring the crossexamination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.

Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan‘s testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of Patula‘s misappropriation or conversion.

80 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Aguirre
G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017

Facts: Accussed Jehlson Aguirre, Michael Arabit, Jefferson Paralejas and Jeffrey Roxas were charged
with Qualified Trafficking in Persons, for recruiting, transporting, harboring, providing or receiving, in
conspiracy with one another, ten girls, including seven minors, for purposes of prostitution and sexual
exploitation. Of the ten girls (complainants), four testified in Court against accused including as to what
the latter told the complainants.

Issue: Whether or not the complainants‘ testimonies as to what accused told them are hearsay?

Held: No. True, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge,
i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. In this
case, however, the alleged statements were addressed to and directed at private complainants
themselves. Thus, private complainants testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own
perception. Indeed, it has been held that testimony of what one heard a party say is not
necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true,
but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence
necessary to convict the accused. Here, the RTC, who had the opportunity to examine the demeanor
of private complainants on the witness stand, found their testimonies to be solid and credible. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case. The Court finds no such misapprehension or misinterpretation as to
warrant a reversal of the RTC‘s assessment of private complainants‘ credibility as witnesses.

81 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Dying Declaration

Patula vs. Calinawan

G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017

Facts: In an Information, Romeo Calinawan was charged with murder for killing Janice Nevado Silan. At
around midnight, Marigor Silan, Janice‘s 7-year-old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their
kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado, Janice‘s brother and
neighbor, was awakened by shouts coming from his sister‘s house. He rushed to her house and saw her
children crying. After bringing her children to his house, he went looking for Janice whom he saw outside
a neighbor‘s house pleading for help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her,
and she answered it was Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When
Darwin Silan, Janice‘s husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who stabbed her and she
reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the medical treatment at the
hospital.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted Calinawan for murder. The trial court noted that Marigor
positively and categorically identified him as the one who stabbed her mother. It noted that she was able
to identify him because of his amputated fingers. In addition, the trial court pointed out that the dying
declaration of Janice to Jonathan corroborated Marigor‘s statement that Calinawan killed her mother.

Issue (1): Whether or not Janice‘s antemortem statement is admissible as a dying declaration?

Held: No. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant‘s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.

Here, the Court notes that in her affidavit, Janice said that she thought she could survive the attack. She
never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was optimistic of her recovery. In view of this, there
seems to be a doubt whether she was aware of her impending death.

Issue (2): Whether or not Janice‘s statement is admissible as a part of res gestea?

Held: Yes. Granting there is such doubt, Janice‘s statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. In order for a statement to be considered part of res
gestae, the following elements must concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All the
foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.

First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never had the opportunity
to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her attacker
when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took pace. Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the
circumstances surrounding her stabbing.

82 | E v i d e n c e
 Patula vs. Umapas
G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017

Facts: Jose Belmar Umapas mauled his wife Gemma and, with the use of alcohol intended for a coleman
or lantern, doused her with it and set her ablaze at their home. Gemma was brought to the hospital for
treatment by Rodrigo Dacanay who informed the attending hospital personnel, which included Dr. Arnildo
Tamayo, that it was Umapas who set her on fire. Gemma was found to have suffered contusions on the
left cheek and on the lower lip, lacerations on right parietal area and on the left temporal area, and
thermal burns over 57% of her body. Gemma later died. The police authorities were unable to talk to
Gemma immediately after the incident as they were prevented from doing so by the attending physician
at the hospital‘s emergency room. But the following day, SPO1 Anthony Garcia was able to interview the
victim at her hospital bed. Though she spoke slowly with eyes closed, Gemma was said to be coherent
and agreed to give a statement about the incident which included her identifying her husband as her
assailant. Gemma was asked if she felt that she was dying, and she said ―yes.‖ SPO1 Garcia reduced her
statement in writing and the same was attested thru the victim‘s thumbmark. A nurse who was present
when the statement of the victim was taken signed as witness.

Issue: Whether or not Gemma‘s antemortem statement is admissible as a dying declaration?

Held: Yes. While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a
report in open court of a dying person‘s declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against
hearsay if it is ―made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the
case.‖ It is considered as ―evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no
person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.‖ Four requisites must
concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant‘s death. Second, at the time the declaration was
made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death.Third, the declarant is
competent as a witness. Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder,
or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.

Here, all the above-mentioned requisites were met. Gemma communicated her ante mortem statement
to SPO1 Garcia, identifying Umapas as the person who mauled her, poured gasoline on her, and set her
ablaze. Gemma‘s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and
circumstances of her death and taking into consideration the severity of her wounds, it may be
reasonably presumed that she uttered the same under the belief that her own death was already
imminent. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant‘s belief in the imminence of her death
can be shown by the declarant‘s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of
her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of her physician. While more than 12
hours has lapsed from the time of the incident until her declaration, it must be noted that Gemma was in
severe pain during the early hours of her admission. Dr. Tamayo even testified that when she saw
Gemma in the hospital, she was restless, in pain and incoherent considering that not only was she
mauled, but 57% of her body was also burned. She also underwent operation and treatment, and was
under medication during the said period. Given the circumstances Gemma was in, even if there was
sufficient lapse of time, we could only conclude that at the time of her declaration, she feared that her
death was already imminent. While suffering in pain due to thermal burns, she could not have used said
time to contrive her identification of Umapas as her assailant. There was, thus, no opportunity for
Gemma to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. Moreover, Gemma would have been competent
to testify on the subject of the declaration had she survived. There is nothing in the records that show
that Gemma rendered involuntary declaration. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for parricide in which Gemma was the victim. It has been held that conviction or guilt may be
based mainly on the antemortem statements of the deceased. In the face of the positive identification
made by deceased Gemma of appellant Umapas, it is clear that Umapas committed the crime.

83 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Declaration Against Interest

People vs. Bernal

G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997

Facts: Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still
unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping upon the person of Bienvenido Openda, Jr. The
theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish
that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal‘s wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former‘s
kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.

Roberto Racasa, who knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre,
narrated that he and the victim were drinking at ―Tarsing‘s Store‖ on that fateful day when Bernal passed
by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came
to the store and asked for ―Payat.‖ When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed ―Payat,‖ he was
handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men. Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a
friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and
Bernal‘s wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used
to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty ―not to do it again because she was a married woman.‖

Issue: Whether or not Openda, Jr.‘s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal‘s
wife is admissible in evidence?

Held: Yes. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably
inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Sec. 38,
Rule 130 provides: ―Declaration against interest.—The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarant‘s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against
third persons.‖

With the deletion of the phrase ―pecuniary or moral interest‖ from the present provision, it is safe to
assume that ―declaration against interest‖ has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is,
pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was
aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to
falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is
admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

84 | E v i d e n c e
 Heirs of Peter Donton vs. Stier
G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017

Facts: A complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages originally filed by
now-deceased Peter Donton, the predecessor of petitioners Heirs of Peter Donton. The subject matter of
this case is a parcel of land with improvements located at No. 33, Don Jose Street, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City. It was previously covered by a TCTC under the name of Donton until its registration in the
names of respondents Duane Stier and Emily Maggay. While Donton was in the US, he discovered that
respondents took possession and control of the subject property, as well as the management of his
business operating thereat. Donton‘s lawyers in the Philippines made demands upon respondents to
vacate the subject property and to cease and desist from operating his business, but to no avail. Thus,
Donton was forced to return to the Philippines, where he learned that respondents, through alleged
fraudulent means, were able to transfer the ownership of the subject property in their names.
Accordingly, his title had been cancelled and a new one had been issued in respondents‘ names. Hence,
he filed a complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages against
respondents, alleging that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, by virtue of which he purportedly
sold the subject property to respondents, was a forgery. He denied signing or executing the document in
favor of respondents. He averred that respondents conspired with the employees of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City to defraud him, and that Stier is an American citizen and a nonresident alien who
is, therefore, not allowed by law to own any real property in the Philippines.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It ruled that petitioners
failed to prove that Stier is an American citizen. It explained that the only evidence that petitioners
presented was a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) certifying that one Duane Otto Stier,
an American citizen, visited the Philippines on September 2, 2001 and left on October 6, 2001. As such,
the RTC reasoned that the same was not sufficient to prove Stier‘s citizenship; at most, it merely proved
the alleged travel of the latter. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Stier is an American citizen that is prohibited from acquiring real property in the
Philippines?

Held: Yes. More than the Certification issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier is an American
citizen, the records contain other documents validating the information. For instance, in par. 164 of
respondents‘ Answer with Counterclaim, they admitted pars. 1, 2, and 3 of the Complaint insofar as their
personal circumstances are concerned, and par. 2 of the Complaint states: ―2. Defendant DUANE STIER
is of legal age, married, an American citizen, a nonresident alien with postal address at Blk. 5, Lot
27, A, B, Phase 1, St. Michael Home Subd., Binangonan, Rizal…‖ Similarly, one of the attachments to the
Manifestation filed by respondents before the RTC is an Affidavit executed by Stier himself, stating: ―I,
DUANE STIER, of legal age, married, American citizen…‖

The foregoing statements made by Stier are admissions against interest and are therefore binding upon
him. An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, an
admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was
made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it, especially so in this case
where respondents failed to present even one piece of evidence in their defense.

Hence, the courts a quo erred in ruling that Stier‘s American citizenship was not established in this case,
effectively rendering the sale of the subject property as to him void ab initio, in light of the clear
proscription under Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution against foreigners acquiring real property in the
Philippines.

85 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Declaration Against Pedigree

Tison vs. CA
G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997

Facts: An action for reconveyance was filed by Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene Dezoller, against
Teodora Domingo before the RTC, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by Sps. Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon and Rene are the niece and nephew,
respectively, of the deceased Teodora who is the sister of petitioners‘ father, Hermogenes Dezoller.
Teodora died in 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and petitioners. Hermogenes died in 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora by
right of representation. The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land
in dispute, as a consequence of which a TCT was issued in his name. Martin sold the lot to Domingo and
thereafter, a TCTC was issued in the latter‘s name. Martin died in 1988. Subsequently, petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by
right of representation.

During the hearing, Corazon was presented as the lone witness, with several documentary evidence
offered to prove petitioners‘ filiation to their father and their aunt. Corazon testified to the effect that
Teodora, sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora‘s niece. After the
petitioners rested their case, Domingo filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed
to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora. It is further averred that the testimony of
Corazon regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and
incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required to establish filiation.

The RTC issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. In upholding the dismissal, the CA declared that the documentary evidence presented by
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and
insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration made by Teodora that Corazon is her niece, is admissible?

Held: Yes. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon to the effect that Teodora in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora‘s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
about pedigree which is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Sec. 39, Rule 130, subject
to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is,
not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before
any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the
third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate
the declaration made by Teodora in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of Corazon or, if at all, it is
necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

A distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very
declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence
aliunde. The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant‘s estate, the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate
of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
some other member of the family.

The Court is sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of
the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that Corazon is
her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is rendered

86 | E v i d e n c e
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More
importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration
made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent‘s
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
Teodora. As held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant‘s own relationship to
another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of
the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main
evidence unnecessary.

Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility,
the same may be admitted by reason of Domingo‘s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the
time they were being offered in evidence. An objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since
the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

87 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Family Reputation

Jison vs. CA
G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998

Facts: Monina Jison filed a complaint for for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of
1945 or the start of 1946, however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza Amolar (who was then employed
as the nanny of Francisco‘s daughter, Lourdes). As a result, Monina was born in 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo,
and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco
by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for
her education, such that she obtained a Master‘s degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank
examiner. In view of Francisco‘s refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. She offered
various pieces of documentary evidence including various notes and letters written by Francisco‘s
relatives allegedly attesting to MONINA‘s filiation. In his answer, Francisco alleged that he could not have
had sexual relations with Esperanza during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be
in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never
recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses,
Francisco contended that Monina had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was
barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an
award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

Issue (1): Whether or not the notes and letters written by Francisco‘s relatives allegedly attesting to
Monina‘s filiation may be admitted under Sec. 39, Rule 130 (act or declaration about pedigree)?

Held: No. The various notes and letters allegedly attesting to MONINA‘s filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue, as Monina witnessed the authors signing the documents,
nevertheless, under Sec. 39, Rule 130, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there
being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and Monina shown by evidence other than the documents in question.

Issue (2): Whether or not the same notes and letters may be admitted under Sec. 40, Rule 130 (family
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree)?

Held: No. Sec. 40, Rule 130, provides: ―The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portrait and the like , may be received as evidence of pedigree.‖ It
is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may
not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the
second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause ―and the like‖ as qualified by the preceding phrase
―[e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.‖

The scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of
ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as ―family possessions,‖ or those
articles which represent, in effect, a family‘s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.
These have been described as objects ―openly exhibited and well known to the family,‖ or those ―which,
if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.‖ Other examples of these objects
which are regarded as reflective of a family‘s reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions
on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates. Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not
constituting ―family possessions‖ as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Sec. 40, Rule
130.

Issue (3): Whether or not the same notes and letters may be admitted under Sec. 41, Rule 130
(common reputation)?

Held: No. The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation
in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in
question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.

88 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Res Gestae

People vs. Dimapilit

G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017

Facts: Rene Boy Dimapilit y Abellado was charged with, and was found guilty by the RTC of, the crime of
murder upon the person of Diego Garcia. Among the prosecution witnesses was Diego‘s live-in partner
Magdalena Apasan. Rene Boy underscores the material inconsistencies in Magdalena‘s testimony and
insists that they cannot serve as a basis for finding him guilty: ―1) Magdalena stated that she saw
accused Junnel as the one who boxed Diego which statement she negated during the next hearing when
she claimed that it was Joel; 2) Magdalena was insistent that she was with Simeon, the victim‘s brother,
when she went to the place of the incident, which is in contradiction to her initial report wherein she
never mentioned of Simeon; 3) Magdalena hid herself behind a mango tree because she feared for her
life and still managed to witness what really transpired on that fateful afternoon which according to the
defense is inconsistent to human experience because if it were true, she should have been too afraid to
peek and see for herself what was happening; and 4) She never asked anyone for help which is contrary
to human.‖

Issue: Whether or not the inconsistencies in Magdalena‘s testimony affected her credibility?

Held: No. A witness‘ inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her credibility as long as there
are no material contradictions in his or her absolute and clear narration on the central incident and
positive identification of the accused as one of the main assailants. Any inconsistency, which is not
relevant to the elements of the crime, ―is not a ground to reverse a conviction.‖

Whether Magdalena was alone or with Simeon in following Diego to Pastor‘s house does not really
matter. Magdalena‘s confusion with the names of the accused also does not affect her credibility as a
witness. It is possible that she might have interchanged the name of ―Junnel‖ to ―Joel‖ due to their vivid
similarity. The Court cannot assume that Magdalena would deliver errorless narrations while recalling the
details of the harrowing killing incident. Instead of weakening her credibility, the trivial lapses strengthen
her statements as they indicate that she was not ―coached or her answers contrived.‖

Moreover, the fact that Magdalena did not ask for help is not contrary to human experience. She clearly
saw how the four (4) assailants took turns in beating Diego to death as the incident happened in broad
daylight. Similarly, she heard how Rene Boy threatened Simeon. Probably, out of fear for her life,
Magdalena was constrained to be mum and helpless. ―Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently
depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioural
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.‖ Hence, the trivial
inconsistencies in Magdalena‘s testimony do not affect the fact that she witnessed how Rene Boy
participated in killing Diego.

89 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Santillan
G.R. No. 227878, August 9, 2017

Facts: In an Information, Geraldo Santillan and Eugene Borromeo, and co-accused who remained at-
large Ramil Santillan, Julious Esmeña, and Andres Cartnueva were charged with the crime of murder
committed upon the person of Ernesto Garcia. The prosecution‘s evidence established Andres invited the
victim Ernesto, who was then watching television in his living room, to go out. Ernesto agreed and they
went to the end portion of an alley. Minutes later, Michael, Ernesto‘s son, was tending their store when
he saw his father running towards their gate while being chased by Ramil and Geraldo, also known in
their place as Dodong Santillan. Thereupon, Ramil stabbed Ernesto at the back. Geraldo, who was also
armed, tried to stab Ernesto but missed. Ernesto ran towards their gate and embraced Michael. Michael
then called out his sister, Julie Ann, who came to help her father while Michael sought assistance from
their uncle, Domingo Trinidad. Julie Ann asked Ernesto who his assailants were. Ernesto answered
Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a certain ―Palaka.‖ Ernesto vomited blood and fell to the ground. Michael
returned onboard a tricycle and they tried to bring Ernesto to the hospital, but their father was already
dead.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found Geraldo and Eugene guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of
murder. It treated the ante mortem statement of Ernesto as a dying declaration. It found that Ernesto‘s
declaration, which was relayed to Julie Ann, concerned the circumstances surrounding his death; that it
was offered in a criminal case in which he was the victim; and that it was made under the consciousness
of impending death, taking into consideration the gravity of his wounds and the immediacy by which
death took place. It also admitted Ernesto‘s declaration as part of the res gestae. Hence, this appeal.

Issue (1): Whether or not Ernesto‘s statement is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration?

Held: Yes. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant‘s death; (b) at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant is
competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All of the above requisites are present in this case.

Ernesto communicated his ante-mortem statement to Julie Ann, identifying accused-appellants and the
other two accused as the persons who stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Ernesto was conscious
of his impending death, having sustained multiple incise and stab wounds, one of which being fatal,
piercing deeply into the middle lobe of his right lung, trachea and esophagus. Ernesto even vomited
blood, collapsed, and eventually died. Ernesto would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for
murder in which Ernesto was the victim.

Issue (2): Whether or not Ernesto‘s statement is admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae?

Held: Yes. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.

Ernesto‘s statement referred to a startling occurrence, that is, him being stabbed by Dodong, Eugene,
Ramil, and a certain ―Palaka.‖ At the time he relayed his statement to Julie Ann, he was wounded and
blood oozed from his chest. Given his condition, it is clear that he had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it identified the authors of the crime.

90 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Entries in the Course of Business

PAL vs. Ramos

G.R. No. 92740, March 23, 1992

Facts: Jaime Ramos, et al. (the Ramoses) held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City
to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. Among the conditions
included in the Ramoses‘ tickets is the following: ―CHECK-IN TIME—Please check in at the Airport
Passenger check-in counter at least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will
consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted passengers if you fail to check in at least 30
minutes before PUBLISHED departure time.‖

The Ramoses claim that they went to the check-in counter of PAL‘s Naga branch at least one hour before
the published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon
checking-in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were
cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney‘s fees for breach of contract of carriage.

PAL disclaims any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of the Ramoses on said flight was due
to their having checked-in late for their flight. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the Ramoses. Before
the SC, PAL emphasize its pieces of documentary evidence: (1) the plane tickets of the Ramoses; and (2)
the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264.

Issue: Whether or not the pieces of documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of
PAL‘s witnesses should be given credit as entries in the course of business?

Held: Yes. There were two other confirmed passengers who came ahead of the Ramoses but were
refused accommodation because they were late. There were no other passengers who checked-in late
after the Ramoses. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented
to corroborate the testimonies of PAL‘s witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their
allegations. The plane tickets of the Ramoses, with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of
carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation ―late 4:02‖ stamped on the flight coupon by
the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents, and the passenger Manifest of
Flight PR 264, which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the Ramoses, are entries
made in the regular course of business which the Ramoses failed to overcome with substantial and
convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence.

A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts
pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof
and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory
and recollection. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks
a uniform language.

This dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the Ramoses in their complaint where
they claimed that no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before the published departure time and
that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late, and in their testimonies where they
contended that there were two different PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter.
The Ramoses only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The
hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly
connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or
characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae.

91 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Entries in Official Records

People vs. Corpuz

G.R. No. 215320, February 28, 2018

Facts: Manuel Corpuz was charged with two counts of murder committed upon the persons of Romana
Arcular and Leonila Risto under two Informations. The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely:
Pedro Dejaresco, Leonilo Bongalan, Teodoro Queriqueri, and Dr. Amelia Gacis. Leonila told Leonilo, her
son-in-law, that she would go to her farm situated. Later, Leonilo went to the farm to check on his
mother-in-law. Upon reaching the farm, he saw Manuel hacking Leonila and Romana with a bolo. Leonila
was hit in the right nape, while Romana was hit in the left nape. Both victims fell to the ground. After
witnessing the incident, Leonilo ran towards the house of Juaquinito Poliquit, the Barangay Captain. After
reporting the incident and that Manuel was the assailant, Leonilo and Juaquinito proceeded to the police
station where the incident was again reported.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found Manuel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Leonilo considering that he knew Manuel prior to the
incident; that the incident happened in broad daylight; and that no improper motive was attributed to
him in testifying against Manuel. Hence, this appeal. Manuel argues that his conviction was based mainly
on the testimony of Leonilo who, however, is not a credible witness. He points out that the police blotter
clearly contradicts Leonilo‘s testimony that he actually saw Manuel hack Leonila and Romana. Thus, there
is reasonable doubt on Leonilo‘s identification of Manuel as the person responsible for the deaths of the
two victims.

Issue: Whether or not the police blotter executed by Leonilo may be given credit?

Held: Yes. Entries in the police blotter are not evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the fact that
the entries were made. Affidavits executed before the police or entries in such police blotters cannot
prevail over the positive testimony given in open court. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions
or for want of suggestions or inquiries. Without the aid of such the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and
for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony
during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter.

Here, Leonilo positively identified Manuel as the person who hacked the two victims. He was certain that
it was Manuel whom he saw having known him for years prior to the incident. Moreover, Leonilo offered
sufficient explanation regarding the apparent inconsistencies between his testimony and the police
blotter. Leonilo had no part in the apparent inconsistencies caused by the contents of the police blotter.
Indeed, he merely reported what he witnessed; whether the police officer accurately recorded his report
is beyond his control. Thus, the statement in the said police blotter to the effect that the suspect was
unknown could in no way prevail over his positive identification of Corpuz as the person who hacked and
killed Leonila and Romana.

92 | E v i d e n c e
 Sabili vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012

Facts: Meynardo Sabili filed his COC for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. He
stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two years and eight months. Prior to the 2010
elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the
4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, he ran for the position of Representative of the 4 th
District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed
that when he filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral
home in Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Among others, Sabili presented a Certification of Residency
issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade.

Florencio Librea filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to
Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification against him before the
COMELEC. Librea alleged that Sabili made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter‘s COC and
likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the LGC. Allegedly,
Sabili falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two
years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.

The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Honrade that Sabili had
been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in Sabili‘s
MR, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a
notary public and, hence, ―cannot be relied on.‖ Subsequently, Sabili presented another, substantially
identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now
been sworn to before a notary public.

Issue: Whether or not the unsworn Honrade‘s Certification may be received in evidence as entry in
official records?

Held: Yes. Sec. 44, Rule 130 provides: ―Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.‖ The following three (3) requisites must
concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which
facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the LGC to ―keep an updated record of all
inhabitants of the barangay.‖ Regarding the second requisite, ―it is the business of a Punong Barangay to
know who the residents are in his own barangay.‖ Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain‘s
exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept
by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider
Honrade‘s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.

93 | E v i d e n c e
 Cercado-Siga vs. Cercado
G.R. No. 185374. March 11, 2015

Facts: In their Complaint against respondents, petitioners claimed that they are the legitimate children of
the late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita Castillo, who were married last October 9, 1929 in Pililla, Rizal.
Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired by gratuitous title a
parcel of land located at Binangonan, Rizal. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father
Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs;
that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law. Sometime in
September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a certain
Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein. Upon verification,
petitioners were furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and
signed by respondents.

Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so married, then said
marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita.
Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and
attorney‘s fees. To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following
documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated November 19, 2000
issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract; 3) Certification of
non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla,
Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification of nonproduction of record of birth of Ligaya
issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint Affidavit of two
disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.

The RTC first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and considered the
subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous before it concluded that the
subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court
held that the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as surviving
spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners. Thus, the RTC ruled that petitioners are
entitled to recover from respondents their share in the property subject of this action. On appeal, the CA
found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly
authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the
baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed
by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was
not given credence by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove
their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the RTC.

Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be
recorded in the local civil registrar and the NSO. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private
document, petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which
should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.

Issue (1): Whether or not the marriage certificate is a public document?

Held: No. Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Order No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept
by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be
proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. Under Sec. 20, Rule 132,
before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and
saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom
the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.

Here, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her
mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution
nor could she identify Benita‘s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate. Petitioners
insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the
original need not be produced. The Court does not agree. A signed carbon copy or duplicate of a
document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe
introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the original. But, an unsigned and
uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no
public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.

94 | E v i d e n c e
Issue (2): Whether or not the marriage contract is an ancient document which need not be
authenticated?

Held: No. Sec. 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: (1) is more than 30 years old; (2)
is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (3) is unblemished by any
alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on October 9, 1929,
hence it is clearly more than 30 years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration. The
marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if
the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is
found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be
satisfactorily accounted for.

The requirement of proper custody is met when the ancient document in question was presented in court
by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case
however, Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a
baptismal certificate which has long been held ―as evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with
respect to her kinsfolk. ―The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites
of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person
baptized.‖ As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody the marriage contract is
expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the marriage contract was given to
her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said document because she cannot read
and write.

On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya‘s kinship is a Joint Affidavit executed by two
persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two affiants were never presented
in court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence. Petitioners also presented
certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were
destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a
further verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of
every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to present a
certification from NSO whether such records do exist or not.

95 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Commercial List

MERALCO vs. Quisumbing

G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000

Facts: Some of the alleged members of the Meralco Employees and Workers Association filed a motion
for intervention and a MR of an earlier Decision of the SC. For its part, Meralco warns that if the wage
increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost
covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. The Union relies
on the All Asia Capital report to support its position regarding the wage issue as an accurate basis and
conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase.

Issue: Whether or not the All Asia Capital report may be the basis and determinant of the rate of wage
increase being a commercial list?

Held: No. Sec. 45, Rule 130 provides: ―Commercial lists and the like.—–Evidence of statements of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.‖

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only ―if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied
upon by them therein.‖

The cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an
analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to
support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen
generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that
the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally
regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not
admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence
when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such
reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made
available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.

96 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Testimony at a Former Proceeding

People vs. Ortiz-Miyake

G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997

Facts: Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the RTC-Makati on a
complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was
indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita
Marasigan alone. Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan
was the only one who testified at the trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were
unable to testify as they were then abroad. The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del
Rosario, the two other complainants in the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by appellant. In
lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo, the mother of Imelda
Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.

The RTC convicted Ortiz-Miyake of both crimes as charged. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment
in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the MeTC-Parañaque as a
basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa involving the same
circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged Ortiz-Miyake
with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory. In thus
convicting Ortiz-Miyake in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the RTC stated that the
facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It,
therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts
and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC-Makati properly adopted the facts and conclusions established in the
earlier decision of MeTC-Parañaque?

Held: No. Sec. 1, Rule 115 provides: ―Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled: x x x (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-
examine him. xxx‖ Section 47, Rule 130 provides: ―Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.‖

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such
right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the
judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. This right, however, is
not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has
already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a
distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made
admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious.

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the
Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. Here, the prosecution
did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case.
Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for
illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged
in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said
previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case
would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

As earlier stated, the Makati court‘s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Parañaque
court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court
according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the
findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based.

97 | E v i d e n c e
 Go vs. People
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012

Facts: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC for Other
Deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC. Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
prosecution‘s complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled
from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.

The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that
he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor‘s advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners‘ Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied
with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. The RTC reversed the MeTC. The RTC
held that Sec. 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking
of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

The CA reversed the RTC and affirmed the MeTC‘s decision ruling that no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have
every opportunity to cross examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking
of the oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the
deposition of the witness.

Issue: Whether or not the deposition of a prosecution‘s main witness outside the country should be
allowed?

Held: No. The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in
civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or
country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. But for
purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Sec. 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the
court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC‘s orders granting the motion to take
the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

98 | E v i d e n c e
Hearsay Evidence: Child Witness Rule

People vs. Ibañez

G.R. No. 197813. September 25, 2013

Facts: Edwin Ibañez and Alfredo Nulla with Jesus Monsillo were all charged with of Murder for killing
Wilfredo Atendido. The prosecution‘s version was testified to by the victim‘s wife (Rowena) and daughter
(Rachel), in succession. On that fateful day, Wilfredo was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with
Jesus and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, an adolescent at the time, was underneath the
house of a neighbor, three meters away. Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate.
Edwin then snatched a t-shirt, and hooded it over the head and face of Wilfredo. was wrestled and
pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredo‘s chest. Jesus, armed with a long
iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on
her father. Thereafter, she saw her mother running out of their house and crying for help. The trial court,
as affirmed by the CA, convicted Edwin and Alfredo of Murder. Both the RTC and the CA found testimony
of Rachel credible. Edwin and Alfredo tries to discredit Rachel‘s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a
mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read, and did
not know how to tell time.

Issue: Whether or not Rachel‘s testimony is credible?

Held: Yes. Throughout Rachel‘s testimony, in her direct, cross and re-direct and recross examinations,
she candidly recounted the events surrounding the killing of her father. The Court accords full faith and
credence to Rachel‘s testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was
categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a concocted story, impressed upon her by other
people.

The Court cannot take Rachel‘s testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she
witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental
maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. With exceptions
provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption,
the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child‘s competence. Only when substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a
party, conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners‘ flimsy objections on Rachel‘s lack
of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and
convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

99 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Esugon
G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015

Facts: Alvin Esugon was charged with robbery with homicide. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year-old son of the
victim (Josephine Castro), testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister, and his
mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw Esugon, whom he calls
―Nonoy,‖ enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair.
Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed,
his father chased Esugon. Carl saw blood come out of his mother‘s lower chest. His father then brought
her to the hospital. Carl positively identified Esugon, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the
one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that Esugon took money from his father‘s
pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well Esugon because there was no light at the
ground floor, although there was light upstairs.

The RTC pronounced Esugon guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, Esugon argued that the RTC erred
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based
solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year-old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his
imagination. However, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies
did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of Esugon. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the 5-year-old Carl was credible?

Held: Yes. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and
events witnessed. As the Rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident,
and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person
to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. That the
witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC, 15 December 2000), every child is now
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on
the party challenging the child‘s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding
the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

Here, Esugon did not object to Carl‘s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to
challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of
communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent
witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, Esugon extensively tested his
direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony
of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to
perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against Esugon.

Esugon points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed. However,
it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and
peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the
inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of Esugon as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did
not shout to seek help upon witnessing how Esugon had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his
credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult.

Carl positively identified Esugon as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to
note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious
familiarity with Esugon as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child‘s family. Verily, the
evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that Esugon, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the
victim.

100 | E v i d e n c e
 Avelino vs. People
G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013

Facts: Bobby ―Abel‖ Avelino was charged with murder before the RTC, for killing Brgy. Chairman
Generoso Hispano. Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of
Avelino. SOCO PSI Lito Cabamongan was also presented, and testified as to the position of the gunman
when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep
when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to the prosecution-witness‘ testimony that Hispano was shot
by the gunman from an elevated plane. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented
as an ordinary witness.

Issue: Whether or not Cabamongan‘s opinion regarding the location of the gunman may be given
credence although he was presented merely as an ordinary witness?

Held: No. His opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty
shells were found is immaterial. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is
one that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. Here, counsel for
Avelino failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

101 | E v i d e n c e
Opinion Rule: Ordinary Witness

People vs. Duranan

G.R. Nos. 134074-75, January 16, 2001

Facts: Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. ―Kalbo,‖ was charged with two counts of rape of Nympha Lozada, a
mental retardate. Nympha‘s mother, Virginia de Lara Lozada, was among the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Duranan contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim‘s mental age was not
proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the RPC, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of
a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant‘s mental age to determine if her mental
age is under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the
presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.

Issue: Whether or not the complainant‘s mother can testify as to the mental condition of the former?

Held: Yes. Sec. 50, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
―Opinion of Ordinary witnesses.—The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in
evidence regarding—
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.‖

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical
and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his
opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient
opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is
required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can
testify as to what it is.

Here, Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of her daughter. To rebut this, Duranan points to
the mother‘s statement that complainant is ―quite intelligent.‖ The statement that complainant is ―quite
intelligent‖ must be read in the context of Virginia Lozada‘s previous statement that complainant ―thinks
like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her declarations are true or believable.‖
Thus, what complainant‘s mother meant was that complainant, although she thought like a child,
nevertheless could tell others what happened to her. Indeed, even the trial court admonished the
defense counsel not to use inculpatory questions because complainant might give inculpatory answers. At
another stage of the trial, the trial court reminded counsel, ―The witness [complainant] is not very
intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish dates.‖

102 | E v i d e n c e
Opinion Rule: Character Evidence

People vs. Diopita

G.R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000

Facts: Rafael Diopita was charged with the crime of robbery with rape. The victim was Dominga Pikit-
pikit. Diopita maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a
person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of ―Ministerial Servant‖ in the
congregation of Jehovah‘s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible
family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God. Diopita also argues that the testimonies
of the defense‘s other witnesses‘ should be given credence as they are Jehovah‘s Witnesses, and as such,
they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question.

Issue (1): Whether or not Diopita by holding the position of ―Ministerial Servant‖ in the congregation of
Jehovah‘s Witnesses, is incapable of committing the crime charged?

Held: No. The fact that Diopita is endowed with such ―sterling‖ qualities hardly justifies the conclusion
that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of ―Ministerial
Servant‖ in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part.
Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his
previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must
be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than
sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of Diopita is unavailing .

Issue (2): Whether or not the testimonies of the defense‘s other witnesses‘ should be given credence as
they are Jehovah‘s Witnesses?

Held: No. The argument is as puerile as the first. The matter of assigning values to the declarations of
witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia
available but not reflected in the records. Hence, the court a quo‘s appraisal on the matter is entitled to
the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would affect the result of the case. There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this
rule.

103 | E v i d e n c e
Rule 131 – Burden of Proof and Presumptions

FEBTC vs. Chante

G.R. No. 170598, October 9, 2013

Facts: Robert Mar Chante (Chan) was a current account depositor of Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC)
at its Ongpin Branch. FEBTC issued to him a Far East ATM Card. The card was tagged in his current
account. A PIN, known only to Chan as the depositor, was required in order to gain access to the
account. With the use of his card and the PIN, he could then deposit and withdraw funds from his current
account from any FEBTC ATM facility, including the Megalink facilities of other member banks that
included the PNB.

A complaint was brought by FEBTC in the RTC to recover from Chan the principal sum of P770,488.30
representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chan‘s Current Account with
the use of the Card. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 PM of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 AM of May 5, 1992,
Chan had used the Card to withdraw funds totaling P967,000 from the PNB-Megalink ATM facility at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the
use of the same machine, at P4,000/withdrawal; and that MEGALINK‘S journal tapes showed that the
Card had been used in all the 242 transactions; that at the time of the ATM withdrawal transactions,
there was an error in its computer system known as ―system bug‖ whose nature had allowed Chan to
successfully withdraw funds in excess of his current credit balance; and that Chan had taken advantage
of the system bug to do the withdrawal transactions.

On his part, Chan denied liability. Although admitting his physical possession of the Card, he denied
making the ATM withdrawals instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the
withdrawals. He alluded to a possible ―inside job‖ as the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a
newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTC‘s had admitted having debited accounts of its
depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as information available to him. Chan claimed
that it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to stand long hours in front of the
ATM facility just to withdraw funds.

The RTC ruled in favor of FEBTC. In holding against Chan, the RTC chiefly relied on inferences drawn
from his acts subsequent to the series of withdrawals, specifically his attempt to withdraw funds from his
account at an FEBTC ATM facility in Ermita, Manila barely two days after the questioned withdrawals; his
issuance of a check immediately after the capture of his ATM card by the ATM facility; his failure to
immediately report the capture of his ATM card to FEBTC; and his going to FEBTC only after the dishonor
of the check he had issued following the freezing of his account.

Issue: Whether or not FEBTC presented preponderant evidence proving Chan‘s liability for the
supposedly fraudulent withdrawals?

Held: No. Although there was no question that Chan had the physical possession of the Card at the time
of the withdrawals, the exclusive possession of the card alone did not suffice to preponderantly establish
that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he had caused the withdrawals to be made. In his
answer, he denied using the card to withdraw funds from his account on the dates in question, and
averred that the withdrawals had been an ―inside job.‖ His denial effectively traversed FEBTC‘s claim of
his direct and personal liability for the withdrawals, that it would lose the case unless it competently and
sufficiently established that he had personally made the withdrawals himself, or that he had caused the
withdrawals. In other words, it carried the burden of proof.

Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of
non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing
evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the
burden of evidence. In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue
by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other
concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order
to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes
from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party
asserting the affirmative of the issue. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving
it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either
side. Sec. 1, Rule 133 sets the quantum of evidence for civil actions, and delineates how preponderance

104 | E v i d e n c e
of evidence is determined. As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of
greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is proof that leads
the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of
Chan‘s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card
had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by
another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds
supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account. FEBTC failed discharge its burden of proof.

 To start with, FEBTC‘s very own Systems Analyst, admitted that the bug infecting the bank‘s
computer system had facilitated the fraudulent withdrawals.
 Secondly, the RTC‘s deductions on the cause of the withdrawals were faulty. Chan‘s subsequent
acts could have been impelled by so many reasons and motivations, and cannot simply be given
the meaning that the lower court attributed to them, and, instead, were even consistent with the
purpose and nature of his maintaining the current account deposit with FEBTC, rendering the
acts not unusual nor illegal.
 Thirdly, the RTC ignored the likelihood that somebody other than Chan familiar with the bug
infection of FEBTC‘s computer system at the time of the withdrawals and adept with the workings
of the computer system had committed the fraud. This likelihood was not far-fetched considering
that FEBTC had immediately adopted corrective measures upon its discovery of the system bug,
by which FEBTC admitted its negligence in ensuring an error-free computer system; and that the
system bug had affected only the account of Chan.
 Fourthly, and perhaps the most damaging lapse, was that FEBTC failed to establish that the PNB-
Megalink‘s ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel had actually dispensed cash in the very
significantly large amount alleged during the series of questioned withdrawals. For sure, FEBTC
should have proved the actual dispensing of funds from the ATM facility as the factual basis for
its claim against Chan. The omission left a yawning gap in the evidence against Chan.
 And lastly, Chan‘s allegation of an ―inside job‖ accounting for the anomalous withdrawals should
not be quickly dismissed as unworthy of credence or weight. FEBTC employee revealed that
FEBTC had previously encountered problems of bank accounts being debited despite the absence
of any withdrawal transactions by their owners. He attributed the problems to the erroneous
tagging of the affected accounts as somebody else‘s account, allowing the latter to withdraw
from the affected accounts with the use of the latter‘s own ATM card, and to the former‘s
account being debited. The revelation tended to support Chan‘s denial of liability, as it showed
the possibility of withdrawals being made by another person despite the PIN being an exclusive
access number known only to the cardholder.

105 | E v i d e n c e
Conclusive Presumptions

Ibaan Rural Bank vs. CA

G.R. No. 123817, December 17, 1999

Facts: Sps. Reyes were the owners of 3 lots covered by TCTs of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. They
mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. With the knowledge and consent of the Bank, Sps. Reyes
as sellers, and Sps. Tarnate as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage of the lots in question. Sps. Tarnate failed to pay the loan and the bank extrajudicially
foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and
awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. The Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was
then registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2)
years from the registration of the sale. On September 23, 1981, Sps. Tarnate offered to redeem the
foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount. However, the Bank refused the redemption on the
ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption
on the ground that Sps. Tarnate did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.

Sps. Tarnate filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They
argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and
tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year redemption period.

The bank opposed the redemption, contending that Sps. Tarnate had no right to redeem the lots because
at the time they offered to redeem on September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as more
than one year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979.

Issue: Whether or not Sps. Tarnate may still redeem the property relying on the 2-year redemption
period provided in the certificate?

Held: Yes. When the Bank received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its
contents. For two years, it did not object to the 2-year redemption period provided in the certificate.
Thus, it could be said that the Bank consented to 2 two-year redemption period specially since it had
time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for
whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, the
Bank misled Sps. Tarnate to believe that they had 2 years within which to redeem the mortgage. After
the lapse of 2 years, the Bank is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only 1 year
and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

106 | E v i d e n c e
 Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an
G.R. No. 128568, April 9, 2003

Facts: The respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, against Sps. Alcaraz. The
complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and
mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) located at Premier St.,
Hipodromo, Cebu City to Sps. Alcaraz. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of the
said residential building and did not include the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was
then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Under the contract, Sps. Alcaraz bound themselves
for 5 years to pay Virginia the monthly rentals. However, they failed to pay rent. Despite repeated
demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential
building, Sps. Alcaraz refused to vacate the same. Respondents sought to repossess the property for their
own use and benefit.

On the other hand, Sps. Alcaraz alleged that the ownership of the lot on which the house stood was
transferred by the NHA to Virgilio, the son of the late Virgilia. A TCT was consequently issued in the name
of Virgilio. According to Sps. Alcaraz, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the house
resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and Sps. Alcaraz. Thereafter,
they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio) and not to respondents since the latter
supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. To support their argument that the house
necessarily became Virgilio‘s property as a result of the acquisition of the lot on which the same was
built, Sps. Alcaraz invoke the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Being an accessory, the
house is necessarily owned by the owner of the lot on which it is built.

Issue: Whether or not the subject lease contract covered not only the land, but also the improvement
thereon, including the building?

Held: No. There is no need to disturb and analyze the applicability of the principle invoked because Sps.
Alcaraz are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the
lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: ―1. That the lessor is the owner of a
building of mixed materials situated at Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City.‖ At the time of the
perfection of the contract, Sps. Alcaraz, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor,
owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to
comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years.
Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased to be
effective because Virgilio‘s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of
the building. They argue that, under Art. 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilio‘s title over the lot necessarily
included the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the contract.

Sec. 2(a), Rule 131 provides as a conclusive presumption that: ―whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it.‖

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, Sps. Alcaraz are barred from alleging the
automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house
after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.

107 | E v i d e n c e
 University of Mindanao vs. BSP
G.R. Nos. 194964-65, January 11, 2016

Facts: University of Mindanao (Inc.) is an educational institution. For the year 1982, its Board of
Trustees was chaired by Guillermo Torres. His wife, Dolores Torres, sat as UMI‘s Assistant Treasurer.
Before 1982, Sps. Torres incorporated and operated two thrift banks: (1) First Iligan Savings & Loan
Association, Inc. (FISLAI); and (2) Davao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (DSLAI). Upon Guillermo‘s
request, BSP issued a P1.9 million standby emergency credit to FISLAI. The release of standby
emergency credit was evidenced by promissory notes all signed by Guillermo, and were co-signed by
either his wife, or FISLAI‘s Special Assistant to the President, Edmundo Ramos.

UMI‘s VP-Finance, Saturnino Petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate mortgage over UMI‘s property in
Cagayan de Oro City in favor of BSP. The mortgage served as security for FISLAI‘s P1.9 Million loan. It
was allegedly executed on UMI‘s behalf. As proof of his authority to execute a real estate mortgage for
UMI, Saturnino showed a notarized Secretary‘s Certificate signed by UMI‘s Corporate Secretary, Aurora de
Leon. The Secretary‘s Certificate was supported by an excerpt from the minutes of the alleged meeting of
UMI‘s Board of Trustees. The excerpt was certified by Aurora to be a true copy of UMI‘s records on file.

Later, BSP granted FISLAI an additional loan. Guillermo and Ramos executed a promissory note to cover
that amount. Saturnino executed another deed of real estate mortgage, allegedly on behalf of UMI, over
its two properties in Iligan City. This mortgage served as additional security for FISLAI‘s loans. BSP‘s
mortgage lien over the Iligan City properties and Aurora‘s certification were annotated on the TCTs and
the tax declarations. BSP also granted emergency advances to DSLAI.

Later, FISLAI, DSLAI, and LBP entered into a MOA intended to rehabilitate the thrift banks, which had
been suffering from their depositors‘ heavy withdrawals. Among the terms of the agreement was the
merger of FISLAI and DSLAI, with DSLAI as the surviving corporation. DSLAI later became known as
Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MSLAI). Guillermo died. MSLAI failed to recover from its
losses and was liquidated. BSP then sent a letter to UMI, informing it that the bank would foreclose its
properties if MSLAI‘s total outstanding obligation remained unpaid.

UMI denied that its properties were mortgaged. It also denied having received any loan proceeds from
BSP. UMI also alleged that Aurora‘s certification was anomalous. It never authorized Saturnino to execute
real estate mortgage contracts involving its properties to secure FISLAI‘s debts. It never ratified the
execution of the mortgage contracts. Moreover, as an educational institution, it cannot mortgage its
properties to secure another person‘s debts.

Issue (1): Whether or not the presumption that the execution of mortgage contracts was within UMI‘s
corporate powers stands?

Held: No. Such presumption does not apply. Securing third party loans is not connected to UMI‘s
purposes as an educational institution. Acquiring shares in another corporation is not a means to create
new powers for the acquiring corporation. Being a shareholder of another corporation does not
automatically change the nature and purpose of a corporation‘s business. Appropriate amendments must
be made either to the law or the articles of incorporation before a corporation can validly exercise powers
outside those provided in law or the articles of incorporation. In other words, without an amendment,
what is ultra vires before a corporation acquires shares in other corporations is still ultra vires after such
acquisition.

Thus, regardless of the number of shares that UMI had with FISLAI, DSLAI, or MSLAI, securing loans of
third persons is still beyond UMI‘s power to do. It is still inconsistent with its purposes under the law and
its articles of incorporation. In attempting to show UMI‘s interest in securing FISLAI‘s loans by adverting
to their interlocking directors and shareholders, BSP disregards UMI‘s separate personality from its
officers, shareholders, and other juridical persons.

Issue (2): Whether or not BSP may rely on the Secretary‘s Certificate issued by Aurora de Leon because
it was notarized which carries the presumption of regularity and authenticity?

Held: No. The Secretary‘s Certificate was void whether or not it was notarized. Notarization creates a
presumption of regularity and authenticity on the document. This presumption may be rebutted by
―strong, complete and conclusive proof‖ to the contrary. While notarial acknowledgment ―attaches full
faith and credit to the document concerned,‖ it does not give the document its validity or binding effect.
When there is evidence showing that the document is invalid, the presumption of regularity or
authenticity is not applicable.

108 | E v i d e n c e
Since the notarized Secretary‘s Certificate was found to have been issued without a supporting board
resolution, it produced no effect. It is not binding upon petitioner. It should not have been relied on by
BSP especially given its status as a bank.

Discussion: Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are presumptions

that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is. They are made conclusive not
because there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. They are
conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules. Sec. 2, Rule 131 identifies two
(2) conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them.

On the other hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary
evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior. Presumptions are not
always true. They may be wrong under certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them,
keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that may render the expectations wrong. Thus, the
application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on the existence of
certain facts on which they are meant to operate. ―Presumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply
their absence.‖ Presumptions are conclusions. They do not apply when there are no facts or allegations
to support them. If the facts exist to set in motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts may
accept the presumption. However, contrary evidence may be presented to rebut the presumption. Courts
cannot disregard contrary evidence offered to rebut disputable presumptions. Disputable presumptions
apply only in the absence of contrary evidence or explanations.

109 | E v i d e n c e
Disputable Presumptions

Rosaroso vs. Soria

G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013

Facts: Spouses Honorata and Luis Rosaroso acquired several real properties, including the subject
properties. The couple had 9 children. When Honorata died, Luis married Lourdes. A complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages was filed by Luis against his daughter, Lucila; Lucila‘s
daughter, Laila; and Meridian Realty Corporation. Due to Luis‘ untimely death, however, an amended
complaint was, with the spouse of Laila, Ham; and Luis‘ second wife, Lourdes, included as defendants.

In the Amended Complaint, it was alleged by the petitioners (some of the children of Luis by first
marriage) that Luis, with the full knowledge and consent of his second wife, Lourdes, executed the Deed
of Absolute Sale covering several properties in their favor. They also alleged that, despite the fact that
the said properties had already been sold to them, Laila, in conspiracy with her mother, Lucila, obtained
the SPA from Luis; that Luis was then sick, infirm, blind, and of unsound mind; that Lucila and Laila
accomplished this by affixing Luis‘ thumb mark on the SPA which purportedly authorized Laila to sell and
convey 3 Lots, which had already been sold to them; and that on the strength of another SPA by Luis,
Laila and Ham mortgaged another Lot with the concurrence of Lourdes. Petitioners further averred that a
second sale took place when the respondents made Luis sign the Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to
Meridian 3 parcels of residential land; and that Meridian was in bad faith when it did not make any
inquiry as to who were the occupants and owners of said lots. Petitioners, thus, prayed that the deed of
sale in favor of Meridian be declared null and void ab initio.

Respondents posited that her signature as well as that of Luis appearing on the deed of sale in favor of
petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that they signed the prepared
deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it was necessary for a loan application. In fact, there
was no consideration involved in the First Sale. With respect to the Second Sale, she never encouraged
the same and neither did she participate in it. It was purely her husband‘s own volition that the Second
Sale materialized. She, however, affirmed that she received Meridian‘s payment on behalf of her husband
who was then bedridden.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to
prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for the parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of
Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the sale was simulated to
make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no payment was made at all.

Issue: Whether or not the first sale should be declared void for lack of consideration based on the
testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband?

Held: No. Under Sec. 3, Rule 131, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions
have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was
sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has
not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima
facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for
the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in
the place of evidence unless rebutted.

Here, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the
sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up
this claim. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. The CA decision
ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the account of
Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of
sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for
the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and
convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that
there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.

110 | E v i d e n c e
 Heirs of Trazona vs. Heirs of Cañada
G.R. No. 175874, December 11, 2013

Facts: Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona, who owned an untitled parcel of land (Lot No. 5053-H)
in Minglanilla, Cebu, covered by a Tax Declaration. The land was purchased from the government in
1940. Since then, Cipriano had taken possession of the land, cultivated it and diligently paid taxes
thereon. In 1949, Dionisio Cañada, the predecessor of respondents, bought the adjacent parcel of land.
It was later found that he had encroached on a small portion of Lot No. 5053-H. Cipriano gave Dionisio
permission to temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands. No action for ejectment was
filed during the lifetime of Cipriano. The latter‘s son Hermogenes, who had cultivated the lot since 1972,
took over. Dionisio later died.

Petitioners went to the Office of the Municipal Assessor to secure a copy of the Tax Declaration. To their
surprise, the Tax Declaration had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one was issued in 1997 in
the name of Dionisio. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of the Tax Declaration by
submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio which involved a
portion of Lot No. 5053-H.

Petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale,
cancellation of Tax Declaration, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and payment of
attorney‘s fees. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery. Respondents, in
their Answer, alleged that the assailed deed was a genuine document. During trial, among the witnesses
presented by petitioners was a document examiner of the PNP Crime Laboratory. He testified that
according to his comparative analysis of Cipriano‘s signature on the assailed deed and standard
signatures on other documents, Cipriano‘s signature on the deed in question was a forgery.

The RTC annulled the assailed deed and ordered the cancellation of the new Tax Declaration, as well as
the reinstatement of old one. The CA reversed said decision and ruled that petitioners had failed to prove
by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery, stating that ―the deed, being a
notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution.‖

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were able to overturn the presumption of regularity of the Deed?

Held: Yes. The assailed deed is a forgery. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by
evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. Here, there is clear and
convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.

 First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had
been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. In concluding that the signature of
Cipriano in the assailed deed was a forgery, the document examiner found that there were
―significant differences in letter formation, construction and other individual handwriting
characteristics‖ between the assailed and the standard signatures of Cipriano.
 Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It
likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation.
 Third, it has been established that Lot No. 5053-H is in the name of Cipriano, who bought it from
the government in 1940. Thus, only Cipriano had the right to dispose of the property, or portions
thereof.
 Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since the time he acquired it
from the government, and even after its purported sale to Dionisio, until his death. Petitioners
continued paying the taxes thereon even after Cipriano had died. Respondents started paying
taxes on the property only after the Tax Declaration was issued in Dionisio‘s name in 1997. It
would be absurd for petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.
 Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself, petitioners were the ones enjoying the fruits of the
property from 1960 until the present controversy. Again, it is incongruous for petitioners to enjoy
the fruits if respondents owned the property.
 Sixth, there was an irregularity regarding the place of issuance of Cipriano‘s residence certificate
indicated in the assailed deed, as compared with the residence certificates of the other persons
indicated on the same page of the notarial register.
 Finally, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed
deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from
where it was taken had turned yellow with age.

111 | E v i d e n c e
 Diaz vs. People
G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015

Facts: An Information for estafa was filed against Dolores Diaz before the RTC for her alleged failure to
return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise received by her in trust, i.e., on consignment
basis, from Leticia Arcilla. The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Arcilla who claimed to
be a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of
whom is Diaz) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items
to her a month after they were entrusted. Arcilla averred that she entrusted merchandise consisting of
umbrellas and bath towels to Diaz as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt duly signed by the latter.
However, Arcilla was not able to remit the entire amount due and ignored Arcilla‘s demands to remit the
proceeds or return the goods.

In her defense, Diaz admitted having previous business dealings with Arcilla but not as an agent. She
clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from
Arcilla on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior
to the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction had long been settled.
However, she denied having received the subject merchandise from Arcilla.

The RTC acquitted Diaz of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay Arcilla. On appeal, the CA
upheld Diaz‘s civil liability.

Issue: Whether or not Diaz is civilly liable for the unremitted proceeds or unreturned merchandise?

Held: Yes. Diaz‘s claim that she was required to sign two one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in
blank during her transactions with Arcilla, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying her
obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Arcilla was able to prove by preponderance of evidence
the fact of the transaction, as well as Diaz‘s failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise,
or to return the same to Arcilla in case such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the
presentation of the acknowledgment receipt, which, as the document‘s name connotes, shows that Diaz
acknowledged receipt from Arcilla of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the
obligation to return the same if not sold.

Under Sec. 3(d), Rule 131, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To
this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Sec. 3(p) of the same Rule, it is
equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behoves every contracting
party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the
prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

Here, Diaz failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, Arcilla‘s possession of
the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been
extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than
the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in Arcilla‘s
favor.

112 | E v i d e n c e
Suppression of Testimony

People vs. Padrigone

G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002

Facts: Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel and his company were charged in an Information
for raping Rowena Contridas, as witnessed by her sister, Nimfa. Rowena was later diagnosed with mental
disorder known as ―Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition.‖ Thus, the prosecution presented Nimfa as
witness.

Padrigone assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He
claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter
should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived Padrigone of the
opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it
was only Padrigone who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter‘s conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand can be considered as
suppression of evidence?

Held: No. The basis of Padrigone‘s conviction was not Rowena‘s declaration before the Chief of Police
but rather Nimfa‘s testimony before the trial court that it was him who raped Rowena, among others.

Also, under Sec. 3(e), Rule 131, the rule that ―evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced‖ does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was
not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a
privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the
defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from ―Acute
Psychotic Depressive Condition‖ and thus ―cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.‖ The non-presentation,
therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also
present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

113 | E v i d e n c e
 Metrobank vs. CA
G.R. No. 122899, June 8, 2000

Facts: Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Tomas Chia offered a parcel of land in Diliman,
Quezon City for sale to G.T.P. Development Corporation, with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness
in favor of Metrobank secured by the subject property. Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty.
Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of GTP, went to METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila to inquire on
Mr. Chia‘s remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. Metrobank obliged with a statement of account
of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000. The deed of sale and the memorandum of agreement between
Mr. Chia and GTP were eventually executed and signed. Later, Atty. Atienza went to Metrobank Quiapo
Branch and paid P116,416.71 for which Metrobank issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This
notwithstanding, Metrobank refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite
repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting GTP to file an action for specific performance
against Metrobank and Mr. Chia.

In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of GTP involving
the subject property. Metrobank for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage upon the
advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with GTP, and by the fact that there are
other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property.

Judgment was rendered by the RTC granting the reliefs prayed for by GTP. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court‘s judgment, ruling that the P116,416.71 paid by GTP to Metrobank did not extinguish the
real estate mortgage inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past due loans secured by the subject
property.

With this unfavorable turn of events, GTP, filed before the CA a MR with alternative prayer to
require Metrobank to furnish GTP of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia. At the re-
scheduled date of oral arguments where Metrobank was supposed to bring before the CA the current
statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released,
Metrobank‘s counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of GTP and Mr. Chia appeared. Thus, the CA
required GTP‘s counsel to file a memorandum in lieu of oral arguments in support of its MR. GTP then
filed its memorandum to which a reply memorandum was filed by Metrobank.

Issue: Whether or not Metrobank‘s failure to bring the current statement evidencing what it claims as
―other unliquidated past due loans‖ at the scheduled hearing is fatal to its cause?

Held: Yes. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for Metrobank to defend its non-release of the
real estate mortgage.

It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on
a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the
case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the
presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case
of his adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if
it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the
fact does not exist. Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the
ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an
opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect
of the inferences afforded. The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own
control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction
upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing
party.

Verily, Metrobank‘s omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause.
Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since the CA extended a reasonable opportunity to
Metrobank that it did not avail.

114 | E v i d e n c e
Official Duty

People vs. Barte

G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017

Facts: Eddie Barte was charged in the RTC with a violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended,
following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu worth P100 to a police officer poseur-buyer during a
buy-bust operation. PO2 Rico Cabatingan, a witness for the Prosecution, declared that he and other
police officers conducted the buy-bust operation on the basis of information received to the effect that
Barte was engaged in the sale of shabu. At the target area, PO2 Cabatingan met with Barte, and
informed the latter that he wanted to buy shabu worth ―a peso.‖ Upon Barte‘s assent to his offer, PO2
Cabatingan handed the buy-bust money to him, and in turn the latter gave to him a small sachet with
white colored contents. PO2 Cabatingan then gave the prearranged signal. The other officers rushed
forward and identified themselves to Barte as policemen. They frisked and arrested him, and brought him
to the police station. PO2 Cabatingan identified the sachet marked ―EBM,‖ which contained the white
substance. He confirmed the request for laboratory examination. He delivered the confiscated substance,
along with the request, to the crime laboratory, which later on found the substance to be positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. PO2 Cabatingan also identified the P100
bill used as the buy-bust money. He asserted that team had conducted prior surveillance of Barte for
three nights, by which they had confirmed that he was really selling shabu. The results of their
surveillance also confirmed that the subject of their surveillance was the same person referred to by their
informant.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, held that ―although no evidence has been produced to prove compliance
[with] the procedure [under Sec. 21 of RA 9165], it is not fatal to the State‘s cause on the validity of the
entrapment… [it cannot] be the sole basis to overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of
police duties where the testimonies of the policemen concerned have been found to be credible.‖

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties overrides the
noncompliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165?

Held: No. Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public
officers. This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two things,
namely: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any
improper motive.

It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are ―susceptible to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.‖ The high possibility of abuse was precisely the
reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 have been put up as a means to
minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from
abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the
evidence to be presented in court.

Here, the RTC‘s position that the absence of proof showing the compliance by the arresting lawmen with
the procedure outlined under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not fatal to the entrapment is unwarranted. Such
noncompliance with the procedural safeguards under Sec. 21 was fatal because it cast doubt on the
integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. It
put into serious question whether the sachet of shabu had really come from Barte, and whether the
sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from Barte at the time of the
arrest. Testimonies provided by the police officers and the presumption of regularity in the performance
of their duties did not override the noncompliance with the procedural safeguards instituted by our laws.
Indeed, anything short of observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what the law
required meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties. The presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties then became inapplicable. As such, the evidence of the State did not
overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of Barte.

Further, the State‘s agents who entrapped Barte and confiscated the dangerous drug from him did not
tender any justifiable ground for the noncompliance with the requirement of establishing each link in the
chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time of presentation. The conclusion that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the shabu confiscated were consequently not preserved became unavoidable.
The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very same one
delivered by Barte to the poseur-buyer.

115 | E v i d e n c e
 De los Santos vs. COA
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013

Facts: Then Congressman Antonio Cuenco of the 2nd District of Cebu City entered into a MOA with the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC/hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio Alquizalas, Medical
Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000 from his PDAF to cover the medical
assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N‘ Tommy Health Program (TNT Program). It was agreed
that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the
TNT Program for an amount not exceeding P5,000 per patient, except those with major illnesses for
whom a separate limit may be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be
subsequently disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase
medicines intended for the indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its
pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official receipts and other
documents. In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote Nelanie
Antoni, Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the
hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited
suppliers of the DOH. The said request was approved.

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions
and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. Filomena Delos Santos,
who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands?

Held: No. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of
an explicit rule that was violated.

Here, the petitioners have failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules
and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners‘ neglect to properly monitor the
disbursement of Cuenco‘s PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell
Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related
thereto. Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have
been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and
unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to
monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded
them that it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as
the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent beneficiaries, be
justified as ―a welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the hospital.‖

In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos‘ argument that the practices of the TNT Office were
already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the same69
remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was installed
as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime ―in the late 2003,‖ Antoni disclosed to her the
irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged prescriptions.70 Hence,
having known this significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter further,
and, likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos
contented herself with giving oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics
not to leave pre-signed prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for
new doctors. But, just the same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or
in December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By
then, too much damage had already been done.

116 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Cadidia
G.R. No. 191263, October 16, 2013

Facts: Hadji Socor Cadidia was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165. The prosecution
presented Marilyn Trayvilla, a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the PNP, who testified that, while performing
her duty as a female frisker at the NAIA Terminal I, when she frisked Cadidia, she noticed something
unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia‘s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her
sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia‘s explanation, Trayvilla
and her female co-employee Leilani Bagsican brought Cadidia to the comfort room inside the domestic
airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered that
inside were two sachets of shabu. The sachets were turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli Appang.

The second prosecution witness, Bagsican, testified that while frisking Cadidia, Trayvilla noticed
something bulky in her maong pants. As a result, Trayvilla asked for her help and with Cadidia, they
proceeded to the comfort room. While inside the cubicle of the comfort room, Bagsican asked Cadidia to
open her pants and pull down her underwear. Inside Cadidia‘s sanitary napkin were two plastic sachets of
shabu which they confiscated. Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping. Thereafter, she
reported the incident to their supervisor SPO3 Appang, to whom she endorsed the confiscated items.

Finally, the prosecution presented SPO3 Appang who testified that when Trayvilla frisked Cadidia, she
called his attention and informed him that something was kept inside Cadidia‘s private area. Accordingly,
he instructed Trayvilla and Bagsican to proceed to the comfort room to check it. Trayvilla and Bagsican
recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from Cadidia. The plastic sachets together with the
sanitary napkin were immediately turned over to him by the friskers Trayvilla and Bagsican.

Cadidia casts doubt on the set of facts presented by the prosecution. She alleges that the testimonies
given were conflicting, thus, the same should not be given credit and should result in her acquittal.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands?

Held: Yes. In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Here, the Court finds no conflict in the narration of events of the prosecution witnesses. In her direct
testimony, Trayvilla testified that they asked Cadidia to remove what was inside her underwear when
they brought her to the comfort room to check what was hidden inside. However, in her re-direct, she
clarified that it was really Bagsican who particularly made the request but she was then also inside the
cubicle with Cadidia. This clarification is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the two of them were
inside the cubicle when the request to bring out the contents of the underwear was made and the
concealed illegal drug was discovered. The other inconsistency alleged by Cadidia pertains to what
happened during the confiscation of the illegal drug at the cubicle. Cadidia alleges that Bagsican and
SPO3 Appang differed in their statements. However, the Court finds no such inconsistency. Bagsican
testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping.
She then turned over Cadidia and the plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified
that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room, they handed to him what was taken
from Cadidia. The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken recollection of events.

Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, minor inconsistencies do not
negate the eyewitnesses‘ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long
as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still
be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses‘ testimonies corroborate one another on material
details surrounding the commission of the crime.

The prosecution witnesses were also unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against
Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled Cadidia who entered
the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search
Cadidia especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of Cadidia upon frisking
prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of
Cadidia would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when they found
the illegal drugs inside Cadidia‘s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that Cadidia and the two friskers
were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of
frame-up and denial of Cadidia cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution
witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension.

117 | E v i d e n c e
Cohabitation

People vs. Edualino

G.R. No. 119072, April 11, 1997

Facts: Jesus Edualino was charged with rape, with Rowena Nantiza as victim. Rowena and her mother
were in Mambalot, Brooke‘s Point, Palawan to attend a dance. At about 10PM of that day Rowena saw
her cousin Antero Bacosa at the dance and she asked him to drink beer with her. Antero got drunk and
fell asleep. It was at this time that Edualino approached her and offered her a glass of beer. Rowena
noticed that Edualino was drunk so she accepted the glass. She then felt dizzy after drinking the beer.
Edualino then dragged her towards a grassy area where no people were present. Edualino then forced
himself on top of her and succeeded in raping her while she was in a semi-unconscious state. Rowena
further stated that she was continuously resisting the assault upon her but Edualino was stronger and he
even boxed her in the stomach. She stated that she passed out after the rape was consummated.

Edualino relies on alternative defenses of alibi and consent on the part of Rowena. Edualino also raises
the issue of the character of Rowena. It is argued that a responsible and decent married woman, who
was then 3 months pregnant, would not be out at 2AM getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina
ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that Rowena merely concocted the charge of
rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking
alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce Edualino while she was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol. Edualino in a final attempt to absolve himself argues that the charge of
rape was concocted by Rowena to save her marriage.

Issue (1): Whether or not attacking the character of the complainant serves the favor Edualino?

Held: No. The moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the
accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.

Here, even if Edualino‘s allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that
she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said
circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped. Edualino cannot successfully argue
that no rape occurred because no medical examination was conducted to confirm the presence of
spermatozoa in her private parts. The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim
is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent
with human nature and the course of things.

After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the
constitutional presumption of Edualino‘s innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Issue (2): Whether or not the charge of rape was concocted by the victim to save her marriage?

Held: No. The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an
attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand
how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by Edualino.

118 | E v i d e n c e
 Uy vs. Lacsamana
G.R. No. 206220. August 19, 2015

Facts: The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City.
The land was previously owned by Sps. Manuel. Luis Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents with Damages against Petra Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana. In the Complaint, Uy
alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife
from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca
had eight children. Uy alleged that in 1964, he and his wife acquired the subject residential land
evidenced by a Deed of Sale from the Sps. Manuel. The sellers‘ OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued
in the name of ―Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy.‖ Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by
a Deed of Absolute Sale, another residential land adjacent thereto from Sps. Contreras. Uy further
alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of
Sale on the subject land, together with the house erected thereon in favor of Sps. Lacsamana.

In her Answer, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real
properties using her paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Batangas City. The RD elevated the matter, on consulta, with the LRC because of an affidavit
subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property was conjugal
in nature and sold without his marital consent. In a Resolution, the LRC decided in favor of registration
stating that since the property in question was registered in Rosca‘s name, such circumstance indicated
that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property.

Issue: Whether or not Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property
acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares?

Held: Yes. There is a presumption established in our Rules ―that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.‖ Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party
and overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as
the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage. Documentary evidence may also be shown. The best documentary evidence of a
marriage is the marriage contract itself.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from
his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly
took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he
was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca
were not legally married to each other. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally
married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Art. 147 of the Family Code which
applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married. The provision states
that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the
contrary. Here, Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194, Rosca was recognized as the sole registered
owner of the property. Second, in the Deed of Sale between Sps. Manuel and Rosca covering the subject
land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca‘s purchase of the land as evidenced by his signature under
―signed in the presence of.‖ This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of Rosca‘s
ownership over the property. Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership executed by Rosca in support of her
real estate loan application with PBC, Rosca stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject
property and that the land was registered under her name and that the phrase ―Petra Rosca, married to
Luis G. Uy‖ in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status. Last, the title to the property in
the name of ―Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy‖ was notice to the world, including her heirs and
successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal property. The words ―married to‖
were merely descriptive of Rosca‘s status at the time the property was registered in her name.
Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should have been in the names of Luis
Uy and Petra Rosca.

119 | E v i d e n c e
Rule 132 – Presentation of Evidence

People vs. Fabre

G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002

Facts: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the RTC of raping his own daughter Marilou. Fabre
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou,
that of Adela, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who
examined Marilou, along with the medicolegal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of
Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the
presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself. It also called Adela back
to the witness stand. The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly
to the narration of the young complainant, that ―even when consumed with revenge, it would take a
certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which could put her own
father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of
shame.‖ Hence, this automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Fabre should acquire added strength for the failure of the
prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence?

Held: No. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further
examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be
adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is
not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is
not cross examined by the other party. Here, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of
Marilou should be more than enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by Fabre.

120 | E v i d e n c e
Leading and Misleading Questions

People vs. Perez

G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003

Facts: Jesus Perez was found guilty of raping Mayia Ponseca. Perez contends that his identification in
open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Perez points out that the prosecutor had already identified him
as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist.
Perez stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named
―Johnny‖ and did not give any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, Perez claims he was alone
in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Perez bewails that the identification
was not done with the usual police lineup.

Issue: Whether or not the leading questions propounded to Mayia are allowed?

Held: Yes. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when
the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.
Here, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and
unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to
ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to
protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading
questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of
justice. It is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, to
fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private part, subject herself to
public trial, and tarnish her family‘s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong desire to
seek justice for the wrong committed against her.

121 | E v i d e n c e
Impeachment

People vs. Castillano

G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003

Facts: Appellants Ronald Castillano alias ―Nono‖ and Jaime Castillano, Jr. was convicted of murder
committed upon the person of Diosdado Volante. Among the witnesses for the prosecution was the
victim‘s wife, Luz. The trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of murder qualified
by evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime on reasonable
doubt. The trial court gave no credence to Ronald‘s claim that he acted in self-defense. Hence, this
appeal. Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent with her
testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement before
the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the
physical evidence on record. On the other hand, the OSG asserts that the credibility of the testimony of
Luz, the prosecution‘s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
examination before the MTC nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason
that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants
nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her
testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz
was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Sec. 13,
Rule 132.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Luz may be impeached?

Held: No. Sec. 13, Rule 132 provides: ―How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement . Before
a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.‖

Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence
consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner
must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the
apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were
made. The statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching
her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given
an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies.

Here, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present
testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The
appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the
specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in
evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement, cannot be considered by
the court.

122 | E v i d e n c e
Reference to Memorandum: Present Memory Revived

People vs. Plasencia

G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995

Facts: Appellants Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of
robbery with homicide upon the person and property of Herminio Mansueto. The RTC convicted the three
accused of murder instead. Hence, this appeal. Appellants challenge Francisca Espina‘s (prosecution‘s
lone eyewitness) credibility because of her alleged inconsistencies. They fault the trial court for allowing
the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm while testifying.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Espina may be given worth although, while testifying, she would
at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm?

Held: Yes. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Sec.
16, Rule 132 states: ―When witness may refer to memorandum.—A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that
the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but
such evidence must be received with caution.‖

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. Here, the exercise
of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be
accurate on dates and like details.

123 | E v i d e n c e
Reference to Memorandum: Past Recollection Recorded

Canque vs. CA
G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999

Facts: Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. She
had contracts with the government for the restoration and asphalting of several roads. In connection with
these projects, Canque entered into two contracts with Socor Construction Corporation. Socor sent
Canque a bill, containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a
month, representing the balance of Canque‘s total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and
services rendered by Socor under the two contracts. However, Canque refused to pay the amount,
claiming that Socor failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the
items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. Hence, Socor brought suit in the RTC to
recover from Canque the said sum. In her answer, Canque admitted the existence of the contracts with
Socor as well as receipt of the billing. However, she disputed the correctness of the bill. Canque
subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-contracts with Socor.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled in favor of Socor. It held that ―by analyzing Socor‘s Book of
Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. K) the court is convinced that the entries (both
payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of
SOCOR‘s commercial transactions with RDC which were entered therein in the course of business. The
court cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exh. K because the fact of their having been
made in the course of business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was
ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason for us
to doubt their authenticity.‖ Hence, this appeal. It is argued by Socor that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Sec. 10, Rule 132.

Issue: Whether or not the entries may be admitted in evidence?

Held: No. Sec. 10, Rule 132 provides: ―When witness may refer to memorandum.—A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that
the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by
the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with
caution.‖

Here, Exh. K was offered for the purpose of showing the amount of Canque‘s indebtedness. This is also
the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of Aday as a
witness. Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence.

Under the above provision, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does
not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the
witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where
the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of
the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident
that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be
more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same
facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing
memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express
injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not
very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness
stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence.

As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only
corroborate Aday‘s testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.

124 | E v i d e n c e
Classes of Documents

Iwasawa vs. Gangan

G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

Facts: Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, met Felisa Custodio Gangan sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Gangan introduced herself as ―single‖ and ―has never married before.‖ Since
then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, Iwasawa came back to the Philippines and
married Gangan. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife
become depressed. To his shock, Gangan confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed away. Iwasawa sought to confirm the truth of his wife‘s confession and discovered that
indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June
20, 1994. This prompted Iwasawa to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to Gangan as null
and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one. During trial, aside from his testimony,
Iwasawa also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of
Marriage between Iwasawa and Gangan; (2) Certificate of Marriage between Gangan and Arambulo; (3)
Certificate of Death of Arambulo; and (4) Certification to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to Gangan.

The RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Gangan‘s prior existing valid marriage to
another man. It held that while Iwasawa offered the certificate of marriage of Gangan to Arambulo, it
was only Iwasawa who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that Iwasawa‘s testimony is
unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of Gangan‘s prior marriage nor of Arambulo‘s death
which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between Gangan and Arambulo and the
latter‘s death certificate. It further ruled that Iwasawa‘s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise
unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded
evidentiary weight?

Held: No. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Iwasawa are all public
documents. As provided under Art. 410, Civil Code: ―The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.‖ As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness.

Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that Iwasawa did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authent icity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only
are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain
unrebutted since neither Gangan nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

125 | E v i d e n c e
 Asian Terminals vs. Philam Insurance
G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013

Facts: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (UMC) 219 packages containing
120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck on board a vessel from Japan to Manila. The shipment was
insured with Philam Insurance Co., Inc. against all risks under a Marine Policy. The carrying vessel arrived
at the port of Manila, and when the shipment was unloaded by the staff of Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), it
was found that two packages were in bad order. The cargoes were stored for temporary safekeeping
inside CFS Warehouse. The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc., the
authorized broker of UMC, and delivered to the latter‘s warehouse. Upon the request of UMC, a bad order
survey was conducted on the cargoes. Owing to the extent of the damage to said cargoes, UMC declared
them a total loss. UMC filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind Shipping Corporation, ATI and
R.F. When UMC‘s demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated by
Philam. Accordingly, UMC issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam. Philam, as subrogee of UMC,
filed a Complaint for damages against Westwind, ATI and R.F.

The RTC ruled in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. The trial court
acknowledged the subrogation between Philam and UMC on the strength of the Subrogation Receipt. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition. In their respective comments to
Philam‘s Formal Offer of Evidence, ATI and Westwind objected to the admission of the Marine Certificate
and the Subrogation Receipt as documentary exhibits. Westwind objects to the admission of both
documents for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the persons who executed them. For the
same reason, ATI assails the admissibility of the Subrogation Receipt.

Issue: Whether or not the Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt were properly admitted in
evidence?

Held: Marine Certificate – No. Subrogation Receipt – Yes. The nature of documents as either public or
private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as
enumerated under Sec. 19, Rule 132, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Sec. 20, Rule 132: ―Proof of private document.—
Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.‖

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Sec. 21, Rule 132; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by
the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or
(d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.

Indubitably, the Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam and
the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the
requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may not be
admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated. Contrary to the contention of ATI
and Westwind, however, Philam presented its claims officer, Ricardo Ongchangco, Jr. to testify on the
execution of the Subrogation Receipt. Indeed, all that the Rules require to establish the authenticity of a
document is the testimony of a person who saw the document executed or written. Thus, the trial court
did not err in admitting the Subrogation Receipt in evidence despite ATI and Westwind‘s objections that it
was not authenticated by the person who signed it.

However, the same cannot be said about the Marine Certificate which Ongchangcho, Jr. merely identified
in court. There is nothing in Ongchangco, Jr.‘s testimony which indicates that he saw Philam‘s authorized
representative sign said document. As regards the issuance of the Marine Certificate after the fact of loss
occurred, suffice it to say that said document simply certifies the existence of an open insurance policy in
favor of the consignee.

126 | E v i d e n c e
Offer of Evidence

Aludos vs. Suerte

G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012

Facts: Sometime in 1969, Lomises Aludos acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy
two stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City, as evidenced by a permit issued by the City Treasurer. In
1984, Lomises entered into an agreement with Johnny Suerte for the transfer of all improvements and
rights over the two market stalls. Johnny gave a down payment to Lomises, who acknowledged receipt of
the amount in a document executed on the same date as the agreement. Johnny made a subsequent
payment of the purchase price. Before full payment could be made, however, Lomises backed out of the
agreement and returned the down payment to Domes Suerte and James Suerte, the mother and the
father of Johnny, respectively. The return of the down payment was embodied in a handwritten receipt.
Johnny protested the return of his money, and insisted on the continuation and enforcement of his
agreement with Lomises. When Lomises refused Johnny‘s protest, Johnny filed a complaint against
Lomises before the RTC for specific performance with damages.

The RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the
Baguio City Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market
stalls, and the Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. The lessee cannot assign the
lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. This was affirmed by
the CA. Lomises moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, contending that no valid sale of the
improvements could be made because the lease contract, dated May 1, 1985, between Lomises and the
Baguio City Government, supposedly marked as Exh. ―A,‖ provided that ―[a]ll improvements [introduced
shall] ipso facto become properties of the City of Baguio.‖ The CA denied the motion as the contract of
lease was never formally offered in evidence before the RTC and could thus not be considered pursuant
to the rules of evidence. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the lease contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises may be
given evidentiary value, although not formally offered in evidence?

Held: No. Under Sec. 34, Rule 132, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by
the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely
a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.

Here, although the contract was referred to in Lomises‘ answer to Johnny‘s complaint and was marked in
his pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the lease contract ―surfaced‖ only
after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was formally offered was the
1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market
and nothing else. In other words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and
all improvements in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.

127 | E v i d e n c e
 Westmont vs. Francia
G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011

Facts: Respondents Amos Francia, Jr., Cecilia Zamora and Benjamin Francia (the Francias) filed a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their investments against Westmont
Investment Corporation and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. before the RTC. Wincorp and Pearlbank
filed their separate motions to dismiss. Both motions were anchored on the ground that the complaint of
the Francias failed to state a cause of action. The RTC issued an order dismissing the motions to dismiss
of Wincorp and Pearlbank for lack of merit. Wincorp then filed its Answer, while Pearlbank filed its
Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim (against Wincorp). After the Francias rested their case, the
case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp. Three days before the scheduled
hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone the hearing on even date, as its witness was
unavailable because he had to attend a congressional hearing. Wincorp‘s substitute witness was likewise
unavailable. The RTC denied Wincorp‘s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to
present evidence. The MR of Wincorp was likewise denied. Later, Pearlbank filed its Demurrer to
Evidence. The RTC granted the same. Hence, the complaint against Pearlbank was dismissed, while the
case was considered submitted for decision insofar as Wincorp was concerned. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable to them. On appeal to the CA, Wincorp
attached several documents to its pleadings which were not formally offered in the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA may be given
weight or evidentiary value?

Held: No. All the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot be given any
weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that these documents were not formally offered as
evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine and
rebut them. Sec. 34, Rule 132 provides: ―Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.‖

The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the
court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight.

128 | E v i d e n c e
Tender of Excluded Evidence

Fortune Tobacco vs. CIR

G.R. No. 192024, July 1, 2015

Facts: Fortune Tobacco Corporation is the manufacturer/producer of, among others, cigarette brands.
Prior to January 1, 1997, specific cigarette brands were subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to then Sec.
142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended. However, on January 1, 1997, RA 8240 took effect causing a
shift from the ad valorem tax system to the specific tax system. Some cigarette brands were subjected to
specific tax under Sec. 142 thereof, now renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of 1997. The rates of
excise tax on cigarettes were increased by 12% on January 1, 2000. To implement this, the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the CIR, issued RR 17-99, which provides ―that the new specific tax
rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented
liquor shall not be lower than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000.‖

Fortune filed a claim for tax credit or refund for erroneously or illegally collected specific taxes. A Petition
for Review was filed with the CTA Division, which ruled that RR 17-99 is contrary to law and the refund
being claimed by Fortune as alleged overpaid excise tax is not properly documented as what was
presented were merely photocopied documents. Fortune elevated its claim to the CTA En Banc, but was
rebuffed after the tax tribunal found no cause to reverse the findings and conclusions of the CTA Division.
Before the SC, Fortune posits that if their exhibits are admitted together with the testimony of their
witness, the same would sufficiently prove their claim.

Issue: Whether or not the subject exhibits may properly be considered?

Held: No. A closer scrutiny of the records shows that Fortune did not file any offer of proof or tender of
excluded evidence. Sec. 40, Rule 132 provides: ―Tender of excluded evidence.—If documents or things offered
in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.‖

Where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did not move that the
same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate court, as documents
forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the
appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the proceedings
below, would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse party — in this case, the CIR, to due process
of law.

It also bears pointing out that at no point during the proceedings before the CTA En Banc and before the
SC has Fortune offered any plausible explanation as to why it failed to properly make an offer of proof or
tender of excluded evidence. Instead, Fortune harps on the fact that CIR simply refused its claim for
refund on the ground that RR 17-99 was a valid issuance. Thus, for its failure to seasonably avail of the
proper remedy provided under Sec. 40, Rule 132, Fortune is precluded from doing so at this late stage of
the case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.

129 | E v i d e n c e
Rule 133 – Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence: Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

People vs. Caliso

G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011

Facts: Delfin Caliso was charged with rape with homicide, but the RTC found him guilty of murder. The
victim was AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl. The records show that AAA died in the river located
in Brgy. Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia,
secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable, had
been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy; that the cries
came from an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was going
on; that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girl‘s cries;
that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a cluster of
banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing
the number ―11‖ mark, who dragged a girl‘s limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl into
the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp body and tossed it to
deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time, Amegable
could not have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her; that she
nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to
having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident; that after the man fled the
crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told her husband what she had witnessed; and
that her husband instantly reported the incident to the barangay chairman.

Issue: Whether or not proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit was successfully
established?

Held: No. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove
the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be
established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are
no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. The Court has distinguished two types
of positive identification, to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen
with the victim immediately before or after the crime.

Here, Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her
barangay several times prior to the killing. However, her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not
have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The
test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of
its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique
physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or
tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the
rest of humanity. A witness‘ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive
identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.

No matter how honest Amegable‘s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look
at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty
about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be
AAA‘s killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness,
even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the
community where the crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso‘s back. Moreover,
many factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her
emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her
tendency to assume. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake
cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.

Amegable‘s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number ―11‖ did not enhance
the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but
generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in evidence, it
remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership or
possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.

130 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Patentes
G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014

Facts: The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant (―AAA‖) against Felimon Patentes. The prosecution avers that: AAA boarded a bus for
Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear
portion of the bus, Patentes suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met Patentes; the first
time was when Patentes persistently courted her. She only knew Patentes as he was a friend of her
brother. After a brief conversation, Patentes suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to threaten to
kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Patentes then accompanied AAA to her grandmother‘s place and
returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, Patentes placed his right hand on AAA‘s
shoulder. Patentes also held AAA‘s right hand, which covers her mouth with a handkerchief. Upon
reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store. Upon
arrival, a man gave something to Patentes, which he immediately placed inside his pocket. Patentes then
brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister, brother-in-law,
nephews and nieces live. Upon entering the house, Patentes dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her
to a sewing machine. Patentes then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale,
causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as Patentes removed
AAA‘s clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, Patentes mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following day, Patentes again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his cigarette, causing her to feel
weak and dizzy as Patentes had carnal knowledge of AAA. This was repeated for the next six days.
Thereafter, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced Patentes that she will marry him.
Patentes agreed. Patentes‘s mother accompanied AAA to the latter‘s house to discuss the marital plans
with AAA‘s family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAA‘s mother asked for a private moment with AAA. In
their conversation, AAA confessed how Patentes forcibly took her to his house and raped her for more
than a week. AAA‘s mother then accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was
examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.

After trial, the lower court found Patentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of Forcible
Abduction with Rape and seven counts of Rape. Aggrieved, Patentes elevated the case to the CA which
affirmed the decision of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
According to the CA, ―AAA‘s account of her ordeal in the hands of Patentes was straightforward, firm,
candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and rigorous cross-examination by the defense,
AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details of her harrowing experience. A thorough reading
of the transcript shows that AAA‘s testimony bears the earmarks of truth and credibility.‖ Hence, this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has discharged its burden of showing the guilt of Patentes for the
crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape?

Held: No. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. Here,
the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of
the charge that Patentes had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or
intimidation. The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue
credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose
charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law.

As culled from the records, AAA lived with Patentes‘ family for eight (8) days — in the same house where
Patentes‘ parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called Patentes‘
mother, ―mama.‖ The members of the appellant‘s family could have noticed that she was being forced
and raped by the accused if the accusations were really true. Indeed, it is incompatible with human
experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a house where the abuser‘s entire family, including
the abuser‘s minor nephews and nieces live.

When Patentes and AAA arrived in the former‘s house, they were greeted by Patentes‘s father. If AAA‘s
account were true that Patentes dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing machine,
Patentes‘ father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least, he would have
talked to Patentes about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, Patentes‘ mother went to AAA‘s house to
propose marriage — contrary to the common experience.

131 | E v i d e n c e
Contrary to the prosecution‘s claim that AAA only saw Patentes a day before the alleged commission of
the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew Patentes as Patentes was a neighbor and friend of AAA‘s
brother. Furthermore, Patentes‘ mother was the midwife who assisted AAA‘s housemaid in giving birth.
Lastly, AAA and Patentes have a common friend, Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in
Patentes‘ house, through AAA‘s invitation.

For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among AAA‘s
family members, AAA‘s father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to Patentes‘
house to discuss AAA and Patentes‘ marital plans. Clearly, this is contrary to human logic and experience,
and inconsistent with the prosecution‘s claim.

The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in
establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. Here, the actuations of AAA after the alleged rape
is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to
willingly go with her abuser‘s mother, and worse, to live with her abuser‘s entire family in one roof for
eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape. It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman
who has been robbed of her honor and chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches
of her malefactor. Instead of escaping from her abuser, AAA visited Patentes‘ neighbor. Even if AAA had
several opportunities to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and
instead described the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the testimony of
AAA that she visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction.

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA have created reasonable doubt. In view of the
foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of Patentes must be upheld considering
that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.

132 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Arcenal
G.R. No. 216015, March 27, 2017

Facts: Jesusano Arcenal was charged with violation of RA 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972), as
amended by RA 7659. The prosecution established that: around 11:00PM on April 11, 2000, the victim
Alvin de Rama was waiting behind Jay Flores and the other drivers at the tricycle terminal at the corner
of the road going to Brgy. Linga and the highway at Brgy. Labuin. Mario Meras was inside the sidecar of
his tricycle which was about three vehicles behind Alvin in the tricycle line. Although there were other
drivers waiting in line before him, Alvin left ahead with his lone passenger and backrider, Arcenal. Fifteen
minutes later, Flores was en route to the terminal after dropping his passenger when he saw Arcenal
driving Alvin‘s tricycle alone coming from the direction of Forest Park Subdivision, Brgy. Linga. Flores had
to apply brakes as Arcenal was speeding towards the direction of Brgy. Labuin. At 6:05AM on April 12,
2000, Alvin was found dead at the Forest Park. Flores heard from the other drivers about Alvin‘s death.
Meras also heard the news and went to Forest Park where he saw Alvin‘s body at the side of the road.
The Pila, Laguna PNP received a radio call from San Pedro, Laguna PNP that the barangay captain of San
Antonio reported about an abandoned tricycle found in Woodville Subdivision. With assistance from the
elements of San Pedro PNP, Alvin‘s father Renato de Rama and SPO3 Rufino went to the San Antonio
barangay hall to identify the recovered vehicle. Renato confirmed that it was indeed his tricycle driven by
his son. SPO3 Anterola noted the bloodstains on the motorcycle and the sidecar. The police officers were
not able to locate Arcenal, who, according to witnesses, was the last person seen with the victim. Dr.
Daissan Alagon, Municipal Health Officer of Pila, Laguna, performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Alvin.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that Arcenal is
guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide?

Held: Yes. In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond
reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the
elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.

Here, there was no eyewitness to the act of killing. However, the Court finds that the pieces of
circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court, which are consistent with one another,
establishes Arcenal‘s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if
sufficient, can replace direct evidence to warrant the conviction of an accused, provided that: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and
(c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave
no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

First. The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Renato, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale in his favor. Second. Alvin was last seen alive at the tricycle terminal at 11:00PM on April 11, 2000,
as stated in the direct testimonies of Flores and Meras. Third. Alvin left the terminal with Arcenal, his lone
passenger and back rider. Flores, who knew Arcenal personally since the latter was also a resident of Pila,
and had once been a tricycle driver, positively identified Arcenal. Fourth. About 15 minutes after they left
the terminal, Arcenal was scurrying onboard Alvin‘s tricycle coming from the Forest Park‘s direction.
Flores was en route to the terminal after he brought a passenger to Linga when he saw Arcenal driving
the vehicle alone towards the direction of Barangay Labuin. Fifth. At 6:05AM on April 12, 2000, Alvin was
found dead on the side of the road on Forest Park with his tricycle patently missing. According to the
autopsy report, his cause of death was shock secondary to intra-cranial hemorrhage, secondary to
trauma. Notably, there were three gaping wounds on the right and left occipital area (at the back of the
head), and contusion hematoma on the entire posterior neck area. Sixth. When the vehicle was
recovered, bloodstains were noted on the motorcycle and the sidecar. Seventh. The fingerprints lifted
from the tricycle matched with Arcenal‘s right hand index finger. According to the supplemental report,
Dactyloscopy Report No. F-051-00-A, 11 ridges of the fingerprints were identical in both the questioned
and standard fingerprints. It proved that the lifted fingerprint labeled as ―Q-3‖ is identical with the right
fingerprint of Arcenal.

133 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Alboka
G.R. No. 212195, February 21, 2018

Facts: Namraida Alboka was charged before the RTC of Muntinlupa with two counts of violation of RA
9165. In Crim. Case No. 07-904 (Sec. 5), the RTC ruled that the testimony of Lagos and Turingan were
direct, unwavering, and consistent on material points that leave no doubt as to their truthfulness; and
that the police officers had no reason to concoct the charges against the accused-appellant; while Alboka
simply denied that the buy-bust operation occurred. In Crim. Case No. 07-905 (Sec. 11), the RTC held
that Alboka was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, an overt act which justified Lagos to search for
and seize the illegal items in her possession. The RTC noted that while Lagos was not able to prepare the
certificate of inventory of the items which were seized and subsequently identified in court, he
nonetheless took steps not to compromise the purity and integrity of the items: by marking them at the
place of arrest and having the custody thereof throughout the operation until these were delivered and
received by the crime laboratory for examination. The RTC concluded that Lagos had substantially
complied with the requirements provided for under Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 and its IRR. Thus, the RTC
resolved the charges against Alboka.

Feeling aggrieved with the resolution of the RTC on the charges against her, Alboka appealed to the CA
which found the appeal to be without merit. The CA noted that Alboka did not assail the chain of custody
of the evidence albeit she raised the issue on the failure of the buy-bust team to conduct an inventory of
the seized items at the crime scene. The CA ruled, however, that even if the procedural requirements in
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 were not faithfully observed, as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the
guilt of the accused would not be affected. Moreover, it held that Alboka failed to overcome the
presumption that the police officers handled the seized items with regularity. According to the CA, Alboka
was caught in flagrante delicto and that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements for the crime
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The crime was consummated with the police officer going through the
operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by Alboka, followed by the delivery of the dangerous
drugs to the buyer. On the charge of illegal possession of shabu, the CA held that after the lawful arrest
of Alboka resulting from the buy-bust operation, two more plastic sachets suspected to contain shabu
were recovered in her possession. The CA observed that the record was bereft of any showing that
Alboka had the authority to possess these two plastic sachets which actually contained shabu.

Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Held: No. The conviction of an accused can only be justified if his guilt has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such
a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

The conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be
acquitted and set free should the prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In
other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for
as long as the prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the
crime charged. This is premised on the constitutional presumption that the accused is innocent unless his
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. And it is precisely because of this presumption that the Court is
required "as an appellate court to sift the records and search for every error, though unassigned in the
appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is warranted, and to correct every error that the lower
court has committed in finding guilt against the accused. In this instance, therefore, the Court is not
limited to the assigned errors, but can consider and correct errors though unassigned, and even reverse
the decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.

To recapitulate, the records of these cases were bereft of any showing that the prosecution had
discharged its burden to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which the accused-appellant enjoy;
(2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs;
and (3) offer any explanation why the provisions of Sec. 21, RA 9165 were not complied with. The Court
is thus constrained to acquit Alboka based on reasonable doubt.

134 | E v i d e n c e
Clear and Convincing Evidence

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr.

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
―Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.‖ Hong Kong reverted back to the
People‘s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Juan
Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three counts of the offense of ―accepting
an advantage as agent,‖ in violation of an ordinance of Hong Kong. He also faces seven counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were
issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI which, in turn, filed with the
RTC an application for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. On September 23, 1999, the RTC issued an Order
of Arrest against Muñoz. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA declared
the Order of Arrest void. The DOJ filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari, praying that the
Decision of the CA be reversed. On December 18, 2000, the SC granted the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz. The Decision became final and executory.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, HKSAR filed with the RTC a petition for the extradition of
Muñoz, raffled off to Br. 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, Muñoz filed in the
same case a petition for bail which was opposed by HKSAR. After hearing, Judge Bernardo issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that Muñoz is a high ―flight risk.‖ Judge Bernardo then inhibited himself from further hearing
the case. It was then raffled off to Br. 8 presided by Judge Felixberto Olalia, Jr. Muñoz filed a MR of the
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by Judge Olalia in an Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing Muñoz to post bail. HKSAR filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by Judge Olalia in his Order. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not an extraditee may apply for bail?

Held: Yes. While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails
a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also ―the machinery of criminal law.‖ This is shown by Sec. 6 of PD
1069 (Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the ―immediate arrest and temporary detention
of the accused‖ if such ―will best serve the interest of justice.‖ Further, Sec. 20 of PD 1069 allows the
requesting state ―in case of urgency‖ to ask for the ―provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition‖; and that release from provisional arrest ―shall not prejudice
re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.‖ Obviously,
an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.

Records show that Muñoz was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard,
such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it
was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution. In fact, the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee‘s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to

135 | E v i d e n c e
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed ―clear and convincing evidence‖ should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extradite must prove by ―clear and convincing evidence‖ that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Here, there is no showing that Muñoz, presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Muñoz may be
granted bail on the basis of ―clear and convincing evidence.‖

136 | E v i d e n c e
 SC vs. Delgado
A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011

Facts: Supreme Court Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused the
transmittal of two sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court–Second Division (OCC-SD). Contained in
the Agenda are the itemized lists of cases taken up by the Court‘s Second Division during the sessions
held on 30 May and 1 June 2011, as well as the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio showing the
specific actions adopted by the division on each case item. The transmittal of the Agenda was made for
the purpose of allowing the Second Division Clerk of Court to prepare the draft minutes of the 30 May
and 1 June 2011 sessions. Christine Puno, an Executive Assistant III at the OCC-SD, received the two
Agenda on behalf of the office. Puno is the duly designated personnel of the OCC-SD authorized to
receive and open the sealed Agenda coming from the Office of Justice Carpio. Promptly, Puno forwarded
both Agenda to Atty. Ma. Luisa Laurea—the Second Division Clerk of Court. Atty. Laurea instructed Ms.
Puno to have the Agenda photocopied, beginning with the one for the 30 May 2011 session. As is
customary, the 30 May 2011 Agenda was ordered to be photocopied in two (2) sets: one to serve as a
duplicate of Atty. Laurea, while the other as a copy of the Agenda Division of the office. The original
Agenda will be left with the Minutes Division, which will draft the minutes of the session. Following the
instructions of Atty. Laurea, Puno gave the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Julius Irving Tanael—a Utility Worker
II at the OCC-SD—for photocopying. Tanael is one of only four personnel in the OCC-SD who are
authorized to make photocopies of Agenda with actions. Upon completing his task, Mr. Tanael reckoned
that the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda were too voluminous to be bound by mere staple wire.
Hence, Mr. Tanael gave the finished copies to respondent Eddie Delgado for stitching. Upon finishing with
the stitching, Delgado returned the two (2) copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Tanael. In turn, Tanael
gave one copy to the Agenda Division and another copy to Puno for transmittal to Atty. Laurea. Before
Ms. Puno could furnish Atty. Laurea her copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda, however, she caught Delgado
acting suspiciously while holding and reading sheets of pink-colored papers, which are similar to that
used by the OCCSD in photocopying Agenda. She then saw Delgado keep the same sheets inside the
drawer of his office desk. It was at that point that Puno began to suspect that the sheets held, read and
kept by Delgado might have been taken from the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Thus, Puno at once
requested Tanael to help check whether the pages of the said photocopies were complete.

The inspection of the duplicates revealed that one copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda—the one given to
the Agenda Division—had missing pages, pages 58, 59 and 70. Later, Puno was able to confirm her
suspicion as she found two of the missing pages i.e., pages 58 and 59, hidden below a pile of expediente
inside the drawer of Delgado‘s desk. She and Mr. Tanael then stapled back the recovered pages 58 and
59, and replaced the still unaccounted page 70 in the copy of the Agenda Division. After office hours,
Puno confided what happened to Auralyn Veloso and Atty. Teresita Tuazon. Veloso is an Assistant
Records Officer in OCC-SD, while Atty. Tuazon is the Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division. Atty.
Tuazon reported the incident involving the missing pages of a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Atty.
Laurea. Alarmed, Atty. Laurea called Delgado, Puno and Atty. Tuazon in her office for an initial
investigation. In the presence of Atty. Laurea, Atty. Tuazon and Puno, Delgado candidly admitted during
the initial investigation that he took pages 58, 59 and 70 from one of the copies of the 30 May 2011
Agenda. However, Delgado also disclosed that he removed the pages from the subject Agenda only as a
favor to respondents Joseph Lawrence Madeja and Wilfredo Florendo. As it turned out, after Delgado
received the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda for stitching, he was approached by Madeja and Florendo
who expressed interest on certain items apparently included in the Agenda. Madeja and Florendo then
asked Delgado if he could provide them with a copy. Delgado professed that out of ―pakikisama‖ he
removed the would-be missing pages from one of the copies entrusted to him for stitching and gave
them to Madeja and Florendo. Madeja and Florendo, however, would eventually return these pages to
Delgado because, purportedly, none of the items about which they were interested was in them.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to show that Madeja and Florendo, indeed, connived
with Delgado in removing the three pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda?

Held: Yes. The denial of Madeja and Florendo, in a complete turnaround from an earlier admission, is
unavailing as against the positive, straightforward and consistent statements of Delgado. First. Delgado‘s
statements, not only in the initial investigation but also in the formal investigation, were unwavering in
their implication of respondents Madeja and Florendo. Delgado categorically identified Madeja and
Florendo as the persons who induced him to remove several pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011
Agenda and thereafter obtained them. Second. It was never shown that Delgado was motivated by any ill
will in implicating Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained
unsullied. We find his statements worthy of belief. Third. The unsubstantiated denial of respondents,
therefore, falters in light of the direct and positive statements of Delgado. The basic principle in
Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail
over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.

137 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Fontanilla
G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

Facts: At around 9:30PM on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in
Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece
of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a
piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso
Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed
their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. An information for
murder was filed against Fontanilla in the RTC. At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that
on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a
nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to
Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais,
a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself
by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim‘s head, causing the latter to fall
face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was
no longer moving.

Issue: Whether or not Fontanilla plea of self-defense is successfully proven?

Held: No. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, Fontanilla had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal
injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or
homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal
liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the
burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held
criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should
discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution‘s evidence,
even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings. Fontanilla
did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful
aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla‘s act of hitting the victim‘s head with a stone, causing
the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim‘s fistic
attack and kicks.

138 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. Cabiles
G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

Facts: An Information for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 was filed against Stephan Cabiles for the
illegal sale of shabu. On October 20, 2005, SPO4 Ernesto Gonzales of the Office of Chief of Bacolod City
Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Force (CAIDSOTG) received an information that a certain
―kano,‖ (Cabiles), of Purok Narra Baybay, Brgy. 8, Bacolod City, was engaged in the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. On October 31, 2005, SPO4 Gonzales formed a team and conducted a briefing for a
buy-bust operation against Cabiles. PO1 Ian Piano, the designated poseur-buyer, was given two pieces of
P100 bills as buy-bust money. At around 4:00PM, SPO4 Gonzales instructed the confidential informant to
meet them at the lagoon of the Provincial Capitol Building on Lacson St. in Bacolod City. SPO4 Gonzales
instructed the confidential informant to send a text message to Cabiles regarding the place where the
sale of illicit drugs would take place. Thereafter, PO1 Piano, together with the confidential informant,
proceeded to the agreed place. Upon seeing Cabiles, the confidential informant approached him and
asked if he had the shabu, to which Cabiles positively confirmed. PO1 Piano handed the buy-bust money
to Cabiles, which he placed in his pocket. Cabiles in turn handed to PO1 Piano a plastic sachet.
Immediately after the exchange, PO1 Piano called SPO4 Gonzales, as the prearranged signal that the sale
was consummated. Thereafter, PO1 Piano placed Cabiles under arrest. While being frisked, police officers
recovered the buy-bust money from his pocket. Cabiles denied the charges against him. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, found Cabiles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu. Hence, this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation must be upheld?

Held: Yes. The testimonies of PO1 Piano and SPO4 Gonzales established beyond reasonable doubt
Cabiles‘ culpability. Their narrations on what transpired in the afternoon of October 20, 2005, from the
moment the confidential informant disclosed the illegal activities of Cabiles up to the time of his arrest
dated October 31, 2005, deserve great respect and credence. The direct account of law enforcement
officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. It should be noted that
―unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any improper
motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and
credit.‖ Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Since, Cabiles failed to present
or refute the evidence presented against him, therefore, the conduct of the operation of the police
officers prevails and is presumed regular.

Further, Cabiles‘ defense of denial is inherently weak and viewed with disfavor for it can be easily
concocted. Denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of a prosecution witness. A defense of
denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and
self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing,
straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters. For this defense to succeed, it must be
proven with strong and convincing evidence. Cabiles failed in this regard.

139 | E v i d e n c e
Preponderance of Evidence

PCIB vs. Balmaceda

G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011

Facts: Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) filed an action for recovery of sum of money with
damages before the RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch.
In its complaint, PCIB alleged that Balmaceda fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager‘s checks.
PCIB later amended its complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the
proceeds from Balmaceda‘s alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and
encashed Manager‘s checks to 34. Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default.
On the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda‘s scheme. According to
Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and
Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the
fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of
Balmaceda‘s money.

The RTC ruled in favor of PCIB and against Balmaceda, as well as Ramos who was found to be in
collusion with the former. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no
sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter‘s fraudulent
manipulations. According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in some of the
Manager‘s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda‘s fraudulent scheme.
It observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired and
encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos. With PCIB‘s failure to prove Ramos‘ actual
participation in Balmaceda‘s fraud, no legal and factual basis exists to hold him liable. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the liability of Ramos is sufficiently supported by PCIB‘s evidence?

Held: No. In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence
offered in opposition. ―Preponderance of evidence‖ is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ―greater weight of the
evidence‖ or ―greater weight of the credible evidence.‖ Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party, whether the plaintiff or the
defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a
favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never
leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an
essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an
―avoidance‖ of the claim.

Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos
conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter‘s scheme to defraud the Bank. In PCIB‘s estimation, it
successfully accomplished this through the submission of the following evidence: (1) the application
forms for MCs, show that the MCs were applied for in favor of Ramos; (2) the Exhibits and their
submarkings prove that the MCs were issued in favor of Ramos; and (3) the Testimonies of the witness
for PCIB. However, the Court cannot accept these submitted pieces of evidence as sufficient to satisfy the
burden of proof that PCIB carries as plaintiff.

On its face, all that PCIB‘s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos‘ name as a payee when he
filled up the application forms for the Manager‘s checks. But the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos
the payee on some of the Manager‘s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in
Balmaceda‘s fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the other Manager‘s checks yet PCIB
never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos‘
participation that would justify his separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmaceda‘s
brother-in-law, their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable, absent concrete proof
of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme.

Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos‘ participation in Balmaceda‘s scheme, it was not even necessary
for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be
entered in the plaintiff‘s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to
reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to achieve this result.

140 | E v i d e n c e
 De La Lanna vs. Biong
G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013

Facts: Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. Leila A. dela
Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped
the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the
car halted, a dump truck driven by Joel Primero (employed by Rebecca Biong) suddenly rammed the car‘s
rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car‘s rear end collapsed and its rear
windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor
wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries. Later,
Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain
became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the
extent that she could no longer move her left arm. She underwent physical therapy to alleviate her
condition. Dra. dela Llana‘s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.
She then underwent a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Dr. Flores operated
on her spine and neck. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela
Llana from the practice of her profession despite the surgery. Dra. dela Llana demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for
damages before the RTC.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness. Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she
lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and
authenticated a medical certificate. The medical certificate stated that Dra. Dela Llana suffered from a
whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations. Dra. Dela Llana also
presented pictures of her damages car. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. However, the CA
reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between
the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Hence, this petition. Dra.
dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of evidence that Joel‘s negligent act was
the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was
strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted
in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana
suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is
credible because she was a surgeon.

Issue: Whether or not Dra. dela Llana was able to establish her case by preponderance of evidence?

Held: No. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has
the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

Here, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel‘s negligence and Dra. dela Llana‘s
whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel‘s
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. Notably,
Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged
car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial evidence. However,
none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the
whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans
or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be
established.

The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision. The medical certificate
cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence. Dra. dela Llana‘s opinion that Joel‘s
negligence caused her whiplash injury has no probative value as she merely testified as an ordinary
witness before the trial court. In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by
preponderance of evidence. While the Court commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and
impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana‘s favor. Her claim,
unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.

141 | E v i d e n c e
 Candao vs. People
G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011

Facts: The Chairman of the Commission on Audit constituted a team of auditors from the central office
to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, ARMM (ORG-ARMM). State
Auditors Heidi Mendoza (Team Leader) and Jaime Roxas (Member) were directed to conduct the said
audit under the supervision of Jaime Naranjo (State Auditor V). From August 24 to September 1, 1993,
the expanded audit was thus conducted on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for
the period July 1992 to March 1993. As stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) Report submitted by the
audit team, it was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency
through the issuance of 52 checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel Haron (Disbursing Officer II)
without the required disbursement vouchers. COA Chairman demanded from Haron to produce and
restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full amount of P21,045,570.64 and submit his
explanation together with the official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in acknowledgment
of such restitution. Later, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed
in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds against several ORG-ARMM
officials/employees. They were charged with violation of Art. 217 of the RPC, as amended. The
Sandiganbayan found Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds, committed
in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria Candao and Abas Candao. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the equipoise rule is applicable?

Held: No. The testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the
prima facie evidence of misappropriation arising from Haron‘s failure to give a satisfactory explanation for
the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM funds under his custody and control. Petitioners likewise did not
accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time
thereafter.

Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule
finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.

Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence
that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand,
specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. In the crime of malversation,
all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public
funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could
not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused
is hardly necessary in malversation cases.

142 | E v i d e n c e
Substantial Evidence

Ombudsman vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011

Facts: Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against Antonio Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza, who were the
Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of LTO District
Office in Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated that he went to LTO at Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a
driver‘s license. He was made to take an examination for driver‘s license applicants by Peñaloza, a clerk in
said office. After the examination, Peñaloza informed him that he failed in the examination. However if he
is willing to pay additional assessment then they will reconsider his application (referring to Peñaloza and
Reyes). He asked how much will that be and Peñaloza in the presence of Reyes answered P680, so he
agreed. He then handed P1,000 to Peñaloza and Peñaloza handed it to the cashier. Peñaloza in turn
handed to him the change of P320 only and a little later he was given the LTO Official Receipt but only
for P180 which O.R. serves as my temporary license for 60 days; and the balance of P500 was without
O.R. and retained by Peñaloza. Attached to Acero‘s affidavit was the LTO Official Receipt, showing his
payment of P180. The above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Camiguin, but the same was later referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB-MINADM-01-
170).

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision, adjudging Reyes guilty of grave
misconduct and finding Peñaloza guilty of simple misconduct. In the main, the evidence submitted by the
parties in OMB-MINADM-01-170 consisted of their sworn statements, as well as that of their witnesses. In
the affidavit of Acero, he categorically identified both Reyes and Peñaloza as the persons who had the
prerogative to reconsider his failed examination, provided that he paid an additional amount on top of the
legal fees. For his part, Peñaloza ostensibly admitted the charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he
incriminated Reyes therein as the mastermind of the illicit activity complained of. To corroborate this
allegation, Peñaloza submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was a former LTO
employee who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing
additional fees; while Valdehueza declared that he was an applicant for a driver‘s license who was
likewise made to pay the said additional fees to Reyes. Upon the other hand, Reyes‘ counter-affidavit
repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting that it was Peñaloza who illegally took the amount of
P500.00 from Acero.

Reyes faults OMB for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Peñaloza, as well as the
affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said
documents before OMB rendered its Decision. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due process was
violated. OMB, on the other hand, counters that Reyes was afforded due process since he was given all
the opportunities to be heard, as well as the opportunity to file a MR of OMB‘s adverse decision.

Issue: Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by
substantial evidence?

Held: No. Indeed, Sec. 27 of RA 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of
the Court to analyze and weigh the parties‘ evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when
there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. After
carefully perusing the records of this case, the Court finds that the above-cited exception, rather than the
general rule, applies herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case should
be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1)
the respondents‘ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one‘s case and submit supporting
evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision
must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to

143 | E v i d e n c e
the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of
the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate;
and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it
and the various issues involved.

Here, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the
evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of OMB‘s decision that found him
guilty of grave misconduct. The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of OMB via a
Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the
violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of
the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished
with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether
before or after the Decision was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to
squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.

The OMB plainly disregarded Reyes‘ protestations without giving him a similar opportunity to be belatedly
furnished copies of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same.
As it were, OMB rendered its Decision on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the
Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of
dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights
of the parties to due process.

144 | E v i d e n c e
 Ramos vs. BPI Family
G.R. No. 203186, December 4, 2013

Facts: Xavier Ramos was employed by BPI Family and eventually became its VP for Dealer Network
Marketing/Auto Loans Division, the duties and responsibilities of which were to: (a) receive applications
for auto loans from auto dealers and salesmen; (b) analyze market demands and formulate marketing
strategies; and (c) enhance dealer and manufacturer relations. During his tenure, a client named Trezita
Acosta entered into and obtained several auto and real estate loans from BPI Family which were duly
approved and promptly paid. Acosta purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family for the
purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had remained unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta
did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent.

After investigation, BPI Family discovered that: (a) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and
succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo Branch, pursuant to
the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (b) Ramos released these
documents without the prior approval of BPI Family‘s credit committee; and (c) Ramos was grossly
remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the bank‘s safety protocols, particularly those
regarding the establishment of the loan applicant‘s identity, and that the promissory note was not even
signed by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing officers. As a consequence, BPI Family
lost P2,294,080, which amount was divided between Ramos and his three other subordinates, with
Ramos shouldering the proportionate amount of P546,000. The foregoing amount was subsequently
deducted from Ramos‘s benefits which accrued upon his retirement. In relation thereto, he executed a
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim agreeing to release the bank from any claim or liability with respect to,
inter alia, his separation pay or retirement benefits.

Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment
of retirement benefits and non-payment of overtime and holiday pay and premium pay against BPI
Family and/or its President at that time, Alfonso Salcedo, Jr. The LA dismissed Ramos‘s complaint, ruling
that the deduction made on his retirement benefits was ―legal and even reasonable‖ since Ramos was
negligent in running his department. It found that Ramos failed to ensure that his subordinates complied
with the bank‘s Know Your Customer (KYC) safety protocols, and that he issued the PO and ATD without
the prior approval of the credit committee. It further noted that the quitclaim executed by Ramos must
be given the force and effect of law, effectively barring any future claim by him against BPI Family.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA in a Decision, holding that the deduction complained of was ―illegal
and unreasonable‖ in that: (a) the alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not substantially proven
as he was not expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass through his hands or to
require the client to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do those details for
him; (b) the issuance of the PO and ATD prior to the loan‘s approval is not an irregular procedure, but an
ordinary occurrence in BPI Family; and (c) the deduction does not fall under the exceptions prescribed
under Art. 113 of the Labor Code on allowable deductions. Further, it found Ramos‘s consequent signing
of the quitclaim to be without effect. Accordingly, it ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the
amount of P546,000, with additional payment of 10% thereof as attorney‘s fees. BPI Family‘s MR was
denied; hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his
duty as head of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division in failing to determine the true identity of
the person who availed of the auto loan under the name ―Trezita Acosta‖. It observed that Ramos should
have forwarded the documents for approval to the Loan‘s Review Section and/or the Credit Evaluation
Section of the bank and should not have authorized the release of the car loan without clearance from
the credit committee. However, it also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned
the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee. Such relaxed
supervision over its divisions contributed to a large extent to its defraudation. Thus, finding BPI Family‘s
negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it improper to deduct the entire P546,000. from
Ramos‘s retirement benefits and, instead,equitably reduced the same to the amount of P200,000. Ramos‘
MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that the deduction made
from Ramos‘s retirement benefits was improper?

Held: No. In labor disputes, the NLRC‘s findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion
when its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. The requirement that the NLRC‘s findings
should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Sec. 5, Rule 133 which provides that
―in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is

145 | E v i d e n c e
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.‖

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos‘s retirement benefits
was improper. Two reasons impel the foregoing conclusion:

First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of
negligence against Ramos. The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue. Here, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate information in credit
applications and determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants rests with the Dealer Network
Marketing Department, which is the department under the supervision of Ramos. Quite the contrary,
records show that these responsibilities lie with the bank‘s Credit Services Department, namely its Credit
Evaluation Section and Loans Review and Documentation Section, of which Ramos was not part of.

Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice when he
issued the PO and ATD without prior approval from the bank‘s Credit Services Department. In fact, as the
CA itself notes, BPI Family adopted the practice of processing loans with extraordinary haste in order to
overcome arduous competition with other banks and lending institutions, despite compromising
procedural safeguards.

Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramos‘s action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the
approval of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family
itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent in his duties. To this end, it is
well to note that in loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their clients wholly comply with
all the documentary requirements in relation to the approval and release of loan applications. As BPI
Family ―uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions,‖ yielding as it did to the demands of
industry competition, it is but reasonable that it solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings. All told,
absent any showing that the NLRC‘s decision was tainted with capriciousness or any semblance of
whimsicality, the Court is wont to grant the present petition and accordingly reverse the CA decision.

146 | E v i d e n c e
Prima Facie Evidence

Lucas vs. Lucas

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

Facts: Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing) before the RTC. Jesse narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy,
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain ―Ate Belen‖ who worked in a prominent
nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got
acquainted with Jesus Lucas, at Belen‘s workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the
two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to Jesse. The name of Jesse‘s
father was not stated in Jesse‘s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told Jesse that his father is
Jesus. Jesus allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and Jesse for a period of about two years.
When the relationship of Elsie and Jesus ended, Elsie refused to accept Jesus‘ offer of support and
decided to raise Jesse on her own. While Jesse was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce
Jesse to Jesus, but all attempts were in vain. Attached to the petition were the following: (a) Jesse‘s
certificate of live birth; (b) Jesse‘s baptismal certificate; (c) Jesse‘s college diploma, showing that he
graduated from SLU-Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the
same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from UP, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles
from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Jesus argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to Jesus as
Jesse‘s father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.

Issue: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?

Held: Yes. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
or a reasonable possibility of paternity or ―good cause‖ for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a ―search,‖ which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it
should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The
court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

147 | E v i d e n c e
 Estate of Marcos vs. Republic
G.R. No. 213027, January 18, 2017

Facts: Civil Case No. 0141 is a forfeiture which emanated from a Petition dated 17 December 1991 (1991
Petition) filed by the Republic through the PCGG, represented by the OSG, seeking the recovery of the
assets and properties pertaining to the Marcoses, who acquired them directly or indirectly through, or as
a result of, the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the government. The properties,
subject of other pending forfeiture cases before the Sandiganbayan (SB), were excluded; and the
properties, subject of the 1991 Petition, were specifically listed and accordingly clustered into 18
categories. Some of the properties listed in the 1991 Petition were already adjudged as ill-gotten wealth
and consequently forfeited in favor of the government. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (the Swiss deposits
case) the Court in 2003 decreed that the deposits in various Swiss banks, referred to in the 1991 Petition,
were ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State. Likewise, in Marcos, Jr. v. Republic (the Arelma
case), the Court in 2012 declared that the funds, properties, and interests of Arelma were also ill-gotten
wealth and forfeited in favor of the State.

The Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to another property listed in the
1991 Petition. The Republic asked the SB to render judgment declaring the pieces of jewelry, known as
the Malacañang Collection and specifically mentioned in the 1991 Petition, as ill-gotten; and to
subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared forfeited in favor of the Republic. The latter
categorized the pieces of jewelry recovered from the Marcoses into three collections and singled out the
Malacañang Collection as the object of the motion. In support of the motion, the Republic cited the letter
dated 25 May 2009 sent to the PCGG by Imelda Marcos, through counsel, demanding ―the immediate
return of all her pieces of jewelry (i) taken by PCGG from Malacañang Palace and (ii) those turned over to
PCGG by the US Government.‖ The Republic argued that the letter proved the claim of the Marcoses that
they owned the Malacañang Collection, including the Hawaii Collection. It further argued that in the 1991
Petition, they were deemed to have admitted the allegations regarding the pieces of jewelry. The
Republic said that the words or stock phrases they used in their Answer had been declared by this Court
in the Swiss deposits case as a ―negative pregnant‖ and, as such, amounted to an admission if not
squarely denied. Finally, it contended that ―the lawful income of the Marcoses during their incumbencies
as public officials was grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of jewelry.‖ Invoking the
declaration of this Court in the Swiss deposits case, the Republic stated that their lawful income
amounting to USD304,372.43 was grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of jewelry in 1991.
The SB granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment favorably to the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was proper?

Held: Yes. The SB correctly held that the forfeiture was justified and that the Malacañang Collection was
subject to forfeiture. The legitimate income of the Marcoses had been pegged at USD304,372.43.
Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the properties were
lawfully acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that they were unlawfully acquired prevails.

The SB also properly ruled that there was no inconsistency or incongruity between Republic‘s Request for
Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, we have held that a request for admission
can be the basis for the grant of summary judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its
subject is deemed to have been admitted by the party and is requested as a result of that party‘s failure
to respond to the court‘s directive to state what specifically happened in the case.140 The resort to such
a request as a mode of discovery rendered all the matters contained therein as matters that have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 26. On the basis of Imelda Marcos‘ letter dated 25 May 2009;
respondents‘ Answer to the 1991 Petition, which was considered to be a ―negative pregnant‖ in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan; and respondents‘ failure to timely respond to petitioner‘s Request for Admission, the
SB thus correctly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Republic.

A careful scrutiny of the three bases used by the SB in justifying the absence of a genuine issue and
eventually granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment leads us to no other course of action but to
affirm the ruling of the SB. The prima facie presumption on unlawfully acquired property indeed finds
application on the first basis. Sec. 2 of RA 1379 provides that ―whenever any public officer or employee
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.‖ And in
this regard, the SB had taken judicial notice of the legitimate income of the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD304,372.43.

148 | E v i d e n c e
 Marcos vs. Cabrera-Faller
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24, 2017

Facts: This is an administrative complaint against Judge Perla Cabrera-Faller of the RTC, Br. 90,
Dasmariñas City, Cavite, filed by Martonino Marcos, a retired judge, for ignorance of the law, misconduct,
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, and for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment/order. The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant‘s grandson, Marc Andrei
Marcos, during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas held on July 29, 2012 at the Veluz Farm,
Dasmariñas City, Cavite. A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) issued its Resolution recommending the prosecution of several members of Lex Leonum
for Violation of RA 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law). In the same resolution, the OCP also recommended that
Cornelio Marcelo, the person assigned to be the buddy or ―angel‖ of Marc Andrei during the initiation
rites, be discharged as a state witness. Thereafter, the Information for Violation of RA 8049 was filed
against Jenno Antonio Villanueva, et al. before the RTC. Finding probable cause to sustain the
prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Order directing the issuance of a warrant
of arrest and, at the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of
the accused. Later, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable cause and to
withhold issuance of warrants of arrest and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest filed by
the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order, quashing, lifting and setting aside the
warrants for their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable
cause.

According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to indict the accused for violation of RA
8049 as the statement of Marcelo and those of the other accused ―were not put in juxtaposition with
each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their respective weight and substance.‖ To her, ―there were
nagging questions left unanswered by the testimony of Marcelo and some improbabilities therein that
boggle the mind and disturb the conscience into giving it absolute currency and credence.‖ In her view,
―the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites‖ and failed to show that the
accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. She found the statements of the prosecution
witnesses, either untruthful, immaterial and incompetent or brimming with flip-flopping testimonies. She
brushed aside the admission of the accused that initiation rites were indeed conducted and that they
were allegedly present in the different stages of the initiation rites, and simply believed the version of the
accused that it was Marcelo, the recruiter and ―angel‘‘ of Marc Andrei, who inflicted the fatal blows on
him, causing his death. Accordingly, Judge Cabrera-Faller dismissed the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Cabrera-Faller‘s dismissal of the complaint was proper?

Held: No. Judge Cabrera-Faller should know that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits. A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the
prosecution‘s evidence is strong or weak. Under Sec. 4 of RA 8049, if the person subjected to hazing or
other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and
members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical
harm shall be liable as principals, and the officers and members present during the hazing are
prima facie presumed to have actually participated, unless it can be shown that he or she prevented the
commission of the punishable acts. This disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing.

Judge Cabrera-Faller must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged for it would be unfair to require the prosecution
to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the
information against the latter.

149 | E v i d e n c e
Probable Cause

PNB vs. Tria

G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012

Facts: Amelio Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB, assigned at its MWSS Branch. MWSS opened
Current Account (C/A) with PNB-MWSS and made an initial deposit of P6,714,621.13. To withdraw from
the account, PNB checks must be issued and three signatures secured—one signatory each from MWSS,
MWSI, and the contractor, China-Geo Engineering Corporation. The C/A became dormant with a balance
of PhP 5,397,154.07. In the meantime, Tria requested a listing of the dormant accounts of PNB-MWSS
and borrowed the folders of MWSS and the C/A. Tria also inquired about the irregularities involving
manager‘s checks committed by the bank‘s former branch accountant. Later, PNB-MWSS received a
letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction of P5,200,000 from the C/A and the issuance of the
corresponding manager‘s check in the same amount payable to a certain ―Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes.‖ The
letter-request was purportedly signed and approved by the duly authorized signatories of MWSS. Hence,
the C/A was re-activated. The letter-request, supporting documents, and Manager‘s Check Application
Form were then evaluated by the bank‘s Sales and Service Officer (SSO) who found the same to be in
order. Edsel Francisco, who was also designated to perform the tasks of a Fund Transfer Processor (FTP),
likewise verified the letter-request and the documents from the C/A folder of the bank. He then effected
the transaction requested by debiting the C/A for the purchase of a Manager‘s Check payable to Atty.
Reyes‖ and prepared a Batch Input Sheet listing the supporting documents for the transaction together
with the other transactions for that day.

A Manager‘s Check was then issued. PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNB‘s Cash Center in the
amount of P8,660,000. Nonetheless, Tria accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting the Manager‘s Check to
PNB‘s Quezon City Circle Branch for encashment and told PNB-Circle‘s SSO, George Flandez, that PNB-
MWSS had no available cash to pay the amount indicated in the Manager‘s Check. He also informed
Flandez that Atty. Reyes was a valued client of his branch and was in a hurry to leave for a scheduled
appointment. To confirm the issuance of the Manager‘s Check, Flandez called PNB-MWSS and talked to
its Sales and Service Head, Geraldine Veniegas. Veniegas confirmed that PNB-MWSS issued a manager‘s
check in favor of Atty. Reyes and sent a letter-confirmation through e-mail to PNB-Circle. While waiting
for the confirmation, Flandez interviewed Atty. Reyes. Atty. Reyes told Flandez that he was an MWSS
contractor and the amount covered by the Manager‘s Check represented the proceeds of his recent
contract with MWSS. Atty. Reyes then showed his driver‘s license and Integrated Bar of the Philippines
identification card to Flandez and wrote the numbers of these cards on the back of the manager‘s check.
Upon receiving confirmation from PNB-MWSS regarding the manager‘s check, Flandez went to the Cash
Center of PNB-Circle to pick up the cash requisition. Tria and Atty. Reyes, however, followed him with
Tria telling Flandez: ―Pirmahan ko na lang ‗tong check, George. Identify ko na lang siya kasi nagmamadali
siya. Dito na lang i-receive. For security… kasi nag-iisa lang siya.‖ Tria then placed his signature on the
check above the handwritten note ―PAYEE IDENTIFIED – AMELIO C. TRIA.‖ Tria later retired as PNB-
MWSS‘ Manager under PNB‘s regular retirement plan.

Issue: Whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of Information against Tria for
qualified theft?

Held: Yes. While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to
ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such authority
is far from absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of
discretion. And indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges against Tria
as there was theft.

What is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable cause to believe that
he is guilty of the crime charged. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only
to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Here, the acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the
encashment of the check provide more than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an
information against him and John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft.

150 | E v i d e n c e
 Del Castillo vs. People
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012

Facts: Pursuant to a confidential information that Ruben Del Castillo alias Boy Castillo was engaged in
selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and
test-buy operation at the house of Del Castillo, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around
3:00PM of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to
serve the search warrant to Del Castillo. Upon arrival, somebody shouted ―raid,‖ which prompted them to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to Del Castillo‘s house and
cordoned it. The structure of Del Castillo‘s residence is a two-storey house and Del Castillo was staying in
the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met Del Castillo‘s wife and informed her that they will
implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
Del Castillo run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to
no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all
went back to the residence of Del Castillo and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover.
SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods. In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the
elder sister of Del Castillo named Dolly, searched the house of Del Castillo including the nipa hut where
Del Castillo allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of Del Castillo found nothing,
but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated
were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four heat-sealed transparent
plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of shabu. Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with
violation of Sec. 16, Art. III of R.A. 6425, as amended.

The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information.
Aggrieved, Del Castillo appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
After the motion for reconsideration of Del Castillo was denied by the CA, Del Castillo filed with the SC
the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not substantial basis for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant exists?

Held: Yes. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Probable cause for a search
warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining
probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed
and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This
Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of
the search warrant. A magistrate‘s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

151 | E v i d e n c e
Iota of Evidence

People vs. Anticamara

G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011

Facts: Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando), Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al), Dick Tañedo (Dick),
Roberto Tañedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeñiza-Tañedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged
with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while Dick, Bet,
Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued. The RTC found Al and Lando
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the accused?

Held: Yes. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

Here, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead
to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. Those
circumstantial evidence are: (1) At about 3:00AM of May 7, 2002, while she and Sulpacio were sleeping
inside the house of the Estrella family in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to
rob the place; (2) Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick
Tañedo, and heard the latter uttering ―somebody will die.‖ (3) Bringing her outside the house, Lando
pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied. (4)
Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo,
Alberto Anticamara and Fred. (5) The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas
in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. (6) The last time that she saw Sulpacio was
when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At
that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle. (7) Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle,
she heard him uttered (sic): ―Make a decision now. Abad has already four bullets in his body, and the one
left is for this girl.‖

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter ―Usapan natin
pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan.‖ (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald Geralde testified that Al admitted his participation as lookout
and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio
from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities
to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of
Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr.
Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr.
Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim‘s death was the gunshot wounds. The report also
indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the
skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.

Although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear
picture that the accused took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him,
and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.

152 | E v i d e n c e
 People vs. De Ocampo
G.R. No. 185212, February 15, 2012

Facts: Maritess Alolod, Efren Deocampo, Edwin Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo were charged with,
and were convicted of, double murder before the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented were sufficient to warrant the conviction of
the accused?

Held: Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 133, the rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of
the crime provides: ―Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.‖ The
circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the
accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.

Here, those circumstances abound. (1) Efren had always been banned from the old couple‘s house
because they strongly disapproved his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no
business being around that house. (2) The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of
May 27, 1998. (3) On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on
the night of May 27 or early morning of May 28. (4) On the night of May 27 the security guard at
Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple‘s
house. They even tried to conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered
that the fence wire had been cut. (5) At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a
woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig. (6) At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren
in the Alolod kitchen. (7) From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple‘s house, with
Efren wearing the old man‘s watch. (8) Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to
Cotabato City and subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for
them. They were of course buried in the garden. (9) A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant
more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house. (10) The bodies of the old couple were found
underneath those plants.

The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not
encourage belief. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the couple‘s
house where they had no business being there. A neighbour saw Efren at the kitchen of that house on
the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not physically impossible for the accused to
be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao was merely 15 kilometers
from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.

153 | E v i d e n c e
 Celedenio vs. People
G.R. No. 209137, July 1, 2015

Facts: Eduardo Celedenio was charged with the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things committed
upon the property of Carmencita De Guzman. The evidence for the prosecution shows that one evening,
a certain Adriano Marquez witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of De Guzman while she was
away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose
house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other,
identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and
requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based on the account
of Marquez. Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque and SPO2 Adrian Sugui,
accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for the
possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a
motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio.
PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2
Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just
bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his
motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report
of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others. PO1 Roque asked
Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested
and was informed of his constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police
station.

The trial court, as affirmed by the CA, in convicting Celedenio, was convinced that the prosecution clearly
established that: (1) a robbery had been committed; (2) it was committed recently; (3) several of the
stolen items including cash were found in Celedonio's possession; and (4) Celedonio had no valid
explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.

Issue: Whether or not the totality of circumstances warranted the finding that Celedonio was solely and
directly responsible for the crime?

Held: Yes. Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence
to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt
against Celedenio. As long as the prosecution establishes Celedenio‘s participation in the crime through
credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed
the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

Here, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an
unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. These
circumstances are: Celedonio was a next-door neighbor of De Guzman; he was seen by another
neighbour going over the concrete fence separating their houses and ransacking a room in De Guzman‘s
house; during the time, no one was inside De Guzman‘s house as all of them were at the wake of De
Guzman‘s recently demised husband; two days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen
that night were found in the compartment of Celedenio‘s motorcycle which he was riding on when
accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by De Guzman as her stolen
property; during the trial Celedenio denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and
claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short,
Celedenio could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.

154 | E v i d e n c e
 Bacerra vs. People
G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017

Facts: Marlon Bacerra was charged with the crime of simple arson punished under Sec. 1 of PD 1613.
During trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Alfredo Melegrito, Edgar Melegrito, Toni Rose
dela Cruz, and PO3 Marcos Bautista, Jr. to testify on the alleged incident. Their collective testimonies
produced the following facts for the prosecution: Alfredo and his family were sound asleep in their home.
At about 1:00AM, he was roused from sleep by the sound of stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the
living room and peered through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize his
neighbor and co-worker, Bacerra. Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo‘s house while saying, ―Vulva of your
mother.‖ Just as he was about to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, ―Vulva of your mother, Old Fred, I‘ll burn you
now.‖ Bacerra then left. Alfredo‘s son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident through a window in his room.
Troubled by Bacerra‘s threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down beside the window. At
around 4:00AM, he heard dogs barking outside. Alfredo looked out the window and saw Bacerra walking
towards their nipa hut, which was located around 10 meters from their house. Bacerra paced in front of
the nipa hut and shook it. Moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning. Alfredo sought help from his
neighbors to smother the fire. Edgar contacted the authorities for assistance but it was too late. The nipa
hut and its contents were completely destroyed. The local authorities conducted an investigation on the
incident.

Bacerra was found by the RTC guilty of the crime charged. On appeal to the CA, he argued that none of
the prosecution‘s witnesses had positively identified him as the person who burned the nipa hut. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition. Bacerra argues that the CA erred in upholding his
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, which, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No direct evidence was presented to prove that Bacerra
actually set fire to Alfredo‘s nipa hut. Moreover, there were two incidents that occurred, which should be
taken and analyzed separately.

Issue: Whether or not the identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely on
the strength of circumstantial evidence?

Held: Yes. No one saw Bacerra actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has
established multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion
that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.

First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that Bacerra stoned Alfredo‘s house and
threatened to burn him. alfredo testified that he saw Bacerra throwing stones at his house and heard
petitioner say, ―okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!‖ Bacerra‘s threats were also heard by
Alfredo‘s son and grandchildren. Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that Bacerra
returned a few hours later and made his way to Alfredo‘s nipa hut. Alfredo testified that at 4:00AM, he
saw Bacerra pass by their house and walk towards their nipa hut. This was corroborated by Alfredo‘s son
who testified that he saw Bacerra standing in front of the nipa hut moments before it was burned. Third,
the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that Bacerra was in close proximity to the nipa hut
before it caught fire. Alfredo testified that he saw Bacerra walk to and fro in front of the nipa hut and
shake its posts just before it caught fire. Alfredo‘s son likewise saw Bacerra standing at the side of the
nipa hut before it was burned.

The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed separately. Instead, they
must be viewed and considered as a whole. Circumstantial evidence is like a ―tapestry made up of
strands which create a pattern when interwoven.‖ Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized
individually because it only forms part of the entire picture. The events that transpired prior to the
burning incident cannot be disregarded. Bacerra‘s threat to burn occurred when he stoned Alfredo‘s
house.

Discussion: Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal
consequences. The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the
relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to
the probative value of the evidence. Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any
inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, ―indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the
fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.‖

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial
evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between ―direct evidence of fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred.‖ The same quantum of evidence is still
required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

155 | E v i d e n c e
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.
There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is
always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided
the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt. Sec. 4, Rule 113 provides three (3) requisites that
should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: ―Circumstantial evidence,
when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.‖

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be established
by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an
unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime. The determination of
whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a
quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be ―consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

156 | E v i d e n c e