Sandra

Bingham is a teaching fellow at the University of Edinburgh. Her

publications include articles on aspects of the praetorian guard and on the
Severans. Other interests include the rediscovery and reception of Carthage,
Roman imperial women and the concept of imperial retreats.

‘Sandra Bingham’s new book is an attractively written assessment of a military

force which was central to political events at Rome, providing close protection
for the emperor and his family, and accompanying him in his campaigns on the
frontiers. The author’s compelling narrative brings before us the officers and
soldiers on duty at the imperial palace and in their fortified encampment on the
outskirts of the city. This is a most welcome evocation of the Praetorians and
their world that will appeal to specialists and general readers alike.’
– Lawrence Keppie, Emeritus Professor of Roman History and Archaeology,
University of Glasgow

‘Sandra Bingham’s book is a much-needed and valuable history of the praetorian

guard from its origins to its disbandment by the emperor Constantine the Great
in AD 312. It covers the history, organization and duties of the guard with full
notes and bibliography. There is no full-length treatment of the praetorian guard
in English, so this book will be greatly appreciated by classical historians,
Roman military historians and students of Roman history. Clear and concise in
style, supported by ancient and current secondary sources, Bingham’s study is
balanced in its treatment of an often partisan subject.’
– Sara Elise Phang, author of Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline
in the Late Republic and Early Principate

‘Sandra Bingham explores the idea that the praetorians were much more than the
emperor’s bodyguard. They had a role in maintaining state security, policing
large gatherings, fire-fighting, arresting and sometimes executing suspects, and
occasionally even spying for the emperor. And by the second century AD they
had developed a battlefield role since part of the guard usually accompanied the
emperor on campaign. As the praetorians were stationed in Rome close to the
emperor and under the control of his right-hand man, the praetorian prefect, they
were inevitably drawn into the political intrigue and power struggles of the
imperial court. Bingham’s fast-paced though carefully constructed narrative,
backed up by sound analysis of crucial issues, expertly conveys the reader
through this blood-thirsty and exciting tale, which highlights important issues in
the wider history of the Roman world. Detailed notes make the book a valuable
tool for students and scholars, while general readers will welcome its crisp and
clear style and eye for intriguing details of life in the guard.’
– Brian Campbell, Professor of Roman History, Queen’s University, Belfast

‘Sandra Bingham’s The Praetorian Guard considers how the Roman elite
military unit shaped Roman history, protecting, counseling, removing and
replacing various emperors. Bingham neatly explains the history of the Guard,
detailing the forerunners of the unit in republican Rome, such as the private
cohorts of Sulla, Marius, Catiline, and even Cicero himself. She considers the
status of the guard in Roman society, where and how it was physically stationed
in the city, as well as the unit’s internal organization, offering also salient
comments about the guard as a fighting unit. Bingham’s copious notes do not
slow down the narrative but allow the studious reader to pursue sundry points in
fuller detail. All in all, a valuable contribution to Roman history generally and
specifically to Roman imperial rule, the household of the emperor, and the
person of the emperor himself.’
– R. Alden Smith, Professor of Classics, Baylor University
 Published in 2013 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

Copyright © 2013 Sandra Bingham

The right of Sandra Bingham to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part
thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of
the publisher.

ISBN: 978 1 84511 884 6

eISBN: 978 0 85773 286 6

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
This book is dedicated to the memory of my parents, Alfred (1914–1994) and
Adelaide (1923–2012), whose love of learning led me to this path.
 CONTENTS
List of Plates
Preface

1. Introduction
2. History
3. Organization
4. Duties
5. Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
 PLATES
1. A Roman Emperor AD 41 (detail) by Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1871).
Image courtesy of the Art Renewal Center® www.artrenewal.org
2. ‘Claudius summoned’ by Lawrence Alma Tadema (1867). Image courtesy
of the Art Renewal Center® www.artrenewal.org.
3. Aureus of Claudius (first issued AD 41–42) showing the praetorian camp
with a figure holding a spear and shield standing in front of a standard. Drawing
by Stephen Copp.
4. The Puteoli frieze, possibly from an arch of Trajan. Drawing by Stephen
Copp.
5. Details of one of the shield emblazons from the Puteoli frieze. Drawing by
Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones.
6. Scene V from Trajan’s Column, with the praetorians on the march across
the Danube. Photo courtesy of H. R. Goette.
7. Antoninianus of Gallienus, dating to AD 258, celebrating the praetorian
guard; the legend reads COHH PRAET VI P VI F. Drawing by Stephen Copp.
8. Tombstone of Lucius Septimius Valerinus (third century AD). Drawing
courtesy of S. James.
th
9. Military diploma for a soldier of the V praetorian cohort, dating to AD
246. © The Trustees of the British Museum.
10. Map of Rome, showing the location of the Castra Praetoria in relation to
the Forum and the Palatine. Plan by Stephen Copp.
11. The Castra Praetoria: excavated building remains and extrapolated
structures. Plan by Stephen Copp.
12. The Castra Praetoria and legionary fortress at Noveseum (hatching
indicates location of contubernia). Plan by Stephen Copp.
13. (A) The Louvre relief, possibly from the Arch of Claudius (AD 51); much
restored. © Louvre/The Bridgeman Art Library. (B) Drawing of the scorpion
cheek-piece by Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones.
 14. Relief from the Arch of Marcus Aurelius (AD 176–80) showing
praetorian soldiers in full armour. Photo courtesy of H. R. Goette.
15. Panel from the Cancelleria reliefs (late first century AD) with praetorians
in tunic and paenula (travelling cloak). Photo courtesy of H. R. Goette.
16. Sestertius of Gaius (issued AD 40–41) addressing the praetorians.
Drawing by Stephen Copp.
17. Sestertius of Galba (AD 68) addressing the praetorians. Drawing by
Stephen Copp.
 PREFACE
This book is based partly on my research on the guard under the Julio-Claudians
(University of British Columbia, 1997) and partly on research conducted since
then, which now has led to a course on the praetorians that I teach at the
University of Edinburgh. Many people have supported me in the endeavour to
see this project to fruition. I would like to single out in particular Tom Harrison,
Greg Woolf, Jill Harries, Jon Hesk, Roger Rees, Roy Pinkerton, Keith Rutter,
Allan Hood, Douglas Cairns, Ulrike Roth and Lucy Grig. An extra special thank
you goes to Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones for the drawings but especially for the laughs
when I most needed them. I am grateful also to the Canadian contingent, Ann
Dusing, Charmaine Gorrie, Arden Williams, Kathryn Simonsen and Eve
MacDonald for their unflagging conviction that I would eventually get this done.
Thanks also to Kate Collingridge, Jill Shaw and Elaine Hutchison for putting up
with me over the years. I am grateful as well to the reader for his insightful and
very helpful comments. And finally to the students who took the course on the
guard and learned to ‘question everything’, I hope you find at least some of the
answers here.
The greatest debt is owed to my husband, Stephen, who never lost trust even
in the darkest times. Without him, the guard would be only a distant memory.
Thanks are not enough.
 1

INTRODUCTION
The praetorian guard was one of the most distinctive features of Roman imperial
rule. An elite unit of soldiers, these men mainly were responsible for the safety
of the Roman emperor and his family, and were well rewarded for their loyalty.¹
They received a higher rate of pay than the rest of the army, they had better
working conditions and their close relationship with the emperor singled them
out as the most privileged group in the military. Under the republic, troops had
not been allowed in the capital, and the presence of the praetorian guard in Rome
under Augustus was one of the most striking – and visible – indications that the
imperial period had begun.²
The genesis of the unit can be found in the republican period. In the early part
of the first century BC, the praetorian cohort that had functioned as a bodyguard
for commanders in the field began to change and to take on more administrative
tasks. The civil wars that erupted shortly thereafter halted this progression, and
the cohorts reverted to being primarily a military force. But when Augustus
decided to institute an armed unit for his personal use, he brought together both
aspects of the earlier republican guard, making his imperial praetorians function
not only in a military but also in an administrative capacity. Throughout the
Julio-Claudian period, reliance on these soldiers for tasks other than guarding the
emperor and his family began to take shape, though this expanding role usually
does not attract much notice in the sources.³ Even during the reign of Augustus,
there had been a realization that having so many soldiers close to the capital
meant they could be used in any number of situations requiring large numbers of
trained personnel. The evolution of the praetorians into a unit that fought fires,
provided security at the games and carried out political espionage can be
explained by the practicality of making use of the troops in the city as part of the
overall organization of civic administration. In fact, there would be few major
changes in the unit until late in the second century AD, by which time the guard
was firmly entrenched in the life of the principate, of the city and of the empire.
The placement of the praetorians in Rome and their close relationship with
the emperor thus brought about the use of the guard in what might be considered
unexpected ways. Such modifications were driven largely by the necessity of
accommodating the requirements of the government which, at this time, was
essentially a dictatorship relying on the military for support.⁴ Although their
primary function was to provide protection for the emperor and his family, from
the beginning the praetorians were assigned to other duties related to imperial
security. They acted as a strategic military force sent to deal with problems
where other measures had proven ineffective, or where there was a need for
covert activity. In its early history, a division of the guard, the speculatores,
became specifically associated with clandestine action. Moreover, the
praetorians were involved in the confinement and execution of those deemed to
be a threat to the state. On the other hand, they were also part of the routine civic
administration in the capital, assisting the vigiles in firefighting and acting as
security at the games and theatre.⁵ They were also involved in a variety of other
tasks, ranging from map-making to engineering works.⁶ The guard could be
employed in these duties precisely because it was the emperor’s personal unit
and could therefore be adapted to whatever need he had of his soldiers.⁷
Throughout their history, the soldiers proved to be pragmatic concerning this
relationship, carrying out whatever demands were made of them and showing
themselves unwilling to put their privileged position at risk. Of course,
sometimes this meant betraying the emperor himself when that position was
perceived to be threatened.
By the end of the first century AD, though, other units such as the frumentarii
had been introduced for tasks that the praetorians had hitherto carried out, and
the guard itself was beginning to be used more frequently in the field as frontline
troops.⁸ Cohorts took part in the campaigns in Dacia under Trajan and those on
the Danube under Marcus Aurelius, for example. This does not mean that they
were no longer active in the capital but rather that their remit had expanded as
the emperors themselves began to take to the field. This was the case even after
the creation in the early second century of the equites singulares Augusti, a
mounted unit that served as an additional bodyguard in battle.⁹ It was only at the
start of the reign of Septimius Severus (AD 193–211) that the guard of the first
two centuries ceased to exist: they were cashiered and replaced with men from
the legions. The rationale for this change was to allow the emperor to ensure the
loyalty of the unit, though it also rewarded soldiers who had been supportive of
Severus’ usurpation of power. Although the name continued to be used, the new
praetorian guard bore little resemblance to that of the previous period and was
much more aligned with the army as a whole, with most recruits coming from
the provinces. Still a privileged unit with respect to pay and length of service,
nevertheless the ‘elite’ nature of the guard had been swept aside by the inclusion
of regular legionaries. But the hope that the praetorians would remain faithful to
the emperor was in vain: instead, the unit played a pivotal role in the so-called
‘crisis of the third century’, being involved in the removal and accession of
several emperors. And just over 100 years after the Severan changes,
Constantine disbanded the unit entirely: after 350 years, the praetorian camp was
silent.
Information about the praetorians in the ancient literary sources is often
limited. This is partly because it was not to the emperor’s advantage that their
activities be made public, but also because the extant sources usually have other
interests on which to focus. It has been noted that ‘[The guard’s] presence
appears normally to have been taken for granted by contemporaries, as it has to
be by us.’¹⁰ This makes the historian’s job that much more challenging. The
development of a military unit technically belonging to the army but superior to
them in status and functioning as a separate entity answering only to the emperor
did not lend itself to close scrutiny. The challenge is to try and identify the
guard’s role in the workings of the principate, and, in doing so, to consider in
each case the attitude of the authors who did include them in their work.
The general problem with the literary sources in the imperial period has been
well documented and only a brief overview need be made here.¹¹ Much of the
information on the early history of the guard is derived from only three sources:
Tacitus, Suetonius and Cassius Dio. Each of these clearly made use of those
writers who had lived during the reigns of the early emperors, but the extent of
the debt to each is difficult to ascertain, especially since it is only rarely that a
named citation is provided. The praetorians appear in all of these authors, to
varying degrees, but the references are often incidental, most commonly in
passages which record events directly connected with the emperor. It is rare that
a passage deals only with the praetorians.¹² Other sources such as Josephus, the
younger Seneca and the elder Pliny provide occasional glimpses into the
workings of the guard in the first century AD, but without comment on the
significance of the praetorians in the events that they narrate.
The situation is even more complicated for the second century. There are few
extant sources at all and those that remain often are fragmentary, as is the case
with Dio for the first half of the century.¹³ The unreliability of the Historia
Augusta, a group of biographies beginning with Hadrian, only complicates
matters.¹⁴ From Marcus Aurelius onwards, the material is better, though for
much of this period Dio is available only in epitomes. Herodian, writing in the
mid-third century, is complete but presents problems of his own.¹⁵ The result is
that, with the exception of the fuller accounts of the first century AD, there really
is very little material in the written sources on which to rely for information
about the guard.
In fact, the praetorians figured more prominently in the history of imperial
Rome than might be surmised from a preliminary reading of the extant literary
sources. Unfortunately, the material sources do not provide too much help either.
Numismatic evidence for the guard is not plentiful: there are a few coins
illustrating its close relationship with the emperor in its early history in
particular, but in general, praetorians are not singled out.¹⁶ The archaeological
remains of the praetorian camp, the Castra Praetoria, in many ways provides
more questions than answers (see Chapter 3). And for issues such as number of
cohorts and effective (that is, the number of men per cohort), while there is
epigraphic evidence attesting to the careers of the officer class, the inscriptions
do not reveal much about matters to do with the day-to-day management of the
unit. Military diplomata fall into the same category (see Chapter 3). All in all,
then, the material record adds some but not much to the overall picture.
Since the publication of the monumental work by Marcel Durry in 1938, Les
Cohortes Prétoriennes, followed closely by Alfredo Passerini’s Le Coorti
Pretorie, there have been few comprehensive studies of the guard and none
easily accessible in English.¹⁷ Recent works in German, Spanish and French are
virtually inaccessible to an English-speaking audience.¹⁸ General books on the
army mention the unit, but usually only as imperial bodyguards, with rarely any
mention of duties beyond that key responsibility.¹⁹ A recent study on the
praetorian prefects includes some incidental information on the guard in its
discussion of the commanders.²⁰ Durry’s work is still cited as the definitive
study of the praetorians, and in fact most modern scholarship on the praetorians
is based on material from his work. But much new evidence has emerged over
the past 70 years, and there is a need for an updated survey. General histories of
the empire usually include information on the unit, but again only as the official
bodyguard of the emperor, sometimes with reference to their privileged position
in Rome. Biographies of emperors also make mention of the guard, though
without much consideration of its role in the events of the reign. This is not
surprising, since the focus of these studies is elsewhere, but it is also the case
that such works can continue to perpetuate certain dated ideas about the
praetorians.
The impression of the guard in modern culture is that of a unit associated
with nefarious deeds, most notably the assassination and replacement of
emperors. Rarely are the praetorians shown in any other light.²¹ In visual media,
the series I, Claudius, originally broadcast by the BBC in the 1970s, provides an
extensive treatment of the praetorians.²² In most episodes, they appear in the
background, standing, watching, guarding, more part of the backdrop than active
participants. Occasionally they are involved in intimidation of individuals and
are seen as executioners, both elements attested in the ancient sources. Yet they
rarely speak and for the most part are seen only as the visual representation of
imperial power, clad in their full armour with the distinctive ‘Attic’-style
helmets (see Chapter 3). More recently, the movie Gladiator, set in the reign of
Commodus, featured the guard throughout.²³ Most notably, the praetorians are
shown as a fighting force in the opening scene; throughout the rest of the film
they are seen in various guises, but always as the bad guys. One scene in
particular, however, rings true, namely when praetorians are sent to arrest the
senator Gracchus, played by Derek Jacobi. The soldiers, marching up to the
villa, are spotted by a slave who then informs his master that they are
approaching; Gracchus’ response – sending the slave indoors and quietly going
with the praetorians – represents an accurate picture, though fictional, of what is
reported occasionally in the ancient sources.
In print, given the number of novels that deal with imperial Rome,
praetorians make a regular appearance. A good example is the series of Roman
detective novels by Lindsay Davis, the so-called Falco series, with 21 volumes
in all so far (1989–2012). Some books focus more tightly on the guard, for
example, Optimus: Praetorian Guard (2006) by P.M. Prescott or Praetorian by
Simon Scarrow (2011). In the former, a guardsman becomes a Christian and part
of a group lobbying for a Christian emperor; it is set in the first century AD. The
second novel is one of intrigue, set in AD 50: the guard must be infiltrated
because of its republican sentiments. In such cases, any adherence to historical
veracity is incidental, but the reader clearly knows that when choosing to read
fiction.
But it is on the internet that so much misinformation about the historical
guard is being disseminated today. In particular, the role of the guard as ‘king-
maker’ is prevalent on many of the websites that mention the praetorians, though
often with incorrect details or exaggerations based on common misconceptions.
For example: ‘In Real Life [sic], the Praetorian Guard was a special force
originally intending to serve as a Roman general’s bodyguard in combat, but the
term was later restricted to the elite personal guard of the Roman Emperors. As a
bodyguard unit, they proved to be a miserable failure. Nine separate emperors
were killed by the guard, and many others were deserted or otherwise messed
over by them. In some cases, the Guard literally sold the Impeial [sic] office to
the highest bidder, then turned on their new master when he faield [sic] to
deliver on his extravagant promises.’²⁴ Generalizations are also common: ‘Both
Praetorian prefects and common soldiers of the Guard tended to be vicious,
ambitious, and extremely arrogant, far more dangerous to the average citizen
than any law-breaker.’²⁵ That there is such a widespread interest in the
praetorians online is gratifying; what is problematic is how much of what is out
there is simply wrong.²⁶
The purpose, then, of the present work is to set the praetorians into a context
that tries to look objectively at the ancient sources, such as they are, and to
challenge modern misunderstandings. In the following chapters, the history,
organization and duties of the guard will be examined in some detail in order to
present a comprehensive picture of this unit. Where areas have been covered
thoroughly by other scholars (equipment, for example), little has been said. The
main interest lies in establishing how the guard developed from the force that
Augustus incorporated early in his reign as his personal army, for his own
protection, to one that permeated all aspects of life in the capital until their
demise in AD 312. That such a group existed should not surprise anyone. After
all, most governments whose authority relies on intimidation by the military
have had an elite force which functions in a similar fashion. Imperial Rome was
no different.²⁷
 2

HISTORY
The imperial praetorian guard was not an invention of the first emperor, but
rather the modification of a republican institution. Prior to the establishment of
the principate, there are several references to armed men acting as bodyguards
for generals in the field, though it was not until the first century BC that the term
cohors praetoria was applied in the sources to this type of unit, and the
attribution was not then restricted just to the military sphere. But the basic idea
remained the same: a corps of men chosen by the commander to be his guard
and often to assist him in other capacities.

Republic

It is difficult to detect the date at which a group that properly can be termed a
praetorian cohort first appeared in the republic. Livy indicates that the dictator
Postumius had a specially chosen cohort as a guard in the early fifth century BC,
which would provide a very early date indeed.¹ But the first use of the term is
later connected with a Scipio: ‘The cohort was called praetorian, because it was
associated with the praetor. For Scipio Africanus was the first to choose the
bravest men, who were never far from him in war. He freed them from the other
duties of military service and they received one and a half times the pay.’² A
consideration here must be the date at which Festus was writing, which makes
the veracity of the passage difficult to assess.³ Moreover, it is uncertain whether
Festus was referring to Scipio Africanus Maior or to his adopted grandson,
Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Numantius. Livy is often cited in support of the
former: Africanus is said by that author to have taken a bodyguard with him
from Spain to Sicily in 205 BC. Complicating the issue, however, is the fact that
the term cohors is not used specifically in reference to the men chosen by him to
serve in this capacity.⁴ Though their purpose seems to correspond well to that of
the praetorian cohort in the first century BC, the fact that they are unarmed, and
the absence of any specific reference to cohors, prevents any secure correlation
to be drawn with the text from Festus.⁵ Furthermore, the origin of the
designation ‘praetorian’ for the unit around the commander is controversial. The
word clearly is related to praetor, though whether in connection with that
official as a general in the field or as the governor of a province is unclear; the
term also may be associated with the general’s tent (praetorium) in the camp,
near which a guard would be stationed.⁶
By the early first century BC, when the republic had begun to undergo radical
changes and the emphasis had shifted from the security of the state to the safety
of the individual, personal bodyguards became a necessity. Sulla, for example, is
said to have had a large body of men protecting him when he became dictator in
82 BC.⁷ While the source for this is late, the way in which Sulla came to power
would have made such a group necessary. It is not clear from the text, however,
whether this force was solely military in composition: at the end of the second
and in the early first centuries BC, there is evidence that the cohorts of various
commanders were made up of friends and relatives rather than soldiers, though
they still functioned as a bodyguard. Indeed the men around Scipio Aemilianus
included volunteers along with clients and friends.⁸ Appian also links a similar
corps – that is, a bodyguard composed of partisans – with the tribune Gaius
Gracchus in the late second century BC.⁹ Guards like this must have been
relatively common at the time: when Gaius Marius was in Africa fighting
Jugurtha in 106 BC, the group around him is singled out as being military in
composition rather than formed of partisans.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, given its nature,
this type of unit continued into the imperial period and the term itself appears
occasionally in Suetonius.¹¹ In fact, it has been argued that the cohors amicorum
of the late republic eventually developed into the ‘immediate entourage of the
emperor wherever he may be’.¹²
The first explicit reference to a military cohort employed as a bodyguard and
specifically designated ‘praetorian’ occurs in 62 BC. Marcus Petreius, the
propraetor of North Italy, had been given command against Lucius Sergius
Catiline, who had been declared an enemy of the state: ‘When Petreius saw
Catiline ... [he] led his praetorian cohort (cohortem praetoriam) into the middle
of the enemy.’¹³ The traitor himself was associated with a praetorian cohort, but
in a somewhat unexpected way; Cicero referred to Catiline’s ‘praetorian cohort
of whores’ in a speech against him in 60 BC.¹⁴ Clearly the term was familiar
enough to Cicero’s audience that the jibe would be understood. Nevertheless it is
not clear how widespread the use of praetorian cohorts was in the mid-first
century BC and indeed it is not certain that every general had his own unit. In 58
th
BC, Caesar took mounted infantry from the X legion as a personal guard when
he met with Ariovistus, king of the Suebi, for he was unwilling to trust his Gallic
cavalry, and the terms of the meeting dictated that no infantry could accompany
him. The terminology makes clear how he viewed this unit: ‘Even if no one were
to accompany him further, nevertheless he would go with the tenth legion only;
he trusted it and it would serve as his praetorian cohort.’¹⁵ Given that it is not
always clear where the men who made up such units at this time came from, this
example – where the guard is comprised of soldiers taken directly from the
legion – may confirm that they originated in the rank and file and consisted
particularly of those men who were most reliable.¹⁶ Nevertheless, since this
seems to be an ad hoc solution, it can be surmised that Caesar had no firmly
established praetorian guard at this date.¹⁷ That he specifically refers to the men
of the Xth legion as a praetorian cohort, however, clearly indicates that he was
acquainted with such a unit, and yet there is no reference in Caesar’s works to
him having a regular detachment of praetorians despite the extensive narrative of
manoeuvres and combat.¹⁸
Moreover, there is some flexibility in the first century BC in the use of the
expression cohors praetoria, because governors of provinces had their own staff,
often referred to in the sources by the same term. For example, in his speech
against Verres, who had been governor of Sicily, Cicero makes several
references to the governor’s praetorian cohort, part of Verres’ staff.¹⁹ Its
members were used in many different tasks, in particular in a judicial capacity.²⁰
A similar type of unit is found with Cicero’s brother Quintus when he was
governor in Asia in 61–58 BC.²¹ Cicero himself, when governor of Cilicia, made
use of a praetorian cohort for administration.²² On one occasion at least his
cohors praetoria was actively engaged in battle.²³ In the late republic, then, a
cohors praetoria could be either the armed bodyguard of a general or the
administrative staff of a governor – both functions would be brought together in
the guard of the imperial period.
The contenders who vied for power after the death of Caesar in 44 BC made
use of bodyguards and, in some cases, these units are referred to as praetorian.²⁴
Octavian is said in this period to have gathered almost 10,000 men to serve as
his guard, but the number is certainly an exaggeration.²⁵ When this group
showed their unwillingness to fight against Antony, some declaring that they had
come only as protection for Octavian, the latter had to resort to promises of
rewards to entice them not to abandon him, though in the end only a few
remained.²⁶ Antony himself had a contingent of men – said to be those who were
the best in body and character – chosen from his army to serve as his bodyguard
on his march from Brundisium to Rome late in 44 BC; this must be what sources
refer to as his praetorian cohort.²⁷ These may be the same men who fought for
him at Forum Gallorum in 43 BC. In fact, at that battle, Antony is said to have
had two praetorian cohorts, one that belonged to him and the other to Marcus
Junius Silanus, who was either legate or tribune under Aemilius Lepidus.²⁸
Antony’s opposition on that day also had two praetorian cohorts, provided by the
consul Aulus Hirtius as additional protection for those marching from the camp
to engage the enemy. Of these, it seems that one belonged to Hirtius himself, the
other to Octavian.²⁹ It is clear that by the late 40s BC it was customary for every
commander in the field to have a bodyguard, and that the term used by the
sources to describe this group is cohors praetoria.³⁰
Later in 43 BC, after a reconciliation had been effected, Octavian, Antony
and Lepidus entered Rome as triumvirs. Each was accompanied by both a
praetorian cohort and a legion; the spectacle was enhanced by the fact that they
entered Rome separately on three consecutive days.³¹ It has been suggested that
the presence of praetorian cohorts with the triumvirs clearly distinguished them
from the consuls.³² More importantly, of course, the triumvirs were no longer on
campaign; while in the field, consuls had the use of a praetorian cohort, as seen
with Hirtius above, but this unit was not allowed within the boundaries of the
city of Rome. The triumvirs blatantly ignored this principle. That there should be
troops in the capital was startling enough; the presence of a select force for each
triumvir no doubt added to the unease of the citizens. Not only did the cohorts
provide protection but, more importantly, they offered visible evidence of the
power of each of the triumvirs. The reaction of the citizens was doubtless
something that Octavian would remember when, as Augustus, he instituted the
imperial guard.
 There is no mention in the sources of praetorian cohorts at the battle of
Philippi in 42 BC, though it is unlikely that they did not take part, and in fact
there is numismatic evidence in support of their presence there. Coins associated
with Octavian show three standards on the reverse with the legend COHORT
PRAE PHIL; a winged Victory with a wreath and a palm is on the obverse, with
the legend VIC AVG.³³ Moreover, Appian relates the story of Domitius
Calvinus, a supporter of the triumvirs, who was conveying a praetorian cohort of
2,000 men (along with cavalry and other troops) across the Adriatic; these were
the men who had been with Octavian in Italy prior to him setting off for
Greece.³⁴ It is likely they were intended to take part in the battle, but the ships
were destroyed en route when the wind failed and they fell into enemy hands.³⁵
After the triumvirs’ victory at Philippi, those soldiers who had served their
time were released by Antony and Octavian. But of these, 8,000 opted to remain
active and the two leaders divided them into praetorian cohorts.³⁶ It is not clear,
however, how many units were created or their size. In 41 BC, it is recorded that
Octavian made use of his praetorian cohorts when fighting against Lucius
Antonius; these are most likely the cohorts organized after Philippi, though there
is no specific evidence to that effect.³⁷ Moreover, Antony is said to have had
three praetorian cohorts with him in 36 BC when he fought against the
Parthians.³⁸ The importance of these soldiers to Antony is emphasized on a coin
issued by him in 32 BC, with the legend CHORTIUM PRAETORIARUM; it
provides the earliest physical evidence that we have for the term.³⁹ But there is
no further information in the sources about these units. The division of soldiers
into praetorian cohorts after Philippi has been called the ‘véritable naissance’ of
the guard.⁴⁰ The evidence shows, however, that even after that date commanders
were not always protected by praetorian cohorts. For example, Octavian was
attacked and nearly killed by soldiers for expelling one of their number from the
games in the late 40s; there is no indication that any protection was in place for
him at this event.⁴¹ And Plutarch records that in 35 BC, Octavia sailed to meet
Antony in Greece, bringing with her 2,000 men to serve as his praetorian
guard.⁴² It is not clear whether these should be considered an adjunct to the units
he already had with him in the east, but the implication is that there was a need
for additional troops, specifically for his protection.
It is probable that the praetorian cohorts of both Antony and Octavian were
involved in the fighting at Actium in 31 BC. But the only evidence for their
participation comes from a late source which records that Octavian had five
cohorts with him.⁴³ After his victory, Octavian took over Antony’s praetorian
cohorts, releasing some of the soldiers and settling them in new colonies.⁴⁴
Before long, however, he had formed the majority of the soldiers from these
cohorts into the imperial praetorian guard.

Augustus to Nero

It is clear that Augustus was influenced in the way in which he structured his
praetorians by the use of such units in the first century BC. It may well be, for
example, that one of the key events was the entrance of the triumvirs into the
capital with their praetorian cohorts: the appearance of armed guards with these
men illustrated where the power resided and Augustus might have decided to
replicate this. But there is, predictably, no indication in the sources of the
rationale behind its establishment.⁴⁵ The precedent of the republican cohorts –
both in a military capacity and in an administrative sense – may have provided
the model, but there had to be some need for transforming what had been
primarily a bodyguard in the field to the emperor’s guard in the capital. It has
been pointed out that ‘[Augustus] had no illusions about the enemies he had
made in his revolutionary career’, and perhaps one need look no further than that
for an explanation.⁴⁶
The praetorians clearly were intended for the emperor’s personal use. In his
account of the military strength of the empire under Tiberius, Tacitus uses the
term proprius miles in reference to the praetorian and urban cohorts: ‘his own
army occupied the city – three urban and nine praetorian cohorts, nearly all
chosen from Etruria and Umbria, or old Latium and the old Roman colonies’.⁴⁷
Evidence for the closeness of this relationship between emperor and guard is
provided by the language on diplomas issued to the praetorians, where the
phrase qui in meo praetorio militaverunt (‘those who served in my imperial
guard’) clearly illustrates the strong association.⁴⁸ Another way in which this
link can be demonstrated is through the oath taken by the soldiers in the city.
Given their proximity to the emperor, it is to be expected that there was a special
oath for the praetorian and urban cohorts that confirmed their allegiance to the
emperor and his household in a way that bound them more directly to him than
were the provincial armies.⁴⁹ The devoted relationship between the emperor and
his praetorian cohorts is shown further by the inclusion of his image on their
standards, something not done by the legions where the image was carried
separately. In addition, the emperor directly gave the watchword to the cohort on
duty at the palace (see Chapter 3). That the unit also played a major role in the
funeral of Augustus adds to this closeness.⁵⁰ All of these factors serve to
illustrate that the guard was not just an integral part of imperial power but was
linked inexorably to the emperor himself.
In considering what the praetorians did, however, it is important to emphasize
at the outset that they were not restricted to serving as the emperor’s bodyguard.
Augustus was resourceful in finding additional duties for them in an attempt to
make better use of the only sizeable military force in Italy and to integrate the
unit into the imperial administration. Indeed, he had another group that served
almost exclusively to ensure his safety, the German bodyguard (Germani
corporis custodes).⁵¹ It was Caesar who first had used Germans as an escort for
his own security and it is possible that Augustus took over this idea from him.⁵²
Primarily a cavalry unit, they have been referred to as the emperor’s ‘private
militia’; it is apparent that, during their existence, they were used to complement
the guard in the task of ensuring the emperor’s safety.⁵³ Dismissed after the
Varan disaster in AD 9, the German bodyguard is attested again in AD 14, when
the pick of the unit was sent north to assist in quelling the revolt in Pannonia
after the death of Augustus; evidently they were an invaluable element of the
imperial system at this early stage.⁵⁴ But it may have been for reasons other than
their skill that they were so relied upon: Tacitus claims that because of their
foreign character, the Germans were used as the personal bodyguard of the
emperor, for they had no political investment in Rome.⁵⁵ It is of note that the
unit did not outlast the Julio-Claudians. They were disbanded by Galba in AD
69, who considered them to be a threat, since they allegedly had shown
preference for his opponent, Gnaeus Dolabella.⁵⁶
The history of the guard, then, is intertwined closely with the early history of
the principate: the presence of a considerable number of troops in Rome whose
loyalty was to Augustus alone was a clear indication that the imperial period had
begun.⁵⁷ In fact, until the major transformation brought about by Severus in the
late second century AD, much of the way in which the unit was organized
remained the same, with only minor changes to such features as the size and
number of cohorts and the command structure (see Chapter 3). While the area of
recruitment was broadened over the course of the first two centuries of the
imperial period, the majority of guard members continued to come from Italy
and those areas that had been colonized early on. The duties of the praetorians
did begin to involve a wider remit, however, with increased action in the field
becoming common after the Julio-Claudian period (see Chapter 4). But it is to
the credit of Augustus that the way in which he structured the guard in the early
years of his rule remained in place for so long.
Yet, despite the importance of the praetorians even in the early principate,
very little is known about their activities during the reign of Augustus. This lack
of information is partly the result of the absence of a contemporary and
comprehensive source for the reign. It is also of interest that Augustus does not
refer specifically to the praetorians in the Res Gestae, the list of his
achievements; the absence from the text of any mention of the establishment of
the guard may stem from a reluctance to advertise quite so blatantly the way in
which his power was maintained.⁵⁸ And by the end of the first century AD, the
praetorians had become such an integral part of the functioning of the city that
later authors did not give much thought to the early history of the unit. The
absence of detail, however, makes it difficult to ascertain how extensive the
responsibilities of the guard were under the first emperor. But there is some
indication that many of the tasks for which there is evidence from the mid-first
century were also undertaken in the earlier period. For example, when Augustus
went east in 22/21 BC, the city was subjected to periods of unrest. There were
riots over the consular elections, and stability was maintained only after the
appointment of Agrippa to look after affairs in Rome.⁵⁹ Whether the praetorians
were used to help quell such disturbances this early in their history is not known,
but it is probable that those cohorts billeted in Rome at the time would have
done so, given their proximity. Moreover, the presence of praetorians with the
emperor on this trip is not recorded in the sources, though undoubtedly some
soldiers went with him, given that accompanying the emperor was their primary
function.⁶⁰
The other ways in which the guard was later employed – assisting with the
fighting of fires, providing security at the games, dealing with prisoners –
probably originated during the reign of Augustus, but again there are only hints
of this in the sources. For example, Suetonius records that there were soldiers at
the games, and that on several occasions troops were posted throughout the city,
as after the Varan disaster of AD 9, but without specific reference to the guard.⁶¹
The involvement of the praetorians in firefighting is not specifically attested for
Augustus’ reign, but they must have taken part in battling any major blazes,
especially before the organization of the vigiles in AD 6.⁶² The evidence for the
guard being involved in executions under Augustus is meagre, but there was a
precedent for such activity. While still a triumvir, Octavian had had the praetor
Quintus Gallius removed from his presence by centurions and soldiers; he was
tortured and then executed because Gallius was suspected to have been armed at
one of the tribunals.⁶³ Suetonius also records the execution of a knight suspected
of being a spy because he had been taking notes during one of Octavian’s
speeches to the soldiers and the citizens.⁶⁴ Such tasks would be precisely the sort
of assignment expected of the guard. Yet the situation under Augustus was
substantially different from that of the emperors who came after him: the
presence of an armed force in the city, while not unknown, was still unusual.
The lack of information, then, about the movements and responsibilities of the
praetorians in this reign can be attributed partly to a desire by Augustus to
downplay their role in the running of the state.
Furthermore, it is not easy to reconstruct the method of command for the
guard before 2 BC, the date at which Augustus appointed the first two prefects.
Prior to that time, the tribunes of the cohorts must have received their orders
directly from the emperor.⁶⁵ The reluctance to delegate responsibility for the
guard to any one individual in the early years of the reign may have resulted
from a desire to deflect criticism for having stationed troops in the city; by 2 BC,
there would have been less concern about their presence. Yet in this early period,
the power later associated with the office of prefect was not evident because the
role of the guard was still developing. Moreover, it is not certain that the position
was first and foremost military in nature: whether the prefects were armed in the
presence of the emperor is unclear and in fact the position was always as much
political as military.⁶⁶ This is seen most clearly in the influential relationship
between emperor and prefect, and in the way in which these individuals were
chosen for the post – most often through patronage.⁶⁷ As the responsibilities of
the praetorians expanded, however, it was only logical that the position of
prefect would take on additional significance, as is well documented.⁶⁸
It is uncertain how the first men who were appointed to the position were
chosen, and in fact very little is known about them other than their names.⁶⁹
Quintus Ostorius Scapula’s career is obscure; he seems to have been the brother
(or cousin) of the Publius Ostorius Scapula who was prefect of Egypt under
Augustus and whose descendants gained the consulship under Claudius.⁷⁰ About
the other prefect, Publius Salvius Aper, nothing is known.⁷¹ The issue of
collegiality here is an important one, for Augustus evidently saw a need for the
office to be shared, and it is usually assumed that having two prefects allowed
one to stay in Rome while the other could be elsewhere.⁷² But the reason for this
decision is more pragmatic than most historians appreciate: it was undoubtedly
to facilitate the supervision of the cohorts in this early period, since they were
not yet housed together, being widely dispersed in the city. In fact, the practice
of having two prefects is not followed consistently throughout the long history of
the prefecture, and it is a mistake to think that this was the ‘norm’ for the
position.⁷³ Dio’s claim about the collegiality of the office as characterized in the
dramatic speech presented by Maecenas to Augustus – that it is dangerous to
entrust the post to a single individual – clearly reflects the benefit of hindsight,
since there was no precedent for such a fear at the time of the establishment of
the prefecture.⁷⁴ It is equally of interest that Augustus chose equestrians for this
office. The reason may be found in their responsibilities: because the praetorians
functioned as the emperor’s personal guard, to have put members of the
senatorial aristocracy in charge of such a unit would have created friction
between them and the princeps, and perhaps be dangerous for the emperor;
equestrians posed less of a threat, given their more modest status.⁷⁵
The rationale for the transfer of direct control over the guard from the
emperor to the prefects is not recorded in the sources.⁷⁶ In fact, there may be a
practical explanation for the transfer of power, namely the inability of the
emperor to continue to oversee the day-to-day command of the cohorts himself,
especially since the praetorians were becoming involved in so many different
activities in the capital. A command structure was necessary to coordinate these
tasks, and it is likely that the movement of the tribunes through the system did
not allow for long-term commands to be established.⁷⁷ The orders for the
soldiers would have continued to originate from the palace, however, where it is
likely that the prefects had their headquarters.⁷⁸ It is clear, however, that the
emperor maintained overall control of the guard, since it remained his personal
army.
The guard under the Julio-Claudian emperors quickly matured into the force
that is regularly documented in general accounts of Roman imperial history.
There were several important developments in this period: the construction of a
permanent camp for the unit – the Castra Praetoria – under Tiberius, and the use
of the guard on a recurring basis to remove those deemed a threat to the
principate are perhaps the most important of these.⁷⁹ Of course, members of the
praetorians were involved in the assassination of Gaius in AD 41; they also
played a significant role in the accessions of Claudius and Nero and, in a more
subtle way, those of Tiberius and Gaius. A closer look at these events, therefore,
is required.
Following the deaths of Augustus, Tiberius and Claudius, the guard assisted
in the way in which information about these events was made public. In each
case, an individual ensured that arrangements were in place for the accession of
the chosen successor with the help of the praetorians. For Augustus, the agent
was his wife Livia, who acted in concert with the guard to make certain that
news of the emperor’s death was delayed until such time as the transition of
power was secure: Tiberius was on his way to Dalmatia at the time and it is not
clear from the sources whether he returned to find Augustus alive or dead.⁸⁰ The
empress stationed praetorians around the house in Nola so that no one could
approach; it is likely that they were used as well to convey the message of
Augustus’ decline to Tiberius, given the need for strict secrecy.⁸¹ The guard was
employed again in AD 37 at the death of Tiberius in Misenum to convey news of
his demise to the provinces; the role of his praetorian prefect, Macro, was key
here. The use of speculatores in this instance would have provided him with
feedback as to the reaction of the governors and thus allow him to gauge the
attitude towards the new emperor.⁸² When Claudius died, as had happened with
Augustus, the change occurred with the collusion of the empress, Agrippina,
who was acting in the interests of her son, Nero.⁸³ Together with the prefect
Burrus, she ensured a smooth transition of power.⁸⁴ Praetorians were used to
restrict access to the palace until it was deemed an auspicious time to announce
the death of Claudius and the accession of Nero.⁸⁵ But the guard also was a
concern: it was not clear whether the praetorians would consent to the choice of
successor (there being another possible candidate in the person of Claudius’ son
Britannicus), and Tacitus records that Burrus had to encourage the cohort on
duty at the palace to show allegiance to the new emperor: ‘Then, in the middle of
the day, the third before the Ides of October, the doors of the palace suddenly
were opened. With Burrus accompanying him, Nero went out to the cohort
which, in military fashion, was present as the watch. There, at the prefect’s
encouragement, they cheered him and he was put into a litter. They say that there
were some who hesitated, looking about and asking where Britannicus was;
soon, with no other option, they followed what was on offer.’⁸⁶ It seems that
even the best-made plans could not completely guarantee the loyalty of the unit
at the transfer of power.
It is the assassination of Gaius, though, that has gripped historians, both
ancient and modern.⁸⁷ As has been noted, the imperial praetorian guard had been
developed by Augustus first and foremost for his own protection. Though the
soldiers became involved in many other tasks after the establishment of the unit,
the security of the emperor still remained their primary function, the one to
which all of the others were subordinated. It is remarkable, therefore, that, just
over 50 years after their introduction, members of the praetorians were
responsible for the assassination of the man they had sworn to protect. Yet, by
AD 41, the guard was so firmly established as a vital part of the management of
the state that several of its members were willing to risk their positions to help
advance other political aims through the elimination of the emperor. It should be
remembered, however, that the conspiracy was restricted for the most part to a
few officers. It is possible that the close association of these men with the
emperor and with the administration meant that they were more easily
influenced by the political situation around them and were corruptible. Most
importantly, they had easy access to Gaius through their personal contact with
him. But the conspirators by no means represented the attitude of the entire
force, which on the whole remained loyal to the emperor. Nevertheless, the
success in carrying out the assassination brought an increased recognition by all
involved in political life in Rome that the praetorians were a force to be
reckoned with and, for the emperor, a potential threat.
 Suetonius and Dio record that there had been other plots against Gaius before
AD 41, but they provide few details.⁸⁸ It is clear, however, that by AD 40,
discontent against the emperor was widespread among many in Rome; for
example, it was in that year that Gaius was granted guards for his statues.⁸⁹ This
displeasure also extended to members of the guard. The details of the conspiracy
are obscure but praetorian officers appear to have been involved right from the
beginning.⁹⁰ One of the major players was the tribune Cassius Chaerea.⁹¹ His
participation is said by Josephus to have resulted principally from resentment at
the many insults to which he had been subjected by the emperor, most of which
were of a sexual nature.⁹² The inclusion of officers in the conspiracy suggests
that the hostility against Gaius was rooted in something which had a direct effect
on them rather than on the guard in general. It is impossible to say what their
actual complaints against him might have been, but Josephus records that
Chaerea, in a comment directed to one of the praetorian prefects, Marcus
Arrecinus Clemens, and to Papinius, a fellow tribune, referred to the guard as
‘torturers and executioners’, which may provide a clue to the grievances felt by
at least some of the officers.⁹³
The plot against Gaius was successfully executed in the January of AD 41.⁹⁴
As might be expected, details of the assassination are obscure. Besides Chaerea,
three other tribunes of the guard were involved: Cornelius Sabinus, Papinius and
Julius Lupus, who was related to the prefect, Clemens.⁹⁵ Clemens himself was
approached by the conspirators, though he did not agree to participate directly,
ostensibly because of his age. It is not known whether the other prefect had
knowledge of the plot; the sources do not even record his name.⁹⁶ The emperor
was killed at the games on the Palatine, with the choice of the place and time
dictated by Gaius’ intention to sail to Alexandria soon after, though the crowd
certainly made it more difficult for anyone to come to Gaius’ assistance when he
was attacked, despite the considerable number of soldiers in the vicinity.⁹⁷ A
further consideration had to be the ability of the conspirators to separate Gaius
from these men, in particular from his praetorian guard and German bodyguard,
both of which were there specifically to protect him. This was made possible by
isolating the emperor as he left the theatre around midday, which happened to be
the time of the change of the guard.⁹⁸ Chaerea is said to have approached Gaius
to ask him for the day’s watchword. He attacked after receiving the reply.⁹⁹
There was no one to come to the emperor’s aid except his litter bearers, who
were ineffective. During the actual assassination, the majority of the praetorians
on duty that day on the Palatine – whatever their responsibility – must have
remained unaware of what was happening. That those in the theatre did not
attempt to get to the emperor or try to follow the assassins can probably be
attributed to the efforts of the ex-consul Valerius Asiaticus, who seems to have
been given the role of calming those in the theatre.¹⁰⁰ In fact, it was the German
bodyguard who first realized what had happened and who began to exact
revenge. Exactly where they had been at the time of the assassination is not
clear: although they should have been in close proximity to Gaius, it appears that
they had not exited the theatre with the emperor.¹⁰¹ It is possible that those guard
members involved in the conspiracy may have played a role in keeping the
Germans from Gaius. But when it was discovered that the emperor had been
killed, the Germans indiscriminately murdered anyone they happened upon and
it was only with difficulty that they were prevented from wholesale slaughter by
the supplication of the crowd still in the theatre. Gaius’ family was also
murdered. Lupus was sent immediately to kill the emperor’s wife Caesonia and
her child; the choice of the tribune for such a task was to implicate his relative
Clemens, according to Josephus.¹⁰²
The involvement of the praetorians in the murder of Gaius is immensely
significant in the history of the guard. This was the first time that the emperor’s
personal unit had taken part in an overtly political action. Although the impetus
had come from some of the officers, and the reasons which led to the act remain
unknown for the most part, it was inevitable that a few of the rank and file of the
guard would be drawn in by the conspirators who needed their cooperation; the
impetus was probably anticipation of a reward. On the other hand, the murder of
Gaius by the very soldiers who had taken an oath to protect him signalled a
transformation in the imperial attitude towards the guard. The emperor’s
personal troops had played an important role at the transition of power between
Augustus and Tiberius, and between Tiberius and Gaius, by helping to ensure a
smooth succession. Now, however, members from the same unit had been the
primary means by which the next succession had taken place, through an act of
murder, and the assassins were men who had been promoted by the emperor
himself. Such a step demonstrated to all that the praetorians could have a huge
impact in the political arena in Rome, and sent a clear message to Claudius, and
to those who came after him, that praetorian officers in particular must be
carefully chosen and closely monitored.
The actions of the guard after the murder are vague, for the account is garbled
in Josephus and difficult to unravel. There are two versions. In the first, the
praetorians decided at a meeting that they must provide their own candidate for
emperor if they were to safeguard their position; their choice was Claudius.¹⁰³
The second records that the acclamation of Claudius occurred by accident when
a soldier named Gratus stumbled upon him hiding in the palace as members of
the guard were rampaging through it. The praetorian saluted Claudius as
emperor, and along with the rest of the praetorians in the palace escorted him
back to the camp.¹⁰⁴ There are problems with both accounts, however, and it is
more likely that Claudius himself is implicated in the transfer of power, having
prearranged with some of the conspirators (perhaps a group acting separately
from Chaerea and his colleagues?) to be found in a certain place in the palace.¹⁰⁵
The role of the prefect Clemens should be taken into account here: although it is
acknowledged that he did not play an active part in the assassination, it is
feasible that, once informed, he alerted Claudius to the plot and assisted him in
escaping after the assassination.¹⁰⁶ That the new emperor was discovered in a
somewhat out-of-the-way place in the palace by a member of the guard lends
credibility to this scenario.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, it is unlikely that any plot would
have succeeded with the knowledge of the prefect unless he had chosen to
support the murder by throwing his support behind a designated successor.
Shortly after the assassination of Gaius, then, Claudius found himself in the
praetorian camp under the protection of the entire guard. The next day, both the
urban cohorts and the vigiles joined in swearing the oath of loyalty to the new
emperor.¹⁰⁸ The urban cohorts may have accepted Claudius in the hope of
receiving a reward from the new emperor, since the praetorian guard had been
promised a considerable donative by him for their loyalty.¹⁰⁹ The grant of a
donative upon a change of emperor was not unusual, though Suetonius records
this particular instance as setting a precedent because it was not associated with
Gaius’ will, an interpretation that has been accepted by many scholars.¹¹⁰ Yet a
similar transaction had happened before. Upon his accession, Gaius had doubled
the amount left to the praetorians by Tiberius and it can be argued that this was
the first time a reward had been given to the guard in exchange for its loyalty in
the future.¹¹¹ It is true, however, that the donative given by Claudius was unusual
in that its size was larger than any previously bestowed, being five times the
annual salary for a praetorian.¹¹² It has been suggested that, rather than the
purchase of loyalty, the grant was made in lieu of any bequest from Gaius, but it
seems clear that Claudius was interested in rewarding the praetorians for their
role in his succession.¹¹³ Further evidence for this comes from two coin types
issued by Claudius; the first, with the legend IMPER RECEPT, shows the
praetorian camp with a figure holding a spear and standing in front of a
standard.¹¹⁴ The other coin depicts Claudius clasping hands with a soldier who
has a shield and carries the standard; the legend reads PRAETOR RECEPT.¹¹⁵
They first were minted in AD 41–2, but the type was reissued throughout the
first few years of Claudius’ reign and must have been intended to reinforce the
importance of the praetorians in his rule.¹¹⁶ The guard also was given 100
sesterces per man on the anniversary date of Claudius’ accession.¹¹⁷ There can
be little doubt that Claudius understood the need not only to continue to show his
gratitude to the praetorians but also to keep the measure of their support for him
before the senate and the people.¹¹⁸
One of Claudius’ first acts was to execute Chaerea for his involvement in the
conspiracy.¹¹⁹ Of the other tribunes involved, only Lupus was put to death. Since
by this time the emperor had assured himself of the support of the guard, the
execution of these officers was not likely to result in any resentment. In fact, the
attitude of the praetorians after the murder, as it had been during crises in the
past, was one of pragmatism. It is possible that for many of the soldiers the
change in emperor was of limited significance. As long as their needs were
looked after and they were well rewarded for their continued loyalty, there was
little incentive to get involved in political intrigue.
The history of the guard in the early first century, then, is one of gradual
development: the institution was changing and maturing into the force that later
authors such as Tacitus would recognize. It was in this period that the
organization of the unit became well established and the duties with which the
praetorians would be associated were sanctioned (see Chapter 4). In addition, the
office of praetorian prefect began to assume the importance that it would later
have.¹²⁰ The men who held the position in the first century were not chosen for
their military ability; as has been noted, most often their appointments were the
result of imperial patronage, which meant that they were selected because of
their affiliation with the imperial household rather than for any particular ability
to manage such a large military force. The reason for this was simple: the
emperor needed to know that someone he could trust implicitly was in command
of his guard, for the greatest danger he could potentially encounter would come
from the armed men who had sworn to protect him.
Two prefects of note from this period are Quintus Naevius Cordus Sutorius
Macro, already mentioned in connection with the accession of Gaius, and Sextus
Afranius Burrus, who held the office under Nero. The conditions under which
Macro was appointed praetorian prefect are not clear; he played a crucial role in
the downfall of Sejanus in AD 31 and it is possible that he had been promoted to
the office in connection with this event.¹²¹ Macro remained sole prefect for the
rest of Tiberius’ reign, an indication that he was trusted by the emperor. But
within a year of Gaius’ accession, Macro had been removed from his position.
The reason for the fall from favour is not known. At some time after the
recovery from his illness in the autumn of AD 37, Gaius apparently indicated to
Macro that he was to have a new position, that of prefect of Egypt.¹²² Such a
transfer would remove him from the command that had the potential to do the
greatest harm to the emperor and would isolate him from the capital and, perhaps
more importantly, from the soldiers there. No doubt this precaution had
something to do with Macro’s actions when Gaius had been ill; it may be that
the prefect had gone beyond what the emperor thought appropriate. For example,
among Macro’s responsibilities at this time would have been the task of giving
the watchword to the guard. Technically, though, this action would have placed
the cohorts at Macro’s disposal for whatever end he chose, and it may well have
been the subsequent mistrust over the ambitions of his prefect that prompted
Gaius to act. The move would have been viewed by Macro as a demotion.
Though it was not until the Flavian period that a definite cursus was established
for these prefectures, that the position of praetorian prefect included control of
the guard and a place close to the emperor means that it must have been viewed
as the premier position. Yet he did not make it to Egypt. Early in AD 38, the
prefect and his wife, Ennia, committed suicide.¹²³ An accusation had been made
against them, though the details are unclear.¹²⁴ It is possible that he was involved
in a conspiracy, but the evidence is insufficient to draw any firm conclusions.¹²⁵
There is no indication that the guard itself was in any way implicated in Macro’s
downfall, and there is no record of its reaction to his removal.¹²⁶
The appointment of Burrus to the prefecture in AD 51 was due to the
influence of Agrippina, the wife of Claudius; she argued that there was a need
for stricter discipline with respect to the praetorians and that this would be
accomplished more easily through the command of a single prefect.¹²⁷ It is not
certain that there had been problems with the control of the guard, though
Agrippina may have been able to use as an excuse the demonstration over food
shortages which that same year had put Claudius in some danger in the
Forum.¹²⁸ Of greater import to Agrippina than Claudius’ security, however, the
appointment of Burrus eliminated those prefects whom she perceived as having
been supportive of the emperor’s former wife, Messalina, and thus loyal to
Messalina’s son, Britannicus. With Nero now old enough to stand for office,
Agrippina must have anticipated that the struggle between Nero and Britannicus
would not be far off.¹²⁹ She obviously wanted to ensure that her partisans were
in a position from which they could provide the greatest assistance.¹³⁰
Burrus was well known to the imperial family. From Vasio in Gallia
Narbonensis, he had been begun his civil career as Livia’s procurator and, after
her death, was retained by Tiberius and Claudius.¹³¹ This connection with the
imperial household would have brought him into contact with Agrippina, and his
appointment as praetorian prefect should be viewed in that context.¹³² At some
point, Burrus also was awarded the ornamenta consularia, granting him the rank
of consul without having held the office, a detail recorded on the inscription at
Vasio but neglected by the ancient historians.¹³³ It is not clear when or why he
was honoured in this way, though it is possible that his role in the accession of
Nero provides the rationale. In connection with Seneca, Burrus managed the
early career of the young emperor.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, he did not play an active role
in what was the most significant event in those years, namely the murder of the
emperor’s mother.
Within a year of Nero coming to power, there was dissension between mother
and son, and when Agrippina realized that her influence was waning she
threatened to present Britannicus to the troops in the Castra Praetoria as
Claudius’ legitimate heir.¹³⁵ Her use of the praetorians in Nero’s accession and
her threat here illustrates that, for the empress, the guard was of paramount
importance in determining the legitimacy of rule. The result of the intimidation
by Agrippina, however, was that Nero banned her from the palace and withdrew
the contingent of guards which accompanied his mother.¹³⁶ Since this escort was
as much a show of status as for her protection, it made its dismissal all the more
disturbing to her; it also meant that she could not influence the soldiers any
longer.¹³⁷ Yet Agrippina survived another four years before Nero decided he had
to get rid of her. It is unknown why he chose to act at this time, but Tacitus
records that the emperor was simply tired of having her around.¹³⁸ The absence
of the praetorians in the event is significant. From the earliest stages of the plan,
it is clear that the guard was not considered as the agent of the murder, though
by this time executions of a political nature, including members of the imperial
family, had long been one of its functions.¹³⁹ Instead, the scheme originated with
Anicetus, the freedman in charge of the fleet at Misenum. When Nero was
young, this man had been his tutor, and Tacitus records that he had great hatred
for Agrippina.¹⁴⁰ The fact that Anicetus had been able to attain the command of
the fleet shows that he also had ambition. That the fleet was used in preference
to the guard, then, must result from the fact that the scheme originated with their
commander: a collapsible boat was to be built, which would result in the death
of Agrippina upon its disintegration.¹⁴¹ But the plot failed and Nero, in fear of
retaliation, sought the counsel of his advisors; when Seneca inquired of Burrus
whether praetorians could be sent, the answer was no, that Anicetus must finish
what he had started. Whether the explanation given – that the praetorians were
loyal to the imperial house and in particular to the memory of Germanicus,
Agrippina’s father – was the real reason or if it was annoyance at the use of the
fleet rather than the guard is not clear. Had Burrus been prepared to make use of
his men, it is certain that he could have found someone among those praetorians
with the emperor at Baiae who would be willing to carry out the execution; as
has been noted, guard members had done so in the past. In the end, Agrippina
was murdered by officers of the fleet, who accompanied Anicetus to her villa;
the crowd that had gathered in celebration of her escape from drowning were
dispersed by the soldiers who were in the area, probably the praetorians who
were with Nero.¹⁴²
There is no indication in the sources of the guard’s initial response to the
news that Agrippina was dead. If there was any uneasiness among the soldiers
over the murder, the reality of the situation soon prevailed. The official version –
that Nero had escaped an assassin sent by his mother – was accepted without
hesitation.¹⁴³ Moreover, the day after the murder, the praetorians demonstrated
their loyalty to the emperor in a display arranged by Burrus that was designed as
well to assuage Nero’s fear.¹⁴⁴ According to Dio, the emperor also granted the
praetorians a donative after Agrippina’s death, though the author’s rationale for
this – that they might expect more crimes to be committed – is not
convincing.¹⁴⁵ It is more likely that Nero was acknowledging the importance of
the praetorians to his rule and ensuring their continued support.¹⁴⁶
Yet it was also under Nero that the threat that had been inherent in the guard
from the very beginning was realized when the praetorians abandoned their
emperor.¹⁴⁷ The impetus came from one of their prefects, Gaius Nymphidius
Sabinus.¹⁴⁸ Appointed to office in AD 65 after the exposure of the Pisonian
Conspiracy, he also was awarded an honorary consulship, presumably for his
role in bringing the plot to light.¹⁴⁹ When Nero went to Greece in AD 66,
Nymphidius remained in Rome in command of those cohorts that did not
accompany the emperor.¹⁵⁰ This gave him military control of the capital and it is
possible that he made use of this opportunity to ingratiate himself with the
soldiers. When Nero returned the next year, alerted to the danger of conspiracy
by one of his freedmen, Helius, who had remained in Rome, he made a grand
entrance, with the guard in full display.¹⁵¹ Yet, before long, Nymphidius was
able to convince the praetorians that Nero had deserted them since a serious rival
for the principate – Servius Sulpicius Galba, governor of Spain – had been
proclaimed by his troops in spring AD 68. This marks the first time that the rank
and file of the unit as a whole had forsworn their oath and deserted an emperor,
but it appears to have been made possible only because Nero’s authority had
been undermined while he was absent. By the time that the emperor returned
from Greece, it is clear that the praetorians who had remained in Rome (that is,
the majority of the unit) were extremely dissatisfied with him and that he needed
to reassert his authority over them. Had he done so – appearing in the camp and
addressing the soldiers – Nero could have regained control in Rome, since the
praetorians had in the past chosen to support the status quo rather than risk their
privileged position.¹⁵² In fact, Tacitus notes that the guard were led to desert
Nero by the deception of its prefect rather than through its own impetus, for the
praetorians always had maintained their loyalty to the Julio-Claudian house. But
the emperor was either unwilling or unable to negotiate with his household
troops in a timely fashion and, as a result, they were left with only the word of
their prefect that the emperor had deserted them, which made their decision that
much easier.
In addition, Nymphidius promised the guard a sizeable donative in Galba’s
name.¹⁵³ What is more, when he became disillusioned with the actions of the
new emperor, in particular the appointment of Cornelius Laco as praetorian
prefect, he attempted to subvert Galba’s authority and be proclaimed emperor in
his own right. The guard refused and Nymphidius was murdered in the Castra
Praetoria.¹⁵⁴ This was the beginning of the involvement of the guard in the
events of the so-called ‘year of the four emperors’ – their contribution would be
significant, though overshadowed by the role played by the provincial legions.¹⁵⁵

AD 69

The choice of Galba as emperor had been decided by the troops in the field, but
any ruler needed the support of the praetorians as well. After all, they had
become so integrated into the workings of the principate that to neglect them
would bring about massive discord. The new emperor, however, did not seem to
recognize this. The bitterness of the guard at being denied the donative promised
by Nymphidius, coupled with Galba’s cruel treatment of the soldiers on the
march to Rome and the dismissal of several officers from the city cohorts,
resulted in much resentment among the soldiers.¹⁵⁶ Because of these problems,
Marcus Salvius Otho, former governor of Lusitania and now one of Galba’s
confidants in Rome, was able to ingratiate himself with the praetorians. He used
bribery to gain their support; Tacitus records the gift of 100 sesterces – a
substantial amount – to each member of the cohort attending Galba at dinner as
an example of his tactics.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, after being overlooked as Galba’s
designated successor in the January of AD 69, Otho used his influence with the
guard to convince them to switch allegiance to himself.¹⁵⁸ On the appointed day,
though the cohort guarding the palace remained loyal for the most part, Galba
was unable to defend himself against the praetorians and assorted legionaries
that attacked him, and he was murdered in the Forum.¹⁵⁹ In the end, it was
Galba’s inability or unwillingness to accept that he needed the support of the
troops in the city and that a donative, even a small one, had to be paid to them in
order to establish this trust, which helped to bring him down.
Of course, the role that the guard had played in ensuring Otho’s succession
demanded recognition, and Tacitus records that the new emperor acquiesced to
the demands of the soldiers. The guard requested the right to appoint its own
prefects, the first time that choice had been granted to it.¹⁶⁰ By allowing them
this right, Otho presumably thought that he would provide a safeguard for
himself, for the soldiers ought to be well disposed toward the commanders they
had chosen, who, in turn, would answer to him. Interestingly, there is no mention
of a donative either demanded or offered. It has been pointed out that this means
that ‘the troops were by no means out of control, the emperor by no means their
helpless victim’.¹⁶¹ Yet, an incident in the following month (February AD 69)
reveals the fragility of the situation.¹⁶² Otho had ordered the urban cohort in
Ostia to come to Rome; no reason for this move is provided in the sources, but
the unit had need of weapons, whatever the intention was.¹⁶³ A tribune of the
guard, Varius Crispinus, was given the task of gathering the weapons from the
armoury in the Castra Praetoria.¹⁶⁴ He did so at night, and his actions caused
great concern among the soldiers in the camp, who assumed that the purpose of
the distribution of weapons was for an attack on Otho himself. Crispinus was
killed in the ensuing fracas and a group of praetorians rushed to the palace to
ensure that the emperor was safe; they withdrew only after Otho appeared and
appeased them through tears and entreaties. The next day, two officers addressed
the guard and promised a donative, though it seems also that there was a
reluctance on the part of the officers to continue to serve when their troops were
so volatile, and this apparently contributed to the change of heart by the
soldiers.¹⁶⁵ It is clear that early in AD 69 the attitude of the praetorians was
unpredictable.
It was under Otho that the guard saw active service in the field for the first
time since the reign of Tiberius.¹⁶⁶ Five cohorts were sent ahead to help block
the advance of the forces sent by Aulus Vitellius, the former governor of Lower
Germany, who in early January had been proclaimed emperor by his troops.¹⁶⁷
In addition, Otho is said to have been accompanied in the field by the ‘rest of the
praetorians’, as well as the speculatores, when he himself went north. It is not
clear how many cohorts this actually involved, since removing all of the guard
from the city would be impractical – there would be a need for at least some
soldiers to stay behind to ensure the security of the capital.¹⁶⁸ At any rate, the
praetorians in the field proved themselves capable of battle in the weeks that
followed.¹⁶⁹ Even after the defeat of most of Otho’s forces, he continued to be
encouraged by his praetorians to keep up the fight and, after his suicide, his
funeral was held by those members of the guard who had remained loyal, with
some of his most devoted supporters killing themselves at the funeral pyre.¹⁷⁰
Vitellius, unsurprisingly, was distrustful of the praetorians who had fought
for his predecessor (and who were mainly the same men who had served under
Nero and Galba). He therefore decided to start afresh. Tacitus records that the
new emperor ‘first split up the guard but then provided its members with
honourable discharge as a consolation’.¹⁷¹ Moreover, 16 new cohorts were
created, each milliary, and with men taken mainly from the Rhine legions.¹⁷²
The attraction of service in the praetorian cohorts seems to have negated the
need for any donative, since there is no indication that such a grant was made.
Yet there may have been some uncertainty over the loyalty of these new troops:
Vitellius minted coins with the legend CONCORDIA PRAETORIANORUM to
emphasize the harmonious relationship between emperor and guard, but the use
of such a legend often implies the reverse.¹⁷³ After Vitellius had been made
aware of the proclamation of Vespasian in the east, his new praetorians took part
in the battles that ensued.¹⁷⁴
On the other side, the Flavians managed to locate several members of the
guard who had been released by Vitellius and enlisted them with the promise of
re-admittance to the ranks of the praetorians in return for their assistance; the
possibility of regaining their lost status is emphasized by Tacitus.¹⁷⁵ By the
middle of December, the capital itself had been attacked, with some of the
fiercest fighting occurring in the area of the Castra Praetoria between those who
were the former praetorians of Galba and Otho, now fighting for the Flavians,
and those who had taken their position, fighting for Vitellius.¹⁷⁶ The Vitellian
soldiers, of course, were fighting not only for the emperor but also for their
enhanced position – they were unwilling to surrender their new-found status.
But, with a Flavian victory, the praetorian guard rallied around Domitian as
Caesar and the Vitellian forces were routed, though his praetorians fought to the
bitter end.¹⁷⁷

Flavians and Antonines

The history of the guard in the late first and into the second century is
remarkably unexceptional compared to that of the early imperial period. In fact,
there was very little change to the unit for over a century (c. 70–193). Vespasian
is thought to have reduced the number of cohorts from the Vitellian 16 to nine,
but he did not dismiss the men as his predecessor had done.¹⁷⁸ It is of note that
the city cohorts received only a token sum (100 sesterces) as a donative upon the
change of emperor; this is thought to be a result of the financial difficulties in
which Vespasian found himself at the outset of his reign.¹⁷⁹ At some point late in
the first century, the number of cohorts increased to ten, where it would stay
until the demise of the praetorians under Constantine (see Chapter 3). Under
Vespasian’s son Domitian, the unit shared with the rest of the army in the grant
of a pay rise, the first since its inception.¹⁸⁰ But, for the most part, the unit set up
by Augustus was well established by the Flavian period and, as a result, there
was little need for adaptation. The most important change in the late first century
came in the more extensive role that the guard began to play in the field: the
experience of AD 69 had shown that they could be effective on campaign and
their participation in military engagements is evident from the Flavians
onward.¹⁸¹
In the late first and into the second century, the main difficulty with any
analysis of the guard is the nature of the literary sources. Compared to the earlier
period, these sources are much less comprehensive, which makes it tricky to
construct a picture of what the praetorians were doing in Rome and elsewhere.¹⁸²
It is the prefecture that attracts most attention and, in particular, the status of the
individuals who held the post and the honours they accrued.¹⁸³ Of particular note
is that, under Vespasian, the position for the first time was held by senators:
Titus, his eldest son, and Marcus Arrecinus Clemens, uncle to Titus’ daughter
Julia and the son of one of Gaius’ prefects.¹⁸⁴ The reason for the use of these
men was probably twofold: Vespasian knew he could trust them but in addition
Titus in particular was a military man unlike the previous prefects and brought to
the position the discipline and skill which were needed to manage a unit
disheartened by recent events.¹⁸⁵ The anomaly of senators as praetorian prefects,
therefore, can be explained by expediency, and the individuals appointed after
the reign of Titus continued to be equestrians.¹⁸⁶
On the other hand, the praetorians themselves do not appear in these sources
that often, and when they do it is either to malign their actions or to compliment
the emperor in his handling of them. A good example of the former is the
situation in which Nerva found himself a year after coming to power. The
praetorians had not been involved in the murder of his predecessor, Domitian.¹⁸⁷
In fact, the soldiers had requested his deification almost immediately after the
deed.¹⁸⁸ Nerva was able to maintain control for nearly a year, but in the summer
of AD 97, members of the guard, spurred on by their prefect, insisted on the
punishment of Domitian’s assassins.¹⁸⁹ Pliny makes much of the situation in
which Nerva was placed by the soldiers: ‘Indeed that was a great dishonour for
our age, a great wound inflicted on the state. An emperor and the father of the
human race – besieged, captured, confined. The opportunity to save mankind
stolen from the gentlest of elderly men, that most blessed thing in the principate
taken from the princeps, namely that he knows no compulsion.’¹⁹⁰ Why it took
so long for the soldiers to make their demands known is not clear. Suetonius
suggests that they were lacking leadership immediately after the assassination,
which may hold a clue to the reason for the initial lack of action, but that cannot
explain the considerable length of time before the confrontation.¹⁹¹ It is possible
that the guard was part of a wider conspiracy and that it simply took time before
the conspirators were ready.¹⁹² At any rate, when the praetorians finally did act,
Nerva had little choice but to comply with their request. Not only were the
individuals who had perpetrated the deed handed over for execution, but within a
few months Nerva also had adopted Trajan as his heir. The key player here is the
praetorian commander Casperius Aelianus. Prefect under Domitian as well, he
had been dismissed prior to that emperor’s assassination, but when Nerva came
to power was soon returned to the prefecture, though the circumstances are not
known. It is possible that his appointment was the means by which the new
emperor sought to placate the guard after the murder of Domitian.¹⁹³ Less than a
year later, however, Aelianus led the drive to have the assassins punished and it
seems likely that he also had a hand in Trajan being installed as heir.¹⁹⁴ That the
prefect remained in post for the rest of Nerva’s short reign after this episode, as
seems to be the case, would be surprising if he were considered a liability either
to the emperor himself or his newly appointed heir; it is more likely that
Aelianus was crucial to the events that brought Trajan to the fore.¹⁹⁵
When the new emperor came to power in AD 98, he summoned Aelianus to
Germany along with several of his fellow praetorians and no more is heard of
them.¹⁹⁶ Although most scholars assume that Aelianus and his men were killed,
the language used by Dio does not specify murder.¹⁹⁷ It is possible that the
prefect was dismissed from his post (and thus from the capital) because of his
role in promoting Trajan’s interests prior to his accession; otherwise he would
have been a constant reminder of the way in which the new emperor had come to
power.¹⁹⁸
In contrast to Nerva, the relationship between Trajan and the guard is
represented in the sources with the emperor in complete control. On his initial
entry into Rome, Pliny describes Trajan as moving freely through the crowd, his
praetorians mingling with the assembled masses: ‘the soldiers were no different
from the people in manner, self-control or deference’.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, Pliny
makes a special point of the fact that Trajan had paid only part of the donative
promised.²⁰⁰ As has been noted, Vespasian had awarded a reduced sum due to
financial restraints, but there is no suggestion that what he paid was only part of
the donative. Titus and Domitian had granted the full amount, according to Dio,
and it is assumed that Nerva paid a donative, but there is no evidence.²⁰¹ The
suggestion has been made that because of the situation at Trajan’s accession –
namely that it was uncontested – he need not offer much.²⁰² Yet given the recent
unrest within its ranks, it would have been risky to deny the guard the amount
promised. It may be that, before he was dismissed, Aelianus had allayed any
concerns on the part of the praetorians regarding the payment.
The relationship between Trajan and the guard thus appears to be one of
mutual respect, though it is difficult to tell from the sources how realistic this
portrayal is. In fact, it has been argued that the praetorians suffered a loss of
status under Trajan and, in particular, that their duty as bodyguard for the
emperor was assumed by the equites singulares Augusti.²⁰³ A mounted unit for
the most part, these soldiers were based in Rome and accompanied the emperor
on campaign.²⁰⁴ But the reason put forward for preference for the equites
singulares – that Trajan could not trust the praetorians and so implemented a
new force to act as his bodyguard (‘a blow to the praetorians’) – is unfounded.²⁰⁵
There is no corroboration for this alleged loss of position and in fact there is
evidence that indicates the opposite – that the guard retained its position under
the new emperor – in the form of a relief from Puteoli, associated with an arch of
Trajan.²⁰⁶ It is clear that these are praetorians from the scorpion decoration on
the shield of one of the soldiers.²⁰⁷ That this unit appears on such a prominent
monument dating to early in Trajan’s reign suggests the praetorians’ importance
to him, especially in light of the infrequency with which they are represented in
art in general. It has been noted that ‘their presence is highly significant and it
draws on and asserts their historical/ideal function. They are portrayed as the
premier Roman/Italian soldiers ... their role confirms [the emperor’s] legitimacy
and excellence, while he allows and encourages them to be represented as the
ideal supporters he would like them to be. Their representation in this way so
early in his reign supports the modern view that Trajan’s principate was indeed a
golden age for the Praetorian Guard.’²⁰⁸ Given such prominence, and in the
absence of other evidence, it must be acknowledged that there was no loss of
status for the guard at this time.²⁰⁹ More likely, then, the praetorians and the
equites singulares worked together, with the creation of the latter unit made
necessary by the increased involvement of the guard in the field and the need for
additional mounted support, something which had begun under Domitian and
would continue under his successors.
The involvement of praetorians in Trajan’s Dacian Wars (AD 101–2, 105–6)
also indicates their importance to the emperor, for they played an active role in
the campaigns.²¹⁰ A contingent of the guard, along with one of their prefects,
Tiberius Claudius Livianus, accompanied Trajan and fought with him alongside
legionaries and auxiliaries. Evidence comes from inscriptions and, in particular,
from Trajan’s Column, where praetorians are shown in various episodes.²¹¹
Though it is often difficult to distinguish between different types of soldiers on
the Column, occasionally it is possible to identify the guard in situations which
suggests active involvement in the campaigns.²¹² For example, praetorians along
with their standards are depicted following the emperor himself as he heads to
war.²¹³ They are also shown ready to take part in battle – a stark change from the
first-century idea of the guard.²¹⁴ How many praetorians were involved is not
clear, with only the IXth cohort confirmed.²¹⁵ The involvement of the
praetorians in battle would continue under Marcus Aurelius who, in AD 162,
sent the praetorian prefect Titus Furius Victorinus with the co-emperor Lucius
Verus to the east against the Parthians.²¹⁶ Marcus also had both prefects with
him on campaign in the north against the Marcomanni later in his reign; units of
the guard were there as well.²¹⁷ By the late second century, then, the guard had
become accustomed to being in the field, not only as part of the imperial
entourage but also as active participants in battles.
Given the lack of reliable and comprehensive literary sources for the second
half of the second century AD, it is difficult to say much about the praetorians in
this period.²¹⁸ For example, the Historia Augusta records that Marcus Aurelius,
on his accession with Lucius Verus in AD 161, offered a sizeable donative to the
praetorians; given that the general trend by this time was to reward the guard at a
change of emperor, the account may reflect the truth, though the amount (20,000
sesterces) is undoubtedly an exaggeration.²¹⁹ In addition, Marcus addressed the
guard in the camp early in January AD 168 at which time he announced
additional privileges for veterans.²²⁰ The use of praetorians as stationarii
(‘outposted soldiers’) is evident in this period from inscriptions; these soldiers
were sent to the provinces as well as to other sites in Italy to assist with
policing.²²¹ It has been suggested that the sending of men from the city cohorts
(since those belonging to the urban cohorts are attested as well) must have been
a decision made at the highest level.²²² But beyond these few details, there is
little that can be said with certainty. It is only with Commodus that a fuller
picture starts to emerge, though the focus again is on the commanders rather than
the cohorts. In his 12-year reign, Commodus went through several prefects,
though Sextus Tigidius Perennis, in post from AD 182 to 185, attracts much of
the attention since he is said to have done Commodus’ job for him.²²³ Yet it has
been argued that arrogation of imperial duties, given the centralization of
authority, is not likely even with an emperor so inclined to indulge himself, and
there is evidence to show that Commodus did take an active role in the running
of the empire.²²⁴ On the other hand, his experience with Perennis, who seems to
have lost the confidence of the emperor though in circumstances that are unclear,
may have made Commodus suspicious of his praetorian prefects – and, by
extension, the guard itself.²²⁵ And this distrust may account for the appointment,
late in the reign, of the emperor’s chamberlain, Marcus Aurelius Cleander, with
the official title a pugione (‘Master of the Dagger’). It is not clear what this
position entailed, though some scholars prefer to see Cleander as overseeing
both the guard and the prefects.²²⁶ If that is the case, then the relationship
between Commodus and the praetorians must have been extremely uneasy in the
years before his death. A demonstration against Cleander in the Circus Maximus
eventually brought about his downfall, though the event is notable as well for an
apparent rift among the urban soldiers, some of whom – named specifically as
praetorians – seemed to be in support of the crowd, perhaps a result of the
strained relationship between the guard and the a pugione.²²⁷

Severans and the third century

At the end of AD 192, Commodus was murdered in a conspiracy that involved

the praetorian prefect Quintus Aemilius Laetus but not the praetorians.²²⁸
Following the emperor’s death, the guard was caught up in the turbulent events
that produced three rulers in six months. Throughout the accounts of both Dio
and Herodian for this period, the praetorians are caricatured as unruly and inept:
for example, Herodian mentions their desire for plunder and debauchery, Dio
their delicacy caused by soft living in the capital.²²⁹ Such depictions are not
helpful when trying to determine the role that the guard played in the events of
the first half of AD 193, and the attitude of the two authors must be borne in
mind in the discussion that follows.
Praetorians were involved in both confirming Commodus’ successor, Publius
Helvius Pertinax, and in his murder.²³⁰ The new emperor is said to have enforced
strict discipline on the city cohorts when he took power – the sources record the
displeasure of the guard in particular.²³¹ After ruling for only 87 days, Pertinax
was confronted by a small group of soldiers in the palace; he attempted to reason
with them without success and was killed.²³² The role of their prefect, Laetus, is
crucial here, since it is clear that he was instrumental in provoking the guard to
act against the emperor, though his reasons are not known.²³³ Immediately after
Pertinax’s death, what is usually described as the ‘auctioning’ of the empire took
place, with two men vying for the principate and Didius Julianus becoming the
next emperor. This incident occurs in both of the main sources for the period,
Dio and Herodian, but only the former makes a spectacle of it and there are
many problems with his account.²³⁴ He notes that the urban prefect, Flavius
Sulpicianus, had been sent by Pertinax to the Castra Praetoria to quell a
disturbance; Sulpicianus must have been there to deal with the urban cohorts
rather than the praetorians, whose prefect does not appear in the story. It is not
known what precipitated the commotion in the camp. Dio then records that when
news of the emperor’s death reached the Castra Praetoria, Sulpicianus tried to
gain the principate for himself, with Julianus arriving shortly thereafter. The
Historia Augusta, usually much less reliable, may add a significant detail to the
story: Julianus had gone to the senate, having heard that it had been convened,
but when he arrived, the doors were closed. He was then urged by two tribunes
of the guard to go to the Castra Praetoria; when he hesitated, he was taken there
by them, only to find Sulpicianus already discussing his position with the
soldiers inside the camp.²³⁵ What seems to be happening here, then, is confusion
after the unexpected murder of an emperor. The guard would have been the first
to recognize that an interregnum would not be in anyone’s interest, in particular
its own.²³⁶ Two groups of soldiers – some inside the camp, others outside –
seized upon two men of senatorial status who were each offered the principate.
In all the sources, the deciding factor for the praetorians in choosing between the
two men was not the amount of money offered, as might be expected from Dio’s
use of the words ‘market’ and ‘auction house’, but rather the relationship
between Sulpicianus and Pertinax, for the urban prefect was the murdered
emperor’s father-in-law.²³⁷ It was thus fear of retribution that caused the soldiers
to support Julianus instead.²³⁸
It became clear very quickly that Julianus had a rival for the principate in the
figure of the governor of Upper Pannonia. Lucius Septimius Severus had been
declared emperor on 9 April by his troops and lost no time in making his way to
Rome, arriving in early June to find that Julianus had been declared a public
enemy by the senate and murdered. One of the first acts undertaken by Severus
was to cashier the entire praetorian guard. The reason given was the
assassination of Pertinax; it is of note that there is no mention of the alleged
buying and selling of the empire.²³⁹ Although those directly responsible for the
murder were put to death, that the entire guard was cashiered as well is
remarkable: it is clear that Severus did not want to employ the former
praetorians and used this as an opportunity to be rid of them. The dismissal
happened so quickly after his arrival at the capital that there must have been
much advance planning involved; in fact, Herodian indicates that officers of the
guard had been approached in secret to betray their men in return for rewards.²⁴⁰
On the other hand, the soldiers probably expected that they themselves would be
rewarded, as had happened so often in the past with a change of emperor, and
thus were able to be deceived quite easily.²⁴¹ The real reason behind the
cashiering, however, must have been that getting rid of those currently serving in
the guard gave Severus the chance to reward his own troops who had supported
him in his bid for power, much as had happened in the civil war of AD 69. But
unlike the earlier occasion, this time Severus took the decision to dismiss all of
the men without compensation, probably because of the somewhat uncertain
financial situation.²⁴² And so, for the first time, the praetorian guard began to be
treated as just another part of the army, with Severus’ legionary soldiers
promoted to what in the past had been an elite unit, open only to Roman citizens
from a prescribed area.²⁴³ This practice of recruitment from the legions – a
completely different approach to what had happened previously – would be
followed until the guard was disbanded in AD 312.
The question arises, therefore, as to whether this unit, which continued to use
the name ‘praetorian guard’, is the same as that instituted by Augustus 200 years
earlier. The answer has to be no. Once service in the praetorian guard became
part of the regular system of promotion for legionaries, and men from all over
the empire could join, the unit no longer was distinguished in the same way.²⁴⁴
While these soldiers may have continued to serve as a bodyguard, they were
much more closely aligned with the army overall. In fact, this new guard was
similar to the type of unit that had been seen in the late republic – a group
specifically providing military protection for a general in the field – especially
since in the century between the change wrought by Severus and the disbanding
by Constantine, the guard was away on campaign more often than in Rome. The
duties that they had had, then, in the first century AD and the ways in which
emperors in the early principate had made use of such a sizeable force in the
administration of the capital may have changed dramatically after this time.²⁴⁵
Severus was criticized for this far-reaching transformation by Dio, who offers
his own explanation for the change – the emperor wanted the praetorians to have
experience as legionaries before serving in the guard; in addition, it provided
him with a way of rewarding his soldiers: ‘Some especially accused him because
he set aside the tradition that the praetorians be chosen only from Italy, Spain,
Macedonia and Noricum, which had provided men more reasonable in
appearance and more simple in character. Instead he ordered that any
requirement be filled from all the legions in like manner, doing so in order that
he might have guards with military knowledge and also have a way of rewarding
those brave in war.’²⁴⁶ For Dio, an eyewitness to much in this period, the result
was negative: the youth of Italy was ruined and they turned to robbery and
gladiatorial fighting.²⁴⁷ A good example is provided by the author in Bulla Felix,
who gathered a band of around 600 men and engaged in brigandage throughout
southern Italy.²⁴⁸ Although Dio may be guilty of exaggerating the lack of
opportunity for Italians once the system of recruitment had changed, such a
radical transformation did undermine the idea of the praetorians as an ‘elite’
unit.
There are several incidents in the early third century that highlight the
problem of ordinary soldiers as praetorians in Rome. Men from the unit were
involved in clashes with the civilian population early in the reign of Alexander
Severus; it is not clear what started the riots – Dio simply says that it was ‘some
trivial cause’ – but the unrest went on for three days and caused great damage to
the city.²⁴⁹ While it is true that an uneasy relationship had existed between the
guard and the populace from the very beginning of its history, this animosity
undoubtedly had been exacerbated by the Severan changes.²⁵⁰ Not long after this
incident, praetorians were implicated in the murder of the jurist and praetorian
prefect Domitius Ulpianus; the cause undoubtedly stemmed from the
commander’s lack of experience in dealing with such a group of soldiers.²⁵¹
And, by AD 229, when Dio himself became consul with the emperor Alexander
Severus, the situation with the soldiers in the city was so unsettled that he could
not take up his post in Rome, ostensibly for fear of his life.²⁵² It is clear that the
use of soldiers of provincial origin in the capital was problematic.
In addition, the unit was involved in the many changes of emperor and
ensuing conflicts in the third century. Indeed, from the death of Severus, the
praetorians played a significant role in the accession of the remaining emperors
of the Severan period. The murder by Caracalla of his brother (and co-emperor)
Geta in AD 211 was facilitated by the relationship the former had forged with
the soldiers; he continually referred to himself as one of their comrades and
made no attempt to hide his preference for a military lifestyle.²⁵³ Caracalla’s
successor was the praetorian prefect, Marcus Opellius Macrinus, who made use
of the guard in a plot against the emperor.²⁵⁴ The reign proved to be brief,
however, since the soldiers were not happy with the change, having been so
favoured by Caracalla, and Macrinus’ moderation of their terms of service, in
particular their pay, was greeted with dismay.²⁵⁵
Furthermore, there were two other candidates for the purple whose
connections appealed to the guard: the cousins Elagabalus and Alexander
Severus, both also cousins of Caracalla. The praetorians seem to have played
only a small part in the overthrow of Macrinus and the accession of Elagabalus
in May AD 218.²⁵⁶ But they were instrumental in his removal four years later,
motivated almost certainly by alarm at his behaviour, in particular, his
relationship with the god Elagabal.²⁵⁷ Dio records that Elagabalus noted their
displeasure with him: ‘The false Antoninus, once having been praised by the
senate, said “Indeed, you love me and, by Jupiter, the people as well and the
legions abroad. But to the praetorians, to whom I give so much, I am not
pleasing.”’²⁵⁸ To ameliorate the situation, Elagabalus adopted his cousin; the
sources describe the rivalry that ensued as each contended for the support of the
soldiers.²⁵⁹ In fact, the emperor made a number of attempts to murder Alexander
in the last months of his reign, but to no avail since his cousin was protected by
the guard.²⁶⁰ Before long, Elagabalus found himself deserted by the praetorians
and he was murdered, along with his mother Julia Soaemias, in the Castra
Praetoria on 13 March 222.²⁶¹ That the soldiers favoured a 13-year-old boy as
emperor says much about the attitude towards Elagabalus and his religious
reforms, for the empire as a whole had been managed quite well.²⁶² The reign of
his cousin fared better, though as has been noted, the guard proved unruly during
Alexander’s tenure and it is significant, therefore, that he managed to hold on to
power for 13 years, given the circumstances.²⁶³
In AD 238, when the principate was contested by three factions – that of
Maximinus Thrax (supported by the army), that of Balbinus and Pupienus
(supported by the senate), and that of Gordian III (grandson of the recently
murdered emperor, Gordian I) – there were riots once again in Rome between
the populace and those members of the guard still in the capital, which resulted
in the Castra Praetoria being besieged.²⁶⁴ The plebs enlisted the help of
gladiators against the praetorians, who were trapped in the camp for several
days, until their hand was forced by the cutting off of their water supply.
Herodian describes how the soldiers then attacked the people in the city,
eventually setting fire to houses, which caused great destruction. Shortly
thereafter, allegedly annoyed at not having had a say in the choice of emperor
and, more importantly, angered at the presence of German soldiers in the capital,
praetorians attacked the palace. Both Pupienus and Balbinus were killed, and
Gordian III was declared emperor by the guard.²⁶⁵ According to Herodian, the
praetorians were fearful that the emperors would replace them as had happened
under Severus. It must be noted, however, that these men – former legionaries –
now had much more to lose than the men of AD 193, since their conditions had
improved considerably once they had become praetorians. But it is clear as well
that the oath of allegiance meant little by this period.
For much of the remainder of the century, the sources are too unreliable to
make many observations about the praetorians.²⁶⁶ There is evidence of action
taken against bandits, with the guard being relied upon to perform the lead role,
much in the manner of the Bulla incident discussed earlier.²⁶⁷ But, since the
emperors were campaigning in the provinces for the most part in this period, so
too was the majority of the guard.²⁶⁸ Yet, ‘from the mid-third century onwards it
is difficult to specify what categories of soldiers escorted and guarded the
emperor in person, all the more so because continual wars and civil unrest meant
that the emperors spent a large part of their time in a wider military context.’²⁶⁹
The changes to the forces in this period undoubtedly had an impact on the guard,
which itself more and more resembled the type of unit found in the late
republic.²⁷⁰ This is especially the case after the introduction of the system of the
Tetrarchs in March 293: each of the four rulers must have had his own
contingent of praetorians, much as had been the case with the triumvirs in the
late republic. There is evidence, for example, of them being with Diocletian
while he was in Nicomedia.²⁷¹ But by the start of the fourth century, the guard
had become more of a menace than a benefit.²⁷² Diocletian had reduced the
effective late in the third century, though it is not clear by how much; this action
may signal the beginning of the end, since it is possible that he wanted to do
away with them completely.²⁷³ Likewise, Galerius is said to have considered
their abolition as well in 306; in this case, the motivation seems to be connected
with taxation.²⁷⁴
 The final chapter in the history of the guard, however, is connected with the
struggle for supreme power in the early fourth century. A usurper, Maxentius,
the son of the former emperor Maximian, was proclaimed by the praetorians in
October 306, a rival to Galerius and his colleagues.²⁷⁵ The senate and people of
Rome also supported him; there may have been a need for the latter because of
the reduced number of soldiers in the guard.²⁷⁶ But Maxentius did not keep the
populace on side for long, if the report in Eusebius is correct that, at some point,
he sent his guard against the mob.²⁷⁷ Though it would be six years before he was
defeated by Constantine, when Maxentius lost the battle of the Milvian Bridge
(28 October 312), it meant the end of the praetorian guard. They were disbanded
later that same year and their camp destroyed.²⁷⁸
 3

ORGANIZATION
As has been seen, the institution established by Augustus changed little in the
first two centuries of its existence. It is to that emperor’s credit that he made use
of the template provided by the late republican bodyguards discussed in the
previous chapter, combining the best of the military and administrative aspects
of these groups. The way that the praetorians were organized in the imperial
period, in particular, did not alter substantially until the comprehensive changes
brought about by Septimius Severus in AD 193. This chapter will explore the
fundamentals of that organization: the number of cohorts, the strength of each,
their pay and recruitment. Moreover, the physical setting of the Castra Praetoria
in Rome will be explored, along with the uniform of the guard. It is important to
remember that most of this organization was implemented at the very outset of
the principate and illustrates well the pragmatic approach of the first emperor.

Number of praetorians

It is difficult to ascertain the number of praetorian cohorts and the effective (the
numerical strength of each cohort) under Augustus because the sources that
include such figures contradict each other. Dio, in his description of the forces
that the emperor allegedly had at his disposal in AD 5, records that, ‘There were
bodyguards, being ten thousand in number, arranged in ten units.’¹ But, in a
passage already cited, Tacitus records only nine cohorts before Vitellius, without
reference to the effective: ‘his own army occupied the city – three urban and
nine praetorian cohorts’.² Most scholars have assumed that Dio was describing
the situation in his own time and therefore have taken Tacitus’ account as the
correct one.³ It has been argued that the original number of praetorian cohorts
was fixed at nine by Augustus to avoid any direct correlation with the cohorts of
a legion but, in fact, it is impossible to know exactly how many cohorts he set
up, and the number may even have fluctuated in the early days of the guard’s
existence.⁴ By the end of his reign or early in Tiberius’ reign, however, the
number had been stabilized at nine.
Epigraphic evidence suggests that praetorian cohorts numbered X, XI and XII
existed prior to the reign of Vespasian.⁵ It had been assumed by scholars that
any increase would have been recorded by Tacitus; the creation of the new
cohorts was thus attributed to the section of the Annals that was missing,
namely, to the reign of Gaius or early in the reign of Claudius.⁶ But an
inscription discovered in 1976 provides confirmation that it was under Tiberius
that at least two additional cohorts were created. Dedicated to Aulus Virgius
Marsus, the stone provides details of an illustrious military career: Marsus
achieved the primipilate (position of chief centurion) of the legio III Gallica
twice, and also served as tribune of the guard under both Augustus and
Tiberius.⁷ Of interest here, though, is that the terms of service in the capital were
with the IIIIth and XIth cohorts. Though the order is reversed in the inscription,
it is likely that the first, with the IIIIth cohort, was under Augustus; this leaves
Marsus tribune of the XIth praetorian cohort at some point in Tiberius’ reign.
Since it seems to have been extremely rare at this period to hold more than one
tribunate in the guard, there must have been extenuating circumstances for
Marsus’ return, and that may well have been the need for experienced officers in
the newly formed cohorts early in the reign of Tiberius. The reversal of the
praetorian tribunates from their chronological order, therefore, is either the result
of imprecision in the setting up of the inscription, a practice that is known from
other examples, or it is a deliberate inversion, to highlight the unusual nature of
the repeated tribunate.⁸ As a result of this inscription, it now seems certain that
there were at least 11 cohorts of praetorians under Tiberius.⁹ There is also good
reason to place the increase in the number of cohorts in the early 20s AD, for
that was the date of the construction of a permanent base for the guard, the
Castra Praetoria, discussed below. It is likely, then, that if one accepts Tacitus’
testimony of nine cohorts in AD 23, he is referring specifically to the period
prior to the establishment of the camp. The organization of his text, with
discussion of the number of cohorts being placed in close proximity to that of the
construction of the camp, may add force to this observation.
Throughout the praetorians’ history, there were few additional changes to the
number of cohorts. At some point before the reign of Vespasian, another cohort
had been added, bringing the total to 12.¹⁰ Furthermore, in his brief tenure
during the civil war of AD 69, Vitellius created 16 cohorts; according to Tacitus,
‘the usual military organisation was thrown into disarray by corruption or by
ambition: sixteen praetorian and four urban cohorts were being enrolled, each to
have one thousand men.’¹¹ The reason for the change was mistrust by the new
emperor of the unit most closely associated with his predecessor, though
Suetonius also suggests that the praetorians had set a dangerous example by
abandoning Galba when emperor.¹² Tacitus also records that Vitellius showed
great indulgence to his own soldiers, allowing them to enrol in the city cohorts if
they chose; this was to the detriment of both the legions and the city cohorts, he
continues, with the former losing their strongest recruits, the latter their
distinction, since 20,000 men were selected at random for these esteemed units
rather than being vetted.¹³ When Vespasian came to power, however, it is
thought that he reduced the praetorian cohorts back to nine.¹⁴ The change is not
mentioned in the sources, and it is difficult to know why he would have done
this, especially since he had to accommodate three different groups in any
reorganization: the old Othonian guard, the former Vitellian men and his own
soldiers.¹⁵ The reduction from 16 cohorts may have been for financial reasons,
though there is also the possibility that he wished to imitate Augustus by having
the same number, in an attempt to associate himself with the first emperor.¹⁶ The
number remained at nine only briefly, for by the end of the first century, a tenth
cohort had been added.¹⁷ The increase probably occurred under Domitian, since
it was in his reign that the guard began to be used more in the field; an additional
cohort, then, would be useful.¹⁸ The number of cohorts would remain stable for
the rest of the unit’s history.
The effective is also a matter of fierce debate: were they quingenary (500
strong) or milliary (1,000 men)? Dio records the latter in the passage cited above
in which he provides the number of cohorts under Augustus, but this figure has
been criticized by many scholars who argue instead for a quingenary cohort,
believing that Dio had attributed to the Augustan period the effective of the late
second century AD.¹⁹ The problem rests with the lack of information in the
literary sources: specific references to the number of praetorians are rare, not
surprising given the nature of the unit and of the sources. It must be noted,
however, that there is no specific evidence in the extant sources for the number
500.²⁰ It has also been observed that, in the context of the conflicts of AD 69,
‘with a praetorian guard of only 6,000 men (paper strength) it is almost
impossible to make sense of the operations in the Otho–Vitellius war’.²¹
Moreover, that Dio would not have recorded such a significant modification as
the doubling of the effective under Severus is unlikely; he was well acquainted
with the changes in the guard which took place early in that reign, in particular
the disbanding of the praetorians after Severus’ accession and their replacement
by soldiers from the legions.²²
Dio’s contemporary Herodian sometimes is cited in support of an increase in
the number of men per cohort in the Severan period, for he records that the
emperor ‘quadrupled’ the troops in Rome: ‘the forces in Rome had been
increased fourfold, and so great an army was encamped before the city that no
external force remained that was trustworthy, nor a rival in size of unit, in
physique or in abundance of resources.’²³ His statement has been interpreted as
an ‘exaggeration’, and it is true that the figures simply do not add up.²⁴ But,
more importantly, it does not mean that the number of men in the individual
praetorian cohorts changed at that time. Severus was responsible for the creation
of three new legions early in his reign, one of which, II Parthica, was housed at
Albanum, about 20 kilometres south of Rome, after AD 197.²⁵ The perception,
then, that the troops had ‘quadrupled’ is Herodian’s way of indicating the
placement of a considerable number of soldiers in the vicinity of the capital, and
he is emphasizing the manner in which Rome became militarized under
Severus.²⁶
In Tacitus, the only reference to the effective occurs in the context of the
changes to the guard under Vitellius, cited earlier: the number is given as 1,000
per cohort.²⁷ It has been suggested that this indicates that the effective was
doubled at the same time as the number of cohorts was increased.²⁸ But Tacitus
undoubtedly would have been more specific about recording such a change, had
it occurred; in fact, his reticence may add to the argument that the cohorts had
always been milliary.²⁹ In the final analysis, there simply is no evidence in any
of the extant sources for an increase in the strength of the individual cohorts
between Augustus and Severus. From the scarce evidence at hand, therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the cohorts were milliary from the outset.³⁰ An
effective of 1,000 men per cohort would also provide greater efficiency, since
the praetorians were used for such a wide variety of tasks in the city, beyond the
basic duty of guarding the emperor and his family.³¹

Service

Recruitment to the guard was restricted to men of free birth who were Roman
citizens. As noted earlier, the first imperial praetorians likely were veterans from
the praetorian cohorts of both Octavian and Antony (see Chapter 2). During
Augustus’ reign, however, it became the practice to recruit soldiers for the guard
directly from citizens on an individual basis.³² Italians dominate in the ranks
from the beginning; it has been argued that this preference allowed them a
means of advancement.³³ Indeed, the number of Italians remains consistently
high until the major overhaul of the guard by Severus.³⁴ Tacitus records that in
the early principate recruits were predominantly from Latium, Etruria, Umbria
and the oldest colonies, that is the most ‘Roman’ parts of Italy.³⁵ Yet there
undoubtedly were many cases of men who managed to defy the rule.³⁶ For
example, Dio records that Gauls and Germans were serving in the bodyguard in
the reign of Augustus; they were sent away from Rome by the emperor after the
Varan disaster in AD 9.³⁷ Moreover, there seems to be recruits from Gallia
Narbonensis, Spain and Macedonia in the cohorts in the first century, though the
inscriptions which refer to these non-Italian praetorians are not securely dated.³⁸
It is only in the civil war years that movement from the legions to the guard was
sanctioned, with Vitellius in particular using promotion to the praetorians as a
way of rewarding those soldiers who had supported his bid for power. Even so,
the number of such transfers for which there is epigraphic evidence is
negligible.³⁹ Conversely, the changes brought in by Severus in the late second
century changed recruitment dramatically, with Italian recruits at minimal
numbers in the third century, once the unit was opened up to transfers from all
soldiers in the legions.⁴⁰
Service in the guard must have seemed an attractive option, since the term of
duty for praetorians was shorter than that of the ordinary soldier – 16 as opposed
to 25 years.⁴¹ Indeed, it is possible that 16 years was only ‘an ideal minimum
length of service’, and that 18 years was the norm.⁴² The age at which these men
joined averaged between 18 and 20.⁴³ The shorter length of service, in addition
to the higher rate of pay and the increased prospects for promotion due to their
proximity to the emperor, probably attracted better recruits to the praetorians,
and seems to have continued to attract Italians to the unit when they were less
inclined to join the legions.⁴⁴ But the social status of these recruits is unknown.
It has been argued both that they were of modest means and that they came from
a more affluent background.⁴⁵ One might consider the demographic evidence
here in an attempt to add to the debate: a considerable difference in the level of
accuracy on gravestones between social classes has been noted, with so-called
age rounding (that is, ages ending in multiples of five) occurring more often
among those of lower status. In a recent study of inscriptions for guardsmen
from the vicinity of Rome, it was shown that the rate of those who engaged in
this process is far less than for the legionaries.⁴⁶ It may be possible, therefore,
that praetorians who were recruited directly to the unit (i.e. before the Severan
change) were from a higher-status background.
Those who served in the guard had the same restrictions as soldiers in the rest
of the army, in particular the inability to marry officially while in service, an
injunction that lasted until the reign of Severus.⁴⁷ It has been noted that, in fact,
praetorians do not enter into informal marriage arrangements all that frequently
until after the Severan change, though the number increases for other soldiers
(both legionaries and auxiliaries) throughout the second century AD.⁴⁸ The
question of whether the attractions of Rome added to the appeal of serving in the
guard is not often considered, yet life in the city was not always that
comfortable. Rome was a notoriously deadly city when it came to hygiene and
sanitation, and it has been estimated that the praetorians (and other city units)
suffered greatly because of this.⁴⁹
After serving their time in the guard, most praetorian soldiers retired, though
some were invited to become evocati Augusti (‘senior soldiers’) and stay on for
further service. The term itself clearly illustrates the close relationship between
the men of the guard and the emperor, for the use of Augusti was reserved for
former praetorians.⁵⁰ An example of such an evocatus is provided by Gaius
Vedennius Moderatus, one of those who benefited from the civil war in AD 69.⁵¹
A member of the XVI Gallica legion that had supported Vitellius, Vedennius
was transferred by Vespasian to the guard; he then spent eight years in the ninth
praetorian cohort, at which point he was honourably discharged. At some time
thereafter he was recalled, becoming an evocatus Augusti for 23 years, perhaps
because of his specialist skills, since the inscription specifically mentions the
imperial armoury.⁵² Not all evocati were so distinguished but, for many, being
recalled must have been an honour not to be refused; in fact, some of these
senior soldiers went on to serve as officers in the unit (see below). For those
praetorians who were discharged, the ceremony occurred on 1 January, though
only every other year.⁵³ Evidence of those who left the unit comes primarily
from gravestones.⁵⁴ Most importantly, these reveal the careers of the soldiers, as
with Vedennius.⁵⁵ But, in addition, the stones provide information about where
these men settled after retirement. Many decided to stay in Rome, despite being
from elsewhere. It has been suggested that they lacked the courage to leave after
having served there for so many years, but it is equally likely that they simply
had grown to like life in the capital.⁵⁶ Some also retired to other parts of Italy
and still others – interestingly, often Italians – decamped to the provinces. It is
possible that some of these men were granted land upon retirement (missio
agraria) and that their choice of location, therefore, was limited.⁵⁷ Such grants
had been made to the praetorians from their earliest history.⁵⁸ But, in fact, most
praetorians simply returned to their place of origin; this was especially the case
after the Severan reorganization.⁵⁹ Some of these former praetorians took an
active role in their communities when they retired, often in administrative roles,
which indicates that they were valued for their abilities.⁶⁰
The opportunity for praetorians to move away from the capital may explain
the need for these soldiers, on being released, to be given military diplomas –
documents that indicated they were Roman citizens with conubium (the right to
marry).⁶¹ Since membership of the guard was restricted to those who already
held Roman citizenship, there was not the same need to provide diplomas
establishing this feature for praetorians as was the case for those auxiliaries
granted the right of citizenship upon discharge. For the praetorians, the
importance was the second component, the grant of conubium, especially if they
were settling outside of Rome.⁶²
The earliest extant diploma for a member of the guard dates to the mid-70s
AD, but its fragmentary nature does not provide much information.⁶³ A complete
diploma from AD 76 is the first example that provides the full wording, and, as
has been noted already, the close association between the emperor and the guard
is highlighted by the text: ‘I have appended the names of the speculatores, those
who have served in my imperial guard, and likewise, of the soldiers who were in
the nine praetorian cohorts and four urban cohorts.’⁶⁴ Numbers of praetorian
diplomas are rare until early in the third century AD, with only 14 listed before
that date in a recent catalogue of these documents.⁶⁵ It is not clear when the first
diplomas were issued for the guard; the civil war of AD 69 might have been the
stimulus.⁶⁶ The numbers in the third century increase substantially, undoubtedly
because of the need for those who had been in the guard to have the right to
marry if they returned to their homeland, which now could be anywhere in the
empire.⁶⁷

Commanders

While the overall command of the guard fell to the praetorian prefects (under the
direction of the emperor), the day-to-day management of the cohorts was done
by tribunes (one per cohort) and centurions (six per cohort).⁶⁸ Praetorian
tribunes had to be of the equestrian class, though soon they also were former
centurions.⁶⁹ How these appointments were made is not certain. Centurions in
the provincial army were chosen by their commanders, but legionary tribunes
generally seem to have been appointed by the emperor, though many men were
probably brought to the emperor’s attention as a personal favour.⁷⁰ Tacitus
suggests that, as their commander, Sejanus chose centurions and tribunes for the
guard himself, but since the author is eager to criticize the prefect, it is not clear
that this was the usual procedure.⁷¹ It has been noted already that the same
author insinuates that Agrippina replaced some of the tribunes and centurions in
an attempt to garner support for Nero as Claudius’ heir: she invented reasons for
the dismissal of some soldiers and had others promoted.⁷² Yet, as with Sejanus,
this may be highlighted in the text because of its anomaly. What is clear is that
praetorian tribunes often had served as primuspilus (‘chief centurion’) and then
moved directly from that post to the city cohorts without having served as a
tribune in the provincial army first.⁷³ Eventually, the standard career path was to
move through the city tribunates, from that of the vigiles to the urban and finally
to the guard.⁷⁴ It is thought that praetorian tribunes had tasks similar to their
counterparts in the legionary army, though the proximity to Rome would have
brought additional pressures.⁷⁵ For example, one of the responsibilities of the
tribunes was to confine soldiers in the camp and to keep the keys of the gates.⁷⁶
This would be even more important with the guard being based in the capital and
the tense relationship between civilian and soldier. Tribunes were assisted by
soldiers with a wide range of responsibilities, including the cornicularius
(‘senior clerk’), the beneficiarius (‘clerk’), the singularis (‘aide’), the librarius
(‘accountant’) and the exactus (‘record keeper’). The scope of these additional
posts indicates the complexity of the tribune’s position.⁷⁷
With regard to centurions, it is thought that many would have been former
praetorian soldiers, most of them evocati Augusti, though men who had been
directly commissioned as centurions in the legions sometimes served in the
praetorian cohorts as well.⁷⁸ After serving in senior positions as rankers, they
were advanced to the post of centurion.⁷⁹ Two of their number were thought to
be of higher rank: the trecenarius (‘senior centurion’) and the princeps
castrorum (‘camp administrator’).⁸⁰ Unlike their legionary counterparts, no
hierarchy can be discerned among the praetorian centurions other than for these
two positions; promotion through the centuries did not occur in the same way as
in the legions, but the trecenarius generally had to have served as a centurion in
either the urban or praetorian cohorts first.⁸¹ There were three posts for each
century, however, that were coveted: the tesserarius (‘officer of the
watchword’), the optio (‘orderly’) and the signifer (‘standard bearer’); these
were prerequisites for advancement.⁸² After serving as trecenarius, the soldier
often moved to an advanced centurionate in the legions and then became
primuspilus.⁸³ There was a clear career advantage to have served in the guard.⁸⁴
Tribunes and centurions of the guard appear in the literary sources more often
than the rankers but still not all that frequently. In most cases, they have come to
the attention of the authors because of notorious behaviour, in particular, their
involvement in conspiracies. Cassius Chaerea, the soldier who led the conspiracy
against Gaius, was a tribune, as were three of his co-conspirators.⁸⁵ The Pisonian
Conspiracy against Nero in AD 65 involved several tribunes, apparently united
by their personal dislike of the emperor.⁸⁶ As Nero’s behaviour became more
eccentric, the soldiers grew less tolerant of his conduct, and some of them were
drawn to conspire against him in spite of their oaths of loyalty. Once again, it
was primarily the officers of the guard, in concert with senators and equites, who
were at the forefront. The focus of the conspiracy was the replacement of Nero
by the senator Gaius Calpurnius Piso. The choice of someone who was not a
member of the Julio-Claudian family may indicate that the impetus came not
from those guard members who were involved but from elsewhere among the
conspirators. In fact, it is recorded that the praetorians were not happy with the
selection of Piso: Tacitus reports a rumour that the officers would replace him
with Nero’s advisor, the philosopher Seneca, soon after the transfer of power had
occurred.⁸⁷ The extent of the involvement of the rank and file is not recorded in
the sources but, as had been the case with the conspiracy against Gaius, there
was a need for the participation of at least a few of the soldiers if the plan was to
succeed. It is likely that the average recruit had no animosity towards the
emperor, though some may have been influenced by the prejudices of their
commanders.
It was the inclusion of the praetorian prefect Lucius Faenius Rufus, however,
that separates this conspiracy from that against Gaius; his involvement marked
the first time that a prefect is known to have taken an active role in a plot against
the emperor.⁸⁸ His colleague Tigellinus did not take part.⁸⁹ The two prefects did
not get along, however, and Tacitus records that, from the start, Tigellinus set
about undermining Rufus’ position.⁹⁰ The prominence of the former as a close
companion of the emperor and his domination of the office of prefect no doubt
contributed to the alienation of Rufus, and this disaffection must have been
noticed by the officers of the guard, if not by the rank and file. It almost certainly
helped to draw Rufus into the conspiracy. His commitment was thought to augur
success, though his actions in the affair were to prove disastrous. His
participation presumably indicated to those involved that he brought with him
the backing of the entire guard, though in reality, it could not guarantee
anything.⁹¹
In the end, delays in putting the plan into action resulted in the betrayal of the
conspiracy. The chronology of the events is not entirely clear, but in the initial
stages, everyone seemed unwilling or unable to act, even after having gained
assurances from Rufus that they had his support. The first disclosure of the plot
came from the squadron commander at Misenum, Volusius Proculus, who had
been approached to carry out the plan because of the delays. His report to Nero
forced the hand of the conspirators, who were then betrayed by one of their
freedmen.⁹² Nero was frightened enough to increase his guard and to post
soldiers at every route into the city, both by land and by water.⁹³ He clearly did
not yet know how widespread the conspiracy was among his officers, and he
used them to convey messages to those accused of complicity, apparently
unaware of the guilt of the men he sent. The emperor sent new recruits, however,
to issue the order of death to Piso, being unwilling to rely upon any of those who
might be favouring the consul.⁹⁴ The ability of those officers eventually
implicated to escape detection for so long resulted from a willingness to carry
out Nero’s order to investigate their fellow conspirators (and others accused with
them) and thus deflect attention away from themselves. It is not clear whether
this interrogation included torture of their colleagues, which would cast a quite
malevolent light on those officers involved. Rufus himself is depicted as taking
part in investigations carried out by Nero and Tigellinus and, in one instance, the
tribune Subrius Flavus wanted to murder the emperor during the procedure but
was stopped by the prefect, who obviously still had firm control over his men.⁹⁵
It was their enthusiastic interrogation that ultimately brought about the
downfall of many of the officers, for they were betrayed by those being
questioned. Nero must have been astounded to discover how widespread the
conspiracy was among the upper ranks of the praetorians. It seems that as many
as seven (of the 12) tribunes were involved; of these, four were demoted, two
committed suicide, one was murdered.⁹⁶ Of the other five, only two seem not to
have been incriminated.⁹⁷ Indeed, it is remarkable that the conspiracy failed,
given the involvement of so many high-ranking members of the guard.⁹⁸ The
entire plan seems to have collapsed because of the unwillingness of those
involved, in particular the tribunes and the prefect, to take decisive action.⁹⁹ For
the majority of the praetorians, however, the Pisonian Conspiracy proved to be a
windfall. They stood to gain no matter what the outcome. If the plot had
succeeded, there can be no doubt that the soldiers would have been enticed by a
large donative to pledge allegiance to the new emperor. On the other hand, when
it failed, Nero saw to it that they were well rewarded for not having deserted
him. After the punishment of the conspirators had been carried out, he gave the
praetorians a donative of 2,000 sesterces, and granted them free grain.¹⁰⁰ These
gifts signalled the emperor’s recognition that, even though the plot primarily had
involved officers, he still needed to acknowledge the loyalty of the majority of
the guard in the affair and ensure their continued support; this was especially the
case, given that the replacement of so many of their commanders was a
disruptive element in itself. It is of note that only members of the guard were
given the donative and there is no mention in the sources of any grant to the rest
of the army, nor for the people as a whole. In addition to these grants to the
soldiers, Nero also rewarded individuals for their loyalty, among them
Tigellinus. The rewards that he received were substantial for a praetorian
prefect: an honorary triumph, and statues in the palace and the forum.¹⁰¹ Such
excessive honours must indicate a significant role in the detection of the plot,
something which the sources have omitted to record.
Tribunes and centurions occasionally are depicted in the sources as taking
part in more benign activities, though not always in ways that are flattering.
Tiberius is recorded to have punished a centurion on Capri who had neglected to
clear the path along which the emperor’s litter was travelling.¹⁰² It was during
the reign of Claudius that praetorians, under the command of the prefect and
tribunes, took part in beast hunts for the first time.¹⁰³ In AD 59, a cohort of the
guard along with centurions, tribunes and their prefect were present at Nero’s
stage debut at the ‘youth games’ in Rome; at the Neronia in AD 65, praetorians
formed part of a procession carrying his lyre (see Chapter 4). From a later
period, Dio records that Gaius Sulpicius Similis, one of the tribunes who served
under Trajan, was a modest fellow who reluctantly agreed to be promoted to
prefect, only to resign it immediately. Dio also includes the story that Plautianus,
Septimius Severus’ prefect, sent centurions to collect zebras for him. As can be
seen, the number of these incidents are relatively few, but this may be a result of
the nature of the sources, which prefer to focus on the more malevolent activities
of the commanders.¹⁰⁴
Beyond these few remarks, little more is known about the officers of the
guard, though the epigraphic record helps to fill in the gaps somewhat. The idea
of a career path for these men – moving from the vigiles to the urban cohorts to
the praetorians – is prominent in modern scholarship.¹⁰⁵ But the evidence comes
from the second century for the most part and it is difficult to know how
representative any career pattern is for the earlier period.¹⁰⁶ An example of what
was to become a typical career for an officer in the first half of the second
century is that of Gaius Arrius Clemens.¹⁰⁷ Clemens began his career as a soldier
in the ninth praetorian cohort and then progressed through several junior posts.
After reaching the status of evocatus, he proceeded to the centurionates, first of
the vigiles, then of the statores (imperial messengers), next of the urban cohorts,
and finally of the praetorian guard, the usual progression for soldiers who began
their service in Rome. He also managed to reach the primipilate, though he
advanced no further.¹⁰⁸
A rare first-century example – that of Lucius Antonius Naso – reveals how
difficult it is to establish what is typical of these careers.¹⁰⁹ Naso had a very
distinguished career, first in the legions and then as a tribune in the Rome
cohorts, beginning with the vigiles. His successive posts in the urban cohorts
(that of XV urban in Puteoli) were rare occurrences, perhaps explained by the
turbulent events of AD 68. The repetition of the praetorian tribunate after being
primuspilus for a second time is also explained by the unusual events of AD 69,
when Naso fell in and out of favour as the emperors changed.¹¹⁰ His assignment
as commander of the veterans (of several armies) in Rome was extraordinary as
well, but resulted from the civil wars and shows the great confidence which
Vespasian had in him.¹¹¹ Although Naso’s career sometimes appears in modern
texts as typical, it is clear that it is anything but, especially for the first century.¹¹²
This is also true of Marcus Vettius Valens, who had an unusual and illustrious
career moving from the ranks of the guard under Tiberius to hold an imperial
procuratorship under Nero, between which he was decorated by Claudius for
service in Britain and reached the rank of equestrian.¹¹³ Clearly this too is a quite
exceptional career.¹¹⁴ Care must be taken, then, when trying to determine how
the career paths for the officers of the guard progressed.

Pay and donatives

The date of the formal organization of the guard traditionally has been accepted
as 27 BC, the year in which Dio mentions the grant to the praetorians of double
the amount of pay that legionaries received: ‘Right away, so it seems, for those
men who would serve as his bodyguard, [Augustus] obtained by vote double the
pay that was given to the other soldiers, in order that he might have a guard
devoted to him. In this way, in all truth, did he eagerly desire to settle the
monarchy.’¹¹⁵ Despite Dio’s suggestion that maintaining loyalty was the
rationale behind the increased rate of pay, in fact, distinguishing the status of the
unit must have been the emperor’s prime motivation.¹¹⁶ The praetorians were an
elite corps, loyal only to the emperor, and the need to establish this clearly for
both the army and indeed for the populace as a whole was a lesson that Augustus
had learned through the years of civil strife. Furthermore, in the imperial period,
pay rates reflected the hierarchy of the army and this did not change throughout
the history of the empire (that is, soldiers in the auxiliaries received the lowest
pay and the praetorians the highest); this was also true of the officers. The
additional duties assigned to the guard over time might have made the higher
rate of pay more explicable, though being the unit that was most closely
associated with the emperor was enough from the outset to ensure that the
soldiers were paid generously.¹¹⁷
But how much did the praetorians get paid? The question presents some
difficulty, since there is little evidence for any specific figures.¹¹⁸ It is usually
proposed, in light of Dio’s observation, that the ratio of pay would be twice that
of the legionaries, though it is possible that the figures were higher.¹¹⁹ Exact
amounts are the subject of some controversy. Tacitus notes that the praetorians
received two denarii a day in AD 14, double what he claims the legionaries
received, and a ratio that corresponds with what Dio provides.¹²⁰ But it is also
reported, again by Dio, that upon completion of his period of service, each
praetorian soldier received 20,000 sesterces, whereas the legionary soldier
received 12,000, a ratio of five to three.¹²¹ Furthermore, in his will, Augustus left
the praetorians 1,000 sesterces, the urban cohorts 500 and the legionaries 300.¹²²
While these examples indicate that there was a clear distinction of status
between the respective units as noted in the grants, there is no consistency in the
ratio given. The way in which the men were paid has been used to try to
calculate the amounts more precisely.¹²³ The soldiers received three instalments
per year before Domitian, and four thereafter, and so the yearly pay must be
divisible by those numbers. But the amounts provided using this method also
vary. In fact, it has been pointed out that ‘the few facts have been so manipulated
by scholars that the resulting statistics are unreliable by their very
divergences’.¹²⁴ The exact figure, therefore, seems unrecoverable. In the end,
though, it is also not of great significance, since the difference between soldiers
was made clear by whatever the ratio: the guard was the emperor’s most valued
military unit and so was paid more. The key point is that, by 27 BC, Augustus
felt secure enough to make the distinction between the provincial armies and his
personal army quite clear to the senate and people of Rome.¹²⁵
 There is no evidence for an increase in pay for the guard (or the army in
general) until the reign of Domitian, nearly 100 years later. That emperor added
a fourth instalment, long overdue.¹²⁶ No doubt this grant was one of the reasons
why his death was so mourned by the soldiers. It should be remembered that
‘soldiers formed part of the rare salaried class in antiquity, and they were
relatively affluent’, something often overlooked in discussions about pay for
soldiers.¹²⁷ That being said, it was not until the reign of Severus in the late
second century that another raise was forthcoming.¹²⁸ It is not clear how large an
increase this emperor provided, but his son Caracalla also added to the pay for
the soldiers, causing hardship for his successor.¹²⁹
Closely associated with the problem of pay is the subject of donatives. There
is a common perception that the praetorians were a force that could be bought
easily and, in fact, Tacitus mentions that Augustus himself ‘seduced the army
with gifts’.¹³⁰ Yet that emperor gave only two donatives that are recorded: the
first was a distribution to veterans in 29 BC, the second on the occasion of Gaius
Caesar’s taking part in exercises with the legions in 8 BC. It is not clear whether
the guard was included in either of these.¹³¹ In fact, evidence for praetorian
reward in this fashion is not apparent in the early years of their history.¹³² The
amounts paid on accession were standard from quite early on in the principate
(as can be seen by the doubling by Gaius of the legacy in Tiberius’ will) but
grants at other times were rare. In the first century, donatives were provided to
the guard only by Tiberius after the fall of Sejanus in AD 31, by Claudius in
celebrating his date of accession, and by Nero twice: the first after the murder of
his mother, Agrippina, and the second after the Pisonian Conspiracy.¹³³ Before
AD 193, no other donatives specific to the unit are recorded; while praetorians
may have shared in those granted to the army in general, for example, that
granted by Domitian after the Dacian War, there are no rewards to them alone.¹³⁴
After the reorganization of the guard, Severus provided a substantial donative to
the praetorians on the celebration of his decennalia in AD 203, recorded by Dio
to be ten gold coins, and Caracalla gave them a reward after the murder of his
brother Geta in AD 211.¹³⁵ As can be seen, the impression of ‘buying’ the
loyalty of the guard is not borne out by the evidence.

Location¹³⁶
Where the praetorians were billeted prior to the construction of the Castra
Praetoria is not clear. Tacitus reports that the soldiers were scattered throughout
Rome before AD 23: ‘[Sejanus] extended the power of the prefecture, limited
thus far, by bringing together into a single camp the cohorts dispersed
throughout the city.’¹³⁷ On the other hand, Suetonius indicates that only some of
the cohorts were kept in the capital prior to that date: ‘[Augustus] never
permitted more than three cohorts to be in the city, and these were without a
camp; the remaining cohorts he had been accustomed to send out to winter and
summer camps near neighbouring towns.’¹³⁸ It is not known where those cohorts
not yet stationed in the capital were located.¹³⁹ Since this was the first time that
troops had been placed in Rome itself, Augustus no doubt considered it prudent
to avoid putting so many armed men in the city during the early years of his
reign.¹⁴⁰ It also has been suggested that the placement of a large number of
troops together may have constituted a threat to Augustus himself, or a
temptation to others to try and subvert their loyalty.¹⁴¹ Yet before long, the
cohorts were all in Rome. As the use of the guard increased because of the
involvement of the praetorians in civil administration, and as the populace
became accustomed to the presence of the soldiers in the city, it became more
practical to bring the cohorts together in Rome to facilitate coordination of their
duties. Thus the discrepancy between Tacitus and Suetonius can be resolved:
Suetonius is referring to the earliest period of Augustus’ reign when the number
of cohorts in the city was restricted to three, whereas Tacitus is recording the
situation just prior to AD 23 when most of the guard was billeted throughout the
city but were not yet housed all together in the Castra Praetoria.¹⁴²
The construction of a camp for the praetorians in the capital, one of the most
significant events in their history, was accomplished through the impetus of
Tiberius’ praetorian prefect, Sejanus, the son of Lucius Seius Strabo, Augustus’
last praetorian prefect.¹⁴³ Sejanus joined his father in the prefecture in AD 14;
the appointment has been linked with the mutiny in Pannonia following the
death of Augustus.¹⁴⁴ But by AD 16, he was the sole prefect.¹⁴⁵ For the next 15
years, Sejanus played a pivotal role in the running of the empire, though it
always must be remembered that the position of praetorian prefect was relatively
new and that he was responding to the situation as it unfolded rather than taking
advantage of an authority already in place. In fact, his relationship with Tiberius
was no different than that between Augustus and Agrippa, for example.¹⁴⁶ Yet
two honours stand out: Sejanus received the ornamenta praetoria (granting him
the rank of praetor without having held the office), which shows the esteem in
which he was held by Tiberius.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, he was consul with the emperor
himself at the start of the year AD 31, a singular honour indeed for an equestrian
and a man who had held no other political office.¹⁴⁸ It is unclear exactly what
status Sejanus had during the period of his consulship: he may have held both
the consulship and the prefecture concurrently.¹⁴⁹ It has been suggested,
however, that an interim prefect or a colleague must have been appointed.¹⁵⁰ At
any rate, the distinction indicated that he was highly regarded by Tiberius.
The exact date of the establishment of the camp is uncertain: as noted above,
Tacitus places the construction in AD 23.¹⁵¹ Conversely, Dio sets the date as AD
20, which seems more likely: given that the motivation came from Sejanus, this
would put the decision to build shortly after he became sole prefect.¹⁵² Tacitus
adds that he brought all of the cohorts together into one camp so that ‘orders
might be received at the same time, and confidence fostered among the troops
through their number, strength and visibility, the very things that would rouse
fear among everyone else’.¹⁵³ The author’s language, however, suggests that he
considered Sejanus to have an ulterior motive, namely control over the city.¹⁵⁴
Yet the reason for the consolidation of the guard in a single location undoubtedly
was pragmatic: to allow better communication and better discipline of a unit that
was becoming an integral part of life in Rome.¹⁵⁵ A problem with discipline
would not be surprising, especially if the guard had been billeted throughout the
capital since its inception; maintaining control may have become increasingly
difficult if the number of cohorts in Rome had gradually increased over previous
years as they were brought into the city from the environs.¹⁵⁶ With the principate
more firmly established, the precautions taken by Augustus to avoid the
appearance of imposing an armed guard on the city no longer were necessary
and it certainly would be safer for the citizens to have the cohorts housed
together where their activities could be monitored.¹⁵⁷
There persists a tendency to interpret the Castra Praetoria as a form of
suburban legionary fortress.¹⁵⁸ Examination of the physical remains of the camp
show this to be inaccurate and, much like the unit it housed, the camp appears to
have been unique.¹⁵⁹ Situated on the highest point of the Viminal Hill, the site
commanded both the capital and its vulnerable northeast approaches.¹⁶⁰ Its
proximity to Rome ultimately led to the camp being subsumed as the city
expanded; by far the best-preserved and most readily accessible portions of the
Castra Praetoria are those sections of its north and east walls, which became
incorporated into the Aurelianic city defences.¹⁶¹ The camp’s south and west
walls apparently were pulled down following the disbandment of the guard by
Constantine, but enough traces have been uncovered to confirm the outline of
the camp: it was predominantly rectangular in shape with rounded corners. For
no apparent reason, the line of the south wall deviates from what would
otherwise be a rectangular plan.¹⁶²
The rampart itself was constructed of brick-faced concrete – a daring use on
such a large and important structure of a building technique that had been used
only sparingly in the Augustan era.¹⁶³ Topped with a wall-walk, parapet and
merlons, the walls were nearly five metres in height. In addition, along the
length of the circuit were positioned at least 16 towers, which did not project
beyond the line of the wall.¹⁶⁴ Presumably there were gates on each of the four
sides, though only the north and east gates are preserved.¹⁶⁵ No evidence of a
protective system of ditches has been located, which suggests that the Castra
Praetoria never was intended to be able to withstand a serious assault.¹⁶⁶
Information on the interior of the Castra Praetoria has proven difficult to
obtain, as urban growth has obscured evidence on the ground. What is known of
the interior arrangements can be gleaned from salvage excavations conducted
over the past two centuries, but there is no systematic publication of these
investigations.¹⁶⁷ With the exception of only the northernmost portions of the
camp, which have remained relatively unexplored, what has come to light thus
far illustrates that the general layout of the Castra Praetoria bears little
resemblance to that of a legionary fortress of the first century AD.¹⁶⁸ The camp
is divided symmetrically by four major avenues along its major north–south axis
into five distinct zones, and is dominated by two long rows of barrack blocks,
the remains of which run almost the entire length of the camp (see Figure 11). A
narrow strip of buildings running through the middle of the scheme separates the
two main rows of barracks; these consist of rooms arranged around small
courtyards and impluvia (‘basins’) and perhaps can be identified as officers’
quarters. Bisecting the primary north–south axis of the camp is another major
avenue running from the east gate, although its path does not appear to have
continued to the west uninterrupted; instead its progress seems to be blocked by
a row of highly unusual barracks orientated on a north–south axis. These
remains consist of an extended series of vaulted cells sharing a common rear
wall and interrupted periodically by stairways at regular intervals; the stairs
presumably led to projecting walkways providing access to a similar row of cells
on the second-floor.¹⁶⁹ Traces of similar building remains uncovered to the
immediate west as well as spatial considerations suggest that there may have
been two parallel rows of these unique two-storey barracks.
At the junction of the two major north–south and east–west axes, one
normally would expect to find the principium (‘headquarters’); however, there is
no structure that can clearly be identified as such, nor is there enough space in
the existing pattern to accommodate what was typically a very large complex.¹⁷⁰
The lack of such a significant building must be related to the unique nature of
the guard’s command structure. Since overall authority of the praetorians
ultimately rested with the emperor, it is likely that the bulk of administrative
matters concerning the unit were handled in the palace rather than in the camp
and, as a result, there would be little need for an elaborate suite of offices
there.¹⁷¹ While apparently lacking a distinct administrative centre of its own, the
main north–south, east–west intersection of the Castra Praetoria still retained a
strong symbolic significance as illustrated by the large amount of votive material
which has been found in the area over the years. More recent excavations in this
area have also revealed that an adjacent barrack block terminated in a large
apsidal hall facing the intersection.¹⁷² This room perhaps can be identified with
one of several ritual structures for which there is literary or epigraphic
evidence.¹⁷³
There is also no firm evidence among the remains uncovered thus far for any
structures that could be acknowledged as houses for the praetorian prefects, that
is, buildings equivalent in size and level of appointments to a legionary
praetorium.¹⁷⁴ This omission is not altogether surprising and again must be
related to the organizational structure of the guard. The praetorian prefecture was
the highest office that an equestrian could attain, and it is unlikely, therefore, that
such important officials would choose to maintain residences in a bustling
military compound when the comforts of Rome were so close at hand.¹⁷⁵ Along
with the principium and praetoria, the absence of other readily identifiable
building types normally associated with a legionary fortress can be explained by
the proximity of the camp to the amenities of the capital. The list includes
structures intended to meet the physical and social needs of the soldiers, such as
a hospital and baths, as well as the extensive workshops that typically provided
the material needs of a unit.¹⁷⁶ Each of these building types has a distinctive
design and typically are rather sizeable structures, but as of yet, no evidence for
their presence has been detected among the remains of the camp.¹⁷⁷ One
building for which there is literary and epigraphic evidence is an imperial
armoury, which was located within the walls of the camp.¹⁷⁸ The semi-
subterranean structure in the southeast corner of the camp, traditionally
identified as a granary, is likely to be this building.¹⁷⁹
Central to any understanding of the layout of the Castra Praetoria, then, is the
idea that the primary intent was to maximize the number of troops that could be
housed there, to the exclusion of almost everything else. The amount of space
that was saved by not having to include subsidiary structures is of considerable
significance. Moreover, the circuit of the Castra Praetoria is notable in that the
wall is reinforced by a continuous arcade of cells along its inner face in opus
reticulatum.¹⁸⁰ The concrete vaults of these cells supported an elevated wall-
walk; the cells themselves feature mosaic floors and plastered ceilings,
indicating that they were intended to serve as communal living quarters or
contubernia.¹⁸¹ There is also another, more subtle, method of space saving
apparent in the remains of the Castra Praetoria: the design of the individual
barrack blocks themselves. The efficiencies inherent in the two-storey blocks are
self-evident, but the more common single-storey barracks are also unusual in
that they were built back-to-back and share a common rear wall instead of being
separated by a narrow alley as is usually the case in legionary examples.¹⁸²
When this relatively simple economy is projected over several rows,
considerable space saving is achieved.¹⁸³
With this in mind, it is tempting to try and use the evidence of the camp to
determine the effective of the guard. In arguing for the cohorts to be 500 strong,
one scholar has stated that ‘the archaeological evidence is decisive’.¹⁸⁴ In fact, it
is anything but. When looking at the numbers of soldiers that the Castra
Praetoria could house, it is clear that up to 15,000 men could be
accommodated.¹⁸⁵ And this total, in fact, may be a conservative estimate. If the
excavated portions of the camp can be used as a guide, the relatively unexplored
northern areas undoubtedly contain a higher proportion of barracks to any other
building type, and that would push these totals even higher. Any attempt, then,
to use the Castra Praetoria to determine effective must take into account the
ability of the camp to house a very large number of soldiers, and it is not at all
clear that the evidence points to the cohorts being quingenary from their
inception.

Equipment and uniform

The physical appearance and equipment of the praetorians has been considered
extensively in recent years.¹⁸⁶ Despite the increased interest, however, it is
difficult to assess this aspect of the unit because the guard does not appear all
that frequently in public art in its early history.¹⁸⁷ It is only in the second century
that praetorians begin to be represented with any regularity, namely when they
take to the field; it may have been considered more acceptable to portray them in
battle than in civilian contexts which would serve as a reminder to the viewer of
the power behind the principate.¹⁸⁸ Ironically, at the same time as these images
appear, it becomes quite difficult to distinguish soldiers of the guard from those
of the legions.¹⁸⁹
How the guard appeared in antiquity bears little resemblance to what might
be expected, given the way in which the unit has been depicted in modern media.
For example, praetorians appear in full armour in the city only rarely. On such
occasions, they were either used to impress visiting dignitaries, as when
Caratacus came to Rome in AD 50, or to intimidate the senate or the populace,
as when Tiberius held a parade of the guard in AD 25.¹⁹⁰ Most of the time, when
in the capital, the soldiers dressed simply in tunics. They had the standard
military belt and sandals (sometimes with socks) and often wore the usual
hooded cloak of citizens and soldiers, namely the paenulae, especially when
travelling.¹⁹¹ Armed with a sword and heavy javelin, they were not helmeted
unless in full armour.¹⁹² In fact, the so-called Attic helmets that appear in artistic
representations of the guard on public monuments are thought to be an
archaizing feature used as a shorthand identification for soldiers and there is
little evidence for these on private monuments or in the archaeological record.¹⁹³
A good example of the typical uniform can be seen on the Puteoli monument,
where the praetorians are in their travelling garb and are carrying swords, spears
and shields.¹⁹⁴ As noted earlier, the identification of these particular soldiers as
belonging to the guard comes from the scorpion emblem on one of the
shields.¹⁹⁵ The emblazon is one of the few ways to differentiate praetorians from
legionary soldiers, for the former made use of a limited number of emblems: the
scorpion was a favourite but they also employed winged thunderbolts and
lightning (sometimes with moon and stars), or alternately a pattern of vine
tendrils.¹⁹⁶ Other monuments that show similar attire (in particular, the girded
tunics) include the Cancelleria reliefs, the Anaglypha Traiani/Hadriani and the
‘Chatsworth’ relief, though these types of images are rare.¹⁹⁷
As was noted earlier, in depictions of battle scenes on monuments such as
Trajan’s Column, it is often difficult to identify praetorians, for they are usually
clad in a similar fashion to the legionary troops.¹⁹⁸ Both wear segmented armour
and carry rectangular shields. It is possible that soldiers of the guard had used
oval shields in the first century, though the extant evidence is inconclusive: on
the adlocutio coin of Gaius, the soldiers seem to have rectangular shields and
even on the Puteoli monument, they are not distinctly oval, though another
adlocutio coin, this time of Galba, shows oval shields quite clearly.¹⁹⁹ By the
early second century, however, it is clear that they had adopted the rectangular
shield, similar to that of the legionary. It is no easier when looking at armour.
Soldiers identified as praetorians can be seen in segmental armour on Trajan’s
Column as well as that of Antoninus Pius.²⁰⁰ From early in the third century, the
guard also used scale armour; Dio records how the praetorians were stripped of
their breastplates of scale armour in his description of the battle between
Elagabalus and Macrinus.²⁰¹ Praetorians clothed in this fashion appear on the
Arch of Constantine.²⁰²
Given the similarity in uniform, then, identification of the guard as opposed
to legionary soldiers on such monuments is often difficult. And, by the mid-
second century, even being depicted close to the emperor is no guarantee that the
soldiers belong to the guard, since other units (e.g. the equites singulares) also
might be found in that position.²⁰³ Only when praetorians are accompanied by
standard bearers in their distinctive lion-skin headdresses, which were used
exclusively by the guard, can the identification be certain, since legionary
standard bearers wore bear skins. Praetorian standards were also unusual in that
they had the imagines (‘portraits of the emperor’) attached to them, rather than
carried separately, providing yet another clue.²⁰⁴
Of great importance in any discussion of the appearance of the guard is the
tradition that the praetorians, when on duty at the palace or in Rome, wore
togas.²⁰⁵ Yet, the evidence is rather circumstantial. Indeed, the assertion
regarding this mode of uniform for praetorians is a misunderstanding of the
literary sources. The passages most often cited are both from Tacitus. First,
during the trial of Thrasea Paetus in AD 66, the author describes the high level
of security put in place by Nero: ‘The next morning two armed praetorian
cohorts were present in the temple of Venus Genetrix; a throng of men in togas
had occupied the entrance to the senate, with swords in the open, and wedges of
soldiers were dispersed throughout the fora and basilicas.’²⁰⁶ The second
example occurs in a speech attributed to Otho early in AD 69 in which the guard
that are with Galba in the palace are described: ‘I am not calling on you to go to
war or put yourselves in danger; all armed soldiers are on our side. That single
togaed cohort does not defend Galba so much as keep him prisoner.’²⁰⁷
Neither of these passages, however, is conclusive in placing the guard in
togas, whether at the palace or in the capital. In the first example, the crucial
factor is that the area was thronging with soldiers and that praetorian cohorts had
taken up a position in the temple itself, a situation that undoubtedly would
provoke dismay on the part of many citizens. But the armed individuals
described as wearing togas are not specified as soldiers and should not be
identified as praetorians.²⁰⁸ It is possible that they were supporters sent by Nero
to intimidate the senators further: given that, in usual circumstances, it was
prohibited for citizens to carry weapons, their appearance would highlight the
dangers for the senators in not acting in Nero’s interest. In the example from the
Histories, the context is of great significance: in trying to inspire his own
praetorians in the coming struggle against Galba, Otho belittles the ability of
those soldiers protecting the emperor by referring to them as if they are nothing
more than civilians – that is, they are nothing to be feared – and the way in
which he does this is to refer to them as being clothed in togas. If the comment
referred to the way in which the praetorians actually were dressed at the palace,
it would lose its effect.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, there is the impracticality of having
praetorians – whose primary task was to protect the imperial family after all –
dressed in a garment that was notoriously cumbersome. The restriction of
movement for any soldiers in togas would render them ineffectual, if there was a
need to pursue and apprehend a target.²¹⁰ These references, then, must be
dismissed as evidence for the way in which the guard was dressed in Rome.
In addition, two other passages adduced in support of the Tacitean passages
must be rejected. These are an epitaph by Martial for Cornelius Fuscus,
praetorian prefect under Domitian, and a passage from Epictetus’ Discourses.²¹¹
In the first, that the prefect might be clothed in a toga is not surprising, in
particular given his role in judicial matters; it need not mean that the rest of the
unit was attired in similar fashion.²¹² And while the second passage does make
reference to a soldier dressed as a citizen, it is clear from the context that he is
working as a spy.²¹³ He entices his fellow spectator at the games to criticize the
emperor, only to then haul him off to prison. In this case, the soldier is in
disguise, and that disguise may well be a toga, though given the date (second
century AD) and the unpopularity of the garment at that time, this is not certain;
at any rate, the clandestine nature of the activity suggests a departure from the
norm and the reference would not work if every praetorian had been dressed
similarly.

The imperial praetorian guard, then, was part of the very fabric of the city of
Rome from early on in its history. The soldiers no doubt enjoyed the higher
status that came with being part of the elite force, with its better pay and working
conditions, along with the increased chance of promotion, due to their closeness
to the emperor, an honour in itself. Furthermore, their camp would have served
as a constant reminder of the power inherent in the principate. Yet the sources
usually portray the praetorians as an indolent and pampered unit. That this is far
from the truth can be seen from the nature of their duties, which is covered in the
next chapter.
 4

DUTIES
One of the most interesting aspects of the praetorian guard is how quickly it
became integrated into the workings of Rome. Although established as a unit
whose primary task was to protect the emperor and his family, within a short
time the praetorians were involved in many other duties in the capital and
beyond. These tasks evolved from the primary function of the praetorians as the
imperial bodyguard and from the close relationship between the emperor and the
guard; they were influenced as well by the way in which praetorian cohorts had
been employed in the late republic (see Chapter 2). As the presence of soldiers
became more acceptable in Rome, praetorians were able to be used in
circumstances where previously there had been no organized response or to
supplement other services that did exist. It is not the case, however, that the way
the unit evolved was inherent in its character from the start. The development of
the guard from a group whose primary purpose was to oversee the protection of
the emperor and his family into a force that had various functions in the state,
some of which could be considered objectionable, was a response to the
requirements of a nascent imperial system.
Moreover that the praetorians changed from a unit that obeyed orders without
question, no matter the task, to one that, only 50 years into their existence, was
willing to murder the man they had sworn to protect, had more to do with the
nature of the Roman state in the early first century AD than with the guard itself.
It was in response to the political events of the times that the soldiers were
drawn into intrigue and, on occasion, driven to forswear their oaths. The
broadening scope of their duties not only provided them with additional
responsibilities but also inserted them into the administration of the city in a way
that made them visible and likely to be influenced. For this reason, a significant
consideration in the assignment of the guard to the range of tasks discussed in
this chapter was the need to keep such a large force in Rome occupied. The
challenge became even more important with the increase in the number of
cohorts under Tiberius: the use of the praetorians in such a wide variety of duties
was the most practical means to keep the soldiers active and not sitting idle in
their camp. Moreover, the extended use of the guard in the capital was
advantageous not only to the city itself but also to the emperor, whose
benevolence could be promulgated at the same time as his power was visibly
demonstrated by the constant reminder of the armed force he had supporting
him.

Imperial bodyguard

The protection of the emperor – and his family – was the primary function of the
praetorian guard throughout its history. As Campbell notes, ‘The Roman
emperor faced the same problems of personal security as most modern rulers. He
was expected to appear in public at the games, in processions, in the senate
house, and in the streets of Rome.’¹ It was the duty of the praetorians to provide
protection in such cases and there is good evidence that they did. Guard
members accompanied the emperor in the senate, from the reign of Tiberius if
not before.² They were present at the games as an escort; when the emperor was
overseeing activities in the capital, praetorians were with him.³ Certainly
whenever the emperor left Rome, some of the guard went with him. For
example, praetorians went with Claudius to Britain and with Nero to Greece;
they accompanied Caracalla to the east.⁴ There is also evidence, in the form of
graffiti and gravestones, for the guard at Pompeii, which may suggest that
soldiers were with the emperor there; it has even been suggested that there may
have been a detachment of the guard stationed near Nuceria, but the evidence is
too limited to be conclusive.⁵
Of course, praetorians would be with the emperor when he went to war, as
has been noted already with Trajan and Marcus Aurelius.⁶ Yet there are also
occasions when there was no security and it may be wrong to assume that
everywhere the emperor went, so too went the guard.⁷ Trajan, for example, is
said to have gone into the houses of citizens without his bodyguard.⁸ This
freedom of movement was seen as a hallmark of that emperor’s greatness.⁹ Nero
was also known to have gone out without any troops: the Pisonian conspirators
considered murdering him when he was at Baiae, a place he ‘often frequented,
taking part in baths and banquets, with his bodyguard (excubiae) removed’.¹⁰
The same emperor was known to have prowled the streets of Rome at night in
disguise, causing disruption; after he himself had come under attack, he always
ensured that he had members of the guard with him.¹¹ It is difficult to argue,
therefore, that praetorians were with the emperor always: the practice varied
from ruler to ruler and no doubt varied as well according to the attitude of the
people towards that rule.¹²
The one place that had a permanent watch of praetorians was the palace. This
guard is thought to have consisted of a single cohort, based on the language used
in Tacitus and Suetonius.¹³ It is difficult to know the routine that the cohort
followed, that is, how the rotation worked. That a change occurred at the eighth
hour (around two in the afternoon) has been asserted, based on a passage in
Martial.¹⁴ The situation at the games where Gaius was murdered – shortly after
midday but at the change of the guard – adds weight to this theory. But it is
difficult to know for certain, given the paucity of information, and it is possible
that there were several shifts over the course of the day. It was to the commander
of this cohort that the emperor gave the watchword, viewed by the sources as
symbolic of control of the empire. Tacitus, for example, records that at the very
start of his reign Tiberius made a show of referring business to the consuls, then
adds by way of contrast ‘but on the death of Augustus, he had given the
watchword to the praetorian cohorts as their commander (imperator)’.¹⁵ It was
this act in particular which indicated that the transition of power to one man had
taken place.¹⁶ Furthermore, the significance of specific watchwords is
emphasized in the sources because of the way in which these words might reflect
aspects of individual reigns. For example, Chaerea was said to have been
incensed by Gaius’ constant use of effeminate watchwords when he was tribune
of the cohort coming on duty, considering it a slight to his masculinity.¹⁷ The
watchword given by Nero in praise of his mother, Agrippina, is also singled out
in the sources, as is that given by Antoninus Pius on his deathbed.¹⁸ Regardless
of the veracity of such information, the presentation of the watchword in the
sources in this way not only reflects characteristics of these reigns, but also
highlights the inherent military nature of the principate.
Nevertheless, even within the confines of the palace, it is not certain that the
emperor always had praetorians with him. Perhaps the best example to illustrate
this is the assassination of Domitian in September AD 96.¹⁹ The murder took
place in the emperor’s chambers; the main individuals behind it were Stephanus,
a freedman of Domitilla (the emperor’s niece), under investigation for
embezzlement, and Parthenius, the head chamberlain.²⁰ Although the assumption
is often made that the praetorians were involved in this plot, in fact the evidence
does not point in that direction. Neither of the two main sources makes any
mention of the guard either being in the vicinity when Domitian was killed or
coming to his assistance after he had been attacked – this despite the fact that the
emperor was said to have become increasingly paranoid as his reign progressed
and the day that had been foretold for his death approached.²¹ Many scholars
argue that the prefects at least had to have knowledge of the plan – and to have
approved of it – in order for it to be successful.²² But even if the commanders
were aware of the plan, which is not at all certain, that does not suggest the
involvement of their soldiers. In this instance, then, the absence of the
praetorians suggests that, while a cohort was on duty in the palace at all times,
this did not necessarily mean that soldiers were in constant attendance upon the
emperor.
Additionally, there must have been some protection for the imperial family
other than the emperor. But it is not clear who received this privilege nor how
many men it entailed.²³ That the honour was given at the discretion of the
emperor is revealed by the situation of Agrippina. A year after Nero came to
power, when his mother’s interference was becoming too much, he removed her
from the palace and took away her guard; Tacitus notes that these were men who
accompanied her as the mother of the emperor, just as they had when she was
the wife of the previous emperor.²⁴ At the same time, Nero was surrounded by a
large group of officers whenever he went to visit Agrippina in her new residence
and, according to Dio, he declared that only the emperor should have soldiers to
guard him.²⁵ It was not just that protection no longer was provided for Agrippina
that was important but, more significantly, her loss of status. In fact, shortly after
the removal of her guard, Agrippina was accused of conspiring against her son;
it is obvious that her vulnerability left her open to such charges.²⁶ And within a
few years, she had been murdered.²⁷
Specific mention of the presence of the guard with family members is
infrequent in the sources. Praetorians formed part of the contingent that went
north to quell unrest at the beginning of Tiberius’ reign. They accompanied
Drusus to Pannonia in AD 14 to suppress a rebellion among the legionaries.²⁸
The cohorts had been strengthened beyond their regular effective and were
reinforced by both praetorian cavalry and German bodyguards. These
precautions proved to be necessary, for the rebels among the legions in Pannonia
were intent on making trouble; in fact, Drusus had the ringleaders of the mutiny
executed, some by praetorians.²⁹ Very little is known about the role of the guard
in the expedition with Germanicus, only that praetorians, along with selected
guard cavalry, provided protection for him in battle.³⁰ On both of these
occasions, two cohorts of praetorians were sent. These examples were used to
argue that this was the number of cohorts that regularly accompanied members
of the imperial family.³¹ In addition, the episode when Agrippina the Elder
brought back the ashes of Germanicus to Rome has been adduced: again, two
cohorts of praetorians were dispatched by Tiberius to accompany them to the
capital.³² But if this interpretation is right, the number of men involved is
excessive, even if an effective of 500 is postulated and it makes more sense to
see these as atypical events. In the case of Agrippina the Elder, the praetorians
surely formed part of an honour guard and therefore the sizeable number is not
unexpected. The other two are military operations, which undoubtedly
necessitated the presence of such a large contingent; the use of praetorians in
these cases echoes the ways in which such troops were used in the late republic.
Here, though, they also would have provided a show of status in addition to
serving a practical purpose; furthermore, it is possible that the praetorians were
there to keep an eye on Drusus and Germanicus, ensuring that their actions were
taken on behalf of the emperor. Indeed, that praetorians were chosen to go north
with Drusus is curious, for one of the complaints of the army was the preferred
status given to the cohorts at Rome, and Tacitus records that members of the
guard were harassed by their legionary counterparts in the hope of provoking a
confrontation.³³ It may have been an acknowledgement of the potential for just
such a conflict that led to the sending of the praetorians with Drusus in the first
place.³⁴
Other examples of the guard accompanying members of the imperial family
are rare. For example, Dio records that Julia Domna did not lose her guard of
praetorians after the death of her son, the emperor Caracalla, in AD 217.³⁵
Alexander Severus, when only Caesar, had a contingent of praetorians to protect
him.³⁶ But the sources in general are silent on this aspect, though it is tempting
to think that any individual of the imperial family who needed protection would
be granted it. As the example of Agrippina shows, however, what was given
could also be taken away.

Securing the state

Another central function of the guard was the protection of the state. While this
responsibility is most obvious during times of war, there were also occasions
when the praetorians were sent from Rome to quell disturbances in peacetime.
Their presence on such missions can be viewed as representing the direct
intervention of the princeps. Two examples will illustrate their importance in
such situations.³⁷
Under Tiberius, the guard was called upon to prevent a slave rebellion led by
one of its veterans, Titus Curtilius.³⁸ In AD 24, this former guardsman was
holding secret meetings in Brundisium and the surrounding area and issuing
pamphlets to incite the slaves there to revolt. The initial response against the
uprising came from a quaestor in the area who made use of crews from patrol
ships which happened to have docked at the port, but his effort did not
accomplish anything. As a result, Tiberius quickly dispatched a tribune of the
guard, named in the text as Staius but otherwise unknown, along with a force of
praetorians, to capture Curtilius and bring him to Rome. Tacitus adds that there
was great fear in the capital because of the large number of slaves there, and this
may explain why the emperor’s personal guard was chosen: the citizens could be
reassured that everything possible was being done. It may also be the case that
those sent were familiar with the man who was leading the revolt. Curtilius, in
fact, was quickly apprehended and without difficulty, suggesting that he was
known to his captors.
The second example comes from the reign of Nero. In AD 58, the citizens of
Puteoli were upset over embezzlement by local officials, with the council
complaining about public disorder.³⁹ The situation escalated to rioting and so the
senate appointed Gaius Cassius Longinus to settle the matter, but the citizens
were unwilling tolerate his severity and so he asked to be relieved of the
responsibility.⁴⁰ It was given instead to the brothers Scribonii, Rufus and
Proculus.⁴¹ They were provided with a praetorian cohort, the first and only time
under the Julio-Claudians that a contingent of the guard was given over to the
command of men of consular rank. Tacitus records that the situation was brought
under control because the citizens of Puteoli were afraid of the soldiers; this fear
no doubt resulted from the executions which the commanders ordered.⁴² By
sending his own guard, Nero was showing that he took a personal interest in the
matter.⁴³ It was at the request of Cassius that the Scribonii were sent, and the
addition of a cohort of praetorians may have been necessary if it had been
decided beforehand that executions would take place, since that was one of the
responsibilities of the guard (see below).
In Rome, however, it usually fell to the urban cohorts to ensure public order,
though they were not used exclusively and sometimes it is difficult to ascertain
which city unit was involved.⁴⁴ Indeed, there are a number of examples in the
sources of citizens being arrested, sometimes imprisoned and on occasion
executed, but without any reference to who performed these deeds. By way of
illustration one might consider the case of the ex-praetor Considius Proculus,
who was arrested while celebrating his birthday. Charged with treason, he was
condemned in the senate and immediately executed, though without any
indication of who carried out the act.⁴⁵ In cases which required a high degree of
security or which involved members of the nobility, however, it is the guard that
appears most frequently. From early in the history of the principate, praetorians
were being used for surveillance of those who were deemed a threat to the state;
furthermore, they occasionally were involved in the execution of those
condemned. It should be noted that, for the most part, all of these tasks involved
members of the upper classes of Roman society and almost all of the examples
are political in nature.⁴⁶
In the first century AD tasks such as these often fell to those members of the
guard known as the speculatores, ‘scouts’ or ‘spies’. These soldiers were
employed in matters that involved issues of national security or where there was
a need for covert activity. As a result, information is scarce in the sources. In the
republic, speculatores were used primarily for reconnoitring.⁴⁷ On occasion
these men were used as a bodyguard.⁴⁸ In fact, Antony had a cohort of
speculatores, which he commemorated on his coinage and which may have
performed both roles.⁴⁹ The imperial unit associated with the guard undoubtedly
was adapted from this republican prototype early in the reign of Augustus.⁵⁰
Although the evidence is limited, it is probable that, for much of the first century
AD, the speculatores associated with the praetorians formed a unit of their own,
but technically were considered part of the guard. Evidence for this comes from
the civil war in AD 69, for it was the tesserarius speculatorum, joined by the
optio, who were first approached by Otho to win over the guard in his campaign
for emperor.⁵¹ By the end of the first century AD, however, the speculatores had
been distributed throughout the praetorian cohorts. This may have happened in
the reign of Vitellius; since the speculatores had been responsible for the
accession of Otho and had fought in the field with him, their continued existence
as a separate unit might have been deemed undesirable.⁵² A close relationship
between emperor and speculatores existed from the creation of the unit;
Suetonius records how Augustus entertained a former speculator at whose home
he had often stayed.⁵³ This special association is also illustrated by inscriptions
from the same period that refer to speculatores Caesaris.⁵⁴ The phrase
speculator Caesaris (or Augusti) occurs only in the early part of the first century
AD; at some point, the title becomes simply speculator, as noted on grave stelae
from later that century.⁵⁵ Evidently there was no longer a need to designate these
men as ‘belonging’ to the emperor by this time, since it was clear that all forces
did anyway.⁵⁶ The significance of the speculatores is also shown by one of the
earliest extant military diplomata in which members of the unit are singled out,
and placed first, in the list of those honoured in the document.⁵⁷
It is not certain how many men comprised this unit. By the middle of the first
century AD, the speculatores were commanded by a trecenarius and this title led
to the conjecture that the unit had 300 men.⁵⁸ Such a number is not corroborated
by other evidence, however.⁵⁹ There is also controversy over whether all of
these soldiers were mounted.⁶⁰ Given their wide-ranging roles, it would have
been impractical for all of them to be so. On the other hand, to have a special
unit in Rome functioning as mounted bodyguards (beyond the usual praetorian
cavalry) would be convenient, given the problem with crowd control. With this
in mind, the speculatores had a distinctive weapon, the lancea, a lance with a
knob on one end and a blade on the other.⁶¹ And since their responsibilities
included couriering imperial correspondence it is certain that at least some of
them were mounted. For example, it was undoubtedly members of this unit that
Sejanus employed to convey correspondence between Rome and Capri after
Tiberius’ withdrawal to the island and, as has been noted, the same group would
have been used by Macro to communicate the information about Tiberius’ death
at Misenum to the provincial governors. In the latter instance, sending the
speculatores allowed reports of the reaction of those to whom he had sent his
messages to be brought back to Macro.⁶² Specific references to their role as
couriers are uncommon, but Suetonius records one example: ‘[Gaius] sent an
eloquent letter to Rome, and warned the speculatores to press on in their vehicle
to the Forum and right up to the senate house and only to hand it to the consuls
in the temple of Mars with all the senate present.’⁶³ Note the element of
theatricality here, in that the soldiers are to make a dramatic entrance before the
entire senate; the specific use of speculatores in this case is an important point,
given what was probably their most important role, namely that of spies.
The sources do not provide many specific examples of this activity, which is
not surprising given its nature.⁶⁴ Dio, however, comments on the need for spies
in a system such as that which Augustus has implemented: ‘Since it is necessary
... that there be some men who both listen covertly and watch closely with
respect to everything that pertains to your rule, you must have such agents in
order that you might not be ignorant of anything that needs scrutiny or
modification.’⁶⁵ Likewise Philostratus, in his Life of Apollonius, records that
Nero’s praetorian prefect Tigellinus used ‘all the eyes with which the
government sees’ to watch Apollonius; it is hard not to interpret this as referring
to the speculatores, though they are not mentioned specifically.⁶⁶ In one of the
few explicit references we have, Suetonius reports that speculatores
accompanied Claudius to banquets, there simply to observe, that is, to spy on the
dinner guests.⁶⁷ And, as has been noted already, in AD 69 Otho sought out
members of the speculatores when he decided to challenge Galba: it is easy to
see why, given their clandestine character. In fact, the unit continued to operate
even after the creation of the frumentarii, who undertook similar activities.⁶⁸ It
is clear that the speculatores had proven their value to the imperial system.⁶⁹
It is possible to detect the guard – in many cases, probably the speculatores –
keeping an eye on those whom the emperor deemed a threat or who were waiting
to be tried.⁷⁰ Sometimes this surveillance resulted in the suicide of the accused.
For example, in AD 16, Marcus Scribonius Libo Drusus was charged with
conspiracy. He was granted an adjournment during his trial and allowed to return
to his house, accompanied by soldiers.⁷¹ Tacitus describes the guard as
disturbing the dinner-party which Libo had decided to give as his final act: ‘his
house was surrounded by soldiers, they were making a racket in the entrance in
order that they could be heard and be seen’. It seems clear that the intention here
was to coerce Libo to kill himself once he realized that there was no hope of
escaping conviction.⁷² Perhaps the most well-known case of this sort is that of
Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso. Charged with various transgressions, including having
invaded a province illegally and corrupting the army, he was tried for treason in
AD 20 upon his return to Rome from the east.⁷³ After his trial, he was sent home
under guard, specifically a praetorian tribune, though Tacitus says that it was not
clear whether the soldier was there to ensure Piso’s safety or his death.⁷⁴ Piso
killed himself after being rejected by both the senate and Tiberius, but constant
surveillance by a praetorian officer no doubt would have added to his
desperation, and in fact, there was a rumour that he had been murdered.⁷⁵
Enforced suicides such as these have been seen as constituting ‘hybrid self-
execution which, conveniently for the emperor, could be thought of as both
criminal-free and victimless’.⁷⁶ The praetorians persuaded the accused through
intimidation to perform an action which would exonerate the emperor from the
murder of a prominent citizen and would allow him to claim that he would have
interceded on behalf of the defendant had he been found guilty.⁷⁷ There are
several examples of individuals who opted to take their lives rather than prolong
the uncertainty when the praetorians arrived.⁷⁸
Members of the imperial family also endured detention by the guard. In the
reign of Tiberius, for example, praetorians were used to provide information to
Sejanus about the actions of Agrippina the Elder and her son Nero Caesar;
Tacitus adds that everything was recorded ‘as if in annals’, which suggests a
highly detailed account of their daily existence.⁷⁹ The result was charges against
Agrippina the Elder and her son; they initially were kept under house arrest, with
praetorians to guard them. After their trial in AD 29, both were exiled:
Agrippina the Elder to Pandateria, Nero to Pontia. Whenever they were moved
after this, they were bound and kept under heavy guard to prevent anyone
making contact with them.⁸⁰ Suetonius includes the rumour that an executioner
was sent to Nero in exile, the appearance of whom led him to kill himself.⁸¹
Again, the implication is that the arrival of this figure was enough to ensure the
suicide, whether or not that was the intention.⁸² Nero’s brother Drusus also
suffered, imprisoned on the Palatine after being declared a public enemy.⁸³
Given the location, supervision by soldiers would be likely.⁸⁴ Tacitus adds that
Drusus was beaten by a centurion named Attius who recorded his final words
and announced them to the senate.⁸⁵ It is clear that the guard was engaged in
surveillance as well as confinement in these cases. And it was not only under
Tiberius that such events occurred: perhaps the most poignant example is that of
Nero’s former wife, Octavia, the daughter of Claudius. Banished to Campania in
AD 62 at the behest of Poppaea Sabina, Nero’s new wife, she was watched over
by praetorians. But her popularity was a problem for the emperor: Tacitus
records that the guard was used to disperse a crowd which had rioted and broken
into the palace when they thought that she had been restored to her previous
position. As a result, she was moved to Pandateria, where she was put to death a
short time later.⁸⁶ Ironically, the unit that usually had a role in protecting family
members turned out in these instances to be the instrument of their destruction.
The guard also had to staff the prison in the Castra Praetoria.⁸⁷ Most of those
kept here were high-profile prisoners such as Herod Agrippa, who was accused
of seditious speech in AD 36 and imprisoned on the orders of Tiberius.⁸⁸
Arrested by Macro, he was kept chained to a soldier while in transport; that this
was common practice at the time is shown by Seneca.⁸⁹ At the request of
Antonia, Tiberius’ sister-in-law, Agrippa was granted several concessions by
Macro; it is clear, therefore, that he was being held in the prison of the camp.⁹⁰
Agrippa was on the way to the baths when news came of Tiberius’ death and
later that same day, the centurion who was in charge of Agrippa’s guards invited
his prisoner to dine with him.⁹¹ Yet, when Agrippa was released to house arrest
early in the reign of Gaius, the instructions for this move were contained in a
letter that was brought to the urban prefect, Lucius Calpurnius Piso. It appears
that, as long as Agrippa was housed in the Castra Praetoria, he was under the
supervision of Macro, but judicial responsibility continued to rest with the urban
prefect.⁹² The practice of housing important prisoners in a high-security location,
such as the prison in the camp, was no doubt to ensure their isolation from
supporters.⁹³
One of the main tasks of the guard, then, was to keep an eye on those deemed
a threat to the state.⁹⁴ Praetorians appear to have participated in surveillance
only in political cases which involved the nobility and especially those who had
any connection with the imperial family. That such activity was the norm can be
seen from Dio, who records that Marcus Aurelius did not put under guard
senators who had been linked with Avidius Cassius in his rebellion against the
emperor in AD 175; the fact that this was not done was deemed noteworthy.⁹⁵ It
was partly for purposes of intimidation that these men were used, for the arrival
of a soldier from the guard indicated to the accused that his fate was sealed, and
often provided the catalyst for the victim’s suicide.
That the praetorians served as executioners is not surprising, then, given such
duties. Since surveillance may be viewed as part of the responsibility to ensure
the safety of the emperor, it follows that occasionally there was a need to
‘remove’ an individual who was deemed a threat. It might be expected that
speculatores of the guard often were used as executioners since these deeds
needed to be accomplished quickly and quietly. Such acts are evident in the
sources from the reign of Tiberius, but may derive from earlier practice.⁹⁶ The
emergence of the treason trials under that emperor and his paranoia about
security, which increased over the years and in particular after the fall of
Sejanus, resulted in the deaths of many prominent Romans.⁹⁷ Other emperors
followed suit. Given the nature of this activity, there is not much detail on
executions in the sources; often there is a name and sometimes a charge, but
little else, though occasionally further information is provided. For example,
Titius Sabinus, an eques of renown, deceived by former praetors to speak his
mind regarding Tiberius, then charged with treason, was held in prison and
executed.⁹⁸ Vibulenus Agrippa took poison in the senate house and was carted
off to prison to be executed.⁹⁹ Sextus Paconianus was strangled in prison
because he had composed verses critical of the emperor while there.¹⁰⁰ A high-
profile example is that of Seneca who, in the aftermath of the Pisonian
Conspiracy, was brought the order to die; according to Dio, soldiers in
attendance had to help him commit suicide.¹⁰¹
As well as the need for action when treason was suspected, executions
obviously were necessary when there was clear evidence of a conspiracy against
the emperor. Often there is little information about these plots in the sources,
with those that were successful – against Gaius or Commodus, for example –
being related in greater detail (see Chapter 2). But it is expected that, for most of
those that failed, the guard was instrumental in removing the accused. For
example, a praetorian officer acted as the agent in the execution of Marcus
Aemilius Lepidus in AD 39. The emperor, accompanied by members of the
guard, went north apparently to suppress an emerging conspiracy involving
Lepidus and Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus.¹⁰² It is impossible to determine the
sequence of events that resulted in the deaths of the two alleged conspirators but,
given the presence of praetorians, it is reasonable to see those soldiers as the
means by which this was accomplished. In fact, Seneca even records the name of
the tribune who executed Lepidus; this individual was probably the commander
of one of the cohorts that was with Gaius. With the need for swift and decisive
action, given the danger posed and the high profile of the conspirators, it might
be expected that the speculatores were used.¹⁰³
Given the nature of the principate, executions were part of the mechanism by
which the emperors ruled and, on occasion, the reasons for such orders being
given seem slight or incomprehensible. An early example is that of Sempronius
Gracchus, exiled by Augustus because of his involvement with Julia; he survived
until Tiberius’ accession, when soldiers were sent to kill him.¹⁰⁴ Claudius is said
to have executed 35 senators and over 300 equestrians, apparently acting in such
a cavalier fashion that when a centurion reported the death of an ex-consul, the
emperor denied ever having given the order, but approved of the action because
the soldiers had been vigilant in avenging him without instructions.¹⁰⁵ Valerius
Asiaticus was one such victim. Charged with adultery and tampering with the
army, he was arrested by the prefect of the guard, Rufrius Crispinus, who was
accompanied by soldiers under heavy arms, as Tacitus puts it.¹⁰⁶ Asiaticus was
returned in chains from Baiae to Rome and dealt with in a private trial. It is
obvious from the way in which he was handled that Claudius took seriously the
threat this man represented. Yet, according to Dio, Asiaticus almost escaped
death, and would have done so had it not been for Claudius’ wife, Messalina.
Acting through Lucius Vitellius, a member of the consilium which was hearing
the charges, she remained insistent on his conviction.¹⁰⁷ Crispinus was rewarded
well, being given one and a half million sesterces and an honorary praetorship –
excessive compensation for an arrest.¹⁰⁸
Nero continued the tradition.¹⁰⁹ Two examples will suffice. Rubellius Plautus
was executed while in exile in Asia, though he was guilty only of arousing
Nero’s fears: a comet had appeared, a portent of a change of power it was
believed, and as the great-great-grandson of Augustus, Plautus became a
target.¹¹⁰ A large number of soldiers was sent by the praetorian prefect
Tigellinus; though warned in advance of their arrival, Plautus refused to flee or
to fight and was killed by a centurion.¹¹¹ Tacitus connects this execution with
that of Faustus Cornelius Sulla Felix, in exile in Gaul, who was murdered at
dinner by assassins, undoubtedly praetorians since the order also came from
Tigellinus.¹¹²
Evidence for such activity beyond the Julio-Claudians is more difficult to
find because of the nature of the sources. Titus, as praetorian prefect under
Vespasian, is said to have used the guard to remove anyone deemed to be a
threat; these men were denounced by his agents and then executed.¹¹³ A specific
example is the murder of Aulus Caecina in AD 79 after he had dined with
Vespasian in the palace; thought to be conspiring with the praetorians, he was
killed as he left the feast. The location suggests the involvement of the guard.¹¹⁴
It is clear that Domitian followed earlier practice, executing several senators for
treason.¹¹⁵ Though there is no indication in the sources as to who carried out this
task, in most cases it undoubtedly fell to the guard; as was the case with previous
emperors, the need to entrust such a duty to men who could be relied upon to act
without question, given the status of those being killed, meant that the
praetorians were the logical choice.¹¹⁶ Dio adds that Domitian handled these
sentences in much the same way as earlier emperors had done: ‘He destroyed
many who had been forced into exile and indeed for not a few of these he
secured their deaths by their own hands in some way or other, so that they
seemed to suffer this voluntarily and not through force.’¹¹⁷ Hadrian also was said
to have removed senators deemed a threat, as he did upon his accession.¹¹⁸
Furthermore, he had Julius Servianus, his brother-in-law and former rival,
executed along with Servianus’ grandson in AD 136.¹¹⁹ The usual explanation
for these deaths has to do with the succession: Hadrian had been ill and it is
thought that Servianus, despite being 90, had seen his opportunity for power.¹²⁰
Again one can guess at the role of the praetorians here, given the status of the
accused. So, although there is not detailed evidence in many of these later cases,
as might be expected given the nature of the task, the tradition of using the guard
for executions in its early history lends credibility to its continued use in the
second and third centuries.
Praetorians were compelled to carry out the wishes of the emperor, even if
that should extend to killing members of the imperial family. Such a task needed
to be done quickly and efficiently and with a minimum of fuss, and the guard
was at hand to do what was ordered without question and with little or no
concern for the correctness or legality of its actions.¹²¹ The murder of Nero’s
half-brother Britannicus is a case in point: the emperor was forced to do this
secretly since there was no charge that could be brought against him. The agent
was the infamous poisoner Locusta, who was in prison (presumably that of the
Castra Praetoria), guarded by a praetorian tribune named by Tacitus as Julius
Pollio.¹²² The involvement of the officer was necessitated by the need for
subterfuge, since Britannicus had support in the city. The official version – that
the young man had succumbed to a natural death – seems to have been widely
accepted, if not completely believed.¹²³ There is no record of any response from
the praetorians to this incident, but the absence of a donative to them after such a
high-profile death suggests that they accepted the official explanation.¹²⁴
The murder of Tiberius Gemellus by Gaius provides another example; it is
recorded that a praetorian tribune was sent to ensure his death.¹²⁵ Philo records
that the officer had to help Gemellus because he did not know how to kill
himself with the sword he was given.¹²⁶ The presence of a tribune from the
emperor’s personal guard coupled with the absence of any announcement to the
senate of Gemellus’ death suggests it was intended that the incident would be
kept quiet.
Perhaps the most sensational of these deaths occurred in AD 48, when it was
alleged that a mock marriage had taken place between Messalina, wife of the
emperor Claudius, and Gaius Silius, consul-elect.¹²⁷ Claudius, assisted by his
inner circle, took quick action and members of the guard were dispatched to
arrest those who had been in attendance.¹²⁸ The emperor himself was conveyed
to the Castra Praetoria to reaffirm the loyalty of the praetorians.¹²⁹ They called
out for retribution. By this time, several of those who had been present at the
party had been brought to the camp by centurions of the guard. They were tried
there by the soldiers – an unusual method, but an extension of trials intra
cubiculum (i.e. behind closed doors) – and executed, Silius among them.¹³⁰ By
allowing the soldiers to have a say in the fate of those charged, the emperor
provided them with the opportunity to reassert their loyalty. The next step was
the removal of Messalina; officers of the guard were sent, allegedly by the
emperor himself, to kill her.¹³¹ Although Messalina tried to kill herself when she
knew that there was no hope, she could not do it, and the tribune was forced to
provide the final blow.¹³² There is no record of the reaction of the guard to the
murder of the empress and no mention of a donative, which might be expected
after such an incident.¹³³
One of the most interesting examples – especially for what it reveals about
the difficulty in interpreting such episodes early in the principate – is the
execution of Agrippa Postumus in AD 14, immediately after the death of
Augustus.¹³⁴ Postumus had been exiled by the emperor in AD 6, a mere two
years after his adoption. Sent first to Surrentum, he was transferred a year later
to the island of Planasia, ostensibly because of his increasing madness, but more
likely because of the risk of keeping him on the mainland where he could be
accessed more easily.¹³⁵ The murder is the first act of the new regime recorded
in the sources, and a praetorian officer acts as agent; no doubt this was one of the
soldiers who had been guarding Postumus so that the emperor could be kept
informed of his activities.¹³⁶ Tacitus notes that the man found the task difficult,
though he was of firm resolve.¹³⁷ Although the soldiers had sworn to ensure the
security of the imperial family as well as that of the emperor, this incident
clearly illustrates the pragmatism of the guard. The praetorians, and especially
the officers, acknowledged that sometimes there would be a conflict between
their oath and the demands of the emperor. Therefore, when a direct order was
issued from the princeps which contravened this pledge, the choice was simple:
the man who was their commander-in-chief must be obeyed.¹³⁸ It is informative
that, immediately after the murder, Livia is said to have been warned that certain
things were best left undisclosed, among which were duties performed by the
military.¹³⁹ The need for such secrecy in many executions no doubt provided the
rationale for using praetorians, and in particular, the speculatores.¹⁴⁰

Policing events¹⁴¹

Spectacles were of major importance to the ancient Romans. Under the empire,
these events included the theatre, the arena and the circus; the latter two were
venues for gladiatorial combat and beast hunts and, in the case of the circus,
horse-racing.¹⁴² During the reigns of the Julio-Claudians, the number of days on
which spectacles were held averaged roughly 90; they steadily increased
throughout the imperial period.¹⁴³ Given the population of Rome, the need for
security at such events was considerable; moreover, factionalism over actors in
the theatre or the colours at the circus was well known.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, some sort
of security force had to be present to oversee crowd safety.¹⁴⁵ Yet the question
of which corps was responsible for maintaining order is a difficult one to answer.
References to policing at these events are rare and even when mentioned it is
often impossible to identify with any precision the unit of soldiers who
performed this service because of the ambiguity of the vocabulary used in the
sources; the generic milites (‘soldiers’) is found most frequently. Yet, to Roman
ears, this term undoubtedly designated the most visible and concentrated force in
Rome, namely the praetorians. Ulpian records that the urban prefect was in
charge of security at the games, and this has been interpreted to mean that he
used the urban cohorts for this purpose since they were under his command,
though it is not certain that this was the case before the third century.¹⁴⁶ In fact,
under the Julio-Claudians at least, it was the praetorians who attended the
spectacles, both the theatre and the games, for the purpose of policing.¹⁴⁷
One of the episodes that is most helpful in illustrating this point is the
occasion on which Gaius was murdered (see Chapter 2). Praetorians were in
attendance, but it is not clear how many were there as protection for the emperor
and how many for security at the venue itself.¹⁴⁸ Any attempt to resolve this is
complicated by the fact that the event took place on the Palatine where there
would have been a cohort on duty anyway. What is most noteworthy here,
however, is the absence of the urban cohorts at the time of the murder. If it had
been their responsibility to be on watch at venues such as this, then one would
expect some mention of them in the aftermath of the assassination. But they do
not make an appearance. Instead, it was the German bodyguard that reacted,
randomly slaughtering several senators and threatening the crowd.¹⁴⁹ The
absence of the urban cohorts, then, reveals that the responsibility for providing
security fell to the guard, at least in the first century AD.
Soldiers had been present as spectators at these events in the late republic but
under Augustus a formal separation between soldiers and populace was
introduced.¹⁵⁰ It is not clear, however, whether this division refers to the seating
arrangements for the audience (i.e. soldiers seated apart from the rest of the
crowd) or, given the use of the praetorians as security, to a command post being
established for those there to maintain order. Post-Augustan evidence points to
the latter; the presence of soldiers – initially as the imperial bodyguard, later
developing into a security detail – necessitated the creation of a method of
physically separating the audience from the praetorians.¹⁵¹ The theatre in
particular was a place where violent activity often broke out and the presence of
soldiers must have been commonplace.¹⁵² In fact, Valerius Maximus referred to
the theatre as a military camp in the city (urbana castra), indicating that soldiers
were highly visible.¹⁵³ Moreover, in AD 15, there was an increase in violence in
the theatre and on one occasion, members of the audience were killed as well as
praetorians and a centurion; a tribune of the guard was injured trying to keep
order and stop any further attacks on the magistrates present.¹⁵⁴ It is clear from
this incident that praetorians were there to take part in the policing of the theatre,
since by then security at these venues was one of their administrative duties.¹⁵⁵
In the reign of Nero, in fact, the praetorians normally on duty at the theatre were
dismissed; the reason ostensibly was to provide greater freedom for the audience
and to stop corruption of those soldiers working there.¹⁵⁶ The experiment failed,
however, because of fights between those supporting different actors, and the
cohort was returned within the year.¹⁵⁷
Nero was known for his love of spectacle and the guard was a regular
presence when he performed. In AD 59, a praetorian cohort along with officers
and prefect were present when Nero debuted at the ‘youth games’ in Rome.¹⁵⁸ It
is difficult to tell whether the soldiers were there as the personal bodyguard of
the emperor, as security to maintain order during the entertainment, as part of the
audience, or maybe even all of these; they apparently were not seated, however,
which suggests that they were policing the crowd.¹⁵⁹ Five years later, at Nero’s
public debut in Naples, praetorians again were in attendance. Once more, it is
not entirely clear whether they were there for security or as spectators, but their
presence is highlighted: ‘[The theatre at Naples] was filled with citizens as well
as with people from the surrounding area drawn by the spectacle; also in
attendance were those who accompanied the emperor out of respect or for
various practical purposes, even maniples of soldiers.’¹⁶⁰ Given the description,
it is likely that the soldiers were there as security for the event and, indeed, that
there was a great number of them, sufficient to be noteworthy.¹⁶¹ Nero was
intending to leave for Greece after his debut and so may have had a greater
number of praetorians with him than would be usual. In fact, one of the main
reasons for his trip to Greece was to participate in the contests and it is not
surprising to find the guard acting as security at such performances there. For
example, during the tour, no one apparently was allowed to leave the theatre
while Nero was performing.¹⁶² Indeed, sometimes the guard is seen to be doing
more than simple crowd management. At the Neronia of AD 65, praetorians
were not only patrolling the seats but were also ensuring the attention of the
crowd, punishing those who seemed to be interrupting the applause; in addition,
the soldiers seconded the request of the audience that Nero sing and their
prefects, followed by tribunes, carried his lyre for him.¹⁶³ Watching for
disruptions during performances had been one of its responsibilities from early
on; in Gaius’ reign, a centurion was used to discipline a knight who had
interrupted a favourite actor.¹⁶⁴ Security clearly had a wide remit.
A major concern for emperors at these events was the opportunity for the
audience to voice opposition to imperial policies. The gathering of such a large
crowd provided a means of communication between the ruler and the people and
allowed him to display the power of his empire.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, it allowed
the people to demonstrate against the emperor or to make requests of him, and in
a more open manner than might otherwise have been possible. The princeps
could not afford to ignore such groups.¹⁶⁶ In fact, protests did occur over issues
of concern for the plebs, for example, the high price of grain under Tiberius and
an increase in taxes under Gaius.¹⁶⁷ The audience was not afraid to let its
feelings be known at times like these: in the midst of civil war in AD 196, the
people protested at the races against the prolonged fighting, demanding to know
when there would be an end to their suffering.¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, good
emperors are shown granting the requests of the crowd, as with Titus and
Trajan.¹⁶⁹ But one of the main reasons for the presence of soldiers at events like
gladiatorial contests or the theatre must have been concern over limiting
dissension to peaceful displays and stopping matters from getting out of hand.¹⁷⁰
In connection with this, there is the use of praetorians, including some
undercover, to spy on those in attendance at these venues. For example, under
Nero, men were present at the theatre to note who was there and what their
expressions revealed.¹⁷¹ While specific examples like this are rare, given the
nature of the principate such activity must have been commonplace. The passage
from Epictetus already mentioned illustrates the sort of role these men may have
played: ‘A soldier in private garb sits down next to you and starts to denounce
the emperor. Then, because you have a kind of pledge from him of his good faith
since he began the abuse, you yourself say what you think, and are immediately
carted off to prison.’¹⁷² In fact, this may have been a primary motivation for
using the guard, given its role in such activity elsewhere.
Of interest is the personal involvement of the praetorians in some of these
contests. A good example is the naumachia (‘naval fight’) staged by Claudius in
AD 52 at the Fucine Lake, in which praetorians were used to surround the
criminals taking part; it fell to the guard to launch missiles at the combatants as
well as to ensure that none of them escaped.¹⁷³ It was under Claudius as well that
members of the guard, including tribunes and their prefect, took part in beast
hunts.¹⁷⁴ The reason for their participation is not given in the sources.¹⁷⁵ But
such a display of military prowess provided yet another demonstration of the
power of the imperial bodyguard, and at the same time furnished an opportunity
for individual guard members to gain honour in a public exhibition.¹⁷⁶ An
appearance in the arena may have been seen as a quasi-military exercise, like the
parades of the praetorians which the emperors held for the public, but in this
instance the contest in the arena replaced combat in the field. It should not be
viewed as a way of debasing or humiliating the soldiers, since even men of high
standing had been involved as hunters and as charioteers in the reign of
Augustus.¹⁷⁷ It has been noted that ‘what attracted [senators and knights] was the
opportunity to display their military prowess, their courage and their skill, plus
the desire for victory, and the shouts of the crowd’, and no doubt the same could
be said of the guard.¹⁷⁸
While the praetorians were being employed as security at these venues, the
urban cohorts were not idle. Given the large numbers of people attending the
events, there was a need for policing to protect against theft and vandalism; in
fact, Augustus himself is recorded to have been concerned about the security of
the streets while events were taking place.¹⁷⁹ Members of the urban cohorts most
likely were used for this task, since patrolling Rome seems to have been one of
their regular duties.¹⁸⁰ Arranged in three (and later four) cohorts, the strength of
this unit is uncertain, but it has been estimated that there would have been
roughly 1,500 men in total in the first century AD.¹⁸¹ They seem to have had a
wide range of responsibilities, mostly associated with looking after order in
Rome and its environs, though occasionally venturing further afield.¹⁸² It would
have fallen to this unit, for example, in Gaius’ reign, to disperse the crowd that
had assembled at the circus during the night to procure free tickets for the next
day’s events and who were said to be disrupting the emperor’s sleep.¹⁸³
Similarly the same unit likely was used by the same emperor to quiet the
neighbourhood where the games were to take place in order to prevent his horse,
Incitatus, from being disturbed.¹⁸⁴ These cohorts were under the command of the
urban prefect, chosen from the ranks of the senators, the only prefecture that was
not equestrian.¹⁸⁵ The responsibilities of the urban cohorts, then, precludes them
from both policing the city and providing security at the games at the same time;
on the other hand, the larger number of praetorians meant that they could be
present at the various venues and still fulfil their other duties. Furthermore, the
use of the guard for security at these events, even when the emperor himself was
not present, reinforced in the audience the feeling that they were enjoying his
generosity. The additional need for the emperor to have access to information
regarding the mood of the populace at the theatre and the games may also have
been a factor in the use of his personal guard as police there.

Fighting fires

The problem of fires in ancient Rome had vexed its citizens for centuries. Under
the republic, there was no formal system of fire-fighting in place despite the fact
that fire was such a common occurrence.¹⁸⁶ Plutarch records that in the first
century BC Marcus Licinius Crassus formed his own contingent of slaves and
purchased buildings which were on fire or near the scene of a fire; there is,
however, no mention of this group actually fighting the flames – they simply
were looking to offer a cheap price to the householder whose property was
ablaze or was threatened.¹⁸⁷ It took the establishment of the principate before a
permanent fire-fighting corps could be created, for the emperor was unwilling to
allow any other individual to usurp this responsibility; it has been argued that
‘once it had become obvious that the security of Rome and the security of the
Princeps were synonymous, action was swift’.¹⁸⁸
Even so, it was only in AD 6 that Augustus finally incorporated the vigiles, a
corps composed of freedmen, as a permanent and active firefighting force.¹⁸⁹
The decision not to use freeborn men in this unit was a result of several factors,
but primarily it was an attempt by Augustus to distinguish the vigiles as a non-
military group.¹⁹⁰ On the problem of how to classify this unit, there is little
agreement among scholars.¹⁹¹ It is true that the vigiles were organized on a
paramilitary basis, in cohorts and centuries, and had officers drawn from other
corps; it is this which seems to be the cause of the difficulty.¹⁹² The only ancient
source that refers to them as soldiers is Ulpian.¹⁹³ On the other hand, their rate of
pay was considerably less than the other city cohorts, or indeed the legionaries
initially.¹⁹⁴ It is revealing as well that the vigiles were not singled out in the list
of those units receiving a legacy from Augustus in AD 14 nor were they
mentioned in Tacitus’ list of troops in Rome in AD 23.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, their
period of service was considerably different from legionaries, at only six years,
with few veterans attested in the epigraphic record.¹⁹⁶ Finally, there is no
evidence of them fighting in the field, which would seem to be a requirement of
any military force.¹⁹⁷ In fact, much of the argument concerning the military
status of the vigiles is derived from careers of the officers, which are not
representative.¹⁹⁸ The lex Visellia of AD 24, however, granted citizenship to
those who had served in the vigiles for six years (later reduced to three years)
and it is true that, after becoming citizens, they could advance through the ranks
in the military, should they wish.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless that they were based in Rome,
under the command of a prefect, meant that they could have a political aspect,
given their numbers. Like his praetorian counterpart, the praefectus vigilum was
chosen from the equestrian order. Most of these men had a combination of
military and administrative experience; appointed by the emperor, they were
equivalent in status to the prefect of the grain supply.²⁰⁰ The duties of the prefect
soon went beyond firefighting, however; in particular, he was responsible for
dealing with certain minor judicial matters, which also has caused some
misunderstanding of the unit itself.²⁰¹
The vigiles were divided into seven cohorts, each commanded by a tribune,
with seven centuries per cohort. The number of cohorts was dictated by the
divisions of the city; every cohort of vigiles was responsible for two of Rome’s
14 regions, with each region having its own watch-house.²⁰² The total number of
vigiles initially seems to have been around 4,000.²⁰³ The large number attests to
the difficulty of controlling fire in Rome; estimates put the number at up to 100
per day.²⁰⁴ It has been pointed out that ‘more than any other fire brigade, the
Vigiles used ample manpower to compensate for the simplicity of the
equipment’.²⁰⁵ It is often assumed by modern scholars that the vigiles were
engaged not only in fighting fires but also in policing the city at night.²⁰⁶ But the
evidence does not support this hypothesis and it is clear that the night patrols
were used for fire prevention rather than for maintaining order.²⁰⁷
It may have been the sheer number of fires, along with the availability of the
praetorians in the city, that meant they became involved in tackling blazes from
early in their history. Under Augustus, there is evidence for members of the
guard even fighting fires at Ostia where citizens set up an inscription to honour a
praetorian soldier who had died in such circumstances.²⁰⁸ On at least one other
occasion we know that cohorts were sent there from Rome when the emperor,
this time Tiberius, saw a red glow in the sky.²⁰⁹ In fact it was the fear of fire in
Ostia as well as the inefficiency of sending men from Rome that finally
prompted Claudius to establish a force, probably a cohort of vigiles, at the port
permanently for the purpose of preventing outbreaks.²¹⁰
In Rome itself, the guard was involved in fighting most of the major fires
which occurred early in the empire. In the reign of Tiberius, Livia was present at
a fire near the Temple of Vesta, encouraging both the citizens and the soldiers
(here praetorians) to work harder in their efforts. She apparently had done the
same sort of thing under Augustus.²¹¹ Drusus, Tiberius’ son, also was
accompanied by soldiers from the guard when he went to provide assistance at a
blaze in AD 15, though the report is rather uncomplimentary.²¹² The praetorians
must have been present at the fire of AD 22 during which the Theatre of Pompey
was destroyed; after their prefect had been praised by the emperor for his efforts,
the senate granted Sejanus a statue in the theatre in recognition of his actions in
helping to contain the flames.²¹³ Occasionally, emperors themselves are recorded
as being present at the fires, no doubt accompanied by the guard. Gaius, for
example, is said to have helped extinguish a blaze and to have been aided in this
by soldiers, most likely his praetorian escort.²¹⁴ A group of soldiers also
accompanied Claudius to a fire at which he stayed for two days.²¹⁵
 Perhaps the best-known conflagration in the imperial period is that of AD 64,
during the reign of Nero. In the accounts of this fire, the role of the praetorians is
not defined clearly, but they must have been present. The sheer size of the blaze
would have made their assistance necessary: ‘Though Rome was regularly
subject to fires as a consequence of overcrowding, timber construction, and
inadequate fire-fighting apparatus, there was nothing routine about this blaze. It
broke out in the early hours of 19 July and lasted for six days, only to be
renewed for a further three days: it effectively levelled three of the fourteen
regions ... leaving only four untouched.’²¹⁶ Yet, there is little recorded in the
sources about the attempts made to fight the fire. Dio hints at a somewhat
malevolent involvement of ‘soldiers’: ‘Indeed many houses were destroyed
because they lacked anyone to save them while many others were set on fire
besides by those who had come to help; for the soldiers, both the others and the
night-watch looking for plunder, not only did not extinguish the fires but also
started others.’²¹⁷ ‘Soldiers’ here must indicate members of the guard in addition
to the vigiles. But whether the purpose of these men was as sinister as had been
thought has been questioned recently. From the report in Tacitus, it is clear that
someone was trying to combat the fire, for he says the fire ‘advanced faster in its
evil pace than the remedies’.²¹⁸ What the units seem to have been doing, then,
was creating a firebreak to stop the spread of the blaze.²¹⁹ The fact that the
‘counter-fires’ were started on the property of the praetorian prefect Tigellinus is
presented as further evidence that this was an attempt to stop the advance; as
former commander of the vigiles, he would have had experience of how to
handle problem fires.²²⁰ The efforts of the vigiles and the guard (and probably
also of the urban cohorts) to fight the fire, then, has been misrepresented by anti-
Neronian sources which portrayed the emperor as the cause of the disaster.²²¹
The rumour that Nero had started the fire himself emerged in that same year and
is recorded by the elder Pliny, Suetonius and Tacitus among others.²²² Thus,
what seems at first to be inhibition of the firefighting process – preventing
people from trying to save their property and setting new fires in the area – in
fact may have been the only remedy available to fight such a large blaze. After
the conflagration had finally been extinguished, it is recorded that Nero made an
effort to ensure that another fire of such proportions would not occur.²²³
It is interesting that accounts of fires after the Julio-Claudians are rare in the
sources and there is little information on imperial intervention. One of the few
examples occurs under Commodus, when a fire spread throughout much of the
city once again. The emperor is said to have come into the city from the outskirts
and encouraged those fighting the fire.²²⁴ Dio records that both civilians and
soldiers were involved in battling the blaze; as seen from the fire of 64, there
was a need for all who could take part to do so in these cases, and the praetorians
no doubt played a large role in assisting the vigiles once again.
Given the interests of the sources, they provide little information about fires.
It is not surprising, then, that the examples which are recorded in the sources are
only those of the greatest significance.²²⁵ The presence of the praetorian guard at
many of these fires, however, does not necessarily seem to be related to the task
of protecting the emperor and therefore an additional reason for their attendance
must be sought. It can only be to assist in the firefighting efforts, a practical use
of such a large body of soldiers located close to the city. Furthermore, the
emperor was responsible for the welfare of the state, and the presence of his
personal armed force would remind the citizens of Rome that he was looking
after them.²²⁶
The vigiles rarely played a role in politics in the city, though their numbers
were considerable.²²⁷ But on one occasion in particular they had a major role: the
removal of Tiberius’ praetorian prefect, Sejanus. Unfortunately, most of what we
know about the prefect comes from hostile sources; only Velleius Paterculus,
writing before Sejanus’ demise, has anything praiseworthy to say about him.²²⁸
This negative bias, along with the lacuna in Tacitus for much of the years AD
30–31, makes it difficult to determine what exactly happened in the last years of
Sejanus’ life.²²⁹ It is clear that when Tiberius retired to Capri in AD 26 Sejanus
took on administrative responsibilities he had not had previously and, in
particular, acted as the emperor’s ‘eyes and ears’ in Rome.²³⁰ But he was merely
one of Tiberius’ many advisors and it is important to separate fact from fiction
here, as far as is possible.²³¹ It is true that Sejanus had control of a sizeable force
of soldiers in the city, but the aspirations that have been attributed to him,
especially his pursuit of imperial power, is a misinterpretation of the activities
that brought him into the political arena and which were later exploited by anti-
Tiberian propaganda. The nature of our sources means that it is impossible to
determine what, in fact, went on in AD 30–31.²³²
 The suspicion of a plot, however, brought about Sejanus’ removal from the
prefecture and his execution on the orders of the emperor. He was arrested at a
senate meeting held on the morning of 18 October; at a second meeting later in
the day, when it was clear that neither the people nor the guard were going to
protest, the senate condemned him to death and he was executed immediately.²³³
The sudden fall from favour has captured both the ancient and modern
imagination, but it must be said that there is no way of knowing, from the extant
sources, the reason for Sejanus’ demise.²³⁴ It is possible that some in Rome felt
that, with the commander of the guard having so much administrative control in
the city, a dangerous situation had been created, especially with the emperor
away from, and the troops housed in, the capital. Whether Sejanus would ever
have used the praetorians against the emperor was not important; it was the
perception that he could have, both by Tiberius and others, that made his
removal necessary. But any conjecture about the motives for his elimination
must remain speculative.²³⁵
The way in which Sejanus was removed raises several issues. That Tiberius
felt compelled to act cautiously can be attributed to the great number of troops in
the city under the prefect’s command and the emperor’s uncertainty as to where
their loyalty would lie in the circumstances. But what is difficult to ascertain is
why Sejanus so easily allowed Macro to take command of the praetorians who
were at the senate meeting, and indeed why the praetorians were there at all.
Most scholars have assumed that the soldiers were attending the senate with their
commander but the reason for this is not clear: as prefect he may have had a few
soldiers with him as escort, but the main reason why the guard attended senate
meetings – as protection for the emperor (and no doubt as a reminder of his
power) – does not apply here, since Tiberius was not in attendance.²³⁶
Furthermore, Dio records that Macro replaced the guard on duty there with
members of the vigiles, but this only complicates matters.²³⁷ Why did the
praetorians so easily acquiesce, especially to be replaced by a unit that was
clearly considered inferior in the hierarchy of the city units? Perhaps strict
discipline would allow them to do nothing else. But it could be Macro’s position
that holds the key.
Various theories have been offered by way of explanation for his
appointment to the prefecture of the guard.²³⁸ As a former prefect of the vigiles,
Macro clearly had been associated with the imperial household for some time.²³⁹
It is possible, however, that it was his marriage to Ennia Thrasylla, the
granddaughter of the astrologer Thrasyllus who was with the emperor on Capri,
that had brought him into close contact with Tiberius at this particular time.²⁴⁰
Furthermore, that he was trusted by Tiberius for what was an extremely sensitive
mission suggests that he had been on the island in the period immediately prior
to the removal of Sejanus. One possibility is that Macro had been appointed
interim praetorian prefect when Sejanus became consul at the start of AD 31;
this argument is based on the belief that holding both offices concurrently was
not possible, but there is no evidence to suggest that this was the case.²⁴¹ But
other suggestions – that there had been a power struggle between the two men or
that Macro had been placed in charge only of those cohorts on Capri by Sejanus
– also have been proposed.²⁴² The idea of a power struggle – dating to long
before AD 31 and exploited by Tiberius – ignores the fact that the prefect
believed Macro on the morning of 18 October. If there had been any discord
between them, it is doubtful whether Sejanus would have trusted him. A sharing
of power is a possible scenario, though the idea of a subordinate prefect (which
Macro would have been on Capri) does not explain the facility with which he
took over in the capital.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Macro was able to command authority on that
day and the most logical interpretation is that this resulted from a prior
association with members of the guard – and the vigiles. Moreover, the fact that
he continued as sole prefect after the fall of Sejanus indicates that Tiberius had
no doubts about his loyalty, or his ability to control the unit.²⁴³ This is especially
significant, given that it is likely that the relationship between the praetorians
and their emperor was somewhat uneasy in the immediate aftermath. In fact, Dio
records that the guard went on a rampage after the execution of their
commander; he attributes this action partly to the annoyance of the praetorians at
having been replaced by the vigiles.²⁴⁴ And there is further evidence of this
anxiety. In AD 32, Tiberius reacted quite irately to a suggestion by Junius Gallio
that the guard be allowed to sit in the rows of the theatre reserved for the equites.
Gallio was accused of trying to subvert the discipline of the guard, expelled from
the senate and exiled, later to be returned and kept under arrest, in this case,
watched over by magistrates.²⁴⁵ The emperor obviously was concerned that the
praetorians remain loyal to him alone.

The wide range of duties that the praetorians undertook belie the interpretation
of them only as the imperial bodyguard. That such a large number of soldiers
was present in the capital meant that they could be used in a variety of ways to
help the emperor and often also the citizens; there was, however, a sinister side
to their role when the security of the emperor or the state was at risk.²⁴⁶ The
literary sources provide many examples of these tasks in the first century AD; by
the second century, however, it is likely that the guard had been integrated so
well into the fabric of the city that specific comment was not needed as to their
involvement in such activities as discussed above, though the dearth of sources
for the later period makes any firm conclusions impossible. Yet that Augustus
saw the potential in this unit beyond simply his own security and that it
continued to function as a useful tool for subsequent emperors is a testimony to
the foresight of the first princeps.
 5

CONCLUSION
The praetorian guard was an elite military force, in existence for over 300 years.
Adapted from a republican institution by Augustus, it was in essence the
personal army of the emperor, and, within a very short time, was responsible
also for specialized military tasks and for various administrative duties. This
development occurred primarily because of the relationship between the
praetorians and the emperor, who saw that such a large number of men in Rome,
answering only to himself, could be useful, both for his own benefit and for the
city. Not only would they assist in the management of the capital but they would
also serve as a constant reminder of the armed force that he had supporting him.
It is, therefore, a mistake to consider the praetorians as simply the bodyguard of
the emperor. From the very beginning, they played a much larger role and had a
far greater impact on life in Rome because of their close affiliation with the
machinery of state.
In the late stages of the republic, there first appeared a unit that is referred to
as a praetorian cohort, whose purpose was to provide protection for the
commander in the field. Provincial governors (as military commanders of their
provinces) had similar units, but with a broader mandate: to provide
administrative assistance as well as personal protection. This model of cohort is
illustrated by the observations of Cicero, in his letters and in his speech against
Verres, where the praetorians are seen to be involved primarily in a judicial
capacity. It is not known what other administrative responsibilities these soldiers
might have had, but they appear to be functioning as much more than a military
unit. The civil wars of the mid-first century BC saw the emergence of praetorian
cohorts for individuals who used these soldiers for their own personal gains,
rather than for state business, that is, for intimidation as well as protection. It
was undoubtedly with such precedents in mind that Augustus formed his own
personal army, the imperial praetorian guard, from those soldiers of the
republican praetorian cohorts not discharged after Actium.
The date for the establishment of the guard likely was 27 BC, at a time when
Augustus was beginning to strengthen his authority. From the very beginning,
the praetorians formed a privileged unit with a higher rate of pay and a shorter
term of service than the average legionary. Organized into nine cohorts of 1,000
men each, they initially were dispersed throughout the city and nearby areas in
an attempt to avoid the appearance of having so many armed men in the capital.
Since this was the first time that soldiers had been stationed in Rome, Augustus
was careful not to offend the citizens by clearly advertising how he had come to
power and was maintaining his principate. In reality, however, the praetorians
increasingly would have been visible to those in the city because of their
growing involvement in its administration and, before long, all of the cohorts
were brought into the capital to facilitate the coordination of their duties.
The organization of the guard did not change much throughout its history; the
original arrangement by Augustus needed little improvement. Under Tiberius,
however, one of the most important changes occurred when he brought all of the
cohorts together into a single camp, the Castra Praetoria. The establishment of a
permanent military base for the praetorians marked an unmistakable change
from the years of Augustus. Now the basis of imperial power was evident to all.
The reason for the move is given by Tacitus: there had been a problem with
discipline, and having all the soldiers together would allow for better control.
But there was probably another reason not recorded in the sources: the expanded
use of the praetorians in a variety of tasks, primarily in Rome, which went well
beyond providing security for the emperor and his family. Having all the soldiers
together would allow for better use of the manpower of the guard, since
assignments could be coordinated more easily. Yet it would have been obvious
to those in the capital that a change had occurred, since the camp dominated the
heights north of Rome and its message could not have been more obvious: the
fortress provided a clear manifestation of imperial power and it was there to stay.
Around the time of the construction of the camp, the number of cohorts was
increased from nine to 12. The date of this change is not recorded in the literary
sources, but epigraphic evidence shows that it occurred during the reign of
Tiberius and it is likely that it happened in conjunction with the building of the
Castra Praetoria. The greater number of soldiers would allow for increased
efficiency in performing the various responsibilities which the guard now had.
Moreover, the additional forces would also provide a stronger show of military
support for the emperor at a time when Tiberius was becoming increasingly
concerned for his safety. Although the numbers fluctuated slightly in the course
of the first century AD, in particular in connection with the civil war of AD 69,
by the end of the century, the cohorts were set at ten, with an effective of 1,000
each. In addition, recruitment to the guard widened slowly from Italy to the most
Romanized provinces as the empire matured; it was only with the wholesale
change wrought by Severus that this system would change dramatically, and
opportunities given to all soldiers to become part of this privileged unit.
That the praetorians occasionally became caught up in the political life in
Rome should surprise no one. Their duties placed both the officers and the
regular soldiers in close proximity to the centre of power and they obviously
took an interest in the affairs of state. Perhaps the most discernible illustration of
this involvement in politics was during transitions of power. The grant of
sizeable donatives to the guard at such times provides the strongest evidence of a
tacit understanding that the soldiers had to be well rewarded for their acceptance
of the new regime. When the praetorians took the initiative in political affairs,
however, it was invariably the officers and the prefects who were at the
forefront. Their close association with the emperor, and thus with the affairs of
state, and the greater possibility of reward, encouraged some to take the risk of
conspiring against the regime. On the other hand, the average soldier probably
remained ambivalent for the most part about the various machinations of power,
as long as his needs were looked after. The praetorians on the whole were
pragmatic about their relationship with the emperor, and realized that they stood
to gain little by challenging the status quo. Although not usually directly
involved in conspiracies, the rank and file generally fared well: if the conspiracy
failed, they were rewarded for their loyalty; if it succeeded, they would be
offered incentives to follow the new emperor. Despite their numbers, it was not
the main body of soldiers that represented the clearest danger to the emperor, but
rather those men whom he himself had placed in a position of trust. Yet, in AD
193, the entire unit was cashiered because of the actions of a few, who had
decided quite rashly to murder the emperor. Expecting to be rewarded by the
new princeps, as had happened in the past, they could not have anticipated that
the empire would become embroiled in a civil war in which they were one of the
first casualties. And so, after 200 years, the praetorians were no longer an elite
force but rather just another part of the army.
Modern views of the imperial praetorian guard have focused most often on its
role as the bodyguard of the emperor. But a closer examination of the various
tasks which these troops performed reveals that they were much more than that.
These other responsibilities have often been overlooked, but they provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the role of the guard in the state. The use of the
praetorians as a specialized military force was an extension of its role to ensure
the safety of the emperor and, in connection with that duty, to provide assistance
when required for the security of the state. The assignments were varied, but the
guard often was sent only when previous attempts to find other solutions to a
serious problem had failed. In each instance, the security of the emperor could
have been compromised had the situation not been resolved. The guard was
especially employed in cases where there was a need for covert action or for
additional security. Often such sensitive tasks were assigned to a special branch
of praetorians known as the speculatores. There is little specific information
about this unit, however, because of the nature of its activities. But its very
presence betrays the vulnerability of a regime based on maintaining control
through armed force, intimidation and assassination.
Perhaps the most sinister of the duties assigned to the guard was the
confinement, and often the execution, of those whom the emperor considered a
risk. Generally these people came from the nobility and most cases are political
in nature. There are numerous examples of the use of praetorians to detain
individuals who simply were thought to be a threat and those who actually had
been charged and were waiting to be tried. In several instances, the intimidating
presence of the soldiers was enough to force the individual to commit suicide.
Such an act removed the responsibility from the emperor and allowed him to
claim that he would have interceded on behalf of the accused and been lenient
towards him if only he had not killed himself. Members of the imperial family
also were spied upon by those guardsmen who were assigned to them, ostensibly
for protection and prestige, but who were reporting back to their superiors the
conversations and events which they witnessed. The praetorians in these cases
served both as a sign of honour, granted by the emperor, and as a means of
control. Whether this was something that happened routinely with all who were
provided with a contingent of guards is not certain, but it is possible that one of
the principal duties for those soldiers assigned to family members was to keep
apprised of their activities. The reason for the choice of the praetorian guard for
such a task was that it owed its allegiance to the emperor alone and could be
relied upon to act in his best interests. In fact, this reliability is seen in particular
in the executions of members of the imperial family; there is seldom any
hesitation to obey the orders of the emperor, despite the unpleasantness of the
task.
The guard was also employed in routine civil administration in the capital. In
fact, Augustus was instrumental in providing a framework that enabled the city
of Rome to be managed in a more professional manner, and it is in the context of
this reorganization that one should include the duties assigned to the praetorians.
In the republican period, the tendency had been to allocate tasks to individuals as
the need arose, a very inefficient and piecemeal method of urban management.
Augustus created numerous permanent positions, such as the positions of the
curatores (‘managers’), which were filled by men from both the senatorial and
equestrian classes, and together these offices formed the basis of a civil service
in Rome. Similarly, he realized the benefits that could be gained from making
use of his personal army and so assigned a wide variety of tasks in the city to the
guard, which, as a military unit, was efficient in handling such administrative
responsibilities.
For example, the guard in its early history acted as a security force at the
many spectacles held in Rome each year. The potential for disturbances was
great at the circus, the arena and especially at the theatre where, on occasion,
spectators had been killed. It is only reasonable to assume, therefore, that there
would have been some system in place to ensure the protection of the crowd.
Soldiers had been providing security at the games from early in the reign of
Augustus, and it became the regular practice to have a contingent there to
maintain order. The urban cohorts would have been kept busy policing the city
during these events; with the majority of citizens in attendance, there needed to
be adequate protection against theft and vandalism in the city streets. The
assignment of the praetorians to the games, then, provided a practical solution to
the problem of maintaining control among the crowd. It is instructive that, on the
one occasion when the soldiers were relieved of this duty at the theatre under
Nero, they were back within a very short time because of fights among the
spectators.
A major concern of the emperor at these events was the potential for
demonstrations against him or his policies. It is clear that the stationing of troops
at the games would also ensure that such protests remained peaceful and would
allow the emperor to keep track of the disposition of the crowd. In connection
with this responsibility, the more ominous task of spying on individuals at the
events was also carried out by guard members, possibly speculatores, since the
atmosphere at the spectacles – so many people gathered together in one place,
without restriction on conversation – encouraged greater freedom of speech than
was usually possible. The use of the guard for security at these venues probably
evolved from its responsibility to protect the emperor whenever he was in
attendance. When he was not there, however, the presence of his personal
soldiers would have served as a reminder to those attending that this was an
imperial event, presented under the auspices of their princeps, and that they were
being entertained through his munificence.
Another of the tasks undertaken was helping to fight fires, no doubt because
of the number of soldiers available to assist the vigiles and, in particular, the
inadequacy of ancient firefighting. It is likely that the guard had had a much
larger role in the prevention and suppression of fire in Rome and the surrounding
areas before the creation of the vigiles in AD 6 and continued to function in a
similar capacity even after this date. The presence of the imperial soldiers at fires
would have reminded the populace that the emperor was looking after them, and
this concern was often reinforced by the attendance of the emperors themselves,
or members of the imperial family, at these events. It should be remembered that
the praetorians were the personal force of the princeps and, since he was
responsible for the welfare of the state, it is not surprising that they should be
called upon to help in these instances. It also was in the emperor’s best interest
to keep his personal guard in the public eye, both to deter any challenges to his
rule and for public relations, and participation in putting out fires would have
helped to foster this relationship.
It was only after the civil war of AD 69 that praetorians began to be active in
the field. Until then, their forays outside Italy were infrequent to say the least.
But by the reign of Domitian, the guard had established itself as a useful force in
battle and cohorts accompanied the emperors to the front line throughout the rest
of their history. Most notable are the Dacian Wars under Trajan, as depicted on
his column, where the guard can be seen playing an active role in the events.
After the change brought about by Severus, the new praetorians were battle-
hardened and there is much evidence for them in all aspects of combat. Yet as
their presence in the field increased, there is a notable decrease in the evidence
for them being involved in the sorts of duties in the capital as they had been
earlier. This is not to suggest that the guard did not continue to be part of the
administration in Rome, but by the early second century, the unit had become
such an integral part of the fabric of the city that little notice was taken of these
routine activities. The nature of the literary sources for this later period also
means that the praetorians appear less frequently in what few accounts exist. The
contrast with their early history could not be more apparent.
In the sources, the praetorian guard is often overshadowed by its
commanders, the praetorian prefects. The office was created in 2 BC, possibly
because of the increasing difficulty in coordinating the soldiers in their many
assignments. It was their close relationship with the emperor, however, that
attracted attention, since they were perceived as having inordinate influence in
the running of the state. It should be noted that, from the very beginning, it was
rare for these prefects to be career military men, even though they were put in
charge of the emperor’s personal troops. A few had served in some capacity in
the army, but more often these appointments were the result of imperial
patronage, which meant that they were chosen because of their affiliation with
the imperial household rather than for any particular ability to manage such a
large military force. The reason is clear: the emperor needed to know that
someone he could trust implicitly was in command of his guard, for the greatest
danger he could potentially encounter would come from the armed men who
were sworn to protect him. In the end, however, the prefects proved ineffective
at stopping any conspiracy against the princeps, and on occasion, joined in
themselves.
The praetorian guard of the Roman empire developed into a multifaceted unit
that not only looked after the personal safety of the emperor but also participated
in the care of the state. Although the general view has been that these soldiers
merely served as the imperial bodyguard, that notion must be revised to
encompass the many other tasks that this personal army had. Augustus obviously
saw the need to have adequate protection for his principate in the capital, but he
also had a rather large number of soldiers that he had to organize after Actium
and he must have realized very quickly that such a force needed to be kept
occupied if he was to maintain control. As a result, the utilization of the
praetorians branched out into other areas of administration where their presence
could be advantageous, both to the emperor and to the city, and where the
benevolence of the princeps could be promulgated. Yet it must have been
obvious to the citizens of Rome, with so many soldiers engaged in a wide variety
of tasks, that the principate was, in reality, nothing other than a military
dictatorship. The guard existed for the protection of the emperor and, through
him, for the benefit of the state, but it always presented a threat of force, and that
formed the basis of imperial rule.
 NOTES
1. INTRODUCTION

1. ‘Elite’ here is defined not in the sense of a specialized force (as, say, the
SAS) so much as an indication of status; these soldiers were a select group
because of their background rather than their ability.
2. As noted by Purcell, ‘If there was a “revolution” in the way Augustus ran
Rome, it was in making available to the relevant magistrates a larger and better
organised body of manpower than had been available before ... it was in the
imposition on Rome of military units ... the three cohortes urbanae, associated
with the city prefect, and the cohortes praetoriae responsible directly to the
princeps ... that the revolution was really effected. The sources for the history of
the early Empire time and again display these soldiers as the principal agents of
state authority.’ See N. Purcell, ‘Rome and its development under Augustus and
his successors’, in A. Bowman et al (eds), The Cambridge Ancient History, vol.
X (Cambridge, 1996), p 793.
3. Such a progression parallels to a certain extent the increased administrative
power that the position of praetorian prefect gained in the first century AD and
beyond. This study will not examine the prefects in any depth; on these
commanders see M. Absil, Les Préfets du Prétoire d’Auguste à Commode (Paris,
1997), which discusses them in some detail; for those after Commodus see L.L.
Howe, The Praetorian Prefects from Commodus to Diocletian (Rome, 1966).
The lack of recent material in English will be addressed by Sandra Ottley, who is
currently working on a monograph that will examine the prefects of the first
century in particular.
4. As noted by Dio 53.11.5, ‘Right away, so it seems, for those men who
would serve as his bodyguard, [Augustus] obtained by vote double the pay that
was given to the other soldiers, in order that he might have a guard that was
devoted to him. In this way, in all truth, did he eagerly desire to settle the
monarchy.’ Cf. J.B. Campbell, The Roman Army 31 BC – AD 337: A
Sourcebook (London, 1994), p 183: ‘In Dio’s view the maintenance of the
privileged praetorian guard and the fact that the provinces controlled directly by
Augustus contained most of the troops, demonstrated the dichotomy between
appearance and reality in imperial politics, since real power depended on control
of the army.’
5. In these duties, they supplemented the other two city units – the urban
cohorts and the vigiles – both of which are discussed in Chapter 4.
6. These sorts of tasks will not be covered in this work, since the examples
are too few to provide evidence that they were regular duties rather than
exceptional. For example, soldiers from the guard were sent by Nero to find the
source of the Nile and to map the area; the expedition was also on a
reconnaissance mission, however. See Seneca, NQ 6.8.3–4; Pliny the Elder, NH
6.181–6; 12.19. On construction projects, see Josephus, AJ 19.257 (stables for
Gaius); Suetonius, Nero 19.2; cf. also Dio 62.16.1–2 (canal at Corinth).
Surveyors and architects were attached to the guard; see R. Sherk, ‘Roman
geographical exploration and military maps’, ANRW II, 1 (1974), pp 549–50 and
G.R. Watson, The Roman Soldier (Ithaka, 1969), pp 144, 214, note 497 (the
inscription of an architect of the guard dated to the late first century AD,
discussed in Chapter 3).
7. As D.B. Saddington (‘Tacitus and the Roman army’, ANRW II, 33.5
(1990), p 3496) notes, ‘What needs stressing [about the guard] is its “incidental
use”, revealed by chance remarks in Tacitus. The emperors found it particularly
useful to use small groups of praetorians, usually under the command of
centurions but also of tribunes, to carry out routine or special missions.’
8. On the frumentarii see N.J.E. Austin and B. Rankov, Exploratio: Military
and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the
Battle of Adrianople (London, 1995); this unit is discussed briefly in Chapter 4.
9. On this unit see M.P. Speidel, Riding for Caesar (London, 1994); they are
discussed briefly in Chapter 2.
10. F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London, 1992), p 64. Yet
one might argue that such a view has caused the misrepresentation of the guard
in modern scholarship.
11. See, for example, J. Matthews, ‘The emperor and his historians’, in J.
Marincola (ed), A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography (London,
2007), pp 290–304. On specific authors see R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford, 1958); A.
Wallace-Hadrill, Suetonius (London, 1983); B. Baldwin, Suetonius (Amsterdam,
1983); F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford, 1964); M. Hose, ‘Cassius Dio:
a senator and historian in the age of anxiety’, in J. Marincola (ed), A Companion
to Greek and Roman Historiography (London, 2007), pp 461–7; H. Sidebottom,
‘Severan historiography: evidence, patterns and arguments’, in S. Swain et al
(eds), Severan Culture (Cambridge, 2007). I intend to discuss the sources’
attitude to the guard in detail elsewhere in due course.
12. One such exception is the background provided by Tacitus concerning the
construction of the Castra Praetoria, but even there his focus is more on the
character of Tiberius’ praetorian prefect Sejanus than on the guard itself; cf.
Annals 4.2.1; see Chapter 3.
13. For example, the Loeb edition of Dio for the years AD 98–161 (Book
VIII in the series) consists of just over 50 pages of Greek, and for the reign of
Antoninus Pius not even the epitomator had access to the original text, so there
are only a few fragments left.
14. On the problems concerning the Historia Augusta see T.D. Barnes, The
Sources of the Historia Augusta (Brussels, 1978); R. Syme, Emperors and
Biography (Oxford, 1971).
15. See H. Sidebottom, ‘Herodian’s historical methods and understanding of
history’, ANRW II.34.4 (1998), pp 2775–2836.
16. Gaius: RIC I, #32; Claudius: RIC I, #7, #11–12; Nero: RIC I, #491;
Galba: RIC I, #118–22, #126; Vitellius: RIC I, #19; Hadrian: RIC II, #908–11.
17. M. Durry, Les Cohortes Prétoriennes (Paris, 1938); A. Passerini, Le
Coorti Pretorie (Rome, 1939; reissued 1969). There are only two monographs in
English: The Praetorian Guard by Boris Rankov (London, 1994) and Soldiers of
Rome: Praetorians and Legionnaires by Robert Evans (Washington, 1986). The
former focuses on technical aspects of the guard; the majority of the book is
given over to a discussion of uniform and equipment, with lavish illustrations.
The book by Evans (a former commander in the US Army) is intended for the
layman, but there are many errors and omissions; the problems are exacerbated
by the fact that he was not a classicist, so there is little on the sources. A recent
issue of the journal Ancient Warfare (5.2, 2011) was dedicated to bodyguards,
and the praetorians are the focus of four of the articles. See also R. Cowan, ‘The
Praetorian Guard: Easy Soldiering in Rome’, Ancient Warfare 2.1 (2007), pp
30–5. My own entries in the Encyclopedia of War, the Encyclopedia of Conflict
in Greece and Rome and in Elite Fighting Forces: From the Ancient World to
the SAS should be mentioned as well. In addition, unpublished dissertations by
R. Cowan (Aspects of the Severan Field Army: The Praetorian Guard, Legio II
Parthica, and Legionary Vexillations AD 193–238, University of Glasgow,
2002) and S. Ottley (The role played by the Praetorian Guard in the events of
AD 69 as described by Tacitus in his Historiae, University of Western Australia,
2009) are available online from the respective institutions.
18. These include H.D. Stöver, Die Pratorianer: Kaisermacher,
Kaisermörder (Munich, 1994); A.R. Menéndez Argüín, Pretorianos (Madrid,
2006); M. Jallet-Huant, La Garde Prétorienne dans la Rome Antique (Paris,
2009); A. Busch, Militär in Rom: militärische und paramilitärische Einheiten im
kaiserzeitlichen Stadtbild (Wiesbaden, 2011; non vidi). An unpublished
dissertation (Universidad de Oviedo, 2009) by H. Ceñal Martinez (La Guardia
Pretoriana. Composicíon, Funciones e Historia) and a book by L. Luć (Oddzialy
Pretorianów Starozytnym Rzymie. Recrutacja, Structura, Organizacja; Lublin,
2004) also should be mentioned; I have not seen either of these.
19. For example, J. Coulston, ‘“Armed and belted men”: the soldiery in
imperial Rome’, in J. Coulston and H. Dodge (eds), Ancient Rome: The
Archaeology of the Eternal City (Oxford, 2000), pp 76–118; Christopher J.
Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration and Public
Order (Oxford, 2012); R.M. Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome
(Abingdon, 2005). The volume on the Roman army in the Blackwell Companion
series (Oxford, 2007) provides passing references in the essays. An article by
Geoffrey Powell (‘The praetorian guard’, History Today 18 (1968), pp 858–66)
takes the traditional line, with little account of scholarship; the entries in the
Neue Pauly also are not easily accessible to English readers.
20. Absil, Les Préfets.
21. This is true also for older historical works. For example, Gibbon’s The
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), Chapter 5, begins
with an examination of the guard, representing the unit as ‘the first symptom and
cause of the decline of the Roman empire’.
22. The series was based on Robert Graves’s novels, I, Claudius (1934) and
Claudius the God (1935), both published by Penguin, though these were adapted
to suit the needs of television. On the novels see Dorothea Clinton Woodward,
‘Review of Graves “I, Claudius”’, Classical Journal 30.6 (1935), pp 366–9; P.
Burton, ‘The values of a classical education: satirical elements in Robert
Graves’s Claudius novels’, Review of English Studies 46, no. 182 (1995), pp
191–218. On the TV series see D. Thomas Benediktson, ‘Review of “I,
Claudius”, directed by Herbert Wise’, Classical World 85.2 (1991), pp 142–3;
http://www.historyinfilm.com/claudius/index.htm (accessed 14/07/11).
23. Directed by Ridley Scott, the movie came out in 2000. On the historicity
of the film, see the article by Dr Allen Ward at
http://ablemedia.com/ctcweb/showcase/wardgladiator1.html (accessed
14/07/11).
24. http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/Praetorian Guard (accessed
14/07/11).
25. http://www.historum.com/ancient-history/24602-praetorian-guard.html
(accessed 14/07/11).
26. Putting the term ‘praetorian guard’ into a search engine such as Google
produces 472,000 results (accessed 14/07/11). Some of these hits are for
commercial products using the name (e.g. a division of Praetorian Wealth
Management: http://praetorianguard.biz/ or Praetorian Disposable Products Ltd:
http://www.disposablegloves.co.uk/), or for gaming sites, but many pertain to the
historical unit.
27. For similar units see J. Black (ed), Elite Fighting Forces: From the
Ancient World to the SAS (London, 2011).

2. HISTORY

1. Livy 2.20.5: ‘The dictator Postumius ... gave the signal to his cohort
(cohorti suae), a select group that he had around him for protection.’ The date is
c. 496 BC. It is possible, however, that Livy is guilty of anachronism here; see
R.M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy, Books 1–3 (Oxford, 1965), p 288. All
translations from Latin and Greek are my own.
 2. Festus on praetoria: praetoria cohors est dicta, quod a praetore non
discedebat. Scipio enim Africanus primus fortissimum quemque delegit, qui ab
eo in bello non discederent et cetero munere militiae vacarent et sesquiplex
stipendium acciperent.
3. Festus’ date is most likely in the late second century AD. See the Festus
Lexicon Project website, hosted by University College London: http://www.ucl.‐
ac.uk/history2/research/festus/indexhtm (accessed 8/5/12).
4. Livy 29.1.1: ‘he had around him three hundred young men, in the flower of
youth and noted for their robust strength, but unarmed’ (trecentos iuvenes,
florentes aetate et virium robore insignes, inermes circa se habebat). Cf.
Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 26.2.
5. The attribution of the innovation to Scipio Aemilianus also is not without
difficulty; appointed by the senate as consular commander against the
Numantines in 134 BC, he took with him a select group to act as his bodyguard,
but the passage describing them makes it clear that these men were mounted. See
Appian, Hisp. 84.
6. L. Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard before Sejanus’, Athenaeum 84 (1996), p
102; Durry: Les Cohortes, p 70.
7. Appian, BCiv 1.100.
8. See Appian, Hisp. 84; J. Crook, Consilium Principis (Cambridge, 1955), p
25. The term used by Appian is regularly translated as a ‘cohort of friends’.
9. Appian, BCiv. 1.25. The date is 132 BC.
10. Cf. Sallust, Jugurtha 98.1. For further examples, see Durry, Les Cohortes,
p 71.
11. For example, in Gaius 19.2, where the cohors amicorum is, in fact,
distinguished from the guard; Nero 5.1; Galba 7.1.
12. Crook, Consilium Principis, p 25.
13. Sallust, Catiline 60.5; see also 61.1 where the term is repeated. As with
Livy earlier, it is possible that the use of the term in this context is anachronistic.
For information on the Catilinarian conspiracy see T.P. Wiseman, ‘The senate
and the populares 69–60 BC’, in J.A. Crook et al (eds), The Cambridge Ancient
History, vol. IX (Cambridge, 1994), pp 327–67.
 14. The term used is scortorum cohortem praetoriam; see In Cat 2.23. My
thanks to Dominic Berry on the date of the publication of these speeches.
15. Caesar, BG 1.40: quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola
decima legione iturum, de qua non dubitaret, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem
futuram. See also Caesar, BG 1.42.
16. Cf. also L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (London, 1984), p
153.
17. Other units that functioned as bodyguards in this period are known,
however. For example, Caesar had a corps of Spaniards as a guard, which he
later dismissed; see Suetonius, Divus Julius 86; Appian BCiv. 2.109. Others who
had similar groups include Marius (Plutarch, Marius 43) and Quintus Sertorius,
praetor in 82 BC (Appian, BCiv 1.112). In addition, Petreius, when fighting as
Pompey’s legate against Caesar in 49 BC, is said to have had a guard drawn
from different sources; among these was a cohort of caetrati (‘peltasts’ – that is,
foot soldiers armed with a small shield), to which the adjective ‘praetorian’ is
attached: praetoria cohorte caetratorum. See Caesar, BC 1.75. That these men
were caetrati suggests that they were not Roman but local Spanish troops, used
much as the German bodyguard would be in the early imperial period, on which
see below.
18. See Durry, Les Cohortes, p 75. On the other hand, as seen above, Appian
uses the term frequently in association with Caesar, even recording at BCiv
2.107 that he dismissed the praetorian cohorts that had been his bodyguard
during the wars. Yet this is most likely an anachronistic use of the term. It is
possible that the 2,000 soldiers attending Caesar when he visited Cicero in 45
BC may indicate that by that time he did have a regular guard, though this is by
no means certain. See Ad Att 13.52.
19. Examples include II.1.14, II.3.29, II.4.43. In each, the expression used is
cohors praetoria, usually translated as ‘governor’s staff’. The term is also used
in a similar way by several of the poets; see Catullus 10.10, Horace Sat. 1.7.23–
5, Tibullus 1.3.2.
20. On Verres’ praetorian cohort see T. Corey Brennan, The Praetorship in
the Roman Republic, vol. 2 (Oxford, 2000), pp 482–95.
21. Cicero, Ad Q.f. 1.1.12: ‘Indeed, what about those you have selected to be
with you from your household personnel or as essential staff – those that are
accustomed to be called the staff of the governor.’ (quos vero aut ex domesticis
convictionibus aut ex necessariis apparitionibus tecum esse voluisti, qui quasi ex
cohorte praetoris appellari solent.) The governor’s staff included ‘humbler
members ... such as lictors’, as noted by D.R. Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero:
Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrum et M. Brutum (Cambridge, 1980), p 150.
22. For example, Ad Att. 7.2.3. Here, members of Cicero’s cohors praetoria
are reported to have witnessed a will. Shackleton-Bailey distinguishes this
cohort as a cohors amicorum praetoria and notes that it ‘consists of friends and
clients’, but the text does not specify that this is a cohors amicorum, and there is
no reason to assume such. See D.R. Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero’s Letters to
Atticus, vol. III (Cambridge, 1968), p 285.
23. Ad Fam. 15.4.7. The date is 51 BC; it has been noted that this is ‘the
general’s bodyguard, enjoying special pay and privileges’. See D.R. Shackleton-
Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1977), p 447.
24. The most succinct summary of this period is provided by Keppie, ‘The
praetorian guard’, pp 104–7.
25. Appian, BCiv 3.40. These men were enticed to join by a cash grant.
Writing in the early second century AD, it is possible that Appian was
influenced by the number of men in the imperial cohorts at that time; see
Chapter 3.
26. Appian, BCiv. 3.42. Donatives in the republic generally were associated
with triumphs, at which time the generals rewarded their troops with booty
gained from battle. Cf. V. Maxfield, ‘Systems of reward in relation to military
diplomas’, in W. Eck and H. Wolff (eds), Heer und Integrationspolitik: Die
römischen Militärdiplome als historische Quelle (Köln, 1986), p 28. Octavian’s
attempt here anticipated the donatives issued to the guard by the emperors in the
imperial period; see Chapter 3.
27. Appian, BCiv 3.45; cf. also 3.50. For Appian, these men clearly are the
equivalent of the imperial guard, for they served as Antony’s escort in Rome,
guarded his house at night under arms and were given passwords. See also
Cicero, Philippics 8.8.25, where this praetorian cohort is listed separately from
Antony’s legions and his cavalry; the date is 43 BC.
 28. Cicero, Ad Fam. 10.30. These cohorts did not just serve as a guard for the
commander, but played an active role in the struggle, according to Galba’s
account of the battle in his letter to Cicero. See also Appian, BCiv 3.66–70.
Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, pp 115–16 provides a brief summary,
with diagram.
29. Cicero, Ad Fam. 10.30.4.
30. W.W. How, Cicero: Select Letters (Oxford, 1962), p 525.
31. Appian, BCiv 4.7.
32. F. Millar, ‘Triumvirate and principate’, JRS 63 (1973), p 59.
33. RPC #1651. It should be noted, however, that there is some confusion
over the dating of these coins and that they might be as late as Claudius or Nero.
34. Appian, BCiv 4.115–16. See also Keppie, The Making of the Roman
Army, p 238, note 23.
35. It may be that the size of this cohort had an influence on the way in which
Augustus structured his imperial guard, though Appian also could be guilty of
anachronism here. For the problem of the size of individual cohorts of the
imperial praetorian guard, see Chapter 3.
36. Appian, BCiv 5.3; cf. also 5.59, where the praetorian cohorts thus formed
meet again. Of those soldiers who were discharged, some settled at Philippi,
forming a new colony (Iulia Victrix Philippi). See Keppie, The Making of the
Roman Army, pp 121, 231, and plate 16c. For problems with the dating of the
coins on which this theory is based, however, see S. Kremydi-Sicilianou,
‘Victoria Augusta on Macedonian coins: remarks on dating and interpretation’,
Tekmeria 7 (2002), pp 63–82.
37. Appian, BCiv 5.24; cf. 5.19–21. Lucius earlier had been forced to get rid
of a bodyguard made up of men from M. Antony’s colonies; see Appian, BCiv.
5.19–20.
38. Plutarch, Antony 39.2.
39. See Edward A. Sydenham, The Coinage of the Roman Republic (London,
1952), #1212, 1213; Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, pp 127, 228, plate
12c.
40. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 76.
 41. Suetonius, Augustus 14.
42. Plutarch, Antony 53.2; Appian, BCiv 5.95 (where the number is given as
1,000); Dio 49.33.4.
43. Orosius 6.19.8; his work dates to the early fifth century AD.
44. For example, at Gunugu in Mauretania; cf. Pliny the Elder, NH 5.20.
45. Augustus made many changes to the military structure shortly after
Actium, most notably the reorganization of the legions in the provinces and their
command structure. See K. Gilliver, ‘The Augustan reform and the structure of
the imperial army’, in P. Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army
(Oxford, 2007), pp 183–200. It may be that the organization of the praetorians
can be seen in the same context, but without a clearer chronology it is difficult to
know for certain.
46. J.B. Campbell, The Emperor and the Roman Army (Oxford, 1984), p 112.
The incident in the 40s at which Augustus was attacked at the games mentioned
above may also have had an impact since it was clear that Augustus’ safety
could be compromised.
47. Tacitus: Annals 4.5.3: insideret urbem proprius miles, tres urbanae,
novem praetoriae cohortes, Etruria ferme Umbriaque delectae aut vetere Latio
et coloniis antiquitus Romanis. Most translators prefer to understand the cohorts
as ‘belonging’ to the city, most recently A.J. Woodman (trans), Tacitus: The
Annals (Indianapolis, 2004), and J.C. Yardley (trans), The Annals: The Reigns of
Tiberius, Claudius and Nero (Oxford, 2008). It seems equally likely, however,
given Tacitus’ attitude towards the praetorian guard in particular, that the author
has chosen the word proprius to emphasize the close relationship between the
emperor and the city cohorts. On the urban cohorts see Chapter 4.
48. As Millar notes, this is a ‘personal grant of rights from the emperor
himself’; see The Emperor: p 65. On diplomas see Chapter 3.
49. See Dio 57.3.2; Campbell, Emperor, pp 27, 30 (where it is pointed out
that in the third century, at least, the oath was considered a ‘holy secret’; see
Herodian 8.7.4).
50. Dio 56.31–42; Tacitus, Annals 1.8.6; Suetonius, Augustus 99.2–100.4. It
is likely that such displays became a regular part of imperial funerals, of which
there are few accounts; for that of Drusilla (in AD 38) see Dio 59.11.2; cf.
Suetonius, Gaius 24.1–2; for Pertinax (in AD 193) see Dio 75.4–5.6.
51. The most comprehensive work on this group is still H. Bellen, Die
germanische Leibwache der römischen Kaiser des julisch-claudischen Hauses
(Wiesbaden, 1981). See also Speidel: Riding for Caesar; R. Sablayrolles, ‘La
rue, le soldat et le pouvoir: la garnison de Rome de César à Pertinax’, Pallas 55
(2001), pp 136–7.
52. For the Germans with Caesar, see BG 7.13.1; Speidel, Riding for Caesar,
pp 12–13.
53. Y. Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army (London, 1994), p 23.
54. On the Varan disaster see Velleius Paterculus, History of Rome 2.118.2–
119.5; Dio 56.18.4–22.2. For Pannonia see Tacitus, Annals 1.24.2. It is
interesting that the language used by Tacitus here – custodes imperatori –
indicates the role that the Germans had (‘guard for the commander’), even when
their task did not involve the emperor directly as here. On the Pannonian episode
see Chapter 4
55. Tacitus, Annals 15.58.2.
56. Suetonius, Galba 12. On the unit that eventually replaced the Germani
corporis custodes, the equites singulares Augusti, see below.
57. W. Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome (Cambridge, 1995), p 91;
Sablayrolles: ‘La rue’, p 135.
58. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 10. Passerini had argued, however, that Augustus
included the praetorians among those referred to generally as milites in the Res
Gestae; while it is impossible to know whether his audience would make this
assumption, it does allow Augustus to mask the significance of the guard. See Le
Coorti, p 210.
59. Dio 54.6.5.
60. Millar, The Emperor, p 61, argues that soldiers accompanied the emperor
on all journeys, even within Italy. Yet this is not accepted by all scholars; see,
for example, Campbell, Emperor, p 113. For further discussion on this see
Chapter 3.
61. For the games see Suetonius, Augustus 14; 43.3; 44.1; S. Bingham,
‘Security at the games in the early imperial period’, Echoes du Monde Classique
18 (1999), pp 369–79. For soldiers as guards in the city see Dio 56.23.4;
Suetonius, Augustus 23; 32.1.
62. There were eight serious fires in the reign of Augustus prior to AD 6 (the
date of the introduction of the vigiles), seven of which occurred after the
formation of the guard. Cf. Paul O. Werner, De Incendiis Urbis Romae Aetate
Imperatorum (Leipzig, 1906), p 46. On the vigiles see Chapter 4.
63. Suetonius, Augustus 27.4. G. Gaggero, Vite dei Dodici Cesari (Milan,
1990), p 237, n. 9, dates this episode to 43–42 BC.
64. Augustus 27.1.
65. P.A. Brunt, ‘Princeps and equites’, JRS 73 (1983), pp 59–60. He queries
as well whether the ‘establishment of a permanent prefecture was not the
culmination of a process in which Augustus had from time to time delegated
supreme command to one or more of the tribunes’.
66. Howe argues, however, that the initial function for these men was
military; see Praetorian Prefects, pp 10, 32. Cf. also Brunt, ‘Princeps and
equites’, p 60; Absil, Les Préfets, p 14. Syme, on the other hand, suggests that
they were ‘military in rank, but political in significance’; see Tacitus, p 591.
Pliny, Panegyricus 67.8, notes that Trajan armed his prefect; this was in case, as
emperor, Trajan did not act in the interests of the state. But the evidence is
inconclusive as to whether this was standard practice, though Herodian (3.11.2)
does suggest that Severus’ prefect, Plautianus, carried a sword at his side.
67. On the relationship see, for example, A.E. Hanson, ‘Publius Ostorius
Scapula: Augustan prefect of Egypt’, ZPE 47 (1982), p 252. On the issue of
patronage in the appointment to the equestrian prefectures, see R.P. Saller,
Personal Patronage in the Early Empire (Cambridge, 1982), p 49; Millar, The
Emperor, p 64; A.N. Sherwin-White, ‘Procurator Augusti’, PBSR 15 (1939), p
17. Saller (Personal Patronage, p 62) notes that ‘it cannot be doubted that
praetorian prefects, whose very appointments testified to the emperor’s
confidence in their loyalty and friendship, were among the most influential
figures in imperial circles’.
68. As Hanson has noted: ‘the pre-eminence of the praetorian prefecture
would have emerged only gradually ... the ordering of the equestrian career at its
highest levels [that is, from prefect of Egypt to praetorian prefect] became fixed
only from the reign of Domitian’ (‘Publius Ostorius Scapula’, p 253). On the
role of the prefects in general see Absil, Les Préfets, pp 55–82; Passerini: Le
Coorti, pp 207–356. Their juridical responsibilities are discussed briefly in
Chapter 3.
69. Dio 55.10.10.
70. K. Wachtel, ‘Ostorii Scapulae’, AArchHung 41 (1989), pp 241–6; M.
Christol and S. Demougin, ‘Notes de prosopographie équestre II: Gens Ostoria’,
ZPE 57 (1984), pp 171–8 (with family tree, p 177); Hanson, ‘Publius Ostorius
Scapula’, pp 243–53; A.E. Hanson, ‘The archive of Isodoros of Psophthis and P.
Ostorius Scapula, Praefectus Aegypti’, Bulletin of the American Society of
Papyrologists 21.1–4 (1987), pp 77–87. It is possible that a marriage between
Publius and the daughter of Sallustius Crispus (one of Augustus’ ministers)
brought the brothers to the attention of the emperor; cf. Hanson: ‘Publius
Ostorius Scapula’, p 247; ‘The archive’, p 81, n. 11.
71. R. Syme (The Augustan Aristocracy (Oxford, 1986), p 301) suggests that
he came from Brixia in Transpadane Italy, based on CIL 5.4201 (= ILS 4902),
which records a Lucius Salvius Aper as a magistrate there in 8 BC.
72. See, for example, Brunt, ‘Princeps and equites’, p 60.
73. Contra R. Syme, ‘Guard prefects of Trajan and Hadrian’, JRS 70 (1980),
p 64. For example, it is not known whether there were two successors to Scapula
and Aper or only one; Seius Strabo alone is attested as praetorian prefect at the
death of Augustus in AD 14. See Tacitus, Annals 1.7.2. Indeed, there are more
examples of single prefects than of pairs in the first three centuries. See Absil,
Les Préfets, pp 87–95.
74. Cf. 52.24.1–6. In Dio’s own lifetime, the example of the praetorian
prefect Fulvius Plautianus (whom Dio intensely disliked; see, for example,
76.15) provided the rationale for such a statement.
75. Cf. Brunt: ‘Princeps and equites’, p 60: ‘it might have been rather
invidious for [Augustus] to choose any particular senators for a commission so
closely linked with his own person.’ See also V. Rudich, Political Dissidence
under Nero: the Price of Dissimulation (London, 1993), p 234; Campbell,
Emperor, p 117. Durry, however, offered the explanation that because Maecenas
was an eques, Augustus preferred to select his praetorian prefects from that
class; see Les Cohortes, p 157.
76. The appointment has been connected with the disgrace of Augustus’
daughter Julia in the same year, and the elimination of her lovers, but without
further comment. See Syme, Augustan Aristocracy, p 300; ‘Guard prefects’, p 64
(‘The occasion might excite curiosity: perhaps after the grave crisis in the
autumn’). Yet there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case.
77. These men were equites and often ex-centurions. The length of tenure for
tribunes is not clear, though some men did serve for a lengthy period; see Brunt,
‘Princeps and equites’, pp 47, 61.
78. Even after the construction of the Castra Praetoria, the centre of
operations for the guard must have continued to be the palace, for practical
reasons; furthermore, there is no evidence of a headquarters building in the camp
itself. See Chapter 3.
79. The camp is discussed in Chapter 3, the removal of those considered a
threat in Chapter 4.
80. Tacitus, Annals 1.5.3–4.
81. The most likely candidates for this task would be members of the
speculatores, on whom see Chapter 4.
82. Tacitus, Annals 6.50.4. There is some suggestion that Macro may have
taken an even more active role in Tiberius’ death; see Tacitus, Annals 6.50.5;
Dio 58.28.4. On Macro see below.
83. References to Agrippina refer to Agrippina the Younger unless otherwise
specified.
84. Tacitus, Annals 12.68.2–3. The similarity of the roles played by the
empresses at the deaths of Augustus and Claudius has been assessed by several
scholars; see, for example, A.A. Barrett: Livia (London, 2004), pp 243–6; L.W.
Rutland, ‘Women as makers of kings in Tacitus’, CW 72 (1978), p 28. On
Burrus see below.
85. The sources hint that the reason for the delay was as much about the
timing as ensuring that all plans were in place; see Tacitus, Annals 12.68.3;
Suetonius, Nero 8. Cf. A.A. Barrett, Agrippina (Yale, 1996), p 142.
 86. Tacitus, Annals 12.69.1: tunc medio diei tertium ante Idus Octobris,
foribus palatii repente diductis, comitante Burro Nero egreditur ad cohortem,
quae more militiae excubiis adest. ibi monente praefecto faustis vocibus
exceptus inditur lecticae. dubitavisse quosdam ferunt, respectantis rogitantisque
ubi Britannicus esset: mox nullo in diversum auctore quae offerebantur secuti
sunt.
87. For a comprehensive discussion of the assassination see A.A. Barrett,
Caligula: The Corruption of Power (Yale, 1990), pp 154–171.
88. See Suetonius, Gaius 56.1; Dio 59.25.5b. Although scholars generally
have accepted the idea of two separate conspiracies in AD 40–41, Barrett
(Caligula, p 155) argues convincingly for the events to be part of a single plot. A
crucial element in the success of any conspiracy is timing; it is unlikely that,
given the constraints of time, two plots could have been conceived and then
attempted within the few months available after Gaius’ return to Rome from
Campania.
89. Cf. Dio 59.26.3. This is the first reference to such a need, and it suggests
that there had been a problem with vandalism or demonstrations centred around
the images. Cf. Barrett, Caligula, p 294, note 29.
90. The text of Tacitus’ Annals is missing for this period, and so we are
forced to rely upon Josephus and Dio for the details. It is possible, however, that
Josephus made use of the history of Cluvius Rufus, who may have been an
eyewitness to the assassination; see Barrett, Caligula, pp 168–9; K. Scherberich,
‘Josephus und seine Quellen im 19. Buch der Antiquitates Iudaicae (ant. Iud. 19,
1–273)’, Klio 83 (2001), pp 134–51.
91. For Chaerea’s career see S. Demougin, Prosopographie des Chevaliers
Romains Julio-Claudiens (Rome, 1992), #419. He had been present at the
mutiny of the armies on the Rhine in AD 14 as a centurion in one of the legions
and is described by Tacitus as a courageous young man; see Annals 1.32.2. We
know nothing of his career under Tiberius.
92. Josephus, AJ 19.21. Cf. also Suetonius, Gaius 56.2; Dio 59.29.2; Seneca,
De Cons. 18.3–4.
93. Josephus, AJ 19.41–2.
94. For a discussion of the exact date see David Wardle, ‘When did Caligula
die?’, AClass 34 (1991), pp 158–65.
95. Cf. Demougin: Prosopographie, #420 (Sabinus); #421 (Lupus); #423
(Papinius). That four tribunes of 12 were involved in the plot reveals the strength
of the conspiracy.
96. This lack of detail does not stop modern scholars from assuming the
participation of both prefects; see, for example, A. Winterling, Caligula: A
Biography (trans Deborah Lucas Schneider, Glenn W. Most and Paul Psoinos)
(London, 2011), pp 174–6; he even notes that the prefects ‘were removed from
office, but remained unharmed because they had helped to elevate the new
emperor to the throne’.
97. Cf. Josephus AJ 19.80–3. See also Barrett, Caligula, pp 162–3. Soldiers
in the area would have included not only those providing protection for the
emperor but also those patrolling the games as well as the cohort on duty at the
palace.
98. See Josephus, AJ 19.99; Suetonius, Gaius 58.
99. In the version given by Suetonius (Gaius 58.2), it is Sabinus who asks for
the watchword.
100. Cf. Dio 59.30.2. For Asiaticus’ possible involvement in the conspiracy
see Barrett, Caligula, p 162.
101. Josephus, AJ 19.119–26.
102. Josephus, AJ 19.191; cf. B. Levick, Claudius (London, 1990), pp 37–8;
Barrett, Caligula, pp 166–7. Though Josephus includes a delay between the
murder of Gaius and that of Caesonia, Barrett quite rightly notes that this would
have allowed Caesonia to escape and thus to ‘become a focus of resentment and
resistance, just as Agrippina and her sons had become in the previous reign’. The
execution of the family must have been planned in advance and taken place
immediately.
103. Josephus, AJ 19.162–5.
104. Josephus, AJ 19.214–26; cf. also Suetonius, Claudius 10; Dio 60.1–3;
Aurelius Victor, Caes 3.16. For Alma Tadema’s interpretation of this episode,
see Figures 1 and 2.
105. Cf. Levick, Claudius, pp 35, 38; Barrett, Agrippina, p 72; D. Hurley
(ed), Suetonius, Divus Claudius (Cambridge, 2001), pp 84–6. Winterling
(Caligula, pp 174–6) sees a key role for Callistus, one of Gaius’ freedman, in the
assassination and choice of Claudius, based on the account in Josephus.
106. The positive depiction of Clemens in Josephus may be the result of the
position of Clemens’ son, also Marcus Arrecinus Clemens, who was a prominent
senator under the Flavians, as noted by T.P. Wiseman, Death of an Emperor
(Exeter, 1991), p 30.
107. Suetonius records that Claudius initially had retreated to an annexe
called the Hermaeum; he then moved to a balcony, presumably associated with
the Hermaeum; see Claudius 10.1; Hurley, Claudius, pp 95–6; Barrett, Caligula,
p 173.
108. Josephus, AJ 19.253; BJ 2.211–12; Suetonius, Claudius 10.4; Dio
60.1.4.
109. The amount of the donative to be given by Claudius was either 15,000
sesterces (Suetonius, Claudius 10.4) or 20,000 sesterces (Josephus, AJ 19.247,
where a donative is also promised to the rest of the army). Cf. Levick, Claudius,
p 32; J. Mottershead (ed), Suetonius, Claudius (Bristol, 1986), p 50. On
donatives in general see Chapter 3.
110. Suetonius, Claudius 10.4: ‘[Claudius] was the first of the Caesars to
have gained the allegiance of the soldiers by means of a bribe’ (primus
Caesarum fidem militis etiam praemio pigneratus). On those who accept this,
see, for example, C.H.V. Sutherland, Roman History and Coinage: 44 BC–AD
69 (Oxford, 1987), p 76, and Durry, Les Cohortes, p 366.
111. Barrett, Caligula, p 175; Hurley, Claudius, p 101. In fact, it has been
argued that ‘by giving them twice as much, Caligula set the precedent that the
loyalty of the guard should be bought by their new imperator, instead of being
rewarded by the old one at his death’. (T.E.J. Wiedemann, ‘Tiberius to Nero’, in
A. Bowman et al (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. X (Cambridge, 1996), p
222).
112. Campbell, Emperor, pp 166–8, points to the ‘violent upheavals of the
republic’ as precedent for such a huge donative but suggests that the Claudian
figure may have been ‘merely a convenient round sum’. On the pay rate for the
guard see Chapter 3.
 113. A. Garzetti, From Tiberius to the Antonines (London, 1974), p 108.
114. RIC I, #7; see Figure 3. The legend reads ‘the emperor received’. The
figure is usually taken to be a praetorian soldier but Fides Praetorianorum has
also been suggested; see Sutherland, Roman History, pp 76–7, after C.L. Clay,
‘Die Münzprangung des Kaisers Nero in Rom und Lugdunum’, NZ (1982), p 43.
115. RIC I, #11–12. The legend reads ‘the praetorians received’. As Grant
has noted, ‘These issues are unique in Roman imperial numismatics and military
history. No other emperor, before or after Claudius, blatantly advertised that he
owed the praetorians his throne.’ See M. Grant, The Army of the Caesars (New
York, 1974), p 151. Cf. also O. Hekster, ‘The Roman army and propaganda’, in
P. Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army (Oxford, 2007), p 351.
116. Cf. Levick, Claudius, p 39. Campbell notes that ‘[t]hey are so unusual,
with their clear emphasis on comradely spirit and mutual support of emperor and
soldier, that Claudius himself may have been directly responsible for their
design. They celebrate an association between emperor and soldiers that
Augustus had been at pains to conceal.’ See Campbell, The Roman Army, p 185.
117. Dio 60.12.4.
118. Mottershead, Suetonius, Claudius, p 50; B. Levick, ‘Antiquarian or
revolutionary? Claudius Caesar’s conception of his principate’, AJPh 99 (1978),
p 95.
119. Josephus, AJ 19.269; cf. Dio 60.3.4. See also Suetonius, Claudius 11.1,
where a further reason for the execution of Chaerea is given, namely that he had
advocated the murder of Claudius.
120. Absil points out that it is difficult to know how much of a role the
prefects had in the routine administration of the cohorts themselves, arguing that
the officers would have looked after their management. See Les Préfets, p 64.
There is, however, very little evidence on which to draw such a conclusion:
direct involvement of the prefects is recorded only in times of crisis, though
Tacitus records a rather more ‘hands-on’ approach for Tiberius’ prefect, Sejanus;
see Annals 4.2.2. On Sejanus as prefect see Chapter 3.
121. For the appointment and Macro’s role in Sejanus’ fall see Chapter 4.
122. Dio 59.10.6. This is the only mention of the appointment in the sources.
Cf. A. Stein, Die Praëfekten von Agypten (Bern, 1950), p 28.
123. Dio 59.10.6; Suetonius, Gaius 26.1; Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 61. The
suicides of Macro and Ennia may have been motivated by a desire to retain their
property within the family rather than risk it being confiscated by the state; on
this see Chapter 4. In fact, Macro was able to bequeath enough money to his
hometown of Alba Fucens for an amphitheatre to be constructed; it is the
inscription associated with this that reveals his previous appointment to the
vigiles. Cf. F. de Visscher, ‘L’amphithéâtre d’Alba Fucens et son fondateur Q.
Naevius Macro, préfet du prétoire de Tibère’, RAL ser. 8, 12 (1957), pp 39–49;
F. de Visscher, ‘La carrière et le testament d’un préfet du prétoire de Tibère’,
BAB 43 (1957), pp 176–8.
124. Philo (Legatio ad Gaium 52–9) records that Gaius contrived charges
against the prefect because, among other things, he was tired of being reminded
of the role Macro had played in the succession, in particular in ensuring the
loyalty of the praetorians after the death of Tiberius. Cf. Barrett, Caligula, p 78.
125. Coincidentally, two other deaths of significance occurred around the
time of Macro’s demise: those of Tiberius Gemellus, Gaius’ cousin and heir, and
Gaius’s father-in-law, Marcus Silanus. Cf. Dio 59.8.1; 4–6; Suetonius, Gaius
23.3. Whether these three deaths are connected in any way is impossible to
determine and any understanding of the events is complicated by the problems
with chronology: was the appointment of Macro to the prefecture of Egypt
before or after the deaths of Gemellus and Silanus? If evidence had emerged of
some sort of arrangement between Gemellus and Silanus (among others),
however, it is possible that the prefect would have been implicated.
126. It is not known when a new praetorian prefect was appointed to the post,
nor who it was. Despite the assertion of several scholars that it was immediately
after Macro’s dismissal that the command of the guard reverted to being shared
by two men, this is not supported by the sources, for Dio (59.11.2) speaks of
only one praetorian prefect at the funeral of Drusilla in AD 38. Contra Barrett,
Caligula, p 80. By AD 41, there definitely were two prefects, one of whom was
Clemens; see Suetonius, Gaius 56.1: praefectorum praetori; Dio 59.25.8.
127. Tacitus, Annals 12.42.2; Dio 60.32.6a. Burrus replaced two prefects, one
of which (Lucius Lusius Geta) was given the post of prefect of Egypt, a move
which had been used in the past to remove praetorian prefects from Rome. The
other (Rufrius Crispinus) reappears in the Pisonian Conspiracy against Nero in
AD 65; see Chapter 3.
128. Suetonius, Claudius 18.2; Tacitus, Annals 12.43.1. Barrett, Agrippina, p
121.
129. The timing here is interesting, since the two prefects were able to
continue in their positions until AD 51, that is, for three years after the death of
Messalina, and two years after Agrippina’s marriage to the emperor. It has been
suggested that two other prefects had been appointed after the fall of Messalina
and before the appointment of Burrus, but there is no evidence for this and it is
difficult to understand why a change of prefects at that time would not have
elicited a comment in the sources; see B. Levick, Claudius, p 74. Scholars often
have not considered the time lapse before Agrippina had the prefects dismissed;
for example, Rudich, Political Dissidence, p 148: ‘Upon Messalina’s fall,
[Crispinus] was dismissed under pressure from Agrippina, who had championed
Afranius Burrus.’ On the demise of Messalina see Chapter 4.
130. Cf. Levick, Claudius, p 74. Agrippina had already arranged that several
of the tribunes and centurions would support Nero; see Tacitus, Annals 12.41.2,
and cf. Barrett, Agrippina, pp 118–21.
131. Evidence for Burrus’ career (and association with the imperial family) is
found in an inscription from Vasio; see CIL 12.5842 (= ILS 1321). On this
inscription and others associating Burrus with this area in Gaul, see W.C.
McDermott, ‘Sextus Afranius Burrus’, Latomus 8 (1949), pp 230–4; Barrett,
Agrippina, p 122. Tacitus is quite complimentary to Burrus (e.g. Annals 12.42.1)
and it could be that they both came from the same area; see Syme, Tacitus, pp
623–4.
132. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 368, refers to Burrus as ‘Agrippina’s creature’,
but that is overstating the situation. McDermott, ‘Sextus Afranius Burrus’, pp
248–54, sees Burrus as a protégé of Seneca.
133. This omission is unusual, since it is possible that he was the first
praetorian prefect to receive such an honour. Cf. McDermott, ‘Sextus Afranius
Burrus’, p 233.
134. On Burrus’ role in Nero’s reign see Tacitus, Annals 13.2.1; Barrett,
Agrippina, pp 142–3.
135. Tacitus, Annals 13.14.3. Shortly after this episode, Britannicus died,
though it is not clear whether he was murdered; see Chapter 4.
136. Tacitus, Annals 13.18.3. Cf. also Suetonius, Nero 34.1.
137. The consequence for Agrippina of the deprivation of this bodyguard and
of being denied quarters in the palace was that she was shunned. Cf. Tacitus,
Annals 13.19.1; Dio 61.8.6. In fact, shortly after her isolation, no doubt bolstered
by the obvious change which had occurred in Agrippina’s status, a charge of
inciting revolution was brought against her by a former friend, Junia Silana. Cf.
Tacitus, Annals 13.19–21.
138. Tacitus, Annals 14.3.1. Cf. Barrett, Agrippina, p 156.
139. For the involvement of the praetorians in the murders of imperial family
members see Chapter 4.
140. Tacitus, Annals 14.3.3.
141. It has been suggested that Nero was forced to rely upon the fleet because
he felt that he could not trust the praetorians while Burrus was in command; see
Barrett, Agrippina, p 184. But clearly Anicetus – and his position – is key here.
142. Tacitus, Annals 14.8.2–5. After the murder, Anicetus returned to his post
until confessing, at Nero’s command, to a false charge of adultery with the
empress Octavia in order to provide a motive for her removal. He was exiled to
Sardinia in AD 62. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.62.2–4; Suetonius, Nero 35.2. On his
exile, see S. Bingham, ‘Life on an island: a brief study of places of exile in the
first century AD’, Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 11 (2003), pp
388–90 (though the conclusions drawn there regarding this exile have been
challenged by Fred K. Drogula, ‘Controlling travel: deportation, island and the
regulation of senatorial mobility in the Augustan principate’, CQ 61.1 (2010–
11), p 241, note 54).
143. Barrett, Agrippina, p 190: ‘[The praetorians’] loyalty to Agrippina was
clearly tempered by a practical realism.’ The official account was repeated in a
letter to the senate in which Nero claimed that his mother wanted to be co-ruler
with him, symbolized by having the oath of allegiance sworn to her separately,
rather than being included with the imperial household. Cf. Tacitus, Annals
14.11.1.
144. Tacitus, Annals 14.10.2.
145. Dio 61.14.3. This grant does not appear in other sources, however. On
donatives in general see Chapter 3.
146. Burrus continued in his position until his death in AD 62. Almost all the
ancient sources record that he was poisoned but Tacitus admits the possibility of
a natural death. See Tacitus, Annals 14.51.1–3; cf. also Suetonius, Nero 35.5;
Dio 62.13.3. The reason given by Dio for the murder was the prefect’s
opposition to Nero divorcing his wife Octavia in order to marry his mistress
Poppaea. McDermott, ‘Sextus Afranius Burrus’, p 253, in support of the story of
murder, points to the words used by Tacitus (infausta dona) when discussing the
grant of Burrus’ estate (as well as that of Rubellius Plautus) to Octavia: ‘These
properties would have been infausta only if they had belonged to men who had
suffered some unnatural misfortune.’ On Plautus see Chapter 4.
147. On this event see Tacitus, Histories 1.5; Suetonius, Nero 47–8; Dio
63.27.2–3.
148. Nymphidius was the son of a freedwoman who was the daughter of
Callistus, the powerful freedman of Gaius and Claudius. See Plutarch, Galba
9.2.
149. Rudich, Political Dissidence, p 130. On the conspiracy see Chapter 3.
150. The other prefect, Gaius Ofonius Tigellinus, went with Nero, though it
is not known how many of the guard went with him.
151. Dio 63.19–20.
152. Tacitus, Histories 1.5.1. As Campbell, Emperor, p 85, notes, a speech to
the guard when there were exceptional circumstances was seen as an opportunity
to test the loyalty of the army: ‘the reaction of the soldiers on the spot to this
kind of political speech could be decisive and their example might influence the
conduct of others’.
153. Plutarch, Galba 2.2; cf. Suetonius, Galba 16.1; Tacitus, Histories 1.5.1;
Josephus, BJ 4.492–3; Champlin, Nero, p 4; Miriam Griffin, Nero: The End of a
Dynasty (London, 1984), pp 185–6.
154. Suetonius, Galba 11; Plutarch, Galba 8–14; Gwyn Morgan, 69 AD: The
Year of Four Emperors (Oxford, 2006), pp 39–41. For a different interpretation
of the event – that Nymphidius had changed his allegiance from Galba to
another senator rather than desiring power for himself – see Sandra Ottley, ‘The
coup of Nymphidius Sabinus’, AHB 24 (2010), pp 95–113.
155. The period is covered in detail by Sandra Ottley, The Role Played by the
Praetorian Guard in the Events of AD 69 as Described by Tacitus in his
Historiae (unpublished dissertation, University of Western Australia, 2009).
156. See Tacitus, Histories 1.5; Plutarch, Galba 15.3–4, 18.2; Dio 64.3.1–2.
Tacitus, Histories 1.20, points out that the dismissals especially were greeted
with suspicion since the remaining officers felt insecure about their positions as
well. See also Morgan, 69 AD, pp 61–2, who notes that the removal of the
officers may indicate problems with maintaining discipline.
157. Tacitus, Histories 1.24. Most scholars place the first phase of Otho’s
seduction of the guard on the journey with Galba from Spain to Rome, based on
the passage of Tacitus. But it is not at all clear from the Latin whether these
‘soldiers’ were indeed praetorians, and it is more likely that they were regular
legionaries since it is not clear why praetorians would be on this journey. See C.
Damon, Tacitus, Histories Book I (Cambridge, 2003), p 152. Morgan (69 AD, p
58) and G.E.F. Chilver (‘The army in politics, A.D. 68–70’, JRS 47 (1957), p 33)
both prefer these soldiers to be men of the VII Galbiana.
158. Tacitus, Histories 1.25–8; Suetonius, Otho 5. What is interesting here is
the position of those praetorians who were used to convince their fellow soldiers
to go over to Otho; in both sources, these men are described as speculatores, a
special branch of the guard, normally used for more clandestine purposes. In
Chapter 24, Tacitus records the grant of land to a speculator named Cocceius
Proculus, a substantial gift; bribes like this no doubt helped Otho in his cause.
On the speculatores see Chapter 4
159. Tacitus, Histories 1.29; 38–41; Suetonius, Galba 19–20; Morgan, 69
AD, pp 70–1.
160. Tacitus, Histories 1.46; Morgan, 69 AD, p 94.
161. Morgan, 69 AD, p 95.
162. On the date see Morgan, 69 AD, p 306, n. 10.
 163. The episode is recounted in Tacitus, Histories 1.80–5. Damon (Tacitus,
Histories, p 262) suggests that these soldiers could have been intended to serve
as a replacement for the city cohorts being sent north against Vitellius, while
Morgan (69 AD, p 106–7) argues that the cohort from Ostia was to be part of the
expedition itself; see also G.E.F. Chilver, A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’
Histories I and II (Oxford, 1979), pp 146–8.
164. On the possible location of the armoury see Chapter 3.
165. Tacitus, Histories 1.82. The donative promised was a substantial sum
(5,000 sesterces), though this amount is less than that promised by Nymphidius
and actually paid by both Claudius and Nero at the start of their reigns.
166. Tacitus, Histories 1.87.1, where the author notes that both urban cohorts
and praetorians accompanied Otho, referring to the latter as the ‘backbone’ of
the army. Chilver, A Historical Commentary, p 156, comments that the phrase
used here (viris et robur) ‘implies quality rather than quantity’. The guard had
last fought with Germanicus in AD 16, though the mock exercises held by Gaius
in Germany had also involved praetorians; cf. Suetonius, Gaius 45.1. On
Germanicus see Chapter 4.
167. Tacitus, Histories 2.11.
168. And some of the praetorians already had been sent to Narbonese Gaul,
as noted by Tacitus (Histories 1.87.1). It has been suggested that ‘up to 7
cohorts’ could have gone with Otho, but that seems unlikely; see R. Ash,
Tacitus: Histories Book II (Cambridge, 2007), p 108.
169. See, for example, Tacitus, Histories 2.22 and especially 2.44, where he
comments specifically on the courage of the praetorians. Plutarch (Otho 12.9)
gives a less favourable account of the praetorians, saying that they acted
shamefully in fleeing from battle. For discussion on the significance of this
episode for the question of the effective see Chapter 3.
170. Tacitus, Histories 2.49.
171. Tacitus, Histories 2.67; cf. also Suetonius, Vitellius 10.1. The discharged
praetorians make another appearance in 2.96, where they are held responsible by
Vitellius for spreading rumours about the possibility of further civil war.
172. Tacitus, Histories 2.93.2. On the Vitellian change to the cohorts see
Chapter 3.
173. On the coin see RIC I, #118; Hekster, ‘The Roman army and
propaganda’, p 341. For the prevalence of Concordia on coins in times of
discord, the reign of Septimius Severus provides an illustrative case: there are
numerous issues associating Concordia with the imperial family, in particular,
with Severus’ sons, Caracalla and Geta, who notoriously did not get along, and
also with Caracalla and Plautilla, his wife, whom he was said to despise. But it
was important that the public image of the family be presented as harmonious;
that also must be the case here, with the army as the target audience.
174. For example, at the second battle of Bedriacum; see Tacitus, Histories
3.16–33.
175. Tacitus, Histories 2.67, 82; 3.24.
176. Tacitus, Histories 3.84.
177. On the accommodation made for all these men after Vespasian’s victory
see Chapter 3.
178. Evidence for the reduction in number of cohorts is given in a diploma
dated to AD 76; see ILS 1993 (= Campbell, The Roman Army, #327), discussed
in Chapter 3.
179. See Dio 64.22.2; B. Levick, Vespasian (London, 1990), p 95.
180. For the pay rise, and pay rates in general for the guard, see Chapter 3.
This increase in pay may partly explain the guard’s anger at the murder of
Domitian, and their demands a year later for the punishment of his murderers, on
which see below.
181. It was under Domitian that the praetorian prefect was first sent to the
field in command of the army: Cornelius Fuscus was sent to Dacia and died in
battle in AD 86 or 87. See Suetonius, Domitian 6.1; Dio 67.6.6; 68.9.3. He also
appears in Juvenal, Satire 4, lines 110–12. It is not clear how many of the guard
went with him, but a praetorian soldier who died in the same Dacian War is
commemorated by the poet Martial (6.76). It is possible that some cohorts of the
guard went north as early as 84/85 in preparation for this war; see M. Roxan and
W. Eck, ‘A military diploma of AD 85 for the Rome cohorts’, ZPE 96 (1993),
pp 67–74, especially p 72.
 182. For the late first century, Suetonius and Dio are the main literary
sources, with occasional remarks in authors such as Pliny the Younger, Martial
and Statius. The situation for the early second century is even less promising:
Pliny again, Dio in fragments only and the notoriously unreliable Historia
Augusta.
183. See Absil, Les Préfets, pp 46–53; Syme, ‘Guard prefects’, pp 64–80.
184. See Suetonius, Titus 6; Tacitus, Histories 4.68; B. Jones, Domitian
(London, 1992), p 60. It is possible that Clemens had been rewarded with
senatorial status as one of Vespasian’s adherents; see G. Houston, ‘Vespasian’s
adlection of men in senatum’, AJPh 98.1 (1977), p 58.
185. See Absil, Les Préfets, p 33.
186. It is not clear whether Titus remained praetorian prefect when he
became emperor; there is no evidence for a replacement.
187. It has been suggested that the praetorians’ role in the murder has been
‘obscured by distortions in the ancient sources ... [they] are unclear about the
role of the Praetorians in the plot to murder Domitian’; cf. H. Flower, ‘A tale of
two monuments: Domitian, Trajan and some praetorians at Puteoli (AE 1973,
137)’, AJA 105.4, p 643. But there is simply no evidence for their involvement
and one need not go looking for it. On the murder see Chapter 4.
188. Suetonius, Domitian 23.1.
189. Pliny, Panegyricus 6.1; Dio 68.3.3; John D. Grainger, Nerva and the
Roman Succession Crisis of AD 96–99 (London, 2003), pp 94–6. For a thorough
assessment of this event, see A. Berriman and Malcolm Todd, ‘A very Roman
coup: the hidden war of imperial succession, AD 96–98’, Historia 50.3 (2001),
pp 324–9.
190. Pliny, Panegyricus 6.1. It is possible that the CONCORDIA
EXERCITUUM coin issues under Nerva were intended to allay fears regarding
the guard; see Flower, ‘A tale of two monuments’, p 643, n. 119.
191. Suetonius, Domitian. 23.1. Julian Bennett, Trajan: Optimus Princeps
(London, 1997), pp 40–1, sees the action as precipitated by indiscipline among
the praetorians, but such a situation was unlikely to have lasted for nearly a year.
192. Berriman and Todd, ‘A very Roman coup’, p 325.
 193. Berriman and Todd, ‘A very Roman coup’, p 326; Flower, ‘A tale of
two monuments’, pp 643–4.
194. Berriman and Todd, ‘A very Roman coup’, pp 326–7; Syme, Tacitus, p
35, n. 4: ‘Indeed nothing proves that Trajan was not the candidate of the Prefect
of the Guard.’
195. As argued by Berriman and Todd, ‘A very Roman coup’, p 328, ‘There
must have been negotiations prior to Nerva’s public adoption of his heir – but it
is difficult to see how this could have been achieved while the emperor was a
virtual hostage of his Guard, unless Aelianus and his men were the very conduits
for that negotiation and the adoption of Trajan was the ulterior demand of the
rebels.’
196. Dio 68.5.4. Cf. also Pliny, Panegyricus 5.
197. As noted by Berriman and Todd, ‘A very Roman coup’, p 327, who
suggest that Aelianus was ‘Trajan’s man’ and so he and his soldiers went north
without suspecting anything. For the traditional interpretation, see, for example,
Flower, ‘A tale of two monuments’, p 644: ‘One of [Trajan’s] first acts as
emperor ... was to summon the Praetorian commanders and their most loyal
followers among the Guardsmen to his headquarters at Mogontiacum (Mainz) in
Germany, where he rapidly executed them without any judicial process.’
198. There are other examples of men who assisted emperors in the capital
and who were later removed to avoid embarrassment: one might adduce
Anicetus, who assisted Nero in the removal of his mother and wife and was sent
to Sardinia, or Julius Pollio, who had a role in the removal of Britannicus under
the same emperor. On Anicetus see above; for Pollio see Tacitus, Annals
13.15.3–5. Two inscriptions (CIL 10.7952 and 10.7863) from Sardinia record his
tenure in the guard and in the urban cohorts. Berriman and Todd, ‘A very Roman
coup’, p 328, with n. 81, offer further examples.
199. Pliny, Panegyricus 23.3; see also 24.2. It should be noted that Speidel,
Riding for Caesar, p 42, refers to these men as equites singulares Augusti, but he
sees a waning of influence for the praetorians at this time, which is not borne out
by the evidence; see below. Even without specific designation in the text,
‘soldiers’ in the capital closely associated with the emperor are likely to be
praetorians.
 200. Pliny, Panegyricus 25.2; cf. 41.1.
201. Dio 66.26.3.
202. Bennett, Trajan, p 59.
203. Speidel, Riding for Caesar, p 43. The date of creation of this unit is
disputed: it was under either Domitian or Trajan. For the background see
Speidel, Riding for Caesar, pp 36–7.
204. They functioned much as the Germani corporis custodes had in the early
imperial period; see Speidel, Riding for Caesar, pp 39–41.
205. Speidel comments that ‘[h]aving killed a number of praetorians, Trajan
could not trust soldiers of that unit with his life’; see Riding for Caesar, p 43.
But if that had been the case, it is odd that Vespasian, who attained the
principate through civil war, had no problem accommodating those members of
the guard who had fought for his enemies; see Chapter 3.
206. See Figure 4. A date of AD 102 has been proposed for this arch; see
Flower, ‘A tale of two monuments’, pp 635–48, who provides a full discussion
of the relief.
207. See Figure 5. On shield decorations and the guard in art see Chapter 3.
208. Flower, ‘A tale of two monuments’, p 644.
209. As noted by Flower, ibid: ‘Far from being publicly disgraced, [the
praetorians’] function as the loyal attendants of the new emperor was celebrated
in the early years of his reign. Such a depiction would make no sense if they had
only recently been relegated to other duties and if Trajan had travelled to Puteoli
and to other towns without them.’
210. The wars are not well documented in the literary sources, with the
fragments of Dio (68.6–15) providing only a basic outline.
211. For epigraphic evidence of praetorians involved in this war, see, for
example, the inscription for the centurion, Lucius Aemilius Paternus (CIL
2.4461 (= ILS 2661); translated in Campbell, The Roman Army #172); Paternus,
decorated for bravery in this campaign by Trajan, was involved as well against
the Parthians. A second example is provided by that of Gaius Arrius Clemens
(CIL 11.5646 (= ILS 2081); translated in Campbell, The Roman Army #91),
discussed in Chapter 3.
 212. On the Column itself see F.A. Lepper and S.S. Frere, Trajan’s Column:
A New Edition of the Cichorius Plates (Gloucester, 1988); Lino Rossi (trans
J.M.C. Toynbee), Trajan’s Column and the Dacian Wars (London, 1971). Rossi
(pp 100–2) notes the conventions regarding the depiction of legionaries and
praetorians.
213. See Figure 6; cf. also the images in Lepper and Frere, Trajan’s Column,
plates VII–VIII.
214. Lepper and Frere, Trajan’s Column, plate XVIII (= Rossi, image 19).
See also Rossi: Trajan’s Column, pp 161–2 (with image 53); 182 (with image
86).
215. CIL 11.2661 (= ILS 2081; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army,
#91), discussed in Chapter 3. Praetorians also may be represented on the
Adamklissi monument, which celebrated Trajan’s victory over the Dacians,
though the identification is controversial. Cf. M.B. Charles, ‘Trajan’s guard at
Adamklissi: infantry or cavalry?’, Historia 53.4 (2004), pp 476–89.
216. ILS 8846. Victorinus later (AD 167) died on campaign, though it is not
clear whether in battle or from plague. He was commemorated by a statue in
Trajan’s Forum, though the inscription (ILS 9002) is incomplete, hence the
uncertainty about the manner of his death. On his career, see B. Rossignol, ‘Les
préfets du prétoire de Marc Aurèle’, Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz 18
(2007), pp 146–9 (my thanks to Michael Crawford for the reference). On the
wars in the period see A.R. Birley, ‘The wars and revolts’, in M. van Ackeren
(ed), A Companion to Marcus Aurelius (Oxford, 2012), pp 217–33.
217. The prefects were Marcus Bassaeus Rufus and Marcus Macrinius
Vindex. See Dio 71.3.5; 5.2–3; Rossignol, ‘Les préfets’, pp 149–55. The
depiction of praetorians on the Column of Marcus Aurelius again illustrates their
key role; see F. Coarelli (trans H. Patterson), The Column of Marcus Aurelius
(Rome, 2008), pp 119, 128, 130; M. Beckmann, The Column of Marcus
Aurelius: The Genesis and Meaning of a Roman Imperial Monument (Chapel
Hill, 2011), pp 152–4 (who notes that soldiers in scale armour generally are
interpreted as praetorians; on praetorian equipment see Chapter 3).
218. These sources include Dio (who is in epitomes for much of the period),
Herodian and the Historia Augusta.
 219. Historia Augusta, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus 7.9. The size of the
donative, if accurate, may reflect the double accession rather than any
uncertainty about the loyalty of the guard, as noted by A.R. Birley, ‘Marcus’ life
as emperor’, in M. van Ackeren (ed), A Companion to Marcus Aurelius (Oxford,
2012), p 156.
220. Fragmenta Vaticana #195; Durry, Les Cohortes, p 380. It is possible
that this act was to compensate the guard for problems with citizens in the
capital, since it is thought that the praetorians were responsible for bringing
plague back to the city from the north; see A.R. Birley, ‘Hadrian to the
Antonines’, in Alan K. Bowman et al (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. XI
(Cambridge, 2000), pp 167–8.
221. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, pp 132 (with note 39 on the
epigraphic evidence), 157 (with note 37). The term ‘outposted soldiers’ is his (he
discusses the difficulty of the terminology on pp 249–52).
222. Ibid., p 157.
223. See, for example, Howe, Praetorian Prefects, pp 65–6 (who refers to
Perennis as ‘vice-emperor’); Absil, Les Préfets, pp 184–5; Birley, ‘Hadrian to
the Antonines’, p 187. On Perennis’ career see O. Hekster, Commodus. An
Emperor at the Crossroads (Amsterdam, 2002), pp 60–4.
224. Hekster: Commodus, pp 55–6.
225. Ibid., pp 69–70.
226. For example, M. Peachin, ‘Rome the superpower: 96–235 CE’, in D.
Potter (ed), The Roman Empire (Oxford, 2011), p 140: ‘Cleander held what
appears to have been a unique position in the history of the imperial
administration. He was known as the a pugione, literally the “Master of the
Dagger”, though this title ought probably to have implied something more like
“Commander of the Imperial Bodyguard”.’ Hekster, Commodus, p 70, sees it as
an attempt by the emperor to weaken the power of the prefecture. On the title see
Historia Augusta, Commodus 6.1, where the office is treated as equivalent to the
praetorian prefects. Epigraphic evidence is provided by AE 1961, 280. Herodian
(1.12.3) mentions the appointment but without the title.
227. Dio 73.13. On Cleander’s fall see Hekster, Commodus, pp 72–5.
 228. Dio 73.22.1–6; Herodian 1.16–17. On Laetus see Howe, Praetorian
Prefects, pp 13, 41–2, 68. For discussion of the plot see Hekster, Commodus, pp
80–3.
229. Herodian 2.5.1; Dio 74.16.3.
230. As successor: Dio 74.1.2; Herodian 2.1–5. Murder: Dio 74.9.1–10.3;
Herodian 2.5.1–9.
231. Dio 74.8.1; Herodian 2.4.1, who records that the praetorians were told
specifically to stop harassment of the citizens; see also 2.4.4. It is not clear why
there had been such a breakdown in discipline, but the murder of Commodus
might have angered the soldiers, given his popularity with the soldiers, on which
see Hekster, Commodus, pp 164–5.
232. The number of praetorians involved in the murder – 200 as recorded by
Dio – shows that this was an impulsive act, one that did not extend far within the
guard. In fact, Dio (74.9.3) indicates that Pertinax had at his disposal both
praetorians and equites singulares with which he could have killed his assassins,
but he chose not to use them. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 128, n.
17, errs in interpreting the ‘night guard’ of this passage as vigiles, for there
would be no reason for them to be at the palace; it must be the cohort on duty
that night that is meant and the terminology used here is different from the usual
expression for the vigiles.
233. Dio 74.6.3; 8.1–9.2. For possible reasons and Laetus’ role in the murder
see A. Appelbaum, ‘Another look at the assassination of Pertinax and the
accession of Julianus’, CPh 102 (2007), pp 203–6. C.R. Whittaker, Herodian
(London, 1969), p 159, n. 2, comments on the ‘double game’ that the prefect was
playing: ‘[he] used the soldiers’ discontent and the freedmen to further another
candidate, perhaps by this time thinking of Septimius Severus.’ For a more
nuanced view of Laetus’ possible motives see T.D. Barnes, ‘The family and
career of Septimius Severus’, Historia 16.1 (1967), pp 87–107, especially pp
100–1.
234. Dio 74.11; Herodian 2.6.4–11. It should be noted that Dio makes a
similar claim regarding Otho, criticizing him for revealing that the empire was
for sale; see 63.9.1.
235. Historia Augusta, Didius Julianus 2.
 236. Herodian’s account (2.6.3) includes just such a delay (‘after one or two
days’); while it is unlikely that Dio would have erred in the chronology, given
that he was present at the senate, it is possible that he has compressed events. On
the chronology see Whittaker, Herodian, p 171, n. 3.
237. The promise of a donative by both Sulpicianus and Julianus must be the
source of the story about a ‘bidding war’, but whether there were rival amounts
offered is not clear; Dio’s bias against the military, in particular the guard, must
be taken into account when assessing his version.
238. Dio 74.11.6; Herodian 2.6.9; Historia Augusta, Didius Julianus 2.6. For
a slightly different interpretation of this event, see Appelbaum, ‘Another look’,
pp 198–207; his question as to how the prefect of the city could settle things in
the praetorian camp (p 204) is resolved by the fact that the urban cohorts were
still housed at this time together with the guard and that must be why
Sulpicianus was sent: to deal with the cohorts under his command.
239. Dio 75.1.1; Herodian (2.9.8) emphasizes the breaking of their oath as the
reason for punishment of the praetorians.
240. Herodian 2.13.1–2.
241. Dio and Herodian offer two different versions of the way in which the
guard was dismissed, though in both cases, the soldiers seem completely
unaware of their fate; see Dio 75.1.1–2; Herodian 2.13.
242. It has been noted that Severus would have saved a sizeable sum of
money with this action; see P. Herz, ‘Finances and costs of the Roman army’, in
P. Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army (Oxford, 2007), p 318.
243. Dio 75.2.4–6; Herodian 2.14.5.
244. On the use of the Severan guard as a core for his field army, see Cowan,
Aspects of the Severan Field Army, passim.
245. The use of legionaries in the guard may be seen as part of the wider
militarization of the empire undertaken by Severus, who also put a legion on
Italian soil for the first time, the II Parthica at Albanum. On Severus’ military
reforms see E. Birley, ‘Septimius Severus and the Roman army’, Epigraphische
Studien 8 (1969), pp 63–82; R.E. Smith, ‘The Roman army reforms of Septimius
Severus’, Historia 21 (1972), pp 481–99.
 246. Dio 75.2.5–6.
247. Dio 75.2.6. He concentrates mostly on their appearance and lack of
urbanity.
248. Dio 77.10. Bulla may have been a former guardsman dismissed in AD
193; he managed to evade Severus’ men for two years, being captured only
through being betrayed. On this episode see Furhmann, Policing the Roman
Empire, pp 134–8 (who questions whether the story is not just a literary
construct).
249. Dio 80.2.2–3. The date is not certain, but the incident occurred before
the death of Ulpian in AD 223.
250. On the relationship between soldier and civilian in the capital, see
Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, pp 89–91.
251. Dio 80.2.2; cf. Herodian 6.9. Ulpian, instrumental in the very early
stages of the reign of Alexander Severus, was murdered by praetorians in AD
223; that he had taken refuge in the palace with Alexander and his mother, Julia
Mamaea, was not enough to save him from the wrath of the soldiers. On the
chronology see R. Cleve, ‘Cassius Dio and Ulpian’, AHB 2 (1988), pp 118–24; J.
Modrezejewski and Z. Zawadzki, ‘La date de la mort d’Ulpien et la préfecture
du prétoire au début du règne d’Alexandre Sévère’, RD 45 (1967), pp 565–611.
252. Dio 80.5.1–2. It was Dio’s strict attitude to discipline that seems to have
been the problem. See 80.4.2.
253. See, for example, Dio 78.3.1–2; 9.1; 10.4. Cf. also Herodian 4.3.4; 4.3–
8. Animosity between the brothers was long-standing and though the sources
favour Geta and are virulent in their hatred of Caracalla, it is clear that one or the
other of the two would win through eventually.
254. Dio 79.4–6. The plot involved several of the officers, mainly tribunes.
This accession marked the first time that an equestrian had become emperor. On
Macrinus see D. Baharal, ‘The Emperor Macrinus’, in E. dal Covolo and G.
Rinaldi (eds), Gli Imperatori Severi (Rome, 1996), pp 46–65.
255. On the displeasure of the soldiers – specifically the guard – with the new
emperor, see Dio 79.17.4. He mentions the change of conditions for all of the
soldiers in 79.28.1–2.
 256. Dio 79.31–40. The guard had been with Caracalla in the east and would
have taken part in the struggles between Macrinus’ forces and those soldiers
supporting Elagabalus. The text of Dio at this point is quite corrupt, with many
lacunae, so specific details are often hard to discern. Herodian (5.4.8) mentions
the praetorians fighting for Macrinus.
257. On Elagabalus’ devotion to the god whose name he took see M. Icks,
The Crimes of Elagabalus (London, 2011), pp 48–52, 72–88. Leonardo de
Arrizabalaga y Prado makes much of this association in his work on the
emperor, The Emperor Elagabalus: Fact or Fiction? (Cambridge, 2010).
258. Dio 80.18.4; cf. also Herodian 5.8.1.
259. Dio 80.17.2–3, 19.1–4; Herodian 5.7.4. On the adoption, see S. Dušanić,
‘Severus Alexander as Elagabalus’ associate’, Historia 13.4 (1964), pp 487–98.
The sources also have the mothers of the two young men at odds with each
other; for example, Herodian (5.8.3) comments on Julia Mamaea offering money
secretly to bring soldiers over to his side.
260. Dio 80.19.2; Herodian 5.8.2.
261. Dio 80.20.1–2; Herodian 5.8.5–8. The influence of Julia Maesa,
grandmother to both young men, must be acknowledged as well in Elagabalus’
demise; see, for example, Herodian 5.8.3–4; Icks, The Crimes, pp 37–40.
262. There were no real problems, such as civil war, invasions or epidemics
during the reign, as noted by Icks, The Crimes, p 88. But the praetorians in
particular, now formed of legionary soldiers, struggled with the behaviour of the
emperor in Rome.
263. Alexander was murdered along with his mother by soldiers on the north
frontier in the spring of 235, having been abandoned by his guard. See Herodian
6.8.5–9.7.
264. Herodian 7.11.2–9. On this episode see Y. Rivière, ‘Les batailles de
Rome: présence militaire et guerrilla urbaine à l’époque impériale’, Histoire
Urbaine 10 (2004), pp 82–4.
265. Herodian 8.8.1–2.
266. As noted by A. Birley, ‘Making emperors. Imperial instrument or
independent force?’, in P. Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army
(Oxford, 2007), p 389: ‘Herodian ends with the year 238 ... for the next half
century reliable information is lacking. The fullest source, the Historia Augusta,
can here hardly be trusted at all, and the others, the Latins, principally Aurelius
Victor, Eutropius, and the Epitome de Caesaribus, or the Greeks, Zosimus,
Zonaras, and the Byzantine chroniclers, are brief, scrappy, and confused.’
267. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, pp 136–7.
268. For example, there is numismatic evidence to suggest that the
praetorians took part in campaigns under Gallienus in AD 261; see RIC V,
#370–2; Figure 7.
269. Millar, The Emperor, p 65.
270. On the changes to the military in the late empire see Y. Le Bohec,
L’Armée Romaine sous le Bas-Empire (Paris, 2006), passim; K. Strobel,
‘Strategy and army structure between Septimius Severus and Constantine the
Great’, in P. Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army (Oxford, 2007), pp
267–85.
271. Lactantius, de Mort. 12. For the praetorian cavalry with Galerius in
Egypt in the mid-290s, along with the equites singulares, see Speidel, Riding for
Caesar, p 73. The bodyguard accompanying the emperor in scenes on the Arch
of Galerius may also include praetorians; for the images see M.S. Pond
Rothman, ‘The thematic organisation of the panel reliefs on the Arch of
Galerius’, AJA 81 (1977), pp 427–54 (especially figure 19).
272. The picture is quite different when looking at the praetorian prefects; a
number of powerful individuals held the office from the late second century
onwards and, by the end of the third century, the prefect was treated as the
emperor’s deputy with a shift to more administrative responsibilities. Their
importance is seen in the fact that the position continued even after the guard
itself had been disbanded. See P. Porena, ‘À l’ombre de la pourpre: l’évolution
de la préfecture du prétoire entre le IIIe et le IVe siècle’, Cahiers du Centre
Gustave-Glotz 18 (2007), pp 237–62; Howe, Praetorian Prefects; T.D. Barnes,
The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Harvard, 1981), Chapter VIII,
‘Praetorian Prefects’.
273. Aurelius Victor, de Caes. 39.47. Bird, in his commentary on the text,
postulates that the reduction in number was substantial and that the reasons for
not disbanding the unit included ‘the prestige of the city and its turbulent mob’;
see H.W. Bird, Aurelius Victor. De Caesaribus (Liverpool, 1994), p 176, n. 36.
274. Lactantius, de Mort. 26.2. The author attributes the declaration for
Maxentius with the emperor’s decision to tax the populace of Rome for the first
time and with the reduction of the guard.
275. Aurelius Victor de Caes. 40.5; Eutropius 10.2. The co-Augustus was
Severus, with Constantine and Maximinus Daia as Caesars.
276. On the support of the people, see Bird, Aurelius Victor, p 180, n. 6.
277. Eusebius HE 8.14.3; Vita Const. 1.35. Cf. also Aurelius Victor, de Caes.
40.24.
278. Aurelius Victor, de Caes. 40.24–25; Zosimus 2.17.2. The praetorians
were sent to fight on the frontiers, according to Pan. Lat. 12 (9) 21.2–3. It is not
clear what happened to any praetorians not in Rome. On the unit that replaced
the guard, see R.I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae: The Palace Guards of the Later
Roman Empire (Rome, 1969); Le Bohec: L’Armée Romaine, pp 68–70. On the
destruction of the camp and its meaning, see A.W. Busch, ‘“Militia in urbe”.
The military presence in Rome’, in L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio (eds), The
Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC–AD 476): Economic, Social, Political,
Religious and Cultural Aspects (Leiden, 2007), p 331.

3. ORGANIZATION

1. Dio 55.24.6. It is of note that, although providing an account of the

military under Augustus, it is only for the city cohorts that Dio seems able to
give specific numbers.
2. Tacitus, Annals 4.5.3.
3. H. Freis, Die Cohortes Urbanae (Köln, 1967), pp 36–7; Durry, Les
Cohortes, p 77. The date at which the urban cohorts were established is not
certain. It is possible that they were set up at the same time as the guard, but it
has also been suggested that the establishment occurred late in Augustus’ reign.
See Freis, Urbanae, pp 4–6; Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 44–5. On the unit itself see
Chapter 4. The numbering of the urban cohorts may add to the view that, early in
their history, there were nine praetorian cohorts, for the urban units used X to
XII from their inception (though the Xth urban cohort is attested first under
Domitian; see Cecilia Ricci, ‘In custodiam urbis: notes on the cohortes urbanae
(1968–2010)’, Historia 60.4 (2011), p 486, with n. 6).
4. On distinguishing praetorian cohorts from the legions see Durry, Les
Cohortes, pp 77–8; Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, p 153. The idea of
fluctuating numbers was first put forward by Passerini in his discussion on the
number of cohorts in the early principate (Le Coorti, pp 44–9).
5. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 78, lists six inscriptions which mention the XIth
cohort and six which mention the XIIth cohort; all are without a firm date,
though he places them in the first century AD. Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p
108, notes that the XIIth cohort is ‘securely attested’ in AD 65. See below.
6. For example, Durry, Les Cohortes, p 79. Several recent works have
continued to be cautious; for example, Le Bohec (Imperial Roman Army, p 21),
who simply states that the increase happened before AD 47.
7. AE 1978, #286 (translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #96); the
important lines for this discussion are the first four:
A. Virgio L. f. Marso, | prim. pil. leg. III Gallicae | iterum, praef. castr. Aegy., |
praef. fabr., tr. mil. in praet. | divi Aug. et Ti. Caesaris Aug. | cohort. XI et IIII
praetoriar.
(To Aulus Virgius Marsus, son of Lucius, chief centurion of the III Legio
Gallica for a second time, prefect of the camp in Egypt, prefect of engineers,
military tribune in the praetorian guard of the divine Augustus and Tiberius
Caesar Augustus of the eleventh and fourth praetorian cohorts ...)
The inscription receives extensive discussion in C. Letta, ‘Le imagines
Caesarum di un praefectus castrorum Aegypti e l’XI coorte pretoria’, Athenaeum
56 (1978), pp 3–19; and B. Dobson, ‘Praefectus castrorum Aegypti – a
reconsideration’, Chronique d’Egypte 57 (1982), pp 322–37. The exact date of
the stone is unknown.
8. Inversion on Marsus’ stone was argued by Letta (‘Le imagines’, p 11). For
other examples on military inscriptions see Dobson, ‘Praefectus castrorum
Aegypti’, p 328. Dobson suggests that Marsus may have wanted to ‘emphasize
the distinction ... of serving two emperors in the responsible task’, and he notes
that the ‘placing of a post ... out of chronological order in a career to emphasize
some special point about it is a common practice’.
 9. Two other interpretations have been proposed, however. The editor of AE
(1978) argued that praetorian cohorts X and XI came into existence at the very
end of the reign of Augustus only to be disbanded by Tiberius prior to AD 23 so
as to number nine in that year (as recorded in Tacitus). This explanation, though
maintaining the order of the tribunates in the inscription, seems unlikely since it
would mean the discharge of two entire cohorts after only a few years’ service.
Demougin, Prosopographie, p 270, proposed that Marsus’ first tribunate was
with the XIth urban cohort, a view also taken by Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’,
pp 109–10. While this solution maintains the order of the tribunates in the
inscription, the absence of the adjective urbanae is troubling, though, as Keppie
points out, not entirely unknown. Ricci, ‘In custodiam urbis’, p 486, notes that
‘the epithet urbana first appears in a late Augustan or early Tiberian text’, but
then concludes (p 487) that Marsus (named as Gallicus in her text) served in the
XIth urban cohort and was promoted to the IVth praetorian. But if, as she
maintains, the inscription ‘demonstrates the original connection between the
Urban Cohorts and the Praetorian’, that is, that the praetorian cohorts used I–IX
and the urban X–XII, why the need to add praetoriarum to the designation of the
th
IV cohort? The suggestion that all of the cohorts initially may have had the
epithet praetoria (p 486, n. 6) is not credible.
10. ILS 2701, dating to AD 65. It is possible that this third cohort was created
at the same time as the other two under Tiberius, as is often assumed by
scholars.
11. Tacitus, Histories 2.93.2: insuper confusus pravitate vel ambitu ordo
militiae: sedecim praetoriae, quattuor urbanae cohortes scribebantur, quis
singula milia inessent. On the praetorians’ role in the year 69 see Chapter 2.
Vitellius held power from April to December.
12. Suetonius, Vitellius 10.
13. Tacitus, Histories 2.94. It has been suggested that Tacitus’ language here
suggests that some of the recruits were ‘unsuitable’; see Ash, Tacitus, pp 361–2.
Of interest is the inclusion of auxiliaries among the new praetorians, though it is
not clear how many were enrolled. Passerini, Le Coorti, p 169, lists an
inscription for an auxiliary (AE 1932, 30), and Tacitus’ language (alaris in 2.94)
suggests that non-citizen soldiers were enrolled, according to Chilver (A
Historical Commentary, p 255). Ash, Tacitus, p 362, notes the unusual use of the
adjective as a noun, and translates it as ‘auxiliary cavalry units’.
14. The number of cohorts is based on CIL 16.21 (= ILS 1993; translated in
Campbell, The Roman Army, #327). A military diploma in which specific
reference is made to the speculatores, as well as to nine praetorian and four
urban cohorts, it dates to AD 76. For further discussion of this diploma and on
military diplomas in general see below.
15. Tacitus, Histories 4.46; Levick, Vespasian, p 152; Miriam Griffin, ‘The
Flavians’, in Alan Bowman et al (eds), The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 11
(Cambridge, 2000), p 26. Cowan notes that Vespasian had to deal with ‘elements
of up to 28 praetorian cohorts’ in this process; see Aspects of the Severan Field
Army, p 12. At first Vespasian attempted to release all the Vitellian soldiers but
he soon realized that it would be better to decide each dismissal on an individual
basis. For examples of Vitellian supporters who were promoted to the guard by
Vespasian, see ILS 2034 (discussed below) and ILS 2036 (= Campbell, The
Roman Army, #63, #62). On the ways in which Vespasian accommodated these
soldiers and on their subsequent retirement see L. Keppie, ‘Colonisation and
veteran settlement in Italy in the first century AD’, PBSR 52 (1984), pp 91–2.
16. Vespasian also offered a reduced donative because of financial restraints;
see Chapter 2. On emulation of Augustus, see Durry, Les Cohortes, p 80;
Passerini, Le Coorti, p 55.
17. CIL 16.81 (a diploma, in which the Xth cohort is mentioned, it dates to
the early second century AD).
18. See Chapter 2. Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field Army, p 14,
associates the increase with Domitian’s Dacian Wars. Cf. also Durry, Les
Cohortes, pp 80–1; Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 21; Coulston, ‘Armed
and belted men’, p 77.
19. Durry first argued for quingenary cohorts; see Les Cohortes, p 86. Among
those who support cohorts of 500 are Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 112;
Grant, The Army of the Caesars, p 88; Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 21
(but for criticism of his use of the Castra Praetoria in this assessment, see
below).
20. This is why Durry turned to the laterculi praetorianorum (the register of
discharges) in an attempt to calculate the number in each cohort; he concluded
from this evidence that the second-century cohorts, at any rate, were quingenary,
and that the increase in effective happened under Severus. See Durry, Les
Cohortes, pp 84–7. His methodology was criticized, however, by Passerini, Le
Coorti, pp 59–62, and by D.L. Kennedy, ‘Some observations on the praetorian
guard’, Ancient Society 9 (1979), pp 283–7. See also Cowan, Aspects of the
Severan Field Army, pp 55–63, for a summary of the methods used by, and for
criticisms of, Durry and Kennedy.
21. Chilver, A Historical Commentary, p 17.
22. Dio 75.2.4–5; see also Chapter 2. As Chilver, A Historical Commentary,
p 16, notes: ‘had [Dio] known that Severus was the first to make a praetorian
cohort 1,000 strong, he would surely have said so’.
23. Herodian 3.13.4.
24. Whittaker, Herodian, p 352, n. 1. Some scholars suggest an increase from
1,000 to 1,500 at this time; see Kennedy, ‘Some observations’, p 288; Coulston,
‘Armed and belted men’, p 77.
25. R.E. Smith, ‘The army reforms’, pp 485–6. The II Parthica clearly is the
‘great army encamped before the city’ in Herodian, despite its distance from the
capital.
26. Complaints about the way in which Severus changed the atmosphere of
Rome with his reforms of the military are also found in Dio (75.2.5–6), as noted
earlier (Chapter 2).
27. Tacitus, Histories 2.93.2.
28. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 82, suggested that the subjunctive mood of the
verb in this passage (inessent) denoted a change in effective, since it marked an
exception (‘not only sixteen cohorts, but also each one thousand strong’), but
that is an overstatement of the force of the verb. It could be, however, that
Tacitus added the clause denoting the effective as a way of reminding the reader
that this was a substantial increase (that is, an additional 4,000 men). My thanks
to Gavin Kelly for his helpful discussion of this passage.
29. Among those who argue for milliary cohorts from the time of Augustus
are T. Mommsen, ‘Die Gardetruppen der römischen Republik und der
Kaiserzeit’, Hermes 14 (1879), p 30; Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 62–5; I.A.
Richmond, ‘The relation of the praetorian camp to Aurelian’s wall of Rome’,
PBSR 10 (1927), p 12; Campbell, Emperor, p 162, n. 6. Other interpretations
have been offered for the purported Vitellian change: for example, Le Bohec,
Imperial Roman Army, p 21, argues for a temporary increase from 500 to 1,000,
and then a reduction back to 500 under Vespasian. Some propose that the
number remained at 1,000 from this time; see Keppie, The Making of the Roman
Army, p 188; Gilliver, ‘The Augustan reform’, p 196. Scheidel, ‘The
demography of the Roman imperial army’, in his Measuring Sex, Age and Death
in the Roman Empire: Explorations in Ancient Demography (Ann Arbor, 1996),
p 126, n. 95, argues that the cohorts were milliary by the time of the Antonine
period. On this see also Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field Army, pp 60–3;
Kennedy, ‘Some observations’, p 287.
30. Although the praetorian cohorts associated with the late republic varied in
size, we know that the units could be sizeable. See Chapter 2. The effective of
the urban cohorts also is not clear; see Chapter 4.
31. In addition to the praetorian infantry, each cohort had a cavalry unit
closely associated with them. The total number of horsemen associated with the
guard is not known, but may have been as many as 1,200. On this body see
Durry, Les Cohortes, p 99; Speidel, Riding for Caesar, pp 31–3.
32. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 240. As Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 117,
notes, it was probably easier to recruit men locally. Until the reign of Septimius
Severus, there was no system in place whereby service in the guard became a
reward for the ordinary soldier from the legions.
33. Purcell, ‘Rome and its development’, p 793; P.A. Brunt, ‘Conscription
and volunteering in the Roman imperial army’, in his Roman Imperial Themes
(Oxford, 1990), pp 193–4.
34. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 99, following Passerini, notes that, at
the beginning of the second century, Italians still comprised 89 per cent of
recruits for the guard, and by the end of the Antonines, the number had fallen
only slightly. For general statistics on the recruitment of praetorians, cf. Durry,
Les Cohortes, pp 239–57, and Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 146–59, where he
provides a list of inscriptions from the first two centuries AD of praetorians
according to origin, but without specific dates. For recruitment in general
(mostly secondcentury evidence) see J. Sašel, ‘Zur Rekrutierung der
Prätorianer’, Historia 21 (1972), pp 474–80; W. Scheidel, ‘Inschriftenstatistik
und die Frage des Rekrutierungsalters römischer Soldaten’, Chiron 22 (1992), pp
281–97, especially p 290.
35. Tacitus, Annals 4.5.3.
36. As noted by Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 118.
37. Dio 56.23.4. It is difficult to know whether Dio is referring to the guard
here or to the German bodyguard, though his language suggests the former.
38. For Macedonia see CIL 6.2767 (= ILS 2032) and CIL 6.2645 (= ILS
2030); cf. Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 79, 241, 252. An example of a praetorian
from Gallia Narbonensis is found in CIL 6.2763. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 241,
cites Pliny the Elder, NH 25.17, as an example of a praetorian from Spain, but
the origin is not clear from the context. Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 156–9, provides
epigraphic evidence for recruits from the provinces; in the first two centuries
AD, Macedonia, Noricum and Spain provided the most non-Italian recruits, but
the numbers vary widely.
39. For example, Kennedy, ‘Some observations’, pp 289–94, lists only three
transfers of this nature, all of which he dates to AD 69: CIL 6.2649 (= ILS 2035);
CIL 6.2558 (= ILS 2036; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #62); CIL
6.2725 (= ILS 2034; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #63, discussed
below). Keppie, ‘Colonisation’, p 92, n. 100, adds four other possible candidates.
S. Dušanić, ‘An early praetorian diploma’, Epigraphica 55 (1993), pp 9–44, errs
in suggesting that the subject of the diploma under discussion – if it even
belongs to a praetorian, which is uncertain – had possibly been moved to the
guard from his legion by Nero in AD 62 (as Dušanić also argues is the case for
ILS 2034); both diplomas clearly belong to the civil war period. On diplomas see
below.
40. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 99. For examples of soldiers who
were promoted to the guard in this period see CIL 6.2437 (= ILS 2037; translated
in Campbell, The Roman Army, #64); CIL 6.2758 (translated in Campbell, The
Roman Army, #65) – both dated to AD 193; CIL 6.210 (translated in Campbell,
The Roman Army, #66) – dated to AD 208. Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field
Army, p 16, n. 27, notes that Thracians and Pannonians dominate in the third
century.
41. The term of duty for praetorians was 12 years in 14 BC, changing to 16
years in AD 5. Cf. Dio 54.25.6; 55.23.1; Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 262–4.
Legionary soldiers usually served for 25 years after the middle of the first
century AD.
42. Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field Army, p 46. Furthermore, he has
argued convincingly that Severus formally increased the length of service to a
minimum of 18 years; see pp 35–47.
43. Scheidel, ‘Demography’, p 111.
44. Campbell, Emperor, pp 10, 111. See also E. Birley, ‘Origins of legionary
centurionates’, in his Roman Britain and the Roman Army (London, 1961), p
122.
45. Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 251–7, argues for the praetorians to be of modest
birth, while Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 159–71, prefers to see these men coming
from better-off families.
46. See Scheidel, ‘Demography’, p 111; R.P. Duncan-Jones, ‘Age-rounding,
illiteracy and social differentiation in the Roman empire’, Chiron 7 (1977), p
338.
47. W. Scheidel, ‘Marriage, family, and survival: demographic aspects’, in P.
Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army (2007), p 418, argues that the
use of the term ‘ban’ is not accurate; he suggests ‘non-recognition’ of marriage
is a more appropriate term.
48. Sara Phang, The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 BC – AD 235): Law
and Family in the Imperial Army (Leiden, 2001), pp 160–4. She offers the
explanation that ‘the Praetorians’ low “marriage” rate is related to their status as
an elite force’. The importance of military diplomas for the praetorians may stem
from this restriction; see below.
49. On the hazards of living in Rome see W. Scheidel, ‘Germs for Rome’, in
C. Edwards and G. Woolf (eds), Rome the Cosmopolis (Cambridge, 2003), pp
158–76; A. Scobie, ‘Slums, sanitation, and mortality in the Roman world’, Klio
68 (1986), pp 399–433. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, p 188, notes
that ‘residence in the capital’ was an attraction for recruits with the reduced risk
of injury or death, but this seems not to be borne out by the demographic
evidence (though better medical attention may have alleviated some of the
problems). My thanks to April Pudsey for her comments on this debate.
50. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 58.
51. CIL 6.2725 (= ILS 2034; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #63):
C. Vedennius C.f. | Qui. Moderatus Antio, | milit. in leg. XVI Gal. a. X, | tranlat
[sic] in coh. IX pr., | in qua milit. ann. VIII, | missus honesta mission., | revoc. ab
imp. fact. evoc. Aug., | arcitect. armament. imp. | evoc. ann. XXIII, | donis
militarib. donat. | bis. ab divo Vesp. et imp. Domitiano Aug. Germ. | . . . . . . . . . .
.
(Gaius Vedennius Moderatus, son of Gaius, of the tribe Quirina, from Antium,
soldier in the XVI Gallica for ten years, transferred to the ninth praetorian
cohort, in which he served for eight years, honourably discharged, recalled by
the emperor and made evocatus Augusti, architect of the imperial armoury,
evocatus for 23 years, awarded military honours twice, by the Divine Vespasian
and by the Emperor Domitian Augustus Germanicus.)
52. Vedennius’ speciality was in artillery, as is evident from the ballista on
his tombstone. My thanks to Lawrence Keppie for this information.
53. G. Wesch-Klein, ‘Recruits and veterans’, in P. Erdkamp (ed), A
Companion to the Roman Army (Oxford, 2007), p 440.
54. On the importance of funerary inscriptions for soldiers see L. Keppie,
‘“Having been a soldier”: The commemoration of military service on funerary
monuments of the early Roman empire’, in J.J. Wilkes (ed), Documenting the
Roman Army: Essays in Honour of Margaret Roxan (London, 2003), pp 31–49;
J. Coulston, ‘Art, culture and service: the depiction of soldiers on funerary
monuments of the 3rd century AD’, in L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio (eds), The
Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC–AD 476): Economic, Social, Political,
Religious and Cultural Aspects (Leiden, 2007), pp 529–61. For details on
funerary inscriptions of the guard in and around Rome see Scheidel,
‘Demography’, pp 111–16; N. Latteri, ‘La statio dei pretoriani al III miglio
dell’Appia antica e il loro sepolcreto “ad catacumbas”’, MEFRA 114.2 (2002),
pp 534–44; Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field Army, passim. On the
relationship between the soldier and the person setting up the stone at Rome see
D. Noy, Foreigners at Rome: Citizens and Strangers (London, 2000), pp 68–71.
For an example, see Figure 8.
55. For careers of those below the centurionate see D.J. Breeze, ‘The career
structure below the centurionate’, ANRW II.1 (1974), pp 435–9; Durry, Les
Cohortes, pp 101–26; he also provides a chart on p 191 listing positions for
careers at all levels.
56. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 301.
57. Just such an award is detailed in the earliest extant diploma for a
praetorian (CIL 16.25), dated to the reign of Vespasian; see below. The grant
provides exemption from taxation as well; it is hard not to see this additional
privilege as related to the settlement after the civil war of AD 69.
58. Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 117 (on the foundation of Aosta in 25
BC). It has been suggested that providing land to those completing their service
meant the treasury need not provide the praemia militiae (a sum of money
provided on retirement), thus resulting in savings; see S. Ferjančić, ‘Veterans of
the praetorian guard in the central Balkan provinces’, Zbornik Matice srpske za
klasične studije 11 (2009), p 114.
59. For examples from each of these groups – those that stayed in Rome,
those that went to the provinces and those that returned to their place of origin –
see Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 301–2, with notes. For details on some who settled
in the Balkan area (though not all were from there) see Ferjančić, ‘Veterans’, pp
114–17. Dušanić’s soldier, if indeed a praetorian, seems to have retired to Spain;
see ‘An early praetorian diploma’, p 24. For examples from the first century see
Keppie, ‘Colonisation’, passim.
60. Ferjančić, ‘Veterans’, p 118. See Wesch-Klein, ‘Recruits and veterans’,
pp 447–9 on the legions; given the status of soldiers from the guard, they must
have been valued in their communities upon their return.
61. On diplomas in general see Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, pp 221–3.
62. Praetorians who settled in areas where they might marry non-citizen
women would have had particular need of these documents. In addition to the
praetorians and auxiliaries, those who received diplomas upon completion of
service included members of the fleet, of the urban cohorts and occasionally
legionary soldiers. For a different interpretation of these documents (that all
were special grants) see S. Dušanić, ‘Pre-Severan diplomata and the problem of
“special grants”’, in W. Eck and H. Wolff (eds), Heer und Integrationspolitik:
Die römischen Militärdiplome als historische Quelle (Köln, 1986), pp 190–240.
63. CIL 16.25. There is appended only part of the name of a soldier from the
second praetorian cohort.
64. nomina speculatorum qui in praetorio meo militaverunt item militum | qui
in cohortibus novem praetoriis et quattuor urbanis subieci. CIL 16.21 (= ILS
1993; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #327). Campbell, Emperor, p
111, notes that it is only on praetorian diplomas that the first person is used of
the emperor (‘I have granted’); on others the third person is used. On the
importance of this wording see Chapter 2.
65. Calculated from the table in P. Holder, Roman Military Diplomas V
(London, 2006), pp 681–98. An example of a third-century diploma (dating to
AD 246) is shown in Figure 9.
66. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 223. The impetus might have come
from soldiers transferred from the legions to the guard in this period who had to
be discharged by Vespasian and who would want some compensation in return.
See M.-P. Arnaud-Lindet, ‘Remarques sur l’octroi de la civitas et du conubium
dans les diplômes militaires’, REL 55 (1977), pp 305–8.
67. Holder, Diplomas V, lists 72 diplomas for praetorians post AD 193. The
last grant comes in AD 306.
68. On the prefecture see Chapter 2.
69. Brunt, ‘Princeps and equites’, p 59.
70. Cf. Campbell, Emperor, p 105; Saller, Personal Patronage, pp 42, 158;
Millar, The Emperor, pp 276, 285.
71. Tacitus, Annals 4.2.2.
72. Tacitus, Annals 12.41.2; Barrett, Agrippina, pp 118–21.
73. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 143. For an exception to this see below on Naso.
Speidel, Riding for Caesar, p 99, notes that primipilares were ‘the most tried and
trusted men in the emperors’ service’.
74. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 143. There are many variations on this career
path, for example, omitting the tribunate of the vigiles; most often this was
because of exceptional circumstances. See, for example, CIL 10.4872 (= ILS
2021) in which Lucius Ovinius Rufus went directly from the primipilate of a
legion to be tribune of the XI urban cohort before moving on to the tribunate of
the III praetorian cohort; the date is Augustan.
75. On the duties of the tribunes in the legions see Le Bohec, Imperial Roman
Army, pp 37–9.
76. Digest 49.16.12.2; noted by Speidel, Riding for Caesar, p 95.
77. All other posts were under the supervision of the cornicularius, who
usually had served for eight years. See Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 93–9, 191; Le
Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, pp 54–5.
78. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 133; B. Dobson and D.J. Breeze, ‘The Rome
cohorts and the legionary centurionate’, Epigraphische Studien 8 (1969), pp
106–10.
79. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 134. It also was possible for a praetorian soldier to
advance to a legionary centurionate at this point rather than to stay in the city
cohorts; see Dobson and Breeze, ‘The Rome cohorts’, pp 105–6.
80. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 137. The term trecenarius is difficult to translate;
see Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 89–96; Dobson and Breeze, ‘The Rome cohorts’, pp
118–19. J.C. Mann, ‘Trecenarius’, ZPE 52 (1983), pp 136–40, offers another
suggestion – that the term is an indication of rank rather than an official title.
81. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 136. Dobson and Breeze, ‘The Rome cohorts’, p
119.
82. Breeze, ‘The career structure’, p 437. See, for example, the career of
Aulus Saufeius Emax, a soldier of the IXth praetorian cohort promoted to
tesserarius (CIL 3.2887 = ILS 9067; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army,
#67):
A. Saufeius P. f. Ca[m. . .] | max. Ansio miles c[oh.] | VIIII pr. (centuriae) Firmi
Ter[tulli], | militavit annis . . . , [bene] | ficiarius t[rib., tes]serarius, co[rnicular.],
| donis do[natus ab] | imperat[ore] . . . . no Cae[sar Aug. tor]quib[us] . .
(Aulus Saufeius Emax, son of Publius, of the tribe Camilia, from Ansium (?),
soldier of the ninth praetorian cohort, century of Firmus Tertullus, served [. . .]
years, clerk of a tribune, officer of the watchword, senior clerk, awarded honours
by the Emperor [. . .] Caesar Augustus, with necklaces ...)
Cf. also the epitaph of Gaius Lucilius Vindex from the VIth praetorian cohort
who was clerk of a tribune (beneficiarius) and then became an optio in a century
(CIL 9.5809 = ILS 2078; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #69).
83. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 139.
84. Dobson and Breeze, ‘The Rome cohorts’, p 110, note that ‘The transfer to
the Rome centurionates ... was a special favour which would require the consent
of the emperor, and men who could obtain this favour would also be able to turn
the opportunity of service in Rome to good use.’
85. For Chaerea see Chapter 2.
86. Tacitus, Annals 15.67.2–3, especially 67.2, Tacitus’ speech by one of the
tribunes, Subrius Flavus, on why he joined the plot; 68.1. See also Dio 62.24.2;
Suetonius, Nero 36.2.
87. Tacitus, Annals 15.65.1.
88. Rufus had been made prefect of the grain supply in AD 55; his
appointment to that post is connected to Agrippina. See Tacitus, Annals 14.51.3,
where he is described as being popular with both the populace and the soldiers.
This reputation may have been the result of the diligence with which he had
carried out his duties when in charge of the grain supply, if a reference to
Faenian granaries (CIL 6.37796) belongs to him.
89. Tigellinus had been appointed prefect along with Rufus on the death of
Burrus in AD 62. He previously had been the prefect of the vigiles, though the
date of his appointment is not certain. On Tigellinus see Demougin,
Prosopographie #651; Griffin, Nero, pp 103–4.
90. Tacitus, Annals 14.57.1; cf. also Dio 62.13.3. The sources make it clear
that Nero relied more on Tigellinus: he was involved in the persecution of
Octavia (AD 62) and provided an elaborate banquet for Nero’s enjoyment (AD
64), but there is no mention of Rufus in these years. See Tacitus, Annals 14.60.5,
64.1, 15.37; Suetonius, Nero 35.2; Dio 62.15.1–6.
91. Tacitus, Annals 15.59.1.
92. Ibid., 15.49.2, 50.4, 51.1–4, 54–56, 57.1–2. See also Dio 62.27.3.
 93. It is not clear where these extra troops came from; Tacitus simply
mentions that there were Germans among them. Tacitus, Annals 15.58.1–2.
94. Ibid., 15.59.4–5.
95. Ibid., 15.58.3–4; Rudich, Political Dissidence, p 117.
96. The seven tribunes were: Pompeius (praenomen and cognomen
unknown); Cornelius Martialis; Flavius Nepos; Statius Domitius (all of whom
were demoted); Gavius Silvanus; Statius Proxumus (both of whom committed
suicide); and Subrius Flavus (who was murdered). Cf. Demougin,
Prosopographie, p 480.
97. They were Veianius Niger and Gerellanus; cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.67.4,
69.1. E. Koestermann, Cornelius Tacitus, Annalen, vol. 4 (Heidelberg, 1965), p
322, notes that the four who were demoted were not listed in Tacitus as being
involved in the plot. It may have been that Nero was uncertain whom he could
trust and preferred to remove any officers that had the least suspicion attached to
them.
98. In addition to those already mentioned, Rufrius Crispinus, praetorian
prefect under Claudius who had been removed by Agrippina in AD 51, was
exiled to Sardinia after the conspiracy. Tacitus, Annals 15.71.4, suggests that the
reason for this was Nero’s animosity towards Crispinus, perhaps connected with
his earlier marriage to Poppaea, now Nero’s wife. Crispinus committed suicide a
year later on the orders of Nero; see Tacitus, Annals 16.17.1–2.
99. Koestermann, Cornelius Tacitus, vol. 4, p 322, argues that it was the
‘incompetence and inactivity’ of Faenius Rufus that accounts for the failure of
the conspiracy. See also Rudich, Political Dissidence, p 118.
100. Tacitus, Annals 15.72.1; cf. Dio 62.27.4; Suetonius, Nero 10.1. The
grant of grain seems to have been intended not just for this one occasion but as a
permanent concession. For a different interpretation of this grant see Barrett,
Agrippina, p 173.
101. Tacitus, Annals 15.72.1; cf. also Suetonius, Nero 15.2; Dio 62.27.4.
According to Suetonius (Otho 1.3), it was a very rare honour for a statue on the
Palatine to be granted to an individual outside the imperial family. The last
praetorian prefect to have been granted such an honour was Sejanus.
 102. Suetonius, Tiberius 60.
103. Suetonius, Claudius 21.3. See Chapter 4.
104. Similis: Dio 69.19; Plautianus: Dio 76.14.3. The examples tend to
cluster in the first century AD for which there are more complete sources.
105. See, for example, Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 45 (‘the soldier
started with three officer appointments in the garrison at Rome, then became a
centurion in a legion and in the three urban corps, then a primuspilus and
returned once more to the capital for a triple tribuneship which could lead to
procuratorships’). See also Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 113 (who dates
such careers back to Claudius’ reign).
106. On the career path in the second century see Dobson and Breeze, ‘The
Rome cohorts’, pp 101–32. For the tribunates of the guard see B. Dobson, ‘The
significance of the centurion and primipilaris in the Roman army and
administration’, ANRW II.1 (1974), p 418. It is not clear how long each post was
held; Dobson and Breeze, ‘The Rome cohorts’, p 107, note that ‘[t]he Rome
centurionates, as they are held in different units with a fixed relationship to one
another, represent promotions as well as transfers, but again there is no fixed
period of tenure of each post, and the temptation to think of a rapid transit must
be resisted’.
107. CIL 11.5646 (= ILS 2081; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army
#91):
C. Arrio C. f. Corn.| Clementi militi coh. IX | pr., equiti coh. eiusdem, donis |
donato ab imp. Traiano | torquibus armillis phaleris | ob bellum Dacicum,
singulari | pr[a]efectorum pr., tesserario, op | tioni, fisci curatori, cornicul. |
tribuni, evocato Aug., (centurioni) coh. I vigil., (centurioni) | statorum,
(centurioni) coh. XIIII urb., (centurioni) coh. VII pr.,| trecenario, donis donato
ab. imp. | Hadriano hasta pura corona aurea, | (centurioni) leg. III Aug.,
primipilari, IIviro quin | quennali, patrono municipi, | curatori rei publicae, |
decur. et Aug. V[I vir.] municipes Matil.
(To Gaius Arrius Clemens, son of Gaius, of the tribe Cornelia, soldier of the
ninth praetorian cohort, mounted soldier of the same cohort, awarded honours by
the Emperor Trajan with necklaces, with armbands and with ornaments for
performance in the Dacian War, aide of the praetorian prefects, officer of the
watchword, orderly, clerk in charge of the treasury, senior clerk of a tribune,
evocatus Augusti, centurion of the first cohort of the vigiles, centurion of the
imperial messengers, centurion of the fourteenth urban cohort, centurion of the
seventh praetorian cohort, senior centurion, awarded honours by the Emperor
Hadrian with an untipped spear and golden crown, centurion of the III Augusta,
chief centurion, member of the board of two for five years, patron of the
municipality, curator of the community; the town councillors, the board of six
Augustales, and the citizens of the municipality of Matilica [erected this
monument].)
Campbell notes that this career is ‘fairly typical of the more elaborate second-
century pattern of promotion to the centurionate from the guard’.
108. For discussion of such careers see Birley, ‘Origins of legionary
centurionates’, pp 118–22.
109. CIL 3.14387 (= ILS 9199; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army,
#95):
[L.] Antonio M. f. Fab. Nasoni |
[(centurioni ) le ]g. III Cyrenaicae |
[(centurioni ) le ]g. XIII Geminae, |
[honorat]o albata decursione ab imp., |
[praef.] civitatis Colaphianorum, |
[primo] pilo leg. XIII Gem., | trib.
leg. I Italic., | [trib. coh.] IIII vigilum,
| trib. coh. XV urban | [trib. coh. ]
XI urban., | trib. coh. IX prae[t. | donato]
ab imperator[e Nerone co]ron. [valla]ri,
corona au[rea] | vexillis [duob]us, ha[stis puris]
du[a] bus | [primo pilo bis le]g. XIV Gem.,
| [trib. coh.] I praet., | et pra[ep]osito
supra | [vetera]nos Romae m[o]rantium
[pluriu]m exercituum, | proc. Aug. [Po]nto et B[ithyni]ae
(To [Lucius] Antonius Naso, son of Marcus, of the tribe Fabia, [centurion] of the
III Cyrenaica, [centurion] of the XIII Gemina, honoured by the emperor in the
white drill (?), [prefect?] of the district of the Colapiani, [chief] centurion of the
XIII Gemina, tribune of the I Italica, [tribune] of the fourth cohort of the vigiles,
tribune of the fifteenth urban cohort, [tribune] of the eleventh urban cohort,
tribune of the ninth praetorian cohort, awarded honours by the Emperor Nero
with a rampart crown, a golden crown, two standards, and two untipped spears,
[chief centurion for a second time?] of the XIV Gemina, [tribune] of the first
praetorian cohort and put in charge of the veterans of numerous armies staying
in Rome, procurator of the Emperor in Pontus and Bithynia ...)
110. For example, he is listed as one of the tribunes cashiered by Galba; see
Tacitus, Histories 1.20.
111. On this appointment, see Keppie, ‘Colonisation’, pp 92–3. He postulates
that Naso held the tribunate of the guard as well as the command over the
veterans concurrently.
112. For example, Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 114: ‘The standard
sequence, of the three city-based tribunates held in due order, is in place under
Nero, as exemplified by the careers of such officers as M. Vettius Valens, C.
Gavius Silvanus and L. Antonius Naso.’ One other first-century example is
Lucius Tatinius Cnosos (AE 1933, 87). But it must be noted that these are the
only examples we have, and therefore it is dangerous to draw any firm
conclusions from such a small sample.
113. CIL 11.395 (= ILS 2648; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army,
#90).
114. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 133, however, refers to Vettius Valens’ career as
‘un curriculum typique’, though this is challenged by Dobson and Breeze, ‘The
Rome cohorts’, p 107 (‘Vettius Valens is anything but typical’).
115. Dio 53.11.5. My thanks to Calum Maciver for his helpful discussion of
this passage.
116. Millar, The Emperor, p 59, notes that there is ‘some acerbity’ in Dio’s
comment; Dio’s attitude to the praetorians is coloured by his experience under
Septimius Severus, something which I intend to pursue elsewhere.
117. On the duties of the guard see Chapter 4. It has been argued that part of
the reason for the increased rate of pay may have been to offset the cost of
purchasing their own food in the markets at Rome, at least before the reign of
Nero, when the grant of grain was given. See P.A. Brunt, ‘Pay and
superannuation in the Roman army’, Papers of the British School at Rome 18
(1950), p 53, with n. 21.
118. For an overview of the problem of pay rates for the army in general see
R. Alston, ‘Roman military pay from Caesar to Diocletian’, JRS 84 (1994), pp
113–23; Watson, Roman Soldier, pp 97–9.
119. Brunt, Pay and Superannuation, p 51, points out that the term ‘double’
is not necessarily exact and can account for a wide range of possibilities.
120. Tacitus, Annals 1.17.6.
121. Dio 55.23.1. This amount was increased by Caracalla for the guard in
the early third century, but it is unclear by how much because the text is corrupt
at that point; see Dio 78.24.1.
122. Tacitus, Annals 1.8.2; Suetonius, Augustus 101; Dio 56.32.2. Keppie,
based on this evidence, argued that the pay for both urban and praetorian cohorts
was the same until sometime between AD 6 and 14, at which point the pay for
the praetorians was doubled. See ‘The praetorian guard’, p 110.
123. See, for example, Watson, Roman Soldier, pp 97–8.
124. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 210.
125. Dio’s claim that the grant of the higher rate of pay was approved by the
senate is important, for it indicates that the emperor’s personal bodyguard was
seen as an accepted part of the principate. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 77, comments
that the act ‘sanctioned’ the existence of the guard. Cf. also Campbell, The
Emperor, p 110.
126. Suetonius, Domitian 7.3. The date was AD 84. Numismatic evidence
supports the text; see Speidel, ‘Roman army pay scales’, p 87, n. 1.
127. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, pp 209–10.
128. Herodian 3.8.5.
129. Dio 79.36.2. For details on the possible rates of increase see R. Develin,
‘The army pay rises under Severus and Caracalla and the question of the annona
militaris’, Latomus 30 (1971), pp 687–95.
130. Tacitus, Annals 1.2.1: militem donis ... pellexit.
131. For the grant to the veterans see Res Gestae 15.3. On the grant for
Gaius’ appearance see Dio 55.6.4. It may be that Tacitus was referring to the
land grants established under Augustus; see F.D.R. Goodyear, The Annals of
Tacitus, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1972), p 104.
132. On donatives in general see Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 114–23; Watson,
Roman Soldier, pp 109–10. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, pp 214–17,
provides a chart listing all donatives granted to the army in the imperial period,
while Menéndez Argüín lists those for the praetorians only; see Pretorianos, pp
155–6.
133. Sejanus: Suetonius, Tiberius 48.4; Claudius: Dio 60.12.4; Agrippina:
Dio 61.14.3. Pisonian Conspiracy: Tacitus, Annals 15.72.1; Dio 62.27.4.
134. Domitian: Dio 67.7.3.
135. Severus: Dio 77.1.1; Caracalla: Herodian 4.4.7, 4.5.1.
 136. A detailed examination of the camp is provided by Menéndez Argüín,
Pretorianos, pp 57–72.
137. Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1: vim praefecturae modicam antea intendit,
dispersas per urbem cohortis una in castra conducendo, ut simul imperia
acciperent numeroque et robore et visu inter se fiducia ipsis, in ceteros metus
oreretur.
138. Suetonius, Augustus 49.1: neque tamen umquam plures quam tres
cohortes in urbe esse passus est easque sine castris, reliquas in hiberna et
aestiva circa finitima oppida dimittere assuerat. Cf. also Tiberius 37.1 (where
Suetonius records the building of the camp for the praetorian cohorts that were
previously ‘scattered and billeted out’); on the context of this passage (namely
that it was part of an enumeration of security measures undertaken by Tiberius)
see Rivière, ‘Les batailles’, p 64.
139. Both Aquileia and Ostia have been proposed as possible sites, but the
evidence is tenuous. See Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 44–5; Keppie, ‘The praetorian
guard’, pp 115–16.
140. Webster, Roman Imperial Army, p 45. Cf. also Campbell, Emperor, p
111.
141. Grant, The Army of the Caesars, p 89.
142. It is possible, of course, that the cohorts referred to by Suetonius (tres
cohortes, no specific designation) are the urban cohorts and that all of the
praetorian cohorts were billeted outside of the capital before AD 23. Keppie,
‘The praetorian guard’, p 116, notes that there is little epigraphic evidence of the
guard in Rome during the Augustan period, but this does not mean that
praetorians were not in the capital at this time and there are several examples of
them being involved in activities in the city throughout Augustus’ reign; as a
result, it would be more convenient to have at least some of the praetorians
situated in Rome. On their duties in this period see Chapter 4.
143. The date of Strabo’s appointment as prefect is not known, but at the
accession of Tiberius, he is recorded in Tacitus (Annals 1.7.2) as taking the oath
after the two consuls and before the prefect of the grain supply; there is no
record of a colleague in the prefecture and it is assumed that he was sole
praetorian prefect at that point.
 144. Cf. B. Levick, Tiberius (London, 1976), p 73. For the mutiny see
Chapter 4. Sejanus had been involved in military affairs prior to this assignment.
Tacitus, Annals 4.1.2, places him in the group that accompanied Gaius Caesar to
the east in 1 BC; Velleius Paterculus also accompanied Gaius east, but does not
mention Sejanus in his description of events. Cf. History of Rome 2.101–3. For
Sejanus’ family connections see A.R. Birley, ‘Sejanus: his fall’, in N. Sekunda
(ed.), Corolla Cosmo Rodewald (Gdańsk, 2007), pp 123–6.
145. Strabo had apparently been appointed prefect of Egypt; see Stein, Die
Praëfekten, pp 24–5. The exact date of his tenure is uncertain, but Stein believes
Strabo died in office. Cf. Pliny the Elder, NH 36.197. The appointment itself is
only tentatively accepted by Levick, Tiberius, p 273, n. 60, and is challenged by
D. Hennig, L. Aelius Sejanus, Untersuchungen zur Regierung des Tiberius
(Munich, 1975), pp 7–8.
146. See Velleius Paterculus, History of Rome 2.127.1, where this
comparison is made. Woodman, however, interprets this section of Velleius’
work as an attempt ‘to counter contemporary criticism of Tiberius’, rather than
as any defence of Sejanus; see A.J. Woodman, Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian
Narrative (2.41–131) (Cambridge, 1977), p 247. Be that as it may, the
comparison still must have been apt for Velleius to have noted it for his readers.
147. The date of this honour is either AD 19 or 20 and Sejanus was the first
equestrian to receive it. There were also other honours in this period, for
example, the betrothal of Sejanus’ daughter to Claudius’ son, which brought
about a close connection to the imperial family. See Tacitus, Annals 3.35.1.
148. Dio 58.4.2–4. Cf also Suetonius, Tiberius 65.1. Syme, Augustan
Aristocracy, p 311, refers to this appointment as a ‘startling and flagrant
anomaly’.
149. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 364; Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 277–8.
150. Hennig, L. Aelius Sejanus, pp 144–55. This may have been Macro, who
would play a pivotal role in Sejanus’ fall later that same year; see Chapter 4.
151. Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1. As Syme has noted, this is to allow him to include
the first mention of the camp in his general assessment of Sejanus at the
beginning of Book 4. See Syme, Tacitus, p 424. Nevertheless, this date is
accepted by Durry, Les Cohortes, p 45.
 152. Dio 57.19.6. It should be noted that Suetonius does not mention Sejanus
in connection with the construction of the camp; cf. Suetonius, Tiberius 37.1.
Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, p 101, n. 28, questions whether the camp
was indeed Sejanus’ idea ‘carried through for the reasons posited in the hostile
ancient sources, or a ploy to distance the emperor from a potentially unpopular
innovation’. One need not believe the reasons given in the sources, but still
accept that the construction was the responsibility of Sejanus.
153. Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1: ut simul imperia acciperent numeroque et robore
et visu inter se fiducia ipsis, in ceteros metus oreretur.
154. This is seen especially in the use of the word ‘alleged’ (praetendebat) by
Tacitus in the sentence that follows the rationale for the camp: ‘[Sejanus] alleged
that the soldiers were disorderly when scattered, that if anything came up
suddenly they could be of greater assistance if they could act together; and that
they would conduct themselves more austerely if the camp was placed far from
the attractions of the city’ (praetendebat lascivire militem diductum; si quid
subitum ingruat, maiore auxilio pariter subveniri; et severius acturos si vallum
statuatur procul urbis inlecebris). This idea – of Sejanus desiring the control of
Rome – is accepted by many scholars, including Durry, Les Cohortes, p 152;
Passerini, Le Coorti, p 52; Erhard Meissner, Sejan, Tiberius und die Nachfolge
im Prinzipat (Erlangen, 1968), p 5, but recent assessments are more measured
(e.g. Wiedemann, Tiberius to Nero, p 213).
155. Levick, Tiberius, p 121, notes that fear of disturbances in Rome against
Tiberius may have been a catalyst as well, yet the cohorts already in place in the
city should have been sufficient to counter any trouble.
156. On the problem of discipline see Campbell, Emperor, p 251, and
Speidel, Riding for Caesar, pp 95–6. Tacitus himself notes that the billeting of
Vitellius’ troops throughout Rome in AD 69 caused problems, since it was
difficult to train and maintain discipline; see Tacitus, Histories 2.93. Such a
situation could have occurred with the guard as well in the early principate.
157. As Gilliver, ‘The Augustan reform’, p 196, has noted, the construction
of the camp was ‘an overt statement about the nature of imperial rule that
Augustus in his guise as restorer of the republic could not have afforded’. See
also Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 122.
 158. See, for example, Ernest Nash, Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome
(New York, 1961), p 221; S.B. Platner and T. Ashby, Topographical Dictionary
of Ancient Rome (Rome, 1965), p 106; L. Richardson, A New Topographical
Dictionary of Ancient Rome (Baltimore, 1992), pp 78–9; Le Bohec, Imperial
Roman Army, p 23.
159. A standardized plan for legionary fortresses only was beginning to be
developed in the first century AD, but even so, the design of the Castra Praetoria
had no obvious precedent. For the development of the fortress plan see A.
Johnson, Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD in Britain and the
German Provinces (London, 1983), pp 222–90. See also Norbert Hanel,
‘Military camps, canabae, and vici. The archaeological evidence’, in P. Erdkamp
(ed), A Companion to the Roman Army (2007), pp 401–7.
160. Pliny the Elder, NH 3.67, refers to the camp as being at the ‘outer edge
of the city’ (ad extrema tectorum). For location see Figure 10. It has been noted
that the main road of the Viminal led from the camp through to the Forum; cf.
Busch, ‘Militia in urbe’, p 320; F. Coarelli (trans J. Clauss and Daniel Harmon),
Rome and Environs: An Archaeological Guide (Berkeley, 2007), figure 59.15.
161. Richmond, ‘The relation of the praetorian camp’, pp 12–22, provides a
comprehensive discussion on the nature of the circuit wall and its chronology.
See also Coarelli, Rome and Environs, pp 19–20.
162. In terms of size, the circuit wall of the camp measures approximately
440 by 380 metres and encloses 16.72 hectares, comparatively small in relation
to the average legionary fortress, which typically encloses around 20 to 25
hectares, on which see Johnson, Roman Forts, p 31.
163. M.E. Blake, Roman Construction in Italy from Tiberius through the
Flavians (Washington, 1959), p 14. Busch, ‘Militia in urbe’, p 330, notes that
this ‘new and very modern method’ corresponded well with the function of the
camp (to strengthen discipline) and contrasted with the marble structures in the
city.
164. See Richmond, ‘The relation of the praetorian camp’, plate VIII.
165. A degree of architectural elaboration, achieved through a decorative
patterning of masonry, is evident on both gates and they have been described as
the translation into brick and concrete of a triumphal arch. See Blake, Roman
Construction, p 15. The enhanced decoration was fitting for the elite units
housed within.
166. Busch, ‘Militia in urbe’, p 328, with n. 42, notes that other camps
located in civilian settlements had ditches, using the example of the Cripplegate
fort in London. The Castra Praetoria was attacked at least twice in its history, in
AD 69 and 238; see Chapter 2. In his examination of the phasing of the
surviving portions of the circuit, Richmond, ‘The relation of the praetorian
camp’, p 22, noted three main periods of repair and alterations prior to the
camp’s incorporation in the city’s defences; two of these have been linked
directly with these historic assaults.
167. Random finds from as far back as 1870 relating to the camp have been
compiled in the Carta Archaeologica di Roma, Tavola III (Florence, 1977),
while large-scale salvage works in the 1980s are summarized briefly in M.L.
Sementilli and L. Cecilia, ‘Castra Praetoria’, Bulletino della Commissione
Archaeologica Comunale di Roma 91.2 (1986), pp 366–9.
168. The well-preserved late first-century AD camp at Inchtuthil illustrates
how design was being codified at this time; see L.F. Pitts and J.K. St Joseph,
Inchtuthil. The Roman Legionary Fortress (London, 1985).
169. It has been suspected by some scholars that these barracks constitute a
later addition to the Tiberian camp undertaken to accommodate an increase in
the guard’s numbers; see, for example, Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, p 82;
Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 112. But while excavation has shown that
there was renovation in the interior of the camp at a later period, there is nothing
to suggest that the two-storey barrack blocks were not original to the Tiberian
construction. In fact, the nature of the camp’s excavations make any arguments
about the date of most of the building remains tricky (for the exception see
below).
170. For example, the principia of the Claudian fortresses at Vindonissa and
Vetera measured 14,400 and 11,400 square metres respectively, while 6,000–
9,000 square metres appears to have been more typical. See Pitts and St Joseph,
Inchtuthil, p 86, for a discussion on comparative principia sizes. For a
comparison between the Castra Praetoria and the legionary fortress at
Novaeseum in Germany see Figure 12.
 171. See Sablayrolles, ‘La rue’, p 139, on the importance of the route
between camp and palace. See Figure 10.
172. Cecilia, ‘Castra Praetoria’, p 368.
173. These structures include the Shrine of the Standards (Herodian 4.4.5;
5.8.5–7), a temple to Mars (CIL 6.2256 = ILS 2090), and an altar to Fortuna
Restitutrix (CIL 6.30876). On inscriptions devoted to gods associated with the
camp see E. Lissi Caronna, ‘Castra Praetoria’, in E. Steinby (ed), Lexicon
Topographicum Urbis Romae, vol. 1, A–C (Rome, 1993), p 252. On the
praetorians and religion see Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 307–58.
174. Praetoria of the first century AD range from 800 square metres to 5,184
square metres; see Pitts and St Joseph, Inchtuthil, p 188.
175. The same theory also applies to the tribunes; they, too, were of sufficient
status to be able to take advantage of urban life. In that case, the centurions
would have been the highest-ranking officers who were resident in the camp,
though perhaps on a rotating basis.
176. Literary evidence suggests that the praetorians made use of the baths in
the city. Herod Agrippa, imprisoned in the Castra Praetoria during the reign of
Tiberius, was said to be on his way to the baths when news of the emperor’s
death reached him (Josephus, AJ 18.228–33). The location of the prison is not
known.
177. For example, among Julio-Claudian fortresses, hospitals ranged from
3,520 to 6,890 square metres. See Pitts and St Joseph, Inchtuthil, p 93. Coarelli,
Rome and Environs, p 247, attributes a hospital to the camp, along with the
praetorium, but as has been noted, there is no evidence for either.
178. Tacitus, Histories 1.38, 80 (on which see Chapter 2); CIL 6.999 (= ILS
333); 6. 2725 (= ILS 2034; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #63,
discussed above).
179. The Carta Archaeologica di Roma, Tavola III, identifies this building as
a granary, as does Lissi Caronna, ‘Castra Praetoria’, p 253. But the remains,
consisting of eight large vaulted cells entered by a staircase from the east, bear
little resemblance to military granaries of which numerous examples exist.
Military architects were concerned with keeping grain dry and well ventilated;
storing it underground, even with a cavity wall, would defeat this purpose.
Moreover, the means of access, via a stairway and narrow passage, does not
suggest the storage of bulk materials that typically were off-loaded on elevated
platforms from carts. One also could question the logic of stockpiling grain
when so close to the capital; as Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’, p 112, notes,
‘food-stocks must have been readily obtainable in the adjacent city’.
180. Lissi Caronna, ‘Castra Praetoria’, pp 252–3. The use of this technique
indicates that this is an original feature; see Blake, Roman Construction, p 15.
181. Coarelli, Rome and Environs, p 247. Richmond, ‘The relation of the
praetorian camp’, figure 1.
182. See D. Davison, The Barracks of the Roman Army from the 1st to 3rd
Centuries A.D. (Oxford, 1989) on the nature of legionary barracks.
183. Another spatial economy evident in all of the contubernia identified in
the camp is that they lack the large storage vestibule that is always found in
legionary examples. This omission can be explained by the fact that the
praetorians would not be expected to maintain an extensive field kit because of
the specialized nature of their duties. Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, p 82,
argues that there may have been store rooms on the ground floor of the multi-
storey barracks, with contubernia on the upper levels, but it is not clear that such
storage areas were needed.
184. Le Bohec, Imperial Roman Army, p 21. Keppie, ‘The praetorian guard’,
p 112, comes to the same conclusion. On the other hand, Kennedy, ‘Some
observations’, p 287, uses the same evidence to argue for milliary cohorts, at
least from the second century.
185. This total is derived as follows: the best-preserved single-storey barrack
contains at least 32 contubernia (the more elaborate arrangement of smaller
rooms displayed at the ends of several of the barrack blocks probably should be
interpreted as officer’s quarters, which would follow the standard military
pattern). At eight men per room, as was the norm, each block would house
approximately 260 soldiers. From what has been excavated thus far, there is
enough physical evidence to suggest that there were at least 30 of these barrack
blocks, allowing for a total of 7,800 men. The four shorter barrack blocks in the
southeast corner of the camp would hold approximately 204 men each, making a
total of 816 soldiers. The remains of the two-storey barracks revealed at least
104 contubernia per floor; if one postulates another similar group to the west of
these, which space would allow, the total number that could be housed within
would be 3,328 men. Those sections of the wall that have survived show that
there were 82 cells in the north wall and 87 in the east wall. Given an equal
number in the south and west walls, with nine more in each of the corners, the
total number of contubernia within the walls would be 347, providing further
accommodation for 2,776 men. My thanks to Stephen Copp for his help with
these calculations.
186. Rankov, The Praetorian Guard; G. Sumner, Roman Military Clothing,
vol. 1 (London, 2002); Roman Military Clothing, vol. 2 (London, 2003); M.
Bishop and J. Coulston, Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the
Fall of Rome (Oxford, 2006). See also Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field
Army, pp 110–34; A. Raúl Menéndez Argüín, ‘La guardia pretoriana en
combate. I: equipamiento’, Habis 41 (2010), pp 241–61; H. Ceñal Martinez,
‘Uso del arco en las cohortes pretorianas’, Gladius 31 (2011), pp 77–82 (my
thanks to Eberhard Sauer for the last two references).
187. For perhaps the most famous image of the guard from this period see
Figure 13.
188. Private monuments, on the other hand, are more numerous. For their
design see Busch, ‘Militia in urbe’, pp 332–8; Coulston, ‘Armed and belted
men’, pp 94–5.
189. On the problem of identifying soldiers on these monuments see, for
example, Charles, ‘Trajan’s guard’, pp 476–89; Coulston, ‘Armed and belted
men’, pp 98–9 (on the Great Trajanic Frieze). That there was separate armour for
praetorians and legionaries in the first century is implied by Tacitus in his
account of Otho’s coup in AD 69: the armoury was opened and the soldiers took
whatever armour they could, ‘without distinction between praetorian and
legionary’. See Histories 1.38.3: rapta statim arma sine mora et ordine militiae,
ut praetorianus aut legionarius insignibus suis distingueretur ...
190. Caratacus: Tacitus, Annals 12.36.2. Tiberius: Dio 57.24.5. Such displays
as these were common in the Julio-Claudian period in particular, employed when
the emperor needed to remind the senate and the populace of the support he had
close at hand; it also reinforced for the guard its special relationship with the
emperor. For other examples (under Gaius and Nero) see Dio 59.2.1; Suetonius,
Gaius 19; Dio 63.4.2–3; Suetonius, Nero 13.1; ibid. 7.2.
191. Sumner, Roman Military Clothing I, p 15, notes that some of the
praetorian cloaks may have been fringed on one side. For an image of the open-
toed and open-heeled sock see Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, p 47.
192. For an example, see Figure 14. For other images see Rankov, The
Praetorian Guard, passim. On the equipment used by the guard, Rankov is
standard but see also Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, passim.
193. A crest was found at Vindolanda in 2001 and is the only one that is
known; it has not yet been published.
194. Flower, ‘A tale of two monuments’, pp 635–40. She suggests that the
context may have been the visit by Trajan to Puteoli to open a new road. See
Figure 4.
195. See Figure 5; Flower, ‘A tale of two monuments’, figure 10. For other
examples see ibid., p 105, n. 72.
196. Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, pp 25–7. The scorpion was Tiberius’
zodiac sign and Rankov notes that its use by the guard stems from him being
their ‘second founder’; this title occurs because he brought the cohorts together
into the Castra Praetoria. See Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 205, 213–14.
197. For the Cancelleria relief see Figure 15; cf. also N. Hannestad, Roman
Art and Imperial Policy (Aarhus, 1988), pp 132–9, with figures 83–5 (identified
as legionaries, but clearly praetorians). On the Anaglypha Traiani/Hadriani see
Mary Boatwright, Hadrian and the City of Rome (Princeton, 1987), pp 182–90,
with figures 40–1. For the ‘Chatsworth’ relief see Diana Kleiner, Roman
Sculpture (New Haven, 1992), p 251, with figure 218.
198. It should be remembered that equipment was expensive: a letter of Pliny
the Younger (6.25) records how he provided his fellow citizen, Metilius Crispus,
with 40,000 sesterces for armour and clothing when Pliny had obtained a
promotion for him to centurion, but he never heard from him again; it has been
suggested that the unit Crispus was going to may have been the guard. See
Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p 262.
199. RIC I, #464; see Figures 16 and 17. See also Rankov, The Praetorian
Guard, p 21; Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, figure 9.1.
200. Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, pp 23–4.
201. Dio 79.37.3–4.
202. Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, p 61.
203. Speidel, Riding for Caesar, passim, prefers to distinguish soldiers close
to the emperor as the equites in most cases, but such identification is not secure.
204. Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, pp 24–5. For an idea of what these
standards looked like see Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, p 25 (a standard from
the funerary relief of Marcus Pompeius Asper, dating to the late first century
AD). Images of these standards also can be found on Trajan’s Column and on
the Arch of the Silversmiths in Rome.
205. For example, Rankov, The Praetorian Guard, p 5: ‘to avoid
antagonising the population of Rome and in accordance with Republican
custom, the Praetorians did not wear armour when performing such duties [as
guarding the emperor] within the city. Instead they wore the rather formal toga,
which would still make them conspicuous in a crowd but was a civilian garment
and the mark of a Roman citizen.’
206. Tacitus, Annals 16.27.1: at postera luce duae praetoriae cohortes
armatae templum Genetricis Veneris insedere; aditum senatus globus togatorum
obsederat non occultis gladiis, dispersique per fora ac basilicas cunei militares.
inter quorum aspectus et minas ingressi curiam senatores. The language used
for the ‘wedges of soldiers’ (cunei militares) technically refers to an offensive
formation (that is, one with much depth), or to a division of the army. See also
Agricola 45.
207. Tacitus, Histories 1.38.2: non ad bellum vos nec ad periculum voco:
omnium militum arma nobiscum sunt. nec una cohors togata defendit nunc
Galbam sed detinet ...
208. The Latin is globus togatorum. That these are praetorians was
suggested, for example, by H. Furneaux in his comments on this passage in The
Annals of Tacitus, vol. II (Oxford, 1907), and more recently by Fuhrmann,
Policing the Roman Empire, p 115, n. 90.
209. The fact that the reference occurs in a speech created by Tacitus for
Otho also suggests that it need not be taken literally, for the reference may
contain an indirect taunt at the guard on the part of the author who resented the
praetorians as the most visible instrument of imperial power. See also Histories
2.21.4, where Tacitus describes Vitellius’ men claiming that their opposition
were ‘an indolent and listless group of soldiers, corrupted by the circus and
theatre’.
210. Though the toga was considered the ‘definitive garment of the Roman
male’ and was restricted to citizens by the middle of the first century AD, its size
made it awkward to wear and it had ceased to be popular. See S. Stone, ‘The
toga: from national to ceremonial costume’, in The World of Roman Costume
(Madison, 1994), p 17. She notes that ‘the width of a developed imperial toga of
the first century A.D. was fifteen to eighteen feet ... and it was consequently
impossible to don the garment without aids ... Its tendency to slip from its
draping made it unsuitable for any physical endeavour.’ My thanks to Lloyd
Llewellyn-Jones for his helpful discussion on togas.
211. Martial, 6.76; Epictetus, Discourses 4.13.5.
212. The praetorian prefects had a juridical function from the Julio-Claudian
period, though it is not certain under which emperor this process began. See
Absil, Les Préfets, pp 67–76 (arguing for the process to begin very early, under
Sejanus); Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 246–51; Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 171–6.
Claudius is a possible candidate, given the evidence of Tacitus (Annals 12.60.1–
2), where it is noted that ‘The divine Augustus had granted jurisdiction to the
knights who governed Egypt and provided that their decrees be treated as if they
had been decided by Roman magistrates. Soon, in the other provinces and in
Rome, knights were ceded very many cases which used to be investigated by the
praetors.’ The phrase equites alias per provincias et in Urbe has been
understood to mean that, along with others of their class, the praetorian prefects
‘had already acquired in some degree the jurisdiction which is otherwise attested
only at a much later date’. See P.A. Brunt, ‘Procuratorial jurisdiction’, Latomus
25 (1966), p 473. For a second-century example (belonging to the reign of
Marcus Aurelius) see Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 138. The
pinnacle of this development was the appointment of several ‘jurist prefects’ in
the early third century, such as Papinian and Ulpian.
 213. The terminology used is ‘in private garb’ – that is, not identifiable as a
soldier. See Chapter 4.

4. DUTIES

1. Campbell, Emperor, p 109.

2. Tacitus, Annals 1.7.5.
3. Games: see below. City: Tacitus, Annals 12.43.1 (Claudius in the Forum).
For other units that complemented the guard in protecting the emperor (Germani
corporis custodies, equites singulares Augusti) see Chapter 2.
4. See CIL 11.395 = ILS 2648, translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #90
(Claudius); Suetonius, Nero 19 (Nero); Dio 79.5 (Caracalla).
5. A. Cooley and M.G.L. Cooley, Pompeii: A Sourcebook (London, 2004), p
188, with numbers G66–69 (tombstones), H59 and CIL 4.1711, 1994, 2145,
4311 (graffiti).
6. See Chapter 2. For further examples, cf. Durry, Les Cohortes, pp 276–7.
7. As Millar (The Emperor, p 64) does: ‘We cannot doubt, however, that the
constant presence of armed soldiers had an important influence on what it meant
to appear before the emperor, and lent an increased immediacy and force to any
sign of imperial displeasure.’ Cf. also Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, p 86;
Durry, Les Cohortes, p 276.
8. Dio 68.7.3. Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, p 88, sees such visits by
the emperor without his guard as a sign of honour, but it is difficult to draw any
firm conclusions from the few examples that exist.
9. It is noted by Pliny as well that Trajan could be approached by anyone as
he went about his business in the city; cf. Panegyricus 24.3. The same is said of
Marcus Aurelius; see Herodian 1.2.4.
10. Tacitus, Annals 15.52.1.
11. Suetonius, Nero 26.1–2; Tacitus, Annals 13.25.1–3.
12. As noted by Campbell, Emperor, p 113: ‘The character of each emperor
and his relationship with the various elements in Roman society will have helped
determine how much the Praetorian Guard was in evidence in Rome. It may not
be right to suggest from a few examples that each emperor was accompanied
everywhere by troops.’
13. The noun is singular in Tacitus, Annals 12.69 and Histories 1.29, and in
Suetonius, Otho 6. See Durry, Les Cohortes, p 275.
14. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 275: ‘après la sieste et avant le dîner du soir’.
Martial 10.48.1–2: ‘Her attendants announce the eighth hour to the Pharian
heifer, and now the cohort armed with pikes returns to quarters as another takes
its place.’
15. Tacitus, Annals 1.7.5: nam Tiberius cuncta per consules incipiebat
tamquam vetere re publica ... sed defuncto Augusto signum praetoriis cohortibus
ut imperator dederat.
16. In the same passage, Tacitus associates the giving of the watchword with
other demonstrations of power: ‘[Tiberius retained] the watch (excubiae), arms
(arma), the other accessories of court (cetera aulae); he was accompanied by
soldiers in the forum and in the senate.’
17. Suetonius, Gaius 56.2; Dio 59.29.2; Seneca, De Cons. 18.3–4; Josephus,
AJ 19.29.
18. Nero: Suetonius, Nero 9; cf also Tacitus, Annals 13.2.3. Suetonius
records that on the first day of his reign Nero used Optima Mater (‘the best
mother’). Durry, Les Cohortes, p 275, is in error when he has Agrippina give the
watchword in place of Nero. Antoninus: Historia Augusta, Antoninus Pius 12.6;
the word was aequanimitas (‘equanimity’).
19. I would like to thank Ben Sherry for his helpful comments on this
episode. The two principal ancient accounts are Suetonius, Domitian 16–17 and
Dio 67.14.4–18.2. For a modern assessment see Grainger, Nerva, pp 1–3; Jones,
Domitian, pp 193–6.
20. Others taking part included Clodianus, described by Suetonius as a
cornicularius, that is, the senior clerk, likely for one of the praetorian tribunes or
prefects; Maximus, the freedman of Parthenius; Satur, a cubicularius (‘servant of
the bedroom’); and an unnamed gladiator. See Suetonius, Domitian 17.2; Dio
67.17.2 (who adds one other, Entellus, the individual in charge of petitions).
21. For example, the emperor is recorded as having lined the walls of the
portico where he walked with reflective stone so that he could see what was
going on all around him. See Suetonius, Domitian 14.4.
22. See, for example, Grainger, Nerva, p 19. Dio, 67.15.2, is the source for
this supposition, for he points out that both prefects as well as the emperor’s
wife, Domitia, had knowledge of the plot, ‘so they say’. It is this last phrase that
raises suspicion about the veracity of his account, especially since the murder of
Commodus as recorded by Herodian (1.17) shows many similarities to Dio’s
account here, suggesting that such a story – but about a different emperor – was
prevalent in the early third century.
23. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 277.
24. Tacitus, Annals 13.18.3: cognitum id Neroni, excubiasque militaris, quae
ut coniugi imperatoris olim, tum ut matri servabantur, et Germanos nuper
eundem in honorem custodes additos degredi iubet. Cf. also Suetonius, Nero
34.1.
25. Dio 61.8.4.
26. On the conspiracy see Tacitus, Annals 13.19–21; Barrett, Agrippina, pp
175–8.
27. On Agrippina’s murder see Chapter 2.
28. Tacitus, Annals 1.24.2; Dio 57.4.3–4.
29. See Tacitus, Annals 1.30.1. Details of the chronology of the revolt are
provided by Levick, Tiberius, pp 72–3.
30. Tacitus, Annals 2.16.3; 20.3.
31. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 277.
32. Tacitus, Annals 3.2.1.
33. Tacitus, Annals 1.17; 27.1. The main complaints of the legionaries were
the length of service and their rate of pay in comparison with the guard.
34. The gravity of the situation also may explain the presence of Sejanus.
There is no reason for him to have accompanied Drusus as commander of the
cohorts, for that responsibility would have been handled by the tribunes, but
Tiberius may have sent the prefect along to provide additional support by a high-
ranking officer and to show how seriously he himself was taking the matter. Yet,
Sejanus is not mentioned again in the account of the events of the mutiny and it
is not clear exactly what role he eventually played.
 35. Dio 79.23.2. He adds that this led to Domna conspiring with the soldiers,
though the text is too corrupt at this point to be certain as to why.
36. Dio 80.19.2. He attributes the employment of this unit to Alexander’s
mother, Julia Mamaea, and his grandmother, Julia Maesa.
37. Other cases are recorded by Suetonius, Tiberius 37.3 (Pollentia) and Dio
55.10a.1 (Cyrenaica; AD 2).
38. Tacitus, Annals 4.27.1–2.
39. Ibid., 13.48.
40. See J.H. D’Arms, ‘Tacitus, Annals 13.48, and a new inscription from
Puteoli’, in B. Levick (ed), The Ancient Historian and His Materials: Essays in
Honour of C.E. Stevens on his 70th Birthday (Farnborough, 1975), pp 155–66.
Cassius was a senator from the region; cf. Griffin, Nero, p 56.
41. These men previously had been legates in the Germanies; they were later
called to Greece by Nero and killed. Cf. Dio 63.17.2; Tacitus, Histories 4.41.3.
42. Tacitus, Annals 13.48. As D’Arms, ‘Puteoli’, p 157, points out, ‘however
harsh and intolerable the remedium of Cassius Longinus, that of his chosen
successors, the Sulpicii Scribonii, was appreciably worse, involving a cohort of
the praetorian guard, which brought with it armed conflict, terror and
punishment’.
43. Nero may have been concerned that riots in the city would cause
disruption elsewhere in Italy. Puteoli had a harbour that was the hub of Rome’s
eastern imports and exports and was also a resort area. Disorder in the city could
have devastated either of these enterprises.
44. On the urban cohorts and their general responsibilities, see below.
45. Tacitus, Annals 6.18.1. The year was AD 33.
46. Two examples of executions of plebs by the guard occur in their early
history: the first was in connection with riots over tax increases under Gaius; see
Josephus, AJ 19.24–26; Dio 59.28.11. Additionally, it is possible that the
execution of two robbers in the reign of Nero also belongs in this category,
though they are of unknown origin; Burrus, as praetorian prefect, was involved,
presumably not doing the act himself, but delegating it to his officers. See
Seneca, De Clem. 2.1.2.
 47. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 108; Passerini, Le Coorti, p 70; Sheldon,
Intelligence Activities, pp 122–3. There was also another unit associated with
reconnaissance – the exploratores, on which see Austin and Rankov, Exploratio,
passim.
48. Speidel, Riding for Caesar, p 33: ‘The name of the speculatores betrays
their origin: reconnaissance was so essential to Roman field marshals, and so
risky that their reconnoitering force became their bodyguard.’
49. Passerini, Le Coorti, p 71; Sydenham, The Coinage of the Roman
Republic, #1214. The legend reads CHORTIS SPECULATORUM and it was
issued in 32/31 BC just prior to Actium. Taken with the other coin minted at the
same time but with the legend CHORTIUM PRAETORIARUM (Sydenham,
Coinage, #1212, 1213) it seems clear that these were two separate units. On the
praetorian coin see Chapter 2.
50. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 108. Each legion in the imperial period also had
ten speculatores, who were assigned to the staff of the governor and functioned
as couriers, bodyguards and often as executioners. See, for example, Seneca, De
Ira 1.18.4, in which a centurion is in charge of the execution of a soldier, but it is
the speculator who is about to perform the act. Cf. also Le Bohec, Imperial
Roman Army, p 51.
51. Tacitus, Histories 1.25.1. The tesserarius was the officer who conveyed
the watchword to the rest of the cohort; see Chapter 3. Given that each cohort
had a tesserarius, the existence of a separate one for the speculatores shows not
only the existence of a separate cohort, but also may shed light on Dio’s
assertion that there were ten cohorts of the guard in this period as well. On the
question of the number of cohorts see Chapter 3.
52. On their role in Otho’s accession see Chapter 2. They are singled out in
Tacitus, Histories 2.11: ‘Otho himself was accompanied by selected corps of
speculatores, along with the rest of the praetorian cohorts, praetorian veterans
and a large number of marines.’
53. Suetonius, Augustus 74. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 108, argues that the
cohort to which this soldier belonged was contemporary with that of Antony’s.
54. CIL 6.1921a (= ILS 2014) and CIL 3.4843 (= ILS 2015).
55. AE 1976, #18, 21, 22.
 56. Speidel, Riding for Caesar, p 34, argues that this change of terminology
was connected with the bringing together of the guard into a single camp.
57. CIL 16.21 (= ILS 1993; translated in Campbell, The Roman Army, #327),
discussed in Chapter 3. Sheldon, Intelligence Activities, p 167, argues, based on
this document, that these men served as the palace guard during the period of the
Flavians, but there is nothing in the diploma to indicate this, nor any other
evidence.
58. The idea originated with Domaszewski; cf. Passerini, Le Coorti, p 70, n.
6. As noted in Chapter 3, the trecenarius was thought to be one of the senior
positions among centurions of the guard.
59. It is of note that 300 is roughly the same number of speculatores that
were found in the legions under Augustus and so the conjecture may have been
an attempt to harmonize these numbers. Speidel, Riding for Caesar, p 34,
adduces further parallels for the number.
60. Cf. Passerini, Le Coorti, pp 71–2; Durry, Les Cohortes, p 110; Sheldon,
Intelligence Activities, pp 144, 166.
61. Speidel, Riding for Caesar, pp 33–4. As he notes, this helps to explain the
episode when Galba nearly was killed by one of these soldiers when the crowd
surged forward: ‘A soldier would never wittingly aim his lance at the emperor.
But if he used the butt of his lance against an unruly crowd to clear the way, the
blade of the weapon might indeed point toward the ruler.’ For this incident see
Suetonius, Galba 18.
62. Tacitus, Annals 6.50.4; see Sheldon, Intelligence Activities, p 166.
63. Suetonius, Gaius 44.2.
64. Rudich, Political Dissidence, p 135: ‘Intuition and common sense ... point
to the inevitability, under tyrannical rule, of some kind of a special repressive
and investigative machinery. A few scattered hints in our sources do, indeed,
imply the operation of a certain network of secret agents in the early Empire.’
Recent work on the epigraphic record for the speculatores (and on members of
the praetorian and urban cohorts as well) has been undertaken by Giorgio Crimi;
see the bibliography for details. To the examples that follow might be added as
well the reconnaissance mission to Ethiopia under Nero and a mission to
apprehend the governor of Egypt in the reign of Gaius. See Seneca, NQ 6.8.3–4;
Pliny the Elder, NH 6.181–6; 12.19 (Ethiopia); Philo, In Flaccum 13.109–15
(Egypt).
65. Dio 52.37.2. The context is the speech of Maecenas to Augustus, advising
him on aspects of his rule. Dio uses identical words in his section on Caracalla;
see 78.17.1–2.
66. Philostratus, Life of Apollonius 4.43.
67. Suetonius, Claudius 35.1: ‘he never dared to go to a banquet unless he
was surrounded by speculatores with lances and had soldiers performing the role
of servants’ (neque convivia inire ausus est nisi ut speculatores cum lanceis
circumstarent militesque vice ministrorum fungerentur). Cf. also Dio 60.3.3.
68. The date of the creation of the frumentarii is late first century, or early
second century AD. Their primary duties were spying and before long
executions, but they were also employed as couriers, tax collectors and
policemen. On this unit see William Sinnigen, ‘The Roman secret service’, CJ
57 (1961), pp 65–73; Austin and Rankov, Exploratio, passim; Sheldon,
Intelligence Activities, passim; Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire pp 152–7.
69. Some scholars prefer to see the frumentarii replacing the speculatores
completely with respect to intelligence gathering; see Sheldon, Intelligence
Activities, pp 167, 251; M. Gichon, ‘Military intelligence in the Roman army’, in
H.E. Herzig and E. Frei-Stolba (eds), Labor Omnibus Unus. Festschrift Walser.
Historia 60 (1989), p 168. Yet, given the standing of the frumentarii – that they
were employed both in Rome and in the provinces and therefore there was the
possibility of divided loyalties – the continued use of the speculatores in the
capital is likely. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 114, n. 87, errs in
suggesting that Nerva disbanded the speculatores; it is clear that they are in
existence as long as the guard; see Cowan, Aspects of the Severan Field Army,
pp 73–7.
70. On occasion the speculatores may even have been watching over
hostages. Based on Dio 59.28.9, Winterling argues that children and wives of
prominent senators were housed in the palace by Gaius in order that the guard
might keep an eye on them. See Caligula, pp 140–1.
71. Tacitus, Annals 2.31.1; cf. also Seneca, Ep. 70.10; Suetonius, Tiberius
25.1; 3; Dio 57.15.4–5; Velleius Paterculus, History of Rome 2.129.2, 130.3. For
the charges see Richard A. Bauman, Impietas in Principem. A Study of Treason
against the Roman Emperor with Special Reference to the First Century AD
(Münich, 1974), pp 60–1; Robin Seager, Tiberius (London, 1972), pp 89–92.
72. A similar situation occurred with Marcus Julius Vestinus Atticus, who got
caught up in the aftermath of the Pisonian Conspiracy in AD 65 though he was
not involved; when the guard arrived at his house during a dinner party, he took
his own life. Tacitus describes Nero’s amusement at the thought of Vestinus’
dinner companions surrounded by praetorians and not knowing what fate
awaited them; see Annals 15.68.2–69.3.
73. For background to the case and analysis of it see Harriet Flower, The Art
of Forgetting: Disgrace and Oblivion in Roman Political Culture (Chapel Hill,
2006), pp 132–8; Victoria Pagán, Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History
(Austin, 2004), pp 69–72; Miriam Griffin, ‘The senate’s story’, JRS 87 (1997),
pp 249–63; C. Mackay, ‘ “Quaestiones Pisonianae”: Procedural and
chronological notes on the S.C. de Cn. Pisone pater’, HSPh 101 (2003), pp 311–
70.
74. Tacitus, Annals 3.14.5; Z. Yavetz,, Plebs and Princeps (London, 1969), p
28, points to the violent reaction of the people in Rome over the death of
Germanicus, in particular their anger with Piso whom they believed to be guilty.
It may have been such demonstrations that prompted the use of the guard.
75. Tacitus, Annals 3.16.1.
76. Paul Plass, The Game of Death in Ancient Rome: Arena Sport and
Political Suicide (Madison, 1995), p 93. There has been much debate over the
value of suicide before conviction as a method of allowing those who survive to
escape further punishment and in assuring that the victim’s will was honoured as
suggested by Tacitus (Annals 6.29.1–2) and Dio (58.15.2–4). See C. Edwards,
Death in Ancient Rome (London, 2007), pp 119–21. On political suicide in this
period see T. Hill, Ambitiosa Mors: Suicide and Self in Roman Thought and
Literature (London, 2004), pp 183–212.
77. As Tiberius did in Libo’s case; see Tacitus, Annals 2.31.3.
78. See, for example, Tacitus, Annals 6.14.2 (Rubrius Fabatus); Suetonius,
Claudius 29.2, cf. Dio 60.14.2 (ex-consul, not named); Tacitus, Annals 16.19
(Petronius); Tacitus, Annals 15.60.4–61.4, cf. Dio 62.25.1–2 (Seneca); Tacitus,
Annals 16.15.1 (Marcus Ostorius Scapula); Tacitus, Annals 16.10.2 (Lucius
Antistius Vetus).
79. Tacitus, Annals 4.67.4.: quis additus miles nuntios, introitus, aperta
secreta velut in annalis referebat .... Cf. Barrett, Agrippina, pp 36–7; R.H.
Martin and A.J. Woodman, Tacitus: Annals, Book IV (Cambridge, 1989), p 246.
For the background to the situation between Tiberius and Agrippina the Elder
see David Shotter, ‘Agrippina the Elder: A woman in a man’s world’, Historia
49.3 (2000), pp 341–57.
80. Suetonius, Tiberius 64; cf. Pliny the Elder, NH 8.145; Philo, In Flaccum
3.9. Agrippina the Elder is said to have lost the use of an eye as a result of a
beating by the centurion who was in charge of her and was force-fed to prevent
suicide by starvation, according to Suetonius (Tiberius 53.2). She died, still in
exile, in AD 33; cf. Tacitus, Annals 6.25.3.
81. Suetonius, Tiberius 54.2.
82. Plass, The Game of Death, p 114.
83. Dio 58.3.8; Suetonius, Tiberius 54.2. The brevity of the account in Dio
leaves much unanswered, though he does mention the involvement of Sejanus in
ensuring that a charge was laid once Drusus arrived in Rome.
84. Drusus died in AD 33, starved to death according to the sources; see
Tacitus, Annals 6.23.2; Suetonius, Tiberius 54.2. Cf. Barrett, Agrippina, pp 47–
8.
85. Annals 6.24.2.
86. See Tacitus, Annals 14.60–1, 64.1; cf. Rudich, Political Dissidence, pp
69–74.
87. The main prison in Rome was the carcer on the slopes of the Capitoline,
but there were other prisons by the beginning of the second century AD. Cf.
Juvenal, Satire 3.312–14; O.F. Robinson, Ancient Rome: City Planning and
Administration (London, 1992), p 194. On the carcer in particular see T.J.
Cadoux, ‘The Roman carcer and its adjuncts’, G&R 55.2 (2008), pp 202–21.
Prisons generally were used only for holding defendants or persons who were to
be executed, and usually were not intended for long-term incarceration, though
this sometimes occurred; cf. F. Millar, ‘Condemnation to hard labour in the
Roman empire, from the Julio-Claudians to Constantine’, PBSR 52 (1984), p
131.
88. Josephus, AJ 18.188–204.
89. See Seneca, Ep. 5.
90. The concessions included having those soldiers acting as his guards and,
in particular, the officer who was in charge of him to be of a compassionate
nature; Agrippa was allowed to go to the baths every day and be visited by his
freedmen and friends; see Josephus, AJ 18.203.
91. Josephus, AJ 18.228–33. These details provide further evidence that there
was no bathhouse in the camp and that the centurions had accommodation there,
as argued in Chapter 3.
92. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 172; cf. also Nippel, Public Order, p 95.
93. Other examples include Mithridates (under Claudius; see Tacitus, Annals
12.21), Paul the apostle (under Nero; see Acts 28.16; Philippians 1.12), and an
unnamed Roman citizen in the reign of Trajan (Pliny, Ep. 10.57). It is possible
that Julius Canus was held in the prison after being sentenced to death by Gaius;
he spent ten days between condemnation and execution, to which, along with
others, he was led by a centurion. See Seneca, De Tranquilitate Animi 14.4–7.
94. A case where the guard was not used is that of Publius Vitellius, accused
of collusion with Sejanus. He was released into the custody of his brother, but
soon committed suicide. See Tacitus, Annals 5.8.2; Suetonius, Vitellius 2.3.
Given the seriousness of the charge, the fact that he was not put under
surveillance by the guard is striking.
95. Dio 72.28.2.
96. Perhaps the incident with Quintus Gallius is the precedent for the use by
Augustus; see Chapter 2. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 279, argues that Nero was the
one who ‘lowered the praetorians to the rank of police and even executioners’
but, from the examples given below, it is clear that they had been used in this
way from early in their history.
97. Seneca, De Ben. 3.26, comments that the treason trials under Tiberius
resulted in more deaths than in the civil war. On treason trials in this period see
Bauman, Impietas, passim; Levick, Tiberius, pp 184–5; Miriam Griffin,
‘Tacitus, Tiberius and the principate’, in I. Malkin and Z.W. Rubinsohn (eds),
Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honour of Zvi Yavetz
(Leiden, 1995), pp 49–57.
98. Tacitus, Annals 4.68–70; Pliny the Elder, NH 8.145; Dio 58.1.1b–3.
99. Tacitus, Annals 6.40.1. The year was AD 36.
100. Ibid., 6.39. The year was AD 35.
101. Ibid., 15.60.4–61.4; Dio 62.25.1–2.
102. On the conspiracy see Barrett, Caligula, pp 101–13. Cf. Suetonius,
Gaius 43, Vespasian 2.3; Dio 59.22.6–7. See also Chris Simpson, ‘The
“conspiracy” of A.D. 39’, in C. Deroux (ed), Studies in Latin Literature and
Roman History 168 (1980), pp 347–66. Lepidus had been married to Gaius’ late
sister Drusilla and was a close friend, while Gaetulicus was the commander of
the armies of Upper Germany.
103. Seneca, Ep. 4.7. Cf. Barrett, Caligula, p 107.
104. Tacitus, Annals 1.53.3–5. Associated in Tacitus with the demise of Julia,
both of whom had been in exile for 14 years, he is said to have died in a manner
worthy of his family name, not shrinking from offering his neck to the soldiers.
No reason is given for his murder, but the connection with Julia was probably
sufficient.
105. Suetonius, Claudius 29.2. See also Dio 60.14.2. On the number of those
executed see B. Baldwin, ‘Executions under Claudius: Seneca’s Ludus de Morte
Claudii’, Phoenix 18.1 (1964), pp 39–48.
106. Tacitus, Annals 11.1.3; the language used is tamquam opprimendo bello.
For further details, see Levick, Claudius, pp 61–4 (who refers to Asiaticus as ‘an
active and athletic culprit’ in an attempt to explain the excessive measures taken
to arrest him).
107. Dio 61.29.5–6.
108. Tacitus, Annals 11.4.3. Rudich, Political Dissidence, p 148, refers to
Crispinus as ‘active in the prosecution of Valerius Asiaticus’, but there is no
evidence that the prefect actually took part in the proceedings.
109. Pliny, Ep. 5.5.3, notes that Gaius Fannius was writing a history of
people put to death or banished by Nero, and that the unfinished work amounted
to three volumes.
110. Tacitus, Annals 14.58.2–59.2. The year was AD 62. Cf. Rudich,
Political Dissidence, pp 68–9. Plautus had been named in connection with the
alleged conspiracy of Agrippina in AD 55 mentioned earlier and had been exiled
in AD 59; cf. Tacitus, Annals 13.20.1; 14.22.
111. The number of men sent varies: Tacitus, Annals 14.58.4, suggests it is
60 but later (59.2) refers to these soldiers as a maniple, which usually consisted
of two centuries. It is obvious that there is some confusion over the exact
number, though it seems to be rather sizeable, an indication perhaps of the
perceived threat from Plautus.
112. Tacitus, Annals 14.57.4; Rudich, Political Dissidence, pp 67–8.
113. Suetonius, Titus 6. See also Levick, Vespasian, pp 192–3.
114. Dio 75.16.3; Suetonius, Titus 6.
115. See Suetonius, Domitian 10, 11, 15; Dio 67.3.3, 4.5, 9.6, 11.2–13, 12.1–
5, 13.1–4, 14.1–3. For a list of these men with a discussion see Jones, Domitian,
pp 180–8. The use of delatores (‘informers’) was widespread by this time and
contributed to the sense of unease. On these see Steven H. Rutledge, Imperial
Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants from Tiberius to Domitian (London,
2001).
116. Dio (67.12.5) records that Domitian often visited these prisoners on his
own; it might be expected that guard members accompanied him, especially if
these men were being held in the prison of the camp.
117. Dio 67.3.4.
118. Ibid., 69.2.5.
119. Ibid., 69.17.1–2.
120. The Historia Augusta (Hadrian 23.8) ostensibly provides evidence that
Servianus was desirous of rule: ‘he had given a dinner for the imperial slaves,
had sat on a stately chair positioned next to his bed and had got up and greeted
the soldiers on duty at the palace’. Of the three reasons, the last clearly is the
most significant.
121. I disagree with Millar, The Emperor, p 63, on the difficulty in
ascertaining to which unit those soldiers functioning as executioners belonged. It
is the guard which is closest to the emperor and to which such a sensitive
responsibility would have been given. Cf. also Nippel, Public Order, p 93.
122. Tacitus, Annals 13.15.3–16.1. Locusta had been imprisoned under
Claudius; see ibid., 12.66.2.
123. As Barrett notes, it was the perception that Nero had murdered
Britannicus that was important, not whether the charge was true; see Agrippina,
p 172.
124. Pollio was promoted soon after to the post of procurator of Sardinia; this
‘removed him per speciem honoris from the city where he might spread rumours
among the guard or serve as a living reproach to the Emperor’. See Miriam
Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford, 1976), p 88. Two
inscriptions (CIL 10.7952 and 10.7863) from Sardinia record Pollio’s tenure in
the guard and in the urban cohorts.
125. See Suetonius, Gaius 23.3; Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 30–1; Dio 59.8.2;
Barrett, Caligula, pp 75–6.
126. Plass, The Game of Death, p 94, argues that such action on the part of
the person sent to ensure death blurs the distinction between execution and
suicide.
127. Tacitus, Annals 11.31–8; Suetonius, Claudius 26.2, 36.1; Dio 61.31.5.
Tacitus’ account of the incident is quite dramatic; on this see Katharine von
Stackelberg, ‘Performative space and garden transgressions in Tacitus’ death of
Messalina’, AJPh 130.4 (2009), pp 595–624. For analysis of the episode see G.
Fagan, ‘Messalina’s folly’, CQ 52.2 (2002), pp 66–79; J. Osgood, Claudius
Caesar. Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge, 2011), pp
209–11; Levick, Claudius, pp 64–7; Bauman, Impietas, pp 177–88.
128. Tacitus, Annals 11.32.1.
129. Ibid., 11.31.1. Bauman, Impietas, p 180: ‘[The] view of the marriage as
an act of usurpation is also implicit in the advice given to Claudius by his
consilium, to go to the praetorian cohorts and ensure his safety before worrying
about revenge.’
130. Tacitus, Annals 11.35.2. For the legal aspects of these ‘trials’, see
Bauman, Impietas, pp 186–7.
 131. The sources are all in agreement about the involvement of the emperor,
though the person who gave the command to the officers was one of Claudius’
freedmen, Narcissus; in fact, Tacitus, Annals 11.37.1–2, insinuates that the order
originated with Narcissus himself, though the freedman attributed it to Claudius.
See also Suetonius, Claudius 26.2; Dio 60.31.5; Josephus AJ 20.149; BJ 249.
Koestermann, Cornelius Tacitus, vol. 3, p 105, argues that the officers sent were
members of the palace watch, but since the other events had taken place in the
camp, it is likely that these men originated from there as well. It must be noted
that although Messalina should have had a contingent of the guard with her
during this very long day, there is no indication as to the role they may have
played in any of the events that occurred.
132. It is reported that a former slave, Euodus, was sent along to make certain
that the order was carried out. This may indicate the uncertainty felt by
Narcissus over whether a praetorian officer would be willing to violate his oath
of loyalty to the imperial family. Alternatively, it may indicate uncertainty over
whether a guard member would obey an order coming from a freedman rather
than from his commander.
133. Yet it is instructive that, even three years later, there could be concern
on the part of the new empress, Agrippina, over soldiers who still might have
residual allegiance to Messalina, and whom she felt compelled to remove from
their posts; see Tacitus, Annals 12.41.2. For discussion see Chapter 3.
134. Tacitus, Annals 1.6.1; Suetonius, Tiberius 22.
135. Suetonius, Augustus 65.4. See Bingham, ‘Life on an island’, pp 385–7.
Cf. also A.A. Barrett, ‘Tacitus, Livia and the evil stepmother’, RhM 144, pp
171–5.
136. It is not certain with whom the order originated; when the centurion
reported to the new emperor that he had carried out his command, Tiberius
appeared not to know what he meant. See Tacitus, Annals 1.6.3. Tacitus adds
that the instructions had been relayed by Gaius Sallustius Crispus, a friend of
Tiberius, to a tribune of the guard, who presumably then had passed along the
command to his subordinate. It is possible that Augustus had left orders that
Agrippa be executed upon his death; Livia is implicated in some of the sources.
Yet the only person who had the power to give such an order to the guard was
the emperor himself, that is, Tiberius. On the problem of the origin of the order
see Seager, Tiberius, pp 48–50; Levick, Tiberius, pp 65–6.
137. Tacitus, Annals 1.6.1. His statement seems to negate the possibility of
independent action on the part of the centurion as presented by Dio (57.3.6). See
also Suetonius, Tiberius 22, where it is reported that it was a tribune who
murdered him.
138. On the oath see Chapter 2.
139. The individual giving this warning is Crispus, whom Tacitus describes
here as a ‘participant in the private matters’ (particeps secretorum); see Annals
1.6.3.
140. Secrecy is evident as well in the case of Clemens, one of Agrippa
Postumus’ slaves, who pretended to be his master. He was brought to Rome by
Crispus and executed in a secluded part of the palace, probably by a praetorian,
given the location and clandestine nature of the murder. Cf. Tacitus, Annals
2.40.2; Dennis Kehoe, ‘Tacitus and Sallustius Crispus’, CJ 80 (1984/85), pp
248–51.
141. For the Julio-Claudian period in particular see Bingham, ‘Security at the
games’, pp 363–79.
142. For the purposes of this discussion, ‘games’ will refer to everything
other than the theatre.
143. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome (London, 1969), p
248; V. Olivová, Sports and Games in the Ancient World (London, 1984), p 174.
David Potter notes that there were 66 days of chariot racing in the fourth century
AD; see The Victor’s Crown: A History of Ancient Sport from Homer to
Byzantium (London, 2011), p 276.
144. Population estimates range from half a million to a million inhabitants
for Rome in the imperial period. See Glenn Storey, ‘The population of ancient
Rome’, Antiquity 71 (1997), pp 966–78; his estimate is half a million. Fuhrmann,
Policing the Roman Empire, p 115, estimates a million. Of course, there also
would have been many visitors from elsewhere at these sorts of events, swelling
that number considerably.
145. For the republican period when responsibility for security at these
venues fell to the aediles, see Nippel, Public Order, pp 21–2. The following
section deals only with Rome; security arrangements at events outside of the
capital are not at all clear from the sources and there are incidents which suggest
that this was lax, for example, at Pompeii in AD 59, on which see Tacitus,
Annals 14.17.
146. Ulpian, Digest 1.12.1.12. Cf. Freis, Urbanae, pp 44–5; Robinson,
Ancient Rome, pp 197–8. It should be noted that evidence for the presence of
soldiers at these events after the first century AD is difficult to find; this may be
partly because of the nature of the sources, partly because, as with modern
venues, there was always a police presence but it was rarely commented upon.
147. Modern scholars often accept the presence of the guard at these events
without further comment; cf. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 278; P. Garnsey and R.
Saller, The Roman Economy, Society and Culture (Berkeley, 1987), p 158.
Nippel, Public Order, p 93, notes that either a praetorian or urban cohort was at
the games.
148. Josephus, AJ 19.76, notes that the crowd was sizeable. He also (AJ
19.91) describes Chaerea as taking his place among the tribunes, close to Gaius,
which suggests that there were other cohorts in attendance besides Chaerea’s
own.
149. Josephus, AJ 19.119–26, 138–42. It should be noted, however, that the
account in Josephus is somewhat incoherent and it is difficult to ascertain the
exact chronology of events.
150. Suetonius, Augustus 44.1. There is no indication of date but the passage
does mention that there had been trouble with the audience. For evidence of
soldiers as spectators at the games in the late republic see Suetonius, Augustus
14.
151. On the hostility between the people and the military at these venues see,
for example, Campbell, The Roman Army, p 171; their difficult relationship has
already been noted: see Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, pp 89–91.
152. See Magnus Wistrand, Entertainment and Violence in Ancient Rome,
Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 56 (Göteborg, 1992), pp 35–6; Alan
Cameron, Circus Factions. Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium (Oxford,
1976), pp 223–4. There were even periods when actors were banished
completely from Rome because of disruptive incidents; see, for example,
Tacitus, Annals 4.14.3; Suetonius, Tiberius 37.2; Dio 57.21.3 (under Tiberius,
recalled by Gaius; cf. Dio 59.2.5); Suetonius, Nero 16.2 (under Nero, though
they had been recalled by AD 60; cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.21.4).
153. Valerius Maximus 2.4.1. He was writing in the early part of the first
century AD.
154. Tacitus, Annals 1.77.1; see also Suetonius, Tiberius 37.2. It is possible
that the violence resulted from restrictions put on actors after previous
disruptions; see Tacitus, Annals 1.54.2. Cameron, Circus Factions, p 225, notes
that the theatre was notorious for ‘rowdyism’, whereas events at the circus did
not promote ‘regular and violent brawls’.
155. Balsdon, Life and Leisure, p 418, n. 117, argues that the urban cohorts
were not used in this instance because ‘the City Prefecture, with command of the
urban cohorts, was not yet established’. Yet Tacitus has Lucius Calpurnius Piso
as urban prefect by AD 14 at least, and probably a year earlier, and therefore the
option of using the urban cohorts clearly was available. See Tacitus, Annals
6.11.3. When the first urban prefect was appointed is not clear; Ricci, ‘In
custodiam urbis’, p 486, n. 7, has the earliest being Marcus Valerius Messalla
Corvinus (26 BC), as does Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 117.
156. Tacitus, Annals 13.24.1–2; cf. Dio 61.8.3.
157. Tacitus, Annals 13.25.4.
158. Ibid., 14.15.4–5; cf. Dio 61.20.2.
159. Dio 61.20.2.
160. Tacitus, Annals 15.33.3.
161. On manipuli see Tacitus, Annals 14.59.2, discussed above, and 12.56.2,
where it indicates a large number of praetorians at Claudius’ naumachia, on
which see below.
162. Suetonius, Nero 23.2.
163. Tacitus, Annals 16.5.1; Suetonius, Nero 21.1. Nero had also introduced
a group of professional applauders called the Augustiani that served as official
supporters when he performed. See Tacitus, Annals 14.15.5; Suetonius, Nero
20.3. It has been suggested that he may have established this group because he
was anticipating a negative reaction from the audience; see A. Futrell, The
Roman Games (Oxford, 2006), p 37. Commodus had a similar group supporting
him, as recorded by Dio (73.20.2); cf. Futrell, The Roman Games, p 38.
164. Suetonius, Gaius 55.1. For the opposite approach, that the spectators
were allowed to show their enthusiasm no matter what their preference, see
Pliny, Panegyricus 33.3–4.
165. Wistrand, Entertainment and Violence, p 65; see also Yavetz, Plebs, pp
21–4; Futrell, The Roman Games, pp 38–42.
166. Futrell, The Roman Games, pp 36–42, provides several examples.
167. Grain riots: Tacitus, Annals 6.13.1. Demonstrations against the price of
grain in AD 19 also occurred at either the theatre or the games. Cf. Tacitus,
Annals 2.87. Taxes: Josephus, AJ 19.24–6 (soldiers not specified, but
undoubtedly meant); Dio 59.28.11. It is possible that Suetonius, Gaius 41.1, also
refers to this incident.
168. Dio 75.4.3–5. This protest seems to have been stage-managed, though
Dio attributes it to the gods.
169. Titus: Suetonius, Titus 8. Trajan: Pliny, Panegyricus 33.
170. Yavetz, Plebs, p 10. Cf. also Cameron, Circus Factions, p 174. On riots
in the imperial period in general see B. Kelly, ‘Riot control and imperial
ideology in the Roman empire’, Phoenix 61 (2007), pp 150–76; T.W. Africa,
‘Urban violence in imperial Rome’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2.1
(1971), pp 3–21.
171. Tacitus, Annals 16.5.2.
172. Epictetus, Discourses 4.13.5. The text dates to the early second century
AD.
173. Tacitus, Annals 12.56.2; Suetonius, Claudius 21.6; Dio 60.33.3–4. On
naumachia in general see F. Garello, ‘Sport or showbiz? The naumachiae in the
Flavian amphitheatre’, in S. Bell and G. Davies (eds), Games and Festivals in
Classical Antiquity, BAR 1220 (Oxford, 2004), pp 115–24.
174. Suetonius, Claudius 21.3. For a similar incident under Nero see Dio
61.9.1.
175. It is possible that the participation of the praetorians in this activity is
associated with procurement of animals for the games, for which there is some
evidence of their involvement; cf. C. Epplett, ‘The capture of animals by the
Roman military’, G&R 48.2 (2001), pp 210–22, especially pp 212, 219. In the
later period, there was a vivarium (‘game enclosure’) managed by the
praetorians; see CIL 6.130 (= ILS 2091), dating to AD 241, for a centurion who
was responsible for overseeing the vivarium of the city units (custos vivari cohh
p[r]aett et urbb). The inscription also mentions two hunters from the guard
(venatores immune(es)). See G. Jennison, Animals for Show and Pleasure in
Ancient Rome (Philadelphia, 2005 reprint), pp 134, n. 1, 141.
176. Ville, however, considers this use a cost-saving measure, referring to it
as an innovation which was ‘more spectacular than expensive’. See Georges
Ville, La Gladiature en Occident des Origines à la Mort de Domitien (Rome,
1981), p 170. Cf. also Balsdon, Life and Leisure, p 310; Plass, The Game of
Death, p 72. Claudius is also said to have used the guard in a similar fashion at
Ostia (against a whale), according to Pliny the Elder (NH 9.14–15), who says
that the praetorians were providing a show for the public. See Osgood, Claudius
Caesar, p 183.
177. Suetonius, Augustus 43.2; Dio 56.25.7–8. The practice of equites taking
part in gladiatorial contests is attested under Caesar as well; cf. Suetonius,
Caesar 39.2; Dio 43.23.4–5. Cf. K. Hopkins, Death and Renewal: Sociological
Studies in Roman History, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1983), p 12.
178. Hopkins, Death and Renewal, p 21.
179. Suetonius, Augustus 43.1: ‘On these days [of the games] he stationed
guards throughout the city (custodies in urbe disposuit), so that it might not be
subjected to prowlers because so few people were at home.’
180. Freis, Urbanae, p 44; cf. Nippel, Public Order, pp 94–5; Sablayrolles,
‘La rue’, pp 139–40, 144. For a summary of their duties see Ricci, ‘In custodiam
urbis’, pp 490–2. For statistics on how many men were available for security
detail in Rome in AD 6 – with interesting modern comparisons – see Fuhrmann,
Policing the Roman Empire, pp 117–18.
181. On the problem of effective see Freis, Urbanae, pp 38–42; Busch,
‘Militia in urbe’, pp 315–16. Dio’s numbers – four cohorts, 6,000 men in total –
are thought to represent the situation in his own period, though it is not
absolutely certain that is the case; see 55.24.6. Because the urban cohorts were
housed with the praetorians in the Castra Praetoria until the construction of their
own camp, the Castra Urbana, the controversy over numbers is more significant
than it seems at first glance, but no firm conclusion can be made. On the date of
the Castra Urbana (now thought to be Antonine) see Ricci, ‘In custodiam urbis’,
pp 488–9.
182. As noted by F. Bérard, ‘Le rôle militaire des cohortes urbaines’, MEFRA
100 (1988), pp 159–82.
183. Suetonius, Gaius 26.4.
184. Ibid., 55.3.
185. The remit of this individual increased over time, until by Severus’ reign,
he ‘had absorbed much of the public-order maintenance and legal jurisdiction
traditionally associated with the praetors, aediles, and other traditional
republican magistrates’. See Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 131; see
also Nippel, Public Order, pp 94–6.
186. See, for example, Steven Johnstone, ‘On the uses of arson in classical
Rome’, in C. Deroux (ed), Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 217
(1992), pp 41–57; H.V. Canter, ‘Conflagrations in ancient Rome’, CJ 27 (1932),
pp 270–88.
187. Plutarch, Crassus 2.
188. Gregory Daugherty, ‘The cohortes vigilum and the great fire of 64 AD’,
CJ 87.3 (1992), p 229. Cf. also Johnstone, ‘On the uses of arson’, p 56; Durry,
Les Cohortes, p 18. In fact, a private firefighting unit had been established by
Egnatius Rufus, an aedile, in 25 BC. See Nippel, Public Order, p 96. It may
have been this attempt that spurred Augustus to action in order to keep control in
his own hands: in 22 BC, after a particularly devastating fire, he instituted a
corps of 600 slaves who were given the responsibility of extinguishing fires; in
19 BC, they were ordered not only to put out the fires but also to prevent their
outbreak. See Dio 54.2; 53.24.4–5.
189. Dio 55.26.4; Suetonius, Augustus 25.2, 30.1; Strabo 5.3.7; Appian, BCiv
5.132 (who has the incorrect date for the formation).
190. Other reasons are given by J.S. Rainbird, The Vigiles of Rome,
unpublished dissertation, University of Durham, 1976, p 219: too few Roman
citizens willing to do the job; using slaves might cause insurrection; collegia
were not trustworthy. There is evidence, however, for citizens joining the corps,
though this is rare; see Rainbird, The Vigiles, p 220.
191. Coulston, ‘Armed and belted men’, p 89, argues that they were
considered soldiers, while Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 117, refers
to them as a ‘military fire brigade’. Others such as G.R. Watson, ‘The pay of the
urban forces’, Acta of the 5th Epigraphic Congress (1967), p 413, and Le Bohec,
Imperial Roman Army, p 22, suggest that it is unlikely that they were a military
unit.
192. Rainbird, The Vigiles, p 447, concludes that they ‘were more soldiers
than firemen’ but his main support for this contention is their organization,
which set them apart from other fire brigades in the ancient world.
193. Ulpian, Digest 37.13.1.
194. Watson, ‘The pay of the urban forces’, pp 414–15.
195. Tacitus, Annals 1.8; 4.5.
196. Rainbird, The Vigiles, pp 229–37.
197. The claim by Robinson, Ancient Rome, p 185 and n. 85, that the vigiles
twice were sent by Augustus to fight in battle is a misunderstanding of
Suetonius, Augustus 25. Of course, their involvement in the civil war of AD 69
must be acknowledged, but the circumstances are unusual; it might be expected
that every imperial unit be called up for one side or the other.
198. It is only in the officer class that movement between the city cohorts can
be discerned, as was noted in Chapter 3.
199. See Durry, Les Cohortes, p 18.
200. Rainbird, The Vigiles, p 298. Daugherty, ‘Cohortes vigilum’, p 230,
remarks on the scarcity of information about these prefects: ‘for the entire three
centuries of the existence of the cohortes we know the names of 43 prefects,
only seven of whom are ever mentioned by historians, and then for reasons other
than firefighting’.
201. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, pp 131–2.
202. J.S. Rainbird, ‘The fire stations of imperial Rome’, PBSR 54 (1986), p
148; see also Sablayrolles, ‘La rue’, pp 140–1. Cf. Dio 57.19.6. The city had
been divided into regions in 7 BC; see Dio 55.8.6.
203. For an estimation of the strength of the vigiles see Rainbird, ‘Fire
stations’, pp 150–1. The number of men per cohort is not clear, but was either
560 or 1,000. The difficulty in estimating their number comes from the late date
of most of the evidence. By the third century, the vigiles numbered 7,000, and
much of our information – especially from inscriptions – comes from that
period.
204. Of these fires, 20 would be large and two serious, according to Rainbird,
The Vigiles, p 376. See Juvenal, Satire 3.197–202, on the dangers of fire in the
crowded areas of the city. Cf. also Edwin S. Ramage, ‘Urban problems in
ancient Rome’, in Ronald T. Marchese (ed), Aspects of Graeco-Roman
Urbanism: Essays on the Classical City (1983), pp 74–9.
205. Rainbird, The Vigiles, p 443.
206. See, for example, Daugherty, ‘Cohortes vigilum’, pp 231, 238;
Johnstone, ‘On the uses of arson’, p 61; Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire,
p 117 (though caution over the date of the evidence is pointed out in note 95).
207. Rainbird in fact states unequivocally that ‘the Vigiles were not a police
force’. See The Vigiles, p 444, and his ‘Fire stations’, p 151: ‘We do not need to
seek an explanation for the large number of vigiles in anything other than
firefighting. Even if they did have minor policing duties, their firefighting duties
had to take priority as fire develops quickly. Their method of patrolling would
probably appear police-like to the modern reader.’ Cf. also Nippel, Public
Order, pp 96–7. For an example, albeit a fictional one, the appearance of the
vigiles at Trimalchio’s party is informative: drawn by the noise, they broke down
the door, not because of the disruption, but because they thought the house was
on fire. Cf. Petronius, Satyricon 78.7.
208. CIL 14.4494 (= ILS 9494; translated by Campbell, The Roman Army,
#61):
. . . . . u | . . militi cohor. VI pr., | Ostienses locum sepult. | dederunt |
publicoque funere efferen. | decrerunt | quod in incendio | restinguendo interit. |
(... soldier of the sixth praetorian cohort. The citizens of Ostia gave a place
for his burial and decreed that he be buried with a public funeral because he died
while putting out a fire.)
This inscription led Durry to suggest that the sixth praetorian cohort may
have been stationed in Ostia prior to being united with the other cohorts in
Rome, but the evidence is tenuous. See Durry, Les Cohortes, p 44; cf. also
Rainbird, ‘Fire stations’, p 157. There are four inscriptions which mention the
sixth praetorian cohort in association with Ostia (CIL 14.215, 223, 4494, 4495)
but 4494 is the only inscription securely dated to the period of Augustus.
209. Seneca, NQ 1.15. It is not clear from the text (cohortes) whether these
men were from the guard or the vigiles, or maybe a combination of the two.
210. Suetonius, Claudius 25.2. The type of unit is not identified in the text;
vigiles, urban cohort and naval unit all have been suggested. In fact, it may be
the urban cohort that was moved in AD 69 by Otho, as suggested by Durry, Les
Cohortes, p 12, n. 6, followed by Rainbird, ‘Fire stations’, p 157. Ricci, ‘In
custodiam urbis’, p 487, argues that the lack of specification makes it impossible
to identify the unit.
211. Suetonius, Tiberius 50.3. The date has been estimated to be AD 16; see
Werner, De Incendiis, p 15.
212. Dio 57.14.10: the joke is that, when asked for water, Drusus replied,
‘Give it to them warm’ – as wine was often served with warm water, this was an
indication of how heavy a drinker he had become.
213. Tacitus, Annals 3.72.3; cf. Dio 57.21.3, who remarks that this
recognition was unusual, since Tiberius previously had honoured other men with
statues only after their deaths. Interestingly, Velleius Paterculus, in his brief
account of the fire (History of Rome, 2.130.1), does not mention Sejanus at all.
214. Dio 59.9.4; cf. Durry, Les Cohortes, p 278.
215. Suetonius, Claudius 18.1; cf. Dio 60.33.12. Agrippina, his wife, was
with Claudius; cf. Barrett, Agrippina, p 130. Mottershead, Suetonius, Claudius, p
73, argues for there to be urban cohorts present as well – for crowd control –
with the praetorians there only to guard the emperor. Yet it is more likely, since
the fire raged for two days, that as many cohorts as were available in Rome
would have participated in combating it, especially since Claudius is said to have
paid as well for the services of the plebs to fight the blaze; see Canter,
‘Conflagrations’, p 275.
 216. Griffin, Nero, p 129.
217. Dio 62.17.1. Cf. also Suetonius, Nero 38.1; Tacitus, Annals 15.38.7.
218. Tacitus, Annals 15.38.3.
219. Daugherty, ‘Cohortes vigilum’, p 233: ‘The accounts of Dio, Tacitus,
and Suetonius reflect active efforts at fire suppression by one of the few
effective methods open to firefighters of the day: containment by demolition or
backfire.’
220. On these counter-fires see Tacitus, Annals 15.40.2.
221. Daugherty, ‘Cohortes vigilum’, p 233.
222. Pliny, NH 17.5; Tacitus, Annals 15.38.1; Suetonius, Nero 38.1. Cf. also
Statius, Silvae 2.7.60–1; Seneca, Octavia, 831–3; Dio 62.16.1–2.
223. Tacitus, Annals 15.43. On the social and economic impact of the fire see
R.F. Newbold, ‘Some social and economic consequences of the A.D. 64 fire at
Rome’, Latomus 33 (1974), pp 858–69.
224. Dio 73.24.3. The fire occurred late in Commodus’ reign.
225. As Johnstone, ‘On the uses of arson’, pp 52–3, notes: ‘the Romans left
no comprehensive record of fires in their city. Our knowledge of them must be
culled from incidental references in literature and, most especially, brief citations
in histories ... fires which concerned powerful men, consumed public buildings,
or impinged on the state were most likely to be reported.’
226. Cf. Johnstone, ‘On the uses of arson’, pp 60–1: ‘fire fighting ... was not
so specialized that other troops could not do it effectively ... any might fight
fires, all asserted the emperor’s substantial presence’. One might adduce a
modern parallel in this context, for even today at fires which threaten a large
area, and especially those which threaten residential communities, the army is
occasionally brought in to supplement those firefighters employed by the state.
227. As noted earlier, they had taken part in the battles of AD 69: they fought
on the side of Vespasian along with the urban cohorts, commanded by the urban
prefect (also Vespasian’s brother), Titus Flavius Sabinus. See Tacitus, Histories
3.64; 69.
228. See, for example, Velleius Paterculus, History of Rome, 2.127–8. On
Sejanus’ early career see Chapter 3.
 229. Many modern scholars have accepted at face value the entire story of
Sejanus’ fall. See, for example, Winterling, Caligula, pp 29–31.
230. On the reasons for Tiberius’ retreat from Rome see Levick, Tiberius, p
167; Birley, ‘Sejanus’, p 137. As noted above, Sejanus made use of the
praetorians to convey imperial correspondence and, no doubt, to report back to
him matters of importance on Capri; cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.41.2; Dio 58.4.2.
231. Sejanus was not the only official that Tiberius relied on. For example,
Seneca, Ep. 83.14, comments that, when he withdrew to Campania, Tiberius
entrusted Piso, the urban prefect, with some sort of secret orders. Cf. Passerini,
Le Coorti, p 273; Syme, Augustan Aristocracy, p 343.
232. The existence of a plot by Sejanus against Tiberius is a vexed issue. The
main source for a conspiracy is Josephus, AJ 18.181–2. There are few other
references: Juvenal, Satire 10.69–72; Tacitus, Annals 5.8.1, 5.11.1, 6.14.1,
6.19.2, 6.47.2, possibly also 6.3, 6.8.3, 6.8.6, 6.23.2; Suetonius, Tiberius 61.1,
75; possibly also Vitellius 2.3. Perhaps the most interesting is that of the
contemporary, Valerius Maximus, who never names Sejanus but alludes to
treason; see 9.11.4. Given the date of publication so soon after Sejanus’ demise,
Valerius clearly is repeating the official version. On the other hand, Dio (whose
account is complete) records that Sejanus was uncertain as to his position with
Tiberius by AD 31, but he did not think to attempt to overthrow the emperor,
since he continued to be held in esteem and realized that the people were
supporting Gaius; see 58.6–8. For a summary of the most prominent modern
theories see Birley, ‘Sejanus’, pp 129–34.
233. Dio 58.11.4.
234. Dio 58.4.1 mentions that Tiberius feared that Sejanus might be
proclaimed emperor in his place, but this must be predicated on Dio’s own
experience of the emperor Septimius Severus and his praetorian prefect
Plautianus; see, for example, Dio 76.14.6. As J. Edmondson, Dio: The Julio-
Claudians (London, 1992), p 118, notes, ‘a large part of the senatorial order and
the Roman plebs were very much opposed to Sej[anus] ... it serves D[io]’s
artistic purposes to magnify Sej[anus]’ position to the highest degree, so that his
subsequent fall appears all the more dramatic’.
235. See Birley, ‘Sejanus’, pp 141–9.
 236. What Dio says (58.9.5) is that Macro sent back to their camp ‘those
members of the guard who happened to be with Sejanus and at the senate’; the
Greek is quite general here, with no specific word for ‘guarding’, though most
translators conclude that is what these men are doing for Sejanus based on them
being praetorians.
237. Dio 58.9.5–6.
238. For views on Macro’s role see Birley, ‘Sejanus’, pp 144–9; Hennig, L.
Aelius Sejanus, pp 151–6.
239. There is epigraphic evidence of Macro’s promotion from prefect of the
vigiles to praetorian prefect, but no indication of the date of the move. See AE
(1957), 250; de Visscher, ‘L’amphithéâtre d’Alba Fucens’, pp 39–49; de
Visscher, ‘La carrière’, pp 168–79. In a later article, de Visscher proposed that
Macro was praefectus vigilum by AD 24, though there is no direct evidence for
the date; see F. de Visscher, ‘Macro, préfet des vigiles et ses cohortes contre la
tyrannie de Séjan’, Mélanges A. Piganiol II (Paris, 1966), p 766.
240. F. Cramer, Astrology in Roman Law and Politics (Philadelphia, 1954),
pp 105–6; see also Birley, ‘Sejanus’, p 147. The marriage occurred in either AD
29 or 30.
241. On Sejanus as consul see Chapter 3. Hennig, L. Aelius Sejanus, p 153,
remarks on the practical difficulty of Macro simply changing commands
overnight, as recorded by Dio (58.9.2–3) and argues therefore that he had
become the substitute commander of the guard at the beginning of Sejanus’
consulship. But in the early third century, Septimius Severus appointed his
praetorian prefect Plautianus consul; it is clear that he held both offices
concurrently. Given the rarity of the same individual holding both posts, it is
difficult to see why Sejanus could not have done the same. On Plautianus see
Dio 76.15.2.
242. That there had been a power struggle was suggested by de Visscher,
‘Macro, préfet des vigiles’, pp 761–8. But cf. Hennig’s criticisms in L. Aelius
Sejanus, p 153, n. 77. That Macro was in charge on Capri was suggested by
Koestermann, Cornelius Tacitus, p 364. See also Hennig, L. Aelius Sejanus, p
154.
243. Barrett, Caligula p 28. Macro continued to serve as prefect under Gaius;
see Chapter 2.
244. Dio 58.12.1–2.
245. See Tacitus, Annals 6.2–3; Dio 58.18.4. Clearly Tiberius did not trust
the praetorians after the initial charge.
246. As Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, p 125, notes, ‘This ugly
business of destroying personal enemies highlights the praetorians’ main
purpose of safeguarding the emperor and his family. It behooved them to
advance the emperor’s interests, no matter how heinous.’
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1. A Roman Emperor AD 41 (detail) by Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1871). Image
courtesy of the Art Renewal Center® www.artrenewal.org.

2. ‘Claudius summoned’ by Lawrence Alma Tadema (1867). Image courtesy of

®
 the Art Renewal Center® www.artrenewal.org.

3. Aureus of Claudius (first issued AD 41–42) showing the praetorian camp with
a figure holding a spear and shield standing in front of a standard. Drawing by
Stephen Copp.
4. The Puteoli frieze, possibly from an arch of Trajan. Drawing by Stephen
Copp.
5. Details of one of the shield emblazons from the Puteoli frieze. Drawing by
Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones.
6. Scene V from Trajan’s Column, with the praetorians on the march across the
Danube. Photo courtesy of H. R. Goette.
 7. Antoninianus of Gallienus, dating to AD 258, celebrating the praetorian
guard; the legend reads COHH PRAET VI P VI F. Drawing by Stephen Copp.
8. Tombstone of Lucius Septimius Valerinus (third century AD). Drawing
courtesy of S. James.
9. Military diploma for a soldier of the Vth praetorian cohort, dating to AD 246.
© The Trustees of the British Museum.
10. Map of Rome, showing the location of the Castra Praetoria in relation to the
Forum and the Palatine. Plan by Stephen Copp.

11. The Castra Praetoria: excavated building remains and extrapolated

structures. Plan by Stephen Copp.
12. The Castra Praetoria and legionary fortress at Noveseum (hatching indicates
 location of contubernia). Plan by Stephen Copp.

13. (a) The Louvre relief, possibly from the Arch of Claudius (AD 51); much
restored. © Louvre/The Bridgeman Art Library.
13. (b) Drawing of the scorpion cheek-piece (soldier in the middle at the back in
13(a) ) by Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones.

14. Relief from the Arch of Marcus Aurelius (AD 176–80) showing praetorian
soldiers in full armour. Photo courtesy of H. R. Goette.
15. Panel from the Cancelleria reliefs (late first century AD) with praetorians in
tunic and paenula (travelling cloak). Photo courtesy of H. R. Goette.
16. Sestertius of Gaius (issued AD 40–41) addressing the praetorians. Drawing
by Stephen Copp.
17. Sestertius of Galba (AD 68) addressing the praetorians. Drawing by Stephen
Copp.