b.

DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINALPROCEEDINGS

1. Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998 

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of
venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of such petition, the
offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public
respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and
Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish
new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to
reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not
cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the
voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.

RULING: YES. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it
“not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so
construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our
own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.”

i. JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER

2. TREAS V PEOPLE

Petitioner: HECTOR TREÑAS Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 195002, January
25, 2012 DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory.

Facts: 1. Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a house and
lot located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He
also gave Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to P120,000. However, when Elizabeth
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted
to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the money for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against Hector. 2. An
Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendered a
Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA which also
rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC. 3. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in
Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of
the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by
petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that
the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were
situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable
presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature.

Issue: 1. Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Ruling + Ratio: The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In this
case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was committed within the jurisdiction of the
RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the offense was committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no
other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was
committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that
points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. There being no showing that the
offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. The case is
REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITION: There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that
city has no jurisdiction over the case.
(IT WOULD AFFECT THE LIFE AND LIBERTY OF THE PARTIES IF ANY OTHER PLACE)

Facts: Javier was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector representative for a term of (1)
year. During that time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines
(BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the following year. 1998, she was again appointed to the
same position and for the same period of (1) year. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing
Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On
September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid
International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of travel, she was paid
₱139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Javier was not able to attend the scheduled international book
fair.
Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash, but Javier failed to do
so. Then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against Javier for
malversation of public funds and properties. Dr. Apolonio further charged Javier with violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 for failure to file her SALN.

During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867 (SNDGNBYN), Javier pleaded not guilty.
Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 on May 16, 2000 in
order to determine jurisdictional issues.On July 6, 2000, the People filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Information, that Javier is a high ranking officer, being a member of the Governing
Board of the National Book Development Board equated to Board Member II with a salary grade 28.
Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear
Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not allege that she is a public official who is classified as
Grade "27" or higher. Neither did the information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to
a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
Court: The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of P.D. 1606 as amended so
provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving: (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; The offense is office-related
because the money for her travel abroad was given to her because of her Directorship in the National
Book Development Board.
ISSUE: Is Javier a public officer thus within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

HELD: Yes. In fine, Javier is a public officer and is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. She
belongs to the employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase "all other national and local officials
classified as ‘Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. The
Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction.

II. JURISDICTION OVER THE TERRITORY

4. Uy v CA G.R No. 119000

FACTS: While Rosa Uy was helping her husband manage their lumber business, she and a friend,
Consolacion agree to form a partnership wherein the latter will contribute additional capital as industrial
partner for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business. Various sums amounting to P500,000 were claimed
to have been given by Consolacion for the business, but no receipt was ever issued. The friendship of the
two turned sour, thus, Consolacion demanded the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa
were all dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Consolacion filed a complaint for Estafa and for violation
of BP 22. The Manila RTC acquitted the petitioner of Estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP
22. Petitioner contents that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under BP 22 and
assuming arguendo that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal, she cannot be stopped from
questioning the jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violation of the Bouncing
checks law.

RULING: Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. This it cannot
take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside that of that
limited territory. Jurisdiction of the court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complain or information. Once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the crimes of Estafa and
violation of BP 22 are two different elements and necessarily, for the court to acquire jurisdiction, each of
the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. The respondent court is wrong to conclude that
inasmuch as the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case then it also acquired
jurisdiction over the violation of BP 22. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered,
dishonoured or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements
necessary for the Manila court to acquire jurisdiction. BP 22 on the other hand, as a continuing offense,
may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committee. Petitioner also timely
questioned the jurisdiction of the court. As provided by jurisprudence, we can see that even if a party fails
to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. The general rule is
that the jurisdiction of a court over a subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. However this rules has been qualified in the case of Tijan vs.
Sibanghanoy wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court can be held to be barred by laches.
This case however cannot be applied in the case at bar since the accused is not guilty of laches. RTC of
Manila has no jurisdiction over the case.

5. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation vs. Romars International Gases
Corporation
G.R. No. 189669, February 16, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent Romars International Gases Corporation, not an authorized distributor or reseller of Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation products was found to distribute and/or sell LPG
products using the same containers of Petron and Shell. These containers were refilled at respondent’s
premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur. The petitioners requested the NBI to investigate said
activities of respondent. The NBI investigation report confirmed that respondent was engaged is said
activities and distributing the gas cylinders in different places, one of them a store called “Edrich
Enterprises” located at 272 National Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City.

The NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga),
two separate Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1, in relation to Section 170 of
R.A. No. 8293 against respondent and/or its occupants. The RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said
Applications and two Search Warrants which were served by the NBI on the same day at the respondent’s
premises and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants on the ground that: (a) there was no probable cause;
(b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure
operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d)
Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. RTC-Naga denied the Motion to
Quash.

On its Motion for Reconsideration, it raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the
Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. It pointed out that the application filed with the
RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not
have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b),
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that it was already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the
application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.

RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing the
search warrants. The CA denied the appeal and the MR

Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not venue in an application for Search Warrant is jurisdictional.
2. Whether or not the newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction which
may be raised at any time.
HELD:

NBI failed to comply with Section 2(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
The petitioner’s application for a search warrant was insufficient for failing to comply with the
requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did
not have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed. Paragraph (b) of
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates that, the application for search
warrant should state the compelling reasons why the search warrants were being filed with the RTC-Naga
instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced.

The omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that
all available objections be included in a party’s motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed
waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
(c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.

In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an
issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they
filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time
of filing of the motion to quash.
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before
the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special
and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

Application for search warrants is not criminal in nature, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional
does not apply thereto.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants,
such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.

The grant of the Motion to Quash was not proper

It was improper for the RTC-Naga to have  taken into consideration an issue which respondent failed to
raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is
clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.

III. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

6. DALMACIO V TULIAO

FACTS: Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted
all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review
where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.  On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.      
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases
best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the
law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of
these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

If warrant of arrest – documents nalang

Judicial determination
For trial

If in flagrante delicto- commitment order by judge

quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach
considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and
that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and in substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accuses is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent. The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.