Marshall Brown, Legal Effects of Recognition
Marshall Brown, Legal Effects of Recognition
Marshall Brown, Legal Effects of Recognition
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to The American Journal of International Law
617
quite distinct from the reason and the virtue of law itself. In the case of
international law, while its sanctions have been inadequate, nevertheless, it
has been generally respected and applied in long periods of peace. Its
basic sanction has been simply and effectively "the desire for reciprocity
and the fear of retaliation."' It has been a good "Rule of the Road" which
the peoples of most nations have respected for their mutual convenience.
This basic sanction is the silent policeman that controls international traffic
in normal times. The free peoples of the world would distrust and even
defy a supra-national policeman serving an international dictatorship.
Another basic principle is that the law of nations rests upon the free con-
sent of peoples. It is not a code imposed by a supra-national authority.
The peoples of the world are entitled to the utmost respect for their own
laws and institutions. They may not be subjected to arbitrary control
without danger to international peace. There are many who advocate some
form of world government enforcing a "World Law." This may be the
ultimate ideal of international society, though it presents obvious difficulties
and objections. We must recognize, because of the lack of any basic under-
standing between peoples concerning legal rights and obligations, that no
freedom-loving peoples will ever delegate supreme authority without re-
serving the right of political protest or judicial redress against govern-
mental interference and injustice. In the present stage of social evolution
throughout the world, it is quite evident that peoples have no common
standards of democracy, of political institutions, of economics or of social
welfare. Until a world government with supreme powers to impose and
enforce a supra-national law is created, we must acknowledge that inter-
national law depends on the free consent of peoples. Neither the League of
Nations nor the present United Nations could possibly alter the fact that
the sovereign free independent nations of the world are unwilling and un-
able to consent to the imposition by a supra-national authority of laws that
may be opposed to their own national interests. The evolution of human
society in the direction of the development of man's noblest qualities can-
not safely be subjected to arbitrary dictatorial control.
Another basic principle is the major premise that the function of recog-
nition is a voluntary, free, political, diplomatic function. There is no su-
preme law, no legal compulsion to constrain any government to accord or
refuse recognition. The only compulsion is the compulsion of the logic of
the facts inherent in each situation.
The fourth basic principle underlying the problem of recognition is that
the judiciary, under any democratic system of government, has a function
quite separate and different from that of the executive. This function is to
protect human interests. The court does much more than decide an issue;
it applies accepted principles of law that are inherent and latent in all hu-
man relationships. While it is obvious that the courts must keep out of
politics, it is just as obvious that the executive must not interfere with the
izations, notably in the case of the new state of Albania after the first
World War, and now in the admission of the Russian Ukraine, which can
hardly be described as an independent nation. It has been generally held
that the presence of non-recognized states and governments in the United
Nations is to be regarded as a special conventional arrangement that does
not imply full recognition by other Members.4
The problem of recognition has naturally been of immediate and great
concern to the Republics of the Western Hemisphere, where changes in gov-
ernments have been frequent and have presented serious diplomatic diffi-
culties, notably in the case of Mexico and Nicaragua during the Adminis-
tration of President Wilson. Frequent revolutions which did great eco-
nomic harm and demoralized the relations of many of these republics were
naturally of concern to the United States Government. President Wilson,
in his devotion to democratic principles, endeavored to fortify the institu-
tion of democracy. In the case of the government of General Huerta in
1914, as well as of other revolutionary changes in Nicaragua, El Salvador,
and Costa Rica, Wilson enunciated the doctrine of "not according recogni-
tion or support to any government which might establish itself unless it
demonstrated clearly that it was elected by legal and constitutional
means. " 5
This Wilson Doctrine, while supporting constitutional governments in
power, actually meant intervention in denying to a people the right to
choose their own government by whatever means at their disposal. The rec-
ognizing government arrogated to itself the privilege of determining
whether a new government was de jure, namely, the decision by a foreign
Power of internal, sovereign, constitutional matters. The Wilson Doctrine
was in harmony with the declaration of Dr. Tobar, former Minister of For-
eign Affairs of Ecuador:
The American Republics for the sake of their good name and credit,
apart from other humanitarian or altruistic considerations, should
intervene indirectly in the internal dissensions of the Republics of the
Continent. Such intervention might consist at least in the non-recog-
nition of de facto, revolutionary governments created contrary to the
constitution.6
4See Malbone W. Graham, The League of Nations and the Recognition of States
(Publication of University of California).
5 Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1913, p. 7.
6 See Larnaude, " Les Gouvernements de fait," Revue G6n6rale de Droit International
Public (1921), p. 498.
The United States thus finds itself in accord with the policy laid down
by the Mexican Government in the statement now known as the Estrada
Doctrine issued by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, Se-nor Don
Genaro Estrada, on September 30, 1930:
second conclusion that in every instance, with the exception possibly of cer-
tain conventions, such as the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and the Treaty of Ver-
sailles in 1919, each nation reserves complete freedom of decision whether
its own interests are best served by the granting or the withholding of rec-
ognition. This holds true, as has already been intimated in the case of the
League of Nations and of the United Nations, where the participation of
non-recognized governments creates certain common relations withini the
ambit of the Organization. Outside of the Organization, the accepted prac-
tice of separate recognition, or of the maintenance or suspension of diplo-
matic relations, continues. There is no doubt that the contacts within the
Organization do not result in recognition, if the clear intention to accord it
is lacking. The participation as a Member without doubt presupposes a
certain measure of relations but they do not have to be direct or general;
recognition is not implied in such contacts. Jules Coucke, commenting on
the discussion in the Assembly of the League of Nations concerning the
status of Albania, states: "On peut concluire implicitement de cette discus-
sion que l'Assemblee n'entend pas faire dependre l'admission d'une re-
connaissance de jure prealabte des Membres de la Societe." 12
There exists considerable literature by political scientists concerning the
nature and effects of recognition. The subject certainly lends itself to spec-
ulation, though once embarked on this sea one may find oneself lost in un-
realistic arguments of a specious nature. For example, there has been much
discussion concerning the qualifiations necessary to warrant the recognition
of a new state. Are the size of a given territory and the number of inhabi-
tants essential factors in according recognition-as, for example, in the case
of the little Republic of San Marino in Italy? Of special importance has
been the question of the ability of a new state or a new government to com-
ply with its international obligations. It has been objected with reason
that recognition should be withheld from any nation which either deliber-
ately or involuntarily fails to fulfill all its international duties. A very
interesting problem was presented by the Soviet Union which demanded
and received recognition, although it had not accepted the general princi-
ples of international law. By recognition the other Powers conceded that
the Soviet Union should be admitted to the rights of international law,
though it evinced no intention to respect the rights of other nations under
the accepted usages of international law.
Other subjects which have intrigued the political scientists have been
whether recognition may be provisional or conditional, whether it is retro-
active in effect, or whether it is irrevocable. One theory, which has been
stoutly maintained by such eminent political scientists as Hans Kelsen, is
that recognition de jure, meaning full, complete recognition without reserva-
tions, has the effect of creating and establishing rights for the recognized
12 "Admission dans la Societ6 des Nations et Reconnaissance de .Jure," Revue de
Droitt International et de L6gWlation Compar6e (1921), p. 321.
state which cannot exist prior to recognition. Kelsen even draws a subtle
distinction between the recognition of a de facto situation which merely ac-
knowledges its existence, and recognition which has a "constitutif" effect,
namely, confers legal rights.13 Problems of this nature certainly deserve
careful consideration, but we are more concerned with problems of an im-
mediate practical nature than with theoretical speculations. In the pursuit
of this end we find light in recent judicial and arbitral decisions by national
and international tribunals.
The confusion of thought concerning recognition revealed in diplomatic
precedents has likewise been reflected in court decisions. The courts in the
United States, in Great Britain, and-to a lesser extent-in France, have
indicated a fear amounting almost to an obsession lest the judiciary, in cases
involving recognition, should trespass on what was imagined to be the spe-
cial prerogative of the executive branch of government. Judges have had
more concern to spare the executive embarrassment than to protect the
legal interests of private individuals, or of foreign states where sovereign
interests were involved. The administration of justice has too often been
subordinated to political considerations; judicial independence has been im-
paired; and a serious misunderstanding of the essential nature of the rela-
tions between the peoples of different nations has been fostered. The courts
have plainly failed in some instances to understand the function and effects
of recognition, as well as the limitations imposed by the demands of simple
justice, on the exercise of this function by the executive. Palpable judicial
absurdities which have involved the miscarriage of justice have resulted
from this attitude of undue deference on the part of the judiciary towards
the executive. In one instance the widow of an American citizen who died
in Mexico was denied by an American court the right to serve as executrix
because she had been designated by a Mexican court during the existence
of a de facto regime which had not been recognized by the United States
Government! 14
In another case, the'Soviet Government was not allowed to appear in court
to prevent the disbursement of Russian funds which had been deposited in
a New York bank. In still another case, funds belonging to the Russian
state were turned over by an American court to a minor functionary for-
merly in the employ of the government of the Czar long after it had ceased
to exist! 15 Although the Soviet Union had been recognized by the French
Government, the court found it necessary to revive artificially a Russian
corporation which had been dissolved by Soviet law, a process which was
aptly called "reviving a mummy." "I In a British case involving the con-
is Lectures at the Hague Academy of International Law, 1932, Vol. IV.
14 Pelzer v. United Dredging Co., 118 Misc. Rep. 210, 195 N. Y. S. 675.
15 Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Y. (1919), 293 F.
133; Hudson's Cases on International Law, p. 70.
16 Banque Industrielle de Moseou v. Banque Russe pour le Commeree et 1 'Indus
Trib. eiv. Seine, May 20, 1921, 50 Clunet 533.
fiscation of private property by the Soviet Government, the court was com-
pelled to reverse a former decision by reason of the retroactive effect of de
jure recognition.17
Owing to different juristic norms prevailing in countries which had al-
ready recognized the Soviet Union, judicial redress of varying degrees
could be obtained in one country although denied in another. The same
facts were subjected to utterly varying interpretations according to the
forum loci. In countries where recognition was denied or refused, the
courts were placed in the embarrassing situation either of failing to pro-
tect Russian private and public interests, or of being constrained to render
decisions which logically would be reversed following the recognition of the
de facto government in Russia.
It should suffice for our present purpose merely to note the judicial con-
fusion created by the failure to understand the nature and the underlying
principles of recognition. In spite of this unfortunate situation, however,
the problem of recognition is not as hopelessly complicated as might first
appear. The subject has seriously preoccupied both publicists and jurists
who have sought conscientiously to clarify the problem. Some judges have
had the courage to sail out on the badly charted sea of legal precedents in
order to find a safe and navigable course for the administration of justice.
The absurdities, the paradoxes, and the gross injustice of some of the cur-
rent fallacies concerning recognition have been intimated. The underlying
principles which should control the function of recognition have, however,
been adumbrated in certain recent court decisions. Without attempting to
reproduce the mass of facts laboriously gathered by jurisconsults, or even
to give a resume of their arguments, we may venture to indicate the main
principles which seem to underlie and control the function of recognition.
If these principles compel acceptance by the force of their own logic, we
may escape the necessity of attempting to reconcile the conflicting concepts
of diplomats and political theorists, as well as the diverse practices of judi-
cial tribunals. Once these major principles are agreed upon, their practical
application would seem to be clear and to offer no serious difficulties. We
are warranted by the existing confusion of thought on the subject and the
resulting anomalies to make the effort to clarify the problem.
The recognition of a new state naturally entails the recognition of a new
government. The elucidation of the problem of the recognition of a new
government cannot fail to throw light upon the problem of the recognition
of a new state. The key to the whole problem of recognition is to be found
in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Horn v.
Lockhardt, arising out of the Civil War, which concerned certain acts per-
formed under the Government of the Confederacy. The Court in this case
observed that:
The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular ad-
ministration of the laws. Order was preserved, police regulations
maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced,
marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer of property regu-
lated, precisely as in time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seri-
ously questions the validity of judicial or legislative acts in the insur-
rectionary states touching these and kindred subjects, where they were
not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority
of the national government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
under the Constitution.18
administration with money or arms or munitions and the like. But the
ordinary agencies, departments, and bureaux of the government must
continue to function notwithstanding its principal administrative of-
fices may be in the hands of usurpers, and in such a case the sale and
delivery to these necessary and legitimate agencies of supplies, mer-
chandise, and the like, to enable the government itself in its unpersonal
aspect to function is a very different transaction from one having for
its object the support of an individual or group of individuals seeking
to maintain themselves in office. The character of each transaction
must be judged and determined by the fact of the particular case.
A similar distinction arises in the field of international law. There
are, on one side, agreements and understandings between one nation
and another changing or even subverting its rulers, which are clothed
with the character of a free choice, preference, and approval, and
which obviously undertake to bear the risks of such a choice. There
are, on the other hand, many transactions to which this character is
alien. Embassies, legations, and consulates of a nation in unrest will
practically continue their work in behalf of the men who are in con-
trol of the capital, the treasury and the Foreign Office-whatsoever
the relation of these men to the country at large may be. Embassies,
legations, and consulates of foreign nations in such capital will prac-
tically discharge their routine duties as theretofore, without implying
thereby a preference in favour of any of the contesting groups or
parties. International payments (for a postal union, etc.) will be re-
ceived from such government; delegates to an international confer-
ence will often be accepted from such government. Between the two
extremes here also there is a large doubtful zone, in which each case
must be judged on its merits.
Facts and practice, as related to the Huerta administration in Mex-
ico, illustrate the necessity of a cleavage in determining the validity
or nullity of its acts.
In the field of international relations the distinction is apparent.
Where pre-existing relations with government agencies continued un-
der such cireumstances as not to imply either approval or disapproval
of the new administration or recognition of its authority, these trans-
actions must be treated as government transactions and binding on it
as such rather than transactions had with a particular administration.
The routine diplomatic and consular business of the nation continued
to be transacted with the agencies assuming to act for the government
and which were in control of the Foreign Office, the treasury, and the
embassies, legations and consulates abroad. Even the United States,
though placing its stamp of disapproval in the most unmistakable man-
ner on the act of Huerta in usurping authority, kept the Embassy in
Mexico City open for the transaction of routine business, entrusting it
to a Charge d'Affaires, and maintained its Consulates throughout Mex-
ieo. Such relations, so maintained were entirely impersonal; they con-
stituted relations with the United Mexican States, with its Government
as such, without respect to the status of the individual assuming to act
for the Government."
19 Hudson's Cases on International Law, p. 155; this JouRNAL, Vol. 21 (1927), p. 161.
These two cases have been cited, not as being necessarily authoritative,
but because they throw light on the essential continuity in the life of the
state, irrespective of changes of governments or of alterations in the normal
administration of civil affairs and justice. It would seem incontrovertible
that there is substantially no interruption in the organic life of the com-
munity under de facto governments. Marriages and divorces occur, chil-
dren are born, wills are made, inheritances transmitted, property exchanged,
contracts signed and executed, litigations carried on and settled, criminals
tried and punished; in sum, human relations remain for the most part un-
affected by political disturbances. The civil and military authorities exact
obedience and co6peration for the protection of the ordinary interests of
the community. Contracts essential for the proper performance of the
affairs of the community with a de facto governmenit differ in no material
respect from contracts made with a de jure government. Such contracts
are those relating to schools, fire department, police department, highways,
and the maintenance of the courts of justice. Whatever exceptions may
seem necessary to safeguard the national patrimony, as, for example, the
alienation of the national domain by a provisional government, are pri-
marily to be decided by the courts, or in rare instances by arbitration. It
would seem sufficient for our purpose to emphasize this basic principle of
continuity in the external life of the state.
The significance of the principle of continuity and the legal consequences
which result from its application can only be fully understood by a consid-
eration of the facts and realities of state life. The question presents itself,
what happens within a state when changes in government occur, whether
peaceably or by violence; when a de facto government like that of Crom-
well, or that of the Soviet Union, holds power unopposed for a considerable
period of time; or when rival factions variously denoted as insurgents, bel-
ligerents, or local de facto governments contend for the control of the cen-
tral government; or when there is a temporary dissolution of the central
government and the internal life of the state is carried on by the "para-
mount, " "ascendant " forces of the local de facto governments ?
The solution afforded by the application of the principle of continuity is
of the greatest significance in determining the nature and legal effects of
recognition. The acceptance of the principle of continuity in the external
relations of the state imposes logically the acceptance of another funda-
mental principle, namely, the validity of the acts of the provisional de facto
government. Although Cromwell's government was denounced as an il-
legal usurpation, no attempt was made after the Restoration to declare its
acts null and void. Even the acts of local de facto governments in the exer-
cise of the normal functions of civil administration-with reasonable limi-
tations and exceptions-are to be considered valid. Thus, various acts le-
gally consummated by the Paris Commune in 1871 were not questioned.
"Nature abhors a vacuum and so does law." It is impossible to conceive of
de facto government "is not only dictated by the practical necessities which
do not permit interruption in international relations, but it flows from the
most essential principles of international law."
It does not seem necessary to adduce additional evidence or arguments to
show that states are compelled by practical necessities to take notice of a
de facto situation and to enter into some form of relation with the new gov-
ernment. Though such relations may be attenuated in form and subject to
reservations or protestations, it would appear obvious that in substance
they necessarily entail recognition of one kind or another.
It would seem clear that the recognition of a new government is of much
greater significance from the political point of view than from the legal. It
is more concerned with diplomatic considerations than with legal effects.
Recognition does not alter the nature of acts consummated under a de facto
regime. Once accorded, it entails the retroactive acknowledgment of the
validity of such acts from the very origin of the new government. If rec-
ognition is refused or long delayed, it may result in diplomatic entraves
and embarrassments for the de facto government. It most certainly results
in serious embarrassments for the non-recognizing government, which may
have sought in vain to base the relations of the peoples of the two nations
concerned on the untenable fiction of the non-existence of the de facto re-
gime and of the nullity of its acts.
Because of this dilemma it cannot matter very much, from the point of
view of legal effect, whether recognition be termed "provisional," "lim-
ited," "conditional," de facto, or de jure. The acknowledgment of a de
facto situation is recognition, no matter how much one may seek to refine
its meaning or its legal effects. Relations of any kind with the de facto au-
thorities can only result in some form of international commitment. The
essential fact is that the respective sovereign wills of two recognized inde-
pendent states have found expression through authorized representatives
of the national will. Dr. Podest'a Costa has correctly stated:
28 "La Beconnaisanee d 'un Gouvernement de Facto par Etats Etrangers," RIev. G6n.
de Droit Int. Pub., p. 22.
ernment. All this, however, cannot alter the inexorable fact of the exist-
ence of the de facto regime, and of the validity of its acts, and of their legal
effects. Facts are facts which no diplomatic subterfuges or juridical fic-
tions can obscure, denature, or nullify.
If the facts, principles and conclusions here set forth be accepted, it
should not be difficult to clarify the problem of the attitude to be taken by
judicial tribunals when confronted by litigations that seem to involve rec-
ognition. The embarrassments, the contradictions, the anomalies, the para-
doxes, and the apparent miscarriages of justice which have resulted from
various judicial decisions in different national courts, would appear to be
due to a fundamental misunderstanding both of the nature of recognition
and of the legal effects resulting from recognition or from non-recognition.
Starting with the generally accepted principle that recognition is the sole
function of the executive branch of government, the courts have been un-
duly solicitous not to embarrass the executive in the free exercise of this
function. They have been quite right in holding that it would be intoler-
able to have two conflicting expressions of the national will on the subject.
But this solicitude, as has been already indicated, has too often resulted in
bewildering decisions where the legal rights of individuals and of sovereign
states, represented by non-recognized governments, have been either denied
or inadequately safeguarded. When the courts acknowledge that recogni-
tion is necessarily the proper function of the executive they are not called
upon to abdicate their own independent judicial functions in the adminis-
tration of justice. Neither diplomatic exigencies, nor the dictates of reason,
nor the demands of equity, can justify the failure to "give justice."
The primary reason why the courts have not infrequently been led to
render decisions of a dubious character would seem to be that they have
misunderstood the nature of recognition and have attached to it erroneous
legal consequences. And this misunderstanding has been due to the failure
to apply the principle of the continuity of the life of the state, both inter-
nally and externally. Once the courts have grasped the fundamental sig-
nificance of this principle, the solution of most of the cases involving the
rights of private individuals and of sovereign states, under an unrecognized
de facto government, becomes relatively simple, due allowance being made
for variations in the organic laws of different countries.
Fortunately, there are to be found in certain recent judicial decisions, as
well as in the writings of jurisconsults, indications of the restricted signifi-
cance of recognition and of its legal effects. They serve to simplify greatly
the main problem and to obviate the necessity of a detailed discussion of
complicated points of law which concern principally the domain of private
international law, and other collateral subjects of public international law,
such as insurgency, belligerency, and responsibility of states. It should
sufiee for our purpose merely to cite various juristic opinions in order to
determine in a broad sense the legal effects of recognition:
Practically all of the cases on the right of a state to sue proceed upon the
theory that the state is continuous and the right of action really resides in
the aggregate body of the people who are merely represented by particular
governmental organizations which may change in charaoter and personnel.25
That the court is bound by the recognition of the political branch of its
own government, and can and should look no further, is a proposition so
well settled and so well grounded in common sense and in the necessities of
orderly procedure that further discussion is unnecessary. ...
It may, however, be observed that the importance of recognizing govern-
mental continuity, quite irrespective of considerations as to the existing
form of a foreign government, or as to the human beings in control at any
particular time, is well illustrated in this case, where it is sought to deprive
a foreign state forever of the opportunity to be heard in an effort to recover
for the loss of property which belonged to the foreign state, i.e., the "Rus-
sian Government, " by whatever name called. It may also be noted, in pass-
ing, that the executive and judicial branches of the government have recog-
nized " the present government of Russia in proceedings to naturalize
Russian subjects." 27
the other hand, acts and decrees that were just in operation and consistent
with public policy were sustained not infrequently to the same extent as
if the governments were lawful. . . . These analogies suggest the thought
that, subject to like restrictions, effects may at times be due to the ordi-
nances of foreign governments which, though formally unrecognized, have
notoriously an existence as governments de facto. Consequences appropri-
ate enough when recognition is withheld on the ground that rival factions
are still contending for the mastery may be in need of readjustment before
they can be fitted to the practice,'now a growing one, of withholding recogni-
tion whenever it is thought that a government, functioning unhampered, is
unworthy of a place in the society of nations. Limitations upon the general
rule may be appropriate for the protection of one who has been the vietim
of spoliation, though they would be refused to the spoliator or to others
claiming under him. We leave these questions open. At the utmost, they
suggest the possibility that a body or group which has vindicated by the
course of events its pretensions to sovereign power, but which has forfeited
by its conduct the privileges or immunities of sovereignty, may gain for its
acts and decrees a validity quasi governmental, if violence to fundamental
principles of justice and to our own public policy might otherwise be done.28
Whether or not a government exists clothed with the power to enforce its
authority within its own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it rules,
capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an inde-
pendent power, able to enforce its claims by military force, is a fact, not
a theory. For it, recognition does not create the state although it may be
desirable. So only are diplomatic relations permitted. Treaties made with
the government which it succeeds may again come into effect. It is a testi-
mony of friendly intentions. Also in the country granting the recognition,
that act is conclusive as to the existence of the country recognized. ...
Again, recognition may become important where the actual existence of a
government created by rebellion or otherwise becomes a political question
affecting our neutrality laws, the recognition of the decrees of prize courts
and similar questions. But except in such instances the fact of the existence
of such a government whenever it becomes material may probably be
proved in other ways. . . . Here, however, we need no proof. The fact is
conceded. We have an existing government (Russian Soviet), sovereign
within its own territories. There, necessarily, its jurisdiction is exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. This
is the result of its independence. It may be conceded that its actions should
accord with natural justice and equity. If they do not, however, our courts
are not competent to review them. They may not bring a foreign sovereign
before our bar, not because of comity, but because he has not submitted
himself to our laws. Without his consent he is not subject to them. Con-
cededly that is so as to a foreign government that has received recognition.
. . .But whether recognized or not the evil of such an attempt would be
the saMe.29
28 Sokoloff v. National City Bank, U. S. Ct. App., N. Y., 1924, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E.
917. See Hudson's Cases, p. 113.
29 Max Wulfsohn et al. v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, U. S. Ct. App.,
N. Y., 1923, 234 N. Y. 372. See Hudson's Cases, p. 89.
Par trois fois, les 2 & 9 Septembre 1891, la justice anglaise a acceuilli les
demandes qu'ils lui presentaient (agents du gouvernement Congressiste en
Chili) et cependant, circonstance capitale a relever, le gouvernement de la
Grande Bretagne n'avait pas reconnu officiellement le gouvernement con-
gressiste, maltre en fait de la capitale du Chili, des villes principales, de la
flotte, de 1'armee et de tous les organes gouvernmentaux.
A 1'heure ou ces lignes sont 6crites, les autres gouvernements europeens,
pas plus que 1'Angleterre, n'ont accorde au gouvernement congressiste la
reconnaissance officielle. Ces baptemes diplomatiques entrainent des pour-
parlers et des procedures que pour des motifs divers, les chancelleries n'ai-
ment pas a precipiter. Supposons que, dans l'intervalle, ce gouvernement
soit oblige de recourir 'a la iustice francaise. allemande. italienne. etc. Les
30 Russian Reinsuranee Co. et al. v. Franeis R. Stoddard, Jr., Supt. of Insurance of the
State of New York, et al. U. S. Ct. App., N. Y., 1925, 240 N. Y. 149. See Hudson's
Cases, p. 106.
11 y a lieu de penser que, 1'&volution des choses aidant, les juges des dif-
ferents Etats, mis en face du droit sovietique, ne recourront 'a la notion de
l'ordre public et ne se refuseront a appliquer la loi russe que dans les cas
ouf 1'application de cette loi viendrait a porter atteinte directement aux
principes essentiels de leur organisation politique et sociale. La notion
d'ordre public n'aura pas pour consequences d'entrainer ainsi un non pas-
suqmus absolu et categorique: elle ne constituera qu'une sorte de "soupape
de sfurete' qui permettra au juge de poursuivre prudemment un travail
d'adaptation laborieux entre des points de vue juridique extremes et op-
poses.3
Limitations of space preclude the further citation of precedents, judicial
decisions, and opinions of jurists. Enough has been presented, it is hoped,
to justify the following main conclusions:
The recognition of a new state or governmaent is a political, diplomatic
function, not a judicial one having specific legal effects. It is determined
by reasons of expediency and high state policy. No state or group of per-
sons organized politically has a legal claim to recognition, though it may
possess strong moral claims.
A de facto state of affairs in the international relations of peoples may
exist that logically requires acknowledgment. The question presented is
not whether there shall be recognition, but what form it shall take, whether
complete and formal, or limited.
"Recognition 'de jure' results either from an express declaration or from
a positive act indicating clearly the intention to grant this recognition, such
as the establishment of diplomatic relations." 36
Recognition "de jure" of a new state, once formally accorded, is irre-
vocable. It does not imply an arbitrary power to alter capriciously the
inexorable facts of international intercourse.
"Recognition 'de jure' is retroactive in its effects from the date when the
new state actually began to exist as an independent state." 3
"Recognition 'de jttre' of a new government is retroactive in its effects
from the date when it began to exercise its authority." 38
Irrespective of recognition or non-recognition, the courts may take cogni-
zance of any fact pertinent to the protection of private and public rights, in-
cluding the acknowledgment of the existence of a new state or government.
The official acts, laws, and judicial decisions emanating from a de facto
regime may not be ignored or regarded as non-existent. If performed in
the normal course of civil and judicial administration, such acts, laws, and
3B Andr6 Prudhomme, Tbid., p. 7.
36 See Resolutions adopted by the Institut de Droit International, this JOURNAL, Supp.,
Vol. 30 (1936), p. 185. The author of the present article was gratified as Rapporteur
of the Commission of the Institut concerning the Recognition of New States and New
Governments to receive the almost complete confirmation of the views and conclusions
here presented.
37Ibid., p. 186.
38Ibid., p. 187.