The Kachin Conflict 2014

The
Kachin Conflict

The Search for Common Narratives

Pillars representing the different Kachin ethnic groups, Manau Ground, Myitkyina, Kachin State

The Kachin Conflict – The search for common narratives 1

About the Author
Carine Jaquet is an academic and aid worker with experience working in Myanmar since 2005. She has spent
over one year living and working in Kachin State on humanitarian aid to conflict affected populations. One of
her speciality areas of focus has been on the delivery of humanitarian aid into conflict affected areas. Carine
holds post‐graduate degrees in political science from Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and in Myanmar language
from the Yangon Foreign Languages University. She has published numerous academic papers on Myanmar
and is an associate researcher at the Research institute for Contemporary Research on South East Asia
(IRASEC). Carine researched and wrote this report between August and September 2013, travelling widely in
kachin state and interviewing UN agencies, international and non‐government organisations, civil society
organisations, academics, members of the local communities and Kachin experts. She was supported by a
national researcher for Kachin language interviews and as a fluent Myanmar speaker, conducted the other
interviews in Myanmar, except with some interviewees who preferred to interact in English language.
The International Management Group (IMG)
IMG is an international organization, established by 13 EU Member States1, plus Norway and Switzerland,
which is financed with public funds for development cooperation. IMG is a ‘not for profit’ legal entity. IMG has
“Joint Management” status with the European Commission, a mechanism whereby the Commission entrusts
some of its implementing tasks to the international organisation. IMG was established in 1994 to address the
specific challenges faced by the international community for reconstruction in the Balkans. At the request of
its members the mandate of the Organisation has been extended both in terms of geographic and sector
coverage. IMG provides institutional capacity building and technical assistance programming specifically in
post‐crisis/post‐conflict areas and developing countries. IMG opened its office in Myanmar in June 2012 and
began implementing programmes to support the reform process on behalf of the EU and Government of
Norway.apacity building
This publication was funded by the European Union
Funding for the Handbook and Options Study publications was provided from the EU's current Myanmar
envelope of 200 million USD. Specific support for the publication came from the EU Instruments for Stability
mechanism. This report was conceived in light of the European Union (EU) program to support peace efforts in Myanmar
as part of the EU’s Instruments for Stability (IfS) € 1.2 million program Action ‘Mid‐Term Support to the Myanmar Peace
Center’. The International Management Group (IMG) is implementing the programme of support for the peace process
between April 2013 and September 2014.
Acknowledgments
The consultant and IMG thank all those consulted in the research for this study. We in particular would like to
thank the Kachin and Myanmar civil society groups, faith‐based organisations, non‐state armed group
members, who generously gave their time and experience to inform this report. International organization and
non‐government organisations also provided useful insights that informed the document.

The consultant would like to thank colleagues, both past and present, and friends and family who have
supported her during the writing of this paper. She would like to thank Lyndal Barry who provided me with not
only inspiration and guidance but also continuous support, She would also like to thank Matthew J. Walton
who provided invaluable commentary to ensure accuracy of the information, She would also like to thank
Seamus Dunne who supported a broader reflection on the security issues and the community based response,
and Edith Bowles who provided useful feedback on both content and structure of the report. She would also
like to thank John Narayan Parajuli and Gwen Robinson who provided invaluable help in editing the paper. She

1Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and The United
Kingdom.


also thanks Thusitha Perera for edits, sharpening the argument and continuous support. Finally she thanks all
the Myitkyina, Bhamo, Kunming, Bangkok and Laiza, who inspired and provided her with insights, experiences,
hopes and fears.

Methodology and sources

This paper is based on observations, interviews, primary and secondary sources in English, Myanmar,
Jinghpaw1, Lisu and Shan languages – including media, academic papers and unpublished sources – collected
over a year in Kachin State and immersion in Kachin culture and politics. It encompasses analyses based on
trips to various locations in Kachin and Northern Shan States between May 2009 and August 2013.2 It also
relies on a decade of study, research, discussion and observation of Myanmar by the author. It focuses on the
experiences of political, religious leaders, civilians and internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the recent
conflict. It proposes an analysis of the narratives of war and peace, highlighting the communication strategies
at play in the search of legitimacy from both parties to the conflict, and the reinvention of the notions of war
and peace in light of the rapidly evolving political situation. The recent evolution of various narratives of the
conflict show the complexity of notions of war and peace as they are encapsulated in the collective Kachin
memory, as well as the reinterpretation of these by local leaderships for political ends. These changing
narratives are part of Kachin political identity, and for warring parties, became a justification for gaining
control over a resource‐rich and strategically located territory.

A particular challenge in the data collection process was access to official primary sources (both Tatmadaw –
armed forces ‐ and government); however this was counterbalanced by interviews and use of open sources to
inform the analysis of this report.

.
Disclaimer: This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this
publication are the sole responsibility of the International Management group Myanmar, and can in no way be
taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
Copyright @2014 International Management Group


Table of Contents
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 10
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 13
BACKGROUND OF EVOLVING NARRATIVES ................................................................................... 14
1. Kachin identity and political struggle ......................................................................................... 15
1.1 The Emergence of Kachin identity .................................................................................. 15
Kachin and the Lowlanders: a history of conflict and strategic interaction .................................. 16
Challenging the local power structures ......................................................................................... 17
Christianity in Kachin State ........................................................................................................... 18
1.2 The current conflict and historical legacy ....................................................................... 19
The Panglong Agreement: unfulfilled promises ............................................................................ 19
Post‐Independence era and disillusionment ................................................................................. 19
2. Narratives of war ..................................................................................................................... 22
2.1 Causes of conflict – a theoretical approach .................................................................... 22
Community, nationalism and conflict ........................................................................................... 22
Appetite for conflict? ..................................................................................................................... 23
2.2 Escalation of the conflict ................................................................................................ 24
The 1994 ceasefire – revisited ....................................................................................................... 24
The Border Guard Forces – the ultimatum .................................................................................... 25
3. Conflicting narratives ................................................................................................................ 27
3.1 Conflict, continuity and changes .................................................................................... 27
When words matter: Expressions of uncertainty .......................................................................... 27
From one conflict to another ........................................................................................................ 28
Old conflict, new image? ............................................................................................................... 29
3.2 The KIO’s war ................................................................................................................. 30
Isolation and Marginalization ....................................................................................................... 30
The Church under attack ............................................................................................................... 31
4. Search for peace – Factors and impediments ............................................................................. 33
4.1 Impediments to Peace ................................................................................................... 33
Different shades of peace ............................................................................................................. 33
The right time for peace? .............................................................................................................. 34
Tatmadaw’s ‘peace’ strategy ........................................................................................................ 34
Peace talks and mistrust ............................................................................................................... 35


4.2 Political and economic incentives of parties to the conflict ............................................ 37
Economic incentives ...................................................................................................................... 37
The international community and the Chinese “elephant in the room” ....................................... 38
5. The human cost of war : Practical implications of the conflict.................................................... 40
5.1 Displacement and protection concerns .......................................................................... 40
Humanitarian crisis ....................................................................................................................... 40
Protection issues and local responses ........................................................................................... 41
Post‐ war uncertainties ................................................................................................................. 42
5.1 Local Security Concerns .................................................................................................. 43
Local security arrangements ......................................................................................................... 43
Ethnic armed groups – what’s next? ............................................................................................. 43
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 46
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 48
Annexes ........................................................................................................................................ 48
End notes ...................................................................................................................................... 49


KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
In the course of compiling this report, key recommendations emerged from scores of interviews on all sides of
the Kachin conflict and extensive historical as well as current research. Although not all are expressed as such
in the main body of this report, these recommendations are in line with the content and, more significantly,
sum up core insights from the relevant parties. These could prove useful for the international community and
local representatives, both organizations and individuals:
______________
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND PROFIT‐SHARING: There must be fair division and transparent
management mechanisms for the region’s natural resources between the key parties, from ethnic
communities to local, state and national governments. This would require revisions – and in some cases,
possible termination – of existing resources‐related contracts and agreements, and thorough reviews by
community representatives as well as government of any new commercial arrangements with both foreign
and domestic investors.
In future there should be greater regulation of various natural resources sectors, from jade to teak, and
minerals to hydropower; strictly enforced standards of transparency, oversight and resources management;
verification of land ownership and usage; and development of revenue‐sharing mechanisms. The particularly
thorny issue of compensation mechanisms – and funds – for local communities that have lost their livelihoods
and/or lands must also be addressed. In addition, large‐scale development projects, such as the controversial
Chinese‐sponsored Myitsone dam project which was suspended in late 2012, should only proceed after
extensive consultation with local communities and the establishment of appropriate compensation
mechanisms. Current projects generating controversy include the Chinese‐sponsored gas and oil pipeline
projects in Northern Shan state, bordering Kachin.
In future there should be greater regulation of various natural resources sectors, from jade to teak, minerals
and hydropower; strictly enforced standards of transparency, oversight and resources management; legal
verification of land ownership and usage; and development of revenue‐sharing mechanisms. The particularly
thorny issue of compensation mechanisms – and funds – for local communities which lost their livelihoods
and/or lands must also be addressed. In addition, large‐scale development projects, such as the controversial
Chinese‐sponsored Myitsone dam project which was suspended in late 2012, should only proceed after
extensive consultation with local communities and the establishment of appropriate compensation
mechanisms. Current projects generating controversy include the Chinese‐sponsored gas and oil pipeline
projects in Northern Shan state, bordering Kachin.
LAND ISSUES: Further to the issues related to natural resources projects as above, there should be
comprehensive complaint and arbitration mechanisms to deal with land‐related grievances and to determine
claims that have piled up over years of alleged land‐grabbing by various parties including business and military.
Such a mechanism should combine elements of the national legal framework and customary local laws and
practices. Notably, under recent national legislation, most small landholders are likely to struggle to recover
land that was confiscated before and during the conflict, due to the difficulties in proving original ownership,
or even long‐term tenure, as the government retains overall rights over land. Under traditional local laws in
Kachin‐populated areas, those using land – mainly as small farmers ‐ gained tenure rights automatically,
without any titles or legally valid documentation. Some proposals to provide a legal basis for complaints
provide for a thorough interview and research process to be conducted by local officials. Regardless, these
complaint and arbitration mechanisms should be relatively simple and “user‐friendly”. They should avoid
imposing complex or costly administrative requirements that would disadvantage farmers in remote areas, or
generally, those who are less literate and not Myanmar native speakers. The state – possibly with assistance
from aid organizations – should provide subsidized or free legal assistance to complainants.


Related to the above is the need for all parties to discuss and agree on ways to include local customary laws
and traditions, as well as the policies of representative bodies such as the Kachin Independence Organisation
(KIO) that are enforced up to today. On land rights for example, any peace talks must determine appropriate
conditions for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Foremost among these are urgent practical
considerations such as safety issues involving mine‐clearing and greater control of local military units. Both
warring parties should in principle return confiscated lands and property to victims of the conflict. At the same
time, land rights and tenure need to be considered in the local context, where customary law and practices
still prevail. This also requires consideration of hierarchies and roles of local political and social systems
(including clan structures; duwas, or Kachin traditional chiefs ruling on highest clans; and elders).
DEVOLUTION OF POWER AND BUILDING TRUST: A process is needed involving all sides, ideally to run in
tandem with any peace talks, to come up with measures aimed at sustainable devolution of power. Such
measures should include grassroots initiatives to fully involve various ethnic minorities (not only Kachin, or
more specifically, the dominant Jinghpaw group). Central to this would be official (and international)
acknowledgement of the historical context, and appropriate consideration of local expectations as well as
previous disappointments. This requires understanding of previous efforts by the KIO and related
organizations to comply with a heavily centralized system during 17 years of ceasefire, and also of the
widespread disillusionment – even a sense of betrayal – that led to the breakdown of peace agreements. Most
significantly, in other ethnic areas, some armed groups with a history of opposition to any suggestions of
ceasefire are now trying for the first time to build peaceful relations with the State. Such groups have indicated
more hope in the peace process than those who feel they were betrayed by the inability of one side or another
to live up to agreements. Given these past attempts by the KIO to cooperate on ceasefire proposals, there is a
greater need for the government side to build trust and avoid past mistakes. At the same time, there are
valuable lessons to be drawn from studying the previous peace arrangements.
SENSITIVITIES OVER ETHNIC PROFILING: At a time when sensitivities about ethnic and religious differences
have been magnified by sectarian violence as well as disputes over proposed modification of the country’s
constitution, Kachin representatives among several other ethnic groups are sensitive to how they are
identified and often have firm pre‐existing ideas about their own self‐identification that have shaped their self‐
image and the conflict. Kachin representatives among several other ethnic groups began pushing in late 2013
for the modification of government plans to launch Myanmar’s first nationwide census since 1983. The
government in late January said the 2014 census, scheduled to take place from March 30 to April 10, would
proceed as planned, despite the calls from ethnic minority groups for modification of procedures. Kachin
representatives said they would not accept subdivisions of their ethnic group along linguistic lines, but only
according to distinct tribes. They asked the government to restructure its existing ethnic classification system
ahead of the census and have refused to participate which means effectively that the data for Kachin State will
not be accurate. While the request seemed unlikely to be granted, the government and international groups
involved in conducting the census and analyzing data should take such concerns into account. The negative
consequences of insensitive handling of census data could inflame racial, ethnic and religious tensions and in
respect to the peace process, could promote distrust and further distance ethnic groups from government
negotiators.
HIGH‐LEVEL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT: To be credible and have any chance of success, any peace talks must
feature direct involvement of the higher levels of military commands on both sides, and should focus on actual
cessation of hostilities, rather than vague phrases such as "de‐escalation of violence". The latter is hard to
monitor, risks creating confusion and therefore, could ultimately perpetuate fighting. As the dynamics of
peace talks in Kachin become more complex, closer coordination with other non‐state armed groups is
required. In addition, beyond the broad aims of any nationwide ceasefire (under discussion since 2013) any
peace agreements or plans between Kachin and central government sides must take a comprehensive
approach to addressing security issues at the grassroots level, including the role of ethnic militias – especially


those in Northern Shan State, bordering the Kachin region. By understanding the drivers – particularly the
economic incentives – for continued involvement in conflict by these groups, some of which have held sway
for decades over lucrative natural resources operations, it should be possible to design plans and implement
development programs which could prevent them from becoming “spoilers” as their income sources dry up.
INCLUSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM: The above recommendation underlines the broader need for inclusive
security system reform, featuring meaningful decision‐making and strategic roles for individual representatives
of various ethnic groups. In the longer term, a so‐called “federal army” should be based on merits of the
officers, not on their ethnicity, and should be composed of voluntary adult recruits only. There should also be
relevant integration measures and training for all non‐state armed groups – an area where international
organizations with experience in the field could provide valuable assistance, although it is questionable, given
the colonial history and strong rejection of foreign interference particularly in regards to the armed forces, as
to how far the Myanmar armed forces would be prepared to go in allowing international trainers on Myanmar
soil..
AID AGENCIES IN ETHNIC AREAS: If the momentum quickens on negotiations between government and KIA
representatives, all aid agencies – international and domestic – involved in areas including Kachin State and
bordering Northern Shan State should review their relief operations and consider longer term implications of
their engagement, particularly to support IDPs in the region. In recognition of the relatively rapid lifting of
previous restrictions, including on humanitarian programs and access to affected areas, they should apply a
“Do No Harm” approach, working in close coordination with existing local structures while constantly assessing
‐ and also mitigating – risks that their presence could be used politically by various parties and agencies. It is
vital from now for aid agencies, as well as all parties to the conflict, to respect international humanitarian law
and aim for unhindered humanitarian aid to all victims, regardless of ethnic and political divides, in all parts of
Kachin State.
With greater access for aid agencies in former conflict‐affected areas, donors and practitioners should
emphasize coordination to ensure that aid is reaching those in greatest need, including in the most remote
areas. Pragmatic and transparent justice mechanisms should be put in place and care should be taken to avoid
stigmatizing populations from areas of intense conflict, and from regions under the control of non‐state armed
groups, as well as returning IDPs.
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: If a nation‐wide ceasefire is reached with most of the Non‐State Armed Groups
(NSAG), including the KIA and its allies, it is important to consider that this – crucial – step will not be an end in
itself. It will certainly raise high, yet probably divergent, expectations among the groups. In this context it is
important to consider peace as a process, and not only as the result of a written contract. Constant
compromises and discussions will be required to make peace sustainable. The government will most likely face
a complex task to harmonize practices and relations with all groups, and it will have to consider each group’s
specificities (including: the history of relations with central State, existing customary structure power, local
natural resources, cohesion and the extent to which the armed groups represent their own and surrounding
communities). In other words, any nationwide ceasefire will not enable the government to use a “one solution
fits all” approach to the peace process. Negotiators and also donors and aid organizations will still have to
work in areas controlled by signatory NSAGs on a bilateral basis, hence they will have to take into account
specific claims, priorities and characteristics of each group.
BUILDING ON CEASEFIRE OR TENTATIVE PEACE AGREEMENTS: In the event that peace negotiations progress
after the preliminary agreements of the past 10 months, technical and financial support should be provided by
international donors and aid organizations to help implement legal and political framework changes at all
levels (national, regional, district, and township). The rule of law and implementation of new policies should
apply in every part of the territory in question. Support for improving local governance, in terms of both
structure and policy approaches, is also required, and will help strengthen peace‐building.


SUPPORTING RECONCILIATION: Aid donors and organizations should also support reconciliation efforts at all
levels of society, including at community and grassroots levels. Emphasis should be placed on cross‐ethnic
development projects, to mitigate ethnic, sub‐ethnic and religious divides and to promote diversity – for
example, through educational activities that acknowledge Myanmar’s immense ethnic, cultural and linguistic
diversity.


Note: This research paper attempts to explain the conflict from Kachin perspectives, particularly in the context of how local
history has been presented in literature and the media by key individuals, and to provide insights into the background of
the conflict. It is designed for international and national agencies engaged in supporting the peace process.
The dominant narrative emerging from stakeholders in the peace process is that economic improvements and social
benefits will bring peace to Kachin State. While improved economic circumstances provide stronger foundations for the
achievement of peace, political grievances must be properly addressed in order to move fully into the next phase of
developing the state. The key issues are outlined below.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE KACHIN SITUATION: The KIO and its armed wing the KIA were among the first
large NSAGs to reach out and sign a ceasefire brokered by then‐prime minister, General Khin Nyunt, in 1994.
Yet, by the end of 2009, while many other NSAGs had joined the government’s ceasefire initiative, the KIA was
returning to warfare. The shift in the KIO’s attitude, from cooperation to one of outright hostility, stemmed
from a variety of issues, which are analyzed in this paper. To complicate matters, the opposing parties voice
contrasting narratives of their rationales for the conflict, and of their search for a lasting peace.
In the wider context, the conflict in Kachin State should not be misinterpreted as an isolated series of events
caused by a group of disillusioned ethnic leaders. In both domestic and international media, it is mistakenly
often depicted as a conflict primarily over control of natural resources, a view that too often underplays vital
political aspects. In fact, the real reasons are more emblematic of attempts by successive governments to
dominate minority ethnic populations. To understand the current situation and explain the motivations of key
players, it is crucial to explore the fundamental misunderstandings between the two sides, summed up in the
contrasting hopes of the Bamar‐dominated central government, and ethnic groups at the periphery of the
country. It highlights the need for the Myanmar government to engage in meaningful political dialogue with
the ethnic minorities beyond the technical aspects of cessation of hostilities. It also shows how vital this effort
would be in building trust among the ethnic minorities in the central government and in the reform process.
Clearly, without such a shift from ceasefire to political dialogue, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities will have
difficulty in any meaningful interaction with the central government.
Through extensive field work, including interviews, and a comprehensive review of media and academic
literature, this paper explores the origins of Kachin politics and analyses the root causes of conflict as well as
the divergent narratives of the key players. What emerges is a picture of missed opportunities on both sides of
the search for peace. Essentially, the conflict is the result of a succession of failures to achieve meaningful
political dialogue, as well as the inability of parties to reach compromises. To establish enduring peace in
Kachin State will require far more than a simple ceasefire agreement. This paper identifies central issues as
well as sensitivities that must be taken into account in order to support a lasting peace. The longer a
comprehensive agreement eludes negotiators, the greater the risk that views will harden on both sides,
undermining any prospect of compromise.
ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT: The roots of the conflict in Kachin state between ethnic armed forces and
government troops go back to grievances over control of the state’s lucrative natural resources and the
preservation of ethnic identity after the end of British colonial rule in 1948. At the 1947 Panglong conference,
the Kachin along with Shan and Chin representatives agreed in negotiations led by General Aung San to the
formation of a Union of Burma in return for promises of full autonomy in internal administration and an equal
share in the country’s wealth. The Panglong Agreement, signed on February 12, 1947 – now celebrated as
Union Day in Myanmar – granted "full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas [the colonial


administrative term for borderlands]" in principle, and provided for the creation of a Kachin State by the
country’s Constituent Assembly. But the promised autonomy and wealth‐sharing failed to materialize.
A series of rebellions among various ethnic groups – many which had not participated in the Panglong
Conference – intensified the atmosphere of growing mutual suspicion. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the Kachin,
along with the Chin, and Shan, finally took up arms against the State amid growing discontent and a sense of
betrayal over perceptions that the Rangoon‐based government was ignoring ethnic interests. In 1961, a group
of young Kachin nationalists established the Kachin Independence Organization. In the following year, 1962, a
military coup led by General Ne Win set the seal on growing mistrust of the central government among key
ethnic groups and ushered in decades of war. In this asymmetric conflict against a professional state army, the
KIA became an effective guerilla force and quickly gained control over large areas of Kachin and northern Shan
states. The Chinese government in Yunnan provided training and weapons to the new guerilla force.
Alongside their military successes, KIO leaders took part in various rounds of ceasefire negotiations with the
Rangoon‐based military regime, notably in the early 1980s. It was not until 1994, however, that a substantive
ceasefire agreement was struck. The ceasefire, which granted political autonomy within a special region in
Kachin State, was maintained from 1994 to 2011. In this period the Kachin population based in these areas
were able to improve their economic circumstances. From 2004, Kachin representatives even participated in
the National Convention process that ended with the drafting of the country’s 2008 constitution. However,
Kachin representatives maintain they were allowed no significant input, and that little attention overall was
paid in the drafting process to ethnic grievances.
In many cases under successive military regimes from the early 1980s, ethnic complaints were deepened by
official neglect or the breaking of pledges. In the lead‐up to the 2010 elections, the military junta backtracked
on earlier promises to the KIA and other key ethnic armed groups, demanding they transform their armed
units into “Border Guard Forces” under partial control of the military, or Tatmadaw. None of the main
ceasefire groups, except the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA), agreed to the demand. Widely believed
to be a result of the stand‐off over the border guard dispute, the government‐backed Election Commission
refused to register Kachin political parties to contest the national election in late 2010, and shortly afterwards,
declared the ceasefire “null and void,” setting the stage for a resurgence of hostilities. Indeed, fighting in
Kachin state flared back up in June 2011, just months after President Thein Sein came to power in March.
The new government almost immediately began negotiating a series of peace agreements with ethnic groups,
from mid‐2011 – declaring that a nationwide ceasefire with all NSAGs would be a priority goal. After fighting
escalated in Kachin state in late 2012, both sides began an uneasy round of talks. In May 2013, the KIO became
the last large armed group to sign a tentative agreement, although it stopped short of a truce or ceasefire
pact. As of early 2014, the agreement stood, by far, as the most fragile of a total 14 peace deals signed
between armed ethnic groups and the government. Even so, the agreement paved the way from late 2013 for
the entry of Kachin representatives to vital talks between most ethnic armed groups and the government over
a proposed nationwide ceasefire. While fighting largely subsided in most of the major ethnic areas from early
2012, tensions between the KIO’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army, and government troops
continue to simmer, erupting in local‐level conflicts in pockets of Kachin and Northern Shan States, and
escalating again in early 2014 as doubts grew over the government’s ambitious timetable to sign a nationwide
ceasefire by April 2014.
KACHIN DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE: In subsequent peace talks after the tentative preliminary
agreements between Kachin and national government representatives, initially in May 2013, the KIA continued
to insist on political dialogue as a condition of any comprehensive ceasefire agreement. Some observers warn
that continuing disagreements between the two sides over the conduct and phasing of negotiations carries the
risk of undermining other peace agreements, particularly in areas around Kachin state. Several other ethnic


groups have followed suit in demanding political dialogue, and the government is striving for a new framework
agreement, ostensibly to address these concerns while remaining in control of the process.
MAY 2013 AGREEMENT: The May 2013 agreement signed by KIA leaders and the government’s peace
negotiating team stopped far short of a ceasefire deal, and was essentially a seven‐point pledge to “de‐
escalate” hostilities. Even so, it represented a significant step for the Kachin. From mid‐2011, KIO and KIA
leaders had stood by as mainstream armed groups managed to reach ceasefires of varying forms. Yet, in stark
contrast with other ethnic armed groups, Kachin forces since 1994 had enjoyed a 17‐year ceasefire that was
often portrayed as a reasonably successful, albeit temporary, arrangement.
In resuming the conflict in mid‐2011, KIO leaders questioned the intentions of the government concerning its
vague commitments to future devolution of power and greater inclusion of ethnic minorities in government.
After the earlier period in 2012 of intense fighting, the KIO spearheaded a drive for political dialogue with
government negotiators, placing at the top of the agenda central issues such as claims for a federal state and a
regional army. Since their May 2013 peace agreement and the resumption of constructive discussions with the
government, KIO leaders along with the Karen National Union and other NSAGs ‐ have actively promoted
coordination among the ethnic groups. Both groups were instrumental in the establishment of the Nationwide
Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), made up of 17 armed ethnic groups, which in late 2013 began
negotiating with the government’s Internal Peace Making Committee (IPMC) to agree on a national ceasefire
framework that would encompass all non‐state armed groups. It became clear that such coordination has
further potential to significantly increase the leverage of ethnic groups in the negotiation process.
TOWARDS A NATIONWIDE CEASEFIRE IN 2014: Discussions about a nationwide ceasefire agreement from late
2013 marked a significant shift in relations between NSAGs and the government, and ultimately in previously
hard‐line attitudes within the military’s top brass. Initially this shift was reflected in the issuance of a draft
nationwide ceasefire framework at a multilateral ceasefire meeting in November 2013, held in Laiza, Kachin
State. The talks, including invitations from government negotiators to NSAG representatives to suggest
amendments to this key document generated sometimes tense or even confrontational responses, but
nevertheless marked significant progress. In a subsequent five‐day meeting on January 20 2014, held at the
Karen National Union (KNU) Lawkheela headquarters, key points of the draft nationwide ceasefire framework
were agreed by all but one of the participating groups, the exception being the Shan State Army‐South. The
meeting brought the goal of a nationwide ceasefire closer than ever before. KIA leaders however continued to
harbor fears – echoed by other ethnic representatives ‐ that the agreement could potentially hand the
government control over large swathes of territory in their state.
OLD FAULT LINES RE‐EMERGE: For the KIO, the revival of old fears, of losing territory and giving up control to
an unsympathetic central government, emerged in the immediate aftermath of the controversial 2010
national elections. The polls were widely condemned by international and domestic critics as flawed. They
nevertheless ushered in a robust parliament and a reform‐minded government. Much has since been written
about the rapid pace of change in Myanmar’s political landscape. By convincing the majority of groups
involved in armed struggle against the Myanmar armed forces to sign ceasefire agreements, the
predominantly civilian government of President Thein Sein succeeded in winning some credibility, both
nationally and internationally.
But amid this striking shift, it is also important to consider how three inextricably interwoven but highly
delicate reform processes are at the heart of the emerging new dynamic: political change, economic
transformation and the peace process. At the same time, several old fault lines have re‐emerged, among them
the conflict in Kachin State. To all sides in the peace process, the rekindling of this old conflict serves as a
powerful reminder of the fragility of the transition process led by the government in Nay Pyi Taw.


Introduction
The main Kachin armed group, the Kachin Independence Army, is the largest ethnic armed group still in
conflict with the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar armed forces). In periods of relative peace when the government
has made strenuous efforts to engage the Kachin in peace talks, the KIA/KIO has been perceived by some
observers as an 'irrational' actor, rejecting such overtures for reasons including pure economic self‐interest.
Primarily, such critics claim Kachin leaders have profited from the extraction and sale of the state’s abundant
natural resources over long years of conflict, and even today maintain unofficial claims on resources and
related benefits that would be jeopardized by comprehensive peace agreements.

Overall, the issue of business interests and development initiatives in the peace process, as Myanmar Peace
Monitor/Burma News International noted in a recent report, “has become a controversial yet unavoidable
topic” in ongoing peace efforts in Myanmar. “While many are worried that business is taking precedence over
politics in the peace negotiations, the demands of NSAGs for business concessions, development and fair
distribution of natural resources are a reminder that ethnic leaders recognize that economic power and
political power are two sides of the same coin. At the same time, business concessions in ceasefire talks are
also seen by some to be a ploy by the government to turn ethnic leaders into ‘mini‐cronies’ while also
performing a public relations stunt to attract more foreign investors,” the report concluded. 3

Some KIO/KIA representatives however managed to get long‐running ethnic grievances back on top of the
political agenda for a crucial meeting of the alliance of 18 main ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, held in the
KIO stronghold of Laiza from November 30 to December 2, 2013. The meeting’s main objective was to review
the draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement proposed by the government. To kickstart the National Ceasefire
Agreement process, government permission was granted, for the first time since Myanmar’s independence
from Britain in 1948, for NSAG representatives to gather legally to discuss future political arrangements. While
a number of key ethnic demands are yet to be considered, the newly created space in the form of this broad
participatory meeting is an indicator of how far both sides have been prepared to go to attain peace.

On October 9 and 10, 2013, the Union Peace‐making Working Committee (UPWC), the government team in
charge of negotiating and implementing ceasefires4, and the KIO signed an agreement to “de‐escalate” their
conflict. This followed their signing of a “Seven point agreement”, which had the same aim, in May 2013. Both
these documents paved the way for further peace talks. However, neither were ceasefire agreements and, on
the ground, localized fighting continued in some areas of Kachin state. KIA leaders have demanded political
dialogue and, unlike other ethnic NSAGs, have not considered a ceasefire necessarily as a first step towards the
resolution of long‐term political issues. The main KIA demand for many years has been greater political
autonomy, which they believe was not fully achieved even during the 17‐year ceasefire between 1994 and
2011. The government’s push from late 2013 to achieve a nationwide ceasefire agreement between 18 NSAGs,
however, gave hope that the process would lead to political dialogue.

Currently, the Kachin conflict is the last remaining armed conflict of significance in the country. After 17 years
of peace following the 1994 cease‐fire, a minor skirmish near the Taping River hydroelectric project on June 9
2011 became the trigger for the resumption of war – barely three months after U Thein Sein assumed his
position as Myanmar’s new president. Within a few days, violence escalated and thousands had to flee their
homes. Soon, the fighting spread to eastern and southern areas of Kachin State. Amid fierce fighting,
government troops managed to reclaim a number of strategic locations formerly under KIA control, including
the KIA headquarters at Laiza, securing access to strategic locations including lucrative jade mines around
Hpakant, about 80 miles west of Myitkyina. Within two years, more than 100,000 civilians had fled their homes
due to fighting or fear of it. Over 90,000 internally displaced people continue to live in temporary camps, most
under the control of the KIO/KIA throughout 2013 and into 2014. Despite various attempts at negotiations and
frequent contact from both sides, no final settlement has been agreed to date.

The government had negotiated ceasefire agreements with 13 different ethnic armed groups by September
20135. But President Thein Sein and his peace negotiators led by U Aung Min, a senior minister in the Office of
the President and head of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), the de facto secretariat for peace negotiations,
faced the daunting task of convincing Kachin political and military leaders to come to the table. Central to the
Kachin position have been persistent doubts about whether the government team could really control the


Tatmadaw and its commanders. Since resuming their old conflict with the government, KIA leaders have
insisted on political dialogue in line with the aspirations of the Panglong Agreement, the pact signed in 1947 by
representatives from Shan, Chin and Kachin groups with General Aung San, who led Myanmar’s fledgling
government ahead of the country’s independence from Britain in 1948. The Panglong Agreement pledged
signatory groups greater political autonomy and a share in the country’s natural resources wealth, among
other benefits. While moves by other key NSAGs to negotiate ceasefire agreements with the government
between 2011 and 2012, left the KIO isolated as it took the opposite stand in resuming armed conflict. Yet, in
2013, the KIA regained the strategic support of the NSAGs in the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a
coalition of ethnic armed groups formed in 2010 to discuss prospects for political dialogue and a Nationwide
Ceasefire Agreement.

During its 17‐year cease‐fire with the previous military regime (1994‐2011), the KIA/KIO controlled patches of
territory across Kachin and Northern Shan States, mainly along the border with China, and established a public
administration that has governed those territories for almost two decades. Several failed rounds of talks
between 2012 and 2013 were interspersed with outbreaks of intense conflict between Kachin and government
forces. Even after their tentative agreement of mid‐2013 and continuing talks, mutual suspicion lingers,
despite public statements from both sides supporting the goal of forging a lasting peace.

BACKGROUND OF EVOLVING NARRATIVES

Tracking the evolving narratives of the conflicting parties is essential to understanding their rationale. Each
side felt deceived by the other at various points over the years leading up to recent hostilities. Both
miscalculated the price of war in terms of economic, human and political costs; and both utilized armed
conflict as a way to force their political agenda on the other side. Over this period, the KIO developed a
consultative mechanism with local communities in territories under its control, to rely on their support. On
the government side however, the conflict neither drew much interest or support from the Bamar majority,
who tended to see it as a situation with little bearing on their lives. Media coverage of the conflict in Kachin
State from inside the country has been relatively scant and poor due to language barriers; safety and security
issues; difficulties in accessing conflict areas; and the costs of travelling to relevant areas. Ethnic media report
regularly from the conflict areas via radio and online media but are widely seen as politically partisan. Overall,
the KIO/KIA has been perceived by Bamar as difficult to deal with, while government‐friendly media have
portrayed the Nay Pyi Taw administration as enthusiastically pursuing peace through its nationwide ceasefire
plan. The narratives of both parties often appear diametrically opposed, and to exacerbate the situation, are
not accurately presented in the media. It also seems that both sides do not even share a common definition of
“peace” and what it would entail.

While compromise does not appear to be a strong point on either side, the challenges of negotiating any form
of ceasefire demand pragmatism, including readiness to compromise and an ability to recognize contextual
sensitivities. As much as the new government is keen to advance the reform process and therefore the peace
process, the KIO may need convincing of the need to reciprocate on a particular concession or offer. If the
government’s aim of a nationwide ceasefire is agreed and a political settlement is enacted, it would be the first
time in Myanmar’s history that a central administration would have access and control over the quasi‐entire
country.

This paper aims to present the broad political context as well as cultural and historical dimensions of the
conflict. This requires examining the ways Kachin individuals, communities and leaders experienced the
conflict, including its direct impact on civilians and how ongoing security challenges weigh on the pursuit of
lasting peace in this region of Myanmar.6


1. Kachin identity and political struggle
Ethnic identity has played a key role in shaping the Kachin political narratives as local leaders have, over time,
developed narratives which are fundamentally distinct (in terms of language, religion, daily practices and so
on) from those of the Bamar people. Ethnic identity has been used to cement local power and to maintain a
degree of autonomy from the central government. Essential to the current political process are concepts of
Kachin identity and how closely those notions are linked to political issues and the power struggle.

Since Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948, Kachin identity has been structured around various
elements that differentiate it from the Bamar ethnic majority, including religion and language. The concept of
identity, for some, was also based on demands for devolution of political power to Kachin people. A “self‐
conscious” Kachin identity manifested itself with the arrival of Christian missionaries and British colonization in
the late 19th century, as in other areas of the country and in other countries of Southeast Asia. The process
gained momentum over the years, and by the time of Independence, the self‐identification of peoples in
Myanmar’s peripheral areas had become structured around the notion of ethnicity.

For the Kachin, the notion of “clan” has been correlated to the notion of “belonging.” With increasing
domination by the Jinghpaw population, the main ethnic strand, and its language over other Kachin ethnic
groups for over a century, linguistic parameters were added to this definition and became part of the
construction of identity. The actual number of clans, and Kachin ethnic groups, is still subject to academic
debate due to the fluid nature of the categories and the confusion over clan names, ethnonyms and ethnic
groups. It is commonly stated that there are five main Jinghpaw clans, including the Marip, Maran, Nhkum,
Lahpai and Lahtaw. In addition, there are several ethnic groups that tend to recognize themselves, or are
recognized, as Jinghpaw, including: Lisu, Zaiwa, Lawngwaw Lachid and Nung Lungmi.7 The KIA recognize six
ethnic Kachin groups including the: Jinghpaw, Lanwngwaw, Rawang, Lachid, Zaiwa and Lisu. Most of those
were part of the origin of the Kachin political movement in the 1950s, led by local chiefs of Jinghpaw culture,
called Duwas.

The complexity of Kachin identity and intra‐ethnic group dynamics to some extent explain the challenges in
understanding the Kachin and their attitudes to the peace process.

1.1 The Emergence of Kachin identity

The origins of the term “Kachin”

Kachin peoples are estimated to comprise approximately 1.5% of Myanmar’s total population.8 Kachin State,
which borders both India and China, is the country’s northern‐most region and the furthest point from Yangon.
The majority of members of the Kachin ethnic group are located in Kachin State while others can be found in
Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, India, and in Yunnan, China. Nonetheless, the ethnonym “Kachin” is only used
for those populations based in northern Myanmar, i.e., Kachin State and the north‐western part of Shan State.
In Kachin State, Kachin populations cohabitate with Shan, Shan Ni9, Bamar and some Rakhine10. The term
“Kachin” itself is relatively recent, only coming into wide use since the 19th century, and is somewhat
problematic in nature. It commonly covers a multi‐ethnic reality, by referring to a group of tribes recognizing
themselves as, or having close relations with, the Jinghpaw clan of the Tibeto‐Burmese ethnic family. This
recognition involves the belief in shared forefathers of the various ethnic sub‐groups11. Hence, the term
“Kachin” usually includes the dominant Jinghpaw ethnic sub‐group, but also the Lanwngwaw, Rawang, Lachid,
Zaiwa and Lisu groups.12

During early colonial times in the early 1900s, Kachin were called “Singpo” by the Bamar and British13. The first
term used in British documents to classify the Kachin is “Kakhyen”, which means “red earth”14 in a Chinese
dialect. During British colonization and the spread of Christianity, confusion appeared over the use of the


terms “Kachin” and “Jinghpaw”. Both carried a primitive connotation. As Ola Hanson, a former missionary in
Kachin State and founder of the Kachin Baptist Convention in the early 20th century, noted:

“Most of them know nothing about the word ‘Kachin’, and, those that do as a rule resent the appellation, as
carrying with it an unpleasant reference to their barbarous and uncivilized ways15. But we accept the term
because it is in common use, and is the only name in which all these divisions and subdivisions can be
included.”16

Only later, from the 1930s, did the term “Kachin” become more widely used. The anthropologist E.R. Leach
argues that the term “Kachin” was, in 1837, used by outsiders to describe hill tribesmen in northern Burma. He
also asserted that until later in the 19th century, the term referred to people that inhabited a territory rather
than to a set of cultural characteristics. In the 20th century, evidence of additional sub‐categories constituent
of “Kachin‐ness” emerged, such as: linguistic, territorial, and political. Furthermore, he noted, the ability to
speak Jinghpaw was originally a social marker, associated with local aristocracy and providing economic and
social advantages.17

Jinghpaw Dominance

As anthropologist Francois Robinne has noted, when asked about one’s ethnic group, a “Jinghpaw” is more
likely to say that he or she is “Kachin”, than a “non‐Jinghpaw”, who would mention their own sub‐group and,
overall, be more reluctant to be called “Kachin” – not only because it reifies the dominance of the Jinghpaw
sub‐ethnic group but also because the term is perceived as emanating from British and later Burmese
authorities.18 Countrywide, the catch‐all term “Kachin” has been increasingly used and Jinghpaw dominance in
representation of the Kachin is apparent. This is not to say that all Kachin leaders are Jinghpaw, but the use of
their language as a common medium of expression, and the prestige and wealth of some Jinghpaw clans,
tends to put them in a greater position of power in relation to other Kachin sub‐ethnic groups.

Overall, Kachin people gave their support to the KIO/KIA depending on the context. At times, these entities
gained or lost legitimacy depending on accumulation of wealth, and levels of violence used against those who
did not support them. Following internal criticism over the KIA’s lack of inclusiveness in the early 2000s, the
KIO acknowledged its weaknesses in failing to consult the local population on political decisions, and sought to
rectify this by launching broad public consultations.

Kachin and the Lowlanders: a history of conflict and strategic interaction

The first reported presence of the Jinghpaw, or Kachin people, in contemporary Myanmar, dates back to the
5th Century AD. More frequent mention of these terms can be found in Burmese royal orders from the 19th
century onwards.19 Prior to colonial times, Kachin clans maintained vassal relationships with Burmese kings
ruling lower Burma. The Kachin were fairly independent and the Bamar kings tended to leave them alone if
they paid their taxes. However, there were constant battles between clans and groups over territory and
resources. According to the missionary Hanson: “It is only British rule that has put an end to their conquests,
and established peace and order among the hills”.20 If this perception is typical of the colonial perspective, it
testifies the existence of violent conflict in the Kachin hills until the early 20th century.

The Kachin highlanders remained in scattered settlements, away from the greater population density of the
plains and valleys, mainly inhabited by Shan and Bamar people. Economically, the Kachin historically depended
on the lowlanders’ supply of rice and partly because of this, tried to maintain close relations, even through
periods of military ascendancy until the 1950s.21 In essence, the Kachin faced contradictory pressures, both to
engage with yet stay distinct from the lowlanders and discourage them from moving into their home turf in
great numbers.22 At the same time, the Kachin maintained much closer relations with the Shan – so close that
a Kachin individual could actually adopt Shan identity, a process that included conversion to Buddhism, as
described by Leach in the early 20th century.23


The formal political separation of the Shan and Kachin territories only took root under British domination.
Relations between highlanders and lowlanders continued to evolve as the Kachin progressively left the hills to
settle in valleys, for economic and security reasons, more notably since armed conflict took hold from 1960.
Currently, settlement patterns of different ethnic groups in Northern Shan and Kachin States are intricate and
illustrate strong relationships. Many of the Kachin elite are originally from Northern Shan State, where a
number important political events and meetings in the recent history of Kachin politics have been held (such
as the creation of the KIA).

All the while, the Kachin have taken advantage of their remote geographical environment to avoid centralized
state control and invasion attempts.24 Commenting on this Kachin trait, the British Chief Commissioner from
1887 to 1890 noted: “These peoples had never submitted to any central control.”25 The statement resonates in
contemporary political narratives, as expressed in declarations by Kachin nationalist movements denying they
were subject to any centralized rule before Independence.26 This ideal of self‐governance and pride in having
“never been conquered” has been seen as a threat by successive central governments; in some circles it has
even fuelled fears that Kachin calls for autonomy could lead to disintegration of the union.27 Finally, the Kachin
and Shan States are resource rich territories with abundant supplies of precious metals, gems, minerals and
timber. For this reason, the Kachin economy has drawn outside interest for centuries, creating opportunities to
establish alliances or trigger conflicts.

Challenging the local power structures

Local political structures in Kachin State have been constantly challenged – and have continued to evolve –
since the British colonial era. Since the inception of the KIO in 1960, nationalist movements have been trying
to make sense of these changes in order to capitalize on them.

In the second half of the 20th century, the political awareness of the Kachin leaders underwent a transition.
This was due largely to the Communist revolution in the newly proclaimed People’s Republic of China,
following Mao Zedong’s defeat of Kuomintang troops in 1949. The Kachin found themselves under pressure
due largely to movements of Kuomintang troops – covertly supported by the United States – across
Myanmar’s border into northern Shan State, to seek refuge and to launch attacks into China. Throughout the
1950s, concerns over the activities of Kuomintang troops and border demarcation claims from China triggered
issues that were to prove long‐lasting between the central government and Kachin leaders.28

In 1960, when Myanmar’s President Ne Win and Chinese leader Zhou Enlai signed a Boundary Agreement,
some lands adjacent to the Chinese border passed to Chinese control, without prior Kachin consent. This,
according to some historians, “…was a major factor behind the sudden outbreak of the…Kachin uprising.”29
Meanwhile, discrimination in the Burma Independence Army by leading Bamar officers who had fought for
independence alongside the Japanese in World War II against Kachin troops, who had been supported by the
allied forces, further exacerbated tensions. Furthermore, Burma’s then‐prime minister U Nu decided to
promulgate Buddhism as a “State Religion” putting the majority‐Christian Kachin leadership at odds with much
of the country. The rationale behind this choice can still be debated, as mentioned by the Professor of politics
Robert Taylor: “How much the state’s leaders in the 1950s consciously used Buddhism as a religious weapons
against state’s rivals and how far they genuinely believed that the faith should be upheld to the state, cannot
be known.” 30 Given their tenuous affiliation with a newly independent Burma, the Kachin felt that respect for
their identity and territory were at risk.

Tensions between the central government and Kachin leaders intensified as their political views diverged, until
many Kachin troops from the Kachin Rifles, formerly guerilla fighters against the Bamar independence forces
and reconstituted as a battalion of the Burma Independence Army, left and took up arms against the central
government. On October 25 1960, what was to become the most influential Kachin institution, the KIO, was
created by seven Kachin students studying at Rangoon University, with the declared goal “to retain the rights
of the Kachin”31. Some months later, the Kachin Independence Council met for the first time in Lashio in Shan
State on February 5 1961, which was subsequently named “Revolution Day” in KIO‐controlled areas as the


group decided to demand an independent state, drive out external elements and create an armed wing, the
KIA.32

The KIA was initially led by a handful of veteran soldiers and former officers who fought alongside the US Army
in Kachin State during World War II.33 At the time the Burmese Army was struggling to unify and
professionalize its forces.34 According to a historian, the Kachin armed struggle: “The KIO (…) within a decade
developed into one of the most successful and best organized of all armed opposition movements in Burma”35.
Amid a rapid increase in its mobile battalions, the KIA took control of areas along the Chinese border including
the Hukawng Valley, Kamaing town and areas of Northern Shan State.36

The KIO’s move to abolish local fiefdoms steadily reduced the power of clan chiefs, which put an end to the
constant vendettas and conflicts of interests between them and succeeded in centralizing local political
power.37 A modern Pan‐Kachin movement was created in the mid‐1990s, under the leadership of some Kachin
sub‐ethnic groups including the Rawan, as a response to the Jinghpaw hegemony. Interestingly, aspects of the
modern Pan‐Kachin movement seemed to mirror the Bamar approach to nation building, with an emphasis on
securing centralized control for the Jinghpaw ethnic group and excluding other groups from decision‐making
processes.38 Some of the sub‐Kachin ethnic groups, as well as the Shan who shared some common interests
and territory, may recognize and respect the Kachin institutions, but they were given little voice to express
their own concerns according to interviews with some Shan Ni.39

Christianity in Kachin State

Overall, Bamar leaders tended to view Christianity as a result of British colonial influence. After Myanmar
gained independence in 1948, such signs of foreign influence were seen negatively and often attracted
discrimination40. Even today, religious minorities encounter a “glass ceiling” in civil services, Buddhist values
are taught in public schools, and so on. Compounding grievances over such matters, under Ne Win’s pseudo‐
socialist policies of nationalization, churches lost their assets and their authority to run schools. Such policies
eroded any remaining trust among Kachin leaders in the Myanmar government. A crackdown on religious
freedom was a key initial cause of the conflict in the 1960s according to an informant who witnessed the
steady deterioration of relations between Kachin leaders and central government in the 1950s.41 Christianity,
especially the evangelical Baptist brand, emerged as the main religion among the Kachin. The Baptist religion
was brought to the animist Kachin by proselytizing foreign missionaries in the late 18th century, and became
the cornerstone of the modern Kachin identity. Alongside demands for autonomy, these elements, seen as
unwelcome foreign influence and colonial legacy, have most likely exacerbated negative perceptions of Kachin
aspirations among the Burmese leadership.

As in other ethnic areas, the predominance of Christianity among the Kachin was recognized by the central
state in the form of specific measures applied during the initial ceasefire agreement in 1994. The historian,
Mary Callahan, reports that in the mid‐2000s the Myanmar Amy North‐Western Regional Commander, Major
General Ohn Myint, exempted Christians from corvée work or forced labour on Sundays out of respect for
Kachin Christian beliefs.42 Furthermore, Kachin religious leaders developed formal political power as they were
often consulted by various sides on political matters, during formal and informal meetings held before key
decisions were made. They could also interact with the government to raise their concerns. For example, the
Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) supported attempts by government and Kachin representatives to hold
dialogue in the 1980s,43 and in 1993‐4 religious leaders acted as mediators between the KIA and the
government.44 In 2011, they were able to play advocate to the Kachin State Level Government, which
recognized their moral authority or ‘awza’ over the community. The KBC meanwhile emerged as a pivotal
patron in the structure of patron‐client relations in Kachin communities, and developed strong relations with
influential “clients” among local political and business leaders.


1.2 The current conflict and historical legacy

The Panglong Agreement: unfulfilled promises

Under British colonial rule came increasing awareness of the distinction between Shan and Kachin ethnic
groups. Each was treated differently by colonial administrators, who reorganized power relations between
them. The British considered the Shan more able to administrate themselves whereas the Kachin were kept
under central administration from Rangoon. When the British departed in 1948, traditional relationships
between the center and the periphery, as well as between the ethnic minorities, changed and Upper Burma
was placed under the direct administration of Rangoon for the first time. The foundations of modern Burma,
as a nation based on recently constructed ethnic identities, had already been established. For the Kachin,
political administration in pre‐colonial history set the context, of the current conflict.

In February 1947, Kachin leaders participated in the Panglong Agreement, an initiative led by late
independence hero General Aung San (father of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and widely seen as the
founder of the modern State of Myanmar). Aung San aimed to pressure the British to grant early
independence to the country by demonstrating he could unite ethnic groups in a newly independent country.45
The decision to create Kachin State was made at this conference, although Kachin leaders today see the
Agreement, at best, as an unfulfilled obligation.46 The Panglong Agreement was intended to pave the way for a
Constitution granting the Kachin, Chin and Shan ethnic groups greater autonomy, but this project disappeared
with Aung San’s assassination later that year. Kachin state was created on January 10 1947, but administrative
recognition from Rangoon was not followed by promised autonomy. These unfulfilled promises lie at the core
of current Kachin grievances.

As the contemporary Kachin leader Dr. Manam Tu Ja observed: “To understand the current grievances of the
KIO, one needs to go back to the Kachin pre‐colonial history. Before the time of British colonization, all ethnic
nationals were living separately from the Bamar in their own territories. But the British occupied the whole
country, and since then, the ethnic groups became mixed. The government started to rule with one policy for
the Bamar and one other policy for the ethnic groups, with a dominion status for the Kachin. After the Second
World War, General Aung San organized Independence. The ethnic leaders accepted him because they wanted
a federal union. He promised to give self‐determination and autonomous rights to the ethnic states. They
trusted Aung San. He showed he was standing for their cause with the promises of Panglong and the visits he
made to Shan and Kachin states. He then tried to write it up in the constitution but was assassinated on the
way.”47

Post‐Independence era and disillusionment

In the post‐Independence environment, Kachin claims for more political autonomy soon emerged. The early
years, under a fledgling legislature in the early 1950s, were characterized by an overall feeling of insecurity as
militia groups grew dramatically throughout the country, while the Army was attempting to reform its
structures and hierarchy48. The government dismissed Kachin calls for autonomy, creating a view among
Kachin that “Aung San’s promises disappeared with him.”49

By the early 1960s, the Tatmadaw, or military, had managed to contain a number of anti‐government
insurgent movements but its officers assumed the role of sole “state‐builders”, leaving a legacy of mistrust
among the population, both ethnic and Bamar. There was then a distinct hardening of positions on the
question of autonomy among non‐Bamar ethnic groups, with the central government’s cultural and religious
‘harmonization’ programs being implemented in order to impose Bamar values on ethnic populations50. In
Kachin State, this generated resentment against the central government. The nationalization of schools was a
key factor in fueling conflict, as it antagonized many Kachin who blamed the central Bamar administration for
seizing Church assets, and objected when the language for teaching became Bamar.51 They felt their culture
was threatened, and some of the leaders promoted the armed conflict as a way to defend it.


The first phase of conflict between the Tatmadaw and KIA broke out in 1961 and lasted 33 years. During this
period short‐lived truces were agreed in 1963, 1972 and 1981. In the 1990s, various Kachin NSAGs signed
ceasefire agreements after the then‐military government, the State Law and Oder Restoration Council
(SLORC), launched talks with ethnic armed groups. The government gave to these territories a new temporary
Status, as “Special Regions” and promised specific support for development, however this did not materialize
for the majority of Kachin in these areas. Several NSAGs and their leaders took up business opportunities with
the Bamar‐dominated government and reaped tremendous profit52. These included peace agreements with:
the New Democratic Army ‐ Kachin53 on the December 15 1989 in Special Region 1, the Kachin Defense Army
in Special region 554, Shan State on January 13 1991 and, in February 1991, the 4th Brigade in Kachin State
Special Region Number 2. Finally, the largest faction, the KIO, signed a ceasefire on February 24 1994, after
several months of negotiations in which the government offered more concessions than in previous, failed,
rounds.55 The final document was kept secret for decades at the request of the government, presumably to
avoid other armed groups demanding – or obtaining ‐ similar privileges. Point 11 of the Cease Fire Agreement,
in particular, created hopes among the KIO leaders as it reads: “Following the successful implementation of
this first phase, the second phase will be marked by continued negotiations on the question of the KIO’s legal
involvement in the new constitution of the Union of Myanmar and of the resettlement and rehabilitation of
the KIO members”. Both parties agreed on the principle of launching a political dialogue, although after the
junta was renamed the State Peace and Development Council in 1997 and unveiled its “Roadmap to
Democracy,” a seven‐step plan to restore democracy, in 2003, it asked the KIO to wait for political dialogue
until the last step of the “Roadmap” plan to draw up a new Constitution, hold elections and set up a
parliament and a civilian government, had been implemented.

The peace agreement, though vaguely worded, mainly focused on military aspects such as troop positions. Yet,
it produced high expectations among the KIO regarding its official recognition by the State and political power‐
sharing. It can be inferred that, because of these expected concessions, the KIO was keen to collaborate while
waiting for the future democratic government to grant it more autonomy. In the meantime, the KIO operated
like a local government in some areas, described by some as a “State within the State”56. For example, under
the KIO, Kachin managed their own education (including primary and secondary schools) and healthcare
systems.

The KIO participated in the 10‐year National Convention to draw up a new constitution and in 2001 presented
a 19‐point proposal requesting self–determination, a state‐based constitution and resolution of issues around
regional governance and authority. The junta did not respond, although the KIO continued to engage in the
2007 National Convention – chaired by the then Lt. General Thein Sein, currently president of Myanmar‐ by
sending representatives, despite increasing frustration57. During these years although other political groups
walked out of the Convention, the Kachin continued their participation, lending legitimacy to the process.

The 2008 Constitution did not end up reflecting the KIO’s inputs and suggestions. Nonetheless, prior to the
2010 General Elections, the Organisation continued to push its demands and maintain hopes that its claims for
autonomy would be incorporated into future governance arrangements. Relations with the government
deteriorated in the lead‐up to the 2010 poll, when the KIO‐backed Kachin State Progressive Party’s (KSPP)
attempt to register as a political party was rejected by the National Election Commission. As the official reason
for this rejection was that the party was headed by KIO official, Dr. Manam Tu Ja, who later resigned his
position as vice chairman of the KIO, along with five KIO central committee members, in order to enable their
participation. However, the party could still not be registered. This move was understood by many Kachin as a
punishment for the KIO for its refusal to support the government’s proposal to turn its armed wing, the KIA,
into a Border Guard Force (BGF), under a plan revealed in April 2009 to bring all NSAGs under the control of
the Tatmadaw58. The elections were held without the KSPP or, indeed, any Kachin political party contesting,
and both sides started to prepare for renewed conflict.

This progressive radicalization was also encouraged through a consultation process launched by the KIO/KIA in
the early 2000s. Following a change of leadership within the KIO, after the chairmanship of General Zaw Mai,
new leaders realized their organisation’s image had been severely damaged due to the behavior of some
leaders who accumulated significant wealth through “cronyism”, including close ties with military commanders
and businessmen, under the post‐1994 ceasefire. A new, more inclusive, leadership style was adopted in the
KIO/KIA, and consultations with community representatives were launched on a number of matters, including


participation in the 2010 elections and other key issues. Today, such broad‐based consultations are still held by
the leadership – a factor, according to some Bamar sources, that makes some peace negotiations more
difficult as the Kachin leadership must take into account public opinion and get the majority of constituents on
board, which can take months, before making key political decisions.

A number of sticking points have recurred in peace negotiations since the inception of the KIO/KIA. The history
of politics in Kachin territories shows a tradition of self‐administration that was, until a century ago,
unchallenged by central authorities. Kachin political representations are still anchored in these past models,
forged through clan based alliances and local‐level agreements. The emergence half a century ago of the
Kachin independence movement is based on this history and explains the more recent hardening of the Kachin
position including efforts to bolster identity, entwining such notions with cultural, religious and political
projects. This position is pivotal to contemporary Kachin leaders, and only an inclusive long‐term reconciliation
process would provide an alternative to more separatist perspectives.


2. Narratives of war

“The President, whenever he visits other countries, mentions the peace process. Sometimes he says
that the armed struggle is due to extreme nationalists who have economic interests. Sometimes, he
himself invites foreign investors. And he thinks if foreign direct investment increases, the armed
groups will be satisfied and that they would be inclined to give peace a chance. His speech does not
reflect the real situation. Armed struggle is not about money, it’s not because we don’t have any food
to eat, it’s about political struggle, and to retain our rights and to get others their rights”, according to
a KIO representative from the Technical Assistance Team Office, supporting the peace process,
Myitkyina, 2013.

As in many conflicts, the KIA and the Tatmadaw do not share a common view of the root causes of the conflict.
A number of Kachin express frustration, claiming the actual causes of conflict have neither been properly
identified nor analyzed by the government. Many feel they have made all possible efforts to engage with the
government politically, hence their reluctance to re‐start a process in which a ceasefire is the first concrete
step and modalities of political dialogue remain undefined. After discussing theoretical approaches towards
the multiple causes of conflict, the events leading to an escalation of the conflict will be examined in the
following section.

2.1 Causes of conflict – a theoretical approach

There are three root causes of the conflict in Kachin:
1. Miscalculation of the costs of war by both parties, each of who believed fighting was the best way to
reach their political objectives. Each side may have underestimated the duration of the conflict as well
as its costs, politically, financially and in terms of human lives.
2. Failure to enforce the 1994 ceasefire, with both sides accusing each other of disrespecting the
agreement. In addition, for the KIO, the ceasefire did not bring about the political dialogue it was
requesting, hence extra frustration was felt on the Kachin side.
3. Rivalry and mistrust between the two sides over the issue of sharing natural resources. Uneven
access to resources resulted in quick and massive economic benefits for elements of the KIO and
some Bamar – and Chinese ‐ businessmen. There is strong economic incentive for the central State to
control these resources, while local leaders see the Bamar presence in the areas as a threat to their
businesses.

Community, nationalism and conflict

Some academic sources suggest that conflict is correlated to the feeling of belonging to a community.
According to the conflict theorist Suganami: “The concept of war seems to contain the idea that those who
engage in it have a clear understanding of what it is and that they are fighting on the behalf of and in the name
of their society against another. War, therefore, conceptually presupposes understanding, on the part of
individual persons that they are members of a particular community and are fighting within the community’s
authority structure.”59

In addition, to understand a given party’s appetite for war, it is important to assess whether the leaders have
made appraisals of the costs versus the benefits of war. Generally, optimistic assessments result in a belief
that the war’s outcome is likely to be victory, or an absence of defeat60. That was certainly the case with the
Kachin conflict, as both parties expected a quick armed offensive and rated their losses as less costly than in
action. For example, a KIO official stated about the duration and intensity of the armed conflict: “We had never
imagined facing this kind of crisis – ever! We had only seen this kind situation in the movies and media ‐ but
this time it happened to us (…). Initially, we had only seen and heard about this kind of war [from]… other
countries.”61


According to some strategists, even if leaders of opposing sides believe the chances of victory are slim, they
make a rational decision to fight: “if the gains of victory are large and the costs of losing are not much greater
than those of making the concessions necessary to avoid war.”62 This was the case for the KIO since 2011. The
leadership may not have been full convinced it could achieve a military victory, but regarded the price of peace
as too high in terms of their own honor, and assumptions about poor future political settlements for their
people. Therefore, “It was too late for the KIO to return to its pre‐cease‐fire condition without a very heavy
cost.”63

In addition, some scholars have demonstrated that war is not only caused by an appetite for fighting and fear,
but also by what could be termed “spirit”.64 Nationalism, also, can be a mechanism of transmission linking
individual interests with collective action. The Kachin, responding as a community, present a shared aspiration
for the war as a mechanism to claim political rights denied them through political dialogue. The KIO’s
narratives of war are defensive, relying on a sense of community – based on blood, linguistic features, religious
and political ideologies. This has been reiterated by the Pan‐Kachin movement and resulted in the ‘buy‐in’ of
the broader Kachin community to the rationale for war65.This is different from the majority of the Myanmar
side, for most of whom this war is a distant reality or a way of asserting control over resources and frontier
territories.

Appetite for conflict?

As stated above, among factors leading to the re‐emergence of the Kachin armed conflict was the assumption
that war was preferable to inaction. Besides, the shortcomings of the 1994 ceasefire agreement demonstrated
the failures to reach mutually advantageous and enforceable agreement.66

It seems that both warring parties were envisaging a quick resolution to the armed conflict and assumed they
would be soon able to force political dialogue on their terms. The Tatmadaw was most likely encouraged by
clashes with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, a Kokang NSAG based in northern Shan State,
that turned into a Border Guard force after the Tatmadaw attacked its headquarters in August 2009, taking the
capital of the Special Region, Laukkai, in a week‐long offensive.

In this respect it can be assumed that asymmetric information in terms of the potential costs and benefit of
the war precipitated the conflict, especially as the Tatmadaw leadership expected a quick military victory and
underestimated the tenacity of the KIA. Due to the disproportionate power balance, ranging from troop
numbers and weaponry to access to technology, as well as sharply contrasting military strategies (i.e. guerrilla
versus standing army); it was widely presumed that the KIA would not stand long against a Tatmadaw
offensive.

The overarching factor, however, was the failure on both sides to enforce the 1994 ceasefire agreement.
Various accounts on both sides illustrate the difficulties of ceasefire implementation for both parties. Some
key structural reasons explain these difficulties. Long delays in government responses to KIO political demands
fueled doubt on the part of the KIO about the actual ability of the government to transform the ceasefire into
a mid‐term peace agreement and a longer‐term political settlement.

Fundamental to the breakdown of the agreement was the fact it did not address the issue of the “indivisibility
of resources”67 such as control of border trade and of the natural resources‐dependent economy.68 Nearly a
third, or 31.2%, of Myanmar’s GDP comprises export of primary resources, including 80% from the
mining/energy sector. Among other resources, Kachin State has massive reserves of jade that by some
measures accounts for the extraction of more than 90% of the world’s stock.69 Kachin State also has timber,
gold, and rare earth as well as vast potential for development of hydroelectricity and agro‐business. Most of
these reserves were, during the ceasefire, in areas under the control of the KIO/KIA, and retaking those areas
seemed to be a central concern for the Tatmadaw.


2.2 Escalation of the conflict

The unmet expectations of the Panglong Agreement are often cited by the KIO and more generally by Kachin
leaders from various religious, political and sub‐ethnic backgrounds. The KIO leadership believes that Kachin
have actively engaged in political dialogue forums since the inception of the Union of Myanmar in 1948,
beginning with their support for the Panglong Agreement.

One interviewee explained how, when he was young, elders in his villages discussed their disappointment
following the Panglong Agreement70. Many Kachin refer to their earlier belief in General Aung San’s promises
for the first step towards longer term resolution of political issues. The Kachin tend to view themselves as
innocent victims of Bamar duplicity. They do not consider the war as a retaliatory measure from their side, but
as a necessary attempt to stop any confiscation of their land, identity and resources. As with other ethnic
armed groups, the KIO/KIA perceives the Tatmadaw as an “invader”71. A religious leader complained: “They
[the Tatmadaw] want to occupy all our Kachinland (…). In the 1940’s there was no Bamar in Kachin State, no
Burmese troops either ‐ they came after Panglong.”72 Overall, among the Kachin, the war is justified as an act
of self‐defense, and as a reaction to external aggression. “We couldn’t stay passive” is a sentence often
mentioned by KIO supporters when asked about why the KIA fights. In retrospect, the earlier period of
ceasefire is now perceived by many as a progressive escalation to war.

The 1994 ceasefire – revisited

The 1994 ceasefire was narrowly focused on military aspects of peace‐making, such as troop positions and
demarcations of areas of control. These were also concerned with the establishment of KIO delegations in
Myitkyina, Bhamo and Kutkai (Northern Shan) as well as a liaison office in Mandalay, to facilitate
communications between both sides. From the perspectives of Kachin leaders the ceasefire experience did not
successfully bring peace. These leaders enjoyed largely unchallenged governance over big and often lucrative
and strategic swathes of the territory. In contrast, for the Tatmadaw, this period enabled the deployment of
more troops to secure the northern areas of the national territory and ensure better preparedness in case of
future conflict.

For both parties, it enabled a temporary “limbo” situation between conflict and ceasefire ‐ or a time of “no
peace, no war”.73 Peace negotiators are re‐examining this period in light of the rekindling of the conflict that
followed post‐2011 skirmishes. A number of contemporary issues related to security and politics in Kachin
State have their roots in the limited and opaque 1994 cease‐fire agreement (as this only involved the military
stakeholders of the warring parties). Although the level of violence during the 1994‐2011 period was low,
violence was still perpetuated in some areas by Kachin armed factions, and the Tatmadaw. Even though the
majority of the Kachin people did not directly experience violence during these years, it is (a posteriori) now
referred to by many Kachin as a period of “violence and exploitation”74. Documentation of this period reveals
that, in some areas, people had to continuously cope with post‐conflict issues; for example, reports of
landmines being laid by individuals75, militarization, with increased presence of Tatmadaw battalions76, and
taxation by non‐state armed groups.77

Among the narratives to develop from earlier peace negotiations, some see the weaknesses of the former
ceasefire agreement as the result of a flawed process. In this respect, a former KIO leader remembers the
KIO’s incentives to discuss peace: “In the mid‐1980s, Breng Seng, the then‐KIO chairman, went to the Thai‐
Myanmar border to meet a number of people including foreign country representatives and diplomats. He was
then advised [by some other ethnic leaders] to look for a solution, not in war but with political means (…). He
was told KIO needed to step out, to change its strategy. He came back and discussed this with other ethnic
leaders. (…) In the early 1990s, the KIO Central Committed was contacted by the government, mainly through
[former prime minister] Khin Nyunt. The negotiation process was very difficult, and they couldn’t reach a final
result because the military wanted the KIA to surrender but the KIA wouldn’t accept this condition. Finally, the
government accepted to peace talks without the prior surrender of the KIA. There was then no negotiation on
disarmament or transformation of the KIA. Just troop relocation was discussed. It was agreed that a political


dialogue was needed but the KIO wanted a tripartite dialogue with the government, KIA and the party that had
won the election, the National League for Democracy”.78 They have more recently dropped this demand.

The KIO/KIA believes the government broke the ceasefire agreement in 2011.79 As a consequence, during
unsuccessful negotiations before May 2013, they insisted the government recall soldiers to their former
positions, away from KIA‐controlled territory. They claim that the initial clashes that rekindled the conflict in
June 2011 came after Tatmadaw soldiers trespassed in KIA areas, despite a prior agreement between both
sides that access should be granted by the KIA in advance to the area. The government in turn contends that it
was the KIO/KIA that broke the ceasefire, as they first used force against Tatmadaw soldiers.

The Border Guard Forces – the ultimatum

External observers note that relations between the junta and KIO/KIA deteriorated sharply well before the
2011 conflict broke out. This followed submission by the Kachin side of a 19‐point proposal to the National
Convention in 2007 requesting self‐determination, a state‐based constitution and a number of demands
regarding regional governance and autonomy. The Tatmadaw then adopted a harsher approach as the
relations with the KIO progressively deteriorated. Major‐General Ohn Myint, Commander of the Northern
Regional Command, reportedly stated in 2007 that: “… [the] KIO can be driven back to the mountains.”80 Then,
According to the journalist Bertil Lintner, during a meeting with Myanmar Army's regional commanders in mid‐
2009, General Than Shwe said that: "We, the Tatmadaw, have to fight the KIA because they have not accepted
our terms”.81 The Tatmadaw position as publicly stated, left few doubts about the potential resumption of the
conflict and over a year before the first clashes, Lieutenant‐General Ye Myint, the Chief of the junta’s Military
Affairs Security, stated: “…if the KIO does not abide by the latest instructions, then relations will revert to the
period before the 1994 cease‐fire agreement.”82 In response, the KIA headquarters mobilized troops and
prepared for the eventuality of the resumption of the conflict.83

The junta’s Border Guard Forces policy had put pressure on the KIA in the lead‐up to the recommencement of
conflict, as it called for all armed groups under ceasefire to turn into Border Guard Forces. Major‐General Lun
Maung, formerly Auditor General of the SPDC, threatened the KIO/KIA: “We will try to convince the KIO to
accept the Border Guard Force through words. If they do not listen… we have to kick them and eliminate
them.”84 The KIA, viewed the request itself as a violation of the ceasefire agreement. KIA Chief of Staff, General
Gam Shawng of the KIA argued that turning into Border Guard Force was the same as surrendering. In an
interview, his position is summed up as follows: “The military government had promised the KIO that there
would be no discussion of surrender or disarmament during the interim period’ [between the cease‐fire and the
start of political dialogue with future elected government], but had ultimately insisted that the KIA and other
cease‐fire groups subordinate themselves to Tatmadaw command as border guard forces, (…) "the same as
surrender."85

A KIO public relations officer based in the KIA headquarters in Laiza explained that the organization’s version of
the final reply to the BGF ultimatum in August 2013: “We ended up in BGF negotiations with no solution in a
meeting held on August 22 [2010] in Myitkyina. Our KIO Chairman was present in that negotiation, as proposed
(by the other party). But General Ye Myint only asked him to answer by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ twice to the BGF
ultimatum and our Chairman up front replied ‘No’ to him. Then General Ye Myint warned him that the situation
would be back to the situation prior to the 1994, starting from 1st September. This was very a short notice. KIA
had to say ‘Yes’ between August 22nd and the 1st of September. We could determine sense that his was a
declaration of war because the condition before 1994 was that of a civil war (…). Government set ultimatum to
the KIA to discharge all the delegation offices, including liaison offices in government control areas on August
25th. This meant that KIA was not recognized anymore. And with the following intrusion by fully equipped and
armed soldiers to the other territories (KIO’s), it was clear that the government was a hell‐bent on
subjugation”.

After it came to power in early 2011, the government of President Thein Sein withdrew the BGF ultimatum in
an effort to lessen tensions with the NSAGs. The gesture was meant to demonstrate goodwill and a late effort
to curb risks of escalation of the conflict. But, for the KIA, this episode demonstrated that the Tatmadaw will,


sooner or later, try to take their turf militarily, and that there would certainly be delays in the implementation
of long‐promised political arrangements.

Once conflict revived, it became clear that none of the parties had planned strategically for its longer term
consequences. They initially tested each other to demonstrate their determination but soon after the start of
armed hostilities, the situation escalated. What was due to be a brief show of power and resolve turned into a
protracted and bitter conflict which destroyed any remaining shred of trust. More importantly it left each
party contemplating how to break out of the vicious cycle of conflict without compromising honor.


3. Conflicting narratives

The narratives and “blame games” among parties to the conflict have long embodied their nearly
irreconcilable viewpoints.86 Official statements from the military about this conflict have been overwhelmingly
security‐oriented, highlighting the Tatmadaw’s focus on combating the insurgency threat, while statements
from the civilian government indicate commitment to reaching a mutually satisfying peace deal. On the other
side, formal statements by the KIO/KIA show an “underdog” mentality, perpetuating the belief that the
organizations are persecuted for political and economic reasons while their causes are overlooked. These
respective views seem irreconcilable initially, as does each side’s refusal to look seriously at the other’s
realities. The grievances on both sides are summed up on one hand by the Kachin view that they were
oppressed by the much larger state and ethnic group in the country, the Bamar. This contrasts with the
government/military/Bamar view that their role is to unify and protect the Union. On both sides, such beliefs
drove oppressive and heavy‐handed campaigns that perpetuated conflict and complicated the political
context.

The third part of this paper explores differences and continuity in the approaches of both sides, through local
perceptions of episodes during conflict periods (1961–1994 and 2011–2013) in Kachin territory. It also focuses
on the construction of a coherent discourse about the continuity of the fighting in recent decades, despite a
number of contextual changes. It then examines the new image that both sides began promoting in the
current period, and concludes with an analysis of KIO self‐representation.

3.1 Conflict, continuity and changes

“It has already been 53 years since we got into this conflict.” According to KIO Public Relations Official,
Laiza, 2013.

When words matter: Expressions of uncertainty

Each party to the conflict has starkly different ways to describe the conflict and its main stakeholders. The
KIO/KIA view blames the recent war on older and underlying issues, and uses specific language to describe
this. After fighting rekindled in June 2011, the KIO/KIA initially referred to the renewed fighting as “ceasefire
violations” (by the Tatmadaw). As time progressed, it was referred to as a “war.” As hopes for peace began to
fade in 2012, the vocabulary used by the KIO/KIA and a number of civil society organizations to refer to the
conflict changed. Kachin activists and researchers began referring to the fighting as the “re‐ignition” of the
conflict.”87 For example, an event in June 2013 organized by advocacy group the Kachin Peace Network
marked the second anniversary of what it called “the resumption of the war in the Kachin Region,” whereas
one year before, the same group held an event to mark the first anniversary of “the Kachin conflict”, as it was
a standalone conflict.88 This shift reveals the change of Kachin perspectives over the present conflict. As all
Kachin recently interviewed for this study, stated they viewed the conflict as continuous, rather than seeing it
as conflict interspersed with periods of peace.

Field observations, showed a degree of conflation by the Kachin in their representations and perceptions of
the Government and Tatmadaw. For example, when a village was attacked, some informants mentioned a
“government attack”. In numerous interviews with Kachin representatives in KIO areas, they failed to
differentiate between the Government and the Army when they spoke of military offensives, battles and
government policies. Even in government‐controlled areas of Kachin State, members of religious and political
elites, use these terms interchangeably, as if both instititutions were combined in one monolithic bloc.89 In
addition, all State institutions – the Tatmadaw and civilian government bodies ‐ tended to be seen as
predominantly predatory.


On the government side, an analysis of the official statements and Myanmar government‐back press articles
reveals uncertainty over how to describe the KIO/KIA, and an escalation of hostility. It was called a “ceasefire
group” until the government’s Border Guard Force ultimatum in 2009. Then, it was referred to as an insurgent
group before the conflict resumed. In state‐owned newspapers, in 2011, the KIO/KIA were for the first time
since the early 1990s described as “insurgents”.90 Then, in periods of intense fighting, the state media referred
to the KIA/KIO as “terrorists”, “rebels” 91 or, again, “insurgents”. They were mainly blamed for injuring civilians
and destroying infrastructure.

The official status of the KIO/KIA is unclear in government pronouncements. The KIO/KIA was on the official list
of illegal organizations under legislation known as the Unlawful Associations Act 17/1 (1908, amended in
1957). Under this law, an association that "interferes with the administration of the law and with the
maintenance of law and order, or that constitutes as a danger to the public peace," may be deemed illegal. The
law is also used to prosecute people on the grounds if they are members or if they have had contact with
illegal organizations. Up to 2014 this meant that people meeting with KIO/KIA representatives could be subject
to harsh punishment and lengthy prison terms. The KIA/KIO was due to be removed from the list of illegal
associations in 2012 – but individuals kept on being arrested and some charged under this act.92 From early
2014 however, amid the improving outlook for talks on a nationwide ceasefire, most NSAGs were hopeful they
would be removed from the list within the year.

All the while, however, the divergence of narratives between the two sides – particularly on the causes of the
conflict and the overall goal of peace talks – continues to affect relations. To many observers, this “perception
gap” is a key point that negotiators must address in ongoing peace efforts.

From one conflict to another

The recent freedom of expression allowed in the national media has made a dramatic difference in the
emergence of contemporary narratives at the national level. It has also demonstrated the media’s ability to
amplify the conflict. A number of interviewees were asked to explain, according to their personal experiences,
the main differences between the current phases of the conflict with the post‐1994 situation. The most
common responses tended to be about the larger scale of current military operations and also the greater
civilian losses. “This war is very different to the previous situation before 1994. [Recently] they used airstrikes
to fight and weaponry they had purchased from other countries. It was more like they were fighting against
foreigners who were invading their country. They used air support when ground forces couldn’t overrun the KIA
posts.”93

For the chairman of the KIO’s internally displaced persons and Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Committee,
the main difference is the military tactics employed and their impact on civilians. “Fighting before 1994 was
just between combatants of Tatmadaw and KIA. But this time, unarmed Kachin civilians were also targeted by
Tatmadaw, and their property is destroyed. Most of the villages that have been destroyed by Tatmadaw were
under KIA protection during the [1994‐2011] ceasefire period. Since last year those villages were no longer
under KIA protection and thus were destroyed by the Tatmadaw. Apparently, the [Tatmadaw] saw even civilian
Kachin as KIA troops; their enemy”.94

In addition, natural resources were mentioned by a number of interviewees as a central factor in the current
conflict, more so than the period prior recent fighting. Natural resources management was repeatedly
mentioned as a local governance concern since Independence and the source of increasing frustration for local
communities. One interviewee mentioned that the 1961‐1994 conflict was about power sharing (a revolt
against subjugation for the KIA – and a war against insurgents for the Myanmar armed forces), whereas the
more recent conflict is primarily about access to and share of natural resources – meaning that political power‐
sharing is secondary95. Another interviewee highlighted the economic incentives: “In 1963, my school was
closed. I remember every night the fighting, all night, firing. After two or three months, the students had to go
back to their homes. This time, people are lenient. They don’t feel like fighting. Many people are killed and
nobody cares. (…) Besides, at this time business interests are what is important. As we speak, logging trucks
continue to go silently into the Kachin jungle.”96


Old conflict, new image?

The KIO/KIA, which struggled to maintain their legitimacy throughout the 1994‐2010 ceasefire ‐ when its
leadership was criticized for its accumulation of wealth, largely through trade in natural resources.97 Some
Kachin leaders and business‐persons, who engaged in lucrative business relations with parties closer to the
then military government, were accused of ‘crony‐ism’ by others. The cease‐fire allowed them to extract and
trade jade, teak and other natural resources.98 Following internal power struggle, the KIO/KIA’s political and
military leaders have carefully forged a new public image through regular consultations on socio‐political
issues, with prominent members of the Kachin population through public assemblies. In June 2011, a public
KIO/KIA forum gave the KIA the mandate to fight with the aim of pursuing a political solution, and to accept a
ceasefire only as part of a more permanent political settlement.99 A subsequent March 2013 forum called for
the maintenance of the KIA's military strength. These forums enable communications between the KIO and
civil society, ensuring a degree of political support from this sector.

It is commonly acknowledged that the KIO has recently shown new signs of enthusiasm to listen to the
opinions of the Kachin people. One interviewee, who participated in these forums, stated: “People suffer but
they support the KIO. If you compare to the former conflict, there is more transparency this time. We now know
what is being discussed when the KIO and the government meet. Before we didn’t know anything, and when
[both sides] started to blame each other for breaking the ceasefire agreement, [the situation] got worse. This
time, they asked for views and opinions from representatives of the Kachin people during the negotiations, and
then they repeat [what was said at these consultations] during the talks. They take into account public opinion
and this is new.”100

A Kachin Baptist leader, speaking at a public briefing to foreign diplomats in Myitkyina in early 2013,
mentioned this new approach: “Before, there were hardliners within the KIO, now they are “soft liners”.
Nowadays, things have changed a lot. They [KIO] listen to the people. It is not the first time for them to
negotiate a ceasefire. Now the people are really supportive of the ideas of KIO, especially because they are not
the ones who broke the cease‐fire. So the trust [in the Government] has been lost. This time, people are still
willing to suffer, rather than getting a ‘cheap peace’. The sentiment of the population is: ‘let’s go and fight!’
What they want is: welfare, rights of indigenous people and religious and cultural rights in peace. The ceasefire
is not enough. It can break at anytime, that is our experience”.

Nonetheless, not everyone is convinced about transformation in the KIO/KIA. Some consider it as merely
cosmetic and primarily a change of communication style, as a Catholic leader explained: “Those days, it was
very different. The leadership was of a very military style. Now they engage with the people, though they still
try to control the situation. Actually, they don’t really carry the public opinion. And people know it.”101 Aware of
their past experiences and of the fact they cannot represent all the Kachin, the KIO responds with openness
and an increased appetite for discussion. The organization’s Technical Assistance Team (TAT) in Myitkyina, that
was created as a result of the May 2013 agreement to support the peace negotiations, invites anyone who has
comments and positive – or less positive – feedback to speak, which is in itself a sign of change.

Finally, the government has also tried to change its image in the eyes of Kachin and other NSAGs, and is keen
to convince ethnic peoples that it has gone through an irreversible change for the better. But many Kachin still
see government gestures as aimed at the international community, in order to gain international support for
its initiatives and reforms. Overall, they still do not feel they get the attention they deserve.102 Some Kachin
leaders recognize the democratic changes at the national level but they emphasize the fact that they mainly
interact with lower level civil servants and soldiers and that there is “no change of mindset at this level.”103
This, again, is a source of frustration.


3.2 The KIO’s war

Isolation and Marginalization

“Nobody supported our struggle from outside. We are on our own. We are here until today because of
the support of our people. That’s why we keep on struggling.” Technical Assistance Team leader,
Myitkyina, 2013.

“We are angry, we are sad, and we feel alone,” Kachin school teacher in KIO area, 2013.104

Interviewees often mentioned a feeling of isolation, both from Bamar people and also, more recently, from
other ethnic armed groups who first criticized them for signing a ceasefire agreement in the 1990s, and then
made their own peace agreements as the KIO resumed armed conflict with the Thein Sein government105.
Isolation may have been an asset for the KIO to set its own direction during the ceasefire period, but it has
now emerged as a hindrance. The Kachin feel forgotten and misunderstood. Even on a practical level, the lack
of basic infrastructure in Kachin State – including roads and bridges – hinders exchanges both within the region
and beyond, thereby reinforcing the sense of isolation.106

In this respect, gaining the support of other ethnic nationalities is important to the Kachin. Many defend the
United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), the main coalition of ethnic armed organizations. The Council,
which in early 2014 comprised six main groups, including the KIO and the Karen National Union, and five
smaller groups such as the Wa National Organization and Arakan National Council, aims to include all ethnic
armed forces in peace negotiations with the government.

The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) was created in November 2010 to advocate for talks with the
government as a united ethnic front. The KIO/KIA has been championing this initiative, and the UNFC
Chairman is the KIA Lieutenant General N’Ban La. Its main objectives, as stated, are: “Establish a federal union,
form a federal union army and protect ethnic areas”.107 Many Kachin leaders would like the UNFC to serve as a
common platform for all ethnic groups and enable a common approach to peace and political talks with the
government. Their demands include holding ethnic nationality conferences to discuss the peace process. Once
perceived as an increasingly isolated alliance in early 2013, UNFC managed to rally other ethnic leaders to
engage as well as question the peace process. They obtained common agreement to put political dialogue on
the top of the agenda – instead of following the initial government plans to agree a ceasefire first and then
discuss longer term political arrangements.

The feeling of isolation among Kachin has been reinforced by the belief that even opposition and civil society
figures operating on a national level do not understand them and, worse, do not care. For example, when the
Tatmadaw escalated its offensive against the KIA/KIO and launched air attacks on KIA bases in late 2012, some
Kachin had hoped for a strong statement from opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, at least urging the
government to protect civilians, especially after air attacks in December 2012. A Kachin religious leader said:
“She is not talkative now, before [when she was not a MP], she surely was, but now, she remains silent. She is
seen as superficial. She’s interested in ethnic people no more”.108 A Kachin humanitarian worker said: “Aung
San Suu Kyi does not know much about the context. Not only about the Kachin, about all ethnic groups. She
does not know about the country very much, she has a theoretical knowledge only, but she tries to be
pragmatic. She tries to be a successful politician. People should not say that NLD [Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy] is an opposition party – the UNFC is!”109 Other interviewees suggested Suu Kyi was not fully
informed of the extent of the military offensive in Kachin State.

Many Kachin in conflict areas felt abandoned by the international community as they expected greater support
after the open conflict ceased110 The KIO hoped for some form of international condemnation of the use of
violence by the Tatmadaw and they wanted the Kachin people’s status as victims of a military campaign to be
acknowledged by Western powers, providing them with greater political leverage to negotiate peace. Overall,
many Kachin believe that the current government has not undergone any significant political transition as far
as ethnic areas are concerned. According to a senior Kachin humanitarian worker: “Until now I don’t see any
improvement around Kachin State, but many social services have improved in cities like Yangon, Mandalay and


Nay Pyi Taw. The European Union should lift sanctions in some sectors to support economic development. But
they should seriously consider the situation of the country. When the United Kingdom and United States
announced their collaboration with the government in the military sector, we became deeply concerned about
the [role of the] Myanmar military.”111

The Church under attack

Adding to Kachin concerns about their relative isolation, military offensives in recent years reinforced the
ethnic dimension of the conflict and were perceived as direct attacks on Kachin identity.112 Churches were
used in military operations or damaged as a result of the conflict. In several reported incidents, Tatmadaw
used local churches to lock up villagers in order to interrogate them, and to prevent them from escaping and
alerting the KIA to their presence113. For example, a church was used as a detention center to interrogate
civilians in Hpaikawn.114 Churches are also used for temporary physical protection, because “The Tatmadaw
knows that KIA would not attack a church”115. As results of skirmishes, the Nam Lin Pa Catholic Church was
damaged, a catechist house totally destroyed by artillery fire and five civilians killed in mid‐2013. In this event,
the Tatmadaw surrounded the village, captured villagers and locked them in the church until nightfall.116 In
Sine Lone, the Catholic Church was used by soldiers who burnt wooden tables and benches inside117. In
Hpakant, the Mawwan Baptist Church was damaged by mortars fired on January 16 2013.118 These events
antagonized the local population, including even the most moderate of Kachin elements, according to eye‐
witnesses.

In addition, armed offensives scaled up in December 2011 and 2012 during the Christmas period, the most
important spiritual festival for the predominately Christian Kachin119, and many Kachin started to see the
offensives as attempts to destroy their culture and religion. This laid the foundations for increased
radicalization120. A few months into the conflict, neutrality was no more an option and speaking about peace
was viewed as traitorous in many parts of Kachin State. The head of the influential Kachin Baptist Church,
Reverend Samson Hkalam, was quoted in a press interview: “People are committed to this fight. Young men
who were previously skeptical of the Kachin Independence Army are volunteering to join. It’s a miracle — the
people’s spirit and motivation.”121

Other religious leaders have used religious discourse to justify and encourage the war. The KIO officials are
ostensibly Baptist and the KIA Chief of Staff, General Gam Shawng reportedly says he prays three times a day,
frequently invokes the Bible in his public speeches and casts the war in religious terms. In one of his speeches
he intoned: "God above is judging the Myanmar Army and humiliating them. If they keep coming at us they will
lose. Our struggle is an investment in something God condones. We are standing on the righteous path."122 A
number of pastors also encourage the combatants, mentioning war in their sermons, holding commemoration
masses and declaring their support to the KIA123. For example, special prayer services have been held in Laiza,
the KIA headquarters, “for the triumph of the Kachin revolution” on the first Saturday of every month.124

Several interviews revealed a shared perception among many ordinary Kachin that their participation in the
war was the right choice. One interviewee explained he believed in fighting and defended the call for war from
religious leaders, quoting from St Augustine, who said that longer term peace may require initial fighting
(interestingly, in the 5th century, St Augustine elaborated the theory of the “Just war”, fought by a legitimate
authority, for a just cause and with the right intentions). Persistent poverty, lack of government services and
other hardships have also given many Kachin justification for armed conflict as a means to achieve lasting
peace. In Laiza, prayers are held regularly for those who died as martyrs. Their photographs are displayed at
the gate of the largest IDP camp in the region, Je Yang Kha. On a wooden board there are photographs
documenting the conflict including: the first KIA and Tatmadaw officers who died, the civilians fleeing Laiza,
the first peace talks, and others. This wordless narrative shows, and disseminates, the history of the war from
the prevailing KIO perspective.


Board depicting the key episodes of the armed conflict,
Picture by the author, Je Yang Kha IDP camp, Laiza area


4. Search for peace – Factors and impediments
“Everyone is delighted by hearing [the word] ‘Peace.’” KIO Public relations Officer, Laiza, 2013.

“What do you mean by peace? What is peace? Of course, people want to stay peacefully. But they
can’t give up their dreams and their expectations. They want to see a political solution that is
acceptable and something that brings Kachin to the Parliament, in Nay Pyi Taw”. Resident of Laiza,
KIO Headquarters, 2013.
While both sides agree they want to achieve a peaceful settlement, paving the way to a lasting peace has
proven particularly difficult for the Kachin. Firstly, KIO/KIA leaders desperately want to avoid the kind of
“deception,” as they called it, by government representatives that they experienced during the 1994‐2011
cease‐fire. Kachin leaders today single out the flaws and inequitable aspects of the former agreement as one
of the causes of conflict, and seem determined to extract solid government guarantees that the next cease‐fire
will last. They have also indicated they prefer to remain in a state of conflict rather than going for a quicker
settlement that would not address their political grievances in a sustainable manner. On the government side,
this is a new political era and recent success stories of several ceasefire agreements seem to have increased
their confidence. The new agreement reached in October 2013 with the KIO created optimism, but the
situation remained fragile with ongoing fighting reported in a number of locations.125

A number of factors may explain the duration of the conflict and the failure so far to achieve constructive
dialogue between the two parties, including two central impediments to comprehensive agreements.126 The
first, and main, issue for the KIO/KIA is that the two sides will not able to guarantee that they will adhere to
the agreement after the deal is reached. The second is the nature and extent of actual incentives for
protagonists to lay down their arms.

To understand the challenging environment of peace talks in Kachin State and the reasons for their repeated
failures, the following section examines four sets of obstacles to peace, which are identified as main
impediments. These include: the divergent notions of peace; suitable timing for a peace agreement; the
military’s pre‐conditions in the negotiation process; and finally, initial mistrust on both sides in the peace
process. The latter part focuses on stakes held by parties to the conflict; the war economy and key economic
incentives; and the role of the international community, especially of China.

4.1 Impediments to Peace

Different shades of peace

Parties to the conflict do not share a common conception of the notion of a peace process. On one hand, the
Kachin request a “genuine” political dialogue to achieve peace.127 This term implies that peace in itself is
insufficient; it also needs to be perceived as based on good will. On the other hand, the government side
reportedly finds this request groundless and considers that the Kachin are creating difficulties.128 An
interviewee who had spent several years in Kachin State and is currently involved in peace support within the
Kachin community explained that, “Some observers think that the KIO wants a war, and is creating difficulties
to avoid sitting at the negotiating table. But this is a wrong perception. What the Kachin want is a real peace,
based on a political solution, whereas all proposals from the Bamar so far are about a cease‐fires [only].”129

A few incidents have supported this perception. For example, during peace talks held on October 30 2012, the
Myanmar military sent senior commanders to participate, but the Kachin sent only lower‐level
representatives, meaning that military discussions could not be held. “It was interpreted as a snub by the
military and left government negotiator U Aung Min undermined as he had worked hard to convince the army
to send a very senior army commander to attend the talks in China, only for him to be stood up.”130 In contrast,
a peace advisor to the KIO explained to the author that the Government negotiation team did not reveal its


composition prior to the meeting, and outnumbered the KIO representatives at the meeting. He also argued
that as the Tatmadaw was launching an armed offensive at the time, the KIA’s Chief of Staff could not travel.131

Later, in April 2013, the peace talks were delayed because the KIO refused to participate without international
witnesses, as it felt this would be a guarantee for favorable dialog and a compelling factor for the government
to hold its promises. At first, China, that has been involved as a peace broker for several months refused, as it
perceived foreign observers as an intrusion into its “sphere of influence”. China finally accepted the presence
of the UN so that talks could be held. . But when the negotiation teams met in May 2013, the KIO/KIA leaders
demanded that international observers be physically present in the room, not just in an adjoining room where
they had been seated. Such behavior was perceived by Bamar leadership as the KIA creating unnecessary
obstacles.132

In terms of the vastly differing notions of peace on both sides. The author and journalist Bertil Lintner has
suggested that “peace” has different meanings: “Clearly, peace means different things to the government and
the ethnic rebels. The former want the latter to accept the 2008 non‐federal constitution and convert their
armed forces into so‐called "Border Guard Forces" under the command of the Myanmar Army. Peace for the
Kachin, on the other hand, means a new, or at least fundamentally amended, Constitution that gives ethnic
states a large degree of autonomy.”133 Although the government has since dropped its demand for the KIA to
merge into Border Guard Forces, disagreements over the mere definition of peace has made talks more
complicated.

The right time for peace?

The KIO/KIA and the government also differ sharply in their perceptions of time. For 17 years, the KIO built up
expectations, waiting for a democratic government to be elected, in order to discuss political matters and, in
the longer term, achieve greater autonomy.134 Because the KIO feels it has been consistent in its demands over
the last two decades, it often cites its own version of history to justify its demands for political dialogue before
any ceasefire. But this kind of multiphase and linear approach stands in contrast to the new government’s
desire to turn the page and move on. In this context, it is not surprising that the nationwide ceasefire initially
scheduled for 2013 was considered premature. Kachin leaders did not believe, a few weeks before the
deadline, that they would have sufficient guarantees from the government, in terms of future political
settlements (especially with regard to degrees of political autonomy, the future of KIA troops, etc.). The KIA
later softened their position and agreed to attend the meeting, which at least paved the way for more
meetings and crucial new signs of cooperation on both sides.

To make public its willingness to meet the KIO/KIA and discuss peace, the government highlighted its views in
the state media. As the New Light of Myanmar reported on August 13 2011: “Government Already Acceded to
Peace Proposals of KIO to Most Possible degree.” Following this, the state media stated twice that President U
Thein Sein announced a halt to military offensives. However, the fighting did not cease creating a situation in
which both parties blamed the other. These episodes not only contributed to further mistrust, but, more
worryingly, hinted that the civilian government and the Tatmadaw may have divergent views on how to
achieve peace. Some Kachin openly questioned the actual role of the government, especially in the peace
talks, considering that under the new system since 2011, the Tatmadaw is effectively under the control of the
government. Many believe that negotiations should be primarily held with the military, and not the civilian
leaders who do not have the authourity to maintain a truce or a cease‐fire.

Tatmadaw’s ‘peace’ strategy

The government claimed in late 2013 it was willing to sign a ceasefire agreement with Kachin representatives
as soon as possible. But various indicators demonstrated that the Tatmadaw remained reluctant to give up its
hold in Kachin areas and attacks were reported during and after peace talks, hinting again at a possible division
between views of the Tatmadaw and the civilian government. Continuing into 2014, the Tatmadaw continued


with lesser but persistent operations in Kachin State. Without full willingness to compromise on either side,
however, the signing of any peace agreement would appear more acceptable for the winner of the military
conflict. Hence, hardline elements on both sides seem determined to achieve a clear‐cut military victory. As
mentioned by a KIA representative, before the conflict: “General Gam Shawng said that he had little hope of a
political settlement while the Tatmadaw held the upper hand in the field. The military's mentality is to arouse
fear in others and then demand what they want without any compromise…Similarly unless fear is in their
minds, they cannot be pressured to do anything […] the KIA has been unable to put fear in the minds of the
Myanmar military so they have refused to compromise."135

Another interviewee, reporting a discussion with a person close to top Government levels, said that the
Myanmar military would not negotiate peace if it was in a position of weakness. He argued that only if military
campaigns to capture the hills near the KIA headquarters of Laiza was successful, would negotiations be
fruitful. As for the Tatmadaw’s position, U Hla Swe, a former Army Commander and Upper House
representative of the military‐backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, said in an interview with the
Democratic Voice of Burma: "It is said that if the [KIO] can't be extended an olive branch, then we should send
them bullets instead… So I said: how did the Second World War end? Because two atomic bombs were dropped
on Japan, forcing them to come and sign a peace treaty on an [American] boat."136 This according to many
Kachin personifies a mindset that has serious implications as the Tatmadaw was still trying to gain ground in
Kachin State in early 2014, even though the government and KIO recognized there had been a de‐escalation of
violence and were keen to pursue peace talks.

In order to ensure a clear military victory, the Myanmar Army used disproportionate military power that
peaked with artillery bombardments and air strikes in late 2012. The Tatmadaw was hoping to lead what it
termed a “flash war” inflicting considerable losses, with limited resources. Colonel Zau Tawng, the head of the
KIA's Strategic Studies Department, claimed that by December 2012, three of the Tatmadaw's regional
commands were engaged in major operations on five fronts involving 132 infantry battalions and an artillery
brigade.137
The Kachin and Myanmar armies’ sizes and military equipment are disproportionate.138 The KIA has fewer
troops, in comparison with the Myanmar military (about 10,000 according to local sources with a few
additional thousands as reservists) but also rudimentary equipment and smaller artillery. It nonetheless
maintained its control over a number of territories as KIA combatants understood their environment better.139
The Tatmadaw’s lack of technical competence to operate newly acquired military assets has also been
mentioned as an impediment.140

In order to build a more conducive environment for peace, both sides must agree on a number of
prerequisites. Yet, not only do they differ in their concepts of “peace” and what an agreement should entail,
they also have contrasting views on how a prolonged stagnation could affect the peace process. Strong
confidence‐building measures are vital, and both sides need to acknowledge that there may not be a clear‐cut
military victory in the short term, even while demonstrating their commitment to achieving a political
settlement.

Peace talks and mistrust

Among hindrances to the peace talk process, the first appears to be the extremely low level of trust among the
parties.141 According to KIO sources, the government’s appointment of successive negotiators through 2011
and 2012 was confusing as a team led by U Aung Thaung was abruptly replaced by U Aung Min, and affected
its credibility with the KIA/KIO. The ensuing talks were further undermined by the fact that key negotiators for
the government side clearly lacked decision‐making powers. Even though they were mandated by the
president, these negotiators did not have any authority on the military, and could not commit to any decision
interfering with military chains of command. As a consequence, such attempts damaged, more than
supported, the building of trust among the parties. As KIO official noted about the 2011 and 2012 negotiations:
“The negotiations were a game” in which "nothing significant was ever discussed.” According to a press
interview in 2013, the General Gam Shawng claimed the government only wanted to discuss a cease‐fire. “We


asked them many times verbally and in writing if they would engage in a political dialogue […] [But] when we
finally came close to a political dialogue with [their delegate] Aung Thaung, the government replaced him with
Aung Min and limited his authority to that of a mediator. Talks then became 'informal discussions'. Although
Aung Min confessed a desire to discuss politics, he claimed the government had instructed [that] all political
discussions must occur in parliament within the framework of the 2008 Constitution."142

The replacement of the first high‐level government negotiating team by one headed by U Aung Min, currently
President’s Office Minister, in May 2012 – and what has been called “his transforming spirit” ‐ seems to have
been a welcome move for the Kachin. A shrewd but diplomatic negotiator, he appears to have won trust from
Kachin leaders, who have commended his efforts. At the same time, the real issue as many observers note is
that while U Aung Min can speak for the central government, he has seemed to lack authority to speak for the
Tatmadaw. Several incidents marred the efforts of the peace negotiators. Both parties blamed each other for
the skirmishes and armed attacks that occurred after the talks143. By late 2013, the civilian government’s
authority and credibility had suffered more than that of the KIO/KIA in the eyes of the Kachin and their
supporters. While U Aung Min was seen overall as “sincere”, many interviewees mentioned their doubts about
the President’s authority over the most fundamental point: military strategy, as they believed the Tatmadaw
was still in control.144

After several unsuccessful attempts to jumpstart peace talks in 2012 and into 2013, the seven‐point
agreement signed by Kachin and government representatives on May 29 2013 created hope on both sides.145
Though symbolic, this initial agreement showed that all parties to the Kachin conflict were keen to achieve
peace. This was the first time KIO/KIA senior officials were able to come to Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin
State, since conflict resumed in mid‐2011. As well as giving permission for the KIA to enter Myitkyina, the
government also agreed to the KIO’s long‐term demand for international observers, with the presence at these
talks of representatives of the United Nations and China. Representatives of seven other ethnic armed groups
also attended as observers.

But the need for further confidence building remained clear. One frequently repeated issue has been the
continuation of armed attacks, allegedly by the Tatmadaw, and in some cases by private militias (and NSAGs
that made cease‐fire in the 1990s and kept their arms) stationed in Northern Shan State. A KIO public relations
officer explained the KIA’s position as of September 2013: “Since the last negotiations in Myitkyina, the KIA
had fully adhered to the seven‐point agreement… But the Army violated those agreed points and is attacking
our posts in Putao nowadays. They also attacked those in Chipwi region on August 17 […]. Tatmadaw
constantly puts military pressure upon the KIA troops. That’s why it is very difficult to trust them.”146

This agreement generated different opinions. According to a religious leader from the government controlled
area, “The seven‐point agreement is good for the government to show off and to get attention from the
international community”. Another religious leader, also from the government controlled area expressed more
hope: “This time it is different, whatever we say they don’t believe and whatever they say we don’t believe.
There is no trust in each other. This is why the seven‐point agreement is there ‐ we are trying a new approach.
Our people are really optimistic”.147 Not long after the agreement however, several skirmishes were reported,
creating uncertainty about the state of the peace process in Kachin State.148

Then, the most important achievement of the last agreement signed on October 10 2013 was the consent by
the KIO leadership to participate in nationwide ceasefire discussions, after consultations with other ethnic
armed groups at the headquarters. During the ethnic conference in Laiza in November 2013, nearly all key
NSAG leaders reviewed the proposed Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement draft and commented on it. A few days
later they met with the Union Peace‐making Working Committee (UPWC) – in charge of reaching peace
agreements with ethnic armed groups and chaired by the Vice‐President U Sai Mauk Kham‐ in Myitkyina to
provide their feedback. At the time of writing this paper, further hopes are projected on a forthcoming
conference, to be held in Hpa’an, Kayin State, in December 2013.149


4.2 Political and economic incentives of parties to the conflict

“A few people do not want peace, such as KIO officers and business people. They do not pro‐actively
try to spoil the process; instead they just ignore discussions on peace. They don’t try to stop peace
talks either. They are only indirectly spoilers.” A Kachin Religious leader, Myitkyina, August 2013.

Economic incentives

Some KIO/KIA leaders own businesses, provide services such as security and issuing licenses and concessions
to exploit timber, mining and other resources, mainly to Chinese and Myanmar businesses. They also raise
taxes from companies as well as from individuals, some of which goes back into the fighting effort. Funding the
conflict has both military and humanitarian implications. Academic sources suggest several channels to fund
conflict worldwide, three of these can be traced in Kachin150. Funds primarily derived from control over
valuable natural resources such as drugs, oil, timber and precious stones. Today, the KIO/KIA are often
associated with logging, jade mining and other natural resources trades. They also get benefits from agro‐
business that spans bananas and rubber plantations that are visible in the surroundings of Laiza151. Finally, the
KIO raises funds from more‐or‐less voluntary –taxes.152

Several interviewees reported that the conflict had not halted natural resources‐related businesses by key
Kachin figures and that some areas of the state were being even more intensively exploited as a result of the
conflict. A Kachin humanitarian worker based in May Ja Yan explained in September 2013 that, “Illegal logging
in areas between Bhamo and Lweje has never been as intensive as for these last two and half years. There are
currently more than 50 trucks detained in various check points. Before the war, they had to give a lot of money
to the Tatmadaw. Yet, it was still a limited taxation. (…) Now, they are freer to move around they just have to
give money to the officers, or groups of soldiers. The road is still under the government control. The
government is afraid to be seen taking economic profit of the situation. They know that the media and the KIO
are watching. The KIO does not ask for money, they do not need as they had already set up a systematic tax
system.”

Other testimonies also suggest that logging is on the rise in the state. According to an interviewee in Bhamo
area, August 2013: “During two years of conflict, they [KIO/KIA figures] earned a lot of money because of
logging, thanks to the conflict. There were no more Tatmadaw check‐points in some areas, as they have been
destroyed. So, no more government tax there and the KIO gets loads of money. Both parties are selling trees,
security and cross‐border services. They levy tax in return for permission to log. Then they get their people
hired, so both KIO as an organisation and its members, as individuals, have made money out of the conflict. So
at times, they are happy to have a long war”.

A number of large companies are reportedly able to operate in the state with the protection of various warring
parties As a Kachin member of a civil society organization told to the author explained: “Before the fighting
there were also many small scale traders but after the fighting had broken out, there were only the big
companies left. Actually most of the check‐points along the way to the Chinese border were just established
during the war and their number increase quickly. This increases the costs for business people as they have to
pay much more bribes and taxes. So only those who have deep pockets can access this area greasing the palms
in each these check‐points. Small dealers started losing their livelihoods as small business cannot pay at all
check‐points. When I spoke with loggers and truck drivers, they mentioned that there were at least 300 fully
loaded trucks per day waiting to cross the border. Sometimes they got stuck there as they did not have enough
money to pay the bribes”.

Complicating the growing momentum for a nationwide ceasefire agreement, the Kachin continue to harbor
suspicions about government motivations and some believe the real incentive is to secure access to the state’s
natural resources. During a public meeting at Myitkyina City Hall with members of the Kachin State
Government in June 2012, the first question raised was about increased Bamar involvement in local natural
resources extraction and trade.153 While field research showed that, overall, the KIO/KIA’s conflict narratives
were widely assimilated and apparently accepted by the local population, the government’s positions were


less frequently exposed, hence more difficult to grasp. One tangible consequence of this lopsided
understanding of the motivations for war is lack of clarity on all sides about what the government really wants
‐ leaving room for various interpretations. Several interviewees felt that, as much as President Thein Sein
should be supported in his economic and political reform efforts, the decision by many western governments
to ease sanctions in 2013 was premature and may have overly encouraged the Tatmadaw as well as the
predominantly civilian government. Many Kachin felt it demonstrated that business interests prevailed over
their safety and the political claims of ethnic groups.154

The KIA meanwhile has acknowledged it destroyed some public infrastructure for military purposes during the
conflict155. Alongside such actions, however, the KIO/KIA also oversaw justice156, education and healthcare
services157 in the territories they controlled, and all the while managed to produce electricity in many parts of
Kachin State158. Any significant peace deals will certainly impact the organizations’ economic role as well as
their role as service provider. It has been noted in other conflicts that economic compensation for winners or
losers takes a central position during transitions to peace. In other words, as the political scientist Humphreys
wrote: “If economic issues were in part responsible for the initial war outbreak then addressing the original
economic issues will likely help to avoid the reoccurrence of war.”159

The international community and the Chinese “elephant in the room”

After reengaging in peace talks in 2013, Kachin leaders wanted to protect their interests by having
international witnesses, such as the United Nations, the US, China, the UK and others, at their meetings with
the Government in order to avoid the misunderstandings that arose after the 1994 ceasefire. As a Kachin
senior humanitarian aid worker noted in Myitkyina in September 2013: “Formerly, they had reached a cease‐
fire agreement and over the years, the KIO continued to maintain its mandate and its commitments made in
1994. But the Tatmadaw broke the agreement and didn’t keep their promises. Neighboring countries like China
and Thailand would not stand for us. But may be the UN agencies, the EU or the US could be present at future
meetings and will listen to both sides and judge or suggest ways forward. And then, peace process would
possibly reach its logical conclusion. The bilateral discussions between KIO and Government will not bring
peace.”

The KIO/KIA want international observers not only to attend the talks but also to participate in monitoring the
implementation of any resulting peace agreements. Some Kachin leaders who consider that political issues are
the consequences of the post‐decolonization have expressed specific wishes for former colonial powers to
accompany them during the peace process. A manager of the Je Yang IDP camp near Laiza said to the author in
September 2013: “There would be no war now if there was an agreement like Panglong. (…). But without the
signing of such an agreement, we were left on our own and had to flee. The British government is indirectly
responsible for Panglong. Now, they are silent, they should not be so...”

The UK and the US were not present in rounds of talks before May 2013 – partly due to resistance by China,
which wanted to be the sole external power at the talks. Nonetheless, both the US and UK have been
providing humanitarian aid, as has the EU and other governments and international bodies. China, which
insisted on an observer role at the early talks as a neighbor and important trading partner of Myanmar, is the
main foreign investor in Kachin State’s hydro power, jade, timber and agricultural production. It supplies
manufactured goods while extracting natural resources. For both sides of the Kachin conflict, there are
considerable economic and political incentives for accessing or controlling the Chinese border. China’s primary
interest is to maintain stability along its border with Myanmar so trade can take place unhindered. The
Chinese government is unequivocally supportive of Nay Pyi Taw, but at the provincial level in Yunnan province
(which borders Kachin state) some representatives of local authorities (who are from Jinghpaw or other Kachin
sub‐ethnic groups) were supporting those who fled the war and crossed into Yunnan. As for companies, overall
their main interest is access to the state’s natural resources. To ensure that business is continued, they are
ready and willing to pay for access and security to whichever armed group controls the area in question.

Mineral resources have affected Kachin politics for the last three centuries. E. R. Leach observed that the jade
mines, operating since the 18th century, had a “major impact on the Kachin politics”160, he also noted the


growing interest of China. Border demarcation claims on both Chinese and Kachin sides were among the
causes of the first Kachin conflict. Chinese authorities remained publicly silent about border politics following
the first ceasefire. But their attitude shifted as concerns grew over instability during tensions between the
Tatmadaw and Kokang ethnic militias (of Shan state) in 2007161. During this episode, as well as the current one
in Kachin State, a dichotomy could be observed between the silent but supportive approach of local
authorities at regional level and a firmer stand at the national level. As people belonging to the Jinghpaw
ethnic group and other Kachin sub‐groups were present on both sides of the Chinese border, China’s local
authorities initially closed their eyes to legal and illegal border crossings by people fleeing the conflict. Some
Yunnan‐based Chinese helped provide those who fled to China with assistance, protection and/or
accommodation162. Meanwhile, Beijing closely monitored the situation with the Myanmar government. Asian
politics researcher Nicholas Farelly noted in a book chapter that: “The overarching priority is the stability and
the relative freedom of commerce and trade that benefited them [the Chinese] so much during the ceasefire
period.”163

In September 2011, Myanmar’s newly appointed president, U Thein Sein, surprised the world with a decree
suspending construction of the massive, Chinese‐led Myitsone Dam hydropower project, located at the
confluence of the Mekka and Malikha rivers, at the Irrawaddy confluent in the heart of Kachin territories. The
move was particularly striking as the government had not informed China Power Investment (CPI), the Chinese
company in charge of the project. The suspension was widely seen as the result of intense advocacy work from
civil society organizations and also an expression of Thein Sein’s willingness to try to address some local Kachin
grievances. Most strikingly, the biggest casualty of the decision was China, which was not officially informed
before Nay Pyi Taw announced the decision.

A few months after this incident, Chinese authorities in August 2012, after several warnings to the KIO,
dismantled Kachin refugee camps in Yunnan and sent thousands of refugees back to Myanmar164. In the
following months, they closed offices of faith‐based organizations from Myanmar that were operating in
Yunnan. Later on, Chinese authorities became even stricter on border security amid the perceived increase of
threats to internal security resulting from escalating conflict within Kachin State. Chinese territory was within
mortar and airstrike range of Myanmar’s military forces, as proven when at least two mortar shells fell inside
Yunnan province in December 2012 and January 2013.165 From then, Beijing actively pressured both the
Myanmar government and KIO/KIA leaders to stop fighting and hosted the first major – albeit unsuccessful ‐
peace talks between them in Ruili, in late 2012. Since then, China has sent representatives to all Kachin peace
talks.

In an increasingly risky business environment in Myanmar, particularly in Kachin State, Chinese companies
have striven even harder to secure local and government guarantees for deals and projects. While many still
have appetite for risk, and the logistical capacity to face new constraints, their strategies partly rely on local
support. As noted by a civil society organization member in May Ja Yang in September 2013, : “These
companies are mainly from China with huge capital. Even though they have enormous capital, they still can’t
operate and to do their business directly. That’s why they have selected many local brokers as their handymen.
Most of these local people are just laborers. In this border area, though many businesses titles belong to local
business persons, they are mostly backboned by Chinese. So Chinese provide capital to local business people
and local people pave the way with money to both Tatmadaw and KIA as law enforcement is very weak during
the conflict. Smugglers pay bribe to both KIA and Tatmadaw in order to carry jade or transport teak to China“.

According to various Myanmar sources, Chinese investments in raw materials and commodities extraction
directly affected the war economy in Kachin State, as proceeds on the KIA/KIO side would be channeled into
arming and purchasing food and supplies for KIA troops. As noted by an interviewed civil society organization
member in May Ja Yang in September 2013: “The KIO sold out rare earth metals concession permits to Chinese
companies because they have to raise funds to feed their soldiers and supply weaponry”. Given the recent
history of Chinese and local investment and natural resources exploitation in Kachin State, any peace process
must deal with such – relatively sensitive – issues concerning the political economy of the war. To sustain any
resulting peace, careful planning must take into account the interests of private companies, neighboring China
and other stakeholders including government and potentially, other foreign investors.


5. The human cost of war : Practical implications of the conflict

“We, IDPs, suffer the most from this conflict”, Je Yang Kha IDP camp manager, Laiza, September 2013.

The conflict in Kachin State is not only the product of two opposing political blocks, or business interests trying
to secure revenue sources. For most of the Kachin population and also some Shan and other ethnic
nationalities, the conflict is the result of willful neglect by central authorities since the inception of modern
Myanmar.

To fully understand the extent of grievances, it is important to note the suffering encountered by Kachin
civilians, including the large numbers who fled their homes, and/or were victims or witnesses of violence by a
range of armed groups, more often than not, the tatmadaw. The following section discusses the humanitarian
situation and issues related to the politics of aid in Kachin State, and local protection mechanisms. In
conclusion, key questions emerging from this conflict have both local and national ramifications, including
security dimensions that all parties to the peace process must focus on resolving.

5.1 Displacement and protection concerns

Humanitarian crisis

As of early 2014, there were more than 92,000 IDPs in about 180 locations scattered throughout Kachin and
Northern Shan States, with greater concentrations in and around main cities, such as Myitkyina, Bhamo, Laiza,
Lweje, and May Ja Yang.166 In addition, a few thousand civilians who fled their homes remained unaccounted
for by humanitarian agencies, as they were believed to be hiding in terrain near their villages in fear of further
aggression by armed groups. Others initially took refuge in camps or with host families across the border in
China. A majority of the IDP camps are supported and managed by religious organizations, and some directly
by the KIO. Many of those who fled their villages found safe havens in religious compounds or in territory
controlled by either the KIO/KIA or the government. Most of the displacement took place between mid‐
September 2011 and mid‐January 2012, although IDP numbers in the state’s northern border regions surged in
December 2012 and January 2013, during air attacks by the Tatmadaw on KIA strongholds.167

Many IDPs noted that political affiliations or sympathies played a part in their decision as to where they turned
for safe haven.168 Many based their decision on which areas (government or KIO controlled), they saw as more
secure. Nonetheless not all IDPs in KIO‐controlled areas are pro‐KIO, and vice versa. Fear of being interrogated
or harassed by armed forces was often the reason IDPs chose to stay in the first place they arrived in169.
Unable to find sufficient income, many depended on food aid. For those staying in government areas in
Christian Churches or Buddhist monasteries, the religious communities initially provided their needs but soon
struggled financially.170 A couple of months into the crisis, a few NGOs and UN agencies supported these IDPs.
Most of the camps outside urban areas, particularly those in KIO areas, are not easily accessible.

Any international agency staff movement in Kachin State must still be cleared by the Relief and Resettlement
Department of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MoSWRR). International employees
are very rarely authorized to leave the towns of Myitkyina and Bhamo. Occasionally, the government has
organized rice distribution in some locations, with reported episodes of bullying of IDPs by local officials or
army officers who exhorted them to return to their village.171 Overall, access to IDPs in KIO‐controlled areas
has been conditional according to political considerations. When there was a political deadlock among the
warring parties, international agencies could not access IDPs at all in these remote areas. When discussions
were gaining ground and belligerents were keener to establish a dialogue, humanitarian access was authorized
on occasion. All the while, the international community has had to rely on local civil society organizations to
reach the victims of conflict.


In Northern Shan State, the situation is different as there are only about 8,000 IDPs in camps but many more
displaced are still unaccounted for. 172 First, civilians in this area did not enjoy the relative stability provided by
the 1994 ceasefire. As a number of NSAGs in the region were associated with drug production and trafficking,
local protection issues were more problematic. People in such areas would flee skirmishes due to security
concerns and did not feel protected by any party. Second, the geographical and administrative settings have
not been favorable to humanitarian support in such areas, as camps were scattered and their existence
depended on the permission of different local authorities that coordinated with each other in an ad hoc
fashion. Finally, these areas are ethnically more heterogeneous. These groups tended to be in smaller
numbers, and were less vocal, and therefore have far less access to humanitarian aid.

The bulk of international aid has been channeled to the most visible and accessible IDPs, in the vicinity of
Myitkyina and Bhamo towns, and it was challenging for the major international agencies to deliver aid beyond
these urban centers. Domestic support groups, such as faith based organizations and civil society entities,
attempted to support IDPs in both urban and remote areas. Overall, the political dividing lines between Kachin
IDPS in government and KIO/KIA‐controlled areas reinforced segregation between victims of the war. These
“politics of humanitarian access” will undoubtedly affect relations between various communities and
government, as well as NSAGs, and their overall legitimacy in the short to medium term.

Protection issues and local responses

“Even though there were no more soldiers, it would still be difficult to get back to the villages for two reasons.
First, most of us have no Myanmar national ID cards and there are many checkpoints along the way… Second,
we have no more livelihoods and no homes left. Where will we stay and what will we eat? Even if peace is
signed tomorrow, we cannot go back right away.” Interview with a Kachin IDP in Je Yang Kha, September 2013.

The main security risk identified by Kachin IDPs is exposure to violence.173 In interviews, many IDPs recounted
experiences of harassment by armed groups, destruction of livelihoods, loss of belongings and, in some cases,
exploitation or recruitment by armed groups.174 Pervasive fear of landmines and unexploded devices were
mentioned by some IDP camp managers in some areas, although so far, relatively few casualties have been
recorded. Many IDPs have noted cases in which the Army targeted civilians accused of supporting the KIO/KIA
for harassment and detention. Over time in Kachin State, as in other ethnic areas, the Tatmadaw was widely
seen as the main perpetrator of abuses. The vast majority of ordinary Kachin in conflict areas see the Myanmar
military – and often, the broader government ‐ as a potential threat. An IDPs interviewed in Laiza in September
2013 stated, “We never saw a good Myanmar soldier. We heard about many scenarios, we’ve seen many cases
of abuses from them. Our children are afraid when they see them.” Another stated, “We have the experience of
being arrested and taken by the Tatmadaw as porters [to carry rations and weapons for the army]. So we are
traumatized, we want to avoid it.”

Some protection issues and local response mechanisms in Kachin State resemble those reported in south‐east
Myanmar.175 Among similarities, there is little international access to displaced people. As a consequence,
protection and advocacy for local populations is mainly provided by community‐ and faith‐based organizations.
With a moral authority that generally places them beyond the politics of conflict, their compounds, for
example, are generally perceived by local people as safe havens. In Kachin State, such organizations could
freely meet both the KIO and government to seek authorization to conduct activities or support for their aid
programs. For example, one faith‐based organization in Kachin State lobbied for IDP children living in camps to
have access to schools. Now, many displaced children are able to participate in primary ‐ and some even
secondary – education programmes.

Also, similar to areas in Karen State in Myanmar’s south‐east, NSAGs position themselves as protectors of local
communities, especially in providing services in three key sectors: physical safety, livelihoods and culture. In
some parts of Karen State, armed groups are seen by local people as “legitimate representatives and guardians
of the Karen people”. Depending of course on how they treat the inhabitants of these areas176, the same is
often said about the KIO in some parts of Kachin State. Yet, NSAGs in various states have reportedly resorted
to coercive practices, including taxation of local populations as well as conscription and utilization of forced


labor177. In Kachin State, currently, they are widely perceived as caretakers and protectors of the population.178
For example, many ordinary Kachin people mention how KIA soldiers would try to inform villagers when
Tatmadaw troops were approaching their area, enabling them to flee before fighting broke out. In some areas
of the state, civilians who lack institutionalized protection have built up networks they can turn to, often
featuring religious leaders and family members. In extreme cases, they have also resorted to hiding out in
nearby forests or fleeing across the border to China, neighbouring states or elsewhere to avoid conflict.

Post‐ war uncertainties

“The solution [to the conflict] is to include ethnic groups, and religious leaders including the non Kachin people
1994 was a kind of success but during the ceasefire, both the KIO and government became corrupted. It was a
lull period and there was no active fighting during these years. But no problem was resolved. I did not see any
positive outcome from this period”. Religious leader interviewed in Bhamo in August 2013.

Some observers have noted attempts by local Kachin leaders to unify a complex mosaic of tribes dominated by
the Jinghpaw ethnic group, reflecting similar efforts to promote unification by the central state and other
ethnic groups. The Jinghpaw are widely assumed to dominate Kachin State both numerically and in political
terms, however until a census that covers Kachin State and elections are held it is difficult to verify this as fact.
Estimates based on the last census results and other calculations estimate that the Kachin people may
currently be a minority in Kachin State, accounting for about only 38% of the population, alongside Bamar and
Shan ethnic groups based in the state.179 Under British colonial rule, Kachin people were classified into
separate different "races" or "tribes" according to languages, including Jinghpaw, Gauri, Maru, Lashi, Azi,
Maingtha, Hpon, Nung (Rawang), Lisu, and Khamti (Shan). Other officials and the local administration
recognized them as a single ethnic group. Today, the Myanmar government views Kachin people as a "major
national ethnic race" comprising the Jingpo, Lisu, Trone, Dalaung, Gauri, Hkahku, Duleng, Maru (Lawgore),
Rawang, Lashi (La Chid), Atsi(Zaiwa), and Taron as distinct ethnic nationalities.

The KIO’s demands for federalism do not overtly take into account the interests of various ethnic groups in
the state including Shan and Bamar populations, as well as minorities of Chinese, Indian and Nepalese
descents. Today, many Kachin elders admit they do not know how a new political system could bring about
more equality for all ethnic groups in the state in the shorter term. According to the interview of a Kachin
politician in September 2013: “We don’t have any experience of federalism here in our country. What will it be?
Maybe this is possible after all natural resources are gone in ethnic areas.” Setting up a federal model – a long‐
coveted goal for many participants in multi‐ethnic talks over a possible nationwide ceasefire – presents various
challenges. The KIO is pushing for the establishment of a federal system as part of the solution to its political
grievances. Yet, it has explained relatively little about the type and form of federalism it desires, reinforcing
the impression that very little has been discussed about the nature of federal set‐up for Kachin state or the
country.

Myanmar’s many NSAGs have differing agendas when it comes to proposals for a lasting ceasefire. This makes
achieving a multilateral ceasefire or a national framework agreement more difficult. Studies of peace
processes in other countries show that approximately two thirds of peace agreements lapse back into
situations of conflict after the first 5 years of peace. More often than not, such reversions occur because the
conditions are not amenable in an immediate and fragile post‐conflict environment for timely transitions of
power and for political stabilization. KIO/KIA concerns over their legitimacy from the populace they depend on
for material support are a key concern of the Organisation.180 The KIO, like the Pan Kachin movement, finds
that unity and support strongest in periods of conflict. To ensure sustainable peace, any agreement will most
likely need to ensure the continuation of KIO power in the State. As an interviewee noted when discussing the
future of the KIO/KIA, in September 2013: “The other question is: “Will the KIO survive?” If the government was
to win, if it wants to stop all the illegal trade, KIO will suffer a lot. The KIO will have to go back to war.”


5.1 Local Security Concerns

Local security arrangements

According to primary sources and interviews with civilian victims of the conflict, the main security concern in
Kachin State are linked to militarization of a given area. Many men, in particular, live in fear of being arrested
or forcibly recruited as porters or soldiers by one party or another, and of being interrogated for information
on the other party. Local Kachin populations tend to trust the KIA more than the Tatmadaw, particularly in KIA‐
controlled areas where the organization is seen as the main provider of security.

The situation is slightly more complex in Northern Shan State near the Kachin State border, due to the
presence of numerous militias, mainly operating to advance their economic interests. Facts are hard to verify
in the region, but the number of militias operating there ranges between 30 to 100, according to local
sources.181 Villagers in areas of militia activity have often professed ignorance about the affiliation of soldiers
operating in their areas and committing abuses. Either way, the potentially destabilizing role of such militias in
future must be factored into peace efforts, as they could create complexities in the longer term and
undermine current peace efforts. As their rationale is mainly economic, the financial gains and losses for local
militias in war on one hand, and peace, on the other, must be considered. Adequate benefits for these groups
will be required to prevent them becoming “spoilers” in the maintenance of peace.

The KIO seems to have a generally positive image in local communities when it comes to service delivery. It is
perceived as able to understand, and meet, basic needs of the local population in areas under its control. It
also backs a number of civil society organizations, including youth and women’s groups, which provide aid to
victims of conflict and could play a vital role in longer‐term peace building efforts. These groups often have
been marginalized in aid delivery, because international organisations are mostly registered to work by
government in government‐controlled areas and do not often have permission to work through these smaller
local organisations. Therefore, bigger humanitarian agencies play a more dominant role in government‐
controlled areas including the state capital, Myitkyina.

This aid segregation between the larger international organisations and the smaller national groups has
created differences of opinion between Kachin people. In order to support reconciliation at national as well as
local levels, these civil society organizations should be included at early stages of planning for peace initiatives.
As many of them have both credibility and reach in local communities, they could be influential in promoting
reconciliation.

Finally, linkages between Baptist and Catholic churches, which have been key aid providers alongside the KIO,
and peace efforts should also be supported, as they were in 1994. They are sometimes the only entities in
Kachin State that manage to be heard by both the KIO and the central government.

Ethnic armed groups – what’s next?

The question of reforming the NSAGs was first raised at the national level by the government in the form of
the Border Guard Forces (BGF) plan in 2009, which triggered the recent conflict in Kachin State. A KIO Public
Relations officer in May Ja Yang explained his perspective on the BGF proposal presented by the central
government as follows, “The BGF have to be located not only at the border posts but not in other regions within
the country (…) And all the battalions would be strictly limited to the border points with China and India only.”
Such curbs on the mobility of troops proved to be a major stumbling block to KIO/KIA acceptance of the
ultimatum, for two reasons: KIA battalions are stationed in a number of areas deep within Kachin State, away
from the border (for example in Hpakant and Tanai). On top of this, the notion of handing control of border
administration to the central government had obviously negative financial implications for the KIO/KIA as they
may have had to relinquish their major revenue stream from taxation of border trade activities in some areas.


Under the plan, as outlined by the Brussels based think tank Euro‐Burma Office in a report released in 2010:
“Lieutenant‐General Ye Myint told the KIA to transform into seven battalions of the BGF, under the command
of the Tatmadaw, the Burma Army. Each battalion would be composed of 18 officers and 326 soldiers: the
highest rank in the BGF would be a mere major and each battalion would have 3 majors, 5 captains and 10
lieutenants. The age limit for the BGF is between 18 and 50, which means that all the officers whose ranks are
higher than major and senior officers older than 50 years of age will be forced to resign from the KIA.
Moreover, each battalion would include at least 3% of officers from the Tatmadaw. These Burma Army officers
would then control key positions of the BGF, including logistics”.182

Another central issue is the proposed chain of command that would ultimately see KIA troops reporting to the
Myanmar military. According to a member of the KIO representative interviewed in May Ja Yang in September
2013: “There would be 100 combatants in each BGF battalion, each comprising 70 KIA soldiers and 30
Tatmadaw soldiers. (…) The battalion commander would be a KIO officer while the second battalion
commander would be a Tatmadaw officer within the BGF. But in fact those Tatmadaw officers will occupy all
the critical ranks of the battalion for example commanding the rations, supplies and logistics sectors. That’s
why KIO had stated that they would accept the BGF proposal one day when genuine transformation would take
place but that it couldn’t accept the BGF proposal at this stage. Since then, tensions between KIA and
Tatmadaw have increased. (…). Even though the chief of the battalion is our staff, they [the tatmadaw] would
take all the critical positions from second commander to ration collector. So we would be living dead. We would
have very little space to move, and we would be under their control if we accepted their proposal. That’s why
[the KIO] Central Committee has determined that the proposal would bring no benefit for Kachin and thus
decided to resist it firmly”.

Since the 1970s there has been no opportunity for soldiers of ethnic minority origins to occupy senior positions
within the Tatmadaw, although there is no published discriminatory policy. There was a glass ceiling for
officers trying for promotions above major level. Therefore, the BGF plan was perceived as the continuation of
the current monopoly held by Bamar personnel in the armed forces. As a solution, some have suggested that:
“Integration and reinsertion of the troops can take place but it needs to be within a federal system, with the
creation of Kachin regiments within a federal Army. They [the KIA] keep on saying this. Chief of Staff should be
of an ethnic nationality background.”183

The question of the age limit and social security for BGF soldiers also became an issue for the KIA. As a
member of the Peace Creation Group CSO stated during an interview in Myitkyina in September 2013, “The
age for service is limited between 18 and 50. But nothing had been mentioned about the pension after
retirement”. Some interviewees said that suggestions were made by Tatmadaw negotiators to the effect of
those above 50 years old should focus either on business or on politics and not the military.

Although the government has now dropped the demand to fold the KIA into a proposed BGF, the question of
reform, and potential integration of KIA combatants will be an unavoidable during ceasefire negotiations.
There is a widespread feeling in the KIA that the Tatmadaw will not back away from its insistence on either
dismantling NSAGs or turning them into regular Army personnel. But this reform process, and the broader
reform of the entire security system itself, cannot take place in such a mistrustful context. As stated in the
Burma News International report in 2013, “Many believe that the BGF scheme is a strategy by the government
to control ethnic armed groups by using compliant armed groups already transformed into BGFs… to fight
against them. For example: using Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) BGF to fight against non‐cease‐fire
Karen groups like the breakaway DKBA 5th brigade and the Karen National Union (KNU). In addition, the
National Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA‐K) which was transformed into a BGF and was used against the KIA.
This pitting of ethnic armed groups from the same area, or ethnicity, and against each other has made many
groups and civilians even more distrustful of the government’s intentions.”184

The future of the NSAGs needs to be cautiously planned to avoid groups of them or individuals becoming
spoilers to the peace process in the longer term. In order to be more inclusive, security sector reforms need to
ensure that information channels are clear and efficient enough to bring these groups – with their potentially
conflicting agendas – into the same fold. In order to ensure longer term peace building, local security needs
must be carefully identified and adequate solutions formulated. Given the widespread belief among local
populations in Kachin State that the KIA is more reliable and able to provide protection than government


troops, trust between Kachin people in these areas and the Tatmadaw will need to be carefully rebuilt through
commitment to the process by both sides.


Conclusion

Various attempts to revitalize the peace process following resumption of the conflict in Kachin State in mid‐
2011 have had two main effects on “peace politics” at the national level. First, the KIO, after supporting, then
challenging and ultimately eroding cohesion among other ethnic armed groups, has recently managed to build
momentum to get the multi‐ethnic United Nationality Federal Council (UNFC) and its messages heard by a
wider audience, by refusing to sign a ceasefire agreement until political dialogue is scheduled. The KIO also
rallied other NSAGs around KIO demands, gaining leverage and legitimacy in the negotiation process. Second,
it questioned and tested the government’s approach to peace, seeking commitments that the government‐led
Union Peace‐making Working Committee will not seek peace solely from a military perspective. It questioned
the limits of Myanmar’s democratic transition by demanding that priority be placed on enacting earlier
government commitments on long‐term political arrangements, particularly the decentralization of power
within a federal system. This was primarily to challenge the government’s initially short‐term strategy of
achieving a ceasefire agreement without answering questions raised by the KIO about the devolution of power
in ethnic areas.

The relatively successful peace talks in May and October 2013 in the government‐controlled capital of Kachin
State, at the Manau festival Ground in Myitkyina, highlight official acknowledgement of the importance of
local power structures in peace efforts as the Manau ceremony is a cultural tradition designed to bind the six
main tribes together as one nation.185 The broader Kachin identity has been shaped since colonial times by the
need to distinguish the upland Kachin from lowlanders. While they forged close ties with the neighboring
lowlander Shan, it was only relatively recently that they began interacting with the Bamar based more in
central areas of the country. Kachin identity is built on common (Christian) religion and (Jinghpaw) language as
well as various traditions that differentiate them from other ethnic groups. Through modern history, the
Kachin have cultivated these differences and leaders have striven to maintain their political influence over
local populations.

But Myanmar’s post‐Independence evolution thwarted some Kachin ambitions. Alongside the push to rebuild
relations with the central government emerged a radicalized ethnic identity and along with it, demands for
more autonomy. The Kachin were soon frustrated at being deprived of political power over their ancestral
territories. The recognition of a state religion – Buddhism –that was not theirs was the final blow, and was one
of the key reasons leading to the first war with the Tatmadaw, which lasted 33 years(from 1961 to 1994).

The ceasefire brokered by Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in 1994 was not a solution for the Kachin
leadership as it was predominantly a military agreement acknowledging troop positions along with assorted
provisions of a military nature. It was not planned as a long‐lasting arrangement but as a temporary deal,
awaiting a civilian government to take over and solve pending political issues. However, 17 years into this
agreement, Kachin leaders saw little political progress. In the meantime, however, the KIO oversaw
administration of a large swathe of territory in Kachin State, running public administration and delivering
justice, education, health and other public services.

Consequently, when the former junta issued the BGF ultimatum just before handing over the power to the
Thein Sein government, Kachin leaders felt increasingly threatened. For the last few decades, interaction with
the central government became gradually more difficult as mutual trust eroded, amid repeated failures to
achieve compromises. Kachin narratives justifying the war tend to revolve around an unfair political process
while the Myanmar narratives are inclined to focus on sovereignty, unity of ethnic groups and national
security. Hence, today, while a number of NSAGs demonstrate cautious optimism and share the government
vision of a nationwide ceasefire as the first big step to longer‐term political dialogue, the KIO takes a different
stand. It wants more guarantees and to ensure that political dialogue will logically and simultaneously go hand
in hand with a ceasefire agreement.

The recent process, with two rounds of promising peace talks in Myitkyina (in May and October 2013) and
increased coordination among the ethnic NSAGs in Laiza (in November 2013), seem to indicate that peace is
closer than ever since the resumption of the conflict. Yet, there are many factors at play. One of the biggest


issues is to agree on the sharing of revenues from natural resources and border trade, in order to avoid
fighting over contested economic dividends and support longer‐term stabilization of the area. Management of
armed militias in Northern Shan State will also be required. To foster a lasting peace, Kachin leaders and
combatants need to identify their own interests in building peace. In early 2014, fighting was still reported in
Southern Kachin and North‐Western Shan States, hinting that the Tatmadaw was attempting to undermine
peace efforts, despite goodwill and promises by the civilian government to reach out and build trust in its
peace initiatives. The KIO recently seems keener than it ever was to engage more seriously, yet it must still
deal with the aspirations of supporters, who widely accepted the rationale for war and will need to be
convinced that peace is possible and preferable. The majority of Kachin people still feel safer with the KIA, and
tend to fear the Tatmadaw as well as central State administration. Above all, the KIO/KIA, in order to trust the
government peace delegation, will need evidence that the government is in control of the Army – not vice
versa as it was between 1962 and 2011. Earlier military attacks in Kachin State, during and immediately after
peace talks, have greatly undermined government efforts to rebuild trust in the state.

The Kachin conflict has displaced an estimated 100,000 individuals, the majority of who want peace and want
to return to their homes. The nationwide ceasefire is only the first step on the long and difficult road of
national reconciliation, between and among ethnic nationalities and the Bamar ethnic group. This conflict also
raises questions about the future of the Tatmadaw and the NSAGs. It also highlighted the need for reforming
the country’s security and military structures. The wider role of the Tatmadaw in governance and its views on
ethnic armed groups are bound to change. The military has a considerable number of soldiers, financial
resources and power; its role was to deal with both internal and external enemies who were deemed to be
undermining national unity. In the context of a national level peaceful settlement, the Tatmadaw would have
to redefine its role. On the NSAGs’ side, leaders and other ethnic decision‐makers must find space in an
increasingly vibrant democratic setup. Safety and security of local civilian populations, particularly among local
ethnic communities who suffered from the conflict will also need to be ensured.

Finally, in the context of the Kachin conflict, the road to peace must pass two major tests within 2014. The first
‐ and most obvious one ‐ is the tentative formalization and implementation of a nationwide ceasefire
agreement and dealing with its impact on relations between the central government and the KIO/KIA (as well
as other NSAGs); the second is to careful preparation of the 2015 general election. Kachin representatives
have been pushing the central government to put an end to their political marginalization and provide Kachin
leaders with opportunities to contest these elections. This is crucial to supporting overall peace architecture in
the country. In October 2013, Dr. Manam Tu Ja , a former KIO leader whose party failed to gain approval to
register and run in the 2010 election, had his political party registered by the Union Elections Commission
(UEC), the Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP). This is a positive step in demonstrating commitment to
inclusion of Kachin and KIO representatives in the electoral process. The steady growth of the KSDP is a
promising development both in terms of improving the credibility of the political transition and providing
representation of Kachin political concerns. The next critical challenge for the government is to make the
elections free, fair and credible in Kachin State, as everywhere else in the country.


Bibliography
Annexes


End notes

1
The language spoken by the dominant Kachin sub‐ethnic group, the Jinghpaw.
2
Please refer to the map in Annex G.
3
BNI, September 2013, pp. 1‐2.
4 The Union‐level peace team is made up of a central committee for making policies and a working committee for
implementing policies associated with ceasefire negotiations. The central committee (UPCC) is chaired by President Thein
Sein, while the working committee (UPWC) is chaired by the Vice President Sai Mauk Kham.
5 The 13 NSAG who initially signed cease‐fire agreement with the current government are: United Wa State Party/Army,
National Democratic Alliance Army – Eastern Shan State, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (5), Restoration Shan State/
Shan State Army, Chin National Front, Karen National Union, Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army, New Mon
State Party, Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army‐ Peace Council, Karenni National Progressive Party,
Arakan Liberation Party/Army (Rakhine State Liberation Party), National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang, Pao
National Liberatio Organisation.
6
Throughout the document, the term ‘Burma’ is used when the text refers to the country, and ‘Burmese’ for the people,
before 1990. ‘Myanmar’ is used for the country, as it was officially renamed in 1990. ’Myanmar’ refers to citizens of the
country as a whole. ‘Bamar’ is used to describe the ethnic group that has dominated governance of the country and is the
most numerous in the country.
7
Robinne, 2007, pp. 64‐5.
8
Thin Maung Than, 2013. Statistical data on Myanmar is generally unreliable due to poor data collection, analysis and
presentation. Data on the population should be regarded as approximate as only estimates are available. The last census
was conducted in the country in 1983, and populations in conflict areas were not counted. A census is currently being
undertaken by government and results should be public by 2016.
9
The “Shan Ni” or “Red Shan” in Myanmar language (“Tai‐leng” or “Tai‐Lai”) in Shan language, are terms used to describe a
sub‐ethnic group of Shan people living in the more densely populated lowlands of western and southern areas of Kachin
state, and in Sagaing Division and western Shan State. This sub‐ethnic group is often seen as problematic for Kachin
nationalists as at times they have laid claim to areas in the southeast of Kachin State and their relative high numbers make
it hard for Kachin to fully question their legitimacy as having a stake in decision‐making in the state.
10
A number of individuals who designate themselves as Rakhine have been resident in Kachin Sate for years; many of them
can be found in the mining areas of Hpakant and Putao. Descendants of Nepalese, Indians and Chinese can also be
encountered there.
11
Hanson, 1913, p.13.
12
Robinne, 2007, p.59.These groups do not share the same native tongue, nor the same alphabet.
13
Robinne, 2009.
14
Robinne, 2009, p. 61‐2.
15
Kachin chiefs received honorific titles from Burmese rulers, according to Leach, 1954, p. 242.
16
Hanson, 1913, p. 13.
17
Leach, 1954, p. 44‐50.
18
Robinne, 2007, p. 62 – 63.
19
Robinne, 2009.
20
Hanson, 1913, p.12.
21
Leach, 1954, p. 235‐236 and Scott, 2010, p. 151.
22
Leach, 1954, p. 20.
23
Leach, 1954, p.30.
24
The Gazetteer of Upper Burma reports: “In 19th century Burmese invasion of Assam, the population of the Mong Hkawn
Valley in the upper Chindwin fled to higher ground as described by ‘to avoid the oppression to which they were constantly
exposed, the Shans sought an asylum in a remote glens and valleys on the banks of the Chindwin, and the Kachin among
the recess of the mountains at the eastern extremity of the valley”.
25
Scott, 2010, p.212.
26
http://www.kachinland.org, accessed on April 13 2013.
27
Interview by the author, Yangon, April 10 2013.
28
Kozicki, 1957.
29
Smith, 1993, p. 158
30
Taylor, 2009, p. 290.
31
Interview with the Technical Advisory Team Leader in Myitkyina, September 2013.
32
Interview with the Technical Advisory Team Leader in Myitkyina, September 2013.


33
Robinne, 2007, pp. 259‐261. At its inception, KIA had to fight the Burmese Army and the Burma Communist Party forces.
Later, the KIO and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) signed a cease‐fire in 1976 and jointly fought the Burmese Army.
34
Callahan, 2003
35
Smith, 1993, p. 191
36
Smith,1993, pp. 220, 251, 257
37
Robinne, 2007, p. 259‐261
38
Lintner, 1997, pp. 204 ‐ 205 and interviews by the author. The leadership is mainly Jinghpaw and Baptist and there is little
representation of other Kachin sub‐groups such as the Rawang and Lisu. KIO leaders regularly refer to the Kachin
Independence Council chairman, Zaung Hkra, as an example of the mixed ethnicity of their leadership, and lack of
discrimination, as he is the only non‐Jinghpaw representative as a Longwa.
39
Interviews in Kutkai, Northern Shan State, March 2013.
40
For example the Tatmadaw, in the early 1960s, under General Ne Win, released and disseminated a propaganda leaflet
called ‘The burning question’. This anti‐Christian document was largely in reaction to the formation of the KIO/KIA. It was
draws differences between Buddhists and Christians and justifies the use of violence against the Christians.
41
Interview in Yangon in April 2013. Smith, 1993, p.180 ‐183.
42
Callahan,2007, p. 43
43
Lintner, 1997, p.157
44
Interviews conducted by the author in Myitkyina showed that the Catholic priest, Father Thomas, played a crucial role in
creating negotiation space between the warring parties. Due to health issues, he was not able to finalize the process and
handed over responsibility to the then Chairman of the Kachin Baptist Convention, Reverend Saboi Jum, in the early 1990s.
45
See Walton, 2008.
46
Dr. Tu Ja, 2011.
47
Interview by the author in May 2013 in Myitkyina.
48
Callahan, 2003.
49
Dr. Tu Ja, 2011.
50
About the Bamarization process on ethnic minorities, see Berlie, 2005.
51
According to an interview by the author in September 2013 in Yangon, these schools, initially created by missionaries,
were highly valued by the Kachin. When the land, buildings and funds were taken back without prior consultation, this
angered the local communities engendering ill‐will towards the central state.
52
Transnational Institute, 2009.
53
The New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA‐K) was a faction of the former Communist Party of Burma (CPB) established in
1989 after the collapse of the CPB. It is considered to have close relations with the Myanmar military and Chinese
governments.
54
The Kachin Democratic Army (KDA) was a break‐away faction from the KIA’s 4th brigade formed in 1990.
55
Taylor, 2009.
56
Callahan, 2007, p. 42.
57
Euro‐Burma Office (EBO), 2010.
58
EBO, 2010.
59
Suganami, 2002, p. 310.
60 Stoessinger, 2000
61
Interview with a KIO public relations officer, May Ja Yang, September 2013.
62
Jervis, 1989, p. 104.
63
EBO, 2010.
64
Lebow, 2010.
65
The Pan‐Kachin movement developed in the mid‐1990s, after the cease‐fire between the government and the Kachin
Democratic Army in Kan Paiti area, Eastern Kachin State. It aimed at representing the interest of a larger group of
population than the Jinghpaw leaders only. A representation office was opened in Chiang Mai and they established
relations with exiled ethnic groups there, at a period where such dichotomy appeared between representatives of the
main ethnic sub‐groups and the sub groups that found themselves in minority.
66
Jackson and Morelli, 2009.
67
Jackson and Morelli, 2009.
68
Collier and Hoeffler, 2000, suggest that countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of primary
commodities – including agricultural products and natural resources – are highly prone to civil violence. They argue that
conflict may be explained either by grievance or greed.
69
Mc Kinsey Global Institute, 2013.
70
Interview in Bhamo, Kachin State, August 2013.
71
Smith, 1993, p. 258.


72
Meeting of civil society leaders with the UN Special Representative on Human Rights, February 15 2013 in Myitkyina.
73
On some comparable dynamics, but in the case of a more comprehensive peace agreement in Northern Ireland, see Mc
Ginty, Muldoon and Fergusson, 2007.
74
In February 2009, the Central Committee of the KIO summarized its grievances as follows: “Today, on the 48th year of
revolution, we have not achieved the stated goal of regaining freedom, but have lost ground in the occupied region. […]
The cease‐fire agreement with the SPDC had not produced peace and progress, but a regression that allowed the rampant
spread of HIV/AIDS and other treatable diseases in the indigenous population which lost the battle for social justice and
caused suffering through the depletion of their natural resources.”
75
This was reported by a resident of Sumprabun Township to the author in early 2011. According to the source, landmines
were used by some Myanmar companies in extractive industries to demarcate their land and discourage hunters from
trespassing.
76
The number of battalions increased from 26 in 1994 to 41 in 2006 according to Kachin Development Networking Group,
2007. Also see Fink, 2008.
77
Reported by several interviewees in various locations of Kachin and Northern Shan State.
78
Interview in Myitkyina, May 2013.
79
See interview extracts in Annex C.
80
Kachin News Group, August 20 2007, mentioned in EBO, 2010.
81
Lintner, A well‐laid war in Myanmar, 2013.
82
Mizzima News, April 22 2010, mentioned in EBO, 2010.
83
Interview of a person close to the Central Committee, Laiza, December 2011.
84
KNG, July 12 2011.
85
Lambrecht, May 2013.
86
See examples of these narratives in annex C.
87
Farnelly, 2012.
88
http://kachin‐news.blogspot.com/2012/06/kachin‐peace‐network‐held‐service‐for.html
89
Interviews in Myitkyina and Bhamo, August and September 2013.
90
The New Light of Myanmar, October 15, 2010, p. 8. About the use of this term, Human Rights Watch, 2012, reports: “for
the first time since 1994, the Myanmar state‐run media referred to the KIA as “insurgents” as opposed to a “cease‐fire
group,” p.26.
91
Moe Oo, 2013.
92
Interview with a lawyer in Myitkyina, July 2012.
93
Interview of a KIO public relations officer, May Ja Yang, September 2013.
94
Interview of the IDPs Relief and Resettlement Committee Chairman, Laiza, August 2013.
95
Interview by the author, Yangon, September 2013.
96
Interview of a religious leader in Bhamo, August 2013.
97
Internal KIO fights are mentioned in KIO statements, for example: “A few leaders, who have become more interested in
their own welfare than that of others, decline to discuss or initiate talks about the purpose or mission, but instead placate
the enemy for personal gain. Now a time has come for the people to realize that there is no consensus of unity of purpose in
the leadership”, see KIO central Committee, February 2009.
98
Woods, 2011.
99
Interview of IDP camp manager, Je Yang Kha, Laiza, August 2013.
100
Civil society representative interviewed in Myitkyina, April 2013.

101
Interview by the author, August 2013.

102
Such as the Lower House speaker on February 9 2013 who organized a public meeting to hear grievances of the Kachin
people, or the IDP camps visit to deliver bags of rice and cash in government controlled areas of the Vice President, U Sai
Maung Kham August on 10 to 12 2013.

103

104
Fuller, 2013.

105
The KIO was blamed expelled from National Democratic Front ‐ an alliance of ethnic armed groups formed in 1976 ‐
that the KIO tried in vain to convince to enter in peace talks with the government, after the 1994 ceasefire.


106
The author attended a public meeting in June 2012 with Kachin MPs, where audience asked about infrastructure
construction and renovation such as: schools, roads and telecommunication. These were mentioned as pivotal issues for
the development of the region.
107
BNI, 2013, pp. 56 – 58.
108
Interview in Bhamo, August 2013.
109
Interview in Laiza, August 2013.
110
President U Thein Sein’s efforts towards peace were recognized by the international community, with, for example,
support for his nomination for the Peace Nobel Prize in March 2013, which was perceived by many Kachin as a denial of
their difficult circumstances.
111
Interview by the author, Myitkyina, September 2013.
112
Some Kachin nationalists considered that the conflict directly targets them: “After a 17 year cease‐fire failed to result in
a political solution, the Myanmar government led by ex‐general U Thein Sein, began a military offensive against the KIO/KIA
on June 9, aimed at the elimination of the Kachin people”.
113
Several reports were collected by the author in 2012 and 2013.
114
December 2012, Northern Shan State, according to NGOs providing humanitarian relief, interviewed by the author.
115
Interview in Kachin State, August 2013.
116
Interview of a witness by the author, Kachin State, August 2013.
117
Interview by the author, Kachin State, August 2013
118
KWAT, February 2013.
119
Another explanation could be considered, as according to Scott, 1900, p. 61, the Myanmar military campaigns are
traditionally conducted from November to February, during the cold season as it was too hot to fight in March and April,
and too rainy from May to October.
120
Fuller, 2013.
121
Fuller, 2013.
122
Lambrecht, 2013.
123
Roughneen, 2012, quotes a pastor at a regular Sunday service for KIA soldiers: “Right now we are in a serious situation,
secularly speaking, as we are surrounded by government forces. But spiritually we are strong, as God is with us.”
124
KNG, July 12 2011.
125
KNG, October 23 2013.
126
Collier, 2000.
127
See, among others, KWAT, June 2013, p. 5. The term “genuine” peace was also mentioned by a number of interviewees,
including representatives of the KIO and the PCG.
128 Burgmann, 2013, states an advisor to President Thein Sein who blames the Kachin for the lack of progress in the peace
process. It also quotes Nyo Ohn Myint, Myanmar Peace Center, saying his organization’s members were ‘confused’ by the
Kachin people believing the government is insincere. “That's their view, because there is illiteracy in those areas".
129
Interview in Yangon, April 2013.
130
International Crisis Group, 2013, p.10.
131
132
133
Lintner, “More war than peace in Kachin”, 2012.
134
Lambrecht, 2013. KIA General Gam Shawng noted that throughout the previous cease‐fire that the military
government “deferred political discussions again and again, stating it was only a caretaker government and that only when
a legitimate government came to power could political issues be discussed”.
135
EBO, 2010.
136
KNG, October 23 2013.
137
Only in the Laiza battle in December 2012 to January 2013, Tatmadaw proceeded to the single largest build‐up in its
history without achieving a military victory. Davis, 2013:“Curiously, the government advance on Laiza played to the few
advantages the KIA enjoyed in an otherwise entirely unequal contest: intimate knowledge of the terrain, initial control of
the heights and far shorter lines of communication and resupply. For this, the Tatmadaw evidently paid heavily in term of
casualties.”
138
New Light of Myanmar, August 13 2011. See also Weng, 2011: “Aung Min responded that the KIA fought the
government first and so the government had to fight back”.
139
KNG, 12 July 2011: “Reverend Laphai Shing Rib, Pastor of Laiza Baptist Church: It is impossible for us to defeat the
Burmese Army, which has much stronger manpower and weapons than we Kachin, without the help from Almighty God.”
140
Davis, 2013: “The difficulties of integrating and adapting to new equipment have undoubtedly been compounded by
persistent problems of manpower and morale. Despite the rapid expansion of the military's order of battle over the past
two decades, it is no secret that Tatmadaw units in the field are woefully undermanned, underpaid and under‐supported”.


141

142
Lambrecht, 2013.
143
Moe Oo, January 2013 and Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Defence Press Release, Tuesday, 29 January
2013
144
KNG, 19 January 2012.
145
See May and October 2013 Agreements, as well as press statement of the last meeting between UPWC and ethnic
representatives in annex F.
146
147
Interview in Bhamo, August 2013.
148
In Northern Shan on 19th August 2013. In September, fighting was reported in several areas in Kachin state, including
Putao, Chipwi and Mansi areas, as well as Northern Shan State.
149
See the Press statement following the meeting, in annex F.3.
150
Humphreys, 2002.
151
Woods, 2011.
152
One interviewee mentioned that companies had to make “donations” to the KIO to get logging permits.
153
Author’s field visit notes.
154
Interviews of the author in Myitkyina in May 2013 and in Bhamo in August 2013.
155
Interview with the TAT leader, Myitkyina, September 2013.
156
Similar example could be found in Nepal during the recent civil war Maoist rebels had set up courts.
157
The same services were provided by ethnic armed groups in other regions to cope with the absence of the state.
158
KIO owns the majority of the shares of the Buga Company that provides electricity to the Kachin State capital,
Myitkyina.
159
Humphreys, 2002, p. 18.
160
Leach, 1954, p. 241.
161
Egreatau and Jagan (2013), pp. 282‐5.
162
See Human Rights Watch, 2012.
163
Farelly, 2012, p.65.
164
Wong, 2012.
165
Robinson, 2013.
166
91,500 according to the detailed camp profile exercise conducted by UNHCR and Partners in June 2013. See OCHA map
in annex G.
167
See the table on displacement pattern in annex H.
168
South, in Humanitarian Practice Network, 2012. Like the displaced populations at the Thai‐Myanmar border, there is a
greater likelihood for those who have family members in the NSAG controlled area to flee to this area.
169
In the camps, security is generally managed by the camp committee. In the bigger camps, there is generally deterring
elements such as fencing, registration of the individuals visiting and roaming duties of night watching.
170
Only the Khat Cho IDP camp, in Waimaw Township is located on a government owned land.
171
Only the Khat Cho IDP camp, in Waimaw Township is located on a government owned land.
172
Author’s field notes.
173
A protection assessment, 2012, see annex H.
174
Recruitment cases by armed groups are still reported in locations in South‐eastern Kachin and Northern Shan States–
according to several interviews conducted by the author between April 2012 and September 2013.
175
South, HPN, 2012. A number of findings are common but two key differences should be noted: (i) it is impossible in
Kachin to do remote management of systematic and large scale relief from China due to local hindrances, (ii) in Kachin, the
role of the volume of aid provided by “businessmen” and private donors in KIO areas, is substantial.
176
South, HPN, 2012.

178
In KIO areas for example, there is a very strict enforcement of law by the KIO. Anyone found guilty of a severe crime is
punished with life sentence. The firmness of the KIO is notorious in cases of drug addiction for example.
179
Holliday, 2010, p. 119. With Mon State, it would be one of the ethnic States where the main ethnic group is actually a
numerical minority.
180
Robinne, 2007
181
Some have closer or looser relations with the KIA ‐ as a whole or specific brigades ‐ or with the Tatmadaw. See the table
in annex I.
181
According to interviews by the author in Muse, Kutkai and Lashio in March 2013.
182
EBO, 2010, p. 3.


183
Interview of a NGO worker by the author, Laiza, August 2013.
184
BNI, 2013, p. 33.

185
This is the symbolic place where traditional religious and political ceremonies take place. See cover picture.


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