,1

I
fL
·..
00002815~
(
i

nMlecuLcn,.
c1 ~ a a !a1 --•- J. _·_. ... u .... z deft...a
..._ .. _·· mlttoi
ba tbs }4.etd... BliW:i.i :R; ...
m t \ e dise' 01·re ct i's
0
-~ .:~::· _l ••
--·- -
•.:UW•I
--·z
TM

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

VOLUJIE I

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

1--·- _...... ···---·~·--··-·.......:.--==1,,

•. l. r;(yfv'-\!} r -~ .,._l'Q (\~!CE:
J.!,;_1~ -·~-~.''4.·,) .,. ......
1'
' .• 1 .O.\o
r"'<'~\r "';'t·D' •
I .
I . ,........... ·,--.-..,...
1.a,'i\J::..!~t {i.)i.'w..&. "'-1')..&.,
1
U

.To'i_\J<13
l
\ ''ox J 2>
I FoL\er oi_o
Place - Washkniton,...0.. -G-:..---------·

Date - April 12, 1954

Pages ...l.:: .. J~ ............. .

JW>ERSOH REPORTING COMPANY '

0.ffic1al '1{1f>ortws
306 Niach Screec, N. W.,
Telephcmes: NArioul. S-3;406
Wasbiagccm 4, D. C.
a.-3407

AllOCIA'Tlll IK P&llfCIP&L CITISI

20120006255

~lllf 32835 DocXd:364799 Page 1 //'1?.l?.")1-..I

Copy No. 8
I
I

•
 ,
,,
l

PAPICH UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

BOWND
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD

• In the Matter of

J, ROBERT OPPENHEIM

Room 2022,
Atomic Energy Commission,
Building T-.3,
Washington, o. c.

The above entitled matter came on for hearing before

the Board, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 o'clock a,m •

• PERSONNEL SECURIT\' BOARD:

DR, GORDON GRAY, Chairman,

DR, WPF.D V, EVANS, Member.
MR, THOMAS A. MORGAN, Member,

PRESENT:

ROGER ROBB, and

C, A, ROLANDER, JR,, Counsel for the Board,

~. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
LLOYD K. GARRISON,
SAMUEL J, SILVERMAN, and
ALLEN B. ECKER, Counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer •

•
~283~ Docld:364799 Page 2
 I N DE X

EXHIBITS RECEIVED

•
Oppenheim No, l 77

WITNESS: DIRECT CROSS

J, ROBERT OPPENHEIMER 83

•
 2

P R 0 E C E E D I NG S

DR, GRAY: I should like at this time to have the

reporters sworn. For the information of Dr, Oppenheimer and

• his counsel, the reporter is Anton Papich, Jr,, the transcriber

Kenneth V. Bowers,

(The reporter and transcriber were thereupon duly

sworn by Dr. Gray,)

DR< GRAY: The hearing will come to order.

This Board, appointed by Mr. K. D. Nichols, General

Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission at the request of

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheiu:ar, is composed of the following

'members: Gordon Gray, Chairman, Ward V, Evans and Thomas A.

• Morgen. All members of the Board are present, and Board counst

Roger Robb and C,A,Rolander,

present.
Dr.,and Mrs. Oppenheimer are

Present also are Mr, Lloyd K. Garrison, counsel

for Dr. Oppenheimer. Would you identify your associates?

MR. GARRISON: Samuel J, Silverman, my partner,

and Allen B. Ecker, associate of my firm.

DR, GRAY: An investigation of Dr. J, Robert

Oppenheim conducted under the provisions of section

10(b)(5)(B)(i - iii) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 has

• revealed certain information which ca~ts doubt upon the

eligibility of Dr, Oppenheimer for clearance for access to

restricted data as provided by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

This information is as follows:

~283~ Docid:364799 Page 4

I
3
This is a letter addressed to Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer,

the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey,

dated December 23, 1953, reading as follows:

• places
"Dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

"Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946

up~n the Atomic Energy Commission the responsibility

for assuring that individuals are employed by the Commission

only when such employment will not endanger the common

defense and security. In addition, Executive Order 10450 of

April 27, 1953, requires the suspension of employment of any

individual where there exists information indicating that

his employment may not be clearly consistent with the interests

• of the national security •

"As a result of additiona 1 investigation as to your

character, associations and loyalty, and review of your

personnel security file in the light of the requirements of thE

Atomic Energy Act and the requirements of Executive Order

10450, there has developed considerable question whether

your continued employment on Atomic Energy Commission work

will endanger the common defense and security and whether

such continued employment is clearly consistent with the

•
interests of the national security. This letter is to advise

you of the steps which you may take to assist in the

resolution of this question.

"The substance of the information which raises the

~3283~ Docid:364799 Page ~

 4

question concerning your eligibility for employment on

Atomic Energy Commission work is as follows:"

•
Let the record show at this point that Mr •

Garrison asked to be excused f.or a few minutes.

"It was reported that in 1940 you were .listed as a

sponsor of the Friends of the Chinese, People, an organization

which was characterized in 1944 by the House Committee

.on Un-American Activities as a Communist front .orgapization •

•
lt was further reported that in 1940 your name was included

on a letterhead of the American Committee for Democratic and

Intellectual rreedom as a member of its National Executive

•
Committee, The American Committee for Democracy and Intellec-

tual Freedom was characterized in 1942 by the House

Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist front

which defended Communist teachers, and in 1943 it was

characterized as subversive and un-American by a Special

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. It was

further reported that in 1938 you were a member of the Western

Counci 1 of the Consumers Union.. The Consumers Union was

cited in 1944 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities

as a Communist front headed by the Communist Arthur Kallet,

• It was further reported that you stated in 1943 that you

were not a Communist, but had probably belonged to every

Communist front organi~ation on the west coast and had signed

many petitions in which Communists were interested.

'
'

~3283~ Docid:364799 Page 6

 "It was reported· that in 1943 and previously you

were intimately associated with Dr, Jean Tatlock, a member

of the Communist Party in San Francisco, and that Dr, Tatlock

• was partially responsible for your association with

Communist front groups.

"It was reported that your wife, Katherine Puening

Oppenheimer, was formerly the wife of Joseph Dallet, a member

of the Communist Party, who was killed in Spain in 1937

fighting for the Apanish Republican Army, It was further

reported that during the period of her association with

Joseph Dal let, your wife became a member of the Communist

Party. The Communist Party has been designated by the

• Attorney General as a subversive organization which seeks to

alter the form of Government of the United States by

unconstitutional means, within the purview of Executive Order

9835 and Executive Order 10450,

It was reported that your brother Frank Friedman

Oppenheimer became a member of the Communist Party in 1936

and has served as a Party organizer and as Educational

Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Party

in Los Angeles County. It was further reported that your

• brother's wife, Jackie Oppenheimer, was a member of the

Communist Party in 1938; and that in August,. 1944, Jackie

Oppenheimer assisted in the organization of the East Bay

branch of the California Labor School. It was further

li;.lllf 3283l Docld:36•799 Page 7

 6

reported that in 1945 Frank and Jackie Oppen.eimer were

tnvited to aninformal reception at the Russian Consulate, that

• this invitation was extended by the American-Russian Institute

of San Francisco and was forthe purpose of introducing famous

American scientists to Russian scientists who were delegates

to the United Nations Conference on International Organization

being held at San Francisco at that time, and that Fraak

Oppenheimer accepted this in vi tati on, It was further reported

that Frank Oppenheimer agreed to give a six weeks course on

"The Social Implications of Modern Scientific Deve lopmeat"

at the California Labor School, beginning May 9, 1946. The

•
American-Russian Institute of San Francisco and the California

Labor School have been cited by the Attorney General as

Communist organizations within the purview of Executive Order

9835 and Executive Order 10450,

"It was reported that you have associated with

members and officials of the Communist Party including Isaac

Folkoff, Steve Nelson, Rudy·Lambert, Kenneth May, Jack

Manley, and Thomas Addis.

"It was reported that you were a subscriher to the

Daily People's World, a west coast Communist newspaper, in

• 194 l and 1942.

"It was reported in 1950 that you stated to an

agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi ga ti on that you had in

the past made contributions to Communist front organizations,

~.., 32835 Docld:364799 Page 8

 7

al though at the time you did not know of Communist Party

control or extent of infiltration of these groups, You furthei

stated to an agent afthe Federal Bureau of Investigation that

• some of these contributions were made through Isaac Folkoff,

whom you knew to be a leading Communist Party functionary,.

because you bad been told that this was the most effective

and direct way of helping these groups,

"It was reported that you attended a housewarming

party at the home of Kenneth and Ruth May on September 20,

1941, for which there was an admission charge for the benefit

of The People's World, and that at this party you were in

the company of Joseph w. Weinberg and Clarence Hiskey, who

• were alleged to be members of the Communist Party and to have

engaged in espionage on behalf of tbe Soviet Union. It was

further reported that you informed officials of tbe United

States Department of Justice in 1952 tbat you had no

recollection that you had attended such a party, but tbat sincE

it would have been in character for you to have attended such

a party, you would not deny that you were there,

"It was reported that you attended a closed meeting

of the professional section of the Communist Party of Alameda

• County, California, which was held in the latter part of July

or early August 1941, at your residence, 10 Kenilw<>rth Court,

Berkeley, California, for the purpose ofhearing an

explanation of a change in Communist Party Polic·y. It was

~ 32835 Docid:364799 Page 9

 8

reported that you denied that you attended such a meeting and

that such a meeting was held in your home.

•
"It was r4i1ported that you stated to an agent of the

Federal Bureau of Investigatt>n in 1950, that you attended a

meeting in 1940 or 1941, which may have taken place at the

home of Haakon Chevalier, which was addressed by William

Schneiderman, whom you knew to be a leading functionary of

the Communist Party. In testimony in 1950 before the

California State Senate Committee on Un-American Activities,

Haakon Chevalier was identified as a member of the Communist

Party in the San Francisco area in the early 1940's."

•
Let the record show that Mr. Garrison has returned

to the hearing room.

"It was reported that you have consistently denied

that you have ever been a member of tbe Communist Party.

It was further reported that you stated to a representative

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1946 that you had

a change of mind regarding the policies and politics of the

Soviet Union. about the time of the signing of the soviet German

Pact in 1939. It was further reported that luring 1950 you

stated to a representative of the Federal Bureau of

• Investigation that you had never attended a closed meeting of

the Communist Party; and that at the time of the Russo-Finnish

War and the subsequent break between Germany and Russia in

1941, you realized the Communist P&rty infiltration tactics

I

l~ 32835 Docld:364799 Page 10

 s
into the alleged anti-Fascist groups and became fed up

with the whole thing and lost what little interest you bad.

It was further reported, however, that:

• "(a) Prior to April, 1942, you had contributed

$150 per month to the Communist Party:E the San Francisco

Area, and that the last sucih payment was ~pparently made in

April 1942, immediately before your entry into the atomic

bomb project.

"(b) During the period 1942-1945 various officials

of the Communist Party, including Dr, Hahnah Peters, organizer

of the Professional Secti~n of the Communist Party, Alameda

County, California, Bernadette Doyle, secretary of the

• Alameda County Communist Party, Steve Nelson, David Adelson,

Paul Pinsky, Jack Manley, and Katrina Sandow, are reported

to have made statements indicating that you were then a

member of the Communist Party; that you could not be active

in the Party at that time; that your name should be removed

from the Party mailing list and not mentioned in anyway;

that you had talked the atomic bomb question over with Party

members during this period; and that several years prior to

1945 you had told Steve Nelson that the Army was working on

• an atomic bomb •

"(c) You stated in· August of 1943 that you did

not want anybody working for you on the Project who was a

member of the Communist Party, since "one always had a

~- 3283~ Docid:~64.799 Page 11

 10

question of divided loyalty" and the discipline of the

Communist Party was very severe and not compatible with complet

•
loyalty to the Project. You further stated at that time that
I

you were referring only to present membership in the Communist

.Party and not to people who had been members of the Party,

You stated further that you keew several individuals then at

Los Alamos who h~d been members of the Communist Party. You

did not, however, identify such former members of the

Communist Party to the appropriate authorities. It was also

reported that during the period 1942-1945 you were responsible

for the employment on.the atom bomb Project of individuals

•
who were members of the Communist Party or closely

associated with activities of the Communist Party, including

Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, Joseph W, Weinber·g, David Bohm,

Max Bernard Friedman, and David Hawkins. In the case of

.Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, you urged him to work on the Project,

although you stated·that you knew he had been very much of a

"Red" when he first came to the University of California and

that you emphasized to him that he must forego all political

activi.ty if he came to the Project. In August, 1943, you

protested *gainst the termination of his deferment and

• requested that he be returned to the Project after his entry

into the military service.

"It was reported that you stated to representat iYes

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on September 5, 1946,

RV 32835 Docid:364799 Page 12

 11

that you had attended a meeting in the ~ast Bay and a meeting

in San Francisco at which there were present persons definitely

identified with the Communist Party. When asked the purpose

• of the East Bay meeting and the identity of those. in attendance

you declined to answer on the ground that this had no bearing

on the matter of interest being discussed.

"It was reported that you attended a meeting at

t!iae home of Frank Oppenheimer on January 1, 1946, with David

Adelson and Paul Pinsky, both of whom were members of the

Communist Party. It was further reported that you analyzed

some material which Pinsky hoped to take up with the

Legislative Convention in Sacramento, California,

• "It was reported in 1946 that you were listed as

Vice Chairman on the lett·erhead of the Independent Citizens

Committee of the Arts, Sciences, :ind Professions, Inc..,, which

has been cited as a Communist front by the House Committee

on Un-American Activities,

"It was reported that prior to March 1, 1943,

possibly three months prior, Peter Ivanov, Secretary of the

Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, approached George Charles

Eltenton for the purpose of obtainins information regarding

• work being done at the Radiation Laboratory for the use of

Soviet scientists; that George Charles Eltenton sub~equently

requested Haakon Chevalier to approach you concerning this

matter; that Haakon Chevalier thereupon approached you,

llW 32Bll Docid:36A799 Page 13

 12

either directly.or through your brother, Frank Friedman

Oppenheimer, in connection with this matter; and that Haakon

•
Chevalier finally advised George Charles Eltenton that there

was no chance whatsoever ofcbtaining the information, It wa~

further reported that you did not report this episode to the

appropriate authorities until several months after its

occurrence; that when you initially discussed this matter

with the appropriate authorities on August 26, 1943, you did

not .identify yourself as the person who had been approached,

and you r.efused to identify Haakon Chevalier as the individual

who made the approach on behalf of George Charles Eltenton;

•
and that it was not until several months later, when you were

ordered by a superior to do so, that you so identified Haakon

Chevalier. It was further reported that upon your return to

Berkeley following your separation from the Los Alamos

Project, you were visited by the Chevaliers on several

e11:casions: and that your wife was in contact with Haakon and

Barbara Chevalier in 1946 and 1947.

"It was reported that in 1945 you expressed the

view that "there is a reasonable possibility that it (the

hydrogen bomb) can be made," but that the feasibility of the

• hydrogen bomb did not' appear, on theoretical grounds, as

certain as the fission bomb appeared certain, on theoretical

grounds, when the Los Alamos Laboratory was started; and

that in the Autumn of 1949 the General Advisory Committee

RW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 14

 13

expressed the view that "11.n imaginative and concerted attack

on the problem has a better than even chance of producing the

weapon within five years". It waq further reported that in

• the Autumn of 1949, and subsequently, you strongly opposed

the development Clfthe hydro1en bomb; (1) on moral grounds,

(2) by claiming that it was not feasible; (3) by claiming that

there were insufficient facilities and scientific personnel

to carry on the development., and (4) that it was not politic-

ally desirable. It was further reported that even after it

was determined, as a matter of national policy, to proceed

with development of a hydrogen bomb, you continued to oppose

the project and declined to cooperate fully in the project •

• It was further reported that you departed from your proper

role as an advisor to the Commission by causing the distributi1

separately and in private,to top personnel at Los Alamos of

the majority and minority reports of the General Advisory

Committee on development of the hydrogen bomb for the purpose

of trying to turn such top personnel against the development

of the hydrogen.bomb. It was further reported that you were

instrumental in persuading other outstanding scientists not

to work on the hydrogen bomb project, and that the opposition

• to the hydrogen bomb," of which you are the most experienced,

most powerful, and most effective member, has definitely

slowed down its development.

"In view of_ your adcess to highly sensitive

· llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 15

 I

14

classified information, and in view of these a I legations

which, until disproved, raise questions as to your ver•city,

• conduct and even your lcyalty, the Commission has no other

recourse, in discharge of its obligations to protect the

common defense and security, but to suspend your clear•nce

until the matter bas been resolved. Accordingly, your

employment on Atomic Energy Commission work and your eligibili1

for access to Restricted Data are hereby suspended, effective

immediately, pending final determination of this matter.

''To assist in the resolution of this matter, you

have the privilege of appearing before an Atomic Energy

•
Commission Personnel Security Board. To avail yourself of

the privileges affordedyou under the Atomic Energy Commission

hearing procedures, you must, within thirty days following

receipt of this letter, submit to me, in writing, rour reply

to the information outlined above and request the opportunity

of appearing before the Personnel Security Board, ~hould

you signify your des,ire to appear before the Board, 'you wi 11

be notified of the composition of the Board and may challenge

any member of it for cause. Such challenge should be

submitted within seventy two hours of the receipt of notice

• of composition of the Board~

"If no challenge is raised asxto the members of the

Board, you will be notified of the date and place of

hearing ,at leas,t forty-eight hours in advance of the date

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 16

 15

set for hearing. You may be present for the duration of the

hearing, may be represented by counsel of your own choosing,

and present evidence in your own behalf through witnesses,

• or by documents, or by both.

"Should you elect to have a hearing of your case

by the Personnel Security Board, the findings of the Board,

together with its recommendations regarding your eligibility

for employment on Atomic Energy Commission work, in the light

of Criteria for Determining Eligibility for Atomic Energy

Commission Security Clearance and the requirements of ExecutivE

Order 10450, will be submitted to me,

,
"In the event of an adverse decision in your case

• by the Personnel Security Board, you will have an opportunity

to review t.he record made during your appearance before the

Board and to ·request a review of your case by the C.ommission 's

Pftrsonnel Security Review Board.

"If a written response is not received from you

within thirty days it will be assumed that you do not wish

to submit any explanation for further consideration. In that

event, or should you not advise me in writing of your desire

to appear before the Personnel Security Board, a

• determination in your case wi 11 be made by

the existing record.

mt on the basis of

"I am enclosing herewilb, for your information and

guidance, copies of the Criteria and Procedures for Determinin@

I .llV 3283~ Docld:364799 Page _17

 16

Eligibility for Atomic Energy Commission Security Clearance

and Executive Order 10450.

•
"This letter has been marked 'Confidential' to

maintain the privacy of this matter between you and the

Atomic Energy Commission. You are not precluded from making

use of this letter as you may consider appropriate,

"I have instructed Mr. William Mitchell, whose

address is 1901 Constitution Avanue, N. w., Washington, D. C.

and whose telephone number is Sterling 3-8000, Extension 277,

to give you whatever further detailed information you may

desire with respect to the procedures to be followed in this

•
matter •

"Very truly yours, K. D. Nichols, General Manager.

"2 Enclosures. 1. Criteria & Procedures.

2. Executive Order 10450."

I think at this time, then, it would be appropriate

for the record to reflect Dr. Oppenheimer's reply of March 4,

1954, 1·shall now read Dr. Oppenheimer's reply.

This is a letter addressed to Major General K. D,

Nichols, General Manager, U. S, Atomic Energy Commission,

Washington 25, D. C •

• "Dear General Nichols:

"This is in answer to your letter of December 23,

1953, in which the question is raised whether my continued

employment as a Consultant on Atomic Energy Commission work

1
lllf 3283~ Docid:36•799 Page 18
 17

nwill endanger the common defense and security and whether

such continued employment is clearly consistent with the

interests ofthe national security.•

• "Though of oou&se I would have no desire to retain

an advisory position if my advice were not needed, I cannot

ignore the question you have raised, nor accept the sug1estion

I.
that I am unfit for public service.

'The items of so-called 'derogatory information'

set forth i.n your letter cannot be fairly understoal except

in the context of my life and my work. This answer is in the

form of a summary account of relevant aspects of my life in

more or less chronological order, in the course of which I

• shall comment on the specific items in your· letter, Through

this answer, and thr.ough the bearings before the Personnel

Security Board, which I hereby request, I hope to provide a

fair basis upon which the questions posed by your letter

may be resolved.

"The PreWar Period

"I was born in New York in 1904, My father bad come

to this country at the age of seventeen from Germany, He was

a successful businessman and quite active in community affairs.

•
Ky mother was born in Baltimore and before her marriage was

an artist and teacher of art. I attended Ethical Culture School

and Harvard Colleee, which I entered in 1922, I completed the

work for my deeree in the spring of 1925. I then left Harvard

HW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 19

 18

to study at Cambridge University and in Goettingen, where in

the spring of 1927 I took my doctor's degree. The following

year I was National Research Fellow at Harvard and at the

• California Institute of Technology.

•
In the following year I

was Fellow of the International Education Board at the Universl

of Leiden and at the Technical High School in Zurich.

"in the SP.ring of 1929, I returned to the United

States. I was homesick for this country, and in fact I did

not leave it again for over nineteen years. I had learned a

great deal in my student days about the new physics; I wanted

to pursue this myself, to explain it and to foster its

cultivation. I had bad many invitations to university positioc

• one or two in Europe, and perhaps ten in the United States. I

accepted concurrent appointments as Assistant Professor at

the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena and at

the University of California in Berkeley. For the coming

twelve years, I was to devote my time to these two facu l t;.es.

"Starting with a single graduate student in my

first year in Berkeley, we gradually began to built up what

was to become the largest school in the country of graduate·

and post-doctoral study in theoretical physics, so that as

• time went on, we came to have between a dozen and twenty

people learning and adding to quantum theory, nuclear physics,

relativity and other modern physics. As the number of students

increased, so in general did their quality: the men who

llV 32835 Docld:364799 Page 20

,,
19
worked with me during those years hold chairs in many of the

great centers of physics in this country; they have made

important contributions to science, and in many cases ,to the

• atomic energy project. lany of my students would accompany me

to Pasadena in the spring after the ·Berkeley term was over,

so that we might continue to work together.

"My friends, both in Pasadena and in Berkeley, were

mostly faculty people, scientists, classicists and artists.

I studied and read Sanskrit with Arthur Rider. I read very

widely, but mostly classics, novels, plays and poetry; and

I read something of other parts of science. 1 was mot

interested in and did not read about economics or politics.

• 1 was almost wholly divorced from the contemporary sc•ue in

this country. I never read a newspaper or a current magazine

like Time or Harper's; I had no radio, no telephone; I learned

of the stock market crash in the fall of 1929 only long

after the event; the first time I ever voted was in the

Presidential election of 1936. To many of ~Y friends, my

indifference to contemporary affairs seemed bizarre, and they

often chided me with being too much of a highbrow. I was

interested in man and his experience; I was deeply interested

•
in my science; but I had no understanding of the relati~ns of

man to his society.

"I splint some weeks each summer with my brother

Frank at our ranch in New Mexico, There was a strong bond of

lllf 3283~ Docid:36~799 Page 21

 20

affection between us. After my mother's death• my father

came often, mostly in Berkeley, to visit me; and we had an

•
intimate and close association until his death •

"Beginning in late 1936, my interests began to

change. These changes did not alter my earlier friendships,

my relations to my students, or my devotion to physics; but the

added something new. I can discern in retrospect more than

one reason for these changes. I had had a continuing,

smoldering-fury about the treatment of Jews in Germany. I bad

relatives there, and was later to help in extricating them

and bringing them to this country. I saw what t"he depreasion

was doing to my students. Often they could set no job&, or

• jobs which were wholly inadequate. And through them, l began

to understand how deeply political and economic events

could affect men's lives. l began to feel the need to

participate more fully in the life of the community. But I

had no framework of political conviction or experience to

give me perspective in these matters.

"In the spring of 1936, I had been introduced by

friends to Jean Tatlock, the daughter of a noted professor of

English at the University; and in the autu~n, I began to

• court her, and we grew close to each other. 1fe were at

least twice close enough to marriage to think of ourselves as

engaged. Between 1939 and her death in 1944 l saw her very

rarely. She told me about her Communist Party memberships;

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 22

 21

they were on again, off again affairs, andaever seemed to

provide for her what she was seeking. I do not believe that

her interests were really political·. She loved this

• country and its people and its life. She was, aa it turned
out, a friend of many fellow travelers and co11ili\lnists, with a
number of whom I was lat•r·to become acquainted,

"I should not give the impression that it was wholly

hecauae of Jean Tatlock that I made leftwing friends, or felt

aympathy for causes whi:h hitherto would have seemed so remote
from me, like the loyalist call8'8 in Spain, and the

organization of migratory workers. I have mentioned some

of the other contributing causes. I liked the new sense of

• companionship, and at the .,time felt that I was coming to

be part of the life of my time and country.

"In 1937, my father died; a little later, when I

came into an inheritance, I made a will leaving this to the
University of California for fellowships to graduate atudents.

"This was the era of what the communists then cal led

the "united front•, in which they joined with many non-

communist groups in support of humanitarian objectives. llany

of these .objectives engage• my interest. I contributed to the

• strike fund of one of the major strikes of Bridges' union;

I subscribed to the People's World; I contributed to the

varioua committees and organizations which were intended to

help the Spanish loyalist cause. I was invited to help

llW 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 23

 22

establish the Teacher's Union, which included faculty and

teaching assistants at the University, and school teachers of

•
the East Bay, I was elected recording secretary, My

connection with the Teacher's Union continued until some

time in 1941, when we disbanded our chapter,

"During these same years, I also began to take

part in the management of the Phys ice Department, the

sel•ction of courses, and the awarding of fellowships, and in

the general affairs of the Graudate School of the University,

mostly through the Graduate Counci 1, of which I was a member

for some years,

•
"I also became in11ol11ed in other organizations,

For perhaps a year, I was a member of the Western Council of

the Consumer's Union which was concerned with evaluating

information on products of interest on the West Coast. I do

not recall Arthur Kallet, the national head of the Consumer's

Union; at most I could have met him if he made a visit to the

West Coast. I joined the American Committee for Democracy

and Intellectual Freedom. I think it then stood as a protest

against what had happened to intellectuals and professionals

in Germany. I list.ad, in the Personnel Security Questionnaire

• that I filled out in 1942 for employment with the Manhattan

District, the very few political organizations of llobich I

bad ever been a member. I say on that questionnaire that I

did not include sponsorships, I have no recollection of the

lllf 3283~ Docid: 364..799 Page 24.

 23

Friends of the Chinese People, or of what, if any, my

connection with this organization was.

"Tbe statement is attributed to me that, wbi le I was

• not a communist, r "bad probably belonged to every communist

front organization on the West Coast and had signed many

petitions in which communists were interested.' I do not

recall tbis statement, nor to whom I might have made it, nor

·the circumstances. The quotation is not true. It seems

clear to me that if I said anything along the lines quoted,

it was a half-jocular over-statement.

''The matter which most engaged my sympathies and

interests was the war in Spath. This was •ot a matter of

• understanding and informed convictions. I had never been

to Spain; I knew a little of its literature; I knew nothina

of its history or politics or contemporary problems. But

like a great many other Americans I was emotionally .committed ; .

to the loyalist causeo I contributed to various organizations
:.: . :. it. c·.::.,···

for Spanish relief, I went to, and helped with, many parties,

bazaars, and the like. Even when the war in Spain was

manifestly lost, these activities continued. The end of the

war and the defeat of the loyalists caused me great sorrow.

• "It was probably through Spanish relief efforts

that I met Dr. Thomas Addis, and Rudy Lambert.

latter, our association never became close.

As to the

As to the former,
.
he was a distinguished medical scientist who became a friend.

Jflf 3283~ Docid:36,799 _Page 2~

 24

Addis asked me, perhaps in the winter of 1937-38, to contributE

through him to the Spanish cause. He made it "clear that tllis

• money, unlike that which went to the relief organizations,

would go strairht to the fighting effort, andtbat it would go

through communist channels, I did so contribute; usually

when he communicated with me, explaining the nature of the

need, I gave him sums in cash, probably oever much less than

a hundred dollars, and occasionally perhaps somewhat more

than that, several times during the winter. 1 made no such

contributions during the spring terms when I was in Pasadena

or during the summers in New Mexico. Later -- but 1 do not

•
remember the date -- Addis introduced me to Isaac Folkoff,

who was, as •ddis indicated, in some way connected with the

Communist Party, and told me that Folkoff would from then on

get in touch with me when there was need for money. This be

did, in much the same way that Addis had done before .. As
, .• "'·· ·~. ; l .

before, these contributions were for specific purposes,

principally fbe Spanish War and Spanish relief. Sometimes

1 was asked for money for other purposes, the organization

of migratory labar in the California valleys, for insta:e,

I doubt that it occurred to me that the oontributions might .

• . be directed to other purposes than those I bad intended, or

that such other purposes might be evil. I did not the11

regard communists as da11gerous; and some of their declared

objectives seemed to me desirable.

lftf 3283~ Docid:36,799 Page 26

 25

"In time these contributions came to an end. I

went to a big Spanish relef party the night before Pea4

Barbor; andthe next day, as we heard the news of the outbreak

• of war, I decided that I had had about enough .of the Spanish

cause, and that there were other and more pressing crises

in the world. My contributions would not have continued much

longer,

My brother Frank married in 1936, Our relations

thereafter were inevitably less intimate than before. He

told me at the time -- probably in 1937 -- th!lt he and his

wife Jackie had joined the Communist Party. Over the years

we saw one another as occasions arose, We still spent summer

• holidays together. In 1939 or 1940 Frank and Jackie moved to

Slanford; in the autumn of 1941 they came to Berkeley, and

Frank worked for the Radiation Laboratory. At that time be

made it clear to me that he was no longer a member of the

i ..... • t

Communist Party.

"As to the alleged activities C?f Jackie and., :· Frank

' (~

in 1944, 1945 and 1946: I was not in Berkeley in 1944 and

1945; I was away most of the first half~ 1946: I do not know

whether these activities occurred or not, and if I bad any

• knowledge of them at the time it would bave been very sketchy •

After Christmas of 1945 my family and I visited my brother's

family for a few days during the holidays, and I remember

that we were there New Year's eve and New Year's day in 1946,

1111 32835 Doold:364799 Page 27

 2&

OD New Year's day people were constantly dropping in. Pinsky

and Adelsoa, who were at most casual acquaintances of mine,

•
may have been among them, but I cannot remember their bein&

there, nor indeed to I remember any of the others who dropped

in that day or what was discussed.

"It was in the summer of 1939 in Pasadena that I

first met my wife. She was married to Dr. Harrison, who

was a friend and associate of the Tolman&, Lauritsen& and othez

of the California Institute of Technology facul~y. l learned

of her earlier marriage to Joe Dallet, and of his death

fighting in Spain, He had been a Communist Party official,

•
and for a yeor or two during their brief marriage my wife
was a Communist Party member. When I met her I found in her

a deep loyalty to her former husband, a complete disengagement

from any pc>litical activity, and a certain disappointment and

contempt that the Communist Party was not in fact what she

had once thought it was.

"My own views were also evolving. Althou&h Sidney

and Beatrice Webb'• book: on Russia, which I had read in 1936,

and the talk that I heard at that time had predisposed me

to make much of the economic progress and generaJ level of

• welfare in Russia, and little of its political tyranny, my

views on this were to change. I read about the purge trials,

though not in full detail, and could nover find a view of

them which was not damning to the Soviet system. In 1938

HV 3283~ DocJd:364799 Page 28

 27

I met three physicists who had actually lived in Russia

in the 30's. All.were eminent scientists, Placzek, Weisskopf

and Schein: and the first two have become close friends. What

• they reported seemed.to me so solid, so unfanatical, so true,

that it made a great impression; and it presented Russia,

even when seen from their limited experience, as a land of

purge and terror, of ludicrously bad management ·and of a

long-suffering people. I need to make c.lear tbat this changin1

opinion of Russia, which was to be reial>rced by the Nazi-

Soviet pact, and the behavior of the Soviet Union in Poland

and in Finland, did not mean a sharp break for me with those

wbo held to different views. At that time I did not fully

• understand -- as in time I came to understand -- how

completely the Communist Party in.this country was under the

control of Russia, During and after the battle of Krance,

h"OWever, and during the battle of England the next autumn,

I found myself increasingly out of sympathy with t~e policy

of d.isengagemel).t and neutrality that the communist press

advocated.

"After our marriage in 1940, my wife and I for

about two years had much the same circle of friends as I

• had had before -- mostly physicists and University people •

Among them the Chevaliers, in particular, showed us many acts

of kindness. We were occasionally invited to more or less

obviously leftwing affairs, Spanish relief parties that still

ltW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 29

 28

continued; and on two occasions, duce in San Francisco an#

once in Berkeley, we attended social gatherings of apparently

•
wel 1 to do poop le, at which Schneiderman, au offic,ia 1 of

the ~ommunist Party in California, attempted, not with

success as far as we were concerned, to explain what the

communist line was all about. I was asked about the Berkeley

meeting in au interview in 1946 with agents of the F.B.B,

I did u()j; then recall this meeting, and in particular did not

in any way connect it with Chevalier, about whom the agents

were questioning me; hence it seemed wholly irrelevant to

the matter under discussion, Later my wife reminded me that

the Berkeley meeting bad occurred at the house of the

• Chevaliers: and when I was asked about it by the F.B.I. in

1950, ·I told them so.

"We saw a little of Kenneth May; we both liked him.

It would have been not unnatural for us to go to a housewarming

for May and his wife; neither my wife oor 1 remember such a

party. Weinberg was known to me as a graduate student; Hiskey

1 did not know. Steve Nelson came a few times with his

family to visit; he had befriended my wife in Paris, at the

time of her husband's death in Spain in 1937. · Neither of us

• has seen him since 1941 or 1942.

•:eecause of these associations that l have described,

and the contributions mentioned earlier, I might well have

appeared at the time as quite close to the Communist Party

lllf 32835 Docid: 364 799 . Page 30

 ~ 29

perhaps even to some people as belonging to it. As I have

said, some of its declared objectives seemed to me desirable.

But I never was a member of the Communist Party, I never

• accepted communist dogma or theory; in fact, it never made

seDSe to me. I bad 110 clearly formulated political views.

I bated tyranny and repression and every form of

dictatorial control of thought. In most cases I did not in

those days know who was and who was not a member of the

Communist Party. No one ever asked me to join the Communist

Party.

"Your letters sets forth statements made in 1942-45

by persons said to be Communist Party officials to the effect

• that I was a concealed member of the Communist Party,

110 knowledge as to what these people might have said.

do know is that I was never a member of the party, cancea led

I have

What I

or open. Even the names.of some of the people mentioned are

strange to me, such as Jack Manley and Katrina Sandow, I

doubt that I met Bernadette Doyle, although I recognize her

name. Pinsky and Ade ls on I met at most casually, as

previously mentioned,

"87 the time that we moved to Los Alamos in early

• 1943, both as a result of my changed views and of the great

pressure of war work, my participation in leftwing

organizations and my associations with leftwing circles bad

ceased and were never to be re-established.

·llW 3283l Docld:36.&799 Page 31

 30

"In. August 1941, I bought Eagle Hill at Berkeley

for my wife, which was the first home we had of our own. We

•
settled down to live in it with our new baby. We had a good

many friends, but little leisure. lily wife was working t.n

biolog at the University, Many of the men I had known went

off to work on radar and other aspects of military research,

I wal!I not without envy of them; but it was not until my firs1:

connection with the rudimentary atomic energy enterprise that

I began to see any way in which I could be of direct use."

Let the record show that llr. Oppenheimer has asked

to be excused briefly.

"The War Years •

• "Ever since the discovery of nuclear fission, the

possibility of powerful explosives based on it had been very

much in my mind, as it had in that of many other physicists.

We had some understanding of what this might do for us in the

wa~, and how much it might change the course of history. In

the autumn of 1941, a special commitee was set up by the

National Academy of Sciences under the chairmanship of

Arthur Compton to review the prospects and feasibility of

the different uses of atomic energy for military purposes •

• I attended a meeting of this committ.ee; this was my first

official connection with the atomic energy program.

"After the Academy mfJetilg, I spent some time in

preliminary calculations about the construction and

lllf 3283l Docid:36,799 Page 32

 31

performance of atomic bombs, and became- increasingly excited

at the prospects. At the same time I still had a quite heavy

burden of academic work with courses and graduate students •

•• I also began to consult, more or less regularly, with the

staff of the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley on their program

for the electro-magnetic separation of uranium isotopes.

I wa .. never a member or employee of the laboratory; but I

attended many of its staff and policy meetings. With the help

of two of my graduate students, I developed an invention

which was embodied in the production plants at Gak Ridge,

I attended the conference in Chicago at which the

Metallurgical Laboratory (to produce plutonium) was establishec

• and its initial program projected.

"In the spring of 1942, Compton called me to

Chicago to discuss the state ofwork on the bomb itself.

During this meeting Compton asked me to take the responsibilit1

for this work, which at that time consisted of numerous

scattered experimental projects. Although I had no

administrative experience and wa .. not an experimental

physicist, I felt sufficiently informed and challenged by

the problem to be glad to accept, At this time I became an

• employee of the Metallurgical Laboratory<

"After this conference I ca 1 led together a

theoretical study group in Berkeley, in which Bethe, Konopinsk:

Serber, Teller, Van Fleck and I participated, We had an

lllf 32835 Docid:364799 Page 33

 32

adventurous time, We spent much of the summer of 1942 in

Berkeley in a joint study that. for the first time really

•
came to grips with the physica 1 problems of atomic bombs,

atomic explosions, and the possibi 1i ty of using fission

explosions to initiate thermo-nuclear reactions. I called

this possibility to the att•ntion of Dr, Bush during the late

summer; the technical views on this subject were to develop

and change from then until the present day,

"After these studies there was little doubt that a

potentially world-shattering under~aking lay ahead, 'Me beean

to see the great explosion at Alamogordo and the greater

explosions at Eniwetok with a surer foreknowledge, We also

• began to see how rough, difficult, challenging and unpredict-

able this job might turn out to be,

"When I entered the employ of the Metal lurgica 1

Laboratory I filled out my first Personnel Security

Questionnaire."

Let the record show that Dr. Oppenheimer has

returned to the hearing room."

"Later in the summer, I had word from Compton that

there was a question of my clearance on the ground that I had

• belonged to leftwing groups; but it was indicated that

would not prove a bar to my further work on the program.

thi~

"In later summer, after a review of t'le experi.menta 1

work, i became convinced, as did others, that a major change

llW 3283~ Docid: 364799 Page 34 ·

 33

was called for in the work on the bomb itself. We needed a

central laboratory devoted wholly to this purpose, where

people could talk freely with each other, where theoretical

• ideas and experimental findings could affecteach other,

where the waste and frustration and error of the many

compartmentalized experimental studies could be eliminated,

where we could begin to come to grips with chemical,

metallurgical, engineering and ordnance problems that had so

far received no consideration. We therefore sought to

establish this laboratory for a direct attack on all the

problems inherent in the mCB t rapid possible development and

product ion of atomic bombs •

• "In the autumn of 1942 General Groves

of the Manhattan Engineer District.

need for an atomic bomb laboratory,

ass~med charge

I discussed with him the

There had been some

th.ought of m1o1king this laboratory a part of Oak Ridge, For

a time there was support for makinir it a military es tablishmeni

in which key personnel wou.ld be commissioned as officers;

and in preparation for this course I once went to the

Presidio to take the initial steps toward obtaininir a

commission. After a irood Cleal of discussion with the personne

• who would be needed·at Los Alamos and with General Groves and

his advisers, it was decided that the Laboratory should,

at least initially, be a civilian establishment in a military

post. While this consideration was going on, I had showed

ll1f 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 3~

 34
General Groves Los Alamos; and he almost immediately took

steps to acquire the site.

•
"In early 1943, I received a letter signed by

General Groves and Dr. Conant, appointing me director of the

. laboaratory, and outlining their conception of how it was to

be organized and administered. The necessary construction

and assembling of the needed facilities were begun. All of

us worked in close collaboration with the engineers of the

Manhattan District.

The site of Los Alamos was selected, in part at least

because it enabled those responsible to balance the obvious

need for security with the equally important need of free

• communication among those engaged in the work, Security,

it was hoped, would be ach.ieved by removing the laboratory

to a remote area, fenced and patrolled, where communication

with the outside was extremely limited. Telephone calls were

monitored, mail was censored, and personnel who left the

area -- something permitted only for the clearest of causes--

knew that their movements might be under surveillance.

On the other band, for those within. the community, fullest

exposition and discussion among those competent to use the

• information was eocourared.

"The last months o1 1942 and early 1943 'had bard ly

hours enough to get Los Alamos established. The real problem

had to do with getting to Los Alamos the men who would make

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 36

 35

a success of the undertaking, For this we needed to

understand as clearly as we then could what our technical

program would be, what men we would need, what facilities,

•• what organization, what plan •

The program of recruitment was massive. Even though

we then underestimated the ultimate size of the laboratory,

which was to have almost 4,000 members by the spring of 1945,

and even though we did not at that time see clearll some of

the difficulties which were to bedevil and threaten the

enterprise, we knew that it was a big, complex and diverse job,

Even the initial plan of the laboratory called for a start

with more than one hundred highly qualified and trained

• scientists, to say nothing of the technicians, staff and

mechanics who would be required for their support, and of

the equipment that we would have to beg and borrow since

there would be no time to build it from scratch, We had to

recruit ata time when the country was fully engaged in war

and almost every competent scientist was already involved

in the military effort.

"The primary burden of this fell on me. To recruit

staff 1 traveled all over the country talking with people

•
who had been working on one or another aspect of the atomic

energy enterprise, and people in radar work, for example, and

underwater sound, telling them about the job, the place that

we were going to, and enlisting their enthusiasm,

liv 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 37

 (
•
• 36

"In order to bring responsible scientists to Los

Alamos, I had to rely on their sense of the interest. urgency

• and reasibility of the Las Alamos mission. I had to tell

them enough of what the job was, and give strong en~ugh

assurance that it might be successfully accomplished in time

to affect the outcome of the war, to make it clear that they

were justified in their leaving other work to come to this job.

"The prospect of coming to Los Alamos aroused great

misgivings. It was to be a military post; men werv asked to

sicn up more or less for the duration; restrictions on

travel and on the freedom of families to move about were to

•
be severe; and no one could be sure of the extent to which .

the necessary technical freedom of action could actually be

maintained by the laboratory. The notion of disappearing

into the New Mexico desert for an indeterminate period and

under quasi-military auspices disturbed a good many scientists,

and the families of many more. But there was another side to

it" Almost everyone realized that this was a great under-

taking. Almost everyone knew that if it were completed

successfully and rapid enough, it might determine the outcome

of the war. Almost everyone knew that it was an unparalleed

• opportunity to bring to bear the basic knowledge and art of

science for the benefit of his country, Almost everyone knew

that this job, if it were achieved, would be a part of

history. This sense of excitement, of devotion and of

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 38

 37

patriotism in the end prevaJl.ed. Most of those with whom I

talked came to Los Alamos. Once they came, confidence in the

enterprise grew as men learned mce of the technical status

• of the work; and though the laboratory was to double and

redouble its size many times before the end, once it had

started it was on the road to success.

"We had information in lahose days of German

activity in the field of nuclear fission. We were.aware of

what it mightmean if they beat us to the draw in the develop-

I
I
ment of atomic bombs. The consensus of all our opinions, and
I
every directive that I had,. stressed the extreme urgency of
I our work, as well as the need for guarding all knowledge of

I
• it from our enemies, Past communist connections or sympathies

did not necessarily disqualify a man from employment, i f we

bad confidence in his integrity and dependability as a man.

"There are two i tams of derogatory information on

I which I need to comment at this point., The first is that it

was reported that I had talked the atomic bomb question over

with Communist Party members during this period (1942-45).

The second is that I was responsible for the employment o•

the atomic bomb project of individuals who were members o

• the Communist party or closely associated with activities of

ta Communist Party.

"As to the first, my only discussions of matters

connected with the atomic bomb were for official work or for
I'
I
i llW 3283!1 Docld: 364799 Page 39
 ------- ~ ----

38

recruiting the staff of the enterprise. So far as l knew

none of these discussions were with Communist Party members.

•
I never discussed anything of my secret work or anything

about the atomic bomb with Steve Nelson.-

"As to the statement that I secured the employment

of doubtful persons on the project: Of those mentioned,

Lomanitz, Friedman and Weinberg were never employed at Los

Alamos. I believe that I had nothing to do with the

employment of Friedman and Weinberg by the Radiation

Laboratory; I had no responsibility for the hiring of anyone

there, During the time that I continued to serve •s a

consultant with the Rslation Laboratory and to advise.and

• direct the work of some of the graduate students, I assigned

David Bohm and Chaim Richman to a problem of basic science

which might prove useful in analyzing experiements in

connection with fast neutrons. T~at work has long been

published. Another graduate student was Rossi Lomanitz. I

remember vaguely a conversation with him in which he expressed

reluctance to take part in defense research, and I encouraged

him to do what other scientists were doing for their country,

Thereafter he did work at the Radiation Laboratory. I

• remember no details of our talk. If I asked him to work on

118 project, I would have assumed thathe would be checked by

the security officers as a matter of course. Later, in 1943,

when Loa.anitz was inducted into the Army, be wrote me asking

lllf 3283~ Docld:36,799 Page •o

 39

me t? help bis return to the project. I forwarded a copy of

this letter to the Manhattan District Security officers, and

let the matter rest there. Still later, at Lomanitz' request,

• I wrote to bis commanding officer that be was qualified for

advanced technical work in the Army.

"I asked for the transfer of David Bohm to Los

Ala6os; but this request, like all others, was subject to the

assumption that the usual security requirements would apply;

and when I was told that there was objection on security

erounds to this transfer, I was much surprised, but of course

aereed. David Hawkins was known to the Personnel Director

at the laboratory, and I had.met and liked him and found him

• intelligent; I supported the suggestion of the Personnel

Director that be come to Los Alamos. I understand that he

had had leftwing associations; but it was not until in

Karch of 1951, at the time of his testimony, that I knew

about his membership in the Communist Party.

"In 1943 when I was alleged to have stated that "I

knew several individuals then at Los Alamos who bad been

members of the Communist Party," I knew of only one; she was

my wife, ofllhose disasspciation from the party, and of wbolle

• integrity and loyalty to the United States I bad no question •

Later, in 1944 or 1945, my brother Frank, who bad been

cleared for work in Berkeley and at oak Ridge, came to Los

Alamos from oak Ridge with official approval.

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 41

 40

"I ·keew of no attempt to obtain secret information

at Los Alamos. Prior to my going there my friend Haakon

•
Chevalier with his wife visited us on Eagle Bill, probably

in early 1943. During the ·visit, he came into the kitchen

. and told me that George Ententon had spoken to him of the

possibility of transmitting technical information to Soviet

scientists. I made some strong remark to the effect that this

sounded terribly wrong to me. The discussion ended there.

Nothing in our long standing friendship would have led me to

believe that Chevalier was actually seeking information; and

I was certain that he had no idea of the work on which I was

•
engaged .

"It· has long been clear to me that I should have

reported the incident at once. The events that led me to

report i t which I doubt ever would have become known without

my report were unconnected with it. During the summer of

1943, Colonel Lansdale, the Intelligence Office of the

Manhattan District, came to Los Alamos and told me that he

'
was worried about the security situation in Berkeley •ecause

of the activities of the Federa1lon of Architects, Engineers,

Chemists and Technicians. This recalled to my mind that

• Eltenton was a member and probably a promoter of the FAECT.

Shortly thereafter, I was in Berkeley and I told the

security officer that Eltenton would bear watching. When

asked why, I said that Eltenton had attempted, through

MW 32835 Docld:364799 Page 42

 41
intermediazies., to approach people on the project, though I

mentioned neither myself nor Chev a lier. Later, when Qenera l

Groves urged me to give the details, I told him of my

• conversatt.on with Chevalier,

friend.
I still think of Chevalier as a

"The story of Los Alamos is long and complex. Part

of it is public history. For me it was a time so filled with

work, with the need for decision and action and consultation,

that there was room for little else. I lived with my family

in the community which was Los Alamos. It was .a rE>markable

community, inspired by a high sense of mission, of duty and

of destiny, coherent, dedicated and remarkably selfless. There

• was plenty in the life of Los Alamos to cause irritation;

the security restrictions, many of my. own devising, the

inadequacies and inevitable fumblings of a military post

unlike any that had ever existed before, shortage,, inequities,

and in the laboratory itself the shifting emphasis on

different aspects of the technica 1 work as the progr.am moved

forward; but I have never known a group more understanding

and more devoted to a common purpose, more willing to lay

asid.e _personal convenience and prestige, more understanding

• of the role that they were playing in their country's

history. Time and again we had in the technical work almost

paralyzing crises. Time and again the laboratory drew itself

together and faced the new problems and got on with the work,

llW 32835 Doc Id: 364 799 Page 4.3

 42

We worked by night and by day; and in the end the many jobs

were done.

•
''These years of hard and loyal work of the scientistt

culminated in the test on July 16, 1945, It was a success.

I believe that in the eyes of thl War Department, and other

knowledgeable people, it waq as early· a success- as they had

thought po•ible, given a 11 ·the circumstances, and rather a

greater one. There were meny indications from the Secretary

of War anti Gene.ra l Groves, and many others, that officia 1

opinion w.a .. one of satisfaction with what had been

accomplished, At the time, it W!lS hard for us in Los Alamos

~atisfaction,

•
not to share that and hard for me not to accept

the conclusion that I had managed the enterprise well and

played a key part in its success. But it needs to be stated

that many others contributed the decisive ideas and carried

out the work which led to this success and that my role

waq that of understanding, encouraginr, suggesting and

decidi~g. It wa.s the very opposite of a one man show.

"Even before the July 16th test and the use of the

bombs in Japan, the members of the laboratory began to have

a new sense of the possible import of what was ·going on. In

• the early days, .. when success was less certain and timing

unsure, and the war with Germany and Japan in a des·perate

phase, it was enough for us to think that we had ajob to do.

Mow, with Germany defeat9d, the war in the Pacific approaching

llW 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 44

 43

a cz·isis, and the succesl!I of our undertaking almost assured,

there was a sense both of hope and of ansiety as to what

thisspectacular development might portend for the future,

• This came to us a little earlier than to the publt.c generally

because we saw the technical development at close range and

in secret; but its quality was very much the same. as the

public response after Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

''Thus it was natural that in the spring of 1945

I welcomed the opportunity when I was asked by Secretary

Stimson to serve, atong with Compton. Lawrence and Fermi,

on an advisory panel to his Interim Committee on Atomic Energy •

.
We met with that committee on the lst of June 1945; and even

• during the week when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were being bombed,

we met at Los Alamos to sketch out a prospectus of what the

technical future in atomic energy might look like: atomic

war beads for guided missiles, improvements in bomb designs,

the thermonuclear program, pwwer,.propulsion, and the new

tools available from atomic 1echnology for research in science,

medicine, and technology. This work. absorbed much of my time,

during September and October; and in connection with it I was

asked to consult with the War and State Departments on atomic

• energy legislltion, and in a pr•liminary way on the inter-

national control of atomic energy.

"I resigned as Director of Los Alamos on October 16,

1945 after having secured the consent ofCommander Bradbury

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 4~

 44

and General Groves that Bradbury should act as my successor.

"There were then on the books at the labc>ratory,

•
embodied in memoranda and reports and summarized by me in

letters to General Groves, developments in atomic weapons,

which could well bllve occupied years tor their fulfillment,

and which have in tact provided some, though by no means all,

of the themes for Los Alamos work since that time, It was

not entirety clear whether the future ot atosic weapons work

in this country should be continued at or confined to Los

Alamos or started elsewhere at a more accessible and more

practical site, or indeed what effect international agreements

•
might have on the program. But in the meantime Los Alamos

had to be kept going until there was created an authority

competent to decide the question of its future. This was to

take almost a year,

The Post War Period,

"In November 1945, I resumed my teaching at the

California Institute of Technology, with an intention and hope

never realized, that this should be a full time undertaking.

The consultation about postwar matter which bad already begun

continued, and I was asked over and over both by the

• Executive and the Congress for advice on atom:k: energy,

bad a feeling of deep responsibility, interest and concern

I

for many of the problems with which the development of atomic

energy confronted our country,

llW 3283~ Docld:J64799 Page 46

 45

"This development wa!'I to be a major factor in the

history of the evolving and mounting conflict between the free

world and the Soviet Union. When I and other scientists were

• called on for advice, our principal duty was to make our

technical experieace and judgment available. We were called

to do this in a context and against a background of the

official views of the government on the military and

political situation of our country. Immediately after the war,

I was deeply involved in the effort to devise effective means

for the international control of atomic weapons, means

which might, in the words of those days, tend toward the

elimination of war itself. As the prospects of success

receded, and as evidence of Soviet hostility and growing

military power accumulated, we had more and more to devote

ourselves to finding ways of adapting our atomic potential to

offset the Soviet threat, In the period marked by the first

Soviet atomic: explosion, the war in Korea and. the Chinese

communist intervention there, we were principally preoccupied,

though we never forgot long term problems, with im~ediate

measures which could rapidly build up the strength of the

United States under the threat of an imminent general war.

•
As our own atomic potential increased and developed, we were

aware of the dangers inherent in comparable developments by

the enemy; and preventive and defensive measures were very

much on our minds. Throughout this time the role of atomic

llV 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 47

 46

weapo1111 was to be central.

From the close of the war, when I returned to the

• West Coast until finally in the spring of 1947 when I went

to Princeton as the Director of The Institute for Advanced

Study, I was able to spend very little time at home and in

teachiar in California, In October 1945, at the request of

Secretary of War Patterson, I had testified before the House

Committee on Military Affairs in support of the May-Johnson

Bill, which I endorsed as an interim means of bringinr about

without delay the much needed transition from the wartime

administration of the Manhattan District to postwar management

•
of the atomic energy enterprise. In December, 1945, and later,

I appeared at Senator McMahon's req19st in sessions of his

lpecial Committee on Atomic Energy, which was coasiderinr

legiaiatioa on the same subject. Under the chairmanship of

Dr. Richard Tolman, I served on a committee set up by General

Groves to consider classification policy on matters of atomic

energy. For two months, early in 1946, I worked steadily

as a member of a panel, the Board of Consultants to the

Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy, wht.a, with

the Secretary of State's Committee, prepared the so-called

• Acheson-Lilienthal report. After the publication of this

report, I spoke publicly in support of it, A little later,

when Mr. Baruch was appointed to represent the United States

in the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee, I became one

Rlf .3283~ J)ocld: 36479_9 Page 48

 47

of the scientific consultants to Mr. Baruch, and his staff

in preparation for and in the conduct of our efforts to gain

support for the United States' plan. I continued as consultant

• to General Osborn when he took over the effort.

"At the end of 1946 I was appointed by the President

as a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic

Energy Commission. At its first •eting I was elected Chairmao

and was reelected until the expiration of my term in 1952.

This was my principal assignment during these years as far

as the atomic energy program was concerned, and my principal

preoccupation apart from academic work,

"A little later I was appointed to the Committee

• on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board, which

was to advise the Military Establishment about the technical

aspects of the atomic energy program; I served on it for

seven years; and twice was designated chairman of special

panels set up by the Committee.

"Meanwhile I bad become widely regal'ded as a

principal author or inventor of· the atomic bomb, more widely,

I well knew, than the facts warranted. In a modest way I bad

become a kind of publt: persona&e, I was deluged as I have beeo

• ever since with requests to lect·ure, and to take part in

numerous scientific activities and public affairs. Most of

these I did uot accept.· Some, important for the promotion of

science or learning or of public policies that corresponded

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 49

 48

to my convictions, I did accept: the Council of the National

Academy of Sciences,,the Commitee on the Present DLnger;

• the Board of Overseers of Harvar.d College, and a good number

of others.

".& quite different and I believe unique occurrence

is cited as an item of derogatory information -- that in

1946 I was "listed as Vice Chairman on the letterhead of the

Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and

Professions, Inc • • • , cited as a Communist front by the

House Committee on Un-American Activities," The fact. ~s that

in 1946, when I was at work on tire international control

•
of atomic energy, I was notified that I had been nominated

and then elected as Vice Chairman ofthis organization,

When I began to see that its literature inciuded slogans such

as "Withdraw United States troops from China" and that it was

endorsing the criticism enunciate• by the then Secretary

Wa llaae of the United States policy on atomic energy 1 I

advised the organization in a letter of October 11, 1946,

that I was not in accord with its policy, that I regarded the

recommendations of Mr. Wallace as not likely to advance the

cause of finding a satisfactory solution for the control of

• atomic energy, and that I wished to resign, When an effort was

made to dissaade me from this course I again wrote on

December 2, 1946, insisting upon resignation.

Later in the postwar period an incident occurred

IHf 32835 Docid:364799 Page 50

 49

which seems to be the basis of one of the items of

derogatory infcanation. In May, 1950, Paul Crouch, a former

communist official, and Mrs. Crouch, testified bef:re the

• California State Committee on Un-American Activities that

in July 1941 they bad attended a Communist Party meeting a.t a

house in Berkeley, of which I was then the tenant. On the

basis of pictures and movies of me which they saw some eight

years later, they said they recognized me as having been

present 9 When the F.B.I. first talked to me about this

alleged incident, I wa~ quite certain that no such meeting

as Crouch described had occurred. So was my wife, when I

discussed it with her. Later, when I saw the testimony, I

• became even more certain.

member of the party.

Crouch had described the 1atherin1

as a closed meeting of the Communist Party. I wa~ never a

Crouch said that no introductions had

been made. I would not recall ever having had a group of

people at my home that bad not been introduced. In May of

1952, I again discussed this alleged meeting with the U. s.

attorney in the Weinberg case (an indictment against Joseph

Weinberg for perjury for having among other thin1s denied

membership in the Communist Party). I again said that I

• could not have been present at a closed meetinl of the

Communist Party because I was not a member of the party; that

I had searched my memory and that the only thing that

conceivably could be relevant was the vaguest impressions that

IRf 32835 Dacid:36•799 Page 51

 50

someone on the campus might at some time have asked permission

to use our home for a gathering of young peopb; that,

•
however, I could recall no such gathering, nor any meeting

even remotely resembling the one described by Crouch; tbt I

thought it probable that at the time of the meeting, which by

then had been fixed by Crouch as approximately July 23rd,

my wife and I were away from Berkeley. Shortly thereafter,

with tbe·aid of counsel, we were able to establish that my

wife .and I left Berkeley within a few days after July 4, 1941,

and did not return until toward the' end of the first week in

August,

"I need to turn now to an account of some .al. the

• measures which, as Chairman of the General Advisory Committee,

and in other capacities, I advocated in the years since the

war to increase the power of the United States and its allies

to resist and defeat aggression.

"The ini tia 1 members of the General Advisory Commi ttE

were Conant, then President of Harvard, DuBridge, President

of the California Institute of Technology, Fermi of the

University of Chicago, Rabi of Columbia University, Rowe,

Vice President of the United Fruit Com·pany, Seaborg of the

• University of California, Cyril Smith of the University of

Chicago, and Worthington of the DuPont Company. In 1948

Buckley, President of the Bell Telephone Laboratories,

replaced Worthington; in the summer of 1950, Fermi, Rowe and

lllf. 32835 .Doc Id: .364 799 Page 52

 51
Seaborg were replaced by Libby of the University of Chicaso,

Murphree, President of Standard Oil Development Company, and

Whitman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Later

• ;. ..
Smith resigned and was succeeded by vo Neumann of The

Jnstitute for Advanced Study,

"In these years from early 1947 to mid-1952 the

.Committee met some thirty times and transmitted perhaps aa

many reports to the Commission. Formulation of policy and the

management of the vast atomic energy enterprises were

responsibilities vested in the Commission itself, The General

Advisory Committee had the role, wh:141 was fixed f~r it by

statute, to advise the Commission. In that capacity we

• gave the Commission our views on questions which the

Commission put before us, brought to the Commission's

attention on our initiative technical matters of importance,

and encouraged and supported the work of the several major

installations of the Commission.

"At one of our first meetings in 1947 we settled

down to the job of forming our own views of the priorities,

And while we agreed that the development of atomic power and

,.
the support and maintenance of a strong basic scientific

activity in the fields relevant to it were important, we

assigned top priority to t!le problem of atomic weapons, At

that time we advised the Commission that one of its first

jobs would be to convert Los Alamos into an active center

1111 3283!1 Docid:364799 Page .'13

 52

for the development abd improvement of atomic w.eapons. In

1945-46 during the period immediately fol lowing the war; the

•
purposes of Los Alamos were multiple. It was the ~nly

laboratory in the United States that worked on atomic weapons.

Los Alamos also had wide interests in scientific matters only

indirectly related to the weapons program, .We suggested that

the Commission recognjz e as the laboratory's central and

primary program the improvement and diversification of atomic

weapons, and that this undertaking have t priority second to

none, We suggested further that the Commission 11dopt

administrative measures to make work at Los Alamos att;ir;ctive,

•
to assist .the laboratory in recruiting, to 1,elp build up

a strong theoretical division for guidance ill atomic weapl!DS

design, and to take advantage of the availability of the

talented and brilliant consultants who had been members of

the laboratory during the war. In close consultation with

the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, we encou~aged and ·

supported courses of development which would markedly increasE!>

the value of our stockpile in terms of the destructive ~ower

of our weapons, which would make the bes~ use of existing

stockpiles and those anticipated, which would provide weapons

• suitable for modern combat conditions and for varied forms of

delivery and which in their cumulative effect would provide

us with the great arsenal we now have,

We encouraged and supported the building up of

llW .32835 Docld:36,799 P.a!Je !ii

 53

the laboratory at Sandia whose pl.ncipal purpose is the

integratlbn of the atomic warhead with the weapous system in

which it is to be used. In agreement with the Los Al.amos stafj

• we took from the very first the view that no radical improve-

ment in weapous development would be feasible without a

program of weapons ~esting, We strongly supported such a

program, helped Los Alamos to obtain authorization for

conducting the tests it wished, and encouraged the establish-

ment of a permanent weapous testing .station and the adoption

of a continental test station to facilitate this work.

As time went on and the development of atomic weapons

progressed, we stressed the importance of integrating out

• atomic warheads and the development _of the carriers, ·aircraft,

missiles, etc,, which could make them of maximum effectiveness.

"We observed that there were opportunities which

needed to be explored for significantly increasing our

arseial of weapous both in numbers and in capabilities by

means of production plant expansion and by ambitious programs

to enlarge the sources of raw mterials, It was not our

function to iormulate military requirements. We did regard

it as our function to indicate that neither the magnitude

•
of existing plant nor the mode of operation of existing plant

which the Commission inherited, nor the limitation of raw

materials to relatively wel 1 known and high grade sources of

ore, need limit the atomic weapons program.

ll'lf 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 55

 54

The four major expansion progra1D11 which were

authorized durinc the six years 1946 to 1952 reflect the

•
decision of the Commission, the Military Establishment, the

Joint Congressional Committee and other agencies of the

covernment to go far beyond the production program that was

inherited in 1946, And the powerful arsenal of atomic

weapons snd the variety of their forms adaptable to a

diversity of military uses which is today a major source of

our military strength in turn reflect the results of ttmse

decisions. The record of minutes, reports and other activities

of the General Advisory Committee will show that that body

•• within the limits of its role as an advisory group played a

significant, consistent and unanimous part in encouracing and

supporting and sometimes initiating the measures which are

responsible for these results.

"As a committee and individually, ouradvice was

'sought on ether matters as well. As early as October 1945

I bad testified before a Senate Committee on the Kilgore-

Magnuson Bill -- the initial measure for a National Science

Foundation: like most scientists I was concerned that steps

be taken for recreating in the United States a healthy

• scientific communityafter the disruption of the war years.

In the General Advisory Committee we encouraged the

Commission to do everything that it properly could to support

atomic science, both in its own laboratories and in the

llW 32835 Docld:364799 Page 56

 55

University centers to which we felt we must look for the

training of scientists for advances of a basic character,

Throughout the postwar peri~ my colleagues and I stressed

• the importance of continuing support and promotion of basic

science so that there might be a bea lthy balance between the

effort invested in military research and applied science,

and that invested in pure scientific training and research

which is indispensable to all else. We supported the

Commission's decision to make available for distribution in

appropriate form llld with appropriate safeguards the tracer

materials, isotopes and radioactive substances wbth have

played so constructive a part in medicine, in biological

• research, in tecbology, in pure science and in agriculture •

"We took an affirmative view on the de11elopment of

reacters for submarines and naval propulsion not only for

their direct military value but also because this seemed

a favorable and forward-looking step in the important program

of reactor development. We were, for the most part,

skeptical about the initially very ambitious plans for the

propulsion of aircraft, though we advocated the studies which

in time brought this program to a more feasible course. We

• frequently pointed out 1D the Commission the technical

benefits which would accrue to the United States by closer

collaboration withtbe atomic energy enterprise in Canada

and the United Kingdom.

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 57

 56

"During a 11 the years that I served, on th• Genera 1

Advisory Committee, however, its major preoccupation was-•ith

• the production and perfection of atomic weapons. On the

various recommendations which I have described, there were

never, ao far as I can remember, any sicnificant divergences

of opinion among the members of the committee, Tblle

recommendations, o~ course, constitute a very small sample of

the committee's work, but a typical one.

"In view of the controversies that have developed

I have Wt the subject of the "Super" and thermonuclear

weapons for separate discussion -- although our Committee

•
regarded this as a phase of the entire yroblem of weapons,

''The Super itself had a long history of considera-

tion, beginning, as I have said, with our initial studies in

1942 before Loa Alamos was established. It continued to be

the subject of study and research at Los Alamos throughout

the war. After the war, Los Alamos intself was inevitably

handicapped pending the enactment of necessary legislation

for the atomic energy enterprise. With the Mcllabon Act, the

appointment of the Atomic EnerCJ Commission and the General

Advisory Committee, we iDthe Committee bad occasion at our

• early meetings in 1947as well as in 1948 to discuss the

subject. In that period the teneral Adtisory Committee

pointed out the still extremely unclear status of the

problem from the technical standpoint, and urged ancouracemeot

llV. 32835 Dacld:364799 Page 58

 57

of Los Ala mos' efforts which were then directed toward

modest exploration of the Super and of thermonuclear systems.

No serious controversy arose about the Sup•r until the

• Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in the autumn of 1949.

"Shortly after that event, in October 1949, the

Atomic Energy Co111111ission called a special session of the

General Advisory Committee and asked us to consider and advise

two related questions: first, whether in view of the Soviet
success the Commission's program was adequate, and if not,

in what way it should be altered or increased; second,

whether a "crash" program for the development of the Super

should be a part of any new program, The Committee considered

• both questions, consulting various officials from the civil

and military branches of the Executive Departments who would

have been concerned, and reached conclusions which were

communicated in a.report to the Atomic Energy Commission in
8ctbber · 1949.

"Thia report, in response to the first question

that had been put to us, recommended a great number of

measures that the Commission should take the increase in many

ways onr overall potential in weapons,

• "As to the Super itself, the General Advisory

Committee stated its unanimous opposition to the initiation
by the United States of a crash program of the kind we bad

been.asked to advise on. The report of that meeting, and the

~ 32835 DocI.d:364799 Page 59

"

58

S~cretary's notes, reflect the reasons which moved us to

this conclusion. The annexes, in particular, which dealt

•
more with political and policy considerations the report
proper was essentially technical in character indicated

differences in the views of members of the Committee. There

were two annexes, one signed by Rabi and Fermi, the other by

Conant, DuBridge, Smith, Rowe, Buckley and myself. (The

ninth member of the committee, Seaborg, was abroad at the time,

"It would have been surprising if eight men

considering a problem of extreme difficulty had each had

precisely the same reasons for the conclusion in whie we

joined, But I think I em correct in asserting that the

• unanimous opposition we expressed to the crash program was

based on the conviction, to which technical considerationsas

well as others contributed, that because of our overall

situation at that time such a program might weaken rather

than strengthen the position of the United States.

"After the report was submitted to the Commission,

it fell to me as Chairman of the Committee to explain our

position QD eeveral occasions, once at a meeting of the Joint

Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, All this, however,

• took place prior to the decision by the President to proceed

•
with the thermonuclear program.

"This is the full story of my "opposition to the

hydrogen bomb." It can be read in the records of the Genera 1

·w 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 60

 59

transcript of my testimony before the Joint Congressional

.
Committee, It is • story which ended once and for all when

in January 1950 the President announced his decision to proceed

• with the program.

hydrogen bomb project,

I never ur1ed anyone not to work on the

I never made or caused any

distribution of the GAC reports wxcept to the Commission itseli

As always, it was the Commission's responsibility to determine

further distribution.

"In summary, in Octobe.r, 1949, I and the other

members of the General Advisory Committee were asked questions

by the Commission to which we had a duty to respond, and to whi

we did respond with our best jud1r111ent in the liCbt of evidence

• then available to us.

"When the President's decision was announced in

January, 1950, our Committee was a1ain in session and we

immediately turned to the technical proble11111 facing the

Commission in carryin1 out the President's airective. We sou1I

to give our advice then and in ensuinl meetings as to tbs most

promising means of solving these problems. We never apin

raised the question of the wisdom ef the policy which had

now been settled, but concerned ourselDes rather with

• trying to implement it, During this period our recommendation1

fnc increasing production facilities included one for a dual

purpose plant whiih could be adapted to make materials either

for fission bombs or materials useful in *Ulermonuclear

llV 3283l ~ocld:364799 Page 61

 60
program. In its performance characteristics, the Savannah

River project, subsequently adopted by the Commission, was

• foreshadowed by this recommendation •

''Ybile the history of the GAC opposition to a crash

program for the Super ended with the announcement of the
President'~ decision, the need for evaluation and advice

continued. There were immense technical complications both

before and after the President's decision. It was of coufose

a primary duty of the committee, as well as otbe~ review

committees on which I served, to report new developments which

we judged promising, and to report when a given weapon or

family of weapons appeared impractical, unfeasible or

impossible. It would have been my duty so to report bad I

been alone in my views. As a matter of fact, our views on

sucb matters were almost always unanimous. It was furthermore

a proper function for me to speak my best judmment in

discussion with those responsibly engaged in the undertakinc.

Throughout the whole development of thermonuclear

weapons, many occasions .occurred where it was necessary for

us to form and to express judgments of feasibility. This was

true ~efore the President's decision, and it was true

• after the President's decision. In ou- report of CDctober 1949,

we expressed the view, as your. l.etter states·, that "an
0

imaginative and concerted attack on the problem has a better

than even chance of producing the weapon within five years,"

llV 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 62

 61

Later calculaions and measurements made at Los Alamos

led us to a far more pessimistic view. Still later

brilliant inventions led to the possibility of lines of

• development of very great promise, At each state the General

Advisory Committee, and I as its Chairman and .. as a member

of other bodies, reported lis faithfully as we .coo ld our

evaluation of what was likely to .fail and what w.as likely to

work,

In the Spring of 1951 work had reached a stage at

which far reaching decisions were called for with regard to

the Commission's whole thermonuclear program. In consultation

with the Commission, I ealled a meeting in. Princeton in the

• late spring of that year, which was attended by all members of

the Commission and several members of its staff, by members

of the General Advisory Committee, by Dr, Bradbury and staff

of the Los Alamos Laboratory, by Bethe, Teller, Bacher, Fermi,

von Neumann, Wheeler and others responsibly connected with the

program.. The outcome of the meeting, which lasted for two

or three days, was an agreed program and a fixing of

priori ties and effort both for Los Alamos and for other aspect!

of the Commission's work, This program has. been an out-

• standing success,

"In addition to my continuing work on the General

Advisory Committee there were other assignments that I was

asked to undertake, Late in 1950 or early in 1951 the

President appointed me to tbe,}kience Advisory Committee to

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 63

 62

advise the Office of Defense Mobilization and the President

in 1952 the Secretary of State appointed me to a panel to

• advise on armaments and their regulation; and I served as

consultant on continental defense, civil defense, and the use

of atomic weapons in support of ground combat. Many of these

duties led to reports in the drafting of which I participated,

or for which I took responsibility. These supplement the

record of the General Advisory Committee as ·an account of

the counsel that I have given our government during the last

eight years.

In this letter, I have written only of those

••
limited parts of my history which appear relevant to the

issue now before the Atomic Energy Commission. In order to

preserve as much as possible the perspective of the story, I

have dealt very briefly with many matters. I have bad to

deal briefly or not at all with instances in which my action.a

or views were adverse to Soviet or communist interest, and of

actions that testify to my devotion to freedom, or that have

contributed to the vitality, influence and power of the

United States.

"In preparing this letter, I have reviewed two decadE

• of my life. I have recalled instances where I acted unwisely.

What I have hoped was, not that I could wholly avoid error,

but that I might learn from it. What I have learned t.as, I

think, made me more fit to serve my country.

IRJ 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 6&

 63

"Very truly yours, J. Robert Oppenheimer,

•
Princeton, New Jersey, March 4th, 1954."

• •

llV 32835 Docid:364799 ·Page 65

 64 6

DR. GRAY: This Board is convened to enable Dr.

Oppenhei-r to present any i11formation he considers appro-

• priate havin1 a bearin1 on the dOCU!IUIDts just read and the

information contained in them, this information bein1, of

course, tbe same as that disclosed to Dr. Oppenheimer in llr.

It• D•.illichc;1ls 1 letter of December 23, 1953 to Dr. Oppenhei•r

and Dr .• Oppenheimer's reply of March 4, 1954, and to provide

a record as a basis for a recommendation to the General

llanajrer of theAtomic Energy Commission as to Dr. Oppenheimer's

eligibility for access to restricted data.

At this point, I should like to remind everyone

•
concerned that this proceeding is an inquiry and not in the

nature of a trial. We shall approach our duties in that

atmosphere and in that spirit,

Dr. Oppanhei-r, have you been 1iven an opportunity

to ezercise the rilht to challeu1e any or all of the -mbers

of this Board?

DR. OPPENJIEillER: I have, indeed.

DR. GRAY: I should point out to you, sir, that if

at any time during the course of this hearing it appears

that grounds for challenge for cause arise, you will ezercise

• your right to challenge for cause and the validity of the

challenge will be determined in closed sellion by the members

of the Board.

The proceedings and stenc;11raphic record of this

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 66

 •
65

2 Board are regarded as strictly confidential between Atollic

Energy Collllliasion officials participating in this matter and

Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses. The

• Atomic .Energy Commisaion will not take the iniative in public

'release of any information relating to the proceeding before

this Board.

How, at this time, Dr. Oppenheimer, you will be

given the opportunity to present any material relevant to

the issues before the Board. At this point I think we shall

find it necessary to e:XClude all witnesses except the one

whose testimony .is being given to the Board under the pro-

visions of the procedures which we must follow in this inquiry.

• I shall read from the Security Clearance Procedures

of the UDited States Atomic Energy Commission, dated 12 Septem-

ber, 1950, under Section 4.15, subsection (b) :

"The proceedings shall be open only to duly

authorized representatives of the Staff of the Atomic

Energy Commission, the individual, his counsel, and

such persons as may be officially authorized by the Board,"

The Chairman would make the observation that Counsel

for the Board has suggested that in the spirit of these regu-

• lations we should have present only the witness who is testi-

fying or who is appearing.

MR. GARRISON: Mr. Chairman,· may I just say that I

have a few preliminary remarks as counsel to make before Dr.

llV 32$35 Docid:364799 Page 67

 . 66

3 Oppenheimer testifies, and it may well be that they will

perhaps bring us to a suitable point of adjourning forthis

•
moraine, so that Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony might begin
this afternoon.
However, if you would prefer that Ill's. Oppenheimer
not be present while I make these preliminary remarks which

have to do largely with procedural aspects of what we pro-

pose to do, it would be quite satisfactory, of course, to me.
DR. GRAY: Let us then proceed ou that basis. So,
Ill's. Oppenheimer, you are not at this moment excused.
I should like to ask Dr. Oppenheimer whether he
wishes to testify under oath in this proceeding?

• DR. OPPENHEIMER:
DR. GRAY:
Surely.
You are not required to do so.
DR. OPPEllJIEIMER: I think it best.
DR. GRAY: I should remind you, then,. of th41 pro-
visions ofSection 1621 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
kDOWJI as the perjury statute, which makes it a crime puuiah-
able by a fine of up to $2,000 and/or impriaolllll8nt of up to
five year& for any person stating under oath any material
matter which he does not believe to be true •

•• It is also an offense under Section 1001 of Title

18 of the United States Code, punishable by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five

years, or both, for any person to make any false, fictious,

RV 3283l Docld:~6A799 Page 68

 67

or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within

the jurisdiction of any agency of the United States.
I thilllc that bef0re you proceed, 11r. Garrison,

• that it would be well to administer the oath to Dr. Oppen-

heimer.
J. Robert Oppenheimer, do you swear that the
testimony you are to giv• the Board shall be the truth, the
whole truth and notbiDC but the truth, so help you God?
DR. OPPENBEI.llBR : I do.

DR. GRAY: May I also point out that in the event

that it is necessary for anyone to disclose ratricted data
during his statements before this Board should advise the

• Chairman before such disclosure in order that persons unauthor-

ized to have access to restricted data may be excused from

the hearing.
Now, Dr. Oppenheimer, you may proceed, and I gather
from what Mr. Garrison said, that he will at this point make
a statement to the Board.
MR. GARRISON: Mr. Chairman, Members of the Board,
I would like to say at the outset that far from baving

thought of challenging any member of the Board, we appreciate

• very much the willingness of men of your standing and respon-

aibilities to accept this exacting and onerous job in the
interests of thecountry. I express my appreciation to you,

We cannot help but be conacious of the fact that

llV 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 69

 68

for the past week the members of the Board. have been

examining a file containing various items about Dr. Oppenheimer

•
to which we have bad, and to which we shall have no access at

all. I have been told that this is a large file, and I

euppose a great deal of ti'me has been spent on it. I am sure

that it goea without saying that we are confident that the

minds of the members of the Board are open to receive the

testimony that we shall submit,

If) ae a result of going through the file, there

are troublesome questions which have arisen, aay items of

derogatory iuformation not mentioned in the Commission's

•
letter of December 23, I know we can count oa you to bring

those to our attention so that we may have aa adequate

opportunity to reply to them.

I would take note at this point of section 4.15(j)

of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission, and of the

second sentence, which reads, "If prior to or during the

proceeding, ia the opinion of the Board, the allegations in

the notification le~ter are aot sufficient to cover all

matters into which inquiry should be directed, the Board shall

suggest to the manager concerned that in order to give full

• notice to the individual, notification letter should be

amended."

· If there are questions that you have in mind about

these possible other items in the file that you would like to

llV 32835 Docid:36,799 Page 70

 69

have cleared up,and shall go through the formality of the

amendment of the letter, we will •ot press. But it would be

helpful to us if we ccllld at least be notified of any such

• items in a manner tbatwould give us adequate time to study

them and to prepare appropriate response.

DR. GRAY: I think you need have no concern on that

score, Mr. Garrison.

MR. GARRISON: I am sure not. I would like at this

point to read into the record a letter from Dr, Oppenheim

to Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated

December 22, 1953. I would be glad to give copies to the

members of the Board •

• I shall explain·the purpose in a moment of reading

this letter to you,

This letter ia addressed to Admiral Lewis L, Strauss,

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. c.,

and is dated December 22, 1953, and reads as follows:

"D19ar Lewis:

"Yesterc;Jay, when you asked to see me, you told me

for the first time that my clearance by the Atomic Energy

Commission was about to be suspended, You put to me as a

• possibly desirable alternative that I request termination of

my contract as a consultant to the Commission, and thereby

avoid an explicit consideration of the charges on whth the

Commission's action would otherwise be based. I was told that

if I did not do this within a day, I would receive a letter
llW 32835 Docld:364799 Page 71
 70

notifying me of the suspension of my clearance and of the

charges against me, and I was shown a draft of that letter •

•

• suggested.
"I have thought •ost earnestly of the alternative

Under the circumstances this course of action

would mean that I accept and concur in the view that I am not

fit to serve this government, that I have now served for some

twelve years. This I cannot do, If I were thus unworthy I

could hardly have served our country as I have tried, or been

the Director of our Institute in Princeton, or have spoken, as

on more than one occasion I have found

;
myself speaking, in

the name of our science and our country,

•
"Since our meeting yesterday, you and General

Nichols told me that the charges in the letter were familiar

c~araes, and since the time was short, I ·paged through the

letter quite briefly. I shall now read it in detail and make

appropriate response.

"Fai thfu 1 ly yours, Robert Oppenheimer."

I have presented that, Mr. Chairman, simply to show

that there has been no disposition on Hr. Oppenheimer's

part to hold onto a job for the sake of a job. It goes with()ut

saying that if the Commission did not wish to use bis service.a

• as a consultant that was all right with him. The point of

this letter is that he felt that he could not in honor and

integrity of his _person simply resign and leave these questions

unadjudicated. Fully realizing the terrible burden of

l1W 32835 Docid:364799 Page 72

 71

going forward with this matter,, and the natural risks in any

proceeding of this character, including what may go on

outside of thtse walls, nevertheless went forward,

• He speaks in this letter of charges, I am glad that

the Chairman pointed out that word is not the appropriate

word to be used here. We recognize that fact and have

noted, indeed, earlier from a letter from General Nichols to

me, dated January 27, 1954, in which I in a letter to him

inadvertently used the word "charges", he said, "Please be

advised that we do not consider that letter, "the one of

December 23, 1953, the principal letter whilh you read into

the record, "as being a statement of charges, but rather a

•• statement of substantial derogatory information bearing upon

his eligibility for AEC security clearance."

Gentlemen, for the last several months I have been

immersed in talking with all of the people I could find who

had worked with Dr. Oppenheimer over the years about their

recollection~ of his activities and their impressions of him

as a man and as a citizen, and I llmve immersed m_yself in his

writings and in all of the details of the case.

I would just like to say that I have been struck

• by the instantaneous and warm and universal support which

everybody that I talked with who llas worked with him has

given. It will be reflected in the testimony which we will

bring here before you. I shall speak a little later about

l1W 32835 Docld:364799 Page 73

•
 '
72

the scope of the testimony and the number of witnesses, hut

1t bas really quite impressed me,

• I have also found among these gentlemen a great

sense of anxiety about this case of what it may portend to

the science program of the country if clearance in the end

could be denied to a man who has tried to serve his country

as Dr. Oppenheimer bas served it9 not so much a sense of what

might happen to the scientists now in the government service

thsmevles, although this certainly bas come to them ae a great

shock, but rather what it 111ay do to the younii scientists

to whom the government 111ust turn in the future for ai.d and

•
assistance in seeking to recruit personnel to the iiovernment •

I mention this not becaase it baa any precise

bearing on t.he action atd the findings in this case, but it is

a part of the warp and woof then of the feelings with which

the witnesses here will address you,

The case as it has looked to me stands out in

sharp feature rather si111ply this way, that these derogatory

itelDS in the file mostly have to cb with activities of Dr.

Oppenheimer that go back to 12 to 15 years ago. A few have

to do with 9 to 12 years, Since the war -- since 1945

• apart from the Crouch incident, which itself has to do with

an alleged occurrence in 1941, there is in this letter of

December 23 -- I think I am correct in saying -- not a single

item of derogatory information except the Independent Citizens

llW 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 74

 73

Committee o~ the Arts, Sciences,from which he in fact resicned,

the pr~er of vice chairmanship, when he saw what it was up to

and except for the hydrogen matter. which stands all by itself,

• Far from being to his discredit, far from casting

doubt on his desire to serve his country as best he sees how

to do it, I think our witnesses will .. persuade you beyond any

doubt that his conduct in the hydrogen bomb ~attar was

beyond any reproach; that it was an exercise of the most

honest judgment done in the best interests of the country,

and thathl.s whole record since the war is rather astonishingly

filled with a continuous series of efforts to strengthen the

defenses of the United States in a world threatened by

• totalitarian aggression •

I was surprisedto find that about half of his

working "time since 1945 has been devoted to service on

government boards and committees, from 1945 on, as a volunteer

citizen, placing his talents at the service of the country.

The richness and the variety of the services that he rendered

in those capacities ,wi 11 be. vividly brought out in the testi-

mony.

I would like to say that everythin·g he has done

•
since the war, the hydrogen bomb and all the rest, has been

done in a blaze of light. There has been not one thing that

has not been done in the full daylight of the work of the

government and subjected to the most searching criticism of the

I l1W 32835 Docid:364799 Page 75

 74
ablest men in science and gover•ment, all doing each in

their own way what thef could' do to serve the i;iountry.

••
I believe this record will be :one which will persuad1

this Board that to exclude Dr. Oppenheimer from the capacity

that he continue to serve the government as he has in the past

would be contrary to the best interests of all of us,

Now a word about the procedure. We hope to present

this case to you in terms of unrestricted data. It would be

an unclassified case. We would like to present it in that

direct lay fashion, I am not a scientist and except for

Dr. Evall!J the mambers of the Board are not, We thought

it would be best if we could avoid having to get involved iD

•• technical evidence of a very complex and difficult nature

which would involve a great deal of time, and which would

perhaps tend to lead us into the wrong path of exposing that

the issue here is whether at a particular juncture Dr.

Oppenheimer's scientific judgment was right or wrong, I am

sure we all agree that the question here is not whether the

advice that he gave at a particular time was from a

scientific point of view one with wh:llb this Board might differ

in the light of history. The real question is was his

• ·judgment an honest judgment; did he do the }?est he coull for

his government •

I was a little fearful if we got into the whole

realm of science that we would perhaps lose sight of that

I ~. 32835 Docid:36,799 Page 76

 75

simple fact.

we want to oo the other band tell you as completely

as we can and I think it can be done within the limits of

• classifi~atioo, the proper limits we can talk about here

exactly how the things were done which he did, and the

procedures that were adopted and the way the tasks were gone

about, the atmosphere in which they were conducted.

I would like to start, 'llleo we get into Dr.

Oppenheimer's testimony, with a somewhat fuller account from

him of his record of public service, beginning with the war

years, and coming down to date.

I would like to start with that because the answer

• to which be gave

portion of his life.

is less complete with respect to that

With respect to the derogatory items

aftbe early years, we have said abo!E all that we can say

except as you of course may wish to question him further, as

I have no doubt you will, with regard to them.· But I would

like to have Dr. Oppenheimer. te 11 you m<r e than be has been

able to do in the encompass of the answer about the way in

which he has sought to serve the country el.nee the war.

Our witnesses will mostly be bringing testimony

• about that service .

When we get through with that, there are a few

supplementary things to be said about these earlier derogatory

items, and some documentary evidence that we want to introduce.

lllf 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 77

I r

76

The witnesses that we would like to call, after you

yourself have filllahed questioning Dr. Oppenheimer, and when

• he is through -- and I should say we will welcome questions as

we go along, whatever you may wish to ask,as Dr, Oppenheimer

testifies, and I hope you will, because I think it will make

it easier for all of us if you would do that instead of

leaving it a 11 for the end -- whenever we are through ... and

the Board is through with questioning Dr. Oppenheimer,

then we would be prepared to invite a considerable number of

witnesses .to testify, There are as of this moment 27 witnesses

whom we expect to ca 11. There may be several more. There-

•
will also be three or four or five I don't know exactly

bow many ..;;_ written documents from some witnesses who are

simply unable to get here at all.

If the Board would like, I should be glad to give

you a ·list of the proposed witnesses, so that you may have

it before you, and also a skeleton of the proposed times.

DR, GRAY: I would think that would be very helpful,

Mr, Garrison, if you would, It just possibly might have

some bearing on the questions that might be put to Dr.

Oppenheimer,

• lunch.
MR, GARRISClr: We will, I think, bring that in after

It is not quite ready for presentation.

DR, GRAY: Very well,

llR. GARRISON: I would like at this time to give

llV 32835 Docld:364799 Page 78

 77

you, and I hope you might perhaps keep this bandy, ao

exhibit called, "Biographical ·Data oo Dr. J. Robert

Oppenheimer."

• DR. GRAY: Are you offering that now, llr. Garrison?

MR. GARRIS(!(:

DR. GRAY:
Yes.

Would you mark the Oppenheimer Exhibit

No. l, and we will received it far the record.

(THE DOCUMENT WAS MARKED OPPENHEIMER EXHIBIT NO. l

AND RECEIVED Fat THE RECORD.)

MR. GARRISON: I would say to the Board that if

you will turn to the first page I, this is a concise summary

of the major steps in Dr. Oppenheimer's career. I twill be

• a bandy guide for use when witnesses are testifying to

particular committees or whatnot to see just at what stage

they call.
Turning to 1!B next page, II, you will see listed

the various government committees on which Dr. Oppenheimer

has served, with the dates of service and the people who

served with him on these various undertakings. This is

since Los Alamos.

DR, GRAY: May I interrupt? Just io the interest

• of keeping the record precisely clear, I wonder if that

last statement is quite correct, because I believe you term-·

inated your association with Los Alamos in the fall' of 1945,

and some of these committees overlap.

J1ll 3283~ Docid:36~799 Pag~ 79

 18

MR. GARRISON: You are correct.

DR. GRAY: I am not making it any more a particular

•
point other than --

MR. GARRISCli: I appreciate the correction. I

should make a further correction, that this is a partial

list of the committees on which be served. They are the

pri,ncipal ones, the ones about which we shall mainly be

talking here at the bearings.

Beginning with III and running all the way over

is a detailed biography in which, to the best of our ability,

we have put down year by year every association of which we

•
have any record of bis .having joined or been a member of,

every publication of bis, every position that he has held on

committees, either private or public, lectures that he has

given, addresses. This is the outward and visible account of

his activities, in short, as best we could compile them. If

there are inaccuracies, they are entirely inadvertent.

One of the things that struck me as I we~t over

this biography, which I asked to have prepared, was the

quite evident fact that during the prewar years in which

most of these derogatory items arise,his energies were quite

• strongly devoted to almost entirely really his scientific

work and scientific undertakings. They reveal really very

little in the way of political interest or associations .on his

part just on the fac• of the record.

RV 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 80

 79

In the postwar period this becomes again apparent,

and I would direct your attention to the fact that in this

postwar period, I donot think there is a single association

• of his that can possibly be questioned as derogatory by the

Commissim or by this Board, or anything, indeed, other than a

rich record of association and devotion to his science and

his se·rvice to the government, and his membership in various

scientific and civic organizations of the highest standing,

There is, of course, also that notation about the

Independen1' Citizens Committee of Arts and Sciences, but that,

as he stated in his answer, he withdrew from because of its

policy in replying to their proffer of an officer's position

• in the a~sociation and indicated his complete lack of

sympathy with the kind of policies which it stood for.

I am going to, in the course of the testimony,

kttroduce in evidence at pertinent places extracts from some

of Dr. Oppenheimer's writings and addresses from the period

1945 ~o date. To attempt to introduce them all here

would be beyond the obvious scope of this inquiry. But I

want to assure the Board that you will find a very consistent

and very striking thread of continuous thought on Dr.

• Oppenheimer's part with respect to the strengthening of the

defenses of this country, with respect to what has to be

done to counter the Russian threat from abroad, with respect

to building the strongest and soundest democratic America

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 81

 80
that man can do, consistent, unvarying and very impressive.

This whole postwar period, everything in it, is

• really utterly inconsistent with any notion that this man

could have been anything but a devoted suporter of the

American system that we love.

I think that is all that I have to say of a

preliminary character, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your

leeting me say it. I think perhaps this would be an

appropriate point to adjourn, and shall we come back at 2:30?

Is that your schedule?

DR, GRAY: Perhaps it should be a recess, I do not

•
know, Mr. Garrison, and not an adjournment. I am sure we

want to try to meet the convenience of everyone concerned,

and at the •ame time not te waste hours or minutes which could

be useful in getting ahead with the inquiry.

Speaking for the Board, I am 5ure we could be ready

at 2 o'clock but I do not want to press you and Dr, Oppenheimer,

MR. SILVERMAN: I was suggesting that we could use

a little extra time,

DR, GRAY: Would you suggest 2 :30?

MR. GARRISON: Let us say 2:15.

• DR. GRAY: All right.

Q

MR •. GARRISON: B•f ore the recess, I want to read

this into the record. This is a letter to me from Mr. William

Kitchell, General Counsel, dated January 15, 1954, that the

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 82

 81

that the Comaissiou will be prepared to stipulate as follows

for purposes of the bearing:

"Ou August 6, 1947 • the Commission recorded clearance

• of Dr. J, Robert Oppenheimer, which it noted bad been

authorized in February 1947,"

What that has reference to, as we will show more

fully in the testimony, was the .fact that in 1947 Dr.

Oppenheimer's personnel file was sent totbe Commission by

Mr. J~.Edgar Hoover, with ~he request that it be reviewed.

This was at the time of the early days of the establishment

of the Commission, and Dr. Oppenheimer had been appointed to

the General Advisory Committee, and bad been elected.its

chairman. The Commission considered this entire file, whth

I believe the evidence will show contained substantially all

that you have before you in the letter of December 23, except

the Crouch incident, which occurred afterwards, though it

related to something in 1941, and except for the hydrogen

bomb matters, and the Commission unanimously after discussing

Dr. Oppenheimer's· qualifications with !llany of the leading

people who bad bad to do with him in the past and With

officials of the government reached the view that there was

• no question as to bis clearance.

testimony.
That we will show later by

I merely mention now that will be before you.

I don't mean to import what I said into the stipulation which

goes in front of what I have just said,

llW 32835 Docid:364?99 Page 83

r

82

DR. GRAY: We will now recess until 2:15,

(Thereupon at 12:20 p,m., a recess was taken until

• 2:15 p.m., the same day.)

•
RV 3283~ Docld:36•799 Pag~ 84
 83
AFTERNOON SESSION 2:15 P.11.

OR, GRAY: We will begin tbe proceed1Dgil at this

•
point again. Let the record show that llrs. Oppenheimer is

not present this afternoon.

Whereupon,
I
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

was called as a witness, and having been previously sworn,

was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR •. GARRISON:

Q Will you tell the Board'wh•t your present position

•
is, Or. Oppenheimer, at Princeton?

A My job is Director of The Institute of Advanced Study.

. For tbe most part this is not relevant to the hearing, but I

will outline briefly some of the circumstances.

The Institute is not part of Princeton University.

It is a sep~rate institute, very highbrow. It has about 130

members who are post-doctoral. Some of them are youngsters

just out of graduate school; some are men of 50 and 60.

We try, though only in part, to patronize scholarship

and science9 science in the old sense of the word, meaning both

• the natural science and the humanities, I think the parts

that are relevant to the welfare of the United States are

fairly limited. We have a very good training ground for

various students in pure mathematics, applied mathematics and

lllf 32835 Docid:364799 Page 85

 84
theoretical physics, Many of them wn. are at the Institute

are supported by the United States Government, many more

• go into work for a limited time or for a longer time on

behalf of our government.

We have a number af governmental undertakings, I think

one of the more ioterestiog·is that we seem fot the first

time to be able to predict cyclogeoesis, the generation of

storms. This is of practical value, and the government has

instituted a program based on the research started at the

institute.

We have one other function which I belie.v, to be

• important at this time. We are as much as we can.be with our

limited resources an open house to scholars throughout the

free world, from Europe, from Japan, from India, mostly, of

course, from Europe. I think more than half of our people are

from outside the United States. I think we.go a long way

toward persuading a very small fraction of the people abroad

that the United States is a humane and civilized place, and

programs about the Institute have been carried by the Voice

of America, and in State Department bulletins, and I beleve

•
that the ill-fated glossy magazine that we put out· in the

soviet Union, called "America", published an account of our

work,

In aoy case, there are many people in the government

who are proud of what we are doing, and I am proud of it,

llV 3283~ DocJ:d:36.&799 Page 86

 85

Q Do you have occasion to use classified material at

the Iastitute?

A The Iastitute has never accepted -- I don•t know how

• the Board of Trustees would respond -- a classified contract.

It has never been asked to accept one. There is work going

on at the Iastitute which is very close to classified work,

but by the time it is fed in to us, it is unintelligible,

and therefore declassified.

Individual members of the Institute, of course, have

done classified work. I am an obvious example, George F.

}<.&I? tr .MV
XelNaa is an example, von Neumann is an example, I woa•t

reel off the list of names. This is an affair between the

• individual and the government.

objection.
The Insti~ute interposes no

Every year I get a letter from Los Ala mos, "Do you

object if we renew the contracts of these people", and I say

that it is up to them and up to you.

Q What security methods have you used at the

Institute in connection with your own classified materials

in the past?

A They have been very elaborate. When I came to

• Princeton, The Atomic Energy

secret facility.
Co~mission established a top

I need not describe the rigamarole that

goes into this, the warning systems and a 11 the rest. There

is a vault there. It has been moved recently, but it still is

llW 3283l Docld:364799 Page 87

 86

at the Institute. I !we never known the canbination. The

combination has been rigidly guarded. I believe our record

•
is that we have never even displaced a document, I hope this

continues to be true. That facility is still in e~istence

for the benefit of other people who wish to use it,

Q When did you come to the Institute at Princeton?

A I came. in the late summer, I think, of 1947. I had

been a professor at California Institufle of Technology and

at the University of California at Berkeley. In late 1946

perhaps or early 1947, the present Chairman of the Atomic

Energy Commission was Chairman of the Nominating "'ommittee to

seek a new director to succeed Dr. Aydelott at the Institute

• and he offered me the job stating that the trustees and the

faculty desired this.

I did not accept at once. I like California very

much, and my job there, but I had, as wi l_l appear, not spent

very much time in California, Also, the opportunity to be in

a small center of scholarship across the board was very

attractive to me, Before I accepted the job, and a number

of conversations took place, I told Mr. Strauss there was

derogatory information about me. In the course of the

• confirmation hearings on Mr. Lilienthal especially, and the

rest of the (;ommissiooers, I believe Mr, Hoo.ver sent my file to

the Commission, and Mr, Strauss told me that be had examined

it rather carefully. I asked him whether this seemed to him

lllf 32835 Docid:364799 Page 88

 87

in any way an argument against my accepting this job,

and he said no, on the contr9¥-- anyway, no -- in April

• I heard over the radio I had accepted, and decided that was a

good idea.

Q
I have been there since.

You said you had not spent much time in C.alifornia.

That I take it was because of your ·engagement ir• pubLir.

service in a rather continuous way'!

A Yes.,

Q That leads, I .think, naturally into a discussion

of your record of public service, and l would like to begin,

Dr. Oppenheimer, with the war years, and have you tell the

•
Board how you happened to get involved in atomic bomb work •

A In the autumn of 1941 I was asked by Arthur Compton

to attend a session of the Special Committee of the National

Academy of Sciences, which had been set up to study the

military uses of fission, the uranium project.

• ... ' .
I think that

committee ha~ other meetings.~;...

; ·, : 1·;
I attended a two day meeting,
·;.. ... .' ,..

At that time -- I need not go into details -- I took an

active part in the discussion.

Q What was your position?

A I was pr.ofessor of physics at the University of

• California, I took an active part in the discussion primarily,

I think, to be sure that the open questions were recognized

as open and some sketch of a program understood. I believe

everyone there was quite clear that we had to8> ahead with this.

RV 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 89

 88

The next step was double. On t~e one hand,

Earnest Lawrence, who was Director of the Radiation Laboratory

at Berkeley, had on the trip to this meeting become more and

• more enthusiastic about the pro11.pects for an electromagnetic

separation of uranium isotopes, and we talked about that the

whole way. When he got back, he started getting other

people thinking about it, and I became a sort of advisor or

consultant without appointment.to that undertaking. I don't

remember just when, but some time in the course of the next

few months I had an idea which turned out to have been useful.

It was not decisive, but it perhaps doubled or tripled the

capacity, or halved orthirded the price of the plant they were

•• building.

I met with them quite often at their Steering

Committee and Coordinating Committee meetings, but never as

an employee. l was still teaching and in fact teaching more

than usual, because other people bad gone off to work on radar

and we were very badly understaffed.

Other things that I began to think more intensively and

on my own about how to make atomic bombs and made some

calculations on efficiency, design, probably amounts of materia J

• and so on, so that I got into it.,and !mew something about it •

The result was that when I was called probably in the first

days of 1942 -- anyway after Pear 1 Harbor -- to Chicago, I

was able to give a little information about this aspect of

llV 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 90

''
 89
the problem. The main thing the Chiego people were up to

was building reactors to make plutonium, or trying to see if

•
they bould build reactors to make plutonium, But in the

original assignment of t.he responsibility,. work on fast fission,

which is wh11t they used as a shorthand for the bomb, was also

part of their job,

The man in charge of it was Gregory Breit, ·ue had

the wonderful code name of Coordinator of Rapid Rupt1111e,

le wrote me some. time in the spring, suggesting that we might

have a conference in Minneapolis, that ·he was interested· in

work I had been dding, and perhaps might even want to come

•
longer to llinneapolis. This never matured. I think Breit

quit in June, I believe it was.

I went on to Chicago at Arthur Compton's request.

I made arrangements to have Bethe and Teller and a few other

people meet and also the heads of the sub-undertakings that

were trying to make measurements relevant to the design·of

bombs and specifications of bombs, and we had confereices

for some days.

Fa.irly early in the game, Arthur Comptan said

would I take charte of this part of the work and I agreed to

• do so 0

two parts.
We also agreed that at that moment the job fell into

One was the job of analysis and thinking, of

theory, and we would set that up as a summer study in

~ lftf 3283~ _DocI~:364799 Page 91

 90

Berkeley. The other was to try to get some sense into

the distorted and fra,mentary work that was going on in a

number of laboratories. There was a third part which was to

• get some new projects started.

Q You spoke about the fragments and the scattering.

I take it that was one of .the factors that led you to think

in terms of what ultimately was to become Los Alamos?

A It did not go quite so fast. We spent this summer in

study, and I traveled around and saw most of the laboratories.

I had very good help from John Manley, who is not Jack

Manley. We had a very heavy study, and began to see what was

involved, not all of it, I would not say all of it until

• much later, and also spent a fantastically large f1·action of

our time on the thermonuclear program,

we really got into it,

That is the first time

What we then saw of the thermonuclear program was

not very relevant to what you are reading in the papers today.

But it excited us, and it seemed to make even more nec~ssary

that we understand what this was all about.

After our conferences were over, I went and reported

to Compton who was off on a summer holiday about this aspect

• af 1 t, as well as others. I then came on, I think, at his

request, and saw Dr, Bush and told him about it,

at about this time prepared a report on our views for

We also

transmission to the British.

llV 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 92

 91

There was a fairly complete interchange. We did

not write about the thermonuclear program, but we wrote

•
about some of the subtleties of the atomic homb program,

Then we began to notice how very much needed doing

and how much the little laboratories were suffering from their.

isolation,

There was supposed to be security; anyway, .there

was good compartmentalization and the result waq that people

would not know what was going on anywhere else. Work was

duplicated, and there was almost no sense of hope or direction

in it,

•
By the fall of 1942, not only the theoretical people

but anyone who knew the experimental sit·uation realized that

this bad to be pulled together. It was not the first jqb,

The first job was to make the stuff •. But in hope that would

come out all right, we had to have a place where we could

learn what to do with it. Thiswas not trivial. We therefore

started chattering about should we have a laboratory in

Chicago, should we have one at Oak Ridge, The prevailing

notion was that there would be more or less a conventional

laboratory until such time as we were really ready to get

• into almost ordnance experiments, and then we would go uout

and get a proving ground somewhere, which would be rather

remote and a very few people inv.olved.

This did not seem sound. It seemed. to me and

I llW 3283~ .Docid:364799 Page 93

 92

knowledgeable people, it was one package, ordnance, chemistry,

physics theory, effects, all had to be understood together

or the job would not get done. These were the considerations

• that led me to say to General Groves, who had by then

been brought into the project as its head, that I thought

a bomb laboratory wa~ a good idea, That I thought it needed

to 111/e t!o characteristics; one, that it be free internally

to talk abot.i; problems from one part of the job to the other,

and that its external security be very, very good indeed,

that it be isolated, if necessary guarded, and all the rest

of it.

General Groves was very much interested from the

• beginning. I think I had a message fr om him to come ·on down

to discuss the matter, and I remember that he and Colonel

Nichols, and Colonel Marshall, and I got into some very

limited' place· on the Twentieth Century Limited and talked about

plans for such a post.

The original plans were much too small. They had

in mind that it might be a useful thing if the key personnel

of the laboratory were commissioned. I at that time very

foolishly I think had no objection to it. I would have been

• glad to be an officer.

But it wa~
I thought maybe the others would •

not very long before I talked to people who had

to come to Los A1amos, especially those who had experience

in radar and in military research, and they explained that

lllf 32835 Docid:364799 Page 94

 93
it was hopeless to superimpose on a natural technical

organization of a laboratory the irrelevant and sort of

• additional organization of the military establishment •

agreed,
We had a long hassle about that, I think everyone

In a letter which reached me early in 1943, signed

by Groves and Conant, it was asreed that initially the workers

iD the laboratory would be civilians, It was contemplated that

later at the more critical phases the key people would be

commissioned, That plan was dropped, I think essentially

because the numbers got so big and there was no need for it,

and it became impractical,

About this time, in the autumn of 1943, Groves

sent an engineer around to look for a place. He was around

in the southwest where I knew the country and in New Mexico,

and I showed him and showed General Groves the City of Los

Alamos. This appealed to General Groves very much, and he

moved with unbelievable dispatch to acquire it, and we

started construction.

It may be of interest to you that one of the first

buildings built, and one of the first projects that we started

was a measurement of the properties of tritium, which is

• a conceivably important part of the thermonuclear prosram, and

one of the first buildings built at Los Alamos had as its

purpose the handling of materials that we thought might be

of interest in thermonuclear work,

llW 3283~ Docld:36,799 Page 9~

 94

We put up a laboratory and a lot of houses which

were hopelessly inadequate to our future needs, but at least

did get us started. The real problem, of course, had nothing

• to cl> with that.

come there,
It had to do with persuading people to

I think it true that at that time among

scientists engaged in inaediate military problems, radar, under-

water sound, ordnance and so on, the name of the uranium

project was not good, because work had been coing on for a

number of years without very much sense ot direction. There

was great fear that this was a boondoggle, which would in

fact have nothing to do with the war we were fighting.

Very, very few people turned us down coming to Los Alamos,

but this was work for everyone. I think it was perhaps most

work for me. I got a large group from Princeton, many

people from the dhemistry group in Berkeley, where we recruited

the key chemical personnel. A group from Stanf·Ord, I won't

bore you with the details of this. But it took from perhaps

Oc.tober or November 1942 until March of 1943 t.o- g-e1. the

rudiments of a laboratory. We stole a cyclotron from Harvard,

some accelerators from Wisconsin, Everybody arrived with

trunkloads of junk and equipment, and in this way we were

• able to be doing experiments -- well, I got to los Alamos

toward the end of March, the equipment started coming a

few days later, and by June we were finding out things that

nobody knew be.fore. That we thought was a fairly good record

1111 32835 Docld:36,799 Page 96

 95
of speed,

We bad a general notion at that time that all the

work of the laboratory would be open to all the scientific

members of the laboratory. This is a matter which General

Groves, I think, concurred in, but which he never entirely

liked, In other words, within the laboratory the competent

people were supposed to know what the story was. It turned

out over and over again this was a wise po Ucy .. Good ideas

came from places that you would not have expected, Enthusiasm

and understanding could be generated because people knew what

it was all about,

On the other ~and, we communicated very sparingly and

• through quite sestricted external channels with other parts

of the Manhattan District, the places that were makinr the

materials, and the other laboratories, and I should say not

at all or almost not at all with any other military research

establishments, except those from whom we needed rear, We

bad some really fantastic security provisions, They were not

in the en4 effective as we know. Families were su~posed to

come with their husbands if they wanted to, but they were not

allowed to leave. We did have to let a couple of people

• leave the project, but tle onus of doing this was very rreat an•

the pressure against it ve:y great.

calls monitored,
We had all our phone

It was illegal .to mail a letter except

in the authorized drops and ingoing and outgoing mail was

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 97

 96

censored.

Our names were not known and our drivers licenses

were all made out under fictitious or artificial names. The

• laboratory was guraded within the post and the post was

gu11Tded. We went to precautions which did not do the trick,

but which looked very formidible at the time.

I bad partly the job of devising these idiotic

things and partly the job of making them welcome, I engaged

in several speeches why these precautions were necessary and

desirable, I think I took most people along pretty well

so that there was not too much kicking about the security

regulations. I think we may have a letter which President

• Roosevelt wrote to me for the laboratory, I should think,

and which gives some people two aspects of it. It was a sort

of officia 1 statement that the security provisions, however

irksom9, were justified, and the other was that we better get

on the job. We had enemies who might be up to it, and we

better beat, them to the draw, Shall we simply submit t.his?

MR. GARRISON: I would like to read this letter

into the record . at this point, i1 I may. This is a letter

from President Roosevelt to Dr. Oppenheimer, under date

• of June 29, 1943:

"lly dear Dr, Oppenheimer:

"I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly

important and secret program of research, development and

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 98

 97

manufactare witb which you are familiar, I was very glad to

bear of the excellent work which is being done in a number

• of places in this country under the immediate supervision of

Genera 1 L. R. Groves and the renera 1 direction of the Committee

of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the

problem is of the utmost importance to the national safety,

and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short

a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted coopera-

tion of all concerned.

"I am writing to you as the leader of one croup

which is to play a vital role in the months ahead. I know

that you and your colleagues are working on a hazardous

••• matter under unusual circumstances. The fact that the outcome

of your labors if of such great significance to the nation

requires that this program be even more drastically guarded

than other highly secret war developments. I have therefore

given directions that every precaution be taken to insure the

•
security of your project and feel sure that those in charge

will see that these orders are carried out. You are fully

aware of the reasons why your own endeavors and those of your

associates must be circumscribed by very special restrictions,

• Nevertheless, I wish you would express to the •cientists

assembled with you my deep appreciation cf their willingness

to undertake the tasks which lie before them in spite of

the dangers and the personal sacrifices. I am sure we can

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 99

 98
we can rely on their continued wholehearted and unselfish

labors. Whatever the enemy may be planning, American scienee

wi 11 be equa 1 to the challenge. With 1his thought in mind, I

• send this note of confidence and appreciation,

''Though there are other important groups at work,

I am writing only to you as the leader of the one which is

operatin1 under very special conditions, and to General

Groves. While this letter is secret, the contents of it may

be disclosed to your associates under a pledge of secrecy.

"Very sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevel't,"

BY llR. GARR'ISON:

Q This, I gathered, was in connection with your own

• efforts to impress upon the group the parmount needs of

security and tb4' importance of the work they were doing,

A The importance I think there was very little doubt

about. Everybody who was there who was a scientist knew it

was important. We had a great deal of trouble with people_

who were not given information, with technicians, machinists,

and so on, who found the ccnditions of life very disagreeable

and no countervailing advantage of being associated with

something they understood. But the scientists knew it was

• important •

you?
Q You were under a great deal of time pressure, were

Was there a sense of urgency in the air?

A My directive, I haven't got it, it is probably at

~ 32835 Docid:364799 Page 1DD

 99

Los Alamos as part of the record, was to lose no day in

preparing an atomic bomb. The definition of an atomic bomb

• was that it should be at least equal to 1000 tons of TNT in

explosive force, This sense of pressure started at the

beginning and never let up, I will come in a moment to bow

it was at the end.

If you want to ask anything about it, please do

not hesitate to interrupt me,

DR. GRAY: Yes. I think, Dr. Oppenheimer, we would

prefer for ynu to go ahead. I do not want to say that no

member of the Board or counsel will not interrupt, and I think

•
we are free to do so, but I think we would like you to proceed
and if there is anything, we will inquire,

THE WITNESS: Fine, We started· out the job there

with two sets of meetings. One wa~ a large meeting --

DR. GRAY: When wa~ this?

THE WITNESS: This would have been April 1943. A

large meeting that I called all the people there in and a

number of others whom I hoped to lure there, and many of

whom were in fact later to come, to discuss the technical

The other was a review committee that Groves

• appointed, more or less to find out what we were up to and to

see that we were doing and what we 'were not doing. One of

the things that the review committee rec_ommended was that we

immediately get into the ordnance problems.

llV 32835 Docld:364799 Page 1D1

 100
This is something we felt very strongly. We

immediately got into large scale chemical and metallurgical

problems •

• Another thing they recommended was that I not try

to do everything myself, but get a personnel director, and.

some aides so that the place would run a little bit better,

We were building a town at the same time that we

were building the laboratory. The program of the laboratory

emerged fr om the technica 1 meetings, and so did many. r1 the

people whowere later to come there and play prominent parts.

Some of them are probably going to appear before you. Bethe

an enormous, robust and talented theoretical physicist;

• Aemiral Parsons, who was the head of the Ordnance Division

and is now gone. Fermi, who came in rather late· and became

an associate director and who among other things was in charge

of those activities of the laboratory whicM·were directly

not relevant to the atomic bomb but looked further ahead.

Bacher, who was in charge of one aspect of the physics of the

•
~e..h "'~
bomb, and who wi 11 appear later, Cyr i 1 Smith, .iiae•iee, ' '°'s
Hartley Rowe, who after he got back from General Eisenhower

in Normandy landings advised us on engineering problems and

• helped set up the Sandia laboratory which has played such a

large part since that time.

BY YR, GARRISON:

. Cl That is Mr, Rowe of the Unit<ltd Fruit Company?

llW 3283~ Docld:364799 P~ge 102

 101

A Yes, Norman Ramsey, who was Parson's deputy.

I mentioned some of the names of people who wi 11 appear

• here probably •

My job, I don't think too much should be made of it,

It was the job of being sure that people understood and that

the decisions were properly made, and there were many not easy

decisions. We did this through a system of groups, divisiom1

and coordinating councils and a steering committee which

finally made the determination of laboratory policy. Sometimes

on trivial things like on did we need another housing

·'
development, sometimes on very serious things which if made

•
wrong would in fact have prevented our doing the job. We had

quite complex relations in which Admiral Parsons was very

helpful with the military services who in the end had to

deliver t;bis thing, and had to train for delivering it, and

bad to be sure that they knew all about it, We had to agree

with them about the hardware, and be sure that the hardware

we were developing would be useable by airmen when they were

actually involved in it.

We had the problem of relations with the British.

Bacher and I were ca 1 led on to discuss with Chadwick and

• 1?e.i ~~t.5
P,owles, the state of the British program and where a British

mission was established at Los Alamos under the leadership

of Chadwick, who is very, tery famous and very forthright

British scientist, a mission of some 20 people, extre•ely good.

llW 3283' Docid:364799 Page 103

 -·---- ·----~--.·-.~--

I We had the problem of relations with the laboratories and

102

plants that were providing us with military, the question

of the specifications of the material and who was to do what •

• We had tbe normal administrative problems of a job that was

quite unfamiliar, not as dangerous as President'Roosevelt's

letter indicated, but still capable of great danger as

accidents occurring shortly after the war showed. It was very

new and terribly exciting,

We bad the job of keeping this rapid expansion and

with the very end large group of brilliant individualistic

and talented~people in harmony and pulling on the same team,

We bad people thei;e who were refugees from Germany and Italy.

• We bad Englishmen, we had lots of Americans.

funny way an international effort.

It was in a

I need to say that it was not an international

effort including Iron Curtain countries, I guess in ~hose days

there was only one iron curtain country. In a visit during

the summer of 1943, Colonel Lansdale, bead of Manhattan

District Security, in a talk, I think, to the key personnel

of the laboratory, made it very clear how great weight the

government attached to maintaining this operation secure

• against Russian espionage or Russian intelligence •

Q As the work progressed, you began to get goals and

deadlines, I suppose, against which to produce the bomb, if

you could?

llW 3283~ Docld:36t799 Page 1Dt

 ., 103

A The ideadline never changed. It was as soon as

possible. This depends on when we were ready, when the s.tuff

• was ready

Q
and bow much stuff we needed •

Wasn•t there a particular effort to get it done

before tbe Potsdam Conference?

A Yes, that was of course quite late. After the

collapse of Germany, we understood that it was important to get

this ready for the war.in Japan. We were told that it would

be very important -- I was told I guess by Mr, Sti~son

that it would be very important to know the state of affairs

before *he meeting at Potsdam at which the future conduct of

•
the war in the Far East would be discussed •

Q Discussed with the Russians?

A I don't want to overstate that. It was my under-

standing, and on the morning of July 16, I think Dr. Bush

told me, that it was the inteliion of the United States statesma1

who went to Potsdam to say something about this to the

Russians, I never knew how much. Mr. Stimson explained later

that he had planned to say a good deal more than what was

said, but when they saw what the Russians looked like and how

it felt, he didn't know whether it was a good idea, The

• historical record as it is published indicates that tbe

President said no more than we had a new weapon which we

planned to use in Japan, and· it was very powerful. I believe

we were under incredible pressure to get it done before the

RV 3283l Docid:3ti4799 Page 1Dl

 104

Potsdam meeting and Groves and I bickered for a couple of

days. But in actual time it has been done enough times.

There havebeen enough lurid news stories about that first

• test so that I need not repeat what it was like, In other

context it should ·be said that it was as successful as we had

any reason to hope, and I believe we got the job done as fast

as we could. That is what we were told to ct>.

MR. GARRISON: At this point I would like to read

. into the record a letter from General Groves --

MR. ROBB: May I inquire, Mr. Garrison, these are

copies, but you have the originals available?

MR, GARRISON: We have the· originals available and

• we would be very glad to show them to you.

MR. ROBB: Thank you.

MR, GARRISON: This is the letter of July 19, 1945,

from General Groves and Dr. Oppenheimer reading as follows:

"Since I returned to Washington l have done 11 tt le

else but think about and talk about the truly magnificent resul1

of the test conducted at Trinity last Monday morning."

Trinity was the code name for the place.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

• MR. GARRISCll: "As time goes on and the test begins

to take on its true perspective,

the outstanding performance of you and

r appreciate more and more
you~ people in making

the test so successful.

ll1f 3283~ Docid:364799 Paqe 1D6

 105
"General Farre 11 and I have dis cussed tbe project in

all its many phases and have reviewed it from every possible

• angle, We . both feel that tbe job is a high water mark of

scientific and engineering performance. Your leadership and

skill and the loyal and able performance of all your

subordinates made it possible,

"An immediate report was cabled to the Secretary of

War on Monday on the great performance.--"

That would be to Potsdam, I take it?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR, GARRISON: --" He promptly cable !I back heartiest

•
congratulations to all concerned. This morning a iuller

written report was sent to him by special courier and he should

have our impressions of the test by the name you get this

letter, I know that The President, The Secretaries of State

and War and General Marshall who are·so importantly engaged

at Potsdam now will be as tremendously impressed as we were

by the results of the test.

"I hope you will show or read the suitable parts

of this letter to the men who did so much to make the job go

so well and that you will extend to them my grateful thanks

• for a job well done.

"Again, with deepest thanks and every good wish for

the continued success of our great project from both General

Farrell and myself, I am, Sincerely yours, L. R. Groves; Major

Hlil 32835 Docid:364799 Page 107

 106

Genera 1, USA."

THE WITNESS: Now, there are a few points I might

• make about this period. After the test but before the pse

of the bombs in Japan, I had a meeting with General Groves

in Chicago to get some last minute arrangements fixed for the

combat use of the weapon. l asked him at that time, how do you

feel about this Super -- the Super was our code name for what

we then thought of the hydrogen bomb, and we don't know any

more than we did when he came up, there was a little work but

very inconclusive. As a matter of fact, the decisive measure-

ments on the behavior of tritium were on my desk when I got

• home --
DR. EVANS:

THE WITNESS:
What, sir?

The decisive measurements on the

tritium -- these are declassified now, as you know -- were on

my desk when I got back from Trinity, General Groves was

unclear whether his mandate and therefore mine extended to

fiddling with this next project. I so reported to the people

in the laboratory, who were thinking about it.

Th~ second point I would not think to mention

•
except that Mr. Garrison has asked me and that is whether

there was any change in tempo after the war against Germany

ended. There was, but it was upward, It was upward simply

because we were still more frantic to have the job done and

wanted to l'Ble it done so that if needed, it would be available,

llW 3283~ Docld:36•799 Page 108

 107

In any case, we wanted to have it done before the

war was over and nothing much could be done. I don't think

there was any time where we worked harder at the speedup

• than in tbs pericxl after the German surrender and the actua 1

combat use of the bomb.

The third thing is that I did suggest to General

Groves some chances in bomb design which would make more

efficient use of the material, and they have long since b.een

done, of course, He turned them down as jeopardizing the

promptness of the availability of bombs. He and I may not

entirely agree about how long a delay would have been involved,

but the very fact that any delay was involved was unacceptable •

• Finally, tkere was, of course, a great deal of

discussion -- and I will return to the formal aspects of

that -- about the desirability of using the bombs in Japan.

I think the hotbed of this discussion waq in Chicago rather

than in Los Alamos. At Los Alamos I heard very little talk

about it, We always assumed if they were needed, they would

be used, But there were places where peple said for the

future of the world it ~ould be better not to use them.

This problem was referred to me in a capacity differer

• than director of Los Alamos, We did everything we could to

get them out there and as fast and smooth as possible.

There was, however, at Los Alamos a change in the

feel of people. I .. talking vaguely because this is a

llW 3283~ Docid:36C799 Page 109

 108
community now of 7 or 8 thousand people, of whom maybe 1,000

or more are scientists and very close to each other, talking

• all the time. This was partly a war measure, but it was

also something that·was here to stay. There was a great

sense of uncertainty and anxiety about what should be done

about it.

The generation of that kind of public -- of a concern

very similar to the public concern -- that followed;Hiroshima

and one natural·,outgrowth of which was our abortive effort

to estab'lli!lh quite a new relation among nations in the control

of atomic energy, that was not something that had its roots

•
very far back, it started toward the end when the war was

about over.

Hiroshima was, of course, very successful, partly

for reasoos unanticipted by us. We had been over the targets

with a committee that was sent out to consult us and to

consider them and the targets that were bombed were among

the list that seemed bright to us.

The Secretary of War deleted one target, and I have

always been glad he did, That was the unbombed and culture

capital of Japan, Kyoto. He strdck that off, The two that

• ware hit were among the targets selected, We sent a mission

on out from Los Alamos to assemble, test the bombs on

Tinian, and to fly with the B-29's that went out over the

targets, and al~o to go in as soon as they could get clearance

llW 3283.5 Docid:364799 Page 110

 109

from General MacArthur.

That mission wa~ under General Farrell who might

appear. I am not sure he can. to see what •ess we made of

• those two towns,

When the war wa over we came east., Dr. Bacher.

Dr. Rabi and I together. There was a rumor of some wondtdul

method of getting energy for nothing that the General

Electric research people had discovered, Groves thought l

ought to have a look at it. It turned out to be nonsense.

In the course of this visit I talked with General Groves.

There were at least two points that I ought to report.

One was that I told him that as I had earlier

• suggested in outlining what the future work of the

laboratory would be, I thought I should not' continue as

director. I was the director of an emergency. This was going

to be something different, and I would not be the right person

to preside over the change or the new effort.

In addition, there was not much left in me at the

moment. We talked about my successor. This was not a

trivial problem. It took a while. I talked to Commander

Bradbury, I talked to General Groves. Everyone was pleased

• with that and I think it was a very fine selection.

therefore free to resign and did mid-October, October 16th

or something like that.

I was

The other thing is that General Groves told me very

lllf 3283~ Docid:36•799 Page 111

 110
briefly that be bad been told by Governor Byrnes, Justice

Byrnes, I guess, who was then I think representing the

•
President on the Secretary of War's Interim Committee, that

with things as they were, the work at Los Alamos ought to

continaa. but this did not apply to the "Super" or didn't

think this applied to the Super.

I don't know whether I left out some thinJs that

would be illuminating. This is not a very vital part of our

story from the point of view of the case, and I would like to

get on.

MR. GARRISCJI: I happen to have here, Mr. Chairman,

the original of the United States of America Medal for

• Merit , •warded to Dr. Oppenheimer, and I would just like to

read it, It would only take a second. The citation is

signed by President Truman to Dr. Oppenheimer "for exceptiona 11~

meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service

to the War Department, in brilliant accomplishments involving

creat responsibility and scientific distinction in

connection with the development of the greatest military

weapon of all time, the atomic bomb, As director of the

Atomic Bomb Project Laboratory in New Mexico, his initiative

• and resourcefulness, and his unswerving devotion to duty have

contributed immeasurably to the successful attainment of the

objective. Dr. Oppenheimer's accomplishments reflect great

credit upon himself and upon the military service," Signed,

JIV 32835 Docid:36t799 Page 112

 •

111

"Harry Truman."

I am sorry I didnt have a copy for you to follow.

I
I MR. ROBB: That is already in the file.

1!
• MR. GARRISON:

DR. GRAY:
This is January 12, 1946,

You wish to read that in the record?

i MR. GARRISON: Yes. I think that is enough for the

I
I war period, I think we will now swing into the postwar
I
problems that arose immediately out of the war, and ·the way

in which they in~olved Dr, Oppenheimer in the service of the

country.

BY MR, GARRISON:

Q You went back to Berkeley, of course, or you

• A

Q
We are not quite so far.
• •
went back to • Pasadena after you left Los Alamos

What did you want to say previous?

A In May I was asked to serve on the Interim

r
Committee which Mr. Stimson set up.

Q This prevented your leaving,

A Yes, this was before I left Los Alamos, Lawrence,

Fermi and Arthur Compton were the other members of this panel.

We met with the Interim Committee I think on the lst of June

I DI not certain -- of 1945 for a very prolonged discussion

'
which was attended by all members of the committee, all

members of the panel and for most of the time General Marshall,

Apart from trying to make as vivid as we could the

32835 Docid:364799 Page 113

 112.

novelty, the variety and the dynamic quality of this field,

which we thought uery important to get across, that this

• was not a finished job, and there was a heck of a lot we didn't

know, much of the discussion 1·esolved around the question

raised by Secretary Sti1111on as to whether there was any hope

at all of using this developme.:it to get less barbarous

relations with the Russians.

The other two assignmnnts wbi:h the panel had, one

was quite slight, We were aske1J to comuient on whether the

bomb should be used. I think the season we were asked for that

comment wu1 because 11 petition ?1ad been sent iu from a very

•
distinguished and thoughtful grJUp of scientistti, "No, it

should not be used," It would be better for everyt1..\ng that

tbey should not. We didn't know beans about the milita,v

situation in Japan, We didn't know whether they could be

caused to surrend·ar by othel' means or whether the invasion

was really inevi1;able. But in back of our minds was the

notion that tbe invasion was inevitable, because we bad been

told that. I have not been able to review this document,

but what it said I think is characteristic of how.technical

•
people should answer questions •

We said that we didn't think that being scientists

especi'i l ly qua lifted us as to bow to answer this quest ion of

bow tt.e bombs shot ld be used or not; opinion was divided

among us as it would be among other people if they knew about

 113

it. We thought the two overriding coDSiderations were the

savinf of liv•s in the war, aJU! the effect of our actions on

the stability, on our strength and the stability of the post

• war world. We did

be very impressive.
say that we did not think exploding one

of these things as a firecracker over a desert was likely to

This was before we had actually done that.

The destruction on the desert is zero, as I think Mr. Gray

may be able to remember, He had seen all these tests.

The other assignment brought me and the other members

of the panel to Washington. They asked us to produce a

prospectus about what needed to be done in atomic energy.

We wrote a great big book, We called in all sorts of people

• Allison -- well, there is a list somewhere about -- I wou't

try to remembe; -- Allison, Rabi, Lawrence,· Thomas -- and

tried to give as good an account of where the problem stood

as we could.•

This included the military applications. There was

a special chapter on the thermonuclear problem written by

Fermi, on the delivery problem, making weapons that were less

clumsy than the ones we had, on the use of atomic energy for

power, and its use for propulsion, its use for instruments·

• of scientific investigation, neutrons and radioactive tracers,

Anyway, it was a fairly big fat book. I suppose it is from

that that the remark is quoted on the feasibility of the

Super that is ascribed to m e in 1945. In any case that would

. - . 32835 Docld:364.799 Page 115

 --··--·-----

114

have been· my summary view of it at that time.

In connection with writing this report, I became

• involved in other ac.tivities here in Washington, The War

Department was anxious to get legislation passed so that the

atomic energy enterprise was not part of its budget and

responsibility, General Marshall talked to me about 1t,and

Mr. Harrison, who was Mr. Stimson's tide, talked to me about

it and others as well. The matter seemed to be a bit st·uck

because on the one hand it was difficult to present

legislation on the domestic control of atomic energy without

saying whether you were going to do anything toward seeking

•
an :t;nt.ernational control of some kind,

On the other band, the State Department was not

quite clear what it wanted to say about this for very ual!r-

standable reasolis. Therefore, I was asked to consult with

Mr, Acheson and eventually with Mr. 'Byrnes and the purposes

of my visits were double, One was to explain bow important

it was for the survival of any atomic energy enterprise· at all

that there be some legishtion and soon. That the people who

were working on the job had some assurance of where they were

going. And t.be second was to urge that .in so far as it could

• be with safety done, we explore the possibility of international

control.

I did that as I say with Mr, Acheson and Mr, Byrnes. Then

I went back to Los Alamos, .We turned in our report from the

IRl-3283~ Docld:364799 Page 116

r 115.

Interim Committee. I was called back to testify on a matter

not direl::tly connected with the atom, and thatwas a pair of

bills to set up a National Science Foundation by the Joint

• ·Committee called the Kilgore-Magnuson Committee. I did so

testify and they asked me what the relation between the atomic

energy undertaking and the National Science Foundation should

be, and I think this is the first time I had public occasion

to talk about the importance of unplanned and unprogrammed

scientific work, the enormous .importance of training

scientists, the importance of freedom in scientific world

. . opposed to the need for programmatic and concentrated work

on practical problems.

• The next day I went up before Bepresentative May's

committee which was cons.illering the May-Johnson Bi 11.

May-Johnson bill was the outgrowth of the effort to get

The

legislation adopted. The President had stated that be would

seek international control, first talk with our allies, the

British and Canada, and other nations, and he was considering

a measure which would at least put our domestic house in order.

This bill had been introduced in the House and Senate

simultaneously, Hearings were being held on it in the House.

• Kost scientists and I think all the liberal press was very

mad at this bill, It •ounded repressive.

penalties for revealing information,

It bad severe

It gave the Commission

that was to handle the atom rather wide and rather undefined

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Pave 117

 .\

111

powers. I had a lot of confidence in the people who had

drafted it, and the people who would be administering it, and

•
I testified in favor of it as an interim measure, because I

thought the sooner this got into organized hands, the better

chance that places like Oak Ridge and Los Alamos would be

taken good care of, and after a year there would be plenty

of chance to amend the legislation with whatever one had

learned in between.

The newspaper PM had on the basis of my testimony

the day before made one of their cartoons "Hats Off", on the

basis of my testimony on this bill put in another cartoon

Hats On" • . They didn't like i.t,

•
0

After that I went with Patterson -- I think before

this Stimson. had left Washington. I saw him on the last

day he was in office here, and he Ill d indicated to me on that

day that he thought it right and necessary to see if we could

work out an international agreement on the regulation of the

atom -- I went with Patterson to talk to President Truman

A-1"4
about it, He told me that he had invited King Mi- Atlee to

come and they would shortly l:!e getting into it. By this time

I moved to Pasadena.·

• I took up a job there as professor of phJ'Sics.

Idid actually give a course, bi;at it is obscure to me how I

gave it now. The intention was to make that quite a fu 11 time

job; and settle in Pasadena at least for that year. I still

)llif 32835 Docld:364799 Page 118

 117

had the appointments at the University of California at

Berkeley and the California Institute of Technology at

Pasadena. I was called away from Pasadena to come back to

• Washington and testify before McMahon's committee, I was sort

of reluctant to do it dn the ground that I hoped to stay put,

But I ca- back, He kept me over for several days to. give

both public testimony and secret testimony.

While that was going on, I was brought into

conferences in the State Department

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q That committee of McMahon's was for what purpose?

A The Special Senate Committee h• was trying to study

• the atom and draft legislation which was better than the

May-Johnson bill, the committee that led to the McMahon Act

under which we are operating even today. I was called into

the State Department in the preliminary discussions of what

the mission that was going over to Moscow might talk to the

llussians about. The United States, England and Canada had

issued a very resounding declaration about the need for

international control of atomic energy consistent with safe-

guards, and the question was what do we do next.

• We discussed this at some length. I got the

impression that we didn't have a very \11!1.l thought through

notion of what international control was, or what we •ould

say to the Russians, and I think it 6nded by our simply asking

lllf 32835 Docld:36•799 Page 119

 118
them to subscribe to the three power declaration,

It is, I think, partly because of that that my interest

•
in and to some extent my knowledge about the problem became

known to people in the Department, and the result was that I

was called back shortly after the opening of the next year

for very serious work on the problem of international control.

I ought to mention one thing that occurred in Pasaden

at that time. General Groves had this immense mass of

technical information developed during the war. A11 of it

was secret. some was about lubricants, some about valves and

some about bombs. He wanted to get started on the job of

•
sorting it out • What should be made public,· what should by

all means not be made pub lie, and what should be wnrried

about,

He appointed Dr, Richard Tolman in Pasadena as

the chairman of the committee, and I was a member of it. You

have a list of the other members. I think Lawrence and Urey

were on it, to begin this process of sorting it out. We

divided things into three classes; those which were manifestly

useful for science and the arts, and seemed to have no

security value of any kind; those that were obviously

• connected with the military aspects of atomic energy and

which should not be' declassified unless there were international

safeguards, an intermediate ~lass of tough problems where

we thought it would be dependent on the political assessment

HW 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 120

 \
119

of the state of the enemy -- it was not enemy in those days

of loviet efforts and the prospects of conflict in a short

time •

• Our general philosophy was that if we are going to

have a long, long period when we are not going to use these

things and don't need these things, the more that is open,

the better American technology and science will prosper.

If the time is kind of short, then the advantages of our

secretly developed inforllltion will be considerable.

DR. GRAY: You say ~r. Tolman was chairman of this

committee?

THE WITNESS: That is right,

• DR. GRAY:

THE WITNESS:
What was this committee called?

I have it down as Declassification

Committee, but I am not sure, May I at this point interpolate

that the biographical material that you were given late this

morning was compiled by a very intelligent secretary, I did

check with her on one or tko things I remember. The records

are good only since we came to the Institute. I wouldn't have

you tlink that they are admirable records of the years

during the war, bec .. e there just are no such things. It is

• the best we could do for your convenience •

Q
BY YR, GARRISON:

Then this takes us into t.he beginning of the plans

for international control of atomic energy.

llV 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 121

 120

A Yes.

Q And the preliminary discussions within the government

about that?

A I have talked about some of the preliminary

discussions, I believe the background for the Lilienthal

paDll. was the following, The Russians didn't want 't'o talk

about the atom at Moscow, but they did agree to this three

power declaration, and they threw the thing into the United

Nations. There there was another resounding declaration and

two Senators, Vandenberg and Connally, were disturbed that

this might leak secrets, that we might not be adequately

protected.

The Secretary of State said no, there wiJ,l be safe-

guards. When be got home be set up a committee under the

chairmanship of Mr. Acheson, with General Groves, Dr. Bush,

Dr. Conant and Jack Mccloy on it, and they were supposed to

devise the safeguards. They sta~ted thinking about the safe-

guards and in Kr, Acheson's words, they soon found they were

trying to devise a cowcatcher without ever having seen a

locomotive, because nobody knew what was meant by international

control. What sort of things would be, who would do what

and what would the rules be, They appointed a panel of which

Lilienthal was chairman, the membershipiou have in full

WIHW(J.,
there, Mr. Barnard was on it, and Mr. 'We+ne)" was on 119 and

we were supposed to make a sketch of intern,ational control

llW 3283' Docid:36•799 Pa9e 122

 121

which would be useful in coping with the atom and which would,

if possible, be a step in carrying out that avowed intent

of our action, namely, so to alter the relations between

• nations that war itself would be a lot less likely.

This wa"' a pretty ambitious thing with a 11 that in

mind, It did not work, but people were talking that way in

those days, and I must say that 1 was one·of those who

talked that way very freely.

Q Did you about this time prepare a memorandum to

llr, Lilienthal containing your ideas?

A The way it worked is that we met and in the first

f•w weeks, a week or two, my job was that of teacher. I would

• get back at the blackboard and say.you can make energy this

way in a periodic table, and that way and that way,

the way bombs are made and reactors are made.

This is

I gave in

other words a course. I gave parts of this course also to

Mr. Acheson nnd Mr. McCloy at night informally. When we

listened to parts of it that I didn't know anything about,

where the raw materials were, and what kind of headache that

was. Then everybody was kind of depressed the way people are

about the a.tom, and we decided to take a recess.

• Mr. Lilienthal asked everybody to write him a note

if they had any ideas as to what might work and asked me in

particular to write a primer on the subject so that people

could have the.facts at their disposal. I stayed in Washington

llV 3283~ Docld:36•799 Page 123

 122

and did both of these. I think the note is the thing to which

you refer.

Q Yes. I show you this document entitled• "Memorandum

0 of February 2, 1946". I* should be entitled. "Extract from

memorandum of February 2, 1946, from Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer

to David E. Lilientha'l, Chairman of the Board of Consultants

to the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy,"

This extract has been copied, has it not, from a carbon copy

in your files from a memorandum which you gave to Mr,

Lilienthal at the time?

:.
A So you tell me. There is no reason why the whole

memorandum should not be available, but it is rather long.

MR. GARRISU'I: I might say to the Board that we

will from time to time as we go along be offering you extracts

'
from writings and articles and addresses of Dr. Oppenheimer.
I
I The full text of each ofthose will be available to the
I
II
I Board, and the only reason for taking excerpts from them
I
I
is to save time, and because they have a certain relevance
I
''
to Dr. Oppenheimer's views at the time with respect to our forei~

\
relations, This is an example of what we shall be doing, I

i
I :""'
would just like to read this, because it is quite a significant

document.

"It is probable that the main desire of our Government

is the achievement of safety and protection against the threat

of atomic war.fare. Even if it were possible to achieve

 123

this without considering such positive features as the

extension of knowledge and its application to constructive

purposes, it might be argued that such a aourse should not be

fol lowed. It is my belief that qui ta apart from its

desirability, the provision for constructive development of

the field of atomic energy will turn out to be essential for

the operation of any system of safeguards, •• In particular,

it has become clear to us that not only politically, but

scientifically and technically as well, the field ~f atomic

energy has witnessed very rapid change and very rapid progress.

I believe that this will be the case in the future, too, and

that no organization and no proposal can be effective which

does not have a flexibility adequate to these changes, I

further believe that any proposed organization must itself

reflect the changing character of the problem and the

constructive purposes which are a complement to control, • ,

"Almost everyone has, at one stage or another in his

acquaintance with this problem, considered prohibiting further

work on atomic energy, and devising a system of inspection

adequate to insure that this prohibition is carried out. It

is not only that this proposal would make impossible the

application of existing knowledge to constructive ends; it

would be so contrary to the human patterns of exploration

and exploitation that no agreement entered into by heads of

state could command the interest or the oooperation of the

llV 32835 Docld:364799 Page 125

 124

people of the world. An apparently less radical solution

would be the separation of the functions and development and

•• of control according to ~hich the only responsibility of an

international authority would be the inspection of work

carried out under a purely national or private iniaiative, and

the possible prohibition of some of this work. The negative

approach to the problem of control would leave the inspecting

agency with inadequate insight, both into the technical state

of the subject, and into its motivation and the organic

characteristics of its growth. . •

"Against this background of the difficulties of

•
control as an isolated and negative function, I have thought

it essential at least to consider combining the functions of

development and of control in a single agency. It is fairly

certain that there are· now, and will increasingly be,

activities having to do with atomic energy which are not vital

to control and which, for human, or organizational, or politica·

I
reasons should not be included lmPng the functions of the

controlling authority; .bat there are certainly several s.uch

functions which, as matters now appmar, should be so included

among them: the development of raw materials, the exploration

• of atomic weapons, and the application, in its more dangerous

forms, of atomic energy to power and technology. • • .

MR. ROBB: Do you have the original of tt.at, Mr.

Gaarison, so that we can see the end of these sentences?

11¥ 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 126

 125

THE WITNESS: We have only my own carbon of it,

but we have it complete.

MR. ROBB: That is what I mean,

THE Wl'll!ESS: I am not ashamed of any aspect of the

memorandum.

MR. ROBB: I was not suggestiDi that you are, Doctoro

THE WITNESS: I didn't want to burden you with it,

DR. GRAY: May I ask a question there. Is your

request there for the purposes of making the entire memorandum

part of the record?

MR, ROBB: Oh, no.

MR, GARRISON: Quite probably we should have had

it ready, and we will have it ready in a moment,

THE WITNESS: Shall we save time by going on and

we will have it as soon as it is available.

MR, ROBB; Yes.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q Would you care to make any comment between the

relationship of the ideas you expressed in this memorandum

and the central philosophy of the Acheson-Lilienthal

Report as it finally emerged?

A The comment seems to come inappropriately from me.

I think they are i<lenticaL I think this is the heart of

United. States policy. I will say more. I think that any

attempt at that time to establish control along these lines

RV 32835 Docld:364799 Page 127

 126
would, if accepted by the Soviets, have so altered their

whole system and so altered their 1*1le relations with the

•
western world that the threat which bas been building up
0

year after year since cou ld not have existed, I think that no

one at that time could with much confidence believe that

they would accept these proposals, I think it was important

to put them forward, and it was also important not to

express too much doubt that they might be accepted.

In the UN we hammered away at this line, but there

are some intervening complications.

Q The central idea of this scheme, I take it, was

that there should be not merely inspection of atomic energy

• production and atomic energy armaments, but actual ownership

and control of that whole process by an international agency,

so that purely national development of these atomic energy

programs would be ruled out, and that would have entailed in

Russia as in other countries the actual ownership of productive

facilities in that land, as in others, by an international

agency, is that correctly stated?

A That is correctly stated. I think it is part of

the stony. It would have meant that the Russian Government

• gave up cont~ol

on their territory.
over things going on involving their citizens

It would have permitted free intercourse

between Russian nationals and people of the rest of the world,

It would have meant that there could be no iron curtain. How

llW 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 128

 127

radical it was I may indicate by a comment that came much

later.· General Ridgway was on the Military Staff Committee

at the UN at the time when ·I was on llr. Brooks' staff, and our

c people had looked at this proposal and said if it were to go

through, they would recommend that all secret military

establishments be abolished. This was quite a slug.

Q Then work went forward on the report?

A We worked very hard on it. I think I should say

this, I have been on many committees. The last thing I want

to persuade you l5 that I was the big cheese on these

committees. I did have this idea, It does derive from me.

But in other ways, the other members of the committee had

similar ideas. \
W•N~~
For instance, Dr. Wiae· and Dr, Thomas said when

they heard about the raw material situation, we ought to get

rid of the scramble for uranium. If we don't work together

on this we will never catch up with the control problem. So

each relying on his experience came to somewhat similar

cone lusions.

I think the implication that I am responsible and

'
alone responsible for the report is wrong. I am responsible

for writing a great deal of it; not all of it, but perhaps a

half of it, It was, I think, persuasive document which both

here and abroad spoke wen of the generosity and prudence and

sense of America.

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 129

 128

MR. GARRISON: I have here, Mr, Chairlll8n, a copy

of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, entitled "Report on the

International Control of Atomic Energy" in case any members

of the Board would like to look at it now or later, I wouli

like at this time to just read into the record three very

short extracts from it,

DR, GRAY: What is the date of that report?

MR, GARRISON: March 16, 1946, It wa~ prepared for

the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy by a board

of consultants, Chester I. Barnard, Dr •. J, R. Oppenheimer,

~; N'l<'c,
Dr. Charles A, Thomas, Harry A. ~iney; David Lilienthal,

Chairman, I can put the page references into these excerpts,

DR. GRAY: I don't think tkat is necessary.

MR, GARRISON: "Ioternationa l control implies an

acceptance from the outset of the fact that our monopoly cannot

last," (p. 53).

"It is essential that a workable system of safecuards

remove from individual nations er their ci tizeos She lega 1

right to engage in certain well defined activities in respect

to atomic energy which we believe will be generally agreed to

be iotriosica lly dangerous becaus.e they are or could be made

steps in the production of atomic bombs," (P. 22)

"It therefore becomes absolutely essential that any

international agency seeking to safeguard the security o·f the

world against warlike uses of atomic energy should be in the

RV 32835 Docid:364799 Pave 130

 very forefront of technical competence in this field. If the

international.agency is simply a police activity for only

negative and repressive functions, inevitably and within a very

short period of time the enforcement agency will not know

enough to be able to recognize new elements of danger, new

possibilities of evasion, or the beginning of a course of

development having dangerous and warlike ends in view,.•·"

(p. 23.)

I think those three paragraphs are significan~

of the central thought of the report. I am sure if the Board

will at its leisure re-read again the memorandum to Mr,

Li lientha l that Dr. Oppenheimer wrote on February 2, 194~,

you will see that the same thought appears in that memorandum

as appears in the final report.

DR, GRAY: For the purposes of the record, these

are not paragraphs which appear consecutively in this

document. I don't know. I am asking for information. Are

they separated? Is my question clear?

llR, GARRISON: Yes, it is, indeed,

MR. ECKER: I believe they do not appear consecutively

where the quotes are closed,

llR. GARRISON: Suppose we at the end of the hour

put the page references in. They should be in,

DR. GRAY: I think that is satisfactory.

BY MR. GARRISON:

lllf 3283~ Docld:364799 Page 131

 130

Q Do you want to go now to your testimony before

the McMahon Committee?

A I will go quickly. When the repof: was done, we

had several conferences with Acheson's committee. In fact,t•e

last and rather delicate chapter of the report which I largely

wrote we did not originally have in. But the committee thought

that some description of how you might get from where we were

then to where we thouirht we would like to be was called for,

This had the disadvantage that it tended to disclose some

aspects of our negotiating position and made the publication

of the report perhaps less wise than it would otherwise have

been,

I went home and I was very soon called back for

two reasons. The report was out and the newspapers greatly

distorted and exaggerated the virtues of denaturinir. We had

said you could fix up fissionable material so it was not

immediately useable in bombs. This was the headline,

Probably when we wrote it we invited that distortion. In any

case it occurred.

I came back partly to attend the meeting to get an

agreed statement out of a lot of technica 1 people. as to

what the truth was and partly to testify before McMahon's

Committee. I remember Senator Vandenberg saying "I like this.

c;:_ is th-:-;:-:d- of tes~~.~0 shou~'.:~~:-~~-~~!-i~" ~~~--~~-~ ~.us::.ia~:~

I think it was largely in that spirit that we went on with it.

11¥ 3283l Docid:364799 Page 132

 131

Baruch bad.been appointed to represent the United States

in these negotia_tions and this was announced, I think, just

about the time the report was done. I went back to California

0 again, but before long I came back to talkath Mr. Baruch

and Hancock and Eberstadt and tell them a little bit about

bow we bad gone about it.

I ~hen gave some lectures at Cornell on a rather

broad subject, but one of the le.c:t.ures was about tbe inter-

national control of atomic energy, It was reprinted rather

widdly, and was an advocacy of the position that we had adopted,

I gave another talk the next day in Pittsburgh which was anothei

job of advocacy of this set of proposals, It was reprinted in

the New York Times. Mr. Baruch told me that I bad

0
scboped bis speech that be was going to make at the opening

of the UN, That was not true, But it did have in it one

element which was missing from the Lilienthal report and that

was the. remark that this business we were talking about was

incompatible with a veto. You could not run a job like this

and have Yugoslavia or Crete decide that they didn't like

what was going on and stop it. This was the veto on

operations; it was not the veto on sanctions, because nothing

we discussed had to do with sanctions. That was the second

0 of Kr, Baruch's points,

We met in Blair Lee House the next day and had a

long discussion with Kr. Baruch and his staff, He asked me

w 3283!1 Docid:364799 Page 133

 132

what we bad done wrong in the report. I remember mentioning

a few points, among them the failure to make clear the relation

of what we proposed to the veto, and the invitation that we

gave to the press and the public to exaggerate the value of

the denaturing,

Very shortly thereafter I agreed 1m serve as one of

the consultants to Mr. Baruch in preparation for and in the

conduct of the UN negotiations. The senior consultant was

Dr. Richard Tolman, whom I mentioned before, I think Dr.

Robert Bacher and I were the most active next to Dr. TciDan,

but Compton and Thomae and one or two other people were also

involved.

We spent through the summer with him and with his

staff, and tried to help, The main job we did was to get au

agreed paper out of the International Commission that

international control was technically feasible, This was

something you could do. The Russian delegate, I think it was

Gromyko, balks at signing this, but finally the Russians agreed

that international control was technically feasible, I think

it is the last time we have agreed with them_ on abything in

the UN, and certainly anything having to do with the atom.

Q They agreed that it was technically feasible, but

the report did not say it was politically feasible.

A They attacked the proposal, They attacked both

the aspects which were prominent in the Acheson and Lilienthal

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Pa9e 134

 133
thing, and tbat wbicb Mr. Baruch added having to do with

sanctions. I tbink 1they mostly attacked the main point,

tbat this would have been a. terrible invasion of their

privacy, and they were not going to have it, This attack

continued for years.

DR. GRAY: May I interrupt you there, Dr. Oppenheimer

I want to know whether you want a break. You have been talking

rather const11nt.ly,

MR. GARRISQI: I think he will be getting a break

because I will be reading a few documents into tbe record,

but I think the Board would like a break,

DR. GRAY: I would like to see the point at which

we will stop the hearing this afternoon,

(Discussion off the record,)

DR. GRAY: Suppose we take a recess for five minutes.

(Brief recess.)

llW 32835 Docid:36£799 Page 135

 134

DR. GRAY : I think we might aa well proc!led, Dr.

Oppenheimer,

•
TBE Wl'111ESS : After the sumer of work with Hr •
Baruch, it became difficult even for a dedicated optimist
to think that anything would coma of the negotiations in
the uue of a real agreement. It was hard to believe that
before it started, and tbe nature of tbe Soviet conduct, not
only tbe kind of objectioDS they made, but the nature of
their dealings was extremely revealing to anyone who saw it
for the first time.
In fact, it is worth recollecting that the Acheson-
Lilientllll Board was working in early 1946 at precisely tbe

•• time when Stalin made the speech about their encirclement

and their need to keep their gaurd up and to re-arm.
I revert to the fact that it was healthy for us to
attempt tbi~, but tbatit should not be read into that time
that we were going around in a mood of high optimism. I baw
seldom been as gloomy in my life; that even includes today •
. Nevertheless there was a job to do and I _continued
to do it. The job was establishing to our friends in the
11.N., to the governments and fo far as possil;>le to. the offi-
cials and tbe people of our friendly na.tions, _that what we
had put up mad• sense alld was not a bluff and was not propo-
ganda and that it bad merit.

I don't know bow important that job was but I

llW 3283~ Docld:364799 Pa9e 136

 135

2 stayed with the Baruch enterprise until he reaigned, and

then I was asked to serve as advisor to General OSborn, who
took over in the spring of 1947. Oaborn asked me to cmie up

• and spend some time with him talking it·over. On the way
I stopped at the State Department and Ur. Acheson allowed me
the President's speech on the Truman Doctrine. Be wanted me
to be quite clear tbat we were enterinc an adversary relation-
ship with the Soviet, and Whatever we did in the atomic talk

- should bear that in mind.

I worked with Ur. Osborn intensively at first. I
testified before the U. N. ABC, or one of its committees, oa
how you would go about on the international cooperative bene-

• ficial uses of atomic energy.

I continued to consult Ur. Osborn in co~aay

Dr. Coaaat aad General Farrell aad General Groves, and maybe
with

General Nichols, as long as the problem of atomic control

was still a matter of debate ia the United Nations until it was
engulfed in the wider but also hopeless job 6f disarmament.
I would. like at this time to say only two things.
One is that the negative view of the possibility of any
agreed solution with the Russians which came on us all then,

• as it has not gotten any different but gotten deeper, and I

would like to refer to that again in connection with the
work we did in 1952 for the State Department on the regula-
tion of armaments, where the contezt was somewhat different.

llW 3283~ Docid:36•799 Page 137

 136

3 Th8 second is to say that incidental good did coma

of tbis effort. I tbiDk tbat in so far as people paid atten-

•
tion to it, tbe United States• propomals were recognized as
indeed semible, and we got lots of credit for them.
I ran into tberepresentatives of tbe Frencb and
Englisb, and some other countries, too -- bowever, pri-:dl.y
tbe Frencb and Englisb - and tbougb always keeping my own
goverlllll8nt infonaed as usU.1, I was, I tb1Dk, able to do
some useful jobs on tbe side. I talked to tbe Frencb offi-
cials as well as tbe Frencb scientists about the desirability
of tbeir building up a real scientific life in France, and

•
about tbe undesirability of their getting into any rivalry
witb us on tbe atomic business.
I said I tbougbt we would be able to help and bave
more fellowsbips and laboratories, and we would get into
lots of trouble if tbey were getting into senaitive areas
from tbe point of view of security. Itbink I always reported
and checked witb tbe officials of' ABC or tbe State Depart-
ment wben any sucb conversations occurred.
Witb tbe United Kingdom it was quite a different
tbing. Tbere we had bad an intimate partnersbip, as you

• read in the newspapers and know anyway, in the last-few years

and duriq tbe war. Tbere were some excluded areas, but all
tbe tbings I was concerned witb the Britisb knew about and

contributed to.

llW 3283~ Docld:36t799 Page 138

 137

4 I visited Europe in the BUllllll8r of 1948. In the

winterof 1949 we undertook to see what could be done to
restore this partnershJ.p. You will hear testimony about this

• ·from other people. The problem kept arising because of raw

materials allocation, because of .the dissatisfaction of the

British, and because of the double problem. that it was non-
sense to have their best people duplicating what we were
doing, and that there was thought to be and perhaps was a
security problem in working with them.
We had a meeting in Princeton for two or three
days that I think was chaired by Ur. William Webster. The

Commission was represented by the General Manager and General

• Counsel. The Military Establishment was represented by

General Nichols and General Norstad, the State Department
by Mr. Kennan and Mr, Butler, and the interest at laiety by
Dr. Conant and m,yself,
This was the beginning of an attempt which was
abortive but which got quite far along to re-uniting the
relations between trnited States, England and Canada in the
atomic energy business. It was abortive -- I bad better
not say why because I was not in the politics of its abortion,

• But I have always regretted that failureand I am not sorry

for the efforts I made.
Mr. lllorgan. When was that?
THE WITNESS: The meeting was in 1949. I read

835 Docld:36t799 Page 139

 138

when I was out West in 1949 of the evening when the President
called in the senators to Blair Bouse when he was leavins,

•
and when they came out of the door the reporters talked to
them and nre told that the senators heard something so
dreadful that they could not speak about it. What they heard
was about the war time collaboration and that the Brit ish
knew a lot about atomic bombs and could probably make them
if they tried, and that they were on the point of tryiq on
tlullr own. Tbis is hearsay testimony, or testimouy as to
what I read in the papers.
As I ssy, our relations with the scieutiats of

1•
I
other countries and some effort to improve what we have
learned to call the basis, the cordiality and strensht of
our alliances, these thinga did come out of these U. H. meet-
I
I
izias. But it was pretty thin fruits compared to the vision
'
I

I of world government and permanent peace which some people

had at the time.
I think now there is stuff to read.
By llfr. Garrison :
Q, Dr. Oppenheimer, I have here a document, called
"Atomic Energy as a contempary problem" by Dr. J. Robert

• Oppenheimer, presented at the National War College iD Wash-

ington, September 17, 1947. This is a steuographic traDS-
cript of the remarks made by you OD that occasion,

This came from your files, I take it?

I

I~ 32835 Docid:364799 Page 140

 139

6 A Tbat is right.
MB. GABRISOR: l would be glad to hand it to coun-
sel as I read an excerpt from it

• THE WITNESS : This may not be published without

the permission of the War College, It has no restricted
data, but it cannot be published without the permission of
the War College •
(Discussion off the record,)
DR. GRAY: Will you proceed,
MR. GAJUlISOll: These excerpts are from pages 6 to 8
of that traDBcript.
Jllll, ROBB: l have it,

• MR. GA1UlISON .: "At the sa11111 time t I think

can take with any seriousness te hope or expectation that tbe
Soviet UDion will accede -~
DO OD•

or that it will come closer to

acceding to what .is now the majority plan,"
Thatis the United States plan.
"That is not too hard to understand. The corner-
stone of our proposal is an iDBtitution which requires can-
did ness and great openness in regard to technical realities
and policy, It involves the working cooperation between

• peoples,:lrrespective of nationality. It involves a maximum

effort to aldish national rivalries in the field of atomic
energy, and in all dangerous areas of atomic energy it in-
volves a total and genuine international action, It is clear

lllJ 3283~ Docld:36t799 Page 141

 140

7 tbat, even for the United States, proposals of thia kind

involve a very real renunciation ••• "

•
MR. ROBB: Wasn't there an omission at that point?
MR. GAB.RISON: There are three dots which I have
indicated here, and if there is anything significan in the
omission
DIR. ROBB: No; I have not said there is.
JIR, GARRISOJI: I have indicated the omiasiou by

dots.
JIR. RO.BB: I think for the record it should be
indicated,
mr. GARRISON : Yes; the reporter will so indicate •

• "But if for the United States and the Western

European powers some sacrifices are required by theae pro-
posals, the sacrifices, the renunciation, required of Russia
are of another order of magnitude; and that is because the
proposed pattern of control stands in a very
'
gross conflict
'

to the present .patterns of state power in Russia, and becauae

the ideological underpinning of tbat power, namely the belief
in theinevitability of ~onflict between Russia and the capi-
talist world, or the allegedly capitalist world, this under-

• pinning, which. is most difficu1t I sqppose for a government

to renounce, would be repudiated by a cooperation as intense
or as intimate as is required by our proposal& for the control
~f atomic energy. Thus wbat we have .asked .of the Russi111ns is
 141
0

8 a very far reach1DC renUDc1at1on alld reversal of the basis

of tbeir state power, alld of their state power 1tself. It
does not ~eem to • likely that we have foUDd inducements,
or cajolery, or threats which together are adequate to •ke
them take this great plunge. That does not mean, I 1111ppoae,
that this will never happen, but it will almost certainly
not happen as a result of tbe discussions in the United
Nations.
"The whole notion of international control pre-
supposes a certain confidence, a confidence which may not
be inconsistent with carrying a gun when you ait down to play
poker, but at least is consistent with siting down to play
poker. In the ;rear alld a half since the effort on these
problems started we have foUDd ourselves forced by the Soviet
moves, alld by the changing political situation throughout
the world, over and over again to take steps which were in
easence a repudiation of that confidence; and the Soviet has
taken ever more grave steps in repudiation of that confidence •••
I therefore think that to believe seriously today (1947)that
in six months, a year, or a year and a half, we will have
something resembliD an ADA (Atomic Development Authority),
the cooperative development of atomic energy, involves a
kind of schizophrenia which can only lead to very bad politi-
cal confusion. I even think the worry that one often hears
discuased in unofficial, and sometimes official, circles --

MW 32835 Docld:364799 Pa9e 143

 142

9 'What would bappen if the Rusaiau suddenly reversed their

stand, embraced our propoaals, and started to work to put

tbam in effect?• - that is an empty worry because it is in

the nature of the proposals we bave mde - a portection afford·

ed by our plau for tbe United States -- tbat they cannot

be imple•nted in very bad faith, that t Jey presuppose a very

large measure of peaceful intection, of cooperation, of

confidence and candor before they can get started. I a•

therefore not very much alarmed tbat lllr.Gr~ko will some day

say to Jiil". Osborn, •we finally bave understood your proposals

and we think they are wonderful , We accept them in full. •

I do not think this will happen,"

Tbe next excerpt is from an article in J'oreign

Affai1'11 for January, 1948, entitled "International Control

of Atomic Energy", by J. Robert Oppenheimer. These are

pages 12, 13 and 14 in tbat article,

Mr. Robb, do you bave page 12 there?
UR. ROBB: Yes,

J.IR. GARRISON: This, you will see, is several

months after the War College speech which we bave just been

through.

"Tiro aspects of this development need to be special-

ly mentioned. One bas to do with wbat my be called the aim

of the United States policy -- the sketch of our picture of

the world as we would like to see it in so far as atomic

llW 3283~ Docld:36t799 Page 144

 143
10 energy - s concerned. Here, the principles of internationali-
zation, opeDDess, calldor and the CCJlllPlete absence of aecrecy,
alld tbe emphasis on cooperative, conatructive development,
the absence of international rivalry, the absence of legal
right for national govermienta to 'intervene -- tbe .. are the
pillar• on which our policy was built ••• The aecolld aapect
of our policy which needs to be mentioned is that while
tbese proposals were bainc developed, and tbeir soundness
explored and ullderstood, the very baaes for international
cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union
were being eradicated by a revelation of their deep conflicts
of interest, the deep and apparently mutual repugnance of
their waya of life, and the apparent conviction on the part
of the Soviet Union of tbe inevitability of conflict -- and
not in ideas alone, but in force. For these reasons, tbe
United 8-tes has coupled its far reachiDC propoaals for the
future of atomic energy with rather guarded reference to the
safeguards required, lest in our transition to the happy
state of international control we find ourselves at a marked
relative disadvantage •• Natural and inevitable as the"
desires are, they nevertheless stand in bleak contradiction
to our central proposals for the renunciation of sovereignty,
secrecy and rivalry in the field of atomic energy. Here
apin, it is no doubt idle to ask how this country would
have responded had the Soviet Union approached the problem

HV 32835 Docid:364799 Page 145

 144

11 ot·atollic energy control in a true spirit of c00peration.

Such a situation presupposes those profound chances in all
ot Soviet policy, which in their reactiou upon us would haw
altered tbs nature of our political purposea, and opened new
avenues tor establishing international control ••••
"Questions will naturally arise as to whetber limited
but nevertheless worthy objectivea cannot be acb1eved in this

0
field. Thus, there is the question of wbetber acree•nts to

outlaw atomic weapona more like the conventional agree•nts,

supplemented by a more modest apparatus for instpection,may
not give us some degree of security. Possibly when the lines
of political hostility were .not as sharply drawn as they are
now between the Soviet Union and the United States, • might
have tried to find an affirmative amnrer to this question.
Ware we not dealing with a rival whose normal practices,
even in matters having nothing to do with atomic energy,
involve secrecy and police control which ia the very opposite
of tbs openness that we have advocated -- and UDder suitable
assurances offered to adopt -- we misht belive that leas
radical steps of internationalization could be adequate •••
Uy own view is that only a profound change in the whole

orientation of Soviet policy, and a corresponding reorienta-

tion of our own, even in matters far from atomic energy,
would give substance to the illi.tial hiSh hopes."

By Ur. aarrison :
Q Dr. ()ppenbeimer, here is a letter to you from lllr.
lllf 3283~ Docld:36•799 Page 146
 . 145

12 Chester Wood, the Secretary of theNew York State Bar Asso-

ciation, enclsoing a traucript of the remarlm that you
addressed to a ••ting of the JUdicial Section of that Asso-
ciation, this being :February, 1948 - the precise da:v is DOt
clear. This wan taken from your files, was it not?
A It was certainly taken froa my files. Tbat is all
I can sa:v.
Q Then you identify the document, I assume, do :rou
Dot?
A If I am to make a seriows identification, I should
see it.
Q Yes. (banding)
MR. GARRISON: The excerpts which I have taken
from that are at pages 7 to 10, inclusive.
TBE WITKBSS: I do identify it.
MR. GABRISON : How I would like to nad from this
address:
"The proposals which the Uoited States made and
which are manifestly not going to be accepted were perhaps
somewhat more radical even than the people of this couotr:v
believed, perhaps even than some of the officers of this
GoverDlll8nt believed. The idea was, not that one would fasten
a scheme of c~Dtrol onto an otherwise unaltered pattern of
the relations between sovereign states. Tile relation was

rather that here appeared to be an opportunit:v, very pressing

ll1f 3283~ Docid:364799 Page 147

 146

13 in its urgency and very rich in ita techDical patterna, for

getting started, for ..king a very profoUlld alteration in

•
tbe relations baeen states, and one which mipt conceivably
ba sufficiently attractive to tha Govermaent of tha Soviet
11Dion to cause tham to reverse 'tl'bat baa been their long-
standing plicy of eztreme secrecy, considerable terror aDd
very great latent hostility to the non-Soviet world.
"The changes that wereimplied or that would have
•
been im,plied by tha acceptance of our propoaals, b~ tha ela-
boration and im,plementation of our proposals, would have
altered the face of the world. They would have done so in
ways that m one is wise enough to predict, but tha.t surely

• would have led to a much greater opeDDess, to a much greater

candidness,· to much more working cooperation between tha
peoples of various nations •••• When you think, for iD8tauce,
that so obVious a notion as the ecoDOllic cooperation of the
countries of Western Europe is still very far from a reality,
you begin to realize that the formal agreement of tha dale-
gates was only the beginning of the problem. But one point
overshadows thia, and that is, h0119ver great the enunciation
of what ia for us a powerful action, however great tha enun-

• ciation might appear to the British, 1!1ho are concerned, as

rapidly as possible to reach the exploitation of atomic
energy as a form of power, the sacrifices which the acceptance
of these proposals would have·meant to the Govermaent of the

lllf 3283~ Docid:364799 Pa9e 148

 147

14 Soviet Union went very mucb further tban tbat, because it

implied a repudiation of tbe pbilosgpby by wbicb that Govern-
Mnt bas co. into being, baa been living •••• "

• DR. GRAY: Do you suppose tbat word "enunciation"

- • improperly transcribed from your re•rka?
TBB WITDSS: Yes. It waa certainly "renunciation".
llll. EC&Ek: It is a verbatim CoPY of tbe 11teno-
grapbar's transcript.
JIB. GARRISON : I am sure you are ript, Jfr. Cll*man.
By Mr • Garrison :
Q Dr. OppeDbeimer, l allow you a manuscript entitled,
"Address by J. Robert OppeDbeimer before tbe Rocbeater

• Institute of International Affairs, December 11, 1948", at

Rochester, New York, devoted to the prospects for world
peace, aud aak you if counsel selected tbat from your files?
A He did.
Q Will you band it to COUDSel.
A Yes. (banding)
MR. GARRISON: Jfr. Chairman, I bave a very· abort
extract from tbat at page 3:
"Certainly there was little to inspire, and nothing

• to justify, a troubled conscience in tbe proposals tbat our

goverlllll8nt made to tbe United Nations, as to the form wbich
the international control of atomic energy should take.
Tbeae proposals, and some detailed means for implementing

lllf 3283.5 Doc.Id: 3641799 Page 1419

 148

15 them, were explored and criticized, elaborated, and recommend-

ed for adoption by fourteen of the seventeen ..mber nations

•
who served on the United Nations Atomic Energy Coimission •

They were rejected as wholly unacceptable, even as a basis

for further discussion, by tlle three Soviet States, whoee
contributions to policy and to debate have throughout consti-
tuted for us a dehasincly low standard of comparison."
YR, GARRISON: . I have here a reprint from the record
of the Association of the Bar ot the City of New York, Volume
&, No, 3, for March, 1951, containing an address by Dr, Oppen-
heimer, entitled "Contempary problems of Atomic Energy",
The excerpts which I am about to read to the Board appear

•• at page 109 of this reprint from the record,

"Our proposals tor the International Control ot
Atomic Energy, which were lar~ly baaed on the technical
realities of the field, were presented on our behalf to the
United Nations by llfr, Baruch, and were widely accepted by

the non-COmmuDist natiou, The implementation of these

propoeals would have required a profound alteration in aome,
at least, of those features of the Soviet syatem which are
responsible tor the great troubles-,110 are in today, The

• failure to persuade the Soviet Goverlllll8nt to alter its

practices was anticipated by many, Yet we should not
that this 1• an objective not only of the past but of the
fo~cet

future as well.

lllf 32835 Docld:364799 Page 150

 149

16 "Let ma mention one or two pointe. One, to my mind

tbe principal one, was that it wae clear that no aeoure
a:vstem could be developed for protectine people against tbe

• abuse of atOll:l.c -apou, unle•s tbe world were open to aooe•,

unl••• it was poaaible to :l.nd out tbe relevant facts eve17-
Wbere in the world which had to do with tbe aeo1U'ity of the
rest of tbe world. Tbi• notion of opeUDeas, of an open

world, la, of course, relevant to other aspects of tbe Soviet

ayetem. It 1• doubtful whether, without the newly terrible,
yet archaic, apparatus of the Iron Curtain, a government
like theSoviet GoverDlllBnt could exist. It is doubtful
whether the abuses of that governmant could persist."

• to read.
D. GARRISON: I have just one more short excerpt
Thia is from another article in Foreign Affairs
of which we have a copy here for July, 1953. This is quite
recent. The excerpts are from pages 525 to 526 of that

article.
"Earlier, shortly after tbe war•s enc;!, the Govern-
ment of the United States bad put forward some modest
suggestions, respouive to these views, for.dealing with
the atom in a friendly, open, cooperative way. We need not

• argue as to whether these proposals were stillborn.

have been very dead a lone, long time, to the surprise of
only a few.
They

Openness, friendliness and COPperation did not

seem to be what the Soviet Govermaent most prized OD this earth.

RV 3283~ Docid:364799 Pa9e ·1~1

 150

17 "It should not be beyond human ingenuity for ua to

devise less friendly proposals. We need aot here detail

•
the maay reason wby they have not been put forward, wby it
has appeared irrelevant and grotesque to do so. 'l'bese
reasons range from the special difficulties of all negotia-
tion with the Soviet Union, through the peculiar oblltacles
presented by tbe programmatic hostility and tbs institutional-
ized secretiveness of Conmuaist countries, to what 11ay be

regarded as tbe more normal and familiar difficulties of

devising instruments for tbe regulation of armaments in a
world witbout prospect of political settlement.
"Instead we oameto grips, or bepa to come to

• grips, with the massive evidences of Soviet bostility and

tbe growing evidences of Soviet power, and with the many
al1110St inevitable, yet often tragic, elements of weakness,
disharmony and disunity in what we have leared to call the
Free World."
THE WITBESS: I think we are through with this. I
will leave it to counsel to say what it means, but I think
that in every case I tried to explain that we could not take
this path to people wbo iasisted on tbiDking that we migbt,

• and yet not to talk publicly of the fact that we wer• giving
up a position until the Goverllll8Dt of the United States had

in fact given it up,

There was a bit of discrepancy between our offical

.RW 3283.5 Docid:_3~4799 Pa9e 1.52

r 151

18 position and reality aDd the opinion, let ua say. of my

colleagues in science. I tried to explain to them tbat the
jig was up, because tbat was relevant to gettinc·bacll: to

• work.
is a
At the same time I CDuld not come out and say, ''This
~leas thiug"becauae I had
• llOlllll official connection
with the Govermaent until the Govermaent had itself said so.
•

I thiDll: these dates will bear that out more or less.

Now we are through with tbis pbaae aDd enteriq
on a new one. In late 1946, I was appointed by tu President
as a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic
Energy Commission. That is a lons big job aud I will talk
about it. Shortly thereafter I was given a concurrent appoint-

• meat which I held perhaps even a little longer.

a ..mber of the Colllllittee ou Atomic Energy of the Joint
Research audDevelopmeut Board iu the military establishment.
That was as

This later became the Research and Development Board aud the
cbairmen varied. The initial arrange.. uts were made by Dr.

Bush who was head of this outfit.

Dr. Bush appointed Conant as chairman, the msmbers
of the statutory military liaison cOlllllittee as members, and
as.civilian members me aud Crawford Greenawalt. There was

• some overlapping of membership between the Advisory COlllllittee

aud thiscOlllllittee, and total overlapping of membersbip bet-
ween the military liaison ccnmttee aud this committee.
What we did ou this committee I don't propose to go

llW 32835 Docid:36•799 Page 153

 152
19 into in auch detail, and I will try to finillh with that
this aftenaoon.

•
The initial job was to try to give direct techni-

cal information to the military on the military liaison

committee. General Groves Jmew quite a lot about the atom
and so did Admiral Parsons. The other members of the commit-
tee in those daya were not very fresh to it. There was at
that time not very much machinery for gathering information.
I think, as Dr. aiah explained it, it seemed like
a good idea if the same technical couideratiou which were
beinc made available to the Commission were being made avail-
able directly to the mil:llary. It was a liaison function •

• We had very little, if any, power, but we had the ability

to talk about camion problems.
The importance of this fUDCtion declined very much
'
beca:uae the military developed admirable waya of getting
their own :lrtelligence and their own knowledge and became as
expert as an:rone. But it did provide a continuing channel of
discussion. Every once in a while we would stir BOMthiDC
up

___ .1 have in mind two

-------=---- "
in this committee which was uaefull.

exa~mples"~--(one, toward the end of \

• 1950 and the beginning of 1951, on the operational readiness ,

for tactical ~e o~-~t-'*.1~~we~~o~I won't spell out

details but the question of getting from the hardware which
the
·-~
I

the COmmission provided and the hardware which the military

llV 32835 Docld:364799 Page 154

 ------------

153
20 services had to the point where you could really make effec-
tive use right away.
Thia was the time, I may remind you, when the feeling

• that war miaht break out,

war -
in ~a
howev~r erroneous -
was very, very general, and there was a war going on
and it was not going too well.
widespread

Another e::umple - our role was certainly a:t major in it--

------===~·-~=~=-=~=-~~-..,...,
come• to_~Ja"Dd that was tryiuc to be sure that there was
an inte~i• capability in the field of hydrogen weapons, of
thermonuclear weapoDS, at a time after the 1952 tests and
before the current aeries of tests when it seelllll important
that having announced this thing throughout the world, we
f>,

• ___J
I)
bave something to back it i:t-:
-----,..... -
There were two panels on this Board of which I acted
as chairman.· One was in the swmer of 1948 1 and I think the
members of it are listed on your paper, which was a general
sorting operation.:: By then an enourmous nUlllber of potentially
useful applicatioDS of atomic energy to military thlnge
came up, some of them crazy, some of them sensible, some of
them immediate and some of them very remote.
We sat down, the three generals, the admiral and I,
and called in other people whose help would be useful and
wrote our best opinion as to the relative time sales and
absolute time aaales of submarine propulsion and nuclear air-
craft propulsion; how it was goiuc with the deliverbility of

llW 32835 Docid:36t799 Page 155

 154
of tacticalweapons, what needed to be_ done here, what needed

to be done there·,

•
The description of the report, the contents of

which I cannot tell you, is not going to be very interesting,

I think it was a decent job.

The report that we wrot.e in late 1950 and early

1951 -- and I may remind you of who was on that committee.

I was again the chairman.

Q You are reading from what?

A The third page of your notes. Bacher, Alvarez,

Lawrence, Kelly, Parsons, Wilson, McCormack. There we

•
took a somewhat deeper bite, because this was the timfj of

the Chinese intervention ind a time when as you way remember

of daily alerts about the possibility of attack oo the

continental United States, a time of very great anxiety.

We addressed ourselves to the question with what we have and

can have soon, how rapidly we can get a really effective use

of the atomic capability that we have developed. What can

we do fast about this, You will hear testimony about this

possibly f1t11 the other witnesses. :

It is also a time at which technical prospect·s

• on the thermonuclear program were quite bleak.

reported.
We so

I think it is interesting that there was no

difference of opinion among us as to what we had solved.

This committee has continued until the Res•arch and

l 1111' 328.3.5 DocJ:d:364799 Pave 1.56

 155

Development Board was abolished. I think these are the few

points that I wanted to cover.

Now we have the GAC appointment and I suppose

• there it woul:t be best to start up fresh in the morning,

There is something to read, It is something that I came upon

in the files during the period of getting them straight,

It is a letter I wrote to Admiral McMorris of the General

Board of the Navy, and it represents the view of our military

problem which, at that time, and I believe before and after,

was the view tha.t I took into the General Advisory Committee

and kept through it. It is not a committee statement,

It is not a report of the GAC. It is my own thoughts. It

• may give some background for what we started out to do and

what we did do in the descriptions we gave on the Genera 1

Advisory Committee.

Q These excerpts fhere come from this carbon from your

files, is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q They begin on page 1.

DR, GRAY: What isthe date of this?

MR. GARRISON; April 14, 1948,

• "Whatever our hopes for the future, we must surely

be prepared, both in planning and in the development of weapons,

and in so far as possible.in our 'force in being•, for more

than one kind of conflict. That is, we must be prepared to

llW 32835 Docid:364799 Page 157

'
r
156

meet the enemy in certain crucial, strategic areas in which

conflict is likely, and to defeat him in those areas. We must

also be prepared, if need be, to engage in total war, to

carry the war to the enmmy and attempt to destroy him, One

reason why we must keep both of these objectives in mind (and

they call for quite definite plane and quite different emphasis

as to equipment, troops and weapons) is that it may not be in

our hands to decide. With this reservation, it seems appropri-

ate to suggest that there may be two phases to the problem.

"At the present time ( 1948), to the best of my

knowledge, the Soviet Union is not in a position to effectively

attack the United States itself. Opinions differ and evidence

is scanty as to how long such a state of affairs may last.

One important factor may be the time necessary for the Soviet

Union to carry out the program of atomic energy to obtain a

significant atomic armament, With all recognition of the

need for aaution in such predictions, I tend to believe that

for a long time to come the Soviet Union will not have

achieed this objective, nor even the more minor, but also dange:

ous possibility of conducting radiological warfare."

THE WITNES~: This was a bad guess.

MR. GARRISON: "In so far as the United States need

not for some time to come fear a serious and direct attack

on this country, it would seem to me likely that our primary

objective would be to prevent the success of Soviet arms and

l1W ~283l Docid:364799 Pa9e 158

 157
Soviet policies, to carry out a policy of attrition, and not

to engage in a total war aimed at destroying entirely the

seurces of Soviet power. There are many arguments for this

and I have little to add to the obvious ones. Yet, the

general political consideration that the consequences, even

in victory, of a total war carried out against the Soviet

Union would be inimical to the preservation of our way of

life, is moat persuasive to me.

"On the other hand, as time approaches, if it ever

should, where as a result of political or military success

in Europe or Asia, a s a result of advancing technological

development and improved industrial output, the Soviet Union

becomes a direct threat to the United States, we sha~l no

longer have this option. We .shout• no longer have this option

if the maintenance of a strategic area such as Western

Europe or Japan could not be achieved without a direct attack

on the sources of Soviet power.

"From this it seems to me that t•o conclusions

would seem to follow: (1) th111t we must be prepared, in

planning, in logistics, and in development, for more than

one kind of war; and (2) that the very greatest attention

must be given to obtaining reliable infamation about the

state of affuirs within tlu:I Soviet Union bearing on its

military potential.

"One final comment: There is to my mind little

llV 32835 Pocld:36•799 Page 159

 158

doubt that were we today, with the kind of provocation which

the Soviet Union almost daily affords, to attack the centers

of Soviet population and industry with atomic weapons, we

should be forfeiting the sympathy of many potential allies on

whose cooperation the success of our arms and the fundamental

creation of a stable peace may very well depend. These same

people would no doubt be almost equally disturbed were we to

renounce, irrespective of the development of Soviet power,

recours·e to such armament."

Are there any comments you would like to make on

the views expressed there?

THE WITNESS: I need to say two things, First, that

this was apparently an answer to some inquiry. I don't

know what the inquiry was. Second, that I was completely

wrong in thinkinc that we could be relaxed about the Soviet

atomic threat. I think I was in very general company. I

think we all very soon rectified these views as the evidence

came in, But this was a year and a half before the first

Soviet explosion ancl the time when my view was, I think,

quite the same as the general intelligence view.

BY MR, GARRISON:

Q This opening paragraph, if I may go back to it for

a moment, sounds to me rather like what Admiral Radford said

the other day about the new look. "We must be prepared to

meet the enemy in certain crucial, strategic areas in which

llV 3283~ Docld:36•799 Page 160

 159

conflict is likely, and to defeat him in those areas. We

must also be prepared, if need be, to engage in total war, to

carry the war to the enemy and lllo attempt to destroy him."

This has emphasis on flexibility, which I think is also

apparent in that testimony by Admiral Radford.

DR. GRAY: Kay I ask, did you read the beginning

of this letter?

THE WITNESS: No. I would like to have the

beginning read, because· the beginning states that I don't

know anything about this subject.

MR, ROBB: It occurred to me, Mr, Chairman, that

the beginning and the end should be read to give the entire

picture.

THE WITNESS: I don't know what the beginning says.

Ma. ROBB: You are quite right, it says you don't

know anything.

THE WITNESS: Shall I do that:

"Thank you for your letter of March 31st. In this

you enclose the agenda for the study of the General Board,

Serial 315. You request specifically such comments as I

can make on Items 110, 118 and 120.

"Though I am aware of the great,· ·importance which

attaches to this study, and the need for serious thought and

effort on the part of many if the study is to be successful,

I nevertheless must protest my almost total lack of

llV 3283~ Docld:36t799 Page 161

 160
qualification for speaking to the question which you have

put, Such comments as I can make should be given no great

weight; they rest on little experience and little knowledge,

"A 11 three of the ite• referred to me have to do

with the plans of the United States for waging war, and with

the kind of war we should fight. Implicit in some questions

and explicit in others, is the issue of weapons of mass

destruction; should we use these, should we plan to use these,

sbouldwe postpone the use of these. Implicit in the question

is also the issue of a limited versus a total conflict: should

the objective be destruction of the enemy, or his defeat in a

specific area, Let me attempt to give my views on these

matters."

Then it goes into what Mr. Garrison read,

The end is: "In conclusion, let me again remind you

that these are in the nature of personal views, and that I

can attach little weight to them, If, in matters which fall

more closely within my field of co~petence, I can be of use

to you,. I shall of course be glad to do so."

DR. GRAY: That is addressed to whom?

THE WITNESS: Admiral McMorris, bead of the Genera 1

Board of the Navy. I am in a complete fog as to what it was

arl l about, except in so far as this answer

DR, GRAY: Was this siened as Chairman of some panel?

THE WITNESS: No, this was an individual opinion,

llW 3283~ Docid:364799 Pa9e 162

 161

DR. GRAY: Thank you.

MR. GARRISC!i: It is simply introduced at this time

to show his general approach to the whole policy of armament

of this country,

TBE WITNESS: There is one small item before we get

into the General Advisory Committee, andthat is the following:

There was set up under the contract with all three services,

Army, Navy and Air Forces, I think the operating; contractor,.

was the Army, a study at California Institute of Technology,

Dr, DuBridge was in charge of it, under the name of Project

Vista, and its function was generally speaking to talk about

ground combat and the support of ground combat. What that

finally came down to wac; the study of the defense of Europe

and what it came down to was the study of what you do to

defend Europe at any time, as soon as possible, if necessary.

The men involved in this project worked very hard on

it, and they kept asking me to come out and talk about the

use of atomic weapons in this picture. I thought they knew

as much as I did, Dr. Bacher was there, Dr. ·Lawrence was

there, Dr. Christie was and ·Dr, DuBr idge was there. But

they finally prevailed upon me, and I went out in the autumn

of 1951, and we worked together on this problem •

.
Dr, Laurttsen and Dr. DuBridge went over with Mr.

Whitman from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to visit

General Eisenhower, Gruenther, Norstadt and Hanley in Europe.

ll1f 3283~ Docid:3tit799 Pave 163

 162
·. What we attempted to do was to be sure it was

clear to them bow varied and useful atomic weapons could be in

ways that are probably now quite obvious to you and ways

which were not completely obvious then. General Eisenhower

made one or two suggestions about things that he thought it

would be handy to have. The principal messages that we

brought back to this country were a plea for more information

as well as more hardware and to make atomic weapons available

and for restriction of the limitations on discussions of mili-

tary protiems.with Allied Commanders, These were the things

that made it hard to get on with these. I don't want to go

into the technical aspects of it, though the antiair use

of atomic weapons, their use to put out enemy airfields,

both those that are near enough for combat planes and the

deep lines strategic ones is an obvious example. This was

the complement to the panel report I spoke of earlier on

getting the atom to work on the battlefield as well as in

the heartland. I think this may be a place to stop,

DR. GBAY: Before we stop, I wonder if you can, Mr.

Garrison, give an indication of the witnesses.

MR. GARRISON: Ithought we might discuss that

informally off the record" I can bring this chart and show

you about hOll it looks now.

DR. GRAY: We will go off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

lllf 32835 Docid:364799 Pa9e 164

 163

DR, GRAY: Are we prepared to say we will meet

again 1:omorrpw morning at 9:30"/

MR, GARRISON: We will undertake to be prompt,

MR, ·ROBB: May I say, Mr, Chairman, as far aa I am

concerned, and Mr, Rolander, I cannot speak for the Board, if

it will acceterate matters and assist counsel to get some

witnesses here, l would be very happj' to come here earlier

in the morning, I do not want to make that proposition too

firm.

08, GRAY: Let the Chairman speak for himself only

and not for the other members of the Board, If by 1118eting

at 9 o'clock we could move a long without inconvenience and

so forth, I believe the Board would be willing to meet at

that time.

RR, EVANS: You can say it for me, because time is

important .to me.

MR, MORGAN: Yes.

DR, GRAY: so would you bear that in mind, Mr.

Garrison. Any telescoping we can do without inconvenience

or harm we w9uld be interested in doing.

(Thereupon ~t 5:13 p.m., a recess was taken until

Tuesday, April 13, 1954, at 1:30 a.m.)

' .

Rlf 32835 Docld:36•799 Page 165