LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.

180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:  The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
J ULY 8, 2014  /  ARDYESGUERRA circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the
  number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
FACTS: witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 
 Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. 15AUG
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
 The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
FACTS:
 When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree
 Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz. (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”,
 Corpuz  argued as follows: in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy. circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that
different from the one testified to by Tangcoy. the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.  The Director of
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved. Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction ISSUE:
  Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
ISSUES and RULING registration case is mandatory.
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, HELD:
as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)? YES. Petition was granted.
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were RATIO:
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of
court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property.  An in rem proceeding is
even admitted having signed the said receipt. validated essentially through publication.  This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence? The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.  The law is unambiguous and its rationale
No.  It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph clear.  Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner  and that the interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for
time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information: Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
1. The designation of the offense by the statute; Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; Facts:
3. The name of the offended party; and Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property. The
5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo
of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence? valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of the issue,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
receipt; No.  The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s
specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.
mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.  Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
tantamount to a demand. Issue 2:  W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking
May a sole witness be considered credible? Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is  that
Yes.  Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the
the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof.
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.
The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the
time it is taken. Held:
Issue 3:  W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused.
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible.  To entertain other formula for "Dura lex sed lex".
computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of  
economic policies – a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of.  Equity and equitable principles only Digest Author: Roman Cyril Panganiban
come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association vs.
Velasco Dissent: Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional RegulationCommission
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty G.R. 19767
and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead Petition:
to failure of taking an individual’s property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the complainants must be  Petition for injunction
equitably compensated for the loss thereof. Petitioners:
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the property owners filed the  
initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts Association
would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property. Respondents:
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa  Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and ProfessionalRegulation Commission
G.R. No. L-22301 Ponente:
August 30, 1967  Villarama Jr., J.
En Banc Date:
February 4, 2014
Facts: Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 ofthe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its Branch 42 denying the petition to declare asunconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.R.A. No.
possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was signed aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under
that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. a regulatory scheme of licensing, registrationand supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. appraisers, assessors,consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners
Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) throughthe Bureau of Trade Regulation and
to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879. Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of itsconsumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the
Professional RegulationCommission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service(PRBRES) created
under the new law. The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated by the PRC and PRBRES
Issue: under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.Petitioners filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, asking the court to
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of firearms. declare asvoid and unconstitutional Sections 28 (a), 29 and 32, of R.A. 9646 that the trial court deniedthus, this petition.
Issues:
Ruling: 1.
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that except as thereafter  
specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition W/N R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule underSection 26 , Article VIof the
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or Philippine Constitution
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, THIRD DIVISION,
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, (Peralta, J.) Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such of the forum. Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused is not appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a
exempted.  promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst
People vs Patricio Amigo GR 116719 never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
Facts: refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien. ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an
Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the regional trial court, Davao City and was obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law? RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged
Issue: to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy. he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon :
Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION(GMCR)
their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of  
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application RESPONDENT
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, :
May 2015 the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION(NLRC) and IMELDA SALAZAR
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a (private respondent)
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in PONENTIA: Justice RomeroNature of the case: Regarding the alleged Illegal Dismissal of SALAZARDoctrine according to the
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled Syllabus:
thereto. VER BA LEGIS  
 
Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995] FACTS OF THE CASE
15AUG Parties Involved/Characters:
•
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.  
FACTS: Imelda Salazar 
 – General System Analyst of GMCR
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon  
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” •
 
and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private Delfin Saldivar
 – Manager for Technical Operations’ support ofGMCR
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act
 
to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner •
 
filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for
 Agustin Maramara
Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent  – Company’s Internal Auditor 
 
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the •
motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.  
Richard Yambao
ISSUE:  – Owner and Manager of Elecon Engineeringwhich is a supplier of GMCR
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of  Story:
It is alleged that Salazar and Saldivar are very close. It is alsomentioned that they share an apartment.1984, reports shows that
the parties to the conversation. the company equipment and sare parts worththousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing. A
HELD: reportprepared by Maramara indicated that:- Saldivar entered into a partnership with Yambao- Saldivar recommended Elecon
 
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner. - The missing aircon was used by Saldivar for personal use(recovered by replevin)
RATIO:  
- Salazar (respondent) got involved because she is a signed witnessof the Articles of Partnership of the two
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.  
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZARCase Digest
1
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992
Digest by Clar
Submitted 30 August 2016
PETITIONER
  backwages
2
 
1
 IRR of Labor Code, Sec. 2
"
 
IRR of Labor Code, Sec. 3
 

 
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZARCase Digest
3
The priority is clearly leaned towards the employee or to labor.TheCourt pointed out the opening paragraph on Labor and the
1973Constitution on Article 2 which enshrines
“full protection”
to labor. In the1986 ConCom, they have designed
Social Justice an Human rights
 toreduce social, economic and political inequalities.
Court held that the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous.Under statcon, if the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
  itmust be applied literally [Verba Legis]
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZARCase Digest (Additional, away from statcon, she is not in a fiduciary position so shecan be reinstated because “strained relations” aren’t relevant in her position)
2
- She knows where the missing aircon is, failed to report it.
Basbacio vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994]
  15AUG
(1984) Because of those, Salazar was suspended and was given timeto explain herself (for 30 days/one month). After 3 days
she already filed acomplaint against GMCR for illegal dismissal (illegal suspension at firstthen it escalated to that).(1985) Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
Heared by
Labor Arbiter  FACTS:
 – in favor of Imelda Salazar, awardedher reinstatement, backwages and other benefits plus moral damages.(1987) Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of
NLRC –
 affirmed Labor Arbiter decision but backwages of 2years only; no moral damagesThus this petition by GMCR before SC frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after
Issue their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
Is she illegally dismissed based on the Labor Code and Constitutionalguarantee?
Held petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his
She was illegally dismissed. acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any
 The Court pointed out
Art 279 of the Labor Code person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.”  The
, which talks aboutthe Security of tenure for claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while
regular employees
which states that: petitioner’s presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering
xxx
that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer
 An employee who is unjustly dismissed from workshall be enti tled to re inst at em ent without loss of seniority
r ig ht s andother privile ge s and t o his full bac kwag es, inc lusive of allowanc es, and t o his ot her benefi t s or is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was “probably guilty.” Petitioner brought this petition for review
t heir m onet ar y equivale nt  
on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 xxx
Corollary to it is the Implementing Rules and Regulations of theLabor Code (IRR) stating that employer cannot terminate ISSUE:
regularemployees without just cause or authorized by laws
1 Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.
 and if suchemployeed get illegally dismissed, he or she will be entitled to be back inhis/her position or be HELD:
reinstated
 without loss of seniority rights plus NO. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
RATIO: a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure. be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
To say then that an accused has been “unjustly convicted” has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his
Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean 15AUG
that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an “unjust conviction.” If his conviction was due to an error in Ponente: BELLOSILLO J.
the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct FACTS:
to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused. [C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is “An Act Providing for Synchronized
Advertisements
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.”
JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993] Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the
15AUG
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1)
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of
FACTS:
District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the
Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the second paragraph of
Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars.
Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The
(a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes
petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the
grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of
POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they
Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post
ISSUE:
a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC
P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, “to primarily
Resolutions.
answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.” The Solicitor
HELD:
General sustained the appeal bond and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and
 
6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
ISSUE:
RATIO:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill
NLRC?
No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.
HELD:
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its
YES. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended
RATIO:
which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.
Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – that the thing may rather have effect than be
The true import of Par. (d) is  that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
destroyed.
municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that
7166  will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.
conflicting provisions. Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be Case No. 11 | Midterms Case No. 2
Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CA
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
GR No. 78687, January 31, 1989
superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the
purpose of the law should prevail.
Facts:
The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were grantees of free Held: No. There is no substantial difference between a co-terminus employee and a
patent. The subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and her husband, contractual, casual or emergency employee for all are tenurial employees with no
petitioners in the instant case. On December 4, 1973, the property of petitioners was fixed term, non-career and temporary. The Early Retirement Law would violate the
mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to equal protection clause of the constitution if the SC were to sustain respondent's
pay their loan, the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government
by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The doctrine
property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of of necessary implications should be applied in this case.
the property disqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. Case No. 14 | Midterms Case No. 5
Issue: City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al.
W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981
Public Land Act. Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as
Held: much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of Facts:
land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the
repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed an “annual additional tax of 1%
the date or conveyance." The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly
The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of the act. levied thereon” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed 3%” Since the
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law maximum limit imposed is 3%, the municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .
should prevai 5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the
ase No. 12 | Midterms Case No. 3 following: 1.5% as per charter of Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund law and .
B/Gen Jose Commendador, et al. vs B/Gen Demetrio Camera, et al. 5% as per order of the municipal board. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid the
GR No. 96948, August 2, 1991 additional one-half percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for
Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent is void
Facts: because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law.
Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is valid or
charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged participation in a legal.
failed coup d’etat. Their case was referred to General Court Martial No. 14. At a Held:
hearing, petitioners manifested their desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by ordinance,
challenges against the President and the members of the general court martial may impose a realty tax of “not less than one-half perfect but not more than two
invoking Art. 18 of CA No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had percent of the assessed value of real property.” The additional one-half percent then
been discontinued under PD 39. is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of implications sustains the contention of the City of
Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA No. 408 has Manila that the additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education
been discontinued under PD 39. Fund Law when the same states that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a
Held: maximum of three per centum.” The doctrine of necessary implications means that
No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed under CA “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that
No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to implement General Order No. 8 issued during which is expressed.
martial law to create military tribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law, General Order Case No. 15 | Midterms Case No. 6
No. 8 was revoked and military tribunals were dissolved. As such, the reason for the People of the Philippines vs Guillermo Manantan
existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. When the reason of the law ceases, the law GR No. L-14129, July 31, 1962
itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex Statutory rule: The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and
ase No. 13| Midterms Case No. 4 apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
Lydia O. Chua vs The Civil Service Commission, NIA Facts:
GR No. 88979, February 7, 1992 Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of the Section
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that “No justice, judge, fiscal…. shall
much a part thereof as that which is expressed. aid any candidate in any manner in any election, except to vote.” Defendant contends
Facts: that this provision excludes justice of the peace and as such, he is excluded from this
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as prohibition. Because of this, the lower court dismissed the case against him. The
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Sec. 2 provides for who are Solicitor General appealed.
qualified to avail of the benefits of RA 6683 which includes, "all regular, temporary, Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
casual and emergency employees." Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is Revised Election Code.
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program filed and application with the Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the Revised Election
respondent NIA which was denied due to the fact that she is a co-terminus employee. Code omitted the words “justice of peace” from the Revised Administrative Code
Her appeal with respondent Commission was likewise denied. provision from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the legislature
Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the clear in the omission, the word judge in the former provision was qualified or modified
benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law) by the phrase “of first instance.” The term “judge” in Section 54 is not modified or
qualified, making it broader and more generic to comprehend all kinds of judges, like GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996
judges of the Courts of First Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Courts of Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.
Industrial Relations and justices of the peace. The rule of casus omissus has no Facts:
applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and operate if and when the Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated
omission has been clearly established. homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief Probation and Parole
Case No. 16 | Midterms Case No. 7 Officer recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the
JM Tuason and Co., et al. vs Hon. Herminio Mariano, et al. ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to
GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978 make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's
Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has recommendation and granted private respondent's application on April 23, 1993.
been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting
again. private respondent's application for probation despite the appeal filed by the private
Facts: respondent.
Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in Held:
Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28,
fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no
and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect
issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall
Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the
to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. trial court and applied for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his
Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Held: Furthermore, the law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious
OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided appeals so neither should the court.
upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason Case No. 20 | Midterms Case No. 11
and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases Cecilio De Villa vs Court of Appeals
involving the validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the governing principle of stare GR No. 87416, April 8, 1991
decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has Statutory rule: When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
been settled), the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer Facts:
open to attack Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati for
Case No. 18 | Midterms Case No. 9 violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner
Juanito Pilar vs Commission on Elections contends that the check in question was drawn against his dollar account with a
GR No. 115245, July 11, 1995 foreign bank and as such, it is not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law..
Statutory rule: The rule is well recognized that where the law does not distinguish, Issue: W/N a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered by BP 22.
courts should not distinguish. Held:
Facts: Yes. The law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case since
On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the what the law only specifies is that “checks drawn and issued in the Philippines,
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the law.” It is a cardinal rule
Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, respondent that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically,
Commission imposed a fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or Case No. 21 | Midterms Case No. 12
lost. Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs Pedro Jimenez
Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions GR No. L-14787, January 28, 1961
and expenditures since he was a "non-candidate", having withdrawn his certificate of Statutory rule: General terms may be restricted by specific word, with the result that
candidacy three days after its filing. the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s
Held: object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one
Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific
file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction class.
or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the Facts:
same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate Petitioner corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and
who pursued his campaign, but also to who who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of household remedies. They import materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is
Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificate of among those petitioner imports. For every importation, petitioner pays 17% special
candidac excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation
Case No. 19 | Midterms Case No. 10 and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. However the same
People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon law also provides that “foreign exchanged used for xxx importation to the Philippines
of xxx stabilizers and flavors xxx shall be refunded to any importer making application resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
therefore.” Petitioner now seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax they paid in Facts:
the total sum of P113,343.99. 16 persons were charged with squatting which is penalized by Presidential
Issue: W/N the foreign exchange used by petitioner in the importation of dental cream Decre No. 772 which provides that “any person who with the use of force, xxx
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of another against his will for
Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to a refund. residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment
Held: xxx” The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of
Yes. The refusal to deny refund was based on the argument that all the PD 772 on the basis of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) since its
items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture.
products, book supplies/materials and medical supplies and that for petitioners to be Issue: W/N PD 772 applies to agricultural lands
exempt, the “stabilizers and flavors” they use must fall under the category of food Held:
products. Respondent contends that since petitioners use these as toothpaste, the No. PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows
same is not a food product. Court ruled that although “stabilizers and flavors” are that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were also illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the
included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, industrial starch and more. Therefore, Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis
the law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that general and because the intent of the decree is unmistakeable. It stated that the “rule of ejusdem
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by a particular recital does not require the generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent is uncertain.”
intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of Case No. 24 | Midterms Case No. 15
construction. Vera vs Cuevas, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the PH
Case No. 22 | Midterms Case No. 13 Rule: The familiar rule of Ejusdem Generis
RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson Facts: Defendant Commissioner on Internal Revenue required the private
GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990 respondents Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers and Consolidated Milk
Statutory rule: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, Company and Milk Industries, Inc. to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
that is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code,
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying which essentially imposes this requirement on all milk products “from which the fatty
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those especially mentioned. party has been removed totally or in part.” Private respondents protest by alleging
Facts: that filled milk is not skimmed milkwhich is required under the law. The lower court
Acting on information received which indicated the acquisition of wealth favored the private respondents on the ground of ejusdem generis.
beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required private respondent Issue: W/N Section 169 of the Tax Code applies to filled milk.
Lt. Col. Tecson to submit his explanation or comment, together with supporting Held:
evidence thereto. Private respondent was unable to provide supporting evidence No. Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the
because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who ha gone abroad. specific and qualifying terms “skimmed milk” in the headnote and “condensed
The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to "investigate the unexplained wealth skimmed milk” in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general
and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service." Private clause “all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally
respondent mainly argues that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in or in part.” In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term
Executive Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A are acts of his alone and not connected with Case No. 28 | Midterms Case No. 18
being a crony, business associate or subordinate. Hence, the PCGG has no Manolo P. Fule vs Court of Appeals
jurisdiction to investigate him. GR No. L-79094, June 22, 1988
Issue: W/N private respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an Statutory rule: Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the
agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. affirmative are mere directory.
Held: Facts:
No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term "subordinate" as Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys close association or relation with out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22,
relative and close associate in E) 1 and the close relative, business associate, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and
dummy, agent or nominee in EO 2. the petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the
Note: Ejusdem Generis – General words followed by an enumeration of persons or stipulation of facts which was not signed by both petitioner nor by his counsel. He was
things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the appellate court.
be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the stipulation
things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. of facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.
Case No. 23 | Midterms Case No. 14 Held:
PP vs Vicente Echavez, Jr. et al. Yes. The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 4, states that “No
GR Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1990 agreement or admission made or entered during pre-trial shall be used against the
Statutory rule: Rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and counsel.” By its very
language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. When the Constitution
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature vested on the Ombudsman the power to "recommend the suspension" of a public
of the petitioner and counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statutes are to be liberally official or employees, it referred to "suspension" as a punitive measure. All the words
construed in favor of the accused. Case is re-opened to receive evidence in favor of associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
the accused. administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of
Case No. 29 | Midterms Case No. 19 Noscitur a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other
Purita Bersabal vs Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of
Gr No. L-35910, July 21, 1978 various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
Statutory rule: Use of word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
while the word “shall” is imperative. Case No. 28 | Midterms Case No. 18
Facts: Manolo P. Fule vs Court of Appeals
Private respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner. The GR No. L-79094, June 22, 1988
subsequent decision was appealed by the petitioner and during its pendency, the Statutory rule: Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the
court issued an order stating that “… counsels for both parties are given 30 days from affirmative are mere directory.
receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be Facts:
submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, petitioner filed a Motion Ex Parte to Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
Submit Memorandum within 30 days from receipt of Notice of Submission of the out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22,
granted by the court. But the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and
for failure to prosecute petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration the petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the
citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. stipulation of facts which was not signed by both petitioner nor by his counsel. He was
Issue: W/N the mere failure of an appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the appellate court.
would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the stipulation
Held of facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure Held:
of an appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts … shall Yes. The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 4, states that “No
decide.. cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city agreement or admission made or entered during pre-trial shall be used against the
courts: provided…parties may submit memorandum.. if so requested.” It cannot be accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and counsel.” By its very
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memorandum is optional. Being language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
optional, a party may choose to waive submission of the memoranda. As a general mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature
rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer of the petitioner and counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statutes are to be liberally
discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may construed in favor of the accused. Case is re-opened to receive evidence in favor of
be enforced the accused.
Case No. 26 | Midterms Case No. 17 Case No. 29 | Midterms Case No. 19
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs Secretary Juan Flavier Purita Bersabal vs Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador
GR No. 106719, September 21, 1993 Gr No. L-35910, July 21, 1978
Statutory Rule: Noscitur a socciis. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of Statutory rule: Use of word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing
various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the while the word “shall” is imperative.
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated. Facts:
Facts: Private respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner. The
The private respondents filed an administrative complaint with the subsequent decision was appealed by the petitioner and during its pendency, the
Ombudsman against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt court issued an order stating that “… counsels for both parties are given 30 days from
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be
suspension of the petitioner, who were employees of the national center for mental submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, petitioner filed a Motion Ex Parte to
health. The respondents argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Submit Memorandum within 30 days from receipt of Notice of Submission of the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was
the 1987 Constitution, while petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only granted by the court. But the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive for failure to prosecute petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it.
by his office. Issue: W/N the mere failure of an appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum
Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the Held
investigation of administrative complaints. The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure
Held of an appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts … shall
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said decide.. cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city
courts: provided…parties may submit memorandum.. if so requested.” It cannot be regard to the day of the week on which it begins. The petitioner bank failed to comply
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memorandum is optional. Being with the legal requirement of publication. Auction sale of petitioner bank is void and of
optional, a party may choose to waive submission of the memoranda. As a general no legal effect.
rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC [G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]
be enforced 15AUG
Case No. 31 | Midterms Case No. 20
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (South) vs Court of Appeals Ponente: FELICIANO, J.
GR No. 117188, August 7, 1997 FACTS:
Statutory rule: The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and
may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. [P]etitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor
Facts: practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (North Association) was
registered with private respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation as the were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue
sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate
their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant
by-laws. Later, it was discovered that there were two organizations within the
subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.
president of North Association that the latter has been automatically dissolved
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s holding that
because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This
resulted in the registration of the South Association, herein petitioner. The North petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion
Association complained and got a favorable result from respondent HIGC declaring
the registration of petitioner association (the South Assocciation) cancelled and Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly
respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence, petitioner association related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits
filed a petition for certiorar
Issue: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are “regular” employees of NSC
Held:
No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondent’s main business, steel-making”; and (ii)
its failure to pass its by-laws. The wor “must” in a statute is not always imperative but they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.
it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statuted
should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in ISSUE:
using the word “must” or “shall”. Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being only “project employees” of NSC.
Case No. 32 | Midterms Case No. 21
PNB vs Court of Appeals HELD:
222 Scra 134, May 17, 1993
NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
Statutory rule: A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to
the day of the week on which it begins. RATIO:
Facts:
Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However, contrary to petitioners’
To secure payments of his loan, private respondent mortgages two lots to
petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, petitioner bank extrajudicially apprehensions, the designation of named employees as “project employees” and their assignment to a specific project are
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale.
Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Property in favor of the effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor
Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. laws.
The notices of sale of private respondent’s foreclosed properties were
published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of a newspaper “Daily On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as “regular employees”, the
Record.” The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project
fall on a Friday and a Saturday respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that
the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”. The
consecutive weeks.” second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one
Issue: W/N the petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication
of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.
Held:
No. it must be conceded that Article 13 of the NCC is completely silent as to Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997)
the definition of what is a week. In Concepcion vs Andueta, the term “week” was 16APR
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days without
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, against legal tyranny.
vs.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28, 1987)
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents. 16APR
Ponente: TORRES, JR. CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, 
FACTS: vs.
Respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured the 12-year old petitioner Karen Salvacion to go INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
with him in his apartment where the former repeatedly raped latter. After the rescue, policemen recovered dollar and peso Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
checks including a foreign currency deposit from China Banking Corporation (CBC). Writ of preliminary attachment and hold Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
departure order were issued. Notice of Garnishment was served by the Deputy Sheriff to CBC which later invoked R.A. No. Ponente: CRUZ
1405 as its answer to it. Deputy Sheriff sent his reply to CBC saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank FACTS:
deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their deceased
has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. CBC replied and invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con
effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. Central Bank of the Philippines affirmed two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a
the defense of CBC. fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
ISSUE:  One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of RA 6426 amended by PD 1246 otherwise known  as the American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother.  Trial court
“Foreign Currency Deposit Act” be made applicable to  a foreign transient. dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of
HELD: the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
NO. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. ISSUE:
RATIO: Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.
[T]he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of HELD:
Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice RATIO:
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no
New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this
“Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, exception.
this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect
and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. to the law maker’s will.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory
Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)
judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the 16APR
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,  Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall as
vs. Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Ponente: CAMPOS, JR. Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall election,
FACTS: petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the  Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election“.
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.  Petitioner also anchored his claim on ISSUE:
Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay
operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains post.
that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC. HELD:
ISSUE: NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of RATIO:
1917. Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
HELD: hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election.  The
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits. proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned.  The
RATIO: electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the successor elected through a recall election.
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as
there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be
one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed filled by the electorate.
as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the same Section 74(b) now
the first enactment. referred to as Barangay Elections.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern (G.R. No. L-28502-03. April 18, 1989)
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have 17APR
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

Paras vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996) vs.

16APR ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, Ponente: NARVASA
vs. FACTS:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was granted a tax credit by the Commissioner accordingly on
Ponente: FRANCISCO 1964. However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be short by P367,994.00. The Commissioner (of
FACTS: Internal Revenue) wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period from
1961 to 1964. ESSO paid under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by the Commissioner.
It protested the computation of interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed that it should not have that the petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended
been required to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00— by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
representing the difference between said deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it with some modification of sentence.
had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus asked for a refund. The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ISSUE:
ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals  which ordered payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing overpaid interest. Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of Commonwealth Act No. 142.
The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only on year 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction HELD:
of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year, 1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed and set aside and petitioner was
reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of Section 51 of acquitted of the crime charged
the Tax Code. RATIO:
ISSUE: [A]n alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be applied on the full tax deficiency of P367,994.00 despite the existence of transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
overpayment in the amount of P221,033.00. authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
HELD: fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed. as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any
RATIO: sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as 1960, the Government already had in its hands the within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to return it sought to be remedied.  Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
to ESSO That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.  The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
from its actuality. The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the lawmakers.
moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept
payee to reimburse an amount paid to him results from the mistake, not from the payee’s confession of the mistake or of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed
recognition of the obligation to reimburse. strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. court limited.

Ursua vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996) Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)
17APR 25APR

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, 
vs. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
Ponente: BELLOSILO members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
FACTS: SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in receiving the copy of a complaint BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR. memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
FACTS: merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1)
Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and
the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing
Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing
stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of
initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners
contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO.  Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. 
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their