Susan Ehrlich - Representing Rape - Language and Sexual Consent (2001)
Susan Ehrlich - Representing Rape - Language and Sexual Consent (2001)
Susan Ehrlich - Representing Rape - Language and Sexual Consent (2001)
`This rich and rewarding book gives concrete linguistic substance to social con-
structionism and should be read not only by linguists but by anyone with a serious
interest in gender or cultural theory.'
Sally McConnell-Ginet, Cornell University
`Representing Rape is a thought-provoking book about sex and violence, language
and the law ± this is serious linguistics with a serious point. Beginning from the
observation that in court, events are always mediated by the language used to
describe them, Ehrlich shows in detail how courtroom discourse about rape and
sexual assault disadvantages complainants and reinforces rape myths. Her analysis
adds a new dimension to feminist discussions of the criminal justice system, and
deepens our understanding of why it often does not deliver justice for women.'
Deborah Cameron, Institute of Education, University of London
Representing Rape is the ®rst feminist-linguistic analysis of the language of sexual
assault trials.
Ehrlich argues that language is central to all legal settings ± speci®cally sexual
harassment and aquaintance rape hearings where linguistic descriptions are often
the only basis upon which juries and judges determine a verdict. In such contexts,
language is not a neutral and transparent re¯ection of the world, but rather helps to
construct the character of the people and events under investigation.
The book is based around a case study of the trial of a male student accused of two
instances of sexual assault in two different settings in Toronto: a university tribunal
and a criminal trial. This case is situated within international studies on rape trials
and is relevant to the legal systems of the US, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New
Zealand. Ehrlich shows how culturally-dominant notions about rape percolate
through the talk of sexual assault cases in a variety of settings and ultimately
shape their outcome.
Ehrlich hopes that to understand rape trials in this way is to recognize their
capacity for change. By highlighting the underlying preconceptions and prejudices
in the discourse of courtrooms today, this important book paves the way towards a
fairer judicial system for the future.
Susan Ehrlich
Acknowledgements viii
Notes on transcription ix
Introduction 1
Conclusion 149
Notes 153
Bibliography 159
Index 168
Acknowledgements
Contemporary feminist critiques of the law have often cited the rape trial as
embodying all that is problematic about the legal system for women. From
the revictimization of rape victims to the legitimization of normative views
of female and male sexuality, the discriminatory qualities of rape trials
have led some feminist legal theorists to conclude that `judicial rape' can
be more damaging than an actual rape, `masquerading' as it does `under the
name of justice' (Lees 1996: 36). For Smart (1989: 161), the rape trial is illus-
trative of the law's juridogenic potential: frequently the harms produced by the
so-called remedy are as bad as the original abuse. Documenting the capacity of
cross-examining lawyers to dominate and revictimize rape victims, or to
perform `rape of the second kind' (Matoesian 1995: 676), work by Conley
and O'Barr (1998) and Matoesian (1993) has convincingly demonstrated
the pivotal role of `talk' in achieving such effects. Yet, this book shows
that perhaps more insidious ± and thus resistant to challenge ± in the
sexual assault adjudication proceedings analysed here was not the power of
`talk' to revictimize victims but rather its role in de®ning and delimiting
the meanings that came to be attached to the events and subjects under
scrutiny. `Seeing' the events and participants in question was not a tran-
sparent process, but one made opaque and partial by a range of culturally-
and institutionally-authorized linguistic practices. Indeed, the overarching
interpretive framework that I argue structured these proceedings was so seam-
less in its coverage that subaltern (i.e., victims') understandings of the events
were rendered unrecognizable or imperceptible. Thus, departing from pre-
vious linguistic scholarship on rape trials, this book ascribes a largely consti-
tutive role to language. That is, in analysing the language of sexual assault
adjudication processes, I attempt to give empirical substance to theoretical
claims about the primacy of discourse in constructing and constituting
social realities.
The `turn to language' that has characterized much recent scholarship in the
social sciences and humanities identi®es `discourse' as an important site in the
construction and constitution of social relations. While this so-called `linguis-
tic' turn owes much to the study of linguistics, discussions of discourse in
these disciplines do not typically attend to the nitty-gritty linguistic details
2 Introduction
of actual verbal interaction. Assuming language to be the most important of
the practices Foucault (1972: 49) includes in his well-known de®nition of
`discourses' ± `practices that systematically form the objects of which they
speak' ± I adopt an approach to discourse that locates its constitutive power
not only in socially- and historically-constructed domains of knowledge,
but also in the linguistic details of socially-situated interactions. In fact, I
want to suggest that analyses of discourse that are grounded in instances of
socially-situated interactions can deepen our understanding of the structuring
effects of language. For, it is not free-¯oating `discourse' that itself constructs
and de®nes the nature of the events under investigation in these sexual assault
proceedings. What accounts for the power of these discursive practices in
`form[ing] the objects of which they speak' is their embodiment in particular
institutional settings. That is, it is only to the extent that these discursive
practices are embedded in institutions and subject to institutional constraints
that they come to be constitutive of `the social'.
In the chapters that follow, I delineate both the discursive constraints
imposed upon speakers' rights in these institutional settings and the effects
of these constraints in shaping and structuring the interpretive framework
that imbued the events and participants with meaning. Chapter 1 reviews
scholarly work within feminist linguistics and feminist legal studies, arguing
that studies of gender performativity must be attentive to the way that insti-
tutions ± speci®cally legal institutions ± constrain and shape `gendered' per-
formances. Indeed, what I demonstrate in my own analysis of sexual assault
adjudication processes (in Chapters 2±5) is the way that the production of
gendered identities is `®ltered' through the ideological frameworks that
dominated the proceedings. Chapter 2 considers what I call the accused's
`grammar of non-agency' and its legitimization in both of the institutional
contexts in which his case was heard. While at times pushing the limits of
contextual acceptability, the accused's testimony was intelligible and compre-
hensible to adjudicators, justi®ed, in part, by appeals to hegemonic notions of
male sexuality. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of question±answer sequences
between the accused's representatives and the complainants. Identifying a
series of propositions presupposed or (pseudo)asserted in these questions, I
suggest that, taken together, they comprise an ideological perspective that
deemed lack of `utmost resistance' on the part of the complainants as tant-
amount to consent. Thus, while Chapter 2 shows dominant ideologies of
male and female sexuality and violence against women to inform judicial
reasoning, Chapter 3 shows their discursive circulation within the trial pro-
cess itself. And as discursive re¯exes of cultural ideologies, presupposed in
questions, these propositions help to constitute the complainants' institu-
tional identities. That is, in response to questions that presupposed their
behaviour to be lacking in appropriate resistance, the complainants were pro-
duced as `ineffectual agents' who `consented' to sex by failing to resist. In
Chapter 4, then, I document the complainants' `grammar of ineffectual
agency'.
Introduction 3
Chapter 5 explores an explanatory model for acquaintance rape also invoked
in these proceedings ± male/female miscommuniciation. Here the com-
plainants' `lack of appropriate resistance' manifests itself in a somewhat
different form. Set against an ostensibly masculine communicative code,
the complainants' signals of non-consent were found de®cient as signals of
resistance because they lacked strength and forcefulness. Given the insidious-
ness with which the discursive practices of these proceedings (re)constructed
the complainants' behaviour as weak and lacking in resistance, Chapter 5
begins to theorize a recon®gured discursive frame that recognizes the
socially-structured inequities that can shape women's responses to men's
sexual aggression. Drawing upon concepts from pragmatics, speech act
theory and feminist legal theory, I propose a transformed set of propositions,
which when encoded in questions, recontextualize the complainants' `ineffec-
tual agency' as strategic agency. In Chapter 6, I summarize my ®ndings and
consider the relationship between the discursive practices of these legal
settings and their material effects.
1 The institutional coerciveness
of legal discourse1
Introduction
Central to an investigation of language as it is embodied within institutional
settings is both an understanding of the relationship between linguistic prac-
tices and speakers' social identities and an exploration of the institutional and
cultural backdrop against which speakers adopt such practices. Building on
scholarship in feminist linguistics, sociolinguistics and feminist legal studies,
I develop in this chapter an approach to the language of sexual assault
adjudication processes that brings together what has traditionally been two
separate (but related) strands of research within feminist language studies:
(1) the study of language use: how individuals draw upon linguistic resources
to produce themselves as gendered and (2) the study of linguistic repre-
sentations: how culturally-dominant notions of gender are encoded (and
potentially contested) in linguistic representations. Because, as Conley and
O'Barr (1998: 3) note, `the details of everyday legal practices consist almost
entirely of language', language is the primary vehicle through which cultural
and institutional ideologies are transmitted in legal settings. Thus, to the
extent that such ideologies are expressed linguistically in legal settings, the
(gendered) linguistic practices of participants may be in¯uenced by other
kinds of linguistic practices. Put another way, my approach elucidates how
the `talk' of participants, speci®cally witnesses, is ®ltered through cultural
and institutional ideologies which themselves are manifest in `talk'.2
Speci®cally, by investigating the linguistic details of a sexual assault trial
and tribunal, not only do I provide a concrete demonstration of how dominant
ideas about male and female sexuality and violence against women are repro-
duced and recirculated in the `talk' of these institutional contexts, but also
how such discursive formations shape and/or constrain the kinds of gendered
identities that are produced. In developing my theoretical approach, I ®rst
draw upon the feminist linguistics literature, arguing that investigations of
gendered `talk' must be attentive to the way that institutions ± speci®cally
legal institutions ± constrain and shape `gendered' performances. I then
turn to the speci®c ways that legal discourse can be shown to make possible
or thwart certain performances of gender.
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 5
Enacting gender though `talk'
Debates over the nature of gender identity and its social construction, origi-
nating in feminist work of the 1990s, have in recent years informed research
in sociolinguistics generally and feminist linguistics more speci®cally. In par-
ticular, conceptions of gender as categorical, ®xed and static have increasingly
been abandoned in favour of more constructivist and dynamic ones. Cameron
(1990: 86), for example, makes the point (paraphrasing Harold Gar®nkel)
that `social actors are not sociolinguistic ``dopes''', mindlessly and passively
producing linguistic forms that are de®nitively determined by social class
membership, ethnicity or gender. Rather, Cameron argues for an understand-
ing of gender that reverses the relationship between linguistic practices and
social identities traditionally posited within the quantitative sociolinguistics
or variationist paradigm. Work in this tradition has typically focused on
establishing correlations between linguistic variables and social factors such
as age, race, ethnicity and sex, implicitly assuming that these aspects of
social identity exist prior to and are determinate of linguistic behaviour
(and other social behaviour). Indeed, early research in language and gender
(in the 1970s and 1980s) was largely conducted within this research para-
digm, focusing speci®cally on the correlation of linguistic variables with
the independent variable of sex. By contrast, more recent formulations of
the relationship between language and gender, following Butler (1990),
emphasize the performative aspect of gender: linguistic practices, among
other kinds of practices, continually bring into being individuals' social
identities. Under this account, language is one important means by which
gender ± an ongoing social process ± is enacted or constituted; gender is some-
thing individuals do ± in part through linguistic choices ± as opposed to
something individuals are or have (West and Zimmerman 1987). Cameron's
comments are illustrative:
Whereas sociolinguistics would say that the way I use language re¯ects or
marks my identity as a particular kind of social subject ± I talk like a
white middle-class woman because I am (already) a white middle-class
woman ± the critical account suggests language is one of the things
that constitutes my identity as a particular kind of subject. Sociolinguistics
says that how you act depends on who you are; critical theory says that
who you are (and are taken to be) depends on how you act. (emphasis
in original)
(Cameron 1995: 15±16)
The idea that an individual's linguistic behaviour does not simply arise from
a set of permanent and invariant social attributes is also suggestive of the
contextually-variable nature of social identities. If identities are not ®xed
and static, then their `performance' can vary across social, situational, and
interactional contexts. It is in this regard that Schiffrin (1996) is critical of
6 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
variationist studies within sociolinguistics, in particular, the practice of
coding aspects of social identity as categorical and invariant across contexts.
Schiffrin argues for a different view, one in which social identities are locally
situated and constructed: `we may act more or less middle-class, more or less
female, and so on, depending on what we are doing and with whom. This
view forces us to attend to speech activities, and to the interactions in
which they are situated' (Schiffrin 1996: 199). Likewise, Goodwin in an
ethnographic study of urban African-American children in Philadelphia sug-
gests that stereotypes about women's speech collapse when talk in a whole
range of activities is examined:
Goodwin's comments not only argue for a dynamic and variable conception of
gender identity, they also point to the variable linguistic resources drawn
upon in performances of gender from one activity to another.
While much language and gender research in the 1970s and 1980s took
`difference' between men and women's linguistic behaviour as axiomatic
and as the starting point for empirical investigations, scholarly work in the
1990s (such as Goodwin's), attentive to the way that the linguistic production
of gendered identities varies according to contextual factors, has questioned
such assumptions on both empirical and political grounds. Henley and
Kramarae (1991) argue, for example, that focusing on differences rather
than similarities between women and men functions to exaggerate and
reinforce gender polarities (arguably, a focus that does not serve the interests
of feminism) and abstracts gender away from the speci®cities of its social con-
text. Indeed, many of the claims about gender-differentiated language that
emerged from studies in the 1970s and 1980s (the most notable being that
women's speech styles are cooperative, while men's are competitive) were
based on studies that did just this: they were based on limited populations
± white, North American and middle class ± engaged in cross-sex conversa-
tions where, as Freeman and McElhinny (1996) note, gender is probably
maximally contrastive, yet their results were overgeneralized to all women
and men. Newer conceptions of the relationship between language and
gender, then, not only question the ®xed and static quality of gender
within individuals but also across individuals and social groups. Like feminist
scholarship, more generally, work in feminist linguistics has attempted to
challenge universalizing and essentialist descriptions of women, men and lan-
guage ± descriptions that are more accurately characterized as contextually,
historically, or culturally speci®c.
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 7
One in¯uential attempt to theorize the relationship between gender and
language in terms of local communities and social practices is the `com-
munities of practice' framework developed by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet
(1992a, 1992b, 1999). Advocating a shift away from overarching generaliza-
tions about women, men and `gendered' speech styles, Eckert and McConnell-
Ginet (1992a: 462) emphasize the need to `think practically and look locally'.
They recommend that the interaction between language and gender be
examined in the everyday social practices of particular local communities
(what they term `communities of practice') because they claim that (1)
gender is not always easily separated from other aspects of social identity
and relations, (2) gender will not always have the same meaning across com-
munities, and (3) the linguistic manifestations of gender will also vary across
communities. In Eckert and McConnell-Ginet's (1992b: 95) words: `gender is
produced (and often reproduced) in differential membership in communities
of practice'. For Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, then, it is not gender per se that
interacts with linguistic practices, but rather the complex set of communities
of practices in which individuals participate. That is, just as women's and
men's involvements in `gendered' communities of practice will vary, so
women's and men's relations to normative constructions of gender (includ-
ing linguistic ones) will vary. Although gender undoubtedly in¯uences the
kinds of communities of practice to which individuals have access and/or in
which they participate, the mediating variable of `practice' in Eckert and
McConnell-Ginet's framework leaves open the possibility of linguistic prac-
tices being variable within an individual speaker as well as across individual
speakers of the same sex/gender (Cameron 1996, 1997).
In a discussion of an experimental setting (Freed and Greenwood 1996)
that produced similar linguistic behaviour in both female and male subjects,
Freed (1996: 67) provides a more concrete description of the way in which
gender is produced through involvement in certain social practices or
activities. Freed and Greenwood found that women and men involved in
same-sex dyadic conversations with friends, displayed strikingly similar
linguistic behaviour ± behaviour typically associated with the so-called
cooperative speech style of women.
First, participating in the same practice produced in the women and men
the same kind of talk; second, outside of this experimental setting, it is
possible that women and men would be less likely to ®nd themselves in
such similar settings, given the sex- and gender-differentiated society in
which we live . . . Thus language and gender studies conducted in natural
settings may often ®nd differences not similarities in women's and men's
speech simply because women and men are frequently engaged in
different activities (see M. Goodwin 1990) and not because of any differ-
ences in women and men themselves. Since it is increasingly clear that
speech patterns are products of the activities that people are engaged in
and not inherent to the participants, we can conclude that communicative
8 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
styles are customs related to actions, activities and behaviors differentially
encouraged for women and men.
(Freed 1996: 67)
That linguistic forms are not inherent to the gender of speakers is a point
also made by Ochs (1992: 340) when she argues that `few features of language
directly and exclusively index gender'. A direct indexical relationship
between linguistic forms and gender is evident in personal pronouns that
denote the gender of an interlocutor. To say that most linguistic features
indirectly index gender, then, is to say, like Freed and Eckert and
McConnell-Ginet, that the connection is mediated by the social stances,
acts and activities that women and men perform linguistically (e.g., display-
ing uncertainty, showing force). In turn, these stances, acts and activities
index or become conventionally associated with normative constructions of
gendered behaviour in a particular community or culture. Tag questions,
for example, may display or index a stance of uncertainty (among other
kinds of stances) and, in turn, a stance of uncertainty may in some com-
munities become associated with feminine identities (Duranti and Goodwin
1992: 335). Given the multifunctionality of linguistic forms, Ochs' account
allows for the possibility that different hearers may assign different (gendered)
meanings to utterances. If, for example, a particular hearer does not associate a
stance of uncertainty with femininity, then that hearer may assign a different
function to a woman's use of tag questions, for example, that of facilitating
conversation. What is challenged, then, under Ochs' account of gender index-
ing is the proposition that a particular linguistic style or linguistic form
directly and exclusively marks gender, for both speakers and hearers. And
what is left open is the possibility of individuals performing social stances,
practices or activities that transgress or transform normative constructions
of gendered behaviour (see Hirsch 1998). Indeed, dynamic and constructivist
approaches to gender more generally allow for the possibility of individuals
actively reproducing and/or resisting linguistic practices implicated in
hegemonic notions of masculinity and femininity.
Institutional coerciveness
While the theorizing of gender as `performative' has succeeded in problema-
tizing mechanistic and essentialist notions of gender that underlie much
variationist work in sociolinguistics, for some feminist linguists (e.g.,
Wodak 1997; Kotthoff and Wodak 1998) Butler's formulation ignores the
power relations that impregnate most situations in which gender is
`performed' and hence affords subjects unbounded agency. For Cameron
(1997), Butler's (1990) discussion of performativity does, arguably, acknowl-
edge these power relations, that is, by alluding to the `rigid regulatory frame'
within which gendered identities are produced. Yet, as Cameron (1997: 31)
also points out, often philosophical treatments of this `frame' remain very
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 9
abstract: `for social researchers interested in applying the performativity thesis
to concrete instances of behaviour, the speci®cs of this ``frame'' and its opera-
tion in a particular context will be far more signi®cant considerations than
they seem to be in many philosophical discussions.' The routine enactment
of gender is often, perhaps always, subject to what Cameron calls the `institu-
tional cooerciveness' of social situations; in other words, dominant gender
ideologies often mold and/or inhibit the kinds of gendered identities that
women (and men) produce.
Addressing the tensions between local and more universal accounts of
language and gender, Bergvall (1999) emphasizes the need to analyse domi-
nant gender ideologies that pre-exist and structure local (linguistic) enact-
ments of gender. That is, while more local and contextual accounts of
language and gender (e.g., Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992a, 1992b,
1999) move us away from overarching and excessive generalizations about
women, men and `gendered' talk, Bergvall (1999: 282) suggests that we
also consider the force of socially ascribed gender norms ± `the assumptions
and expectations of (often binary) ascribed social roles against which any per-
formance of gender is constructed, accommodated to, or resisted.' Likewise,
Woolard and Schieffelin (1994: 72) argue that we must connect the `micro-
culture of communicative action' to what they call `macrosocial constraints on
language and behavior'. Certainly, the examination of language and gender
within institutions elucidates some of the macro-constraints that pre-exist
local performances of gender. Indeed, Gal (1991) suggests that because
women and men interact primarily in institutions such as workplaces,
families, schools and political forums, the investigation of language and
gender in informal conversations, outside of these institutions, has severe
limitations. It `creates the illusion that gendered talk is mainly a personal
characteristic' (p. 185), whereas, as much feminist research has revealed,
gender is also a structuring principle of institutions.
Sexual assault adjudication processes are a rich and fertile site for the inves-
tigation of gendered ideologies that pre-exist and `coerce' many performances
of gender. Embedded within legal structures, feminist legal theorists (e.g.,
MacKinnon 1987, 1989, Bartlett and Kennedy 1991, Lacey 1998) have
argued, are androcentric and sexist assumptions that typically masquerade
as `objective' truths. The crime of rape, in particular, has received attention
from feminists critical of the law, because in Smart's (1989: 50) words `the
legal treatment of rape epitomizes the core of the problem of law for
feminism.' Not only are dominant notions about male and female sexuality
and violence against women implicated in legal statutes and judicial decisions
surrounding sexual assault, I argue they also penetrate the discursive arena of
the trial. Moreover, the material force with which the law legitimates a
certain vision of the social order, through, for example, ®nes, imprisonment
or execution, means that the discursive imposition of ideologies in legal
settings will have a particular potency. Hence, by locating my analysis of
gendered linguistic practices in the context of sexual assault adjudication
10 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
processes, I propose to explore the `institutional cooerciveness' of these par-
ticular institutional settings or, put differently, the way that these settings
shape and constrain performances of gender. While acknowledging the
dynamic and performative nature of gendered identities, I demonstrate in
what follows how particular institutions make available or thwart certain
de®nitions of masculinity or femininity, thereby homogenizing what in
other contexts might be realized as variable and heterogeneous performances
of masculinity or feminity. That is, outside of these institutional settings,
when unaffected by the discursive and ideological constraints that permeate
these contexts (i.e., when engaged in other kinds of social practices and
activities), the male defendant and female complainants might recount
their narratives quite differently. Concomitantly, the nature of their gendered
(linguistic) identities, because they are mediated by the particular social
practices and activities (e.g., communities of practice) within which the par-
ticipants are engaged, might also be quite different outside of these institu-
tions. While, as Eckert and McConnell-Ginet suggest, gendered identities,
and social identities more generally, arise out of individuals' participation
in a diverse set of communities of practice, institutional forces may constrain
such identities, belying the complexity of their formation. And, to the extent
that certain gendered identities are inhibited or facilitated by the sexual
assault hearings analysed here, this kind of institutional discourse provides
a window onto the `rigid regulatory frame' (Butler 1990) within which
gender is often enacted.
Put in Cameron's terms, this book explores the way that the linguistic repre-
sentation of gender `in the third person' shapes the enactment of gender
`in the ®rst person'. That is, encoded in third-person forms, talk by lawyers
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 11
and adjudicators about the accused, the complainants and violence against
women more generally represents male sexual aggression in particular ways,
that is, `his' sexual prerogatives are privileged and protected at the expense of
`her' sexual autonomy. Such representations transmit androcentric values and
attitudes; yet, they also have a strongly constitutive function: they shape and
structure witnesses' own accounts of the events and concomitantly the way
that gender is enacted in the ®rst person. Having explicated the relevant
aspects of the ®rst kind of inquiry in feminist linguistics ± the linguistic
construction of gender `in the ®rst person' ± I turn now to an explication
of the second: what is meant by `the linguistic construction of gender in
the third person'? Moreover, how can the linguistic construction of gender
in the third person shape enactments of gender in the ®rst person?
Sexist language
Early work on gendered linguistic representations (in the 1970s and 1980s)
focused on the way that language differentially represents men and women.
Schulz (1975), for example, documented what she called the `semantic
derogation' of women in unequal word pairs such as bachelor±spinster,
master±mistress, governor±governess or warlock±witch. Although parallel at some
point in the history of English, Schulz argued that these pairs have not
developed in a uniform way: systematically over time the terms designating
women have taken on negative connotations in a way that the terms
designating men have not. In addition to elucidating the perjorative nature
of terms referring to women, early work on sexist language pointed to the
way that masculine generics such as he and man render women invisible.
Empirical support for such claims has been adduced by a substantial body
of psycholinguistic research that shows he/man generics to readily evoke
images of males rather than of males and females, to have detrimental effects
on individuals' beliefs in women's ability to perform a job and to have a nega-
tive impact on women's own feelings of pride, importance and power. (For a
review of this work see Henley 1989.) Thus, whether or not generic readings
are intended by the use of he/man language, empirical research suggests that in
many contexts interpretations do not correspond to intentions. Indeed, the
documentation of the negative effects of he/man generics ± both material
and symbolic ± was a major impetus behind nonsexist language reform efforts
of the 1970s and 1980s. Attempting to challenge the androcentric and sexist
values encoded in language, advocates of nonsexist language reform intro-
duced alternative linguistic forms into languages, with the intention of
supplanting male-de®ned meanings and grammar. For example, by replacing
masculine generics (e.g., he, man) with neutral generics (e.g., singular they, he/
she, generic she) language reformers challenged the claim implicit in the use
of masculine generics, that is, that men are the typical case of humanity,
with women constituting a deviation from this norm. While most attempts
at linguistic reform have focused on codi®ed instances of sexist language, that
12 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
is, on those aspects of languages that are in some sense intrinsic to its gram-
matical and lexical structure, feminist linguistic resistance has also involved
the coining of new terms to express women's perceptions and experiences,
phenomena previously unexpressed in a language encoding a male worldview.
The claim made by Spender (1980: 164) is that lexical gaps are not innocent;
rather, `when one groups holds a monopoly on naming, its bias is embedded
in the names it supplies' and the names it does not supply. Thus, innovative
terms such as sexism, sexual harassment and date rape are said to be signi®cant in
that they give a name to the experiences of women. As Gloria Steinem (1983:
149) says of these terms: `a few years ago, they were just called life.'
In arguing for the necessity of gender-based language reform, feminist
linguists have generally assumed that language is not a neutral and tran-
sparent means of designating social realities. Rather, a particular vision of
social reality is assumed to be inscribed in language ± a vision of reality
that does not serve all of its speakers equally. The idea that language does
not merely re¯ect but also creates and maintains unequal social relations is
one that underlies the efforts of nonsexist language reformers and has its
origins in the work of two American anthropological linguists, Edward
Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. The Sapir±Whorf hypothesis, as it is known
within the disciplines of linguistics and anthropology, holds that the gram-
matical and lexical structure of a given language has a powerful mediating
in¯uence on the ways that speakers of that language come to view the
world. Whorf's comments are illustrative:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we
do not ®nd there because they stare every observer in the face; on the con-
trary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic ¯ux of impressions which
has to be organized by our minds ± and this means largely by the linguis-
tic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and
ascribe signi®cances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agree-
ment to organize it in this way ± an agreement that holds throughout our
speech community and is codi®ed in the patterns of our language. The
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, BUT ITS
TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY; we cannot talk at all
except by subscribing to the organization and classi®cation of data
which the agreement decrees. (emphasis in original)
(Whorf 1956: 213±14)
For Whorf, speakers of radically different languages are led by the structure of
their language to develop radically different ways of categorizing and viewing
the world. Indeed, in describing Hopi, an Amerindian language, Whorf's
goal was to establish the worldview he believed to be embedded in the
grammatical and lexical patterns of the language. The strongest articulation
of the Sapir±Whorf hypothesis within language and gender studies appears in
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 13
the work of Dale Spender (1980), who argued that because men have had a
`monopoly on naming', it is their view of the world that is encoded in
language.
While the Sapir±Whorf hypothesis is an appealing one and still in¯uential
in `weaker' forms (e.g., Gumperz and Levinson 1996), the `strong' version of
the hypothesis as articulated above has few adherents today. The fact that
speakers of a particular language can make conceptual distinctions that
their language appears not to allow constitutes a powerful argument against
the `strong' version of the hypothesis. Crystal (1987) cites some Australian
aboriginal languages, for instance, that have few words for numbers: the
number lexicon may be restricted to general words such as all, many, few
and then words for one and two. Yet it is not the case that speakers of such
languages cannot count beyond two nor perform complex numerical opera-
tions. Indeed, subsequent scholarship on Hopi has shown that Whorf's
claims about the `worldview' possessed by Hopi speakers ± claims upon
which much of his theoretical work was based ± are themselves questionable
(Duranti 1997). A weaker version of the Sapir±Whorf hypothesis (which has
generally come to replace the `strong' version popular in the mid-part of the
twentieth century) suggests that recurrent patterns of language use may pre-
dispose speakers to view the world in particular ways, but that such a world-
view is not all-determining. Clearly, a feminist or antiracist critique of the
sexist and racist assumptions embodied in language (such as Spender's)
would be impossible if the grammatical and lexical structures of languages
were so powerful as to prevent thought or a worldview outside of those
structures. Speakers `can see through and around the settings' (Halliday
1971: 332) of their language, but to do so may require interrogating some
of the most basic `common-sense' assumptions encoded in familiar and recur-
ring uses of language. This is not to say that sexist and androcentric language
is of no signi®cance. On the contrary, foregrounding the ideological perspec-
tives that languages encode can be dif®cult precisely because of their insidious
and commonsensical quality. As Cameron (1998b: 11) says, whether or not
one subscribes to a `strong' version of Sapir±Whorf hypothesis, the sexism
of language matters: `to the extent that our lives are carried on in language
(which is to a considerable extent, for most of us), the sexism of language
must constantly re-enact and reinforce the commonsense ``normality'' of
sexist assumptions.'
Feminist (like other critical) analyses are interested here not just in legal
doctrine but also in legal discourse, i.e., how differently sexed legal sub-
jects are constituted by and inserted within legal categories via the
mediations of judicial, police or lawyers' discourse. The feminist
approach therefore mounts a fundamental challenge to the standard
ways of conceptualising law and the legal, and moves to a broader under-
standing of legally relevant spheres of practice.
(Lacey 1989: 10)
While Lacey is writing in the 1990s, earlier feminist work on the law of rape
and sexual assault also included within its domain of critique, not only
statutes surrounding rape (i.e., legal doctrine), but also `the mediations of
judicial, police or lawyers' discourse'. Although not articulated in terms of
the `disciplinary' power of law's `discourses', a work like Susan Estrich's
Real Rape (1987) is suggestive of the social control and regulation exercised
by the criminal justice system in its treatment of what Estrich calls `simple
rape' as opposed to `real rape'. The question Estrich explores is why many
cases of rape that meet the statutory de®nition are not considered as such
by police, prosecutors, judges and juries. That is, Estrich argues that the
law differentially prosecutes perpetrators and differentially protects the
interests of victims. And, paradoxically, it is the cases of rape that are least
frequent that the law treats most aggressively. (Research by Russell (1982,
1984) has shown that women are much more likely to be raped by husbands,
lovers and dates than by strangers.) In cases of `stranger rape' (what Estrich
terms `real rape'), when the perpetrator is an armed stranger `jumping from
the bushes', and, in particular a black stranger attacking a white woman,
Estrich argues, the law is likely to arrest, prosecute and convict the perpetra-
tor. By contrast, in cases of what Estrich calls `simple rape', that is, when a
woman is forced to engage in sex with a date, an acquaintance, her boss or
a man she met at a bar, when no weapon is involved and when there is no
overt evidence of physical injury, rapes are much less likely to be treated as
criminal by the criminal justice system. Marcus (1992) provides support
for Estrich's claims, elaborating on the intersection of racism and sexism in
the criminal justice system's prosecution of rapists. While inter-racial rape
cases make up a minority of rapes committed and brought to trial, when
white women are raped by black men (especially strangers) they are much
more likely to obtain convictions than in cases where the perpetrator is
white. Clearly, racist ideologies inform judges' and juries' decisions in rape
20 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
cases, demonizing black men and protecting white women; that is, the law's
abhorrence of the rapist in stranger cases is exacerbated when the rapist is a
man of colour.3
To the extent that stranger rape is considered to be `real rape' by the
criminal justice system, the magnitude of the problem of rape diminishes
(at least, from the system's point of view). First, stranger rape is a relatively
infrequent event and second, when it does occur, it tends to be prosecuted
more successfully and more frequently than many other violent crimes
(Estrich 1987: 4). Estrich comments:
Put in slightly different terms, the `discourses' that surround the prosecution
of real rape vs. simple rape cases in the criminal justice system (i.e., Lacey's
`mediations of judicial, police or lawyers' discourse') bring into being de®ni-
tions and categories of what constitutes a `legitimate' or believable victim and
a `legitimate' perpetrator. `Legitimate' perpetrators, for example, are strangers
to their victims, carry a weapon, and in¯ict physical injury upon their victim,
beyond the sexual violence; `legitimate' or believable victims are women
raped by precisely these kinds of perpetrators. The discourses of rape that sur-
round the criminal justice system's treatment of rape, then, construct stranger
rape as `real rape' and render the vast majority of rapes invisible. Consider the
relationship between the differential treatment of real rape and simple rape
(i.e., real rape is `addressed aggressively by the system' whereas simple rape
is not) and their disclosure and reporting rates. In a well-cited survey of
approximately 1,000 adult women in 1978, Russell found that 56 per cent
of her respondents said that at some point in their life they had been a
victim of `forced intercourse' or `intercourse obtained by threat'. Of this
group, 82 per cent of the rapes involved non-strangers, yet less than 10 per
cent of these were reported to the police. On the basis of a number of other
studies investigating rape reporting rates, Estrich draws the generalization
that women are less likely to report rape `the closer the relationship between
victim and assailant' (1987: 11). That is, while rape generally is a vastly
under-reported crime, `real rapes' are much more likely to be reported than
`simple rapes'. MacKinnon (1987: 81) speculates as to the conditions under
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 21
which women will report rape: `the rapes that have been reported . . . are the
kinds of rape women think will be believed when we report them. They have two
qualities: they are by a stranger and they are by a Black man' (emphasis mine).
In a similar way, Estrich suggests that victims who do not disclose and report
rape are those who are not deemed `legitimate victims by the police and
criminal justice system' (1987: 15). In other words, de®nitions and categories
of `real rapes' and `legitimate' or believable victims are socially controlling in
the sense that they determine the likelihood of women disclosing and report-
ing rape. (Arguably, the reporting of rape is a necessary step in the law's
(ostensible) attempts to deter rape.) It is not only through coercive legal mea-
sures, then, that (some) men's sexual interests and prerogatives are protected
by the criminal justice system at the expense of women's sexual autonomy; it
is also through culturally-powerful legal discourses that achieve their force
through self-regulation and self-surveillance.
The translation of Estrich's insights into a language of `discourses' and
`disciplinary power' is consistent with and runs parallel to work by Lees
(1996, 1997), who conceptualizes the rape trial as means of controlling
female sexuality. According to Lees (1997: 86) `insuf®cient attention has
been paid to the function of the [rape] trial process in policing women's
sexuality.' Analysing British rape trials that occurred over a four month
period in 1993, Lees concentrates on the trials' (i.e., cross-examining lawyers')
preoccupation with victims' intimate bodily functions. Constantly focusing
on bodily ¯uids such as menstruation in their questioning, Lees argues that
cross-examining lawyers cast doubt on the `rationality' of victims, given
the control that bodies and particularly menstruation are said to exert on
women's abilities to `reason'. Of relevance here are MacKinnon's (1987)
remarks about the `pornographic' nature of rape trials. It is perhaps only in
pornography that the intimate details of a man removing a tampon from a
woman's vagina ± the topic of questioning in one of Lees' examples ±
would be expressed in a public forum. Hence not only does the public
spectacle of sexualizing victims' bodies call into question their ability to
reason, it also casts aspersions on their `respectability'. Indeed, in Smart's
(1989: 39) terms they are obliged to participate in a `pornographic vignette'.
Lees' argument ultimately associates this `de®lement of the complainant
through language' with social control and regulation:
Rape trials today can be seen both as operating as a warning, and a way of
restricting the activities of women through inciting fear of the public
sphere, but also through punishing a victim for breaking the silence
enforced by the emphasis on female respectability and chastity.
(Lees 1997: 73)
In the same way that the discourses of `simple rape' and `real rape' engender
self-regulation and self-surveillance with respect to victims' disclosure
and reporting of rape, so the rape trial, according to Lees, functions as a
22 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
mechanism of `disciplinary' power. But, not only do the rape trial's degrading
and humiliating qualities discourage victims from engaging with the crim-
inal justice system, Lees suggests that, as a form of social control, the rape
trial may extend its reach beyond victims of rape. That is, the activities of
women more generally may be curtailed by a mechanism that `incite[s] fear
of the public sphere'.
Statutory discourse
In Canada, revisions to criminal laws governing acts of sexual aggression were
legislated by Parliament in 1983, 1985, 1992 and 1995, largely in response
to concerted feminist lobbying (Comack 1999). The major changes in 1983
involved replacing the offences of rape (and indecent assault) with the more
general offences of sexual assault. Such changes functioned to expand the
narrow view of sexual aggression denoted by rape, making criminally punish-
able sexual acts of aggression that did not necessarily involve penetration.
More signi®cantly perhaps these changes marked a shift in the way the
Canadian Criminal Code conceptualized rape ± as a crime of violence rather
than a crime of sex. Designating rape as a kind of assault emphasized the
af®nity between unwanted sexual aggression and other forms of assault and
battery.5 The 1983 legislation also abolished the marital exemption rule
which had made it impossible for husbands to rape their wives; the corrobora-
tion rule which required that a complainant's testimony be supported by
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 23
independent evidence; and the recent complaint rule which obligated the
complainant to make a prompt complaint in order that her testimony be
deemed reliable. While the 1983 legislation introduced fairly strict con-
ditions under which complainants' sexual history could be admissible as
evidence, this so-called rape shield provision was struck down by the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1991. Responding to the strong lobbying efforts
of Canadian feminists, legislation in 1992 reintroduced rape shield amend-
ments setting out a new test for determining the admissibility of a com-
plainant's past sexual history as evidence in sexual assault trials (Mohr and
Roberts 1994). In addition, the 1992 amendments provided a de®nition of
`consent' with respect to sexual offences and restricted the defence of mistaken
belief in consent `to situations in which the defendant actually took ``reason-
able steps'' to ascertain that the complainant was consenting' (Busby 1999:
271). Of signi®cance in the 1992 rede®nition of consent is its focus on
what the complainant said or otherwise communicated at the time of the
(alleged) sexual assault, rather than on what the defendant thought she
communicated or on what she might have communicated at some other
point in time. According to Busby:
Moreover, the 1992 rede®nition asserts that consent is not obtained under
certain conditions including: if a third party consents on behalf of the com-
plainant; if the complainant is incapable of consenting; if the accused induces
the complainant to consent by abusing a position of trust, power or authority.
What these provisions make criminally punishable are instances of coerced
sex that don't necessarily involve physical violence or the threat of physical
violence.
Statutory reform in the United States has had a different history, as feminist
reformers in the 1970s believed that introducing a formal requirement of
consent for sexual acts of aggression would focus undue attention on com-
plainants in trials, for example, on the extent to which they resisted, on
their `provocative' clothing and behaviour and/or on their `promiscuous'
sexual history. Interestingly, what has been heralded as a progressive reform
by Canadian feminists in the 1990s (see Busby above) ± focusing on the com-
plainants' behaviour and whether or not she communicated consent ± was
deemed as strategically problematic by American feminists in the 1970s.
Thus, emerging in the legislative reform of the 1970s was a focus on the
defendant's conduct rather than the complainant's, which brought with it a
renewed emphasis on `forcible compulsion' as the core of sexual assault
24 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
offences, of which physical force and violence was one form (Schulhofer 1998:
31). Arguably, this focus on `forcible compulsion' leaves open the possibility
of physical violence or the threat of physical violence becoming a necessary
criterion for the crime of sexual assault, thereby perpetuating the criminal
justice system's preoccupation with cases of what Estrich calls `real rape' in
which the armed stranger `jumps from the bushes' to attack his victim. None-
theless, state legislative change in the 1970s instituted a number of progres-
sive reforms: corroboration rules were abolished in virtually every state;
resistance requirements were abolished or softened; marital exemption rules
were eliminated or weakened; and rape shield provisions were introduced
in every state to restrict conditions under which evidence pertaining to com-
plainants' sexual history was admissible (Schulhofer 1998: 33). Post-1970
reform, not surprisingly, has had to grapple with the issue of `forcible com-
pulsion', speci®cally, how to extend legal concepts of force and coercion so
that they include more than just physical violence or the threat of physical
violence. Representative of the most progressive changes in this regard is a
1992 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, which in essence rede®ned `physi-
cal force' ± a requirement for a sexual assault conviction by New Jersey law ±
to mean non-consent:
Judges' discourse
The discrepancy between `law as legislation' and `law as practice' is probably
most explicit in judicial decision-making. Within the Canadian context,
Comack (1999: 234) remarks that despite the widespread reform to Canadian
sexual assault law in the 1980s and 1990s (of the type discussed above),
`judicial decisions continue to re¯ect traditional cultural mythologies about
rape'. For example, although 1983 reforms replaced the offence of rape
with the offence of sexual assault (attempting, among other things, to include
under its rubric acts of sexual aggression that did not only involve penetra-
tion), a year later, a New Brunswick Court of Appeal judge held that grab-
bing a woman's breasts did not constitute sexual assault because women's
breasts, `like a man's beard', were only secondary sexual characteristics (R. v.
Chase 1984). According to Mohr and Roberts (1994: 5), because the drafters
of the 1983 legislation did not de®ne sexual assault, `it is judges who, by
default, become the law-makers as far as the de®nition of the offence is
concerned.' 6 In a more recent Canadian judicial decision (R. v. Ewanchuk
1998), an Alberta Court of Appeal judge upheld the acquittal of a defendant
on the basis of the complainant's `implied' consent. While the complainant
testi®ed that she feared resistance would cause the accused to become violent,
the judge determined that `her suppressed concerns about the possibility of
force from Ewanchuk' were tantamount to (implied) consent. His comments
also included reference to her dress: `it must be pointed out that the com-
plainant did not present herself to Ewanchuk [the defendant] or enter his
trailer in a bonnet and crinolines' (emphasis mine) and to more `appropriate'
ways that she might have resisted the accused: `the sum of the evidence indi-
cates that Ewanchuk's advances to the complainant were far less criminal than
hormonal. In a less litigious age going too far in the boyfriend's car was better
dealt with on site ± a well-chosen expletive, a slap in the face or, if necessary, a
well-directed knee.'7 In sum, without indicators of resistance, whether that
took the form of wearing `a bonnet and crinolines' or slapping the accused
in the face, the judge determined that the complainant had implied consent.
De®ning consent as the absence of resistance departs dramatically from the
1992 statutory provision, which de®nes consent as `the voluntary agreement
of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question'; moreover,
such a de®nition suggests that it is women who are responsible for controlling
men's sexual urges.
26 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
More systematic investigation of Canadian judicial decisions has been con-
ducted by Coates et al. (1994). Analysing the language of twelve sexual assault
trial judgements written between 1986 and 1992, Coates et al. determined
that judges were limited in the `interpretative repertoires' (Wetherell and
Potter 1988) they deployed in describing sexual assaults. That is, in describ-
ing `stranger' rapes, judges employed a language of assault and violence; how-
ever, in describing acquaintance rapes, Coates et al. (p. 191) demonstrate that
`the vocabulary . . . used was often more suitable to consensual acts than to
assault'. For example, the unwanted touching of a young girl's vagina was
described as `fondling' in one trial judgement; in another, a judge described
a defendant acquitted of rape and forced fellatio as `offering' his penis to his
victim's mouth. Expressions such as `fondling' and `offering a penis' conjure
up an image of affectionate, consensual sex, thereby situating `the violent acts
that were at issue into a framework of normal sexual activity' (p. 193). Thus,
in spite of the fact that 1983 statutory reforms explicitly reconceptualized
sexual assault as a crime of violence rather than a crime of sex, most of
these decisions (even in cases where the accused was convicted) adopted a lan-
guage of erotic, affectionate and consensual sex in depicting sexual assault.
And, consistent with Estrich's claims about the criminal justice system's dif-
®culty in treating non-stranger rape or acquaintance rape as criminal, it was in
the non-stranger cases that this `anomalous' language, inconsistent with
Canadian law, was used.
Trial discourse
In her book-length study of acquaintance rape trials, Sanday (1996) elucidates
some of the failures of American sexual assault legal reforms, as evidenced
within the context of trials. Describing the notorious William Kennedy
Smith trial that took place in Florida in the fall of 1991, Sanday remarks:
`the trial was an example of how a woman's reputation can be dragged
through the mud even in the face of the legal reform that explicitly forbids
such information into court' (p. 217). Of relevance here is the fact that Florida
was in the forefront of rape law reforms in the 1970s and instituted, among
other progressive provisions, a rape shield provision which held that a com-
plainant's past sexual history was only admissible as evidence under very
restricted circumstances. Indeed, under this law the judge prohibited the
defence attorneys from asking any questions about the complainant's, Patricia
Bowman's, past sexual history. According to Sanday, however, the defence
lawyer (Roy Black) was nonetheless able to introduce such evidence `through
the back door':
Questions about her bar-going habits painted a certain picture, as did her
underwear, which Black asked the jurors to examine for tears to show that
Smith had not forced her. As the black Victoria's Secret panties and sheer
black bra with blue satin trim were passed from hand to hand to be
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 27
checked for tears or stains, along with the newly bought Ann Taylor
dress, it was obvious that another, more important message was attached
to the show. . . . Roy Black left the indelible impression that this un-
attached young woman, who had left her illegitimate child at her
mother's for the night, was out for a night on a town famous for its
bars frequented by rich men and fortune-seeking women. All of this
without explicitly getting into Bowman's past sexual history.
(Sanday 1996: 219)
The law as it stands, the governing legal standards, are capable of being
interpreted in either a victim-oriented or perpetrator-oriented fashion.
The basic legal concepts are contested, such that the outcome in sexual
harassment cases may ultimately turn on the orientation of the particular
judge or the political views of the members of the jury. To be sure, the
language of the law is the language of objectivity and there is the back-
ground assumption that legal proceedings are fair. But there is also
remarkable variation in the meanings ascribed to core legal concepts.
(Chamallas 1995: 3)
28 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
While legal categories and concepts may be encoded in statutes, such encod-
ings do not `®x' and `cement' their meanings; indeed, as we have seen, they can
be interpreted and implemented in ways that are far removed from their
intended, feminist-in¯uenced meanings. Of central importance to feminist
critiques of the law, then, are the actual practices whereby legal concepts
(e.g., `consent' and `sexual assault') give rise to, often variable and contested,
meanings and interpretations. That is, if legal concepts are endowed with
meaning during the course of socially-situated legal practices (e.g., judicial
decision-making, trials), then understanding and deconstructing this
meaning-making process requires an investigation of such legal practices in
relation to the social context in which they are embedded. Indeed, Smart
goes even further in her problematizing of legislation, arguing that engaging
with law at the level of statutory or policy reform `only legitimate[s] the legal
forum and the form of law' (p. 165). Rather than focusing on law as legisla-
tion, Smart suggests that
It is law's power to de®ne and disqualify which should become the focus
of feminist strategy rather than law reform as such. It is in its ability to
rede®ne the truth of events that feminism offers political gains.
(Smart 1989: 164)
For Smart, then, it is the law's power to impose and af®rm culturally-powerful
visions of social reality that should be the object of feminist critique. As
Comack (1999: 65) says of Smart's project, `the task becomes one of unpack-
ing the discourse of law to reveal the context in which it has been constituted
and the biases it contains.'
`Unpacking the discourse of law' to elucidate its sexist and androcentric
biases is an endeavour that resonates with feminist linguists' efforts to analyse
sexist language in the 1970s and 1980s and more recently to understand the
way that gendered meanings are constructed and reproduced in discourse
(Cameron 1998a). Indeed, to the extent that legal discourse embodies
gendered assumptions, it comprises part of the `rigid regulatory frame' that
shapes and constrains performances of gender ± a primary focus of this
book. That the legal discourse of sexual assault constructs and produces
certain kinds of (gendered) sexual subjects is evident from the preceding
discussion. Women are legitimate victims of rape when they are subject to
violent attacks from strangers (Estrich 1987); otherwise, they are held respon-
sible for men's sexual aggression. For example, the complainant in the R. v.
Ewanchuk case was chastised for not wearing `a bonnet and crinolines' that
would presumably have controlled the accused's sexual advances; and, Patricia
Bowman was represented as a gold-digging seductress out to entrap an
eligible and wealthy bachelor. Constructed both as victims (when the per-
petrator is heinous) and agents (when the perpetrator is respectable), the
complainants occupy contradictory subject positions in line with the contra-
dictions that imbue dominant notions of female and male sexuality and sexual
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 29
violence. Crenshaw elaborates on the restricted, but contradictory, subject
positions women come to occupy in the discourse of rape law:
Part of the regulation of sexuality through rape law occurs in the percep-
tion of the complaining witness at the rape trial . . . Feminist legal work
has emphasized the ways that perceptions of the credibility of witnesses,
for example, are mediated by dominant narratives about the ways that
men and women `are' . . . The routine focus on the victim's sexual history
functions to cast the complainant in one of several roles, including the
whore, the tease, the vengeful liar, the mentally or emotionally unstable,
or, in a few instances the madonna. Once these ideologically informed
character assignments are made, `the story' tells itself, usually supplant-
ing the woman's account of what transpired between the complainant and
the accused with a ®ction of villainous female intentionality that misleads
and entraps the `innocent' or unsuspecting male.
(Crenshaw 1992: 408)
Data
The data presented here come from two sources: they were transcribed from
audiotaped recordings of a York University (Toronto, Canada) disciplinary
tribunal dealing with sexual harassment.10 In addition they come from
transcripts of a Canadian criminal trial in which the same defendant was
32 The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse
charged with two counts of sexual assault.11 Both adjudication processes dealt
with the same events ± two alleged instances of acquaintance rape with two
different women. The complainants were casual acquaintances prior to the
alleged instances of sexual assault. They met coincidentally a short time
after the incidents, discovered each other's experience with the accused, and
together launched complaints against him in the context of York University
and later in the context of the Canadian criminal justice system. Within the
context of York University, the accused was alleged to have violated York
University's Standards of Student Conduct, speci®cally the provisions of its
sexual harassment policy. Within the context of the criminal justice
system, the accused was charged on two separate counts of sexual assault on
two separate complainants.
The accused and the complainants were all white undergraduate students at
York University. Each of the women, on two separate nights three days apart,
had been socializing with the defendant and had invited him to her dormitory
room on the university campus. Thus, in Estrich's terms, these are cases of
`simple rape' as the complainants were (allegedly) assaulted by an acquaint-
ance and not an armed stranger. Moreover, that the complainants and accused
were both white meant that the legal system's demonization of men of colour
in attacks against white women (MacKinnon 1987, Marcus 1992) did not
enter into these cases. The ®rst complainant, whose pseudonym is Connie,
was a casual acquaintance of the accused. Both were volunteers at a centre
for autistic children. Prior to the night of the alleged sexual assault, Matt,
the pseudonym I use to refer to the accused, had occasion to help Connie
with some personal problems relating to an abusive ex-boyfriend. On the
night of the alleged assault, Connie and Matt met for dinner at approximately
10.30 in the evening. After an enjoyable dinner, according to the com-
plainant's testimony, Connie invited Matt back to her room in university
residence. At that point, he brie¯y massaged her and they then engaged in
some consensual kissing. From that point on, Connie reported in her testi-
mony that she objected to his further sexual advances; in spite of her objec-
tions, Matt allegedly persisted in unwanted sexual aggression. His acts of
unwanted sexual aggression, according to Connie's testimony, included:
removing her clothes, putting his ®ngers inside her vagina, putting his
penis between her legs and rubbing it against her, and pushing her face
onto his lap so that she was forced to perform fellatio on him until orgasm.
In both the university tribunal and the criminal trial, these facts were not
at issue. What was at issue was whether or not the sexual acts were consensual.
The second case involved the complainant whose pseudonym is Marg. Matt
and Marg had met for the ®rst time the night before the alleged sexual assault.
On the night of the sexual assault, Marg was socializing with her friend
Melinda (a pseudonym) at a downtown Toronto club. Marg's car was towed
away during the period of time Marg and Melinda were at the club and, as
a result, they sought help from Matt and his friend, Bob (a pseudonym for
Melinda's boyfriend). Given the lateness of the hour (3 or 4 o'clock in the
The institutional coerciveness of legal discourse 33
morning), it was decided that the four would spend the night in Marg's
university residence room and that Matt would help Marg retrieve her car
the next morning. After deciding that the men would massage the women
(and vice versa), Marg agreed that Matt could sleep in her bed, but warned
him on a number of occasions that if he crossed the line `he was dead'.
That is, in this case, the complainant did not admit to any consensual
sexual activity as the ®rst complainant did. Once in bed, according to the
complainant's testimony, Matt initiated a number of unwanted sexual
advances: he began to go under her clothes and touched her breasts and
vagina. On a number of occasions, as a result of the unwanted sexual aggres-
sion, Marg asked Melinda, who was in the other bed with Bob, to join her in
the washroom. In attempts to solicit help from Melinda, Marg recounted the
details of Matt's sexual aggression on a number of occasions. On one of Marg's
and Melinda's visits to the washroom, Melinda overheard Matt telling Bob
that Marg was the third woman in three nights that he had been with. In
spite of Marg's attempts to solicit help from Melinda, and by association,
Bob, Matt continued to initiate unwanted acts of aggression, according to
Marg's testimony. These included: putting his foot between her legs and
inserting his toe in her vagina, unbuttoning her shirt, sucking on her breasts
and putting his ®ngers in her vagina. As in the ®rst case, in both the tribunal
and the criminal trial, the occurrence of these particular sexual acts was not at
issue; what was at issue was whether or not they were consensual.
In both the university tribunal members' decision and the judge's decision,
mention was made of the similarity in the accused's behaviour with respect to
the two complainants: `in each instance, he showed a remarkable similarity of
approach, in suggesting massage and progressing from there to kissing and
fondling and indicating to the complainants that they owed him satisfaction
to the point of one way or the other emission of semen . . . because he had done
them favours. In the one instance, for being taken out to dinner, and in the
other instance, for efforts to locate a car' (Reasons for Judgement in Her Majesty
the Queen and M.A.).
Introduction
Of increasing interest in sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology and
socially-oriented studies of discourse is the role of language in constructing
and constituting social realities. Beginning from the assumption that
language is not a neutral and transparent re¯ection of the world, work
within a variety of traditions (e.g., ethnography of communication, inter-
actional sociolinguistics, critical discourse analysis, discursive psychology)
has delineated the constitutive effects of linguistic forms. Duranti (1997:
214), for example, asserts that when speakers use language, they help consti-
tute the reality they are trying to represent: `not only do certain expressions
require an understanding of the surrounding world for their interpretation,
they also actively shape the surrounding world.' Likewise, Hutchby and
Woof®tt remark that in the very process of using language to designate
and describe states of affairs in the world, speakers are actively `building
the character' of those states (Hutchby and Woof®tt 1998: 228). To say
that linguistic forms are constitutive elements of social realities is not to
say that there is no reality beyond language; rather, the claim is that our
experience of reality is mediated by language and the particular perspectives
that it entails. Cameron (1992), for example, points to the androcentric
nature of terms such as penetration, fuck, screw, lay, all of which turn hetero-
sexual sex into something men do to women. Indeed, from a female perspec-
tive, penetration would be more appropriately encoded as enclosure,
surrounding, or engul®ng. What becomes clear from `names' such as these is
the extent to which language functions as an ideological ®lter on the
world: language shapes or constructs our notions of reality rather than label-
ling that reality in any transparent and straightforward way.
Within the context of adjudication processes, language is the primary
means by which witnesses (and lawyers and adjudicators) convey information
about the events that are the subject of a court's or tribunal's deliberations.
Hale and Gibbons (1999: 203) distinguish between `two intersecting
planes of reality' in the courtroom: the reality of the courtroom itself ±
what they call the `courtroom reality' ± and the reality that comprises the
The accused's grammar of non-agency 37
events under investigation in the courtroom ± what they call `the external
reality'. In the court's representation of this `external reality', visual images
(e.g., photographs, diagrams) and physical entities (e.g., weapons, clothing)
are often introduced as evidence, but Hale and Gibbons (1999: 203) remark
that `by far the most common representation of this other reality [the external
reality] is . . . through testimonial evidence which consists of descriptions of
the events by witnesses ± versions of the second reality presented through language'
(emphasis mine). With respect to legal cases involving sexual abuse, sexual
harassment and/or sexual assault, linguistic descriptions are often the only
basis upon which juries, judges or adjudicators determine a verdict (Capps
and Ochs 1995), as the events under examination are typically without
corroboration and/or physical evidence. Dramatically different accounts of
what happened can emerge in the talk of sexual assault trials, for example,
and on the basis of such potentially contradictory narratives, judges and
juries must determine what Capps and Ochs (1995: 21) call an of®cial story:
`on the basis of divergent versions of events, jury members [and adjudicators]
construct a narrative that is plausible and coherent in their eyes, but the
truth is beyond their reach. In this sense rendering a verdict is analogous
not to ascertaining the facts of a case but to determining an of®cial story.'
Given the centrality of language in adjudication processes generally, and
sexual assault and harassment cases speci®cally, the testimonies of witnesses
in these contexts do not simply re¯ect a defence of innocence or an accusation
of guilt. Rather, through their linguistic descriptions, witnesses (and lawyers)
are actively involved in constructing and constituting the `facts' of cases.
Duranti eloquently articulates this position:
That the lexical items designating objects and events in a trial can consti-
tute `potentially important social acts' is convincingly demonstrated by
Danet (1980) in her analysis of a Massachusetts trial in which a Boston
obstetrician-gynaecologist was charged with manslaughter for performing a
late abortion. Focusing on the ways that the prosecution and the defence
named and categorized the aborted entity, Danet illuminates the ideological
38 The accused's grammar of non-agency
and strategic signi®cance of such choices: the prosecution consistently used
terms such as `baby', `child' and `little baby boy' whereas the defence used
terms such as `fetus' and `products of conception'. In other words, the `war
of words' waged in this trial invoked and reproduced more general cultural
debates about the `living' status of aborted entities. After all, intrinsic to
legal de®nitions of manslaughter, and arguably a conviction, is the concept
of `killing' which presupposes the prior existence of a `life'. Danet comments
on the signi®cance of linguistic choices in light of the ambiguous status of the
objects and acts (e.g., aborted entity, late abortion) under scrutiny in the
manslaughter trial:
One cannot separate what happened from the language that is used to
describe or explain what happened. When the meaning of an act is
ambiguous, the words we choose to talk about it become critical.
(emphasis in original)
(Danet 1980: 189)
The ambiguity that Danet associates with a late abortion within the context
of a manslaughter trial, I would suggest, also characterizes the instances of
acquaintance rape that are the subject of deliberations in the university tri-
bunal and criminal trial analysed here. Neither conforms to Estrich's category
of `real rape': neither was performed by a stranger; neither involved a weapon;
neither exhibited evidence of physical violence; and in one of the cases the
complainant acknowledged that there was a certain amount of consensual
intimate contact. As argued in Chapter 1, instances of `simple rape' are, at
worst, discounted and rendered invisible by the criminal justice system and
the mainstream culture more generally, and, at best, display an equivocal
and borderline status as rape. For Danet, the ambiguous nature of acts invests
the language used to describe them with `critical' import. Even more than in
cases of `real rape', then, the language denoting the `simple rapes' in the sexual
assault adjudication processes analysed here will, in Hutchby and Woof®tt's
terms, `build their character'.
In this chapter, I focus on the way the defendant constitutes and constructs
the events under investigation through what I am calling a grammar of non-
agency (cf. O'Connor 1995). Put somewhat differently, I am interested in how
the defendant draws upon a variety of linguistic resources that all work to
represent him as innocent of unlawful sexual acts of aggression. Given the
potential importance of language in shaping social realities ± especially in
this type of case where linguistic descriptions are the only form of evidence
± this chapter also considers the extent to which the defendant's linguistic
construction of the `facts' is afforded legitimacy and authority in the contexts
where this case is tried. That is, in Capps' and Ochs' terms, to what extent
does this particular characterization of events become the `of®cial story'?
The accused's grammar of non-agency 39
Grammatical choices as social acts
Following Duranti (1994), I assume that the grammatical choices social actors
make in these kinds of settings, like the lexical choices, not only construct a
particular perspective on events, but are `potentially important social acts'. In
order to understand the social signi®cance of such choices, it is important to
recognize the range of linguistic alternatives available to speakers in describ-
ing a particular event. Consider the following four sentences. Each of them
presents a somewhat different perspective on the same series of events ± a
difference that is related to the events' participant structure.
6 MB: And he took my shoulder and rolled me back over and then he started
kissing me . . . and then at the same time he started to go down my pants . . .
and then he started putting his ®ngers inside of my vagina. (CT)
7 CD: I mean, I can tell you that early on he took my shirt off and I can tell
you when he unclasped my bra and I can tell you that he pulled my pants down
right after I tried to explain to him why I didn't want him to do that, and
he eased me back down on the bed and he pinned my arms against the bed and
that's when he pulled my pants down. (CT)
8 CD: He grabbed my hair from the back of my neck and sort of wrapped it
around his hand and pushed me down in between his legs and told me
that I could put it in my mouth or he would put it in. (CT)
9 MB: And while he was talking to me eh . . . he pushed my one leg down off the
window sill and he put . . . his foot in between my legs and he kept trying to put his
toes through my track pants . . . into my vagina. (UT)
10 CD: And uhm (long pause) then he (long pause) he he put his . . . his . . .
penis between my legs and he was rubbing it there and saying `well this is what
teasing is.' He took my head and . . . he put it between his legs . . . and uhm
(long pause) he was holding my hair. Uhm and then (long pause) then I
stopped and he pulled me back up and kissed me again a::nd then he he
made me do it again . . . and then I stopped again . . . and he pulled my
head back up and kissed me again and then put me back and told me not to
stop this time. (long pause) I didn't. (UT)
When confronted by the university lawyer (in the tribunal) with the com-
plainants' version of events ± formulations much like those illustrated in 6 to
10 ± Matt sometimes overtly denied the truth of such propositions, as in 11 to
13.
11 HL: Now then she says . . . then he grabbed my arm and squeezed it really
tight and he made me promise not to tell anyone.
MA: That is totally utterly false. (UT)
12 HL: Okay. Now . . . she says that you grabbed her wrists and pinned her
down on the bed. I gather
MA: That is totally false. (UT)
13 HL: Now . . . she says he kept me pinned down on the bed. I kept
struggling to get up and he kept laughing at me.
MA: Yeah that is totally false. (UT)
The accused's grammar of non-agency 43
Far more frequent in Matt's testimony, however, were subtle and insidious
linguistic expressions of mitigated and obscured agency ± linguistic expres-
sions that together comprise what I am calling Matt's grammar of non-
agency. Indeed, in contrast to the representations of Matt in 6 to 10, in
Matt's own version of these events he rarely cast himself in a highly agentive
role. Rather, he consistently de-emphasized his agentive role by (1) miti-
gating his agency when casting himself as the subject of transitive verbs
designating acts of aggression, (2) diffusing his agency by referring to the
complainants as the agents of sexually-initiating events or referring to himself
as a co-agent along with one of the complainants and (3) obscuring and
eliminating his agency through grammatical constructions that concealed
his responsibility in sexually-initiating sexual acts.5
Mitigating agency
While Matt did not generally narrate himself as the subject of transitive verbs
designating sexual acts of aggression (i.e., positioning himself in a highly
agentive role), when he did, as in the italicized sentences of 14 and 15
(both from cross-examination), the expressions he used either mitigated the
force of his agency or the negative nature of his agentive acts.6 In example
14, for instance, Matt employs adverbials (e.g., perhaps) and modal verbs
(e.g., might) which together cast doubt on the cross-examining lawyer's impli-
cit assertion ± that Matt set the stage for the sexual acts of aggression with
both complainants by saying he was hot and removing his shirt. Moreover,
the sequence ends with Matt asserting that he cannot remember. According
to Drew (1992: 481), in the context of courtroom discourse, a sequential
object such as I can't remember `not only avoids con®rming what is proposed
in the question, but also avoids discon®rming it: that is, the witness thereby
avoids directly challenging or disputing a version proposed by the attorney,
but nevertheless neutralizes that version.' Hence, the highlighted linguistic
expressions of 14 `neutralize' OD's version of the events, thereby mitigating
the force of Matt's agency in setting the stage for non-consensual acts of sexual
aggression.
14 OD: Did you make some exclamation basically that you were hot and
took off your shirt?
MA: I perhaps might have.
OD: Do you remember doing the same thing with Miss B., getting hot
and taking off some of your clothes?
MA: She took off her sweater so that I could give her a massage.
OD: Do you remember indicating you are hot and taking off any of your
clothes?
MA: I perhaps might have taken my shirt off because I was hot or because of
the massage. I can't remember. (CT)
44 The accused's grammar of non-agency
The italicized sentence of 15 shows Matt in a highly agentive positioning:
he is the grammatical subject of a transitive verb designating a sexual or inti-
mate act. Yet, Matt's characterization of this act differs substantially from the
characterization HL imputes to Connie, that is, you grabbed her by her hair.
Using the language of love (i.e., caressing) rather than the language of violence
(i.e., grabbed, entwined ), Matt mitigates the negative (i.e., violent) nature of
this act, constructing himself as an agent of loving and consensual sex.
15 HL: Now . . . she said . . . that you grabbed her by her hair and pulled her
face up to yours. Did that happen?
MA: No after uhm she performed oral sex, she voluntarily came up and
started kissing me.
HL: Okay she says that during this oral sex you have your hand entwined
in her hair? Do you recall that?
MA: Yeah I was caressing her hair.
HL: She says you pushed her back down a couple of times.
MA: No. She performed oral sex for twenty minutes and then I ejaculated
and that was it.
HL: Okay she said you rolled over and went to sleep, holding her by the
hair.
MA: I believe I also said that in my oral testimony that after that we laid
down together. There might have been some kissing and whatever and
then we fell asleep.
HL: Okay.
MA: And that was it as far as any sexual activity that evening. (UT)
Diffusing agency
Representing the events in question as consensual and reciprocal took still
other linguistic forms in Matt's testimony. Consider example 16 where
Matt is being questioned by his lawyer (SC) in the criminal trial about
events that occurred with Marg. These are the same events described by
Marg in 6; in Matt's version, example 16, she is responsible for removing
her clothes.
17 SC: Can you tell us from that point forward what takes place between you
and Marg?
The accused's grammar of non-agency 45
MA: Well, I went back into bed and then Marg came back into bed and we
started to fool around again. (CT)
18 OD: Do you remember her saying to you that she was tired and wanted to
go to sleep?
MA: Yes.
OD: And you didn't let her ± well, you proceeded to touch her anyway, isn't
that correct?
MA: No, we started kissing. (CT)
19 HL: Okay. Now I gather that you did give her a massage and after a
couple of minutes you laid down beside her and kissed her.
MA: Well, from what I recall we just laid there for about ®ve minutes and
then uh we started kissing. (UT)
20 OD: Okay. Despite her clear indications to you, you then started kissing her
and easing her down on the bed and feeling her chest. Do you remember that?
MA: I remember that after we had that discussion that we started to fool
around again. (CT)
In example 20, unlike 18 and 19, Matt does not preface his alternative
characterization of events with either an overt correction marker or a contras-
tive discourse marker; rather, as Drew (1992) points out, in such examples the
witness challenges or disputes the lawyer's claims in a more indirect way.
Example 21 shows the transformation seen in 18 to 20 taking place over a
number of turns. After overtly denying the truth of OD's proposition twice ±
that Matt started kissing the complainant ± Matt then supplies a different
version of events: we both came and kissed each other mutually. Not only do we
see the same alternation between singular you in the prosecuting lawyer's
question (i.e., you started kissing her?) and we in Matt's response (i.e., we . . .
kissed each other), as in 18 to 20, we also see Matt being very explicit about
the mutual nature of the sexual activity in example 21.
21 OD: Okay. You're the one who started to kiss her ®rst; is that correct?
MA: That's incorrect.
OD: You started kissing her?
MA: That's incorrect.
OD: Who started kissing who?
MA: As I was saying, we were lying in the bed and before coming in, she
was lying ± and I lied next to her and we laid there for about two minutes
and the we both came and kissed each other mutually. (CT)
Matt's attempts to diffuse his responsibility for the events under investigation
extended beyond sexual events to seemingly innocuous non-sexual ones. In
example 22, for instance, Matt performs a great deal of conversational work
to represent his dinner with Connie as a mutual endeavour. Asking initially
whether Matt is the initiator (i.e., agent) of their contact that night (i.e., you
decided to call Connie?), HL receives a response from Matt which casts Connie as
the agent of the activities (i.e., Connie asked me if I could call her that evening).
(Notice that this response is not prefaced by either an overt correction marker
nor a contrastive discourse marker and thus indirectly challenges HL's
characterization of events.) Repeating this formulation a couple more times,
HL is met with responses from Matt that highlight the mutual nature of their
decision to have dinner (i.e., Well it was a mutual thing and it wasn't me merely
asking her). Finally, over the course of several turns, HL's initial utterance in
which Matt is the agent of the activity is transformed into one where the
agency for getting together is distributed over both Connie and Matt (i.e.,
Well, we agreed to get together to get something to eat).
29 HL: Because she says that during this time you were starting to take her
pants off. Is that right?
MA: I believe at one point that . . . well I don't think actually I think in
the evening I think she took her pants off.
HL: Okay, what pieces of clothing did you remove of hers?
MA: I think I helped her with her shirt . . . uhm I tried to undo her bra
and then she helped me. She took her bra off. Uhm at one point both of our
pants were undone. I cannot recall if I undid her pants, or if she undid my
pants.
HL: Okay. She says you pulled her pants off. You don't remember who
pulled her pants off?
MA: I'm I don't I mean she might have taken her pants off herself. I might
have taken her pants off. She might have taken my pants off. I might have
taken my pants off. I don't know. (UT)
30 MA: Well once once their friend had left the room and . . . it was
established that we were going to stay there. (UT)
31 MA: Then it was decided . . . that it would be easier if we all just stayed
there overnight. (CT)
32 MA: Well, it was understood at the restaurant that we would be staying
overnight at Glendon. (CT)
The accused's grammar of non-agency 49
33 MA: I think it was prior to that that when it was agreed after I had the
conversation with Bob uhm that it was agreed that I was going to stay.
(UT)
34 MA: I got into bed uhm and I think it was agreed that they wanted to give
. . . they wanted us to give them a massage ®rst. So we started massaging
them uhm . . . So we were massaging them and it must and well it was
agreed like after we massaged them that they were going to give us a
massage. (UT)
35 HL: Then you asked her to give you a massage. Is that right?
MA: Well it was agreed earlier that the girls would massage us . . . I'm
sorry that we would massage them and that the girls afterward would mas-
sage us. (UT)
The patient or entity acted upon is the grammatical subject in both sentences;
in 37b, however, there is no implicit agent. Thus, while agentless passives
suggest that an agent is lurking in the background, unaccusative construc-
tions completely eliminate the agent from the representation of the event.
Consequently, the causal relationship implicit in agentless passives ± that
an agent wilfully affected a patient in some way ± is absent in unaccusative
constructions altogether. Rather, as Toolan (1991: 234) says of these kinds
of syntactic forms: `the affected participant [patient] formerly in object posi-
tion is now the sole stated participant, occupying subject position, and the
former description of a causal relation, what x did to y, is now simply a
report of what happened to y, or even, what y ``does''.' Not only does a sen-
tence containing an unaccusative construction, then, eliminate all reference to
the underlying cause of the event designated by the verb, according to Toolan,
it can also represent its grammatical subject (i.e., patient or affected partici-
pant) as `doing' something or `acting' in some sense.
In the italicized sentences of examples 39 to 44, nominalizations repre-
senting sexual acts and activities (e.g., the sexual activity, something sexual,
the intimacy) are the grammatical subjects of unaccusative verbs such as
start, begin, and go on. Recall that a nominalization refers to a noun that has
been transformed from a verb allowing deletion of the agent, as in the
italicized expressions of 38, also from Matt's testimony.
38 MA: Up to this point there wasn't any really major major sexual activity,
like there wasn't any oral sex. There wasn't any uhm stimulation or
anything.
45 MA: We were kissing and we I think we did it for you know quite some
time not an exorbitant amount of time and then . . . it started getting more
involved and more sexual. (UT)
46 MA: So at that point what happened . . . we started fooling around uhm
she started to feel my genitalia I started to feel hers. Uhm at this point our
pants weren't really off, we had just had gone under each others' pants.
Uhm and then it just kept progressing. (UT)
47 SC: Right. What happened next please?
MA: It became ± once we had undone our belts, I did Connie's and then
she did mine, and we started fondling each other and became increasingly
sexual.
SC: Yes?
MA: Neither of us had climaxed but it started to heat up and both of us
became really, really aroused and that's, as I said before, that's when
she sat up and said, `I think that we might be going too far.' (CT)
48 MA: Now that we had addressed this and come to a decision that we
wouldn't tell our co-workers, she laid back down on the bed and we
started to fool around again. And it was after that we fooled around
again for quite some time and it became increasingly sexual. (CT)
49 SC: Yes. And were you becoming sexually aroused at this point, Mr. A?
MA: I knew that at that point that there was a sexual ± that this is becoming
something sexual because she was next to me without her shirt on and it's a
single bed and we were very close in touching up against each other. (CT)
52 The accused's grammar of non-agency
50 SC: All right. What happens next, please?
MA: So then it started to escalate . . . So then this continued for a while and
then Melinda got up out of bed and wanted to go to the washroom. So
then Marg got up and both of the girls went to the washroom. (CT)
51 TM: So you do admit that you said nothing to him at that point about the
insertion of his ®nger in the vagina? (UT)
52 TM: After this incident in which you ®rst indicated the insertion of his
®nger in your vagina, uhm you make reference to the fact that Matt was
really angry. (UT)
53 TM: So at this point you permitted him to go to sleep even after the second
insertion of the vagina? Or fondling or whatever? (UT)
56 SC: Well, your shirt came off ®rst as a result of fondling of the breasts, right?
(CT)
Finally in 57 and 58, we see the defence lawyer in the criminal trial trans-
forming Connie's statements, in which Matt is accorded a highly agentive
positioning with respect to sexual acts of aggression (i.e., he is the gram-
matical subject of transitive verbs that designate acts that are wilful and
intentional and have consequences for the patient, Connie), into nominaliza-
tions that allow the deletion of Matt as agent.
57 CD: At that point is when he grabbed my hair and wrapped it around his
hands and pushed my face down between his legs and gave me an ultimatum.
At that point that became the more pressing matter to get out of that
situation more than to get him out of my room.
SC: So in fact was the fellatio, was that the last act of sex that was between the
two of you before everything died down and before Mr. A. went to sleep
and you went into the chair? (CT)
58 SC: All right, ma'am. Now, after the exchange of the fellatio, . . . I am inter-
ested in knowing that at the conclusion of the situation does Mr. A. sort of
calm down? (CT)
In spite of this decision and the university lawyer's recommendation that the
defendant be expelled from the university, the tribunal members decided
instead to penalize the defendant by restricting his access to the residences
on campus where the events under investigation had taken place. Their
justi®cation for opposing rustication is provided below:
Criminal trial
Matt was convicted on one count of sexual assault within criminal court
(Count 2) and acquitted on the other.12 The judge convicted Matt on the
count involving Marg and cited the corroborating evidence from Marg's
witness, Melinda (and even evidence from Matt's witness, Bob) as crucial
to such a verdict.13 Matt was acquitted in the case involving Connie
(Count 1). Something that distinguished the two cases, other than the
presence of other people in Marg's dormitory room, was the fact that
Connie acknowledged in her testimony that she was attracted to Matt and
that she engaged in consensual kissing with him. At a certain point, she
also reported that she wanted no further intimate contact, yet, according to
her testimony, Matt persisted in violent acts of sexual aggression. (Examples
7, 8 and 10 are representative of Connie's version of the events.) Aspects of the
judge's decision made reference to this consensual intimate contact between
Connie and the accused:
The accused's grammar of non-agency 57
I am content that the offender's conduct [in Count 2] was directed by a
refusal to accept `no' for an answer and wilful blindness in the sense that
he expected that he could in the end overcome indications of unwilling-
ness to accept his advances. That is the same conduct he exhibited in
Count 1, except that in respect of that matter, I was left with a reasonable
doubt to the effect really that he may have succeeded in seducing the
complainant in that count against her better judgement by persistence.
The same persistency took place on Count 2, except that there was
never consent on Count 2.
(Reasons for Judgement in Her Majesty the Queen and M.A.)
In the judge's words, then, although Matt exhibited the same `persistence' in
both cases, `there was never consent on Count 2'. Indeed, that some consensual
intimate activity occurred between Connie and Matt seems signi®cant to
the judge's acquittal of Matt on Count 1. Consider other comments from
his decision:
Human nature in many respects remains human nature and does not
change, especially in the dif®cult area of sexual conduct and the impulse
imbedded in humanity towards the purpose of the continuation of the
human race. Young men must be sensitive to a young woman's right
to say no, and young women, in turn, must realize that when a young man
becomes aroused during sexual activity beyond a moderate degree there is a
danger that he will be driven by hormones rather than by conscience.
(Reasons for Judgement in Her Majesty the Queen and M.A.)
One of the social discourses surrounding male sexuality in the West, and
evident in this judge's decision, concerns men's socially-acceptable `compel-
ling' and `uncontrollable' sexual impulses ± what Hollway (1989) has
termed the male sexual drive discourse. As to the social acceptability of such
a view of male sexuality, Estrich (1987: 101) refers to American sex manuals
that `laud[ed] male sexual responses as automatic and uncontrollable'
(although also comments on newer ones that `no longer see men as machines
and even advocate sensitivity as seductive'). Constructing male sexuality as
driven by a powerful biological imperative, this discourse confers respons-
ibility upon women: women who dress `provocatively', for example, or
engage in some intimate activity with men (as in Connie's case) run the
risk of setting this powerful and compelling biological drive in motion
(Burr 1995). Informed by the male sexual drive discourse, the italicized com-
ments from the judge's decision call upon young women to realize that, once
aroused, young men's sexual urges are uncontrollable. In the terms of Coates'
research, the judge employs an externalizing causal attribution. That is, he
attributes Matt's `persistent' sexual aggression to a force outside of Matt: it
is not Matt who is responsible for the sexual acts of aggression; rather, it is
his hormones. Particularly noteworthy is the linguistic manifestation of
58 The accused's grammar of non-agency
this externalizing causal attribution ± there is a danger he will be driven by his
hormones rather than by conscience. In this sentence, italicized in the decision
above, hormones assumes the role of agent, whereas the generic young man,
referred to by he, assumes the role of patient ± the entity acted upon by
hormones. (The corresponding active sentence would read: there is a danger
his hormones will drive him.) Articulated in this way, the judge's comments
resemble the agentless passives and unaccusative constructions that Matt
uses throughout his testimony. Sexual acts are represented as having a force
and life of their own, uncontrolled by a human agent, only the compelling
force of male hormones. Thus, like portions of the tribunal members' decision
discussed above, the male sexual drive discourse invoked by the judge discur-
sively locates the cause of male sexual aggression outside of the male offender
and concomitantly functions to diminish and reduce Matt's culpability and
responsibility for the particular sexual assault under investigation (i.e.,
Connie's).14 Continuous with Matt's (and his representatives') grammar of
non-agency, even in their grammatical properties, these decisions confer
authority and legitimacy upon Matt's version of the events in question.
59 SC: And then the massage was reciprocated by her giving you a massage,
is that correct?
MA: Yes.
SC: And how did that all take place?
MA: Well, my shirt came off and I still had a T-shirt on. . . . I lie down on
the bed and she proceeded to give me a massage.
Q: And when you say your shirt came off, how did your shirt come off?
MA: I mean, I gather that I took it off. She took hers off. (CT)
Conclusion
That a defendant accused of sexual assault attempts to construct an innocent
identity in the institutional settings where his case is heard is not in itself
60 The accused's grammar of non-agency
unpredictable or surprising. What is perhaps less predictable is the way in
which aspects of the adjudicators' decisions are continuous with Matt's repre-
sentation of himself as a non-agent, even in their grammatical manifestations.
The adjudicators lack Matt's strategic imperative (i.e., they are not facing
criminal charges); moreover, in Matt's attempts to represent himself as a
non-agent his testimony at times pushes the limits of contextual accept-
ability. In spite of this pragmatic inappropriateness, however, the defendant's
testimony is apparently comprehensible and intelligible to the adjudicators.
That is, the defendant's characterization of the events is afforded legitimacy in
both of the institutional contexts in which this case was heard to the extent
that forces represented as external to Matt, and not his own agency, are the
putative causes of his sexual aggression (i.e., his insensitivity, his hormones).
Recall Capps' and Ochs' comments regarding `of®cial stories' being deter-
mined by the `plausibility and coherence' of court narratives. Clearly, an
institution's assessment of what constitutes a plausible and coherent narrative
is not based exclusively on linguistic criteria, that is, on criteria of pragmatic
well-formedness. Rather, following Gal (1991: 197), this work suggests that
notions of plausibility and coherence within such settings are ideologically-
driven ones; a society's institutions are not `neutral arenas' for talk: `they
are structured along gender lines to lend authority to reigning classes and
ethnic groups but speci®cally to men's linguistic practices.'16 Indeed, the
broader social discourses (e.g., the male sexual drive discourse) that `frame'
these adjudicators' understandings of male violence against women are so
powerful and pervasive that the likes of Matt's testimony ± testimony that
pushes the bounds of contextual acceptability ± is recognizable to them.
The intelligibility of the defence's version of events within these institu-
tional contexts also sheds light on the `rigid regulatory frame' (Butler
1990) within which gender is enacted. As argued in Chapter 1, `performances'
of gender ± linguistic or otherwise ± are subject to what Cameron calls
`institutional coerciveness': dominant gender ideologies that pre-exist local
(linguistic) enactments of gender and structure the kinds of gendered identi-
ties that women and men produce. In recognizing and conferring legitimacy
upon Matt's grammar of non-agency, the adjudicators in the tribunal and
criminal trial were at the same time casting judgement on what constitutes
an appropriate and intelligible performance of masculinity. That is, viewed
within the interpretive frame of the male sexual drive discourse, for example,
Matt's encoding of sexual events in unaccusative constructions ± construc-
tions that represent the sexual events as `acting' of their own accord ± consti-
tutes a performance of hegemonic masculinity.17 And, by attributing the
cause of Matt's sexual aggression to factors outside of Matt, the adjudicators
licensed a view of male sexuality and masculinity that portrays violent men as
not being the `agents' of their own actions. Consistent with the claims of
feminist legal scholars such as Lees (1997) and Crenshaw (1992), then,
these decisions do what Crenshaw argues adjudication of male sexual
aggression does more generally: `maintain a considerable range of sexual
The accused's grammar of non-agency 61
prerogatives for men' (p. 408). Likewise, Lees (1997: 2) says the following
about the treatment of male violence against women within the British
criminal justice system: `the law ostensibly constrains male violence against
women but in substance allows such violence to continue.'
To say that the defendant's characterization of himself as a non-agent, and
the view of hegemonic masculinity that accompanies such a representation,
receive validation in these institutional contexts is not to make the strong
claim that Matt's linguistic descriptions directly `cause' the adjudicators'
decisions. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there is psycholinguistic
evidence to suggest that violence against women represented in the passive
voice (as opposed to the active voice) leads subjects, especially men, `to belittle
the amount of harm suffered by the victim and to lessen the perpetrator's
responsibility for the violence relative to the victim's' (Henley et al. 1995:
80). In other words, the way that violence against women is linguistically
encoded can affect individuals' interpretations of harm and responsibility.
At the same time, Coates found that judges discursively located the causes
of sexual assault outside of the offender (i.e., externalizing causal attributions)
in 71 per cent of the decisions she analysed and that these kinds of attribu-
tions, because they in some sense reduced the culpability of offenders, were
consistently associated with lower sentences. Thus, the kinds of causal attri-
butions found in the adjudicators' decisions analysed here, while continuous
with Matt's representation of his sexual aggression, are also consistent with
other ®ndings regarding the kinds of judicial reasoning that informs decisions
in sexual assault trials more generally. What I want to claim is not that Matt's
grammar of non-agency `causes' the adjudicators' decisions but rather that it
fails to challenge and concomitantly reinforces the adjudicators' dominant
understandings of male sexuality and violence against women. Constituted
by gender ideologies, Matt's testimony also functions to reproduce these
ideologies in the form of adjudicators' decisions that diminish, de¯ect and
diffuse his culpability. And left unchallenged, such ideologies become `natur-
alized', rendered invisible and commonsensical. In a context where partici-
pants actively construct, often competing and contradictory, versions of the
events under investigation, then, a question arises as to the emergence of
alternative representations of Matt's sexual aggression in the `talk' of these
adjudication processes. In the chapters that follow, I consider precisely this
± the possibility of discursive challenges to the expressions of sexual violence
against women we have seen throughout this chapter.
3 `I see an option . . . I simply
want to explore that option
with you'
Questions and ideological work1
Introduction
Practice theorists such as Bakhtin (1981), Bourdieu (1977) and Volosinov
(1973) have all conceptualized language as constituting and embodying
ideology.2 In this view (Philips 1992: 378), language is `itself material'
rather than independent and simply symptomatic of material realities.
Scholarship on the language of institutional settings has given this theoretical
view empirical substance: researchers have investigated the role of discursive
practices in constructing and constituting power relations among profes-
sionals and clients, in particular, the interactional mechanisms by which cer-
tain ideological or interpretive `frames' dominate institutional interactions,
while others are suppressed (Philips 1992). Todd (1989) and Fisher (1991),
for example, document how doctors' medical and technical concerns prevail
in interactions with patients, even when patients articulate their problems
in social and/or biographical terms. In her comparison of a doctor±patient
interaction and a nurse-practioner±patient interaction, Fisher (1991: 162)
isolates aspects of interactional structure related to such discursive control:
the doctor, much more than the nurse-practitioner, asked questions that
`both allow[ed] a very limited exchange of information and le[ft] the way
open for his [the doctor's] own assumptions to structure subsequent
exchanges'. By contrast, the nurse-practitioner used open-ended, probing
questions which maximized the patient's own `voice' and interpretation of
medical problems. In the context of legal settings, Walker (1987: 79) also
comments on the interactional control exerted by questioners. As part of
her investigation of linguistic manipulation in legal settings, she interviewed
witnesses who reported `a feeling of frustration at being denied the right to
tell their own stories their own way'. While the stories told in court were
the witnesses' own, lawyers and judges had the socially-sanctioned preroga-
tive to `present, characterize, limit and otherwise direct the ¯ow of testimony'
such that the frames structuring the stories were often not the witnesses' own.
In Fisher's (1991: 162) terms, `both the questions and the silences ± the ques-
tions not asked ± do ideological work.' Not only was Fisher's doctor±patient
interaction structured by the doctor's assumptions (due to questions that
Questions and ideological work 63
allowed a limited exchange of information), but implicit in these assumptions
were views about the centrality of the nuclear family to this mother's sense of
well-being or ill-health. According to Fisher, the doctor's questions func-
tioned to reinscribe the hegemonic discourse that `justif[ies] the traditional
nuclear family which has at its center a mother' (Fisher 1991: 162, emphasis
in original).
In this chapter I too consider the `ideological work' performed by questions
in institutional settings. While the previous chapter demonstrated the extent
to which adjudicators' decisions can be informed by rape mythologies, this
chapter focuses on discriminatory views of violence against women as they
(re)circulate within adjudication processes themselves. Indeed, embedded
within the questions asked of complainants, rape mythologies become
much more insidious, I argue, because of the structuring potential of lan-
guage. Not only do questions, with their implicit and explicit propositions,
frame and structure the complainants' `talk' about their experiences of sexual
assault, they also produce the complainants as particular kinds of subjects ± as
subjects who are `passive' in their responses to sexual aggression, as opposed to
strategic and active. Fairclough's (1995: 39) comments on his use of the term
`subject' within institutional contexts are relevant here: `the term ``subject'' is
used . . . because it has the double sense of agent (``the subjects of history'') and
affected (``the Queen's subjects''); this captures the concept of subject as quali-
®ed to act through being constrained ± ``subjected'' ± to an institutional frame'
(emphasis mine). In the terms of this investigation, one manifestation of
Fairclough's `institutional frame' are the questions asked of complainants;
that is, the questions' presuppositions embody ideological perspectives
which have consequences for the way in which the complainants are `quali®ed
to act' linguistically.
The idea that linguistic devices (e.g., questions) can be instrumental in the
structuring and constraining of interpretive perspectives in discourse has
manifested itself in a variety of theoretical works over the last few decades
(for example, Bateson 1972, Goffman 1974, 1981, Gumperz 1982a,
1982b). In particular, the concept of framing, associated with Bateson, has
in¯uenced sociologists, sociolinguists and discourse analysts interested in
contextually- and interactionally-based approaches to language. Bateson
demonstrated that no interactional move, verbal or non-verbal, could be
understood without reference to a broader interpretive perspective (Tannen
1993). Duranti and Goodwin's explication of framing makes this claim
more concrete:
Ideology
Up to this point, I have discussed, following Fisher (1991), the potential
of questions ± and silences ± in institutional settings to do ideological work.
Questions and ideological work 65
In delineating more speci®cally how this work is achieved I have pointed to
the propositions presupposed in questions and the way in which such propo-
sitions can comprise an ideological ®lter or lens (i.e., an ideological frame)
through which events under scrutiny in a courtroom, for instance, are inter-
preted and assigned meaning. Because the term ideology may be the most
elusive of concepts in the whole of the social sciences (McLellan 1986 cited
by Blommaert and Verschueren (1998)), following Woolard (1998), I high-
light themes that recur in a wide range of discussions on the topic. First,
ideology typically refers to mental phenomena, that is, ideas, beliefs, or con-
sciousness (Woolard 1998: 5). Second, ideology is typically conceptualized as
re¯ecting the interests of a particular social position, even though its perspec-
tive is almost always `naturalized', in other words, perceived as common-
sensical, inevitable and universally true. Third, by naturalizing particular
social con®gurations and relations (i.e., rendering them commonsensical),
ideology functions to maintain these con®gurations and relations and thus
supports the interests and the power of the social classes from which it derives.
While for some theorists, ideology is always associated with dominant groups
and their sustaining of asymmetries in power, for others `ideology may be a
tool of any protagonist in the contestation of power . . . subaltern as well
as dominant' (Woolard 1998: 7). Like Fairclough (1995), I adopt some ver-
sion of this latter view, assuming that social institutions are characterized
by diverse and potentially competing ideological frames (what Fairclough
calls ideological-discursive formations (IDF)) associated with different
groups within an institution. For example, the ideological frame that, I
claim, is dominant within the sexual assault adjudication processes analysed
here is not without contestation. However, given the constraints that a
dominant ideological frame places on `debate' and `meaning' within these
institutional contexts, resistance to the status quo is often dif®cult to recog-
nize. Thus, I assume, again like Fairclough (1995: 27), that a de®ning
characteristic of an institutionally-dominant ideological frame is its capacity
to be naturalized ± to be accepted as commonsensical. What I explore in
this chapter and the next is the extent to which dominant ideological per-
spectives sustain their dominance or hegemony in these institutional settings,
that is, the extent to which they conceal and obscure resistant or counter-
hegemonic perspectives and thereby retain their `naturalized' status.
In order to protect the `innocent man' from `false charges of sexual offences',
Canada too has imposed strict rules of proof on sexual violence cases. While
degree of resistance is not a requirement which has ever been formally
Questions and ideological work 67
encoded in the Criminal Code of Canada, other such `special evidence' rules
have been. For example, as discussed in Chapter 1, until 1983 the Canadian
Criminal Code had a corroboration requirement for rape, which demanded
that a complainant's testimony be supported by independent evidence, and
a recent complaint requirement, which obligated the complainant to make
a prompt complaint in order that her testimony be deemed reliable. Both
of these requirements were intended to guard against the false accusations
of sexual assault that women ostensibly make against men. Although it
would appear that resistance requirements have not been encoded in statutes,
resistance requirements have often been operative in the adjudication of sexual
violence cases in Canada. Backhouse (1991: 103) argues that a very high
standard of resistance was set in the Ontario case of R. v. Fick in 1866
when the trial judge in this case stipulated that in order for rape to occur
`the woman [must have] been quite overcome by force or terror, she resisting
as much as she could, and resisting so as to make the prisoner see and know
that she really was resisting to the utmost' (cited in Backhouse 1991: 103). In
the 1970s, Clark and Lewis (1977) investigated the characteristics of Toronto-
area rape cases leading to perpetrator arrest and prosecutions in 1970 and
determined that a victim's testimony of lack of consent was deemed credible
only when she resisted her attacker to the utmost of her capabilities.
Continuing into the 1990s in Canada, judges have often granted credibility
to an accused's defence of `honest but mistaken belief in consent' and
acquitted the accused on the basis of the complainant's lack of resistance.3
Thus, whether or not strict rules of proof or `special evidence rules' are actu-
ally encoded in law, the adjudication of sexual assault cases can still require
such strict rules of proof in order to convict the accused. Indeed, in the
remainder of this chapter I argue that the `utmost resistance standard' is
the primary ideological frame through which the events in question and, in
particular, the complainants' actions are understood and evaluated. This
(re)framing functions to characterize the women as not `resisting to the
utmost' and ultimately (re)constructs the events as consensual sex, thus
protecting the interests of the defendant, who in Wigmore's words is `the
real victim'.
The linguistic power afforded lawyers is most apparent, some researchers have
argued, in the coercive and controlling questions they ask during cross-
examination. Both Danet et al. (1980) and Walker (1987) have developed
taxonomies of questions used in the courtroom, based on the extent to which
the questions constrain or limit the witness's response. The most `coercive'
of question types, for example, in Danet's taxonomy is the declarative (e.g.,
As a matter of fact, she didn't sign it, did she, Doctor?) because its form func-
tions to severely restrict the possible response: it is a question requiring a `yes'
or `no' answer; furthermore, its declarative form is meant to predispose wit-
nesses to merely con®rm the declared proposition. By contrast, the imperative
(e.g., Tell us what took place at the meeting with the patient) is the least
`coercive' of question types within Danet's taxonomy because it imposes no
particular form on the response. While Danet et al. (1980: 228) found
coercive questions to be more frequent in cross-examination than in direct
examination, the effectiveness of coercive questions in controlling responses
was somewhat limited: `the ®rst general ®nding to note is that coerciveness
of question form apparently in¯uences formal features of responses, but has
little or no bearing on more substantive aspects of replies.' That is, although
the use of a declarative may be effective in producing a `yes' or `no' response
(i.e., the question-type constrained the form of the response), there seemed to
be no correlation between the use of declaratives and the substance of the
response. A perhaps more important function of `coercive' questions in
legal adjudication processes is associated with questioners' ability to impose
their interpretation on the evidence through a strategic use of question forms
(Woodbury 1984). Conley and O'Barr (1998), Drew (1992) and Matoesian
(1993), for example, have all pointed to the importance of `coercive' question-
ing in lawyers' attempts to make damaging comments about witnesses during
cross-examination. For Conley and O'Barr (1998: 26), controlling question
70 Questions and ideological work
form, irrespective of the responses elicited, is tantamount to transforming `the
cross-examination from dialogue into self-serving monologue'.
Discursive control
Before considering the `utmost resistance standard' and its discursive penetra-
tion and circulation within the sexual assault adjudication processes under
investigation here, I ®rst delineate some of the interactional mechanisms by
which discursive control is achieved in my data.
Strategic questioning
Following Woodbury (1984), I adopt a notion of questioners' `control' that is
not related to a questioner's ability to `produce' a desired answer from an
addressee (as Danet et al. (1980) and Walker (1987 do), but rather to a ques-
tioner's ability to in¯uence and evaluate evidence. That is, for Woodbury
(1984: 199), control refers `to the degree to which the questioner can
impose his (sic) own interpretations on the evidence'. Within Woodbury's
continuum of control, Wh-questions generally display less control than
yes-no questions because Wh-questions ask of `the addressee that he (sic) pro-
vide or specify the questioned item' whereas yes-no questions ask of the
addressee that `he (sic) agree or disagree with the propositional content of the
question' (emphasis mine, p. 200). That is, a broad Wh-question such as
`And then what happened?' functions to impose little of the questioner's
interpretation or words on the testimony: there is no proposition contained
within the Wh-question other than the notion that `something happened'.
By contrast, a prosodic yes-no question, (i.e., a declarative sentence containing
prosodic cues marking it as a question) as in 1 contains a more substantive
proposition ± the addressee was attracted to Stephen.
Furthermore, not only does question 1 contain the proposition that the
addressee was attracted to Stephen, it also expresses the speaker's (ostensible)
belief in that proposition and expectation that the proposition will be con®rmed by
the addressee. It is in this respect that yes-no questions are generally more
controlling than broad Wh-questions ± they function to make available to
the adjudicating body (whether it be a judge or jury or tribunal) the ques-
tioner's interpretation of events, irrespective of the addressee's (i.e., witness's)
answer.
Woodbury's classi®cation of yes-no questions according to the questioner's
ability to contribute to or `control' evidence is ordered below from least
`controlling' to most `controlling.'
Presupposition
The presupposition of propositions provides a further locus for the circulation of
ideological frames within the legal settings I am examining. Presupposition is
a term used by linguists `to refer to propositions whose truth is taken for
granted in the utterance of a linguistic expression' (Green 1996: 72). For
example, the sentence John realizes that Mary is seriously ill presupposes the
truth of the proposition `Mary is seriously ill.' That is, in uttering such a
sentence the speaker takes for granted that the proposition `Mary is seriously
ill' is assumed knowledge between speaker and addressee, forming the back-
ground for the assertion `John realizes X.' By contrast, the sentence John thinks
that Mary is seriously ill does not presuppose the truth of the proposition `Mary
is seriously ill.' The speaker who utters such a sentence does not take for
72 Questions and ideological work
granted or assume that `Mary is seriously ill'; in fact, the sentence could be
appropriately produced by a speaker who knows the embedded proposition
to be false. What these two examples demonstrate is that certain linguistic
constructions (e.g., the predicate realize as in John realizes that Mary is seriously
ill ) act to trigger presuppositions whereas others do not (e.g., the predicate
think as in John thinks that Mary is seriously ill ). Indeed, a variety of linguistic
forms (e.g., words, phrases, syntactic constructions) have been isolated
as sources of presuppositions and thus designated as presupposition-triggers
(Levinson 1983). Existential presuppositions are triggered, for example, by
de®nite noun phrases and possessive constructions: by using expressions
such as the girl next door or Mary's children, the speaker is presupposing the
existence of a girl who lives next door and the existence of children whose
mother is Mary. Factive presuppositions are triggered by certain factive pre-
dicates (e.g., know, regret, realize, to be aware of, etc); that is, the complements of
such predicates are presupposed (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971). And conno-
tation presuppositions are triggered by certain lexical items. Green (1996: 74)
explains: `many lexical items are used in only a subset of the class of situations
in which they might conceivably apply, and the restrictions have been
claimed to be (or re¯ect) presuppositions about the situation.' The lexical
item, assassinate, for example, means `kill' but there are presuppositions
encoded within its meaning that severely restrict the kind of `killing' that
quali®es as assassination. First, assassinate presupposes that a killing is
intended; second, it presupposes that the victim has considerable political
power and has been killed in order to thwart that power (from Green
1996: 75). Presupposition triggers are numerous in English and the above
examples only begin to illustrate the range of phenomena that has been
classi®ed as presuppositional.
One of the de®ning features of presupposition is its ability to survive nega-
tion and interrogation, or put another way, its ability to remain constant or
true under negation and interrogation. Thus, like the sentence John realizes
that Mary is seriously ill, both its negative ± John doesn't realize that Mary is
seriously ill ± and interrogative ± Does John realize that Mary is seriously ill?
± versions presuppose the proposition `Mary is seriously ill.' The fact that
presupposed propositions remain constant under negation and interrogation
has potential consequences for the `ideological work' that questions do in
legal adjudication processes. While controlling questions (in Woodbury's
sense) display a pseudo-declarative or -assertive function, that is, they
signal questioners' belief in the truth of the propositions contained within,
they do not presuppose or even assert these propositions. By de®nition, a
question always contains a variable or unknown quantity, which the addressee
of a question is being asked to supply (Lyons 1977). The act of questioning,
then, confers upon the addressee the right to supply this variable ± the
`unknown' information. For example, the addressee of a prosodic yes-no
question (a controlling question, in Woodbury's sense) has the ability to
discon®rm the proposition contained therein even though the question's
Questions and ideological work 73
particular form expresses `the speaker's expectation that his (sic) belief, what-
ever it is, will be con®rmed' (Woodbury 1984: 203). By contrast, proposi-
tions that are presupposed by linguistic expressions cannot be denied with
the same effectiveness or success. To illustrate I draw upon the following
examples from Green (1996: 76):
7 No, he wasn't.
8 The students regret that Mr. D. was late although Mr. D. was not late.
9 Q: You had what I would call a subjective fear of this man. In other
words, you were genuinely scared of him, right?
A: Yes.
Questions and ideological work 75
Q: But he didn't do anything overt to cause you to be fearful? By overt
I mean, he didn't do anything outward to make you afraid, never
threatened you?
A: He never uttered any threats.
Q: No. Never punched you or mistreated you physically in any way?
A: No.
Ideological work
Previous scholarship on rape trials from a broadly linguistic (i.e., conversa-
tional-analytic) perspective has also focused on their question±answer
dynamics, arguing that the `ordinary mechanics of cross-examination . . .
simultaneously re¯ect and reaf®rm men's power over women' (Conley and
O'Barr 1998: 37).6 That is, both Matoesian (1993) and Conley and O'Barr
(1998) have elucidated the power of cross-examiners to `reproduce rape', in
76 Questions and ideological work
Matoesian's words, or to revictimize rape victims in the courtroom. Building
on these insightful analyses, I too demonstrate the way in which questioners
exert discursive control. However, I argue that not only do cross-examining
questions have the effect of revictimizing complainants, they also perform
substantive ideological work. Speci®cally, through the pseudo-declaratives
and presuppositions embedded in questions ± many of which were reformula-
tions of complainants' previous propositions ± the defence and the tribunal
members in both the tribunal and criminal trial imposed interpretations on
evidence. That is, although the complainants described their experiences as
sexual assault, they were discursively represented and produced as `passive'
and `ineffectual' agents, their so-called lack of resistance being construed as
tantamount to consent. What follows is an analysis of the various propositions
that emerge in question±answer sequences between cross-examining ques-
tioners, including the so-called neutral tribunal members, and complainants.
Taken together, I argue that these propositions `frame' the way the events
come to be understood: they function as an ideological ®lter through which
the complainants' acts of resistance are characterized as `inaction' and the
events generally are (re)constructed as consensual sex.
10 Tribunal
GK: Uhm . . . now this is a question. I realize that . . . that you were under
certain stress, but in your story I heard the men left the room twice on two
different occasions
MB: Right.
GK: And you and Melinda ((the other woman in the room)) were in your
room alone. Uhm what might have been your option? I see an option. It may not
Questions and ideological work 77
have occurred to you but I simply want to explore that option with you. Uhm did
it occur to you that you could lock the door so that they may not uh return
to your room?
MB: It did, but it didn't. Now it does. I mean looking back. Everyone was
telling me that nothing's going on. Don't worry about it. Forget about it.
When your friends are telling you nothing's going on, you start to ques-
tion . . . maybe nothing is going on. I just . . . I couldn't think.
11 Tribunal
GK: But in spite of Marg telling you that he was trying things that she
didn't want, were you . . . I mean I don't know how to phrase this uhm . . .
did you feel you had some options to do something for Marg? [or did you feel]
MK: [Well, I ] wanted
to do something for her but I didn't know what to do. I was afraid that if I
said anything to Matt or tried to do anything that he would hurt me or
hurt Marg for trying to stop it. And everything was happening so fast,
I didn't even think about knocking on the neighbour's door or anything.
12 Tribunal
GK: I mean . . . that evening did you ever feel you knew Bob enough to
get him involved because I think you were intimidated?
MK: Yeah. I was close enough with Bob to
GK: to tell him you know `get up and do something. I hear some
noises.' Or you didn't feel that there was anything really going on.
I don't want to put words in your mouth. Tell me how you felt please.
MK: I felt towards Bob? And how
GK: how ± what options you might have had to tell Bob something and
what
MK: Well, I tried to. The incident in the bathroom when I asked Bob
to go talk to Marg . . . was the only thing I could think of . . . to get some-
one to tell Matt to stop it. I thought well Bob and Matt are friends. He'll
listen to Bob but they didn't get the opportunity. I kind of think that Bob
is very much in¯uenced by Matt. . . . I think he's scared of Matt. I think
Matt is a very intimidating person. He scares a lot of people . . . the way he
talks.
Through the repeated use of the word option, GK not only conveys her belief
that the complainants had an alternative course of action, but also that their
failure to pursue other alternatives was a choice. Indeed, intrinsic to the mean-
ing of option is the notion of choice, as demonstrated by the following entry
from the Funk & Wagnalls Canadian College Dictionary:
13 Tribunal
TM: So I guess my my question to you is uh you had a choice at this point
even though you say in your your oral testimony that you didn't have a
choice. Everybody has a choice . . . and your choice was that you could have
asked him to leave. So I'm wondering why you didn't ask him to leave?
We all have free will. Let me rephrase the question or put another question
to you then in the absence of an answer of that one. Why did you let uh
what you say happened happen?
CD: ((crying)) I didn't let it happen.
TM: But you had certain options. You could have left the room. By your
admission there was a time when he was asleep. You could have called
through a very thin wall. Uh you actually left the room to go to the wash-
room. Uh you had a number of options here and you chose not to take any of them.
14 Tribunal
GK: What I'm trying to say and I I realize what I'm saying is not going . . .
You never make an attempt to put him on the ¯oor, or when he leaves
the room to close the door behind him, or you know you have several
occasions to to lock the door. You only have to cross the room. Or to
move him to the ¯oor, but these things are offensive to you?
MB: I was afraid. No one can understand that except for the people that
were there. I was extremely afraid of being hurt. Uhm: as for signals, they
were being ignored. I tried I mean maybe they weren't being ignored I
don't know why he didn't listen to them. I shouldn't say they were
being ignored but he wasn't listening. And I kept telling him, I kept tell-
ing him, I was afraid to ask him to sleep on the ¯oor. It crossed my mind
but I didn't want to get hurt. I didn't want to get into a big ®ght. I just
wanted to go to sleep and forget about the whole entire night.
Examples 15 to 23 below illustrate in more detail the many options that the
cross-examining questioners and tribunal members deemed as appropriate
and possible for the complainants to pursue.
Seeking help
In example 15, TM asserts over a couple of turns that cry[ing] out or yell[ing]
out is a natural and appropriate way of responding to real trouble, thereby under-
mining Connie's claim that she was in trouble.
15 Tribunal
TM: Why is it that you made no attempt to scream? Can you explain
what you mean by `I really didn't want anybody to know?' If you were
in such dif®culty, if you felt threatened, if you felt that an assault was
taking place, it strikes me as only natural to cry out and that help probably
was available as that wall was extremely thin . . . Could you tell the panel
what was in your mind?
CD: I was afraid. I was ashamed that I had lost control of the situation.
I was embarrassed and above that, I honestly can't tell you why I didn't
scream.
TM: I would submit, though I understand your embarrassment, if your
story is correct, the fact is that help overrides embarrassment and if you
really were in trouble then the only appropriate way to protect yourself was to
yell out. Embarrassment would have been the last thing on your mind
at the time if you were in real trouble.
80 Questions and ideological work
Examples 16 and 17, from the criminal trial, also show the cross-examiner
suggesting that `seeking help' was a reasonable option for Connie.
16 Trial
Q: And I take it part of your involvement then on the evening of January
27th and having Mr. A. come back to your residence that you felt that you
were in this comfort zone because you were going to a place that you were,
very familiar; correct?
CD: It was my home, yes.
Q: And you knew you had a way out if there was any dif®culty?
CD: I didn't really take into account any dif®culty. I never expected there
to be any.
Q: I appreciate that. Nonetheless, you knew that there were other people around
who knew you and obviously would come to your assistance, I take it, if you had
some problems, or do you know? Maybe you can't answer that.
CD: No, I can't answer that. I can't answer that. I was inviting him to my
home, not my home that I share with other people, not, you know, a com-
munal area. I was taking him to my home and I really didn't take into
account anybody else around, anybody that I lived near. It was like
inviting somebody to your home.
Q: Fair enough. And I take it from what you told us in your evidence this
morning that it never ever crossed your mind when this whole situation
reached the point where you couldn't handle it, or were no longer in
control, to merely go outside your door to summons someone?
CD: No.
17 Trial
Q: What I am suggesting to you, ma'am, is that as a result of that situa-
tion with someone other than Mr. A., you knew what to do in the sense
that if you were in a compromising position or you were being, I won't
use the word harass, but being pressured by someone you knew what to
do, didn't you?
CD: No, I didn't. Somebody had suggested that, I mean, I could get this
man who wasn't a student not be be permitted on campus and that's what
I did.
Q: What ± but I am suggesting that you knew that there was someone or a source
or a facility within the university that might be able to assist you if you were
involved in a dif®cult situation, isn't that correct, because you went to the student
security already about this other person?
CD: Yeah, okay. If you are asking if I knew about the existence of student
security, yes, I did.
18 Trial
Q: And in fact just raising another issue that I would like you to help us
with if you can, this business of you realizing when the line was getting
82 Questions and ideological work
blurred when you said `Look, I don't want to sleep with you', or words to
that effect, yes, you remember that?
CD: Yes.
Q: Well, when you said that, what did that mean or what did you want
that to mean, not to have intercourse with him?
CD: Yeah, I mean, ultimately, that's what it meant. It also, I mean . . .
THE COURT: You didn't want to sleep with him but why not, `Don't undue (sic)
my bra' and `Why don't you knock it off?'
CD: Actually, `I don't want' ± `I don't want to sleep with you' is very
cryptic, and certainly as he got his hands under my shirt, as he took off
my shirt, as he undid my bra, as he opened my belt and my pants and
pulled them down and I said, `Please don't, please stop. Don't do that.
I don't want you to do that, please don't', that's pretty direct as well.
19 Trial
MB: And then we got back into bed and Matt immediately started again
and then I said to Bob, `Bob where do you get these persistent friends?'
Q: Why did you even say that? You wanted to get Bob's attention?
MB: I assumed that Bob talked to Matt in the hallway and told him to
knock it off.
Q: You assumed?
MB: He was talking to him and came back in and said everything was all
right.
Q: Bob said that?
MB: Yes.
Q: But when you made that comment, you wanted someone to know, you
wanted Bob to know that this was a signal that Matt was doing it again?
MB: Yes.
Q: A mixed signal, ma'am, I suggest?
MB: To whom?
Q: What would you have meant by, `Where do you get these persistent
friends?'
MB: Meaning Bob is doing it again, please help me.
Q: Why didn't you say, `Bob, he was doing it again, please help me'?
MB: Because I was afraid Matt would get mad.
Q: You weren't so afraid because you told Bob, `Where do you get these
persistent friends?' Did you think Matt would be pleased with that
comment because it was so general?
MB: I didn't think about it but I thought that was my way of letting Bob
know what was going on.
20 Trial
Q: I am not trying to be critical here. We weren't there, you were, but
when you talk about I think instinct, ma'am, the muscle memory was
there when Matt had already offered to leave once, and I take it it's
quite obvious that it never crossed your mind at that point to tell him to leave
and in fact he never did?
CD: No, the context was certainly different. Before I could even think of
him leaving I wanted him to stop. I mean, that came ®rst.
21 Tribunal
TM: My question to you is although you say you have no choice . . . uh did
you not have a choice? You could have asked him to leave at this point.
Why did you not ask him to leave?
CD: Because . . . I wanted to explain to him why I wanted him to stop.
I wanted him to understand I didn't want him to be angry. I didn't want
him to be offended, I wanted him to understand.
Physically resisting
In response to many questions about options not pursued, both complainants
would sometimes make reference to the fact that they were physically incap-
able of carrying out the suggested actions. In 22 below, for example, Connie
explains that she was underneath Matt at a certain point in time and cites her
immobility as the reason she did not leave, did not pick up a phone, etc.:
I mean, before I could be in a position to pick up a phone to, to leave, I had to be
in a position to move and I wasn't. In spite of her assertions throughout
example 22 (this example continues immediately after example 20) that
she was underneath Matt, that she couldn't move, that she couldn't get her
arms free, the cross-examiner continues to ask Connie about her acts (or
lack thereof) of physical resistance: whether she tried to push him off (Did
you try to push him off?) and whether she sat up to express her resistance verb-
ally (Did you ever sit up at the point that he was trying to remove your pants and say,
`What's going on here? Look at the two of us, how far we have gone here?'). Such
questions are reminiscent of Schulhofer's (1998: 20) description of a 1947
Nebraska Supreme Court decision, which applied the utmost resistance
standard to a woman's charge of rape: `only if a woman resisted physically
84 Questions and ideological work
and ``to the utmost'' could a man be expected to realize that his actions were
against her will.'
22 Trial
Q: And all of this happened fairly quickly. Again, I realize it's ridiculous
to suggest that you are looking at a watch, but I take it that we've got this
ongoing behaviour, that it's so physical that you are in no position to
leave or do anything?
CD: That's right. I mean, before I could be in a position to pick up a
phone to, to leave, I had to be in a position to move and I wasn't. So
before thinking of I have to pick up the phone and I have to walk out
the door, I had to think of how am I going to get out from underneath
this man.
Q: Right. Did you try to push him off?
CD: Yes, I did.
Q: You weren't able to?
CD: No, I wasn't.
Q: Is that because you weren't able to get your arms free or because he was
on top of you?
CD: I couldn't get my arms free and I couldn't push him off.
Q: At one point you were naked?
CD: Yes.
Q: At what point was that?
CD: I can't even pinpoint a speci®c time.
Q: Well, your shirt came off ®rst as a result of the fondling of the breasts,
right?
CD: Yes.
Q: And Mr. A. started to undue (sic) your belt and try to take your pants
and try to take them down to which you responded `don't' and all of that
other stuff?
CD: Yes.
Q: And yet he was still able to do that with your other pants?
CD: Yes.
Q: And were your arms still in the same position above your head and
crossed over and being held by one hand?
CD: Yes. I am not sure at what point exactly he let go of them.
Q: But I take it, whatever he did, if he let go of your hands they went to
another part of your body that rendered you incapable of getting out from
under?
CD: Yes.
Q: Ma'am, did you ever sit up at the point that he was trying to remove your
pants and say, `What's going on here? Look at the two of us, how far we have
gone here', nothing like that.
A: Everytime I tried to sit up, I got pushed back down.
Questions and ideological work 85
Example 23, from the tribunal, also shows the cross-examining questioner
posing questions to the complainant, Marg, about physical acts of resistance.
(This question±answer sequence concerns Marg's responses to Matt's attempts
to put his toe in her vagina.) A negative Wh-question, the ®rst italicized
sentence, presupposes the proposition `Marg didn't get up,' and, in addition,
signals the speaker's surprise at/con¯ict with such a proposition. Moreover,
the word just in Why didn't you just get up? expresses the speaker's belief
that such an action could have been performed easily and unproblematically
by Marg. Further on in the example, we see that the questioner asks two more
questions about Marg `getting up': a negative tag question ± You did not get up.
Is that correct? ± and a negative prosodic yes-no question ± And you still did not
get up? Both continue to express the cross-examiner's (ostensible) surprise at
her `lack of action'; furthermore, the word still suggests that the act of getting
up was long overdue. Despite the fact that several of Marg's responses point to
a physical act of resistance she did perform ± pushing Matt's toe away ± this
act was clearly not `vehement' enough to satisfy the cross-examiner's standard
of resistance.
23 Tribunal
TM: It's after that point that you're sitting on a windowsill and now
comes a rather bizarre incident according to you.
MB: Yeah.
TM: Uh . . . he attempts to stick his toe
MB: Right
TM: in your vagina?
MB: Yes.
TM: Uh: . . . now you were very upset the previous night when a total
stranger whom you picked up in a bar took your hand and put it on
his . . . uh crotch. Uh::m . . . yet you don't deny that you continue to
sit there at the windowsill while this is going on.
MB: I didn't sit there and let him do that. I was sitting in the fetal
position, he kept trying to put his toe there and I kept pushing it away.
TM: Why didn't you just get up?
MB: I didn't know what to do. You don't understand. The whole
entire time. I didn't know what to do. I was not thinking clearly.
Where would I have gone?
TM: You've now had a whole night's experience with this young man
according to you
MB: And I [still didn't know what to do.]
TM: [And you're still prepared] to uh to to tell this panel that
you are sitting there allowing his kind of bizarre [behaviour to go on?]
MB: [No I wasn't allowing
it.] I kept pushing his foot away and telling him that I did not want to go
to his house.
86 Questions and ideological work
TM: But I come back to the fact you did not get up. Is that correct? When he ®rst
began to do this?
MB: No I pushed his foot away.
TM: And then he continued to do it?
MB: Right.
TM: And you still did not get up?
MB: I . . . don't think so.
24 Trial
Q: So do I take it then ± correct me if I am wrong ± that the only effort that you
would have made to try and jolly him out of this or have him leave was to say that,
`I have a class in the morning so you'll have to leave', or words to that effect?
CD: No. That was not the only effort I made with regards to making him
stop doing what he was doing. It may have been the only time that I out-
right said, `Now you have to leave', but I certainly did make it clear
beforehand.
Questions and ideological work 87
Q: But, ma'am what I am getting at is this: You, according to what I
heard you say in your evidence today, you must have been outraged by
what he was doing to you at this point?
CD: I hadn't got to outrage.
Q: You were still stunned, were you?
CD: Yes.
Q: And the best you could come up with I suggest is, `I've got a class in the
morning, you better leave'?
A: At the time it was the best I could come up with.
25 Trial
Q: And if I understand you also told us that you never clearly gave that
message to Matt. It was like a broken telephone line. You were trying to
tell Melinda and Bob what Matt was doing?
MB: No. I told Matt that I wanted to go to sleep. When you want to go to
sleep, that means you don't want to do anything.
Q: And that's as far as you went though?
MB: No. I also said, `No I don't want to do anything.'
26 Trial
Q: But this was Melinda, not some person you ran into in the hall. Why
would you hold back with her if you wanted her to help you?
MB: I wasn't holding back. I was telling her what happened and asking
her for help.
Q: And you said, `Matt is touching me', and not `Matt is putting his
®ngers in my vagina. What's going on?'
MB: It's not something you blurt out. It's kind of humiliating.
Q: Even to Melinda?
MB: Even to anybody.
Q: Even to Melinda?
MB: Yes, even to Melinda.
Q: Well, I suggest to you it's no wonder she didn't know what to tell you because
you didn't really tell her anything?
MB: Sir, I said Matt was touching me and I didn't want him to.
27 Tribunal
MB: At that point I did not respond at all. Like I said I was in shock I
wasn't sure what to do . . . so I got out of the bed. I went and I asked
Melinda to come in the hallway or in the washroom and talk to me
and I told her what had happened. I went back into the room and I
said `I just want to go to sleep.'
TM: So you do admit that you said nothing to him at that point about the second
insertion of the vagina?
MB: And I did not respond in any way.
28 Tribunal
TM: But you had certain options. You could have left the room. By your
admission there was a time when he was asleep. You could have called
through a very thin wall. Uh . . . you actually left the room to go to
the washroom. Uh you had a number of options here and you chose not
to take any of them. Subsequent to that you chose not to tell anybody
for a number days including the police or the campus security and it
was only some days later . . . that you chose to make a decision about
this. And then only in concert with Marg. Let's let's move on.
BW: I don't think you're asking a question [and]
TM: [well yes I think I was] my
question was I asked asked her very speci®c questions
BW: Okay okay. But let me let me interrupt. Uh the only question
that emerged out of the long statement Connie is whether or not you can
Questions and ideological work 89
explain why at this juncture you didn't do anything?
CD: Well I can't explain.
Reformulating fear
The most frequent response to questions concerning the complainants' and
the witness's so-called passive or ineffectual behaviour in spite of `options'
was that they had been motivated by fear, as in examples 11, 12, 14, 15,
and 19. Indeed, when asked throughout the tribunal and the criminal trial
why they didn't pursue certain avenues of resistance, both the complainants
and their witness typically pointed to Matt's frightening and intimidating
presence. Consider example 29 from Marg's direct testimony:
29 Tribunal
HL: Is there anything else that you haven't told us that you want to?
MB: (long pause) Only that hh . . . I know everything . . . the night that
was dumb. It was dumb of me to invite Matt to stay well in my bed
eh ± heh but in residence everyone is like your brother like I said and you
don't imagine that that could happen uhm and that. Well, I have
de®nitely learned from this. But I didn't yell I didn't . . . I didn't do any-
thing because I didn't know what to do. I mean everyone kept telling me
just forget about it, just go back to bed, just go to sleep. And I ®gured you
know if I yelled . . . Melinda and Bob weren't going to help me. I mean hh
they were just lying there. Like I kept telling Melinda and I told Bob that
what he was doing and . . . and they they didn't obviously care. After Bob
had talked to Matt when we were laying in bed that Matt tried something
again and I said to Bob you know `Where did you get these persistent
friends' to let Matt or let Bob know that Matt was doing it again and
Bob said `Oh I don't know, you know.' It's that was it ± he didn't care.
Uhm so I ®gured you know if if he if he hits me I mean they're not going to
stop him and the door was locked so like I hh he's a scary guy I mean hh he is
very intimidating. If he intimidated Bob not to get out of the bed or or to go
with him and he made Melinda afraid that he was going to hit her. I mean I
didn't want I didn't want to get hit, I didn't want to get raped, but I didn't
want to get hit. I just didn't know what to do. ((voice trembling)) ((snif¯ing))
30 Tribunal
BW: In your statement, I think, twice, you mention `he was sounding
very angry' and `I was scared' and I was wondering if you could elaborate
on what you mean by that? What was he saying that you found scary?
90 Questions and ideological work
If you remember anything speci®c or whether it was an impression.
CD: It was just rough. It was mostly . . . he just . . . it was demanding.
I didn't feel like I had any more choice. And whatever he said was no
longer a request. It was a demand.
BW: So, in your statement when you say he said `I paid for dinner and you
invited me up so what did you expect' . . . that was something you per-
ceived as demanding and rough? It wasn't like a joking comment in your
mind?
CD: No, it wasn't a joke at all.
BW: Did he raise his voice? Or was it just very emphatic?
CD: No, he didn't raise his voice but it was very blunt, very . . .
BW: Okay.
Here we see the tribunal member trying to get at the precise causes of
Connie's fear: What was it about Matt that was frightening? Was it some-
thing he said? Was it his tone of voice? Similar kinds of questions, probing
the exact origins of Melinda's fear, are evident in example 31. (This example
follows directly after example 12 in which Melinda has just described Matt as
a very intimidating person.)
31 Tribunal
BW: Could you explain that? Because we've heard that twice and in your
story the only time you mention about being scared of Matt was with
the eavesdropping incident . . . that he was very scary. He was insisting
that you tell him. Were there other things that he did or is it a general
demeanor? What do you mean by he's very scary?
MK: He's . . . the way he . . . it seems to me if his way . . . it's either his
way or no way. The way he was talking to Bob like even his friend Bob
when I asked Bob to come to the bathroom, Matt said `No, don't go.' And
Bob hesitated not to go which sort of led me to believe that Bob was
scared of Matt and maybe Bob knows a history of [Matt]
BW: [Well,] let's just stick
to what you know. The two times in that evening that you found Matt
scary would be the eavesdropping incident and with Bob . . . how insis-
tent he was about Bob. You saw a side of him that scared you. Anything
else than those two things?
MK: No.
Again BW tries to isolate the speci®c aspects of the defendant or the defen-
dant's behaviour that were frightening to the witness. I suggest that the
attempt to pinpoint so precisely and exactly the causes of the women's fear
has the effect of reducing or minimizing it. Indeed, in the second line of
example 31, BW comments that the only time the witness has expressed
her fear of the defendant is in relation to the eavesdropping incident, signify-
ing the limited range of the witness's fear. It seems that it was not suf®cient
Questions and ideological work 91
for the complainants simply to report that the defendant was a scary guy or
a very intimidating person [who] . . . scares a lot people. Through this tribunal
member's questioning and his attempts to impute the women's fear to very
speci®c aspects of the defendant's behaviour, its potential impact on the
women's actions is called into question. In the last part of example 31, we
see the tribunal member cutting Melinda off and reformulating her
comments about her fear of Matt. Thus, what begins as a description of
how intimidating the witness found the defendant (I think Matt is a very
intimidating person) is transformed into the witness feeling frightened only
twice over the course of events (The two times in the evening that you found
Matt scary). That is, after producing fairly detailed descriptions of Matt's
scariness, Melinda's ®nal response in 31 con®rms that there were only two
things about Matt that scared her. Expressed more generally, BW's reformu-
lation of Melinda's fear functions to reshape her own description of it, its ®nal
articulation being much diminished from the original formulation.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the questions asked of complainants in sexual
assault adjudication processes under the assumption that the questions
asked ± and the questions not asked ± in institutional discourse `do ideo-
logical work' (Fisher 1991). Constituted by and constitutive of cultural
ideologies of gender, these particular types of institutional settings are fertile
grounds for the (re)circulation of discourses that disadvantage and dis-
criminate against women. As a number of feminist theorists have said of
the legal adjudication of rape, rather than protecting the sexual autonomy
of women, the rape trial can be seen `as a public mechanism for the control
of female sexuality' (Lees 1997: 88) and concomitantly a forum in which a
considerable range of men's sexual prerogatives are protected (Crenshaw
1992: 408). I have attempted to give empirical substance to these claims.
By considering the way in which cross-examining questioners, including
so-called neutral tribunal members, control evidence through their
questioning, I have identi®ed a number of propositions that are presupposed
or (pseudo)asserted within this discourse. When taken together these propo-
sitions form a powerful ideological frame through which the events under
investigation are understood. First, it is presupposed and/or `declared' that
the complainants had choice and options when confronted with the threat
of sexual aggression. Second, the complainants are depicted as being
unconstrained in their choice of appropriate avenues of resistance. Indeed,
viewed within the context of `numerous' and `unlimited' options, the com-
plainants' responses to Matt's sexual aggression come to be construed as
ineffectual and passive. Third, then, the women's `lack of resistance' is estab-
lished: because they did not pursue readily available and numerous options
they did not resist to the utmost. Finally, through questions that discount
the paralysing and pervasive nature of the women's fear, the motivation for
92 Questions and ideological work
their `inaction' is eliminated. Thus, although no longer codi®ed in law, the
utmost resistance standard circulates discursively within these adjudication
processes, (re)constructing the events in question as consensual sex. That is,
without utmost resistance on the part of the complainants, according to
this standard, rape did not occur.
In presupposing resistance to be unproblematic for the complainants and
their fear, irrelevant or inexplicable, the cross-examining questioners and tri-
bunal members, through their questions, were implicitly judging the com-
plainants' behaviour against the standard of the `normal' subject of legal
discourse ± the rational, autonomous, freely-choosing individual of classic
liberal theory. That such a subject permeates the legal doctrine of the
Anglo common law system is a claim articulated by both feminists and
critical legal theorists; the following excerpt from an introduction to a collec-
tion of articles on feminist legal theory is representative:
Introduction
Co-constructing an ideological `frame' that characterized the complainants
and their witness as autonomous, self-determining subjects, unconstrained
by the socially-structured inequities that can shape women's responses to
male sexual aggression, I have argued that the cross-examining questioners,
including the `neutral' tribunal members, (re)presented the events in question
as consensual sex. This is not to say, however, that the complainants and their
witness subscribed to this same interpretation of events. In example 30 from
the previous chapter (and repeated below), we see the complainant, Connie,
asserting that Matt's utterances were demands, not requests; that is, from
the complainant's perspective, there were no `options' to choose from.
1 Tribunal
BW: In your statement, I think, twice, you mention `he was sounding
very angry' and `I was scared' and I was wondering if you could elaborate
on what you mean by that? What was he saying that you found scary? If
you remember anything speci®c or whether it was an impression.
CD: It was just rough. It was mostly . . . he just . . . it was demanding.
I didn't feel like I had any more choice. And whatever he said was no longer a
request. It was a demand.
Likewise, example 2 indicates that, for Connie, the sexual activity was not
consensual.
2 Tribunal
BW: We know that you don't know but is it possible I guess is the
question. Is it possible that he . . . saw the events differently . . . than you
perceived them?
CD: I suppose it's possible. But . . . I don't see how, I mean . . . hhh how
many times do you have to say `no I don't want to do this'? You know,
how many times do you have to push a hand away? How many
times does this have to come back and for you to push it away again?
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 95
How many times do you have to say `No, please don't' before somebody
understands.
3 Trial
Q: Guess I am just asking you did you have it in your mind that your
room at some point might be a place that you can go, particularly
when you started to get into trouble with Mr. A?
MK: That didn't even enter my mind.
Q: Why didn't it enter your mind?
MK: Because as things were happening they were happening so fast and I
didn't have a lot of time to think about what to do, what to do. Every-
thing clouded over on me.
Q: Right. I know it did, but what about from 4.30 in the morning until
10 or 11 in the morning, it still didn't cross your mind?
MK: No.
Q: You know your roommate was there because you said `I am home', or
words to that effect?
MK: Yes.
(a few intervening questions)
Q: It never crossed your mind to go back and speak to Wayne again since
that was his job?
MK: No.
Q: Did it ever cross your mind?
(a few intervening questions)
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 97
Q: You didn't think that he might be a safe person to help you out of your
dilemma?
MK: I wasn't thinking. I wasn't thinking clearly and I didn't know what
to do.
Q: Is it because of your exhaustion you don't know what to do now? You
sure seemed to know what to do when the car was towed and the fact that
you wanted to get back up to see Bob and that suggests a presence of mind
you have?
MK: I have never been put in a situation like that and, as I said, things
were happening quickly and I was at a loss of what to do. I have never
been put in that position. I am not experienced with that. I just didn't
even think about it.
Implicitly claiming that Melinda has `failed' to seek help for Marg, the
defence attorney asks a number of questions about possible sources of help.
Melinda is questioned about whether she thought of her residence room as
a safe refuge and whether she enlisted the help of her roommate or the
residence adviser, Wayne. Faced with repeated questions about her `failure'
to pursue such options, Melinda responds by referring to her inability to
think clearly under the circumstances. Indeed, this is one `stroke' in the
portrayal of ineffectual agency ± a portrayal produced in the `talk' of the com-
plainants and their witness in the process of being `subjected . . . to an insti-
tutional frame' (Fairclough 1995: 39). Contributing to the realization of this
depiction are a variety of grammatical forms (illustrated in example 3), used
by the complainants and their witness, that emphasize their inability to act in
ways that effectively express their resistance to Matt's sexual aggression. That
is, when questioned about the `numerous' and unlimited `options' that they
were `free' to pursue, the complainants and their witness did not generally
respond by casting themselves in the roles of agents and actors, that is, as indi-
viduals who `purposefully intiate[d] or cause[d] actions' (Capps and Ochs
1995: 67). Rather, when they did represent themselves as initiators or causers
of actions (i.e., as agents or actors) their causal role was severely diminished;
otherwise, they represented themselves as experiencers of cognitive or emo-
tional states or as patients ± entities that were acted upon. Speci®cally, the
complainants and their witness: (1) referred to themselves as agents or
actors of negated actions, that is, actions that were not performed, (2) referred
to themselves as agents or actors of unsuccessful actions, (3) referred to them-
selves as agents or actors of actions, the force of which was diminished by
adverbial or adjectival phrases, (4) referred to themselves as experiencers of
negated cognitive states, (5) referred to themselves as experiencers of fear,
and (6) referred to themselves as patients, that is, entities that were acted
upon.2 I use terms such as agent, actor, experiencer and patient to refer to
the semantic roles that referents designated by noun phrases assume in rela-
tion to the verbs they are predicated of. Agent and actor refer to the intentional
initiator of an action. If this action has consequences for an object or animate
98 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
patient, then the intentional initiator is referred to as an agent; if not, it is
referred to as an actor (Duranti 1993). Experiencer refers to one who experiences
some psychological or cognitive state (e.g., feeling or thinking) and patient
refers to a person or thing undergoing an action. Consider the following
four sentences in which the noun phrase the woman assumes the semantic
role of agent, actor, experiencer and patient, respectively.
Examples 4a and 4b depict the woman as exercising agency, given her repre-
sentation as a wilful and purposeful initiator of the actions. In example 4c,
by contrast, the woman is represented, not as an initiator of an event, but
rather as an experiencer of an affective state, fear; indeed, example 4d repre-
sents the woman as an entity acted upon by the force of this emotion.
The examples that follow are generally drawn from, and are representative
of, answers that the complainants and their witness provided to questions of
the type illustrated in Chapter 3 ± that is, questions asked by the cross-
examining questioners or the tribunal members that presupposed and
(pseudo)asserted the complainants' ready access to a variety of options in the
face of (potential) sexual aggression. Whenever the examples below have been
drawn from responses to questions asked in direct examination this is expli-
citly indicated. (The posing of questions in direct examination is an issue I
return to later in this chapter.)
Negated actions
In examples 5 to 10, the italicized sentences display the complainants
and/or their witness as the agents or actors of grammatically-negated acts.
Generally, then, all of the italicized predicates designate actions that were
not caused or initiated by the referents of their subjects. In 5 to 7, we see a
number of vocal actions that were not realized, for example, yelling, scream-
ing or saying something while in 8 to 10 it is cognitive events that are repre-
sented in this way, for example, formulating an idea or thinking of a way of
seeking help. Two of the italicized sentences (in 5 and 7) are even more
extreme expressions of inaction on the part of the complainants ± I didn't
do anything.
5 I just sat there, and I didn't ± I didn't do anything. I didn't say anything.
(CD, Trial)
6 I didn't ®ght and I didn't scream. I didn't say anything. (MB, Trial)
7 I have de®nitely learned from this . . . but I didn't yell I didn't . . . I didn't do
anything because I didn't know what to do. (MB, Tribunal, direct)
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 99
8 I never even formulated the idea that I can't handle this by myself. I thought that
I could get control of the situation back and I thought that ± I just didn't
think about it. (CD, Trial, direct)
9 It crossed my mind that if I can't get him out, then, you know what do I
do? But I never really formulated into a coherent this is what I have to do next.
(CD, Trial)
10 And everything was happening so fast, I didn't even think about knocking on
the neighbour's door or anything. (MK, Tribunal)
Unsuccessful actions
In a similar way, the italicized sentences in examples 11 to 14 all represent the
complainants as agents or actors of actions that were not performed. In these
examples, however, the acts are represented as `attempted' but `unsuccessful',
given the presence of the main verb try. More speci®cally, example 11 repre-
sents a failed cognitive act; examples 12 to 14, various failed attempts at
verbal acts of resistance; and examples 15 to 18, unsuccessful acts of physical
resistance.
11 I was too busy trying to ®gure out how to make him stop. I thought I could do
it. (CD, Trial)
12 Well, I tried to [talk to Bob about Matt's aggression]. The incident in the
bathroom when I asked Bob to go talk to Marg . . . was the only thing I
could think of . . . to get someone to tell Matt to stop it. (MK, Tribunal)
13 I was afraid. No one can understand that except for the people that were
there. I was extremely afraid of being hurt. Uhm: as for signals, they were
being ignored. I tried [to give signals of non-consent] I mean maybe they
weren't being ignored I don't know why he didn't listen to them. (MB,
Tribunal)
14 I told Matt, I said if the circumstances would have been different differ-
ent, maybe. It was a lie but I mean it was another way for me to try to tell
him `no'. . . . It wasn't getting through so I tried different approaches. (MB,
Tribunal)
15 I tried to get out of the bed and go talk to Melinda about what had been said at
the door. I tried to get out. (MB, Tribunal)
16 I kept trying to move away and push my head back up but he had my hair and
every time ± every time I tried to, he just pushed me back down. (CD, Trial)
17 Everytime I tried to sit up, I got pushed back down. (CD, Trial)
18 I tried to get out of the bed . . . he pulled me back down. I tried to get out of the
bed he pulled me down again. (MB, Tribunal)
Experiencers of fear
By far, the most frequent response to questions concerning the complainants'
and their witness's `failure' to pursue the numerous options presented to them
was that they had been motivated by fear. Many such expressions of fear
appear in the examples of Chapter 3 and in the examples presented previously
in this chapter. I provide the following question±answer sequence as a further
representative example:
36 Trial
Q: And you didn't encourage that and said, (sic) `Thanks for coming
fellows, see you around', anything to jolly him out?
MB: I was afraid and I just sat there staring I was so afraid.
Q: You were afraid that Mr. A. was saying to Bob, `Let's go out of here,
let's leave'?
MB: No. I was afraid because he was mad because I didn't want to do any-
thing with him so he was mad with me, so I was afraid that he was going to
physically hurt me because I didn't want to do anything with him.
Q: Right. So what, so you did what?
MB: So I just sat there and desperately hoped that he would leave.
Q: And you felt that if you tried to keep the momentum up of having
him leave or open the door or something he might turn on you and
say, `Oh, no, not so fast'?
102 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
MB: I hoped that he would forget and I know that doesn't make sense,
but forget that I was there and carry on his conversation with Bob and
leave. I was afraid to make a noise that they might turn and realize that
I was there and then Matt take it out on me.
37 From that point that I realized that it had gotten out of control. (CD,
Trial)
38 I mean actions were happening too fast for me to know how to react to
them, for me to know what to do, and be logic and coherent about
what the next move would be. (CD, Trial)
39 Everything was happening too quickly for me to react to it. (CD,
Trial)
The idea that the women's thoughts were not within their control has a more
explicit grammatical realization in examples 40 to 42. Their minds are
depicted in the semantic role of patient ± as entities that were subjected to
certain thoughts and not others.
40 Q: Guess I am just asking you did you have it in your mind that your
room at some point might be a place that you can go, particularly
when you started to get into trouble with Mr. A?
MK: That didn't even enter my mind. (MK, Trial)
41 Q: Why didn't you say `Look, you can't do this to me', whatever. `I've got
a class in the morning', why did that come to your mind? . . . Were you
still worried about his feelings?
CD: No. I don't know why that's the ®rst thing that came to my mind. (CD,
Trial)
42 It never even crossed my mind of anything sexual happening. (MB, Tribunal)
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 103
Examples 43 to 45 also show the women as acted upon, either by the force of
emotions or by the overwhelming strength of the events. That the italicized
portions of examples 40 to 45 all have verbs of motion further reinforces this
representation: the women are controlled by potent and active forces.
46 I was waiting for or hoping somebody would help me and say, `Let's leave.'
(MB, Trial)
47 All I wanted was to take ± someone to take control of the situation and help me
because I wasn't thinking of what to do for myself. (MB, Trial)
48 Tribunal
TM: So you do admit that you said nothing to him at that point about the
insertion of his ®nger in the vagina?
MB: And I did not respond in any way.
TM: Alright. I . . . would ask you another question. Do you not think,
knowing what I assume you know about young men, that if you said
nothing to him . . . that he would . . . think . . . that it might be
wanted as opposed to not wanted?
49 Tribunal
TM: Since my last question . . . since you did not tell him the ®rst time
that it was unacceptable to you to put his ®nger in your vagina, does it not
stand to reason that he saw no reason not to fondle you the same way this
second time?
MB: First of all I did not react. I've already gone over this. I did not
respond. I didn't do anything. I just lied there.
TM: Well that could be conceived as consent could it not?
Unlike 48 and 49, example 50 shows the complainant, Connie, explicitly chal-
lenging the (pseudo)assertions of the defence attorney's questions. (This is
example 24 from Chapter 3.) That is, Connie quite forcefully discon®rms
the proposition that is (pseudo)asserted in the preceding prosodic yes-no
question: No. That was not the only effort I made with regards to making him
stop doing what he was doing.
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 107
50 Trial
Q: So do I take it then ± correct me if I am wrong ± that the only effort
that you would have made to try and jolly him out of this or have him
leave was to say that, `I have a class in the morning so you'll have to
leave', or words to that effect?
CD: No. That was not the only effort I made with regards to making him
stop doing what he was doing. It may have been the only time that I out-
right said, `Now you have to leave', but I certainly did make it clear
beforehand.
51 Trial
Q: But, ma'am, what I am getting at is this: You, according to what I
heard you say in your evidence today, you must have been outraged by
what he was doing to you at this point.
A: I hadn't got to outrage.
Q: You were still stunned, were you?
A: Yes.
Q: And the best you could come up with I suggest is, `I've got a class in the
morning, you better leave'?
A: At the time it was the best I could come up with.
52 Trial
Q: You never asked Mr. A. to leave?
MB: No.
108 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
Q: I am suggesting that's another mixed message. You said that you
wanted to ignore this?
MB: Can I comment on that?
Q: Sure. If I am suggesting something to you I think you are entitled to
do that.
MB: If you are suggesting by my telling Matt not to leave was a mixed
message, `I just want to go to sleep', not responding to him and
saying, `No I don't want to do anything', and `Good night everybody',
is a pretty loud message to me and I am sure it would be to any person
that chose to listen to it.
Q: Did you say yesterday that you wore his shirt in the course of all this
going on?
53 Trial
Q: Okay. So after he had your pants or your jeans off, what happened
next?
CD: He put his ®ngers into my vagina.
Q: Okay. And how long did he do that for?
CD: I don't know.
Q: Okay. And did you say anything to him about this?
CD: By then somehow, I and don't remember how, but by then my
hands, like I could move my hands. My hands were free and he wasn't
holding them any more and I kept pushing his hand away and I kept telling
him to stop and I physically would push his hand away and would try and get
up, but he was still on top of me and I couldn't get up but every time I
pushed his hands away they would go right back.
54 Trial
Q: So after he puts his ®ngers inside of your vagina he gets on top of you?
MB: Yes, while he is still doing it.
Q: And then what happened?
MB: And I said, `Melinda', I said, `I need to talk to you out in the hallway.'
And I sat up and kind of pushed him off of me and then Melinda got up
and we went out in the hall and we were talking and I said, `Matt is
touching me and I don't want him to, I don't know what to do.'
55 Trial
Q: Counsel asked you as far as you were concerned when you indicated
`Please don't, please don't, stop, I don't want you to do that' ± you
were telling him that you were repeating that type of comments to
him when he was touching you, and Mr. C. said to you something to
the effect do you know if he even heard that, referring to the comments
that you were making to him. What I want to ask you is how you
were saying that to him? Were you saying it to him very quietly,
medium, very loudly? Can you comment on that?
CD: I wasn't screaming but it was certainly loud, serious, I mean, and I
don't think ±
Q: Sorry, I didn't hear that.
THE COURT: `I don't think', and she hasn't ®nished.
CD: No. It was in a forceful tone of voice loud enough to be heard without
screaming.
Q: From your observations of what was going on is there any reason from
what you could tell that he would not have heard what was being said?
Given that you said it in a forceful tone and loud enough is there any
reason, as far as you know, that he wouldn't be able to hear your
comments?
A: No, I don't see how he couldn't have heard them.
It is signi®cant in this context to point out that within the Canadian criminal
justice system, as is the case in all systems deriving from English common
law, Crown attorneys represent the state; that is, they do not represent com-
plainants, who assume the role of witnesses for the state. Furthermore, with
the exception of personal records applications, complainants cannot have
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 111
independent legal representation in criminal cases. Busby elaborates on the
lack of agency complainants exercise within the criminal justice system:
Lees (1997: 57) makes similar comments about complainants' status within
the British criminal justice system:
Even more signi®cant perhaps than the limited representation and advocacy
that complainants receive from prosecuting lawyers are the ideological per-
spectives that they themselves embrace or embody on behalf of the state.
Lees (1997: 57), for example, suggests that prosecuting lawyers in Britian
are `inept at countering myths and prejudices about women' put forth by
defence lawyers; indeed, according to Lees, `they often share them'. The
ideologies of prosecuting lawyers notwithstanding, given that such indi-
viduals are representatives of the state, and not the complainants, their ability
to transform or reframe the terms of debate in sexual assault trials may be
constrained by the standards and values of the state ± standards and values
that do not serve the interests of many groups of women.
Further evidence of the `framing' in¯uence of the utmost resistance stan-
dard in structuring the `talk' of these adjudication processes can be seen in
example 56. Like example 55, the question±answer sequence in example 56
occurs during re-direct examination. In fact, it is the ®nal question asked
of Marg by the university lawyer during the course of the tribunal proceed-
ings. Despite the generality and the open-endedness of the university lawyer's
question, Marg seems to be responding to the many questions asked of her
112 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
throughout the tribunal about her so-called `lack of resistance'. That is, what
is signi®cant about this response is its dialogic nature (Bakhtin 1981).
56 Tribunal
HL: Is there anything else that you haven't told us that you want to?
MB: (long pause) Only that hh . . . I know everything . . . the night that was
dumb. It was dumb of me to invite Matt to stay well in my bed eh ± heh but
in residence everyone is like your brother like I said and you don't
imagine that that could happen uhm and that. Well, I have de®nitely
learned from this. But I didn't yell I didn't . . . I didn't do anything because
I didn't know what to do.
57 Trial
Q: And what happened next?
MB: And then ± just let me think for a second, I want to make sure that I
get it right. And then I said, I looked at him and I said, `I don't want to do
anything. I am going to sleep. Leave me alone.' And I rolled over and then
he grabbed my arm and he pulled me back down again and he said `What
are you doing on Sunday?' And I thought that was a really unusual com-
ment and I said, `Well, why? What did you mean?' And he said, `What
are you doing on Sunday?' And I said `I don't know.' And he said, `Well,
you are coming to my house and we'll do it then.' And I said `Pardon?' and
then he grabbed my arm tighter and said, `You are coming to my house
and we'll do it then.' And I thought that if I agreed at that second and said
yes, that he would leave me alone, that I would be safe, that if I could just
push it off. I had no intention of going there Sunday but if I could get him
out of my room to leave me alone, Sunday was another day and he won't
be there, so I ®gured I would be safe. . . . And then he grabbed my arm
and said `Promise me.' And I said `I promise.' And then he grabbed my
arm really tight again and he said, `I want you to promise me. And I
said, `I promise.' And he grabbed me even tighter and he said, `You
114 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
better not go back on your promise.' And I said, `I won't, I won't, Sunday
we'll do it.' And he said, `Well, I don't know, maybe we should just do it
now.' And I said, `Sunday would be better, Sunday is better.' And then he
said, ®nally he agreed and he said, `All right, then.' And he just rolled
over and cuddled up to me and went to sleep and I just laid there the
whole time just waiting for him to leave.
58 Trial
Q: Okay. And then what happened next?
CD: I performed oral sex on him.
Q: Why did you do that? Did you want to do that?
CD: No.
Q: Why did you do it?
CD: Because I was scared and I really didn't feel that I was being given
any choice in the matter.
Q: What did you think would happen if you didn't do what he told you?
CD: I don't know. I don't think I really gave much thought to what
would happen if I didn't, except that I was afraid not to.
Q: What were you afraid of or what were you afraid would happen if you
did not do the oral sex that he told you to?
CD: I was afraid that he would hurt me.
Q: When you said that you felt you had no choice, what did you mean by
that?
CD: I felt that I had to do it or get hurt.
Any agent possesses a range of causal powers, which she deploys in the
course of her everyday activities. This does not mean that interactants
share equal resources, but rather that, even in asymmetrical interaction,
the weaker party can exercise some power. . . . By positing a logical con-
nection between agency and power, the possibility is rejected that actors
can ever be completely determined by their circumstances. Even when
their activities are severely restricted or where the power imbalance is
extreme, there is always a sense of could have done otherwise. (emphasis in
original)
(Davis 1988: 87±8)
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 115
Faced with the threat of continued and/or more severe expressions of sexual
and physical violence from Matt, the complainants' situations were `severely
restricted'. Yet, in spite of these severe restrictions, examples like 57 and 58
capture the complainants' active deployment of strategies intended to increase
their likelihood of survival. Thus, even though `the weaker party', they are
exercising some aspect of their `causal powers'. As researchers on violence
against women have asserted, submitting to coerced sex or to physical
abuse can be `a strategic mode of action undertaken in preservation of self'
(Lempert 1996: 281).4 That is, if physical resistance on the part of victims
can escalate and intensify violence, as some research shows (Dobash and
Dobash 1992) and many women believe ± and are instructed to believe ±
then submission to coerced sex is undoubtedly the best strategy for survival.
Indeed, example 58 shows Connie explaining her actions in precisely this way.
Hidden and obscured by the prevailing narrative of the court, then, are the
causal connections that the complainants establish between the situation of
Matt's escalating physical and sexual violence and the fear and immobility
that such violence engendered in them. As Lacey (1998: 117) has said of
sexual assault legal doctrine, `the liberal discourse of autonomy appears to
leave no space for the articulation of the affective and corporeal dimensions
of certain violations of autonomy' (emphasis in original). I have previously
demonstrated in Chapter 3 that the `talk' of these adjudication processes
`left no space' for the complainants' expressions of fear ± an `affective dimen-
sion' of their response to Matt's sexual aggression. Arising from that fear are
the kinds of strategic responses the complainants describe in 57 and 58; and
these strategic responses are also marginalized or (re)framed by notions that
circulate within the discourse: `the rationally-choosing subject' whose mind
is `dominant and controlling' (Lacey 1998: 113). Consider example 59 below,
repeated from Chapter 3 (example 19):
59 Trial
MB: And then we got back into bed and Matt immediately started again
and then I said to Bob, `Bob where do you get these persistent friends?'
Q: Why did you even say that? You wanted to get Bob's attention?
MB: I assumed that Bob talked to Matt in the hallway and told him to
knock it off.
Q: You assumed?
MB: He was talking to him and came back in and said everything was all
right.
Q: Bob said that?
MB: Yes.
Q: But when you made that comment, you wanted someone to know, you
wanted Bob to know that this was a signal that Matt was doing it again?
MB: Yes.
Q: A mixed signal, ma'am, I suggest?
MB: To whom?
116 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
Q: What would you have meant by, `Where do you get these persistent
friends?'
MB: Meaning Bob is doing it again, please help me.
Q: Why didn't you say, `Bob, he was doing it again, please help me?'
MB: Because I was afraid Matt would get mad.
Q: You weren't so afraid because you told Bob, `Where do you get these
persistent friends?' Did you think Matt would be pleased with that
comment because it was so general?
MB: I didn't think about it but I thought that was my way of letting Bob
know what was going on.
What this example displays is yet another kind of strategic response adopted
by the complainants to Matt's sexual aggression. When Matt begins his
sexual aggression once again, Marg attempts to attract Bob's attention.
Rather than saying `Bob, he is doing it again, please help me?', as the defence
lawyer suggests, Marg employs a somewhat more indirect formulation: `Bob
where do you get these persistent friends?' Asked by the defence lawyer why
she uses what he characterizes as a mixed signal, Marg responds that she was
afraid Matt would get mad. Like many of the question±answer sequences
analysed in Chapter 3, the defence lawyer here employs a multi-step discur-
sive tactic to undermine the credibility of Marg's behaviour. That is, in
addition to characterizing her utterance as a `mixed signal' (i.e., as weak
and ineffective), he also discounts the fear she claims motivated this particular
formulation. Viewed within an alternative contextualizing framework,
Marg's utterance could be construed as a strategic response to her fear of
Matt's escalating violence; yet, within the context of example 59, repre-
sentative of much of the discourse of these adjudication processes, it is
(re)constructed as `passive' and `lacking in appropriate resistance'.
Adjudicators' decisions
To what extent were the adjudicators' decisions consistent with the repre-
sentations of the complainants and their witness that were prevalent in the
discourse of the adjudication processes and exempli®ed in this chapter and
Chapter 3? Consider excerpts from the tribunal members' decision. (Recall
that the tribunal members deemed Matt's behaviour to fall below university
standards, but, at the same time, imposed upon the accused a somewhat leni-
ent penalty for two convictions of acquaintance rape.)
At the outset of their interaction with Mr. A., both complainants were
very clear as to their intentions. They clearly set the limits at the very
beginning but their resolve became somewhat ambiguous as the night progressed.
Did their actions leave Mr. A. with the impression that they had changed
their minds later in the evening? There is little doubt that both
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 117
complainants did not expressly object to some of the activity that took place that
evening. It is also clear that their actions at times did not unequivocally indicate
a lack of willing participation. For example, the actions of Ms B. [Marg] in
constantly returning to bed may have left Mr. A. with the impression
that she was interested in continuing the sexual touching. Further,
much was made of the fact that Ms D. [Connie] voluntarily attended a
pub with Mr. A. the very evening after the incident, and that she even
slow danced with Mr. A.
(In the Matter of M.A: Reasons for Judgement of the University Discipline
Tribunal, p. 19)
Continuous with the ideological frame that structured the adjudication pro-
cesses, this excerpt suggests that the complainants' protests were too unclear
and equivocal to send the message to the defendant that they were not
consenting to the sexual activity. Particularly noteworthy are the italicized
sentences above. In describing the complainants as not expressly object[ing] to
some of the activity, their resolve as somewhat ambiguous and their actions as
not unequivocal, the tribunal members continue their representation of the
complainants as `weak' and `ineffective' in resisting Matt's acts of sexual
aggression. Indeed, they remark that Marg's constant returning to her own
bed may have signalled to Matt that she was consenting to sexual activity.
That is, like the discourse of the adjudication processes, it is the `equivocal'
nature of the complainants' behaviour (i.e., they are not resisting to the
utmost) that potentially transforms sexual assault into consensual sex, accord-
ing to the tribunal members' decision.
Following this assessment of the complainants' behaviour, the tribunal
members go on to comment on the complainants' own characterization of
their actions.
Both complainants conceded in their testimony that they did not take
the most sensible and available steps to prevent the sexual touching
from continuing. They both agreed that in hindsight their actions
were irrational and ineffective. At a minimum they both agreed that
they should have unequivocally asked Mr. A. to leave their rooms
when the activity escalated beyond the limits they initially set; however,
they asserted that at the time they were in shock and confused and they
did not wish to offend Mr. A. considering that he had helped them with
personal problems.
(In the Matter of M.A: Reasons for Judgement of the University Discipline
Tribunal, pp. 19±20)
Young men must be sensitive to a young woman's right to say no, and
young women, in turn, must realize that when a young man becomes
aroused during sexual activity beyond a moderate degree there is a
danger that he will be driven by hormones rather than by conscience.
(Reasons for Judgement in Her Majesty the Queen and M.A., p. 828)
In calling upon young women to realize that, once aroused, young men's
sexual urges are uncontrollable, the judge is implicating young women in
the control of men's sexual drives. What is evident in both decisions, then,
is an emphasis on the women's behaviour and actions and an interrogating
of their role in resisting/controlling Matt's sexual aggression. Not only
does the frame of utmost resistance dominate and structure the `talk' of
these sexual adjudication processes, it also informs, perhaps constrains, the
kind of reasoning that underlies these decisions and verdicts.
Unlike juries, the adjudicators in the university tribunal were not an over-
hearing, non-speaking audience (Atkinson and Drew 1979). That is, the
tribunal members not only adjudicated the hearing but also asked questions ±
questions that, combined with the questions of the defence, performed sub-
stantial ideological work. Thus, to the extent that the tribunal members'
questions contributed to the ideological frame that dominated the pro-
ceedings, the consistency of the two discourses (the talk and the adjudicators'
decision) within the university tribunal is not altogether surprising. By
contrast, the judge in the criminal trial was essentially an overhearing,
non-speaking audience. While authorized to ask questions of witnesses,
this was a rare occurrence. Can we say, however, that the judge's decision
was in¯uenced by the linguistic representations I have argued dominated
these proceedings? Put another way, what is the relationship between the
`talk' of these adjudication processes and the adjudicators' decisions? As I
suggested in Chapter 2, I am not making the strong claim that the linguistic
representations of the adjudication processes `cause' the adjudicators to reason
and decide in the way they do. On the other hand, given the absence of
Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency? 119
representations that challenge culturally-dominant notions of sexual violence
against women, the `talk' of the adjudication processes may reinforce and
perpetuate such notions. With respect to the representation of the com-
plainants speci®cally, a plethora of rape myths are blaming of victims, as
is the ideological frame that dominates both the criminal trial and the univer-
sity tribunal analysed here. As Lazarus-Black and Hirsch (1994: 12±13) say of
the identities constituted in legal discourse, `the subject position from which
one enters the legal process or is ``entered'' involuntarily in¯uences the success
or failure of the struggle'.
Conclusion
In a discussion of representations of violence against women in the main-
stream media, Chancer (1997: 227) cites Stuart Hall (Hall et al. 1978) on
the dif®culty of alternative `voices' emerging within such contexts: `what
debate there is tends to take place almost exclusively within the terms of reference
of the controllers . . . and this tends to repress any play between dominant and
alternative de®nitions.' I have argued similarly that the `debate' evident
within these adjudication processes tended to be `framed' almost exclusively
by a culturally-dominant ideological perspective that presupposed the
complainants' behaviour to be lacking in appropriate resistance ± this lack
of resistance being equivalent to consent. Yet, the interactional (i.e.,
question±answer) quality of these adjudication processes (i.e., they are
literally dialogic) had consequences for the particular potency with which
alternative perspectives were submerged in these contexts. While Chancer
(1997: 227), following Hall et al. (1978), argues that `viewpoints which chal-
lenge dominant perspectives seldom shine in the spotlight of contemporary
mass culture',5 my data show that linguistically-encoded dominant ideologies
acted as a constraint on the complainants' own linguistic practices. That is, not
only did the dominant perspectives obscure and/or render invisible
the complainants' acts of strategic agency (i.e., did not allow them to
`shine'), they also produced them as subjects who had not acted strategically.
Questions, as we have seen, can mould or exert control over the forms of
answers. And, in response to innumerable questions whose presuppositions
and (pseudo)assertions embodied the utmost resistance standard, the
complainants were cast as agents who were ineffectual: their performances
of strategic acts within `the external reality' were transformed into perfor-
mances of ineffectual acts of resistance within the linguistic representations
of `the courtroom reality'. And, without effectual and appropriate resistance,
the dominant discourse (re)framed the sexual activity as consensual.
The kinds of `coerced' identities that I have claimed the complainants and
their witness produced in these institutional settings, in large part due to the
institutionally-sanctioned strict role integrity of questioner and respondent,
are, like the perpetrator's identity described in Chapter 2, subject to inter-
pretation and reception along gendered dimensions. Matt's representation
120 Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategic agency?
of himself as a non-agent of sexual aggression described in Chapter 2, for
example, becomes intelligible as a gendered way of being when understood
against the background of the male sexual drive discourse ± a discourse
that absolves men of their responsibility and agency for sexual aggression,
attributing it instead to their uncontrollable sexual drives.
Likewise, the complainants' representation and production of themselves as
`ineffectual agents' is intelligible in so far as it reinforces and perpetuates
stereotypical images of women as weak and passive. Particularly pervasive
in the area of male/female sexual relations are stereotypes of `active and
aggressive masculinity and passive and victimised femininity' (Lacey 1998:
100), images con®rmed by the representations (self- and other-generated)
of the complainants. Different about the identities constituted in these
contexts is the degree of institutional coerciveness involved: while Matt's repre-
sentation of himself as a non-agent was afforded legitimacy by the adjudi-
cators, the complainants and their witness were `called into' their subject
positions involuntarily by a dominant discourse that constrained their
possibilities for representing their strategic agency. Indeed, the discursive
constraints imposed upon the complainants within the adjudication processes
mirrored the highly restrictive circumstances surrounding the sexual assaults.
Just as the complainants and their witness had few opportunities to challenge
the prevailing narrative of the court, so they had few possibilities for action
within the context of Matt's intimidating and frightening demeanour and
his escalating sexual and physical violence.
5 `The signals . . . between men
and women are not being
read correctly'
Miscommunication and acquaintance
rape1
Introduction
With the aim of theorizing a transformed ideological frame that renders
visible the complainants' subaltern perspectives, I turn in this chapter to a
relatively new cultural explanation for acquaintance rape, and gender struggle
more generally ± male/female miscommunication. Although a miscommuni-
cation account of rape has been heralded `as a progressive alternative to the
victim precipitation model with its associated victim-blaming' (Crawford
1995: 123), I suggest that its particular manifestation in these adjudication
processes does not eliminate victim-blame. On the contrary, fragments of
this new model are incorporated seamlessly into more traditional ideologies
surrounding sexual violence, leaving intact the overarching assumption
that women are responsible for rape. For example, while not held accountable
for rape on the basis of their `provocative' dress or their `promiscuous' sexual
past, the complainants discussed in this study were nonetheless held account-
able for not communicating their lack of consent clearly and unambiguously.
Indeed, the miscommunication model of date rape, as it is manifest in these
adjudication processes, is the utmost resistance standard in disguise: because
the complainants' signals of non-consent did not take particular forms, their
resistance to Matt's sexual aggression was deemed as weak and equivocal ±
such equivocation being tantamount to consent.
At the root of a miscommunication account of rape is the difference or dual-
cultures theory of communication between women and men. Initially applied
to gender relations by Maltz and Borker (1982), the dual-cultures model has
its origins in work by Gumperz (1982a, 1982b) on the nature of cross-
cultural or inter-ethnic communication. Demonstrating that communication
between interlocutors from different cultural groups can be problematic due
to differences in the conversational norms of groups, Gumperz showed that
interlocutors themselves often did not perceive this kind of conversational
dif®culty as rooted in `linguistic' differences; rather, on the basis of such
dif®culty, they made value judgements about interlocutors' personality
characteristics and/or interpreted their behaviour through the lens of racist
and ethnocentric ideologies. One of Gumperz's points concerns the
122 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
imperceptibility of conversational norms: despite genuine attempts to
communicate on the part of interlocutors, their unwitting violation of
unrecognized norms at times functioned to reinforce and perpetuate negative
cultural stereotypes. Applying Gumperz's account of problematic cross-
cultural communication to male±female communication, Maltz and Borker
(1982) and later Tannen (1990), in her popularized and best-selling version
of this model ± You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation ±
suggest that women and men, like members of different cultural groups,
learn different communicative styles because of the segregated girls' and
boys' peer groups they play in as children. This segregation results in inade-
quate or incomplete knowledge of the other groups' communicative norms,
which in turn leads to miscommunication. A crucial point for Tannen
(1990: 47) in her articulation of this dual-cultures model is the legitimacy
of both men's and women's conversational styles: `misunderstandings arise
because the styles [women's and men's] are different' and `each style is
valid on its own terms'. In fact, it has often been the so-called innocence of
the communicative differences underlying male±female miscommunication
that has been critiqued by scholars advocating a `dominance' rather than a
`difference' approach. (See, for example, Freed (1992), Henley and Kramare
(1991), Troemel-Ploetz (1991), and Uchida (1992).) That is, in arguing
that women's and men's styles are separate but equal (as Tannen does
above), Tannen ignores the power or dominance relations within which men's
and women's conversational styles are developed ± power relations that help
to shape the particular forms that these styles take. It is not merely an accident,
for example, that men, more than women, interpret questions as requests for
information or interpret problem-sharing as an opportunity to give expert
advice. (These are claims made by Tannen (1990) about men's speech
styles.) As Crawford (1995: 96) says of these: they `can be viewed as preroga-
tives of power. In choosing these speech strategies, men take to themselves the
voice of authority.' Put another way, locating explanations for women's and
men's different communicative styles (to the extent that they actually exist)
in their so-called separate peer groups obscures the effects of power on the
particular way these styles come to be constituted.
Critiques of her work notwithstanding, Tannen (1992: 252) is very explicit
about the fact that her version of the dual-cultures model of miscommunica-
tion is only meant to explain `quotidian conversational frustrations' and not
more serious instances of gender struggle: `there is no reason . . . to think I
would seek to explain away rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment or
sexual abuse as conversational misunderstandings.' Nonetheless, as Crawford
(1995: 123) argues, miscommunication has become the dominant cultural
model for explaining acquaintance rape: `the miscommunication framework
has become the culturally dominant explanation for acquaintance rape
among helping professionals, educators, and the college students whose
behavior the model seeks to explain.' Indeed, in what follows I show that
Miscommunication and acquaintance rape 123
miscommunication models of acquaintance rape have also entered legal and
extralegal arenas, where arguably they have more serious consequences. In
the university tribunal analysed here I show that Matt and two of the tribunal
members invoked a miscommunication model of male±female communica-
tion as a way of explaining what transpired between Matt and the com-
plainants. While at times the explanatory framework deployed could be
characterized as a separate-but-equal model of miscommunication, more
often it was what Crawford (1995) calls a de®ciency model of miscommunica-
tion. That is, both the accused in his testimony and the tribunal members
through their questioning communicated that neither Matt nor the com-
plainants interpreted the other's verbal and non-verbal communicative acts
accurately, primarily because the complainants were `de®cient' in their
attempts to signal non-consent. As a reconstituted manifestation of the
utmost resistance standard, I show that this particular framing of the events
succeeds in characterizing the complainants' behaviour as lacking in appro-
priate or utmost resistance, thereby af®rming the sexual prerogative of the
defendant.
1 MA: Uhm she was just reciprocating and we were fooling we were fooling
around. This wasn't . . . heh this wasn't something that she didn't want
to do.
HL: How did you know?
MA: How did I know?
HL: Yeah.
MA: Because she never said `no', she never said `stop' and when I was
kissing her she was kissing me back . . . and when I touched her breasts
she didn't say no.
This example shows the defendant explaining how he knew when the com-
plainant was expressing consent ± because she didn't say `no' and didn't say
`stop' in response to each of his sexual advances (`when I was kissing her',
124 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
`when I touched her breasts'). Examples 2 to 5 are further expansions on this
theme. Especially noteworthy in examples 2 to 5 is how temporality becomes
crucial to the defendant's notion of consent. In each example, there is explicit
acknowledgement on the part of the defendant that the complainant has
expressed lack of consent at some previous point in the interaction; however,
because she did not communicate her protests in the wake of each of his acts of
sexual aggression, he understood her to be `consenting.' In example 2, the
university counsel questions the defendant about events that took place
after Marg left the dormitory room (to tell Bob that Matt was taking advan-
tage of her). The university lawyer is trying to determine why the defendant
continued with his sexual advances after hearing of the complainant's feelings:
While Matt acknowledges that Marg felt he was taking advantage of her, he
attempts to discredit and undermine this charge by pointing out in lines 10
to 13 that `she never said no' (`when she let me kiss her'), `she never said stop',
`she never said Matt is taking advantage of me' at previous points in the
encounter. We see here how the timing of acts of resistance is an integral
part of Matt's de®nition of consent: only if Marg were to protest then, at the
very moment Matt initiated a sexual advance, would he hear her as expressing
a lack of consent. The question of timing is also operative in Matt's response
to questions about why he resumed sexual activity after Marg's comments to
Bob. Matt focuses on Marg's subsequent act, that is, `getting back into bed',
in justifying his interpretation of consent. Indeed, Matt's repeated use of
temporal expressions referring to previous points in the interaction (e.g.,
then, at that point in lines 6, 9, 15, 16, 18, 31, 39±40) indicates the importance
of temporality to his de®nition of consent. It seems that every new point in
the interaction provides a new opportunity for Matt to ascribe consent or
lack of consent to the complainant's behaviour.
Examples 3 and 4 contain further questioning of the defendant by the
university's counsel. Example 3 shows Matt claiming that, at some point
during the night, Marg indicated that under different circumstances she
might willingly engage in sexual activity:
4 MA: She was like caressing and like we were fooling around and I was
caressing her and everything.
HL: She already told you that under different circumstances she might do
it. Right?
MA: She had said earlier in the washroom
HL: Yeah. So this is after
MA: Yeah but the thing, I knew, I know what you're saying but the
thing is this, whenever I was engaged with sexual activity with Marg,
okay? If Marg or anybody for that matter, if if that person at that time
when I'm doing something, say if I'm lying in bed with them and
reach over and grab their breast and, I had already done something
with this person and they consented with it and, they did not move
my hand away or anything and didn't say `no', didn't say `stop', didn't
say uh uh uh, jump up and say `No I want you to leave', I am assuming,
okay? Uhm that if a person does not resist to anything when they, that
that that is consent.
HL: Okay.
MA: I never heard and I don't . . . I never heard from uh this instance
you're referring to. I never uh heard at that time her refuse to engage
in whatever we were engaged in.
In this example, the defendant is quite explicit about his de®nition of consent:
`If Marg or anybody for that matter, if . . . that person at that time that I'm
doing something . . . didn't say ``no'', didn't say ``stop'', didn't . . . jump up
and say ``No I want you to leave'', I am assuming, okay? . . . that is consent.' In
short, Matt seems to be saying that since Marg did not express resistance in
response to each of his advances, she `consented' to his sexual aggression.
Whereas my discussion of examples 1 to 4 has focused on the temporal aspect
of Matt's de®nition of consent, example 5, from a tribunal member's
questioning of the defendant, shows that his understanding of consent rests
also on the strength of expressions of resistance:
5 GK: One last question, if Marg was asleep and there's testimony that says
that she's asleep and we have testimony that says it's debatable whether
she was asleep
MA: Mhmm
GK: Uh why do you continue caressing her?
Miscommunication and acquaintance rape 127
MA: Well as I said last week what occurred was that we had gotten back
into bed and we started kissing and she said that she was tired, you know,
she never said like `no', `stop', `don't', you know, `don't do this' uhm `get
out of bed'.
Matt acknowledges that Marg has said that she is tired; he does not construe
this as resistance ± she did not say `no' `stop' `don't', etc. We see almost
identical comments by the defendant about the strength of signals of resis-
tance in examples 1 and 2, for example, `she never said ``no''', `she never said
``stop''' (in line 11 of example 2). Moreover, in example 2 Matt makes reference
to gender (in line 22): he hypothesizes how he would convey non-consent if
he were a woman, raising the possibility that signals of resistance are expressed
differently by women and men. And, as a woman in Marg's situation, Matt
would produce signals of nonconsent that were strong and forceful (`I would
get up out of bed', I would ask this person to leave', `I would tell the two other
people') and that were expressed at a particular point in time (`I would deal
with it then'). In sum, examples 2 to 5 all contain Matt's acknowledgments
that Marg has expressed lack of consent at some point during the course of
their encounter. However, because Matt de®nes `consent' as the absence of
vehement expressions of resistance in the wake of every sexual advance, he
contends that his escalating sexual aggression is justi®ed.
One way of understanding Matt's (re)de®nition of consent is in terms of the
socially-conditioned process by which linguistic forms are endowed with
meaning. As argued in Chapter 1, a woman may say `no' with sincerity to
a man's sexual advances, but the `no' gets ®ltered through a series of cultural
beliefs and attitudes that transform the woman's direct negative into an
indirect af®rmative, for example, `she is playing hard to get, but of course
she really means yes' (McConnell-Ginet 1989: 47). From examples 1 to 5,
we see that, for Matt, `no' is reconstructed as `yes' in the absence of aggressive
and frequent expressions of resistance on Marg's part. Perhaps relevant to
Matt's (re)construction of `consent' (out of the absence of strong and frequent
enough expressions of resistance) is a feature of hegemonic masculinity
already discussed in Chapter 2 ± the male sexual drive discourse. Recall
that in acquitting Matt of the sexual assault involving Connie, the judge in
the criminal trial made reference to this discourse in his decision. That
Matt himself invokes the male sexual drive discourse is shown in example
6: here the university counsel, HL, is asking him why he continued with
his sexual advances towards Connie when earlier he had indicated that he
was not interested in her sexually.
6 HL: Okay . . . Then you ± she said you said `I changed my mind about not
wanting to sleep with you.'
MA: Okay, there was a point . . . and this is the, I believe second time in
the evening that she said she did not want to have sex. Uhm we were fool-
ing around and then I stopped and I said I wanted to discuss something
128 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
with her, but I was very reserved. Then I told her, well . . . cause we were
fooling around I had become aroused and that . . . uhm . . . uh . . . that I was . . .
yeah that I was sexually aroused and that I had desires to want to have sex.
And I had expressed to her earlier that I . . . didn't want to and . . . it was
more because we were involved in such . . . heavy sexual activity that I chan-
ged my mind.
Given that Matt's sexual advances towards the two complainants seem to
depend on whether he is sexually aroused from one moment to the next, it
is perhaps not surprising that he claims to interpret Marg's expressions of
resistance as also variable from moment to moment. Put another way,
Matt's interpretation of `consent' relies on culturally-dominant values and
beliefs (or discourses) that form the background for the interpretation of
linguistic utterances, including how a woman's `no' is interpreted. Changing
one's mind about wanting sex is completely consistent with the male sexual
drive discourse which says that once aroused, men's sexual urges are `com-
pelling' and `uncontrollable'. And, I am suggesting that Matt's interpretation
of Marg's expressions of resistance as variable and as not de®nitive relies on
such views of hegemonic masculinity.
Notice in example 8 that the tribunal member does not accept `I don't know'
as an appropriate response to his questions about the defendant perceiving the
events differently than the complainants. Instead, the complainant is enjoined
to acknowledge that misperception and miscommunication were possible
ways of understanding the unwanted sexual aggression. Here we see again
how questioners have the power to reformulate a respondent's answer: the tri-
bunal member's questioning has the effect of restructuring the propositional
content of the complainant's responses (i.e., from `I don't know' to `I suppose
it's [miscommunication] possible').
Even more insistent about `gendered' miscommunication as an explanatory
model for the events under scrutiny is the woman faculty member, GK, when
questioning Marg:
130 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
9 MB: I kept saying `let's just go to sleep.' I didn't honestly 1
know what else in my mind to do at that time. For me 2
that was all I could do to tell him I didn't want to do 3
anything. 4
GK: And did it occur to you through the persistent 5
behaviour that maybe your signals were not coming 6
across loud and clear, that `I'm not getting through what 7
I want and what I don't want?' Does it occur to you `I 8
need to stand up and say something', `I need to move 9
him to the ¯oor?' This is the whole thing about getting 10
signals mixed up. We all socialize in one way or the 11
other to read signals and to give signals. In that 12
particular context, were you at all concerned your 13
signals were not being read exactly and did you think 14
since signals were not being read correctly for you, 15
`should I do something different with my signals?' 16
MB: I did. He made me feel like I wasn't saying 17
anything, that I wasn't saying `no' and that's why I 18
asked to talk to Bob, thinking if I couldn't tell him 19
maybe Bob could tell him. Bob came in the room and 20
said everything was okay just to forget about it and go 21
back to sleep. I tried that. I told Matt, I said if the 22
circumstances would have been different, maybe. It was 23
a lie but I mean it was another way for me to try to tell 24
him `no'. I mean obviously I just wanted to go to sleep. 25
It wasn't getting through so I tried different 26
approaches. And in my mind I hoped that they were 27
getting through, I mean, I was making it as clear as I 28
could. I'm not sure if that answers your question or not 29
but . . . . 30
GK: No, it's because right from there to the end you, 31
you had felt that you hadn't made it clear because at 32
the end you said you were willing to lie and give him 33
this phone number and get rid of him. So all along the 34
way you felt your signals were not read correctly. But 35
the whole thing is, you know, that concerns all of us is 36
that the signals of, you know, between men and women 37
are just, are not being read correctly and I'm not 38
debating who's lying and who's telling the truth 39
because it's not mine to say that. The substance is why, 40
that signals, do you feel at that time your signals were 41
not being read correctly? 42
Note that, on lines 10 to 16, GK contends that signals are bound to get mixed
up because `we all [are] socialize[d] in one way or the other to read and give
Miscommunication and acquaintance rape 131
signals'. Furthermore, lines 37 and 38 show GK invoking gender socialization
as an explanation for this differential interpretation of `signals': `the signals . . .
between men and women . . . are not being read correctly'. This tribunal
member seems to subscribe to a `different-but-equal' model of miscommuni-
cation in lines 38 to 39: `I'm not debating who's lying and who's telling
the truth'. In other words, it is not a question of one person lying and the
other telling the truth; rather, `signals' are interpreted differently by these
individuals. In lines 5 to 16 and 31 to 35, however, she seems to subscribe
to a `de®ciency' model of miscommunication (Crawford 1995) ± one in
which the complainant is represented as de®cient in her attempts to com-
municate lack of consent. For example, she ®rst asks on lines 12 to 14 whether
Marg was concerned about the interpretation of her `signals': `In that particu-
lar context, were you at all concerned your signals were not being read
exactly?' and then assumes (or presupposes) in lines 15 and 16 (in the
clause introduced by since) that the `signals' were not being read correctly:
`did you think since signals were not being read correctly for you, ``should
I do something different with my signals?''' Moreover, in lines 31 to 35
the tribunal member asserts that Marg must have known her signals were
not being read correctly `all along'; otherwise, she would not have lied to
the defendant. Implicit in the tribunal member's questions, then, is the
claim that Marg was responsible for `do[ing] something different with
[her] signals', given that she knew Matt wasn't interpreting them correctly.
Though GK suggests in 9 that Marg has not adequately or appropriately
signalled her non-consent, she does not generally focus on questions of appro-
priateness when she asks Matt about his interpretations. In examples 10 and
11, we see GK questioning the defendant, Matt:
Here, we see the tribunal member again expressing her understanding of the
events in terms of a difference or dual-cultures model of miscommunication:
she asserts, on lines 66 and 67, that `people . . . tend to give people signals in
different ways' and wonders, on lines 59 and 60, whether Matt `read more
verbal signals than non-verbal signals'. Not surprisingly, the defendant
echoes her characterization of the events: `Yeah I know there's there's a com-
munication thing.' In contrast to GK's questioning of Marg, however, there is
no suggestion in her questioning of Matt that he had other ways of inter-
preting Marg's `signals': the tribunal member is `just trying to intepret
these signals [for herself]'. Like example 11, example 12 shows GK concerned
with Matt's verbal and non-verbal `signals'.
While GK does focus on `signals' from Marg that Matt did not `pick up', there
are no direct assertions in example 12 about Matt knowing that his inter-
pretations were faulty. (Consider, by contrast, GK's assertion to Marg on
lines 34 and 35 of example 9: `So all along the way you felt your signals
were not read correctly'.) Nor does GK assert that Matt should have or
could have considered other interpretations. (Again, compare example 12
to GK's questioning of Marg in example 9, lines 8 to 10: `Does it occur to
you ``I need to stand up and say something, I need to move him to the
¯oor'''.) Thus, although the complainant was criticized for not making her
signals clearer and not changing her signals, Matt is not generally criticized
for what might be faulty or inaccurate interpretation of signals. Indeed, when
GK questions Matt about `mixed signals' in 10 to 12 it seems to be her assess-
ment of the situation that is at issue. For example, as already noted, on lines
67 and 68, she `is just trying to interpret for [herself] these signals' and on line
78 `it's very hard for [her] to know' about the signals that Matt does or does
not `pick up' on.
In addition to the types of questions found in 10 to 12, GK's questioning of
Matt also focused on Marg's behaviour, speci®cally, the `signals' that she did
Miscommunication and acquaintance rape 133
not use. That is, in 13 and 14 below, we do not see GK questioning Matt
about his behaviour or interpretations; rather, GK is attempting to con®rm
that Marg did not pursue avenues of resistance that GK seems to regard as
appropriate. Beyond GK's noting `that [Marg] stays in bed . . . , that [Marg]
doesn't leave', consider her comments in examples 13 and 14:
13 GK: Uh when you left the room, as you left the room several times, was
the lock ever used?
MA: The lock was never used
GK: Was the lock ever used when you were inside the room?
MA: The lock was never used.
14 GK: Okay. And as you said earlier and I want to make sure that I under-
stand correctly, at no point were you asked to go on the ¯oor?
MA: No.
While B's response, interpreted literally, does not answer A's question, the
cooperative principle would hold that B's interlocutor performs the necessary
inferential work to interpret B's response as being an answer to the question
136 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
asked. Speaker A thus concludes that it is later than 10 o'clock, for example,
because 10 o'clock is the time the mailman typically comes. Consider a
similar example, where A and B are on a camping trip without watches or
clocks.
Again we see that B's response, from a literal point of view, does not answer
A's question. However, because, according to Grice, A will assume rational
and cooperative behaviour from B, A will draw inferences, or conversational
implicatures, that establish a connection between A's question and B's
response. Grice's point is not that speakers are always cooperative in their
communicative behaviour; rather, his argument is that the presumption of
cooperation on the part of listeners gives rise to inferences. As Levinson
(1983: 102) notes `inferences arise to preserve the assumption of cooperation;
it is only by making the assumption contrary to super®cial indications that
the inferences arise in the ®rst place.'
Note that in both of examples 15 and 16 it is not just the presumption of
cooperation that gives rise to implicatures or inferences; the precise inferences
drawn depend on assumed knowledge within the local context (i.e., the time
the mail is delivered) or within the culture or world more generally (i.e., how
the sun's position relates to time). That is, in making inferences or, in Grice's
terms, calculating implicatures, interlocutors draw upon assumed cultural
and world knowledge. That general cultural knowledge is involved in the
calculating of implicatures is also evidenced by the well-formedness of the
following sequence of sentences.
17 Fred got the picnic supplies out of the car. The beer was warm.
Based on his own work in Western Samoa, Duranti argues that Samoans do
not ®nd speakers responsible for the intentions that might lie behind their
speech acts; rather speakers are held responsible for the social effects of
those acts. Duranti (1992: 42) provides a more concrete demonstration:
`after offending someone, an American can say ``I didn't mean it.'' This
cannot be done by Samoans, given that part of what one meant is what the
other person understands as meant' (emphasis in text). Morgan (1991: 429)
demonstrates that a similar view of meaning exists in some African-American
communities: what a speaker intends to mean in producing an utterance
`is given less credence than the overall effect or interpretation' of an utterance.
The idea that an utterance `means' what its addressee understands it to mean,
while seemingly at odds with a mainstream Western view of meaning, is, in
fact, compatible with my emphasis on the effects that sexual acts of com-
munication can have on unequally-positioned social actors. If interlocutors
bring to bear on utterance interpretation different kinds of cultural pre-
suppositions (arising from their unequal locations), then what an addressee
understands an utterance to mean may differ from a speaker's intent. Can
we, like the Samoans, ascribe responsibility to interlocutors for the social
effects, `intentional' or not, of their speech acts? This question lies at the
heart of ongoing debates over the proscribing of sexual harassment within
institutional and legal contexts. Feminists who have focused on the institu-
tionalization of sexual harassment policies have generally recognized the
value of considering the effects of sexual behaviour on victims. For example,
Crocker (1983: 706), in an analysis of university de®nitions of sexual
harassment conducted in the 1980s, argues that `the victim's experience of
harassment must inform the university's attitude'. Likewise, Traugott
(1995: 5), who analysed the sexual harassment policies of Cornell, Harvard,
MIT, Stanford, Yale and the system-wide policy of the University of
California, points to `the discursive value of pairing intent and effect' in de®-
nitions of sexual harassment. Of the sexual harassment policies considered by
Traugott, MIT's policy came closest to achieving this goal. (Note that this
policy deals not only with harassment on the basis of gender, but also on
the basis of race, disability, religion, etc.)
20 HL: Do you have anything more that or speci®c to say to the panel about
the evidence that you've heard and uh that Matt has given?
MB: The truth? I mean I don't know what else to reply to. You think, at
least I do, that you know you're walking down the street and someone
grabs you. I was prepared for that I thought, but you don't expect some-
one that you know to do that and when it's happening, I mean, you do
whatever you have to to survive. ((crying)) I mean I was just thinking
how to survive that second. I mean I didn't care if that meant getting
back into bed with him. If he didn't hurt me I didn't care at that
second. I mean I didn't want to do the things I did and looking back
on them I shouldn't have gotten back into bed, I should have yelled,
I should have done something, but, I was in a room full of people that
weren't helping me and somebody was trying to hurt me. I did whatever
I could to get by. I don't know what else to tell you.
Miscommunication and acquaintance rape 143
Like other expressions of the complainants' fear illustrated throughout this
book, Marg cites her fear as the driving force behind her actions. For example,
here Marg refers to the need to survive (without getting hurt ) as motivation
for `getting back into bed with [Matt]': `I was just thinking how to survive
that second. . . . I didn't care if that meant getting back into bed with
him. If he didn't hurt me I didn't care at that second.' Connie's comments
from the criminal trial are comparable (part of this example appears as 58
in Chapter 4):
21 Trial
Q: How were you feeling about this time about him and the situation?
CD: I was scared and I was disgusted and I really wanted him to leave.
I was scared and I wanted it to be over and I wanted him to go away.
Q: Did you say anything to him?
CD: No. I kept trying to move away and push my head back up but he
had my hair and every time ± every time I tried to, he just pushed me
back down.
Q: Was there any pain from that?
CD: It was more fear than pain. I mean, it was uncomfortable.
Q: What happened when you moved and tried to raise your head? What
happened then?
CD: Because he had my hair and was pressing down, I mean, it pulled
but, I mean, it was much more frightening than painful.
Q: Okay. And then what happened?
CD: I performed oral sex on him.
Q: Why did you do that? Did you want to do that?
CD: No.
Q: Why did you do it?
CD: Because I was scared and I really didn't feel that I was being given
any choice in the matter.
Q: What did you think would happen if you didn't do what he told you?
CD: I don't know. I don't think I really gave much thought to what
would happen if I didn't, except that I was afraid not to.
Q: What were you afraid of or what were you afraid would happen if you
did not do the oral sex that he told you to?
CD: I was afraid that he would hurt me.
Q: When you said that you felt that you had no choice, what did you
mean by that?
CD: I felt that I had to do it or get hurt.
That is, out of fear that Matt would hurt her, Connie submitted to his
demands and performed oral sex on him: `I felt that I had to do it or get
hurt.' While evident in many aspects of the complainants' testimony, the
idea that the complainants' behaviour was shaped and constrained by their
intense fear of Matt did not generally inform the questions asked in both
144 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
the university tribunal and the criminal trial. On the contrary, the com-
plainants' behaviour was evaluated from the vantage point of a masculine
subject (i.e., Matt) whose behaviour was unencumbered by the fear and
paralysis illustrated so vividly in examples 20 and 21 above. After all, if
Matt had been a woman subject to sexual aggression, according to his testi-
mony, he would have reacted aggressively and forcefully: `Yeah but if some-
body takes advantage, if . . . I was a woman . . . I would get up out of bed, I
would ask this person to leave, I would tell the two other people and I would
deal with it then. . . . No I'm sorry I do not think it's appropriate to get back
into bed with somebody who you claim was taking advantage of you.'
Consistent with this interpretive standard, example 22 shows TM (Matt's
representative in the university tribunal) (re)constructing Marg's attempts
at resisting Matt ± attempts that were developed out of fear ± as consensual
sex. Recall that Marg tried to avoid further aggression in the moment by tell-
ing Matt (a) that she would have sex with him on Sunday and (b) that she
would have sex with him under different circumstances. These so-called
lies are the subject of TM's comments below:
23 MB: And I thought that if I agreed at that second and said yes, that he
would leave me alone, that I would be safe, that if I could just push it
off. I had no intention of going there Sunday but if I could get him
out of my room to leave me alone, Sunday was another day and he
won't be there, so I ®gured I would be safe.
That is, according to the research literature (and our own data) on young
women and sexual communication, they are communicating their
refusals indirectly; their refusals rarely refer to their own lack of desire
for sex and more often to external circumstances which make sex impos-
sible; their refusals are often quali®ed (`maybe later') and are accompanied
by compliments (`I really like you, but . . .') or by appreciations of the
invitation (`it's very ¯attering of you to ask, but . . .'); and sometimes
they refuse sex with the kinds of yes's which are normatively understood
as communicating refusal.
(Kitzinger and Frith 1999: 309)
Conclusion
In concluding this chapter, I consider the feasibility of a `reasonable woman's'
perspective ± or the perspective of a `reasonable person in the victim's
circumstances' ± informing the dominant discourses that have been shown
to (re)circulate in the `talk' of sexual assault adjudication processes. Relevant
to this question are the following comments from McConnell-Ginet:
As legal scholar Kathryn Abrams has pointed out, male judges who have
been educated about women's distinctive experiences are less likely to
assume that they can simply look to how they themselves might be
affected by an action to decide whether it is part of a pattern of sexual
harassment.
(McConnell-Ginet 1995: 4)
The general point is that in order to mean, agents presuppose, take things
for granted, and that what can be taken for granted depends on what has
been (often and audibly) expressed and can be assumed to be readily
accessible. Views that are little heard, that are not common currency,
can reliably function as background only in linguistic exchanges between
familiars. Such views will not contribute to general patterns of meaning
more than what is said and thus they will not leave their mark on
standard interpretations.
(McConnell-Ginet 1988: 92)
That is, while `views that are little heard' can form the background for the
interpretation of utterances, for example, gay implicature, their restricted
circulation limits the contexts in which `they will . . . leave their mark
on . . . interpretations'. Indeed, according to Liang, gays and lesbians use
gay implicature precisely because of the restricted contexts in which it will
be appropriately interpreted. By contrast, `readily accessible' cultural knowl-
edge will inform the interpretation of utterances in many cultural contexts.
McConnell-Ginet (1989), for instance, argues that an utterance such as
`You think like a woman' functions as an insult in most contexts in our
culture, not because all listeners adhere to the proposition that women have
questionable intellectual abilities, but rather because listeners are aware
that such a (sexist) proposition is prevalent and pervasive within the speech
community; that is, it is part of a widely-held set of mutually accessible
cultural beliefs. Attempting, by contrast, to make the comparable utterance
`You think like a man' function as an insult will be less successful in many
cultural contexts because the proposition that men think `illogically' is not
part of that same set of dominant societal beliefs (Cameron 1998: 88).
Given that dominant groups have contributed disproportionately to the back-
ground knowledge we draw upon in `standard interpretations', then that
stock of beliefs and attitudes will undoubtedly be informed by sexist (and
racist and homophobic) assumptions.
148 Miscommunication and acquaintance rape
I have argued that Matt explains his (re)construction of Marg's signals of
non-consent in terms of a `difference' or dual-cultures model of miscom-
munication: because Marg does not express her non-consent according to a
`masculine' code of behaviour (i.e., forcefully and aggressively after each of
Matt's sexual advances), Matt contends that she is consenting. Put another
way, Matt strategically draws upon hegemonic notions of male sexuality
and of masculinity in justifying his interpretations of Marg's behaviour.5
In keeping with McConnell-Ginet's comments above, it is precisely the
pervasiveness and dominance of such notions that licences Matt's account
of the events. As Lees (1996: xiii) says of rapists who invoke rape myths to
explain their violence: `rapists do not invent their rationalizations; they
draw for their vocabulary on social myths re¯ecting ideas they have every
reason to believe others will ®nd acceptable.' Matt has likewise not `invented'
his rationalizations; on the contrary, he has the cultural weight of a sexist and
androcentric belief-system informing and authorizing his (mis)interpreta-
tions. While undoubtedly having access to Marg's perspective, that is, to
her fear of sexual and physical violence that shaped her communicative acts
of resistance, Matt was able to strategically ignore such a perspective, given
its culturally-subordinate status (i.e., it is `little heard' as opposed to `readily
accessible'.) Indeed, what Matt and the tribunal characterized as `mis-
communication' is better understood as culturally-sanctioned ignorance.
Conclusion
This book is about the de®ning and delimiting force of institutional dis-
course. Analysing the nitty-gritty linguistic details of socially-situated inter-
actions, I have shown how culturally-dominant notions about violence against
women penetrate, and circulate within, the talk of sexual assault adjudication
processes. Given the institutionally-sanctioned power accorded to questioners
(i.e., adjudicators and lawyers) in these settings, such ideologies ± embedded
primarily in the presuppositions or (pseudo)assertions of questions ± have a
particular potency. That is, because witnesses are `systematically disabled'
from asking questions or initiating turns (Hutchby and Woof®tt 1998:
166), their ability to challenge or resist the assumptions encoded in questions
is severely limited. To the extent, then, that this discourse is embodied in
institutions and subject to institutional (discursive) constraints, it comes to
build the character of the events and individuals it represents.
The rational male whose sexuality is so potent is, after all, that same poor
creature who is driven to rape by the urgings of his uncontrollable sexual
drives and whose cognitive capacities are so fragile that he is at times
incapable of recognizing the distinction between that apparently rather
straightforward dichotomy, yes and no. Similarly, the poor, passive
female ± the very same subject who, according to the English and
Welsh law of incest, does not, like a man `have' sexual intercourse but
rather (and graciously?) `permits' a man to have sexual intercourse with
her ± is also the calculating and deceptive seductress who uses her
sexuality to entrap men.
(Lacey 1998: 100)
Given the contradictions that inform the `rule-bound discourses' that make
performances of gender culturally intelligible, it is perhaps not surprising
that Matt's variable and at times contradictory (linguistic) performances of
gender are considered to make cultural sense. The same latitude and range
of gendered subject positions is not, however, extended to the complainants
and their witness; on the contrary, I have argued that their identities as
`ineffectual agents' are thrust upon them by a dominant discourse that con-
strained their possibilities for representing their strategic agency. Indeed,
the gendered subject positions made available (in the case of Matt) and
thwarted (in the case of the complainants and their witness) within these
institutional settings all worked in service of the same goal: protecting a
range of sexual prerogatives for Matt at the expense of the complainants'
sexual autonomy.
The contradictory and variable (linguistic) constructions of masculinity
that emerged in these settings are indicative of the indirect and non-exclusive
relationship existing between linguistic forms and gendered meanings. As
Ochs (1992: 340) argues, `few features of language directly and exclusively
index gender'. Indeed, the grammar of non-agency adopted by Matt (and
Conclusion 151
validated by the judge in the criminal trial as a performance of hegemonic
masculinity) is a strategy that may be adopted by other accuseds attempting
to represent themselves as innocent in legal contexts. Komter (1998), for
example, in her investigation of the interactional dilemmas of courtroom
participants in the Netherlands, found at least one of her suspects to use a
similar linguistic strategy to Matt while defending himself of a shooting.
(See note 4 of Chapter 2.) It is probably only in the context of a sexual assault
trial, however, where discourses of male and female sexuality are salient, that
these kinds of non-agentive linguistic forms would take on a gendered mean-
ing or, put another way, would become intelligible as a performance of hege-
monic masculinity. Not only, then, does this analysis point to the indirect
relationship between linguistic forms and gendered meanings, but also to
the highly contextualized nature of this relationship. The same linguistic
practices can be variably interpreted as gendered depending on context;
moreover, as we have seen, very different, and even contradictory, kinds of
linguistic identities (e.g., identities that are non-agentive vs. identities that
are aggressive and forceful) can be interpreted as `masculine' in the same
context (i.e., the context of these sexual assault hearings).1
Material effects
In a variety of contemporary feminist writings, a focus on discourse or discur-
sive practices has often been counterposed with a focus on material realities.
Barrett (1992: 201), for example, points to a central issue evident in feminist
scholarship that sets the valuing of `words' against that of `things': `many
feminists . . . have traditionally tended to see ``things'' ± be they low pay,
rape or female foeticide ± as more signi®cant than, for example, the discursive
construction of marginality in a text or document.' Indeed, Comack exempli-
®es this dichotomizing of `word' and `things' in the following comments
about postmodern approaches to the law:
In the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that with his past and his intel-
ligence and willingness to contribute considerably to society . . . the accused has
learned a lesson and is unlikely to commit this sort of offence again. He is clearly
without any prior record. He has a great deal to contribute to society and I expect
he will. His own rehabilitation does not, in my opinion, require a custodial term;
however, for general deterrence and to re¯ect, as a sentence of this nature must,
abhorrence of society of such conduct, and the Court's duty to extend its pro-
tection to those who are in vulnerable positions, I am content that a moderate
degree of incarceration is required. I would sentence the accused then to a
period of 6 months. Additionally, I would place him on probation for a period
of 18 months on the statutory terms and conditions, that he must be of good
behaviour and keep the peace. Additionally, that he have no contact, direct or
indirect, with the complainant, and as well that he report forthwith after com-
pletion of sentence and thereafter as required by the probation of®cer for the
purpose of counseling in respect of appropriate attitudes towards women in
the sexual context.
(Reasons for Sentence in Her Majesty the Queen and M.A.)
The conviction was appealed by the defence, but the appeal was dismissed. Thus, I
assume that Matt spent six months in jail.
13 It is signi®cant to note that the vast majority of acquaintance rape cases would not
have this kind of corroborating evidence.
14 Busby (1999) argues that the foundational principles of the criminal justice system
(i.e., the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
accused's right to silence), combined with the rape mythologies that often
inform judicial reasoning, make the convictions of defendants in sexual assault
cases unlikely. With respect to these two cases, the judge was only able to ®nd
guilt `beyond a reasonable doubt' when there was corroborating evidence from
witnesses present at the scene of the sexual aggression. In the other case, the
156 Notes
judge did not ®nd guilt `beyond a reasonable doubt' perhaps because the com-
plainant had acknowledged consenting to some intimate activity, which, in turn,
set in motion Matt's `uncontrollable' sexual drive.
15 In saying that this utterance is pragmatically inappropriate, I am not saying that it
is grammatically ill-formed. Rather, I am suggesting that it is somewhat odd
within this particular context.
16 It is not only the accused's `linguistic practices' that are authorized in these institu-
tional settings, but also the version of events (and concomitant ideologies) encoded
in his linguistic practices.
17 According to Connell (1987: 185), hegemonic masculinity is a dominant, cultural
ideal of masculinity that does not necessarily correspond closely to the personalities
of actual men: `the public face of hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily what
powerful men are, but what sustains their power and what large members of
men are motivated to support.'
The Crown further urged that the trial judge had committed error in law by
imposing on the victim a requirement that she resist in order to show absence
of consent. Had that occurred, we would agree that there was error in law, but
a review of the trial judge's reasons does not, in our view, support the allegation.
The trial judge did note that the complainant had not resisted or objected, but it
seems clear that he did so in the context of determining whether Weaver's
expressed belief that she was consenting. The following quotations from the
reasons show what the trial judge considered to be the basic question of fact
before him: . . .
`I should mention that by all accounts there was absolutely no force exerted.
She was not handled roughly. She was apparently inert and her explanation of
that is certainly credible and I've accepted that already. I've found that she
didn't consent to this at all. And perhaps if she hadn't been so sick, or ill she
might have been able to express her repugnance or her aversion to what was
happening to her. I think she was helpless in the circumstance and she was
being taken advantage of, obviously. But the accused still has a possible defence.
Did he realize that he was doing this without consent?' . . .
We must observe that, on the printed record, an honest belief in consent seems
a remarkable ®nding. But we did not see or hear the witnesses, as did the trial
judge, and we must defer to this ®nding.
4 McElhinny (1997: 127) argues that `postulating ordinary and institutional inter-
actions as separate obscures contests in institutional settings, especially those
serving women, the poor and minorities, over what is legitimately institutional.
Notes 157
It also obscures interactional inequalities in putatively ordinary interactions (such as
families), and the ways that people's interactions in work settings can shape inter-
actional styles elsewhere.'
5 This is not the criminal trial that forms the basis of my analysis in this book.
6 Conley and O'Barr (1998: 32) argue that general cross-examining strategies, when
deployed in the context of rape trials have a particular poignancy: `a woman telling a
story of physical domination by one man is subjected to linguistic domination by
another.'
7 Within the context of trials, questioning of witnesses must always occur in the
form of questions. While this same general regulation applies to administrative
tribunals, it seems, at least in this particular tribunal, that such a regulation was
not strictly enforced. Both the tribunal member, GK, and Matt's representative,
TM, sometimes employed declaratives rather than interrogatives in their asking
of questions.
Conclusion
1 Lacey (1998: 116) makes an additional point regarding the possible effects of
complainants' inability to recount their own version of events in sexual assault
trials. For Lacey, this `silencing effectively denies rape victims . . . the chance to
approach the court as an audience capable of acknowledging their trauma ± a process
which is arguably crucial to surviving the trauma and among the most important
things which a public rape trial should achieve.'
Bibliography