The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe From Mugabe To Mnangagwa 1st Ed 9783030477325 9783030477332 Compress

AFRICAN HISTORIES
AND MODERNITIES
The History and

Political Transition of
Zimbabwe
From Mugabe to Mnangagwa
Edited by
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni · Pedzisai Ruhanya
African Histories and Modernities
Series Editors
Toyin Falola
The University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX, USA
Matthew M. Heaton
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions to
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spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades. Indeed,
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ings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect the way we
think about African and global histories.
Editorial Board
Akintunde Akinyemi, Literature, University of Florida, Gainesville
Malami Buba, African Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies,
Yongin, South Korea
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Insa Nolte, History, University of Birmingham
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More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14758
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
Pedzisai Ruhanya
Editors
The History and

Political Transition of
Zimbabwe
From Mugabe to Mnangagwa
Editors
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni Pedzisai Ruhanya
Archie Mafeje Research Institute University of Johannesburg
University of South Africa Johannesburg, South Africa
Pretoria, South Africa
African Histories and Modernities

ISBN 978-3-030-47732-5 ISBN 978-3-030-47733-2 (eBook)
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Foreword
Zimbabwe’s sole political leader since independence in 1980, Robert

Gabriel Mugabe, lost power after a military coup in 2017. For a fortnight
in November 2017, the coup was, for some observers in the academy and
media and for many Zimbabwean citizens, indeterminate and imbued
with potential for the emergence of a political leadership that would
reform the authoritarian and divisive nationalist politics that had come to
define the Zimbabwean state. Zimbabwe’s once efficient public service
provision, effective state bureaucracies and large formal sector had disinte-
grated significantly in the two decades preceding the coup. This decline
was a consequence of marked economic regression and rising state corrup-
tion. For many, the 2017 coup opened up possibilities for economic turn-
around and regeneration of state institutions.
This insightful edited volume by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai
Ruhanya comes three years after the coup. It assesses the degree to which
the various openings that the coup created were indeed opportunities for
real political and economic reforms. Are the politics and governance of the
post-coup ZANU PF administration, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, radi-
cally different from that of the ZANU PF government that Mugabe
headed? Have the values and practices of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni has else-
where referred to as ‘Mugabeism’ atrophied? Why is Zimbabwean politics
locked in interminable transitions? These are only a few of the critical
questions this book addresses.
Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Bruce Wharton’s “Zimbabwe’s Coup:
Net Gain or No Gain?” (2019) has endeavoured to evaluate the fate of the
v
vi FOREWORD
reform agenda following the 2017 coup. In the broader literature, Clayton
Thyne and Jonathan Powell’s “Coup d’État or Coup d’Autocracy: How
Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008” (2016), Ozan Varol’s The
Democratic Coup d’État (2017), Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans’
“Coups and Democracy” (2014) and Paul Collier’s “In Praise of the
Coup” (2009), among others, debate and reach some varying conclusions
about the impact of coups on political processes such as democratisation.
For example, whereas Collier is in praise of the coup for being a means of
liberating an oppressed people from dictatorship, Thyne and Powell warn
that in fact, personal dictatorships and misrule have often been post-coup
outcomes.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s book adds to the aforementioned lit-
erature. Like Thyne and Powell’s work, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s
study is not in praise of the coup, and, similar to Thomas-Greenfield and
Wharton, they strike a pessimistic tone with regard to the extent of politi-
cal reform since the 2017 coup. However, two crucial points distinguish
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s study from competing works focusing on
Zimbabwe’s post-coup politics. The first is that it surpasses other studies
in terms of scope. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya have assembled an
ambitious book, which examines how post-coup national politics interacts
with, and is shaped by, themes such as nationalism, political economy and
gender. The result is a rich appraisal of politics after the coup that is use-
fully historicised, incorporates political economy and pays notable atten-
tion to gender, which so inscribed politics before and during the coup.
The 2017 coup represents a departure from some of the politics of old
because it was Zimbabwe’s inaugural coup, impacting civil–military rela-
tions for years to come, but a significant part of subsequent politics has
deep historical roots that this book enables the reader to grasp. A second
point that distinguishes Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s book is that it fore-
grounds arguments by young and older Zimbabwean scholars about their
distressed country’s politics.
In recent years, academic interest in coups and military rule has declined
in African Studies, owing to the marked reduction in the frequency of
coups and also because intellectual fashions come and go. Nonetheless,
coups continue to occur and, as the recent case of Zimbabwe shows, their
incidence is not the preserve of countries with a history of successful
coups. The study of coup motivations, dynamics and consequences
FOREWORD vii
remains an important and productive intellectual pursuit, even if it has

gone out of fashion for some scholars. This book, with its focus on post-
coup politics, substantiates my point through its remarkable range of
insightful contributions.
St Antony’s College, Oxford

Blessing-Miles Tendi
Acknowledgements
This book is founded upon the collective efforts of its editors and con-
tributors. As editors, we appreciate the commitment and cooperation of
all contributors to this project, and therefore take this opportunity to
thank them most sincerely. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni would like to thank
Professor Tshilidzi Marwala (Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Johannesburg) for facilitating his 2019 Visiting Professorship
at the Johannesburg Institute of Advanced Study (JIAS) and Dr Bongani
Ngqulunga (Director of JIAS) for accepting him as Visiting Professor at
the institute, which enabled completion of this book project. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni also extends thanks to Professor Mandla Makhanya (Principal
and Vice-Chancellor of the University of South Africa), under whom he
works, for giving him time off to work on this book project. The editors
also extend their thanks to Professor Blessing-Miles Tendi (University of
Oxford) and Mr Siphosami Malunga (Executive Director of the Open
Society Initiative for Southern Africa) for contributing foreword and post-
script respectively.
ix
Contents
1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert

Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A
Repetition Without Change 1
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya
Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture 23
2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and

Discontinuities 25
Rudo Gaidzanwa
3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components

and Unfinished Business 51
4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in

Zimbabwe, 1980–2018 85
Zenzo Moyo
5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and

Civil Society117
Stanley Tsarwe
xi
xii Contents
Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133
6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition

Politics135
Bekezela Gumbo
7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe:

The Case of Pro-Mthwakazi Movements155
Samukele Hadebe
8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe,

2002–2017181
Pedzisai Ruhanya
Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205
9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third

Chimurenga” in Zimbabwe207
Philip Pasirayi
10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in

Zimbabwean Politics221
Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele
11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End

of Quality Press?245
Wellington Gadzikwa
Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation

Restore Legacy 273
12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted

Economy: What Now Under the Second Republic?275
Toendepi Shonhe
Contents xiii
13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299

Sylvester Marumahoko and Tinashe C. Chigwata
14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in

Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy331
Lyton Ncube
15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359

Mkhululi Sibindi

Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises389
Siphosami Malunga
Index399
Notes on Contributors
Tinashe C. Chigwata is a senior researcher at the Dullah Omar Institute

for Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights at the University
of the Western Cape in South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Public Law
from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. His other quali-
fications are an MPhil in Local Government Law (University of the
Western Cape) and a BSc (Honours) in Administration (University of
Zimbabwe). His current research interests are in the areas of local govern-
ment law, decentralisation and constitutional law. Dr Chigwata has exten-
sive experience working in both the public and private sectors in Zimbabwe
and South Africa.
Wellington Gadzikwa is a lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at
the University of Zimbabwe. He has been a senior lecturer at Harare
Polytechnic Division of Mass Communication (thirteen years), Information
Officer-Ministry of Information (six years). He is a media analyst and
consultant, and had published four books on the media as well as
various articles in academic journals and chapters in books. He com-
pleted his PhD at UNISA in 2018.
Rudo Gaidzanwa is Professor of Sociology at the University of
Zimbabwe. She specialises in social policy, land and gender studies and has
published on gender and land, extractivism and social policy. She is also a
gender and human rights activist. Her publications include Images of
Women in Zimbabwean Literature (1985), Speaking for Ourselves:
Masculinities and Femininities amongst University of Zimbabwe Students
xv
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
(ed., 2001) and A Beautiful Strength: A Journal of Eighty Years of Women’s

Rights, Movements and Activism in Zimbabwe since 1936 (co-edited with
I. Matambanadzo, 2017). She is former Dean of the Faculty of Social
Studies at University of Zimbabwe (2008–2012) and a former Dean of
the College of Social Sciences at Zimbabwe Academy of Sciences. She
served on the Presidential Land Committee in Zimbabwe in 2003 and as
the Coordinator of Affirmative Action Programme at the University of
Zimbabwe, as well as lead researcher for the WoMIN and Centre for
Natural Resource Governance Study on Gendered Extractive Activities in
Zimbabwe, 2017.
Bekezela Gumbo is currently a DPhil student at the Centre for Africa
Studies at the University of the Free State. His research interests include
politics of transition, political institutional engineering for sustainable
political stability and socioeconomic and human development in Southern
Africa. He serves as a principal researcher at Zimbabwe Democracy
Institute, an independent research institute in Zimbabwe. As an under-
graduate, he studied political science, and his Master’s degree is in
International Relations from the University of Zimbabwe.
Samukele Hadebe is a senior researcher at Chris Hani Institute,
Johannesburg. He holds a doctorate in Linguistics awarded jointly by the
University of Zimbabwe and the University of Oslo. He was the chief edi-
tor of the Ndebele dictionary Isichazamazwi SesiNdebele (2001). The sub-
jects of his publications include language planning, translation, literature,
nationalism and labour issues. He has worked as a university lecturer,
a senior civil servant and in civil society organizations.
Siphosami Malunga is the Executive Director of the Open Society
Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and a human rights lawyer with
extensive experience in justice and governance in Africa. He took the helm
at OSISA in August 2013; having previously worked with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the senior governance
advisor and regional programme manager in the Regional Bureau for
Africa. He managed UNDP’s democratic governance programme for
Africa, providing policy analysis and intellectual leadership to governance
advisors in UNDP’s Africa offices. Malunga joined the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN’s Transitional Administration
in East Timor in 2000 as an advisor to the transitional minister of
justice, and later as senior defence trial attorney with the UN Serious
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii
Crimes Tribunal. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked with the UN in

Afghanistan to rebuild the justice sector, before moving to UNDP’s
Governance Centre in Oslo, where he led UNDP’s effort to integrate
conflict prevention in democratic governance policy and program-
ming. In 2008, he moved to Johannesburg to work in UNDP’s East
and Southern Africa office until 2011. Malunga earned his LLB at
the University of Zimbabwe in 1994 and a Master’s in International
Law (Cum Laude) from the University of Oslo, Norway, in 2007. He
is a regular contributor, writer, commentator and contributor to
leading continental and global publications on political, social and
economic issues in Africa.
Sylvester Marumahoko is a Global Excellence and Stature Scholar with
the School of Post Graduate Studies (Research and Innovation) at the
University of Johannesburg in South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Public
Law from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. His other
qualifications are MPhil in Local Government Law (University of the
Western Cape), MSc in Rural and Urban Planning (University of
Zimbabwe), MPA (University of Zimbabwe) and BSc (Honours) in
Politics and Administration (University of Zimbabwe). His current
research interests are in the areas of electoral reform in Southern
Africa (with a special focus on Zimbabwe), constitutional law, the
civil society–state relationship and intergovernmental relations. Dr
Marumahoko has extensive experience working in both the public
and private sectors in Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Trust Matsilele recently completed his PhD at the Department of
Communication Studies, University of Johannesburg. He studied
Zimbabwe’s social media dissidence with an interdisciplinary approach
that encompassed media, anthropology and history. Matsilele’s research
interests include the use of social media by voices on the margins, the use
of artificial intelligence and big data in contemporary newsrooms and
whistleblower citizen journalism.
Zenzo Moyo is a South Africa-based Zimbabwean researcher, who has
practised both as a school teacher and as a university lecturer. Dr Moyo
completed his MA (2013) and PhD (2018) in Development Studies at the
University of Johannesburg. His PhD thesis was on state–civil society rela-
tions, and how these have moderated processes of democratisation in
Zimbabwe. One of his recent publications is a 2018 article titled ‘“What
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Would We Be Without Them?” Rural Intellectuals in the State and NGOs

in Zimbabwe’s Crisis-Ridden Countryside”, which is based on his MA
research and was published by the Critical Sociology Journal. Currently, Dr
Moyo works as a researcher at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic
Reflection in Johannesburg. His research interests are in civil society, social
movements, democracy, African and opposition politics, human rights and
the links between education and development.
Shepherd Mpofu holds a PhD in Media Studies from the University of
the Witwatersrand and is currently a Senior Lecturer in Communication
Studies at the University of Limpopo. He is a former Global Excellence
Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg. His research and
teaching interests are in media and identity, politics, digital media, citizen
journalism and comparative media systems. He is currently working
on two books, on social media and identity in South Africa and dia-
sporic media and identity in Zimbabwe.
Lyton Ncube is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Communication
Studies Department, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds
a PhD in Cultural and Media Studies from the Centre for Communication
Media and Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2015). Lyton Ncube’s
Doctoral thesis shows the nexus of football, power, identity and develop-
ment discourses in modern Zimbabwe. Using Zimbabwe’s two prominent
football clubs, Dynamos FC and Highlanders FC, the study demonstrates
how football is intricately intertwined with the daily exigencies of exis-
tence of the people of Zimbabwe. His research interests are in the political
economy of the media, critical theory, cultural studies and the sociology of
sport, particularly the nexus of football, nationalism and social identities.
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni is Research Professor and Director of
Scholarship in the Department of Leadership and Transformation in the
Principal and Vice-Chancellor’s Office at the University of South Africa
(UNISA) and is also the 2019 Visiting Professor at the Johannesburg
Institute of Advanced Study at the University of Johannesburg. He holds
a DPhil in Historical Studies from the University of Zimbabwe. He has
taught at the University of Zimbabwe, Midlands State University,
Monash University (South Africa/Australia), the Open University
(United Kingdom, UK) and the University of South Africa. He is a
member of the Academy of Science of South Africa, a Fellow of the
Centre of African Studies in the Netherlands and a Research Associate
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix
of the Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies at the Open
University; he is also highly rated as a social scientist by the National
Research Foundation of South Africa. He has published over 100
academic works, including seven sole-authored books, and seven
edited volumes. His latest major publications are books entitled
Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization
(2018) and Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa:
Turning Over a New Leaf (2020, forthcoming).
Philip Pasirayi is a Zimbabwean human rights activist and researcher.
He holds a DPhil in International Development from the University of
Oxford (UK). His research interests are in media, democracy, governance
and human rights. He is currently working as Executive Director of a local
Zimbabwean NGO, the Centre for Community Development in
Zimbabwe, based in Harare.
Pedzisai Ruhanya is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the University
of Johannesburg’s School of Communication, Faculty of Humanities. He
is the director of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI). He studied
journalism, sociology, human rights and media and democracy at the
Universities of Zimbabwe, Essex (UK) and Westminster (UK).
Toendepi Shonhe is a political economist and Research Fellow at Thabo
Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa. He holds
a Master’s in public policy management from the University of
Witwatersrand in South Africa and PhD in Development Studies—
Agrarian Relations from the University of KwaZulu Natal. His research
interest is in agrarian change and economic development. He recently
published a book on reconfigured agrarian relations in Zimbabwe. His
current research work focuses on the agrarian transition in Zimbabwe as
well as land reform, food security and capital accumulation in Africa.
Mkhululi Sibindi is a doctoral student in International Business,
Economics and Trade at the University of South Africa. He completed his
MBA at Zimbabwe Open University. His academic and professional
engagements have included appointments at Richfield Graduate Institute
(South Africa) Trust Academy (Bulawayo). He currently serves as
Senior Lecturer at Richfield Graduate Institute of Technology in
Pretoria. He is a specialist in international capital flows, expansion
strategies and multinational firms’ heterogeneity. His research inter-
ests focus on developing markets, with specific emphasis on Africa. He is
expert in advanced econometrics and quantitative research.
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Stanley Tsarwe is a senior lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at

the University of Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in Journalism and Media
Studies from Rhodes University, South Africa. He also holds an MA in
Journalism and Media Studies from the same institution. He has research
interests in media and democracy; African radio and democratisation; and
media, conflict and peace in Africa.
List of Figures
Fig. 6.1 A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition

politics139
Fig. 6.2 Conceptualising identity politics as a dominant political
culture in Zimbabwe 144
Fig. 12.1 Zimbabwe trade 1995–2016. Notes: Imports, exports.
(Source: Simoes 2018) 288
Fig. 12.2 Balance of payments developments: 2009–2017. (Source:
RBZ 2018) 289
Fig. 12.3 Diamond exports and imports from partners for Zimbabwe,
2000–2016. (Source: Various Sources, Adopted from TMALI,
UN COMTRADE) 290
Fig. 12.4 Interconnectedness of Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks.
Notes (Abbreviations): AMU, Arab Maghreb Union;
CEMAC, Central African Economic and Monetary
Community; CMA, Common Monetary Area; CEN-SAD,
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States; CEPGL, Economic
Community of the Great Lakes Countries; IOC, Indian Ocean
Commission; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on
Development; MRU, Mano River Union; SACU, Southern
African Customs Union; WAEMU, West African Economic
and Monetary Union; WAMZ, West African Monetary Zone.
* Members of CEN-SAD. (Source: Ncube and Mokoti
(2019), figure updated from UNESC (2009), Economic
Development in Africa 2009: Strengthening Regional
Economic Integration for Development. United Nations
publication. Sales No. E.09.II.D.7. New York and Geneva) 291
xxi
xxii List of Figures
Fig. 14.1 Demonstrators gathered outside State House after the long
march to and from the Highfields suburb. (Source: Author) 340
Fig. 14.2 A manipulated WhatsApp picture of Grace Mugabe bent
over, General Chiwenga fucking from behind. (Source:
WhatsApp meme) 345
Fig. 14.3 A tweet allegedly from the ZANU–PF handle claiming that
there was no coup, but military action that aimed to help
Mugabe, who had been taken advantage of by his wife 349
Fig. 14.4 Tweet by prominent Zimbabwean musician Mapfumo
suggesting that Grace’s character had triggered Operation
Restore Legacy. (Source: Thomas Mapfumo’s Twitter handle) 350
Fig. 14.5 Trevor Ncube’s tweet, sarcastically commending Grace’s
contribution in the downfall of her husband. (Source: Trevor
Ncube’s Twitter handle) 351
Fig. 14.6 A manipulated WhatsApp image of Robert Mugabe blaming a
miserable-looking Grace for their demise. (Source: WhatsApp
meme)352
Fig. 14.7 A WhatsApp meme that trended on 24 November 2017, on
the inauguration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa.
(Source: WhatsApp meme) 353
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections

conducted between 1990 and 2018 100
Table 12.1 Land grabs in Zimbabwe 286
Table 15.1 Taxonomy of market failures impeding internationalization 371
Table 15.2 Trade policy objectives 377
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe:

From Robert Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson
Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A Repetition
Without Change
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya
It would seem that the age of revolutions is over, to be succeeded by the

age of transitions. These transitions were expected to be less violent than
revolutions; liberal democracy was expected to enable peaceful change.
Illiberal regimes are worse off. The authoritarian of Egypt, Algeria,
Zimbabwe and Sudan have witnessed military interventions in transitional
politics. Military forces embody violence, and their political interventions
tend to block rather than enhance transitions. This book is about the
problematic history of Zimbabwe and its politics of transition. At least six
problematic transitions have been discernible in the country, something
S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (*)
Archie Mafeje Research Institute, University of South Africa,
P. Ruhanya
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political
Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_1
2 S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA
that led Thandika Mkandawire (2016) to write of ‘transition overload’.

The first was the decolonisation transition of 1980, which was expected to
deliver a sovereign Zimbabwe inhabited by free citizens who would enjoy
restored land that had been stolen by white settler colonisers. The reality
is that the land remained in the hands of minority white citizens, and at
the end of two years’ independence (in 1983), Zimbabwe plunged into
Operation Gukurahundi, which left over 20,000 mostly Ndebele-speaking
people dead as a ‘party-state’ and ‘party-nation’ was constructed (Kriger
2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a).
During the second transition, white dominance in the economy was
dismantled. This entailed affirmative action, indigenisation and deraciali-
sation of the economy, which took place in an environment of constraint
that was based on an unwritten policy of reconciliation and the regulatory
framework of the Lancaster House Constitution. For an agreed period of
ten years (1980–1990), the Zimbabwean government could not amend
the constitution. The third transition involved economic liberalisation.
This began in 1990 in accordance with the demands and conditions of the
notorious Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Mlambo 1997). This neo-liberal
transition not only destroyed the progress that had been made in the social
spheres of education and health, but also provoked protests from workers
and students who were hard hit by a combination of retrenchment, with-
drawal of subsidies on basic commodities and privatisation.
The fourth transition was the agrarian transformation that took place
under the banner of the Third Chimurenga and the radical Fast-Track Land
Reform Programme, which was meant to deliver land to Zimbabwe’s land-
less black people. The consequence of this was the collapse of the national
economy, partly because the implementation of land reform was chaotic
and partly because it led to Zimbabwe being ostracised by the interna-
tional community (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Alexander 2006; Sadomba
2011). The fifth transition was democratisation, which was fought for
under the leadership of the labour movement (the Zimbabwe Congress of
Trade Unions), the National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC) with the overarching themes of democ-
racy, constitutionalism and human rights. The culmination of its partial
success was the Inclusive Government of 2009–2013. The challenges of
this period were highlighted in The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics
of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement by Brian Raftopolous (2013).
Michael Aeby (2015) depicted this period, in which a ‘power-sharing’
1 INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 3
government was in charge, as ‘Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition’. This was

not only because of the politically complex situation that was carried over
into it, but also because of the attempts being made behind the scenes
by the ruling party to outmanoeuvre the opposition. Violence decreased
and the economy stabilised slightly, but power did not shift from the
Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). If any-
thing, ZANU–PF used the five years of the government of national unity
to recover and consolidate its power, and in the 2013 elections the party
emerged stronger and in charge of government once more.
The sixth and the latest transition, at the time of writing (2020), was
the so-called ‘military-assisted transition’ of November 2017, which led to
the fall from power of the long-serving president Robert Gabriel Mugabe,
paving the way for the rise to power of Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa
(International Crisis Group 2017; Moore 2018; Rutherford 2018).
Mugabe died in Singapore on 6 August 2019; he was buried at his rural
home in Zvimba district of Mashonaland West province. This book is an
attempt to comprehend the difficulties that surround successful political
transition in Zimbabwe, with the primary focus on understanding political
cultures and the role of the military in civilian politics, as well as how the
Mnangagwa regime remains entangled in so-called Mugabeism. This is a
term used to describe a nationalist matrix of power that is underpinned by
party-state and party-nation constructions, and is held hostage by those
who claim to have liberated the country from colonialism (see Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009b, 2012b, 2015).
It is clear that the political, economic and social quagmire in Zimbabwe
since political independence was attained, which deepened in the 2000s
with the long presidential incumbency of Mugabe and the ‘repetition
without change’ represented by the ascendance to power by Mnangagwa
on the back of a military coup, require proper framing and historical con-
textualisation. The situation is caused by a complex political culture, which
has arisen through the entanglement of many different strands: the physi-
cal conquest of settler colonialism, the Cold War’s ideological inflexibili-
ties, African nationalist patriarchal models of liberation (Campbell 2003),
regimental/warrior traditions that lead to the prosecution of a liberation
war, and the postcolonial legacy of personality cults and their geronto-
cratic tendencies, excluding women and young people, and indeed all
those who are deemed to have not participated in the liberation struggles,
from the corridors of power and ownership of strategic resources (see
Hammar et al. 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a; Tendi 2010).
The concept of entanglement, as articulated by Sarah Nuttall (2009:

11), ‘is a means by which to draw into our analysis those sites in which
what was thought of as separate—identities, spaces, histories—come
together or find points of intersection in unexpected ways’ and ‘It is an
idea which signals largely unexplored terrains of mutuality, wrought from
common, though often coercive and confrontational, experience.’ For
Zimbabwe, Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopolous (2003: 17) high-
lighted the entanglement of historicised and racialised assertions of land
reclamation not only with technocratic and ahistorical liberal notions of
private property protection, but also with developmentalism and notions
of good governance on the one hand and emergent forms of indigenous
nationalism underpinned by national sovereignty on the other.
With specific reference to current politics in Zimbabwe, one can posit a
Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement at a basic level. The Mnangagwa
regime is a direct child of Mugabeism; indeed, Mugabeism is its recurrent
theme. What emerged as the ‘Second Republic’ is deeply interpellated by
the immanent logics (even the poverty of logics) of Mugabeism (for details
of Mugabeism see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b, 2012a, 2015). Mnangagwa is
Mugabe’s political protégé. This Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement is
clearly manifested in the contradictory political discourses of Operation
Restore Legacy, which was used to legitimise the military coup of
November 2017, and the mantra of ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’,
which purported to be setting out a new politics that was predicated on
neo-liberalism and market-determined economic logic. The elephant in
the room of Zimbabwe’s transitional politics is the nationalist matrix of
power (otherwise known as Mugabeism) that is partly built on the colo-
nial legacy of violence and authoritarianism and was partly invented by
nationalists to safeguard postcolonial power. At least ten interrelated and
overlapping coordinates for ZANU–PF’s nationalist matrix of power are
discernible:
• The invention of a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party-nation’ (see Kriger 2003);

• Pedagogical ‘Chimurenga’ nationalism backed up by a constructed
‘patriotic history’(Ranger 2004);
• Reduction of elections to a mere ritual to validate legitimised power;
• Assumed warrior tradition cascading from anti-colonial liberation
wars and the privileging of the gun as the guardian of attained power;
• Executive lawlessness known as ‘kutonga’ (to rule, not to govern);
• Neo-traditional patriarchal political culture of gerontocratic rule;
• Naturalised and routinised rule by violence and coercion;

• Practices of sorcery, witchcraft and poisoning of enemies and
competitors;
• The fetishising of academic qualifications to reinforce the right to
political office;
• Securocracy, plutocracy and predatory state politics based on primi-
tive accumulation (see Shumba 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019).
This is the political terrain within which the Mnangagwa regime has
emerged and finds itself. How do we make broader sense of it? Where
does the potential for people’s freedom lie? In considering these ques-
tions, we have to reflect deeply on the legacy of the liberation struggles
and their implications for freedom. The sociologist Roger Southall, in
Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa (2013),
posited that the liberation movements of southern Africa moved into gov-
ernment by embodying the hopes of those who supported them both
domestically and internationally, but their performance in governmental
terms was deeply disappointing. Michael Neocosmos’s Thinking Freedom
in Africa: Towards a Theory of Emancipatory Politics (2016) provides the
most extended critique of national liberation politics. The liberation
movements were clear on what they were against (anti-racism, anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism) and very unclear on what they were for.
Neocosmos (2016) was very critical of the idea of attainment of freedom
under the aegis of the state. This is why he concluded that the politics of
the liberation movements ‘was based on a contradiction that it found
impossible to overcome: the struggle for freedom was a struggle not only
against the colonial state, but to a certain extent against the state itself, like
all struggles for freedom; yet at the same time freedom was said to be
attainable only under the aegis of an independent state, as it had been
frustrated by colonial domination’ (Neocosmos 2016: 130).
Even such luminaries of the liberation movements as Joshua Nkomo,
who led the Zimbabwe African People’s Union and commanded the
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, expressed disappointment with
the performance of liberation movements in government. ‘Freedom Lies
Ahead’ is the title of the concluding chapter of Nkomo’s autobiography,
Nkomo: The Story of My Life (1984). In this chapter, Nkomo, who after
death was declared by ZANU-PF as the ‘Father of Zimbabwe’, reflected
deeply on liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe while taking advantage of
a life in exile in the United Kingdom. He posited that ‘The hardest lesson
of my life has come to me late. It is that a nation can win freedom without
its people becoming free’ (Nkomo 1984: 245). Most, if not all, former
colonies gained ‘political independence’ one after another as the ‘physical
empire’, with its direct colonial administration (direct juridical administra-
tion), was universally condemned after the end of the Second World War
in 1945. The key signatures of this political independence became a new
national anthem, a new flag, the faces of black/African leaders in parlia-
ment, the faces of black/African prime ministers or presidents at state
house, the changing of countries’ names (with the exception of South
Africa) to the vernacular and admission of the newly ‘sovereign’ states into
the lowest echelons of the United Nations (Meredith 1984; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2012b).
Yes, the elites in charge of the state gained the freedom to accumulate
resources ahead of everyone else, through a process known as bureaucratic
state parasitism. Yes, Nkomo was correct: freedom of the state did not
automatically translate into freedom for the people. What eventually hap-
pened in Zimbabwe under Mugabe is well articulated by Issa G. Shivji
(2003: 15): ‘National question turns into state-building. Nation-building
is substituted by party and party by leader, the founder of the nation.’
Mugabe and his wife (Grace Mugabe), as the first family, ended up being
the centre of national politics. This is a bane of, if not the underside of, the
decolonisation of the twentieth century.
Neo-colonialism exacerbated the lack of freedom for both the state and
the people in Africa, and on another level, it gave some African leaders an
excuse to blame external factors for their failure to deliver freedom. This
was articulated by Kwame Nkrumah in Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of
Imperialism (1965):
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it, in

theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sov-
ereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed
from outside. […]. Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism.
For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for
those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. (Nkrumah
1965: ix–xi)
Blaming and railing against imperialism became a key trope of

Mugabeism. Nkomo also reflected on the problem of neo-colonialism as
he meditated on questions of liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe. But

his take was different from Mugabe’s:
I refuse to accept that we cannot do better than we have so far done, or to

reach for the easy excuse that all our mistakes are simply a colonial inheri-
tance that can conveniently be blamed on the invaders. Of course our his-
tory has made us what we are, and the recent period of that history was
distorted first by the influence of remote empires, then for ninety years by
direct colonial rule. It is up to us to do better now. (Nkomo 1984: 245)
Like the Mugabe regime, the Mnangagwa regime is using the discourse
of sanctions to justify all its limitations. Indeed, sanctions must be removed
because they always hurt the poor and they also give failing regimes a con-
venient excuse to blame external factors. It would seem Nkomo again had
a different take: he strongly believed that African leaders were duty bound
to deliver freedom to the people even within the constraining environ-
ment of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Nkomo rejected easy
excuses for the non-delivery of freedom and services to the people. He
suggested that ‘African leaders must improve their record of human rights,
and African peoples too must have greater regard to their responsibilities’
(Nkomo 1984: 247). Nkomo (1984: 252) concluded his autobiography
with a positive note: ‘It is not too late to change all that, to muster the
collective energy of our people and build the new Zimbabwe we promised
through all those long years of suffering and struggle.’
Perhaps Nkomo was able to reflect on liberation and freedom in
Zimbabwe in these terms because he was not in power! But his medita-
tions indicated the strong potential for reconstituting the political and
transcending the scourge of Mugabeism. Mugabeism itself failed to rise
above intolerant and repressive political cultures of Rhodesian settler colo-
nialism. Instead of breaking with colonial settler traditions of brutality and
repressive political practices, Mugabeism innovated and ‘improved’ on the
Rhodesian settler colonial Leviathan, adding the logic of governance by
military operations, with devastating implications for democracy, human
rights and people’s freedoms (see Rupiya 2005). To racism and patriarchy,
Mugabe added tribalism. What emerged was a complex ‘securocratic state’
with a party, military and parasitic business complex at its helm (a
Chimurenga aristocracy in power) (see Shumba 2018). The ‘right of con-
quest’ that was used by Rhodesian settler colonialists was succeeded by
Mugabeism’s mantra of ‘I died for you’ (by ‘right of liberating you’),

which became the main basis of his claim for leadership of Zimbabwe.
Mugabeism’s political longevity was predicated on the strong national-
ist–military alliance that was forged during the anti-colonial armed libera-
tion struggle (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). In fact, Mugabe was installed
at the helm of ZANU–PF by the military during the course of the libera-
tion struggle (Sadomba 2011). However, as noted by Norma Kriger
(2003), the nationalist–military alliance was always unstable and tension-
ridden, with those in uniform and those who were demobilised (the war
veterans) making continuous demands on the civilians in power.
Throughout the postcolonial period, the guerrilla veterans and ZANU–
PF colluded with and manipulated each other to build power and privilege
in the army, police and bureaucracy, and among workers (Kriger 2003).
Liberation war discourse united the civilian leadership and the guerrilla
veterans, although ‘war credentials’ became a site of contestation—being
bestowed and taken away depending on one’s fall from political grace with
ZANU–PF. The paradigmatic case was that of Joice Mujuru, who rose to
the level of vice-president of the country on the basis of strong liberation
credentials and being a woman. In 2014, Joice Mujuru was politically
disparaged and removed from power and the party in a whirlwind of polit-
ical events, with Grace Mugabe accusing her of plotting to unseat Robert
Mugabe. Joice Mujuru’s liberation credentials were questioned and rub-
bished as she was thrown into political oblivion. This sheds light on the
political context of the military coup that culminated in the fall of Mugabe
and the rise of Mnangagwa to power in 2017.
By the time of the military coup, Mnangagwa had been enduring verbal
assaults from Grace Mugabe for some time. He had survived poisoning;
he had been expelled from the government; his long political career was
hanging by a thread. By the time the coup took place, Mnangagwa was in
exile in South Africa. From there, he gave Mugabe a warning, indicating
that something was being organised:
I will go nowhere. I will fight tooth and nail against those making mockery
against ZANU-PF founding principles. You and your cohorts will instead
leave ZANU-PF by the will of the people and this we will do in the coming
weeks. (Mnangagwa 2017)
The November 2017 Military Coup and the Rise

of Mnangagwa to Power
In an ironic political twist, the veteran leader of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe,

who had been in power since 1980, was removed from office by his own
military. For over thirty-seven years, Mugabe had ruled Zimbabwe in alliance
with the military, but he finally became the victim of what he had created.
The coup was distinctive because of the political discourse of its organisers
and practitioners, who were at pains to make the military takeover constitu-
tional. For example, on 13 November 2017, when the Commander of the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Constantine Chiwenga, called for a press state-
ment surrounded by ninety senior military and security officers, following
the expulsion of Mnangagwa from government and party, the Zimbabwean
constitution was quoted widely. Section 212 in particular was used to explain
the intervention of the military in civilian politics. Secondly, and ironically,
those who were staging the military coup continued to express their loyalty
to Mugabe. Thirdly, participants harked back to the anti-colonial liberation
history, and defined military intervention in politics as part of a patriotic duty
to protect this history’s legacy (Chiwenga 2017; Raftopolous 2019).
While the broader context of the military intervention was the liberation
struggle and postcolonial history, the immediate terrain was factionalism
and ructions within ZANU–PF, pitting the Lacoste faction against the G40
faction.1 Mnangagwa’s liberation war credentials were useful in attracting
the army and war veterans to his camp. The G40 became ‘criminals around
the president’, who were blamed for the deteriorating security situation as
well as the social and economic meltdown by those who had staged the
military coup. In announcing the military coup, Major General Sibusiso
Moyo carefully crafted his language to speak of calming a degenerating
political, social and economic situation, as well as propping up the authority
of the president and buttressing his constitutional roles (Raftopolous 2019).
1
The Lacoste faction supported Emerson Mnangagwa. It wanted Mugabe to be succeeded
by Mnangagwa who was one of the two deputy presidents of Zimbabwe. It was not clear who
the G40 supported as successor to Mugabe. It was composed of what could be termed the
‘Young Turks’ within ZANU-PF. These were a younger generation of politicians without
liberation credentials. But they had managed to form a close circle around Mugabe and
Grace Mugabe. Its most vociferous member was Professor Jonathan Moyo who was opposed
to Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe. Grace Mugabe openly sided with the G40. Immediately
before the military coup of November 2017, Professor Moyo openly put forward the name
of Sydney Sekeramayi as the senior ZANU-PF politician to succeed Mugabe. But Sekeramayi
never rose to the occasion.
Brian Raftopolous (2019) summarised the three-pronged strategy that

aimed to finish off what the military coup had set in motion, removing
Mugabe and putting Mnangagwa in power. The first element entailed
avoiding any reference to a military coup, maintaining that Mugabe
remained the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and seeking the
High Court to constitutionalise the takeover. The second involved mobili-
sation of the civilian population by war veterans to give the takeover popu-
lar support. The third was to give a constitutional veneer to the military
intervention through the use of ZANU–PF party processes and proce-
dures. This entailed convening a ZANU–PF Central Committee meeting
on 13 November 2017, at which the military were thanked for bringing
stability to the party and to government. As noted by Raftopolous (2019:
7), the Central Committee took several decisions, including the formal
expulsion of twenty members of the G40 faction from the party, removing
Mugabe from the position of president and first secretary of the party and
recommending his resignation as state president, relieving Grace Mugabe
of her post of secretary for the Women’s League, removing Phelekezela
Mphoko from his position of vice-president, bringing back into the party
all those who had been pushed out by the G40 and, finally, electing
Mnangagwa as new interim president of ZANU–PF and nominating him
as candidate to fill the vacancy of state president.
At parliamentary level, the ZANU–PF Parliamentary Caucus began to
move the process of impeachment of Mugabe on 20 November 2017, and
the process was put in motion in parliament the next day. Mugabe was left
with no option but to write a letter of resignation on 21 November. This
paved the way for the inauguration of Mnangagwa as new state president
on 24 November.
The Mnangagwa Regime: Second Republic or

Repetition Without Change?
For a Zimbabwean people who had endured Mugabeism for over thirty-
seven years, the military coup and the ascendance to power of Mnangagwa
brought hope that life would be different; and inevitably, Mnangagwa
tried to position his regime as a force for change. In his first presidential
address, Mnangagwa made a number of pledges. The first was that he
would put Zimbabwe on a path to economic recovery by promoting a
market economy that was predicated on attracting foreign investment and
ensuring its safety. Indeed, changes were made to the indigenisation legis-
lation. The second was to compensate white farmers who had lost land
under the radical land reform programme. The third was to return
Zimbabwe to the ambit of international community (re-engagement).
The fourth was to be a president of all Zimbabweans (nation-building and
national healing). The fifth was to deal decisively with corruption (see
Raftopolous 2019).
The main hurdle for Mnangagwa was to gain full legitimacy as the state
president of Zimbabwe. This meant he had to call for national elections.
His advantage was that the opposition was in disarray, rocked by factional-
ism following the death of Morgan Tsvangirai on 14 February 2018. The
key disadvantage was that ZANU–PF was also in disarray. But Mnangagwa
had no option but to organise elections if he was to ‘move beyond the
shadow of the coup and seek a new legitimacy through an election that was
perceived to be peaceful and credible’ (Raftopolous 2019: 18). The elec-
tions were held in July 2018, with Mnangagwa facing the youthful Nelson
Chamisa of the MDC Alliance in the presidential contest. Mnangagwa
emerged the winner with 50.6 per cent, while Chamisa had 44.3 per cent.
While the campaign period was very peaceful, on 1 August 2018, the mili-
tary shot and killed six protesters in Harare who were protesting over the
delayed announcement of presidential results. Secondly, Chamisa and his
party disputed the results of the presidential elections and built a case that
was heard at the Constitutional Court. The court upheld Mnangagwa as
the winner, but Chamisa’s challenge raised the long-standing question of
political legitimacy that has been haunting Zimbabwe since 2000.
But what really dented the image of the Mnangagwa regime, which was
desperate for international engagement, was the killing of civilians by the
army in Harare. This meant that the ‘second republic’ was born with what
could be termed a very bad birthmark. What made matters even more
complicated was that it was not clear who deployed and ordered the mili-
tary to intervene in civilian political protest. Was the ‘second republic’ a
military junta, where political disputes would always be resolved through
violent military intervention? Mnangagwa was forced to institute a
Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances of 1 August in order to deal
with the regime’s image, but like all government instituted commissions
its outcomes were disappointing, and its value was not clear. It was purely
and simply a public relations exercise.
As the Mugabe regime was, Mnangagwa’s regime is besieged by numer-
ous challenges. The pledge to put Zimbabwe on an economic recovery
and growth path predicated on a neo-liberal framework has provoked
social turmoil, which manifested itself in a second round of public protest
in 2019. Once again, the army had to intervene with its usual violence
following an increase in the price of petrol. The health sector is character-

ised by strikes. The regime’s monetary policy and overall macroeconomic
turnaround strategy, predicated on notions of ‘austerity for prosperity’,
appear to be the previous regime’s structural adjustment programme, and
its problems, in another guise. The second challenge is the long-standing
one of national healing and national unity. The consequences of Operation
Gukurahundi are haunting the Mnangagwa regime, and the National
Peace and Reconciliation Commission has not resolved anything, while
Mnangagwa dithered when given an opportunity to apologise for the
Gukurahundi atrocities. He seems to be fast losing the opportunities that
were offered him by popular antipathy towards Mugabe.
The third serious challenge cascades from the regime’s failure to suc-
cessfully return Zimbabwe to the ambit of the international community.
Violence and intolerance of political dissent has escalated since Mnangagwa
came to power, and democratic reforms are nowhere to be seen. The fourth
challenge is the continuing tensions within ZANU–PF, emanating from
the factional conflicts that rocked the Mugabe regime. What is particularly
dangerous is that since the removal of Mugabe the security sector has not
been free of tensions and the ripple effects of factionalism (see Raftopolous
2019). It would seem that Mnangagwa is busy consolidating his personal
power and has not committed himself to any reform agenda, including
what he promised in his first presidential national address. Zimbabwe is not
yet beyond Mugabeism; indeed, Mnangagwa seems to be a poor copy of
Mugabe. By bringing the military directly into civilian political structures,
Mnangagwa has not demilitarised the state; instead he has deepened mili-
tarisation. The military is now officially part of political culture. This book
grapples with the question of political culture(s), the so-called national
question, the consequences of a militarised politics, patriarchal and sexist
tendencies, gridlocked and blocked democratic transitions, challenges of
economic recovery and growth, and many other problems, all of which
rocked Mugabeism and are being repeated under the Mnangagwa regime.
Organisation of the Book
The chapters in this book are grouped in four sections: Part 1, Colonialism,
Nationalism and Political Culture; Part 2, Identity, Militarisation and
Transitional Politics; Part 3, Social Media, Democracy and Political
Discourse,’ and Part 4, Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation
Restore Legacy. Together they constitute a transdisciplinary academic
study of the gridlocked and problematic transition from Mugabe to
Mnangagwa, which has turned out to be nothing but repetition without
change. Chapter 2 is by Rudo B. Gaidzanwa—a leading Zimbabwean

sociologist and feminist. She explores the complex issue of political cul-
tures in Zimbabwe and explains their entanglement with colonialism,
nationalism, patriarchy and sexism. At the centre of the chapter are issues
of hegemony and resistance as well as discontinuities and continuities.
Chapter 3 is by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni. It explores the perennial
and complicated ‘national question’ and how it sits at the centre of com-
plex political cultures. Embodied by the national question are a key set of
issues that Zimbabwean citizens have to prioritise in their current strug-
gles for transition, inclusivity, equality, prosperity, democracy and develop-
ment; the connections, disconnections, gaps and opportunities among
these in terms of citizen priorities and contemporary civil society advocacy
for democracy and development; the constitutive parts of some ‘big ideas’
that would help civil society and citizens to coalesce towards a common
agenda for democracy and development; and finally, the practical interven-
tion mechanisms and strategies needed in order to develop a national con-
sensus/common vision/agenda among Zimbabweans that is built around
identified citizen demands, priorities, ideals and aspirations, including
those being articulated in the ongoing citizen protest movements.
Chapter 4 is by Zenzo Moyo. It studies the key question of political
cultures, and posits that if democracy is indeed about opening closed
political systems, then opposition politics becomes the avenue by which
participation, inclusivity and accountability can be realised. Together with
other aspects of civil society, opposition parties are responsible for creating
and developing public opinion, which in turn feeds into the political cul-
ture of a society. In developing states, especially those whose organic
development has been disrupted by both colonialism and anti-colonialism
struggles, the exercise of opposition politics faces an extra burden—that is,
justifying its connection with the often exclusive politics of liberation. The
chapter delineates political cultures that have fashioned the repertoire of
opposition politics since independence was attained in Zimbabwe, and
demonstrates how these cultures, together with the construction of a
party-state, have combined and broadened, in the process perpetuating
themselves.
Part 1 is completed by Stanley Tsarwe, who takes the question of politi-
cal cultures into the domain of media and society. Chapter 5 broadly
examines how Zimbabwean political practices over many years have shaped
the country’s current democratic institutions, values and practices, with a
particular focus on relationships between the state, civil society and the
media. Deploying the notion of political culture, the chapter examines the
state of civil society and its role in Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy. It
views the media as part of civil society, sketching its development and cur-
rent state as a stakeholder in democratic transition. At the centre of the
discussion are the practices and political values that have arguably contrib-
uted to a narrowing democratic culture over the years. It boldly argues
that this can be located in the centralist tendencies of the state, the limited
involvement of diverse civil society groups, a restrictive media environ-
ment and the conflation between state and party politics.
Part 2 opens with Bekezela Gumbo’s interrogation of the role of iden-
tity politics in Zimbabwe’s transitional politics. Chapter 6 offers a concep-
tual construction of the three group identifiers upon which identity politics
has manifested as a dominant political culture, positing that the past and
future of transition lie in its nature and extent and how it is harnessed and
utilised in the transition process. Gumbo maps out three basic clusters that
seem to vary as national transition questions bedevil the nation from time
to time. These three overriding ‘group-coalescing’ and/or ‘group identi-
fier’ strands are racist nationalism, the politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony
and the politics of liberation entitlement. It is Gumbo’s thesis that these
three group identifiers have nurtured and prolonged the existing political
culture in Zimbabwe, which has in turn shaped political transition in the
country.
Chapter 7 is by Samukele Hadebe, who posits that the ethnicisation of
politics in Zimbabwe has reached levels that both academics and policy-
makers continue to ignore—at great peril to the stability and even territo-
rial integrity of the country. Hadebe gives a historical context of ethnic
rivalry and conflict in Zimbabwe, with a particular emphasis on the ethni-
cisation of liberation movement narratives in the first instance, and also
delves deeply into perception of the pro-Mthwakazi movements. The
author is of the view that it is useful to try and understand how these
groups perceive issues, as their perceptions have a material basis. Like
Gumbo, Hadebe is concerned with exploring political mobilisation on
ethnic and regional grounds, and the possible implications for Ndebele-
speaking communities in particular and Zimbabwean politics in general.
Part 2 closes with Pedzisai Ruhanya’s examination of the challenges
brought about by the militarisation of state institutions. Militarism has
become a political culture in Zimbabwe in the same way as politicised
ethnicity. Chapter 8 posits that the overthrow of President Robert Mugabe
cannot be explained adequately by the combined military intervention
and public protests in November 2017. The story is more complex than
this, and requires careful analysis of the distinct and organised militarisa-
tion of key state institutions from 2002 to 2017 that facilitated Mugabe’s
fall. Ruhanya deploys the competitive authoritarian analytic lens to under-
stand events, while at the same time critiquing it for not enabling him to
fully address the distinct role of the military and its liberation connection
to the ruling elites. Ironically, the politicisation of the military that served
Mugabe well from 1980 until November 2017 was the same infrastruc-
ture that devoured him. He unwittingly constructed a de facto military
state led by a de jure civilian authority under his authoritarian tutelage.
The chapter shows that when military interests were threatened by Mugabe
and his wife, the security apparatus played its hand to block the rise of
dynastic and familial politics. Four zones in which power was contested
were calculatedly infiltrated by the military, thereby capturing both party
and state over the long term. The roles of the media, judiciary, electors
and legislature are examined.
Part 3 opens with Philip Pasirayi’s analysis of the intersections of media
and politics during the ‘Third Chimurenga’ in Zimbabwe. This issue was
introduced in Part I by Stanley Tsarwe—who explored the entanglement
of media, society and political culture. Chapter 9 specifically explores the
hidden strategies of media control that were deployed by ZANU–PF dur-
ing the violent seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe from 2000.
The media was central in the ruling party’s efforts to justify this controver-
sial exercise. In the state media, this land redistribution was justified as the
‘Third Chimurenga’, meaning the third and final phase of the war against
colonial rule in which land was a central grievance. The chapter explores
how Professor Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for
Information and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the
state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs, and the creation and
dissemination of content via routine briefings, which resulted in a commit-
ted, self-policing journalistic team and a pliant state press. At the centre of
the chapter are the media briefings that were held by Moyo with journal-
ists and editors from the state press, which were a kind of political re-
education that explained what constituted the ‘national interest’ and how
this was supposed to be framed in the state media. Moyo established a
hard-working and hands-on style of management, and considered history
and culture to be an important part of the media. The chapter gives an
insight into the inner workings of the ZANU–PF media machine, showing
how it was carefully designed both institutionally and ideologically to
achieve set objectives from the perspective of hybrid regimes, and the
means and mechanisms of media control in these contexts.
Chapter 10 by Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele looks at social
media and the concept of dissidence in Zimbabwean politics. Their depar-
ture point is that most media studies in Zimbabwe since 2000 have tended
to focus on questions about politics and the economy, with much empha-
sis on how the media, both private and public, mediated state–opposition–
civil society relations. The focus has seen a dramatic shift following the
Arab Spring uprisings, from 2010 onwards, which saw social media being
credited for the toppling of most of the North African strongmen. Mpofu
and Matsilele posit that these reports failed to appreciate the human and
social relations constituted by the social media. Their argument pivots on
the relations between online and offline worlds, and the chapter demon-
strates how relations since 2000 have been mischaracterised because of a
failure to appreciate the anthropological view of state–opposition–civil
society relations. The authors note that social media comments were not
protests, juvenile insults as some scholars have argued, but rather dissi-
dence. This dissidence, they argue, has a history and is part of Zimbabwean
cultural expression that has simply morphed into social media as forms of
mediation and dariro (playground) have changed over time. Social media,
the authors say, is the same as other cultural gatherings where dissidence
has been allowed in Zimbabwean society. While focusing on the period
post-2013, they draw strong connections with earlier periods to demon-
strate the long-running thread of dissidence.
Part 3 closes with Wellington Gadzikwa’s exploration of the ‘tabloidisa-
tion’ of political news in Zimbabwe and the question of press quality.
Chapter 10 posits that the media is indispensable to the functioning of a
democracy as it is the pre-eminent vehicle for public debates in the mod-
ern public sphere(s). The conduct of the press and the ethical virtues it
projects are directly linked to its ability to enhance democracy. In
Zimbabwe, after more than two decades of political turmoil and unprec-
edented economic decline, journalistic standards have plummeted for vari-
ous reasons. The author argues that this decline in standards has taken
place owing to a process of tabloidisation of the mainstream broadsheet
newspapers. This tabloidised media negates the natural function of the
media in terms of democracy through diversion, trivialisation and sensa-
tionalisation of important issues. The core argument of this chapter is
predicated on a qualitative content analysis of and in-depth interviews
about the media coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from
ZANU–PF. Three national dailies with different owners, The Herald,

Daily News and Newsday, are studied, from October 2014 to January
2017. The chapter reveals the stark reality that news outlets have been
contaminated, and are now championing a tabloid news agenda that is
inimical to rational political debate and needs a serious rethink if it is going
to be restored to its previous function.
Part 4 opens with a chapter by Toendepi Shonhe that uses documen-
tary and historical data analysis to reveal how primitive accumulation con-
figures economic development under neo-liberalism and proposes an
inclusive transformative social policy to attain development from below.
Chapter 12 demonstrates empirically how the disarticulated pattern of
accumulation configures periphery economies, such as Zimbabwe, subsi-
dising capital by exporting wealth. This aids the further development of
the centre at the expense of the periphery. Shonhe posits that the
‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ economic development path exposes the
structurally disarticulated economy to intensified removal of its productive
capacity by global monopoly capital, through financialised capital accumu-
lation. Inviting speculative monopoly capitalism, unaccompanied by a
conscious attempt to reverse uneven development in the periphery, deep-
ens extroverted economic development, Shonhe argues. The new ruling
class imposed by the military coup is inclined towards promoting global
capital interests, which perpetuate imperialism and dependency. In alliance
with monopoly finance capital, the ruling class extracts considerable prof-
its by intensifying the extraction of natural mineral and agricultural
resources, adding surplus value, royalties and rents, and interest on loans
that undermine sovereign accumulation. By opening Zimbabwe for busi-
ness, under the disguise of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), but
without a deliberate plan to reverse uneven development, the ruling capi-
talists have become an extension of global capital, if not captured agents
of the latest form of imperialism. Opening Zimbabwe for business there-
fore allows the transference of surplus value through international trade,
unequal exchange in trade and unequal rewards.
Chapter 13, by Tinashe C. Chigwata and Sylvester Marumahoko, reit-
erates the point that Zimbabwe has gone through serious political, eco-
nomic and social challenges for over two decades. Once known as the
shining light of Africa, the country has dominated international headlines
for the wrong reasons. In November 2017, Zimbabwe experienced a radi-
cal change to the constitutional and political order, bringing to an end the
Mugabe era. Chigwata and Marumahoko benchmark Mnangagwa’s
regime on his promises to reform the political, economic and social fabric
of the country, including government, which is characterised by corrup-
tion, among other forms of abuse of public power. At an international
level, President Mnangagwa has initiated efforts to end Zimbabwe’s isola-
tion from the international family of nations. For Chigwata and
Marumahoko, the key question is whether the idea of a new Zimbabwe is
possible. If so, under what conditions can Zimbabwe be reborn again?
Their chapter posits that the fall of Mugabe is only the first step towards
building a new Zimbabwe, and argues that the overriding task is to dis-
mantle the Mugabe system of governance that epitomises not only the
public sector but also non-state sectors. With the right kind of leadership,
Zimbabwe has the potential to set the development and democratic pace
on the African continent.
Chapter 14 is by Lyton Ncube. It focuses on how Zimbabwe’s
Operation Restore Legacy reflected misogyny, sexism and hyper-
masculinity. Ncube posits that Zimbabwean political culture is punctuated
by (hetero)gendered traditions and tendencies, and as such pivots on the
construction of hegemonic masculinity. This reproduces and reinforces
male-gendered domination, gender exclusion, sexism and misogyny.
Theoretically, the chapter is guided by Raewyn Connell’s hegemonic mas-
culinity concept. Hegemonic masculinity refers to ‘the configuration of
gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guar-
antee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’
(Connell 2005: 77). The chapter therefore explores gendered and sexist
discourses that manifested and played out both in the streets and digital
spaces during Operation Restore Legacy. Empirically, it reflects on the
political fates of female political figures such as Joice Mujuru and
Grace Mugabe.
Chapter 15 by Mkhululi Sibindi draws the book to a conclusion. It
deals with the Mnangagwa regime’s drive to bring Zimbabwe back to the
ambit of the international community. This re-engagement question is
examined from the specific vantage point of the endeavours made to
attract FDI in the post-Mugabe era. Sibindi argues that given the nature
of Zimbabwe’s economic and political scenarios there is no doubt that the
political competence of the new Zimbabwe government will be measured
on how a failed economy can be returned to productivity. In this context,
the new government has made an effort to reach international communi-
ties in search of FDI. What Sibindi examines is the compatibility of
Zimbabwean economy as an FDI host market. Central to his discussion is

the realisation of what FDI is and motives of multinational enterprises
(MNEs), which are agents of FDI. In view of MNEs’ motives, the discus-
sion illuminates the path dependency of investment motives from FDI and
aspects in host markets that influence the decision to invest in a specific
host market, together with the role of government in the internationalisa-
tion process.
Going Forward
A regime born of a military coup, even if it attempts to ‘civilianise’ itself
through appointing an unelected civilian figure as president and organis-
ing elections (post facto) to cover its illegitimate footprints, remains a
progeny of violence. The civilianisation process has seen key military fig-
ures, including the Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, chang-
ing military fatigues for civilian designer suits to assume political and
government positions. The implication of all this is the direct and open
invasion of the political by the military. Thus, despite the elections of
2018, Zimbabwean politics has remained volatile and characterised by
intrigues, plots and counter-plots within the ruling party. The political
culture has become even more complex and violent.
A number of writers in this volume therefore wrestle with the funda-
mental question of the political culture of Zimbabwe and its sub-questions
of identity, militarism, patriarchy, masculinity, sexism and disdain for
democracy and human rights. These were the hallmarks of Mugabeism.
What is emerging clearly is that the Mnangagwa regime is a product of this
political culture, and because of this genealogical affinity it is very difficult
for the so-called Second Republic to make a clear break with Mugabeism.
The very act by Mnangagwa of moving the old politicians who were
Mugabe’s lieutenants for over thirty-seven years into the headquarters of
ZANU–PF to continue with the administrative aspects of the party, and to
plot its future political strategy, indicates beyond reasonable doubt that
genuine democratic reforms are not on the horizon for the
Mnangagwa regime.
Worse still, it is under the Mnangagwa regime that the military has
formally and overtly asserted its authority in the party and government.
On an economic level, the regime’s acceptance of a crude neo-liberal
framework reminiscent of the notorious Structural Adjustment
Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s reveals desperation, and surrender to
the mantra of market forces as the silver bullet for economic recovery and
economic growth. On a political level, the way the Mnangagwa govern-
ment has handled political and social protest has amounted to scoring an
own goal. Using the military to deal with civil disputes at a time when the
country’s citizens and the wider world have questions about the nature of
the Mnangagwa regime—particularly whether it is a military junta mas-
querading as a civilian government—is a sign of folly, if not a failure to
cover up the influence of the military on governance issues. Having come
to power at a time when previous ways of thinking about progressive gov-
ernance (ranging from Marxism and Third World nationalism to neo-
liberal visions) have become obsolete, the Mnangagwa regime is bound to
fall into repetition on all fronts. It is indeed not clear whether we are see-
ing old wine in new goatskins or new goatskins containing old wine.
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PART I
Colonialism, Nationalism and Political

Culture
CHAPTER 2
The Political Culture of Zimbabwe:

Continuities and Discontinuities
Rudo Gaidzanwa
Introduction
Pye and Verba (1965) defined political culture as the totality of basic val-
ues, feelings and knowledge that underlie the political process in a specific
country or environment. The manner in which citizens interact with and
experience governance institutions shapes their participation in civic and
political affairs. Thus the beliefs, opinions, emotions and experiences of
citizens, residents and members of communities are shaped by the behav-
iours of governance institutions at all levels. When governance structures
are remote and inaccessible, citizens may become alienated from them,
resulting in disconnection between the governed and the governors. In
some instances, governance structures and personnel may be authoritar-
ian, coercive and intolerant of dissent, also resulting in the alienation of
citizens from their governments. Such governance systems generate dis-
sent, protest and opposition, resulting in their destabilization, as well as
that of the structures and societies concerned. Ideally, citizens desire the
freedom to engage with those who preside over their governance systems
R. Gaidzanwa (*)
Department of Sociology, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_2
26 R. GAIDZANWA
and structures, in order to influence policies, programmes, change and

decisions that are made on behalf of citizens. Ideally, societies with respon-
sive political and social systems and structures that accommodate citizens’
opinions and ideas will generate and promote a positive political culture.
Political culture in Zimbabwe has been influenced since 1893 by British
colonization. The British imposed their preferred governance models on
the colonized peoples who inhabited the territory that was named
Southern Rhodesia and subsequently Rhodesia. In the era preceding colo-
nialism, the political cultures of native peoples were varied. The Ndebele
people operated under a monarchical system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008),
while the Shona and related peoples had a less centralized system, which
comprised chiefs and headmen and headwomen as their political authori-
ties. The Shona chiefs were drawn from selected families and clans, and
they administered the law with the aid of elders who were selected for
their expertise in and knowledge and experience of Shona culture and its
laws and customs. Collectively, the chiefs, elders and representatives of
clans and families managed decisions agreed by their Dare, the group of
elders and advisors that counselled the chief. In this way, the culture of
political representation based on family and clan ensured that decisions
taken by the collective representative body were acceptable to a majority
of those who were subjected to their clan’s laws, rules, customs, structures
and institutions. This system attempted to avert tyranny by individual
chiefs and afforded the common people some control over their society
and the administration of justice.
Ndebele political culture was different from that of the Shona people
because the Ndebeles, who had originated from Zululand, had a monar-
chy presided over by a king who was at the pinnacle of the political system
(Cobbing 1983). The next tier of authority after the monarch comprised
privileged older males who were chiefs from various clans, who exerted
authority on a daily basis at village level. The authority of the chiefs was
hereditary, since holders of authority had to be born in the patrilineage of
chieftainship and could pass on their titles to their male progeny. The
Ndebele chiefs were members of a council, the Imbizo, which exercised
collective authority over matters affecting clans and families and advised
the king. Women, except those born into or related to royalty, captives and
other subordinate groups who were assimilated into the polity and society
occupied the bottom of the hierarchy, removed from the centres of power.
2 THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 27
Colonisation and Domestication of the Traditional

Authorities After Military Defeat: Ndebele
and Shona Groups’ Experiences
In 1888, Cecil John Rhodes and his colonists of the British South Africa
Company travelled to what is now Zimbabwe to search for minerals, land
and other resources. They deceived Lobengula, the illiterate Ndebele
king, into signing the Rudd Concession, which gave the colonists pros-
pecting rights to minerals such as gold. The economic activities of the
colonists inevitably generated conflicts with the local people, resulting in
armed confrontations. The colonists triumphed over the Ndebele and
Shona groups who, lacking equal or superior weaponry, were overpow-
ered and dispossessed of their land. The settlers set up a new polity and
established a political culture that constructed the natives as subjects of the
colonial order rather than citizens on a par with the white population.
Despite resistance by the locals in 1890, in which the Ndebele and Shona
collaborated against the settlers under the leadership of the spirit mediums
Nehanda and Kaguvi, who were executed after their capture, the Shona
and Ndebele peoples were finally conquered and subordinated to settler
authority.
Exclusion of Blacks After Sidelining

and Undermining the Shona, Ndebele
and Other Groups
The settler government imposed a political culture and system of govern-

ment that was undemocratic, and in the process subordinated both the
Shona and the Ndebele chiefs and their peoples. The Ndebele kingdom
was eradicated: its monarchy was disbanded and the king ‘disappeared’.
The settler regime passed legislation that allowed their appropriation of
the lands of the conquered Shona and Ndebele peoples. The settlers des-
ignated what they termed ‘tribal areas’ and ‘reserves’ that were to be occu-
pied by the colonized peoples, while the settlers took the fertile,
well-watered and desirable land throughout the territory that was renamed
Rhodesia, after their leader. The regime invited more settlers from out-
side, and thereafter, successive settler regimes passed legislation, including
the Land Apportionment Act (1930), the Native Land Husbandry Act
28 R. GAIDZANWA
(1951) and the Land Tenure Act (1969), all of which monopolized for the
white population the best agricultural land.
In the twentieth century, the native peoples continued to resist the set-
tlers, peacefully and sporadically at first and then by military means when
negotiations failed to resolve their problems. Peaceful resistance by the
natives was accomplished through organized political protest mainly under
the leadership of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), founded
in 1961, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), founded in
1963. However, peaceful native resistance to the white settler regimes
failed to bear any fruit until both ZANU and ZAPU resorted to armed
resistance through guerrilla warfare. ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, oper-
ated from Zambia while ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, operated from
Mozambique. The war for national liberation was fought largely in rural
Zimbabwe by guerrillas, with assistance from the peasantry and urban-
dwellers who provided cash, food and other necessities. The support of
frontline states, comprising Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique,
and other African states further afield was key in enabling these liberation
movements mount the war. With support from the peasantry and other
sections of the black populations, the spirit mediums and the majority of
traditional structures and authorities, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the war
for national liberation forced the settler regime into negotiations with the
nationalists in ZAPU and ZANU and their armed wings, the Zimbabwe
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), respectively. The war for national
liberation took a heavy toll on black and white populations and forced the
settler government to negotiate a settlement with African political leaders
in 1979, resulting in the attainment of independence in 1980.
Political Culture and Practices Under Colonialism:

Economic and Political Marginalization of Blacks
and Domestication of the Traditional Authorities
The colonial era and the dominant white political culture were informed
by a fear of communism, the need to prevent black economic, political and
social empowerment and the achievement of universal adult suffrage.
Joshua Nkomo, one of the leading black nationalists, wrote in his biogra-
phy (2001) about his family’s experience during the colonization of
Zimbabwe, noting that blacks, through the Native Land Husbandry Act
(1951), were forced to move to areas designated ‘native reserves’, where

they could occupy land but could not possess its freehold. Nkomo (2001:
65) also noted that black people were not allowed to own urban land in
colonial Zimbabwe, but could only lease it. This ensured that blacks could
not develop significant livestock and crop holdings in rural areas and that
an African urban middle class would not emerge. The blacks lived under
the control of white Native and District Commissioners, who had the
power to limit black livestock holdings, decide the acreage planted to
maize and levy heavy taxes on blacks, thereby limiting their capacity to
accumulate wealth and challenge white rule. The white farmers’ unions
demanded and secured the criminalization of black farmers’ production of
Virginia tobacco, which earned higher export prices, and only allowed
black farmers to grow Turkish tobacco for local consumption.
In many rural areas, traditional authorities, chiefs and headmen, virtu-
ally all male, lost the support of the black population during the colonial
period. De Valk and Wekwete (1990) argued that blacks in colonial
Zimbabwe perceived most chiefs and headmen to be tools of colonial local
government. Thus, resistance was played out at the local level through
struggles around soil conservation, livestock control, land use and land
tenure issues, resulting in the destruction of most local government infra-
structure, such as dip tanks, schools, clinics and bridges, during the war of
resistance. De Valk and Wekwete (1990) also noted that attempts by the
colonial government to use the black traditional leadership to advance
colonial political projects, culture and practices generated massive resis-
tance from the bulk of the black rural and urban populations. In many
rural areas, the native authorities chose to side with the nationalists and
liberation forces to resist colonial rule by disobeying directives to control
livestock numbers through culling, to rotate the use of land in the native
farming areas and to dig contour ridges as required by the soil conserva-
tion authorities.
The white Rhodesian political culture accommodated intra-racial com-
petition, though the conservative and racist parties such as the Rhodesian
Front, the primary white party, continued to dominate the political land-
scape before as well as after 1965, when Rhodesia adopted the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI). The white moderate, liberal parties
and politicians, and religious and cultural groups such as the Quakers that
stood up against all-white governments, comprised a minority of the white
population, so they had scant effect on the political culture and policies of
the Rhodesian Front. The white moderate groups were sidelined,
30 R. GAIDZANWA
lampooned and demonized for supporting more equitable black political

representation. After UDI, until 1980 when independence was attained,
the black population was accorded token parliamentary representation
despite comprising the majority of the population.
In colonial Zimbabwe, there were separate voters’ rolls by race, with
the whites represented and registered on the A voters’ roll with 80%
weighting, this being based on higher income, property holding, educa-
tion and other requirements, while black voters, comprising the bulk of
the population, were confined to the B roll and only 20% weighting:
owing to racial discrimination, most black people had lower incomes,
property holding and education than whites. The limited role that blacks
played was not likely to change the culture of exclusion and the dispropor-
tionately high political representation of whites. It was clear that blacks
would remain marginal to the politics of their country unless drastic
change occurred to transform the political system and culture, which was
based on racial and class discrimination. After UDI, the culture of white
dominance and black marginalization through separate and unequal rights
with respect to land, education, civil and political rights, especially the
franchise, did not change.
Colonial political culture extolled the virtues of pioneering, of hewing
a country out of ‘the bush’ and constructing a civilized prosperous society
to replace the backward and barbaric societies that the ‘pioneers’ had
encountered. There was a sprinkling of white liberals, but they were hope-
lessly outnumbered by the die-hard white nationalists and could not
threaten the majority.
In colonial Zimbabwe, the majority of white citizens agreed with or
tolerated the racist political culture despite its exclusionary aspects. The
white liberal opposition and all manner of dissenters and radical politicians
of the left were pilloried and labelled ‘nigger lovers’, ‘kaffir lovers’ or other
racially charged epithets. Those who dissented from the Rhodesian Front’s
politics were exiled, deported or hounded out of colonial Zimbabwe,
examples being Bishop Dodge and Doris Lessing, the author of the classic
The Grass Is Singing, who was declared a prohibited immigrant in 1956.
She was only able to return to Zimbabwe after independence in 1980.
Maenzanise (2008) also noted that Bishop Lamont, a Roman Catholic
bishop, was accused of siding with and/or failing to report the presence of
‘terrorists’, the term used to refer to the liberation fighters. He was
deported in 1976. Other liberal whites emigrated from Zimbabwe to the
USA, Europe and elsewhere, some of them returning after independence.
Lowry (2007) observed that many white Rhodesians regarded African dis-
affection to be agitated by external forces, implying that the oppressed
black populations of colonial Zimbabwe had no real grievances.
The displacement of black people, especially those who occupied lands
that were desired by white enterprises and individuals for settlement, was
common. Moore (2005) documented the struggles of the Tangwena peo-
ple to retain their ancestral lands in Gaerezi, which the colonial regime
desired for settlement. Their forcible displacement was well publicized
internationally, generating animosity towards the Rhodesian regime.
Resistance to Colonization by the Black Populations

Significant resistance to the white regime and its policies gathered steam
from the 1940s onwards as blacks realized that the white regimes were
determined to retain a racially discriminatory governance system. ZAPU,
led by Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU, led by the Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole and later Robert Mugabe, were the major parties that spearheaded
the resistance to settler rule.
Under threat of economic sanctions from Britain, the Rhodesian regime
refused to institute a racially just system that would, over an agreed period,
guarantee the adult black population the franchise. Instead, the regime
unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965. Marginal repre-
sentation of the black populations in the legislature, the judiciary and poli-
tics continued until independence was attained after a brutal armed
struggle. For resisting colonialism, the leaders of the black political parties
and prominent dissenters, such as Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, Josiah
Chinamano and his wife Ruth, were incarcerated in detention camps in
isolated areas. Such camps included Gonakudzingwa (the place of exile)
and Whawha prison, which were intended to minimize the nationalists’
contact with and influence over their supporters and the general populace.
Luminaries of the liberation struggle who were detained in these camps
included, from ZAPU, Naison Ndlovu, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, Jane Ngwenya,
Thenjiwe Lesabe, Paul Mukondo, Daniel Madzimbamuto, Joshua Nkomo
and Joseph Msika, Nkomo’s deputy. Both Nkomo and Msika became
vice-presidents in independent Zimbabwe. Members of ZANU who were
detained included Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, who became the
first President of independent Zimbabwe, Edgar Tekere, Leopold
Takawira, Maurice Nyagumbo and Simon Muzenda, who became
vice-president.
32 R. GAIDZANWA
After these nationalist politicians had been incarcerated, a guerrilla war

ensued: the black population considered their options for peaceful resis-
tance to have run out. There were differences between resistance groups
and among the small white minority that supported the struggle for
national liberation about the political options available to resist the white
regime under Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front. Both ZANU and
ZAPU organized guerrilla armies, ZANU’s army, ZANLA, operating
mostly from bases in Mozambique, and ZAPU’s army, ZIPRA, operating
from Zambia and Botswana.
The brutal guerrilla war resulted in the displacement of millions of
black people, who were herded into crowded, fortified camps named
keeps or protected villages under the watch of the Rhodesian army and
security personnel. A significant proportion of the young black people
who did not join the guerrilla forces either moved to the towns or remained
in the villages, from which they often provisioned the guerrillas with food,
clothes and intelligence on Rhodesian army movements, usually under
threat of death if discovered by the white army or other security personnel.
This relationship between the populace, especially the peasants who lived
in the operational areas, and the guerrillas and spirit mediums who pro-
vided advice and encouragement was to confer electoral advantages to
ZANU and ZAPU in rural areas before and after independence.
Significant resistance to the white regime and its policies gathered
steam as blacks realized that the whites were determined to retain the
racially discriminatory system. The peasantry were caught between the
forces of the Rhodesian regime and those of the liberation armies, which
expected and extracted support from them. Peasants attracted violence
from both Rhodesian government and guerrilla forces if they did not com-
ply with demands for information about enemy movements. The libera-
tion forces frequently demanded food from the peasants, and sometimes
sex from young women in the villages. Thus, the relationships between
the peasantry and the two forces on the ground were fraught with contra-
dictions. Villagers simultaneously supported and feared the guerrillas and
the violence they exercised over those whom they considered to be dis-
obedient or suspected of being spies of the Rhodesian regime or enemies
of the struggle. The peasantry also resented and feared the reprisals that
could be exacted on them by Rhodesian government forces if they were
found to be ‘running with and aiding and abetting the terrorists’,
phraseology often deployed by the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation

in its descriptions of those who supported the black guerrillas.
Marginal political representation of the black population in the legisla-
ture, the judiciary and politics continued during the years of the war for
national liberation, until independence was finally attained after a brutal
armed struggle. The war for national liberation only ceased after a settle-
ment was negotiated at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 between
Britain and Zimbabwe’s nationalist parties. The Lancaster House
Agreement resulted in a ceasefire, and the subsequent election was won by
ZANU under Robert Mugabe. Racially driven political, social and eco-
nomic culture, based on the exclusion of the majority population, had
failed to build a viable nation that was inclusive of all race, gender, ethnic
and class groups. The brutal war for national liberation that ensued
wounded the different groups and left a troubling legacy in a divided
nation. The political culture that developed during the war, especially
under ZANLA and ZANU, also influenced post-independence Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe’s Political Culture After Independence

Under the rule of ZANU, Zimbabwe’s political culture developed in the
shadow of and reacted to Rhodesia’s racially, culturally and politically
exclusionary culture, characterized by predatory and separatist ethnic, cul-
tural, economic and political institutions and arrangements. There were
continuities between the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean political cultures
because an overbearing and intolerant state was retained. This was domi-
nated by one party, which considered itself to be the legitimate representa-
tive of the majority despite the racial, class, gender and other cleavages
that continued to exist within the population. No radical changes occurred
in the political culture save for the Africanization of the civil service, the
emigration of whites who feared the ‘black peril’ and the marginalization
of whites that took place in countries ‘to the north of us’, as indicated by
many whites who fled the ‘black peril’ of independence shortly after 1980.
In organizing the ruling party, ZANU jettisoned the spirit mediums
and traditional leaders who had partnered with them during the war and
adopted the model of the mainstream Christian churches, characterized by
two male-dominated wings, the main and youth wings, and a wom-
en’s wing.
34 R. GAIDZANWA
Attempts at Promoting Racial and Ethnic Harmony

In 1975, during the struggle for national liberation, ZANU had split into
ZANU (PF) and ZANU (Ndonga). At independence, ZANU–PF took a
conciliatory tone, lauding the participation and sacrifices made by diverse
people of all races, ethnicities and cultures as they fought for the indepen-
dence of Zimbabwe. For example, Guy Clutton Brock, a white supporter
of the liberation struggle, had his ashes interred at the National Heroes’
Acre in Harare after his death in 1995. The only other non-black person
to be honoured and buried as a national hero was Kantibhai Gordanbhai,
a Zimbabwean of Asian origin.
Despite these attempts to foster class, racial and ethnic harmony
through recognition of the heroism of all Zimbabweans, the cleavages
between racial, ethnic and gender groups have continued to simmer, and
at times they have exploded into violence as state functionaries, in collabo-
ration with the leading lights of the dominant party, ZANU–PF, attempted
to retain control of the narrative and control of the state. These episodes
have continued to take place after independence. They are discussed here
in the context of the political culture that has been developed and
embraced by ZANU–PF. Ethnic-based and other confrontations are
placed in the context of the Gukurahundi massacres (1983–7), during
which the Zimbabwean army and other state organs, at the behest of
Mugabe and his security and military chiefs, are held by the Catholic
Justice and Peace Commission to have killed over 20,000 people of
Ndebele origin.
Resistance by Urban Populations

A major problem for ZANU-PF after independence has been its inability
to capture the support and loyalty of urban populations, which have ques-
tioned ZANU politics and culture, particularly its command orientation
and desire to control rather than engage the population democratically.
Urban-dwellers in Zimbabwe have traditionally belonged to diverse par-
ties, and to a range of religious, political and other formations and organi-
zations. Because of this background, they have been ready to query
political, social and other initiatives suggested and championed by
ZANU-PF. In addition, urban areas are heterogeneous and have diverse
populations that encompass the country’s different ethnic, professional,
political and social groups. Attempts by ZANU-PF to exert control over
urban populations without their consent have led to resistance and vio-
lence, resulting in ZANU abandoning urban areas, which have voted con-
sistently for independent or opposition candidates since independence.
Thus, ZANU -PF has concentrated its efforts on winning hearts and
minds in rural areas, where people have less access to consistent and reli-
able information: television and other media that could potentially alien-
ate them from ZANU are scarce. The discussion of Operation
Murambatsvina later in this chapter will address this issue.
ZANU–PF influences and appeals to a small section of the urban popu-
lace, consisting mainly of liberal, middle-class, black elites who were mar-
ginalized by colonialism and racism. At independence, the old black
professional elites were largely sidelined by ZANU-PF, and new black
elites linked to ZANU-PF nationalists emerged. These new, predomi-
nantly male, elites accessed the civil service, parastatal bodies and the pri-
vate sector. A small section of these ambitious young businessmen and
women, and ‘dealers’ who were striving for wealth, also accessed ZANU
to facilitate and monopolize significant business opportunities, favoured
access to tenders and other routes to wealth accumulation. This was evi-
dent in the so-called Willowgate scandal, in which political elites accessed
scarce cars that had been assembled by a state-controlled entity and then
illegally re-sold them at huge profits to the public. The exposure of this
corruption dented the credentials of the ‘revolutionary party’, as ZANU
was called. Other exposures regarding preferential elite access to land and
other scarce goods and resources exposed ZANU’s hypocrisy, given its
radical rhetoric about justice and equality. The new political culture privi-
leging these elites generated a rift between the people and ZANU.
However, the urban poor and working classes who had to toil and
scrimp for survival quickly found out that they could not depend on
ZANU-PF, since the party failed to implement policies that could grow
the economy and deliver jobs, especially to those who were unskilled and
had little schooling. A significant proportion of working people in urban
areas aligned themselves with the Movement for Demopcratic Change
(MDC) which ZANU-PF referred to as a ‘sell-out’ party.1 The Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC), was held by ZANU–PF to lack the ‘cor-
rect’ ideological orientation, while rural areas were declared to be and
constructed as ZANU–PF territory and a no-go area for the MDC and
1
ZANU-PF termed the MDC a ‘sell-out’ party due to its urban black and white support
base. ZANU-PF has a predominantly rural support base.
36 R. GAIDZANWA
other opposition parties. In 2020, ZANU-PF remains a party with a pre-

dominantly rural following, mired in semi-feudal relations with the rural
populace. ZANU- PFsecures the votes of the rural poor through food aid
and agricultural support, this including bags of fertilizer, seed and other
requirements. In exchange, the rural poor are expected to vote for ZANU–
PF and participate in party activities, while traditional leaders benefit from
ZANU–PF’s largesse in the form of houses, cars, agricultural supplies and
salaries.
ZANU–PF has captured and exercises control over the political choices
and behaviour of the black rural poor, arguing that it has a compact with
rural people, forged through the war of national liberation, in which the
gun continues to lead politics. This privileged place for ZANU–PF in the
politics of post-independence Zimbabwe has cemented and consolidated
the party’s dominance over rural inhabitants in the three Mashonaland
provinces and, to a lesser extent, in Masvingo and Midlands provinces.
Matebeleland South and North have been alienated from ZANU–PF
because of the Gukurahundi massacres.
Resistance to ZANU–PF Hegemony

and Gukurahundi Atrocities
The rivalry between ZANU- PF and ZAPU and their forces resulted in
confrontations and clashes between their forces at Entumbane in Bulawayo
after independence. This rivalry continued, despite attempts to integrate
the warring forces with the aid of the British Military Assistance Team.
Cameron (2017) accessed documents dating from January to April 1983
that showed the British government desired to safeguard its strategic,
political and economic interests in Zimbabwe and other parts of Southern
Africa rather than safeguarding, securing and protecting the people, who
were casualties of the violence unleashed against them by the Fifth Brigade
in Matebeleland and the Midlands at the behest of Zimbabwe’s govern-
ment. The government had mounted a military operation that resulted in
the deaths of over 20,000 people, in what is known as the Gukurahundi
(which can be translated as the rain that sweeps away the chaff), directed
against what was characterized as insurgency against the state. The declas-
sified documents also showed that the Thatcher government wanted to
prevent an exodus of Zimbabweans to the United Kingdom. Cameron
also deduced that Mugabe, then President of Zimbabwe, needed white
business and other critical communities to stay in the country to enhance
its economic stability.
Thus, there appears to have been a convergence of interests between

the top echelons of the British and Zimbabwean governments in down-
playing or minimizing the magnitude of the Gukurahundi atrocities.
Cameron indicated that the British diplomat and ambassador in Harare,
Robin Byatt, did not fully disclose to Western diplomats the background
to these events. Apparently, Byatt chose to boycott a meeting that had
been convened with the Canadian embassy on 11 March 1983, in Harare,
to exchange data on the atrocities. Cameron concluded that Byatt’s sole
concern in reporting the violence was the safety and security of the white
communities in the affected areas.
Cameron concluded that, as a result of Byatt’s reports, the British con-
tinued to render military assistance to Zimbabwe by training Fifth Brigade
personnel, including forty-three trainees under the British Military
Assistance team at Inkomo Barracks. In addition, Mugabe was awarded an
honorary degree by the University of Edinburgh in 1984 as a result of
considerable lobbying by Lord Carrington, who served as Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs between 1979 and 1982.
He was an important player in the Lancaster House negotiations around
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1979. Cameron also noted that the com-
mander of the Fifth Brigade, Colonel Shiri, was offered a place at the
Royal College of Defence Studies in London in 1986.
In response to Cameron’s publication, the British government con-
demned the brutal and criminal suppression of the populations in
Matebeleland and the Midlands, indicating that the United Kingdom gov-
ernment supported a process of truth and reconciliation, as envisaged in
the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe.
The Gukurahundi massacres and their aftermath inflicted grave injuries
on Zimbabwean society, creating widespread mistrust, fear and dread. It
divided the country and the wounds inflicted on the bereaved families in
Matebeleland and the Midlands have not been healed. There is still need
for truth and reconciliation to ensure that the vengeful politics of the early
1980s can be exorcised from the Zimbabwean political arena. The events
around Gukurahundi, in which men, women and children were killed sim-
ply because of their ethnic identity, have to be resolved through a process
that is acceptable to those who were subjected to violence, ranging from
murder and rape to beatings and verbal and other intimidation and terror.
The Gukurahundi episode set a negative precedent because interroga-
tion, denunciation and truth-telling have not occurred. Beyond the state-
ment by Mugabe that it was a ‘moment of madness’, not much has been
38 R. GAIDZANWA
done, and many of the families of the Gukurahundi victims have never
been able to secure justice for their relatives and families. This precedent
indicates that people who commit atrocities can get away without punish-
ment and victims of injustice are not likely to secure justice from state or
society. Thus, such events might be repeated as long as the culture of
impunity persists.
While ZANU–PF and other groups have put the Gukurahundi massa-
cres behind them, the events have created resentment in Matebeleland
and the Midlands over decades. The Rhodesian Front governments vio-
lated the rights of black people, and this fuelled the war for national libera-
tion. As long as the suppressed anger remains unaddressed, Zimbabwe
cannot function as a cohesive nation with shared goals and aspirations.
The experience of colonial violence demonstrates that violations of black
people by white governments created lasting resentment, and there is no
reason to believe that the populations of Matebeleland and the Midlands
will be content to tolerate the political culture of violence and impunity
that was exhibited through the Gukurahundi events and the near-silence
in their aftermath. Robert Mugabe’s remark is not sufficient to assuage the
anger, grief and resentment.
The Post-colonial State’s War on Women: Operation

Clean-Up (1983)
Apart from the Gukurahundi massacres, which targeted predominantly
Ndebele people, a significant proportion of whom supported ZAPU, led
by Joshua Nkomo, the ZANU-led government, headed by Mugabe, also
showed considerable hostility towards urban women in 1983, through
what it termed Operation Clean-Up. This state violence against women
related to their freedom of movement and association. The initiative
entailed the use of violence against unaccompanied women and their
arrest and incarceration in remote locations, on suspicion that they were
engaged in acts of prostitution. The attacks against predominantly black
working-class women who were found outside their homes in the eve-
nings were carried out by the police and the army. Women and ‘vagrants’
were taken to police stations and prisons in various parts of Zimbabwe,
having been stopped and questioned. They were required to show that
they were ‘honest’ people of ‘good morals’ by producing their marriage

certificate, failing which they were taken to ‘minda mirefu’, the ‘long
fields’ that were earmarked for the resettlement of people who were moved
from crowded towns after independence, for ‘rehabilitation’. Gaidzanwa
(1983) criticized the hostile and misogynistic political culture of ZANU–
PF that these events indicated.
These assaults against women and the poor, especially in urban areas,
were intended to displace them from towns, where there was more free-
dom from control by the state, and hand them over to the traditional
authorities who controlled the rural areas. Urban areas were perceived by
the state to be nests of opposition politics and feminist activism, neces-
sitating the disruption and demonization of the women involved. The
Women’s Action Group, which comprised women of all races, was tar-
geted for vilification, the state’s view being that these ‘middle class
women were misleading and defending prostitutes’ and therefore
deserved to be castigated and denounced. This stigmatization of and
violence against poor, black, urban women was an exercise that was delib-
erately mounted to intimidate and discipline them by limiting their free-
dom of movement and association. The moral justification for this was
questionable, and indicated the continuation by a black government that
touted its liberation credentials of colonial thinking about black women:
that they were immoral and required elite male control, defining them as
‘prostitutes’ if they moved about in public and on the streets of towns
and cities after dark. Gaidzanwa (1992: 115) also drew attention to the
divisive ways in which women were classified either as respectable or
unrespectable, creating divisions between them and weakening their
political activities and potential collective action. Thus, black women’s
struggles against the gender politics and gender cultures of the patriar-
chal state and the classes that buttressed this state and its violence against
black women, needed to be sustained. There was a glaring absence in
Zimbabwe of cultural and political practices that promoted and secured
the freedoms of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, class, culture and
ethnicity. The gendered political culture of ZANU–PF was similar to that
of the Rhodesian Front, which marginalized black women in many areas
of politics and public life.
40 R. GAIDZANWA
The Revolt of War Veterans against ZANU–PF Over

Their Unpaid Pensions and Compensation (1996–7)
ZANU–PF collided with war veterans over their unpaid pensions and
compensation after months of protests. Wilfred Mhanda (2011), himself a
war veteran, stated that the war veterans were incensed after suspicions
were raised about the War Victims’ Compensation Fund being looted by
undeserving senior politicians, military and business leaders, who were
paid for non-existent injuries, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, night-
mares and material losses, despite some not even having participated in the
war of national liberation, while war veterans, many wallowing in destitu-
tion in rural areas, had not been compensated for their service and injuries.
The protests resulted in a judicial commission being set up to investigate
this abuse of the war victims’ fund. Mugabe was compelled to accede to
lump sum payments of Z$50,000 (US$4300) to each veteran and monthly
pension payments of Z$2000 (US$174). These payments were unbud-
geted, and Mhanda (2011) noted that, in addition to cash settlements, the
veterans demanded land and immediate settlement of their claims for
compensation for injuries or disability under the War Victims’
Compensation Fund. Given that most of the veterans had struggled for
the previous seventeen years with no compensation, there was much sym-
pathy for their plight, although no compensation was paid to the families
of the veterans who had died in the struggle for independence.
The political culture that developed during the struggle for national
liberation was characterized by authoritarianism and opportunism by a
significant section of the senior political class, and this was clearly exposed
by the debacle involving war veterans’ compensation demands. It was clear
that the elitist culture of the politicians and others in the top echelons was
still a problem for ZANU and the general populace after independence.
Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Remove

the Rubbish)
Colonial governments often moved the black populations of Zimbabwe

whenever they were perceived to be standing in the way of a particular
project. The Mugabe regime adopted the same modus operandi, displacing
populations that were inconveniently located at specific political moments,
an example being in 2005 when an election was due. By this time, urban
populations had in general grown tired of the Mugabe regime and its
oppressive rule, so urban voters were consistently voting for opposition

parties, such as the MDC.
The Mugabe regime dealt with this by implementing an operation that
was named Operation Murambatsvina (Remove the Rubbish), also offi-
cially known as Operation Restore Order. Operation Murambatsvina was
described as an exercise to sanitise cities that had become disfigured by
slum dwellings and unplanned settlements, which posed a threat to peo-
ple’s health. It was presented as a slum-clearance measure to prevent the
spread of vermin, disease and disorder. In the middle of winter, the state
deployed bulldozers and other machinery to destroy the dwellings of
about 700,000 people. Given that the MDC’s support base was located in
the towns, it was quite clear that Operation Murambatsvina was actually
intended to undermine and disperse those populations that supported and
voted for the opposition party. To a large degree, the urban poor were
moved to rural areas, where their votes for the MDC were likely to be
diluted by those for ZANU–PF, Mugabe’s party, if indeed they were reg-
istered to vote in the rural constituencies to which they were unceremoni-
ously moved without notice.
Operation Murambatsvina disenfranchised the black, urban poor in the
same way that Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front had disenfranchised the
majority of black people before independence by imposing property quali-
fications that excluded them from voting. Clearly, then, the political cul-
ture of the Rhodesian Front, which aimed to exclude or brutalise those
sections of the population that did not support the ruling party or actively
opposed it, continued after independence.
Racial Tension and Class Confrontations Over

Land: Hondo Yeminda (the War Over Land)
Race- and class-based confrontations occurred between the state and
white farmers over land, and the farmers were violently dispossessed of the
land they held and worked. These ‘land wars’ were related to unresolved
issues that dated back to the colonization of Zimbabwe. The British South
Africa Company suppressed the Ndebele in 1893 and the Shona in
1897–8, then forcibly moved them into ‘native reserves’ that were spe-
cially created. Palmer and Parsons (1977) documented the progressive
encroachment on the lands held by both Ndebele and Shona peoples in
colonial Zimbabwe. Grievances over the appropriation of natives’ land
42 R. GAIDZANWA
finally resulted in the war for national liberation, which eventually resulted
in independence in 1980. However, resentment over colonization, racism
and the mistreatment of black populations during the colonial era
remained. Inequalities in access to land were resented, and this resulted in
further tension: white farmers retained control over the best urban resi-
dential land, farmland and water and other resources after independence.
Calls for land reform were made by various black lobby groups. When
reform was slow, and failed to address the land hunger that persisted, par-
ticularly in rural Zimbabwe, white-held farmland was invaded by black war
veterans. Racial inequalities in landholding persisted until the year 2000,
when calls for a new constitution resulted in the production of a draft.
This contained a clause that allowed the state to compulsorily acquire land
from large-scale commercial farmers, the majority of them being white.
The state was expected to pay only for improvements that had been made
to the land rather than the value of the land itself. In reaction to the vote
that rejected the proposed constitution, perceived to have been instigated
after campaigns led by opposition parties and whites, war veterans occu-
pied white-owned land throughout Zimbabwe, pushing the country into
crisis. The referendum results were ignored and in April 2000, parliament
amended the constitution, allowing the state to compulsorily acquire
commercial farmland, as suggested by the draft.
The parliamentary vote resulted in what was termed the ‘Third
Chimurenga’ (third war for liberation) and ‘hondo yeminda’ (land war) in
reference to widespread occupations of land previously held by white
farmers. The hondo yeminda was part of a political wave driven by injus-
tices from the colonial past that had remained unresolved after indepen-
dence. The land invasions by war veterans resulted in agricultural
productivity plummeting and Zimbabwe’s economy drastically deteriorat-
ing. In addition, the Mugabe regime had also alienated various class, eth-
nic, racial, gender and other groups through discrimination and poor
economic management and governance. As a result, some elements of the
population felt marginalized, and migration escalated after 2000 as
Zimbabweans departed to search for better lives elsewhere.
In the meantime, the MDC gained traction and became popular in the
towns where ZANU–PF failed to make headway, as urban housing needs
were not easily met owing to the relatively high cost and low availability of
residential land. ZANU–PF was unable to redistribute this land as it was
controlled by local authorities, so the party had no incentives to persuade
urban working and middle-class people to vote for them.
Operation Makavhotera Papi? (2008)

Operation Makavhotera Papi? (2008) was presented in the form of a ques-
tion that can be loosely translated as Operation for whom did you vote?
This was a result of ZANU–PF losing the 2008 parliamentary and presi-
dential elections. Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC presidential candidate,
beat Robert Mugabe, while ZANU–PF lost the parliament to the MDC,
winning only 94 of the 210 parliamentary seats. Sokwanele (It is enough),
an organization that monitors human rights violations and comments on
social and political issues, including the conduct of elections, noted that
ZANU–PF lost despite the gerrymandering of constituency boundaries,
electoral fraud and widespread voter intimidation, violence and some mur-
ders, especially in rural areas. Sokwanele also argued that Tsvangirai’s win
occurred in spite of all the hurdles placed in the way of the MDC by
ZANU–PF.
Despite Tsvangirai’s win, a recount that took over a month (with no
independent observers present) announced that he had not garnered an
absolute majority, necessitating a run-off. Operation Makavhotera Papi?,
fronted by the military and other uniformed forces, was unleashed on the
opposition and voters deemed to be sympathetic to the MDC, resulting in
Tsvangirai’s withdrawal from the run-off to stop the violence that had
been unleashed on voters. Operation Makavhotera Papi? claimed over 500
lives, and thousands were tortured during the ‘election’, in which Mugabe
ran and ‘won’—the sole candidate for the presidency! However, the
Southern African Development Community declined to recognize him as
the duly elected president, preferring to broker the formation of a govern-
ment that shared power between the MDC and ZANU–PF.
The utilization of military and other security personnel in election and
governance-related issues therefore became institutionalized, generating
ominous and problematic dynamics for future political power struggles
within and outside ZANU–PF. The Global Political Agreement (GPA)
between ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties, one led by Tsvangirai and
the other by Mutambara, underpinned the Government of National
Unity. Although the GPA was supposed to produce a new constitution
that would transform the politics of Zimbabwe by eroding the coercive
power of ZANU- PF and enable other political parties and players to
participate in politics if adopted by all Zimbabweans, the sustained vio-
lence by ZANU-PF controlled security personnel against the supporters
of the two MDC signatories of the GPA, led by Tsvangirai and
Mutambara, poisoned the atmosphere and militated against the produc-
tion of a document that would be acceptable to all parties and their
44 R. GAIDZANWA
supporters against the production of a document that would be accept-

able to all parties and their supporters. The militarized violence unleashed
by ZANU–PF also portended future power struggles within and outside
ZANU–PF, as the securocrats and military personnel, a significant pro-
portion in post since the liberation war days, moved to the centre of
political activities.
In retrospect, it is notable that Rhodesian governments utilized the
police and military to suppress dissent, while allowing the politicians to
handle broad governance issues. However, in ZANU–PF, the security and
military elites moved to the centre of governance, and by 2008 and 2012,
when elections were held, they played a central role, enabling Mugabe to
be ‘re-elected’ against the will of the people.
The post-independence ZANU–PF governments led by Mugabe, like
the white-led governments before independence, failed to unite the
nation’s various racial class and ethnic groups because of their divisive
political cultures. In contrast to the Rhodesian governments, which had at
least managed to unite most of the white population through racist and
unequal distribution of resources, such as land, in their favour, the post-
independence government of Mugabe failed to manage its differences
with other races and non-ZANU–PF politicians, and unite the blacks.
Instead, Mugabe and ZANU–PF tormented, violated and discriminated
against those groups, parties and politicians that questioned their rule.
Mugabe fell out with politicians such as Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua
Nkomo and Edgar Tekere, all of whom were his former comrades in arms
during the struggle against colonialism. Unlike Ian Smith, most of whose
white allies stood with him to the end, Mugabe, at various points during
his rule, fell out with a significant proportion of his comrades and margin-
alized them, in order to achieve unquestioned hegemony over
ZANU–PF.
Thus, the post-independence era in Zimbabwe has been dogged by a
culture of racism, ethnic and class discrimination, and intolerance by the
ruling classes. In the wake of the displacement of white farmers, who were
critical to the colonial economy, the economic deterioration that was
experienced, especially after the hondo yeminda and Operation Makavhotera
Papi?, speaks to the problems caused by the ZANU-inspired political cul-
ture that continues to afflict the country. The racist colonial political cul-
ture has been replaced by an oppressive, hegemonic political culture
privileging ZANU–PF over other parties. The prevalent culture, charac-
terized by class discrimination and poverty, has created social, economic
and political strife. The land invasions by war veterans and other groups
were also fuelled by the growing chasm between the privileged sections of
the black and white races. Increasing poverty, especially among the black
majority, generated resentment against the Mugabe regime and its poor
management of the economy. Thus, the colonial governments failed to
democratize Zimbabwe and create a nation in which people could thrive
regardless of their race, class, ethnicity and gender. The post-independence
government of Mugabe also failed to foster economic, ethnic, gender and
political democratization, resulting in a ‘soft coup’ against Mugabe by his
comrades in arms from the liberation struggle.
In contrast, Ian Smith, the iconic Prime Minister of Rhodesia who is
still celebrated by sections of white Rhodesia, never had to suffer the igno-
miny of betrayal by his key henchmen, and the majority of the white popu-
lation admired and agreed with him. Smith bemoaned what he perceived
to be his betrayal by the British and other Western regimes, but in contrast
Mugabe felt betrayed by his comrades, such as Emmerson Mnangagwa,
whom he sidelined and victimized. This resulted in Mnangagwa fleeing for
his life through Mozambique, to seek refuge in South Africa. Mnangagwa
returned to lead the coup that dislodged Mugabe from power in 2017,
after thirty-seven years of iron-fisted rule—deposed by colleagues from his
own party in the same way that he had colluded to depose Ndabaningi
Sithole, the previous leader of ZANU. In addition, Mugabe had also lost
the presidential election in 2008 and relied on the army to subvert the will
of the Zimbabwean people and restore him as president. The debt he
owed the military and security elites was to be repaid through the coup
against him in 2017, which ushered in a new political culture of brazen
militarization. This proved to be difficult to circumvent or confront in the
wake of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2018.
ZANU–PF, under its new militarized leadership, has retained its stran-
glehold on black rural populations, especially in the provinces of
Mashonaland, Manicaland and the Midlands. These rural populations are
relatively isolated, impoverished and vulnerable to punishment by the
state and/or ZANU–PF-aligned chiefs, headmen and supporters if they
decline to vote for the correct party. In rural areas, it is more difficult for
the opposition to have a viable presence because of the patronage relation-
ship between the chiefs, headmen and ZANU–PF. However, the party can
only access rural Matebeleland populations through former ZAPU sec-
tions of the party, owing to the problems arising since the Gukurahundi
massacres. In the other provinces, chiefs are the ‘enforcers’ for ZANU–PF,
and are rewarded through access to executive powers over their people;
46 R. GAIDZANWA
this enables them to police dissenters. In August 2018, chiefs were given

state-funded cars even though most chiefs cannot drive! However, despite
these arrangements, the Matebeleland provinces remain relatively more
open to other political parties, such as the MDC and other smaller groups.
Militarization, Securitization of Resources

and the Coup Against Mugabe in 2017:
The Development of a Militarized Political Culture
in Zimbabwe
While Rhodesia was in a state of civil war between 1970 and 1980, the
Rhodesian military was not able to take over the state and its institutions.
However, in post-independence Zimbabwe, the constant reliance by the
Mugabe regime on the security and military elites to keep the populace in
line had the unintended effect of placing these personnel in contexts where
they were constantly interacting with civilians, governance institutions and
business structures. Mugabe’s government also deployed the Zimbabwe
National Army (ZNA) to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to
help the Kabila regime repel rebels. Through such actions, Mugabe inad-
vertently facilitated the ZNA’s involvement in diamond mining and
smuggling.
The elites in the ZNA, police and intelligence were drawn into dia-
mond mining through their exposure to mining in the DRC, where
they collaborated with both the Kabila regime and the rebels in looting
diamonds. By the time diamonds were discovered in Marange, eastern
Zimbabwe, the ZNA, police and intelligence were already well versed in
the practices and conventions around diamond mining in the
DRC. However, in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, the security
for diamond extraction is usually the responsibility of the private min-
ing and security concerns that have licences to mine diamonds. This
arrangement reduces the risk that locals and women in particular will be
abused, since private security actors are less likely to expect the state
and legal systems to support them when they commit violent acts near
the mines. On the other hand, state and military agents and security
personnel can invoke defence of the state and its interests as a shield to
hide acts of violence.
Operation Hakudzokwi (Operation No Return)

Human Rights Watch (2009) reported that in 2008, in the Marange area
in eastern Zimbabwe, the military and security forces mounted Operation
Hakudzokwi (Operation No Return), to violently drive out alluvial dia-
mond panners from the Marange diamond fields. In 2016, the Alternative
Information and Development Centre described the gruesome mass mur-
ders, beatings and maimings that had occurred, and stated that hundreds
of panners had been beaten and gunned down by the security forces, both
police and military. The takeover of the diamond fields by Zimbabwean
military and security took place in the wake of the Government of National
Unity that was formed with the MDC. The Human Rights Watch report
documented the use of child labour and violence against villagers in
Chiadzwa by ZANU–PF operatives. Operation Hakudzokwi was esti-
mated to have resulted in the deaths of over 200 people. Physical and
sexual violence against women and girls by the police, soldiers and diggers
was also rampant. The seizure of diamond fields and the killings, beatings,
torture arrests and harassment of villagers, male and female, who were
panning diamonds occurred during an economic crisis that was character-
ized by hyperinflation, high unemployment, widespread food insecurity
and poverty.
The Human Rights Watch report suggested that the state allowed the
military to rotate army brigades in Marange to ensure that they could all
benefit from the diamond trade, thus earning their loyalty as well as that
of senior ZANU–PF personnel. The report also pointed out that instead
of seeking aid, the power-sharing government formed in 2009 could har-
ness the diamond income that was being stolen through illegal mining and
smuggled out of the country. The report suggested that Zimbabwe could
generate as much as US$200 million per month if Marange diamonds and
other minerals were managed in a more transparent and accountable man-
ner to fund an economic recovery programme, which would benefit ordi-
nary villagers. Prior to his resignation, Mugabe indicated that at least
US$5 billion in diamond revenue was never accounted for.
Historically, state security has not been involved in Zimbabwean mines,
whether securing or participating in mining or benefiting from mining
proceeds. However, in the Marange area, securitization was accomplished
through the declaration of the diamond fields as ‘protected areas’ under
national security legislation, thereby securing state protection. The dia-
monds in Marange were securitized but the people there were not secure.
48 R. GAIDZANWA
Instead, they were rendered more vulnerable, since their livelihoods were
disrupted by mining activities that were taking place on their farmland and
near their homes. The Protected Places and Areas Act (1959) requires the
Marange people to procure clearance letters from the police every month
to access their homes and move around their village, effectively curtailing
their freedom of movement. On the other hand, the diamond mine per-
sonnel and military and security operatives were able to move around
freely even before they had relocated and resettled the villagers who were
displaced. The military diamond miners’ rights were prioritized over those
of the villagers, who lost their freedom of movement, their grazing lands
and their livelihoods.
Saunders (2009) observed that the Zimbabwean military and security
elites in the police, army and intelligence have diversified their activities
beyond diamond mining and have ventured into mining gold, chromite
and other minerals. They can convert their skills in securing obedience
from local populations, gained during the war for national liberation, into
enforcing the obedience of villagers and local communities to further their
mining interests.
The experience of security and military elites in the DRC has inevitably
impacted on the state in Zimbabwe. Through their access to diamond-
related income, they have developed aspirations to control economic,
social and political power from extractive resources. Increasing their off-
budget resources has enabled them to fund their political interests, ren-
dering them less reliant on political patronage. They are able to finance
and influence political players, election results and political events through
the creation and support of a new political culture that is aligned to their
interests. They are therefore more empowered against other blocs that
have traditionally controlled Zimbabwe’s politics and economics. In effect,
they have been able to create a militarized political and economic culture
that is more aligned to their aspirations and interests.
The militarization and securitization of extractive resources, as this
example has shown, has multiplied the opportunities for gendered and
sexualized physical violence against women and girls, and generalized vio-
lence against civilians. Thus, Zimbabwe’s traditional mining culture is
being transformed into one that is based on the power of political, military
and security participants, whose interests are varied and whose model is
based on the securitization and militarization of extractive resources.
The new political culture pits military elites against poor civilians, com-
mercial and industrial players, and other civilians who have traditionally
participated in mining and commercial activity. In Zimbabwe, the milita-

rized independence struggle sowed the seeds of militarization in politics
and the economy. The security and military elites are now firmly ensconced
in mining activities.
This new culture is being extended into the commercial agricultural
sector, with the military venturing into what is called command agricul-
ture for food security. Militarized agriculture brings the military into
increased contact with women, who provide the bulk of the casual, sea-
sonal and permanent labour in planting, weeding and harvesting crops,
and are vulnerable to sexual and physical violence by men who are steeped
in militaristic and masculine cultural values that privilege male domination
over women, disempowered men and children and other disadvantaged
groups. Clearly, this negatively affects women’s everyday and work-
ing lives.
Conclusion
The Political Culture of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s political culture is being transformed through the increased
involvement of military and security sector players in agriculture, mining,
politics and other sectors of the economy. The militarization and securiti-
zation of economic activities is, in turn, transforming the form and con-
tent of the economic and political cultures. This development will most
likely generate new types of conflict and more competition between civil-
ian, business, military and security elites, who are also increasingly major
players in sectors of the economy where they have not been traditionally
involved. This development presages a shift in the cultures and practices
around conducting business in these sectors. There is a need to determine
how the norms of business and entrepreneurship will continue to be
respected under these conditions. In addition, there is the formal involve-
ment by Zimbabwe’s military and security elites as politicians, ministers
and functionaries in the state sector. This consolidation of securocrats in
the economy, politics and other sectors of life points to the transformation
of political life and culture in the country. There is clearly a need to deter-
mine the trajectory of these developments and their impact on Zimbabwe’s
political cultures, as well as the prospects for economic, social and political
democracy under these conditions.
50 R. GAIDZANWA
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CHAPTER 3
The Zimbabwean National Question: Key

Components and Unfinished Business
Introduction
The concept of the ‘national question’ is an embodiment of key and com-
plex issues to do with nation-making, state-making, liberation, reconstitu-
tion of the political, rights, entitlements and freedoms. Thus, this chapter
delineates the key issues that define or underpin Zimbabwean citizens’
struggle for an inclusive, democratic and developed Zimbabwe—the key
citizen ideals, priorities and aspirations constitutive of what is known as
the national question. At a secondary level, the chapter outlines the key
process(es) through which Zimbabweans can package these ideals, priori-
ties and aspirations into a national common vision/agenda for the national
struggle for democracy and development.
S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (*)
Archie Mafeje Research Institute, University of South Africa,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_3
52 S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI
Background
Zimbabweans, working collectively and individually, have undoubtedly
played a critical role in spearheading the struggle for liberation from colo-
nialism, democracy, equality and national development across space and
time. However, the ability of ordinary citizens to shape the national politi-
cal discourse and development paradigm as well as to effectively mobilize
themselves and others for democracy and development has been con-
strained by the lack of a common vision or national agenda crystallizing
around the ‘big idea’ that captures the nation’s struggles and aspirations.
The lack of this big idea among citizens in particular has become more
apparent post-Mugabe than ever before, as civil society has not only strug-
gled for relevance but also struggled to connect itself to the broader
Zimbabwean society and ongoing community struggles in various parts of
the country. These struggles include public sector strikes against poor
working conditions and even non-payment of wages, as well as urban resi-
dents’ protests against poor service delivery that have been organized spo-
radically since the fall of Robert Mugabe. Prior to this, the hashtag or
social media protests took Zimbabwe by a storm from late 2015; and the
urban citizen protests and demonstrations against deteriorating economic
conditions, corruption, rent-seeking behaviour by the state and govern-
ment officials’ intransigency and profligacy, which have come to character-
ize life in Zimbabwe, began before November 2017. All these citizen
protests and movements were demonstrating some potential of citizen
assertiveness and helping to profoundly reconfigure Zimbabwe’s political
landscape.
Mapping the Contours of the Zimbabwe

National Problem
National questions, national visions and national agendas are inherently
contested, and there is always need for a proper understanding of a coun-
try’s contextual challenges and opportunities in order to create an inclu-
sive national vision. The most important step in civil society attempts to
craft a common national agenda is to understand the nature of Zimbabwe’s
political, economic and social challenges: the Zimbabwe Problem.
Zimbabwe is a country undergoing various incomplete transitions that
have produced a complex and multi-layered crisis of governance and con-
testations over resource ownership and distribution, nation-state building,
3 THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 53
citizenship and belonging, as well as inclusive and sustainable develop-

ment. As Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopolous (2003) correctly note,
the Zimbabwe crisis is not about a single issue rooted in a one-off event or
single historical trajectory, but a ‘mixture’ of ‘historicized and racialised
assertion of land restitution and justice’; ‘ahistorical, technocratic insis-
tence on liberal notions of private property’, ‘development’ and ‘good
governance’; ‘a new form of ‘indigenous, authoritarian nationalism (based
around claims of loyalty and national sovereignty)’, ‘a non-ethnicized,
“civic” nationalism (grounded in liberal democratic notions of rights and
rule of law)’; ‘a radical, Pan-Africanist anti-colonial, anti-imperialist cri-
tique of “the West”’; ‘a “universalist” embrace of certain aspects of neo-
liberalism and globalization’; ‘a monopoly claim over the commitment to
radical redistribution’; and ‘a monopoly claim over the defence of human
rights’ (Hammar and Raftopolous 2003: 17).
Another important point to understand is that there is a core set of
complex, overlapping and contested citizen priorities that need to be
packaged into the national agenda. This core set of citizen issues, priorities
and concerns cannot be understood through some simplistic treatment of
the Zimbabwean experience as something defined through chronological,
linear time frames in which the ‘colonial’, ‘anti-colonial nationalist strug-
gle’ and ‘postcolonial’ interludes are separate episodes with temporal
moments of ruptures and discontinuities.
To define a broadly inclusive national agenda around which the nation
can be galvanized, it is critical to approach the Zimbabwean experience as
a continuum of separate, distinctly different historical episodes. Such an
approach enables a global and more nuanced analysis of the set of issues
that need to be resolved, prioritized and processed when crafting an inclu-
sive national agenda. This approach puts the future in the same ‘duration’
as the past and the present, and creates more space for an inclusive citizen-
ship. This kind of approach is particularly important in the light of what
Hammar and Raftopolous describe as the ‘unfinished business’ of the
nation that cuts across the colonial, anti-colonial nationalist struggle and
postcolonial Zimbabwe, at one level, and the important continuities that
can be missed in a simple chronological and linear analysis that emphasizes
discontinuities, at another level. The cross-cutting national issues include
what Horace Campbell dubs ‘the patriarchal model of liberation’ that
silences ‘her story’ and privileges misogynistic and masculinist traditions
(Campbell 2003); the subordination of civil society to nationalism that is
intolerant of dissent and plurality; the struggle for civil and political
liberties that were only partially realized in 1980 and have suffered reversal
since then; and the continuum of violence as a political tool since the time
of colonial conquest.
The key contested but cross-cutting national issues discernible in
Zimbabwe’s overlapping historical phases of development can be summa-
rized into ten categories. The first is the popular struggles to gain national
sovereignty and territorial integrity free from colonialism and imperialism.
The second is the expectation of the return of land that was appropriated
by colonial settlers and its equitable distribution among indigenous peo-
ple. The third is liberation of women from patriarchy, sexism and neo-
traditionalism. The fourth is the achievement of civil and political liberties,
which were denied under colonialism. The fifth is the building of cordial
society–state relations mediated by the rule of law and constitutionalism
and predicated on equitable access to strategic resources. The sixth is the
setting afoot of legitimate, responsive and representative governance that
delivers services. The seventh is the constriction of inclusive national
development propelled by economic growth that is capable of alleviating
poverty, disease, ignorance and unemployment. The eight is the introduc-
tion of democracy, social peace, human security, and equal rights. The
ninth is the eradication of violence and impunity, and the tenth is the lib-
eration of peasants and workers from poverty, disease and ignorance (see
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).
Framing the National Issues in Zimbabwe

Historically, it has always been difficult for nation-states to define a com-
mon national agenda and vision because of class, ethnic, gender, partisan
and generational cleavages. The situation is compounded by the very fun-
damental question of what is ‘national’, which is inherently and highly
contested. Even the very term ‘nation’ carries two meanings—it is a refer-
ence to the people within a state and the nation-state itself as a construc-
tion by the elites—but these are highly contested constructions (Billing
1995: 24). What often escape the minds of analysts is that the very ‘cre-
ation of the nation-as-people’ and ‘nation-as-states’ has never been ‘a har-
monious process, in which a traditional “ethnie” grows from small shoot
into the full flower of nationality, as if following a process of ‘natural’
maturation’ (Billing 1995: 27).
Michael Billing explains that the interrelated processes of creating a
‘nation-as-people’ and a ‘nation-as-state’ are always mediated by conflict
and violence because ‘a particular identity has to be imposed’, and ‘one

way of thinking of the self, community and indeed of the world has to
replace other conceptions, other forms of life’ (Billing 1995: 27). It is
within this conflictual and violence-laden discursive terrain of nation and
state formation that national questions, national visions and national agen-
das are crafted, defined, named and imposed on society by those who
emerged victorious and powerful (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The situation
becomes even more complex in places such as Zimbabwe and other post-
colonial African states, where the nation and state are deliberately con-
flated to the detestable extent that the president (understood in patriarchal
terms as the father of the nation) becomes the state on the one hand and
the national question is reduced to race and ethnic questions on the other
hand (Prah 2006).
With specific reference to Zimbabwe, national questions, national
visions and national agendas were initially imagined, crafted and named in
the context of an anti-colonial struggle. This anti-colonial struggle was
itself a contested terrain in which even the naming of the imagined post-
colonial sovereign nation-state provoked contestations. As Enocent
Msindo correctly noted, by the early 1950s the Zimbabwean political
scene was dominated by ethnic-based societies such as the Kalanga Cultural
Society, Matebeleland Home Society, Monomotapa Offspring Society,
and many others (Msindo 2007: 273–296). National consciousness was
being formed, even though the African National Congress had been in
existence since 1934 (Ranger 1970).
What also needs to be understood is the notion of nation-state and citi-
zenship that developed under colonial rule, which has continued to have
an important bearing on postcolonial attempts to define national visions
and agendas. Mahmood Mamdani’s work is insightful on this as he aptly
explains the nature of the colonial nation-state and ‘how the subject popu-
lation was incorporated into—and not excluded from—the arena of colo-
nial power’ (Mamdani 1996: 15). Mamdani’s central point is that
citizenship was ‘a privilege of the civilized; the uncivilized would be sub-
ject to an all-round tutelage’. The third is that ‘a propertied franchise
separated the civilized from the uncivilized’, making it impossible for
those considered uncivilized to enjoy and civil and political rights
(Mamdani 1996: 15 & 17). Even the educated and urban-based ‘natives’
‘who were exempt from the lash of customary law’ were not included in
urban civil society—rather, ‘they languished in a juridical limbo’ (Mamdani
1996: 18). The consequence of all this was the construction of a
bifurcated colonial state characterized by ‘two forms of power under a

single hegemonic authority’ with ‘urban power’ speaking ‘the language of
civil society and civil rights’ (direct rule through use of civil protected
rights) and ‘rural power’ speaking that of ‘community and culture’ (indi-
rect rule enforced through invented tradition) (Mamdani 1996: 18).
Mamdani’s discussion of the colonial state can be easily extended to the
question of how people have been incorporated into the arena of postco-
lonial power and who defines national interests, national visions and
national agendas within a context characterized by Luise White (2015) as
‘unpopular sovereignty’, which was not only the hallmark of Rhodesia’s
Unilateral Declaration of Independence but also describes the Harare
regime Emerson Mnangagwa that came to power at the end of 2017.
The reality of colonial bifurcated citizenship had deep implications for
the character of the anti-colonial nationalist liberation struggles. In the
first place, the struggles of the colonized subjects became ranged against
both ‘customary authorities in the local state and against racial barriers in
civil society’ (Mamdani 1996: 19). The anti-colonial struggle was in a way
a struggle for inclusion into civil society that was ring-fenced by race and
privilege. What was being created is what Mamdani terms ‘an indigenous
civil society’ (Mamdani 1996: 20). This struggle could not be achieved
without deracialization of the state.
The third moment of development of civil society was that of political
independence, which produced a deracialized state without a deracialized
civil society that continued to protect colonially accumulated privileges.
The state pushed the agenda of deracialization of civil society through
such initiatives as Africanization, affirmative action and indigenization
projects. This agenda united ‘the victims of colonial racism’ (Mamdani
1996: 20). As Mamdani (1996: 20–21) puts it, ‘To the victims of racism
the vocabulary of rights rang hollow, a lullaby for perpetuating racial privi-
lege.’ The rupture between state and civil society came during the fourth
moment of redistribution of resources, which became imbricated in
regional, partisan, class, ethnic, gender and even familial cleavages.
Mamdani argues that the fourth moment that brought civil society into
existence became ‘the moment of the collapse of an embryonic indigenous
society, of trade unions and autonomous civil organizations, and its
absorption into political society’. He elaborates:
It is the moment of the marriage between technism and nationalism, of the

proliferation of state nationalism in a context where the claims of the state—
both developmentalist and equalizing—had a powerful resonance, particu-

larly for the fast-expanding educated strata. It is the time when civil
society-based social movements became demobilized and political move-
ments statized. (Mamdani 1996: 21)
Mamdani’s analysis helps us to comprehend the limits in current efforts

to build a common national vision in postcolonial Africa, especially those
related to the continued rural–urban divide. According to Mamdani, the
rural sector remained excluded from the mainstream colonial state and its
associated privileges and rights, administered under decentralized authori-
tarianism of invented ‘traditional administrative’ authorities. The postco-
lonial African state generally failed to integrate the rural sphere in its
postcolonial reform agenda, focusing more on deracializing the central
state without detribalizing the local state. The democratization agenda
was never extended to the rural sector, and there continued to be a discon-
nect between rural and urban sectors in the civic movement’s struggles for
democratization across the continent. In the case of countries such as
Zimbabwe, where the anti-colonial liberation war was fought in the rural
areas, the liberation struggle failed to deliver liberation to the peasants.
Analysis of the liberation struggle by scholars such as Norma Kriger has
shown that the liberation war and its legacy actually helped to entrench
authoritarianism and marginalization in rural areas. Where the traditional
chief used tradition and custom to enforce authoritarian local rule; the
guerrillas and party cadre used claims of revolution and development to
justify authoritarianism. Consequently, rural masses have remained sub-
jects rather than citizens even after bearing the brunt of the anti-colonial
armed liberation struggle. Given this background, it is important for civil
society efforts to deal with the national question and craft a national
agenda for democracy and development to be anchored not only on the
critical questions of decolonization, deracialization, democratization, de-
patriarchalization, and deimperialization, but also on the often neglected
issues of the continued rural–urban divide and the marginalization of rural
masses as a class from the both the national discourse and the nation-state.
The Nationalist Framework of a Common Vision

Any attempt to develop a common national agenda needs to start with a
nuanced analysis of the anti-colonial nationalist struggle that gave birth to
Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean identity, because it helped to define the set of
issues and core values that continue to shape Zimbabweans’ present and
future struggles for an inclusive citizenship. While the anti-colonial strug-
gle was characterized by ambiguities, contradictions and ambivalences
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011), it was
the most certain in terms of shaping a common foundation, a common
purpose, a shared legacy, common identity, belonging and a national
vision and agenda. Terence Ranger reinforces this point, arguing that the
sequence of nationalist thought and organization from the Bantu Congress
of the 1940s and early 1950s through the revived mass nationalist parties
of the late 1950s and early 1960s and into guerrilla war is crucial for con-
temporary debate about democracy in Zimbabwe (Ranger 1997). Brian
Raftopolous also emphasizes the significance of Zimbabwean nationalism
in the building of a common national vision. He correctly notes that
‘Nationalism, as a mobilizing ideology, has had a powerful presence in
Zimbabwean history’, although ‘we now have a more complex picture of
nationalism, reflecting both its resonance and its uneven differential pres-
ence’ (Raftopolous 1995: 115). Most of the economic, political and social
issues that dominated national discourse and struggles in the 1990s and
2000s, and even 2020, are traceable historically to the colonial and anti-
colonial politics of the 1960s and 1970s.
The national agenda for the anti-colonial struggle was not just to defeat
colonialism and construct an independent Zimbabwe, but also very much
a struggle for democracy and human rights that were denied by the colo-
nial state. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Zimbabwean national
question was understood as a colonial question and a struggle for a birth-
right. This articulation of the national question was encapsulated by anti-
colonial grievances of early nationalist leaders and their followers. As a
colonial question and a struggle for birthright, it was eloquently expressed
in the intellectual writings of early nationalists such as Ndabaningi Sithole
(1959), Nathan Shamuyarira (1965), Eshmael Mlambo (1972) and Enoch
Dumbutshena (1975). Sithole articulated this nationalist understanding
of the national question when he argued that African nationalism was
against European domination but not against the ‘white man’. He elabo-
rated that the basic constitutive elements of African nationalism included
the ‘African’s desire to participate fully in the central government of the
country; his desire for economic justice that recognizes fully the principles
of “equal pay for equal work” regardless of the colours of the skin; his
desire to have full political rights in his own country; his dislike for being
treated as a stranger in the land of his birth; his dislike for the laws of the
country that prescribe for him a permanent position of inferiority as a

human being’ (Sithole 1959: 37). This amounted to a liberal nationalist
and inclusivist articulation of the national question in which the educated
black elites used the evidence of education to claim inclusion within the
colonial society as equal citizens.
The early articulations of the national question emphasized the notion
of ‘partnership between people of all races without which there can be no
peaceful progress in this country’. There was emphasis on the non-racial
orientation of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC)
and its ‘complete loyalty to the Crown as the symbol of national unity’.
The SRANC also emphasized that it was opposed to tribalism (SRANC
1979: 3). This is why this first mass nationalist political formation, formed
in 1957, tried to define the national question in terms of seeking ‘national
unity’, ‘true partnership regardless of race, colour and creed’ and ‘a com-
plete integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere and the
social, economic and political advancement of all’.
While the National Democratic Party (NDP) that succeeded the
SRANC was more radical in its demands and defined itself as ‘a political
party initiated and led by Africans’ and dedicated to ‘the struggle for, and
attainment of freedom for African people of Southern Rhodesia’ (Nyangoni
and Nyandoro 1979: 21), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)
and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that succeeded the
NDP committed themselves to fight for ‘one man one vote as the basis of
government’. In its Policy Statement of 21 August 1963, ZANU commit-
ted itself to building what it termed ‘The ZANU State’, predicated as
nationalist, democratic, socialist, pan-Africanist; based on the rule of law,
separation of powers; unity, non-racialism and indivisible state principles
(ZANU 1963). At its Inaugural Congress of 12–13 May 1964 held in
Gwelo (now Gweru), the founder president, Ndabaningi Sithole, asserted
that ZANU ‘stands for democracy, socialism, nationalism, one man one
vote, freedom, Pan-Africanism, non-racialism and republicanism’
(Nangana and Nyandoro 1979: 75).
Almost throughout the whole African continent, gaining civil and
political rights was a constitutive part of the anti-colonial nationalist strug-
gle. This point is captured well by the Nigerian political scientist Claude
Ake, who has strongly argued that the language of the nationalist move-
ment was the language of democracy, as displayed in the writings of the
key nationalist intellectual leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah (I Speak of
Freedom); Nwafor Orizu (Without Bitterness); Jomo Kenyatta (Facing
Mount Kenya); Odinga Odinga (Not Yet Uhuru); Julius Nyerere (Freedom
and Development); Leopold Senghor (African Socialism); Amilcar Cabral
(Unity and Struggle); and Frantz Fanon (The Wretched of the Earth).
African nationalism denounced the violation of dignity of the colonized,
the denial of basic rights, the political disenfranchisement of the colo-
nized, racial discrimination, lack of opportunity and equal access, and eco-
nomic exploitation of the colonized. In the words of the celebrated African
nationalist leader and theoretician of the anti-imperialist struggle,
Amilcar Cabral:
We are fighting so that insults may no longer rule our countries, martyred
and scorned for centuries, so that our peoples may never be exploited by
imperialists not only by people with white skin, because we do not confuse
exploitation or exploiters with the colour of men’s skins; we do not want any
exploitation in our countries, not even by black people. (Cabral 1972)
Explaining the people’s aspirations in fighting against colonialism,

Cabral clarified that we should ‘always bear in mind that the people are
not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone’s head. They are fighting to
win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go for-
ward, to guarantee the future of their children’ (Davidson 1979: 45).
At the centre of the struggle were issues of belonging, citizenship,
resource ownership, and sovereignty. Later were added such aspirations as
socialism as part of the horizon of the struggle (Zeleza 2003). The opti-
mism and certainty of the vision was shared throughout the continent. As
Mahmood Mamdani reminisces about the age of African nationalism, ‘We
were against monarchy, against dictatorship, against neo-colonialism,
against imperialism. And we were for socialism, sometimes for democracy,
but always for socialism. Socialism had become a language in which we
spoke to one another’ (Mamdani 2010). The people were mobilized
around the vision of a more democratic and inclusive socio-economic dis-
pensation where citizens had equal opportunities to prosper, irrespective
of differences of race, ethnicity, gender and ancestry (Ake 2000: 46).
Those involved in the anti-colonial struggle were easily accepted as
‘freedom fighters’, despite some of their wartime excesses as documented
by Kriger for Zimbabwe’s Mtoko District. Democracy meant freedom.
Democracy was a solution to minority rule and its denial of civil and politi-
cal rights. Socialism meant equitable distribution of resources and inclu-
sive development. It was a solution to economic and social problems of
inequality, poverty and underdevelopment. Liberation meant the rebirth

of a nation in which those who have for centuries been reduced to ‘colo-
nial subjects’ are politically reborn as ‘sovereign citizens’ (Mamdani 1996).
While the anti-colonial nationalist struggle was basically a struggle for
democracy and inclusive citizenship, Stephan Mair and Masipula Sithole
explain how often there was lack of internal democracy during the libera-
tion struggle and how colonial authoritarianism became entrenched in the
nationalist struggle, reproducing itself within the nationalist movement
through violent and intolerant cultures (Mair and Sithole 2003).
Zimbabwean nationalism often emphasized monolithic unity at all costs,
did not tolerate pluralism, celebrated ‘commandism’ and sought to subor-
dinate all social movements to its imperatives. Even simple ‘disagreement
could mean death’ (Ranger 2003: 2). How the immanent logic of colo-
nialism impinged on anti-colonial nationalism, in the process reproducing
not only authoritarian practices but also tribalism and racism is important
to emphasize because it continued into the postcolonial practice of politics
and governance.
The Postcolony of Zimbabwe

With the attainment of political independence, the key issue about the
national question became that of nation-building and state-making. Anti-
colonial nationalism had to be transformed into a new framework for
national patriotism (Kaunda 1975). Unity was desperately needed for the
postcolonial nation and state to emerge, and black people had to be united
if a new nation had to be born. Ethnicity had always worked against unity
in the past. Zimbabwe, like other postcolonial societies, was constituted
by a kaleidoscope of different ethnic and racial groups. Trying to impose
national unity by force of arms resulted in the commission of atrocities in
Matebeleland and the Midlands regions barely two years into indepen-
dence (CCJP and LRF 1997). An unwritten policy of reconciliation was
proclaimed in 1980 as part of allaying the fears of whites. Lack of unity
also had implications for economic development. Between 1982 and
1987, efforts were expended on dealing with what was referred to as the
‘dissident’ problem, which in reality meant military conquest of
Matebeleland and the Midlands regions where the opposition PF–ZAPU
continued to enjoy political support. Only the signing of the Unity Accord
on 22 December 1987 brought to an end the low intensity war that cost
the lives of over 20,000 Ndebele-speaking civilians.
The post-1980 national question also entailed de-racialization and

Africanization processes to create advancement opportunities for the pre-
viously marginalized African groups. More importantly, the new govern-
ment had to begin to deliver services and development as part of its
fulfilment of the liberation war promises. People expected a better eco-
nomic and social life as well as a democratic environment different from
that which they endured under the colonial regime. The national question
could then be rendered from the people’s perspective as the ending of
poverty and underdevelopment imposed on the African people by
ninety years of colonial rule; and the bridging of the gap between the
poor, as the formerly colonized, and the rich, who were mainly the former
colonizers, in terms of equitable wealth redistribution, increasing income
and opening opportunities. This entailed deracialization of the patterns of
ownership of productive property. The people also expected sustained
economic growth and sustainable development as well as entrenching
democracy and the ensuring of greater participation of the people in the
system of governance.
While there were indeed commendable efforts at delivery of services in
the spheres of education and health, there was more of continuity in terms
of politics of repression and authoritarianism. This is why Ibbo Mandaza
characterized the Zimbabwean state of the 1980s as a ‘schizophrenic’ one
(Mandaza 1986: 1–18). While trying to uplift the previously impoverished
black people, the same state tended to repress them politically speaking.
But the first decade of independence was the most progressive in terms of
service delivery. The Willowgate Scar Scandal, however, indicated where
the country was going. The ZANU–PF political elite that had presented
itself as committed socialists concerned with welfare of the people, had
started ‘chewing’ the Leadership Code. White colonial primitive accumu-
lation was succeeded by black primitive accumulation. James Muzondidya
has correctly described the postcolonial project reform process as follows:
While at independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF government committed

itself to establishing a more cohesive nation-state based on democracy, rec-
onciliation, social justice and equality, and tried to transform and democra-
tize the structure of governance in urban and rural areas through
decentralization of powers and resources to local authorities, its post-
colonial project of building a just, equitable and non-racial society was not
achieved in the 1980s and the foundation for a truly democratic order was
not laid. (Muzondidya 2011: 8)
What was laid was an authoritarian political system carrying over from
the Rhodesian Front to ZANU–PF but hiding behind a facade of consti-
tutional democracy (Ncube 1991). From the late 1980s onwards,
Zimbabwe went on a downward spiral characterized by increased authori-
tarianism and corruption. By this time, what constituted the national
question had become highly contested, as ZANU-PF as a government had
revealed its true character of being violent, corrupt, unaccountable, arro-
gant and dictatorial. The introduction of executive presidency seems to
have marked the beginning of Zimbabwe’s overt descent towards authori-
tarianism and open corruption.
The Lancaster House Constitution began to undergo constant amend-
ments. The Leadership Code was abandoned. A drive towards a one-party
state was attempted forcefully. The Economic Structural Adjustment
Programme (ESAP) was introduced despite opposition from workers, stu-
dents and progressive intellectuals. Despite ZANU–PF’s attempts to use
violence and other means to control and dominate society while proscrib-
ing democratic spaces, its ideas and ‘national visions’ were always con-
tested, and the national question continued to be articulated around
questions of democracy, freedom and inclusive development. As
Muzondidya notes:
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the government struggled to

impose itself and its political ideals on the nation. Its power continued to be
challenged by a number of groups and individuals who felt excluded from
both the national project of development and the structures of political and
economic power. Such challenges ensured that there were always spaces in
which the state’s unpopular policies could be questioned, and that demo-
cratic tendencies were able to coexist with authoritarianism, uneasily.
(Muzondidya 2009: 200)
In direct response to ZANU PF’s attempts to continue centralizing

power and entrench dictatorship through an unaccountable system of
governance centred on the Executive Presidency, from the mid-1990s the
national question was mainly articulated in terms of constitutionalism.
The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and other civil society orga-
nizations, including the critical main labour union at the time, the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), began to demand a new
people-driven constitution to replace the Lancaster House Constitution
that had undergone a catalogue of amendments. The principle of
separation of powers was heavily compromised by a powerful and inter-

ventionist executive arm of the government. It was, therefore, not surpris-
ing that the 1990s became dominated by a new articulation of the national
question in terms of democratization and human rights discourses. The
formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September
1999 was a culmination of the crystallization of democracy and human
rights demands that emerged in the 1990s and the realization that
Zimbabwe needed a strong opposition with the potential of unseating
ZANU–PF. ZANU–PF had allowed the democracy and human rights
aspect of the national question to fall off the national radar as it pushed
more for regime security at whatever cost. Increasingly, democracy and
human rights began to be castigated as alien ideas.
The national question in postcolonial Zimbabwe also continued to be
articulated around questions of economic justice. In the face of a crisis of
livelihoods in the late 1980s and economic structural adjustment in the
1990s, Zimbabwe’s rural and urban communities increasingly began to
(re)organize themselves into powerful social movements that demanded
increased state protection from the growing hardships, better access to
health, education, jobs and business opportunities, and called for increased
public consultation in policy formulation (Murisa 1996: 16). From the
late 1980s, students mobilized themselves into a powerful social force that
led opposition to authoritarianism, one-party state, corruption and gov-
ernment neglect of workers and women’s rights. Pushed by the militant
workers suffering from the effects of ESAP and increasingly resorting to
strikes, from the mid-1990s, ZCTU increasingly transformed into a for-
midable labour movement that pushed for radical activism and a dual
agenda against political authoritarianism and neo-liberalism (Matombo
and Sachikonye 2010: 109–130; Bond and Saunders; Sutcliffe 2013).
From the late 1980s, there also emerged a new type of women’s social
activism that brought together women from diverse social and racial back-
grounds and challenged the state for its limited commitment to ending
women’s subordination and exploitation in society (Raftopolous and
Alexander 2006: 40; Kanji and Jazdowska 1993: 11–26). The social activ-
ism of the 1990s, as some analysts have noted, reached fruition between
1996 and 1998, when the constellation of social movements drawing their
constituents from labour, women, youth, students, intellectuals and the
unemployed collectively grouped into a shared struggle under the National
Constitutional Assembly (McCandless 2011; Matombo and Sachikonye).
During the same period, frustrated black business persons began to

push both government and white capital to create more opportunities for
their members through their own pressure groups, such as the Affirmative
Action Group, the Indigenous Business Development Council and the
Indigenous Business Women Organization (Muzondidya 2009: 191–192;
Maphosa 1998: 176–98). The thousands of war veterans who had been
demobilized at independence in 1980 also regrouped and mobilized their
members under the weight of the economic and social burdens of the
1990s. This turned into one of the most powerful social movements in the
1990s and extracted serious concessions from government, including the
1997 financial payouts that resulted in the October 1997 currency crush.
Frustrated with the government’s slow pace of land reform and confronted
by diminishing access to land, demographic pressures, deteriorating pro-
ductivity of available land and generalized decline in sources of income,
the rural population, including both peasants and war veterans, from the
late 1990s also increasingly applied underground social pressure, includ-
ing land occupation, to force land redistribution onto the policy agenda
(Moyo 2007).
What is clear from this discussion is that throughout the 1980s and
1990s, the national question in Zimbabwe continued to revolve around
the central issues of democracy, accountability, freedom and rights; politi-
cal and economic justice, including redistributive justice; economic and
political equality; and inclusive citizenship. In the 1990s, there was a con-
stellation and national convergence of social forces around these issues
mainly because civil society was able to articulate them as the national
agenda in a coherent rather than disjointed manner. The intensified pres-
sure mounted on the state by these social forces from the mid-1990s drove
the government into panic mode, and forced it to make major conces-
sions. The unbudgeted 1997 payout of compensation and pensions to war
veterans, for instance, was a panic reaction by a government that could not
withstand their pressure. The decision by government to embark on a
constitution-making process in 1999, in a move designed to deflate social
movement pressure by taking away the initiative from the NCA, was a
major concession and climb-down, and an indication of the government’s
acknowledgement of the collective power of the social forces represented
by the NCA. Its hijacking and cooption of the peasant-war veteran land
occupation movement from 2000 was similarly done in an attempt to deal
with pressure from this powerful social movement that was articulating a
common vision and national agenda.
Defining Post-2000 Zimbabwean National Issues

The key issues of democracy, accountability, freedom and rights, political
and economic justice, economic and political equality, and inclusive citi-
zenship that have been contested and remained central to the debate
about the national question in Zimbabwe throughout the country’s his-
tory have not been successfully resolved, and have continued to shape
people’s struggles around the country. However, since 2000 some of these
issues have become prominent while others have mutated and began to
express themselves in slightly different issues; yet they are still part of the
same unresolved challenges. For instance, from 2000 onwards the opposi-
tion MDC party and a significant number of citizens centred the national
agenda debate around the issue of democracy and human rights—an issue
that had also defined Zimbabwean citizens’ struggle during the anti-
colonial struggles from the 1950s. They used these democracy and rights
discourses to critique ZANU–PF’s nationalist discourse of liberation,
which they criticized for being ‘top-down, centralized, always trapped in a
time warp’. Just like the nationalist discourse before it, the MDC–civil
society national agenda discourse castigated ZANU–PF governance for its
lack of justice, equality and inclusivity, and for being based on patronage
and cronyism.
Another key issue on the national agenda in the post-2000 period was
the regular deployment of violence by ZANU–PF to deal with political
opponents, an issue that had also defined the national agenda during colo-
nial rule when nationalists managed to mobilize not only citizens but also
the international community against the Rhodesian government’s use of
violence against blacks. Under pressure from opposition, ZANU–PF
responded by mobilizing its structures of violence and even bragging of its
violent history, in the process inviting regular military forces and militias
to be partisan in defence of the regime (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 49–80).
Post-2000 elections were marred by violence, and political violence
reached its peak during the presidential election run-off of June 2008
(Masunungure 2009: 79–97).
The question of political violence and repression increasingly came to
occupy a central place in the national agenda debate because it was a ques-
tion that had haunted postcolonial Zimbabwe since the time of Operation
Gukurahundi in the 1980s. Raftopolous summarizes the core issues well
when he writes that:
From the late 1990s Zimbabwe entered a period that has come to be known
generally as the ‘Crisis in Zimbabwe.’ The crisis became manifest in multiple
ways: confrontations over land and property rights; contestations over the
history and meanings of nationalism and citizenship; the emergence of criti-
cal civil society organizations campaigning around trade union, human
rights and constitutional questions; the restructuring of the state in more
authoritarian forms; the broader pan-African and anti-imperialist meanings
of the struggle in Zimbabwe; the cultural representations of the crisis in
Zimbabwean literature; and the role of Robert Mugabe. (Raftopolous
2009: 201–202)
While the Global Political Agreement of 2008 and the Inclusive

Government of February 2009 tried to address issues of violence on the
national agenda, the issue of democratic reform continued to be a con-
tested national agenda issue that was never successfully resolved
(Raftopolous 2013a: xv). ZANU–PF continued to resist any changes that
threatened its continued prolongation in power and the perquisites that
power brought, while the opposition parties and a number of civil society
organizations (CSOs) pinned their hopes of democratic reform on a new
‘people-driven constitution’ (Masunungure and Shumba 2012: xiv). The
constitution-making process thus became another theatre of struggle for
opposition parties and civics, on one hand, and ZANU–PF, on the other.
The national question during this period, as Raftopolous correctly notes,
continued to be entangled in ‘conflicting notions of change’ itself
(Raftopolous 2013a: xv).
Post-July 2013 Contours of the National Question

The fundamental question that has been asked about the post-31 July
2013 phase is whether the national question and national agenda need to
be redefined. Did the contours, essence and meaning of the national ques-
tion undergo a paradigm shift after 31 July 2013 to the extent that it war-
rants redefinition? To scholars such as Brian Raftopolous, ‘the events of 31
July 2013 represented not simply a return to certain continuities of
ZANU(PF) rule, but also a reconstitution of the political terrain in
Zimbabwe, particularly around the immediate future of opposition poli-
tics in the country, and the possible implication of the Zimbabwean expe-
rience for regional politics’ (Raftopolous 2013: 972). According to
Raftopolous, the post-31 July 2013 period marked ‘the end of an era’:
It is fair to conclude that the politics of political and civic opposition that
emerged in the late 1990s and continued through the first 13 years of the
2000s has come to an end in its current form. The political and economic
conditions that gave rise to its emergence have changed substantially and the
social forces that have emerged […] pose new challenges for party and civic
organization and mobilization. (Raftopolous 2013: 986)
Raftopolous’ views are buttressed in the writings of Cornelius Ncube,

who also argues about the limits of the democracy and human rights dis-
course as a citizen-mobilizing ideology. For him, the outcome of the 2013
elections marked the ‘end of an era for human rights discourse’:
The strategy of the previous opposition to discredit the ZANU-PF regime’s

legitimacy in nearly every post-2000 election carried weight because of the
latter’s complicity in human rights abuses and violations. The peacefulness
of the 2013 elections and the absence of gross human rights abuses by
ZANU-PF not only during these elections but since the formation of the
coalition government in 2009 seem to have diminished the effectiveness of
the rights-based discourse as a tool to make morally and politically based
demands of or claims against the state. (Ncube 2013: 100–101)
Ncube goes on to add that the efficacy of deploying ‘human rights

discourse to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the ZANU-PF regime’ was
curtailed by the 2013 developments, and civic groups had to rethink the
articulation between rights and redistribution questions.
At regional and international level, the limits of the democracy and
human rights discourse as a mobilizing discourse were also exposed when
both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the
African Union not only endorsed the election outcome but also gained an
opportunity to disengage from their decade-long engagement on the
Zimbabwe national question after the adoption of a new constitution and
the holding of the July 2013 elections. The SADC Election Observation
Mission (2013) not only endorsed the election outcome but also declared
that ‘a new chapter in the process of consolidation of democracy in the
Republic of Zimbabwe [had] been opened’. The opposition parties’ and
citizens’ post-2000 ‘dry’ democracy and human rights discourse also
seemed to have lost its mobilizing currency within the international com-
munity, when most Western governments started to reengage the ZANU–
PF government after the adoption of the 2013 constitution and the
holding of relatively violence-free elections in the country.
From this analysis, it is clear that the post-2000 democracy and human
discourse that failed to effectively integrate other critical issues of eco-
nomic rights and justice, livelihoods and other socio-economic rights
issues within the broader national agenda discourse had lost its appeal for
Zimbabwean citizens by the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first
century (Manheru 2013). The reconfiguration of Zimbabwe’s political
economy in the 2000s, the deterioration of economic and social condi-
tions, and increased hardships on the part of citizens led to a process of
reconfiguration of citizen priorities, where issues of livelihoods and socio-
economic rights came to occupy centre stage in the national agenda
debate. As Morgan Tsvangirai clearly summed up the issue in his post-2013
election interview:
[…] In the early to late 1990’s a human rights agenda was at the forefront,
no doubt about it, but in a continent … facing other crises, obviously the
focus will change, depending on the crisis. And it puts the human rights
agenda at the bottom of priorities. (Raftopolous 2013)
Since the July 2013 elections, there has been community apathy to
politics and civic activism, which has been caused by political disillusion-
ment over the outcome of the elections and the mounting social and eco-
nomic hardships. Citizens disenchantment and apathy to politics worsened
soon after the July 2013 elections even within a context of deepening
economic challenges and social hardships. The broad sense is that citizens
are not interested in secular politics because it does not deliver results. A
growing number of people are turning to their community organizations,
such as churches, burial societies and informal residents’ groupings when-
ever they need to deal with problems as a collective.
All this calls for the civic movement to rethink its structures and forms
of interventions within this new context, and there is a need for broad-
based approaches that also place emphasis on economic governance issues,
including corruption, social services delivery and the enjoyment of all
human rights, that is civil political, social and economic (Raftopolous
2013). Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros’ Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of
the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America (2011) argues
for a broad national vision that calls for restructuring ‘the apparatus of the
state in the name of the oppressed’, as demanded and fought for by social
forces in civil society (Moyo and Yeros 2011: 13). In their analysis, the
national question is also broadened beyond the traditional political
economy articulation as an economic question. It is an open call for

rethinking nationalism itself as the discursive terrain within which national
agenda and vision has been crafted to make it reconnect social justice
redistributive agendas with democratic and human rights as well as femi-
nist and womanist agendas. The ongoing citizen protest movements being
coordinated by social media activists (hashtag activists) and community
leaders seem to have made this vital connection with changes in Zimbabwe’s
political landscape and citizen priorities and concerns.
The Hashtag Civic Movements and the Countdown

to the Fall of Mugabe
A lot has been said about the causes and motivation for the ongoing citi-
zen protest action. The explanations have ranged from spontaneous revolts
to organic citizen protest action to external conspiracy theories. Those in
government who have obviously been shaken by and worried about the
protests have contemptuously sought to dismiss them in public by depict-
ing them as products of machinations by the Zimbabwean government’s
enemies, especially the United States and French governments, who have
been accused by the government of funding the protests. Those outside
government who have been critical about the transformative potential of
the protests have depicted them as spontaneous actions ignited by govern-
ment recklessness. In these critics’ view, like other protests before them,
the current protests are bound to wilt as soon as the government manages
to introduce cosmetic reforms and partially address some of the popular
grievances that led to the initial protests, such as the government’s unilat-
eral promulgation of Statutory Instrument 64, which banned the import-
ing of a number of goods that are used in households and traded in the
informal sector, such as coffee creamers, camphor creams, white petro-
leum jellies, body creams, baked beans and potato crisps, among many
other items. Others who see some politically transformative potential in
these protests have explained the July stay away or #zimshutdown and the
series of demonstrations that immediately preceded it and those that came
afterwards as spontaneous and rootless acts by a new generation of social
movement activists mobilizing angry citizens to protest against unpopular
government decisions and policies, such as the banning of the importation
of essential household goods and increased corruption by the police.
Those who have tried to offer a more nuanced analysis of the ongoing
citizen protests have projected them as more than spontaneous outbursts
of popular anger. They have instead viewed them as an organic political
process resulting from long-term evolving processes on the Zimbabwean
political landscape in the post-July 2013 period of citizen disillusionment
with both the state and organized politics. The various developments in
this evolutionary political processes period, as Zimbabwean political ana-
lyst Simukai Tinhu has explained, include the lone protests of the likes of
Itai Dzamara and his Occupy Africa Unity Square colleagues (Tinhu
2016). They also include the uncoordinated and sporadic strikes, demon-
strations and acts of defiance by various groups and communities that have
taken place.
Since 2013, various communities and groups across Zimbabwe’s urban
and rural communities have been engaged in nascent social movement-
building processes through their activities exhibiting some levels of collec-
tive defiance of authority, reclamation of socio-economic rights and
recreation of independent livelihoods in ways that challenge the power of
the state and its domination of their lives. The youth and unemployed in
the main urban centres of Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare, for
instance, have increasingly engaged in a collective drive for autonomy and
recognition by trading in undesignated parts of the city, setting up their
own business stalls, operating unregistered taxis that do not pay tax to the
government and refusing to pay for unsatisfactory services, such as unreli-
able electricity and water. They have also consistently and collectively
resisted government attempts to clamp down on their informal activities.
Throughout 2014 and 2015, citizens in various parts of the country
organized themselves to protect their socio-economic rights and liveli-
hoods. Examples of such action included protests by the Matobo villagers
of Maleme against the takeover of their community land by a senior gov-
ernment official and the Masvingo Vegetable Vendors’ protest against the
municipal hiking of trading licence fees, which forced authorities to reverse
unpopular decisions. University lecturers, students and general staff at the
University of Zimbabwe also went on strike, resulting in the university’s
temporary closure after violent clashes between students and riot police.
Residents in the key towns of Harare, Bulawayo and Chitungwiza orga-
nized against pre-paid meters, while their counterparts in smaller towns
such as Kwekwe joined calls for a rates boycott against poor service deliv-
ery. These community protest actions all indicate a renewed public interest
in community activism and CSO community mobilization, which seemed
to have disappeared over the previous few years. Through their actions
could be easily dismissed as ‘the rumblings of the street’, these groups
were actually engaged in a kind of social protest politics—which are an
important resource for social movement-building.
The second phase, according to the political evolution school, took the
form of social media activism, in which a group of tech-savvy youths
started using the internet as a launch pad for attacks on Mugabe’s regime
towards the end of 2015. The most prominent and successful of these
social media activists was the youthful pastor Evan Mawarire, who, through
his videos and hashtag #ThisFlag, and the use of Facebook and Twitter,
generated popular support among citizens, reaching out to thousands of
disenchanted Zimbabwean citizens locally and abroad. Ongoing street
demonstrations, including rioting and demonstrations in Beitbridge, pub-
lic rioting in Harare and the mass stay away (#zimshutdown) in urban
areas during July, and the Movement for Democratic Change–Tsvangirai-
led mass demonstrations in the streets during August constitute the third
phase in this political continuum (Tinhu 2016). Following this logic,
there was little spontaneity in the current wave of protests, because they
were a result of natural progression in the country’s politics. In the words
of Simukai Tinhu:
In reality, importation ban through Statutory Instrument 64/2016 and the

numerous police roadblocks were just triggers, not causes. In particular,
#zimshutdown2016 was a paroxysm in what could be considered a third
wave phenomenon in protest politics. In other words, the protests should be
seen as part of the continuum of a new kind of politics that is increasingly
taking centre-stage on the nation’s political landscape. (Tinhu 2016)
From the discussion here, it is clear that after years of bottling up their
anger and trying to cope with their growing daily hardships, Zimbabwean
citizens had been pushed to the edge by the prevailing hardships, and
found the courage and motivation to take to the streets to express their
discontent. The list of their grievances included unpaid public-sector
wages, proliferating corruption, declining living standards and police
injustice. For instance, the delays in payment of civil servants in June 2016
led to a widespread strike of teachers, health workers and other civil ser-
vants. The July riots in Beitbridge were also sparked by the government’s
promulgation of Statutory Instrument 64, which banned the importation
of a number of products that were lucratively traded in the informal sector.
The unilateral ban, coming at a time when 90% of the population was
reportedly surviving on the critically important informal market, could
not have caused worse outrage. As Ian Scoones rightly points out, the
informal sector is the economy today: it cannot be ignored or wished
away. It is what the 90% live on, and policies that upset and disrupt it are
bound to be resisted (Scoones 2016). The protests in Harare were simi-
larly started by taxi operators protesting against the abuse of road blocks
by police, who aimed to extort money from taxi drivers.
Towards an Unclear Political Future

The ruling party, opposition and organized civil society groups were all
caught unprepared by the non-partisan citizen protests that erupted in
July 2016. What surprised many people about these protests was not just
their spontaneity and their sudden eruption after a period of general citi-
zen apathy to political action in the post-July 2013 period and relative
political quietness in the country, but also the high levels of popular sup-
port for the protests. Since the outbreak of these citizen protests, the
Zimbabwean political landscape has been reconfigured profoundly, and
there has been raging debate about the causes and motivation of the pro-
tests, their forms of collective mobilization and organization, their con-
nections and linkages with mainstream civil society, the opportunities,
challenges and risks created by these protests, and their potential for engi-
neering political and social change in Zimbabwe.
The citizen movements, especially hashtag movements, have success-
fully utilized social media to break the restrictions on political mobiliza-
tion in the closed political space of Zimbabwe. The way in which social
media activism has been used to mobilize and organize protests has opened
a new frontier of activism and collective mobilization. The very fact that
the hashtag movements have been able to translate online mobilization
into street demonstrations reveals the power of social media in politics and
the challenges faced by dictatorial regimes in controlling cyberspace.
Through cyberspace, those Zimbabweans in the diaspora and inside
Zimbabwe have been able to connect and strategize. The influential role
that social media has played in a context where there has been a vast spread
of internet use in Zimbabwe, primarily on smartphones, has created a
huge potential for further mobilization of citizens for collective action
(Magaisa 2016; Mlilo).
The ongoing civil protest movements have not only constituted a

renewed threat to ZANU–PF’s hegemonic rule but also contributed to
renewed citizen reassertiveness. Commenting on the protests during the
earlier phase of July 2016, Brian Raftopolous (2016b: 6) argues that the
current citizen protest movement is different to earlier forms of civic activ-
ism in that it did not appear to be driven by any specific party or civil
society organization. The citizen protest movements have operated fluidly,
mobilizing citizens through web-based hashtag movements, such as
#ThisFlag and Occupy Africa Unity Square, and operated through no
known or recognized public leaders, except for a few individuals who
occasionally spoke on behalf of the movements. The success of the citizen
protest movement has largely been based on the fact that it is rooted in
disaffection with the status quo, rather than any particular party loyalty.
To a large extent, the protests have been non-partisan and this has
made them much more popular on the ground, gaining support from
across the political divide, and making it more difficult for the state to
contain or dismiss on a political basis. For instance, Evan Mawarire’s
#ThisFlag movement managed to bring together Zimbabweans who held
varying political views to speak out against bad governance and state injus-
tices with one voice. Mawarire’s flag campaign was built around the
national flag rather than any political party ideology. His profile also helped
to appear to be an authentic voice against injustices and corruption at a
time when a growing number of Zimbabweans have lost faith in politi-
cians. The failure by political parties to deliver on public expectations has
seriously undermined popular confidence in political parties, the state and
its institutions. Many people across the country have lost confidence in
political parties and have increasingly sought advancement of their collec-
tive interests through social movements, such as community clubs and
churches. The fluid organizational networks and mobilization structures
of the citizen movements and their utilization of social media, particularly
the use of Facebook, Twitter, Viber, Snapchat, Instagram and WhatsApp
to communicate real-time information, has helped the movements reach a
wider social base.
The citizen movements have had a mass appeal mainly because they
speak to issues of real contemporary concern to Zimbabwean citizens: cor-
ruption, repression and a lack of economic opportunity, particularly
among youth and urbanites. While the politics of despair and desperation
has galvanized citizens into action, by focusing on topical and pertinent
issues such as the crisis, corruption and neglect of social services, citizen
activists keep the torch alight. The emphasis of the citizen movements on
poverty; injustice and corruption and the daily suffering of the people,
including even those in the security sector, might end up winning them
over onto the side of the people against a failing regime. What is provided
by citizen movements is the return of people power.
Notwithstanding the opportunities created and the success of the citi-
zen movements, their potential for facilitating democratic transition has
remained restricted by a number of challenges. These include over-reliance
on social media rather than community structures. As Blessing–Miles
Tendi cautiously warns in his widely circulated think-piece written in July
2016, social media activism can never substitute for organized political
activity on the ground (Tendi 2016). In his view, if the current citizen
movements, especially social media activists, want to make a successful
contribution to political change in Zimbabwe, they need to work in sync
with traditional civil society groups who have structures and leaders in the
communities that can be relied on to mobilize and organize citizens even
when the state blocks social media spaces. While traditional civil society is
currently crippled by a lack of funding, social media activists’ reliance on
low-cost mobilization and organizational processes makes it possible to
run sustainable programmes together.
Another glaring gap in the new citizen movement is its limited social
support base. The hashtag movement’s activist base is mainly made up of
young middle-class urbanites in Zimbabwe and others in the diaspora.
Hashtag activism has not reached older generations in the same manner
that it has the young because these generations are not accustomed to
engaging through multiple social media routes, in the same manner that
the young are doing. Moreover, although a significant number of
Zimbabweans are engaging in this way, a significant number of the poor
and unemployed do not have unlimited access to internet and social media
because of the high costs of these services, especially after the recent gov-
ernment directive to mobile services to suspend mobile data promotions.
The main limit of the new citizen movements are their urban concen-
tration. Most of the significant protests that have occurred since July 2016
have been in the main towns of Harare and Bulawayo, while others such
as Gweru, Mutare, Masvingo and Kwekwe have experienced little action.
Mass protest action has not reached the rural areas, where two-thirds of
the population lives, except for isolated protests by villagers against expro-
priation of their land by private developers. Only 34% of Zimbabwe’s
population is classified as urban by the World Bank. This is far less than
Tunisia where the Arab Spring started, where 68% is urban. Social media
use is less widespread in the rural areas. As a result, Zimbabwe’s rural
youth have played a marginal role in online activism, despite their numeri-
cal majority. It is therefore important for new citizen movements to forge
strategic partnerships with traditional civil society in order to develop
presence in communities. Traditional CSOs and community-based organi-
zations (CBOs) have established structures in both urban and rural com-
munities that are effective citizen mobilization.
Another key challenge that has weakened ongoing protest movements
is the absence of a broad and inclusive political strategy and a unifying
ideology among the key leaders. As critics have noted, ongoing citizen
activism in Zimbabwe has no well-crafted political agenda or common
vision beyond wanting to see Mugabe out of power. Mawarire, for
instance, has insisted that his activism is not aimed at regime change but at
making the government accountable through redressing the numerous
economic problems facing the country. Some activists, especially those
under the banner of Tajamuka, are openly calling for Mugabe to go. While
#ThisFlag movement is non-violent in its approach, the #Tajamuka/
Sesijikile movement is confrontational and the leaders mostly use marches
and demonstrations to pressure government into acting on their demands.
#Tajamuka/Sesijikile is also clear that it wants President Robert Mugabe
to step down. The leading activists have no consensus about who would
lead a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe and what that leadership’s agenda
should be.
More critically, the new citizen movement’s agenda has focused on
urban grievances, such as industrial jobs and improved social delivery ser-
vices. They have rarely included rural people’s grievances, and there is lit-
tle connection between rural and urban struggles. Rural people also have
grievances against the government, but they have different demands and
priorities from their urban compatriots. The new civic activism in
Zimbabwe has thus came to resemble what Partha Chatterjee (2004: 4)
has described as ‘the closed association of modern elite groups, seques-
tered from the wider popular life of communities, walled up within
enclaves of civic freedom and rational law’. It is therefore critical for the
new citizen movements to work with traditional CSOs and CBOs to build
a common civic agenda that infuses rural grievances into a broad national
agenda. This could help to broaden the social base of the new movements
and create a broad coalition that has greater political transformative powers.
The citizen movement is also primarily focused on socio-economic

issues and policy issues such as import bans and bond notes rather than
governance politics. As Chloe McGrath (2016) argues, this is a difficult
space to inhabit. While this positioning strategically disables ZANU–PF
and Mugabe from flagging the regime-change accusation, it limits the
political potentiality that citizen movements will produce concrete change
in a country where a change in the governance culture is needed in order
to address socio-economic rights. Successful citizen movements in other
parts of the world, such as Latin America, have sought to fight on all fronts
rather than just one (Earl 2008). Strategic alliances are needed between
traditional civil society organizations focusing on governance issues and
citizen movements to ensure that the new agenda pushes both socio-
economic rights and governance issues as a complete demand for basic
citizenship rights. Without such an alliance and a strategy that seeks to
fight the state on all fronts, it is easy for the state to isolate and divide the
citizen movements by pretending to accommodate softer issues (socio-
economic rights) while ignoring governance issues.
The main challenge to a coordinated civil society struggle for demo-
cratic change, however, is that there is an apparent disconnect between the
new citizen protest movements and traditional civil society. While the new
movements being coordinated by hashtag activists and community leaders
seem to have made the vital connections with Zimbabwe’s political land-
scape and citizen priorities and concerns, traditional civil society organiza-
tions have remained locked in the civil and political rights paradigm and
struggled to capture the nation’s aspirations or develop effective strategies
to connect civil society democratization agendas with ongoing commu-
nity struggles around livelihoods.
A number of traditional CSOs seem to have reached organizational
stagnation owing to a lack of ideas, lack of funding since 2013 and limited
connections with the new social bases, which include vendors, resettled
peasant farmers, artisanal and small-scale miners, Zimbabwean diaspora
labour migrants and the millions of unemployed youths and school drop-
outs who have come to numerically dominate the country’s urban land-
scape. They have also struggled to relate to the new generation of citizen
movement leaders and their movements, which seem to be able to mobi-
lize communities for action without structures and funding. Rather than
welcoming these citizen protests and seeing them as an opportunity to
scale up their community mobilization efforts, most CSOs have viewed
them and their leaders as competitors seeking to render traditional CSOs

irrelevant in the ongoing struggles for democratization.
Given all the challenges outlined here, there is a strong possibility that
the current citizen movements will come and go, and civil society will not
be able to seize on the current moment to translate citizen displeasure
with a dictatorial and failing regime into concrete politics capable of deliv-
ering democratic change (Ncube 2016). One can even speak of CSOs
failing to capitalize on the Gramscian interregnum, in which the new is
slowly coming to the fore and the old is taking time to die. In this political
vacuum, elements of the establishment, such as the military, might take
advantage of the situation and entrench themselves in strategic positions
of power (Youde 2016: 1; Pinto 2016; McGrath 2016: 1). The experi-
ences from countries that underwent the Arab Spring, such as Egypt,
where civic protests did not deliver democratic change but military rule,
show that those men and women who wield the monopoly of violence
often take advantage of power vacuums to deliver repetition with-
out change.
At the conceptual and theoretical level, the hashtag movements speak
directly to the will to live as opposed to the will to power as a driver of
politics. The Zimbabwean problem emanates from the fact that ‘the politi-
cal’ is understood from a Machiavellian perspective of the will to power
(Machiavelli 1992). The reduction of the political to the will to power
constitutes the original corruption of the political as a totality involving
the distortion of its noble vocation and essential function (Dussel 2008:
3). According to the leading decolonial theorist and philosopher of libera-
tion Enrique Dussel, the original and noble vocation of politics was
founded on the will to live, not the will to power (Dussel 2008). In this
original conception, ‘Politics is above all that action that aspires towards
the advancement of the life of the community, of the people, of humanity’
(Dussel 2008: 61). In the corruption of the political, the will to live is
‘negated by the Will-to-Power of the powerful’ (Dussel 2008: 78). But
‘Politics, as consensual and feasible Will-to-Live, should attempt through
all means to allow all members to live, to live well, and to increase the
quality of their lives’ (Dussel 2008: 85).
When the political is corrupted, power is understood as a ‘thing, an
object at hand, or a well-bound package’ that has to be conquered, taken
and then retained by all means necessary (Dussel 2008: 131). The funda-
mental consequence of this is that it gives rise to incorrect conceptions of
power as something readymade and available for conquest and retention.
Within this context of corrupted power, it is important to focus on chang-

ing people’s lives, their cultures (ways of doing things) and institutions
rather than on taking over political power. When politics is reduced to a
narrow and violent road, a movement that is preoccupied with taking con-
trol of already corrupted institutions and power structures will not benefit
the political community or the citizens. It will simply result in what Frantz
Fanon calls ‘repetition without change’, borne out of a skewed definition
of the national question (Fanon 1968).
In order to achieve the kind of transformation that gives citizens equal
opportunities for inclusive development and prosperity, Zimbabwe needs
to redefine, reconstitute and reconfigure the political from its framing
around the will to power into a new direction that privileges the people’s
will to live. As veteran nationalist and president of ZAPU Dumiso
Dabengwa remarked, ‘the national question that has bothered each one of
us is how to do we transform Zimbabwe from a pseudo-democracy to a
real democratic nation-state’ (Dabengwa 2011: 4). In his words, ‘we need
to change the system first and foremost, more than we just need to change
the person’ (Dabengwa 2011). Without a radical change of the concep-
tion, constitution, and configuration of the political that has a profound
effect on Zimbabwe’s political practices, we will remain with pseudo-
democracy backed up by a facade of constitutionalism.
The drive for a new inclusive constitution that gathered momentum
towards the end of the 1990s and was further boosted during the course
of the Inclusive Government was one indicator of the quest for changing
the foundation of the political in Zimbabwe. Now that Zimbabwe has a
new constitution, CSOs need to focus on breathing life into it by ensuring
that its provisions are operationalized. There are also many other areas
where civil society can actively play a role in pushing for the transforma-
tion of Zimbabwe to ensure that the national question is addressed. The
focus areas include contributing towards social cohesion in a country that
is emerging from high levels of polarization; putting pressure on govern-
ment to stamp out corruption; agitating for implementation of the find-
ings of the land audits; and focusing on the topical issues of employment
and devolution of power. Focusing on these tangible issues will certainly
give the struggle for democracy and human rights content and will free
civil society organizations and their funding agencies from the regime
change agenda. This democratic build-up did not culminate in a demo-
cratic transition. Rather, the gridlocked politics produced a military coup
that materialized in November 2017.
Conclusions
While the military coup of November 2017 was greeted with popular sup-
port by a people desperate for the end of Mugabeism, it did not lead to the
refounding of national politics through rescuing the emancipatory aspects
of liberation and decolonization. The military takeover’s notion of restor-
ing legacy had nothing to do with this, but had everything to do with who
captured the state. What the ordinary citizens expected at a minimum was
the implementation of the new constitution by whoever was taking over
from Robert Mugabe. Of course, because Zimbabwe is a former settler
colony with its unfinished business of decolonization, it would make a lot
of sense for any reform agenda to deliberately combine entrenchment of
human rights and redistributive justice as part of a struggle for liberation
and freedom. This has to be done concurrently with genuine and honest
dealing with the past, allowing acknowledgement of wrongdoing to enable
healing, reconciliation and the emergence of new humanity. Rewriting
inclusive histories that privilege both ‘his’ and ‘her’ stories and all margin-
alized narratives as part of nation-building and the establishment of a new
method of living together is urgent. For a country that has experienced
massive movement of people to other countries, rethinking belonging and
citizenship is imperative, including a redefinition of being Zimbabwean
beyond the current diaspora, veteran and born-free groups. Like other
postcolonial states, Zimbabwe has to rethink its ideological compass
beyond Mugabeism—which largely became a vague and emotional railing
against the West bereft of any democratic content.
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CHAPTER 4
Opposition Politics and the Culture

of Polarisation in Zimbabwe, 1980–2018
Zenzo Moyo
Introduction
The importance of opposition politics in consolidating democracy in post-
colonial African states has often been erroneously reduced to political par-
ties. The outcome of this mischaracterisation has been the development of
a “politics of opposition”, where every policy proposal, developed either
by the ruling party or by the opposition, is opposed not for what it is, but
for where it comes from. The agenda of opposition politics becomes less
about democratic governance and opening up closed political systems,
and more about contesting for state power at all costs. Opposition parties,
broadly defined as organised political associations of people working
together to compete for political office by offering alternative hegemonies
to that of the ruling party, should be appreciated for providing an organ-
ised platform where “hard politics” can be practised. However, it should
also be appreciated that these parties do not offer the entirety of opposi-
tion politics.
Z. Moyo (*)
Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA),
Johannesburg, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_4
86 Z. MOYO
The experiences and influence of African opposition political parties

cannot be properly understood without paying attention to the role and
impact of other sources of political opposition (Olukoshi 1998). Many
other stakeholders, such as civil society, universities (students and academ-
ics), research institutes, media and even dissidents within the ruling elite
contribute to oppositionist politics, and this fact needs to be acknowl-
edged. As will be shown in this chapter, civil society and opposition par-
ties’ operational spaces often intersect in developing countries to create
political cultures that have come to define societywide political engage-
ments. This is eloquently elucidated by Dolo (2006), who says:
Both NGOs and opposition parties engage a populace that has often been
excluded from the social and political mainstream seeking to assert their
interests or even provide services to them that the government is either
incapable of and/or unwilling to provide. Their mutual emphases on erect-
ing structures that foster public deliberation, problem solving, and partici-
patory governance make these social and political actors allies in the
prosecution of democracy.
The practice of democracy, presently hegemonic and often invoked as

an unproblematic exercise, is what undergirds the practice of opposition
politics. Many political theorists and writers (e.g. Shils 1968; Olukoshi
1998; Nkiwane 1998; LeBas 2006) have strongly argued that the exercise
of opposition politics serves to deepen and strengthen democracy. The
existence of opposition politics in and of itself creates an expectation
among citizens that whatever grievances they may have will be better artic-
ulated by those in the opposition. Teshome (2009), writing specifically
about opposition parties in Africa, argues that a true democracy is where
the ruling elite has an effective opposition, since opposition provides vital
competition on policy and ideological alternatives.
Indeed, if democracy is about opening closed political systems, then the
practice of opposition politics becomes the avenue by which participation,
inclusivity and accountability can be realised. Together with other aspects
of civil society (e.g. intelligentsia, media, non-governmental organisa-
tions), opposition parties are responsible for creating and developing pub-
lic opinion, which in turn feeds into the political culture of any society. In
developing states, especially those whose organic development was dis-
rupted both by colonialism and anti-colonialism struggles, the exercise of
opposition politics faces the extra burden of justifying its connection with
4 OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 87
the often exclusive politics of liberation. Thus, this chapter seeks not only
to delineate political cultures that have fashioned the repertoire of opposi-
tion politics in Zimbabwe, but also to show how these cultures—polarisa-
tion and the construction of a party-state—have combined and broadened,
in the process perpetuating and sustaining themselves.
Development of a Political Culture: Tending

Towards Polarisation
Zimbabwe is one of the many African countries that are still led by nation-
alist parties.1 In most such countries, the environment where opposition
politics is practised has been deliberately configured to make it difficult for
political opposition to thrive. In order to maintain or bypass this obstacle,
several cultures have been developed by political protagonists. The most
encompassing and far-reaching of these in post-independence Zimbabwe
is that of polarisation. As this chapter discusses, many political alliances
that were formed; results of elections since 1980; and the general practice
of opposition politics attest to the predominance of this culture. This is
not to say that polarisation and its vagaries emerged post-independence,
for it can be traced back to the epoch of colonialism. It only means that
post-independence political players have deemed it fit to maintain the exis-
tence of polarised politics and expand its utility for their own sustenance.
Simply put, polarisation has been deployed as a mobilisation strategy by
the political elite, who, in doing so, have managed to ring-fence the par-
ticularities of their politics to portray them as significantly different from
that practised by adversaries. But what do we mean by political polarisation?
Polarisation can be understood to mean the “widening of political and
social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the gravita-
tion of previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other
or both extremes” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 322). In addition,
as LeBas (2006) observes, where polarisation occurs as a social phenom-
enon, processes of inclusion and exclusion are emphasised through the
intensification of the boundary between them, which makes it possible to
identify actors in terms of us versus them. Within this binary setup, other
cleavages that define a society recede in importance, while the division on
which polarisation is based expands to organise almost all social
1
African countries still led by liberation movements include Namibia, Botswana, South
Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola.
88 Z. MOYO
interactions. Many political issues in society are constructed and defined in

binary terms of whether you are with us or with them. Those who fail to
find their way into the binary tension do not survive for long. In essence,
polarisation is crystallised when societal groups build alliances with other
groups that espouse similar ideas, in the process consciously creating
boundaries to ensure the exclusion of those whose ideas are interpreted,
rightly or wrongly, as contrary to their own. “Political polarisation there-
fore collapses complex interactions between political actors into a simple
battle between two groups, whereupon an uncritical consensus develops
within either of the groups” (Moyo 2018: 86). This uncritical consensus
in turn develops more polarising ideas, hastening a culture that frames a
society in binary terms. LeBas (2011) observes that polarising ideas are
chosen because they serve instrumental functions for elites in these groups.
This is more so for opposition groups, who may find it useful to define
exclusively what sets them apart from those in power. Even though this
may be harmful in the long run, in the short term it is useful because it
maintains discipline and internal cohesion. McCandless (2012) elucidates
on this strategic use of polarisation by some social movements in
Zimbabwe, who faced dilemmas of whether to prioritise political or eco-
nomic rights, and whether to work with the government or donors in
order to broaden their prospects for transformation. These dilemmas
became the bedrock of polarisation. And as it turned out, instead of lead-
ing to transformative change, the strategy expanded the phenomenon of
polarisation in terms of time, strength and structure.
McAdam et al. (2001: 322) emphasise that political polarisation
“hollows-out” the moderate centre, silences neutrals and impedes the
reconstitution of previous coalitions, sometimes violently. Two distinct
and dominant groups become discernible. Because political polarisation is
issue-based, these groups do not necessarily have to be of equal influence.
Thus, it does not matter even if one is disproportionately larger than the
other in terms of size, since the major determinant is not numerical, but
how entrenched their positions and counter-positions are. As this chapter
states, the phenomenon of polarisation has been deliberately institution-
alised in Zimbabwe as a political strategy by the ruling classes as well as
those in opposition groups.
Polarisation by and of itself creates cleavages, and in turn these divisions
buttress polarisation (Moyo 2018). Minor differences in a polarised envi-
ronment almost always balloon beyond proportion, and it becomes diffi-
cult to control their domino effect since even minor differences between
protagonists are made to fit into an existing polarisation dialectic. Thence,

where polarisation has been institutionalised, opposition politics turns
into politics of opposition. This means that even the best ideas proposed
by a political adversary, whether in the ruling class or opposition elite, are
rejected not because of their value proposition, but because they are inter-
preted within the polarisation dialectic. Protagonists in a polarised rela-
tionship often elaborate themselves in terms of personnel, and as they do
so, internal uncritical consensus on ideas develops. The alliances that were
formed in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2018 have more often than not
defaulted to the polarisation dialectic.
Having said this, it is important to emphasise that polarisation as a
political strategy does not completely close off the existence of other polit-
ical assemblages that are not defined by the polarisation dialectic. Moyo
(2018) illustrates this subtle position. The existence of two distinct adver-
saries, Group A and Group B, does not necessarily preclude the formation
of other protagonists that we can call Group C+. The polarisation phe-
nomenon simply means that the role that C+ plays will dissipate because A
and B will appropriate most of the political space available in the polity.
The result, over time, will be that C+ will either disappear into oblivion,
continue to subsist a miserable life or gravitate towards either A or B,
unless it becomes popular enough to take over the position held by
either A or B.
The culture of political polarisation in Zimbabwe has gone through
several distinct phases, three of which are worth noting. Between 1980
and 1987, the polarisation tension was defined more by ethnicity, region-
alism, centricism and the desire by the Zimbabwe African National Union–
Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) to subordinate or control all political
formations and civil society (Raftopoulos 2004). For the decade between
1988 and 1999, the dialectic was mainly between the ruling party and
some strong aspects of civil society, which included labour, students and
the human rights movement. These organisations stepped into the arena
of opposition politics at a time when opposition parties were at their weak-
est, while the ruling nationalist party’s unbridled dominance was on the
rise (Mlambo 2014). After 2000, the tension was between the ruling
party, together with a small section of civil society on one side, and the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and a broader group of civil
society organisations on the other. In all these three phases, which will be
further discussed, the opposition had to contend with a complex
90 Z. MOYO
party-state system, another culture that the ruling party had instituted
since independence. Its reach and effects are explained in the next section.
The Creation of a Party-State: Landscape

for Opposition Politics
In interrogating the exercise of opposition politics in any given country,

one must examine the nature, composition and the role of the state in
shaping the landscape in which politics has to be exercised. The role of the
state is mainly defined by its ideological orientation, which is to say
whether it gravitates towards Marxist or liberal ideas. The most salient dif-
ference between Marxists and liberals in their interpretation of the state is
in relation to their interpretation of its role in adjudicating universal soci-
etal interests. Marxists’ views are based on a belief that, even though it
may not be absolute, the state works mainly for the interests of the ruling
or capitalist class by virtue of the ruling class’ control of state institutions
(Moyo 2018). Femia (1987: 28), interprets a Gramscian conceptualisa-
tion of the state by characterising it as a “complex of political and theoreti-
cal activit[ies] by which the ruling classes not only justify and maintain
their domination, but also succeed in obtaining the active consent of the
governed”, in the process accounting for its hegemony. Thus, for Marxists,
the structure of the state and its various institutions are instruments that
ruling classes use to accomplish their ends, albeit in some instances man-
aging to harness the active participation of the dominated. The hegemony
of the ruling elite, therefore, is constructed through a careful balancing of
coercion and consent, with the ultimate objective being to accumulate and
consolidate power (Moore 2008; 2014).
In contrast, liberals (e.g. Locke, Weber and de Tocqueville) hold the
view that a state is a neutral entity made up of a set of independent and
autonomous institutions such as the executive, judiciary and the legisla-
ture. Its neutral character, according to liberal thinkers, should help the
state to adjudicate fairly all competing interests that define society. Chipkin
(2012: 4–5) asserts that, in liberal terms, the state should “provide a neu-
tral framework with which different conceptions of good life can be pur-
sued”. Chipkin further alleges that the fulcrum of a liberal state is a
bureaucracy that can be organised autonomously from the egocentric
interests of any social class or group of individuals, therefore making it a
reliable instrument to guarantee the autonomy of institutions such as par-

liament, the executive and the judiciary.
How do these two almost contradictory conceptions of the state inter-
pellate the practice of opposition politics in developing countries such as
Zimbabwe? After attaining independence, many developing countries,
including Zimbabwe, adopted a hybrid role for the state, where dominant
liberal practices interwoven with some aspects of Marxism guided the new
ruling elite. However, once these nationalist parties tasted the power of
authority, they abandoned the Weberian notions of state in order to gain
unfettered access to state structures, which led to the blurring of lines
between party and state. This resulted in the parameters of the ruling party
penetrating those of the state, leading to what some theorists (e.g. Zolberg
1966; Widner 1992; Moore 2003; Southall 2016; Shumba 2018) have
characterised as a party-state. In analysing the emergence of the party-state
phenomenon in West Africa, Zolberg (1966: 124) defines it as a “party-
dominant” as opposed to a “government-dominant” system of gover-
nance. Many state structures, including parliament, the executive and the
judiciary become extensions of the ruling party. In a party-state, even
though there may be occasional attempts by the bureaucracy to portray a
separation between state and party, it is always difficult to succeed “because
in the eyes of the population it is impossible to be loyal to two modern
chiefs”, since most senior bureaucrats are always senior members of the
ruling party (Zolberg 1966: 126). To this end, as Moyo (2018) argues,
the public service gets overwhelmed by the political, as state institutions
such as the police, the courts, public media and the army become partisan,
and those who attempt to resist this co-optation are pushed out of
the system.
The description of a party-state as outlined here is linked to a relatively
new political framing known as Mugabeism. In his book Mugabeism?
History, Politics and Power in Zimbabwe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015)
describes Mugabeism as a degenerated nationalism where a single indi-
vidual and his political party try to symbolise a nation, albeit with no
coherent ideological content. In the context of Zimbabwe, Mugabeism
involves processes that consistently worked to delegitimise all other politi-
cal actors that threatened Mugabe’s power, and was practised mostly as
the politics of survival and opportunism during a crisis (Moyo 2018). This
is what this chapter refers to as a party-state culture, which contextualises
the environment in which opposition politics have been practised since
1980. The nationalist government that came into power at independence
92 Z. MOYO
sought to create a party-state from the onset. Senior party members were
deployed to lead and staff all state institutions that mattered. This meant
not only that institutions were to be attuned to serve the narrow interests
of the ruling party, but also that any opposition party in existence at the
time, or still to be formed, would find it very difficult to operate, since the
political landscape was to be deliberately and progressively configured to
respond mainly to the interests of those in power. For example, the lon-
gest serving Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (Godfrey
Chidyausiku) was a former ruling party deputy minister. The longest serv-
ing Police Commissioner (Augustine Chihuri) and all army and air force
commanders since independence were members of the ruling party. The
neutrality of the state in the execution of its duties is not possible if all
decision-makers within the bureaucracy are linked to one political party.
This portended a skewed engagement between those in power and those
in opposition politics, as will be outlined next.
Political Players and Relations Post-Independence

(1980–1990)
Upon winning elections in 1980, ZANU–PF purported to form an inclu-
sive government by including members of the Patriotic Front–Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (PF–ZAPU) in the new cabinet. In ZANU–PF’s
terms, all of its political adversaries were to become its allies simply because
the ruling party had undertaken a hegemonic construction project that
was designed to consolidate its newly found power. The language of rec-
onciliation dominated every sector of the post-colony state, and this was
reflected in Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s 1981 New Year’s Eve speech,
in which he declared to the nation that “our new nation now demanded
of us either as individuals, or communities, a single loyalty that is a proper
and logical manifestation of our national unity and spirit of reconciliation”
(Moyo 1993: 7). PF–ZAPU, the largest opposition in the country at the
time, and some major aspects of civil society responded positively to this
call and submitted themselves wholly to the new ruling elite. PF–ZAPU
became part of the “inclusive government” and some of its senior mem-
bers, including its president, Joshua Nkomo, were appointed into cabinet.
There were other smaller opposition political parties that were not
invited into the inclusive government. These included the Abel Muzorewa-
led United African National Council (UANC), which had won only three
parliamentary seats in the 1980 elections and none in subsequent elec-

tions. There was also ZANU–Ndonga (led by the nationalist Ndabaningi
Sithole), which did not win any seats in the 1980 or 1985 elections, but
was to win one seat in its tribal stronghold of Chipinge in 1990, two in
1995 and one in the 2000 elections. It is likely that these two opposition
parties and other smaller ones were not invited into the new government
by Mugabe because their support base was insignificant enough to be of
no trouble in the hegemony building project that ZANU–PF was about to
start. Furthermore, in the eyes of ZANU–PF, the UANC and ZANU-
Ndonga had discredited themselves by participating in a compromised
internal arrangement with the Rhodesians in 1979, which was subse-
quently overruled by the Lancaster House negotiations later that year.
However, and as observed by Raftopoulos (2004), before long it
became clear that ZANU–PF’s policy of reconciliation and its attendant
hegemony building project were to be based on the subordination and
control of opposition parties and civil society. The success of this project
was to depend not on the ruling party’s ability to fulfil the objectives of the
liberation struggle, but on the co-optation, and then confrontation, of
those who had the potential to resist the ruling party’s hegemony. As early
as 1982, contradictions began to emerge between ZANU–PF and PF–
ZAPU. A “discovery” of military arms was made at PF–ZAPU-owned
properties in February 1982, which led to the immediate arrest of senior
PF–ZAPU leaders, and the party’s members in cabinet were expelled. In
retaliation to this ill treatment of their revered leaders, some ex- Zimbabwe
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZAPU’s military wing) combatants, who
had been commissioned into the post-independence armed forces,
deserted, some of them retaining their weapons. They went back into the
bush, albeit as an unstructured and unorganised army. This provided an
excuse for the party-state to deploy a specially trained-for-purpose army
unit, tagged the Fifth Brigade, which was deployed exclusively in the
Matabeleland and Midlands regions of the country—where PF–ZAPU
had significant influence and support.
This military operation was christened gukurahundi, a derogatory
Shona adjective for the “first spring rains that clean-up the veld-chaff after
a long dry spell” (Todd 2007: 356). If anything, the objective of the
operation was in its name, to clean up what the ruling elite interpreted as
dirt in PF–ZAPU strongholds. This army unit, trained by North Koreans,
operated outside normal army structures and its commander, Perence
94 Z. MOYO
Shiri,2 reported directly to Mugabe. In concert with other historians,

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002) interprets gukurahundi as a legacy of historical
antagonisms between the Shona and Ndebele, as well as antagonisms
between ZAPU and ZANU politicians that dated back to the 1963 split,
and the legacy of mistrust between liberation armies of these political par-
ties.3 Coltart (2016) argues that gukurahundi had political rather than
military objectives. Mugabe and his party had desired a one party-state
system even before he assumed power. He therefore targeted ZAPU and
its supporters because they stood in the way of fulfilling this objective.
Serious human rights abuses, including the massacre of over 20,000 civil-
ian members of the Ndebele ethnic group, were committed by this heavily
armed military brigade, which was unleashed for more than four years to
chase fewer than 400 dissidents (CCJP 2007; Alexander et al. 2000;
Coltart 2016). For all intents and purposes, gukurahundi portended
political polarisation between those in power and those who offered the
best challenge to that power.
In December 1987, gukurahundi came to an end after PF–ZAPU
capitulated, ostensibly to achieve an end to the senseless killing of inno-
cent civilians in its name. A Unity Accord was signed by both ZANU–PF
and PF–ZAPU from which emerged a purportedly “new party” that has
come to be known as ZANU–PF, a name no different from that of the
victor. As expected, the signing of the agreement ended the military
campaign against PF–ZAPU and the people of the Midlands and
Matabeleland (Raftopoulos 2004; Kriger 2006). It also ended the history
of opposition between these two nationalist parties, not least the Ndebele
and Shona divide as well as regional exclusivity. The result of PF–ZAPU’s
capitulation and the subsequent signing of the Unity Accord led to the
emasculation of the only opposition party of note in the country, and it
became clear that the unity agreement was meant to control and subordi-
nate opposition politics. This is true because thereafter, and not for lack of
trying, it took the country over a decade to fashion an opposition party
that was capable of seriously challenging the nationalist party.
2
Perence Shiri was promoted to Air Force of Zimbabwe Commander in 1992, and in
2017 participated in the military coup that deposed Mugabe; he was rewarded with a minis-
terial position in 2018. For more about the military coup, see Chap. 8 in this volume.
3
For more on gukurahundi, see CCJP and LRF (1997), the first comprehensive report to
be produced after the disturbances; also see CCJP (2007); Alexander, McGregor and Ranger
(2000); Eppel (2004); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002; 2012); Cameron (2018); Doran (2017).
Talk about institutionalising a one-party-state, which had been long

proposed within ruling party circles, gained momentum after the signing
of the Unity Accord (Moyo 2018). Some of the ruling party’s senior
members, including its legal affairs secretary at the time, Edson Zvobgo,
even suggested that it was possible to sneak in such a system without alter-
ing the constitution simply through winning all seats in the next elections,
which were due in 1990 (Doran 2017).4 In fact, the dissolution of PF–
ZAPU between 1987 and 1989 robbed the country of the only organised
opposition party that could challenge the ruling party’s hegemony, and in
parliament all but one seat belonged to the “new” ruling party (Sachikonye
1991; Moyo 1993; Muzondidya 2009).
Even though it consolidated the ruling party’s hegemony, the signing
of the Unity Accord in itself failed to end political polarisation in the coun-
try. Moyo (1991) posits that the signing of the Accord in 1987 gave lead-
ers a false expectation that unity, for them more important than democracy,
would be achieved. Overt in this flawed logic was a threat of violence to
any political formation that sought to wrestle power away from the nation-
alist party, as would be attested not only by the violence meted out on
human rights and civil society activists and MDC members a decade later,
but also the blatant threat from commanders of the armed forces, who
openly declared that the office of the president in Zimbabwe was a strait-
jacket reserved for those who participated in the liberation struggle, and
that they would never salute (read allow) any president who did not have
liberation struggle credentials (Nehanda Radio 2009; The Zimbabwean
2011; Gagare 2017). This self-allocated power by the military command-
ers made them into king-makers, as will be shown. Since the signing of the
Accord, the politics of the nationalist parties has come to be used to pro-
duce insiders and outsiders in Zimbabwean politics (Kriger 2006; Dorman
2006), in itself a perpetuation of the polarisation dialectic. Thus, towards
the close of the first decade when civil society in the form of labour and
students’ movements took up the oppositional role to challenge the ruling
class on several grounds, which included corruption, the de facto one-
party state,5 and the liberal trajectory the state had increasingly adopted,
4
Legally, owing to the constitutionally enshrined ten-year embargo on altering the consti-
tution, it would have been difficult to implement the one-party system before the expiry of
the ten years. Thus, ensuring that the ruling party won all seats outright would have been the
shortest route to achieve the goal.
5
For more on the one-party-state system that was almost instituted in Zimbabwe, see
Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991).
96 Z. MOYO
this exclusionary and polarising liberationist language re-emerged. It was

to be expanded further around 1999 when the MDC, a very formidable
opposition party, was formed, which will be discussed later in the chapter.
Civil Society and Opposition Politics

In relative terms, the labour movement and the student movement were
the most developed aspects of civil society during the first decade of inde-
pendence. They both grew and consolidated with massive assistance from
the party-state. However, their relationship with the ruling class has been
a chequered one, which portends for an interesting examination. Owing
to space limitations, this chapter will confine its interrogation of civil soci-
ety to just two—the labour movement and the students’ movement.
The Workers’ Movement

The labour movement submitted itself to the new dispensation in 1981
when fifty-two labour unions belonging to disparate federations were
brought together by ZANU–PF to form one federation, the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).6 Two members of ZANU–PF, Alfred
Makwarimba and Albert Mugabe,7 were elected president and secretary-
general, respectively. The ruling party had already started to consolidate
its project of party-state building, and by deploying ZANU–PF cadres to
lead the federation meant ZCTU had to develop a close relationship with
the emerging party-state. This helped to keep labour, a potential source of
opposition politics, on a tight leash. The influence that these party deploy-
ees soon exacted within the labour movement can be exemplified by the
following message to workers in 1981 given by Albert Mugabe:
Strikes do more harm than good. We do not need to retard economic prog-
ress by arranging strikes… There are some bad eggs in the union move-
ment… There are some people in the movement who go out looking for
difficulties and try to be difficult. We will watch them closely and discourage
striking as much as we can. (Saunders 2001: 139)
6
The fifty-two unions were organised under six different federations, with the National
African Federation of Unions (NAFU) and the African Trade Union Congress (ATUC)
being the most dominant. NAFU was linked to ZAPU while ATUC was closer to ZANU
(Sachikonye 1995: 132).
7
Albert Mugabe was a brother of President Robert Mugabe.
Of course, it cannot be denied that the close relationship that devel-

oped between labour and the new government also came with some ben-
efits for the workers, notably within the legal framework, where several
Acts beneficial to the workers were enacted. These included the 1980
Minimum Wages Act, which permitted government to periodically set
minimum wages for workers, the Employment Act of 1980 and the
Employment (Conditions of Service) Regulations of 1981, which pro-
tected workers against arbitrary dismissal. Thus, for at least the first five
years post-independence, the labour movement marched in unison with
the new ruling class, and supported almost all the projects that the new
ruling elite instituted. This was to change towards the end of the decade,
as will be discussed later in the chapter.
The Student Movement

The student movement, another potential source of opposition for any
government, had a similar genesis to that of the ZCTU. Zeilig (2006:
108) describes the life of Zimbabwean students who were at tertiary insti-
tutions in the early years of independence as state-privileged owing to
their “rarefied and privileged existence”. Zeilig (2007) argues that stu-
dents were the most pampered section of post-colony society, who were
being educated to run the new bureaucracy; therefore it was paramount
that their grooming was to be in tandem with the agenda of the ruling
party. In reciprocation, their activism was in most cases geared to support
the ruling party’s programmes and, as the ruling elite would have put it,
to consolidate the gains of independence. In the period between 1980 and
1988, university students and the party-state developed cordial relations,
and students took every opportunity available to show that they were
marching in step with the ruling party. They held several demonstrations
to prove this, one of which supported the party-state’s 1983–1987 heavy
clampdown in Matabeleland. This was in spite of the fact that this violated
innocent civilians’ human rights. Some students even requested to be
trained and armed to go and fight the “dissident epidemic” in Matabeleland
(Dorman 2001: 75). This was very uncharacteristic of university students,
who should be critical of power. However, it was also understandable in
the sense that the student movement in Zimbabwe had strong historical
connections with the ruling party that had developed during the liberation
struggle.
98 Z. MOYO
Why Civil Society and Party State Relations Soured

The support that the ruling party gained from civil society in general, and
students and workers in particular, in the early years of its rule was not
undeserved. The new party-state massively expanded the provision of
social services to many people who had previously been discriminated
against. It invested in education and health, and tried its best to effect the
vision of education and health for all by 2000. Poor students went to uni-
versities and tertiary institutions without any need to pay tuition; in fact,
they received subsistence grants and student loans from the party-state.
Enrolments at schools and tertiary institutions increased massively. For
example, enrolment at the only university in the country at the time, the
University of Zimbabwe, rose from 1481 to 7699 students between 1980
and 1988, an increase of 420 per cent (Zeilig 2006). Comparable growth
also happened in teacher training colleges, where figures for trained teach-
ers rose from 18,483 in 1979 to 60,886 in 1989 (Kanyongo 2005;
UNESCO 2001). Treatment and medical care in clinics and hospitals was
at the expense of the party-state. These gains were assisted by the rapid
economic growth experienced in the first two years of independence,
which, according to Muzondidya (2009), averaged 12 per cent per annum.
There was also massive external funding that propped up the new govern-
ment. In a sense, it was clear that the ruling party was committed to insti-
tuting a “developmental state”, based on inclusivity and social justice
(Muzondidya 2009: 174). Thus, in return, the emerging civil society,
intelligentsia, workers and students, with the exception of those affected
by gukurahundi in Matabeleland and Midlands, felt indebted to the party-
state, and the hegemony-building project of the ruling class was enhanced.
The period between 1987 and 1989 was a busy one in Zimbabwe polit-
ically. First, the Unity Accord was signed in December 1987 after a pro-
tracted negotiation process. As outlined earlier, the extermination of
PF–ZAPU created a huge vacuum in opposition politics. This also meant
that the other side of the political polarisation dialectic was left unoccu-
pied. However, this was not the case for long, since the cordiality between
the party-state and the students and workers came to an end at around the
same time. This disengagement led to serious confrontation between civil
society and the party-state. Students and workers embarked on intermit-
tent demonstrations. These became an open challenge to the party-states’
growing hegemony, after enjoying unbridled ascendance since indepen-
dence. Both labour and students, taking advantage of the political
liberalisation brought about by the cessation of hostilities between

ZANU–PF and PF–ZAPU (Saunders 2001), became both the de facto
voice of the opposition and the edifice that occupied the other side of the
polarisation boundary vacated by PF–ZAPU. This makes it possible to
argue that even at its strongest and most persuasive moment, the practice
and dynamism of hegemony always opens itself up to challenge and resis-
tance (Guha 1997), almost as if it is digging its own grave. In Zimbabwe,
as the dominance of the ruling class grew, the deputies created in anticipa-
tion of a united post-colony became the disrupters of that dominance.
Thus, in the second decade after independence, these two major aspects of
civil society offered a spirited and militant political opposition to the party-
state. They did so with no significant support from weak opposition par-
ties, which is the subject of the next section.
Weak Opposition Party Politics in Zimbabwe

Upon stumbling across Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) figures,
which indicated that 118 political parties had registered to participate in
the 2018 harmonised elections, someone not so well versed with politics
in Zimbabwe would be forgiven for thinking that the country is a thriving
democracy. Forty-eight of these political parties went on to participate in
the harmonised elections, with forty-one of them being first time partici-
pants. The presidential race, even more out of step with past trends, was
contested by twenty-three aspirants. These figures, juxtaposed with previ-
ous trends, are astounding. In parliamentary elections between 1980 and
2013, fewer than ten political parties participated in each election, with
the exception of 2008 when the number rose to fifteen. For the presiden-
tial polls between 1990 and 2013, the highest number of participants was
five candidates, in the 2002 and 2013 elections. The absurd 2018 figures
are not a reflection of a tolerant political system, but one that lacks regula-
tion in the registration of political parties, possibly to benefit the incum-
bent, who has unfettered access to state institutions and funding. One
only needs to call for a press conference and announce the formation of
one’s party. Therefore, they register with ZEC only for the purposes of
participating in electoral processes. This registration is a mere formality
that is made even easier by the Electoral Act’s (Chapter 2: 12 of 2004)
very loose description of a political party, which defines it as “an associa-
tion of persons the primary object of which is to secure the election of one
100 Z. MOYO
or more of its members to a local authority or parliament, or to secure the

office of president, or to campaign for a specified result at a referen-
dum” (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 2018). This very elastic defini-
tion contextualises the emergence of many political parties in the build-up
to elections, more so in the 2018 context. However, as will be seen in
Table 4.1, the presence of these parties has not disrupted the status quo
owing to the entrenched polarisation phenomenon that hollows the mid-
dle by recognising only two dominant sides of the dialectic, as contextual-
ised earlier.
Zimbabwe’s 1990 presidential elections, the first after the signing of
the Unity Accord in 1987, had only two candidates, the then incumbent,
Robert Mugabe, and challenger Edgar Tekere, leader of the newly formed
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). The eccentric Tekere, a veteran
Table 4.1 Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections conducted
between 1990 and 2018
Election Winner results Vote Second-placed Vote Third-placed Vote
Year share results share results share
1990 Robert Mugabe Edgar Tekere (ZUM) None

(ZANU–PF)
2,026,976 83.05% 413,840 16.95%
1996 Robert Mugabe Abel Muzorewa Ndabaningi Sithole
(ZANU–PF) (United Parties) (ZANU Ndonga)
1,404,501 92.76% 72,600 4.8% 36,960 2.44%
2002 Robert Mugabe Morgan Tsvangirai Wilson Khumbula
(ZANU–PF) (MDC) (ZANU-Ndonga)
1,685,212 56.2% 1,258,401 42% 31,368 1%
2008a Morgan Tsvangirai Robert Mugabe Simba Makoni
(MDC-T) (ZANU–PF) (MDK)b
1,195,562 47.9% 1,079,730 43.2% 207,470 8.3%
2013 Robert Mugabe Morgan Tsvangirai Welshman Ncube
(ZANU–PF) (MDC-T) (MDC)
2,110,434 61.09% 1,172,349 33.94% 92,637 2.68%
2018 Emerson Mnangagwa Nelson Chamisa Thokozani Khupe
(ZANU–PF) (MDC-Alliance) (MDC-T)
2,456,010 50.67% 2,151,919 44.4% 45,513 0.9%
Table compiled by the author

These results are for the first round only
a
b
Simba Makoni contested the election as an independent candidate, but was endorsed by the Arthur
Mutambara-led MDC. This explains the source of the 8.3 per cent of the vote, which was roughly equiva-
lent to the seats that were won by Mutambara’s MDC
nationalist and former secretary-general of ZANU–PF, had been fired

from the ruling party (in 1988) for his consistent criticism of the party,
and for openly challenging the party’s desire to establish a de jure one-
party state. He, together with other senior ZANU–PF members, such as
Byron Hove and Sydney Malunga, had become an opposition within the
ruling party. Although other opposition parties existed throughout the
1980s, their influence was very insignificant. For example, there was the
UANC, which was perpetually hamstrung by the stigma of Muzorewa’s
participation in the 1979 internal settlement. There was also ZANU–
Ndonga, which, in addition to its tainted image after partaking in the
internal settlement, was also incapacitated by the absence of its leader,
Ndabaningi Sithole, who had been holed up in self-imposed exile in the
United States since 1983 (Nkiwane 1998).
Thus, between 1988 and 1990, Tekere, with solid revolutionary and
nationalist credentials, joined forces with the resurgent labour and student
movements to challenge the political monopoly of the ruling party.
Together, they spoke and mobilised against corruption (for example the
Willowvale Motor scandal),8 against the de facto one-party state and
against the impending Economic Structural Adjustment Programme,
which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had
recommended for the Zimbabwean government and was due to be imple-
mented from 1990. In 1989, Tekere, who had consummated his sacking
from ZANU–PF by forming his own party, indicated his intention to chal-
lenge Mugabe in the 1990 elections. University students, who had trans-
formed from being admirers of the ruling party to become not only an
irritation to the party-state, but also a serious opposition force, openly
mobilised for Tekere and ZUM. Considering that it was formed just a year
before elections, and that it was up against a formidable system, ZUM’s
performance was significant as it managed to partake in both the presiden-
tial race, as well as in 107 of the 120 contested parliamentary constituen-
cies. It went on to win 20 per cent of the presidential vote and two
parliamentary seats (Dorman 2001; Nhema 2002; Nkiwane 1998).
Interestingly, and relevant to this chapter, ZUM failed to consolidate its
position and did not survive to the next election because it soon split into
two, with the seceding faction calling itself the Democratic Party (DP).
The DP argued that Tekere was autocratic and had personalised the party.
Nkiwane (1998: 101) argues that the collapse of ZUM was almost
8
For more on the Willowvale Motor scandal see Coltart (2016: 185–187).
102 Z. MOYO
inevitable because the party was formed on the backdrop of a very strong
“dose of Tekere’s personal convictions”, which were not likely to be sus-
tainable in the long run especially in the context of losing an election, and
more so in a party-state system the ruling party had created.
Several other smaller parties existed between 1990 and 1995. They
included Ian Smith’s Conservative Alliance, formed way back in 1984 and
formally disbanded in 1992. There was also the Forum Party, formed in
1993 and led by former Chief Justice, Enoch Dumbutshena. The Forum
Party also suffered internal divisions in the build-up to the 1995 elections,
and split; it did not survive beyond these elections. Another promising
opposition party was the United Parties (UP), formed in 1994 as an
attempt by several parties, including ZUM, UANC and some members of
the Forum Party, to fashion a united alliance to proffer a challenge to the
party-state in the 1995 elections. This was never to materialise, since UP
withdrew from the elections citing an uneven electoral environment.9
A post facto analysis of the political environment in the first two decades
of independence shows that the polarisation culture, intertwined with the
caprices of a party-state, made sure that opposition parties remained weak-
ened, while the dominance of the ruling party was enhanced as its unfet-
tered access to state resources increased. The withdrawal by some
opposition parties from participating in elections was a sign of discontent
with this party-state complex that had always benefited the ruling party.
With no serious challenge in 1995, ZANU–PF won all parliamentary seats
save for three, one of which was won by an independent candidate who
had just been expelled from ZANU–PF. ZANU–Ndonga won the other
two, while the UANC did not even participate. The result of the 1996
presidential election was also a one-sided affair, with the ZANU–PF can-
didate winning a landslide victory, garnering more than 92 per cent of the
votes amid massive discontent within the population, epitomised by an
eight-week strike in June 1996 by teachers, nurses, doctors and other pub-
lic servants, who were joined by students, human rights groups and
churches (Zeilig 2007). In terms of opposition parties, it is safe to con-
clude that the ruling party was navigating in easy waters between 1990
and 2000. This is even clearer when one looks at Table 4.1, which is a
collation of presidential results between 1990 and 2018. However, in
terms of broader opposition politics, the ruling class met a formidable
9
See Nkiwane (1998: 99–103) for a detailed discussion of these opposition parties.
challenge in the form of civil society, which is the subject of the next
section.
Broadening a Counter-Hegemony and Consolidation

of Oppositional Politics
Even though the period between 1990 and 2000 had weak opposition
political parties, it was probably the bedrock of contemporary opposition
politics, and it witnessed the deepening of the polarisation culture. Civil
society, now broadened by the development of independent media, human
rights movement (which included organisations such as Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition, Human Rights NGO Forum and Women of Zimbabwe Arise;
see also Chap. 5 in this volume) and the constitutional movement, on vari-
ous matters met the party-state head on. Civil society became the fulcrum
of a counter-hegemonic block that occupied the other side of the polarisa-
tion boundary. ZCTU led this initiative. The 1991 events in neighbouring
Zambia, where the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, a party formed
out of a labour federation, had provided an example of how workers can
stand up against a liberation movement in a quest to champion multi-
partyism (Chanda 1995; Tsvangirai 2011).
First, the labour movement in Zimbabwe, irritated and bleeding owing
to the deleterious effects of the ESAP introduced in 1990, moved towards
militant agitation. As a consequence of market deregulation that disman-
tled all state-imposed market controls, increased imports from external
manufacturers and targeted expenditure within the public sector (all being
IMF-recommended liberal policies), many companies had closed down,
and over 25,000 workers had been retrenched as early as 1992 (Kanyenze
et al. 2011; Mlambo 2014). By 1994, public expenditure on health care
had dropped by 39 per cent from 1990 levels, while per capita expenditure
declined from Z$58 in 1990 to Z$36 by the end of 1995. This exacer-
bated avoidable deaths, which resulted in what were derogatively called
“ESAP deaths” (Moyo 2018: 119). Between 1991 and 1997, over 50,000
people in the manufacturing sector lost their jobs, and ZCTU’s member-
ship slumped from 1,5 million to 1 million (Southall 2017). All these
losses, which affected poor workers and students the most, irreversibly
strained the relations between the party-state and the suffering population.
Because there were no strong opposition parties to lead resistance
against this assault on the poor, running battles escalated between
104 Z. MOYO
developed aspects of civil society and the party-state. Not surprisingly, the
state responded with violence to genuine disgruntlement from organised
society. This served to draw human rights, labour and student activists
closer to each other. One expression of this common victimhood was the
1997 formation of a constitutional movement, organised under the ban-
ner of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). It came about after
an acknowledgement by civil society that a solution to the suffering perpe-
trated by the ruling elite could only be achieved if, and only if, the existing
constitutional dispensation negotiated by a few elite politicians at Lancaster
House in 1979 was dismantled.10 There was also a regional conjuncture in
the mid-1990s when other countries in Southern Africa, such as Botswana,
South Africa and Namibia, were involved in what were considered to be
progressive constitutional-making processes (Sachikonye 2011). Many
human rights organisations, religious groupings, student and youth
groups, women’s organisations and workers unions became part of this
movement. Thence, the issue of the constitution became a non-political
way of talking about the exercise of politics (Dorman 2003: 849;
Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004: 359). As argued by Moyo (2018), the
NCA became the confluence for topical issues such as democracy, the land
question, human rights, women’s rights and a people-driven constitution-
making process, all packaged as intertwined and synonymous with
constitutionalism.
Between 1997 and 2002, more human rights organisations came into
existence, swelling the ranks of the counter-hegemonic movement. One of
these organisations was the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), flagged
here because it has a bearing later. When all these organisations were being
formed, it is important to note that their friends and foes were already
predetermined. Most were formed to agitate against the state, which had
become even more draconian. In 1999, these counter-hegemonic organ-
isations, including the NCA, organised a National Working People’s
Convention (NWPC), at which a resolution was taken to form an opposi-
tion political party, the only way to challenge state power. Thus, as a fulfil-
ment of that NWPC resolution, on 11 September 1999, the MDC was
born into a polity that had already been mobilised, and counter-hegemonic
sentiments were very strong. One of the key figures in the formation of
the party, and its former secretary general, opined:
10
Interviews with Takura Zhangazha, 3 September 2015, Harare; Tendai Biti, 25
November 2015, Harare; and David Coltart, 14 December 2015, Bulawayo.
The MDC was born out of our struggles to achieve a new constitution in
Zimbabwe. So the NCA was key in the formation of the MDC… The MDC
would be created normatively out of the NWPC held on 26 February 1999.
The NWPC was a gathering of civic organisations. The MDC was born out
of civic society. So the question “what is the MDC” becomes relevant
because the MDC becomes an acknowledgement by civil society that the
battles which we were fighting, whether they were for constitutional reform
or for better wages, or for better laws … were not sufficient unless we had
political reform. This is why resolution number 11 of the NWPC is a resolu-
tion that now says we as the civic societies are now acknowledging that all
these things that we are talking about, we will not achieve them unless we
have political reforms and therefore we need a political party or movement.11
Myths, realities and peer pressure dissuaded the MDC from relating to
any other organisation that had a relationship with the ruling party (Moyo
2018). This was part of the deployment of polarisation politics as a strat-
egy to define territory. This also explains the MDC’s good performance in
the 2000 parliamentary elections, held just nine months after its forma-
tion. Beyond 2000, the MDC as an opposition party continued to share
cordial relations with these civic organisations for many more years to
come, and it served to organise post-2000 Zimbabwean political society
into a polarisation dialectic that pitted ZANU–PF and its allies against the
MDC and its allied civil society groups. Because of the dominance of
polarisation, these respective civic organisations felt compelled to protect
ZANU–PF and the MDC at all times from both real and imagined
enemies.
Meanwhile, between 1997 and 2000, the party-state, aware of the
threat to its hegemony posed by civil society, had moved to occupy the
civil society space through sponsoring the formation and co-opting of
some civic organisations. This led not only to the crystallisation of the
polarisation phenomenon, but also to violence directed towards those per-
ceived to be occupying the other side of the dialectic (Moyo 2018). In
1997, the party-state wooed the Zimbabwe National Liberation War
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) to its side by awarding war veterans gra-
tuities. In 1998, ZANU–PF also engineered a split within the labour
movement. Some members of ZCTU broke away to form the Zimbabwe
Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU). In the same year, some members of
the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (ZINASU), also broke away
11
Interview with Tendai Biti, 25 November 2015, Harare.
106 Z. MOYO
allegedly at the instigation of the party-state to form a rival union, the

Zimbabwe Congress of Students’ Union (ZICOSU). Thus, for every
political organisation formed in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, prevailing
culture demanded that it be either pro-ruling party or pro-MDC. This
also explains why all the parliamentary election results between 2000 and
2018 were dominated by only these two political parties. No other party
could muster more than two constituencies, except in 2008 when the
Mutambara-led MDC won ten seats, which it failed to retain in the next
election.
However, it should be noted that despite this, there were instances
when organisations belonging to the two different blocs were forced to
work together for the benefit of their membership. This was more so for
membership-based organisations, such as the workers’ and the students’
movements. For example, both ZCTU and ZFTU are members of the
tripartite negotiating forum, representing workers. According to the dep-
uty secretary general of the ZFTU, “in most issues there was encouraging
convergence and congruence between us [ZCTU and ZFTU], although
sometimes we got the perception that our colleagues [ZCTU] held the
view that we must change the broader political set up first”.12 This was also
the case with the student movement. For example, during the tenure of
the 2009–2013 unity government, students were invited to parliament by
the portfolio committee on higher education to discuss issues that were
affecting students. The two federations had to meet to craft a common
position before they went to meet the committee.13 Such meetings, how-
ever, were at executive level and not at grassroots level.
What is central to this chapter’s argument is a delineation of the politics
that perpetuated the polarisation culture even beyond the signing of the
1987 Unity Accord, which was supposed to achieve unity by negating
polarisation. From the foregoing, it is undeniable that the politics of the
1990s was defined by polarisation between civil society and the party-
state. Events that took place, such as the workers’ and students’ strikes,
demonstrations, stay-aways and court challenges, interrupted the domi-
nance of one party in Zimbabwean politics, but did not quite bring change
in terms of who governed the country, portending a case where the old
12
Interview with Noah Gwande, deputy secretary general of ZFTU, 28 October
2015, Harare.
13
Interview with Blessing Vava, former spokesperson of ZINASU, 24 July 2015,
Johannesburg.
seemed to be dying, but the new could not yet be born (Gramsci 1999),
a phenomenon that persisted for many more years.
Later in the 1990s, another tendency towards broadening the phenom-
enon of polarisation emerged. This was the cloning or doubling-up of civil
society organisations. For example, the existence of ZNLWVA, which had
drifted closer to the ruling party, was countered by the formation of the
ZLP, a group viewed as part of the counter-hegemonic movement. The
students’ movement fed into the dialectic by breaking into two groups—
ZINASU and ZICOSU. The labour movement was no exception, since
the ZFTU emerged to counter the politics of the ZCTU. As these binaries
developed, the hollowed centre was not only sustained, but broadened as
well, making it near impossible for a third alternative to survive in that
binary space. Thence, new labour federations and students unions that
were formed could not survive in their own right (Moyo 2018).
Furthermore, in 1999, as the party-state took up the NCA’s challenge and
created a state-sponsored Constitutional Commission, animosity between
the state and the counter-hegemonic civil society increased. The NCA
refused to be part of this Commission, and thus two parallel constitutional
processes were instituted, buttressing the polarisation culture, which at
that point cut across society, including media, religious organisations and
the economy. The result of these parallel constitutional processes was that
they cancelled each other out, and upon conclusion, neither of them pro-
duced a product that could be universally accepted.
In pursuance of the polarisation culture, between 1997 and 2008, civil
society was virtually divided into two distinguishable formations—those
who were closer to the ruling party, and advanced pro-hegemonic politics,
and those more aligned to the new opposition party (MDC), professing
counter-hegemonic policies (Ncube 2010). As a result of this polarisation
culture, which has persisted up to 2018, other important national ques-
tions that fell outside the major thrusts of these two groupings were
peripheralised, which impoverished the country’s politics. For example,
within the pro-hegemonic cluster, the over-dominance of redistributionist
and nationalist rhetoric relegated issues of democracy, human rights and
democracy to the periphery, while within the opposition alliance, socio-
economic issues that would have rebounded from a resource redistributive
policy thrust were missed as the preoccupation became more about
respecting property rights, free and fair elections and good governance
rhetoric framed within neo-liberal standards. Peripheralising of other
important questions was also noted by Raftopolous and Phimister (2004),
108 Z. MOYO
who argued that civil society from the counter-hegemonic bloc concerned
itself more with ensuring the fulfilment of liberal objectives, while also
cognisant of the bourgeois nature of such politics. The pro-hegemonic
bloc endorsed the radical ruling party’s transformational policies, while
also cognisant of their democratic deficits. Both blocs did not take time to
self-criticise, and therefore some important questions that were mutually
despised by the two blocs suffered the most.
The whole objective of a party-state as discussed earlier, is to create
institutions that are responsive to interests of the ruling elite. The blurring
of lines between the party and the state suggests some kind of inclination
towards structural permanency, where those running the state envisage
themselves staying in power whether they are popular or not. Thus, when
an office as important as that of a chief justice is held successively by peo-
ple who are loyal to one political party by virtue of them being senior
members of that party, or when police commissioners and commanders of
the military are appointed not on the basis of their professionalism, but
because they belong to the ruling party, then one should not be in doubt
about the intentions of those in power. In Zimbabwe, there are also pieces
of legislation that inevitably impact more negatively on opposition activists
than on the ruling class. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA [2007,
Chapter 11:17]) enacted in 2002 is a perfect example. Its administration
and enforcement resides with the police, whose head and several other line
managers are loyal members of the ruling party. POSA is a piece of legisla-
tion that infringes on several people’s freedoms, including the freedom of
assembly, association and the right to liberty.
This Act has been extensively abused by the police to deny those in the
counter-hegemonic bloc the right to hold political gatherings, including
some campaign rallies. In some instances, opposition politicians have been
arbitrarily arrested, detained without trial and tortured by the police.
Some have been denied food, legal representation and even medical atten-
tion during detention. The anti-riot, and law and order sections of the
police have been notorious for all these malfeasances. There have also been
accusations from the opposition bloc that such kind of ill treatment is
always directed to the opposition side of the polarisation dialectic.14
14
See for example, a skewed police report (ZRP 2007) that concluded opposition forces
were responsible for political violence in 2007. It does not accuse any pro-hegemonic organ-
isation of any form of violence. See also Amnesty International (2000, 2008a, b) for violence
committed against counter-hegemonic activists by state-linked institutions.
The 2008 presidential elections resulted in a stalemate. No outright

winner could be determined and a run-off had to be conducted. This run-
off was never to be, since the three-month inter-election period witnessed
the worst violence since the time of gukurahundi. The ruling class was not
about to give away its power, and predictably so. The gravity of the vio-
lence, targeted mainly at those suspected to have voted for the opposition,
forced Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC president, to withdraw from the run-
off just five days before the election. Human Rights Watch (2011) and
Amnesty International (2013) show that the violence was organised and
led by the party-state, and more than 200 people were killed, 5000 beaten
and tortured, and 36,000 people were displaced. According to Timberg
(2008) and Shumba (2018), the security forces, through the Joint
Operations Command, planned all the violence during the inter-election
period. Over 200 senior army officials directed militias, police, secret state
agents and war veterans in the execution of the plan to beat and kill MDC
activists and supporters with the intention of depleting their number
(Timberg 2008). The uniformity and pattern of the violence indeed con-
firmed centralised planning and organisation (Masunungure 2009). This
buttresses the point that state security agents chose to be partisan in order
to preserve the status quo.
In November 2017, owing to the self-bestowed role of king-makers,
the military commanders forced the long serving president, Robert
Mugabe, to retire, and in his place installed Emmerson Mnangagwa (see
Chaps. 8 and 13 in this volume). No official structure, national, regional
or global, dared to call the process a coup. Most celebrated, and argued
that the army had done well. But what this misplaced show of might (by
the military) demonstrated was where real political power is located. The
military was allowed to choose who should be the president of the coun-
try, and was also permitted to strengthen its influence by deploying some
of its senior members in the ruling party structures and cabinet. The very
act of the military involving itself in internal leadership succession issues of
the ruling party confirms the workings of a party-state. Moving forward,
it will be very difficult for any civilian leader to do anything that is not in
agreement with the desires of the military.
110 Z. MOYO
Conclusion
The blurring of lines between state institutions and the ruling party has
continued even beyond Mugabe’s ouster in 2017. Thus, when the MDC
announced that it was going to challenge the election results proclaimed
by the ZEC chairperson, Justice Priscillah Chigumba, those not familiar
with the workings of the party-state would have raised their hopes.
However, those who believe in a Marxist interpretation of the state would
have foretold with certainty the outcome of such an electoral challenge. A
reflection on the November 2017 “constitutional coup” would have made
reaching such a prediction quite easy. The party-state complex and the
polarisation culture in Zimbabwe have fed into each other to advantage
the ruling party. The gukurahundi disturbances, the 2008 violence and
electoral outcomes provide a basis for such an argument. The conduct of
ZEC, the military and the Constitutional Court with regard to the 2018
elections portends the endurance of the party-state culture. Thus, Marxists’
views that the state is an instrument of accumulation for the ruling class
may be on point in Zimbabwe.
Earlier, this chapter argued that the state and the ruling party in
Zimbabwe are coalesced to an extent that it becomes impossible to delin-
eate where the party ends and where the state begins. State structures,
especially the police, the army, the secret service, state media, the electoral
bodies and courts, have all been accused of malfeasance by those in oppo-
sition politics. Evidence of this is in the violence, overt or subtle, that has
been directed at members of the opposition. The polarisation between the
ruling class on one side and the counter-hegemonic bloc on the other has
developed in an environment where the ruling party became delegitimised
(Raftopoulos 2003). However, even though the old seemed to be dying,
the new could not yet be born because the counter-hegemonic bloc failed
not only to negotiate its connection with the country’s history and socio-
economic issues, but also to sufficiently deal with the powerful effects of
an ever-strengthening party-state complex.
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in Rural Areas. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/

politically-motivated-violence-deliberately-targeting-opposition-political-activ-
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CHAPTER 5
Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture:

Media and Civil Society
Stanley Tsarwe
Introduction
How can Zimbabwe build sustainable democratic institutions, practices
and values that can become integral to its political culture? This chapter
looks at the dominant political culture that has evolved over the years in
pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe and how this culture is responsible
for the state of civil society, the media and the limited level of democratic
consolidation. Such practices, the chapter argues, have contributed to a
narrowing democratic culture over the years. More specifically, this chap-
ter seeks to achieve the following three objectives. First, it attempts to
define and apply the problematic notion of political culture in the context
of pertaining Zimbabwean political values. Secondly, it seeks to examine
the state of civil society and its role in Zimbabwe’s transition to democ-
racy. Thirdly, viewing the media as part of civil society, the chapter broadly
sketches out the development and current state of the media in Zimbabwe
as a stakeholder in democratic transition.
S. Tsarwe (*)
Department of English, Journalism and Media Studies Section,
University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_5
118 S. TSARWE
While Zimbabwe has successfully established universal suffrage and

holds periodic elections, as most African countries have, there has been
deep scepticism about the country’s levels of democratic deepening—par-
ticularly around core democratic values such as respect for human rights,
freedom of the press, tolerance of alternative political views, free and fair
elections, and good governance. It argues that this can be located in cen-
tralist tendencies inherited by the post-colonial government from the
white colonial regime, limited involvement of diverse civil groups in civic
and political processes, a restrictive media environment and conflation
between the state and party politics. The biggest obstacle to democratic
deepening in Zimbabwe has roots in undemocratic practices that were
inherited by the post-colonial government, where elite continuity contin-
ues to dominate the country’s political landscape, and in strategic institu-
tions such as the media (see Sparks 2009; Moyo 2004; Tsarwe and Mare
2019a; Mano 2016). In Chap. 1 of this book, make reference to “the
postcolonial legacy of personality cults and their gerontocratic tendencies,
excluding women and young people, and indeed all those who are deemed
to have not participated in the liberation struggles, from the corridors of
power and ownership of strategic resources” (p. 2). They later argue that
the political elites in charge of the post-colonial state gained the freedom
to accumulate resources ahead of everyone else through the process they
aptly paraphrase as “bureaucratic state parasitism”. This was functionalised
through a systematic and well-oiled scheme of patronage that the ruling
Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) elite
would exploit for personal political mileage. As McGregor puts it,
“Zimbabwe inherited from the Rhodesian era powerful, centralized state
bureaucracies, staffed by colonial-era personnel” (2002, p. 12) who, with
time, became functionaries of the Zimbabwe African National Unity–
Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) through widened networks of patronage.
The chapter begins by acknowledging that understanding the relations
between state, media and civil society is key in explaining the current levels
of democratic deepening in any democracy, including Zimbabwe. Since
attaining independence from British colonial rule four decades ago, in
1980, Zimbabwe has been governed by a ZANU–PF-led government,
and arguably, as the governing party, ZANU–PF has been an influential
agent in the development of particular political values. Noting that the
concept of political culture is difficult to pin down, with others stating that
“political culture remains a suggestive rather than a scientific concept”
(Chilton 1988, p. 420), this chapter does not necessarily concern itself
5 UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 119
with a deep conceptual analysis of exactly how political culture should be

defined. However, an attempt is made to conceptualise it at a level of detail
that is adequate for studying the state of Zimbabwe’s democratic
deepening.
Understanding Political Culture

Political scientists, social scientists and historians alike have all attempted
to define the concept of political culture with little or no success, and
“thirty years of definitions and theoretical criticisms have now passed
without the earlier promise of the concept being redeemed” (Chilton
1988, p. 420). Almond’s (1956, p. 396) initial formulation defined politi-
cal culture as the “particular pattern of orientations to political action”.
Successive revisions and re-definitions have also yielded an understanding
of political culture as “the spirit of public institutions, political passions of
the citizenry, goals articulated by the political ideology, and both formal
and informal rules of the political game” (Dawson and Prewitt 1969,
p. 26 cited in Camara 2008).
With more contemporary research, the definition continues to drift
away from earlier individual behaviourist studies, which were underpinned
by survey-based research on individual attitudes, to a more collective
understanding of political culture as a process in which “political meaning
is constructed in the interplay between the attitudes of individual citizens
and the language and symbolic systems in which they are embedded” (Da
Silva et al. 2015, p. 1). Back in 1963, two political scientists, Almond and
Verba (1963), conducted a study examining the political cultures associ-
ated with five democratic countries: Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United
Kingdom and the United States. They identified three basic types of politi-
cal cultures, which can be used to explain why people do or do not partici-
pate in political processes (Chilton 1988), naming these as: (1) parochial
political culture, (2) subject political culture and (3) participant political
culture. Parochial political culture was identified in Mexico, where citizens
are mostly uninformed and unaware of their government and take little
interest in the political process. Subject political culture was identified in
Germany and Italy, where citizens are somewhat informed and aware of
their government and occasionally participate in the political process.
Lastly, participant political culture was identified in the United Kingdom
and the United States of America, where citizens are informed and actively
120 S. TSARWE
participate in the political process (Formisano 2001; Chilton 1988;

Gendzel 1977).
While Almond and Verba’s (1963) theory classified different countries
according to observed political cultures in those democracies, the reality is
that such a classification might not necessarily fit precisely when applied to
different contexts, particularly one such as Zimbabwe whose political his-
tory and genealogy may be fundamentally different from the Western
democracies where these theories were originally premised. It might be
the case that some democracies will not fit perfectly into these classifica-
tions—at least if they are transplanted wholesale in their original formula-
tions. Some democracies may straddle two or all three of these classifications,
or perhaps not fit into any of them. For example, while Zimbabwe may
share with Mexico a parochial political culture, as the majority of its poor
and marginalised citizens are mostly uninformed and unaware of their
government and take little interest in the political process, it might also
make sense to classify Zimbabwe under subject political culture, as its citi-
zens are somewhat informed and aware of their government and occasion-
ally participate in the political process, during periodic elections, for
example. Therefore, Almond and Verba’s (1963) classifications should not
be taken as hard and fast classificatory categories without some modifica-
tions to suit context. The same may be true of a number of countries that
are still experiencing challenges as they negotiate democratic transition.
While a number of scholars have offered different theoretical and method-
ological approaches to understanding political culture, this study never-
theless uses Almond and Verba’s (1963) deployment of the concept as a
heuristic lens through which to view the nature and configuration of polit-
ical culture in Zimbabwe.
Having inherited an undemocratic governance system from the white
colonial regime that gave way to independence in 1980, and despite gar-
nering majority support in elections, the ZANU–PF government made
little effort to democratise the state, its practices and its institutions. This
is ironic given that the spirited bush war culminating in Zimbabwe’s
independence was primarily against despotism, racism, inequality and
disenfranchisement of political and civic rights of the black majority by
a white minority. Zimbabwe’s post-colonial government failed to tran-
scend the intolerant and repressive political cultures of the Rhodesian
settler regime. Using “Mugabeism” as a conceptual lens with which to
describe former President Robert Mugabe’s cult-like political culture,
argue that “instead of breaking with colonial settler traditions of brutality
and repressive political practices, Mugabeism ‘innovated’ and ‘improved’

on the Rhodesian settler colonial Leviathan, adding the logic of ‘gover-
nance by military operations’ with devastating implications for democ-
racy, human rights, and people’s freedoms”. As Chikerema and Chakunda
(2014) argue, democratic decay, political violence and intolerance, and a
culture of impunity characterised by electoral fraud have been the defining
features of Zimbabwe’s political landscape since independence. As will be
seen in subsequent sections of this chapter, the government—in the fash-
ion of most post-colonial African governments—sought to control civic
groups through legislation, registration and various other measures that
would enable the regime to know what was going on in these organisa-
tions (Makumbe 1998a).
On the other hand, and in direct opposition to the increasing pressure
to deliver an alternative to a deteriorating economy and widespread cor-
ruption by government officials, the state responded to criticism by legis-
lating repressive media laws that were roundly accused of stifling dissent,
alternative views and freedom of the press (Moyo 2009). In Zimbabwe,
the de facto political culture adopted by President Mugabe after indepen-
dence was general intolerance to alternative political views. Naturally,
opposition politics was viewed as lacking credibility, as Mugabe’s regime
consistently labelled opposition politicians as “Western-backed mercenar-
ies”. In addition, there has been a constant deployment of legal and extra-
legal means to silence and censor the media—particularly private
media—viewing these as enemies of the state (Moyo 2009; Chuma 2008).
It is arguable that this has resulted in limited democratic consolidation
since independence, as critical institutions, such as a private media capable
of providing checks and balances on state power, are weakened by repres-
sive laws and state censorship. More of these issues will be discussed in
due course.
Civil Society and Democratisation in Zimbabwe

The concept of civil society originated in Western literature in the writings
of Hegel, Gramsci and Marx (Mayhew 1997; Geremek 1992). This is,
however, not to imply that the notion of civil society is alien to Africa, or
that there has never been a civil society on the continent (Makumbe
1998a). Responding to Darnolf’s (1997) claims that in Africa “a differen-
tiated civil society in which individuals organize themselves outside the
family and articulate interests to the state does not, to any large degree,
122 S. TSARWE
exist” (p. 21), Makumbe (Makumbe 1998a) argues that the African expe-
rience of civil society is largely focused on the people’s struggle against
despotic rulers, repressive regimes and governments that violated both
their individual and their collective rights. Evidence can be drawn from
student movements in South Africa in the 1960s and in Zimbabwe’s pre-
and post-independence societies, as well as the role of the media (as part
of civil society) in both these eras of democratic transition (see Makunike
2015; Mlambo 1993, 2013; Tengende 1994; Zeilig 2007, 2008). It is on
the basis of this formulation that this chapter advances arguments for the
role of civil society in the democratic deepening in Africa, while arguing
that the diminishing exuberance of civil society in Zimbabwe is a cause for
concern, as it has direct implications on the level of democratic deepen-
ing there.
However, as this study argues, a formerly vibrant Zimbabwean student
activism movement progressively weakened and fizzled out, initially in
response to pressing economic deterioration in the early 1990s, and more
directly as a result of state action, and repressive legislation promulgated
by the government to suppress dissent and active political participation
(Makunike 2015; Makumbe 1998a). While Zimbabwean civil society has
played a significant role in the liberation struggle against British colonial
rule, and since independence, this study acknowledges, as Makumbe
(1998a) does, that it is unfair to expect African civil society to develop in
the same way as Western liberal democracies. The chapter discusses these
issues later. More urgently, a key question at this juncture, before turning
to the state of civil society in Zimbabwe, is about what civil society is, and
how Zimbabwean civil society has been influenced by, and in turn has
influenced, the country’s prevailing political culture.
Jürgen Habermas (1989) developed an enduring and popular political
theory (albeit gaining an equal share of criticism) examining the nature of
modern public spheres. His thesis includes one of the most articulate
understandings of civil society. He posits that civil society is a sphere com-
posed of non-state private individuals who, through their ability to exer-
cise free will and reason, have the capacity to critique public authority
(Habermas 1986), and in this way contribute to democratic deepening.
These individuals are necessarily non-state actors and non-political, and
act autonomously outside state influence and within the confines of the
unwritten rules of rational debate. More specifically, Habermas describes
civil society as “composed of more or less spontaneously engaged associa-
tions, organisations and movements that, attuned to how social problems
resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in
amplified to the public sphere” (148). In this understanding, even though
these public discourses are initiated by loose coalitions of private and
autonomous individuals and associations, they carry with them the public
voice and public sentiments. With the increase in mass media during the
twentieth century, these public discourses are connected to the state and
political authorities—a process that in liberal theory is the sine qua non of
modern democracy. The underlying assumption in this line of thinking is
that power is diffused evenly in different social and political strata, and
that it is accessible to all, including individual citizens who are willing to
exercise their rational capacity to debate matters of governance.
However, the challenge that could face this liberal understanding of
civil society is the question about what happens in societies such as
Zimbabwe where power is concentrated in the state and political elites,
with little of it exercised by private, autonomous individuals. In most
African countries—and indeed Zimbabwe—the post-colonial government
has sought to control civic groups through legislation, registration and
various other measures, which enable the regime to know what is going on
in these organisations (Makumbe 1998a; Diamond 1997). Africa has a
history of state censorship of the media, repressive media laws, limited and
constricted scope for civic and political freedoms, and a general centralisa-
tion of power within the state. In the context of civil society participation
in democratic processes, Makumbe (1998a), avers that there is a range of
intractable problems bedevilling the growth of a vibrant civil society in
Zimbabwe—and this is the case in most African countries.
The first of these problems relates to the narrow institutional surface
area offered by pre- and post-colonial governments for meaningful con-
tact and deliberative dialogue with civil society. In contemporary
Zimbabwe, the limited space for engagement between government and
ordinary members of society manifests in a constant feeling that policy
formulation lacks civic and participatory consultations, while relations
between civil society and security services remain very fragile. Secondly,
civil society organisations in Africa are often crippled by problems of pov-
erty, corruption, nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, ethnicism, illiber-
alism and willingness to be co-opted by state power and external agents
(Diamond 1997 cited in Makumbe 1998a). For example, the vibrant
labour movement that gave birth to popular politics and the emergence of
the biggest opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, has
not been sustainable as most workers faced retrenchment during the
124 S. TSARWE
unpopular early 1990s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

enforced by the Bretton Woods institutions (Makunike 2015; Makumbe
1998a). In addition to the dearth of organised labour movements, the
popular student-based political activism coterminous with the 1960
nationalist movements against the colonial regime fizzled out in the face
of crushing economic conditions, rendering political activism secondary
to the more pressing and immediate struggles of daily survival. Thirdly,
civil societies in Africa are not capable of sustaining themselves without the
support of either the state or foreign international donor funds, and gov-
ernments often take the opportunity to either manipulate or muzzle them.
This became clearly apparent at the time when Mugabe’s ZANU–PF
regime increased pressure on numerous alternative labour movements,
including teachers’ representative bodies, medical professionals’ bodies,
independent churches and a number of grassroots bodies, and they increas-
ingly began to drift towards the government, while others that were more
sympathetic to the government were formed.
University students were closely tied to the national liberation move-
ments and the African struggle against colonial oppression from the 1960s
onwards, as part of the nationalist onslaught on colonial rule. However,
post-colonial African governments were intolerant of the same student
movements in which the nationalist movements had strong representa-
tion. This led to the emergence of powerful alternative politics and grass-
roots resistance, challenging the colonial state hegemony. While some of
these groups have shaped the nature and state of democratic deepening in
Zimbabwe, their vibrancy has severely dwindled since 1980, resulting in
the state regrouping its hegemonic machinery and imposing an overbear-
ing presence on all socio-political, economic and cultural spheres, effec-
tively crowding out the deliberative space. The effect has been a decreasing
interest in political participation by ordinary Zimbabweans, voter apathy
during elections and a general disengagement from all civic processes.
In the 1990s, two developments further complicated government–stu-
dent relations. The first was the deteriorating economic fortunes that
directly affected student welfare, forcing students to join organised work-
ers under the leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(Makunike 2015; Chibango and Kajau 2010; Zeilig 2007). The second
was the unpopular University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 1990,
which gave excessive powers to government-appointed vice-chancellors to
discipline both students and lecturers (Makunine 2015; Chibango and
Kajau 2010; Zeilig 2007; Ngara 1995). The relationship between the
government and students (and their culture of resistance) soured towards

the close of the 1980s, because of growing public corruption and the rul-
ing party’s insistence on establishing a one-party state (Makunine 2015;
Makumbe 1998a).
In the next section, we take a look at the media in Zimbabwe as part of
civil society, and observe how it has contributed in the democratisation
process against the backdrop of repressive media laws and the struggle for
economic survival.
The Media as Part of Zimbabwean Civil Society

The role of the media in modern democracies has been extensively dis-
cussed in contemporary literature. The key thrust has been that traditional
mass media and more contemporary digital media technologies play a
critical role in promoting civic engagement and participation within mod-
ern democracies (Papacharissi 2010; Dahlgren 2009; Buckingham 2000;
McChesney 1999). Most of this literature originally focused on the tradi-
tional mainstream press (including newspapers, radio and television) and
later on networked digital media technologies (the internet, social media
and mobile phones) as necessary in fostering open political debates and
the exchange of policy ideas, unhindered by political and corporate elites.
Central to this thesis is the necessity for these media to be free from any
influence by corporate and political elites, so they achieve their objective
of deepening democracy. While these claims have been central in media
and democracy literature, they have recently been facing fierce criticism
because of the rise of the partisan press, including Robert McChesney’s
critique of how corporate and political elites use the media to sustain their
power and interests (1999). Despite these criticisms, the media and
democracy thesis still holds some sway in scholarly writing, and that is
acknowledged here. This section is premised on the argument that an
independent and free media—with particular reference to traditional
mainstream media and the internet—is still, and may continue to be, a
necessary ingredient in contemporary democracies despite the criticisms
levelled against it. The argument will be used to assess Zimbabwean
media’s level of independence, freedom and ability to mediate a demo-
cratic space for public political engagement.
It is noteworthy that when Zimbabwe became independent, the coun-
try inherited a fairly diverse media landscape characterised by a vibrant
state-owned media and a blossoming private press, reflecting the existing
126 S. TSARWE
economy that was dominated by private white capital (Chuma 2008).

However, since 1980, the new government has revived authoritarian con-
trol of the public media (both print and electronic) for political reasons,
muzzling the press’ civic role of providing oversight of political authori-
ties. In Chap. 9 of this book, Pasirai raises the argument that the
Zimbabwean government has used state media as a resource to enhance
the ruling party’s dominance. Pasirai argues that, as in colonial days, pub-
lic media entrenched the ruling party’s hegemonic power and vilified pro-
democracy activists and opposition parties. More succinctly, he discusses
how Professor Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for
Information and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the
state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs and by creating and
disseminating content via routine briefings, which resulted in a self-polic-
ing journalistic team and a pliant state press.
We now direct our focus on two critical strategies that the government
has traditionally used to prevent the media from effectively performing its
civic functions. The first is the co-option of the media onto the govern-
ment’s post-independence development agenda by encouraging main-
stream media to adopt a developmental journalism approach. This
emphasised supporting the ruling elite rather than guarding against power
abuse. While the approach partly helped to facilitate public knowledge and
support of the post-colonial state’s developmental policies and strategies
(Mafunda et al. 2012), the increased centralisation of media ownership by
the government played out badly, as it hindered true criticism of the gov-
ernment when it was necessary. In this way, mainstream media, particu-
larly public media, played a lapdog role, incapable of standing at a critical
distance from political authorities. Besides introducing significant owner-
ship and editorial changes (which mostly involved the replacement of criti-
cal white editors with black editors who were willing to toe the
government’s line) in the public print and broadcasting sector, the gov-
ernment maintained the state monopoly in broadcasting as well as the
repressive legal infrastructure that had been used by the colonial regime
(Saunders 1999; Chuma 2008; Ndlela 2008). Rønning and Kupe (2000)
see this as creating tension between a “democratic” (as reflected in the
Lancaster Constitution) and an “authoritarian” impetus (inbuilt inherited
restrictive laws), which undermined the diversity and pluralism of political
opinion in the Zimbabwean mainstream public sphere. They also argue
that the co-existence of authoritarian state control of the public media and
the relative freedom enjoyed by private media created a dual legacy of
authoritarianism and democracy (Tsarwe and Mare 2019a; Tsarwe 2019).

In a political context such as Zimbabwe, where the government wields
enormous power over control and ownership of the media (Mare 2013),
political elites seek control of the media in order to influence news and
opinions in their own interests, and in the process trample its norma-
tive roles.
The second strategy is the passing of a number of repressive media laws
and the establishment of statutory regulatory bodies alongside them.
Examples of these laws include the Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), the Public
Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Criminal Law (Codification and
Reform) Act of 2004. However, following the ascendancy of Emmerson
Mnangagwa as president after the military coup in 2017, most of these
laws have now been repealed, being replaced in 2019 with equally contro-
versial bills that continue to impose limitations on constitutionally pro-
vided freedom of access to information, freedom of the media and freedom
of speech. For example, AIPPA was repealed and replaced by three bills:
the Freedom of Information Bill, the Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill
and the Data Protection Bill. These laws have largely been condemned by
many elements of both media and civil society.
Passed in 2001, the BSA, among other things, places excessive powers
in the hands of the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting
Services, who in consultation with the Broadcasting Authority of
Zimbabwe is the ultimate licensing authority. Criticism has not only been
levelled against the powers given to the Minister of information, but also
the fact that the authority has gone for a number of years without a board,
and without proper explanation from government. It has also hindered
the licensing of community radio stations—an unresolved issue that has
been at the centre of public and civil society concern for decades in the
country. On the other hand, POSA (passed in 2002), is the colonial era
Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), created to restrict freedom of
expression, movement and assembly. In its present state in independent
Zimbabwe, the law criminalises anyone who undermines or makes “any
abusive, indecent, obscene or false statement about or concerning the
President or an acting President, whether in respect of his person or his
office”. The law has been a major block to the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression.
The proposed bills that have repealed these laws remain antithetical to
free speech and free media. In summary, the Freedom of Information Bill
128 S. TSARWE
sets out the procedure for access to information held by public institutions
or information held by any person, the scope of limitations on the right of
access to information, the rights of third parties, the role of principal offi-
cers and information officers of entities in its implementation, procedures
for internal and court appeals in respect to requests for access to informa-
tion and the time limits within which these processes must be carried out.
While Section 3(b) and 5 of the Bill seek to cultivate a culture of voluntary
disclosure of information by public entities and statutory bodies, these
seemingly progressive sections are frustrated by Section 5, which imposes
a duty on such bodies to produce a written information disclosure policy.
It thus compels public institutions to designate information officers, that
is, organisational officers, responsible for the handling and processing of
requests for public information. Unfortunately, the Bill is silent on the
practical steps necessary to enforce or strengthen these voluntary disclo-
sure mechanisms. In addition, the Bill states that requests for such infor-
mation should be made only in writing. The Zimbabwe Media Commission
Bill seeks to regularise the establishment of the Zimbabwe Media
Commission, as outlined in Chapter 12 of the Constitution. According to
this, the Media Commission is one of the country’s independent commis-
sions set up to support freedom of the media. However, the Bill has been
accused of bestowing wide discretionary powers on the minister over the
Commission, thereby compromising the independence of the Commission
as spelt out in the Constitution. In addition, the Media Institute of
Southern Africa Zimbabwe has also cited that Section 10 (4) of the Media
Commission Bill allows for the possibility of police involvement in
Commission investigations, arguing that this allows the criminalisation of
communication activities.1
The third bill, the Personal Information/Data Protection Bill, seeks to
govern the processing of personal information by private and public bod-
ies. It also prevents the unauthorised use, collection and processing of
identifiable personal data (TechZim 2015). To implement this law, the
Data Protection Authority of Zimbabwe is to be established. As with most
of the bills cited here, one problem that has been raised is the power
invested in the president in the appointment of board members in consul-
tation with the minister. For civil society and the media, this is a cause of
concern mainly because of the high levels of scepticism about government
1
See http://crm.misa.org/upload/web/misa-zimbabwe-commentary-on-the-zimba-
bwe-media-commission-bill-2019.pdf.
appointments, which are usually viewed as political in nature. Many

Zimbabwean media scholars have argued that the passage of the laws was
designed to silence critical private media, to inhibit media development
(especially in the electronic media sector) and to increase the influence of
the Minister of Information and Publicity on mediated communication in
the country (Chuma 2008; Moyo 2009).
The consequence of these forms of restrictive government intervention
is a media that is polarized and largely limited in its ability to engage in the
fair, balanced and objective public discourses necessary for deepening
democracy. As a result, and more appropriately, the Zimbabwean media
system fits into a model termed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as a polar-
ised pluralist model. The notion of political pluralism is largely attributed
to their comparative study of media systems in Western and Southern
European countries. They describe a polarised pluralist media model as
largely characterised by a high degree of political parallelism and relatively
low levels of journalistic professionalism, with the state playing a central,
interventionist role (Chuma 2008; Mare 2013; Muneri 2012). As stated
earlier, the impact of this is that the media falls short of its civic role of
deliberating on matters of national importance, choosing rather to align
itself with dominant centres of power. The polarization of Zimbabwean
media is aptly described by Muneri (2012), who observes that it is divided
along party lines, with government-owned media fully supportive of the
ruling party and privately owned newspapers leaning towards opposition
political figures and issues.
Conclusion
This chapter seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it defined and applied
the notion of political culture in the context of Zimbabwean political val-
ues. Secondly, it examined the state of civil society and its role in
Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy. Thirdly, and viewing the media as
part of civil society, it broadly sketched the development and current state
of the media in the country as a stakeholder in democratic transition. The
chapter made the case that the narrowing democratic culture can be
located in centralist tendencies inherited by the post-colonial government
from the white colonial regime, the limited involvement of diverse civil
society in civic and political processes, a restrictive media environment and
the conflation of the state and party politics. Overall, the biggest obstacle
to democratic deepening in Zimbabwe has its roots in undemocratic
130 S. TSARWE
practices inherited by the post-colonial government, with an elite continu-

ing to dominate the country’s political landscape, as well as strategic insti-
tutions such as the media.
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PART II
Identity, Militarisation and

Transitional Politics
CHAPTER 6
The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s

Transition Politics
Bekezela Gumbo
Introduction
Identity politics was an inalienable and continuous political strand in
Zimbabwe’s political economy and society in the past, continues to be so
in the present and will be so in the foreseeable future. It has been tightly
networked, determined and preconditioned across regional and genera-
tional divides. Although the subject has not been 2020 given much atten-
tion in the mainstream literature, it should be noted that key transition
questions that have successively beset the nation since decolonisation in
1980, such as the liberation question (1950s–1980), the nation-building
question (1980–1987), the land reform question (1980–2001), the
democratisation question (1999–2020) and the post-Mugabe power
transition question (2013–2017), have been heavily punctuated and
defined by identity politics. It has become more of a defining culture for
the social, economic and, more importantly, political past, present and
future. Thus, the history of transitions in Zimbabwe can best be described
as identity politics tuned into a dominant political culture. With guidance
B. Gumbo (*)
Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, Harare, Zimbabwe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_6
136 B. GUMBO
from David (Easton, 1957) systems theory, it can be stated that identity
politics has been the most dominant political environment, responsible
for influencing inputs (demands and supports), outputs (policies, pro-
grammes) and feedback from the political system.
As shall be revealed in this chapter, identity politics in Zimbabwe has
historically been a three-pronged phenomenon. This appears in three
basic clusters that seem to vary as differing national transition questions
bedevil the nation. These three group-coalescing and/or group identifiers
are racial nationalism, the politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony and the poli-
tics of liberation entitlement. These have nurtured and prolonged
Zimbabwe’s political culture, in turn shaping its successive political transi-
tions. The ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF) has been at the centre of the alternation, cross-
pollination and metamorphosis of these three filaments of identity politics,
and has embedded them in the country’s dominant political culture.
This chapter interrogates the identity politics factor in post-colonial
Zimbabwe and its role in shaping the political economy. It offers a concep-
tual construction of the three group identifier threads around which iden-
tity politics has manifested as a dominant political culture. The chapter
posits that the past and future of transition in Zimbabwe lie in the nature
and extent of identity politics, and how this is harnessed and utilised in the
transition process.
Identity Politics: What Are Its Political Strands?

Identity politics as a determining political culture in Zimbabwean history
cannot be fully understood without exploring what identity politics really
is and what constitutes its fundamental tenets and/or strands. The term,
when it first appeared in humanities literature used by Anspach (1979:
765), referred to ‘social movements which seek to alter the self concep-
tions and societal conceptions of their participants’. Two tenets defining
identity politics here are that it is the coalescing of a group of people into
a single unit or social group, and secondly that this single unit creates and
recognises its own common identity based on a particular political identi-
fier strand, fighting for others in society to respect, understand and recog-
nise the unit that is created around it. Life within this unit is therefore
shaped by the dictates of this overriding identifier, which ties group mem-
bers together.
6 THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 137
Identity politics, in other words, should be understood as politics based

on certain identities that are in turn the result of a particular group identi-
fier. It is an attempt to defend, promote and empower a certain group of
people who exist as an organised unit with a certain shared identity and
come as such to take up positions of power in politics and economics.
Ford (2005: 53) notes that identity politics is ‘a political orientation built
around a (pre-existing) social identity’ and that ‘identity comes before the
politics: we begin with identities whose shape and character are, or at least
could be, pre-political and then we opt to get political about them’. It is
built around a pre-existing social reality common to group members, and
they use this common reality to organise and/or orient themselves for
political purposes. This pre-existing reality constitutes what has been
problematised here as group identifier strands, and it can present itself in
the form of shared history, language, religion, ethnicity, skin colour or
suffering that is uniform among group members.
Arthur (2004: 1) lists the following as popular group identifier strands
that usually metamorphose into dominant political cultures:
activities based on the shared experiences of members of a specific social

group (often relying on shared experiences of oppression) … include not
only those organized around sexual and gender identities, but also around
such identities as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and disability.
Identity, once established and entrenched within a group in a society, is

used as a norm that determines political choices, reactions of the group
concerned and its interactions with outsiders (Ford 2005; Bernstein 2005;
Arthur 2004). It thus becomes an overriding political culture that can be
used to predict political behaviour, justify policies, predict political options
and reactions, and ultimately shape socio-economic and political develop-
ment in a country dominated by that particular group.
In contemporary politics, identity politics has become the general
framework for key contestations, and ethnic, sectarian, religious and
national identities have become dominant group identifiers undergirding
the overriding political culture in societies (Inac ̇ and Unal 2013: 1).
Identity politics has become a dominant political culture across the world,
instances including ‘separatist movements in Canada and Spain, and vio-
lent ethnic and nationalist conflict in post-colonial Africa and Asia, as well
as in the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe’ (Bernstein
2005:47).
138 B. GUMBO
Identity Politics Shapes Transition Politics: Easton’s

Systems Theory
The role of identity politics in transitions is best understood in terms of
David Easton’s systems theory. According to this theory, transition is an
outcome of a political system resulting from the system’s processing of
inputs (demands and support) from the environment (society) into out-
puts (government policies, decisions and programmes) and feedback
(reactions) from the environment (society) (Easton 1957: 384). Easton
(1957: 386) notes that:
demands have their birth in two sectors of experience: either in the envi-
ronment of a system or within the system itself … in the environment we
have such systems as … culture … social structure and demography. Each
of these constitutes a major set of variables in the setting that help to
shape the kind of demands entering a political system … The members of
every society act within the framework of an ongoing culture that shapes
their general goals, specific objectives and procedures that members feel
ought to be used.
In this context, identity politics has emerged as a dominant political

culture in Zimbabwe, constituting the environment within which the
political system and/or process operates. It serves as the environment
that Easton envisioned as a key determinant of the kind of inputs chan-
nelled into the political system, the kind of gate-keeping done within
the system to determine the entry of inputs into the processing machin-
ery of the political system, and the kind of outputs and outcomes from
the system.
Identity politics conditions the hearts and minds of society, and forms
the political system to the extent that outputs, inputs and feedback cannot
be the way they are without the kind of coaching that identity politics
imposes. Figure 6.1 provides a diagrammatic and contextualised illustra-
tion of the role of identity politics as an environment that shapes outcomes
of the political system on selected but key transition questions and contes-
tations in Zimbabwe.
Inputs
Outputs
Demands
Decisions/Policies
1. Nation building
2. Shona ethnic 1. Majority rule &
hegemony Lancaster House
Constitution
3. Land (1950s- Political System 2. Gukurahundi
2000s)
Operation
4. Democracy and 1. ZANU-PF Government
3. First Track Land
economic Recovery Reform Programme
2. Political Institutions
(1999-2018)
populated with ZANU-PF 4. 2008 June election
5. Power transition supporters and rerun violence
sympathisers
Support 5. Indigenisation and
economic
1. Successive empowerment policy
ZANU-PF electoral 6. 2013 Constitution
victories
7. 2017 Coup d’etat
2. Apathy and rise of 8. 1 August 2018
MDC post election
violence
Environment
Identity Politics
Racist Nationalism
Politics of Shona ethnic hegemony
Politics of liberation entitlement
Fig. 6.1 A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition politics
Identity Politics: A Dominant Political Culture

in Zimbabwe
There are three key political strands upon which identity politics has been
nurtured in Africa: racial nationalism, tribal and/or ethnic hegemony and
religious sectarianism. Although religious sectarianism has not been a
problematic group identifier in the Zimbabwean body politic, key political
140 B. GUMBO
contestations have been punctuated and symptomised by three popular

group identifier tenets:
i. racial nationalism;
ii. politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony;
iii. politics of liberation entitlement.
Together, these make up the essence of identity politics in post-colonial

Zimbabwe, which has become a domineering political culture steering the
course of political transition in the country. Identity politics so construed
shapes, nurtures and defines all other political cultures in Zimbabwe. We
now discuss the conceptual construction of these three group-coalescing
identifiers and illustrate how they have metamorphosed into rigid political
cultures that have defined, shaped and predicted political transitions in the
Zimbabwean political economy.
Racial Nationalism This is another group-coalescing and/or political

orientation that uses race as a political strand, uniting group members into
a single movement or unit that competes for political, social and economic
resources in a society. This is a more cross-cutting political organisation
magnet, which in most cases cuts across tribal or ethnic groups since skin
colour is shared by many linguistic and ethnic groups. Nationalism in
Zimbabwe was and still is typified by what Taylor (1989: 414) describes as
shared experiences of colonial subjugation and social exclusion of certain
(black/African) members of a group. This is what united black nationalist
movements in Southern Africa during the decolonisation movement,
doing the same among settlers resisting decolonisation (Kriger 1999). For
instance, it was possible for nationalists in Zimbabwe to gain assistance
from Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania because the politics
of decolonisation were based on racial nationalism—the fight for majority
rule advocated by leaders of political parties populated by black people in
a society dominated by black majorities, against minority rule by white
people in a society with few white people.
Songs of decolonisation struggles, such as the famous ‘dubulibhunu’

(shoot the whites) song that reverberated across all nationalist movements
in Southern Africa, served as a pointer to the fact that nationalism in the
region had strong racial foundations. This foundation and/or inclination
was also evident in the emphasis on African people and nationals of African
origin as the main political strand that identified membership of nationalist

political parties, illustrated in the names of nationalist political parties such
as Zimbabwe’s African People’s Union and African National Union, the
African National Congress and Kenya’s African National Union. It cannot
be denied that most of these African National political parties transmogri-
fied from trade unions that previously championed labour rights and
demands peculiar to African workers. Labour was racially stratified and
nationalists’ political movements born out of such organisations were
inescapably prone to remain racially organised. This racial nationalism
defined transition trajectories after colonial rule came to an end, in terms
of policies, nation-building, political contestations and development.
Politics of Tribal and/or Ethnic Hegemony This is political coalescing

and/or orientation based on ethnic and/or tribal distinctiveness. It is usu-
ally based on a shared language and/or claims of a shared historic nation-
ality that existed before the status quo, and ties group members into a
single unit that competes with and is strongly opposed to others within
the society. This kind of politics has led to the proliferation of ethnic or
tribal political parties, such as the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) in 1963, which was dominated by Shona-speaking tribes, as a
breakaway from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which
continued after 1963 to be populated by Ndebele-speaking tribes (Sithole
1979; Moore 2014). The undergirding norm has been the propagation
and prolongation of Shona hegemony in all spheres of life versus Ndebele
ethnic politics of repulsion and animosity. State policies, decision-making,
allocation of political posts, political contestations and transition trajecto-
ries in these political systems have reflected subservience to the whims of
tribalism or ethnic politics.
Politics of Liberation Entitlement This post-colonial group was based

on shared liberation history or what has been termed patriotic history, a
political strand that ties group members into a single unit that fights to
promote, defend and prolong the liberation legacy against ‘others’. The
Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) has been
the creator and beneficiary of this style of identity politics since the 1990s.
The patriotic history narrative depicts ZANU–PF (united with its libera-
tion war veterans) as the sole giver and guarantor of independence and
sovereignty in Zimbabwe, which is constantly threatened by imperialist
forces (Tendi 2010). This form of identity politics metamorphosed from
142 B. GUMBO
the cross-pollination between three political factors: the racial nationalism

and tribalist/ethnic-hegemony politicking described above and domestic
pressures and/or shocks posed by post-independence generation frustra-
tions over human development failures of nationalist governments. As
Onslow notes, the politics of liberation entitlement centres on the
following:
importance of personality, ethnic and clan politics which helped to shape the
liberation movement during the struggle for independence … [and] … the
role of ‘armed struggle’... These formative attitudes and experiences forged
political cultures which have continued to play out in the domestic political
arena post-independence’ (2011: 2).
It is a simultaneous consolidation of the past liberation history and use

of history to repel threats of erosion posed by the future. A group of
nationalists who participated in the liberation struggles leading to the
decolonisation of countries in Southern Africa have created an identity
narrative that gives them entitlement to the state, power, resources and
destiny of the post-independence state against threats of transition caused
by post-independence demographic transformations (Raftopoulos 2010:
202). Political contestations, key national questions and political transi-
tion have been punctuated by contestations between the ‘liberation enti-
tlement’ stock-holder group and the post-independence generation, with
the former importing and deploying their founding racial nationalism and
tribalism politics.
Identity politics has been a constant factor throughout post-colonial
politics in Zimbabwe to the extent that it has become a dominant political
culture determining the distribution of resources, a defining political cul-
ture since the decolonisation of Zimbabwe and a guiding culture in most
political contestations and controversies. To restate the thesis of this chap-
ter, the political economy reveals that identity politics as a dominant politi-
cal culture has been based on three fundamental ‘group-coalescing’
identifiers: racial nationalism, politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony and poli-
tics of liberation entitlement. These three factors have defined almost
every sphere of life in Zimbabwe, and all critical junctures for transition
have been captured in this web of identity politics.
History of Transition in Zimbabwe: From Racial

Nationalism to Politics of Liberation Entitlement
In Zimbabwe, political transition from the settler state to a black majority-
governed state has been an interplay of identity politics founded on racial
nationalism, tribal/ethnic hegemony politics (Sithole 1979) and the poli-
tics of liberation entitlement. The analysis presented in this chapter
attempts to give a concise overview of how these three factors have played,
and still play, a decisive role in transition politics. Identity politics as a
political culture has indeed determined political transition trajectories.
The state media have been instrumental in creating, transforming and sus-
taining the dominant political culture that has kept ZANU–PF in power.
Figure 6.2 lays out a conceptual framework that summarises identity poli-
tics and its overriding role in key national transition questions from inde-
pendence till 2020.
The identity politics of early nationalist movements and/or political
parties combined racial nationalism and the politics of tribal/ethnic
hegemony. At its inception in the 1950s, nationalism was organised
around race—the desire to end colonial subjugation and establish black
majority rule. Political parties such as the 1957–1959 Southern Rhodesia
African National Congress (SRANC), and its successors, the 1960
National Democratic Party and ZAPU, appealed more to cross-cutting
group identifier filaments such as a shared history of colonial oppression,
sameness of skin, a traceable history of common nationality and pan-
African claims of the historical inheritance of the country from shared
forefathers. These political parties had a multi-ethnic executive member-
ship and were led by Joshua Nkomo, who came from a Ndebele ethnic
minority. Such a situation has become close to impossible today, because
of the political culture of Shona ethnic hegemony cultivated by the post-
independence government.
The cross-cutting nature of identity politics as a political culture of that
time was portrayed in the branding of the movements and the policy posi-
tions of those parties that assumed advocacy for all black people against
white domination—racial nationalism. Emphasis was placed on ‘African
Nationals’ or ‘African People’ as a key political group, and their identity
was propagated by SRANC and ZAPU. In addition, Nkomo, the then
President of SRANC, gave the following pan-African policy response to
the Land Husbandry Act enacted by the settler government in 1951:
144 B. GUMBO
Zimbabwe -Identity Politics

in Transition
Tribalist ethnic Politics of liberation

Racism Nationalism politicking entitlement
(Blackness vs Whiteness) (Shona vs Ndebele) (Liberation vs post-
independence generation
1. The liberation and /or 1. The nationalist movements and 1. Electoral contestations from
decolonisation struggle parties were punctuated by 2000-2013 have been punctuated by
against white minority rule tribalism and ethnic exclusionary anti-whiteness and reverence of the
was racist from the start politics liberation struggle rhetoric
ie “Zimbabwe African ie The 1963 ZAPU splits, the ie ZANU PF has branded the
nationals/peoples” being a Shona-Ndebele interparty opposition parties as conduits of
defining feature for conflicts such as the battle of white settlers and surrogates of the
membership to nationalist eNtumbane
movements. West
2. Electoral contestations from 2. The land redistribution program
2. Land redistribution 1980-1987 were founded on was characterised by entitlement of
policy pitched on racist tribal and ethnic exclusionary ‘liberation’ group to the spoils.
frameworks and execution politics
plans ie most fertile land were given to
ie ZANU-PF 1980-87 election ZANU-PF and veterans of the
ie Lancaster house slogan such as “Pasi na Joshua liberation war.
constitution protected Nkomo”
whites for ten years post- 3. Political transition has been
independence by precluding 3. Post-conflict political enchored on the liberation struggle
land reforms, the First transformation and state building hyrachy of entitlement
Track Land Reform policy had serious subservience
Program delved deeper into to tribal and/ or ethnic Ie the military of Zimbabwe and
racism exclusionary politics ZANU-PF have vowed to ensure that
presidency is reserved for the
3. Post-2000 electoral ie ZANU-PF government
liberation struggle elite
contestations punctuated by Gukurahundi massacres in
anti-white racist rhetoric Matebeleland and Midlands in
from the ruling ZANU-PF 1983-1987
Fig. 6.2 Conceptualising identity politics as a dominant political culture in

Zimbabwe
Any act whose effects undermine the security of our small land rights, dis-
possess us of our little wealth in form of cattle, disperse us from our ancestral
homes in the reserves and reduce us to the status of vagabonds and a source
of cheap labour for farmers, miners, and industrialists—such an Act will turn
African People against society to the detriment of the peace and progress of
this country (Phimister 1993: 227–228).
This designation of the ‘African People’ as a defining identity of national-

ists made it easier for black nationalism to resonate with pan-African
movements led by black African Americans, such as Martin Luther King Jr
in the United States. To buttress the assertion that Zimbabwean national-
ism in its pre-1963 form was based on black skin rather than narrow ethnic
politics, Martin Luther King Jr expressed this when he noted the follow-
ing about SRANC:
Although we are separated by miles, we are closer together in mutual strug-

gle for freedom and human brotherhood … there is no basic difference
between colonialism and segregation … our struggles are not only similar;
they are in a real sense one (Sibanda 2005: 41)
This recognition would have been difficult if the nationalists had been
embroiled in narrow tribal ethnic politics. The telos of the struggle was to
fight the ‘white man’, and songs such as ‘dubulibhunu’ resonated across
tribal and ethnic divides. The role of race as a group identifier was evident
in the emphasis on ‘African Nationals’ as the main population represented
by SRANC, while genuine transition did not require the exclusion of
‘European nationals’ from Rhodesia. Thus, the personality cult built
around the leading nationalist of the time—Joshua Nkomo as ‘Father
Zimbabwe’—illustrated the cross-cutting nature of the foundation of
nationalism. The nationalist unity politics of 1975–1977 that led to the
formation of the failed Zimbabwe People’s Army were an attempt to
return nationalist movements to this holistic and/or cross-cutting identity
politics that had been eroded (Moore 2014).
The 1963 split in ZAPU that gave birth to a Shona-dominated ZANU
led by Ndabaningi Sithole was an important event that indicates how trib-
alism and ethnicity became deeply embedded within nationalism (Sithole
1979). It was a turning point in pan-African nationalism. Original pan-
African nationalism based on black racism broke into its constituting
pieces. Transition from tribal/ethnic fragmented identities that had been
promoted by colonial divide-and-rule policies to a united African Peoples
identity crumbled at this point, and has failed to rise again. There emerged
a political culture that evolved around tribal and/or ethnic segmentation,
particularly using linguistic difference as a key identity upon which politi-
cal organisation and liberation struggle was built.
The immediate post-split ZAPU–ZANU inter-party conflict in Harare,
Gweru, Bulawayo and other areas took clear tribal and/or ethnic
146 B. GUMBO
dimensions. Later splits, including the one that resulted in the formation
of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, also indicated how ethnicity
was defying the attempts to forge a transition in nationalist identity poli-
tics (Moore 2014). This had consequences for the political trajectory of
the state thereafter. Sithole (1979) described these splits as ‘struggles
within struggles’, and they should be understood as a point in time where
identity politics based on tribalism conditioned the political direction of
the nationalist movement, which had the possibility of giving birth to a
Zimbabwe that was more united than it is today. Some researchers have
found that the colonial government and the Cold War policy of the United
States influenced the ZAPU split, weakening the party and preventing the
possibility of a Soviet-backed political grouping from getting to power in
Southern Africa (Moore 2014). However, this study contends that post-
independence realities have proved that these factors merely added more
fuel to the already simmering conditioning power of tribal politics.
Instead of using messages that united, the nationalist political parties
that participated in the 1980 general elections used racist and tribal mes-
sages, and sloganeering such as ‘pasi na Nkomo’ (down with Nkomo),
‘phansi lo Robert Mugabe’ (down with Robert Mugabe) and down with
the whites (Cliffe et al. 1980). These messages brewed animosity among
supporters of the main contenders PF–ZAPU, and ZANU–PF. Instead of
transforming political contestations into more accommodative politics,
electoral contestation in this period failed to go beyond the African mis-
conception of a political opponent as an enemy. Societies were engulfed in
tribal exclusionary identity politics, to the extent that Ndebele- and Shona-
speaking populations were made to perceive each other as worse enemies
than their former colonial masters had been (Cliffe et al. 1980; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009).
At independence, the black majority government was faced with key
political transition questions, such as nation-building to move national
politics from racial or tribal animosity to a rainbow nation focused on
developing the whole nation as a single people, and land re-distribution to
ensure fairness in land ownership and control. This was re-stated in the 4
March 1980 inauguration speech of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe,
when he noted that:
Surely this is now time to beat our swords into ploughshares, so we can
attend to the problems of developing our economy and our society… I urge
you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new pledge to forget
our grim past, forgive others and forget. Join hands in a new amity and
together as Zimbabweans trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism,
and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate
our economic machinery (www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabe-on-
reconciliation).
However, as shall be noted here, tribal/ethnic politics of exclusion and

racial political culture stood in the way of this transition in the political
culture of the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The post-independence rec-
onciliation and transformation of the dominant racial and tribalist political
culture to a ‘Zimbabwean’ identity promised by the black majority gov-
ernment of Mugabe turned out to be a mere political gimmick. Although
the racial hegemony identity politics sponsored by the settler government
was abandoned, the government revived Shona hegemony, tribal/ethnic-
based political culture, as a replacement.
Zimbabwe missed a critical juncture to transition to multi-partyism,
and to the creation of a political system based on tolerance of political dif-
ferences and on the importance of being Zimbabwean over being Shona
or Ndebele, black or white. The events that followed the independence of
Zimbabwe from Britain in 1980 illustrated that ZANU–PF had no politi-
cal culture capable of ushering in institutional and social changes that
would ensure national unity transcending tribal/ethnic hegemony poli-
tics, and had no plans beyond public rhetoric (Sithole and Makumbe
1997). Independence meant that racial nationalism was over; tribal/eth-
nic exclusionary politicking was intensified. The Shona–Ndebele linguistic
differences led the country into seven years of chaotic conflicts that claimed
around 20,000 people from the Ndebele minority, who were killed by
ZANU–PF’s Shona-dominated North Korean-trained army—the Fifth
Brigade—in a government programme code-named Gukurahundi
(Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources
Foundation 1997; Tendi 2011; Onslow 2011; Moore 2014). In pursuit of
this policy, ‘most leading personalities of PF-ZAPU and the former ZIPRA
[Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army] were sacked from government
and from the national army, while others were detained’ (Sithole and
Makumbe 1997: 134). Although the programme was officially aimed at
tracking down and capturing ‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland and Midlands,
the actual plan turned out to be an enforcement of the Shona hegemony
identity politics or a Shona-ruled one party state.
148 B. GUMBO
The 1980 and 1985 election results proved that PF–ZAPU was a
Ndebele ethnic minority party and ZANU–PF a Shona ethnic majority
party, whereas the whites kept their racial identities because these parties
enjoyed loyal support in the Matabeleland and Mashonaland regions
respectively (Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 127). The ruling party’s pursuit
of a one-party state policy and commitments by the then prime minister to
assimilate or crush PF–ZAPU was tantamount to threatening the Ndebele
ethnic minority with extinction. Thus, Mugabe even justified killing civil-
ians by the Fifth Brigade, arguing that it was not easy to differentiate them
from dissidents (Tendi 2011). Although PF–ZAPU and ZANU–PF tried
to end this tribal ethnic politics through a 1987 Unity Accord, which saw
PF–ZAPU being assimilated into ZANU–PF and Joshua Nkomo, its
leader, being made Mugabe’s deputy in a one-party state (Onslow 2011;
Dzimiri et al. 2014: 219), the roots had gone too deep to the extent that
it has persisted to date. It can be argued that ZANU–PF engaged PF–
ZAPU after it had confirmed that the politics of Shona ethnic hegemony
that it had been cultivating for seven years had been successfully estab-
lished and was ready to show its intended benefits. Today, the idea of hav-
ing a Ndebele president in Zimbabwe is, in reality, unthinkable. The years
of ZANU–PF rule have entrenched Shona hegemony as a dominant polit-
ical culture to the extent that the highest political office a Ndebele minor-
ity can dream of is being appointed by a Shona-speaking leader to serve as
his or her vice-president. Even the main post-independence opposition
political party that claims to be a doyen of democracy, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), has religiously followed this undemocratic
political culture as if it set in stone. Political attitudes, beliefs, choices and
preferences have been modelled by post-independence tribalist ethnic
identity politics in such a manner that a political party fielding a president
who is not from the Shona-speaking ethnic majority effectively gives vic-
tory to its closest contender.
The formation of the MDC in 1999 and the subsequent rise in its
political support across the country created feelings of optimism, particu-
larly regarding the possibility of transformation in the three group identi-
fiers that have sustained identity politics as a dominant political culture. In
the language of systems theory, the formation of MDC in 1999 can be
conceptualised as the reaction of the environment to the outputs of the
ZANU–PF dominated political system and a formidable factor in the
political environment that was capable of causing major changes in the
dominant political culture. First, MDC had a sphere of support and
organisation that included the white population. It was believed that this
would transform Zimbabwe’s racial nationalism into a multi-racial nation-
alism based on Zimbabwean nationality rather than black race. Secondly,
it was thought that the MDC would transform the politics of Shona hege-
mony into equality-based inter-tribal and inter-ethnic political organisa-
tion and representation. Thirdly, it was believed that MDC, with its
leadership composed of post-independence politicians, would create a
new political culture that could break away from the traditional politics of
liberation entitlement that had been the order of the day in ZANU–PF
policies and programmes, such as the land redistribution policy and the
leadership succession debates.
To a great extent, the expected changes did not materialise. Instead,
racial nationalism and the politics of liberation entitlement became stron-
ger and a formidable force against the MDC challenge. The system became
more resilient to changes imposed by the environment. Political contesta-
tion was typified by racial nationalism and the politics of liberation entitle-
ment, and statements by leading personalities in the political system
pointed to this fact. For instance, at the ZANU–PF December 2000 con-
gress, President Mugabe noted that ‘The only white man you can trust is
a dead white man … our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of
the white man, our real enemy… The white man is not indigenous to
Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans…’ (Mugabe
2000 in Newsweek 16/11/2017). These sentiments accurately captured
the essence of racial nationalism as a political culture nurtured and spon-
sored by ZANU–PF. It assumed that black Zimbabweans were more
‘Zimbabwean’ than white Zimbabweans, and the latter should be treated
as enemies by the former. The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP)
introduced in 2001 was seen by some as a ZANU–PF government
response to MDC’s cross-cutting organisation, which saw many white
Zimbabweans supporting and joining the opposition. The fact that MDC
opposed the manner in which the programme was imposed and spoke out
against brutality unleashed against white farmers in the process saw
ZANU–PF creating a picture of MDC as the puppet of white Zimbabweans
and an imperialist project of the West. Mugabe commented on the ongo-
ing FTLRP in the ZANU–PF congress held in December 2003: ‘Let Blair
and the British government take note and listen. Zimbabwe is for
Zimbabweans. Our people are overjoyed. The land is ours. We are now
the rulers and owners of Zimbabwe’ (ibid).
150 B. GUMBO
From the revival of racial nationalism in the early 2000s came the poli-
tics of liberation entitlement as a corollary political culture, to assist in
resisting threats of political transition posed by MDC and other forces in
civic society and media. ZANU–PF and its liberation war veterans created
this group identifier in such a way that it appeared to be a pillar of ZANU–
PF nationalism, operating side by side with anti-white racism against the
winds of change. The politics of liberation entitlement was manifested
through a political culture that sought to reserve powerful political posi-
tions and the national honour of being accorded the status of national
hero for former fighters and/or participants in the liberation war that
ended in 1979. Powerful units of the political system, such as the military
and state-controlled media, have been used to implant this culture in the
hearts of Zimbabweans. The electorate has been reminded that this group
identifier strand is held in high esteem before most contested elections.
For instance, in the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, the then
Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, gave
a media briefing at which he said:
We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security
organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will
pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of
lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known
that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected
to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not
accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that
threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people
(Zvinavashe in NewYork Times, 11/01/2002).
This was repeated by Major General Martin Chedondo, who addressed

Second Brigade soldiers in 2012 before the 2013 elections:
We cannot be seen supporting a political party that is going against the ide-
als of a nation, which came by as a result of a liberation struggle, which saw
many of the country’s sons and daughters losing their lives. As soldiers we
must support ideologies that we subscribe to, I for one will not be apolo-
getic for supporting Zanu-PF because I was part of the liberation struggle…
(Chedondo in The Herald, 08/05/2012).
Robert Mugabe echoed these sentiments in past elections, with the

intention of making people conceive of his main opponent, Morgan
Tsvangirai, and anyone else without ‘liberation struggle credentials’, as
unqualified for presidency. ZANU–PF and its war veterans were entitled
to rule and determine who would rule. When the country missed political
transition after the contested March 2008 presidential election results led
to a violence-ridden re-run in June of the same year, President
Mugabe noted:
The war veterans came to me and said, ‘President, we can never accept that
our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken
merely by an ‘X’ made by a ballpoint pen. ‘Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana
ne AK? (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle
between the two? Do not argue with a gun (Mugabe in The Herald,
23/06/2008).
These sentiments indicate that the only possible political transition

could come from ZANU–PF liberators who were entitled to rule.
In addition to the above two strands in the dominant political culture
in Zimbabwe, ZANU–PF has created and nurtured a political template
and/or narrative that makes subservience to Shona ethnic hegemony a
ubiquitous political norm, particularly in terms of determining the hierar-
chy of political leadership. The MDC did nothing to alter this in its organ-
isational formation and the allocation of powerful decision-making
positions. The Shona ethnic group or tribe must rule, and choose who
among its rival Ndebele tribe should give assistance services as a vice-
president. This in part explains Thokozani Khuphe’s failure to succeed
Morgan Tsvangirai as leader of the main opposition after the latter’s death
on 14 February 2018. It was politically unpalatable and unwise to choose
her over Nelson Chamisa or anyone else, because the dominant Shona
hegemony meant that her succession would politically disadvantage the
party in the 2018 elections. This would have been worse given that the
main political contender in the race for presidency, President Emmerson
Mnangagwa, represented Shona hegemony.
The succession of President Mnangagwa after a military assisted palace
coup that deposed Mugabe was made possible by the dominant political
culture conceptualised in this study. Being a key player in the formation
and implementation of the two key group identifiers of identity politics
152 B. GUMBO
championed by the ZANU–PF elite, Mnangagwa had no compunction in

eliminating Obert Mpofu, a member of the Ndebele ethnic group from
the ‘presidium’ (the top three executive positions), despite the fact that he
had remained the most senior minister and never used his power to benefit
after Mnangagwa’s self-imposed exile. The system that was heavily influ-
enced by tribal/ethnic hegemony and the politics of liberation entitlement
made it unthinkable for Mpofu or any other aspirant to seize the opportu-
nity and fill the power void that had arisen. The same strands in identity
politics explain the war on the pro-Mugabe faction that was linked to
Grace Mugabe, the former president’s wife. They were accussed of erod-
ing the liberation struggle legacy since they were a ‘generation forty’ typi-
fied by the deficiency of liberation struggle credentials. The ‘generation
forty’ was defined by Mnangagwa (2017) as ‘minnows who have no lib-
eration credentials’. Thus, the coup d’état was code-named Operation
Restore Legacy. What legacy was it other than the desire to naturalise
power transition within the liberation struggle elite? Robert Mugabe’s
successors being his wife and members of the ZANU–PF faction associ-
ated with her posed a threat that power would be handed over to someone
with no liberation struggle history.
Conclusion
It can be stated that identity politics is a dominant political culture in
Zimbabwe and it is a key determinant of political transition post-Mugabe.
The three political strands and/or group identifiers, racial nationalism, the
politics of Shona tribal hegemony and the politics of liberation struggle
entitlement, will continue to define the kind of transition to come in the
near future. These three strands of identity politics exist inseparably from
one other and they shape the major outcomes of the political system. The
ruling ZANU–PF stands to benefit from this political culture, and any
political attempt to dismantle this rigid barrier to political transition should
direct its energies towards removing these three political strands of iden-
tity politics. It will be after this takes place that inter-ethnic equality, equi-
table allocation of political goods and consensual democracy will be a
possibility.
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Hegemony and Its Incipient Decline. African Journal of Political Science 2
(1): 122–139.
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MA: Havard University Press.
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www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00344893.2011.596439?src=recsy
s&journalCode=rrep20
CHAPTER 7
The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization

in Zimbabwe: The Case of Pro-Mthwakazi
Movements
Samukele Hadebe
Introduction
The bruised and polarised relationship between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic
groups is deeply rooted in the annals of history, which makes it a protracted
social conflict. (Muchemwa 2015)
The unforeseen but inevitable military intervention—unforeseen by many

including President Robert Mugabe who trusted the military’s loyalty, yet
inevitable in the sense that the military had already been overreaching and
dabbling in party politics as witnessed when it thwarted opposition leader
Morgan Tsvangirai from taking power—in Zimbabwe’s political landscape
coincided with the heightening of politicization of ethnic identities, espe-
cially in the Matabeleland provinces of Zimbabwe. Understandably, the
challenge is not only about how to reverse direct military meddling in
politics but also how to address the upsurge of pro-Mthwakazi ethnic
S. Hadebe (*)
Chris Hani Institute, Johannesburg, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_7
156 S. HADEBE
consciousness. Prolonged economic stagnation, delayed democratic tran-

sition and unresolved national healing questions have collectively given
fertile ground to political groups on the fringes to embark on ethnic
mobilization calculated to break up the country. This chapter demon-
strates that the ethnicization of politics in Zimbabwe has reached levels
that both academics and policymakers continue to ignore at great peril to
the country’s territorial integrity. It is imperative that Zimbabwe should
address perceived ethnic marginalization, unequal development and resti-
tution for injustices of the past. While there is no obvious nexus between
the military and ethnic factors, however, both are likely to be dominant
themes in Zimbabwe’s political discourse for the foreseeable future.
Analysis of the ethnicization of political mobilization in Zimbabwe, par-
ticularly by the pro-Mthwakazi movements, is fraught with contradictions
and contestations that further complicate the country’s embattled demo-
cratic discourse. However, the democratization discourse within a human
rights framework has largely eschewed overt reference to ethnic politics,
notwithstanding its subtle but profound influence. Even advocacy for a
devolved local governance system, which was predominantly a Matabeleland
agenda, was stealthily couched in order to deny the ethnic political under-
tones that motivated it in the first place. In the mainstream, ethnic con-
sciousness and its politicization is roundly denounced if not denied, since
its ugly reality remains a national embarrassment. Yet it is undeniable that
pro-Mthwakazi ethnic mobilization ostensibly against the state is, in fact,
targeted against Shona people collectively for their perceived ethnic chau-
vinism and triumphalism, which is characterized by, among other things,
economic, political and cultural hegemony in post-colonial Zimbabwe.
The focus by many scholars has largely been on ‘decolonization poli-
tics, democracy and land politics, and this has left another important
aspect of Zimbabwe’s conflict conundrum unattended and still unad-
dressed’ (Muchemwa 2015: 2). For example, since 2000, there has been
an upsurge in pro-Mthwakazi formations, with the following being among
those emerging: Patriotic Union of Matabeleland, Matabeleland Freedom
Party, Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF), Mthwakazi Liberation
Organisation, Mthwakazi Republican Party (MRP), 1893 Mthwakazi
Restoration Movement, Mthwakazi Human Rights Restoration Movement
(MHRRM), Umhlahlo Wesizwe sikaMthwakazi and Ibhetshu Likazulu,
all more or less intent on secession. Moreover, there have been three
claimants to the defunct Ndebele throne; with one even hoisting a
‘Mthwakazi’ flag and demanding occupation of the State House residence
in Bulawayo, while another claimant’s coronation had to be stopped by a
Zimbabwean court in 2018.
7 THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 157
It could be argued, and convincingly so, that prolonged economic stag-

nation, delayed democratic transition and unresolved national healing
questions have collectively given fertile ground to groups on the fringes of
Zimbabwe’s political landscape that aim to embark on ethnic mobiliza-
tion, calculated to break up the country in pursuit of justice. In a way, the
twin unacknowledged malaises in Zimbabwe’s politics; the roles of ethnic
politics and the military in the configuration of Zimbabwean political
landscape, have become too visible for anyone to pretend that they do not
matter much. In an ironic turn of historical events, the direct military
intervention in Zimbabwe’s political landscape coincided with the height-
ening of politicization of ethnic identities, especially in the Matabeleland
provinces of Zimbabwe. Calls for an independent Mthwakazi state and
efforts to install a Ndebele king became fervent particularly from 2017.
While there is no obvious nexus between the military and ethnic factors,
however, both are likely to be dominant themes in Zimbabwe’s political
discourse for the foreseeable future unless both trends are consciously
arrested. Undoubtedly, Zimbabwe’s discourse on democratization in the
not so distant future may likely be dominated by the challenges posed by
direct military meddling in politics on the one hand, and the upsurge of
pro-Mthwakazi consciousness characterized by secessionist tendencies on
the other.
Since this discussion is not about the role of the military in Zimbabwean
politics but on the ethnicization of political mobilization, particularly by
pro-Mthwakazi groups, any reference to the military will only be made in
so far as it relates to the subject under scrutiny. Similarly, the ethnicization
of political mobilization is not confined to pro-Mthwakazi groups only,
but cases elsewhere will only be discussed if they influence the phenome-
non of pro-Mthwakazi consciousness and the politicization of ethnicity.
The chapter gives a historical context of ethnic rivalry and conflict in
Zimbabwe. A particular focus is the ethnicization of liberation movement
narratives. Furthermore, the chapter characterizes ethnic politics in
Zimbabwe from the viewpoint of pro-Mthwakazi movements. It is useful
to try and understand how these groups perceive issues since they are
partly the focus of this analysis. Lastly, the chapter explores political mobi-
lization on ethnic and regional grounds and its possible implications for
the Ndebele-speaking communities in particular and Zimbabwean politics
in general.
158 S. HADEBE
The Historical Context of Ethnic Rivalry and Conflict

in Zimbabwe
Writing on the troubled relations between the Ndebele and Shona in con-
temporary Zimbabwe, Muchemwa (2015: 1) states that ‘The bruised and
polarised relationship between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups is
deeply rooted in the annals of history’, hence premising this discussion on
the presupposition that the upsurge of pro-Mthwakazi groups is informed
by the historical context of ethnic rivalry and even conflict between the
Ndebele and Shona groups. The dominance in literature of Ndebele and
Shona relations could create a certain false impression to a non-
Zimbabwean reader, that these two are the only ethnic groups in the
country. While Zimbabwe is multilingual and multicultural, the Ndebele
and Shona seem to dominate both the historical and political space, leav-
ing aside the whites, who, regardless of their tiny numbers, occupy a dis-
proportionate space in the history of the country. Disparate linguistic and
cultural groups such as the Tonga, Venda, Sotho, Kalanga, Nambya, Ndau
and many others are subsumed within the Ndebele and Shona dichotomy
in the ethnic narratives. From a linguistic level, the Hwesa, Barwe and
Ndau people are marginalized owing to their forced assimilative relation-
ship with Shona (Sithole 2018), and the same could be said of speakers of
Kalanga, Tonga or Sotho in relation to Ndebele, for example.
We will not dwell here on who constitute the Ndebele as this has been
dealt with by many writers already (see Hughes and van Velsen 1954;
Omer-Cooper 1966; Cobbing 1976; Ranger 1999), of course without
reaching a consensus (Hadebe 2006). Similarly, it does not advance my
argument to delve into whether or not the Ndebele constitute an ethnic
group. Ethnicity itself as a concept is elusive and not easy to grapple with,
since it is ‘both amorphous and imbued with doses of subjectivity’
(Mabhena 2014: 2). Actually, according to Seymour-Smith (1986: 116),
ethnicity ‘may be objective or subjective, implicit or explicit, manifest or
latent, acceptable or unacceptable to a given group or category of people’.
Therefore, it suffices for this discussion to acknowledge that there is cur-
rently a Ndebele ethnic sentiment that has been subject to explicit political
mobilization attempts by pressure groups and political formations, espe-
cially the pro-Mthwakazi movements.
Employing the designation Mthwakazi in this discussion is in no way a
political statement that acknowledges the rights of the imagined nation or
its claim to independence, but merely utilizes the nomenclature that the
relevant groups under discussion prefer for their envisaged project. Of
course, the term has become culturally and politically loaded. In essence,
it is synonymous with ‘amahlabezulu’, originally referring to people col-
lectively under the Ndebele kings without delineating their ethnic origins,
either as abeZansi (from the south), abeNhla (those from the north) or
abakaMambo (those previously ruled by Mambos). Notably, these various
political and pressure groups have a fuzzy conceptualization of Mthwakazi
and even have no consensus on its geographical demarcation. However,
their convergence seems to be on the shared desire for self-determination
of the Ndebele people, perhaps culminating in an autonomous state.
Undoubtedly, this ethnic political mobilization is a Ndebele response
to perceived Shona domination, although the degenerating economic
conditions in the country could be the underlying root cause. But it would
be untrue to suggest that the pro-Mthwakazi sentiment is a post-
independence phenomenon or even to posit that ethnic rivalry between
Ndebele and Shona groups is new. The rivalry and conflict pre-date the
colonial era, when the pre-colonial Ndebele kingdom tended to have an
aggressive posture owing to its military prowess. It is also an undeniable
fact that Ndebele warriors looted cattle, grain, young men and women
from neighbouring Shona chiefdoms in the same way they extended that
aggression towards groups in Botswana and Zambia, not to mention the
numerous battles against the Afrikaner and African communities across
the Limpopo during the Ndebele people’s troubled journey to Zimbabwe.
It is a fact that the majority of people who constitute the Ndebele today
became such as a result of that nation-building programme, painful though
it might have been. It is equally true that economic benefit and political
power rather than ethnic hatred against the targeted groups could have
motivated Ndebele aggression. However, the resultant ethnic hatred and
backlash for which the Ndebele kingdom paid heavily, and for which
Ndebele people continue to pay, cannot be ignored. For example, some
Shona and Tswana chiefs cooperated with British South African Company
mercenary forces in the destruction of the Ndebele kingdom while Kalanga
chiefs opted for neutrality. The Ndebele as a people underwent terrible
subjugation after two genocidal wars by the British imperialists, and little
sympathy came their way then or does so today.
Of significance is the justification used by the invading colonial forces,
whose pretext was the protection of Shona from ‘marauding’ Ndebele
raiders (see Warhurst 1973; Smith 1998; Guzura and Ndimande 2015).
160 S. HADEBE
While it has been noted that many lies were told by colonial invaders, this
pretext has had a profound impact on the relations of Ndebele and Shona.
The colonial rulers were keen to keep the two groups divided by competi-
tion and mistrust (Kavanagh 2014). Even when Africans in general real-
ized the limitations of this division and rivalry, it has not been easy to
stamp it out. It permeated the social, economic and political lives of
Africans in colonial times. It even became a destabilizing factor for the
trade union movement (see Mothibe 1996) and later on the nationalist
movement.
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that in Zimbabwe, history and memory
have been used and abused for sectarian interests. Of course, history is not
neutral and might never be, but there are instances of manipulation that
have detrimental effects on human progress. Recorded Ndebele history
has fared no better. According to Hadebe (2006: 53), ‘This distortion of
Ndebele history, which began with some colonial historians, has persisted
in independent Zimbabwe. Some history textbooks continue with the
colonial stereotyping of the Ndebele.’ This claim is substantiated by
Lindgren (2002: 146): ‘The old, colonial image of the Ndebele as cruel
warriors is still evident in some of these Zimbabwean schoolbooks, not
always in words but often in pictures.’ Notable cases are Garlake and
Proctor (1985) and Parsons (1985). Therefore, from a Ndebele point of
view, not much truth is known about the Ndebele people’s history.
According to one historian who has written much on Ndebele, ‘The most
outstanding feature of contemporary written evidence for early Ndebele
history is that none of it was penned by an Ndebele person’ (Rasmussen
1978: 163). Of course, this has changed since independence. It is evident
that colonial writers, be they historians or novelists, ‘painted a bad picture
of the Ndebele in order to justify the invasion and ultimate destruction of
the Ndebele state in spite of the many peace efforts that Lobhengula had
done to avoid war with the British’ (Hadebe 2007: 10). While most of
these distortions, especially on Ndebele and Shona relations, have largely
been proven false, nonetheless, the negative stereotypes of Ndebele people
as ‘savages, lazy, thrifty and uneducated’ continue unabated particularly in
social media. Contrary to challenging these stereotypes, Kavanagh (2014),
in his self-published Zimbabwe: Challenging the Stereotypes, actually rein-
forces them. For example, in spite of historical evidence to the contrary,
Kavanagh (2014: 100) condescendingly writes that:
The children of Mthwakazi, of Lobengula and Mzilikazi, wake up to find

that, having been the lords of Zimbabwe before the coming of the whites
and consistently treated as superior to the Shona by the whites during the
colonial era, they are now to be ruled by the descendants of those they once
ruled and whom they and their colonial masters traditionally regarded
with contempt.
In a manner typical of all his forebears, Kavanagh reinforces the white

paternalistic view that saw everything African through a tribal prism. It
would seem that the past is not only seen from the context of the present,
but is also exploited to justify and confirm present circumstances. In any
event, the ‘biography of any nation is written backwards from the now’
(Anderson 1991: 204); hence the contestations in Zimbabwe’s
historiography.
The Ethnicization of Liberation Movement Narratives

Another aspect of Zimbabwean history that is not only contested but is
also a major source of grievance and sense of collective injustice is the
memory of the liberation struggle. It has been observed that ‘Inasmuch as
history is the property of victors’ (Chomsky 1979: 1), so is memory. This
has been said in the context of Zimbabwe’s official narrative of the libera-
tion legacy that belittles and marginalizes the roles of both the Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary
Army (ZPRA), and by extension the contribution of Ndebele-speaking
communities (Hadebe 2016).
For the record, while the British brokered the Lancaster House
Agreement, brought about a ceasefire and subsequent elections that facil-
itated the transfer of power; it ironically denied the freedom fighters their
deserved military victory. American diplomat Andrew Young proudly
confirmed that it was a victory for the West, having ‘curtailed at least
temporarily the trend toward growing dependence on Soviet military aid
to bring about African liberation’ (ZCP 2018: 3). Without a military vic-
tory, the contribution of armed conflict and the respective roles of ZPRA,
the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Rhodesia
Security Forces and other armed groups would be difficult to ascertain.
It would seem that the victorious parties have their stories positively
remembered and told, while those of political losers, such as ZPRA, are
either forgotten or distorted. Although the victorious party, the
162 S. HADEBE
Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) led by

President Robert Mugabe won power through the British supervised
elections and not through a military victory, its official narrative, espe-
cially its ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger 2004:505, 2010: 218) has empha-
sized and perhaps even magnified ZANLA’s military effort as having
been the decisive factor. Undoubtedly, that aggravated the frustration of
not only many ex-ZPRA fighters and ex-ZAPU supporters, but the gen-
erality of Ndebele people who largely supported the war effort under the
aegis of ZAPU and ZPRA.
Since ZANU–PF’s politburo is responsible for conferring hero status
on deceased liberation veterans, the dominant perception from the
Ndebele region is that former ZPRA and ZAPU heroes and heroines are
deliberately marginalized as a calculated move to erase their contribution
from memory. This perception grew strongly when Lt General Lookout
Masuku was denied hero status in 1986, and Joshua Nkomo had this to
say to about 20,000 mourners who attended Masuku’s funeral: ‘He is not
being buried at the Heroes’ Acre. But they can’t take away his status as a
hero. You don’t give a man the status of a hero. All you can do is recognise
it. It is his’ (Nkomo 1986). Of course, that was in the context of a conflict
between ZAPU and the ZANU–PF government, and although some
things changed after the 1987 Unity Agreement, perceptions of marginal-
ization of memory linger on. For example, the perceived snubbing of
ZPRA heroes continued even two decades after the Unity Accord, as testi-
fied by a statement by the ZAPU president, Dumiso Dabengwa, in 2013
at the burial of Retired Colonel Richard Dube (Gedi Ndlovu) in Bulawayo’s
Lady Stanley cemetery:
We don’t doubt that he was a national hero and was meant to be honoured
by the country for the work that he did [… judging from past experiences
with what we had seen in the case of Thenjiwe Lesabe, Swazini Ndlovu and
earlier Lookout Masuku, it was a waste of time to hope that as ex-ZPRA he
would have been granted the befitting national hero status (Bulawayo News
24, 2013).
The public broadcaster, the main purveyor of Zimbabwe’s ‘patriotic his-

tory’, is seen as the main culprit in this alleged marginalization of ZPRA
war memory. The liberation war of the late 1960s to the 1970s has gener-
ally been seen as a continuation of the anti-colonial resistance and wars by
both Ndebele people (in 1893 and 1896–7) and Shona people (in
1896–7). To the consternation and frustration of some Ndebele people,

only the Shona first Chimurenga is publicized, and the liberation war that
brought independence is portrayed as the second Chimurenga, fought by
ZANU/ZANLA and by implication the Shona people. The two brutal
wars, known as Imfazo, waged by the Ndebele at the onset of coloniza-
tion, are barely mentioned, and when they are, they are subsumed under
the Chimurenga that began after both Ndebele wars of resistance. The
many military leaders that led the Ndebele war effort and died either on
the battlefield or after being sentenced by victorious colonists are rarely
recognized, as the Shona war leaders Nehanda and Kaguvi have been
recast to monopolize that space.
It should be borne in mind, however, that this apparent ethnicization
of liberation struggle narratives has a background. Mobilizing for the war
and waging it transformed not only the two major liberation parties,
ZAPU and ZANU, but further entrenched a culture of violence as an
instrument of politics. Zimbabwe’s story was not going to be the same.
The war itself had many incidents that widened the rift between ZAPU
and ZANU, further worsening ethnic relations as both ZPRA and
ZANLA’s recruitment (intentionally or otherwise) tended to be region-
ally based.
Numerous attempts to mend the relations and in some cases train and
fight as one force had in some instances disastrous consequences, if mas-
sacres in Mgagao (Tanzania) or Mboroma (Zambia) or even the Zimbabwe
People’s Army experience in Mozambique, are put into context. ZPRA
and ZANLA cadres fought each other openly in foreign countries and did
not even shy away from doing so within Zimbabwean borders still con-
trolled by their common enemy. Embarrassing as it was, this reality has to
be confronted without prejudice if one is to understand the politics of
armed struggle in Zimbabwe. In a free Zimbabwe, both ex-ZPRA and ex-
ZANLA cadres seem to underplay that ugly history, and have conveniently
forgotten about it. Why do we bring it up here? To explain that competi-
tion for power between ZPRA and ZANLA did not suddenly intensify
after the Lancaster House Agreement, as Joshua Nkomo seems to imply
(Nkomo 1984: 200), and that ethnic rivalry is not gone.
Equally important is the reality of cached arms in some ZAPU proper-
ties and allegations of a planned military overthrow of the ZANU–PF
government. To the disservice of former ZAPU supporters and Ndebele
people in general, ZAPU/ZPRA leaders have maintained their claim of
innocence in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Ironically,
164 S. HADEBE
many Ndebele people still hold on to the ZAPU/ZPRA leaders’ claims to

innocence. As both sides to the conflict seem to be sworn to silence since
the Unity Accord, the veracity of allegations of a coup remain difficult to
ascertain. ZPRA’s sacrifice and contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe
has largely remained an untold story. Perhaps it is no exaggeration that in
the country’s ‘patriotic history’ or in the Second Chimurenga annals, it is
the victorious ZANLA and ZANU–PF self-praise narratives that predomi-
nate. Indeed, while the whites Alexander in Zimbabwe have been described
as ‘orphans of the empire’ (Alexander 2004: 193) one may perhaps
describe the Ndebele as Zimbabwe’s ‘step-children’. The question of
belonging has been very controversial for both whites and Ndebele people
in independent Zimbabwe, which has often displayed bouts of fierce but
narrow and exclusive nationalism.
While the largely pro-Shona narratives of the country’s liberation draw
on aspects of Zimbabwean history, they are also influenced by war propa-
ganda, partisan bias, glorification of individual members of the ruling elite
and public policies pursued by the government at any given period. Songs
sung during the war by ZANLA guerrillas and celebratory songs after
independence have dominated state radio and television stations, thus car-
rying the ZANU–PF/ZANLA side of the story of liberation. Simultaneously
there has been a concerted effort to de-legitimize and peripherize ZPRA
from the new ZANU–PF reconstructed liberation war history (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2006). Consequently, ZPRA songs were hardly played on radio
and television during the early years after independence up to 1987.
All these perceived biased narratives of the liberation struggle have
helped to create institutionalized memories of collective hurt or a per-
ceived sense of injustice among some Ndebele people, whose support
from pro-Mthwakazi movements is perhaps a disguised longing for
vengeance.
Characterization of Ethnic Politics

from Pro-Mthwakazi Perceptions
It is important to attempt to understand how the pro-Mthwakazi groups
themselves conceive of ethnic politics and political mobilization solely on
ethnic grounds. In available sources, the different groups vary in their
philosophical grounding, apart from grievances. Some have websites and
even online newsletters, while others have barely any sources accessible to
the public. But generally, their views are carried by media outlets—print,
radio and online. Some few others have been partly researched and are
cited in academic works. What interests us in this discussion is not just the
ethnicization of political mobilization, which in any case could be preva-
lent across the board, but the openness about and acknowledgement by
the pro-Mthwakazi groups about the ethnicization of politics. For exam-
ple, the underlying conviction shared perhaps by all these groups is their
perception that Zimbabwean politics is ethnically based in favour of the
Shona speakers, to the disadvantage of the minority Ndebele speakers.
erceived Unequal Development

P
Perhaps the perceived unequal development of Zimbabwe’s provinces is
one overarching problem, especially with socio-economic stress caused by
severe job losses. Unequal development of infrastructure and public ser-
vices such as schools, hospitals and roads was a deliberate colonial policy
that favoured white areas rather than the so-called African reserves. It is an
underdevelopment legacy throughout colonial Africa, as the urban areas
have better facilities than rural ones, and within the urban areas the high-
density African townships were much more deprived than the glamorous
leafy low-density suburbs. While the economic divide that was characteris-
tic of the enclave economy persists, the post-independence Zimbabwe
government has made significant strides in improving the lives of the black
majority and building infrastructure in rural areas.
With the near collapse of the Zimbabwean economy, however, most
developmental strides have been reversed. But since the economic decline
has affected the whole country, how do we account for the different reac-
tion by pro-Mthwakazi groups? Such feelings probably derive Gukurahundi
is a Shona word literally referring to a heavy rain that washes away chaff
but in this context the term referred to the ethnic cleansing of Ndebele
people from perceptions ingrained during the Gukurahundi days.
Government propaganda at that time claimed that the Matabeleland
region would be left behind in terms of development owing to dissident
activities. Indeed, there was much destruction of government infrastruc-
ture, public facilities and private property. Schools were burnt down, buses
and shops were destroyed, and skilled personnel such as teachers were
targeted. While these acts of economic sabotage had an impact on the
general level of development in the region, the speeches by people such as
the then Minister Enos Nkala sank into the psyche of the Ndebele people.
The propaganda that was espoused by ministers such as Nkala was to the
effect that the Zimbabwean government intended to impoverish and
166 S. HADEBE
starve the Ndebele out of existence so that their provinces could be repop-
ulated by the Shona. Starvation was also used during Gukurahundi as a
weapon of war. Hence, when pro-Mthwakazi activists talked about the
under-development of the region, they would be merely invoking memo-
ries that the same government once claimed to pursue the policy of under-
developing Matabeleland. Whether indeed the ZANU–PF government
ever toyed with the idea of depopulating the Ndebele-speaking areas will
never be known, but suffice to say there remain perceptions to that effect
in sections of the Ndebele community.
erceived Discrimination in Employment and Promotion

P
Unlike in colonial times, there is no law or official policy that discriminates
against the employment or promotion of Ndebele-speaking people either
in the civil service or in the private sector, yet this is one area of grievance.
Perceptions of job discrimination are not confined to Mthwakazi activists
but have also been noted by researchers. The Minorities At Risk (MAR)
project notes that ‘There is massive unemployment and general social des-
titution in the area. Furthermore, although there are no restrictions to
high office, civil servants in Matabeleland are disproportionately Shona,
and do not even speak Ndebele’ (Zimbabwe Review 2008). Notably, the
MRP has been very vocal on the jobs issue and has highlighted a number
of cases, including the eviction of Shona-speaking teachers in Lupane,
demonstrating against employment patterns at KFC in Bulawayo in 2017
and Pick and Pay in Bulawayo in July 2018, and against the election of a
Shona-speaking mayor for Bulawayo in September 2018. A number of
Mthwakazi groups, including MRP, Ibhetshu Likazulu and 1893
MHRRM, marched against the same tendency at Egodini Mall in
Bulawayo. Accordingly, Mabhena writes that ‘the hegemony of the Shona
people in Zimbabwe has been largely influenced by ethnicity and the quest
to dominate Matabeleland politically, socially and economically’ (Mabhena
2014: 1).
It would seem that one of the key motivations for a devolved system of
local governance was the desire to protect local jobs for local people. MAR
quotes the Research and Advocacy Unit as saying:
There is a Shona presence in Matabeleland, and many Ndebele speak Shona.

In Bulawayo, about 80% are Ndebele but many of the businessmen and
Government posts are Shona. There was a large movement of Shona to
Matabeleland in the 1980s and into the 1990s. There is a certain amount of
ethnic tension due to this. The majority of Ndebele over Shona in part of
the country is diminishing. Large numbers of the Ndebele youth are
migrating to South Africa. The proportion of elderly in the rural areas is
increasing (Zimbabwe Review 2008: 46).
Indeed, few adults in Matabeleland who lived through the Gukurahundi

period would not understand Shona, but that actually aggravated ethnic
tensions as the largely Shona civil service, especially the police, maintain
their Shona mother tongue in Matabeleland. That behaviour is perceived
as the conqueror’s arrogance and a source of bitterness, and hence a mobi-
lizing force for Mthwakazi activists. True, there is to a large extent arro-
gance and triumphalism on the part of some Shona-speaking officials, but
there are also some who had had no opportunity to learn Ndebele,
Kalanga, Nambya or Tonga. Linguistically speaking, the dominant group
hardly has a motivation to learn the languages of the dominated, and in
the Zimbabwean context, since Shona is now literally spreading through-
out Zimbabwe and understood to an extent by even non-Shona people,
this limits the chance that Shona speakers will learn other languages.
eacher Deployment and Failure Rate

T
The three provinces of Matabeleland; that is Bulawayo Metropolitan,
Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North, have some of the country’s
Ordinary level examinations are taken after four years of secondary educa-
tion in Zimbabwe. One can proceed to train as a teacher or nurse of police
after passing ordinary level examinations. There are a number of possible
reasons to account for the deteriorating educational performance, includ-
ing socio-economic decline and the abject poverty of many households.
The high levels of school dropouts and migration of both pupils and
teachers to better prospects in South Africa has not made the situation any
better. But what seems to irk the Ndebele community is what they per-
ceive as the deliberate deployment of Shona teachers who cannot utter a
Ndebele word to teach beginner classes at primary schools. There has
developed an unfortunate belief that Shona teachers generally do not take
their work seriously if deployed in Matabeleland. As mentioned earlier,
MRP has been most vocal on this issue, particularly after their campaign at
Makuzeze school in Lupane district. The ignominious failure rate in
schools is therefore largely blamed on Shona-speaking teachers, who are
seen as agents for the cultural annihilation of the Ndebele. With a high
failure rate, very few Ndebele speakers make it to colleges and universities
168 S. HADEBE
in the region, which are numerically dominated by the majority Shona—

further aggravating ethnic animosity.
Unfortunately, this matter has been debated in public forums and also
dominates social media, creating a hostile learning environment. Pupils go
to class with an attitude that their Shona-speaking teachers are not helpers
but destroyers, while similarly the affected teachers cannot be comfortable
in a hostile environment where they are viewed with suspicion and mis-
trust. But most significant is poor performance in the sciences and math-
ematics, which excludes many learners from certain career paths. Because
the government has largely been insensitive to these community concerns,
pro-Mthwakazi activists have seized on them as confirmation of an ulterior
agenda against Ndebele people.
inguistic, Cultural and Religious Aspects

L
The job opportunities issue and language matters have been a rallying
point for pro-Mthwakazi groups, which unfortunately the government
has not attended to. Ethnic rivalry has not spared the churches, where fac-
tions have arisen on ethnic lines. But it is in fact in traditional religion that
ethnic conflict primarily continues to simmer. The Njelele shrines, which
have courted political controversy since the anti-colonial wars of 1894 and
1896–7, have continued to be controversial throughout the liberation war
to the post-independence era. While Zimbabweans generally profess
Christianity, traditional religion still holds sway for many, especially among
politicians who tend to frequent shrines as elections approach. The rituals
conducted by some Shona speakers and especially ZANLA war veterans at
the Njelele shrines have been perceived as sacrilegious by local communi-
ties. However, these Shona traditionalists claim dominion over the whole
of Zimbabwe, including the shrines, and therefore do not feel obliged to
follow local protocols that are held in great awe.
As recent as July 2018, there were reports of a bombing inside one of
the sacred Njelele shrine and suspicions point to people linked to govern-
ment who could easily access explosives. That many artisanal miners within
the locality have access to dynamite does not seem to have been consid-
ered by a community used to witnessing violations of their holy places.
This has a precedent, in that during Gukurahundi there was an attack on
the same Njelele shrine and the destruction of many religious parapherna-
lia, such as clay pots, and the assaulting of shrine keepers who are normally
revered in the community as rainmakers. Such religiously significant issues
have been utilized by the activists to buttress their claim that the Shona
government will stop at nothing to destroy everything in Matabeleland

and usurp the cultural history for its hegemonic agenda. MRP, Ibhetshu
Likazulu and the Matojeni Cultural Association were some of the organi-
zations that were at the forefront of mobilizing against what was clearly
seen as a religious affront by local communities. While the culprits have
yet to be arrested and identified, the assumption is that it could be either
state agents or Shona people, which means the same thing for communi-
ties whose main source of information on this matter is pro-Mthwakazi
activists.
he Humiliating Unity Accord of 1987

T
While the ruling party and government usually cite the Unity Accord
between Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU and Robert Mugabe’s ZANU–PF as
having set the tone for national reconciliation, some people still perceive
the agreement as a source of Ndebele humiliation. For example, the Unity
Day holiday celebrated annually on 22 December has since 2015 been
converted by Ibhetshu Likazulu to commemorate the thousands of
Ndebele people who perished during the Gukurahundi terror. The state
has obviously been uncomfortable with this twist by Mthwakazi radicals,
and in 2016 tried to block the public event at Stanley Square, Makokoba,
in Bulawayo. Mbuso Fuzwayo, the secretary-general of Ibhetshu Likazulu,
had to seek a court injunction that allowed the event to proceed, to the
chagrin of the police. Both the MRP and MLF are strong critics of the
Unity Accord as a sell-out document.
Of all the pro-Mthwakazi movements, it would appear that Ibhetshu
Likazulu has been the most effective and consistent in its message and
activities, and hence attracts sizeable audiences in its non-partisan gather-
ings. The organization has gained public sympathy for its call for justice
for Gukurahundi victims and its commemorative events of the same,
including memorial lectures about ZPRA/ZAPU and Ndebele icons such
as Lookout Masuku. Notably, Ibhetshu Likazulu seems to focus mainly on
those iconic figures who perished during the Gukurahundi, such as
Masuku and Jini Ntuta. It also commemorates the memory of the bomb-
ings at Mkushi and Freedom Camps in Zambia, where ZAPU mass graves
are not given the same attention as ZANLA’s in Chimoio and Nyadzonia
in Mozambique. It is as if Ibhetshu Likazulu is stoking the conscience of
the ruling party for its selective memory of the fallen heroes. But the orga-
nization goes even further, and commemorates annually the Mgagao
Massacre—where ZANLA guerrillas with the support of the then host
170 S. HADEBE
Tanzanian soldiers and Chinese instructors massacred without warning

their ZPRA brethren. Although the event was deemed to be the result of
partisan rivalry, it also smacked of ethnic conflict. The ZANLA and ZPRA
camp commanders happened not only to be both Shona but were also
cousins, or so some eyewitnesses say.
Drawing on all this background, the commemorations by Ibhetshu
Likazulu despise and dismiss the Unity Accord as nothing but a smoke-
screen by the dominant Shona government to destroy the Ndebele people
by non-military means, such as economic emasculation and joblessness. It
is on these platforms that the other pro-Mthwakazi groups that are directly
partisan, unlike Ibhetshu Likazulu, get an audience for their highly inflam-
matory condemnation of the government, the ruling party and Shona
people in general. Ironically, while the majority of the pro-Mthwakazi for-
mations draw their grievances from post-independence nation-building
politics, those pursuing the revival of the Ndebele monarchy seem to dis-
count, if not totally omit, the colonial period, liberation struggle and post-
independence conflict from their narratives, and focus on the perceived
right to Ndebele statehood.
erceived Ethnicization of Party Politics

P
Whether by design or general incapacity, the political leaders from
Matabeleland who are part of the ruling ZANU–PF, mainly through the
Unity Accord, have been perceived as weak and ineffective by some among
the Ndebele populace. They are perceived as incapable of addressing the
developmental challenges of the Ndebele region even if they hold seem-
ingly powerful ministerial positions. It is therefore argued that because
they are of Ndebele origin they have less power than their Shona counter-
parts. Perhaps the only two powerful ministers from the region who
wielded considerable power were Enos Nkala and Jonathan Moyo.
However, these two were originally ZANU–PF members who were never
perceived as pro-Ndebele by their very allegiance to the Shona party
ZANU–PF and not ZAPU. Similarly, the main opposition MDC party has
had its internal challenges, leading to splits, and two of these splits had
ethnic overtones. The pro-Mthwakazi activists, some of whom were at
one time or another members of the opposition MDC, are convinced that
ethnicity underlined oppositional politics. It is perhaps with that belief,
rightly or wrongly, that these activists convince themselves that ethnic
mobilization for political goals is what the dominant Shona groups
are doing.
Obviously, the competition for positions is tougher both in the ruling

ZANU–PF and opposition MDC, so fractionalization on regional and
ethnic lines would not be unusual. Moreover, some pro-Mthwakazi activ-
ists complain that Ndebele people have so far held the deputy presidency
in both parties but never that of president. If the ethnic factor were to be
applied, and considering that Ndebele people are barely 20% of the popu-
lation, then even that high position would be impossible to attain.
Political Mobilization on Ethnic and Regional Appeal

As already alluded to, the pro-Mthwakazi movements have not attracted a
critical mass, yet their activities and messages should be ignored. For
instance, MRP activists demonstrated against President Mnangagwa at a
church service in Bulawayo, attracting police wrath and arrests in the pro-
cess. Later on, they successfully thwarted the National Peace and
Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) public consultations in Bulawayo
and Lupane. The MRP went on to field local council and parliamentary
candidates and contested the 2018 elections in Matabeleland and parts of
Midlands. The MRP in particular has gained visibility, and is also pursuing
constitutional means towards the Matabeleland solution, whereas the
other groups may not be similarly thinking of such non-violent means as
electoral contest. For its participation in the 2018 elections, the MRP has
in fact come under a barrage of criticism for perceived betrayal of the
Mthwakazi cause, especially from MLF president Churchill Guduza. He
argues that pro-Mthwakazi movements should focus on the pursuit of
independence for their separate nation and not endorse the Zimbabwe
state by seeking political office through Zimbabwean elections. So what
exactly are the areas that appeal for pro-Mthwakazi movements?
Focusing on the perceived marginalization of the Ndebele-speaking
regions has some appeal for many people. It not only draws attention to
the supposed unequal development and lack of infrastructure but also to
the perceived marginalization of Ndebele people in jobs and in high posi-
tions, especially in Matabeleland. With Zimbabwe’s high levels of unem-
ployment, the issue of job discrimination tends to heighten ethnic anger,
but not yet at the levels of xenophobia witnessed in South Africa.
Because of the inept handling of the emotive issue of Gukurahundi by
the government, this issue remains a fertile ground for ethnic mobilization
among the Ndebele. Some activists have even composed songs that depict
Shona people as killers of Ndebele people. By appearing to criminalize
172 S. HADEBE
debate around Gukurahundi, as seen in the banning of Maseko’s painting

Sibathontisele, the government has inadvertently inflamed feelings of col-
lective hurt and injustice that are being repeatedly exploited by the activ-
ists. What is more troubling is that the collective anger is now
intergenerational, as most of these activists were not even born during the
Gukurahundi period. Suppressed anger and frustration from generation to
generation has the potential for violent explosion, particularly towards
unsuspecting and unprepared targets.
Closely linked to the emotive Gukurahundi issue is the anger towards
the constitutionally enshrined NPRC. This is the successor organization
to the Organ for National Peace and Reconciliation, itself a product of the
Global Political Agreement (GPA) between ZANU–PF and the MDC fac-
tions. It is doubtful that when the GPA negotiators were talking about
dealing with political violence they even considered Gukurahundi.
Therefore, in its design and composition, the NPRC has no capacity to
address this issue. Having realized this shortcoming, pro-Mthwakazi activ-
ists, with the tacit support of many in Matabeleland, disrupted consulta-
tive meetings in Bulawayo and Matabeleland North. Interestingly, the
MRP activists argued during their disruptions that as the commission was
made up almost entirely of Shona people, with only one Ndebele commis-
sioner, Leslie Ncube, it was not possible to hear Ndebele people’s griev-
ances against the Shona Gukurahundi killers. Indeed, that argument
sounded reasonable, and many people were sympathetic to it, but the
commission did not dare to say that Gukurahundi was not part of its terms
of reference. Overlooking the grievances in this area created a rallying
point for pro-Mthwakazi activists. To his credit, President Mnangagwa has
on different occasions, albeit belatedly, met Matabeleland Collective (a
loose coalition of civil society groups), former ZPRA veterans and
Matabeleland chiefs, and in all three encounters the Gukurahundi issue
was discussed. This gesture by a head of state would have been inconceiv-
able under Robert Mugabe; although like his predecessor, Mnangagwa
has not apologized for Gukurahundi.
Last but not least, the activists appeal to the historical justification that
there was an independent Ndebele state prior to colonial conquest. The
unification of Ndebele country and its provincialization was an administra-
tive arrangement of the colonial government that took place without con-
sent of the conquered. They argue that Mashonaland was occupied
separately in 1890 and Matabeleland in 1893, with the Union Jack being
raised on two separate occasions to mark British occupation. Similarly, at
decolonization, Solomon Mujuru, the ZANLA commander, hoisted the

Zimbabwe flag in Harare to mark the country’s independence while simul-
taneously Lookout Masuku, the ZPRA commander, did the same in
Bulawayo. They further draw appeal from the unfortunate reality of a
divided liberation movement, this initially being based on strategy and
personalities but eventually on ethnic dimensions as well.
The historical justification has a strong appeal even to elderly people
who remember the Matabele Home Society of the 1940s and Chief
Khayisa Ndiweni’s federal project of the late 1970s. The various but
unsuccessful attempts to install a Ndebele king resonates with the histori-
cal justification and the sacralizing of the Mthwakazi nation as rooted in a
glorious past and deserving legitimacy. More-so, the ‘prince’ Bulelani
Lobhengula Khumalo’s claim is not only supported by most Khumalos
but by a significant number of chiefs as well. Of course, the persistent
fractionalization of the Khumalo clan saw a court challenge from an earlier
aspirant, Peter Zwide Khumalo, while some sections of the clan shifted
loyalty to Bulelani’s elder brother, who was emerging as a rival for the
throne as well. The disparate efforts by Mthwakazi groups seemed to con-
verge on a desire for the coronation of Bulelani. Even MRP, which is sup-
posedly republican, was very outspoken in support of the coronation.
Indeed, there are many contradictions within the pro-Mthwakazi move-
ment, which has suffered fractionalization for personal rather than ideo-
logical differences.
Possible Options for Addressing Ethnic-Based

Political Mobilization
Writing on poor race relations in Rhodesia, Warhurst (1972: 6) had this to
say: ‘The tragedy of modern Rhodesia is that races are so concerned with
promoting their own sectional interests that they ignore the hopes and
fears of the other group.’ We may as well substitute Zimbabwe for
Rhodesia and ethnic groups for races, and realize the truism of that obser-
vation both yesterday and today. Indeed, the poor race relations in
Rhodesia and the exclusive focus on sectional interests led to a conflagra-
tion in the form of a protracted guerrilla insurgency that cost many lives,
both black and white. Surely, that blight in the country’s unenviable group
relations should not be allowed to repeat itself; more so, if one considers
the chilling prediction that ‘ethnicity and identity conflicts will be the
dominant forms of violence and war in the coming years’ (Makaya 2005:
174 S. HADEBE
15). It is imperative that responsible stakeholders, including the govern-

ment, realize the imminent risk to the country’s stability when sections of
society are aggrieved by perceived ethnic marginalization. In the following
sections, we consider some ways that in which these grievances could be
addressed, in order to avert the ethnic conflict characteristic of most civil
wars in the underdeveloped world in general, and in Africa in particular.
I mplementation of Constitutional Provisions for Devolution

To their credit, the people of Zimbabwe collectively conceded to the
devolution clause in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (as amended in 2013),
knowing full well that it had long been the desire of people from
Matabeleland. The option of a devolved system of local government, itself
a compromise from a federal system, was meant to peacefully address the
developmental challenges and grievances over resources allocation. Of
course, devolution is not a panacea, especially in its watered down form as
enshrined in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it would have gone a long
way towards increasing citizen participation and decision-making in their
local affairs. It has the potential to inculcate a sense of belonging and feel-
ing of worthiness that are currently missing from the majority jobless and
angst-ridden Ndebele youths. From 2013 to 2018, the ZANU–PF gov-
ernment literally did nothing to implement devolution of power, and
instead proposed amending the Constitution to erase devolution before
implementing any aspect of it. In an ironic twist, Vice-President and
Justice Minister Mnangagwa was perceived as anti-devolution, and yet in
2018 as president he not only campaigned on devolution ticket but also
confirmed it in his inauguration speech. It is without doubt that the imple-
mentation of devolution would lessen the ethnicization of politics in
Matabeleland.
n Effective and Resourced NPRC to Address Gukurahundi

A
The NPRC was instituted for other matters than Gukurahundi justice, but
as the situation has shown, it should address Gukurahundi in Matabeleland
and Midlands provinces. This might mean amending the constitution to
extend its tenure and its powers to address and settle the sensitive matter.
It is an opportunity that should not be missed, and communities ought to
be prepared for the pain they would have to go through before true heal-
ing begins. But for true justice and possible forgiveness between the two
antagonistic ethnic groups, the NPRC should hear grievances dating back
to the pre-colonial Ndebele aggression against Shona chiefdoms. Most
Ndebele people have dismissed this proposition out of hand, believing it

to be a pretext to avoid Gukurahundi. There are no living survivors from
that period, but the hurt and humiliation lingers on, and will do so unless
it is also acknowledged and atoned for. No one reminds us better of this
deep-seated anger by some Shona people against the Ndebele than
Muponde (2004), in his analysis of leading Zimbabwean writers—notably
Solomon Mustswairo (Mutswairo 1983), Dambudzo Marechera (1978)
and Patrick Chakaipa (1958). He concludes: ‘These xenophobic musings
in Zimbabwean literature are important to consider in any discussion of
the attempted ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland after 1980. There is a way
in which the attempted genocide in Matabeleland was viewed as “pay-
back” time by the Shonas’ (Muponde 2004: 189). Indeed, there is no way
of avoiding the need to heal ‘the memory of past victimhood’ by the
Shona that was perpetrated by the pre-colonial Ndebele state.
ffirmative Action to Compensate for Setbacks in Matabeleland

A
Undeniably, the Matabeleland provinces lag behind partly because of the
post-independence conflict, which not only led to massive loss of lives but
also devastated economic livelihoods. A proper addressing of the
Gukurahundi legacy could perhaps bring about a compensatory fund and
affirmative action for seriously affected communities, households and
individuals. Part of the affirmative action programmes should focus on
education and training. The effective way to empower communities is to
give them education, and Ndebele communities desperately need that
support to escape from a cycle of poverty and joblessness. In most devel-
oping economies, it is the public sector that tends to be the biggest
employer, and Zimbabwe is not an exception. Affirmative action in recruit-
ment for training as teachers, nurses, police officers, prison staff, immigra-
tion and customs personnel would go a long way in this regard.
conomic Development, Rebuilding Infrastructure and Job Creation

E
Perhaps none of the options so far proposed would make any sense or even
have an impact as long as Zimbabwe remains in the economic doldrums.
The need for sustainable economic growth and the creation of decent jobs
is a necessity for stabilizing the country economically and politically. The
country needs a facelift in infrastructure development and the provision of
affordable and reliable social services to the majority, including rural com-
munities. One may recall that when the majority of people could get
decent employment and life was relatively good for many households,
176 S. HADEBE
there was less ethnic consciousness—particularly in terms of political

mobilization.
lurality in Remembrance of Liberation Legacy

P
A seemingly minor and cost-free option is allowing a plurality of voices in
remembrance and celebration of the liberation legacy and other contested
memories. It is no longer necessary in a supposedly constitutional democ-
racy to have the state guiding citizens on who its heroes and heroines are,
and how they should be remembered. Once different communities are
freed to commemorate their icons, with time the memories of them would
cease to be rallying points for anger and a desire for vengeance. For exam-
ple, in September 2017, the Zimbabwe Republic Police personnel made
news by blocking prayers at Bhalagwe. Images of police officers kicking
Dumiso Dabengwa’s candles at the memorial site became a hit on social
media, and infuriated Ndebele people worldwide. In 2018, the govern-
ment (now under Mnangagwa) allowed activists to visit Bhalagwe more
than once, and visiting the memorial site ceased to be newsworthy.
Furthermore, there is no reasonable justification why people should not
be permitted to lay flowers on Lookout Masuku’s grave on Heroes Day.
Even the renaming of places, especially streets, in memory of the revered
heroes/heroines from the region could ameliorate the bottled-up anger.
Flexibility around some of these seemingly small issues could go a long
way in healing individual communities and eventually the nation.
onstitutional Clause on Exit Referendum

C
Perhaps it is time that Zimbabwe considers a constitutional clause on an
exit referendum once in every thirty or so years, as is the case in some
progressive multiethnic countries. The exit clause has actually been proved
to prevent rather than foster secession, as seen in Canada with Quebec and
in the United Kingdom with Scotland. One advantage of the exit clause is
that those needing to exercise it have no reason to opt for violent divorce,
as was the case for Eritrea, South Sudan, the Saharawi Democratic Republic
and many others. Such an exit clause could serve more as a deterrent so
governments did not promote what has been referred to as ‘internal colo-
nialism’ (Mabhena 2014) or excesses such as Gukurahundi or other forms
of ethnic chauvinism, which make some communities feel less Zimbabwean.
Conclusion
The likely risks from the ethnicization of political mobilization should not
just be a cause of concern to the government of Zimbabwe, but to all
stakeholders—even beyond the Ndebele and Shona people. Be that as it
may, the government is still expected to play a leading role in helping the
country to address these political fissures, which run along ethnic lines.
Currently, as already discussed, the government of Zimbabwe has a dis-
missive if not arrogant posture towards the perceived grievances emanat-
ing from Ndebele-speaking regions. This indifference is in itself a threat to
the stability of the country, as Bamfo (2012: 37) has noted about African
countries in general: ‘Ironically, secession is one threat which few African
governments want to acknowledge exists because it implies giving tacit
recognition to the most reprehensible behaviour any group or a region
can perpetrate against the state.’ He further demonstrates that most gov-
ernments are ill-prepared for secessionism. While pro-Mthwakazi move-
ments may not pose any security threat to the establishment, assuming
that this is the government’s assessment, ignoring issues raised continues
to stoke frustration and desperation, which in the long run could reach
untenable levels.
Unequal development of regions and perceived job discrimination is a
grievance that could be addressed by appropriate policy changes, includ-
ing deliberate affirmative action. The issue of perceived linguistic margin-
alization is a sensitive and potentially explosive matter that also could be
addressed by appropriate policy changes with minimal costs, if any. It is a
normal expectation by all citizens in an independent country to be able to
freely use their languages and occupy any posts they like, as long as they
have the requisite qualifications, skills and experience.
When all is said and done, the elephant in the room remains the unre-
solved Gukurahundi issue. As Murambadoro and Wielenga (2015) state,
if Gukurahundi is not acknowledged it will hamper any possible reconcili-
ation process in Zimbabwe. They even go on to suggest that perhaps
Zimbabwe needs to shift from ‘state security’ to ‘human security’, to facili-
tate reconciliation. Such adjustments would facilitate the work of organs
such as the NPRC. But most importantly, the people of Zimbabwe in
general and those from Ndebele-speaking areas specifically should find
ways of ensuring that Gukurahundi does not repeat itself, and that its
memory is not used for political mobilization. While justice for the victims
is indeed overdue, using the episode politically is another matter
178 S. HADEBE
altogether. Most of the pro-Mthwakazi grievances are genuine, although

few people might agree with their approach and intended outcome. In a
worst case scenario of an ethnic conflagration, there are hardly any spoils
or victors, and hence the need to take seriously any tendencies towards the
ethnicization of politics.
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Zimbabwe Communist Party. 2018. 2018 Election: What happened? What next?
ZCP Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 3.
CHAPTER 8
The Militarisation of State Institutions

in Zimbabwe, 2002–2017
Pedzisai Ruhanya
Introduction
On 21 November 2017, Zimbabwe’s founding President, Robert Mugabe,
was ousted after 37 years at the helm. Mugabe later died in Singapore on
6 August 2019; he was buried at his rural home of Zvimba in Mashonaland
West Province. Mugabe’s fall followed succession battles that pitted him,
his wife Grace Mugabe and a group of young generation party cadres
known by the name Generation 40 (G40) on one hand against veterans of
the liberation struggle fronted by now-President Emmerson Mnangagwa,
known as Team Lacoste, on the other. At the centre of bringing Mugabe’s
presidency to an end was the army, which for decades had helped him to
remain in power. In the last days of party succession infighting, the mili-
tary used their liberation wartime credentials and the umbilical cord that
connected them to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAPU)
parties to align with Mnangagwa to defeat Mugabe.
P. Ruhanya (*)
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_8
182 P. RUHANYA
The events leading to the resignation of Mugabe renewed an interest in

studying the competitive nature of authoritarian regimes. Having survived
every election since independence through the use of methods such as
manipulation, coercion and rigging, Mugabe was pressured to resign by
an amalgamation of disparate voices, with the top leadership of the mili-
tary—from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)
and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the wartime
military wings of ZANU and ZAPU respectively—playing decisive roles.
Among the other forces that participated in the overthrow of Mugabe
were the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), civil
society, the ruling ZANU–PF, parliament and citizens through mass pro-
tests. The media, through their framing and representation of Mugabe as
a tyrant who overstayed his welcome, were complicit.
This broad constituency was coordinated by Mugabe’s traditional sup-
porters, the war veterans, who argued that Mugabe was being arm-twisted
by elements in the G40 faction, owing to his advanced age. The military
intervened in ZANU–PF factional fights under the guise of national secu-
rity through an operation codenamed Operation Restore Legacy. The
judiciary gave its support for a military coup, as well as nullifying the oust-
ing of Emmerson Mnangagwa by Mugabe. This study argues that the
militarisation of key state institutions through the placement of members
of the army, especially veterans of the liberation struggle, in important
positions of authority facilitated the coup. The military factor in events
leading to 15 November 2017 is not largely flagged up in terms of how
competitive authoritarian regimes operate. The efficacy of the military and
its liberation war credentials in the Zimbabwe transition was enabled by an
arguably lapdog media, which did not investigate and expose the partisan
military involvement in public affairs in the lead-up to the coup.
Zimbabwe’s Competitive Authoritarian System

Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal
democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means
of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them
at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are com-
petitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest
seriously for power, but the elections in which they participate are not
democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of the
incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair (Levitsky and Way 2010).
8 THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 183
It is largely the electoral aspect of this that has left many regimes endorsing
authoritarian states as largely democratic. This view is supported by
Howard and Roessler (2006: 365), who posit that “these regimes feature
regular, competitive elections between a government and an opposition,
but the incumbent leader or party typically resorts to coercion, intimida-
tion, and fraud to attempt to ensure electoral victory”.
Schedler (2002: 15) warns against an obsession with elections as a mea-
sure for democracy, postulating that most scholars who follow this route
seem to forget that the modern history of representative elections is a tale
of authoritarian manipulations as much as it is a saga of democratic tri-
umphs. In this case, elections occasionally result in a “liberalizing electoral
outcome”, which often leads to a new government that is considerably less
authoritarian than its predecessor. This kind of system leaves us with com-
petitive authoritarianism, which is a hybrid regime type including both
democracy and authoritarianism, leading to a whole suite of supposedly
democratic institutions, such as the judiciary, legislature and executive,
which are in fact seldom democratic. This is what Diamond (2008)
describes as pseudo-democracy, as the system is not entirely democratic as
well as not entirely authoritarian, while Schedler (2002) describes it as the
foggy zone between wide and liberal democracy and closed
authoritarianism.
In Zimbabwe, this hybrid system became more visible in the events
leading up to the coup that pressured Mugabe to resign. Four fundamen-
tal state institutions—media, legislature, judiciary and the electoral sys-
tem—were demonstrably captured by factions aligned to now-President
Mnangagwa and military interests, and were thus used as zones of ZANU–
PF/military politicking.1 The capture was either direct, through rapid
recruitment of security sector personnel by those institutions, or indirect,
through patrimonial recruitment enforced in these institutions. This mili-
tary strategy was sophisticated and clandestine to the extent that an out-
sider analysis might arguably fail to capture the essence of military
recruitment and the appointments that were made in public political are-
nas. For example, the government encouraged its troops to attend univer-
sity studies to ensure they passed the meritocracy test.2 the situation was
even worse with Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agents as they
are hard to separate from civilians. Many appointments of what people
1
This is a specific and main theme identified across primary and secondary data.
2
Interviews, Bulawayo Province, 29 July 2017.
184 P. RUHANYA
think to be civilians are but recruitment of intelligence services into public

institutions. The media in general, the African Union, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the international commu-
nity failed to understand the complex nature of the military before
the coup.
Authoritarian Erosion and Internal Contradictions

in ZANU–PF
Stepan submits that the study of authoritarian breakdown and overthrow

must not focus on the final collapse of authoritarian regimes but must take
into consideration the “incremental process of authoritarian erosion” and
the opposition’s contribution to it. Stepan further calls for an understand-
ing of the dynamic relations between five groups of people, namely:
1) the core supporters of the regime (who find that their political, economic
or institutional are best served under the status quo); 2) those in charge of
the coercive apparatus that maintains the regime in power; 3) the regime’s
passive supporters; 4) the regime’s active opponents; and 5) the regime’s
passive opponents.
Stepan (2001) presents two scenarios that show how these groups are
likely to react in a strong authoritarian regime and in a weakening authori-
tarian regime. For the core group of regime supporters in a strong author-
itarian regime, authoritarian rule is a timely shield against danger and
provides much-needed patronage. The military and security officials will
identify with and safeguard the interests of a strong authoritarian regime,
concluding that national security requires the armed forces to run govern-
ment. They will participate in institutions and political processes that
directly and indirectly serve the interests of the regime. The opposition
will be demobilized, fearful of the coercion that can be unleashed against
them. However, in a weakening or eroding authoritarian regime, all these
groups will act and think in different ways. The core group of supporters
will start to fragment. Some will realize that the continuance of authori-
tarianism is not in their best interests, and will move towards overt or
covert opposition.
Examining post-independence Zimbabwe elections results between
1980 and 1996, Sithole (2000) and Sithole and Makumbe (1997) trace
authoritarian erosion in ZANU–PF, arguing that the ruling party was
experiencing a gradual decline in elite cohesion. Sithole (2000) further

asserts that this phenomenon was precipitated by the decline in elite cohe-
sion because of opposition to the party’s desire to constitute a one-party
state. Fierce critics of a one-party state, such as Edgar Tekere, were fired
from ZANU–PF in 1987, leading to the formation of the Zimbabwe
Unity Movement in 1989; this contested general and presidential elec-
tions in 1990. The decline in elite cohesion persisted, with growing criti-
cism and challenges within the party. Of importance was Margaret Dongo’s
challenge and subsequent winning, as an independent candidate, of the
Harare South constituency by-election in 1995.
This led to more former ZANU–PF members standing as independent
candidates, and even winning against party candidates. Further, Sithole
argues that elite fragmentation continued to grow as manifested in former
ZANU–PF secretary for legal affairs in the political bureau Eddison
Zvobgo’s calls for the re-democratisation of the Zimbabwe constitution,
with particular reference to powers of the executive. In 1998, Dzikamai
Mavhaire, the ZANU–PF Member of Parliament for Masvingo Central,
said during a parliamentary debate that “Mugabe must go”, leading to his
suspension from the ruling party for two years. However, it should be
noted that although there were instances of a lack of elite cohesion, inter-
nal dissenting voices and the emergence of opposition parties challenging
the status quo, this did not substantially weaken ZANU–PF. The emerg-
ing opposition could not mount a serious challenge to the ruling party’s
growing hegemonic grip on Zimbabwean politics. This could have been
because the internal challenges and contradictions did not affect ZANU–
PF support, particularly among the state’s security and coercive apparatus,
and mainly among the military, thanks to its connections with ZANU–PF
through the liberation struggle.
Elite Fragmentation in Women’s and Youth Leagues

Owing to the succession challenges in ZANU–PF, internal fissures, elite
fragmentation and splits appear to be a noteworthy feature of Zimbabwe’s
political transition. As observed in this chapter, a critical element that has
kept the ZANU–PF regime solid has been its capacity to thwart internal
dissent and the central role Mugabe played as the glue holding the party
together. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) submit the significance of elite
defection, splits and internal fissures, considering them essential in most
transitions from authoritarianism to democratisation. These fissures in
186 P. RUHANYA
ZANU–PF threatened military elites and their factional interests, as well as

their liberation values if they were to be vanquished.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 16) observe that in cases of elite dis-
integration during transitions, there is usually a gap between hard-liners
and soft-liners that arises among authoritarian regime elites. Usually there
is a struggle between defenders of the status quo (hard-liners) and those
turned reformers (soft-liners), because soft-liners develop an “increasing
awareness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usu-
ally occupy important positions, will have to make use… of some degree
or some form of electoral legitimation.” This notion is also supported by
Linberg (2009), who developed the following causal chain:
the more internal party fragmentation, the higher the costs of repression
and the higher the chances of defection (exit) and the more probable the
possibility of defeat of the hegemonic political party.
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Lindberg’s analysis can be aptly employed to

explain the outcome of the March 2008 general election in Zimbabwe. In
the run-up to it, ZANU–PF was engulfed in factionalism and elite frag-
mentation, culminating in a debilitating campaign called “bhora musango”.
The outcome of this campaign was the first acknowledged electoral defeat
for Zimbabwe African National Union-Patrioc Front (ZANU–PF), with
the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai polling 47.87%, Mugabe 43.24% and
Simba Makoni 8.31%. The Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai
(MDC–T) won 100 seats to ZANU–OF’s 98 and MDC–Mutambara’s 10.
Following this electoral defeat, in his address to the politburo,
Mugabe fumed;
We went to the elections completely unprepared, unorganized and this

against an election-weary voter. Our structures went to sleep, were deep in
slumber in circumstances of an all-out war. [The structures] were passive;
they were lethargic, ponderous, divided, diverted, disinterested, demobil-
ised or simply non-existent. It was terrible to see the structures of so embat-
tled a ruling party so enervated. As leaders, we all share the blame: from the
national level to that of the branch chairman. We played truant; we did not
lead, we misled; we did not encourage, rather we discouraged; we did not
unite, we divided; we did not inspire, we dispirited; we did not mobilise, we
demobilised. Hence the dismal result we are landed with.
To insulate the party from this trend, ZANU–PF coined the message
“bhora mughedhi” for the 2013 general election. However, at the begin-
ning of 2017, the Women’s and Youth Leagues of ZANU–PF that
appeared to be at the vanguard of the party, following the fall-out with
veterans of the liberation struggle and the sacking of senior party leaders
such as former Vice-President Joice Mujuru in 2014 and sustained efforts
to force Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa out, there were suspen-
sions and incessant fights in the two wings. At the height of these power
struggles, Mnangagwa was dismissed from both party and state on 6
November, and went into brief exile in South Africa. Before Mnangagwa’s
dismissal, the arbitrary expulsion and suspension of members sympathetic
to him were the order of the day, as ZANU–PF prepared for an extraordi-
nary congress in December 2017. However, following the military coup,
that extraordinary congress turned into Mnangagwa’s coronation as leader
of both party and state with key military personnel as part of his ascend-
ing team.
Comparative Analyses of Elite Incohesion

in ZANU–PF
Although divisions have always been present in ZANU–PF, the magnitude

of elite incohesion and fragmentation in 2008 was exceptional for six rea-
sons. First, it had previously been on a smaller scale in terms of geographi-
cal location, in a constituency such as Manicaland or Harare.
Second, previous elite fragmentation had been supported by large
numbers, but individuals were opposed to the status quo in terms of, for
example, a single member of the politburo. Third, previous rifts and elite
incohesion had not permeated the internal core support base of the party,
thereby failing to gain traction. Fourth, and most importantly, the issues
of succession and factions were not as pronounced as they became.
Fifth, although elite fragmentation has always been present, the centre
was able to weather the storm. Those fomenting fragmentation were
excluded, while others hesitated to join them. Six, previous elite fragmen-
tation had taken place during a period of de facto one-party state. Even
though expelled officials went on to form opposition parties, they could
not mount formidable challenges to ZANU–PF hegemony.
However, the discord in the Women’s and Youth Leagues threatened
the heart and soul of ZANU–PF in five respects. First, the fragmentation
188 P. RUHANYA
was national, with pockets of vehement resistance to Mugabe’s rule in all

ZANU–PF provinces. Second, it was supported by vast majorities nation-
ally, leading to the suspension and expulsion of senior ZANU–PF officials
across the country. The expulsion of Vice-President Joice Mujuru and
votes of no confidence in all but one provincial executive committee in the
run-up to December 2014 and to Mnangagwa at the November 2017
congress buttresses this point.
Third, the elite incohesion cut across all organs of the party, from the
politburo, Women’s League and Youth League to cell committees.
Furthermore, owing to party–state conflation, elite incohesion affected
the external organs that had always been the shock-troops of ZANU–PF,
such as the state bureaucracy and the coercive apparatus of the state,
including war veterans and party youth militia. Thus, elite fragmentation
was not only a preserve of ZANU–PF but transcended into state
institutions.
Fourth, owing to Mugabe’s advanced age, succession was consuming
the attention of both the party and the state; it had become an overarching
national question. Fifth, one common feature of elite fragmentation under
Mugabe had been the inability of the centre to hold and its incapacity to
stamp authority within the party. That the party’s dirty linen was being
washed in public and it had become fashionable to contradict Mugabe and
his decisions made it clear that the centre was indeed brittle.
Lack of Elite Consensus in the Security Apparatus?

The state security apparatus has always been the bulwark of ZANU–PF
support owing to the politico-military nexus. The coercive apparatus,
including war veterans, had been at the forefront of aggressively cam-
paigning for ZANU–PF rule. In 2000, the army declared that the office of
president was a straitjacket office, whose incumbent must satisfy certain
attributes—chief among them participation in the liberation war. The mil-
itary had always been the defender of last resort when ZANU–PF faced
external threats. It did so effectively in November 2017 when Mugabe
and his faction were toppled. According to the military, he was surrounded
by criminals, and they wanted to restore his legacy and that of the war of
liberation.
Alexander and Tendi (2008) note that since 2000,
Zimbabwe’s state has been described as increasingly “militarised”, with mili-

tary men being appointed in key positions throughout the state, and an
expanding range of decisions and actions being taken by the military, from
political strategy to the formulation and implementation of agrarian and
economic policy.
This militarisation has taken two forms: the militarisation of ZANU–PF

itself, by deploying army personnel in the commissariat of the party, and
the militarisation of the state, in the form of the deployment of military
personnel to state institutions, such as state-owned enterprises and the
national prosecuting authority. President Mugabe’s essential skill was in
practising Machiavellian politics to secure ZANU–PF’s hegemony by cre-
ating interdependence between three institutions: the party, the military
and the state. This relationship was the backbone of his rule.
Nonetheless, the hostilities, contradictions and fragmentation in the
security apparatus of the state, mainly around the issue of succession, cou-
pled with the incapacity of the centre to hold, were ZANU–PF’s litmus
test and the principal driver towards its fragmentation, which could lead to
a possible electoral loss. It can be argued that ZANU–PF was stronger in
2008 even though it lost the general election than it had been in its frac-
tured state before the military coup.
The discord and elite incohesion manifested in the contretemps
between Mugabe and war veterans had the effect of weakening ZANU–
PF, leading to Mnangagwa’s failure to win the presidency decisively in the
July 2018 election. During his last days, Mugabe accused the military of
interfering in ZANU–PF internal politics on the succession issue during
the 2015 ZANU–PF conference in Victoria Falls. This revealed the long-
held view that Mugabe, the civilian nationalist, had uneasy relations with
military veterans of the struggle that dated back to the bush war of the
1970s. In March 2017, a faction close to Mugabe complained that the
military had been involved in supporting a faction aligned to Mnangagwa
in the Masvingo provincial chairperson election. That election was nulli-
fied on the grounds of bad weather, which deterred some party supporters
from voting, but a re-run ensured victory for Mnangagwa’s candidate.
In 2017, personal attacks on Mugabe, the patron of the war veterans,
by the association’s leadership, such as Jabulani Sibanda, the former chair-
person of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association,
Christopher Mutsvangwa, the current chairperson, Victor Matemadanda,
the association’s secretary general, and the firing of Mutsvangwa from
190 P. RUHANYA
cabinet were indicative of growing dissent within the security establish-

ment. In addition, derogatory attacks by war veterans and some sections
of ZANU–PF youth wing on Grace Mugabe, and their ousting and vote
of no confidence in former Vice-President Mphoko and former ministers
associated with G40, such as Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and
Patrick Zhuwawo, indicated the magnitude and unprecedented extent of
elite fragmentation.
Grassroots Incohesion: Grace Mugabe at the Centre

The entry of Grace Mugabe into mainstream ZANU–PF politics in 2014
arguably heralded the summit of elite incohesion and fissures in all organs
of the party, including the Women’s League that she led before her expul-
sion in November 2017. Her entry into politics coincided with unprece-
dented purging and expulsions from ZANU–PF. Her demeanour and the
inference that she was in complete charge of both the party and the state,
without any constitutional legal basis upon which to exercise such powers,
was the seedbed for chaos and anarchy in all the organs and structures of
the ruling party.
Grace’s meddling in party structures arguably fuelled and accelerated
elite incohesion and popularized the politics of dissent within ZANU–
PF. Members were fired more for disrespecting Grace Mugabe than for
infringing the party constitution. More importantly, Mugabe had always
prevailed, gluing ZANU–PF together by playing factions against each
other. However, with the entry of Grace Mugabe into politics, her hus-
band was forced to become a faction leader.
The dissent among war veterans, the Youth League, the Women’s
League and some vigilante groups associated with ZANU–PF indicated
resistance to the capture of the party and the state by Mugabe and his wife.
Statements by war veterans such as Jabulani Sibanda that ZANU–PF had
suffered a “bedroom coup” were a result of Grace Mugabe’s ubiquitous
political interference in party affairs beyond her realm as secretary of the
Women’s League. The hierarchical set-up in ZANU–PF was distorted,
with Grace assuming a position superior to that of second secretaries.
When Mphoko once stated he was subordinate to Grace Mugabe,
Christopher Mutsvangwa criticised him, stating that the vice-president
“respects the marriage certificate more than he respects the Constitution.
We are an elected constitutional republic.”
The central argument here is that the higher the elite incohesion and
internal fragmentation among party elites, the more likely it was that the
military, with its interests in the survival of ZANU–PF and their economic
interests, would intervene against Mugabe. Internal fragmentation, elite
incohesion and defections from ZANU–PF increased as Zimbabwe moved
inexorably towards the 2018 election, which would have a potential
impact on the party’s electoral chances. The situation could threaten mili-
tary interests and their hegemonic capture of state power.
State-Controlled Media’s Capture by

Military Interests
As argued by Levytsky and Way, the media is always one of the targets of
a competitive authoritarian regime because it is a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, it can be the regime’s possible downfall, while on the other
hand it can be a tool for maintaining power through propaganda that
decimates the opposition’s political appeal to the electorate. Apart from
reliance on repressive legislation such as the Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, Broadcasting Services Act, Interception of
Communications Act, and the Public Order and Security Act, among oth-
ers, the ZANU–PF government has maintained a military presence among
the top leadership positions of the national broadcaster—the Zimbabwe
Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), the Broadcasting Authority of
Zimbabwe (BAZ) and the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (ZIMPAPERS),
among others. The placements are not meant to transform military actors
into civilians; on the contrary, it is meant to militarise civilian spaces.
In the lead-up to the coup, this infrastructure helped the military to
control the narrative driven in the state media and influence how the pri-
vate and alternative media reported events. A cursory look at the military
architecture within the state media shows that in 2009, eight senior secu-
rity sector members were appointed by the then Minister of Information
and Publicity, Webster Shamu, onto media-related boards. Among the
retired security sector officials appointed were: Brigadier-General
Epmarcus Kanhanga (ZIMPAPERS), Retired Colonel Rueben Mqwayi,
Brigadier-General Elasto Madzingira (both BAZ), Brigadier-General
Benjamin Mabenge, Major-General Gibson Mashingaidze (both
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings), Brigadier-General Livingstone
192 P. RUHANYA
Chineka (Transmedia), Brigadier-General Collin Moyo (Kingstons) and

Colonel Claudius Makova (New Ziana).3
Denis Magaya, a son of ZANLA High Command member Comrade
(Cde) Arthur Magaya, was a short-lived ZBC board chair in 2014 along-
side such members as Professor Charity Manyeruke, a University of
Zimbabwe Dean of Social Studies linked to the security sector and a close
ally to the former first lady, Grace Mugabe, and Cleopatra Shingirai
Matanhire-Mutisi, the wife of Brigadier-General Francis Mutisi, among
others.4 The message appears clear: military interests need to be protected
in all key areas of state power, and the media is one of them. As a result,
state-controlled media have been very vibrant in diverting attention from
the decay in the political economy that is causing poor economic perfor-
mance and severely affecting the social wellbeing of Zimbabweans, instead
laying blame on the targeted sanctions imposed by certain western coun-
tries on key ZANU–PF leaders.
This study argues that on 13 November 2017, when the Zimbabwe
Defence Forces (ZDF) commander, Constantine Chiwenga, issued a
statement that ordered ZANU–PF to stop purging veterans of the libera-
tion struggle, he was indeed interfering in the public affairs of the state,
contrary to the provisions of the constitution, something that the media
did not expose. Chiwenga said:
Let us begin by quoting the Constitution of this country particularly the

preamble which speaks of “Exalting and extolling the brave men and women
who sacrificed their lives during the Second Chimurenga/Umvukela and
national liberation struggles and honouring our fore bearers and compatri-
ots who toiled for the progress of our country.”5
The statement shows the competitive authoritarian nature of the regime

in Zimbabwe, as argued by Levitsky and Way (2010). The media failed to
pick up that the army general was contradicting himself by appearing to be
following constitutional dictates while he was violating Zimbabwe’s con-
stitutional democracy by dabbling in partisan politics. Furthermore, on 15
November, the military spokesperson Major-General Sibusiso Moyo
3
The Zimbabwean, 7 October 2009.
4
See The Herald, 17 February 2014. New board for ZBC announced. Available at: http://
www.herald.co.zw/new-board-for-zbc-announced/.
5
Statement by Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander, Constantine Chiwenga, issued on
13 November 2017. Accessed at: www.nehandaradio.com on 15 January 2017.
addressed the nation through ZBC Television (ZBC TV). He noted that:
“to the media, we urge you to report fairly and responsibly”.6 ZBC TV
would have reported fairly and responsibly if it had properly characterized
what had happened as a military coup.
Private Media and Coverage of the Military Coup

The collusion of the media stretched beyond the purview of the state to
private media. Deliberate mischaracterisation of the coup or the failure to
properly interpret the events that led to the ousting of President Robert
Mugabe demonstrate this. Private media, like their counterparts in the
state, shied away from calling the military intervention a coup, which
played into the military narrative of targeting criminals around the
Mugabes. NewsDay reported on 16 November that the intervention by
the military was ephemeral, which was meant to pacify the regional and
international communities that feared a full-blown military coup.7 The
article also focused on the military takeover being bloodless, and hoping
this trend continued. This missed a major element of the coup, which was
the deliberate disregard of the country’s constitution—as this places
deployment of the military in the hands of the president. The report by
NewsDay was not surprising: the owner and publisher of the paper, Trevor
Ncube, appeared on Twitter during the military takeover romanticising
the coup. For example, on 21 November, the day Mugabe resigned, he
tweeted that:
Zimbabwe National Army is not a mercenary army. They will be going back
to the barracks. Where they belong. #Zimbabwe.
Ncube continued tweeting:
We did this!! Nobody helped us. Our recent history has taught us that we
are our own liberators. Starting from the bottom we can rebuild Africa’s
bread-basket again. Let’s do this thing!!
6
Full statement delivered on ZBC TV on 15 November 2017 by Major-General Sibusiso
Moyo. Accessed at: www.ewn.co.za on 15 January 2017.
7
See NewsDay, 16 November 2017, “Military takeover should be temporary”. Available
at: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/military-takeover-temporary/.
194 P. RUHANYA
One could argue that the newspaper took its cue from its publisher,
who openly supported and embraced the military’s takeover without any
scrutiny of its legal and constitutional roles in Zimbabwe’s constitutional
democracy. The constitution forbids the military from interfering in the
public and civilian affairs of the state, such as soldiers patrolling in the
streets without the authority of the president, and arresting citizens, which
is the role of the police. Once a leading critic of the government, on 21
November the Daily News led with the headline “Mugabe resigns as
President of Zimbabwe”. The story focused on the impeachment process
as the reason for his resignation. The story did not investigate the complex
reasons for his ousting, such as his loss of control of the coercive and
repressive apparatus that was running the country unconstitutionally.
Therefore, the impeachment process was a legitimation process of a coup
that the media was not articulating. The media failed to read the hybrid
nature of this competitive authoritarian system, as argued by Levitsky and
Way (2010) when they submitted that these regimes set up a whole range
of democratic institutions but systematically undermine them resulting in
unfair competition.
The diaspora radio and website Nehanda Radio focused on Mugabe
being under house arrest.8 Interestingly, the article did not mention the
nature and character of the coup, but focused on the rationale the army
gave for its coup, dubbed Operation Restore Legacy. This platform is usu-
ally critical of ZANU–PF and the state apparatus that has helped to per-
petuate ZANU–PF rule, and yet when the coup took place, it gave a voice
to the army, thereby rationalising the military takeover. The failure to fulfil
a watchdog and investigative role demonstrates the collusion of the private
media in endorsing the coup. Another publication worth mentioning is
the Daily Telegraph, a British independent newspaper. This, just like
Zimbabwe’s domestic publications, tried to portray the removal of
Mugabe as positive. In its 15 November article,9 the newspaper carried an
article under the headline “Zimbabwe Crisis”:
8
See Nehanda Radio, 15 November 2017, “Mugabe ‘under house arrest’ after army
takeover”. Available at: http://nehandaradio.com/2017/11/15/mugabe-house-arrest-
army-takeover/.
9
See Daily Telegraph, 15 November 2017, “Zimbabwe crisis: ‘Moment of hope’ as Robert
Mugabe’s iron grip on power evaporates”. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/.
Moment of hope’ as Robert Mugabe’s iron grip on power evaporates. The

headline demonstrates the editorial bias which attempted a coup as a neces-
sary intervention. The editorial bias received endorsement of the British
Foreign Minister, Boris Johnson, who took a swipe at Mugabe’s authoritari-
anism calling the transition facilitated by the coup as “potentially a
moment of hope”.
Military Seizure of the ZANU–PF Party Internal

Electoral Processes
It is submitted that when looking at Zimbabwe’s military assisted transi-
tion, we have to factor in how intra-party electoral and succession dynam-
ics were mediated. The capture of the ZANU–PF electoral system by
securocrats’ interests saw the outcome being manipulated through actions
and a lack of action by the security sector before, during and after the
coup. Whereas broadly ZANU–PF was capturing national electoral pro-
cesses, that assisted the military. It is this environment that Donno (2013)
observes to be electoral authoritarianism, in which political offices are
filled through multiparty elections, but the electoral playing field is skewed
in favour of the ruling party. Capturing this political arena gives the sys-
tem the necessary security of continuity, despite opposition electoral pres-
sure. The strategy for capturing the electoral process was executed through
use of the security sector as a key part of campaign teams; deployment of
retired securocrats and war veterans to install an environment of fear and
sabotage; pre-election military terror campaigns or operations meant to
tweak voting patterns and choices; the issuing of televised press statements
by army generals during the run-up to elections with the intention of
reminding the electorate that voting ZANU–PF was better than assuring
punitive consequences of voting for the opposition; and populating state
institutions responsible for administering elections with securocrats and
their loyalists, capable of sacrificing professionalism for loyalty to
ZANU–PF.
The military has directly and indirectly taken charge of the election
processes and made it very hard for anyone not aligned with it to win
presidential office. This was part of ZANU–PF’s philosophy. Meredith
(2007: 1) observes Mugabe making this concession in one of his speeches:
“our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall
have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the
vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes
196 P. RUHANYA
and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.” It is the very system
that Mugabe constructed that led to his downfall.
Literature on electoral processes in Zimbabwe show that after the secu-
rity sector successfully installed Robert Mugabe as leader of ZANU–PF, all
elections that followed have been militarised.10 In 1980, the governor of
Zimbabwe–Rhodesia had initially expressed the view that elections might
not be conducted in some ZANU–PF strongholds owing to violence per-
petrated by ZANLA forces during campaigns, only to change this decision
a few days later.11 ZIPRA forces were not immune from doubling as cam-
paign teams for Joshua Nkomo.12 This created a culture that allows securo-
crats to influence election results. The security sector that installed Robert
Mugabe after capturing ZANU went on to force PF–ZAPU into the 1987
Unity Accord after it had been satisfied that the CIO, 5th Brigade and
other militia had implemented their assigned campaign strategy across
ZAPU strongholds.13 Following the ZANU–PF militarized campaigns in
Matabeleland before the 1985 election, the estimated number of deaths
amounted to over 10,000; and these were carried out in a style later used
in the 2008 presidential run-off elections.14 This legacy will always remain
in the minds and hearts of Zimbabweans as they approach elections, and
it has been often invoked to instil fear and influence the electorate’s
choices.
The retired security sector and war veterans have been a very important
agent in enhancing the capture of the electoral process and ensuring the
continuity of the securocratic state. They have helped to pursue and
enhance military capture of the electoral process in the following ways:
they can use violence and threats, forcing a sell-out label on opposition
members and supporters in door-to-door ZANU–PF campaigns; being
10
This was a general theme across the interviews held. It simply indicates that the military
has been in use in all elections in which ZANU–PF has been involved. Interviews, July–
August 2017.
11
See Nehanda Radio, 24 December 2013. Joshua Nkomo letter to Robert Mugabe from
exile in the United Kingdom. Available at: http://nehandaradio.com/2013/12/24/
joshua-nkomo-letter-to-robert-mugabe-from-exile-in-the-uk/.
12
Interviews revealed that ZIPRA forces were key campaign teams for PF–ZAPU, and to
date it has been pivotal in Matabeleland as part of ZANU–PF war veteran campaign
machinery.
13
Interviews, July–August 2017.
14
See Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in
Matabeleland & Midlands 1980–1989, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice &
Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation, September 2001.
scattered across the country’s communities, they can indoctrinate, moni-

tor and spy on citizens at household level; they convince the grassroots to
perceive them as ZANU–PF creators, kingmakers and fathers of the army;
they capture and use public resources (schools, government aid and proj-
ects, local government infrastructure) to further ZANU–PF political
interests; they preside over ZANU–PF capture of government food hand-
outs, using them in “food-for-a-vote” campaigns in hunger-stricken vil-
lages; and they undermine traditional leaders at kraal head level,
frogmarching them to vote for ZANU–PF.15 Under such circumstances,
election results are predictable before the election takes place. The elec-
toral process is thus captured.
Memories of pre-election ZANU–PF military exercises, such as
Operation Gukurahundi (1983–7) land reform (2000), Operation
Murambatsvina (2004) and Operation Makavhoterapapi (2008), are still
fresh in the minds of victim communities. The clampdown on vendors
that coincided with voter registration in Harare in 2017 was another
example; it must be understood as a political strategy of sabotaging oppo-
sition strongholds rather than an attempt to clear the streets. These so-
called military operations have had a clear long-term strategy of rigging
the electoral environment in that they have all been strategically timed,
before contested presidential elections; they were targeted in areas where
ZANU–PF performed dismally in the previous election; and violence was
used without mercy and judicial remedies.
Electorates and presidential candidates have been continuously
reminded and assured—always as presidential elections approach—of a
repeat of similar operations and/or worse if ZANU–PF loses the presiden-
tial election. The 2008 run-off elections provide the clearest example of
the gun being used to protect the vote. But it is also important to look at
the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, when the ZDF commander,
General Vitalis Zvinavashe, released a press statement to the state media:
We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security
organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will
pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of
lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence,
15
Interviews, July–August 2017. See also The Guardian, 22 June 2008. “This is no elec-
tion. This is a brutal war.” Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/
jun/22/zimbabwe1.
198 P. RUHANYA
s overeignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be

known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is
expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, there-
fore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda
that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and
our people.16
This statement demonstrates the conflation between the party and the
state and the party and the military. Zvinavashe’s press release set the stage
for future overt military interventions in the country’s political life. Major-
Generals Douglas Nyikayaramba, Martin Chedondo and Zimbabwe
Prison Service Retired Major-General Paradzai Zimondi, among others, in
many instances before the 2008 June presidential elections sent similar
threats to the electorate and those with presidential ambitions. Mugabe
also issued a solidarity statement that clearly toed the line drawn by the
securocrats in one of his addresses in the same period:
The war veterans came to me and said, “President, we can never accept that
our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken
merely by an ‘X’ made by a ballpoint pen.” Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana
ne AK? (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle
between the two? Do not argue with a gun.17
Major-General Douglas Nyikayaramba recently emerged to be a spokes-

person of the ZANU–PF military electioneering team. During the
Government of National Unity (GNU) era, he was chosen to represent a
military presence in the constitution-making committee, and he advo-
cated for a constitutional clause that would ensure Mugabe was “president
for life”. He told the nation:
I am in ZANU–PF and ZANU–PF is in me and you can’t change that…

Truly speaking, I am ZANU–PF and ZANU-PF is in me and you can’t
change that … I am sure everyone, including yourself, has now woken up to
realise that he (Tsvangirai) is not the right candidate … The bottom line is
that I will not surrender; I will not salute someone like that personally…
16
See Zimbabwe: Press Freedom, 16 January 2002. Available at: https://www.africa.upenn.
edu/Urgent_Action/apic-011602x.htm.
17
See President Mugabe’s statement, The Herald, 23 June 2008.
What he (Tsvangirai) is saying is nonsense. We are dealing with a national

security threat…18
When the country was bracing itself for the watershed 2018 elections,
in the previous September, a serving Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)
Major-General, Douglas Nyikayaramba, commandeered chiefs assembled
at Four Brigade in Masvingo to ensure that President Robert Mugabe
won the 2018 elections. He unequivocally stated:
Did anyone ever say to a traditional chief that you are old, leave the chief-
tainship for me? That is unheard of. What will happen to the chief’s aides?
We need to remind each other. No chief was voted for. No son has ever
ordered his father to step down from his role as leader of the family, so the
same applies to our case with President Mugabe. That is what we should
remind each other when we meet. Whites want divide-and-rule, and they
saw that Mugabe is the nerve centre of the country. Let us not sell the coun-
try for the love of sugar. We are here to strengthen the relationship between
chiefs, the President and the army.19
Militarising the election environment means that the results do not

indicate the people’s democratic choice but rather expresses their choice
of life over death. No matter how independent the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission (ZEC) might try to be, if the context of the electoral process
is not liberated from military capture, elections will remain neither free
nor fair. Election-based transition that is contrary to military interests is
impossible. ZEC is among the most politicized bodies in Zimbabwe, with
its administration infiltrated by un-uniformed agents of the security sector
and its political agents. In 2002, an ex-colonel in the ZNA, Sobuza Gula-
Ndebele, was appointed to chair the Election Supervision Commission
(ESC), while Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba was ESC Chief
Executive Officer, and this military-led team presided over the running of
the first contested presidential elections after the Unity Accord. He was
later promoted to Attorney General in 2008—a move seen as a direct
reward for the 2002 election services.
18
See Financial Gazette, 18 July 2011.
19
See Pindulanews, 12 September 2017.
200 P. RUHANYA
The Militarized Judiciary and Its Role in the Coup

The judiciary at all levels is expected to be active in setting a clear demarca-
tion between the political terrain and the military topography, and repri-
manding security personnel for crossing from the latter to the former.
However, owing to its capture by securocrats’ interests, the judiciary has
failed to play its constitutional role of oversight through judicial activism;
it only acts when cases have been brought to it. In addition, many politi-
cally charged cases that have been brought to the judiciary have been
clearly stage-managed by ZANU–PF so that the judiciary causes inaction
or action that furthers its interests.20 The judicial system has been captured
by military interests through the recruitment of military personnel,
ZANU–PF agents and loyalists, which has meant the system has lost its
credibility in the public domain.
Capture of the state judiciary intensified simultaneously with the emer-
gence of MDC as a serious threat to ZANU–PF’s political hegemony. The
ZANU–PF military operation Fast Track Land Reform Programme, in
2000, which targeted white commercial farmers whom the government
believed to be financial and electoral aids of the newly formed MDC, led
to outright judicial capture by military interests. This led to the resigna-
tion of then Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, Nicholas McNally and David
Bartlett, among others, from their posts after the security sector allowed
war veterans to enter and dance on Supreme Court tables.21 Commenting
on the same issue, and displaying his disregard of the courts, President
Mugabe had the following to say: “The courts can do whatever they want,
but no judicial decision will stand in our way. They are not courts for our
people and we shall not even be defending ourselves in these courts”22
20
In Jealousy Mbizvo Mawarire v Robert Gabriel Mugabe NO, Morgan Richard Tsvangirai
NO, Arthur Guseni Oliver Mutambara, NO, Welshman Ncube and the Attorney General
(SC 146/13, CCZ 18/13), Mr Mawarire successfully filed an application seeking an order
directing the president to proclaim the elections to be held (after amendment) by 25 July,
and the Constitutional Court ruled in his favour. It had always been ZANU–PF’s desire to
have early elections before electoral reforms, whereas opposition parties in the GNU wanted
them to take place after electoral reforms agreed in the Global Political Agreement (2008)
had occurred. Mawarire was either sent by ZANU–PF or his actions were encouraged by
ZANU–PF to secure a winning strategy.
21
See www.pindula.co.zw/.
22
See NewsDay, 20 September 2016. “The abusive relationship between the Executive
and Judiciary”. Available at: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/09/abusive-relationship-
executive-judiciary/.
In 2005, when High Court Justice Tendai Uchena’s ruling allowed

Roy Bennet—an imprisoned opposition Member of Parliament—to con-
test elections in prison, Robert Mugabe dismissed the decision as “stupid”
and the justice concerned reversed the judgement.
From 2000 onwards, Mugabe used his party’s militarised patronage
network to populate the judiciary bench with his Trojan horse judges at a
time when a critical land reform case was before the courts. It was through
the work of these judges, with the help of Constitutional Amendment
Number 17 Act (2005) introducing section 16B in the constitution, that
the illegal farm grab exercise and violation of property rights were legal-
ized, despite the SADC Tribunal ruling declaring those actions illegal
(Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. et al. v. Republic of Zimbabwe). The previous
Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku (former ZANU–PF MP and Deputy
Minister), Justice Guvava (his niece), Justice Charles Hungwe (ZANLA
war veteran and one of the founders of the Zimbabwe National Liberation
War Veterans Association), current Chief Justice Luke Malaba (beneficiary
of the land reform), former Judge President Rita Makarau (former non-
constituency Member of Parliament appointed by the president) and cur-
rent Judge President George Chiweshe (a Retired Brigadier-General,
Chair of ZEC during disputed 2008 elections) were among other justices
who found their way to the judicial system through the patronage net-
work resulting in de facto capture of the system by security sector
interests.23
The judiciary has demonstrated too much ineptitude when it comes to
cases that involve the vested interests of ZANU–PF’s securocratic system.
It must be remembered that war veterans were key architects of the farm
invasion in the early 2000s, and putting war veterans on the judicial bench
was a clear indication that ZANU–PF will do anything to protect the secu-
rity sector even if it violates the constitution. In reference to a recent dis-
missal of the case challenging the adoption of bond notes, Alex Magaisa,
a Kent University legal expert, aptly sums up the decay in the judiciary as
follows: “Taking matters to Chiweshe’s court is like goats taking a petition
See www.pindula.co.zw/.
23
202 P. RUHANYA
to a hyena!”24 The Campbell case was another example of this. Similarly,

during the 2016 national demonstrations by social movements and oppo-
sition parties calling for electoral reforms, the High Court declared the
violent clampdown by the police on peaceful demonstrations on 26 August
unconstitutional. Mugabe, at a ZANU–PF youth rally captured on
national television, criticized the court ruling as “reckless disregard to
peace”.25
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Bill, 2017 has
allegedly been part of Mnangagwa’s efforts to capture the judiciary in
light of indications that he has become the stronger champion of military
interests when compared with his G40 counterparts aligned to Grace
Mugabe. The disruptions that occurred during the appointment process
of new Chief Justice Luke Malaba are believed to be part of Mnangagwa’s
state capture calculations, as he preferred his former comrade in arms—
retired Brigadier-General Judge President George Chiweshe instead of
Justice Malaba, who has a history of making unpredictable court rulings
and is sympathetic to G40. It is believed that by putting Justice Chiweshe
in charge of the Constitutional Court, Mnangagwa wanted to insulate his
future actions from being declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court in the event that he took over power from Robert Mugabe. Thus,
Hofisi and Feltoe argue that there exists a theory espousing that:
amendment of section 180 to give the President the sole discretion in

appointing the Chief Justice was to enable the President to appoint Justice
Chiweshe who has a liberation war background and strong ties with the
military… It seeks to get rid of the public advertisements and interviews in
respect of the three senior positions of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice
and Judge President of the High Court. These appointments are to be made
by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.
Section 339(2) of the Constitution defines the phrase “after consultation”
as requiring the proffering of views which are not binding on the appointing
authority…The amendment proposes a return to the provisions of the
Lancaster House Constitution (as amended), which scholars noted was
“legally opaque” and only allowed for appointment of persons acceptable to
the government.
24
See “About George Chiweshe-Pindula, Local Knowledge”. Available at: www.pindula.
co.zw/index.php?title=George_Chiweshe.
25
See Human Rights Watch, 6 September 2016.
So the military man—Mnangagwa—was working tirelessly to ensure

that the military regained its control over the judiciary and, fortunately
enough for him, parliament rubberstamped his plans. It came as no sur-
prise when, in November 2017, High Court Judge George Chiweshe, a
military man, made two rulings: the first legitimised the military coup as
constitutional and the second the dismissal of Mnangagwa by Mugabe as
unlawful. Mnangagwa had therefore both legal legitimacy from the court
and political legitimacy from ZANU–PF processes after the party had fired
Mugabe and installed him as leader of the party and consequently the
government. The complex relationship between the military and the judi-
ciary and their civilian handlers in ZANU–PF under Mnangagwa escaped
media scrutiny and exposure, leading to the coup and its aftermath.
Conclusion
Hybrid regimes as defined by Levitsky and Way (2010) place the civilian
authority at the centre of running the state. However, this chapter argues
that such an explanation is not adequate in explaining specific contexts
such as Zimbabwe. While Zimbabwe has certain aspects that suit the
descriptive character of hybrid regimes, the military factor and its libera-
tion history stand apart. Whereas most hybrid regimes are led by civilian
authorities with an undoubted control of state institutions, this study has
shown that the civilian authority in Zimbabwe is arguably de jure but in
practice the military runs the affairs of the state. The clash between
Mugabe’s interests and those of the military elites in planning his succes-
sion, which led to the fall of Mugabe, shows that the military had control
over key civilian institutions that administers the affairs of the state.
Contrary to assertions by Haggard and Kauffman that in dominant-party
rules “militaries that intervene in politics can return to the barracks; the
raison d’être of political parties is to rule” (1995: 269), some key military
personnel have joined the civilian government following the November
2017 military coup to consolidate power through military influence.
Therefore, in the case of Zimbabwe, the military has a ubiquitous role in
the political and public affairs of the state. Its history with ZANU–PF and
PF–ZAPU as former liberation movements has allowed soldiers to use
their coercive influence to determine the politics of both party and state.
204 P. RUHANYA
References
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Polls in 2008. Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin, No. 80, Winter.
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realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/03/democracy_in_retreat.html. Accessed
2 Feb 2018.
Donno, D. 2013. Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.
American Journal of Political Science 57 (3): 703–716.
Haggard, S., and R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Howard, M.M., and P.G. Roessler. 2006. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science 50
(2): 365–381.
Levitsky, S., and L. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lindberg, S. 2009. In ‘A Theory of Elections as a Mode of Transition’, in
Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, ed. Staffan Lindberg.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Meredith, M. 2007. Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Mugabe’s Future.
New York: Perseus.
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Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press.
Schedler, A. 2002. The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections.
International Political Science Review 23 (1): 103–122.
Sithole, M. 2000. Zimbabwe: The Erosion of Authoritarianism and Prospects for
Democracy. In The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa, ed. Y.W. Bradshaw
and S.N. Ndengwa. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press.
Sithole, M., and J. Makumbe. 1997. Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU Pf
Hegemony and Its Incipient Decline. African Journal of Political Science 2
(1): 122–139.
PART III
Social Media, Democracy and Political

Discourse
CHAPTER 9
The Media and Politics in the Context

of the “Third Chimurenga” in Zimbabwe
Philip Pasirayi
This chapter explores the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic

Front (ZANU–PF) media strategies during the “Third Chimurenga” in
the early 2000s. The media was central in the ruling party’s violent seizure
of white-owned farms starting from 2000. In the state media, this contro-
versial exercise was justified as the “Third Chimurenga”, meaning the
third and decisive phase of the war against colonial rule during which land
was a central grievance. I explore how the party’s media strategy under the
newly created Department of Information and Publicity was re-geared in
line with the party’s hegemonic ambitions and hybrid politics. I discuss
how Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for Information
and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the state press
through meetings, money, threats to jobs, and creating and disseminating
content via routine briefings, which resulted in a committed, self-policing
journalistic team and a pliant state press. I conducted interviews with
selected journalists and editors from the state press to discuss media brief-
ings that were held by the Department of Information and the framing of
P. Pasirayi (*)
Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_9
208 P. PASIRAYI
the land issue in the state press. The land issue was the primary theme of
the “Third Chimurenga”. I show how Moyo established a hardworking
and hands-on style of management, and considered history and culture to
be an important part of what he was addressing. This chapter contributes
to a Zimbabweanist literature on the media and political science literature
in what are known as hybrid regimes, where the media plays a central part
in regime legitimation and/or survival.
Although ZANU–PF’s interference in the operations of the state media
started in the 1980s and 1990s, the new measures that were introduced by
the Ministry of Information and Publicity in 2000 under Moyo were
designed to entrench the party’s control over the state media in new ways.
While Chiumbu and Moyo (2009) acknowledge ZANU–PF’s media strat-
egies, such as institutional re-gearing, the use of incentives and the cultiva-
tion of loyalty to control public media, they do not provide details of how
this was achieved. I build on this and other works, and my interviews with
state and party elites and journalists, to interrogate the relationships
between state and party elites and journalists, the political and ideological
means of political control focusing on institutional arrangements, media
briefings that were conducted by the Ministry of Information and Publicity
with journalists and editors, amounted to political re-education about
what constituted the national interest, and the payment of money to a
cabal of journalists that was assigned to do clandestine media work in sup-
port of the regime.
This chapter draws on Zimbabwean state media policies and practices
to give insight into the workings of the media in what I argue should be
seen or conceptualised as a hybrid regime. The media is a key arena of
contestation in these regimes alongside the electoral, judicial and legis-
lative arenas (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Hybrid regimes, also known as
competitive authoritarian regimes, emerged in the post-Cold War context
in Africa. These regimes blend authoritarianism with democratic practice
(Diamond, 2002). Diamond argues that in the contemporary era “democ-
racy is the only broadly legitimate regime form” and political regimes
are under pressure from international and domestic constituencies “to
adopt – or at least to mimic – the democratic form” (Ibid: 24). Hybrid
regimes are pseudo-democratic in that, though they are characterised by
multi-party electoral competition and functioning legislatures, judiciaries,
a strong civil society and a critical media, these mask the reality of authori-
tarianism and are intended to legitimate power (Ibid.). Andreas Schedler
(2010: 70) notes that hybrid regimes “have set up the full panoply of
9 THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 209
liberal-democratic institutions” but specialise in their manipulation to

consolidate power and achieve undemocratic objectives. However, for
some hybrid regimes there is also a genuine concern for legitimacy that
influences their strategic approach or intervention, including in the media.
I argue that it is this concern for legitimacy that drives political executives
in hybrid regimes to consider “hidden” strategies, such as press brief-
ings, money, bribery and other options, as opposed to direct censorship
of the media.
In the literature, Zimbabwe under ZANU–PF is regarded as a hybrid
regime. Levitsky and Way (2010) note that Zimbabwe attained indepen-
dence in 1980 when it was already a hybrid regime, suggesting that its
predecessor, the Rhodesian state, was a hybrid system as well. It is there-
fore important for scholars interested in the Zimbabwean media to look at
how state media policy and practices have been re-geared to suit the inter-
ests of the ruling party’s hybrid politics. This is especially the case because
the media mirrors the political system within which it exists. Many studies
on the media in Zimbabwe do not acknowledge that ZANU–PF is run-
ning a hybrid system that influences the party’s strategic choices and inter-
ventions, including in the media.
While ZANU–PF still used heavy-handed means to control the media,
which are widely acknowledged in the literature, the party also devised
hidden ways of controlling the press. While hybrid regimes use coercion
particularly when their hold on power is threatened, it is also crucial to
explore the non-coercive strategies of media control, as opposed to cen-
sorship, newspaper shutdowns and the incarceration of critical journalists.
Political executives in hybrid regimes prefer strategies such as institutional
re-configuration, patronage and the forging of manipulative ties with
journalists because they may be more effective in creating and sustaining
legitimacy. The strategies of the Ministry of Information and Publicity
under Moyo demonstrate a new media regime with its own style of man-
agement that was different from the earlier period. There emerged a highly
complex politics that shaped media practice which involved material incen-
tives and threats but also the committed participation of journalists from
the state-controlled media in defending the “Third Chimurenga”. The
lesson that we can draw from these shifts in state media policy and practice
is that hybrid regimes cannot afford to be rigid: they have to be continu-
ously introspective and devise new strategies for prolongation of their
rule. If they do not do this, that is, re-invent themselves, they run the risk
of crumbling. This study therefore adds to our understandings of hybrid
210 P. PASIRAYI
regime renewal and persistence. Let us now consider some of the strate-
gies that ZANU–PF implemented in the media.
Despite his recent arrival in ZANU–PF and his history of criticising the
party, Minister Moyo was considered to be key in the ruling party’s new
media strategy. Journalists and editors from the state-controlled media
described him as a hands-on, hard-working and articulate minister in con-
trast to his predecessors. Moyo embarked upon the propagation of patri-
otic history. He wrote articles under different pseudonyms, such as Mzala
Joe in the Sunday News, Nathaniel Manheru in The Herald and Lowani
Ndlovu in the Sunday Mail. When asked about his approach towards the
media and his work ethic and philosophy, this is what Minister Moyo said:
I believe modestly that what I did have [when I was the Minister of
Information and Publicity from 2000 to 2004], as I still do, is that, if you
make me the minister responsible for cleaning your toilets, I make sure that
I keep them clean all the time. I also think that there are people, when they
have their jobs they try to discharge those jobs to the best of their ability. I
did not take through the Ministry of Information and Publicity and my
position as Minister as a status position. I took it as a job. When I was
appointed to this position, I rolled up my sleeves and got down to some
serious work. I worked for 17 hours a day and slept only for 4 hours and you
would come to Munhumutapa [the government building] at 2 am and find
us there. With that sort of commitment and dedication, when it shows
results people then start saying you are getting too powerful but I will be
trying to do my job. I will be trying to make sure that whatever I do, I get
results. If I needed assistance of the police to get something done, I would
do that. If I needed the Ministry of Finance to support us, I would go. If I
needed Air Zimbabwe to give us Boeing 767 to go and pick up our stranded
Warriors [the Zimbabwe national football team] at Johannesburg airport in
South Africa to take them to Seychelles, I would organise that. That’s what
information is all about; it’s not just about press conferences. (Interview
with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare)
The new hybrid media system that ZANU–PF was designing required
a new set of ideas, policies and institutions in response to the shifting poli-
tics. But while the new political context required new approaches, it must
be emphasised that the strategies that were deployed by ZANU–PF in the
media were also informed by the past, including some of the strategies that
were used by the colonial authorities in Rhodesia to control the media and
justify authoritarian practices. This chapter gives an insight into some of
the characteristics of the new hybrid media system. I reflect on some of the
media control strategies that were deployed by the Ministry of Information
consistent with this.
The Ministry of Information devised a range of strategies to control the
state press. Following his appointment as the Minister of Information and
Publicity in 2000, Jonathan Moyo immediately purged senior journalists
and editors in the state media on the pretext that they had “overstayed”;
he considered these editors irrelevant to the new ZANU–PF media agenda
and the party’s legitimation needs. In their place, Moyo appointed loyal-
ists who were ready to toe his line. This appointment of loyalists to key
positions was crucial in safeguarding ZANU–PF interests. A senior jour-
nalist who had worked for the main state-controlled daily newspaper, The
Herald, in the early 2000s had this to say: “Journalists working for the
state media who did not toe the party line [ZANU–PF] were either purged
or demoted whilst young journalists with little experience in the news-
room were promoted to editors. This was meant to ensure a pliant media
that was always ready to defend and regurgitate the ZANU–PF ideological
position” (Interview, 13 March 2013, Harare). Bright Matonga, who was
Moyo’s deputy at the Information and Publicity Ministry said:
When Moyo came in [as Minister of Information and Publicity] in 2000,

some of the journalists in the state media had “overstayed”; they didn’t toe
the line so you wanted people that you could tell what to do. Editors were
removed from the state media then we brought in a young crop of journal-
ists that was hungry for success, hungry for promotion, hungry for identifi-
cation and journalists we could tell what to do. We basically told them that
we were in a war zone and you follow the command. We were defending the
country and the media is the first and last line. (Interview with Bright
Matonga, April, 2013, Harare)
Minister Moyo forged manipulative ties with journalists from the state
media, whom he asked to carry out clandestine media work. These jour-
nalists were part of Moyo’s core team; they were proud to be associated
with the minister. Moyo created commitment among journalists via his
own work ethic and an elaborate project that involved incentives and
threats. Forging close ties with journalists was a form of political control.
The journalists testified to these Machiavellian strategies. A senior journal-
ist from The Herald who was part of Moyo’s team stated that:
212 P. PASIRAYI
We worked closely with Prof Moyo on a number of media projects which

had nothing to do with our daily newsroom work. But he contacted us
directly and bypassed the editors. We could meet during odd hours to work
on different media projects that he gave us. We were paid handsomely for
doing this work. We don’t know where he was getting the money but I can
tell you that we were paid good money. You need to understand that this is
the time that Moyo came in as Minister of Information and unlike previous
ministers such as Mai [Mrs] Mujuru and Chen Chimutengwende, who, if I
may say, took a bystander role in terms of being active and manipulating the
media or in being interested in the actual content of the newspaper. Moyo
came with a different approach. As an intellectual and a political scientist,
Moyo had a certain way of influencing the ideological direction of the paper
without physically being present at The Herald. For example, he is the only
minister, if my memory serves me well, who held on a weekly basis no less
than seven press briefings. Naturally if you are a journalist and your own
minister is having such kind of press briefings, it means he will dominate the
content of the media. You had to align yourself with him and his views.
(Interview with an informant, March 2013)
Moyo managed to create an ethos where journalists wanted to please

him and to be on his team when he served as Minister of Information and
Publicity. He managed to build a committed team of journalists whose
responsibility was to ensure that the regime’s new media agenda was suc-
cessful. A senior journalist from The Herald who worked closely with
Minister Moyo stated:
I would pride myself as one of the few journalists that Moyo started having
an interest in working with when he became minister. He approached PD
[Pikirayi Deketeke] who was the news editor of the Sunday Mail then with
a view of recruiting journalists that were to work for a website that was
called zimday.com and I am one of the journalists that were recruited and
given the task of recruiting the other three journalists, Munyaradzi Huni,
Innocent Gore and Itai Musengeyi. We then held meetings with Moyo
sometimes going into the wee hours. What was the strategy we were going
to take? We said we were not going to only rely on The Herald and the
Sunday Mail but also on the Internet and we had to establish multi-
dimensional internet sites where we could write stories that were positive
about the government without revealing our identity. Where he [Moyo] got
the funding I don’t know but I can tell you confidently that we were paid
handsomely and there were some stories that were plucked from our website
that got published in The Herald, but very few people knew that we were
the ones who wrote those stories. There were other stories that were also
quoted outside the country. So that was one area where Moyo would work
directly with journalists without involving the editors. He would also some-
times call a journalist directly and say that he wanted a particular story to
come out and how he wanted it written. It was then the duty of the journal-
ist to go and brief the editor to say that the Minister has called me and said
that this story must find its way in the paper or give it prominence. I think
the problem that Ray Mungoshi [who was editor of The Herald] faced is
that he sought to challenge this interference. Moyo was not amused by that
and Mungoshi was sacked. (Interview with a senior journalist at The Herald,
Harare, March 2013)
Moyo also held routine media briefings with journalists and editors
where he lectured them on what constituted the national interest and how
this was to be framed in the news. While media briefings are standard pro-
cedure that underline state–media relations in most countries, Moyo’s
routine meetings with journalists and editors from the state media consti-
tuted political re-education sessions. The journalists were told to be patri-
otic and this meant defending the ruling party’s interests. George
Charamba, who served as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Information and Publicity as well as Presidential Spokesperson, said that
the media briefings were intended to orientate journalists “on the subcon-
scious side of the state” and what constituted national interests (Interview
with Charamba, March 2013). He also revealed that the media briefing
meetings were also about material that was not for publishing. Charamba
stated that:
The briefings with journalists were meant to keep the media in touch with
the state and decisions of the state. They were an outreach by government
to media houses. But briefings are not just about material that is publishable
[my emphasis]. They are also a way of anticipating policies. This is why the
Americans have got what they call the deep backgrounder, when you are
taken in for a briefing session which doesn’t originate any copy. The idea is
to put you in touch with the subconscious side of the state [my emphasis] so that
when policies eventually begin to unfold you are informed of these policies
so that you know how you can use your journalism to promote them.
(Interview with George Charamba, March 2013)
The media briefings organised by the Department of Information and

Publicity were thus critical platforms that state officials used to develop a
214 P. PASIRAYI
clear media agenda. What we learn from these media briefings is that
media control in hybrid contexts is not always direct. The media briefings
that were organised by the Department of Information and Publicity were
a hidden way of controlling media content in the state press.
We can see that the media briefings by the Information Ministry were
an instrument of political control that shaped the framing of news in the
state press. A senior journalist from The Herald who participated in the
media briefings stated that: “You could easily tell the importance of cer-
tain issues or topics with the emphasis that Prof. Moyo or Charamba
placed on these issues during the briefings. As a journalist your work was
simple; to go back to the newsroom and try as much as possible to reflect
these views in your story. You were always under pressure to reflect these
views and making sure that you do not distort or misrepresent the
Minister’s views” (Interview with senior reporter from The Herald, 23
March 2014). A senior journalist from The Herald who also took part in
the media briefing meetings confirmed this view:
Moyo would talk directly to journalists and he would also give us the back-
ground as to why some of the decisions in government were taken and why
certain policies were adopted and from that perspective they were some kind
of re-education for journalists, especially those from the state media, as to
what were the real national interests of our country. Most journalists that
were working for the state media felt that they really should defend govern-
ment policy. There are so many things that we discussed during the media
briefings but you must also understand that some of the issues, in my view,
were conspiracies. The Minister [Moyo] gave us background on a number
of government policies and the reasons why certain decisions were taken.
We were told what was going on in ZANU–PF and government, the issues
that were being debated and as a paper we then took decisions based on this
as to how we should frame our news stories in The Herald. They [ministry
officials] had a certain way of explaining things to us which informed us how
they wanted these issues to be covered. After these media briefings it was
clear how the officials wanted us [at The Herald], to write our stories and
represent certain issues. When you are addressed by George Charamba, the
Permanent Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson, you would assume that
what he was saying was a reflection of President Mugabe’s views. So you
would try as much as possible to reflect these views in your story. (Interview
with informant, March 2013)
The lectures to journalists and editors on the national interest were a

subtle form of political control.
Jonathan Moyo also developed a number of means of manipulating
journalists via meetings, by using money and threatening jobs. These
strategies exerted pressure on journalists to exercise self-censorship. Some
editors from the state press said they were worried about what would hap-
pen to them “the morning after publishing of the newspaper” if they had
misrepresented or distorted the government position (Interview with a
reporter from The Sunday Mail, Harare, March 2013). The journalists
said that they knew what was permissible or publishable in the political
environment in which they operated, which meant they exercised self-
censorship with little direct interference from the state officials. The for-
mer editor of the Sunday Mail, William Chikoto, explained:
People say all sorts of things about how the two [Professor Jonathan Moyo
and George Charamba] edited the papers, about this and that; there was
nothing like that. You made the decisions yourselves; what to run, what not
to run, but what then happens is when you published a story, the feedback
comes the next moment, the morning after publication of the newspaper,
isn’t it? So there was no instruction to editors. I remembered during my
editorship, Jonathan Moyo only came once into the Sunday Mail newsroom
when he was on a tour to familiarise himself with our work as the minister
responsible. He would not come into the newsroom [and] neither would
Charamba. There was nothing like that. Much of our contact with them was
during the media briefings but when the story comes you would have to
make the decision as the editor on what comes out and what doesn’t. There
was a lot of self-censorship, but for us what made it easy was that there was
a lot of conviction about the ideological position that we were supporting.
So when you are editing, you are doing your best to be as professional as you
can in defending that position. There was also an attempt [by journalists] to
bring in some things that were not true, that could not be substantiated, so
your job as the editor was to fight as much as possible to remove that. I
remember one encounter that I had with a Minister then, he had given a
story to a journalist which I edited in line with our editorial policy. When the
story came out, the Minister confronted me. He said I was not editing the
story but that I was editing him. You know those kinds of things. But the
point is who are you editing, the story or the source? We were editing the
story and not people and really the relationship sometimes would get nasty
but we were doing our best. But the point is, if you did not have an ideo-
logical conviction of the whole question of land reform and the way it was
carried out you would not survive. I think this is why we had some journalists
216 P. PASIRAYI
leaving because they could not withstand the pressure. (Interview with
William Chikoto, March 2013, Harare)
The editor of The Herald, Pikirayi Deketeke, drew a distinction between

Moyo’s regime of media control and that of the Rhodesians. He explained:
This whole issue of saying government-controlled media is misplaced.

During the Rhodesian era you would see the Rhodesia Herald with blank
pages where stories would have been pulled out because they had to go to
the Ministry of Information somewhere in the Prime Minister’s office and
censored. This is what we call control. Government is the main source of the
information that happens in the country. The purpose of the Minister of
Information is to meet the media to get an understanding of what is going
on in government and you find this even in the UK when Tony Blair [for-
mer UK Prime Minister] was at the war front, he would move with journal-
ists and brief those journalists about British foreign policy towards Iraq and
to date it still happens. So it does not denote control. (Interview with
Deketeke, March 2013, Harare)
There are variations in patterns of media regulation in authoritarian and

hybrid regimes. The Rhodesian state was authoritarian, and as such it built
a repressive apparatus to silence the media through direct censorship,
deportations and incarceration of journalists. In Rhodesia under the
Rhodesian Front, media control was achieved through outright censor-
ship, whereby regime censors were dispatched to the newsrooms to pull
out stories deemed unpalatable before newspapers were published. While
authoritarian rulers can afford to act in this way, the situation is different
in hybrid regimes where legitimacy is desired. Authoritarian rulers do not
greatly care about legitimacy; they do care about holding on to power.
Their main goal is to retain power regardless of what means or methods
they use to do so.
While politics and institutional pressures produced a loyal and self-
censoring body of editors and journalists, they were not the only factors
that shaped news framing in the state press in Zimbabwe post-2000.
Journalists and editors had agency and often shared the ideological views
of the state and party officials. As noted above, some journalists said that
they defended land reform out of ideological conviction and real belief in
the political project, not only because of political pressure exerted by
Moyo and Charamba and other state officials. One of the journalists,
Lovemore Mataire, said: “Look, my mother and father met in Mozambique
[during the liberation war in the 1970s]. They were ZANLA [Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army] cadres. I was born in Mozambique
during the liberation war. I consider myself a product of Chimurenga for
which land was a central grievance. How else was I supposed to interpret
‘Fast-Track’ Land Reform? I played my part to defend the revolution
[land reform] through writing” (Interview with Lovemore Mataire, April
2013, Harare). We can see in this case that it was not only political pres-
sure that influenced the journalist’s framing of the land issue, but also
family experiences and ideological understanding. This was thus a highly
complex politics that shaped media practice, involving material incentives
and threats, and also the committed participation of journalists for whom
ZANU–PF’s “Third Chimurenga” was a valuable extension of the strug-
gle launched in the 1970s.
The journalists and editors often defended the land issue on ideological
grounds. William Chikoto, who served as editor of the Sunday Mail from
2001, stated that: “Yes there was a lot of self-censorship but for me and
Pikirayi [editor of the state-run weekly newspaper The Herald] what made
it easy for us was that ideological conviction about land reform. If you did
not have an ideological conviction of the whole question of land reform
and so on you would not survive. I think this is why you had some journal-
ists leaving. For us the advantage was that we had worked with editors
such as Charles Chikerema, whose ideological position on the whole thing
[of land reform] was clear” (Interview with William Chikoto, April 2013,
Harare). Chikerema was a former editor of the Sunday Mail and The
Herald, an avowed communist who was well known for his criticism of
ZANU–PF for abandoning the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The editor of
The Herald, Pikirayi Deketeke, also stated that ideology was important in
the interpretation of the land issue in the state-controlled press. He
explained that:
The public [state-controlled] media’s interpretation of Fast Track land

reform was driven by the ambitions of the liberation struggle and the expec-
tations of the majority of our people. I remember, as a young journalist,
being labelled all sorts of names working with Charles Chikerema, who was
the editor then, and he was being labelled as a socialist who was out of his
time and so on, because he had been defending certain values that he
thought were important and others were trying to adopt Western liberal
ideology and values. So interpretation of land reform was guided by patrio-
tism and the national interests. What does my mother expect? What does a
villager in Murewa expect? What does a worker in Highfield expect? What
218 P. PASIRAYI
are people’s expectations? Is it access to good health, housing, a better

wage, a better income and how do you juxtapose those interests with the
interests of foreign capital especially Western capital that was responsible for
colonialism. So we took a position, we have always been aligned with the
majority views. (Interview with Pikirayi Deketeke, March 2013, Harare)
The journalists and editors from the state press said that patriotic jour-
nalism was guided by their own understanding of professional interests as
well as the interests of their audiences. They questioned the notion of
professional journalism, which they equated to European or Western stan-
dards, which were at odds with African values. They argued that journal-
ism “does not exist in a vacuum” but that it needs to serve the communities
where it operates. They argued that the patriotic journalism that they
practised was responsible because it spoke to “the ideals and aspirations of
Africans”, according to Deketeke. When probed further to clarify what he
understood by professional journalism, Deketeke said that:
A journalist does not exist in a vacuum. The views of a European journalist

towards land reform [in Zimbabwe] would be different from the view of an
African journalist because we all belong to different families, our communi-
ties and our culture; there is an ideological setting to what we do as profes-
sionals. There was an element of pure reportage—what was going on which
we can probably classify as professional but there was a second role which
was the ideological inclination of this whole issue. As professional journal-
ists, we owe it to our readers not just to write stories that do not address
their concerns or those of the communities that we belong to. Journalism is
not just like pumping water […] but even with water you will have to treat
it first before giving it to people and that is where the ideology comes in.
Some might see it as subjective and so on but in our view it was really a ques-
tion of interpreting what was going on and what it meant to ordinary peo-
ple. Professionalism does not exist in a vacuum. The question of land reform
was bigger than ZANU–PF; it was bigger than sloganeering for ZANU–
PF. It is only that ZANU–PF was the party that championed land reform,
but it is a question that was there long before people were segmented into
either ZANU–PF, MDC [Movement for Democratic Change] and so on.
My own mother will tell you stories about how black people watched help-
lessly when white people took their land. So those are issues that are at the
core of families and our people and absolutely have nothing to do with slo-
ganeering for ZANU–PF. If we identified with a patriotic cause that was
being championed by ZANU–PF, yes, there is that coincidence but what
guided us was the national interest which should be the case with any pro-
fessional journalist. (Interview with Deketeke, March 2013, Harare)
The views by Deketeke demonstrate the use of the idea of the national
interest in justifying the framing of the land issue in the state press. But
added to that is a kind of specific culturalist (or Africanist) argument and
the influences of the specific history of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle in
justifying patriotic journalism. We can see the echoes of these practices in
the post-independence one-party states where partisan or biased media
coverage that was in favour of the nationalist leaders in these regimes was
justified in terms of national interests.
Unlike in authoritarian regimes, where media control is achieved
through direct censorship and other repressive strategies, hybrid regimes
prefer hidden strategies of control to evade criticism and achieve legiti-
macy. In this chapter, I have discussed the political and institutional means
and mechanisms of media control that were deployed by the Information
and Publicity Ministry in Zimbabwe post-2000. I have demonstrated that
Minister Jonathan Moyo developed a highly complex and sophisticated set
of rules and politics that guided the party’s new media strategy. As we have
seen, Moyo developed a sophisticated mechanism to control the state
media that blended coercive and hidden strategies. I have demonstrated
that media control was not achieved entirely through heavy-handed
means. While he purged journalists who did not toe his line, Moyo also
developed a number of methods to manipulate journalists via meetings,
money and threatening jobs, and created and disseminated content via
briefings with journalists and editors. He developed a hands-on style of
management and managed to build a self-policing journalistic team that
was proud of and endeavoured to reflect his and other ZANU–PF offi-
cials’ views in the news. These hidden strategies were effective means of
media control consistent with ZANU–PF’s hybrid politics.
References
Chiumbu, S., and D. Moyo. 2009. Re-gearing Policy and Propaganda in Crisis
Zimbabwe. In The Power of Communication: Changes and Challenges in African
Media, ed. K.S. Orgeret and H. Ronning. Oslo: Academic Press.
Diamond, L.J. 2002. Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13
(2): 21–35.
Levitsky, S., and L. Way. 2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal
of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65.
———. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schedler, A. (2010). Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense. Journal of Democracy
21 (1): 69–80.
CHAPTER 10
Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence

in Zimbabwean Politics
Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele
Introduction
There has been no area in Zimbabwe’s political, social and economic life
that has received more scholarly attention than the media. Most of the
studies, post-2000, have tended to focus on political economy questions,
showing how the media, both private and public, mediated state opposi-
tion and civil society relations. Following the successes of the Arab Spring
uprisings in North Africa from 2010, there has been an observable shift in
focus, with much emphasis on social media effects, specifically on political
mobilisation against hegemonies (Willems 2019; Matingwina 2018;
Mutsvairo 2016; Mutsvairo and Sirks 2015; Mare 2014; Moyo 2011;
Atton and Mabweazara 2011; Moyo 2009). This chapter argues against
S. Mpofu
School of Language, Media and Communication, University of Limpopo,
Polokwane, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
T. Matsilele (*)
Department of Media Studies and Public Relations, Cape Peninsula University of
Technology, Cape Town, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_10
222 S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE
the techno-determinism that has occupied much of the scholarship around

the effects of social media since 2010, while advocating for a more nuanced
explanation to cyber-cultures, which are context specific. This study builds
on Gabriella Coleman’s seminal work on hacktivists and trolls, and on
Malcolm Gladwell’s loose network theory, which encourages the critical
reading of each context without extolling technologies in instances where
social media mediates revolutions. Methodologically, this is a qualitative
content analysis study that theoretically employs the public sphere. The
study uses the period between 2013 and 2019 with a bias towards leading
“dissidents” of the period: Baba Jukwa, Evan Mawarire and Tajamuka.
These cases help to explain the concept of dissidence in the public sphere,
which in Zimbabwe’s Shona culture is known as dariro (playground).
As already stated, in this chapter we make an attempt to move away
from techno-deterministic biases as we try to give a more nuanced,
context-specific narrative that explains the nature, shape and character of
social media dissidence in Zimbabwe. This chapter heavily leans on
Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s chapter (Chap. 3), which addresses the national ques-
tion. At the core of our argument is the view that Zimbabwe’s social media
dissidence is a result of a lack of cohesion around the national question.
Like Gladwell (2010) and Aouragh and Alexander, this study employs
anthropological lenses to understand other contributing factors in social
media-driven revolutions as it traces dissident moments, led predomi-
nantly by youths, beginning with the mystery figure of Baba Jukwa in
2013 and climaxing in 2016 with #Tajamuka and #ThisFlag movements.
Beyond 2016, these movements continued and newer ones emerged, such
as #BusStopTV and Comic Pastor. For more on the political culture that
has shaped Zimbabwe for the past 100 years, see Chap. 2, which deals
with the political culture of Zimbabwe. Unlike in North Africa, Zimbabwe’s
social media dissident moments are ephemeral and fleeting, failing to
unseat hegemonic actors. This failure to transform via social media upris-
ings could add another layer to what the introductory chapter alludes to
when articulating the concept of transition overload. However, our central
aim is to demonstrate how relations post-2013 have been mischaracter-
ised, with a failure to appreciate the anthropological view on state opposi-
tion–civil society relations. Theoretically, this work contributes to the
growing body of literature that rebels against general scholarship on social
media studies, which climaxed with the characterising of the Egypt upris-
ing as the ‘Twitter Revolution”. Such studies (techno-deterministic)
ignore local contexts as they try to extol technologies.
10 SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 223
Conceptually, we argue that what we are seeing on social media are not
protests, juvenile insults as some scholars have argued, but rather dissi-
dence. This dissidence has a history and is part of Zimbabwean cultural
expression that has simply morphed into the social media sphere as a way
of mediation known as dariro. We characterise social media as dariro, as
we do other cultural gatherings where dissidence was allowed in
Zimbabwean society, just as it was allowed in coffee houses and theatres in
Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere. While our focus looks at the period since
2013, we make strong connections to earlier periods to demonstrate this
long-running thread of dissidence. To discover what we are seeing on
social media, we employ a reconfigured public sphere theory, a qualitative
methodology and online ethnography technique. We borrow our concep-
tualisation from Matsilele’s (2019) seminal study on dissidents in
Zimbabwe.
Social Media and Dissidence

For centuries, dissidents have existed on the margins because media gate-
keepers kept them out of public discourse, considering them to be anath-
ema to national development and cohesion. However, their importance
has always been in invoking national consciousness even though they were
subjected to marginalisation. With the advent of social media, this has
changed: dissidents can effectively maximise their agency without profes-
sional gatekeepers. Social media also allows them to do what is often
regarded as dangerous in the offline zone, with their propagation of politi-
cal dissidence reaching larger audiences and creating bonds at the speed of
light, a factor that gives governments headaches. For Zimbabwe, the term
dissidence has a very specific social, historical and political association: dis-
sidents are seen as rebels or enemies of the state. To label someone as a
dissident is to paint them as justifiably deserving of violent repression by
the state. Therefore, this chapter examines how Zimbabwean dissidents
have been using social media and how the government and the ruling
party have been responding to this. The chapter explores how social media
dissidents are shaping the national discourse as they dissent from official
power structures.
First, an exploration of how social media has been used for political
mobilisation purposes is crucial in order to locate the phenomenon of dis-
sidence. Writing on elections, Davies (2014) observes that social media
allows political actors, particularly smaller parties or less well-known
candidates, to circumvent mass-media filters to get their messages across.

This enabling capacity brings some equilibrium between players of all sizes
when it comes to engaging in civic discourse and political and public
debates. This means that, beyond the ballot box and traditional party ral-
lies, political parties and citizens can debate manifestos, national agendas
and policies in the social media sphere as a collective or on different plat-
forms. These multiple sites are what Bosch (2010) considers to be multi-
ple spheres and discursive arenas. Another consequent advantage that
comes with social media use by small actors is that some of the debates
taking place are carried forward to the mainstream media, by journalists
who generate content from these platforms (Davies 2014). This, to a great
extent, has been the approach adopted by most social media dissidents in
Zimbabwe to advance narratives in the public sphere. Most of the narra-
tives in the public sphere, save on social media, do not go far in challeng-
ing and exposing state actors, even though they have passing moments of
sensationalisation, as Gadzikwa (dealing with the tabloidisation of political
news) argues in Chap. 11 of this book.
As alluded to earlier, these effects of social media have seen extensive
study, while several developed countries have seen the increased use of
social media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc.) arguably translating to
enhanced political fortunes for particular actors. The success of social
media use in elections has received attention in Canada (Dumitricia),
Sweden (Gustafsson 2012), Denmark (Andersen and Medaglia 2009) and
in the United States (USA) (Banda 2010; Mascaro and Goggins 2011),
with scholars arguing that the use of social networking sites is contributing
to voting patterns. Davies asserts that the network effects of social media,
amplifying as they do the transmission of a political message through social
connections, make social media a valuable part of an election campaign.
The debate about “fake news” and the 2016 US elections continues to
rumble on. The question of whether or not Russia used fake news and
hackers to influence elections in the USA and in Europe is being taken
seriously by investigators, although the evidence is inconclusive. It is not
fake news, however, to argue that President Donald Trump campaigned
outside traditional media predominantly through his Twitter handle.
Though one cannot conclusively attribute his victory to his social media
activities, social media did play a part (Kellner 2016). How big or how
small a part it is difficult to say.
Unlike Canada, Sweden, Denmark and the USA, Zimbabwe is still
largely rural (the World Bank estimated it at 67.62% rural as of 2015),
with a large percentage of its population not online. These factors limit the
penetrability of social media. That said, the country has seen improved use
of information and communications technology, “with 6900km optic
fibre connections, three major mobile service providers, high literacy rate
of 98 % and high mobile network subscription” (Masuka et al. 2016, 2).
These statistics, of course, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Just
because there is a huge volume of data usage, coupled with mobile pene-
tration currently in the region of 96%, does not automatically indicate that
the use is geographically or demographically widespread. The matter is
complicated, for instance, by multiple ownership of mobile lines, dormant
SIM cards and so on. Generally, accurate data is hard to come by (Masuka
et al. 2016). Research conducted by Masuka et al. (2016) indicates, how-
ever, that high literacy rates across the country have influenced higher
percentages of mobile ownership, even among smallholder farmers con-
centrated in rural areas. These factors help to demonstrate the extent to
which social media power can be imagined.
Given the foregoing, this chapter looks at how social media dissidents
are shaping political discourse within Zimbabwe. We argue that dissidence
has not only taken different forms but has also tended to inhabit what we
call unlikely sites, hidden or invisible, and accidental sites. These are sites
where dissidence is either disguised or accidental; there is little to identify
it outright as dissidence or, indeed, to suggest its motives. It is hardly
articulated as dissidence and its objectives are often silent, understated or
only hinted. These unlikely and accidental sites range from domestic to
public spaces, and from intellectual spaces to political ones. They draw in
scholars, writers, musicians, artists, activists and politicians, causing a
cacophony of voices that is a central feature of dissidence in Zimbabwe.
These hidden sites allow the flourishing of subaltern voices, including the
arts, music, comedy and literature. Dissidence is not only touched by—
and drawn to—sites of power, but is also distinctly shaped by those who
disrupt power precisely because power regards them as inconsequential.
At any rate, it appears that the literary arts and music in Zimbabwe have
been a site of hidden dissidence. This chapter addresses three specific
forms of dissidence: Baba Jukwa, #ThisFlag Movement and
#Tajamuka/#Sesijikile.
Method and Theory
We used qualitative methodology in conducting this research (Snape and
Spencer 2003, 17; Strauss and Corbin 1994, 10). The research is a situ-
ated activity that locates the observer in the world. This rejects the linear
model of communication and neglect of the human experience (Du Plooy
2009, 35). Qualitative methods can be used “to obtain the intricate details
about phenomena such as feelings, thought processes, and emotions that
are difficult to extract or learn about through more conventional research
methods” (Strauss and Corbin 1994, 11). To understand the phenome-
non of social media dissidence in Zimbabwe, we employed the virtual
ethnography data collection method. Bowler (2010, 1270) says that
“online ethnography refers to a number of related online research meth-
ods that adapt to the study of the communities and cultures created
through computer-mediated social interaction”. Since understanding how
particular cultures of the internet interact with the already existing politi-
cal dissidence, culture in Zimbabwe is at the centre of this study. We felt
that a kind of online ethnography would be an appropriate way to gather
data from Facebook and Twitter. In gathering this data, we had to be
interact with cases being investigated, what is often regarded as lurking.
By interacting, we mean liking, retweeting, sharing and responding to
some of the posts that were shared by these dissidents.
This study employs the public sphere as a theoretical entry point
through which the quotidian work of social media dissidents can be under-
stood. The public sphere is a normative fit because it deals effortlessly with
issues of democracy, public engagement and participatory politics—issues
that are currently central to debates about the Zimbabwean polity.
Habermas, Lennox and Lennox posit that “by public sphere, we mean
first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public
opinion can be formed”. Mpofu (2014) and Castells go further, elucidat-
ing that public sphere is not just a space for social interaction but is a space
for cultural and communicative release and debate. It is through the pub-
lic sphere that decisions of the state are influenced, shaped and negotiated.
Through such a public sphere, access is purportedly guaranteed to all citi-
zens. But how is a public sphere configured? Is it possible to guarantee
access to all? How and in what sense? Habermas et al. answer this:
A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in

which private individuals assemble to form a public body, they then behave
neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor

like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a
state bureaucracy.
Hence, citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unre-

stricted fashion; that is, “with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and
association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about
matters of general interest”. Dean (2003, 95) asserts that “the public
sphere is the site and subject of liberal democratic practice”, and that “it is
that space within which people deliberate over matters of common con-
cern, matters that are contested and about which it seems necessary to
reach consensus”. Habermas (1962) investigates the ways in which a new
public sphere emerged during the time of the Enlightenment and the
American and French revolutions, and how this promoted political discus-
sions and debates (Kellner 2000). The public sphere made it possible to
form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful
interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society. The public sphere
thus presupposed freedom of speech and assembly, a free press and the
right to freely participate in political debate and decision-making, ele-
ments of liberal democracy. Castells (2010) notes that the public sphere is
an essential component of socio-political organisation because it is the
space where people come together as citizens and articulate their autono-
mous views to influence the political institutions of society. Gerhards and
Schäfer (2010) suggest that the public sphere serves as a forum to com-
municate, collectively, relevant issues, allows citizens to be informed about
critical societal developments and allows them to observe and keep a vigi-
lant eye on political, economic and other elites.
Tracing the Dissident Trope 2000–2010

The term dissident was used in pre-independence Zimbabwe to refer to
the military organisation of native Zimbabweans who participated in the
armed struggle against the white minority regime of Ian Smith. The term
enjoyed usage among Rhodesian soldiers, politicians, and the Information
Ministry, as an epithet for guerrillas fighting for land, equality, justice and
dignity (Matsilele 2019). As noted, the dissident was a nullified person or
a non-person. The term enjoyed further popular usage in post indepen-
dence Zimbabwe, mostly towards Patriotic Front– Zimbabwe African
People’s Union (PF–ZAPU) combatants who had resisted or were falsely
alleged to have resisted demobilisation and integration into the new

Zimbabwean army by Robert Mugabe’s governing Zimbabwe African
National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). The characterisation of
these combatants normalised and justified the Gukurahundi genocide that
left in excess of 20,000 people, most of whom were Ndebele-speaking and
therefore suspected to be PF–ZAPU supporters, dead (Mpofu 2014;
Coltart 2017).
The term disappeared from the state media for about a decade until the
late 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, Zimbabwe was gripped by its
first ever, and very serious, food riots. Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade unionist
with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), persuaded work-
ers across the country’s cities to stage a mass stay away from work. This
was an immense success (Raftopoulos 2000). Tsvangirai quit the labour
union and formed a party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
It was the first mass opposition to challenge post-1987 ZANU–PF power,
with a strong urban base among workers and with a vanguard of University
of Zimbabwe students. The label of dissident resurfaced and was applied
to Tsvangirai, his supporters, University of Zimbabwe students’ pro-
democracy organisations, white commercial farmers and indeed anyone
perceived to be against the status quo (Mazango 2005; Townsend and
Copson 2005, 6). From the government’s perspective, these groups of
people were “traitors or sell-outs, puppets of the West and agents of
regime change”, while viewing itself and its support base as “sons of the
soil patriots, revolutionaries and liberators” (Hwami 2012, 12).
The period 2000–2010 is characterised as a decade of crisis because of
a series of political and economic crises that bedevilled Zimbabwe, begin-
ning with the food riots in 1999, followed by the ZANU–PF govern-
ment’s loss of the Constitutional Amendment vote in 2001. The
government smarted under this loss, leading the military to declare that
no one who had not fought in the war of independence would be a leader
of Zimbabwe. This was in apparent reference to Tsvangirai. The irony is
that Zvinavashe was in effect saying that only those who were once dissi-
dents in the parlance of the Rhodesian government could become
President of Zimbabwe. The term had come full circle. Past dissidents
could rule Zimbabwe, but not current ones.
Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), an umbrella body of
students from the country’s universities and colleges, was one of the first
organisations to be marked as a dissident body by the government func-
tionaries and the police at the turn of the century. Traditionally, ZINASU
membership is drawn from public universities and colleges, with the

University of Zimbabwe, the oldest in the country, playing a leading role
and providing most of its prominent leadership. However, it is a demo-
cratic body. With the economic situation worsening at the turn of the
millennium, the government struggled to pay student grants/loans
(Hwami 2012). This led to a cycle of student protests across country’s
universities but centred on the University of Zimbabwe. This coincided
with the formation of the MDC. But the government did not think there
was any coincidence; rather, they pronounced that the pro-democracy
movements were part of a sinister plot of regime change that was taking
place because of the bilateral dispute. Public media rhetoric, and by
ZANU–PF politicians during rallies, ramped up the discourse of “sell-
outs” and “puppets”. Perhaps the government’s pronouncement was not
merely paranoia.
Another big shaper of post-1980s politics was the ZCTU, until the late
1980s a tripartite alliance partner of the ruling ZANU–PF: the labour
body participated in ZANU–PF central committee meetings and defended
the government agenda. The late 1980s saw tensions sharpen when the
government accepted the structural adjustment programmes cocktail
ordered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
The programme led to massive job losses and the decimation of domestic
industries as Zimbabwe opened its doors to competition from the devel-
oped world and the trickle-down neoliberal free market. This situation
would worsen by the turn of the new millennium. Indeed, by that time the
good relations between ZCTU and the government had all but ended, as
the government started barring the labour body from protesting without
police clearance. To some extent, one can argue that laws introduced ear-
lier in the decade of crisis were meant to cripple ZCTU’s operations; that
is, to stop it morphing into a dissident body.
The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), for instance, was one such
law that was promulgated to undermine ZCTU, and indeed anyone who
wanted to strike and protest for purposes of registering discontent, which
the government feared would make it look bad. ZCTU would, just like
ZINASU, have strong links to the main opposition party MDC, seeing the
labour-backed party as a platform from which to renegotiate workers’
interests. ZCTU also had strong ties to the MDC as the top tier of its
former leaders had been instrumental in the formation of MDC: these
included former ZCTU President Gibson Sibanda, who went on to
become the inaugural deputy president of the MDC, and former Secretary
General of ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, who became MDC’s inaugural

President. The nexus between ZCTU and MDC would also mean that the
labour body would be targeted just as ZINASU was for “selling out” the
government. ZCTU would compete with ZINASU, the MDC and the
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to be labelled puppets of the
West and agents fighting for regime change. Some of their members would
also face arbitrary arrest and torture in police cells.
Some of the accusations that the MDC was a foreign-funded puppet
party were true. However, this was not a serious accusation since ZANU–
PF and indeed the Zimbabwean government itself routinely enjoyed for-
eign funding—something revealed by the current finance minister, Mthuli
Ncube. The MDC, initially backed by internal financing, would later get
financial support from overseas pro-democracy initiatives. Mugabe referred
to the MDC in the following terms:
The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union
face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior pro-
fessionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It
is much deeper than these human superficies; for it is immovably and impla-
cably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwit-
tingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old
and as strong as the forces that control it; that converges on it and controls
it; that drives and direct; indeed, that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a
counterrevolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inim-
ical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday. (Hwami 2012, 8)
The NCA is another organisation to impact post-2000 Zimbabwean

politics. This started as a constitutional lobby group fighting the govern-
ment’s unilateral constitution-making mandate. It has now morphed into
a political party. The NCA campaigned against the government-proposed
constitution of 1999 and handed ZANU–PF its first electoral defeat in
2000. The NCA would continue to fight for a people-driven democratic
constitution and constitution-making process during the decade of crisis.
The government labelled the leading NCA figure during this period,
Lovemore Madhuku, as a dissident who was bent on enriching himself.
President Mugabe went to the extent of insinuating that when NCA cof-
fers ran dry, Madhuku went on the streets to provoke the police to suffer
police brutality, and in return got more funding for his lobby group
(Mlambo 2006). NCA leadership, just like that of ZINASU, MDC and
ZCTU, was subjected to state-sponsored violence, unlawful and indis-

criminate arrests, and disruption of the organisation’s activities through
legal and extra-legal interventions.
Lastly, Zvakwana/Sokwanele, a social movement that mostly worked
online without clear leadership, and targeted President Robert Mugabe’s
“continued misrule”, was another important organisation to be consid-
ered in the dissident category. Sokwanele, which means “enough is
enough” in Ndebele, was the name adopted, says Talbot (2009, 1), by this
“Zimbabwean pro-democracy website whose bloggers last year (2008)
published accounts of atrocities by Robert Mugabe’s regime and posted
Election Day updates describing voter intimidation and apparent ballot
stuffing”. This social movement engaged in ad hoc and ephemeral activi-
ties, from printing newsletters and pamphlets to distributing red cards and
used condoms as a way of fomenting dissidence against the Mugabe
regime (Anderson 2012). Zvakwana was an interesting forerunner to
social media dissidence, utilising blogs at a time when Zimbabwe was still
poorly connected to the internet, smartphones were unheard of in the
country, phone lines cost more than US$300 and social media as we know
it today was still in its infancy. As such, it utilised both online and offline
channels. Its audience was small, fragmented and localised. The publica-
tion on its website of details of government “atrocities”, although reach-
ing an insignificant audience, was a sign of things to come with Baba
Jukwa. For more on these dissident moments, refer to Chap. 4, dealing
with polarisation in Zimbabwe.
Social Media Dissidence in Perspective

As we argued earlier, dissidence involves throwing power into disarray;
disorientating it. How does one manage to do this? In this section, we try
to link this question with the chronology of social media dissidence. Where
and when did social media dissidence commence? What was its nature and
character? How did it evolve and how does it express itself today? These
are some of the questions we now briefly examine. For this task, we find
Gabriella Coleman’s seminal work Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The
Many Faces of Anonymous especially useful. It appears that dissidence in
the social media sphere has evolved together with the development of
related technologies. This point has already been emphasised in our study
of the technical history of networks and social media. The earliest forms of
social media dissidence were not taken seriously, being dismissed as the
work of hacktivists and trolls with too much time on their hands. More
recently, however, there seems to have been widespread panic at their
work, with governments, continental institutions and policymakers up in
arms at different forms of cyber-wars and cyber-criminals. In other words,
social media did not immediately begin by throwing power into disarray;
this is a quality it has taken on as it has become more ubiquitous, accessi-
ble and global.
Let us consider trolling, for instance. This notion is described as target-
ing people and organisations, the desecration of reputations and the
spreading of humiliating information (Coleman 2014). Coleman (2014)
observes that it is a multifarious activity that flourishes online and boasts a
range of tight-knit associations, a variety of genres and a small pantheon of
famed individuals. Should we believe that trolls emerge organically only
from computer keyboards and smartphone keyboards? One view is that
trolling as a behaviour emerges offline, is facilitated, renegotiated and
extended online, and then continues offline, in a ceaseless back-and-forth
exchange. In fact, the origin of trolling extends far beyond the genesis of
the internet, taking root, as Coleman intimates, in the vagaries of myth
and oral culture.
Today’s trolls, who in the past could have been characterised as trick-
sters, or those imbued with the capacity of disorientating power, share a
few characteristics, such as a preoccupation with messing with power,
defying norms and bending rules. Set against the concepts of dissidence
and social media, trolling seems to be a key aspect of social media
dissidence.
The practice of trolling was already common in the hacker underground
movement of the 1980s. However, hackers operated in different contexts.
They traced themselves back to so-called phone phreaks (Coleman 2014,
35). These were people who illegally entered the telephone system by
recreating the audio frequencies used by the system to route calls (Coleman
2014, 35). However, the end of the analogue phone network spelled the
end of the golden age of phreaking. The proliferation of computer net-
works marked the beginning of new modes of trolling, particularly by
giving rise to the hacker underground, which peaked in the 1990s. Many
of these hackers were mischief-makers, gadflies and merry wanderers
around the network. As the internet spread from academic and military
circles in the late 1970s, it mushroomed to include hundreds of lists with
spirited and, at times, ferocious discussions (Coleman 2014, 39).
It is in mailing lists, also known as listservs, where the term trolls first
came into common usage (Coleman 2014). It “referred to people who
did not contribute positively to discussions, who argued for the sake of
arguing” (Coleman 2014, 39). Their sole intention was to confuse and
disturb the logical flow of a conversation. With the 1990s boom in mailing
lists, there was an observable surge in lists that encouraged unrestrained
free speech and, indeed, were celebrated for it. The genesis of popular
internet trolling can be traced to 4chan and 2chan image boards in Japan.
4chan was popular for its extreme permissibility—making questions of free
speech largely irrelevant—which was fostered by a culture of anonymity
embraced by its users (Coleman 2014). As Coleman further argues, much
of the material was designed to be shocking to outsiders, a discursively
constructed border fence meant to exclude the uninitiated. It was on
4chan that Anonymous grew. By 2006, this name was commonly used by
participants. The primary ideal of Anonymous, of course, is anonymity.
Hence, “The posts on 4chan have no names or any identifiable markers
attached to them. The only thing you are able to judge a post by is its
content and nothing else” (Coleman 2014, 47). It is out of Anonymous
that certain social media dissidents would emerge, among them: Mohamed
Bouzizi, Nawaat, Chelsea Manning and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange
(Coleman 2014). Manning and Assange would become popular and be
punished for their dissidence after hundreds of thousands of United States
(US) cables were published, with most exposing the dark secrets of US
operations in Iraq (Coleman 2014). Manning was condemned to a mili-
tary prison for espionage after she disclosed to WikiLeaks nearly 750,000
classified and diplomatic documents. She was slapped with a 35-year sen-
tence, only to have this commuted during President Barack Obama’s last
days in office. In April 2019 Assange’s asylum was withdrawn and he was
arrested; currently (June 20) he’s in HM Prison Belmarsh and on trial.
Anonymous would go on to actively participate in the Arab Spring revolu-
tions in Tunisia and Egypt, publishing information that would fuel anger
and resentment towards the strongmen of the North African region. In
the Zimbabwean context, there have been some dissidents who have chal-
lenged the ZANU–PF government. In some cases, they have been vio-
lently suppressed, while in other cases, such as that of Baba Jukwa, the
dissidents responsible have never been found. In the next section, we pres-
ent data and analyses relating to three dissidents in Zimbabwean politics:
Baba Jukwa, #ThisFlag Movement and #Tajamuka/#Sesijikile.
Data Presentation and Discussion
Baba Jukwa Typology

Information scraped from the page indicates that the Baba Jukwa Facebook
page went live on 22 March 2013. The owner of the page described him-
self/herself as a “Concerned father, fighting nepotism and directly linking
the community with their leaders, government, Members of Parliament
and ministers”. No Zimbabwean citizen answering to the name or sur-
name “Baba Jukwa” has been traced, and therefore this appears to have
been an avatar for an anonymous user or users. However, in a post of 29
March 2013, Baba Jukwa claimed once to have worked for the feared
Central Intelligence Organisation. He also claimed to be a ZANU–PF
insider. The mystery surrounding Baba Jukwa led the government to float
names, of which many were of journalists operating from outside the
country, with the exception of Edmund Kudzayi, who was arrested for
being Baba Jukwa. To demonstrate his influence, by the end of 2013 his
page has over 350,000 followers. This followership rattled the govern-
ment as it went on to propose a bill (the Cybercrime Bill) that communi-
cations scholars and civil society allege is meant to clamp down on
oppositional voices, with a fully fledged ministry whose responsibility is
monitoring social media.
Baba Jukwa’s posts not only focused on exposing events that were
unfolding within “his” “evil” party ZANU–PF and in government, but
also on profiling events that he believed helped to build the standing of
the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, in the 2013 elections. As we
will see, Baba Jukwa claimed that he wanted Tsvangirai’s party to win elec-
tions in order to save ZANU–PF from evil. For this reason, Baba Jukwa
followed the Movement for Democratic Change’s party events and posted
pictures that portrayed Tsvangirai’s growing support base. For instance,
on 20 July 2013, Baba Jukwa wrote on his wall that “Tsvangirai takes the
lead as Mugabe takes the road”. The post, one could argue, was meant to
boost morale in MDC–T’s support base and avoid the voter apathy that is
prevalent in most countries under dictatorships, as elections are viewed to
be foregone conclusions. The same could be said of Baba Jukwa’s selective
use of categories, such as prefixing names of Members of Parliament with
“Hon” for “Honourable”. On 20 July 2013, Baba Jukwa said, “Hon
Chamisa, the MC is taking to the stage to entertain the crowds,” a post
that also indicates immediacy. He is there where the action is, and not just
a keyboard warrior. Baba Jukwa adds, “with this crowd, it’s no surprise
why Mugabe is having headaches over the elections”. The use of “Hon”
in this instance lends credence to the legitimacy of Chamisa and the
MDC–T, which he deliberately denies those in ZANU–PF. Below, we
presents these categories of content from Baba Jukwa to show the nature
of his dissidence:
Type of Example 1 Example 2 Example 3

content
Baba Baba Jukwa tells the “Tsvangirai agent “Airforce of Zimbabwe

Jukwa- nation that he will attempts to bribe helicopters grounded at
sourced announce electoral results Baba Jukwa again” Manyame airforce base”
news/ of 31 July 2013. This was posted on [posted posted on
Official posted on 30 July 2013 May, year not given]
updates
Crowd- “The anonymous “Anonymous Reports on Chiadzwa
sourced whistleblower is Driving whistleblower is diamond looting by
news [Baba Zimbabwe’s Mugabe driving Zimbabwe’s Minister Obert Mpofu.
Jukwa Insane”. Baba curated this Mugabe insane” [posted 12 June 2013]
curated] news article that appeared [posted 19 July
on www.wikileaks-forum. 2013]
com
Crowd “Zimbabwe electoral Urgent appeal from Vendors run for dear life
sourced fraud unearthed” This Kennedy Masiye after seeing Tsvangirai’s
news [not post was sourced online [posted 16 October face. This news was
curated] and has no traceable date 2016.] sourced from
myzimbabwe.co.zw.
[posted 19 July 2013]
As the table above demonstrates, Baba Jukwa’s page contained, in the

main, three types of content. The first type is uncurated crowd-sourced
news (Baba Jukwa simply forwarded the news, without editing, checking
or endorsing it). The second type is curated crowd-sourced news (that is,
Baba Jukwa appears to have curated the news). The third type is Baba
Jukwa-sourced leaks. Content like this, in a post 9/11 world order, can
only be posted by someone who is dissenting against the system and
intends to throw power into disarray. This is even more dangerous in
countries such as Zimbabwe, with a known history of meting brute force
on dissidents, their supporters and even ethnic belonging. The next dissi-
dence type we discuss is that of Pastor Evan Mawarire with the #ThisFlag
movement.
#ThisFlag Typology
#ThisFlag was begun in April 2016 by Evan Mawarire, a 41-year-old
Zimbabwean pastor who appeared, with a Zimbabwean flag draped
around his neck and shoulders, in a video posted on Facebook, YouTube
and Twitter. The movement is active on Facebook and Twitter. On
Twitter, the campaign operates under several handles, such as #ThisFlag
and E Mawarire @PastorEvanLive. On Facebook, the movement uses the
names Evan Mawarire and This Flag/Ifulegi Leyi/Mureza Uyu. The
movement uploads self-made videos of Zimbabweans venting against the
state, and sometimes trolling it. The rallying call is around the significance
of the national flag, which they say originally represented noble values
such as shared prosperity, democracy and the country’s potential in agri-
culture and mining, but has now been soiled and inverted by ZANU–
PF. The posts are made by users who mostly reveal their true identities.
For instance, Mawarire, unlike Baba Jukwa, has a traceable biography, a
factor that points to his distinct mode of dissidence.
Unlike Baba Jukwa, Mawarire had a face and real experiences that reso-
nated with citizens. His painful realities reflected the challenges that most
ordinary citizens were facing, and these challenges became the message for
recruiting thousands of Zimbabweans both online and offline, whether on
university campuses or street corners. Mawarire’s movement operated
with no budget as it was practically a no cost campaign: all that he and his
followers needed to mobilise Zimbabweans across the world was a smart-
phone. This meant the government could not easily claim that he was
being funded by the West, which had a regime change agenda. His dissi-
dence rattled the government, with President Mugabe warning Mawarire
never to return to Zimbabwe at a national event in 2015; by this time he
had already fled into exile.
There are three types of content on #ThisFlag’s page: calls to action,
protests and trolling. The content on Mawarire’s Twitter and Facebook
accounts, as on Baba Jukwa’s Facebook page, intends to throw power into
disarray by asking uncomfortable questions, employing tactics that are dif-
ficult to censor or prohibit (that is, actions that can only be censored at
great reputational cost to the regime) and encouraging followers to bypass
traditional gatekeepers by self-recording and uploading content that
makes the government look incompetent or just plain bad. The content
on Mawarire’s #ThisFlag page is also meant to inspire courage against
tyranny without engaging in open combat. Unlike Baba Jukwa and
Tajamuka, who call for physical confrontation with the state, Mawarire
opts for a more Martin Luther King approach—confronting power
through peaceful means and powerful oratory, which mobilises citizens to
courageously confront, question and expose the hypocrisy demonstrated
by powerful elites. Below illustrates the types of dissidence expressed by
Mawarire.

content
Protest Mboko (then We don’t want them (Bond Another rant against
vice-president) Notes) debate with Reserve Mugabe. There will be
Buda Muhotera (24 Bank of Zimbabwe governor more no doubt. (1 June
June 2016) (10 June 2016) 2016)
Call to Let’s gather to Shut down Zimbabwe (5 Undenge must go (2 July
action honour Dzamara July 2016) 2016)
Trolling Notice to sue police Celebrating blockage of Profiling National
over malicious Beitbridge border (1 July Electoral Reform Agenda
arrests (23 March 2016) demonstration (26 August
2018) 2016)
The origin of flags seems to have been “to rally the community to cer-
emonies of religious worship” (Partridge 1966, 16). Conventionally, how-
ever, national flags function to symbolically distinguish countries and to
stimulate the patriotism of the citizens of those countries. Citizens have
used their flag to draw attention to the contested question of patriotism in
Zimbabwe. ZANU–PF has historically monopolised patriotism, assuming
for itself the power to name patriots and shame “sell outs”. By appropriat-
ing the flag, Mawarire threw ZANU–PF’s monopoly of patriotism into
doubt. Mawarire’s preferred style for doing this was to focus on what one
could call authentic and everyday bread-and-butter grievances, which mil-
lions of Zimbabweans could relate to across political, class and even racial
divides. Another signal feature of #ThisFlag is its claim to moral superior-
ity and what one could call moral understatement. Mawarire casts himself
as a cross between Desmond Tutu and a modern-day Martin Luther King,
a preacher of conscience who is reluctantly driven to rebel by a superior
moral code. Like Martin Luther King, Mawarire is a preacher and a min-
ister of religion who has taken on the dominant political system of his
country and exposed its deepest civil contradictions. Even his delivery in
his signal video post contains something of the African American civil
rights preacher, down to the gospel of nonviolence and sacrifice. A third
communicative device used by #ThisFlag, as we have pointed out, is its

drawing on the politics of feeling—in this case of feeling angry and
betrayed. Not only are feelings hard to deny, but social media is perhaps
the single most optimum device for tapping into feelings and emotion. In
the video, Mawarire not only mentions his utter helplessness regarding his
failure to pay school fees for his two daughters, but also uses specific body
language to embody the helplessness. For instance, he pauses and sighs
often, gathers the flag in his hand and looks at it longingly. At moments
he appears as if he is about to burst into tears. This embodied communica-
tion means that the video is powerful political communication rather than
a mere transcription, manifesto or collection of typed words. What
Mawarire is not able to say (or claims he is unable to say) is articulated by
his silences, pauses, sighs and gazing on the flag. The use of feeling to
persuade, it seems, is an avenue of communication that is uniquely avail-
able to social media dissidence because of the unique aesthetic and techni-
cal features of social media itself.
#Tajamuka/Sesjikile Typology
“Tajamuka” is a Shona colloquialism translated to mean “we object”, “we
reject” or “we have rebelled”. Their political communication is often pref-
aced with “Hatichada” (“We no longer going to obey”) and “Hatichatya”
(“We are not afraid any more”). We argue that the concept of rebellion has
a strong resonance with dissidence, as both dissidents and rebels under-
stand themselves to be challenging dominant and hegemonic networks of
power. As alluded to earlier, the organization exposes names and informa-
tion to the public, with the intention of making the authorities uncom-
fortable. Names of alleged perpetrators, confidential details and regular
updates of individuals suspected of being behind abductions are some-
times included. The point of this is apparently to protect activists from
being harmed should the abductors be identified in time. It is a way to let
the perpetrators know that the world knows, as it were. The Tajamuka
campaign comprises the youth wings of various political parties (with the
main exception of the ruling ZANU–PF, of course) and civic society
organisations, churches, youth movements’ informal sector pressure
groups, and labour and student movements. #Tajamuka uses Twitter and
Facebook. The page has an image of Linda Masarira holding a Zimbabwean
flag, another (anonymous) activist dressed in a T-shirt marked “Mugabe
must go” and a picture of picketing citizens. Linda Masarira has now
joined a fully fledged political party, and is now the spokesperson of a fac-
tion of the MDC–T led by Thokozani Khupe. The table below gives an
illustration of the type of content promoted by this type of dissidents.

content
Leaks @ZimMediaReview 13 Tajamuka/Sesjikile @ Tajamuka/Sesjikile @

September 2016 TajamukaZW 11 TajamukaZW 31 August
More September 2016 2016
A face many won’t More More
forget: Asst Comm ALERT! Last night Update: Police arresting
Makedenge, responsible #ZanuPF youth thugs innocent bystanders in the
for arrests, torture of in 4 trucks went CBD whom they suspect as
many journalists, activists. around terrorising being violent protesters
residents in Epworth, #ZimShutDown
targeting #Tajamuka
activists leaving
Expose ZANU PF thugs broke #Tajamuka member ALERT! #Tajamuka activist
into Thandiwe Ncube’s Silvanhos Mudzviva in Silvanos Mudzova has just
house and beat her up hospital after being been taken from his home
tortured by State by 6 armed state agents in
agents (15 September Harare. (14 September
2016) 2016)
Call to Tiri kuti kubva iye zvino Vafundisi vudzai vanhu We are now seeking answers
action ZRP inofanirwa kuti nyika yaparara from AFRIMEXBANK
kundosunga vanhu (pastor tell people that AND IMF regarding any
varikutorera vana our country is now on information that can help us
veZimbabwe mari its knees) ascertain the value of the
nezvekutengesa (23 June Zimbabwe yese Bond Note. (6 November
2016) tauriranai kuti mbavha 2016)
nemhondi kuti
hazvivhoterwi
Tajamuka curates different kinds of content on its page, such as videos

of Tajamuka members, crowdsourced videos, posters and “email bomb-
ing” campaigns. As alluded to earlier, the organisation exposes names and
information to the public, with the intention of making the authorities
uncomfortable. The other type of content represented here is calls to
action. This is what distinguishes #Tajamuka from other dissidents in that
they led at such frontline actions. This might also be the reason that Linda
Masarira poured so much scorn on Mawarire for not being seen on the
streets—where Tajamuka was very active. A final example involves an email
bombing campaign of a banking institution that was linked to the bond

notes that the Zimbabwe government was about to print. Tajamuka
espouses open defiance and, on some occasions, physically challenges the
law and order apparatus; it says that it does not heed what it regards as
illegitimate laws. This has seen its members being frequently arrested,
beaten and detained by police. The major events that Tajamuka has partici-
pated in were the demonstrations against the continued stay of the then
Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko at the Rainbow Towers. This was the
place where the then Vice-President Mphoko had been living for over five
hundred days. The protest was a demonstration of disapproval over the
government’s excessive spending on luxuries for members of the executive.
Conclusion
If dissidents are individuals or collectives who actively challenge an estab-
lished doctrine, policy or institution, then Baba Jukwa challenges corrup-
tion and abuse of power, ZANU–PF (which is an established institution)
and state-sanctioned violence; Mawarire challenges economic malaise and
political and constitutional delinquency, invoking the betrayal of those
who died fighting for independence (we argue he challenges established
institutions), while Tajamuka challenges constitutional delinquency, dra-
conian laws (such as POSA), corruption and so-called state capture (we
argue that Tajamuka challenges established doctrine that is enforced in
part by the legal architecture). From the outset, this chapter has attempted
to demonstrate the continuation of dissidence moments that can be traced
back to Mbuya Nehanda, King Mzilikazi, Chief Mapondera and
Chaminuka. Their principles continue to rise up whenever there is a
requirement to demand restorative justice, acting through a pastor, edu-
cated youths or anonymous figures. Because these are mediums working
through selected agency, they can decide to conceal themselves but still
drive their point home. The anonymous dissident does not reveal his or
her identity, literally manifesting as an anonymous actor, playing in the
shadows. Perhaps the most famous global example is the Anonymous
movement. Others, such as WikiLeaks, start out anonymously before
revealing themselves. The likes of Edward Snowden are outed without
their consent. In Zimbabwe, the example of an anonymous dissident is
Baba Jukwa. Dissidents can operate as a collective, such as the Occupy
Movement or, again, the Anonymous movement. The Zimbabwean
example is Tajamuka, a youthful outfit made up of individuals from
different political parties, religious formations and civic groupings. In

Zimbabwe’s history, we are always reminded of how Shonas or Ndebeles
rebelled as a collective, and it seems this is what is happening with
#Tajamuka. Lastly, we argue that Mawarire challenges economic malaise
and political and constitutional delinquency, referring to the betrayal of
those who died fighting for independence. By invoking the dead, Mawarire
is appealing to a higher conscience, and at the same time is invoking the
place occupied by the departed dissidents, as if to say we will continue
fighting even at the cost of our own lives until you give us what you need.
This is demonstrated throughout his overarching message: “Hatichada
Hatichatya”.
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CHAPTER 11
The Tabloidization of Political News

in Zimbabwe: End of Quality Press?
Wellington Gadzikwa
Introduction
The media is indispensable to the functioning of a democracy as the pre-
eminent vehicle for public debates in the modern public sphere(s). The
conduct of the press and the ethical virtues it projects are directly linked
to its ability to enhance democracy. In Zimbabwe, after more than two
decades of political turmoil and unprecedented economic decline
(Raftopoulous 2009), journalism standards have plummeted owing to
various reasons (Media Ethics Committee 2002; Mano 2005; GPA 2008;
VMCZ 2013; IMPI 2014). This chapter argues that the decline in the
standards of journalism is due to a process of tabloidisation of the main-
stream broadsheet newspapers. This tabloidisation has been defined as
“the tendency by all the media to adopt tabloid-style to reduce critical
arguments to mere rhetoric” (Thusu 2007: 8). A tabloidised media
negates the natural function of the media in terms of its democratic influ-
ence through diversion, and the trivialisation and sensationalisation of
W. Gadzikwa (*)
Department of English, Journalism and Media Studies, University of Zimbabwe,
Harare, Zimbabwe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_11
246 W. GADZIKWA
important issues. Through a qualitative content analysis and in-depth

interviews of the media coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from
the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) by
the three national dailies, The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay from
October 2014 to January 2017, this chapter reveals the stark reality that
broadsheet newspapers, whoever their owners, have been contaminated,
and now champion a tabloid news agenda that is inimical to rational politi-
cal debate. This attitude needs a serious rethink if the media is going to
function properly again.
Background to the Media Standards Debate

After the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections, the Minister of Media,
Information and Broadcasting Services, Jonathan Moyo, bemoaned the
state of the media in Zimbabwe, characterised by what he described as
artificial divisions created by polarisation. Moyo lamented that the media
failed to report socio-political and economic developments in the country,
alleging:
We have a media that is principally useless. If you rely on it for information

about the state of the country, you will be by choice putting yourself among
the ignorant; you won’t know what is really going on by reading the media.
(The Herald, Friday 2 January 2015)
In light of these sentiments, Moyo commissioned the first ever national

inquiry into the state of media, the Information and Media Panel of
Inquiry (IMPI). The mandate of IMPI was to promote and elevate the
standards of media practice. The inquiry reflected a general concern from
government that the media was not functioning according to societal
expectations. The concerns of failure by media to meet these expectations
were taken to be representative of overall perceptions of the state of the
media. The IMPI sought to:
inquire into the integrity and adequacy of news and information in relation
to the needs of or on; the economy, national interest, national security, poli-
tics, national processes such as referenda, elections, constitutional exercises
and inquiries, citizenry, both rural and urban as well as local and diaspora,
rights and justice, global issues, gender and marginalised groups.
(IMPI 2014)
11 THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 247
Similar concerns over the perceived decline of standards of journalism

were also shared by media civic organisations and media academics, espe-
cially with regard to a lack of adherence to ethical journalism practices
(Media Ethics Committee 2002; GPA 2008; VMCZ 2013; MMPZ 2014).
The other concern involved vindictiveness on the part of owners who dic-
tate editorial content, resulting in unethical practices (Mano 2005). In
light of these concerns, the IMPI findings demonstrated that polarisation
has resulted from the media failing to create an ideal public sphere where
issues affecting society can be debated and discussed objectively. In par-
ticular, IMPI noted that:
misrepresentation, which is often coupled with sensational headlines has

become an unfortunate phenomenon of Zimbabwe’s journalism and a cause
for constant frustration among newspaper readers who have sadly come to a
realisation that the stories appearing on front pages of Zimbabwe’s various
newspapers do not always bear any resemblance to the sexy headlines below
which they are printed. (IMPI: 198)
From this quote, it is possible to argue that the decline in journalism

standards goes beyond media polarisation and points towards the tabloid-
isation of the press. Polarisation of the media simply resembles the politics
of the day. The media is bound to take opposing positions, which does not
necessarily curtail a strong and vibrant public debate since politics is about
ideological contests. This chapter seeks to go beyond polarity as the main
cause of the decline in journalism standards in Zimbabwe by extending it
to the damaging process of the tabloidisation of the press.
As noted earlier, polarisation does not necessarily lead to a decline in
standards if media practitioners support their ideas with facts. What is criti-
cal in the Zimbabwean setting is assessing why standards of journalism are
described as declining albeit in a polarised environment. This research
seeks to establish whether or not tabloidisation is the reason for the decline
in journalism standards, in terms of truth-telling, accuracy, independence,
fairness, impartiality, humanity and accountability, through an analysis of
the coverage of selected events, such as the expulsion of Joice Mujuru
from ZANU–PF and government. This study focuses on three national
daily newspapers in Zimbabwe from the three leading newspaper stables
across the ownership divide: The Herald (state-controlled newspaper,
Zimpapers), Daily News (privately owned, Associated Newspapers of
Zimbabwe (ANZ) and NewsDay (privately owned, Alfa Media Holdings
248 W. GADZIKWA
(AMH). The three newspapers extensively covered the Joice Mujuru story.
An assessment of this coverage will allow conclusions to be drawn about
whether or not the decline in journalism standards can be attributed to
tabloidisation.
The Expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF

and Government
Joice Teurai Ropa Mujuru (born Runaida Mugari on 15 April 1955) is a

liberation war heroine in Zimbabwe’s war of independence. She was mar-
ried to Solomon Mujuru (a war hero and army general) until his death in
2011. Joice Mujuru served in the ZANU–PF government in various
capacities, including being a cabinet minister until she was appointed the
first female Vice-President in independent Zimbabwe in 2004. This was a
milestone for all women in the political arena. Mujuru was perceived by
many to be former President Robert Mugabe’s natural successor. In April
2015, she was expelled from the ruling ZANU–PF, in which she was the
Second Secretary, on charges of plotting to topple Mugabe from power.
The allegations against her made by ZANU–PF were as follows:
• plotting to unconstitutionally remove former President Robert

Mugabe from power;
• causing divisions and orchestrating factionalism in the ruling
ZANU–PF;
• creating competing centres of power in the party;
• corruption and extortion;
• criminal abuse of office;
• providing leadership for the regime change agenda. (The Herald, 3
April 2015)
The expulsion of Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government was exten-

sively covered by the mainstream print and electronic media. Her expul-
sion presents an opportunity to assess whether or not the selected
newspapers adhered to broadsheet journalism or adopted tabloid journal-
ism styles in their coverage. From analysis of this, it is possible to establish
whether or not the media is undergoing the damaging process of tabloid-
isation, which in itself would point to a decline in standards of journalism
(Bird 1992; Sparks 2000; McNair 2001).
Tabloids and Tabloidisation
A discussion of the tabloidisation of the press requires an understanding of
the meaning of the term “broadsheet journalism” as opposed to “tabloid
journalism”. Broadsheets are newspapers in a large format, which are writ-
ten and distributed for a national audience on the basis of a national news
agenda (Franklin et al. 2005)
Broadsheets value a traditional mix of politics and diplomacy with sport
on the back pages. Their major aim is in-depth and comprehensive cover-
age, which is written using moderate and emotionally controlled language
(Ibid: 30). They tend to lead on an issue or the substantive consequences
of a story rather than the first-hand human interest approach employed by
tabloids.
As such, broadsheets are more text heavy than the pictorial tabloids,
and they are less inclined to use more unconventional reporting practices
such as door-stepping or paying for stories. The character of broadsheet
news coverage, the papers’ tone and the characteristics of their readers,
who are the more affluent groups in society, have resulted in them being
regarded by both journalists and readers as the epitome of journalistic
excellence (Franklin et al. 2005: 29–30).
The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay can be classified as representa-
tives of typical broadsheet newspapers in Zimbabwe. In this regard, they
should be measured by the high standards associated with broadsheet
newspapers and as the epitome of journalistic excellence.
Tabloid Journalism
Any discussion of tabloidisation naturally calls for an in-depth understand-
ing of the nature of tabloids and tabloid journalism. Sparks (2000)
defines that
the tabloid is a from marked by two major features: it devotes relatively little
attention to politics, economics, and society and relatively much attention
to (...) sports, scandal and popular entertainment; it devotes much attention
to the personal and private lives of people, both celebrities and ordinary
people, and relatively little to political processes, economic developments,
and social changes. (2000: 10)
250 W. GADZIKWA
Another tabloid critic, Bird (2000), further defines tabloid journal-

ism as the
storytelling news style which focuses more on personalities, dominant usage

of visual images, and preference for sensationalism instead of analysis and
rational descriptions, techniques such as dramatisation, photo-enhancements
and re-enactments. (2000: 215)
From the definitions proffered by Sparks (2000) and Bird (2000), it

follows that tabloid journalism is closely related to topics such as sensa-
tional crime stories, astrology, television, gossip columns about personal
lives of celebrities and sports stars, and junk food. Tabloid journalism is
also associated with tabloid-size newspapers, but the terms “tabloids”,
“supermarket tabloids”, “gutter press” and “rag” refer to the journalistic
approach of such newspapers rather than the size. It is important to note
that the term “tabloid” is used more often as a concept than in physical
reference to the more compact size of tabloid newspapers. Örnebring and
Jönsson (2004) argue that the tabloid press is
synonymous not only with a specific paper format but also with a certain way
of selecting and presenting news. From the very beginning, the tabloid press
was criticised for sensationalism and emotionalism, for oversimplification of
complex issues, for pandering to the lowest common denominator and
sometimes outright lies. (2004: 287)
From this quote, it is clear that some of the distinguishing characteris-

tics of tabloid styles and techniques include sensationalisation, fake news,
deception, heightened emotionalism, obscenity, disregard for media eth-
ics, especially privacy, and more visual imagery. Of particular note is that
the content of tabloids is usually meant to cater for a section of the audi-
ence that does not need or demand serious content (Bird 1992). The suc-
cess of tabloids over the years (mainly in the Western world), with its focus
on meeting the needs of individuals as consumers, is interpreted as a sign
that it may contribute very little or nothing to the life of citizens (Sparks
2000). Tabloid journalism has also been described as showing the chang-
ing journalistic mood, which has seen the news media become part of the
entertainment industry rather than a forum for informed debate about
issues of public interest (Franklin 1997). The confusion of broadsheet and
tabloid subjects has led to fears that broadsheet journalism and tabloid
journalism will become indistinguishable, this resulting in dumbing down

or tabloidisation (McNair 1998).
Tabloidisation is considered to be a contamination that leads to a
decline in journalism standards when the quality press adopts tabloid styles
in their news writing and presentation (Esser 1999; Franklin 1997; Bird
2000; Sparks 2000). Tabloids are known for pandering to the lowest com-
mon denominator, that is trivialisation and sensationalism, concentrating
more on scandals, news of shock value, and gossip and infotainment
(Örnebring and Jönsson 2004).
The centrality of the role of media in politics, especially the traditional
role of informing citizens about public affairs, is seriously threatened if the
quality media becomes tabloidised. The media has an indispensable role in
not only informing but also interpreting societal issues. More critically, the
media is also a source of definitions about reality, and its conduct must
always be brought under public scrutiny, especially in terms of objectivity
and impartiality.
The conversion of news into entertainment rather than a forum for
informed debate about important issues that concern the public has been
described as the net effect of tabloidisation (Franklin 1997; Thusu 2007;
Johansson 2007; Olkonen and Vilma 2011).
Tabloidisation, Media and Democracy

A well-functioning democracy relies on citizens who are well informed
politically, with the media playing a central role that connects state and
society (Klein 2000). A tabloidised media negates this important role
because it cannot “input”, publishing facts and opinions that are socially
relevant, a form of warning system of developments in society that indi-
cates changes in consensus, problems, people and decisions, or provide
“output”, in which the public is informed of political decision-making
processes and their results (Ibid: 177). Tabloidisation threatens democ-
racy, inhibiting its proper functioning by failing to give critical information
and knowledge that the public need to exercise their rights as citizens
(Sparks 2000).
The relationship between the media and politics is crucial as it links
important interdependent institutions in society—media and politics.
Citizens need objective information from the media for them to fully par-
ticipate in socio-political affairs. Tabloidisation of political coverage in
political campaigns works against democracy and the media’s role in
252 W. GADZIKWA
providing political information that allows citizens to participate meaning-

fully in politics (Landmeier and Daschmann 2011). It can also lead to
disenchantment with politics if it affects the quality press.
Tabloidisation Indicators
In order to analyse whether or not the coverage of the expulsion of Joice
Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government by the newspapers selected can
be attributed to tabloidisation, it is critical to discuss the indicators that are
used to measure or detect tabloidisation. This can be quantified in many
ways. A quantitative study of the changes in British newspapers from 1952
to 1997 by McLachlan and Golding (2000) brought to the fore some of
the tabloidisation indicators, such as fewer international news stories, an
increase in pictures and decrease in text, upsurge of human interest/enter-
tainment stories and a decrease in political and parliamentary news stories.
Some of the indicators that have been suggested include de-
contextualisation and the personalisation and simplification of complex
issues. This leads to limitations on the ability of the reader to comprehend
the issue presented (Boykoff 2008; Bird 1992, 2000; Calabrese 2000).
Other indicators include the promotion of emotion in news by exploiting
human tragedy, replacing significant news with trivia, putting more weight
on banalities and bizarre rarities, and less weight on in-depth analysis and
political debate (Bakkes 1999). Tabloidisation is also marked by the visual
composition of the newspapers, such as a dynamic layout meant to attract
readers, especially on the front page, easy readability, striking appearances,
simplified journalism, sensationalisation and the use of bold types, colour
and imagery. There is also a decrease in text, more visual photographs,
tables and diagrams, all of which lessen the amount of the text (Sparks
2000; Schonbach 2000). Tabloidisation results in an overall decrease in
journalistic standards, punctuated by a decrease in hard news, such as poli-
tics and economics, and an increase in soft news, such as sleaze, scandal,
sensation and entertainment (Esser 1999).
Methodology and Theoretical Framework

As indicated earlier, this study was necessitated by ever-growing concerns
about the decline of journalistic standards in Zimbabwe. A critical investi-
gation of the root causes as well as the symptoms of the decline was carried
out through the analysis of stories focusing the depiction of Joice Mujuru
in The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay. These three newspapers were
selected because they covered the story extensively and on a daily basis.
They also come from the country’s three main newspaper stables, and thus
are representative of the national print media landscape. The analysis of
stories from these newspapers is sufficient to reach a conclusion on whether
the Zimbabwean “quality” press is undergoing the damaging process of
tabloidisation or not. The specific objectives of the study were to:
• examine whether the framing of Mujuru’s expulsion from ZANU–

PF in selected newspapers was based on factual or sensational
reporting;
• establish forces motivating the tabloidisation of political news and
discourses in contemporary Zimbabwe;
• examine the standards of journalism in Zimbabwe, focusing on the
framing of Mujuru’s expulsion from ZANU–PF in selected
newspapers.
In examining whether or not the decline in journalism performance

and standards in Zimbabwe can be attributed to tabloidisation, four ques-
tions were asked;
• How did The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay frame the expulsion
of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government?
• To what extent was the expulsion of Joice Mujuru sensationalised in
the selected newspapers?
• What are the main forces leading to the dearth of serious/factual
reporting and exacerbation of tabloidisation of political news
in Zimbabwe?
• Which of the three papers best illustrates the worst effects of tabloid-
isation, and why?
To fulfil the aims of the study, a qualitative research methodology was

employed.
A qualitative methodology enables the collection of a lot of data, cap-
turing all elements of an event to allow for a full description (Becker 1996;
Sandelowski 2000). Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted
to either confirm or invalidate the findings from the qualitative content
analysis (textual) of the newspaper articles and also to establish the moti-
vating factors of tabloidisation of political discourse in the selected
254 W. GADZIKWA
newspapers. Qualitative content analysis was instrumental since it is “an

approach of empirical, methodological analysis of texts within their con-
text of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step
models without rash quantification” (Mayring 2000: 2). The sample size
consisted of 222 newspaper articles and 19 in-depth interviews with key
informants.
The period of the study covered early October 2014 to January 2017,
when the factional fights in ZANU–PF were becoming intense. During
this time, Mujuru was the vice-president, was expelled from the party and
formed her own political party as an opposition leader.
The study was underpinned by an eclectic three-pronged theoretical
framework informed by media framing theory, agenda-setting and the
concept of the public sphere. The analysis of frames in news stories is criti-
cal because they present a persistent pattern of cognition, interpretation
and presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which media dis-
course is organised for the construction of social reality (Goffman 1974;
Gitlin 1980; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Entman 1993; McQuail
1994; Tankard 2001; Butler 2009). Framing analysis is critical when ana-
lysing news articles in terms of tabloidisation. This is because tabloidisa-
tion is characterised by declining standards of journalism through the
adoption and spill over of tabloid formatting to the quality press, the con-
version of news into entertainment (Esser 1999; Turner 2004; Sparks
2000; Franklin 1997), the prevalent use of simplistic language and a
dynamic layout of content (Bird 2000). All these processes involve a form
of framing in the writing of the news.
Furthermore, frames in news are important because they may affect
learning and evaluations of issues and events, and this has an effect at indi-
vidual and societal levels. At individual level, they may result in altered
attitudes about a particular issue, mainly based on exposure to certain
frames, while at societal level they contribute to the shaping of social pro-
cesses, such as political socialisation, decision-making and collective
actions (De Vreese 2005).
Through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a representative story for
each frame from the selected newspapers was analysed. CDA allowed
study of the language and power in terms of discourse and ideology. The
assumption was that the news stories contained political goals or agendas
that were biased towards a particular ideology, especially in terms of
choices of quotes used, naming of sources, perspective from which the
story was written and what was omitted, which all formed the overall
portrayal by the story and the resultant frame (Johnstone 2008). In doing
CDA, the context was identified as critical with regard to three levels:
macro, meso and micro. The micro-level allowed for the examination of
issues at the time when the stories were written. At meso-level, focus was
on the context of the production and reception of the stories, while micro-
level allowed for analysis of the actual words used in the stories, in terms
of the linguistic devices used to depict the ideas (Caldas-Coulthard and
Coulthard 1996; Richardson 2007).
A representative story was selected for analysis to reveal the salient
aspects of each frame using four categories, namely words and symbols,
preferred meanings, omission analysis and limiting debate, and integrating
it with other stories that conformed to the frame. The analysis of the arti-
cle would reveal or identify the kinds of words and symbols associated with
the treatment of Mujuru at a particular historical moment. Preferred
meanings—which would reveal the intended meanings that a particular
newspaper sought the audience to consider as natural or the only possible
interpretation of a story—were also considered. Omission analysis assumes
that a story is a construction that privileges certain meanings and not oth-
ers. The gist of this is to explore what is left out or remains unsaid, or is
silenced or prevented from manifesting because of a choice of particular
words and symbols, rather than others that would have created possible
alternative meanings. The implication that a story can say more from what
it does not openly narrate than what it says directly suggests that particular
ways of reporting can limit debate of other possible views of the same
story. This phenomenon of limiting debate implies a deliberate critique of
what could have been left out in the story in its framing.
The study established the following frames from the selected newspa-
pers: putschists cabal, traitor/economic saboteur, incompetent/simple-
ton, corrupt, false war legend, regime change agent, greedy, cruel
stepmother, sympathetic, victim, brave leader, mature leader, counter-
frame, grand coalition, moderate frames.
Key Findings
Tabloidisation has been attributed to the increasing commercialism and
commercialisation of the media sphere, dumbing down to appeal to tar-
geted audiences, prioritising profits over public service quest, abandoning
journalistic standards and emphasising more attractive, entertaining sto-
ries while marginalising objective journalism and critical issues (Franklin
256 W. GADZIKWA
1997; Barnet 1998; Esser 1999; Sparks and Tulloch 2000; McNair 2001;
Harris 2006).
Technological advances that allow journalists to produce stories within
a short period of time, which compromises their ability to check facts,
coupled by reliance on entertainment-oriented public relations-generated
content, have also been given as reasons for the trend towards tabloidisa-
tion (Barnet 1998). Instead of reactivating and reinvigorating the public
sphere with new information, technology has fuelled tabloidisation by
eroding the role of media as watchdog. The net result is a debasement of
the standards of journalism by diminishing the capacity of civil discourse
(Sparks 2000).
In the United States of America (USA), tabloidisation has been caused
by the internationalisation and deregulation of media ownership and con-
tent. The result is that there is a prevalence of free market and profit-
oriented owners who pursue whatever sells (Sparks 2000). Such a scenario
results in the subordination of news values to commercial values (Schudson
1995). The control of editorial policies by owners such as Rupert Murdoch
on the UK Sun, as well as mergers and takeovers in the late 1980s, also led
to newspapers considering financial aspects above anything else (Blumler
and Gurevitch 1995). The spread of tabloidisation is a reflection of a situ-
ation where the “bad” is pushing out the “good” (Williams 2003: 30).
Owing to tabloidisation, news stories are now “bright, light and trite”,
shorter with more pictures, simpler and less wordy; and there has been a
rise of what is described as sound bite journalism, where more pictures and
entertainment get more priority over serious newspapers, prestigious news
bulletins and current affairs programmes (Williams 2003: 231).
Tabloidisation has also seen a retreat in investigative journalism, with a
shift towards “soft” and “light” news (Franklin 1997: 4).
Media Framing of Joice Mujuru
The Herald Frames

In the analysis of The Herald articles, it was discovered that the newspaper
was entirely negative and reproachful in its framing. Also revealed were
predominantly derisive and pejorative frames, which reflected the factional
and power struggles within the party at the time. These frames included
the putschists cabal frame, in which Mujuru was depicted as leading a
cabal seeking to oust former President Mugabe from power through
alleged assassination plots by her allies, such as Rugare Gumbo, Didymus

Mutasa and Nicholas Goche. These allegations were also emphasised in
other frames, such as traitor/economic saboteur. In this frame, Mujuru
was accused of betraying both the president and the country by associat-
ing with what were perceived to be the enemies of the country identified
as Britain, the European Union and the USA. Furthermore, Mujuru was
framed as a simplistic thinker who could not handle issues to do with state-
craft, a corrupt person who abused her position in government to further
the business interests of her family, an agent of regime change who col-
luded with hostile Western countries against ZANU–PF and a greedy and
cruel stepmother, who enjoyed the suffering of children sired by her late
husband with other women by refusing to execute General Mujuru’s will.
In the false war legend frame, Mujuru was described as an impostor riding
on a stolen image of war heroics to catapult herself into various beneficial
positions in ZANU–PF and the government. All these frames were inter-
connected as they reinforced each other with overlapping aspects, but the
most common thread is that they served to amplify that Mujuru wanted
to take over power at all costs, and should be ejected and rejected by
ZANU–PF supporters.
Joice Mujuru was framed in this way because of The Herald’s position
in Zimbabwean politics as a willing tool and mouthpiece of the ruling
ZANU–PF. The newspaper was controlled by the Ministry of Information,
Media and Broadcasting Services through the permanent secretary, who
claimed to speak on behalf of the President. Through the 51% sharehold-
ing that the Zimbabwean government has in Zimpapers (the publishers of
The Herald), successive information ministers have exercised direct edito-
rial control, especially since 2000 when the information ministry was
brought under the Office of the President. The Herald is deployed as an
attack dog against the perceived machinations of a Western-inspired
regime change agenda since the country embarked on the Land Reform
Programme in 2000. It is The Herald that defines the preferred
Zimbabwean position every time and it has no restrictions in terms of
circulation in the country, while other newspapers are regarded as opposi-
tion and are “banned” in ZANU–PF rural strongholds. Therefore, the
newspaper has considerable influence in ZANU–PF politics, and once it
said Mujuru was a traitor, ZANU–PF supporters merely accepted the
dominant reading.
The other basis for the negative framing was that The Herald reportage
was hijacked by a faction that wanted Mujuru to be eliminated from
258 W. GADZIKWA
ZANU–PF by any means necessary. The Minister of Information at the

time, Professor Jonathan Moyo, dictated the framing of Mujuru through
negative images. From the qualitative analysis of the actual stories, it
became clear that The Herald was considered to be the willing tool of a
faction in ZANU–PF that was able to amplify Mujuru’s alleged flaws to
justify rejecting and ejecting her. The negative images given by the official
newspaper were meant to make readers view her as a political villain and
not the victim of political machinations involving succession battles within
ZANU–PF. The framing also sought to justify her expulsion in the public
eyes. Again, this demonstrates that tabloidisation has the potential to cor-
rupt media practice and also highlights that the potential dangers of trivi-
alising stories of huge political significance are phenomenal if objectivity is
replaced by subjectivity (McNair 2001). In this study, The Herald is prob-
ably the worst example of a platform for mass deception and character
assassination, using brazen and unethical practices that bordered on belit-
tling the intelligence of its readers.
Daily News Frames

In contrast to The Herald’s malignant regime of negative images of
Mujuru, the Daily News framed her expulsion from ZANU–PF and the
government by adopting a basically sympathetic framing, which led to
blind support for her. In the sympathetic frame, Mujuru was presented as
a defenceless widow deserving public sympathy after what was described
as a brutal ousting from ZANU–PF by powerful forces led by former
President Mugabe and his wife. The Daily News sought to portray her as
a victim of ZANU–PF conflict. In an effort to prop her up as a viable
political alternative, the Daily News portrayed Joice Mujuru as a new,
brave and formidable leader who could challenge President Mugabe polit-
ically. Linked to this perceived bravery, Mujuru was portrayed as a moder-
ate and mature leader with qualities that showed experience, maturity,
moderation, reconciliatory and a developmental disposition, who was
therefore worth considering as a viable opposition leader. The Daily News
also sought to defend Mujuru by countering the pejorative framing by The
Herald in the counter-frame. The fight over the expulsion of Mujuru from
ZANU–PF became a battleground between the two publications, with
much disregard of media ethics and the need to offer meaningful debate
to their readers. Finally, through the use of a grand coalition frame, the
Daily News tried to push for the formation of a coalition of opposition
political parties, led by either Joice Mujuru or Morgan Tsvangirai. that

would challenge ZANU–PF and dislodge former President Mugabe
from power.
Analysis of the stories showed that they were designed to endear
Mujuru to the reader. The frames overlapped and reinforced each other,
as they were not confined to a single story but intersected in almost all the
stories. The most common thread was that of the victim, serving to amplify
sympathy for Mujuru as an unfortunate defenceless widow and victim of
President Mugabe and his wife, especially after the death of her husband.
The Daily News also sought to portray her as a political giant who could
wrestle power from Mugabe. Overall, the framing of Mujuru by the Daily
News was sympathetic. In a bid to sympathise with her, the Daily News
resorted to tabloid styles, and concentrated on reacting to what The
Herald was writing about her instead of telling readers whether or not she
was guilty of the charges laid against her. The Daily News’ framing pre-
sented a different kind of tabloidisation by pushing at all costs the image
of a brave leader who was ready to challenge President Mugabe and
needed readers’ sympathy. The Daily News only provided information that
sought to exonerate Mujuru of the corruption allegations, but failed to
openly critique her capabilities in terms of leadership and economic pro-
grammes. The newspaper maintained a blind hero-worshipping style, try-
ing to whip up support for her as someone who opposed ZANU–PF and
expending its energies on a possible coalition between Mujuru and Morgan
Tsvangirai. It thus relied on stereotyping, which extolled one side of the
story at the expense of the complicated image of a human being.
NewsDay Frames
NewsDay framed the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and the
government by vigorously attempting to set an agenda that presented
Mujuru as a moderate leader who would be acceptable to Zimbabweans.
This was buttressed by framing her as a victim to be sympathised with.
This kind of framing was akin to campaigning for her without really
informing readers who she was and what she had to offer politically.
Analysis of the NewsDay stories revealed three main mutually reinforc-
ing frames. The first was the moderate leader frame, in which Joice Mujuru
is presented as a viable political alternative to Mugabe. A moderate leader
is someone who is amenable to the growth of business and accepts Western
investment without any preconditions.
260 W. GADZIKWA
The second is the sympathetic frame, its main thrust being to elicit
sympathy for Joice Mujuru by portraying her as a defenceless widow who
was persecuted for no justifiable cause by her rivals in ZANU–PF. The
third is the victim frame, which emphasised the perception of Mujuru as a
victim of factional politics in ZANU–PF. She was portrayed as vulnerable,
especially when her husband General Solomon Mujuru was no longer
there to protect her. The portrayal of Mujuru as a victim was linked to the
overall framing of her as worth sympathising with, and also as a moderate
leader who was being punished for entertaining hopes of becoming the
President of Zimbabwe.
It is important to show that the study argued that these frames were not
confined to a single story but intersected in almost all of them. The sym-
pathetic and victim frames were specifically deployed to buttress the mod-
erate leader frame, which sought to convince readers and citizens that
Joice Mujuru was a leader for the future who could appeal to them mainly
because she had the liberation war credentials that were lacking in long-
time opposition leader, MDC–T (Movement for Democratic Change–
Tsvangirai (faction)) leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. Despite the
pronouncement that NewsDay sought to present facts in an objective
manner, this coverage showed that the newspaper had abandoned its com-
mitments in favour of sensation as a survival technique, to capture reader
attention and sell copies (McNair 2001). The result of such an approach
is the creation of emotion around the vulnerability of Mujuru after the
death of her husband and dissemination of the belief that she was being
persecuted because she had ambitions to be the president. The other ste-
reotype that NewsDay peddled was that Mujuru was an economic messiah
for Zimbabwe, which indicates de-contextualisation and the personifica-
tion of a complex issue (Bakkes 1999).
Tabloidisation of Coverage
The Herald
The results of the content analysis of the stories demonstrated beyond
reasonable doubt that The Herald employed tabloid reporting styles, such
as subjectivity, sensationalism, use of large photographs, manipulation, use
of unidentified, fictitious and low credibility sources, publishing of false-
hoods, emotionally appealing language and extensive descriptions, edito-
rialising of news stories, printing of unconfirmed gossip and outlandish
claims, dramatisation, distortion, exaggeration, trivialisation, simplifica-

tion and personification in its coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru
from ZANU–PF. In the corrupt frame, The Herald resorted to plagiarism
and printing outright lies, in an effort to make sure that Mujuru was seen
as undesirable and unfit to be a member of the party. Again, in the putsch-
ists cabal, the newspaper resorted to innuendo and fictitious sources to
allege that Mujuru’s allies were plotting to assassinate President Mugabe,
to the extent that they were planning such activities and could possibly
manipulate the security of the country. The failure of the smooth imple-
mentation frame, The Herald trivialised and exaggerated the facts, and
presumed readers would be gullible enough to believe that Mujuru was
entirely responsible for the collapse of all government-owned businesses in
the country and the failure of the smooth implementation of the Zimbabwe
Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation blueprint. The
Herald’s frames, such as putschists cabal, traitor/economic saboteur,
incompetent/simpleton, corrupt, false war legend, regime change agent,
greedy and cruel stepmother, contain tabloid styles that point towards the
damaging process of tabloidisation (Turner 2004; Bakkes 1999).
The findings of the study show that The Herald was undergoing a pro-
cess of tabloidisation and was drifting away from the expectations of a
serious broadsheet journalism newspaper. The adoption of tabloid jour-
nalism techniques by broadsheet newspapers is considered to be associated
with the decline in journalistic standards (Bek 2004; Conboy 2005; Glynn
2000). The confusion of broadsheet and tabloid subjects is associated with
fears that broadsheet and tabloid journalism will become indistinguish-
able, resulting in dumbing down or tabloidisation (McNair 1998). This
seems to be the case in The Herald’s coverage of the expulsion of Joice
Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government. The subjectivity and sensation-
alism exhibited by The Herald reflected the control of editorial content by
forces outside the newsroom, who dictated the official position, regardless
of the facts on the ground. The content of the stories did not reflect the
abilities of its journalists but what the wielders of power dictated in terms
of official correctness. Tabloidisation was beyond the control of the pro-
fessional journalists who worked at The Herald, and reflected the conver-
sion of the newspaper into a lapdog by those who exerted editorial control
in pursuit of factional politics in ZANU–PF.
262 W. GADZIKWA
Daily News
The Daily News coverage was characterised by the use of tabloid format-
ting and styles, such as the use of unidentified sources, sensational word-
ing, speculation and editorialising, and the use of colour pages with
photographs larger than the stories. These modes of representing Mujuru
were found to be misleading to the readers because the attention-getting
headlines, focused on the individual rather than the subject matter, and
there was less weight on in-depth analysis and political debate (Bakkes
1999; Schonbach 2000).
The Daily News did not rise above an attempt to oppose The Herald’s
framing of the Mujuru ouster, but failed to provide alternative perspec-
tives that could enable citizens to make informed political decisions on
what Mujuru had to offer as a politician. Just as in the case of The Herald,
the Daily News was undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisation.
The implication for democracy is that with the kinds of framing seen in the
Daily News, democratic debate on issues that affect people is limited, and
sometimes even omitted and ignored. Thus, democratic expectations of
the media in the creation of a rational public sphere necessary for an
enlightened and informed citizenry are undermined.
The overly sympathetic framing of Mujuru by the Daily News predis-
posed it to focus more on eliciting sympathy for her as a victim. The study
discovered that this frame of victimhood obscured real issues, such as
accusations of plotting to assassinate President Mugabe, corruption and
extortion, and working against the interests of ZANU–PF by leading divi-
sive factional politics that bordered on regime change. This encouraged a
de-contextualised portrayal of Mujuru and a projection of her individual-
ism by entirely focusing on her person instead of the allegations she was
facing in ZANU–PF (Bird 2000; Bakkes 1999). Such attributes of the
newspaper demonstrate that it adopted tabloid rather than broadsheet
journalism formats, therefore confirming the argument that the Daily
News was undergoing the process of tabloidisation (Bird 1992; Franklin
1997). The implication is that informed debate was stalled if not
obfuscated.
The depiction of Mujuru as a victim who deserved sympathy was also a
result of the polarity that exists in the Zimbabwean media. The Daily News
fixated readers on a few themes that were a form of political jingoism, and
the end result was the trivialisation of the allegations that Mujuru was fac-
ing in ZANU–PF.
NewsDay
NewsDay attempted to frame Mujuru in a different way, by depicting her
as a moderate leader who could deliver Zimbabwe out of its economic
quagmire. The drive to push for the acceptance of Mujuru as an accept-
able and moderate leader by NewsDay led it to resort to tabloid styles such
as subjectivity and emotionalism, as it actively tried to elicit sympathy
(Bakkes 1999; Franklin 1997) for her by depicting her as a defenceless
innocent widow who was being ruthlessly crushed for being ambitious
enough to dream of leading the country. These frames were meant to
naturally predispose readers to understand Mujuru’s plight from a single
perspective. The stories were not incisive enough to give citizens the
power to make decisions based on a full understanding of who Mujuru
really was politically, and thereby took a plunge into the tabloidisation of
news (Esser 1999; Sparks 2000). In this regard, NewsDay actually suc-
ceeded in closing off debate on critical national themes, of democracy, rule
of law, land and corruption, and failed to set an inclusive transforma-
tive agenda.
The desire by NewsDay to project Mujuru as a moderate leader who
could challenge for political power predisposed it to focus more on elicit-
ing sympathy for her without telling its readers why they should support
her and what she had to offer to the electorate. NewsDay also did not
provide information on whether Mujuru was not guilty of all the charges
that were levelled against her but instead sought to set an agenda and give
her momentum that would allow her to challenge for political office. The
portrayal of Mujuru by NewsDay also meant that more focus was on her as
an individual than on the alternatives she could offer or on qualifying the
perceived moderate nature of her leadership (Bird 2000; Bakkes 1999). It
seems that NewsDay presented a narrow definition of her moderate views.
These are only defined in terms of perceived links with Western countries,
which are presumed to offer more viable economic options to Zimbabwe
than Chinese investment. Furthermore, the moderate nature of Mujuru
was expressed to satisfy the interests of big business only; the assumption
was that with economic growth everything would fall into place. This is
rather fallacious. Again the assumption and perception that Mujuru was a
moderate had no basis in fact as she had not proved this in practice, since
she had only been deputising for Mugabe during her stay in govern-
ment—unless NewsDay intended to insinuate that she was leading a paral-
lel government.
264 W. GADZIKWA
Forces Behind the Tabloidisation of Political News

in Zimbabwe
The analysis of The Herald revealed that the dearth of serious news was
attributed to a desire to concentrate on what sells or what readers feel
about a subject. Such an approach points towards sensational news, which
favours the exciting over the factual (Franklin 1997). The media in
Zimbabwe is gravitating towards tabloid journalism owing to the cut-
throat competition with online publications in a shrinking economy. As a
result of this competition, newspapers have resorted to sensationalism as a
way to attract readers to buy copies. The publishing of sensational news
that titillates the mind is the result of a media that is operating in an
economy where the marginal propensity to spend is fast diminishing,
resulting in fierce competition for readers by selling sensation (Esser 1999).
Another exceptional factor that promotes the tabloidisation of political
discourse in the case of The Herald was the allegation that the newspaper
was being manipulated by political forces or a faction of ZANU–PF, which
dictated the editorial direction with utter disregard for journalistic ethics.
This was done to smear Joice Mujuru’s character by any means, including
the publishing of falsehoods. The hijacking of editorial control by a faction
allegedly led by the so-called Team Lacoste, allegedly headed by Emmerson
Mnangagwa, used the Zimpapers stable, including The Herald, to fight
Jonathan Moyo, who was believed to front another faction called
Generation 40 (G40) in the ZANU–PF succession matrix.
Another cause of the tabloidisation of the Zimbabwean press was the
polarisation of the press along political lines, which resulted in the publica-
tion of half-truths, conjectures and innuendos as all the newspapers sought
to fulfil their own objectives, these being set by forces outside the news-
rooms. Media polarisation has been defined mainly along political lines,
with the private and state-owned media holding entrenched positions
reflective of a polarised society, especially after the Land Reform Programme
and the emergence of the MDC as a major threat to ZANU–PF’s political
and economic hegemony in 1999 (Chari 2009; Raftopoulous 2009). The
net effect of this media polarisation is the sacrifice of objectivity as the
newspapers seek to reinforce their chosen position (MMPZ 2002).
While the polarisation of the media has for over two decades been iden-
tified as one of the major causes of tabloidisation, sensationalism, corrup-
tion and political interference have been identified as the other root causes.
Media corruption has seen journalists coming directly under the control
of powerful politicians (VMCZ 2013; IMPI 2014).
The result of corruption in the media is that there is a concentration on
trivial matters rather than the conduct of powerful figures. As a result, the
media’s role as the Fourth Estate is compromised and its general failure to
unpack concrete material issues becomes apparent. In the case of The
Herald, Mujuru is rejected outright, while in the Daily News a sympa-
thetic frame is used to project her as a victim of the succession battle in
ZANU–PF even after she was expelled from the party. The study also
found out that the poor remuneration of most journalists in the country
increased their vulnerability to manipulation by politicians, thus compro-
mising their role in terms of reporting political issues. The media ends up
being a mere mouthpiece for politicians’ views, instead of a watchdog act-
ing on behalf of society. The Herald, NewsDay and the Daily News, whether
by default or design, are undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisa-
tion. Tabloidisation by its nature negates the efficient functioning of the
mediated public sphere by working in opposition to the creation of “gen-
eral truths, general principles which would guide the formulation and
implementation of the necessary regulation of social life” (McNair
2001: 39).
Tabloidisation of Political News in Zimbabwe:

The Worst Case Scenario
The study has established that all the selected newspapers are undergoing
the damaging process of tabloidisation in terms of political news report-
ing. The Herald presents the worst case scenario, followed by the Daily
News and NewsDay respectively. Tabloidisation of political news at The
Herald manifests itself in targeted character assassination and the demoni-
sation of perceived political foes from a political faction that has hijacked
editorial control. The result of such assassinations and smear campaigns is
the printing of gossip and fake stories, especially with regard to Mujuru
(Bird 2000; Sloan 2001). The Herald has lost any kind of relevance in its
political stories, which are written in a brazen propagandist manner that is
even worse than that of tabloids, which openly admit they spice up issues
to provide readers with relaxation or simply give people what they want
(Sparks 2000). The conversion of The Herald into a war zone for compet-
ing political factions in ZANU–PF is the major reason for the
266 W. GADZIKWA
tabloidisation of its political reporting. While tabloids use attention-seek-

ing and entertaining stories to sell copy (Franklin 1997), this does not
seem to be the case for The Herald, which has had a strong market pres-
ence in Zimbabwe since 1897, and still has the support of loyal advertisers
who seem unmoved by the editorial content.
The tabloidisation of political news by The Herald stems from the
hijacking of editorial content by a faction of ZANU–PF. This was epito-
mised by the coverage of Joice Mujuru, when Jonathan Moyo was in con-
trol of the editorial angle. When Moyo lost control, being moved to
another ministry, he immediately became a target of the entire Zimpapers
group, as the so-called Team Lacoste allegedly fronted by Mnangagwa
used the papers to advance its interests against the G40 faction. The
hijacking of editorial control took place through former media and infor-
mation permanent secretary George Charamba, who was openly rebuked
by the First Lady Grace Mugabe for writing “useless stories” and for fight-
ing Jonathan Moyo through the Zimpapers stable (“Prof Jonathan Moyo
is clean—First Lady”, Sunday Mail, 30 July 2017). It therefore follows
that the way in which The Herald dramatises factional fights conforms to
the description of tabloidisation by Franklin (1997: 19), who argues that
“news media has become part of the entertainment industry rather than
being a forum for informed debate about important issues of public con-
cern”. The Herald thus represents the worst in terms of tabloidisation of
the political story, and the resultant tabloidisation by the Daily News and
NewsDay is in response to the framing of Mujuru by The Herald. The
tabloidisation that manifests in the Daily News and NewsDay is motivated
by commercial motives to survive in a declining economy and an attempt
to offer an alternative voice, albeit in support of a perceived political ally.
However, the two newspapers fail to provide alternatives beyond the ste-
reotype that whoever opposed Mugabe could offer solutions to the coun-
try’s economic and political challenges. They seem to enjoy peddling
subjective stereotypes, and in the process fail to offer alternative views that
can enhance public understanding.
With the exception of its counter-frames in which it exposed the falla-
cies in The Herald’s framing of Mujuru, especially the corrupt frame, the
Daily News is the direct opposite of The Herald in terms of sensationalisa-
tion and trivialisation in its reportage of Joice Mujuru. NewsDay, though
marked by a desire to prop up Mujuru using sensationalism and tabloid
formatting, tried to be less tabloid in its approach by revealing the bad side
of Mujuru, especially showing that she has some cruel and corrupt
tendencies.
It is the contention of this study that developing countries such as
Zimbabwe, which have been bedevilled by close to two decades of politi-
cal and socio-economic challenges, need a press that can promote robust
debate and produce quality news, especially in terms of political reporting,
so that citizens can hold informed views and make meaningful contribu-
tions. The research has demonstrated that readers are clear about their
expectations from broadsheet newspapers and demand better and more
analytical content that does not drift towards infotainment. This means
that the media should not continue to offer such a disservice to readers.
If citizens are to rely on social media for information, as alluded to by
respondents, then the mainstream press would become irrelevant in
Zimbabwe. Furthermore, newspapers seem to have been hijacked, who-
ever owns them, and have virtually abdicated their roles of being watch-
dogs and as the Fourth Estate.
Conclusions on the Tabloidisation of Political News

in Zimbabwe
The research has established that in the coverage of the expulsion of Joice
Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government, The Herald, Daily News and
NewsDay departed from objective journalism by focusing on reporting
political statements without providing a balanced analysis of material reali-
ties in the country. The newspapers concentrated more on issues that were
meant to appeal to the human instinct for entertainment rather than infor-
mation, as with typical tabloid newspapers (Brookes 2000). In this sense,
they continually undermined the readers’ intelligence, and wittingly or
unwittingly assisted in maintaining the situation that has reduced the
country to a place of tears and silence.
The framing of Mujuru by the three newspapers also points to a lack of
publication of serious and accurate information that enables citizens to
make informed political choices. This could possibly lead to apathy about
politics and have the net effect of destroying the public sphere of rational
debate (McNair 2001).
Furthermore, the reportage examined has the potential to lead to mass
cynicism about political news: some respondents indicated that they no
longer believed what was published by the three newspapers. Ordinary
268 W. GADZIKWA
readers continually questioned the authenticity of the reportage on the

Mujuru issue, especially focusing on why she had not been charged with
treason—something that the newspapers did not question. Readers
believed that the media could be playing games, as previously all other
political leaders who had been accused of treason, such as Ndabaningi
Sithole of ZANU–Ndonga and Morgan Tsvangirai, were arrested and
charged. The study established that the newspapers simply wanted to push
sales by writing about the allegations that Mujuru was facing.
One frightening aspect is the perception by readers that all the newspa-
pers under study are partisan, and the only place to look for information is
social media. In such a scenario, the media ceases to function as a public
sphere and thus becomes irrelevant to society.
Broadsheets in Zimbabwe are adopting tabloid styles, and seem to fulfil
the pejorative sense of tabloid formatting in being very casual, concise and
sensationalist in both tone and language (Conboy 2005; Sampson 1996).
In the final analysis, The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay are fast drifting
away from broadsheet journalism, which should inform the public by
using serious language and tone (McLachlan and Golding 2000).
Tabloidisation is not good for democracy, and the newspapers studied
here took fixed positions that did not lead to enlightenment of the citi-
zens. Democracy relies on citizens who are well informed in political
terms, and this can be made possible by the media. Without such knowl-
edge, citizens may fail to exercise their democratic rights, which in
Zimbabwe has seen citizens voting without choosing by focusing on indi-
vidual cultic leaders instead of candidates’ economic and political pro-
grammes. This study has demonstrated that the Zimbabwean media is not
providing citizens with critical information about politicians’ programmes
but focuses more on personalities as either the problem or the solution.
This leads citizens to continue to invest in personalities as opposed to their
programmes of action. The Zimbabwean media scene seems to conform
to an assertion by Sparks quoted in (Williams 2003), that “while there
may be more information as well, public understanding is declining. Public
ignorance and apathy is growing as the seriousness, challenging and truth-
ful is being pushed aside by the trivial, sensational, and vulgar and manipu-
lated” (2003: 230).
What this suggests is that tabloids and tabloidisation have the potential
to further dilute the already unstable public sphere, as noted by
Mabweazara:
in Zimbabwe the prospects of readers becoming less interested in conven-

tional hard news, and less critical of the techniques typical of the tabloid
style, is glaringly significant. (2005: 32)
A media that is tabloidised does not promote the consolidation of a

democratic culture. Tabloids have no obligations to promote debate on
serious issues, as they enjoy “themselves stirring up one-sided prejudices,
encouraging half-truths and intolerance among other ills” (Sampson
1996: 48). Such a description fits very well how The Herald, NewsDay and
Daily News framed the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and
government.
In light of the undeniably damaging process of the tabloidisation of
political news, it would be prudent for the three newspapers to do some
self-examination and rededicate themselves to ethical and objective jour-
nalism in order to earn respect from readers as the watchdogs of society,
distancing themselves from such vested interests as politicians and political
parties. There is also a need for The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay to
wean themselves from their current polarisation and sensationalisation, as
the contemporary challenges are not permanent. Readers will continue to
demand objective information in order to be able to make informed deci-
sions in matters such as elections and other important societal matters.
Another compelling requirement is to insulate the public media, such as
The Herald, from direct control of government ministers by re-establishing
a buffer zone between it and the government if it is to be rescued from the
trend towards tabloidisation. This study is not exhaustive in terms of tab-
loidisation in Zimbabwe, and future research must extend the study to
include other media, such as radio and television magazines and even doc-
umentaries, since tabloidisation occurs in all forms of journalism (Bek
2004; Conboy 2005; Glynn 2000). Such research would enable a com-
prehensive understanding of the nature and extent of the tabloidisation of
the media in Zimbabwe. Further studies also need to done in terms of
how the media can be rescued from the damaging trend towards tabloid-
isation that is currently manifesting itself in political news reporting.
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PART IV
Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and

Operation Restore Legacy
CHAPTER 12
Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s

Extroverted Economy: What Now Under
the Second Republic?
Toendepi Shonhe
Introduction
The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ economic development path exposes
the structurally extroverted economy to an intensified dispossession of repro-
ductive capacity by global monopoly capital through financialised primitive
capital accumulation. Inviting in speculative monopoly capitalism, if unac-
companied by a conscious attempt to reverse uneven development in the
periphery, lends itself to the intensifying of disarticulated economic develop-
ment. The new ruling class imposed through a military coup is inclined
towards promoting global capital interests, thereby perpetuating imperialism
and dependency. In alliance with monopoly finance capital, this ruling class
will extract substantial profits by intensifying the extraction of natural mineral
and agricultural resources in the form of surplus value, royalties, and rents
and interest on loans, thereby undermining sovereign accumulation.
T. Shonhe (*)
Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Relations,
University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_12
276 T. SHONHE
By opening Zimbabwe for business, in the guise of attracting foreign

direct investment (FDI), without a deliberate plan to reverse uneven
development, the ruling capitalists have become an extension of global
capital, if not captured agents of the latest form of imperialism. Opening
Zimbabwe for business transfers surplus value through international trade,
unequal exchange and unequal rewards.
This chapter reveals how the disarticulated pattern of accumulation
configures periphery economies such as Zimbabwe to subsidise capital by
exporting wealth, furthering the development of the centre at the expense
of the periphery. Mnangagwa’s intentions to open Zimbabwe for business,
disadvantaging national interests, is clear. What would an alternative
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) government have meant?
Could there have been a different narrative? What economic develop-
ments could reverse Zimbabwe’s current economic crisis and allow inclu-
sive economic development? This chapter reveals how Zimbabwe’s future
economy may take shape, using a political economy lens. The nexus
between politics, policy and economic development trajectories is revealed.
The chapter proposes transformative social policies, and inclusive policies
in which development counteracts primitive capital accumulation.
The end of the Mugabe era on 17 November 2017 gave Zimbabwe an
opportunity for a fresh start. The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ plan
signalled a new dawn in which the country’s economy was opened up to
international investment, property rights and human rights were observed,
and government policy was more consistent—and therefore business con-
fidence was restored. A vital part of this was the need to eradicate illegiti-
macy from the state through the holding of a free and fair election that
was monitored by the international community. This was expected to
reverse the militarism epitomised by the 17 November 2017 coup, which
gave birth to President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s pseudo-civilian
government.
Ostensibly, this new dawn expressed a clean break with the repressive
Mugabe regime and its associated redistributive policy agenda, which
included land and indigenisation laws that forced foreign-owned compa-
nies to cede majority ownership to Zimbabweans, and had therefore scared
away investors since 2000. The new economic development plan resem-
bled the neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)
of 1991, its second phase—the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic
Transformation (ZIMPREST) (1996–2000), the Short Term Emergency
Recovery Programme (STERP) I and II, implemented by the Government
12 PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 277
of National Unity (GNU), and the Medium Term Economic Development

Plan (2009–2013). The latter policies were marred by power contestation
between the MDC formations that were part of the GNU and the
Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), as the
latter was known to be highly intransigent (Bracking and Cliffe 2009).
What does all this mean for Zimbabwe’s economic development plan?
How would it impact on different interest groups and the citizenry in
general? The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) defines the new develop-
ment plans as:
Opening up of the economy to business is therefore the most sustainable

cure for the major challenges the country is facing. Opening Zimbabwe for
business means attracting investment, foreign and domestic, that is required
to increase production, jobs, fiscal space, exports and eventually the happi-
ness index for Zimbabweans. It moves the economy beyond stabilisation.
Opening up the economy also calls for local business to improve on their
efficiencies and competitiveness in order to brace for competition from for-
eign investors. (RBZ 2018, 5)
The chapter relies on documentary and historical data analysis to reveal

how primitive accumulation will configure economic development under
neo-liberalism, and proposes an inclusive transformative social policy that
would be attained through development from below. The rest of the chap-
ter is structured as follows: ‘The State and Development in Africa‘ pro-
vides the background to the economic development in Africa, while
‘Primitive Accumulation and Renewed Rush for African Resources‘ dis-
cusses primitive capital accumulation, the conceptual framework applied
in this chapter. ‘Zimbabwe’s Extroverted Economy‘ outlines how
Zimbabwe’s disarticulated economy configures trading patterns, detailing
how unfair trading patterns undermine domestic economic development.
In ‘The National Question, Sovereign Accumulation and Regional
Integration‘, it is illustrated how the national question may be resolved
through sovereign accumulation and regional integration under intro-
verted economic development. ‘Inclusive Social Development‘ discusses
prospects for inclusive economic development through the designing and
implementation of a transformative social policy. This section also critiques
the MDC policy proposals. ‘Conclusion‘ presents some concluding
remarks.
278 T. SHONHE
The State and Development in Africa
(Mis-) Understanding the African State

Debate on the state and development in Africa is split between the possi-
bility of a developmental state and its impossibility on the basis of lack of
capacity, character or political will by African leaders (Mkandawire 2001a).
As a result, and based on the later assumptions, African nations are encour-
aged to reduce the size of government, privatise their economies, adopt
good government practices, democratise and create an environment con-
ducive for investment (ibid). These prescriptions are based on the Golden
Straitjacket proposed by Friedman, on which today’s neo-liberal economic
orthodoxy is based. This one-size-fit-all prescription stipulates that:
a country needs to privatize state-owned enterprises, maintain low inflation,

reduce the size of government bureaucracy, balance the budget (if not run-
ning a surplus), liberalize trade, deregulate foreign investment, deregulate
capital markets, make the currency convertible, reduce corruption and
privatize pensions. (Friedman 2000)
For Mkandawire (2001), a combination of pessimism associated with

state incapacity and optimism for the possibility of an array of proposed
changes is self-contradictory. Indeed, the debate on African states has been
on what ought than what is. It has concentrated on some conjunctural
circumstances which are treated as if they are structural and intrinsic to
African societies, while Africa is treated as homogeneous, leading to the
proverbial throwing away of the baby with the bath water (ibid).
Eurocentric epistemology characterises African governments as corrupt,
inept and unable to foster development (Diamond 1988; Chazan 1994;
Chabal 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999). For Cox and Negi (2010, 71), the
dominant view is that political institutions are deficient and sub-Saharan
Africa is:
[a] landscape of weak if not failed states, tribalism and civil war, and a sharp
disjuncture between the formal character of whatever democratic institu-
tions exist and how politics is conducted in practice. The result of this, it is
claimed, is the material backwardness of sub-Saharan Africa: a failure to
develop. These views are extraordinarily rife. They have, in turn, found their
way into more academic understandings. The state and its relation to society
emerge as the central problem: the argument is that given the state’s weak-
ness and the vacuity of representative institutions we should not expect any-
thing other than developmental failure.
On the contrary, as Cox and Negi (2010) argue, Africa has weak and
undemocratic states because of the failures of capitalist development.
These include dispossession of their means of reproduction—including
land—leading to their conversion into labour. Moreover, as Mamdani
(1996) contends, colonialism created a bifurcated state made up of a privi-
leged white class in the modern centres and a weakened African class in the
rural areas. This structural framework perpetuated uneven development
and injustice, and drove political instability. The argument as advanced by
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, 29), is that there is a stable correlation between
‘social and economic development and political stability’. These structures
undermined Africans and advanced minority European settler
accumulation.
Under conditions of indirect rule, then, accumulation finds it difficult
to establish roots, even though externally owned funding may trigger
some limited element of them. The absence of labour and land markets
therefore undermines Africans’ accumulation in bifurcated states created
by colonialism (Mamdani 1996; Saul and Leys 1999). Moreover, the per-
sistence of tribal land tenure systems, in which chiefs allocate land to mar-
ried males, preclude private title to land and undermine accumulation
(Mamdani 1996). In Zimbabwe, this system persists, and the small-scale
resettled land has been added into the communal area belonging to tradi-
tional leaders. While the fast-track land reform of 2000 eradicated inequal-
ities in land ownership, land tenure systems remain a subject of
policy debate.
Chabal and Daloz (1999), and also Cox and Negi (2010, 74), suggest
that a narrative dominates in Africa where the absence of representative
institutions leads public officials to treat the state as a private resource,
resulting in ‘corruption, nepotism, downright fraud and diversion of
resources’ intended for the building of state institutions and expected to
aid effective development. Mkandawire (2001a) adds that by the 1990s,
the African state was being demonised for its ‘weaknesses, its over-
extension, its interference with the smooth functioning of markets, its
repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its
absence, etc’. The state had become “the ‘rentier state’, the ‘over-extended
state’, the ‘parasitical state’, the ‘predatory state’, the ‘lame Leviathan’, the
280 T. SHONHE
‘patrimonial state’, the ‘prebendal state’, the ‘crony state’, the ‘klepto-
cratic state’, the ‘inverted state’, etc”.
In the end, lack of development is seen as a consequence of the absence
of state institutions capable of driving a developmental agenda. An associ-
ated ill is the pervasiveness of patrimonialism, where personal networks
with clients established through kinship, communal affiliation and ethnic-
ity are deployed by state officials to maintain legitimacy and power, in
return for the distribution of largesse (ibid), incorporating traditional
leaders in patrimonial networks (Mamdani 1996). As a result, some writ-
ers have concluded that the Asian model, in which economic planners are
shielded and given latitude to plan and implement policies, and there is
extended coordination of economic policies, is beyond the scope of African
governments (Lewis and Stein 1997).
All this is contrasted with a developmental state that is undergirded by
an ideology that is developmentalist, focusing on achieving high rates of
accumulation and industrialisation (Mkandawire 2001). As opposed to a
‘soft state’ (Myrdal 1967, 1118), a developmental state ought to be a
‘strong state’ capable of delivering an ‘ideological hegemony’ that derives
its legitimacy from its ability to promote sustainable development, eco-
nomic growth and structural change in the productive system at domestic
and global level (Mkandawire 2001). The challenge with defining devel-
opmental states based on their performance is that some countries may be
affected by exogenous factors that they may be unable to resist, leading
either to stagnation or to regression. The world systems theory explains
how the developed nations have tended to configure developing nations
in fashions intended to resolve their own crises (de Janvry 1981). This has
been a source of opposition to state intervention in favour of market-
driven development.
As Mkandawire (2010) explains, the general attitude towards African
governments has many angles and explanations. First, ideologically, neo-
liberalism came to prominence on the back of the rise of neo-conservative
movements in many developed countries. It was later adopted by funding
institutions and donor countries. Secondly, globalisation has forced struc-
tural changes by countries to ensure that market forces are at the centre of
planning, forcing governments to retreat from market intervention.
Thirdly, this coincided with changes in attitudes towards so-called Third
World countries, which combined to lend credence to the vision of gov-
ernment failure in the periphery. At a number of crucial moments,
Zimbabwe has appeared unsure of which ideological orientation is driving

the developmental project.
Critiquing Zimbabwe’s Economic Development Trajectory

As Masaka (2013) observes, to describe Zimbabwe’s economy as socialist
in the 1980s or a free market in the 1990s is to offer a false dichotomy.
Economic planning has swung back and forth between intervention and
free market, but there has ‘always been a mix of the two in practice’.
Politics has also been of influence (Sachikonye 2002) in defining the utility
of economic development strategies (Masaka 2013). At independence, in
1980, Zimbabwe maintained a planned economy that had been intro-
duced by the Ian Smith government after the imposition of sanctions and
the subsequent Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, targeting
inclusion of the Black majority. Whereas a nationalist/social-welfarist pol-
icy framework was adopted (Muzondidya (2009) in the first decade, those
that followed consisted mainly of free-market policies. As Masaka (2013)
argues, the welfarist policy resulted in a better economic performance and
improved the standard of living of ordinary people when compared with
the later free-market policies of the 1990s.
Free-market policies implemented from 1991 included ESAP, in which
reforms included ‘liberalisation of the economy and privatisation of
government-controlled or owned companies’ (Masaka 2013, 319), with
catastrophic consequences on the economy (Sachikonye 2002). Despite a
high performance between 1991 and 1996, possibly resulting from
pre-1991 economic policies, the effects of a series of counterproductive
and damaging policies under ZIMPREST, which took over from ESAP,
resulted in some negative effects, including ‘continuous currency devalu-
ation, wage declines, massive retrenchments, rising rates of unemploy-
ment, and widespread deindustrialization’ (Masaka 2013, 321).
An attempt to return to centralised economic planning after 1997 was
half-hearted. Moreover, as Moyo and Yeros (2007), reveal, the land
reform included tenacious efforts towards radicalisation yet was compro-
mised by allowing capital space and therefore allowing some land to
remain in the hands of international and domestic capital. Heterodox eco-
nomic planning from 2005 to 2018 resulted in a mixture of redistributive
and indigenisation policies on one hand and the acceptance of neo-liber-
alism on the other. The introduction of STERP under the reconstruction
and neo-liberal reform agenda had positive economic growth outcomes,
282 T. SHONHE
but this was supported by political stability under the GNU. Thus, the
wider context of the post-coup ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ intro-
duced after November 2017 must be brought to bear if its implications are
to be understood.
Arguably, there were three epochs of imperialist penetration in Africa.
As Harvey (2005) explains, the first (1875–1945) was the period referred
to as ‘the rise of bourgeois imperialism’, characterised by monopoly capi-
talism and the outflow of capital as the developed nations opened up the
interior of Africa through trade, infrastructural development, and creating
mines and manufacturing centres. The period was characterised by plun-
der and violence, which was aimed at subjugating Africans into circuits of
exchange that were dominated by capital from the centre (Kemp 1967).
The second phase, from the end of the Second World War, steered the
continent towards a new era of rising African nationalism and a shift of the
centre from Britain to the United States of America (Zack-Williams 2013).
The third phase, from the late 1970s until the 1990s, saw the triumph of
neo-liberalism and the implementation of institutionalised Structural
Adjustment Programmes in all African countries (ibid). For Zimbabwe,
despite opposition by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, ESAP
was introduced in 1991, bringing with it a raft of economic policy revi-
sions that limited government involvement in various economic activities
(Stoneman 1981). By 2015, neo-liberalism is epitomised by the export of
finance capital (Amin 2015) and globalised capital flows.
The development of the African states did not reverse the tide of impe-
rialism and its interference in African domestic affairs (Zack-Williams
2013). Even though the American military was unchallenged, China
established economic interests, characterised in Africa by a lack of concern
for human rights abuses (ibid). For many African leaders, this presented an
alternative to democratic procedures that accompanied aid and trade from
the West. However, as Mkandawire (2001) posits, the failure of structural
adjustment programmes compels us to revisit the efficacy of neo-liberalism
in Africa, with the Bretton Woods institutions recognising the importance
of state intervention and resource distribution beyond ensuring the exis-
tence of a conducive business investment environment. Efforts towards
nation-building and development in Zimbabwe have not been able to
eliminate some of the vices constructed by colonialism. Indeed, the lead-
ers have held on to some of them and developed a post-colonial ideology
from the ashes of colonial ideology to advance their personal interests
(Ekeh 1975).
Arguably, there cannot be a one size fits all solution. As Ha-Joon Chang
(2007) observes, Japan would not have developed into a motor industry
powerhouse had government intervention been shunned. The govern-
ment kicked out General Motors and Ford in 1939 and directed the Bank
of Japan to bail out Toyota in 1949 (ibid). Today, Japanese motor cars are
commonplace and a preferred brand in many parts of the world. Moreover,
some theorists have concluded that post-Second World War development
approaches have failed to work in Africa. For instance, Matthews (2004),
agreeing with N’Dione (1994), suggests that these must be rejected
because they do not take African cultural values and perspectives into
account. As N’Dione et al. (1997) observe, these assumptions are not
universal. As a result, ‘the poor remain poor, inequities persist and grow
more stark, and aspirations to a better future remain, for the most part,
only aspirations’ Matthews (2004, 382). Berg (2007, 541) also suggests
that viewing Africa’s development from the ‘Western window’ renders
analysis distorted and flimsy because it lacks cultural relativism, ‘greatly
simplifies and mis-represents the diverse cultures and histories of the con-
tinent’. Moreover, Berg (ibid), 552) posits that ‘Development, in some
cases, acts as the avenue for capitalist exploitation and neo-imperialist
motives’, as the next section discusses.
Primitive Accumulation and Renewed Rush

for African Resources
Zimbabwe’s development plan after the November 2017 military coup

and the pronouncement of the ‘Open for Business’ policy, is best under-
stood from the dialectical and historical materialism perspective. Such an
approach allows us to bring into play social science, power relations, gen-
der, generational differences and ecology, exploitation, racism, sexism,
militarism and imperialism (de Janvry 1981). Contradictions between the
centre and the periphery resulting from capitalism’s failure to self-sustain
create the need for a continual expansion of the sphere of circulation,
through the incorporation of pre-capitalist areas in search of cheap labour
and cheap raw materials (Marx 1977). This is a consequence of the het-
erogeneity of the world economic system, where capital accumulation in
the periphery is configured to resolve the crises of the centre and manifests
in the dialectic between production and circulation (de Janvry 1981).
284 T. SHONHE
Primitive capitalism is, as Arendt (1968, 28) puts it, ‘the original sin of
simple robbery’. It is carried out in two main forms: on one hand, at the
production site—through the exploitation of labour that is paid below a
level sufficient for labour’s social reproduction (Moyo et al. 2012)—and
through commodity marketing through mispricing and under-invoicing.
For Moyo et al. (2012, 185), the developed countries exploit the periph-
eries ‘either directly or indirectly, the net effect being a systematic transfer
of surplus value, far beyond the initial investment’ through the ‘repatria-
tion of profits, interest payments, and dividends, monopoly rents, as well
as unequal exchange’. Amin (2011, 52) therefore concludes that, in the
main, primitive accumulation habitually finances the rich, while the poor
majority carry the burden, even though the former solely benefit, as ‘It
continues today’. The scramble for African resources is 1884 in full swing
and is characterised by concentration and centralisation of capital in the
centre, but this originated in the 1890s by way of dispossession of the
means of reproduction. The 2016 Want to Want report (2016), The New
Colonialism, observes that:
The continent of Africa is today facing a new colonial invasion, no less dev-
astating in scale and impact than that which it suffered during the nine-
teenth century. As before, the new colonialism is driven by a determination
to plunder the natural resources of Africa, especially its strategic energy and
mineral resources.
In this phase, all facets of production are controlled at the centre

through finance capital. In agriculture, this is achieved through the exten-
sion of credit, contract farming and joint ventures channelled through
international finance. As Amin (2015) observes, input financing character-
ises the upstream while global commodity chains characterise the down-
stream of the international finance circuits. Land is grabbed for capitalist
investment, alienating Africans and converting them into workers, consti-
tuting the recolonisation of Africa.
This has been observed by scholars to lie at the heart of imperialist prac-
tices, and therefore to underline the need to create a counterbalance; the
objective of this is to create an alternative globalisation movement
(Luxemburg 1968). The Analytical Report of the Land Matrix II (2016)
reveals that of the 1004 ‘land deals’ that had been signed, 422, covering an
area of 10 million hectares, were in Africa. Of these, 32% were in agro-fuels,
compared with 45% of those in Europe and 50% of those in the Americas,
and 39% were in food crops. Land Matrix (2018) data shows that
since 2008 a total of 352,677 hectares had been contracted out under lease
agreements between the government of Zimbabwe and some newly settled
A2 (medium-scale) farmers on one hand and some Chinese, Mauritius,
Germany, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Russian nationals and trans-
national corporates on the other hand. Table 12.1 shows the nature of land
grabs since 2008. Under the ‘Open for Business’ mantra, the Zimbabwean
President has offered land for the construction of a golf course to the
United States President, Donald Trump (Report Focus News 2018). This
is illustrative of the reversal of land reform and a confirmation of how inter-
national capital continues to grab resources in Africa.
In mining, unequal trade is also common. Unfair pricing is used to
siphon surplus value to the metropoles, where the mining companies are
headquartered. The 2016 Want to Want report reveals that 101 compa-
nies listed on the London Stock Exchange have mining operations in 37
sub-Saharan African countries and control over US$1 trillion worth of
African natural resources. These companies are mostly involved in gold,
platinum, diamonds, copper, oil, gas and coal, whose extraction has seen
Britain aiding and abetting the extraction of US$192 billion from Africa
as surplus value, through tax evasion, illicit financial flows and the unac-
counted cost of adapting to climate change (Hilary 2016). In Zimbabwe,
the companies include Anglo American, Caledonia Mining, Mwana Africa
Plc, Vast Resources, Sable Mining Africa Ltd, Premier Africa Minerals Ltd
and Aquarius Platinum Ltd. Chinese companies, such as the Anjin dia-
mond mining company, have also been involved in diamonds, while others
have been engaged in gold and platinum mining. Zimbabwe exports stood
at US$2.7 billion in 2016, and its top exports were gold (US$896 mil-
lion), raw tobacco (US$383 million) and diamonds (US$206 million),
most of which were destined for South Africa. These natural resources are
mainly exported in raw form and are semi-processed in South Africa before
being exported to developed countries.
The mining sector also experienced conspiratorial and fraudulent accu-
mulation by a capitalist class comprising some mining companies, public
officials and bureaucrats, who connived to line their pockets using revenue
from the sale of minerals (TMALI forthcoming). Bracking and Sharife
(2014) established that besides conventional corruption carried out by
politicians, mispricing by corporates involved in mining and the export of
minerals has been responsible for the siphoning of national wealth to
developed countries, such as the United States of America, Switzerland,
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Illicit financial flows commonly
Table 12.1 Land grabs in Zimbabwe
Investor name Investor country Negotiation status Implementation Contract Nature of Intention/crop
status size the deal
Dubai World Africa United Arab [2008] Concluded [2008] In 290,000 Outright Tourism
Services, Renaissance Emirates, Russian (contract signed) operation purchase
Group, Charles Davy Federation, (production)
Zimbabwe
Afrifresh, Smallholders South Africa, [2012] Concluded [2010] In 7864 Lease/ Livestock and corn (maize),
Zimbabwe (contract signed) operation concession fruit, peas, pepper, potatoes,
(production) apple, seed production, soya
beans, tea, tomatoes,
vegetables, banana
Amatheon Agri Holding Germany, [2013] Concluded [2014] In 900 Lease/ Corn (maize), grains, soya
N.V., Zimbabwean Zimbabwe (contract signed) operation concession beans, wheat
Farmers (5) (production)
Anhui State Farms Group, China, [2011] Concluded In operation 10,000 Lease/ Corn (maize), soya beans,
Ministry of Defence Zimbabwe (contract signed) (production) concession wheat
Hubei Province Lianfeng China, [2014] Concluded 685 Lease/ Livestock, non-food
Overseas Agriculture Zimbabwe (contract signed) concession agricultural commodities
Development Co., Ltd tobacco
(Hubei Lianfeng), Lianhua
company
Anhui Tianrui China [2013] Concluded [2013] In 3228 Lease/ Food crops, non-food
Environmental Technology (contract signed) operation concession agricultural commodities
Co. Ltd (production) corn (maize), tobacco
Sunbird Bioenergy Africa Mauritius, Concluded Start-up phase 40,000 Lease/ Cassava (maniok)
Limited, Government of Zimbabwe (contract signed) (no production) concession
Zimbabwe
Total 352,677
Source: Extracted from Land Matrix, 2018

take place through tax avoidance, tax evasion, trade invoicing, transfer
pricing and trade-based money laundering (the African Union High Level
Panel), as well as the unofficial repatriation of funds to the mother country
or offshore accounts. The Global Financial Integrity group estimates that
Zimbabwe has lost about US$12 billion from 1993 to 2013 to illicit
financial flows, while other losses were also experienced in wildlife, fisher-
ies and timber (TMALI forthcoming). In the absence of concerted efforts
towards curbing illicit flows, the ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ para-
digm is a mere extension of imperialism that fast-tracks the transfer of
commodities and surplus value to the centre. It leads to extroverted econ-
omies that are structured to service the needs of the external world, some-
thing to which we turn to in the next section.
Zimbabwe’s Extroverted Economy

At the global commodity exchange level, surplus value is transferred to the
centre through loans, unequal exchange in trade and unfair pricing, trig-
gering the development of disarticulated economies in the periphery (de
Janvry 1981). There is a tendency by the centre to manipulate interna-
tional commodity prices, relying on unequal trade and non-equivalent
exchange. As Ha-Joon Chang (2007, 281) remarks:
While they were imposing free trade on weaker nations through colonialism
and unequal treaties, rich countries maintained rather high tariffs, especially
industrial tariffs, for themselves.
The developed countries take advantage of material discrepancies

between production and market prices and the unequal rewards for ren-
dered labour with the different productivity levels inherent in the ulti-
mately traded commodities. Under contract farming, for instance, the
production and commodity circulation processes are captured by interna-
tional corporates who occupy the commodity value chains. The produc-
tion and circulation of raw tobacco mainly produced by smallholder
farmers, making up 14% of total exports for Zimbabwe, second only to
gold (32%), serves to illustrate how the input and output markets are cap-
tured by monopoly capital. Arguably, the input market is captured through
the provision of contract farming, which includes farming inputs and
labour costs at a premium, directing the farming system, packaging and
delivery of the tobacco to the contract auction floors and its pricing.
288 T. SHONHE
For instance, of the 188.9 million kg of tobacco delivered to the auc-

tion floors in 2017, 157 million kg (84%) were sold under contract farm-
ing, at an average price of US$2.98/kg (TIMB 2018). Chinese markets
accounted for 33%, Far East (48%), Africa (21%) and European Union
(17%) of the exported value of US$904.4 million, averaging US$4.96/kg
(ibid). The tobacco pricing structure is configured to ensure that a meagre
US$2.98/kg is transferred to the farmer, whereas, after a process that cost
+/−US$0.40c, the semi-processed commodity is exported at double the
price (US$4.96/kg) (MN interview 2017). Moreover, the price of the
processed and packaged tobacco cigarettes rises to +/−US$60/kg, with
some brands imported back into Zimbabwe as finished products. In the
mining sector, much of the processing of diamonds and platinum happens
in South Africa, while it is exported as raw ore from Zimbabwe. Under
neo-liberalism, Zimbabwe will not achieve substantial development of its
home market, thereby perpetuating a disarticulated economy in which the
country exports its produce and consumes imports that are secured at far
higher prices (see Shivji 2009), thus resulting in trade deficiencies—as
shown in Fig. 12.1.
From 2007, the country’s imports were more than its exports, thereby
weakening its capacity to fund its external obligations in terms of foreign
currency supply, a situation that worsened with the introduction of a
surrogate bond introduced on 28 November 2016. The RBZ (2018)
monetary statement for the first quarter observed that the current
account and the overall balance of payment have been in deficit for the
Fig. 12.1 Zimbabwe trade 1995–2016. Notes: Imports, exports. (Source:

Simoes 2018)
2625
1313
–1313
–2625
–3938
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Current Account Capital Account Financial Account Overall Balance
Fig. 12.2 Balance of payments developments: 2009–2017. (Source: RBZ 2018)
period 2009–2017, as shown in Fig. 12.2. An all-time overall balance of

payment deficit of −US$1313 billion was reached in 2017.
In 2017, Zimbabwe’s export earnings stood at US$3519.7 billion
against an import bill of US$4.81 billion. Imports mainly consist of refined
petroleum accounting for US$735.9 million (15%), consumption goods
for US$1055.9 billion (22%), capital goods for US$802.6 million (17%)
and merchant imports for US$2641.9 billion (55%), including packaged
medicaments (RBZ 2018).
These commodities are mainly for consumption, yet the country
exports raw materials for processing to other countries. No wonder unem-
ployment has become endemic. As Fig. 12.3 shows, Zimbabwe imports
more gold than it exports, even though it is the most exported commodity
for the country.
As a result of this extroverted trading imbalance, the economy can nei-
ther create jobs in the home market nor generate demand for locally pro-
duced goods. There exist no forward and backwards linkages associated
with value addition that can generate sovereign accumulation.
290 T. SHONHE
700000000 700000000
600000000 600000000
500000000
500000000
Trade Value (Imp)

Trade Value (Exp)
400000000
400000000
US$
US$
300000000
300000000
200000000
200000000
100000000
100000000 0
0 -1E+08
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Zim Exp Imp from Zim
Fig. 12.3 Diamond exports and imports from partners for Zimbabwe,
2000–2016. (Source: Various Sources, Adopted from TMALI, UN COMTRADE)
The National Question, Sovereign Accumulation

and Regional Integration
There is an outstanding agenda of nationalism, involving the forces of

imperialism, neo-colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013) and rampaging
primitive capital accumulation through the capital’s latest weapon, which
involves export monopoly finance (Moyo et al. 2012). Ndlovu-Gatsheni
(2013) maintains that the national question involves the challenges around
nation-building, creation of state institutions, poverty alleviation and
decreasing unemployment. For Moyo (2007) the land question, a critical
dimension of the agrarian question, and national development are central
to the resolution of the national question. Developing an egalitarian soci-
ety at home and pan-African unity at continental level is therefore critical
for the advancement of the national project and the African national ques-
tion (Nkrumah (1965). As the Ghanaian socialist path pushed by Nkwame
Nkrumah revealed, predicting such reforms for an economy that is not
self-sufficient is faulty. There is need for sovereign accumulation in which
national development is driven from below, relying on African resources.
The 2017 Global Financial Integrity report revealed that illicit flows
over the period 2005–2014 stood at US$2 trillion. Fraudulent transfer of
resources from Africa undermines the continent’s capacity to develop the
home economy. Combined with the disarticulated structural issues ema-
nating from unfair exchange, the lack of an African integration in eco-
nomic development, including trade, potential economic development is
Fig. 12.4 Interconnectedness of Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks. Notes

(Abbreviations): AMU, Arab Maghreb Union; CEMAC, Central African Economic
and Monetary Community; CMA, Common Monetary Area; CEN-SAD,
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States; CEPGL, Economic Community of the
Great Lakes Countries; IOC, Indian Ocean Commission; IGAD, Intergovernmental
Authority on Development; MRU, Mano River Union; SACU, Southern African
Customs Union; WAEMU, West African Economic and Monetary Union; WAMZ,
West African Monetary Zone. * Members of CEN-SAD. (Source: Ncube and
Mokoti (2019), figure updated from UNESC (2009), Economic Development in
Africa 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Development.
United Nations publication. Sales No. E.09.II.D.7. New York and Geneva)
undermined. As shown in Fig. 12.4, for Zimbabwe, while some frag-

mented platforms exist, the country’s economic trade is mainly linked to
the Common Market for East and Southern Africa and the Southern
Africa Development Committee. The same applies to Malawi and Zambia.
This tends to limit the benefits from inter-Africa trade and therefore per-
petuates the country’s extroverted trading, benefiting developed countries.
Africa’s sovereign accumulation positioning will trickle down to
Zimbabwe’s own progress. The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ approach
is misinformed and lacks ideological clarity, and as such is the epitome of
292 T. SHONHE
the anti-nationalism emphasised by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013). As Ha-Joon

Chang (2007, 282) observes, while the developed countries pursued glo-
balisation policies from the 1950s and there is a claim that developing
countries lagged behind,
This story misrepresents the process of globalization among the rich coun-
tries during this period. These countries did significantly lower their tariff
barriers between the 1950s and the 1970s. But during this period, they also
used many other nationalistic policies to promote their own economic
development – subsidies (especially for research and development, or R&D),
state-owned enterprises, government direction of banking credits, capital
controls and so on. When they started implementing neo-liberal pro-
grammes, their growth decelerated. In the 1960s and the 1970s, per capita
income in the rich countries grew by 3.2% a year, but its growth rate fell
substantially to 2.1% in the next two decades.
To this extend, the ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ plan, consolidates

rather than resolves the national question, itself the basis of the liberation
struggle (Moyo and Yeros 2007). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 52) con-
cludes that:
The attempts by African leaders to implement their individual national proj-

ects reveal poor conceptualisation, preference for top-down and authoritar-
ian approaches within postcolonial states that were not fully decolonised and
indigenised. The acceptance of the Westphalian template for the postcolo-
nial state reinforced continued subjection of Africans to Euro-American
global imperial designs including using the same institutions they deployed
to colonise Africa. What is needed, are African institutions anchored on
African histories, cultures and values that are not alienating to the
African majority.
The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ development plan is therefore

ideologically bankrupt, poorly conceptualised and negates the objectives
of the liberation struggle born out of the national question and the
national project. Neo-liberalism and its vices undermine sovereign accu-
mulation, while the workings of international capital at a global scale
capture commodity circuits in a fashion that exports surplus value to the
developed centres, on a magnitude that only regional integration is
capable of reversing. This is achieved by, as Gumede (2018, 3) proposes,
radical ‘delinking from the global system’ and ‘resistance against
imperial forces and ideologies’. This means that development in

Zimbabwe must be inclusive and from below.
Inclusive Social Development

Engendering inclusive development in national development is central to
sovereign accumulation and the resolution of the national question.
Mkandawire (2001) proposes that Africa must rely on a transformative
social policy to fulfil the nation-building project. Transformative social
policy is grounded in ‘the norms of equality and social solidarity…. these
norms serves many functions: production, protection, reproduction, re-
distribution and social cohesion or nation building’ Adesina (2009). For
Mkandawire (2001), and Gumede (2018), a transformative social policy
aimed at fostering production, redistributive and protective roles is vital
for national development. Gumede (2018) also agrees with Adesina
(2009) that a transformative social policy involves the improvement of
human wellbeing and the transformation of social institutions, social rela-
tions and the economy. As such, there is a need to link social policies to
economic policies, acknowledging the role of politics, shifting power rela-
tions, differentiated access to resources and ideological orientation in eco-
nomic development issues (Gumede 2008; Mkandawire 2001).
Transformative social policy ought to touch on the social and national
questions and citizen participation, and therefore bring about inclusive
development (Gumede 2018). In this regard, ideology and structure are
central to the establishment of a developmental state (ibid).
In peripheral disarticulated economies such as Zimbabwe (Shonhe
2018), achievement of inclusive transformative development requires the
implementation of a transformative social policy where citizen participa-
tion is prioritised. Extroverted trading of primary commodities from min-
ing and agricultural activities, a common feature in African economies,
undermines possibilities for inclusive development. Zimbabwe’s ‘Open for
Business’ plan is devoid of a transformative social plan, and has therefore
been captured by the elite, being designed to consolidate unfair trading,
unfair treaties and the export of jobs to the centre. Gumede (2018, 124)
observes:
Most discourses on development have been framed around getting Africa to

be formed in the image of the West, both economically, politically and
socially. Economically, the various economic policies that have been adopted
since independence have largely reflected the version of development that
294 T. SHONHE
the West prescribes either directly or through international financial institu-

tions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
By playing to the whims of international capital for the purpose of

attracting FDI, the Zimbabwean government falls squarely into the trap of
a vicious circle of primitive accumulation orchestrated through the work-
ings of finance capital. Gumede (2018) identifies a lack of progress in the
unification of Africa and the persistence of African leaders’ externally ori-
ented and subservient attitudes towards Western dictates, and suggests
that imperial powers and designs are assisted by the manner in which their
thoughts remain caged by Eurocentrism. Zimbabwe’s developmental
prospects are also complicated by the absence of an alternative economic
development narrative from social and opposition movements. For
instance, the MDC policy proposals have more points of similarity with
than differences from those of the ruling ZANU–PF, as both have neo-
liberal inclinations.
Conclusion
The introduction of ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ combined with the
erasure of redistributive policies negatively affects the resolution of the
national question and the implementation of an inclusive and transforma-
tive social economic development policy. The government’s quest to
attract FDI has the effect of propelling primitive capital accumulation,
undermining the home economy and sovereign accumulation. The export
of raw commodities by extroverted economies has the effect of exporting
job opportunities to developed economies and therefore undermines
inclusive development. Extroverted natural resource extraction also
attracts environmental damage and expunges possibilities for sustainable
development. Zimbabwe needs a radical transformative inclusive social
policy to be designed and implemented.
African leaders continue to be guided by Western ideology in policy-
making. Yet such an ideology is intended to advance neo-colonialism and
to configure capitalist production in order to help resolve over-/under-
accumulation in the centre. More recently, Western countries have
increased their investment pledges into Africa, with China announcing a
US$60 billion financial support package for the continent. Fortunately,
many of these countries show reluctance in extending financial assistance
to Zimbabwe on the basis of past performance, notwithstanding the
Mnangagwa-led government’s relentless effort towards international capi-

tal. These investment initiatives should be assessed from the point of view
of primitive capital accumulation, in which cheap labour, cheap raw mate-
rials and surplus value are exported to world’s developed centres. The
question that remains unanswered is whether African leaders are aware of
the potential negative effect of exposing their economies to primitive
accumulation and international capitalism, and are willingly participating,
or whether they are acting out of ignorance, guided by Western ideology.
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CHAPTER 13
The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe
Sylvester Marumahoko and Tinashe C. Chigwata
Introduction
Zimbabwe has gone through deep political, economic and social chal-
lenges for close to three decades. Once known as the shining light of
Africa, Zimbabwe is now often known for dominating international head-
lines for the wrong reasons. In November 2017, the country experienced
a radical change to the constitutional and political order, which brought
an end to former President Robert Mugabe’s 37-year reign. Emmerson
Mnangagwa, who was once Mugabe’s right-hand man, assumed leader-
ship of both the country and the ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). He was reelected in the July 2018
harmonised elections, although under disputed circumstances. The
removal of Robert Mugabe has provided the country an opportunity to
S. Marumahoko (*)
School of Post Graduate Studies (Research and Innovation), University of
Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa
T. C. Chigwata
Dullah Omar Institute for Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights,
University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_13
300 S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA
break from the past, and hopes have been raised for the birth of a new
Zimbabwe. This chapter explores some of the measures that the adminis-
tration post-Mugabe should implement to set the country on a new path.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is not to argue for a particular political
formation or political leaders to govern. Rather, its objective is to explore
whether the idea of a new Zimbabwe is possible and what it would take to
realise this objective. Before discussing the prospects for this desired state
of affairs, it is important to examine the current situation, which is explored
in the first part of the chapter. A brief overview of the fall of Mugabe and
rise of Mnangagwa is then provided to show how a leader who com-
manded respect beyond the shores of our continent could exit in such an
undignified manner. The core section is dedicated to a discussion of the
prospects for a new Zimbabwe, and concluding remarks end the chapter.
The Zimbabwean ‘Problem’

The Zimbabwean problem is multifaceted, including economics, gover-
nance, politics and humanitarian issues (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 124).
The problem is attributed to different sources, depending on where one is
sitting or whose interests one serves. The colonial legacy, including the
authoritarian colonial state and its institutions, as well as its policies, which
significantly damaged the well-being of the black population, is often cited
as one of the sources of this problem (Muzondidya 2009: 167–168).
Raftopoulos (2009: 201) attributes the Zimbabwean problem partially to
the political legacies of African nationalist politics. Imperialism, including
the restrictive measures (perceived by some as sanctions) imposed on
Zimbabwe by western countries, is often cited by the ruling party and its
sympathisers as the major source of the problem (Government of
Zimbabwe 2013: 8). On the other hand, another group, largely consti-
tuted by the opposition, some western countries, a section of civic society
and some scholars, attributes the Zimbabwean crisis to the ruling elite in
ZANU–PF. They often cite bad policies, corruption and economic mis-
management by ZANU–PF as some of the major causes. Putting this
blame game aside, it is clear that the Zimbabwean problem is the outcome
of a variety of factors. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 100) argues that the con-
tribution of the ruling elite to the problem should not be ignored. What
was its contribution to the Zimbabwe problem and how did the prob-
lem evolve?
13 THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 301
Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 after a protracted armed

resistance against British colonial rule. A constitution negotiated at
Lancaster House by the British government, Rhodesian minority govern-
ment and the liberation movements paved the way for independence
(Marumahoko 2018: 16). While conserving white freedoms and benefits,
the Constitution provided a foundation for constitutionalism in post-
colonial Zimbabwe by, among other things, guaranteeing individual
rights, the independence of the judiciary and multiparty democracy
(Muzondidya 2009: 172). The first democratic elections of 1980, held
under the regime of the Lancaster House Constitution, were won by the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party under the leadership of
Robert Mugabe. Bourne (2011: 103) argues that ZANU was ‘structured
as a Marxist party, with a politburo, and top-down organization reflecting
the tenets of “democratic centralism”’. He further contends that ‘Mugabe
was highly dependent on the military leaders’ of the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army, the military wing of ZANU during the libera-
tion struggle. These leaders continued to play a critical role during
Mugabe’s days in power, and they ultimately shaped his removal close to
three decades later. The ZANU-led government adopted a development
paradigm that centred on rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement.
A number of pro-poor policies were adopted, which impacted positively
on the delivery of public and social sectors such as education, health and
sanitation (Muzondidya 2009: 168–169; Bourne 2011: 111). Boosted
with political power and a strong economy, backed by productive agricul-
ture, mining and manufacturing, the government had the necessary instru-
ments to transform the lives of the majority of Zimbabweans who were at
the receiving end of colonial policies. The period 1980–1990 is generally
regarded as a decade of social progress.
While advancing welfare programmes, ZANU did not lose sight of the
need to entrench its power amid the strong competition that was coming
from the Joshua Nkomo-led Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)
party. The Prime Minister’s Directives on Decentralisation of 1984 and
1985, which provided for the establishment of various vertical state organ-
isation structures, were used by ZANU to consolidate its hold on political
power. The roles of the party and state were fused through bodies that
were formed according to these Directives (Muzondidya 2009: 178;
Bourne 2011: 218). At around the same time, a confrontation with ZAPU
took place in the Matabeleland provinces and some parts of Midlands,
ZAPU’s strongholds. The military deployment to solve what Muzondidya
refers to as a ‘political problem’ in these provinces, dominated by Ndebele-

speaking people, resulted in the loss of human life and property
(Muzondidya 2009: 179, 185). Peace was restored when ZAPU merged
with ZANU in 1987 to form ZANU–PF under an agreement called the
Unity Accord. This effectively ended competitive politics, so the political
hegemony of ZANU–PF was unchallenged. As a result, and according to
some scholars, Zimbabwe became de facto a one party state, where oppo-
sition and criticism had no role (Bourne 2011: 120; Ndlovu-Gatsheni
2003: 118). The appetite of some of the ruling elite not just for political
power but also for private accumulation grew. Corruption cases of a grand
nature that rocked the country, such as the Willowgate Scandal of 1988,
attest to this. Constitutional amendments that were instituted towards the
end of the first decade of independence ensured that the executive, in
particular the President, could not be effectively checked by oversight
institutions such as parliament.
In the second decade of independence, ‘many things began to go seri-
ously wrong’, overshadowing positive developments in the country
(Bourne 2011: 126). The foundation for this situation had been set in the
first decade. Corruption became widespread, poverty deepened, politics of
patronage began to flourish, and labour strikes and food riots became the
order of the day (Raftopoulos 2009: 203–204). The World Bank-backed
Economic Structural Adjustments Programme (ESAP), which the govern-
ment adopted in the 1990s, failed to arrest the deteriorating economic
and social situation (Muzondidya 2009: 188). Instead, owing to market
liberalisation, privatisation and the reduction of government expenditure
through the removal of government subsidies on food, health and educa-
tion, the socio-economic gains recorded in the first decade began to be
eroded. People lost their jobs, prices rocketed, companies closed and cor-
ruption gained momentum. It was no wonder that ESAP was nicknamed
‘Extreme Suffering for African People’ (Bourne 2011: 127). Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2003: 122) argues that the adoption of ESAP not only proved
that the ZANU–PF government had abandoned the people but also that
the political leadership, which had proclaimed itself socialist at indepen-
dence, had easily turned capitalist. Conversely, Bourne (2011: 127) claims
that the regime’s attitude towards limiting the landscape for political par-
ticipation, especially from opposition parties and alternative sources of
power, did not change. Legislative amendments, incentives and sanctions
were some of the many strategies that were utilised towards this end
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 123). However, with the right political and
economic direction, this state of affairs could have been rescued as the
economy had not reached the life support stage. The ingredients for a full-
blown crisis were brewing as Zimbabwe approached the new millennium
(Raftopoulos 2009: 201–203). Disagreeing with the direction that
ZANU–PF was taking, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
was formed in 1999 from a conglomeration of labour, student and civic
groups. The party, which mobilised on democratic principles, would later
drive ZANU–PF to the limit, forcing the ruling party to embark on drastic
measures to stay in power. The opposition was easily branded a creation of
the west and an enemy of the state that needed to be extinguished by
whatever means possible.
The third decade of independence is often described as the crisis decade,
when the political and economic situation spilled out of control. Key ques-
tions around the role of the state, land and property rights, political and
civil liberties, economic direction and the central role of the former
President, Robert Mugabe, came to the forefront (Raftopoulos 2009:
201). Raftopolous (2009: 202) contends that ZANU–PF ‘drew on a com-
bination of revived nationalism that privileged its role in the liberation of
the country, prioritized the centrality of the fight for land, and demonized
all those outside the selective “patriotic history” it espoused’. It adopted
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in early 2000, under which land
in the hands of white farmers was taken without compensation and redis-
tributed to blacks as a way of addressing inequalities in land ownership.
Britain and some other western countries responded by imposing restric-
tions on Zimbabwe, as they considered the programme to be an unlawful
deprivation of property rights. ZANU–PF has argued since then that these
are not restrictions but actually illegal economic sanctions that hurt ordi-
nary citizens the most (Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8, 12). The
question of whether these are restrictions or sanctions again depends on
which side of the fence one is sitting on. What is not in dispute is that,
after the programme was imposed in the early 2000s, the economy, which
was already struggling, descended to crisis levels characterised by hyperin-
flation, low agricultural and industrial productivity, a ballooning informal
sector and a gross domestic product that had shrunk by 50% as of 2008
(Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8).
Facing an international barrage of criticism regarding its human rights
record, among other issues, Zimbabwe walked out of the Commonwealth
in 2003. Relations with other international organisations and multilateral
finance institutions soured, marking the beginning of Zimbabwe’s
international isolation. With the MDC posing a serious threat to ZANU–

PF’s political hegemony, especially after taking control of urban local gov-
ernment, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 104) contends that ‘regime security
was often given priority at the expense of human security’. Bourne (2011:
162) establishes that the ‘state could no longer provide many of its citizens
with food, basic services, a guaranteed rule of law, and socio-economic as
well as civil and political rights’. Gubbay (2016: 13) notes that the effec-
tiveness and independence of the judiciary, the bedrock of the rule of law
and constitutionalism were compromised in many respects. The failure by
the judiciary and parliament to effectively exercise their designated consti-
tutional role facilitated the abuse of executive power (Hatchard et al.
2004: 314). The Government of National Unity (GNU), established in
2009 and constituted by ZANU–PF and the two MDC formations, fol-
lowing the disputed elections of 2008, rescued this situation.
The fourth decade of independence began when Zimbabwe was being
governed by the GNU. The GNU managed to stabilise the political and
economic situation as food, among other things, began to be more widely
available in shops. The adoption of a multicurrency regime anchored on
the United States (US) dollar contained inflation. Public service delivery
in areas such as water, sanitation, health and education improved (Bourne
2011: 226). The GNU also successfully steered the adoption of the first
home-grown Constitution, which is pregnant with promise for a better
life for ordinary citizens. The adoption of the new Constitution did not
solve the Zimbabwean problem, however. Soon after the 2013 harmon-
ised elections, which were won by ZANU–PF and brought an end to the
GNU’s tenure, the situation began to regress. The stagnant economy,
which is perhaps the biggest challenge confronting the political leadership
in Zimbabwe since the 2013 elections, shows that it takes more than elec-
toral votes, whether genuinely acquired or not, to fix bread and butter
issues. The developments after the removal of Robert Mugabe from office
in November 2017, to be discussed in the next section, support this thesis.
The Fall of Mugabe and the Rise of Mnangagwa

On 21 November 2017, President Robert Mugabe handed in his resigna-
tion letter to Jacob Mudenda, the Speaker of the National Assembly.
Earlier on, the military had taken over the country and confined the
President to his residence, claiming that it had been forced to intervene in
civilian affairs in order ‘to pacify a degenerating political, social and
economic situation in [Zimbabwe] which if not addressed may result in

violent conflict’ (Jordan 2017: 1). Its publicly stated objective was to
‘address the human security threats in the country’ (Jordan 2017: 1;
Jongwe 2018: 1).
The events that culminated in Mugabe’s resignation were welcome for
some while for others they were unacceptable and frightening in a consti-
tutional democracy. Whichever side one is on, the question that begs an
answer is whether the events fall into the narrative of a national democratic
project or a military takeover. Some say the events had no bearing as the
president voluntarily gave notice of his resignation in terms of section 96
(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Huffingtonpost 2017: 1; VOA
2017: 1). In democracies, leaders leave office when they have lost the sup-
port of the people. The president’s departure from office was endorsed by
the leaders of the opposition, ordinary citizens and the international com-
munity. However, the status of the departure was cast wide open when
Mugabe later made an about-turn and insinuated that a military coup, and
not voluntary resignation, was the reason he vacated office so suddenly.
This has prompted some to reexamine the circumstances.
It seems there are merits to Mugabe’s claim that he left office owing to
a military coup. His ousting had some of the characteristics of coups seen
across the world, although it was celebrated by citizens and was not criti-
cised by the international community. First, the army moved tanks and
other military vehicles and gun-wielding soldiers to strategic places around
the country, which is often the case when mounting a military coup. The
parliament building was barricaded, the police disarmed and the president
confined to his residence. Secondly, the military placed some of Mugabe’s
ministers and strong supporters under house arrest. Thirdly, a senior mili-
tary official broadcast live on radio and television, reassuring citizens that
the military had not seized political power but were taking measures to
restore normality in accordance with the Constitution.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe vests the power to deploy the military
in the President and not the army commanders, as happened during the
measures that culminated with Mugabe’s ousting. In addition, there are
special circumstances under which the army can be moved from the bar-
racks. One of these circumstances relates to disasters. In this case, how-
ever, there was no disaster to attend to, nor was there a humanitarian
crisis. The country was not at war with a foreign power and parliament had
not approved the deployment of the army.
A related question is why the events were happening 37 years after
independence, and where they were taking the country. It has been sug-
gested that one of the reasons that explains Mugabe’s unceremonious
departure from office is that he had lost the support of the army and the
influential war veterans that had propped up his rule for close to four
decades (Kwaramba 2017: 1; Rupiya 2012: 13). Another reason is perhaps
that Mugabe had incensed the army and the war veterans by procrastinat-
ing about the question of who would succeed him in the party and gov-
ernment. This saw the emergence of two factions in ZANU–PF, the
so-called G40 and Lacoste factions, each vying to take over (Chirimambowa
2016: 1).
The situation was compounded by the emergence of Grace Mugabe,
the first lady, as a formidable voice in the ruling party, close or working
with the G40 factions. She appeared to have sidelined the war veterans and
the commanders of the army, who were historically considered the van-
guard of the ruling party (Chirimambowa 2016: 2; Kwaramba 2017: 1).
Mugabe helped to seal his own fate by appearing to suggest that he would
prefer his wife to take over from him. This brought him into conflict with
the army and the war veterans who preferred Emmerson Mnangagwa, one
of Mugabe’s vice-presidents. In the end, Mugabe lost the battle to shape
the succession debate.
There are a few lessons that can be drawn from this. One of them is
about the danger of concentrating too much power in one person at the
expense of institutions. Another is that sitting presidents need to avoid
overstaying their welcome. Yet another is that leadership should always
change hands. It should be acknowledged, however, that not everything
about Mugabe was bad. The strong education system that Zimbabwe is
often acclaimed for is largely attributed to ZANU–PF policies and Mugabe
in particular. The idea of land reform, which many criticise Mugabe for,
was not bad in itself, but it could have been handled better. Finally,
Mugabe cannot be blamed for everything that has gone wrong in
Zimbabwe. All Zimbabweans, particularly those who were governing with
him, must take equal blame and acknowledge their mistakes and wrong-
doing. Even ordinary citizens must take a portion of the blame: it is often
said that the people deserve the government they every nation has the
government it deserves. History the world over has proved that people
power can remove governments that no longer serve their interests. Even
so, the removal of Mugabe may have been necessary, but did it mark the
beginning of a new era for Zimbabwe?
With Mugabe gone, his former vice-president and close collaborator,

Emmerson Mnangagwa, took the reins of power in both the government
and the ruling party in November 2017. He announced himself on the
political scene as a reformist who was prepared to redefine the political and
economic trajectory of the country. He nonetheless appointed a cabinet
that primarily constituted ministers from the previous government to take
charge until the July 2018 harmonised elections, raising early questions
about his intentions to change. He declared that ‘Zimbabwe is Open for
Business’ and initiated the process of international reengagement.
President Mnangagwa introduced a raft of measures, which included anti-
corruption initiatives, to ensure effective, clean and accountable govern-
ment. The political environment improved, to the extent that opposition
political parties largely freely mobilised. Even though the electoral envi-
ronment improved in general, the question remains whether this improve-
ment was enough to guarantee an undisputed election outcome. The
outcome of the July 2018 harmonised elections, in which Mnangagwa was
reelected, was disputed by the MDC, giving rise to a legitimacy deficit.
In his inauguration speech, Mnangagwa declared the ‘dawn of the
“Second Republic”’ in Zimbabwe. The stated strategic vision of
Mnangagwa’s government was for Zimbabwe to become a middle-income
country by 2030. He initially appointed a refreshed cabinet and retired a
number of senior bureaucrats who had been in government for decades.
The government announced a number of reforms to address the economic
challenges. However, ever since his reelection on 30 July 2018, the econ-
omy is threatening to descend to the 2008 crisis levels with clear indica-
tions that the market lacks confidence and trust in the new government.
Prices are rocketing, fuel is in short supply and companies are struggling to
access foreign currency to enable production. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:
128) argues that the economy will not ‘be solved by populist rhetoric,
devoid of pragmatism’. The question, therefore, is what it would take to fix
the Zimbabwean problem. The question is dealt with in the next section.
Fixing the Zimbabwean Problem

Zimbabwe is endowed with a rich natural and human resource base that
gives it an advantage over its regional and international counterparts (see
Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 16). Bad governance that has given rise
to political, economic and humanitarian problems requires urgent fixing,
however (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 100). According to Smith (2007: 6),
there are four sets of attributes that require reform if good governance is
to be brought about: constitutional, political, administrative and public
policy. He argues that at ‘the constitutional level good governance requires
changes that will strengthen the accountability of political leaders to the
people, ensure respect for human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and
decentralize political authority’. When it comes to political action and
organisation, Smith states that ‘three attributes of good governance are
common to the governance agendas of most aid agencies; political plural-
ism, opportunities for extensive participation in politics, and probity and
incorruptibility in the use of public powers and offices by servants of the
state’. Turning to administration, he argues that ‘good governance
requires accountable and transparent public administration; effective pub-
lic management, including a capacity to design good policies as well as to
implement them’. In this section, we discuss six interventions that cut
across these attributes and have the potential to make a positive impact on
Zimbabwe.
Building Trust and Confidence

Public trust and confidence are key indicators of a functional government
and good governance (Chanley et al. 2000: 239). When people have con-
fidence in government institutions, they are more likely to support gov-
ernment policies, comply with the laws and pay taxes, among other
responsibilities. In Zimbabwe, public trust and confidence in government
institutions has been on a downward spiral in both the Mugabe and
Mnangagwa era. The decline appears to be linked to people’s disappoint-
ment in government, its inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inability to fight cor-
ruption, disputed elections, negative perceptions of the economy and an
increase in their knowledge of how the government works, among other
issues. In the ensuing paragraphs, we recommend reforms in democratic
and administrative processes as some of the ways in which public trust and
confidence can be restored.
Democratic Processes
Good governance denotes in part that governance processes, procedures
and structures are democratic (Smith 2007: 4). The departure of Mugabe
presents a real opportunity for the country to redeem public trust and
confidence. One of the ways in which this can be achieved is by opening
up political processes. This entails breaking from a past in which
opposition politics was criminalised and frowned upon, and when those
who led opposition endured harassment and intimidation, thereby closing
the space for the democratic exchange of ideas. According to Osaghae
(1999: 9), one of the crucial elements for assessing democratisation is the
existence of pluralism and multipartyism. This relates to the existence of
an environment that encourages competitive politics in which the opposi-
tion parties have a fair chance of coming to power. Although the political
environment improved after the fall of Mugabe, the motivation for liber-
alisation is inadequate, in the sense that it appeared to have been pressured
by external actors rather than being driven by a shared genuine desire for
reform. Although external pressures are crucial for the establishment of
democracy in countries previously under authoritarian rule, such pressures
are motivated more by the need for such countries to entrench their inter-
ests (Smith 2007: 272). Thus, the desire to reform should be locally
shared and driven, with international actors merely taking a supporting
role. Reforms should, for instance, target institutions that administer elec-
tions or play a facilitative role in that regard, given that Zimbabwe has a
long history of contested electoral processes and outcomes (Kambale
(2012: 1; Rupiya 2012: 9; Southall and Slabbert 2018: 1). Public media
reforms are also important in the context of enhancing democratisation
and increasing public trust and confidence in government (African
Network of Constitutional Lawyers 2012: 4). Finally, it has been observed
that the reform of the Public Order and Security Act will go a long way
towards fostering a healthy political environment, as the legislation tram-
ples upon fundamental freedoms relating to association and assembly,
among others, that are entrenched in the Constitution (Human Rights
Watch 2013: 2). Politically, the legislation is out of sync with the pledge
by Mnangagwa to do things differently.
Administrative Processes
Good governance is not only about democratic governance processes but
also about efficient and effective administrative systems (Smith 2007: 4).
Such systems were largely absent at all levels of government during the
latter half of Mugabe’s rule. Thus, it is crucial that the new government,
post-Mugabe, should undertake extensive administrative reforms to
improve efficiency and effectiveness. At the heart of the reforms is the
need to refine the way in which government agencies work. This can be
achieved by, among other things, professionalising human resource man-
agement, changing organisational structures and reviewing governance
procedures. It is important that government agencies attract and retain

public servants with the right skills, qualifications and dedication if service
delivery is to improve. Professionalisation should be at the centre of the
new recruitment and selection policy. Recruitment and selection should
be preceded by rigorous job analysis (Ashraf 2017: 1). There is a need for
the new administration to set up good succession planning in public ser-
vice. Jarvalt (2007: 8) notes that viable succession planning needs to be
accompanied by a training policy that motivates employees, heightens
their organisational awareness, offers promotion opportunities, promotes
common civil service culture and increases the skill base. The question of
reducing the number of government employees will also need to be
addressed, given that the civil service is bloated—to the extent that around
90% of the revenue collected by government goes towards meeting its sal-
ary obligations. The size of the civil service could be reduced by, among
other strategies, eliminating ghost workers, verifying that civil servants on
the payroll are actually working, laying off contract workers, voluntary
retrenchments, early retirement, recruitment freezes and the closing of
government agencies whose functions can be efficiently performed by the
private sector (Lienert 1998: 6). To its credit, the Mnangagwa administra-
tion has already laid off a few senior government officials. These retrench-
ments, however, need to be based on performance evaluations and other
verifiable considerations. Currently, it is hard to tell what the criteria for
the retrenchments are, leading critics to speculate that they are targeting
bureaucrats who are perceived to be sympathetic to Mugabe. The remu-
neration of government employees ought to be addressed as part of the
administrative reforms. This entails reviewing the current remuneration
policy, enhancing transparency and improving the ability of government
to recruit and retain individuals with skills that are in short supply. A good
remuneration policy needs to be guided by fiscal realities, competences,
meritocracy, the penalisation of poor performers, the scarcity of certain
skills and experience, and the elimination of salary gaps for comparable
jobs; among other considerations (Lienert (1998: 7). It is also important
that the efficiencies of government agencies are reviewed as part of the
administrative reforms that are meant to improve service delivery.
Getting the Most Out of Limited Public Resources
Corruption
In Zimbabwe, corruption is prevalent across all sectors, manifesting itself
mainly through bribery, extortion, nepotism, patronage and grand venal-
ity, among other forms of abuse of power. The Corruption Index for
2018 ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 176 countries which were surveyed. It
is estimated that Zimbabwe is losing US$1 billion annually to corruption
to the detriment of economic and social development (Takawira 2017:
204). Corruption is harmful as it often increases the cost of doing busi-
ness, dissuades foreign direct investment, distorts the financial and eco-
nomic environment, undermines human capital development, creates
inequalities in opportunities available to citizens and business actors, leads
to inefficiencies in public service delivery and often results in poor alloca-
tion of resources, among other negatives (Mugova 2017: 1; Wafawarova
2015: 1). Thus, the fight against corruption is perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge confronting the post-Mugabe administration. The Zimbabwe Anti-
Corruption Commission (ZACC) faces a plethora of challenges that
undermine its ability to fight corruption effectively. The challenges include
political meddling, a lack of operational independence, the politicisation
of corruption cases, a shortage of skilled staff and lack of sufficient
resources. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which prosecutes
corrupt suspects, is grappling with similar challenges. In the first quarter
of 2018, the Prosecutor-General issued a statement bemoaning the lack of
political will, human capacity and financial support as the reasons most
corruption cases were not being prosecuted (Hodzi 2018: 1). In response
to the inability of the ZACC and NPA to contain corruption, President
Mnangagwa established a special anti-corruption unit in his office respon-
sible for investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. It remains to be
seen whether this unit will bring dividends in the war against corruption.
Corruption in Zimbabwe is now so entrenched that only genuine anti-
corruption efforts anchored on key strategies have better prospects of con-
taining it. A multi-actor and sectoral approach, whereby financial
institutions, audit firms, anti-corruption agencies and tax authorities work
in collaboration to prevent, detect, investigate and respond to corruption,
is necessary. Without close collaboration and coordination between the
agencies responsible for the identification, investigation and prosecution
of corruption cases, the war against corruption is unlikely to be won any
time soon. The recovery of proceeds of crime is an important aspect of
anti-corruption initiatives throughout the world. There is, therefore, a

need for Zimbabwe to set up or strengthen a specialist asset recovery
agency responsible for tracing the proceeds of corruption, securing freez-
ing orders, and confiscating and forfeiting assets. The courts play an
important role of ensuring that those that steal from the poor are jailed.
Currently, the judiciary faces a number of challenges that constrains its
ability to deliver justice, such as lack of sufficient resources and corruption
within its judicial ranks. Stiffer penalties for offenders can be an effective
deterrent of corrupt behaviour. The existing penalties provided in law are
not harsh enough to realise this objective. It has also not been uncommon
for high-profile corrupt suspects or individuals to receive preferential
treatment during investigation, prosecution and sentencing. There have
been a number of arrests and prosecution of senior bureaucrats, politicians
and other influential people in the post-Mugabe era, but the rate of arrests
and prosecution does not mirror the deep state of corruption. The fact
that there have been no significant successful prosecutions and that arrests
and investigations are widely perceived to be selective continues to raise
questions about the genuineness of anti-corruption efforts under the
‘Second Republic’ (Mahere 2019: 1).
Resource Wastage
The wastage of public resources is one of the challenges that the new
administration needs to overcome. While an appetite for wasting resources
is common throughout public services, including in state-owned enter-
prises and local government, it can be easily identified at high levels of
government. President Mnangagwa has followed in the footsteps of
Mugabe, whose cabinet was often criticised for being disproportionate to
the size of the country and the state of the economy. On 8 November
2019, Mnangagwa announced the appointment of six new ministers and
five new deputy ministers. At 25 ministers, 18 deputy ministers and 10
provincial ministers, the cabinet is now bigger than the one he inherited.
He has also created an additional ministry (that of National Housing and
Social Amenities). All ministries have permanent secretaries, principal
directors, departmental directors and other senior staff, whose employ-
ment comes with hefty remuneration packages. Given that some of the
ministries have identical responsibilities and functions, the duplication of
roles and resource wastage is ubiquitous. The creation of non-essential top
government positions, excess ministries and expendable departments is
associated with a spike in travel and subsistence allowances,
supererogatory travelling, unnecessary events and unimportant interna-

tional travelling (Langa 2015: 1; Magaisa 2018a: 4). This resource wast-
age, which a struggling economy cannot bear, could be contained by
making cabinet leaner, and abolishing unnecessary senior positions, min-
istries and departments. In addition, it would help to do away with unnec-
essary travel, reduce the number of delegates when travelling locally and
abroad, and consume locally produced goods and services. It is also
important that through its oversight function, parliament should hold the
executive accountable for resource wastage, among other forms of unsound
or uneconomic usage of resources.
ublic Procurement Process

P
The public procurement process is one of the most critical governance
process, in which development plans are translated into action in mone-
tary terms. The importance of this process for national development in
Zimbabwe is recognised in the 2013 Constitution, which requires that
public funds be spent transparently, prudently, economically and effec-
tively. Besides these general principles of public finance, the Constitution
(section 315) requires the public procurement process to ensure that it is
transparent, fair, honest, cost-effective and competitive. It singles out joint
ventures, contracts for the construction and operation of infrastructure
and facilities, and concessions for mineral and other rights as state con-
tracts whose negotiation and performance requires strict regulation (see
section 315(2) of the Constitution). This constitutional framework is
there to ensure that Zimbabwe gets the most out of its public procure-
ment processes. During the Lancaster House constitutional order, it was
recognised that Zimbabwe did not always get the most out of its public
procurement processes. More than six years into the new constitutional
regime, the situation has not changed at all levels of government, and
procurement is often being used to benefit a few key players, usually along
political, social and economic lines (Chigudu 2014: 21). The practice of
contractors being paid for goods and services they have not delivered
remains common. In other cases, some contractors provide substandard
work and get paid for it, while others inflate prices above the market rates,
usually in connivance with government officials. There is evidence of some
contractors who have been given government contracts despite lacking
the requisite capacity to deliver them. Thus, value for money has not been
achieved in a significant number of contracts which have been awarded,
and the overall implication is that a significant quantity of public funds
continues to be lost through the public procurement process (Chigudu

2014: 23). Building a new Zimbabwe requires that there should be a
change in how the public procurement process is utilised. If it is used for
the public good, it has the potential to drive economic growth and social
development.
A Culture of Constitutionalism
A new Zimbabwe needs a culture of constitutionalism, which is the cen-
trepiece of any constitutional democracy, to develop. Constitutionalism
requires the limitation of state power through a constitution or other
mechanisms, to protect the citizens against arbitrary rule (Okoth-Ogendo
1993: 66). The key ingredients of constitutionalism are supremacy of the
constitution, a Bill of Rights, separation of powers, democratic and
accountable governance, independence of the judiciary and the rule of
law. All these key principles of constitutionalism are captured in the 2013
Constitution of Zimbabwe. Thus, the foundation upon which a culture of
constitutionalism can be built upon is already there. What is required is
the creation of a conducive environment for this culture to thrive. While
the full implementation of the Constitution is perhaps the starting point
for the culture to develop, a change in political culture is essential given
that the politics of independent Zimbabwe has been toxic.
Rule of Law
The starting point for setting Zimbabwe back on the right path is respect
for the rule of law (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 129). This is important as the
rule of law is the bedrock of any democratic society, which includes differ-
ent dimensions of justice. The rule of law is a complex principle that
requires the strict observance of constitutional and legislative rules, which
can only flourish in an environment where the independence of the judi-
ciary is protected and promoted. Gubbay (2016: 1) states that if a certain
piece of legislation is required to give effect to a constitutional principle,
goal or vision, such legislation should be enacted expeditiously, because
without it that principle, goal or vision will not be realised. Once the rel-
evant pieces of legislation are in place, he states that a climate of legality
becomes important because without it laws are meaningless (Gubbay
2016: 1). The rule of law also requires an impartial and independent judi-
ciary to oversee a legal framework that is known, clearly formulated, sta-
ble, predictable and applied uniformly. These principles provide a ‘basis for
“legitimate expectations” on the part of the citizens. The rule of law, thus,
guarantee that citizens know what obligations are imposed by the law, and
can expect these obligations to remain unchanged until the law is changed’,
but not in a retroactive manner (Smith 2007: 78). On the economic side,
it is highly unlikely that an investor, especially an international one, will
invest in a country where the legal framework is not predictable and
respected, where the judiciary fails to implement the legislative framework
fairly and where court decisions are not respected. Black markets, tax eva-
sion and financial irregularities, which are common in Zimbabwe, are all
symptoms of a market that lacks trust and confidence in the existing for-
mal legal governance architecture. Thus, the rule of the law is not only
important to protect and promote political rights but also economic
development. In countries in transition such as Zimbabwe, the rule of the
law is particularly crucial to ‘help establish a clear break with the past, and
new political culture in which all participants respects the law’ (Smith
2007: 81).
espect for State Institutions

R
Respect for state institutions is a fundamental feature in a constitutional
democracy. Evidence in independent Zimbabwe, where the executive neu-
tralised other arms of government, demonstrates that imbalance of power
among the different arms of government is bad for democracy. The execu-
tive easily conducted its activities as it pleased with little or no oversight
from other arms of government (Veritas 2016: 2). This unequal balance is
one of the sources of many problems experienced after the first decade of
independence. Modern constitutions are increasingly making provisions
for independent constitutional commissions to strengthen democracy by,
for example, complementing the role of the traditional arms of govern-
ment. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, for instance, shares govern-
mental power not just among the three arms of government (executive,
parliament and judiciary), but also makes provision for the establishment
of several independent commissions supporting democracy. The commis-
sions include the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Zimbabwe
Gender Commission and the National Peace and Reconciliation
Commission. The Constitution also makes provision for the Office of the
Auditor General, ZACC and the NPA. It becomes important for these
arms of government and constitutional bodies to respect each other’s
functional terrain while cooperating with one another to avoid repeating
the mistakes of yesteryear. The decision of President Mnangagwa to
establish a prosecutorial unit in his office has raised questions about

whether the executive is not encroaching on the terrain of the NPA to the
detriment of oversight. The same argument can be used in relation to the
continued use of the President’s power under the Presidential (Temporary
Measures) Act to make law, an area reserved for parliament. Thus, respect
for state institutions is necessary for a new Zimbabwe, otherwise it remains
the old one.
edefining the Relationship Between the State and Its Citizens

R
A new Zimbabwe is possible, but not without redefining the relationship
between the state and its citizens. The state has obligations to its citizens
inasmuch as the citizens have a role to play in a democratic society. The
state is there to serve. It, therefore, follows that the delivery of public and
social services to the people by the state is not a favour but an obligation.
The relationship between the state, on one hand, and citizens, on the
other hand, should be seen from the perspective of the fundamental
human rights that are inalienable to every human being. Human rights
‘are claims to entitlements that are held to be morally defensible regardless
of the law in any particular sovereign state. Rights claim that others should
act in a particular way, or refrain from acting in ways which restrict the
enjoyment of what is claimed’ (Smith 2007: 45). The respect, protection
and promotion of human rights is a fundamental virtue of any democratic
society (Smith 2007: 4). The state has a role to mediate relations between
citizens to ensure that both individual and group rights are respected.
Access to water, housing and sanitation are important socio-economic
rights that should be protected and promoted by all tiers of government
and their agencies as well as by constitutional bodies. The cholera out-
break of September 2018, which affected many and resulted in several
deaths, shows that the government, at all levels, is failing to fulfil these
rights. Yet the Constitution obliges the government to promote and pro-
tect these rights and to ensure that they are realised in practice. Thus,
unless there are radical improvements in how the state delivers key public
and social services, it will be a long time before a real new Zimbabwe can
be realised.
Economic Reforms
Zimbabwe is in the grip of an economic crisis that has persisted for close
to three decades. The crisis, which can be traced back to the Mugabe era,
manifests among other aspects in high unemployment rate, liquidity chal-

lenges, a dwindling formal sector, corruption, heavy local and foreign
debt, shortage of foreign currency and a lack of foreign direct investment.
These problems have persisted in the ‘Second Republic’ under the
Mnangagwa administration, dampening the euphoria and enthusiasm that
accompanied Mugabe’s ousting (Moulds 2017: 1). Economic reforms are
necessary if the new administration wants to restore the country to its
former glory as a regional economic powerhouse. Mnangagwa’s
Transitional Stabilisation Programme, an economic blueprint, carries a
number of austerity measures to arrest some of the economic challenges.
For instance, it provides measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, address debt
challenges, and curb corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours
(Government of Zimbabwe 2018: 11, 17, 18, 21). The economic reforms
are yet to make a meaningful impact, partially because they lack effective
implementation. The biggest culprit is the government, which continues
to disrespect its own laws, policies and programmes. For instance, unbud-
geted, unauthorised spending and overspending are still common
(Mhlanga 2019: 1). The executive continues to spend resources outside
the parameters approved by parliament. Such ill-disciplined fiscal behav-
iour has caused economic problems, such as hyperinflation, which have hit
the poor the hardest in a country where unemployment is high and
xtreme poverty is endemic. The absence of meaningful social safety nets
exacerbates the plight of the poor. A number of factors need to be consid-
ered if economic reforms are to succeed, such as securing buy-in from
ordinary citizens, opposition political formations, the business sector and
the major international actors, including banks and other financial institu-
tions. Furthermore, the government needs to address the contradictions
in the ideologies underlying economic reforms. For example, although the
country has pledged to liberalise the economy, key resource allocation
systems remain centrally controlled, particularly by the executive. This
could explain why efforts towards reforming the economy have thus far
failed to deliver the desired dividends.
Currency Reforms
Zimbabwe has been operating a multicurrency regime, with the dominant
currency being the US dollar since 2009. In 2016, the government intro-
duced bond notes, a surrogate currency, with the stated objectives of
incentivising exports, addressing cash shortages and preventing export of
the US dollar at the expense of the local economy. The bond notes, which
were said to be backed by hard currency under the Afreximbank facility,

were pegged at 1:1 with the greenback. In short, the bond notes were said
to be redeemable in exchange for US dollars. Initially, this arrangement
worked until the government started to introduce more bond notes to the
market to fund its expenditure (Magaisa 2018a: 3). Eventually, the bond
notes lost value against the US dollar, resulting in the latter disappearing
from formal channels and trading on the parallel market at high rates. In
October 2018, the government introduced new monetary and tax regime
measures, which included the provision of the opening of foreign currency
accounts. These operated in parallel with the Real Transfer Gross System
(RTGS)/bond notes accounts. On 24 June 2019, the government
announced that foreign currency was no longer legal tender in Zimbabwe,
making the RTGS dollar/bond notes the only acceptable medium of
exchange for local transactions. On 7 November 2019, government
announced that it was replacing the RTGS dollar with the Zimbabwe dol-
lar. Although the country has tried to address the problem of shortage of
foreign currency by banning local purchasers from using hard currency,
the problem persists. Most local businesses and service providers have con-
tinued indexing prices to the US dollar. The situation is made worse by a
lack of consistency in the application of the policy. For instance, the gov-
ernment has allowed mining companies and non-governmental organisa-
tions to continue doing business, including the payment of salaries, in US
dollars. The government is also undermining its own policy. At ports of
entry, the government policy that customs duty for car imports is made in
US dollars and not the local currency has been retained. The adoption of
about five currency regimes in less than three years shows that there is
confusion and a lack of know-how. Unfortunately, the Zimbabwe dollar
continues to lose value daily, impacting negatively on its buying power.
The potential solution to the currency crisis that is unfolding lies in a full
return to the multicurrency regime in which the Zimbabwe dollar has no
role. This is required until the economic fundamentals are in place for the
country to adopt its own currency. These include an increase in exports
and therefore an improved ability to generate enough foreign currency to
cover the country’s major needs.
isposal of Non-Performing State-Owned Enterprises

D
Zimbabwe has many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), established to
advance government policy in areas such as the provision of public infra-
structure and services such as water, energy, telecommunications,
transportation, health and education, to mention just a few. Almost all

SOEs have not performed well ever since the economic situation took a
downturn. In 2016, for example, the Auditor General reported that 15
SOEs faced collapse as they were in untenable financial positions (2016:
2). The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and its subsidiaries,
National Railways of Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board and TelOne
were some of those that were reported to be on the brink of collapse
owing to a deplorable financial situation (Majaka 2017: 1; Auditor-General
2016: 2). In the post-Mugabe era, the government needs to put in place
policies that promote good corporate governance in these organisations.
A critical part of realising this objective is ensuring that skills, competency
and experience constitute the main basis upon which people are appointed
to senior positions in these SOEs rather than patronage, as has been the
preferred practice. Given this background, the new administration should
also consider privatising some of the SOEs (Majaka 2017: 1).
Investment
There is no doubt that real economic development will not be realised in
Zimbabwe unless there is tangible foreign direct investment. If the coun-
try is to attract investment, it is crucial that it reviews its investment policy,
which under Mugabe was primarily anchored on the Look East policy.
Adopted by Mugabe after western governments imposed restrictions on
Zimbabwe, the policy seeks to expand bilateral and trade relations and
offer priority to investors from the Far East countries. Chinyama (2015: 1)
argues that the Look East policy often benefited China more than
Zimbabwe, given that China has access to Zimbabwe’s abundant natural
resources at low cost. He further argues that most of the investments
China made in Zimbabwe have not generated meaningful employment
opportunities, as Chinese companies bring their own workers (Chinyama
2015: 1). Other concerns are that local employees are paid wages that are
below those stipulated by the government and that Chinese companies do
not often place premium on environmental impact assessment (Chinyama
2015: 1). As a result, many of the development projects established by the
Chinese were undertaken at the expense of environmental preservation.
Since Mugabe, President Mnangagwa has tried to reach out to western
countries for investment. In this regard, he has sent ministerial delegations
to engage with their governments and to participate in platforms for
investment, such as the World Economic Forum. In addition, the
Mnangagwa government has amended the Indigenisation and Economic
Empowerment Act and adopted the motto ‘Zimbabwe is Open for

Business’ in a bid to attract investment. Real investment has not been
forthcoming despite all these spirited efforts, because the rhetoric has not
translated into real action. Zimbabwe’s human rights and rule of law
records seem to be the major stumbling block. The disputed election of
Mnangagwa has come with legitimacy deficiencies. Magaisa (2018b: 4)
argues that Mnangagwa’s administration needs to fix this deficit through
engaging the opposition, particularly Nelson Chamisa’s MDC, and under-
taking serious political reforms. Without this, it is highly unlikely that
investors will invest in Zimbabwe in the near future. While foreign invest-
ment is necessary, it is also important that the new administration improves
the environment for local investment, as charity begins at home. For
example, the new administration can promote local investment by reduc-
ing taxes, eliminating red tape in the approval of investment projects,
reviewing the procedures for doing business and providing various
incentives.
he Stimulation of Local Production and the Role of the Reserve Bank

T
Zimbabwe has been struggling to manage its imports bill, with imports
significantly greater than exports. The implication is that more foreign
currency goes, adversely affecting the balance of payments. To make mat-
ters worse, the majority of the imports are on consumption and not pro-
duction goods and services. This means that the foreign currency is being
spent on goods that do not generate additional foreign currency. As a
result, the country the country is struggling to mobilise enough foreign
currency to meet its needs. In the absence of sufficient foreign currency,
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has been allocating foreign cur-
rency to different sectors depending on priority considerations. The chal-
lenge is that some of the key sectors have not always been able to access
the foreign currency they need to enable the production of goods and
services. The result is often that there are shortages of certain goods and
services which has a knock-on effect on price increases. The role of the
RBZ in the allocation of foreign currency is also inefficient and provides
room for rent-seeking. It is a mere attempt to address the symptom of the
problem rather than being the long-term solution to foreign currency
shortages—which lies with increasing local production and increasing
exports (Magaisa 2018a: 3). Local production can be stimulated in various
ways, including the provision of incentives to local industries. Until
Zimbabwe begins to rely on its local industries, particularly for
consumption goods, the balance of payments and therefore foreign cur-

rency shortages will remain a big problem. The role of the RBZ in quasi-
fiscal activities is also problematic, and takes it away from its core function
of setting monetary policy. Each time the bank is involved in quasi-fiscal
activities, from the days of Mugabe when the RBZ Governor was Gideon
Gono, the result has often been that the inflation rate increases and debt
balloons, among other challenges. Unfortunately, those in power have
turned a blind eye to this lesson from the past.
Vertical Power-Sharing
Like most post-colonial African governments, the ZANU–PF-led govern-
ment inherited a system of government that concentrated governmental
powers and resources at the centre. This centralisation of governmental
powers continued as Zimbabwe walked into independence, giving rise to
an over-centralised system of government. Hatchard et al. (2004: 20) con-
tend that this system gave ‘little or no space for alternative challenges,
questions or control’ at both vertical and horizontal levels. The respon-
siveness and accountability of the government were, therefore, compro-
mised. The problems that Zimbabwe has experienced since 2000 can
partially be attributed to the nature of this system. Building a new
Zimbabwe will require the dismantling of this system and its replacement
by a form of government in which governmental powers are shared at
multiple levels. According to Manor (2013: 32), if this multilevel system
of government is to work well, key ingredients must be in place. First,
substantial powers must be devolved to democratic subnational units.
Secondly, substantial resources must be devolved to subnational level.
Thirdly, mechanisms that promote the horizontal accountability of
bureaucrats to elected representatives as well as the downward account-
ability of elected representatives to the citizens are required. If these ingre-
dients are in place, such a system of government has the potential to
deliver development, democracy and peace (Chigwata 2018: 4–6).
he Democratic Benefit
T
Vertical power-sharing can deepen democracy in many ways. The organ-
isation of government at multilevel levels creates multiple opportunities
for political participation whether directly or through representatives
(Smith 2007: 156). Citizens are likely to participate more when govern-
ment is physically closer to them. Civil society activities are often
stimulated when governmental powers and resources are injected into

subnational and local arenas in order to influence decisions over the use of
such resources (Manor 2013: 33). Smaller political parties and indepen-
dent candidates, who often face difficulties in competing for political
power at the national level, have a higher chance of succeeding at subna-
tional and local level when the political costs of mobilisation tend to be
low (Chigwata 2018: 5). The overall effect of this is that the democratic
pluralism that lubricates a democratic society is promoted. Citizens are
also more likely to hold public officials accountable at subnational or local
level owing to the closer proximity of government. A multilevel system of
government reduces the concentration of power at central level and the
powers given to subnational governments can be effective in checking
central government and preventing the arbitrary exercise of power
(Hatchard et al. 2004: 187). This vertical separation of powers can go a
long way towards complementing the horizontal separation of powers,
involving the role of the judiciary, parliament and independent constitu-
tional commissions (Chigwata 2018: 4–5). Thus, vertical power-sharing
has the potential to enhance participatory, responsive and accountable
governance in Zimbabwe.
he Development Benefit
T
Alongside its democratic benefits, vertical power-sharing also has the
potential to engender development as public resources and power are dif-
fused closer to the people. This enables the easier provision of public
goods and services in line with local needs and preferences. The result is
often that the government’s responsiveness is improved (Manor 2013:
33). With decentralised governmental powers and resources, citizens in
different parts of the country can define and lead their own developments.
Some provinces are endowed with a variety of natural resources, yet the
level of development in these provinces does not mirror this rich resource
base. This imbalance can be attributed partially to the centralised
approaches of exploiting natural resources, which have defined resource
extraction and utilisation since independence at the expense of local com-
munities. Real vertical power-sharing will ensure that local communities
have direct access to the resources within their respective communities, so
they can define their own development. Development projects led by the
people themselves are likely to be more sustainable than those imposed by
central government. Another benefit associated with vertical power-shar-
ing is that it encourages competition, innovation and experimentation
among subnational and local governments, which may result in the devel-
opment of superior public policies that can make a positive impact on
development objectives.
eeping the Nation Together

K
For a while, Zimbabwe has been polarised primarily along political lines.
This polarisation is beginning to adversely impact national integration and
peace. Signs of one of the most dangerous forms of polarisation, ethnic
polarisation, are also emerging. The key question is what will keep the
national together. Vertical power-sharing can be a potential solution, given
that it creates an environment that allows geographically concentrated
groups to determine and shape those issues that immediately affect their
lives (Chigwata 2018: 5). The potential for this is high in countries where
ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in certain areas, such as
Zimbabwe, where almost everyone has a province and local authority area
that they call home. Most minority ethnic groups, such as the Ndebele,
Venda and Tonga, are geographically concentrated in certain provinces,
usually along border areas. Even the subethnic groups of the dominant
Shona are geographically concentrated in certain areas. This concentration
of ethnic groups, especially in border areas, increases the risk for secession.
However, the potential for this can be neutralised by real vertical power-
sharing, which creates an environment where local interests can be accom-
modated ‘within the stability of a strong central authority’ (Hatchard et al.
2004: 185). The resultant multilevel system of government prevents a
winner takes all situation, since political power can still be exercised not
just at national but also at subnational and local levels (Manor 2013: 33).
Vertical power-sharing has a high chance of accommodating a diversity of
interests. Thus, governmental powers and resources should be diffused
not only to subnational governments but also to the people.
Lessons from the past show that Zimbabwe needs to do away with
an over-centralised system of government. The big advantage is that the
2013 Constitution, while not perfect, provides a foundation upon which a
devolved system of government can be built. This shift towards a devolved
system of government ‘is premised on the fundamental belief that once
they are entrusted with their own destiny through the medium of pop-
ular local democratic institutions, human beings can govern themselves
in peace and dignity in pursuit of their collective well-being’ (Hatchard
et al. 2004: 185). Zimbabwe has much to gain if it adopts a devolved
system of government which can be accommodated in a unitary form of
government. It should, however, be acknowledged that a multilevel sys-

tem of government requires significant state capacity, which is currently
not available (see Manor 2013: 32). Nevertheless, the absence of signifi-
cant state capacity should not be the reason why centralisation should be
adopted, as a capacity-building process can run parallel to the process of
devolution.
International Integration
Ever since Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform
Programme in the early 2000s, its relations with multilateral institutions
and western countries have been sour. It has defaulted on several of its
debt obligations. The country has isolated itself from the west preferring
to engage with the east. As a result, and unlike some of its African coun-
terparts, Zimbabwe has not been able to access financial support from the
multilateral institutions and to attract significant budgetary support from
the western countries. Yet the country badly needs a cash injection to
stimulate its faltering economy. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 128) argues that
‘[i]n this century of globalisation, it is impossible for any nation, including
the developed West, to try and isolate itself even in a “splendid isolation”
fashion from the complex web and framework of the international com-
munity’. Even the eastern countries that Zimbabwe has been dealing with
for the past two decades do business with the west. Zimbabwe does not
have the luxury to choose which countries to deal with given its precarious
economic situation. Thus, ‘the way forward for Zimbabwe lies in return-
ing to the diplomatic chessboard and to bargain from within, rather than
to adopt a belligerent stance against the international community’
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 129). Zimbabwe has no choice but to reenter
the international family of nations by normalising relations with multilat-
eral institutions and the west. The settling of debt obligations and improv-
ing its human rights record are some of the many measures that can have
a positive impact on Zimbabwe’s relations with international actors.
Conclusion
Zimbabwe has experienced several decades of political and economic chal-
lenges that can largely be attributed to the political and economic choices
of the ruling elites. Very few in the ruling ZANU–PF or close to the party
are willing to acknowledge their role in or take the blame for Zimbabwe’s
economic and political crisis. Some of them attribute the economic crisis
to sanctions or restrictions imposed on Zimbabwe by the west, thereby
choosing to ignore the impact of corruption and mismanagement, among
other ills, that have bedevilled the country for several decades. The coun-
try is endowed with rich resources, both natural and human, that are
needed to reboot economic development. In 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a
new Constitution that is progressive in many respects and provides a foun-
dation for Zimbabwe to move forward. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (
2003: 129) What the country has been lacking is ‘a flexible, malleable and
visionary leadership capable of charting a new dispensation not clouded in
bankrupt ideologies, but consonant with the prevailing local, regional and
international developments’. The fall of Robert Mugabe in November
2017 provided an opportunity for the country to break from its ugly past
and set a new development path. Mugabe’s successor, Emmerson
Mnangagwa, announced himself on the international stage as a reformist
willing to change the political and economic course that has led the former
bread basket of Southern Africa to a basket case. He announced the birth
of a ‘Second Republic’ characterised by clean governance, an open busi-
ness environment and widened scope for the exercise of fundamental
human rights and freedoms. The change process has, however, been slow
and painful, making it indistinguishable from the old dispensation. Unless
the new administration begins to walk the talk of change, Zimbabwe will
remain a basket case. What is required is a governance culture where polit-
ical, private and individual interests do not thrive at the expense of the
public good.
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CHAPTER 14
Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic

Masculinity in Zimbabwe’s Operation
Restore Legacy
Lyton Ncube
Introduction
This study demonstrates the (hetero)gendered nature of Zimbabwean
politics. It discusses the ways in which politics in contemporary Zimbabwe
is complicit in the construction of hegemonic masculinity, in the process
reproducing and reinforcing male-gendered domination, gender exclu-
sion, sexism and misogyny. Theoretically, the study is guided by Raewyn
Connell’s (1987, 1995) hegemonic masculinity concept. Hegemonic
masculinity refers to ‘the configuration of gender practice which embodies
the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy,
which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men
and the subordination of women’ (Connell 1995: 77).
Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Southern African Development
Community protocol on Gender and Development, which is committed
to achieving gender equality and equity through the development and
L. Ncube (*)
Communication Studies Department, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_14
332 L. NCUBE
implementation of a gender-responsive legislation, policies and pro-

grammes. In addition, Zimbabwe has a quota system for women aimed at
increasing female representation and participation in political parties and
parliament. Section 124(b) of Zimbabwe’s 2013 constitution reads:
for the life of the first two Parliaments after the effective date, an additional
sixty women members, six from each of the provinces into which Zimbabwe
is divided, elected through a system of proportional representation based on
the votes cast for candidates representing political parties in a general elec-
tion for constituency members in the provinces.
Regardless of efforts to promote female participation in the public

sphere, misogyny is rife in political discourse. Gender relations in
Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, remain largely biased against women. Despite
their seemingly high demographic numbers, women’s participation in
decision-making remains glaringly low (Gudlanga 2013; Mutopo and
Chiweshe 2014). Male dominance is not only a sexual and social problem
but also a political problem, which is directed at maintaining existing
power relations that subordinate women (Gudlanga 2013: 151).
Significant studies have examined gender and politics in colonial and
post-colonial Zimbabwe (Gaidzanwa 1985; Chitando and Mateveke
2012; Gudlanga 2013; Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014; Tendi 2016). The
main focus of these studies is the nexus of government gender policies and
female participation in politics. However, studies from ‘below’ making
thick descriptions (see Geertz 1973) of the general public’s views and
attitudes towards women manoeuvring into traditionally perceived male-
dominated domains are scarce. The study analyses political banter, includ-
ing songs, chants, slogans, placards, posters and WhatsApp memes directed
at former first lady Grace Mugabe during Zimbabwe’s November 2017
military coup, codenamed Operation Restore Legacy.
Background and Context
Since its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been ruled by male presi-
dents only. These include former presidents Canaan Banana, Robert
Gabriel Mugabe and the incumbent Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa.
This creates an impression that the presidency is a male domain. A golden
moment for Zimbabwean women was when prominent politician Joice
Teurairopa Mujuru served as one of Mugabe’s deputies both in the
14 MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 333
Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and in

government between 2004 and 2014.
With age taking its toll on Mugabe, Mujuru was touted as one of the
front runners to succeed Mugabe and potentially the first female presi-
dent. However, her bid to succeed Mugabe suffered a major knock in
December 2014. This period was defined by an ugly political succession
war within the ruling ZANU–PF. Press reports suggested that Mujuru
and then Minister of Defence Emmerson Mnangagwa were embroiled in
bitter factional struggles in an attempt to succeed President Mugabe.
Eventually, Mujuru was dismissed from both the party and government.
Mujuru’s major rival Mnangagwa replaced her both in the party and in
government (Tendi 2016).
However, Mujuru’s demise is incomplete without mentioning the role
played by a fellow woman—Grace Mugabe, wife of the former president.
Grace Mugabe formally joined politics in August 2014, assuming leader-
ship of the powerful and vocal ZANU–PF Women’s League. Her decision
to join politics triggered extensive media coverage amid speculations that
she was preparing to succeed her ageing husband (Chibuwe 2016). Upon
assuming the Women’s League position, Grace boasted at a number of
ZANU–PF rallies that she was now the ‘no-nonsense referee’ in the party.
True to her words, she showed ruthlessness in officiating at ZANU–PF
factional battles, with yellow and red cards being regularly flashed. Mujuru
became the first major political casualty to be jettisoned from the field of
play by the no-nonsense referee. Prior to the December 2014 ZANU–PF
congress, Grace embarked on nationwide rallies dubbed ‘Meet the People’.
During the rallies, she lambasted Joice Mujuru, raising unfounded allega-
tions that she was lazy, corrupt, a gossiper, a factional leader and plotting
to usurp Mugabe from power (Chibuwe 2016; Tendi 2016). In essence,
Grace Mugabe sought to exert moral authority by questioning Mujuru’s
moral decency and her suitability as a political leader (Tendi 2016). Such
accusations precipitated the suspensions and dismissals of nearly 200 top
party and government officials, including Mujuru (Chibuwe 2016).
Grace paved the way for Mnangagwa to the presidency by facilitating
the removal of Mujuru, but their alliance was short lived as factionalism
resurfaced in the post-Mujuru era. Two rival factions, Lacoste and
Generation 40 (G40), allegedly fronted by Mnangagwa and Grace Mugabe
respectively, became embroiled in bitter battles to succeed Robert Mugabe.
ZANU–PF commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, Professor Jonathan Moyo
and Mugabe’s nephew Patrick Zhuwawo were reportedly Grace’s key
334 L. NCUBE
allies. Using similar methods to those that helped to jettison Mujuru,

Grace embarked on nationwide ‘Youth Interface’ rallies. These were preg-
nant with venom and openly denounced Vice-President Mnangagwa,
accusing him of fanning factionalism and plotting to dethrone Mugabe
through unorthodox means.
President Mugabe dismissed Mnangagwa from both the government
and party on 5 November 2017, accusing him of disloyalty, deceitfulness,
disrespect and unreliability (Machivenyika 2017), when Mnangagwa’s key
ally, General Chiwenga, was in China on official duties. Upon his return,
Chiwenga issued a statement declaring that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces
(ZDF), major stockholders in the ruling ZANU–PF, were not happy with
purges against cadres who had liberation credentials (Chidza 2017). To be
precise, the military were not happy that ‘counter-revolutionaries’ around
Mugabe had hijacked state and party power (Ankomah 2018). Chiwenga
underscored that the ZDF were ready to intervene if such purges were not
reversed. It is important to note that the military made their move after
the Zimbabwe Republic Police had attempted to arrest Chiwenga at
Robert Mugabe International Airport upon his return from China. For
General Chiwenga and some of his top allies in the army and ZANU, it
was now therefore a do or die mission; it was either Mugabe or them.
Consequently, on 14 November, there were reports that heavy military
equipment had been moved and placed in strategic areas in and around
Harare (Ankomah 2018; Asuelime 2018). In the early hours of the 15th,
the military through Major-General Sibusiso Moyo announced Operation
Restore Legacy via the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (Ankomah
2018; Asuelime 2018).
This military intervention culminated in the resignation of President
Robert Mugabe, opening the door for the return of his former ally turned
opponent Emmerson Mnangagwa from exile in South Africa as the
president-designate (Asuelime 2018). However, before Mugabe’s resigna-
tion, the military and war veterans mobilized members of the public to
march in solidarity with Operation Restore Legacy. Thus on 18 November
2017, thousands of Zimbabweans marched in Harare and other towns
and cities, calling for Robert Mugabe to quit. During public demonstra-
tions, the first lady Grace Mugabe became a target of sexist and misogynis-
tic vitriol. This study explores gendered and sexist discourses that
manifested and played out both in the streets and digital spaces during
Operation Restore Legacy. The military announced the end of Operation
Restore Legacy on 18 December 2017, so events beyond that date will
not be analysed.
Literature Review: Gendered Zimbabwean

Public Sphere
Studies on gender and politics in Zimbabwe have been a focus of academ-
ics over time. Some literature suggests that the Zimbabwean political
landscape is highly gendered and biased against women (Gaidzanwa 1985;
Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014; Chikafa 2014; Gudlanga 2013; Tendi 2016;
Ncube 2018). While women generally outnumber their male counter-
parts, their participation in public affairs remains limited (Gudlanga 2013;
Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014). Male dominance is not only a sexual and
social problem but also a political problem directed at maintaining existing
power relations that subordinate women (Gudlanga 2013: 151).
While there is a growing literature on gender and politics both in colo-
nial and postcolonial Zimbabwe (Gudlanga 2013; Tendi 2016), most of
these studies have a bias towards the interface between gender policies and
female participation in politics and the economy. Studies paying particular
attention to ‘ordinary’ people’s views and attitudes towards female partici-
pation in politics are few and far between.
Literature also shows that in pre-colonial Zimbabwe women were to an
extent not only confined to the public sphere but also actively participated
in it (Gudlanga 2013). For example, some women were chiefs, arbitrators
in courts, village elders, leaders in wars and spirit mediums. Zimbabwean
women had power and were recognized in their traditional society as
exemplified by mbuya Nehanda, a legendary figure who played a signifi-
cant role in the history of the liberation of Zimbabwe (Gudlanga 2013).
However, women’s participation in politics and the public sphere declined
during the colonial period, as capitalism strengthened patriarchy by
according men more elaborate citizenship rights (Barnes 1999; Nhongo-
Simbanegavi 2000; Gudlanga 2013).
Studies also show that African women participated in the liberation
struggle both as armed combatants within the Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe African People’s
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African
People’s Union, and as rural supporters who provided local groups of
guerrilla fighters with information and logistical support as well as domes-
tic services such as cooking and laundry (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000;
Ranchod-Nilsson 2006; Gudlanga 2013). For example, ZANLA had
female instructors, including Joyce Mujuru, while ZIPRA had female
instructors such as Molly Mpofu, who trained ZIPRA combatants at their
336 L. NCUBE
base in Zambia (Gudlanga 2013). Apart from these high-ranking female

cadres, both ZANLA and ZIPRA had a lot of women who were fighting
as part of their armies inside the country (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000;
Gudlanga 2013).
However, struggles for gender equity ensued in post-independence
Zimbabwe. The newly born Zimbabwe nation struggled to chart a course
for gender policy and practice (Ranchod-Nilsson 2006). For instance, sev-
eral women participated in the liberation struggle in various significant
ways, but there was no concrete commitment from the ZANU–PF gov-
ernment to transform gender relations or improve women’s circumstances
(Ranchod-Nilsson 2006). Joice Mujuru was the only woman who made it
into Mugabe’s male-dominated cabinet.
Away from politics, there have been publications focusing on
Zimbabwean women’s struggles with patriarchy in areas such as the music
industry (Mhiripiri 2011; Chitando and Mateveke 2012; Ngoshi and
Mutekwa 2013) and football fandom (Chiweshe 2014; Ncube 2014;
Chikafa 2014; Ncube and Chawana 2018). Such studies show that not all
women have submitted to patriarchy, but some devise various strategies to
claim space and express their artistic talents (Chitando and Mateveke 2012).
Focusing on the Mbare Chimurenga choir musical group, Ngoshi and
Mutekwa (2013) contend that women are used to articulate propaganda,
conformity with and submission to current power structures. However,
Tendi (2016) warns that when writing about gender and politics, we must
be wary of reproducing gender as a binary system that depicts women as
passive actors or even simply as victims. He cites the case of Grace Mugabe,
who invoked gendered discourses to her own benefit. She repeated many
of the sexualized slurs against Mujuru (Tendi 2016).
This study builds on this vast body of literature, contributing to the
debate on gender and politics in Africa and Zimbabwe. Focusing on a
topical subject, Operation Restore Legacy, the study’s uniqueness lies in
the endeavour to capture and critically theorize views from below.
Operation Restore Legacy is yet to be interrogated through gender lens.
Theoretical Context: Hegemonic Masculinity

Raewyn Connell’s (1987, 1995) hegemonic masculinity concept provides
a useful framework for understanding intersections of hegemonic mascu-
linity, sexism and misogyny in Operation Restore Legacy. Our focus is on
the demonization of Grace Mugabe during the period under study, and
we discuss attitudes and practices in Zimbabwe that promote gender

inequalities, sexism and misogyny in the political arena. The concept of
hegemonic masculinity has been used in gender studies since the early
1980s to explain men’s power over women (Jewkes et al. 2015). Connell
(2005: 77) contends that hegemonic masculinity is ‘the configuration of
gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to
guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination
of women’.
Gee (2009) avers that Connell based her notion of hegemonic mascu-
linity on Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony theory. Hegemony is a position of
dominance attained through relative consensus rather than regular force
(Gramsci 1971). Hegemony addresses the relations of societal power, ide-
ology and the domination of ‘common sense’, the taken-for granted, what
appears natural or normal (Hearn 2012). It highlights domination and
degrees of consent, whether contingent or backed by force. The societal
consensus is one that is built among those who benefit from the promo-
tion of masculinity, as well as many of those who are oppressed by it,
notably women (Jewkes et al. 2015). Hegemonic masculinity is, as much
for women as for men, a cultural ideal of manhood, which is rewarded by
women’s interests, attentions and efforts to replicate this ideal in their
male relatives and associates (Jewkes et al. 2015). Using the case of Grace
Mugabe, the study benefits from the concept in demonstrating violence
and sexual assault visited upon women aspiring for presidency in contem-
porary Zimbabwe.
Hegemony ‘involves persuasion of the greater part of the population,
particularly through the media, and the organization of social institutions
in ways that appear “natural”, “ordinary”, “normal”’ (Donaldson 1993:
645). The study demonstrates how politics in Zimbabwe serves as a site
where spatial arrangements of domination are produced, reinforced and
naturalized. Critically, it demonstrates how political discourse serves as a
strategic vehicle through which particular conceptions of gender are mani-
fested as natural or commonsensical and are reproduced for a large audi-
ence. Gruneau and Whitson (1993: 192) argue that historically constituted
male dominated spaces ‘assume considerable importance in a changing
world where traditional places and times for men’s exclusive association
are disappearing’, resulting in many men experiencing ‘a loss of control’.
Politics in Zimbabwe remains one of the exclusive male domains. An anal-
ysis of chants, talks, posts and digital media memes targeting Grace
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Mugabe during Operation Restore Legacy can show us how politics func-
tions as a vital cog in the country’s hegemonic masculinity.
Hegemonic masculinity is grounded in the feminist perspectives of
male social dominance and patriarchy (Connell 1987; Graham 2014;
Peled 2016). All men benefit from patriarchy (Connell 1995). In essence,
in a patriarchal society, women are generally placed in a subordinate posi-
tion, and men tend to dominate the economy, politics and the family.
Although men are structurally related to women in a superior position and
inherently benefit from the patriarchal dividend, they do have a choice
about whether or not actively to occupy oppressive positions vis-à-vis
women and other men or to resist these (Jewkes et al. 2015). This choice
may be highly constrained owing to a lack of exposure to other ideas and
information, but it is ultimately still a choice (Jewkes et al. 2015). The
study demonstrates how male dominance in politics is even naturalized by
some members of the general public in Zimbabwe.
Connell and Messerschmitt (2005) argue that there can be more than
one hegemonic masculinity within a society. Various masculinities are in
existence at any given moment (Connell 1995). These include hegemonic
masculinities, subordinated masculinities, marginalized masculinities,
complicit masculinities and protest masculinities (Connell 2000: 30). The
hierarchy of masculinities is an expression of the unequal shares in privi-
lege held by different groups of men (Connell 1995). Hegemonic mascu-
linity is the most respected, desired and dominant form of masculine
identity for a given culture or subculture (Gee 2009).
While hegemonic masculinity is often seen as a ‘configuration of gender
practice’, it is sometimes presented as a cultural ideal or an aspiration that
only limited numbers of men can practise (Connell and Messerschmitt
2005: 849) or even one that can never be fulfilled. For instance, working-
class men in poor African countries cannot be regarded as hegemonic, as
they do not perceive themselves to be ‘in power’ (Jewkes et al. 2015).
Flood (2002) highlights two interrelated notions of hegemonic masculin-
ity: first, as a particular configuration of gender practice related to legiti-
mizing male authority, and second, as a description of the type of masculinity
that is culturally valued in a given society. Spandler and McKeown (2012)
assert that the reproduction of dominant gender relations is complex and
subtle. The study shows how hegemonic masculinity operates and legiti-
mizes male authority in subtle but complex ways, while marginalizing
women with aspirations for the highest political office. The study also dem-
onstrates how hegemonic masculinity is valorized especially in contexts
where male dominance is exhibited against women perceived as politically

ambitious who are viewed as working to subvert the traditional gender
order. Critically, the study demonstrates how analysed posters and chants
conflate hegemonic masculinity with heterosexuality and virility.
Hegemonic masculinity, just like any other social identity, changes over
time and across cultures (Connell and Messerschmitt 2005; Graham
2014). According to Connell (1995), hegemonic masculinity is not per-
manent and is always prone to contestation at any given moment in soci-
ety. However, regardless of such shortcomings, the concept is persuasive
in discussing Zimbabwean politics as a collision point for hegemonic mas-
culinity, sexism and misogyny.
Methodology
The study is qualitative. It employs an explanatory case study design to
examine intersections of political discourse, sexism, hegemonic masculin-
ity and misogyny during Operation Restore Legacy. A case study is a quali-
tative inquiry that aims at gaining an in-depth conception of a given
situation and the meaning that the situation has for the parties involved
(Yin 2011). Case studies are usually preferred ‘when how or why ques-
tions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events,
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-
life context’ (Yin 2011: 1).
Data was collected especially through ethnographic methods, using
observation that enabled the researcher to make ‘thick descriptions’ (see
Geertz 1973) of the phenomenon under investigation. On 18 November
2017, Zimbabweans from all walks of life took to the streets in most of the
country’s towns and cities calling for Robert Mugabe to resign. My par-
ticipation in this historic demonstration provided me with an opportunity
to reflect on the gendered nature of Zimbabwe’s political space. I was an
observer as participant in arguably the largest demonstration that took
place in Harare on this particular day. Upon arrival from Gweru (my
home), I joined fellow demonstrators at Robert Mugabe Square, which is
nearer to the ruling ZANU–PF headquarters. We embarked on an approx-
imately 10 kilometre walk to Zimbabwe Grounds, in the high-density sub-
urb of Highfields, where politicians from across the political divide
addressed a bumper crowd. After the address, we marched back to Harare’s
Central Business District and proceeded to State House, where we hoped
to gain access to Robert Mugabe. However, the military denied this, so we
proceeded to Mugabe’s private residence in Borrowdale.
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Though most of the data was collected during the Harare demonstra-
tion, the process begun on my trip to the capital from Gweru. On our way,
songs and discussions revolving around Zimbabwe’s political situation
dominated, with Grace Mugabe being the main target of sexist ridicule.
However, episodes worth thick descriptions were evident on our way to
and from Zimbabwe Grounds. I paid close attention to misogynistic and
sexist banter directed at Grace Mugabe and its possible symbolic mean-
ings. My specific focus was on songs, chants, slogans, dances, placards and
posters. I used my mobile phone to capture both visual and audio material
worthy of analysis. During the march, casual conversations with fellow
demonstrators also ensued. Purposive sampling was used to select material
for analysis (Fig. 14.1).
Fig. 14.1 Demonstrators gathered outside State House after the long march to
and from the Highfields suburb. (Source: Author)
Besides this data obtained through fieldwork, I also took an interest in

WhatsApp memes that ridiculed Grace Mugabe during the period under
study. Papacharissi (2002) contends that online platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter, blogs and online newspapers, offer citizens a public
space to produce public opinion. Thus, it was critical to subject these
memes to semiotic and qualitative content analysis. Findings are presented
in two groups.
Findings
‘General Chiwenga give us a boob-less commander-in-chief’

This study demonstrates that Grace Mugabe was subjected to misogynistic
and sexist vitriol during the course of Operation Restore Legacy. Chants,
songs and slogans openly denounced Grace, accusing her of harbouring
presidential ambitions and straying into a heterogendered male space. A
sexist song sung by demonstrators, together with escorting members of
the military, supports my observation:
General Chiwenga tipeiwo Commander mukuru (General Chiwenga, give us

a commander in chief)
Tipeiwo commander (Give us a commander)
Commander asina mazamu (A boob-less commander in chief)
Commander Mnangagwa (Commander in chief Emmerson Mnangagwa)
Susan Rakoczy contends:
Sexism is prejudice plus power directed against women, undergirded by the

structures of patriarchy. Based on the Latin for ‘father’, pater, it literally
means the rule by a father or fathers. In patriarchy, the male is the norm and
women are understood to be inferior in every way: biologically, intellectually,
anthropologically, socially. Women—all women, every woman—are inher-
ently of lesser value than any male human being. (Rakoczy 2004: 10)
The song quoted can be understood in a specific context. Zimbabwe’s

president doubles as the Commander in-Chief of the country’s Defence
Forces. The country’s military is an integral part of ZANU–PF’s architec-
ture, though it does not conventionally appear as a formal part of the
party’s structure. On the eve of Operation Restore Legacy, General
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Chiwenga stated that the Defence Forces were major stockholders in the
ruling ZANU–PF party, so they were intervening to deal with ‘counter-
revolutionary’ elements that had infiltrated the party (Chidza 2017).
Mnangagwa had already been sacked, and speculations were rife that
Grace was set to succeed her husband,1 assuming the powerful position of
Commander in-Chief of the Defence Forces. In essence, upon joining
politics in August 2014, Grace Mugabe had to battle media rumours and
speculation that she wanted to succeed her husband (Ankomah 2018).
This was coupled with claims that she had instigated a ‘bedroom coup’,
usurping her ageing husband’s power to run affairs of the state and
ZANU–PF. This bedroom coup talk is credited to Jabulani Sibanda, a
former leader of the war veterans. In 2014, Sibanda, one of Mujuru’s per-
ceived allies, bemoaned that Grace had staged a bedroom and boardroom
coup to control the party and government (Matenga 2014). However,
Sibanda was denounced by opponents, largely perceived as Mnangagwa
sympathizers, who described his comments as treasonous. Incidentally, in
November 2017, some of those people who had denounced Sibanda were
shouting ‘bedroom coup!’.
If the speculation that Grace would become president came to pass,
army generals (predominantly male), including Chiwenga, would salute
and take orders from a female commander in-chief. And in the song
quoted, ZANU–PF members, the army and some members of the general
public expressed resentment of the idea of a female president. It appears,
the area of discomfort was mazamu/breasts, key features of womanhood.
Studies on gender demonstrate that the female body remains a site of con-
testation. In most cases, misogyny manifests through vilification of female
body parts. For instance, in Zimbabwean football stadia, sexist songs
revolve around female body parts, such as buttocks and breasts (Chiweshe
2014; Ncube and Chawana 2018). In this case, the country’s president
should be a man—without boobs.
The demonstrating public also sang and chanted ‘Upresident hausi
hwemhuri hwekusiirana’ (presidency is not a family inheritance). Some of
the demonstrators shouted, ‘No to Mugabe Dynasty, Grace Stop It’. I
submit that such chants were motivated because by this point some
1
However, addressing a press conference at his Borrowdale residence on the eve of the 30
July 2018 disputed Zimbabwe national elections, Robert Mugabe dismissed allegations that
he wanted to hand over power to Grace. He said he wanted Sydney Sekeramayi, his former
Minister of Defence, to succeed him.
Zimbabweans hated Robert Mugabe and no longer wanted to be reminded

of his 37-year tyrannical rule. During his presidency, Mugabe and his wife
had gained a voluminous record of human rights violations, corruption
and profligacy in the midst of glaring poverty, with most Zimbabweans
living below the poverty line. Moreover, Grace’s ascendancy to the presi-
dency meant a continuation of Mugabeism even in the aftermath of the
unpopular dictator.
Some members of the demonstrating crowds waved placards bearing
pictures of Mnangagwa and shouted, ‘Bring back VP Mnangagwa’. Some
chanted, ‘Mnangagwa is our true liberator and hero, Grace you are a nui-
sance’. Slogans were chanted, such as ‘Pamberi ne Garwe redu woye
(Forward with our crocodile). Songs praising Mnangagwa were com-
posed. For instance, people sang:
Mnangagwa ingwena (Mnangagwa is a crocodile)

Mnangagwa ingwena (Mnangagwa is a crocodile)
Tinodawo ngwena yedu itungamire (We want our crocodile to lead
the nation)
Mnangagwa ndibaba vedu (Mnangagwa is our father)
Mnangagwa’s supporters call him Ngwena/Garwe or crocodile. He

earned this nickname during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle when he was
a member of the so-called crocodile gang, which was famous for bombing
petrol tanks in the industrial area of Southerton in Salisbury (now Harare).
Some also say he earned the title from his shrewd tactics, which were simi-
lar to those of a crocodile, in outmanoeuvring opponents. Importantly,
demonstrators demanded for the appointment of Mnangagwa as presi-
dent, and not Grace. As argued by Rakoczy (2004), in patriarchal estab-
lishments, fathers are legitimized as natural rulers while women are viewed
are treated as inferior. Chakona (2011: 14) argues that ‘the term patriar-
chy refers to autocratic rule by the male head of a family but now it broadly
refers to social systems in which power is primarily held by adult men’.
Patriarchy is an ideology that idolizes men and minimizes the role of
women (Chitando and Mateveke 2012). Indeed, Zimbabwe remains
patriarchal, as observed during Operation Restore Legacy.
Grace Mugabe was also mocked as ‘Gucci Grace’, arguably for her
expensive taste in fashion, which further strained an already ailing
Zimbabwean purse. She was equated to Marie Antoinette, the last Queen
of France before the 1789 French Revolution that ousted King Louis
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XVI. I observed that the angry demonstrators pinned all economic prob-
lems recurring in Zimbabwe on Grace. Some expressed that Grace spent
taxpayers’ money on luxuries in Dubai, Malaysia, Singapore, London and
elsewhere. However, it is critical to note that the angry demonstrators
overlooked the fact that Zimbabwe’s economic problems went far beyond
Grace Mugabe’s expensive lifestyle. The post-2000 period in Zimbabwe is
largely regarded in academic circles as the ‘crisis’ decade (Hammar and
Raftopolous 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).
Name calling and infantilization were also rampant, with Grace being
labelled ‘Marujata’, or a talkative village girl. In what can be viewed as a
denouncement of female leadership, some (including women) chanted
‘No to petticoat’ (leadership). This reinforces the patriarchal philosophy
that women should be confined to the domestic arena. Grace was also vili-
fied and framed as a prostitute. People sang:
Taramba kutongwa nehure (we can’t be ruled by a prostitute)

VaChiwenga, taramba kutongwa nehure (General Chiwenga we can’t be
ruled by a prostitute)
Grace uyu ihure (Grace is a prostitute)
Hatitongwe nehure isu (We can’t be ruled by a prostitute)
From my conversation with some of the participants, I gathered that

Grace was labelled a prostitute owing to allegations that she had become
so powerful that she could seduce men on two fronts: in terms of money
and physically. The demonization of Grace as a prostitute also partially
arose from allegations that she cheated with a lot of men (see Vambe
2014). For instance, there were rumours that she had had an adulterous
relationship with prominent businessman and ZANU–PF politician James
Makamba. He told the media in 2018 that he had fled Zimbabwe and
lived in self-imposed exile, fearing that President Mugabe could kill him
over suspicions that he was dating his wife (Mabhena 2018). Moreover,
the lampooning of Grace as prostitute was also informed by the fact that
it is widely acknowledged she started dating and had children with Robert
Mugabe while she was still married to Stanley Goreraza; and Mugabe was
still married to Sally, who was on her death bed. It is relevant to note that
in patriarchal heteronormative societies such as Zimbabwe, men deliber-
ately associate infidelity with women (Ncube and Chawana 2018). There
is a tendency to conveniently pretend that women are the only prostitutes,
exonerating their male counterparts from such vilification. In fact, in
patriarchal societies men are hailed as ‘mabhuru’ (bulls), legitimizing infi-

delity. Finally, the quoted song appeals to General Chiwenga to redeem
the people. It appears they cede their agency to him because he was the
main face of Operation Restore Legacy, which had engineered the down-
fall of the feared and disliked Mugabe couple. Moreover, as Commander
in Chief of the Defence Forces, Chiwenga could implement their wishes
through deployment of the military, as he had already done.
Misogyny and sexism targeting Grace was not only confined to physical
spaces but also cascaded into digital sites. Her fall from political grace
became a topical subject on most digital social platforms including Twitter,
WhatsApp and Facebook. Fig. 14.2 illustrates this assertion.
Fig. 14.2 A manipulated WhatsApp picture of Grace Mugabe bent over, General
Chiwenga fucking from behind. (Source: WhatsApp meme)
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The manipulated picture shows connections of political power, sex and

domination. It insinuates that by ‘capturing’ the Executive, Grace had
‘fucked’ her opponents, presumably Mnangagwa and Chiwenga. However,
Chiwenga launched Operation Restore Legacy, which ruined and subse-
quently ended Grace’s political career. This was a way of ‘counter-fucking’
and taming Grace, as reflected in the statement ‘He who fucks last fucks
the hardest!’. This was assumed to be the ‘hardest fuck’ Grace had to
endure in her life, and symbolises the punishing penises that women must
endure (Miller 2014). Sex is often an instrument of domination, and it is
as such that it is inseparable from political discourses, which are under-
pinned by power and domination (Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013). From the
picture, the sex scene and position are worthy thick descriptions. From the
background and furniture, it appears the sexual act took place in an office
(presumably the President or an army general’s office). This mirrors a
power contestation unfolding at the time. Grace’s machinations had
already claimed Mnangagwa’s political scalp, and Chiwenga was likely to
be the next victim. Thus, he had to counter-fuck Grace before it was too
late. To cement that this was not a pleasurable sexual act, in the image
General Chiwenga performed the act in his military beret, to underline his
superiority as the Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces and army
general. The sex position (dog style) depicted also deserves examination,
with Grace bending over, Chiwenga thrusting violently behind her. This
position allows uninterrupted penetration. Grace is supposed to be expe-
riencing how it feels when ‘real men fuck’. However, Miller (2014: 101)
contends that ‘the point is to exaggerate sexual copulation to ridiculous
proportions’. This is testified by the portrayal of Chiwenga smiling, an
affirmation of performing aggressive masculinity. However, Grace’s face
shows misery, shock, trauma and pain. The picture suggests that Grace
had never anticipated such humiliation in her political career or life.
Viewed through the hegemonic masculinity lens, Chiwenga demon-
strated what ‘real men’ do to enforce male dominance and force women
into submission. Whitehead (2002) asserts that masculinity is connected
to dominance, and the sexual act of intercourse with women is seen sym-
bolically as a powerful confirmation of this connection. Hegemonic mas-
culinity is enforced through a demonstration of virility and libido (Hunter
2005; Stern and Buikema 2013; Graham 2014). Fucking Grace also signi-
fies rape because Operation Restore Legacy was not by mutual consent.
For example, in the former Yugoslavia (see Mostov 2000), in the midst of
the war, women became rape victims because soldiers believed that this
was the best way to humiliate their male opponents. In this case, raping
Grace was communicating to Robert Mugabe that control was being exer-
cised over him and his wife. Ngoshi and Mutekwa (2013) argue that the
female body has always been cast as nurturing, providing sexual pleasure.
The fecund female body is often exalted as a metaphor for the authoritar-
ian creed. Moreover, ‘nations consist of sexed and gendered beings, and
so the trinity of nation, sexuality and gender cannot be separated when
attempting to understand the objectification of women and the exploita-
tion of the female body in the service of particular political creeds and
national ends’ (Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013). According to Mbembe
(2006: 163), ‘power dons the face of virility’, owing to the sexualized and
gendered nature of political power in which domination is masculinized
and subordination is feminized (cited in Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013).
Some of the WhatsApp memes insinuated that Chiwenga was a real
man, so his name should be emblazoned in all male lavatories. It can be
deduced from this that Chiwenga had done what most men and some
women aspire—show power and demonstrate it.
This supports the argument by Jewkes et al. (2015) that hegemonic
masculinity is as much for women as for men a cultural ideal of manhood,
and both men and women in society aspire to replicate it. Chiwenga was
celebrated as a symbol of hegemonic masculinity arguably for successfully
taming the ‘deviant’ Grace, who had to an extent transgressed patriarchal
norms. In traditional Shona and Ndebele cultures in Zimbabwe, married
women and respectable women are not supposed to challenge their hus-
bands in public, but Grace Mugabe challenged her husband and everyone
in ZANU–PF, which contradicts male dominance as espoused in Connell’s
hegemonic masculinity concept.
‘Like Jezebel, Grace Authored the Downfall of her Husband’

The study shows that some of the chants and slogans demonized Grace
Mugabe by framing her as the evil and unpopular Jezebel, King Ahab’s
wife. In the Old Testament, in 1 Kings Chapter 21, King Omri fixed a
marriage for his son and successor, Ahab, to Jezebel, a queen of Baalism
from North Mesopotamia in Tiberius, near the Red Sea. Jezebel brought
the worship of Baal to the Israeli kingdom, contrary to Israel’s worship of
Yahweh. During Ahab’s reign, Jezebel persecuted the prophets of Yahweh.
She controlled King Ahab to the extent that she planned the assassination
of Naboth to get his vineyard, Jezreel (field of blood). Some of the
348 L. NCUBE
protestors expressed that Grace had become powerful and evil as Jezebel
did. For instance, in conversations some cited incidents such as the dis-
placement of poor villagers from Manzou farm in Mazowe area on the
instructions of Grace, who subsequently turned the place into a wildlife
and mining area.
The comparison between Grace and Jezebel was also motivated by
accusations that Jezebel manipulated Ahab, and in the process contributed
to the ending of his reign, largely because she was older than he was. In
this instance, Grace was accused of taking advantage of Robert Mugabe
largely because she was so much younger: when they married, she was 31;
her husband was 72. Just like Jezebel, Grace Mugabe was accused of
authoring her husband’s downfall. In this narrative, Operation Restore
Legacy was an intervention to save the country since King Ahab (Robert
Mugabe) was no longer in the driving seat, but instead an ambitious
Jezebel (Grace Mugabe). Just like Jezebel, Grace had become feared and
untouchable. Critically, King Ahab was dethroned and killed by King Jehu
of Damascus at a time when Jezebel had no son to take up the Omride
throne. Likewise, the protesting public in Harare expressed the feeling
that Mugabe was ousted at a time when Grace’s sons were still young to
dream of succeeding their father.
It was alleged that Grace had become the de facto President of
Zimbabwe, as demonstrated by the manner in which she publicly
denounced senior government officials, including Vice-President
Mnangagwa. The general sentiment was that Grace had captured the
Executive, so she had to be stopped before she further debased state
power. For example, Fig. 14.3 shows a tweet from 15 November 2017
that was purportedly posted under the official ZANU–PF Twitter handle,
suggesting that Operation Restore Legacy had been motivated by the
desire to deal with criminals (G40 members) and a woman (Grace) who
were taking advantage of an aged Mugabe.
On the same day (15 November 2017), screenshots of a tweet by
United States of America-based Zimbabwean musician Thomas Mapfumo
trended on WhatsApp. The tweet also insinuated that Grace’s behaviour
triggered the chaos that resulted in the military intervention (Fig. 14.4).
Mapfumo’s tweet constructed Grace as somebody who lacked wisdom
and composure. Consequently, her character made the situation unten-
able. Grace was therefore supposed to shoulder the blame for actively con-
tributing to the ousting of her husband from the presidency. This is
because Grace had threatened patriarchy by venturing into a perceived
Fig. 14.3 A tweet

allegedly from the
ZANU–PF handle
claiming that there was
no coup, but military
action that aimed to help
Mugabe, who had been
taken advantage of by
his wife
masculine space. ‘Historically-constituted male dominated spaces assume

considerable importance in a changing world where traditional places and
times for men’s exclusive association are disappearing’, resulting in many
men experiencing a loss of control’ (Gruneau and Whitson (1993: 192).
Some of the tweets mockingly thanked Grace for assisting Zimbabweans
in removing Mugabe. An example was posted by Trevor Ncube on 15
November 2017 (Fig. 14.5).
Trevor Ncube is the chairperson of Alpha Media Holdings, publisher of
Zimbabwe’s vibrant daily newspaper NewsDay and two weeklies, The
Standard and The Independent. Grace’s contribution to the fall of Mugabe
was applauded, albeit in a satirical manner. Since 2000, especially since the
arrival of the Movement for Democratic Change in the political arena,
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Fig. 14.4 Tweet by

prominent Zimbabwean
musician Mapfumo
suggesting that Grace’s
character had triggered
Operation Restore
Legacy. (Source: Thomas
Mapfumo’s
Twitter handle)
opposition groups had tried in vain to remove Mugabe from power with-
out success. However, Grace’s actions chronicled earlier, especially the
accusations that she had captured the Executive, triggered Operation
Restore Legacy.
Some of the memes featured both Robert and Grace Mugabe. However,
they were sympathetic to Robert Mugabe while vilifying the figure of
Grace. An example is Fig. 14.6.
The image depicts a shabbily dressed, hopeless and worried Grace seek-
ing refuge from her equally disgraced husband. The image is a mockery of
the usually neatly and expensively dressed former first lady. In the image,
Mugabe blames Grace for their miserable situation. ‘I told you, leave
Mnangagwa alone, but you persisted’, Mugabe is saying. However, Grace
Fig. 14.5 Trevor

Ncube’s tweet,
sarcastically
commending Grace’s
contribution in the
downfall of her husband.
(Source: Trevor Ncube’s
Twitter handle)
is defensive (perhaps Zimbabweans’ general view of her). In the picture,

she challenges her husband to think about their next destination since they
have lost power. Mugabe’s supposed utterance that he had warned Grace
not to continue fighting Mnangagwa is gendered. It creates an impression
that there was no way a woman would prevail in a power contest with a
man. Hegemonic masculinity should be viewed as a particular configura-
tion of gender practice related to legitimizing male authority (Connell
1995; Flood 2002). However, Mugabe’s statement here can be histori-
cized and contextualized in his long-time relationship with Mnangagwa,
who had worked as his assistant from the days of the liberation struggle.
In that respect, Mugabe was aware Mnangagwa had the potential to
remove him from power, since he knew his strengths and weaknesses.
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Fig. 14.6 A
manipulated WhatsApp
image of Robert
Mugabe blaming a
miserable-looking Grace
for their demise.
(Source:
WhatsApp meme)
Grace’s presumed response ‘Robert STOP IT’ humorously reminds

people of the days when Grace earned the moniker ‘Dr STOP IT’ during
her ‘Meet the People’ and ‘Youth Interface’ rallies. During these events,
Grace vilified her opponents, and those accused of transgressing ZANU–
PF ideology were warned to ‘STOP IT’, or else she would flash a red card.
With Operation Restore Legacy emasculating Grace’s powers, her fall
from political grace triggered social media delight. Siziba and Ncube
(2015) contend that satirical social media memes can be read as a form of
weapon by the weak and oppressed, who cannot ordinarily openly mock
the figure and person of the President of Zimbabwe (Fig. 14.7).
The study shows that just like other WhatsApp memes trending during
this period, Grace was depicted as dejected and traumatized. Contrastingly,
Robert is imagined as smartly dressed and looking relaxed. Such images
are a complete reversal of the powerful Grace Mugabe that Zimbabweans
Fig. 14.7 A WhatsApp meme that trended on 24 November 2017, on the inau-
guration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa. (Source: WhatsApp meme)
had become accustomed to. It appears she struggled to accept the reality
that somebody other than her husband was now the President of
Zimbabwe. From the satirical memes portraying a powerless Grace, it can
be deduced that she was being reminded that guns wielded by soldiers
during Operation Restore Legacy were real instruments of power and not
the regular verbal insults she used during ZANU–PF rallies. Foucault
(1980) contends that power is seen in its external form at the point where
it is in direct and immediate relationship with that we can provisionally call
its object, its target, its field of application; that is, where it installs itself
and produces its real effects.
Conclusion
This study’s major conclusion is that hegemonic masculinity, sexism, and
misogynism were strongly discursive during Operation Restore Legacy.
Despite efforts to redress gender imbalances, Zimbabwe remains patriar-
chal. Women’s participation in the public sphere, politics, and strategic
managerial positions, among other things, remains limited. Using the case
of Grace Mugabe, we see that the view that women should be restricted to
the private sphere persists. Male-gendered domination and a perpetuation
354 L. NCUBE
of gender exclusion are evident. By the time Mugabe was ousted from
office, his wife Grace had become a powerful and feared figure who was
running the party, state and government. She was set to succeed an ageing
Mugabe and extend Mugabeism. Critically, Grace was on the verge of
making history by becoming the first female President of Zimbabwe,
albeit through unpopular and undemocratic methods. However, the mili-
tary, through Major-General Sibusiso Moyo, declared Operation Restore
Legacy in November 2017, claiming that they were dealing with ‘counter-
revolutionary’ elements that were destabilizing the ruling ZANU–PF and
government. The study submits that at subtext level, military intervention
was motivated by the desire to thwart the political dreams of a courageous
and ambitious woman who was on the verge of breaking into a tradition-
ally male domain. Apart from the military and ZANU–PF politicians,
some members of Zimbabwean society who participated in demonstra-
tions that called for Mugabe to stand down denounced Grace’s presiden-
tial dreams. It was evident that these people were hostile to the idea of
female leadership in general. The study indicates that in terms of female
participation in the public sphere in general and in politics in particular,
Zimbabwe is still prejudiced by a gendered, phallocentric, sexist and
misogynistic society. Critically, the chapter widens scholarship on gender
and politics in Africa, illuminating the gendered dimensions of African
political spaces. Politics and state political institutions in Zimbabwe are
constructed as masculine domains, which are seen as naturally controlled
and led by males.
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Zimbabwe’s Constitution of 2013.
CHAPTER 15
Foreign Direct Investment

in the Post-Mugabe Era
Mkhululi Sibindi
Introduction
Given the nature of Zimbabwe’s economy and politics, there is no doubt
that the political competence of the new government (November 2017)
will be measured on how it returns a failed economy to productivity. In
this context, the new government has made an effort to reach out to the
international community in search of foreign direct investment (FDI).
This chapter examines whether the Zimbabwean economy is a compatible
FDI host market. Central to the discussion is defining what FDI is and the
motives of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are agents of FDI. In
view of MNEs’ motives, the discussion extends to illuminate the decision
to invest in a specific host market, together with the role of government in
the internationalization process (Sibindi 2019).
Documented evidence suggests that the flow of FDI and the selection
of probable host markets is informed by the motives of MNEs, which are
informed by transaction cost theory (the essence of the firm). In this view,
M. Sibindi (*)
Business Management, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_15
360 M. SIBINDI
transaction cost creates path dependency, with host market selection

revolving around the size of the economy, size of supporting industry,
consumer index, and infrastructure and capital market development. This
chapter assesses if Zimbabwe can advance MNEs’ objectives. The discus-
sion revolves around three major academic disciplines: political economy,
international trade, and economics and business.
The demise of Robert Mugabe as a President of the Republic of
Zimbabwe brought with it a wave of political and economic optimism. In
his 37 years at the helm, President Mugabe led Zimbabwe to political,
social and economic deadlock. His economic policies outright destroyed
an economy that was once referred as the bread basket of Africa
(Mlambo 2017).
There is no doubt that Mugabe’s political disaster had a causal impact
on the economy of the country. In the first ten years of independence,
Mugabe, a former guerrilla fighter, emerged without a clear economic
philosophy, combining communist and capitalist principles as a matter of
convenience rather than a matter of principle (Kanyeze , Chitambara and
Tyson 2017). The economy remained stable in the first decade of Mugabe’s
rule, but strains of economic decay and mismanagement started to emerge
as it drew to a close (Sachikonye 2016). In response, the government
adopted an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which
endeavoured to reposition the economy according to the new economic
equilibrium and was strongly supported by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Nyabereka 2017).
The first ESAP, which had a lifespan of five years, targeted to transform
the economy towards a market-driven philosophy, promoting higher
growth and poverty reduction through four fundamental paradigm shift
approaches. First, the adjustment programme proposed the reduction of
parastatal and fiscal budgets, spending and deficits. Second, it proposed
liberalizing trade regulations and the foreign exchange system. Third, it
suggested that Zimbabwe should carry out domestic deregulation. Fourth,
it suggested that as sustaining a skill base is key to economic growth, it
recommended the establishment of training programmes for vulnerable
societies.
Despite heavy financial backing from the World Bank and the IMF,
which amounted to US$ 400 million a year for two years, there were no
significant results, although there was a slight relaxation of trade policies
and improvement in production exports; there was also evidence of slight
improvement in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors. The IMF audit
15 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 361
committee concluded that ESAP had had no substantial results in employ-

ment creation and poverty alleviation. It reduced government spending by
less than 5%.
After the demise of ESAP in 1998, the economic situation took an
unprecedented nosedive between the years 2000 and 2008 (Kavila and Le
Roux 2016). Manufacturing was at its lowest, most industries closed and
inflation skyrocketed to more than 89.7 sextrillion % at its peak, probably
the worst inflation record in the recent past and arguably the worst in
world economic history—even compared with the Weimar Republic
(Reckendrees 2015; Stolper 2017) and Yugoslavia (Lyon 1996).
In the closing stages of 2008, the government introduced the
Zimbabwean dollar and introduced a multicurrency, of which the American
(US) dollar emerged as a major medium of exchange (Mlambo 2015).
The economy seemed to stabilise, but the central bank had no control of
money supply, hence economic intervention policies (monetary policy)
were both not feasible and ineffective. Nonetheless, despite the fact that
the introduction of the multicurrency economy was able to stop inflation,
the economic fundamentals were not adjusted to stimulate growth.
Industries were not resuscitated, infrastructure continued to become more
dilapidated, and the decay of corruption and economic mismanagement
was not arrested. Many controversial indigenization laws were passed.
After five years, US dollars became scarce, and their limited circulation and
liquidity problems had an impact on an already fragmented economy
(Nyabereka 2017).
On the political scenario, the landscape rapidly changed as well. Quite
unexpectedly, in November 2017 internal squabbles within Zimbabwe
African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) forced Robert
Mugabe to fire his deputy Emmerson Mnangagwa, who self-exiled in
South Africa. In his absence, the military rolled out tanks (in what was
later known as Operation Restore Order) and besieged Harare, and finally
Mugabe fell from grace. Mnangagwa emerged as a leader of ZANU–PF
and the President of Zimbabwe. Although he won general election in
2018, narrowly defeating Nelson Chamisa of the Movement of the
Democratic Change Alliance, his legitimacy was a subject of debate around
political and legal circles. However, on 24 August 2018, the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe dismissed claims that the election process had flawed
and unanimously declared Mnangagwa as the winner.
The fall of Mugabe and the ascendancy of Mnangagwa as the new presi-
dent signalled a new era in Zimbabwe’s political and economic landscape.
362 M. SIBINDI
Nevertheless, the new government faced a problem synonymous with

most developing economies: an acute shortage of national saving to
finance investments. The country is in perennial need of foreign invest-
ment to stimulate economic growth.
Consequently, in order to fix the economy and stimulate growth, mem-
bers of the new government have undertaken global tours to promote
Zimbabwe as a potential investment destination. In this endeavour to
stimulate FDI, many economic and political analysts have examined a
series of aspects that are intertwined in international economics, business
and trade. The overarching objective of this chapter is to explore these. In
this context, we focus on four fundamental aspects of FDI. The first sec-
tion defines FDI and the motives of MNEs (agents of FDI). The second
section explores the determinants of FDI in host markets. The third sec-
tion explores the role of government in international business. The fourth
section explores the response of the government to market failures.
What Is Foreign Direct Investment?

Perhaps the most confusing aspect of FDI is a definition of the term. In
most cases, political and economic commentators confuse foreign aid and
FDI. For this reason, it is imperative to explore the fundamental aspects
that distinguish them.
Foreign aid is a form of aid from a donor organization that has no com-
mercial or profit objectives. Most sources of foreign aid are non-
governmental organizations that are involved in charity work (Nwaogu
and Ryan 2015). Quite frequently, they have a specific function, and the
aid is distributed to particular communities through community networks
and leadership (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim 2014). This type of funding
seemingly confuses many economic analysts, who assume that MNEs
blindly invest in a particular host market simply because there is a shortage
of capital or the government is making an effort to attract FDI.
FDI has been defined by a series of seminal and contemporary studies
as follows. The IMF (2011) regards it as a classification of international
investment that reflects the purpose of a firm established in one economic
market in acquisition of control in a firm established outside the country
of its origin. Subsequently, the IMF regards the firm as a channel of direct
investment in the host market, whereas the domestic firm is considered to
be a direct recipient (Aregbeshola 2014). Likewise, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2009) says FDI
“reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in

one economy (‘direct investor’) in an entity resident in an economy other
than that of the investor (‘direct investment enterprise’)”. This hypotheti-
cal framework points out long-term vested interests as well as underlining
the presence of a lengthy commercial bond between the enterprise and the
investor with regard to ownership and control of the investment in the
host market (Aregbeshola 2014).
Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD 1999: 4) describes FDI as “an investment
involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and
control by a resident entity (the foreign investor or parent enterprise) of
one country in an enterprise (foreign affiliate) resident in a country other
than that of the foreign investor”. The IMF (2015) asserts that FDI is
considered to occur in the following form as equity capital, reinvested
earnings and other capital:
• Equity capital is regarded to be the monetary value of the currency

injection of an MNE investment in capital structure (ordinary share)
of the enterprises; this transaction occurs through merger and acqui-
sition. An injection of capital worth more than 10% of ordinary
shares or control stake in an enterprise is mostly regarded as a lever
of power over the activities of the enterprise.
• Studies define retained earnings as a fraction of disposable profits,
not given to shareholders as dividends but instead reinvested as a
form of capital either to pay debts or to revamp the firm core activi-
ties or both. As such, retained earnings are considered to be part of
the shareholders’ equity. From a financial viewpoint, retained earn-
ings indicate the performance of a business as a going concern.
• Other forms of direct investment capital are considered to be short-
and long-term debt and borrowing, which entails financial instru-
ments such as debt securities, credits and a suppliers’ network
between foreign associates and direct investors. The investing firm
might also avail itself of assets and machinery that is used for produc-
tive purposes.
Understanding Sources of FDI

This section highlights the nature and motivations of MNEs.
364 M. SIBINDI
Consistent with the discussion in the next section, FDI is considered to

be an investment of more than 10% of ordinary stock from an organiza-
tion resident in one economic market to an enterprise resident in another
market (the host market). In this view, MNEs are business entities that are
governed by the theory of the firm, which borders on Corse’s seminal
work on transaction cost theory (1937) and conclusions drawn by
Williamson (1990, 1995, 2010, 2015). Therefore, it is imperative to high-
light underlying concepts of the theory of the firm and transaction costs.
The Nature of MNEs

There is a consensus among economists and business scientists that the
ultimate goal of a firm is to make a profit and to enhance shareholder
equity. In order to gain an insight into the behaviour of MNEs as they
endeavour to create variables that promote and sustain investment in host
countries, we have to explore their ultimate objectives.
According to Coase (1937), Augier and Teece (2009) and Williamson
(1998) a firm is a black box of decision that optimises resource allocation
to maximise profits. The theoretical concept of a black box not only
defines the relationship between risk and return, but it also explains factors
that attract capital movement, those risk factors created by both macro-
and micro environmental factors that influence international capital.
The theory of the firm as expounded by Coase (1937, 1998) asserts
that every firm exists to maximise profits, a point echoed by Baumol
(1958) and Stevens (2018). In the concept of profit maximization, firms
measure where the optimal level of profits is achieved. The assumption is
that they adjust the marginal cost of production to the marginal revenue.
The relationship between the two will inevitably give a distance between
extra cost and extra revenue, which will define profit margins and hence
confirm the theory of the firm. Furthermore, according to Camilleri
(2018), firms in a monopolistic competition are nothing but agents that
are aiming to increase the value of return. Pitelis and Teece (2009) aug-
ment the concept, indicating that a typical firm’s overriding objective is to
achieve maximum returns. This chapter assumes that the objectives of
MNEs are fundamental in investment trends and subsequent micro-level
mechanisms that attempt to achieve set objectives within a specified trad-
ing period.
Motives of MNEs
According to Ghauri (2018), understanding MNE motives allows a
detailed insight regarding the pattern and selection of host markets. MNEs
invest in different markets for different motives and rationales; in this
understanding, the motivation behind FDI is not exclusive. Without a
doubt, the motives of MNEs are deemed to affect investment patterns and
the subsequent behaviour of multinational firms in offshore markets.
Furthermore, evidence from various studies indicates that MNEs’ motives
change over time and are determined by internal variables, such as firm
structure and key competencies, as well as aspects of individual host mar-
kets (Dunning 2015).
Literature in this field agrees that firm motivation has a direct impact on
FDI patterns and host market selection (Teece 2014). MNEs select host
markets that are conducive to business objectives or where business and
political risks can be easily mitigated, and/or where business opportunities
can be exploited. In an attempt to examine the relationship between
MNEs’ motives and the selection of host markets in general, and Zimbabwe
in particular, this discussion uses Dunning’s classical eclectic model as the
lens through which to view the linkages between MNEs’ motives and host
markets.
Cantwell and Verbeke (2017) assert that the most-cited influential tax-
onomy of multinational motives is advocated by Dunning: the OLI model
(or eclectic theory); therefore, Dunning’s work is the overriding principle
of our analysis. The eclectic model asserts why a firm decides to invest in
those global markets in which it will be most able to sustain its invest-
ments: this involves ownership advantage (O), location advantage (L) and
internationalization advantage (I).
Resource-seeking, in this context the focal motive for outward FDI,
enhances a firm’s strategic objectives by accumulating and employing a
specific category of resources that are either not available in domestic mar-
kets (raw materials or natural resources) or are accessible at a cost-effective
rate in host markets. These can include, for instance, labour or energy. The
resource-seeking motive is regarded as a pull factor from host markets.
Consideration by MNEs will take into account pricing and the availability
of production factors. Owing to economic failure and the current perfor-
mance of Zimbabwe’s economy, production factors are both scarce and
expensive. For instance, most fuel and energy is imported, primarily from
South Africa, so it would be difficult for MNEs to select the country as a
366 M. SIBINDI
possible FDI destination given the challenges around transaction costs,

which might undermine the theory of the firm that governs the essence of
MNEs (Sibindi 2019).
In market-seeking, MNEs invest in a host economy to enhance their
strategic objectives by exploiting the prospects granted by the size of the
economy. A number of objectives are influential in this decision. MNEs
invest in host markets to serve potential customers and suppliers in foreign
markets. They might attempt to develop goods and services in line with
host market demands, effectively reducing the transaction cost by elimi-
nating the cost of serving a market from their country of origin. In the
recent past, MNEs have invested in a market as a strategic move to control
entry and exit barriers (Dunning 2015).
Notwithstanding the fact that most products consumed in Zimbabwe
are imported from South Africa, MNEs have not begun to occupy the
market so they can reduce transaction costs. There are a number of rea-
sons that might contribute to this, but the most obvious one is the size of
the economy, which is determined by support industries in terms of both
suppliers and customer network. Over the years of record hyperinflation,
Zimbabwean industries have depleted to nothing. Despite the small size of
the economy, the country’s purchasing power parity is the lowest in the
world, and it has been regarded as one of the worst performing economies
in the world between 2004 – 2009 and 2018 to present. The current state
of the economy is not encouraging for any MNE.
Efficiency-seeking is a dual approach in which market- and firm-level
aspects are deemed to be interdependent. In the first strand, MNEs take
advantage of costs and the convenience of particular factors in different
host markets. In the second strand, they exploit economies of scale, scope
and supply, as well as consumer taste in host markets. This links firm-
specific aspects and market-level considerations. Taking this into account,
from a firm-level perspective, conditions in Zimbabwe are not conducive
for MNEs to profitably exploit business opportunities. A number of
aspects are influential in this regard, including the factors already discussed
that will increase transaction costs. Estimates of these costs might elimi-
nate the suitability of a particular destination.
Host Market Determinants of FDI

This section links country or market variables that are favourable to out-
ward FDI. A number of studies are presented to illuminate the linkage
between firm heterogeneity and aspects of a host market. Establishing this
link allows an insight into how MNEs select possible host markets.
According to Alfaro (2017) and Sibindi (2019), market size is impor-
tant in host market selection; this buttresses the concept that a huge mar-
ket enhances the efficiency of resource utilization and the exploitation of
economies of scale. For instance, numerous empirical studies assert that
there is a causal linkage between the size of a market and the volume of
inward FDI. This is reinforced by evidence from classic and contemporary
empirical literature.
In the recent past, emperical studies have established that there is a
causal relation between population, market size and inward FDI. Likewise,
a series of recent studies has established that gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate is a substantial explanatory variable; however, total
GDP is not. This indicates that the size of a host market’s national income
is insignificant, hence increases might not be too relevant to FDI decisions
or MNEs’ growth prospects.
In the context of firm motivations we have already explored, it can be
deduced that market size is fundamental to FDI. Zimbabwe’s market size
is very small, with a population of at most 16 million signifying that the
total market size is smaller. Prospective MNEs will face challenges of
resource utilization.
In addition, macro-economic indicators suggest that the Zimbabwean
economy has no stability or economic growth. Unemployment is very
high, with national statistics indicating than more than 80% of the able-
bodied population is unemployed. Economic indicators already men-
tioned suggest that from the perspective of MNEs, the country would not
be a competitive investment destination.
According to Aregbeshola (2014), existing studies about the signifi-
cance of trade openness to inward FDI are inconclusive. Trade openness is
measured in two ways: first, by the impact of imports on the value of GDP;
secondly, by the contribution of exports to overall GDP. Inward FDI is
inclined towards the tradable sector of a host market’s exposure to global
trade, which must be considered when an investment decision is made.
The whole argument hinges on the “tariff-jumping” assumption:
MNEs decide to invest in a host market either through a subsidiary or a
368 M. SIBINDI
merger or both, if they face a challenge in exporting their products to

prospective markets. In contrast, exporting MNEs may select to invest in
a host market since trade imperfections cause transaction costs.
Consequently, when MNEs invest in host markets that they have been
serving through exports, they reduce transaction costs significantly
(Mourao 2017).
Despite the fact that a considerable number of Zimbabwe’s consumer
goods and other commodities are imported from neighbouring countries,
mainly South Africa and Botswana, MNEs from these countries are seem-
ingly reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe such that they could service the
market and reduce transaction costs. There are a number of reasons for
this. As noted, the economic situation in Zimbabwe is not conducive to
any business, whether a domestic or multinational firm. Consequently, in
view of the challenges in the economic environment, MNEs apparently
find no reason to invest in a host market where they would be most
unlikely to recoup both transaction costs and sunk costs.
A surge of recent literature regards wages and other labour costs as one
of the aspects that is most important in the volume and direction of
FDI. This assumption is validated by the fact that labour costs influence
the cost of production, and is supported by proponents of both the depen-
dency hypothesis and the modernization hypothesis, even though the
viewpoints of these two schools of thought tend to contrast. Nevertheless,
despite being postulated in both theoretical and empirical studies, there is
no substantial evidence of the causal relationship between inward FDI and
wage ratio in host markets. Furthermore, a number of empirical studies
cast doubt on the substance of the relationship between wages and inflows
of FDI in host markets. Deng and Yang (2015) conclude that a higher
wage ratio in the host market discourages potential investors. In addition,
according to Anyanwu (2015), the nexus between wage rates and inward
investment is inconclusive; the study concludes that MNEs are motivated
by skills competency in host markets.
In view of the political stability of host markets, many studies are incon-
clusive about whether the political stability of host markets has an impact
on inward FDI flows. Circumstantial evidence indicates that if a prospec-
tive host market has the potential to increase the return on foreign invest-
ment for MNEs, the investment trends both in terms of volume and
direction are far less affected by the political instability of the host nation.
This scenario is more pronounced in the mining industry if a host nation
has significant resources to exploit, but if there is political insecurity MNEs
use their size to reduce the risk—by using their own security services and
developing their own infrastructure (Lindberg and Sverrisson 2016).
In the context of Zimbabwe’s economic, business and economic envi-
ronment, government intervention through policy regulation has been
one of the biggest setbacks to international investment. In a series of trade
regulations, the Zimbabwean government passed controversial indigenous
laws that allowed at least a 51% controlling stake for black Zimbabweans.
Such policies create a degree of uneasiness for existing foreign investment
and make it difficult for such a destination to be attractive to future FDI.
The Role of Government

in Business Internationalization
In an attempt to gain insight into the roles of the Zimbabwean govern-

ment, this discussion embraces two approaches. First, the discussion con-
siders a neoclassical theory of competitive general equilibrium theory
(Arrow-Debreu 1954). Second, traditional market failure arguments are
examined, concurrently with an outline of the type of intervention under-
taken by the government to encourage inward FDI. The section disre-
gards both outward FDI and exports, as does the rest of the chapter. In
the discussion about market failure, we detail some of the existing studies
that argue for a broader response to business internationalization by the
government. This embraces both firms’ needs and the requirement to
guarantee that they have the right incentives when they undertake essen-
tial adjustments to macro-environmental changes, owing to trade invest-
ment liberalization and other aspects of globalization.
According to the neoclassical Arrow-Debreu (1954), and Kurz (1974),
the theory of the perfectly competitive general equilibrium economy
asserts that the market comprises entities who are motivated by self-
interest, firms that exist to maximize wealth and individuals who exist to
maximize utility, engaging in the production, exchange and consumption
of products and services. Through this interaction, they provide an alloca-
tion of resources that mutually beneficial. An efficient allocation of
resources synchronizes the utility-maximizing options for consumers with
the profit maximization option for firms. Market equilibrium determines
the optimum quantity of goods that are produced and consumed. Through
this process, firms maximize social welfare. In this argument, an individual
can be better off without at the same time making another individual
370 M. SIBINDI
worse off (welfare economics): in such a process, the allocation of resources

is Pareto-efficient. Conversely, in reality, markets might not be perfectly
competitive and might not produce an efficient allocation of resources.
Deviation from the norm is called market inefficiency. This is caused by
certain traits of goods and services, such as the existence of externalities or
public goods, and factors in the market, for instance monopoly, oligopoly
and inadequate information. This discussion assumes that government
intervention might neither hinder nor enhance multinational activity
and FDI.
A common justification for government intervention is the supposition
that there is a market inefficiency owing to a lack of information or that it
is either inaccurate or incomplete, which hampers market players’ ability
to access information, and affects its cost. Market inefficiency in both
resource and goods markets hinders the process of internationalization
and FDI, since prospective market players (buyers and sellers) need com-
plete information about potential investments, suppliers, customers and
prices and quantity of goods traded. The interaction between buyers and
sellers is enabled through a system that results mostly in small and valued
short-term transactions, because of the uncertainty and unreliability of
buyers and sellers (Besedes and Prusa 2004; Christodoulopoulou 2010).
Consequently, a poor match will terminate a relationship, whereas an
excellent match between market players will enhance mutual benefits. In
effect, even though they only have a modest value, small orders play an
essential role in creating trade flows (Harris and Moffat 2011). A major
factor here is that entering a foreign market, especially a developing econ-
omy such as Zimbabwe’s, involves huge sunk costs for the initial invest-
ment. To mitigate costly and abortive investment, small orders give a
strong indication to a prospective investor that the market is sustainable
and beneficial. Table 15.1 shows market failures that impede the interna-
tionalization of business.
The argument that small orders indicate a sustainable future investment
is reinforced by Besedes and Prusa (2004) in an empirical study that uses
data from in US firms concluded that “many trade relationships start small
but those that start large have a longer duration. The more reliable the
supplier, the greater the fraction of trade that starts large. Relationships
involving more reliable suppliers have a longer duration. The data indicate
the chance of a trade relationship ending is highest during the first few
years (i.e. the learning phase) and a small fraction of relationships end even
after the supplier has proven to be successful.”
Table 15.1 Taxonomy of market failures impeding internationalization

Type Description
Market failure owing to

imperfect markets
Imperfect information Firms using inaccurate or incomplete information to assess
costs and benefits of international production
Asymmetric information Costs of acquiring information make it more available to some
than others, leading to adverse selection and/or moral hazard
Financial barriers Firms without sufficient collateral or track record have less
access to finance
Missing markets There is no market for externalities; public good elements;
extreme cases of asymmetric and imperfect information
Appropriability failure Problems with the enforceability of property rights, especially
over knowledge and technology
Barriers to entry and exit
Sunk costs Irreversibly fixed costs of internationalization result in entry
and exit being costly undertakings
Institutional failure:
government
Public good argument In situations where the government has a comparative
advantage in supplying a good or service (usually information)
Institutional failure:
networks
Group formation Networks may not possess the right portfolio of skills,
information and knowledge, and membership rules may
exclude some firms
Systemic failure
Bounded rationality and Lead firms to make sub-optimal choices of technology to
path dependency which they may become locked in
Source: Harris and Robertson (2002)
Booth di Giovanni (1998) argues from a government perspective that

search models cannot inform investment policies with regard to the exis-
tence or otherwise of market failures. The discussion hinges on the follow-
ing aspects. First, firms may lack appropriate facts, and the existence of
uncertainty does not translate to the existence of market inefficiency but
rather indicates information is costly. This does not mean that there is no
justification for government intervention, assuming that the government
understands the economic benefits of information in the firm’s decision-
making process, (e.g., by internationalizing). Casson (1999) and Buckley
(2014) augment this standpoint, and assert that in this position the
372 M. SIBINDI
government has a comparative advantage in information; based on this

(instead of market failure), it has a rationale for intervention.
Secondly, a large fraction of poorly informed decisions leading to
investment demise are likely to be related to optimal search behaviour. It
is arguable that information costs leading to irregular results is one of the
aspects of the market, and they are not necessary as a selection device (for
promoting the fittest firms). In this instance, information cost provide
enticements for knowledge and innovation, which is key to the system of
diversified construction upon an evolutionary interpretation of the mar-
ket. Thirdly, search theory exploration indicates that in general firms
ought to commit more resources to pre-internalization and information
collecting where risk is high, as is probable in global markets.
Consequently, collecting information is expensive, and when firms do
not wholly engage, it might be that they simply have incomplete informa-
tion about the market and might overlook prospects for internationaliza-
tion (both firm-level prospects, such as profit growth, and gains for the
whole economy). For this reason, we can be sceptical about defining this
scenario as market inefficiency, but it might motivate government inter-
vention. For instance, the government is a prospective beneficiary if
knowledge is provided that can enhance transactions in the market, when
gains are made by all parties involved. In this view, the government reduces
market inefficiency through the provision of appropriate information.
As to the cost of irregular information, access to efficient and suitable
information and consultancy services is particularly significant for smaller
firms, for whom the price of information access and absorption are higher
(Harris 2011). Conversely, the irregular provision of information poten-
tially exists for all firms across the board.
Harris (2011) argues that moral hazard challenges arise after a contrac-
tual agreement has been concluded. Both entities cannot completely guar-
antee that contractual agreements will be properly fulfilled, leading to a
chance that one of the parties will default. Agreements may be intended to
transfer the higher risks from one entity to the other, but the costs of
arranging, observing, implementing and enforcing frequently lead to
some difficulties occurring (the incomplete contract dilemma).
Financial obstacles are deemed to be an aspect of market inefficiency.
This is caused by the challenge in persuading prospective lenders or equity
providers to fund the internationalization process. In most instances, this
is caused by inadequate collateral or historical background to mitigate
risks related to the enterprise’s business objectives. In this view, global
markets are imperfect, and asymmetric information risk and uncertainty

prevalence are very high (Harris and Moffat 2011).
Furthermore, high entry costs are often related to high-risk failure and
small firms being unable to proceed or failing to invest in global markets.
Consequently, the problem arises that financial institutions and firm share-
holders opt for a short-term approach (importantly so when it comes to
problems of corporate governance, adverse selection, moral hazard and
principal–agent issues). This obstacle seems to be an institutional failure,
therefore appearing to be a rationale for the government to intervene
(government guarantee, export credit loans) or endeavouring to deliver
missing market factors, such as encouraging (through tax concessions)
suppliers of equity (Buckley 2014; Harris and Moffat 2015).
In rare instances, the consequences of irregular information might be
that buyers and sellers may not agree on the right transaction value—as
certain categories of information have an aspect of public good that the
markets alone (without government intervention) might not be able to
supply. These are dependable and unbiased sources, such as those devel-
oped via international embassy links and other government networks and
connections, which are created through governments’ short- and long-
term relationships with global investors (Buckley 2014).
In addition, increased globalization exposes multinational firms to
trends in global products. Therefore, systems development technology
links MNEs with consumer choices, needs and wants, thereby eliminating
information asymmetries in the market. This is a positive technological
spillover. Nonetheless, such externalities and spillovers will not be paid for
by the market, and this might be concluded to be a missing market factor
(Sibindi 2019).
Implementation failure arises when pioneering (comparable category)
ventures (that are a requirement for inflowing investment) do not yield
the essential property rights. If information is released formally or pirated,
it ceases to be private and becomes public knowledge. Once this is dif-
fused, property rights frequently become challenging to implement. The
challenge is partially one of synchronization: the firm’s knowledge (merged
into a new niche product market) about a particular product might need
to be divulged (or it is not feasible for a firm to prevent disclosure). The
wholesaler and retailer may not synchronize efficiently, while allowing the
producer to recover the cost of research and development (innovation
cost). However, this might lead to a disincentive to internationalize for
multinational firms, and regulations and institutions such as patenting and
374 M. SIBINDI
licensing bodies cannot be adjusted if they only have authority in one ter-
rain; to ensure perfect property rights, therefore, there is a reason for the
government to intervene (Harris and Moffat 2015). According to Casson
(1999), the authority or government cannot implement property rights
fully but it can appropriate using other alternatives, such as taxation, so
there is a direct correlation between governments’ investment provision
activities that are funded from taxation and the flow of inward FDI.
Obstacles to entry and exit are largely the result of the substantial sunk
costs related to the internationalization process. Sunk costs include the
cost of information about demand conditions in global markets, the cost
of developing a distribution network, the cost of product modification for
different markets and the cost of complying with regulations in host mar-
kets (including dealing with social and business ethics differences). These
costs may be repeated in full if a multinational firm opts to exit a foreign
market for any amount of time. The presence of just a few players in the
market can reduce competition, and this has a direct bearing on market
efficiency and customer welfare.
The objective of government intervention is to reduce such obstacles
through the establishment of information services and/or through fund-
ing the sunk costs involved in entry and exit. However, it is also possible
that funding certain sub-groups in the market may bring about obstacles
to MNEs’ entry in host markets and might influence the decision to exit
host markets for example, if a government funds underperforming firms,
or if government subsidy leads to displacement (Hilber and Voicu 2010).
A government becomes an obstacle to firms and markets when it has a
comparative advantage in supplying information about goods and ser-
vices, and publics utilities that enhance firm level competitiveness, but fails
to supply both information to firms and public goods. An example is pub-
lic goods that enhance firms’ performances and may be used by more than
one firm, yet this free use produces a very low level of demand and thus
low utility and production, to the disadvantage of society. Quality stan-
dards information and an institutional legal framework are aspects that are
essential in globalization and FDI. Therefore, host governments have a
role to promote the profile of their respective countries, and can also seek
to enhance inflows from global markets through bilateral trade agree-
ments and investment policies (Bathelt and Li 2013; Hilber and
Voicu 2010).
Searching for information frequently rests on the presence and proxim-
ity of business contacts and global networks and alliances that enhance the
accessibility of information and the knowledge of global markets. Networks

are assumed to be key to the internationalization process, as the acquisi-
tion of empirical knowledge about global markets is an integral part of
entry into and sustainability of outward investment. Access to and interac-
tions with prospective players in the market enable multinational firms to
acclimatize, and to adjust their business culture in host destinations.
According to this understanding, the motive behind government inter-
vention is to access networks of prospective global business partners
(Harris and Moffat 2011; Harris 2011; Hilber and Voicu 2010).
Furthermore, network failures occur because technological knowledge
is defined as tacit knowledge that cannot be easily diffused. This is argu-
able: networks are fundamental in the internationalization process as dif-
fusion depends on individual contact. Developing an international network
provides a link to FDI and the transfer of tacit knowledge, hence reducing
problems related to multinational firms with restricted competencies and
therefore restricted financial forecasts. Teece and Al-Aali (2011) argue
that even support from networks in information provision, duplication
and simulation is not easy, particularly if productive knowledge is embod-
ied in a firm’s dynamic proficiencies.
According to Teece (2014), a network may increase the resource base
of a firm in the following ways. First, it enhances the firm’s receptive and
competitive aptitude, therefore influencing its internal competences.
Secondly, the type of alliance has an effect on the category of information
and knowledge to which the firm has access, such that innovation and dif-
fusion translate into shared activity; networks are key to the innovation
process. A network failure occurs when loosely connected firms have an
overlapping technological base, or when the network leads them in the
wrong direction. Government support with regard to information provi-
sion might be a feasible remedy for this (Teece and Al-Aali 2011;
Teece 2014).
Lastly, there is an aspect of systematic failure that takes place at the
highest level, which encompasses the entire technological system. “Thus,
while individual, firm competence is the central basis of innovative perfor-
mance, firms operate within ‘systems of innovation’ which integrate their
activities with those of other organizations” (Dodgson and Bessant 1995).
In this view, firms are located within specific national and regional techno-
logical processes that comprise different capabilities, networks and enti-
ties, which together define the framework in which the firm operates
(Jones et al. 2011; Peiris et al. 2012).
376 M. SIBINDI
According to Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1958), these structures

are also on an accumulative returns, path dependency course, with differ-
ent (unequal and deviating) results across regions and nations. These
aspects have been discussed in detail as “cumulative causation models”
and have been further augmented by adding regional context (Dixon and
Thirlwall 1975). The concepts operate under cumulative returns with vir-
tuous circles of spread and reaction, but can fail if system players (firms,
institutions and networks) reach an operational deadlock either because of
old technology or if they obstruct diversity and growth creation, for
instance by hindering the genesis of new branches in the industry (Hilber
and Voicu 2010).
Processes are extremely multifaceted, and involve, for example, finan-
cial, educational, science and technology systems in a particular region.
These directly influence the operating environment of the firm.
Furthermore, a firm is also exposed to qualitative aspects, such as culture
and legal statutory framework, which are difficult to quantify, but may
obstruct or enhance the firm’s objectives (McCombie 2017). Harris and
Moffat (2011), argue that in terms of government mitigating systematic
failure, the common theme is the need to create variety and to increase
connectivity in these technological systems.
If market failure is threatened, responsible governments respond by
adjusting trade policies. After the demise of Robert Mugabe, the govern-
ment mooted a new political and economic agenda. As a result of this, a
trade policy framework has been provided that determines the flow of
outward investment to South Africa. According to trade policy and strate-
gic framework document (2019), the overarching objective of Zimbabwe’s
trade policy is to achieve sustainable GDP by efficiency gains from trade
through the improved allocation of efforts across markets to accelerate
economic growth. As such, the trade policy provides a platform for the
increased mutual benefit of intra-regional trade. Therefore, it is necessary
for trade integration to be complemented by sectoral cooperation and
greatly improved policy harmonization programmes that address real eco-
nomic capacity limitations.
The trade policy agenda also respond to Economic Partnership
Agreements between European Union (EU) and Southern African
Development Community (SADC) countries. As partnership agreements
establish a sequence of incompatible trade regimes between EU states and
SADC members, deeper regional integration will probably be destabi-
lized. Current trade policies assume wide-range engagements with global
Table 15.2 Trade policy objectives
Ultimate Economic Objective: Increase sustainable GDP and GDP growth by

• Efficiency gains from trade, through improved allocation of effort across markets;
• Enabling more firms to take successful advantage of export market opportunities in
pursuing their business growth and development goals;
• Upgrading innovation, quality, design, management through enhanced exposure to
international marketplaces and best practice
Intermediate objectives:
a) To increase the efficiency of international markets and marketplaces, both by reducing
barriers to trade and investment and by addressing market failures that would otherwise
inhibit access to international marketplaces, such as trade fairs;
b) To ensure that firms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have
access to efficient information and advisory services relating to business opportunities in
overseas markets;
c) To raise the level of international marketing and export competencies among firms
across a wide spectrum of exportable goods and services sectors;
d) To facilitate access to networks of business contacts in overseas markets, especially for
SMEs;
e) To raise awareness about international trade and investment among firms across a wide
spectrum of sectors, and encourage more firms to take an active approach to exploiting
overseas market opportunities;
f) To reduce procedural barriers to exporting, and promote efficient procedures and best
practice in trade transaction information management;
g) To strengthen institutional links for international business, such as bilateral links
among business communities, chambers of commerce, and providing bilateral channels
for networking and information, etc;
h) To enhance the “country image” of the country in overseas markets as a supplier of
goods and services; to raise the profile of national suppliers overseas
Source: Booth di Giovanni (1998)
trading blocs to enable the easy flow of trade, investment and multina-
tional activity. Booth di Giovanni (1998) provides a theoretical framework
that fosters understanding of government response to market failure.
Table 15.2 highlights the important fundamental traits of trade promo-
tional objectives for the United Kingdom government, but they are still
applicable in Zimbabwe’s trade policy scenario at the time of writing.
Zimbabwe’s trade policy augments the assertion by Jones et al. (2011)
that this method is directed towards supporting and aiding firms who
intend to invest in the country.
With this realization, the criticism of an incremental approach to mul-
tinational promotion is validated by observing that MNEs that are born
global and target international niches are probably better informed about
378 M. SIBINDI
market traits than multinational firms. This is largely because MNEs inter-
nationalize incrementally, whereas born global firms in knowledge-based
markets have more access to the shared intellectual capital that is embed-
ded in the international industry. Perhaps the challenge that born global
firms face revolves around the developing of new products for multiple
markets and the cost of research and development. Furthermore, their
products have short lifecycles, and given their more multifaceted offerings
they are high-risk investments (Vasilchenko and Morrish 2011; Morrish
and Jones 2013).
Morrish and Jones (2013), augment this position, and argue that firms
that take advantage of trade promotion from the government or from
bilateral agreements adopt easily and sustain their investments much lon-
ger. Furthermore, the type of information that multinational firms require
is more specific, and it is contended that trade policies should seek more
relevant and user-friendly information for multinational firms on which to
base their decisions. There is also a concern that trade policies should sup-
port research and development, access to venture investments and support
in developing international business and political networks. In a nutshell,
it is argued that trade policies need to adopt a more inclusive approach
that priorities international business in a more comprehensive sense than
internationalization, and also identify aspects that sustain investment,
including leverage, and harness human capital and financial and knowl-
edge resources.
Another aspect that is highlighted by Bell et al. (2001) is the impor-
tance of a domestic firm network that contributes to the decision to enter
international markets and to sustain investments. This network includes
domestic contacts. This assertion is reinforced by a series of studies that
have emphasized the importance of interpersonal relationships in the
internationalization process. Most relationships formed in international
business are more probably formed at home than abroad. These contacts
enhance the decision-making of an investing firm and enable an appropri-
ate market entry selection strategy (Vasilchenko and Morrish 2011;
Morrish and Jones 2013).
According to Yakop and Bergeijk (2011), the government has a dual
role in enabling the internationalization of business. The first is to inter-
vene in market failures and the second is to ensure multinational firms gain
the right incentives as they adjust to globalization. According to Harris
and Li (2012), the government fails to ensure multinational firms receive
the correct incentives if they implement unsuitable macro-economic
policies; for instance, the overvaluation of exchange rates after trade liber-
alization. Trade regulations that endeavour to alleviate against the short-
run influence of liberalization might have negative consequences, and
result in pervese reduction of MNEs activities in host markets.
(Heydon 2012).
In this regard, the assumption is that multinational firms make micro-
level decisions to internationalize operations not only because of business
prospects but also from many other perspectives. These are path depen-
dent on aspects such as government trade objectives, bilateral trade agree-
ments between governments, regional trade objectives and institutional
arrangements. In this chapter, we have highlighted aspects of government
intervention that determine the process of internationalization and multi-
national firm behaviour, as decisions that build on variables to sustain
investment are upheld. As a result, this section has discussed market failure
considerations for governments, which intervene principally to enhance
multinational activity in international markets. Without a shadow of
doubt, there are certain aspects of international business that require gov-
ernment support. Nonetheless, because of multinational firms’ different
needs, government support needs to be flexible, reflecting firms’ hetero-
geneous nature.
There is criticism, however, that trade policies are not adequately geared
to born global firms and not adequately flexible to include different sub-
groups of firms with different motivations for FDI. In most circumstances,
changes in trade regulation as a result of criticism highlight the different
resources that are available for different multinational firms. In this view,
the motivation of trade policy is to ensure that multinational firms get the
right incentives. This indicates the need for regulations that enable multi-
national firms to obtain those things (i.e., absorptive capacity and dynamic
capabilities) that reduce sunk costs and sustain investment.
Despite resurgent efforts by the government of Zimbabwe to adjust
trade policies and lure FDI to what they have termed a new Zimbabwe,
the intended objective is seemingly eluded. From a political perspective,
Zimbabwe is still treated with a shadow of scepticism. There is no guaran-
tee that the new government, which has shown no willingness to improve
the institutional framework, will return the country to the rule of law and
widespread respect of property rights.
From a business and economic perspective, Zimbabwe is still not a first
destination choice for investment. The government is incapable of supply-
ing public goods that are fundamental for firm-level endeavours.
380 M. SIBINDI
Furthermore, those aspects that are known to induce inward FDI are very
low in Zimbabwe, the size of the economy is small, supporting industries
have collapsed and the financial system is in serious intensive care.
Capital Market and Inward FDI

This section highlights the financial procedures of FDI in terms of mergers
and acquisitions. The discussion enhances our understanding of the link-
age between FDI and stock markets. A series of studies assume that there
is a causal relationship between stock market growth, the financial system
and FDI inflows. According to Aregbeshola (2014) the stock market has
a positive indication on the direction of FDI in host destinations. With this
realization in mind, this section attempts to understand the compatibility
of the Zimbabwe stock market with inducing inward FDI.
The fundamental difference between a domestic firm and a multina-
tional firm is the transfer of investment from the country of origin to the
host destination. The global concept of FDI is a category of cross-border
investment, in which an investor resident in one country establishes a last-
ing interest and significant degree of influence over an enterprise in
another country. Ownership of 10% or more of the voting power in an
enterprise in one economy by an investor in another economy is evidence
of such a relationship (OECD 2015). FDI is a key factor in global eco-
nomic integration, opening up more investment opportunities (Kantarelis
2008). According to the World Investment Report (2015), investment is
transferred through geographical boundaries by means of mergers and
acquisitions. In legal terms, these are two different things: a merger is a
combination of two separate entities of which the target firm ceases to
exist, while an acquisition is a total takeover of the target firm by the buy-
ing firm, its stock, assets and liabilities (Gitman 2014). From a commercial
perspective, merger and acquisition results in the consolidation of assets
and liabilities under one firm, hence only a faint line distinguishing the
two. In this view, there is a lack of academic work that explores the envi-
ronment and aspects that lead to firms’ investment options.
According to Walsh (1989), mergers and acquisitions result in firm syn-
ergy, which is a creation of a whole that is greater than the simple sum of
its parts. A series of recent studies assert that both acquisitions and merg-
ers result in two types of synergy, namely financial synergy and operational
synergy, creating value in the process. According to Gitman (2014),
financial synergy is a combination of a firm with an excess of cash (or slack)

and a firm with a high returns project; this can yield a payoff in terms of
higher value of the combined firm. As a result, synergy is most likely to
increase when a bigger firm acquires smaller firms or when publicly traded
firms acquire private businesses (Kumar 2008).
The most apparent benefit of financial synergy is the improvement of
debt capacity, because when two firms combine their earnings and cash
flows these are stabilized and predictable, hence giving the combined
firms a greater aptitude to borrow and improve working capital, which
they could not have attained as single entities (Beron and Groh 2014).
The borrowing power of a combined firm also creates tax benefits through
higher cash flows or the lower cost of capital for the combined firm.
Furthermore, tax advantages can arise through the manipulation of taxa-
tion statutes or from the use of net operating losses to shelter revenue.
Thus, a profitable entity that acquires a less viable firm may exploit net
operating losses to lessen the tax load. Alternatively, an entity that can
increase its depreciation after either merger or acquisition will begin with
taxes and create its value.
From an operating synergy perspective, value is created by either an
increase in income or an increase in growth or both. Operating synergies
can be classified into four categories. First, economies of scale may arise
from merger or acquisition, allowing the combined firm to become more
cost efficient and profitable. Second, a combined entity can determine
both supply schedules and pricing strategy using the levers of reduced
competition, which should increase both revenue and profitability mar-
gins. Third, the combination of different strategic units and functions of
business will increase in better-quality output and greater quantity. Fourth,
a combined firm uses its higher capital gearing to modify old products and
invent new product lines, thus creating new markets and developing exist-
ing ones (Devigne et al. 2016; Gitman et al. 2015).
In the context of Zimbabwe, the literature reviews other macro-
economic factors, such as the size of the economy, infrastructure and
industry. In addition, the financial sector in Zimbabwe is in serious dis-
tress, with many banks suffering from a crisis in viability. This also applies
to the stock market, which was temporarily shut down during the height
of inflation in 2008. With the advent of a multi-currency regime, the stock
market was resuscitated, but it has not shown any signs of recovery. This
certainly has negative aspects for any MNEs that intend to invest in
Zimbabwe.
382 M. SIBINDI
Conclusion
This section outlines conclusions around four substantive issues:
• the nature of FDI and motives of MNEs;

• aspects of host market that determine FDI;
• government roles in FDI and international business;
• mergers and acquisitions.
In the first section, we discussed a wide range of literature on the nature

of FDI and the motives of MNEs based on the theory of the firm, consid-
ering the general objectives of business from a wide range of
perspectives.
In the theory of the firm, the firm is the black box of decision-making
that attempts to maximise resources allocation with the ultimate objective
of profit-making. This being the case, we outlined the process of business
internationalization and the relevance of MNEs’ objectives and motives in
the selection of volume and direction of FDI. The essence of understand-
ing this anchors on the fact that firm objectives and motives have a causal
explanation in the selection of a possible host market.
In the second section, we discussed literature on the internationaliza-
tion process, with particular reference to host market aspects and the
determination of FDI. The literature reviewed in this section details those
host market aspects that are most favourable in enhancing the strategic
position of MNEs. The literature reviewed casts doubt on the strategic
fitness of Zimbabwe as an investment destination. Evidence entailing the
dependency on firm motives and host market conditions indicates that
firm-level decision-making selects host markets that are compatible with
their business objectives.
The literature points to other aspects that determine internationaliza-
tion such as industry sector, size of firm and agglomerations/network and
international exposure among firm executives, but more evident is the
important role of tacit knowledge creation and acquisition in both micro-
and macro-environment level of the firm. In addition, we reviewed recent
economic models that emphasize the significance of sunk cost and variety
in productivity (heterogeneity across firms). The mitigation of entry costs
requires a sufficient knowledge base and complementary assets and
resources, more specifically human capital and research and development
that enhance absorptive capacity. Thus, having different knowledge
resource bases relates to differences in innovation ratio, and other aspects

of aggregate productivity determine productivity differences between firms.
The last section addressed market inefficiency arguments for govern-
ment intervention in view of business internationalization. The primary
objective of this intervention is to motivate firms to invest in host markets.
Certainly, there are certain aspects of global markets that require govern-
ment intervention through trade promotion and bilateral agreements.
Nevertheless, because of the heterogeneity of multinational needs, recent
scholarship casts doubt upon the flexibility of government support.
Criticism that policy alone does not address the fundamental issues that
drive inward FDI is evidenced. A fundamental aspect that is prominent in
this literature review revolves around aspects that impede the internation-
alization process. These are a result of such factors as market inefficacy or
are caused by firms’ absorptive capacities and dynamic capabilities. In this
instance, government policies that promote trade enable multinational
firms to improve firms’ absorptive capacities and dynamic capabilities.
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Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises
Siphosami Malunga
A Tale of Broken Promises: Zimbabwe

After Mugabe
For millions of Zimbabweans, who had suffered political repression and
economic deprivation and decline during the preceding 40 years, Mugabe’s
removal was a much-needed relief. Little did it matter that it was his com-
rades, with whom he had killed thousands, stifled dissent, closed the dem-
ocratic space and plundered the economy and public purse who removed
him, under the banner of the ironically titled Operation Restore Legacy.
He was the head of the Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front
(ZANU–PF) system, and as such, his exit was seen by many as providing
an opportunity for change.
For that reason, rallied by the army generals who were seeking but
struggling to “constitutionally” remove Mugabe, thousands of
Zimbabweans came out to the streets to send a message to Mugabe “to
leave and leave now”. Thus, they “sanitized” the coup.
After his removal, the generals summoned Mugabe’s former deputy,
Emmerson Mnangagwa, back from exile to take over. Mnangagwa had
dramatically fled the country weeks earlier after being fired by Mugabe,
claiming that he feared for his life after an alleged poisoning attempt.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2
390 S. MALUNGA
After taking control of the ruling party and reversing all of Mugabe’s
decisions and dismissals that had affected Mnagangwa’s faction, the gener-
als took their plan to Parliament, forcing Mugabe to buckle and resign.
Mnangagwa was inaugurated as President on 27 November 2017 with
promises to bring in political and economic reforms. At his inauguration,
attended by foreign diplomats and opposition leaders, Mnangagwa prom-
ised to undo the disastrous results of Mugabe’s 40-year rule. He promised
to fix the ruined economy and open the long isolated and ostracised coun-
try for business and investment. He promised to restore and respect
democracy, to repeal draconian laws, to restore the rule of law, to fight
corruption, to revisit compensation to white farmers for land, to re-engage
the international community and most importantly to respect the will and
voice of the people, which, he argued was the voice of God. To that end,
he promised to provide the people with the ultimate opportunity to decide
on the future political leadership of the country via free, fair and peaceful
elections. Individually and taken together, what Mnangagwa promised
was exactly what the country needed, and what it had been denied by
Mugabe and ZANU–PF for decades. Two years after Mugabe was deposed,
with Zimbabweans worse off than they were during the worst of Mugabe’s
equally disastrous rule, it is clear that Mnangagwa’s is a tale of broken
promises. So what went wrong?
False Expectations, False Change

To start, post-Mugabe Zimbabwe was a proverbial house built on sand.
Driven by Mugabe’s henchmen, who had been the architects and imple-
menters of his disastrous policies in the previous four decades, it was not
really the change that Zimbabweans and the world thought it would be. It
was triggered by and aimed to settle an internal ZANU–PF factional fight
(between the Generation 40 (G40) faction, led by Grace Mugabe, and
Lacoste, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, inside ZANU–PF. It was and had
never been a people’s project and certainly never ideologically founded or
spurred on by a genuine desire for real political and social change. To that
extent, little should have been expected from the coup. This alone easily
explains why it delivered nothing in resolving Zimbabwe’s long-term cri-
ses and instead dug the country into a deeper hole. The so-called new
dispensation has been a catalogue of failure since November 2017, failing
the several tests it faced.
Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises 391
Failed Political Reform

The first test for the post-coup regime was openness to political reform.
Under Mugabe, ZANU–PF had shown extreme political intolerance. In
the 1980s, seeking a one-party state, Mugabe, with Mnangagwa as his
security minister, had massacred thousands of supporters of the opposition
party Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), forcing its leader Joshua
Nkomo to capitulate and join a unity government under ZANU–PF. In
the 1990s, Mugabe had violently suppressed all signs of internal and exter-
nal opposition, sending gunmen to shoot and kill opponents in the
Zimbabwe Unity Movement. In 2000, his ego dented by the loss of the
constitutional referendum, and fearing that he would lose the parliamen-
tary election to the new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),
Mugabe had deployed party youths and war veterans to violently attack
white farmers and farm workers perceived to be supporters of the new
opposition party. In 2008, with clear signs of having lost the presidential
election to Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round, he resorted first to rig-
ging, then violence, to win the run-off from which Tsvangirai ended up
withdrawing.
When Mnangagwa took over in 2017, all eyes were therefore on how
his regime would treat the opposition. Never mind that Mnangagwa had
been Mugabe’s mastermind and enforcer of violence against the opposi-
tion, going back to 1980. As security minister, he had directed the intel-
ligence aspects of the Gukurahundi operation that left 20,000 civilians
dead. In 2000, 2002 and 2008, he had also played a key role in election-
related violence directed at MDC officials and supporters. He was consid-
ered a key architect of the closed political space in Zimbabwe, an idea that
went back decades. To many, it was therefore unreasonable to expect any
meaningful change in political tolerance after the coup. Yet, aware of his
own dubious credentials and also to curry favour with his western backers
and funders, especially the United Kingdom, Mnangagwa promised to
open the country up not just for business but also politically. In a public
relations stunt, he publicly visited sick MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai
and offered government support for his medical treatment as well as the
transfer of his official state-purchased residence, which Mugabe had
refused to hand over. He even tolerated criticism in the media and from
civil society on historically taboo subjects, such as Gukurahundi. To cap it
all, he even “joined” social media.
392 S. MALUNGA
The period between the coup and elections in July 2018 saw a marked
and unprecedented improvement and opening up of political, civic and
media space. But purges of G40 elements, Mnangagwa’s erstwhile neme-
sis, continued, with selective arrests and prosecutions. There were still
bans on protests, arbitrary arrests, the abuse of power and authority, and
regular violations of constitutional and human rights that targeted activists.
Fixed and Flawed Elections

The second major test was the general election in July 2018. Seen as being
central to restoring democracy after the coup, there was little doubt that
the post-coup elections would need to pass the free, fair and peaceful test.
Previous elections in Zimbabwe had been bloody, with outcomes con-
tested. In 2008, because of the violence, the continental and global com-
munity had refused to sign off the presidential elections, forcing Mugabe
into a coalition government with Morgan Tsvangirai. In the 2013 elec-
tion, although it had been peaceful, the manipulation of the roll of voters,
which was withheld by the electoral commission until election day, again
undermined the legitimacy of Mugabe’s victory. In 2018, Mnangagwa
was therefore aware that if anything was needed to gain internal and exter-
nal legitimacy as part of his open for business mantra, delivering free, fair
and peaceful elections was the silver bullet.
Despite their promises, Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF resorted to tried
and tested tactics. They retained the tainted and discredited Zimbabwe
Election Commission and Secretariat, considered by many as lacking inde-
pendence and made up of security and intelligence personnel. Again, as in
previous elections, the commission failed to release the voters roll on time
and in a searchable format, and even then it was plagued with irregulari-
ties. As in previous elections, ZANU–PF leaned on the army—whose
mere presence especially in rural areas intimidated voters. It also manipu-
lated the government’s agricultural subsidy scheme to “buy” the rural
vote. As in previous years, ZANU–PF and Mnangagwa monopolized the
state media in their electoral campaign, denying equal and fair play to the
opposition. With the Mugabe era draconian laws on access to information
and protection of privacy, and on public order and security, still firmly
intact, the pre-election environment and playing field was far from being
level. The operational conduct of the election, including the tabulation,
transmission and announcement of elections results, pointed to a rigged
process. With the closeness of the results between Mnangagwa and his
opposition challenger, Nelson Chamisa—with Mnangagwa receiving just

over the 50% required—no wonder the outcome was disputed and chal-
lenged in court. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Mnangagwa
but failed to give its reasons for almost 18 months, further entrenching
partisan perspectives.
Leopards Can’t Change Their Spots

Mnangagwa’s third test involved human rights. As he had played a central
role as Mugabe’s right hand, in the gradual and systematic erosion of citi-
zens’ rights for the preceding 40 years, many were sceptical that he and
ZANU–PF would miraculously begin to respect human rights. The scep-
tics were right. Shortly after the July election, in response to public protest
against delays in announcing election results, Mnangagwa deployed the
military—who shot and killed six unarmed civilians and injured scores
more. These killings, conducted in full view of election observers and
international media, cemented the scepticism about any post-Mugabe
change by Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF. As damage control, Mnangagwa
commissioned an international commission of enquiry led by former
South African President Kgalema Motlanthe, but it was made up of
regime-sympathizing local commissioners whose work was carefully cho-
reographed. In a further clear sign that little had changed, despite recom-
mendations by the Motlanthe Commission to hold military officers to
account responsible for the killings, Mnangagwa instead promoted the
commander of the unit responsible, while other perpetrators remained
untouched.
There would be further failures. In January 2019, when citizens who
were angered by the sudden increase in the price of fuel took to the streets,
Mnangagwa again deployed the army against them. What followed was a
military operation conducted under cover of an internet shutdown in
which grave violations, beatings, torture, rapes and plunder were carried
out against innocent civilians. Mnangagwa would later boast that he had
deployed the army to deal with protesters after giving instructions to use
a “special whip laced in salty water”. After the protests, thousands of civil-
ians were arrested and tried in unfair and fast-tracked trials, while hun-
dreds were sentenced to many years in prison.
Again, in August 2019, with the country and citizens facing dire social
and economic conditions, the opposition MDC called for nationwide
mass protests. Complying with the public order and security law, it sought
394 S. MALUNGA
police authorization for the protests, which was denied. On the day, riot
police unleashed an orgy of violence against peaceful protesters, beating
and arresting many.
Throughout Mnangagwa’s rule, the government has continued to
selectively target critics, labour, human rights and political activists for
intimidation, harassment, abduction, arrests, detention, torture and kill-
ings. In many instances, it has relied on pseudo-elements in the security
sector or party youth wings to carry out these heinous crimes. Fearing an
uprising similar to those in Sudan, Egypt and Algeria, the government has
resorted to selective abductions of critics who lead or call for citizen action,
in order to spread fear and deter citizens from protesting. Most recently,
the leader of the striking hospital doctors’ union, Peter Magombeyi, was
abducted, detained for five days, tortured and then dumped in the out-
skirts of Harare. The government claimed that a shadowy “third force”
was involved. Other critics calling for accountability for Gukurahundi
atrocities, including activists such as Zenzele Ndebele, Thandekile Moyo
and Mkhululi Hanana, have also been intimidated, followed and threat-
ened by unidentified individuals. In an unprecedented surge of intoler-
ance, the government has also resorted to abducting, beating and torturing
human rights activists, such as Tendai Mombeyarara of the Citizens
Manifesto and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe, which
is led by Obert Masaraure. Samantha Kureya, “Gonyeti”, a comedian, and
Ian Makiwa, “Platinum Prince”, a musician, have also been abducted,
beaten and tortured for satirical and musical productions that were deemed
inflammatory and offensive to Mnangagwa and the regime. Some have
not been so lucky. Blessing Toronga, an MDC political activist, was
abducted from his house in Glen Norah Township in Harare by unidenti-
fied men after the protests on 24 January 2019. His body was found in an
advanced state of decomposition in March this year.
As Mugabe did in the 1980s, Mnangagwa has relied on trumped-up
treason charges against perceived critics and opponents. Victims include
Morgan Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube and others in 2000, those involved
in the MDC ’17 Petrol Bomb Case in 2015 and MDC deputy president
Tendai Biti in 2008. In 2019 alone, the government has charged seven
civil society activists with treason, continued to prosecute Pastor Ivan
Mawarire, for Mugabe-era treason charges, and charged several MDC
politicians, including Job Sikhala, Joana Mamombe and Ostallos Siziba,
with treason. Undoubtedly, on this score Mnangagwa has not only proved
sceptics right, but has matched Mugabe in many respects.
A Corrupt and Predatory Elite

The third major test for Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF was their policy and
attitude to corruption, bad governance and poor leadership. When he
took over from Mugabe, Mnangagwa promised to open the country, iso-
lated for many years, for business. He promised to fight corruption and to
ensure the rule of law.
Corruption, bad governance and poor leadership have been at the cen-
tre of Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social problems for the past
40 years.
Under Mugabe, a politically connected and predatory elite, comprising
ruling ZANU–PF officials, their families and friends, prioritised the per-
sonal accumulation of wealth over public interest and service. This elite
has been involved in high-level corruption scandals since 1980. It has
siphoned off billions of dollars, abused public resources and enjoyed
impunity from any form of accountability. Almost all Mugabe’s ministers
have been at one time or another been implicated in corruption.
Mnangagwa’s commitment to addressing corruption, bad governance
and poor leadership was therefore in the spotlight. His choice of ministers,
his attitude towards corrupt elites and his appointment of capable leader-
ship were objects of scrutiny. In all these aspects, he failed dismally. He
appointed and retained corrupt cabinet ministers—some of whom, in yet
another public relations stunt, he has now sought to arrest. He set up an
anti-corruption unit in his office, which has delivered nothing. He has
allowed powerful elites connected to him, such as Kuda Tagwirei’s
Sakunda, to retain monopolistic control of the country’s lucrative fuel
supply contract. He has allowed the use of the Reserve Bank for preferen-
tial access to foreign currency exchange for connected elites, which it
expatriates, launders or sells on the black market at a premium in a system
of arbitrage. He has allowed the plunder of US$3 billion from the “com-
mand agriculture” subsidy scheme, most of which has found its way to
Sakunda.
As the country faces a severe public service crisis in the water, energy,
health and education sectors, Mnangagwa has presided over declining and
deepening social conditions. Poor governance and leadership tied to cor-
ruption have seen his ministers preoccupied with lining their pockets and
diverting public resources to their personal upkeep and benefit rather than
addressing the multiple crises the country faces.
396 S. MALUNGA
A Failed Economy
Mnangagwa’s greatest test was the extent to which he would be able to fix
Zimbabwe’s ruined economy. His inability to do so has been his most epic
failure.
In the main, wages have lost all value and purchasing power owing to
the disastrous economic policies of Mthuli Ncube, Mnangagwa’s Minister
of Finance. Ncube was initially feted as a professor from Oxford and a
former African Development Bank Chief Economist, but he was also pre-
viously founder and owner of a failed Zimbabwean bank, Barbican, who
has banned the use of foreign currency exchange, reintroduced the dis-
credited Zimbabwe dollar, introduced an extortionate transactional tax on
electronic transactions and allowed activities at the Reserve Bank that have
been condemned by the International Monetary Fund. In the past six
months of 2020, in the latest budget announcement the finance minister
has been accused of embarrassingly cooking the national accounting books
by understating the contributions of China by over US$100 million.
The disastrous economic policies and the accompanying corruption
have seen doctors and nurses go on strike for months because of poor
wages and working conditions: no hospitals have adequate equipment,
medicines or medical supplies. The government response has been to
abduct leaders of doctors’ or teachers unions and to fire all doctors.
Living conditions have deteriorated for the majority of citizens to levels
worse than during the Mugabe era, with power blackouts for days and
shortages of fuel, banknotes, medicines and other basic needs. Inflation
has shot up in the third quarter of 2020. In June 2020, the government
banned the use of foreign currency, deepening the hardship but proclaim-
ing the return of a robust national currency. In November 2019, the gov-
ernment introduced new bank notes but the release was marred by another
corruption scandal in which hundreds of thousands of dollars surfaced on
the black market when the maximum permitted withdrawal is $200.
The Final Test Mnangagwa’s last test will be whether and how long he can
hold on to power in the context of the continuously deteriorating condi-
tions in the country. There is an overwhelming consensus that the situa-
tion seems to have reached breaking point. Whatever the plan for removing
Mugabe may have been for the coup comrades, it is hard to imagine that
this is what was agreed or expected. It is possible that the plotters
collectively underestimated what was required to fix Zimbabwe. They

assumed that they could continue to fudge their way forward by stifling
dissent, stealing elections, printing money, recklessly spending state funds
and plundering the economy without consequence. If that is the case, they
were wrong. In removing Mugabe, they promised and offered people
change. They managed to temporarily persuade and gain the support of
erstwhile detractors, such as the United Kingdom, and the sceptical sup-
port of many Zimbabweans. In two short years, they have squandered it
all: the hope, the goodwill, the promise, the trust. They have also lost the
trust of their own supporters and each other. They have run out of excuses.
The sanctions excuse, used effectively by Mugabe, has lost its shine: it no
longer cuts it as Zimbabweans realize that ruling elites continue to plun-
der and live large while they suffer. But can Mnangagwa still salvage the
situation or will it roll on towards a cliff edge? The former looks unlikely,
in the light of honest reflection on the past two years, a realization that
there are simply no more cards for him or ZANU–PF to play, when it
comes to fudging the economy and politics, and also that relying on coer-
cion will soon stop working. The hardline ruling party in Ethiopia,
EPRDF, came to a similar conclusion after many years of relying on repres-
sion: it realized that there was a real chance of losing everything. If
Mnangagwa and his comrades reach this epiphany, they may yet survive
and play a part in creating a different future. At almost 80 years old, hav-
ing served for almost 60 years in government and having orchestrated and
watched Mugabe being humiliated, it can be assumed that Mnangagwa
would want a different fate. This would ideally involve an inclusive negoti-
ated process to address the country’s political, economic and social prob-
lems, preferably moderated by an external actor. Recently South Africa has
hinted that it is losing patience with the crisis, which may signal its willing-
ness to mediate. If Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF have no answers, neither
it seems does the MDC, which has shown hesitation and ambiguity in its
intentions. While the deteriorating economic conditions provide the typi-
cal context for popular uprisings of the kind seen in which ruling parties
were ousted in Egypt, Tunisia and more recently Bolivia, Algeria and
Sudan, this is unlikely to happen on its own. Besides, it is hardly a viable
strategy. The MDC will have to be more deliberate and intentional. Doing
nothing is as bad as Mnangagwa waiting and hoping nothing will come of
the decline. If a negotiated solution is preferred, the MDC will have to
push for one. If a popular uprising is desired, it will have to lead and direct
398 S. MALUNGA
it. A spontaneous, leaderless, uprising by frustrated and angry citizens is

also likely. This was the case in Egypt and to a great extent Algeria and
Sudan. This option is what both Mnangagwa and the MDC should be
worried about, as it places both outside the game.
Revolving Coup Door?

In the meantime, it is an open secret that there are disagreements at the
highest levels inside government and ZANU–PF. It is conceivable that the
prevailing situation is not the one envisaged by those soldiers drafted into
the coup who are now worse off than during the Mugabe era. There are
reports that junior officers are suffering squalid and dehumanizing living
and working conditions. If the state of ordinary Zimbabweans is a mea-
sure, this is unsurprising. There is talk of another coup. Experience from
elsewhere shows that once it has been opened, the door leading to military
overthrow of a government is hard to close. To that extent, whether it is
another coup or increased citizens’ agitation, not just for change but for
survival, Zimbabwe seems headed for a major confrontation. Rather than
wait for it to happen and try to pick up the scattered pieces afterwards, the
Southern African Development Community, led by South Africa (which
has much to lose), the African Union and international bodies need to
refocus their spotlight on Zimbabwe once again. But this time, they must
ensure that the political change will genuinely reflect the will of the people
and not the small and predatory elite that now fights over the country’s
decaying carcass.
Index
A counter-hegemonic, 108
AAG, see Affirmative Action Group leading, 76
Abel Muzorewaled United African pro-Mthwakazi, 166, 168–172
National Council (UANC), 92 student, 104
Abuse of power, 240, 311, 392 vilify prodemocracy, 126
Access to Information and Protection Administration
of Privacy Act (AIPPA), 127, 191 direct colonial, 6
Accumulation configures periphery direct juridical, 6
economies, 17, 276 new, 310, 312, 317, 319,
Accusations, 108, 203, 262, 333, 320, 325
348, 350 post, 300
regime-change, 77 post-Mugabe, 311
Accusing, 8, 341 transparent public, 308
denounced Vice President Administrative reforms, 310
Mnangagwa, 334 extensive, 309
Activism Adoption, 68, 201, 254, 261, 302,
judicial, 200 304, 318
ongoing citizen, 76 Adult suffrage universal, 28
political, 124 Adulterous relationship, 344
radical, 64 Affirmative action
social, 64 deliberate, 177
vibrant Zimbabwean student, 122 entailed, 2
Activists Affirmative Action Group (AAG), 65
citizen, 76 Affirmative action programme, 175

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2
400 INDEX
Africa disaffection, 31
colonial, 165 domestic affairs, 282
colonise, 292 economies, 293
development, 283 experience of civil society, 122
postcolonial, 57, 137 governments, 121, 124, 177, 278,
shining light of, 17, 299 280, 321
sovereign accumulation histories, 292
positioning, 291 integration in economic
state, 28, 55, 57, 85, 278–282 development, 290
state and development in, 277–283 journalist, 218
sub-Saharan, 278 leaders, 6, 7, 278, 282, 292,
African American, 145, 237 294, 295
African countries, 87, 87n1, 118, 123, liberation, 161
177, 282, 286 misconception, 146
and control, 286 national question Nkrumah, 290
poor, 338 nationalism, 58, 60, 282
African National Congress nationalist patriarchal models of
(ANC), 55, 141 liberation, 3
African National Union nationalist politics, 300
dominated Zimbabwe, 145 nations, 278
ruling Zimbabwe, 118, 181, 299 natural resources, 286
African Nationals, 141, 143, 145 opposition, 86
African Network of Constitutional political leaders, 28
Lawyers, 309 political spaces, 354
African Socialism, 60 reserves, 165
African Trade Union Congress resources, 277, 283–287, 290
(ATUC), 96n6 societies, 278
African Union, 68, 184, 398 states, 28, 55, 57, 85, 278–282
African Union High Level Panel, 287 struggle, 124
Africanist, 219 subjugating, 282
Africanization, 33, 56 townships, 165
Africanization processes, 62 undermined, 279
Africans values, 218
accumulation in bifurcated women, 335
states, 279 workers, 141
alienating, 284, 292 Africans People, 7, 59, 62,
and opposition politics, 86 141, 143–145
civil society, 122 Afrikaner and African
communities, 159 communities, 159
continent, 18, 59 Air force, 92
continental level, 290 Air Force of Zimbabwe
cultural values and perspectives, 283 Commander, 94n2
INDEX 401
Air Zimbabwe, 210 Army

Ake, Claude (political scientist), 59, 60 mercenary, 193
Alexander, J., 2, 94, 94n3, 188 national, 147
Alexander, K., 64, 164 new Zimbabwean, 228
Alfa Media Holdings organized guerrilla, 32
(AMH), 247–248 trained, 147
Newsday/Southern Eye, 247 unorganised, 93
Alfaro, L., 367 white, 32
Algeria, 1, 394, 397, 398 ASSAf, see Academy of Science of
Allegations, 163, 164, 248, 257, 259, South Africa
262, 264, 268, 333, 342n1, 344 Assange, Julian, 233
Alliances Assassinate, 261, 262
nationalist-military, 8 Assassination plots alleged, 257
political, 87 Assassinations, 257, 258, 265, 347
united, 102 Assault, 8, 39, 103
Allies, 44, 86, 92, 105, 192, 257, 261, sexual, 337
266, 334, 342 Associated Newspapers, 247
America tabloidisation, 256 Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe
Americans (ANZ), 247
black African, 145 Asuelime, 334
dollar, 286, 304, 317, 318, 361 Atrocities, 12, 36–38, 61,
military, 282 231, 394
Amnesty International, 108n14, 109 Attorney General, 199, 200n20
Anglo American, 286 ATUC, see African Trade Union
Angola, 87n1 Congress
Anonymous movement, 240 Auditor General, 315, 319
Anti-colonial nationalist struggle, 53, Augier, M., 364
57, 59, 61 Authoritarian erosion and internal
Anti-corruption initiatives, 307, 312 contradictions, 184–185
Anti-devolution, 174 Authoritarian erosion and internal
Anti-imperialism, 5 contradictions in ZANU
Anti-imperialist meanings, 67 PF, 184–185
Anti-nationalism, 292 Authoritarian manipulations, 183
Anti-racism, 5 Authoritarian nationalism, 53
Antoinette Marie, 343 Authoritarian practices, 61, 210
Anyanwu, 368 Authoritarian regimes, 182, 184, 186,
APN, see African 208, 219
Peacebuilding Network competitive, 182, 191, 208
Arab Spring, 16, 76, 78, 221, 233 Authoritarian rule, 184, 309
Aregbeshola, 362, 363, 367, 380 Authoritarian rulers, 26
Armed resistance, 28 Authoritarian states, 126, 183
protracted, 301 Authoritarian tutelage, 15
402 INDEX
Authoritarianism enfranchised, 41
closed, 183 Boob-less commander-in-
competitive, 183 chief, 341–347
decentralized, 57 Book Mugabeism, 91
electoral, 195 Botswana, 28, 32, 46, 87n1, 104,
increased, 63 141, 159, 368
political, 64 Boundaries, 43, 87, 88, 99, 103
regimes blend, 208 geographical, 380
Bretton Woods institutions, 124, 282
Brian Raftopoulos’ book, 2
B Bribery, 209, 311
Bantu Congress, 58 Bright Matonga, 211
Barriers to entry and exit, 366 Bring back VP Mnangagwa, 343
BAZ, see Broadcasting Authority of Britain, 31, 33, 147, 257,
Zimbabwe 282, 303
Bekezela Gumbo’s interrogation, 14 aiding, 286
Beliefs British brokered Lancaster House
fundamental, 323 Agreement, 161
real, 216 British colonial rule, 118, 122, 301
unfortunate, 167 British Foreign Minister, 195
Bifurcated states, 279 British foreign policy, 216
Bill of Rights, 314 British government, 36, 37, 149, 301
Billing, Michael, 54 British imperialists, 159
Bills British independent newspaper, 194
controversial, 127 British newspapers, 252
import, 289 British occupation, 172
third, 128 British South Africa Company, 27, 41
Binary setup, 87 British supervised elections, 162
Bishop Dodge, 30 Broadcasting, 126
Bishop Lamont, 30 Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe
Biti, Tendai, 104n10, 394 (BAZ), 127, 191
Black people Broadcasting Services, 127, 246, 257
impoverished, 62 Broadcasting Services Act (BSA),
young, 32 127, 191
Black political parties, 31 BSA, see Broadcasting Services Act
Black populations, 28–33, 40, 42, 300 Building trust and
oppressed, 31 confidence, 308–310
Blacks, 2, 6, 27–33, 35, 36, 38–40, Bulawayo, 36, 71, 75, 145, 156, 162,
42, 44, 45, 59–62, 65, 66, 120, 166, 169, 171–173
126, 141, 143, 145–147, 149, Bulawayo metropolitan, 167
165, 173, 218, 230, 300, 303, Bulawayo News, 162
315, 364, 369, 382, 395, 396 Bulawayo’s Lady Stanley, 162
INDEX 403
Bureaucracy, 8, 90–92, 118, 188, Campaigning, 188, 259

227, 278 critical civil society organizations, 67
new, 97 Canada, 137, 176, 224
Bureaucrats Candidates
conniving, 286 independent, 102, 185, 322
senior, 91, 307, 312 parliamentary, 171
Business presidential, 43, 197
international economics, 362 right, 198
internationalization/ Capacity-building process, 324
internationalisation, 369–380, Capital
382, 383 direct investment, 363
objectives, 365, 372, 382 domestic, 281
opportunities, 35, 64, 365, 366 foreign, 218
paradigm, 287 global, 17, 275, 276
parasitic, 7 human, 311, 378, 382
plan, 276, 292, 293 international, 286, 292, 294,
prospects, 379 295, 364
scientists, 364 market and inward FDI, 380–381
By-election, 185 movement, 364
nation’s, 282
shared intellectual, 378
C subsidise, 276
Cabinet minister, 248, 395 working, 381
Cabral, A., 60 Capital accumulation
Cadres financialised primitive, 275
deploying ZANU-PF, 96 primitive, 275–277, 290, 294, 295
ex-ZANLA, 163 Capitalism, 17, 275, 282–284, 335
high-ranking female, 336 international, 295
young generation party, 181 Capitalist philosophies, 360
Calabrese, A., 252 Cases
Caledonia Mining, 286 basket, 325
Cameron, H., 36, 37, 94n3 charged, 200
Campaign critical land reform, 201
door-to-door ZANU-PF, 196 CCDZ, see Centre for Community
email bombing, 239 Development in Zimbabwe
food-for-a-vote, 197 CCJP, 61, 94, 94n3
militarized, 196 CCMS, see Centre for Communication
period, 11 Media and Society
pre-election military terror, 195 CCZ, 200n20
rallies, 108 Ceasefire, 33, 161
smear, 265 Central Committee, 10
teams, 195, 196, 196n12 Central committee meetings, 10, 229
404 INDEX
Central Intelligence Organisation Chedondo, Martin (Major General),

(CIOs), 183, 196, 234 150, 198
feared, 234 Chief Justice
Central issues, 65 former, 102
Central point, 55 longest serving, 92
Central stage, 69, 72 Chief Mapondera, 240
Centralisation, 126, 284, Chiefs
321, 324 aides, 199
general, 123 commandeered, 199
Centrality, 251, 303 modern, 91
Centralization increased, 126 traditional, 57, 199
Centralized state bureaucracies, 118 Chieftainship, 26, 199
Centre Chigwata, Tinashe Carlton, 17,
competing, 248 18, 321–323
developed, 292, 295 China on official duty, 334
hollowed, 107 Chinamano, Ruth (wife), 31
main urban, 71 Chineka, Livingstone (Brig-
manufacturing, 282 Gen), 191–192
moderate, 88 Chinese
modern, 279 companies, 286, 319
nerve, 199 instructors, 170
Challenges investment, 263
address debt, 317 markets, 288
alternative, 321 CIOs, see Central Intelligence
contemporary, 269 Organisation
contextual, 52 Circumstantial evidence, 368
court, 106, 173 Citizen displeasure, 78
economic, 69, 307, 317, 324 Citizen re-assertiveness
formidable, 187 renewed, 74
internal, 170, 185 Citizenry
law, 240 general, 73
liquidity, 317 informed, 262
major, 277 Citizens
moral hazard, 372 alienation of, 25
new, 68 angry, 70, 398
political, 266 arresting, 194
social, 17, 52, 299 enlightened, 262
socio-economic, 267 equal, 59
unresolved, 66 free, 2
Champion multi-partyism, 103 galvanized, 74
Championed labour rights, 141 guiding, 176
Character assassination, 258, 265 individual, 119, 123
INDEX 405
informing, 251 traditional, 75–77

marginalised, 120 urban, 55
mobilize, 66, 75 Civil society groups
new, 75–77 organized, 73
ordinary, 52, 80, 236, traditional, 75, 77
303–306, 317 Civil society organizations (CSOs), 63,
picketing, 238 67, 71, 74, 76–79, 89, 107, 123
sovereign, 61 community mobilization, 71
television reassuring, 305 Civil society organizations/civil society
voting, 268 organisations (CSOs)
white, 2, 30 free, 79
Citizenship traditional, 76–78
bifurcated, 56 Civilian authorities, 203
disenchantment and apathy, 69 de jure, 15
inclusive, 53, 58, 61, 65, 66 Civilianisation process, 19
Citizenship rights, 335 Civilianise, 19
basic, 77 Civilians
Civic activism, 69, 74 designer, 19
new, 76 handlers, 203
Civic organisations, 68, 105, 247 innocent, 94, 97, 393
respective, 105 members, 94
Civics Class discrimination, 30, 44
movement’s struggles, 57 Climate change, 286
processes, 124 Coalitions
society organizations, 238 grand, 255, 258
Civil disputes, 20 political, 76
Civil liberties, 303 possible, 259
Civil society Cobbing, J., 26, 158
activists, 95, 394 Codification, 127
activities, 95, 321, 394 Cold War, 3, 146
allege, 234 Coleman intimates, 232
allied, 105 Colonial
an indigenous, 56 authoritarianism, 61
and democratisation in authorities, 210
Zimbabwe, 121–125 conquest, 54, 172
and opposition politics, 96–99 domination, 5
deracialized, 56 era, 28, 42, 118, 127, 159, 161
differentiated, 121 era Law, 127
efforts, 57 historians, 160
emerging, 98 ideology, 282
state of, 14, 117, 122, 129 image, 160
strong, 208 inheritance, 7
406 INDEX
Colonial (cont.) Commander in-chief, 341–347

invaders, 160 Commander in-chief boobless, 341
legacy, 4, 300 Commander mukuru, 341
nation-state, 55 Commodity circulation processes, 287
oppression, 124, 143 Commodity marketing, 284
rulers, 160 Commodity value chains, 287
settlers, 7, 54, 120 Common civil service culture, 310
stereotyping, 160 Commonwealth, 37, 303
subjects, 61 Community-based organizations
subjugation, 141, 142 (CBOs), 76
writers, 160 Comparative analyses of elite dis-
yesteryear, 230 cohesion in ZANU-PF, 187–188
Colonial masters, 161 Competitive general equilibrium
former, 146 economy, 369
Colonial rule Conflict
defined transition trajectories armed, 161
post, 141 ethnic, 168, 170, 174
direct, 7 nationalist, 137
Colonial state pre-date, 159
bifurcated, 56 protracted social, 155
hegemony, 124 Conflicting notions of change, 67
Colonial Zimbabwe, 29–31, 41 Conflicts generated, 27
Colonialism Conflictual, 55
defeat, 58 Congo, 46
internal, 17 Connell’s hegemonic masculinity
new, 284 concept, 18, 331, 336, 347
resisting, 31 Constitution, 2, 9, 37, 42, 43, 63, 67,
Colonies former, 6 68, 79, 80, 95, 95n4, 104, 105,
Colonisation/colonization, 26–28, 128, 174, 185, 190, 192–194,
31–33, 41, 42, 163 198, 201, 202, 230, 301, 304,
Colonists, 27 305, 309, 313–316, 325, 332
victorious, 163 new, 42, 43, 68, 79, 80, 105,
Colonized peoples, 26, 27 304, 325
Colonizers former, 62 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 37, 174,
Colony, 6 305, 314, 315
former settler, 80 vests, 305
Comic Pastor, 222 Constitution of Zimbabwe
Commander asina mazamu, 341 Amendment, 202
Commander Defence Forces, 341, Constitution-making process, 65, 67,
342, 345 104, 230
Commander Defense Forces and Constitutional Amendment
army, 346 Number, 201
INDEX 407
Constitutional amendments, 302 party’s, 208

Constitutional clause, 176, 198 political, 208, 211, 214, 215
Constitutional Court, 11, 110, taking, 79, 304, 390
200n20, 202, 393 undoubted, 203
Constitutional delinquency, 240, 241 Corruption
Constitutional exercises, 246 allegations, 259
Constitutional Lawyers, 309 and extortion, 248, 262
Constitutional legal basis, 190 included, 95
Constitutional order, 227, 313 increased, 70
Constitutional processes, 107 open, 63
Constitutional republic elected, 190 proliferating, 72
Constitutional roles, 9, 194, 200 Corruption cases, 302
designated, 304 prosecuting, 311
Constitutional veneer, 10 Corruption Index, 311
Constitutionalise, 9 Counter-fuck Grace, 346
Constitutionalism, 2, 54, 63, 79, 104, Counter-fucking, 346
301, 304, 314–316 Counter-hegemonic, 103, 104,
Contemporary Zimbabwe, 123, 158, 107, 108n14
253, 331, 337 bloc, 108, 110
Context, 8, 9, 14, 16, 18, 34, 46, 55, Counter-hegemony, 103–109
56, 69, 73, 79, 91, 100, 102, Counter-plots, 19
117, 120, 123, 127, 129, 138, Counter-positions, 88
157–163, 165, 167, 199, 203, Counter-revolutionary elements,
207–219, 222, 232, 233, 254, 342, 354
255, 282, 309, 332–334, Countering, 258
336–339, 341, 359, 362, 365, Country
367, 369, 376, 381, 396, 397 coup, 305
Continuous currency devaluation, 281 Courted political controversy, 168
Continuous demands, 8 Courts
Continuum, 53, 54, 72 appeals, 128
Contradictions, 5, 32, 58, 93, 156, declaration, 201
173, 184–185, 189, 283, 317 ruling, 202
civil, 237 Credit, 172, 174, 284, 292, 310,
Control 363, 373
a loss of, 337, 349 banking, 292
authoritarian state, 126 Criminal abuse, 248
direct, 269 Criminal Law, 127
exerting, 34 Criminalisation/
little, 339 criminalization, 29, 128
livestock, 29 Criminalizing debate, 171–172
loss of, 39, 194, 337 Criminals, 37, 188, 193, 248, 348
lost, 266 around the president, 9
408 INDEX
Crisis Data Protection Authority of

blown, 303 Zimbabwe, 128
economic, 47, 228, 276, Data Protection Bill, 127, 128
316, 325 David Easton’s systems theory, 138
in Zimbabwe Coalition, 67 Debt securities, 363
multi-layered, 52 Decentralisation, 301
political, 325 Decentralization, 62
viability, 381 Decentralize, 308
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Decision-makers, 92
254, 255 Decisions
Cross-pollination, 136, 142 contacts enhance, 378
Crude neo-liberal framework, 19 court, 200, 315
Cultural relativism, 283 informed, 251, 269, 372
Culture informed political, 262
cyber, 222 judicial, 200
given, 338 managed, 26
guiding, 142 micro level, 379
of polarisation in powerful, 151
Zimbabwe, 85–110 unpopular, 71
ongoing, 138 unpopular government, 70
oral, 232 Defenceless, 263
particular, 226 Defenceless widow, 258, 260
Cumulative causation models, 376 unfortunate, 259
Currency Degenerating, 9, 159, 399
crisis, 318 Degree
crush, 65 high, 129
dominant, 317 large, 41, 121
hard, 318 significant, 380
injection, 363 Deimperialization, 57
local, 318 Deindustrialization, 281
regimes, 318 Demobilisation resisted, 228
surrogate, 317 Democracy
surrogate bond, 288 consolidation of, 68, 117, 121, 269
Currency reforms, 317–318 constitutional, 2, 63, 176, 192, 194,
required, 318 304, 314, 315
Cybercrime Bill, 234 contemporary, 13, 58, 125
Cyberspace, 73 deepen, 86, 321
deepening, 118, 119, 122, 124,
125, 129
D enhancing, 309
Data presentation and entrenching, 62
discussion, 234–238 internal, 61
INDEX 409
issues of, 16, 65–67, 104, 107, positive, 302

226, 262 social, 311, 314
liberal, 1, 53, 122, 123, 183, 227 substantial, 288
modern, 123, 125 sustainable, 53, 62, 280, 294
multiparty, 301 uneven, 17, 275, 276, 279
pseudo, 79, 183, 208 Development approaches, 283
strengthen, 86, 315 Development benefit, 322
thriving, 99 Development discourses, 293
Democracy and Political Discourse, 12 Development goals, 377
Democratic Change, 78, 123, 186 Development objectives, 323
Democratic Party (DP), 101 Development paradigm, 52, 301
Democratic transition, 12, 14, 75, 79, Development plans, 277, 283,
117, 120, 122, 129 292, 313
delayed, 155, 157 new, 276, 277
Democratic triumphs, 183 Developmental challenges
Demonized Grace Mugabe addressing, 170, 174
framing, 14 Developmental disposition, 258
Demonstrations Developmental strides, 165
historic, 339 Developmentalism, 4
intermittent, 98 Developmentalist, 57, 280
largest, 339 Displacements of black peoples, 31, 32
mass, 72 Disrespecting Grace Mugabe, 190
national, 202 Disrupted consultative meetings, 172
ongoing street, 72 Dissidence
peaceful, 202 fomenting, 231
public, 334 hidden, 225
Demonstrators long-running thread of, 16, 223
angry, 344 political, 223, 226
fellow, 339, 340 Dissidence in Zimbabwean Politics
Development Shepherd Mpofu and Trust
capital market, 360 Matsilele, 221–244
capitalist, 276 District Commissioners, 26
critical societal, 227 Dominance
human, 142 male, 332, 335, 339, 346, 347
human capital, 311, 378, 382 male social, 338
inclusive, 17, 63, 79, 277, 293, 294 unbridled, 89, 98
inclusive transformative, 17, white, 2, 30
277, 293 Dominant liberal practices
infrastructural, 282 interwoven, 91
organic, 13, 86 Dominant political culture, 14, 117,
payments, 289 135–144, 148, 151, 152
political, 137 Double-edged sword, 191
410 INDEX
Dubai, 344 Economic messiah, 260

Dussel, Enrique (Liberation), 78 Economic Partnership
Dynamic layout, 252, 254 Agreements, 376
Dynamic proficiencies, 375 Economic planners, 280
Dzikamai Mavhaire, 185 Economic planning, 281
Dzimiri, 148 centralised, 281
Economic powerhouse, 317
Economic progress, 96
E Economic quagmire, 263
Easton’s Systems Theory, 138–139 Economic recovery path, 11
Eclectic model, 365 Economic sanctions, 31
classical, 365 illegal, 303
Economic blueprint, 317 Economic situation, 9, 229, 303–305,
Economic choices, 324 319, 361, 368
Economic conditions, 52, 68, 124, precarious, 324
159, 393, 397 Economic Structural Adjustment
Economic culture, 33, 48 Programme (ESAP), 63, 64, 101,
Economic deadlock, 360 103, 124, 276, 281, 282, 302,
Economic decline, 16, 165 360, 361
unprecedented, 245 adopted, 360
Economic development neo-liberal, 276
alternative, 294 Economic trajectory, 307
domestic, 277 Economics, 48, 137, 249, 252, 300,
inclusive, 276, 277 360, 362, 370
introverted, 277 Economies of scales, 366,
potential, 290 367, 381
real, 319 Economists, 364
Economic development issues, 293 Economy
Economic development path, 17, 275 declining, 266
Economic development plan, 277 developed, 294
new, 276 developing, 175, 362, 370
Economic development strategies, 281 disarticulated, 17, 275, 277, 287,
Economic development trajectories, 288, 293
276, 281–283 enclave, 165
Economic growth extroverted, 17, 275–298
expected sustained, 62 failed, 18, 359, 396–398
rapid, 98 faltering, 324
sustainable, 175 fragmented, 361
Economic growth outcomes host, 366
positive, 281 local, 317
Economic malaise, 240, 241 multicurrency, 361
Economic meltdown, 9 planned, 281
INDEX 411
political, 69, 135, 136, 140, 142, winning, 92

192, 221, 276, 360 Elite Fragmentation in Women and
shrinking, 264 Youth Leagues, 185–187
socialist, 281 Elite groups modern, 76
stagnant, 304 Elites
strong, 301 authoritarian regime, 186
Education, 2, 30, 59, 62, 64, 98, 106, corporate, 125
167, 175, 301, 302, 304, 306, educated black, 59
319, 395 political, 35, 62, 87, 118, 123,
Egypt, 1, 78, 233, 394, 398 125, 127
Egypt uprising, 222 Emergence, 67, 68, 80, 91, 100, 123,
Eighty Years, 397 124, 185, 200, 264, 306
Election environment, 199 Employment Act, 97
Election interview, 69 Employment creation, 361
Election outcome, 68 Employment opportunities, 319
undisputed, 307 Employment patterns, 166
Election results Endeavour of Foreign Direct
parliamentary, 106 Investment, 362
presidential, 151 Enemies of the struggle, 32
securocrats influence, 196 Energy
Election Supervision Commission collective, 7
(ESC), 199 direct, 152
Elections strategic, 284
competitive, 183 Enforcement, 108, 147
contested, 150, 309 Entrench authoritarianism, 57
democratic, 301 Entrench dictatorship, 63
disputed, 304, 308, 320 Environment
early, 200 conducive, 314
free, 68 conducive business investment, 282
free and fair, 107, 118, 276 constraining, 7
general, 146, 186, 187, 189, 332, democratic, 62
361, 392 economic, 311, 368, 369
harmonised, 99, 246, 299, 304, 307 hostile, 168
influence, 196, 224 hostile learning, 168
multiparty, 195 open business, 325
national, 11, 342n1 operating, 376
next, 95, 101, 106 polarised, 88, 247
parliamentary, 45, 99, 105, restrictive media, 14, 118, 129
106, 391 Environmental damage, 294
periodic, 118, 120 Environmental preservation, 319
provincial chairperson, 189 ESAP, see Economic Structural
representative, 183 Adjustment Programme
412 INDEX
ESAP deaths, 103 F

ESC Chief Executive Officer, 199 Facebook, 72, 74, 224, 226, 234,
Ethnic chauvinism, 176 236, 238, 341, 345
perceived, 156 Facing Mount Kenya, 59
Ethnic cleansing, 165, 175 Faction leader, 190
Ethnic consciousness, 155, Factional politics, 260, 261
156, 176 leading divisive, 262
Ethnic majority, 148 Farmers
Ethnic majority party, 148 black, 29
Ethnic minority party, 148 resettled peasant, 77
Ethnic origins, 159 smallholder, 225, 287
Ethnic overtones, 170 white, 10, 29, 41, 42, 44, 149, 303,
Ethnic political undertones, 156 390, 391
Ethnic politics white commercial, 200, 228
narrow, 145 white racist commercial, 201
narrow tribal, 145 Fast Track Land Reform, 217, 279
tribal, 147, 148 Fast Track land Reform Program
Ethnic segmentation, 145 (FTLRP), 2, 149, 200, 303, 324
Ethnicism, 123 Fast-tracks, 287
Ethnicity, 34, 39, 45, 60, 61, 89, 139, Father Zimbabwe, 5, 145
145, 146, 157, 158, 166, 170, Fathers, 55, 197, 199, 216, 234, 341,
173, 280 343, 348
politicised, 14 FDI, see Foreign Direct Investment
Ethnicization, 14, 155–180 FDI and stock markets, 380
Euro-American global imperial FDI decisions, 367
designs, 292 FDI inflows
Eurocentric epistemology, 278 inward, 380
Eurocentrism, 294 Fight corruptiom, 308, 311, 390, 395
Europe, 30, 224, 284 Fighting
European domination, 58 constitutional lobby group, 230
European journalist, 218 guerrillas, 227
European nationals, 145 Finance
European settler accumulation, 279 export monopoly, 290
European Union (EU), 257, public, 313
288, 376 Finance capital, 17, 275, 282,
European Union and SADC 284, 294
countries, 376 Financial assistance, 294
Evaluations, 254, 310 Financial Gazette, 199n18
Extreme Suffering for African Financial institutions, 311, 317, 373
People, 302 international, 294
Extroverted natural resource Financial irregularities, 315
extraction, 294 Financial obstacles, 372
INDEX 413
Financial payouts, 65 nature of, 382

Financial support package, 294 outward, 365, 367, 369
Financial viewpoint, 363 search of, 18, 359
Force Vice President Emmerson volumes and direction of, 368, 382
Mnangagwa, 187 Former President Mugabe, 256,
Forced assimilative relationship, 158 258, 259
Forced Morgan Tsvangirai, 109 Former President Robert Mugabe,
Forced Robert Mugabe, 361 120, 248, 299, 303
Forced structural changes, 280 Former secretary general, 101, 104
Forces Fraudulent transfer of resources, 290
armed, 9, 93, 95, 184 Fraught, 32, 156
external, 31 Free speech, 127, 233
formidable, 149 unrestrained, 233
guerrillas, 32 Freedom
imperial, 293 attainment of, 5, 59
imperialist, 141 civic, 76
inimical, 230 fundamental, 309
invading colonial, 159 guaranteed, 127
main, 253 people’s, 5, 7, 108, 121
meting brute, 235 political, 123
mobilizing, 167 presupposed, 227
political, 264 struggles for, 5
powerful social, 64 white, 301
regular, 337 Freedom Camps, 169
regular military, 66 Freedom fighters, 60, 161
social, 64, 65, 68, 69 Freedom lies ahead, 5
Foreign Aid, 362 Freedom of assembly, 108, 127, 227
economic commentators Freedom of expression, 127
confuse, 362 French governments, 70
Foreign associates, 263 French revolutions, 227, 343
Foreign currency, 288, 307, 318, 320, Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
395, 396 (FROLIZI), 146
shortage of, 317, 318, 321 Fucking Grace, 346
Foreign currency accounts, 318 Funding
Foreign currency shortages, 320, 321 enjoyed foreign, 230
Foreign currency supply, 288 massive external, 98
Foreign debt, 317 Funding agencies, 79
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Funding institutions, 280
agents of, 19, 359, 362
defined, 362
direction of, 368, 380, 382 G
financial procedures of, 380 Gadzikwa, Wellington, 16, 224
414 INDEX
Gaidzanwa, Rudo, 39, 332, 335 political, 152

Gedi Ndlovu, 162 produced, 289, 313
Gender, 12, 18, 33, 34, 39, 42, 45, supplying, 379
54, 56, 60, 137, 246, 283, 331, Goreraza, Stanley, 344
332, 335–339, 347, 351, Governance
353, 354 accountable, 314, 322
equality, 331 agendas, 308
equity, 336 bad, 74, 307, 395
examined, 332 castigated ZANU-PF, 66
exclusion, 18, 331, 354 clean, 325
identities, 137 corporate, 319, 373
inequalities, 337 culture, 77, 325
Gendered beings, 347 democratic, 85, 309
Gendered Zimbabwean, 335–336 formal legal, 315
Gendzel, 120 local, 156, 166
General Chiwenga, 334, participatory, 86
341, 344–346 progressive, 20
General Lookout Masuku, 162 representative, 54
Generations system of, 18, 62, 63, 91
new, 70, 77 Governance issues
Geographical demarcation, 159 economic, 69, 77
Geographical location, 187 ignoring, 77
Ghana socialist path, 290 Governance politics, 77
Global commodity chains, 284 Government
Global Financial Integrity (GFI), accountable, 307
287, 290 agencies, 309, 310
Global Political Agreement (GPA), aid, 197
43, 67, 172, 200, 245, 247 alternative MDC, 276
negotiators, 172 appointments, 129
Globalization, 53, 292, 369, 374, 378 arms of, 315
increased, 373 black majority, 146, 147
GNU, see Government of building, 210
national unity bureaucracy, 278
GNU and Zimbabwe African National central, 58, 322
Unity Patriotic Front civilian, 20, 203
(ZANU-PF), 277 coalition, 68, 392
Golden Straitjacket, 278 colonial, 29, 40, 45, 146, 172
Golding, P., 252, 268 employees, 310
Goods failure, 280
consumer, 268 food handouts, 197
essential household, 70 functional, 308
markets, 370 functionaries, 228
INDEX 415
fund, 374 settler, 27, 28, 143, 147

gender policies, 332 subnational, 322, 323
government perspective, 371 subsidies, 302, 374
host, 374 support, 375, 379, 383, 391
in FDI and International western, 68, 319
Business, 382 white, 29, 38
inclusive, 2, 67, 79, 92 Government expenditure, 302
institutions, 308 Government infrastructure, 165
involvement limiting, 118, local, 29, 197
129, 282 Government intervention,
levels of, 309, 312, 313 283, 369–375
manages, 70 restrictive, 129
ministers, 269 Government of national unity (GNU),
nationalist, 91, 142 3, 43, 47, 198, 200, 277,
networks, 373 282, 304
new, 18, 62, 93, 97, 98, 126, 183, Government officials
307, 309, 359, 362, 379 denounced senior, 348
new Zimbabwe, 18 senior, 71, 310, 348
of Zimbabwe, 177, 286, 300, 303, Governmental powers
307, 317, 379 concentrated, 321
parallel, 263 decentralised, 322
permitted, 97 Governors, 25, 196
policies, 138, 214, 276, 308, Grace Mugabe’s case, 353
318, 383 Grace’s actions, 350
positions, 19, 215, 312 Grace’s ascendancy, 343
post-colonial, 118, 120, 123, Grace’s behaviour, 348
129, 130 Grace’s character, 350
post-independence Zimbabwe, 165 Grace’s contribution, 349
posts, 166, 309 commending, 351
power-sharing, 2, 47 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 303,
practices, 278 367, 376
pre-and post-colonial, 123 growth, 367
promulgation, 72 growth rate, 367
propaganda, 165 sustainable, 376
pseudo-civilian, 276 value of, 367
recent, 75 Gubbay, Anthony (Chief Justice), 200,
recklessness, 70 304, 314
resisted, 71 Guerrillas, 8, 28, 32, 33, 57, 58, 164,
response, 149, 377, 396 169, 173, 227
responsible, 376 fighter former, 360
role of, 19, 359, 362, 369–380 fighters, 335
roles, 382 warfare, 28
416 INDEX
Gukurahundi, 12, 34, 36–38, 45, 66, Herald’s position in Zimbabwean

93, 94, 98, 109, 110, 147, politics, 257
165–169, 171, 172, 174–177, High Court, 9, 202
228, 391, 394 High Court Judge, 203
christened, 93 High literacy rates, 225
Historical inheritance, 143
History
H annals of, 155, 158
Habermas, J., 122, 223, 226, 227 country’s, 66, 110
Hackers, 224, 232 cultural, 156, 169
underground, 232 economic, 361
Hacktivists, 222, 232 inclusive, 80
Harare demonstration, 340 known, 235
Harare regime, 56 long, 309
Harris, N.R., 256, 370, 372–376, 378 modern, 183
Hashtag activism, 75 political, 120
Hashtag activists, 70, 77 postcolonial, 9
Hegel, 121 recent, 193
Hegemonic reconstructed liberation war, 164
agenda, 169 shared, 137, 143
machinery, 124 technical, 231
networks, 238 traceable, 143
Hegemonic masculinity violent, 66
concept, 18, 331, 336, 347 Host Markets Determinants of FDI,
conflate, 339 362, 367–369
construction of, 18, 331 Human rights
Hegemony activist, 394
alternative, 85 fundamental, 316, 325
cultural, 156, 169 organisations, 104
economic, 264 Human rights abuses, 68, 94, 282
ethnic, 14, 34, 136, 139, gross, 68
140, 142, 143, 147, 148, Humanity/humanities, 78, 136, 247
151, 152 new, 80
growing, 98 Husband
ideological, 280 ageing, 333, 342
political, 200, 302, 304 disgraced, 350
ruling party’s, 93, 95 late, 257
theory, 337
tribal/ethnic, 14, 136, 140, 142,
143, 147, 152 I
Hegemony building project, 93, 98 Identity
attendant, 93 common, 58, 136
INDEX 417
conflicts, 173 penetration, 282

defining, 136, 145 IMPI, see Information and Media
ethnic, 37, 148, 155, 157 Panel of Inquiry
fragmented, 145 Impunity, 38, 54, 121, 395
group-coalescing, 14, 136, 140, 142 Independence
masculine, 338 attained, 209, 301
national, 137 attainment of, 28
particular, 55 country’s, 173
shared, 137 decade of, 62, 96, 302–304, 315
social, 137, 339 hard-won, 150, 197
Identity politics Mugabe, 360
conditions, 138 operational, 311
cross-cutting, 143, 145 Indigenous Business Development
defining, 136 Council (IBDC), 65
ethnic, 148 Indigenous Business Women
filaments of, 136 Organization (IBWO), 65
nature and extent of, 136 Inform investment policies, 371
racial hegemony, 147 Information
role of, 14, 138 asymmetric, 373
sustained, 148 complete, 59, 370
tribal exclusionary, 146 critical, 251, 268
Identity Politics Factors, 135–154 humiliating, 232
Identity politics in Zimbabwe inadequate, 309, 370
Transition Politics, 139 incomplete, 372
Identity Politics Shapes Transition irregular, 372, 373
Politics, 138–139 minister of, 127, 129, 191,
Ideologies 210–212, 216, 258
bankrupt, 325 new, 256
developed post-colonial, 282 objective, 251, 269
particular, 55 personal, 128
political, 119 political, 252
repulsive, 230 public, 128
transgressing ZANU-PF, 252 publishing, 233
unifying, 76 quality standards, 374
Imbizo, 26 real time, 74
IMF, see International Monetary Fund supply, 374
Imperialism valued, 338
bourgeois, 282 Information and Broadcasting
global capital interests Services, 246
perpetuating, 17, 275 Information and Media Panel of
Imperialist, 60, 141, 149, 159, Inquiry (IMPI), 245–247, 265
283, 284 findings, 247
418 INDEX
Information and Publicity ministry, global, 373

211, 219 potential, 368
Information and Publicity ministry in prospective, 370
Zimbabwe post, 219 Israel’s worship, 347
Information Bill, 127 Israeli kingdom, 347
Information Bill sets, 127
Infotainment, 251, 267
Infrastructure J
public, 318 Johannesburg
rebuilding, 175 airport in South Africa, 210
repressive legal, 126 Joice Mujuru
Infrastructure development, 175 coverage of, 266
Interception of Communications Act expulsion of, 16, 246–248, 252,
(ICA), 191 253, 259, 261, 267, 269
International Crisis Group, 3 lambasted, 333
International Development, 325 portrayed, 258
International engagement, 11 Joint Operations Command
International finance, 284 (JOC), 109
International finance circuits, 284 Jomo Kenyatta, 59
International integration, 324 Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, 169
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Journalism
2, 101, 103, 229, 294, 360, 362, broadsheet, 248–250, 261,
363, 396 262, 268
International niches, 377 independent, 35
International reengagement, 307 investigative, 256
International stage, 325 objective, 255, 267, 269
Internationalization, 19, 256, 359, patriotic, 218, 219
365, 369–380, 382, 383 professional, 218, 261
Internationalization advantage, 365 simplified, 252
Internet, 72, 73, 75, 125, 212, 226, sound bite, 256
231–233, 393 tabloid, 248–251, 261, 264
Internet use, 73 Journalists
Interregnum new, 78 and editors, 15, 207, 208, 210, 211,
Intervention mechanisms, 13 213, 215–219
Interventions committed participation of,
legal, 231 209, 217
necessary, 195 critical, 209
overt, 198 manipulating, 215
witnessed military, 1 orientate, 213
Investors professional, 218, 261
direct, 363 purged, 219
foreign, 277, 363 purged senior, 211
INDEX 419
recruiting, 212 L
selected, 207 Labour
senior, 211–214 cheap, 144, 283, 295
young, 211, 217 included, 89, 276
Judicial Service Commission, 202 resurgent, 101
Judiciary, 15, 31, 33, 90, 91, 182, unions, 63, 96, 228
183, 200–203, 208, 301, 304, Labour movement, 2, 96, 97, 103,
312, 314, 315, 322 105, 107, 123, 124
independent, 314 formidable, 64
Justice Lancaster Constitution, 126
economic, 58, 64–66 Lancaster House, 37, 93, 104,
redistributive, 65, 80 301, 313
restorative, 240 Lancaster House Agreement, 33,
social, 62, 70, 98 161, 163
Justice & Peace, 196n14 Lancaster House Constitution, 2, 63,
202, 301
negotiated, 301
K Lancaster House negotiations, 37, 93
Kalanga Cultural Society Land
(KCS), 165 ancestral, 31
Kaleidoscope, 61 audits, 79
Kanhanga, Epmarcus (Brigadier- community, 71
General), 191 deals, 284
Kenya, 141 grabs, 285, 286
Khupe, Thokozani, 239 issue, 208, 217, 219
Khuphe, Thokozani, 151 lost, 10
King, 26, 27 markets, 279
King Ahab’s wife, 347 occupation, 65
King, Jr. Martin Luther, 145 occupied, 31
King, Martin Luther, 237 ownership, 146, 279, 303
approach, 237 politics, 156
Kingmakers, 95, 109, 197 question, 104, 290
Knowledge reclamation, 4
empirical, 375 redistribution, 15, 65, 149
firm, 373 reform question, 135
private, 373 restitution, 53
productive, 375 restored, 2
public, 126, 373 small-scale resettled, 279
tacit, 375, 382 tenure issues, 29
technological, 375 urban, 29
Kriger for Zimbabwe’s Mtoko use, 29
District, 60 watered, 27
420 INDEX
Land Apportionment Act, 27 factional, 333

Land Husbandry Act, 143 former, 229, 342
Land reform former war veterans, 342
championed, 218 formidable, 258
defended, 216 incumbent, 183
fast track, 217 individual cultic, 268
Land Reform Programme, 257, 264 intellectual, 59
radical Fast-Track, 2 key ZANU-PF, 192
Land Tenure Act, 28 mature, 255, 258
Land tenure systems moderate, 259, 260, 263
tribal, 279 political, 28, 150, 170, 197, 268,
Landscape 300, 308, 333
economic, 361 recognized public, 74
for opposition politics, 90–92 revered, 93
urban, 77 senior party, 187
Language senior PF-ZAPU, 93
body, 238 settler, 27
controlled, 249 veteran, 9
polarising liberationist, 96 Leadership
shared, 140 association’s, 189
Law and Order Maintenance Act black traditional, 29
(LOMA), 127 civilian, 8
Laws clear, 231
better, 105 female, 344, 354
constitutional, 240 intellectual, 59
customary, 55 no to petticoat, 344
draconian, 240, 390, 392 political, 151, 302, 304, 390
illegitimate, 240 top, 182, 191
inherited restrictive, 126 visionary, 325
passed controversial indigenous, 369 Legacy
rational, 76 dual, 126
repressive, 121 restoring, 80
repressive media, 121, 123, shared, 58
125, 127 underdevelopment, 165
rule of, 53, 54, 59, 263, 304, 308, Legal circles, 361
314–315, 320, 379, 390, 395 Legal constraints, 227
Leaders Legal expert, 201
black/African, 6 Legal framework, 97, 314, 315
brave, 255, 259 institutional, 374
citizen movement, 77 Legal Resources Foundation, 147
civilian, 109 Legally opaque, 202
community, 70, 77, 398 Legislating, 121
INDEX 421
Legislation values, 186

indigenisation, 10 Liberation credentials, 39, 152, 334
passed, 27 strong, 8
responsive, 332 Liberation entitlement
tramples, 309 centre, 142
Legislative amendments, 302 politics of, 14, 136, 140–152
Legislative arenas, 208 stock-holder group, 142
Legislature, 15, 31, 33, 90, 183, 208 Liberation history, 9, 142, 203
Legitimacy shared, 141
deficiencies, 320 Liberation movements
deficit, 307 divided, 173
legal, 203 former, 203
new, 11 narratives ethnicization of, 14
political, 11, 203 national, 124
sustaining, 209 Liberation Movements in Power, 5
Legitimate regime form, 208 Liberation struggles
Legitimizing, 338, 351 anticolonial nationalist, 56
infidelity, 345 armed, 8, 57
Lesabe, Thenjiwe, 31, 162 credentials, 95, 151, 152
Liberalization, 2, 99, 281, 302, 309, elite, 152
369, 379 entitlement, 152
trade investment, 369 history, 152
Liberalizing electoral outcome, 183 legacy, 152
Liberals narratives, 163
parties, 29 Liberation war
thinkers, 90 anti-colonial, 4, 57
trajectory, 95 background, 202
white, 30 credentials, 9, 182, 260
Liberation discourse, 8
armies, 32, 94 heroine, 248
connection, 15 promises, 62
country’s, 164 veterans, 141, 150
exclusive politics of, 13, 87 Liberation wartime credentials, 181
fighters, 30 Limitations
forces, 29, 32 real economic capacity, 376
legacy, 141, 161, 176 Limited democratic consolidation
national, 5, 28, 32–34, 36, 38, 40, post-Zimbabwe, 117
42, 48, 105, 124, 192 Limited involvement, 14, 118, 129
of Zimbabwe, 164, 335 Limited numbers, 338
politics of, 13, 14, 87, Literature
136, 140–152 contemporary, 125
question, 135 contemporary empirical, 367
422 INDEX
Literature (cont.) Marginalizes, 161

humanities, 136 Marumahoko, Sylvester, 17, 18, 301
on electoral processes in Marxist interpretation, 110
Zimbabwe, 196 Marxist party, 301
political science, 208 Marxist-Leninist ideology, 217
recent, 368 Marxists, 90, 110
review, 335–336, 381, 383 Masculinities, 338
Logic complicit, 338
flawed, 95 hyper-, 18
immanent, 4, 61 marginalized, 338
logical flow, 233 performing aggressive, 346
logical manifestation, 92 subordinated, 338
market-determined economic, 4 Mashingaidze, Gibson (Major-
political continuum, 72 General), 191
settler colonialism’s, 7 Matabeleland agenda, 156
London Stock Exchange (LSE), 286 Matabeleland and Midlands
Long presidential incumbency, 3 regions, 93
Long serving president Robert Gabriel Matabeleland chiefs, 172
Mugabe, 3, 109 Matabeleland Collective, 172
Long-term debt, 363 Matabeleland Freedom Party, 156
Louis XVI, ousted King, 343–344 Matabeleland North, 167, 172
LRF, 61, 94n3 Matabeleland provinces, 155, 157,
LSE, see London Stock Exchange 175, 301
Matabeleland provinces lag, 175
Matabeleland region, 165
M Matebeleland Home Society
Mabenge, Benjamin (Brig-Gen), 191 (MHS), 55
Machiavellian strategies, 211 Matsilele, Trust, 223, 227
Madzingira, Elasto (Brig-Gen), 191 on social media, 16
Marauding Ndebele raiders, 159 Mawarire, Evan (Pastor), 72, 74, 76,
Marginal political representation, 33 222, 235–241, 394
Marginal representation, 31 Media and Broadcasting Services, 257
Marginalisation Media discourse, 254
alleged, 162 Media ethics, 250, 258
black, 30 Media Ethics Committee, 245, 247
perceived, 171 Media Framing of Joice
perceived ethnic, 156, Mujuru, 256–260
170–171, 174 Medium Term Economic
perceived linguistic, 177 Development Plan, 277
political, 28–31 Members of Parliament (MPs), 234
Marginality, 30, 31, 33, 76, 264, 364 and ministers, 234
Marginalized African groups, 62 Meredith, M., 6, 195
INDEX 423
Michael Neocosmos’ Thinking Millennium, 228

Freedom, 5 new, 229, 303
Militarized Judiciary, 200–203 Miller, K., 346
Military Minimum Wages Act, 97
-assisted transition, 3, 195 Minister
action, 191, 349 articulate, 210
architecture, 191 current finance, 230
arms, 93 former ruling party deputy, 92
beret, 346 new, 312
campaign, 94 powerful, 170
circles, 232 provincial, 312
conquest, 61 senior, 152
coup code, 332 Minister of Information and Publicity,
coup of November, 4, 80 129, 191, 210–212
defeat, 27 on mediated communication, 129
deployment, 301 Minister of Media, 246
equipment heavy, 334 Ministerial delegations, 319
factor, 182, 303 Ministries
fatigue changing, 19 excess, 312
influence, 203 fully fledged, 234, 239
interests, 15, 183, 191–193, 199, Ministry of Finance, 210
200, 202 Ministry of Information, 208–211,
involvement partisan, 182 213, 216, 257
junta, 11, 20 Ministry of Information and Publicity,
junta masquerading, 20 208–210, 213
leaders, 163, 301 Ministry officials, 214
politicking, 183 Minorities, 2, 29, 32, 60, 120, 141,
prison, 233 143, 147, 148, 165, 227, 279,
prowess, 159 301, 323
recruitment, 183 Minorities At Risk (MAR), 166
Military coup, 3, 4, 8–10, 17, 19, 79, Minority ethnic, 143, 148
80, 94n2, 127, 182, 187, 189, Minority ethnics groups, 323
193–195, 203, 275, 283, Minority Ndebele speakers, 165
305, 332 Minority regime, 227
full blown, 193 Misogynistic, 39, 53, 340,
Military elites, 44, 46, 48, 49, 341, 354
186, 203 Misogynistic vitriol, 334
threatened, 186 Misogyny, 18, 331–354
Military intervention Misogyny manifests, 342
combined, 14 Mkandawire, Thandika, 2, 278–280,
inevitable, 155 282, 293
inevitable direct, 155 MN interview, 288
424 INDEX
Mnangagwa, Emmerson (Commander Morrish, S., 378

in-chief, Justice Minister, Movement for Democratic Change
President), 45, 109, 127, 181, (MDC), 2, 35, 64, 72, 89, 123,
182, 187, 267, 276, 299, 306, 148, 182, 186, 218, 228, 234,
307, 325, 332, 334, 341, 353, 260, 276, 303, 349, 391
361, 389, 390 -Mutambara, 186
administration, 310, 317 activists, 95
and military interests, 202 Alliance, 361
candidate, 10, 189 factions, 172
claimed, 346 formations, 105, 148
coronation, 187 inaugural President, 230
dismissal, 187 policy, 277, 294
dismissed, 187 president, 11, 43, 109, 229, 394
era, 308 Movement for Democratic Change
failure, 189 formations, 64
government, 20, 319 Movements and activism in
ingwena, 343 Zimbabwe, 76
liberation war credentials, 9, Moyo, Collin (Brig-Gen), 192
182, 260 Moyo, Jonathan (Minister, Prof), 15,
ndibaba vedu, 343 92, 95, 210–216, 219, 246, 258,
pictures, 343 264, 266, 333
regime, 3–5, 7, 10–12, 18–20 Moyo, Sibusiso (Major General), 2, 9,
regime desperate for international 69, 281, 284, 290, 292, 354
engagement, 11 Mozambique, 28, 32, 45, 87n1, 141,
regime’s acceptance of crude 163, 169, 216, 217
neo-liberal framework, 19 Mphoko, Phelekezela (Vice President),
regime’s failure, 12 10, 190, 240
regime’s monetary policy, 11 Mpofu, Molly, 335
rule, 320, 390, 394 Mpofu, Obert, 152
state, 11, 12, 172, 182, 187, 202, Mpofu, Obert (Minister), 152
307, 392 Mpofu, Shepherd, 16, 228
sympathisers, 342 Trust Matsilele on social media, 16
Mobile penetration, 225 MRP activists, 171, 172
Mobile phones, 125, 340 Msika, Joseph, 31
Modern constitutions, 315 Msindo, E., 55
Modernization hypothesis, 368 Mthwakazi
Moffat, J., 370, 373–376 activists, 166, 167
Money flag, 156
extort, 73 groups, 166, 173
laundering based, 287 Human Rights Restoration
lenders, 372 Movement, 156
supply, 361 Liberation Front, 156
INDEX 425
Liberation Organisation, 156 Extroverted Economy, 275–295

nation, 173 facilitated, 15
radicals, 169 fellow woman Grace, 333
Republican Party, 156 fired, 203, 389
Restoration Movement, 156 former President, 120, 152, 248,
state, 157 258, 259, 299, 303, 332
Mthwakazi Republican Party (MRP), Grace, 333
156, 166, 167, 169, 171–173 helping, 52
Muchemwa, C., 155, 156, 158 interests, 203
Mudenda, Jacob, 304 ministers and strong supporters, 305
Mugabe Dynasty, 342 nephew Patrick Zhuwawo, 333
Mugabe must go, 185, 238 ouster, 110
Mugabe regime, 7, 11, 12, 40–42, 45, presidency, 181
46, 231, 276 pressured, 183
repressive, 276 regime, 72, 121, 231
Mugabe resigns, 194 reign, 299
Mugabe, Albert, 96, 96n7 removal of, 12, 194, 306
Mugabe, Grace (First Lady, wife), 266, removing, 9, 10, 349, 396, 397
332, 334 resignation, 305, 334
Mugabe, Robert (President, Prime rule, 188, 309, 360
Minister), 8, 9, 14, 28, 31, 33, served, 15
38, 43, 52, 67, 76, 80, 92, 96n7, statement, 351
100, 109, 120, 146, 151, 152, succeed, 333
162, 169, 181, 193, 195, 196, successor, 152, 325
201, 202, 228, 231, 248, 299, system, 18
301, 303, 304, 325, 333, 334, toppled, 188
339, 342–344, 347, 348, 350, unceremonious departure, 306
352, 360, 361, 376 Mugabe-Mnangagwa entanglement, 4
and Mnangagwa era, 308 Mugabeism
and war veterans, 189 culture, 3, 7, 19, 120
authoritarianism, 195 endured, 10
central role, 44, 185, 393 mantra, 8
claim, 305 rocked, 12
days, 10 Mugova, S., 311
days in power, 301 Mujuru, Joice (Vice-President)
defeat, 181 allies, 261
deposed, 94n2, 151 and Chen Chimutengwende, 212
deputy, 148 and votes, 188
dethrone, 334 exonerate, 259
era, 17, 276, 316, 392, 394, expulsion framing of, 253
396, 398 expulsion of, 248, 258
era manifests, 316–317 flaws alleged, 258
426 INDEX
Mujuru (cont.) Muzondidya, James, 62

frame, 263 Muzorewa’s participation, 101
framing of, 253, 258, 259, 262,
266, 267
jettison, 334 N
moderateness of, 258–260, 263 Naison Ndlovu included, 31
ouster, 262 Nambya, 158, 167
perceived bravery, 258 Namibia, 46, 87, 104
plight, 263 Nation
politician Joice Teurairopa, 332 born Zimbabwe, 336
portrayal of, 260, 262, 263 developed, 280, 282
project, 263 developing, 280
propping, 9 divided, 33
Solomon, 173, 248, 260 host, 368
Multinational enterprises (MNE) imagined, 158
and investment decision, 367 international family of, 18, 324
born global, 377, 378 new, 61, 92
decision, 366, 367 postcolonial, 61
exporting, 368 rainbow, 146
internationalize, 378 separate, 171
investment in capital structure, 363 Nation building, 6, 10, 61, 80, 135,
motives and host market, 365 141, 146, 159, 170, 282,
motives and selection of host 290, 293
markets, 365 Nation building question, 135
motives change, 365 Nation-as-people
motives of, 359, 362, 365–366, 382 creation of the, 54
objectives, 364, 382 Nation-as-states, 54
objectives and motives, 382 Nation-state
prospective, 367, 368 cohesive, 62
Zimbabwe, 360, 365, 366, 368 imagined postcolonial sovereign, 55
Multinational firm’s real democratic, 79
heterogeneity, 379 Nation-state building, 52
Multiparty, 195, 208, 301 National African Federation of Unions
Multipartyism, 309 (NAFU), 96
Mutare, 71, 75 National agendas
Mutekwa, A., 336, 346, 347 common, 52, 54, 57
Mutisi, Francis (Brigadier- crystallizing, 52
General), 192 debate, 66, 69
Mutopo, P., 332, 335 discourse, 66, 69
Mutsvairo, B., 221 inclusive, 53
Mutsvangwa, Christopher, National anthem new, 6
189, 190 National Assembly, 304
INDEX 427
National audience, 249 National saving, 362

National broadcaster, 191 National security, 47, 182, 184, 246
National common vision/agenda, 51 National security threat, 199
National consciousness, 55, 223 National statistics, 367
National Constitutional Assembly National television, 202
(NCA), 2, 63–65, 104, 105, National transition questions, 14,
107, 230 136, 143
coffers, 230 nature of, 14
leadership, 230 National unity, 3, 12, 59, 61, 92, 147
National convergence, 65 National visions
National Democratic Party common, 57, 58
(NDP), 59, 143 inclusive, 52
National development, 52, 223, 290, National wealth, 286
293, 313 National Working People’s
inclusive, 54 Convention (NWPC), 104, 105
National discourse, 57, 223 Nationalism
dominated, 58 anticolonial, 61
National economy, 2 civic, 53
National embarrassment, 156 degenerated, 91
National event, 236 exclusive, 164
National flag, 74, 236, 237 multiracial, 149
National healing, 10, 12, 155, 157 racial, 136, 139–152
National hero, 34, 150, 162 revived, 303
National hero status, 150, 162 Nationals of African origin, 141
National honour, 150 Native Land Husbandry Act, 27, 28
National Housing and Social Native peoples, 26, 28
Amenities, 312 Native populations, 27
National income, 367 Natives, 26, 28, 29, 41, 55, 227
National inquiry first ever, 246 Natural maturation, 54
National integration, 323, 324 Natural mineral, 17, 275
National interests, 15, 56, 150, 198, Natural progression, 72
208, 213, 215, 217–219, Natural resources, 284, 286, 294,
246, 276 322, 365
real, 214 exploiting, 322
National Peace and Reconciliation Natural rulers, 343
Commission (NPRC), 12, Natural successor, 248
171–172, 174–175, 177, 315 Nature
National Prosecuting Authority bourgeois, 108
(NPA), 189, 311, 315, 316 chaotic, 2, 147
National Question in Africa, 69 competitive, 182
National radar, 64 competitive authoritarian, 192, 194
National Railways of Zimbabwe, 319 complex, 184
428 INDEX
Nature (cont.) people’s grievances, 76, 172

crosscutting, 143, 145 people’s history, 160
gendered, 331, 339, 347 person, 160
grand, 302 point, 160
heterogeneous, 379 populace, 170
hybrid, 194 president in Zimbabwe, 148
Ncube, Cornelius, 68 region, 162, 170
Ncube, Leslie, 172 response, 159
Ncube, Lyton (Doctoral), 18, 335, speakers, 146
336, 342, 344 statehood, 170
Ncube, Mthuli, 230, 396 war effort, 163
Ncube, Trevor, 193, 349, 351 warriors, 159
Ncube, Welshman, 63, 200n20, 394 wars of resistance, 163
Ndau people, 158 word, 167
Ndebele youth, 167, 174
-speaking areas, 166, 177 Ndebele aggression, 159
-speaking civilians, 61 pre-colonial, 174
-speaking communities, 14, Ndebele history, 160
157, 161 early, 160
-speaking people, 2, 166, 302 Ndebele kings, 27, 157, 159, 173
-speaking tribes, 140 illiterate, 27
and Shona, 27, 41, 94, 146, Ndebele people, 26, 27, 38, 159, 160,
160, 177 162–165, 168–172, 175, 176
and Shona dichotomy, 158 infuriated, 176
and Shona groups, 27, 158, 159 Ndebele state
and Shona in contemporary independent, 172
Zimbabwe, 158 pre-colonial, 175
and Shona people, 41, 162, Ndebele statehood, 170
170, 177 Ndiweni, Khayisa (Chief), 173
and Shona relations, 158, 160 Ndlovu, Sikhanyiso, 31
chiefs, 26, 27 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 2–6, 8,
commissioner, 172 13, 26, 54, 55, 58, 66, 91, 94,
communities, 166, 167, 175 146, 147, 164, 222, 290, 292,
country, 172 300, 302, 304, 307, 314, 324,
cultures, 347 325, 344
humiliation, 169 Nehanda Radio, 95, 194
icons, 169 Nelson Chamisa’s Movement, 361
king resonates, 173 Neo colonialism, 6, 7, 60, 290, 294
minority, 147, 148 Neo-imperialism, 7
monarchy, 170 Neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, 278
origin, 34, 170 Neo-liberal inclinations, 294
people by nonmilitary, 170 Neo-liberal visions, 20
INDEX 429
Neo-liberalism, 4, 17, 53, 64, 277, Non-military, 170

280–282, 288, 292 Non-partisanships, 73, 74, 169
Neo-traditional patriarchal, 4 Non-payment, 52
Neo-traditionalism, 54 Non-racialism, 59
Neoclassical, 369 Non-Shona people, 167
Neocosmos, M., 5 Nonviolence, 237
Nepotism, 123, 234, 279, 311 North Africa, 221, 222
Network failure, 375 North African, 16, 233
Networks North Koreans, 93
analogue phone, 232 North Mesopotamia, 347
computer, 232 NPRC resourced, 174–175
customer’s, 366 NWPC resolution, 104
developing distribution, 374 Nyerere, Julius, 60
domestic firm, 378 Nyikayaramba, Douglas (Brigadier-
global, 374 General), 198, 199
international, 375 Nyikayaramba, Douglas (Major
organizational, 74 Generals), 198, 199
patrimonial, 280
personal, 280
political, 378 O
widened, 118 O’Donnell, G., 185, 186
New Zimbabwe Post- Obama, Barack, 233
Mugabe, 299–325 Objectivity, 251, 258, 264
News Obligations
conversion of, 251, 254 debt, 324
fake, 224, 250 external, 288
hard, 252, 269 salary, 310
replacing significant, 252 Oblivion, 89
sensational, 264 political, 8
soft, 252 Occupy Africa Unity Square, 71, 74
News articles, 254 Occupy Movement, 240
News bulletins prestigious, 256 Odinga Odinga, 60
Nexus, 156, 157, 230, 276, 332, 368 OECD, see Organisation for
politico-military, 188 Economic Co-operation and
Nkala, Enos (Minister), 165, 170 Development
Nkiwane, T.C., 86, 101 Open for Business policy, 283
Nkomo, Joshua, 5–7, 28, 29, 31, 38, Opening Zimbabwe for business, 17,
44, 92, 143, 145, 146, 148, 162, 276, 277
163, 169, 196, 301, 391 Operating synergies, 381
Nkrumah, K., 6, 59, 290 Operation Gukurahundi, 2,
Non-governmental organisation, 86, 12, 66, 197
318, 362 Operation Makavhoterapapi, 197
430 INDEX
Operation Murambatsvina, 35, Oppositional politics, 103–109

40–41, 197 underlined, 170
Operation Restore Legacy Optimum device, 238
in November, 354 Oratory powerful, 237
launched, 346 Organisation for Economic
triggered, 350 Co-operation and Development
Opportunism, 40, 91, 123 (OECD), 362, 380
Opposition Organisational awareness, 310
activists, 108 Organisations/organization
alliance, 107 autonomous civil, 56
bloc, 108 civic, 68, 105, 247
civic, 68 counter-hegemonic, 104
covert, 184 cross-cutting, 149
effective, 86 donor, 362
elite, 89 important, 231
emerging, 185 included, 103
forces, 101, 108n14 international, 303
largest, 92 membership-based, 106
leader, 234, 254, 258, 260, 390 political, 106, 140, 145, 149
leader MDC longtime, 260 pro-democracy, 228
main, 151, 170, 229 pro-hegemonic, 108n14
MP imprisoned, 201 religious, 107
PF-ZAPU, 61 socio-political, 227
political, 86, 87, 99 top-down, 301
politicians, 108, 121 women’s, 104
strong, 64, 103 Organizational processes, 75
weak, 99–103 Organizational stagnation point, 77
Opposition parties OSISA, see Open Society Initiative for
formidable, 96 Southern Africa
new, 107, 391 Outbursts spontaneous, 71
new vibrant, 123 Outcomes intended, 178
organised, 95 Over-extension, 279
strong, 103 Overlapping technological base, 375
use, 182
weak, 99–103
Opposition politics P
contemporary, 103 Pan-African
exercise of, 13, 86, 90 claims of historical inheritance, 143
faces, 13, 86 nationalism, 145
labelled, 121 policy response following, 143
practice of, 86, 87, 91 Pan-Africanism, 59
repertoire of, 13, 87 Pan-Africanist, 59
INDEX 431
anti-colonial, 53 Peripheralising, 107

Parliament, 6, 10, 42, 43, 91, Personal Information/Data Protection
95, 100, 106, 182, 203, 302, Bill, 128
304, 313, 315–317, 322, Police
332, 390 arresting, 108, 171, 194, 240
building, 305 brutality, 230
Parliamentary debate, 185 cells, 230
Parochial, 119, 120 clearance, 229
Parochialism, 123 commissioners, 108
Patriarchal injustice, 72
dividend, 338 involvement, 128
establishments, 343 officers, 175
model, 3, 53 officers kicking Dumiso Dabengwa’s
Patriarchy candles, 175
legitimacy of, 18, 331, 337 riot, 71, 394
strengthened, 335 roadblocks, 72
threatened, 348 wrath, 171
Patriotic Union of Matabeleland, 156 Policies
Patriotic-Front Zimbabwe African bad, 300
People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) changes, 177
capitulation, 94 colonial, 165, 301
combatants, 227 debate, 279
crush, 148 deliberate colonial, 165
engaged, 148 economic, 189, 280–282, 293,
force, 196 360, 396
main contenders, 146 economic intervention, 361
strongholds, 93 editorial, 215, 256
supporters, 228 formulation, 64, 123
Paul, Mukondo, 31 free-market, 281
Perceived ethnicization of party implementing unsuitable macro-
politics, 170–171 economic, 378–379
Perceived jobs discrimination, 177 inclusive, 276
Perceived male-dominated inclusive transformative social
domains, 332 economic
Perceived political ally, 266 development, 17, 277
Perceived snubbing, 162 indigenisation, 281
Percentages, 22 issues, 77
Perceptions land redistribution, 149
dominant, 162 nationalistic, 292
negative, 308 official, 166
of job discrimination, 166 one-party state, 148
pro-Mthwakazi, 164–171 political, 6
432 INDEX
Policies (cont.) Political disaster, 360

post-colonial state’s Political discourses
developmental, 126 contradictory, 4
pro-poor, 301 national, 52
professing counter-hegemonic, 107 Political disenfranchisement, 60
proposal, 85, 277, 294 Political disillusionment, 69
pursued globalisation, 292 Political disputes, 11
radical ruling party’s Political dissent, 12
transformational, 108 Political dreams, 354
recommended liberal, 103 Political economy decay, 192
redistributive, 107, 276, 294 Political economy lens, 276
regulation, 369 Political engagements, 86, 125
selection, 310 Political environment, 102, 136, 148,
training, 310 215, 307
unpopular, 63 healthy, 309
welfarist, 281 Political events, 8, 48
written information disclosure, 128 Political executives, 209
Policy agenda, 65, 376 Political fates, 18
associated redistributive, 276 Political field, 148
Policy Statement, 59 Political figures, 129
Policymakers, 14, 156, 232 female, 18
Political assemblages, 89 Political filaments
Political association, 85, 223 continuous, 135
Political associations organised, 85 main, 141, 151
Political culture Political formations, 59, 89, 95,
and practices, 28–31 158, 317
based, 147 particular, 300
complex, 3, 13 Political fortunes, 224
defined, 25, 119 Political game, 119
defining, 142 Political gatherings, 108
dominant white, 28 Political giant, 259
forged, 142 Political gimmick, 147
new, 45, 48, 149, 315 Political jingoism, 262
observed, 120 Political landscape, 29, 52, 70–73, 77,
of Zimbabwe, 19, 25–49, 222 92, 118, 121, 130, 155, 157, 335
overriding, 137 Political landscape post, 71
positive, 26 Political legacies, 300
repressive, 7, 120 Political liberties, 54
undemocratic, 148 Political longevity, 8
Political debate, 125, 227, 252, 262 Political mobilization
rational, 17, 246 ethnic, 159
Political differences, 147 ethnicization of, 155–178
INDEX 433
explicit, 158 Political scene, 55, 307

Political news, 16, 224, 245–269 Political science, 208
Political office, 5, 85, 171, 195, 263 Political scientists, 59, 119, 212
highest, 148, 338 Political set, 106
Political opinion, 126 Political socialisation, 254
Political opponent, 66, 146 Political space, 89, 158, 339, 354, 391
Political order, 17, 299 closed, 73
Political organisation, 106, 140, 145 Political stability, 279, 282, 368
ethnic, 149 sustainable, 175
Political organisation magnet cross- Political strata, 123
cutting, 140 Political strategy, 19, 88, 89, 189, 197
Political parallelism, 129 inclusive, 76
Political participation, 124, 302, 321 Political system
active, 122 closed, 13, 85, 86
Political parties, 31, 46, 59, 74, 85, dominant, 237
86, 91, 92, 94, 99, 100, dominated, 148
103–106, 108, 140, 141, 143, Political template, 151
146, 148, 150, 186, 203, 224, Political trajectory, 146
230, 238, 239, 241, 254, 259, Political transition
269, 307, 322, 332 missed, 151
Political party ideology, 74 predicted, 140
Political passions, 119 shaped, 14
Political players and relations post- Political transition post-Mugabe, 152
independence, 92–96 Political transition questions, 146
Political polarisation, 87–89, 95, 98 Political turmoil, 16, 245
portended, 94 Political values, 14, 117, 129
Political potentiality, 77 particular, 118
Political power Political villain, 258
real, 109 Politicians
seized, 305 elite, 104
Political practices, 7, 13, 39, 79 nationalist, 32
repressive, 121 powerful, 265
Political processes, 25, 118–120, 129, radical, 30
184, 249, 308 Politicisation/politicization, 15,
organic, 71 155–157, 311
Political purposes, 137 Politicking
Political quietness relative, 73 tribal/ethnic exclusionary, 147
Political representation tribalist/ethnic-hegemony, 142
equitable black, 30 Politics
high, 30 accommodative, 146
Political rights paradigm, 77 advanced pro-hegemonic, 107
Political scalp, 346 anti-colonial, 58
434 INDEX
Politics (cont.) tribal/ethnic, 147

civilian, 3, 9 tribal/ethnic-hegemony, 14, 136,
clan, 142 142, 143, 147
competitive, 302, 309 tribalism, 140, 142
complex, 209, 217 Politics and Power in Zimbabwe, 91
concrete, 78 Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political
contemporary, 137 Agreement, 2
country’s, 72, 107 Polity, 26, 89, 104, 226
current, 4 new, 27
ethnicization of, 156, 174, 178 Population/populations
exercise of, 104 bodied, 367
familial, 15 civilian, 9
functions, 338 main, 145
gridlocked, 79 rural, 45, 65
hard, 85 speaking, 146
hybrid, 207, 209, 219 urban, 29, 34–36, 40
internal, 189 white, 27–29, 44, 45, 149
joining, 342 Post-Cold War context, 208
militarised, 12 Post-independence
national, 6, 80, 146 conflict, 170, 175
national liberation, 5 demographic transformations, 142
nationalist, 300 domestic political arena, 142
nationalist unity, 145 emerged, 87
new, 4 era, 44, 168
of opposition, 85, 89 generation, 142
organized, 71 generation frustrations, 142
participatory, 226 government, 44, 45, 143
partisan, 192 politicians, 149
polarised, 87 realities, 146
popular, 123 state, 142
post-colonial, 142 tribalism, 148
post-independence nation- Zimbabwe, 3, 36, 46, 87, 117, 165,
building, 170 184, 227, 336
powerful alternative, 124 Post-independence opposition
predatory state, 5 main, 148
regional, 67 Post-independent
secular, 69 one-party states, 219
shifting, 210 Post-Mugabe
transform, 43, 149 economy, 12
transitional, 1, 4, 14 power transition question, 135
tribal, 146 Post-Second World War (PWWII)
tribal-ethnic hegemony, 14, 136, development approaches, 283
142, 143, 147 Postcolonial
INDEX 435
interludes, 53 postcolonial, 4, 56
legacies, 3, 118 public, 18, 308
project, 62 ruling party’s hegemonic, 126
project reform process, 62 rural, 56
reform agenda, 57 self-allocated, 95
Postcolonial Zimbabwe, 53, separation of, 59, 64, 314, 322
64, 136, 140, 156, 301, simmering conditioning, 146
332, 335 societal, 337
haunted, 66 substantial, 321
Poverty threatened Mugabe’s, 91
abject, 167 throwing, 231, 232
alleviation, 290, 361 transformative, 76
glaring, 343 urban, 56
reduction, 360 usurp, 333, 342
Power voting, 380
ageing husband’s, 342 will to, 78, 79
amid, 301 wrestle, 95, 259
attained, 4 Powerful forces, 258
centralizing, 63 Powerful Grace Mugabe
collective, 65 Zimbabweans, 352
colonial, 55 Powerless Grace, 353
consolidate, 90, 203, 209 Practices of sorcery, 5
contest, 351 Practitioners, 9, 247
contestations, 277, 346 Pre-election ZANU-PF military
corridors of, 3, 118 exercises, 197
corrupted, 78, 79 Premier Africa Minerals Ltd and
devolution of, 79, 174 Aquarius Platinum Ltd., 286
discretionary, 128 Presidency
disorientate, 232 deputy, 171
disrupt, 225 executive, 63
economic, 63 President
evaporates, 195 country’s, 342
executive, 45, 304 elected, 43, 96
foreign, 279, 305 female, 333, 342, 354
imperial, 294 former, 120, 152, 248, 256, 258,
in, 338 299, 303, 332, 333
legitimate, 208 incumbent, 188, 332
legitimised, 4 male, 332, 333, 342, 354
lost, 351 new, 361
maintaining, 191 power, 316
nationalist matrix of, 3, 4 President of SRANC, 143
people’s, 75, 306 Presidential address Mnangagwa, 10
personal, 12 Presidential Spokesperson, 213, 214
436 INDEX
Presidium, 152 Prolongation, 67, 140, 209

Press Promotion
briefings, 209 multinational, 377
conferences, 99, 210, 342n1 opportunities, 310
free, 227 Propagation, 140, 210, 223
gutter, 250 Protests
partisan, 125 civic, 78
private, 125 current, 70
state-controlled, 217 current citizen, 74
tabloid, 250 initial, 70
Prime Minister’s Directives, 301 isolated, 75
Primitive accumulation lone, 71
black, 62 organized political, 28
configures, 17 provoked, 2
Primitive capitalism, 284 public, 11, 15, 393
Privileges misogynistic, 53 significant, 75
Pro-hegemonic bloc, 108 social, 20, 72
Pro-hegemonic cluster, 107 student, 229
Pro-Mthwakazi urban residents, 52
activists complain, 171 Protracted guerrilla insurgency, 173
consciousness, 157 Protracted negotiation process, 98
movements, 14, 155–178 Provinces, 36, 45, 46,
Pro-Ndebele, 170 155, 157, 165–167,
Profit growth, 372 174, 175, 188, 301, 302, 322,
Profit margins, 364 323, 332
Profit maximization option, 369 Provincial executive committee, 188
Profitability margins, 381 Provincialization, 172
Profligacy, 52, 343 Provoked social turmoil, 11
Progressive constitutional-making Proximity closer, 322
processes, 104 Pseudo-democracy, 79, 183
Progressive multiethnic countries, 176 Public administration, 308
Projects Public advertisements, 202
developmental, 281 Public broadcaster, 162
envisaged, 159 Public consultations, 64, 171
federal, 173 Public corruption growing, 125
hegemonic construction, 92 Public debate, 16, 224, 245, 247
hegemony-building, 93, 98 Public deliberation, 86
imperialist, 149 Public discourses, 123, 223
indigenization, 56 objective, 129
national democratic, 305 Public event, 169
political, 29, 216 Public media reforms, 309
Proliferation, 56, 140, 232 Public media rhetoric, 229
INDEX 437
Public opinion, 13, 86, 226, the victims of colonial, 56

227, 341 Racist, 14, 29, 30, 44, 146, 201
Public order, 392, 393 foundation, 141
Public Order and Security Act identities, 148
(POSA), 108, 127, 191, 229, Racist nationalism
240, 309 founding, 142
Public policies, 164, 176, 308, 334 transform Zimbabwe’s, 149
superior, 323 Radicalisation, 281
Public procurement process, 313–314 Rainbow Towers, 240
Public resources, 197, 322, 395 RBZ Governor, 321
limited, 311–314 RBZ in quasi-fiscal activities, 321
Public sphere Re-education, 15, 208, 214
ideal, 247 sessions, 213
mediated, 265 Re-enactments, 250
modern, 16, 122, 245 Real investment, 320
new, 227 Real Transfer Gross System, 318
rational, 262 Real Transfer Gross System
unstable, 268 (RTGS), 318
Publishing of falsehoods, 260, 264 Rebels, 46, 222, 223, 237, 238
Pye, L., 25 Rebuild Africa’s bread-basket, 193
Reclamation, 4, 71
Recolonisation, 284
Q Reconciliation
Quakers, 29 national, 169
Qualitative methodology, 223, post independence, 147
226, 253 Reconciliatory, 258
Qualitative methods, 226 Reconfiguration, 69
Qualitative research methodology, 253 Reconfigure, 52, 79
Quasi-fiscal activities, 321 Reconstitute, 79
Quebec, 176 Reconstitution, 51, 67, 88
Queen, 343, 347 Reconstruction, 281, 301
Recruiting, 212, 236
Recruitment, 163, 175, 183, 184,
R 200, 310
Race new, 310
black, 145, 149 Red cards, 333, 352
presidential, 99, 101 distributing, 231
Racial backgrounds, 64 Red sea, 347
Racial barriers, 56 Redistribution questions, 68
Racial discrimination, 30, 60 Redistributive policy thrust, 107
Racism Redress gender imbalances, 353
anti-white, 150 Reduction, 4, 78, 302, 360, 379
438 INDEX
Reduction of elections, 4 strict, 313

Reform agenda, 12, 57, 80 Rehabilitate, 147
neo-liberal, 281 Rehabilitation, 39, 301
Reformist, 307, 325 Relations
Reforms causal, 367
constitutional, 105 complicated government-
cosmetic, 70 students, 124
economic, 316–317, 390 cordial society-state, 54
electoral, 200, 202 dynamic, 184
political, 105, 320, 391–392 entertainment-oriented public, 256
Refounding, 80 ethnic, 163
Regime censors, 216 normalising, 324
Regime change, 76, 77, 79, 228–230, party state, 98–99
236, 248, 255, 257, 261, 262 poor race, 173
Regime change agenda, 79, 236, post-independence, 92
248, 257 social, 16, 293
Regime change agent, 255, 261 state media, 213
Regime legitimation, 208 troubled, 158
Regimes unenviable groups, 173
civilian, 182 Religious sectarianism, 139
dictatorial, 73 Religious worship, 237
eroding authoritarian, 184 Repatriation, 284
feature, 183 unofficial, 287
malignant, 258 Republic, 190
new constitutional, 313 Second, 4, 10–12, 19, 218,
new media, 209 275–298, 307, 312, 317, 325
regimes set, 194 Republicanism, 59
repressive, 122 Research
security, 64, 304 contemporary, 119
strong authoritarian, 184 survey-based, 119
supporters, 184 Research and Advocacy Unit, 166
weakening authoritarian, 184 Research institutes, 86
white, 31, 32 Research methods, 226
Region, 61, 93, 141, 148, 162, 165, Reserve Bank, 395, 396
166, 168, 170, 171, 176, 177, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ),
225, 233, 376 277, 288, 289, 320, 321
speaking, 171, 177 Reserves, 27, 95, 144, 150, 165
Regionalism, 89, 147 native, 28, 29, 41
Registration, 99, 121, 123 Resettlement, 39, 301
voter, 197 Resign, 182, 183, 194, 339, 390
Regulations Resignation, 10, 47, 182, 194, 200,
necessary, 265 304, 305, 334
INDEX 439
voluntary, 305 Rhodesian minority government, 301

Resignation letter, 304 Rhodesian regime, 31, 32
Resignation President Robert Rhodesian settler colonial
Mugabe, 334 Leviathan, 7, 121
Resistance Rhodesian settler colonialism, 7
anti-colonial, 162 Rhodesian settler colonialists, 7
generated massive, 29 Rhodesian settler regime, 120
grassroots, 124 Rhodesian soldiers, 227
groups, 32 Rhodesian state, 209, 216
indicated, 190 Rhodesians, 7, 29, 31, 33, 93, 120,
peaceful, 28, 32 121, 209, 216, 301
peaceful native, 28 white, 29, 31, 45
Resist colonial rule, 29 Richardson, J., 255
vehement, 188 Right of conquest, 7
Restitution, 53, 156 Right of liberating you, 8
Retired Brigadier General, 201, 202 Rights
Retired Brigadier General Judge basic, 60
President, 202 civic, 120
Retired Colonel Richard Dube, 162 civil, 56, 237
Retired Colonel Rueben Mqwayi, 191 civil protected, 56
RF, see Rhodesian Front claim, 316
Rhetoric collective, 122
populist, 307 colonists prospecting, 27
public, 147 counterhegemonic bloc, 108
Rhodesia democratic, 268
modern, 173 discourses, 64, 66, 68
renamed, 27 economic, 69, 88
substitute, 173 equal, 54
Rhodesia Herald, 216 individual, 301
Rhodesia Security Forces, 161 political, 30, 55, 58–60, 77,
Rhodesia Unilateral Declaration of 304, 315
Independence, 29, 56 small land, 144
Rhodesian army, 32 unequal, 30
Rhodesian army movements, 32 women’s, 64, 104
Rhodesian Broadcasting Rights rang, 56
Corporation, 33 Rioting, 72
Rhodesian era, 118, 216 public, 72
Rhodesian Front (RF), 29, 30, 32, 38, Rival union, 106
39, 41, 63, 216 Rivalry
Rhodesian government, 32, 44, 228 ethnic, 14, 157–161, 163, 168
Rhodesian government’s use of partisan, 170
violence, 66 Rivals, 151, 173, 260, 333, 339
440 INDEX
Robert Mugabe International Ruling classes use, 90

Airport, 334 Ruling elite, 15, 86, 90–93, 97, 104,
Robert Mugabe Square, 339 108, 126, 164, 300, 302,
Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF 324, 397
regime, 124 new, 91, 92, 97
Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, 169 Ruling party
Robert STOP IT, 352 circles, 95
Roessler, G., 183 insistence, 125
Role of Government in Business ruling party ZANU-PF, 33
Internationalization, 369 Rulings, 203
Roman Catholic, 30 unpredictable court, 202
Rootless acts, 70 ZANU-PF headquarters, 339
Roots, 118, 129, 148, 159, 232, Zimbabwe African National
252, 264 Union Patriotic Front
establishing, 279 (ZANU-PF), 118, 152,
Royalties, 17, 26, 275 170, 171, 181, 182, 229,
Ruhanya, P, 14, 15 238, 248, 257, 294, 299, 324,
Rule 333, 334, 339, 342, 354, 395
analytic, 254 Run-off elections, 197
autocratic, 343 presidential, 196
black majority, 143 Run-up, 150, 186, 188, 195, 197
direct, 56, 279 Rural masses, 57
dominant party, 34, 203 Rural people, 36, 76
gerontocratic, 4 Rural strongholds, 257
guaranteed, 304 Russia, 224
indirect, 56, 279 Russian nationals and transnational
informal, 119 corporates, 286
late Mugabe’s despotic, 122 Rutherford, B., 3
legislative, 314
local, 57
minority, 60, 141 S
perpetuate ZANU-PF, 194 Sabelo, J., 13
policies, 145 Sable Mining Africa Ltd, 286
routinised, 5 Sabotage, 195
tyrannical, 343 economic, 165
white, 29 Sabotaging opposition
Rule Zimbabwe, 228 strongholds, 197
Rulers, 149, 160, 216, 343 Sachikonye, L., 64, 95,
despotic, 122 95n5, 96n6, 104,
Ruling capitalists, 17, 276 281, 360
Ruling class, 17, 44, 88–90, 95–99, Sacralizing, 173
102, 108–110, 275 Sacrifice, 34, 164, 237, 264
new, 17, 97, 275 Sacrilegious, 168
INDEX 441
SADC, see Southern African electronic media, 129

Development Community financial, 381
Sadomba, Z.W., 2, 8 formal, 317
Saharawi Democratic Republic, 176 informal, 70, 72, 73, 238, 303
Salisbury, 343 non-state, 18
Sally, 344 private, 35, 166, 310
Sam, Moyo, 69 public, 18, 52, 72, 103, 175
Samir, 382 rural, 57
Sampson, A., 268, 269 social, 301
Samukele Hadebe, 14 tradable, 361
Sanctions, 7, 31, 192, 281, 300, 302, urban, 57
303, 325, 397 Security apparatus, 15, 188–190
Sandelowski, M., 253 Security establishment, 190
Sanitation, 301, 304, 316 Security forces, 47, 109
SAPs, see Structural Adjustment Security officers, 9, 195
Programmes Security officials, 184
Saviour Kasukuwere, 190, 333 Security organizations, 150, 197
Scandals, 35, 101n8, 249, 251, 252, Security personnel, 32, 43, 46
395, 396 reprimanding, 200
Schizophrenic, 62 Security sector, 12, 49, 75, 183, 191,
Schmitter, 185, 186 192, 195, 196, 199–201, 394
Scholars, 16, 57, 67, 112, 129, 156, Security sector personnel, 183
183, 202, 209, 223–225, 234, Security threat, 177, 199, 305
284, 300, 302 Securocracy, 5
communications, 234 Securocrats, 44, 49, 194–196,
Scholarship 198, 200
general, 222 retired, 195
Schonbach, K., 252, 262 Segregation, 145
Schudson, M.S., 256 Self conceptions, 136
Scoones, I., 73 Self-censorship, 215, 217
Scotland, 176 exercised, 215
Secession, 156, 176, 177, 323 Self-determination, 159
Secessionism, 177 Self-imposed exile fearing, 344
Second Chimurenga annals, 164 Semi-processed commodity, 288
Second Chimurenga/Umvukela and Senghor Leopold, 60
national liberation struggles, 192 Sensationalisation, 16, 224, 245, 250,
Second Chimurenga/Umvukela and 252, 266, 269
national liberation struggles and Sentiments
honouring, 192 counter-hegemonic, 104
Second Secretary, 190, 248 ethnic, 158
Second World War, 6, 282 general, 348
Sectors pro-Mthwakazi, 159
broadcasting, 126 public, 123
442 INDEX
Separation teachers, 167

horizontal, 322 traditional, 347
vertical, 322 traditionalists claim dominion, 168
Settler regime, 27, 28, 120 tribal hegemony, 152
white e, 28 war leaders Nehanda and
Settler rule, 31 Kaguvi, 163
white, 230 Shona chiefdoms, 174
Settlers, 2, 3, 7, 27, 28, 31, 54, 80, neighbouring, 159
120, 121, 141, 143, 147, Shona government
230, 279 dominant, 170
set, 27 Shona groups, 27, 158, 159
Sex, 32, 346 dominant, 170
Sex scene, 346 Shona Gukurahundi, 172
Sexism, 13, 18, 19, 54, 283, 331–359 Shona hegemony
Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in dominant, 151
Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore entrenched, 148
Legacy, 331–359 identity politics, 147
Sexist represented, 151
banter, 340 Shona hegemony tribal/ethnic, 147
ridicule, 340 Shona people, 26, 41, 156, 162, 163,
tendencies, 12 166, 169, 170, 172, 175, 177
vitriol, 341 depict, 171
Sexual copulation, 346 Shona-Ndebele, 147
Sexualized slurs, 336 Shona-speaking
Seychelles, 210 leader, 148
Seymour-Smith, 158 tribes, 140
Shona Shonhe, T., 17, 293
and Ndebele peoples, 27 deepening extroverted economic
and Tswana chiefs, 159 development, 17
chiefs, 26 Short Term Emergency Recovery
colloquialism, 238 Programme (STERP), 276, 281
conquered, 27 Sibanda, Gibson
culture, 26, 222 former ZCTU President
dichotomy, 158 Gibson, 229
dominant, 151, 170, 323 Sibanda, Jabulani, 189, 190, 342
ethnic hegemony, 143, 148, 151 denounced, 342
mother tongue in Sibindi, M., 18, 359, 366, 367, 373
Matabeleland, 167 Significant resistance, 31, 32
party ZANU PF, 170 Simon, Muzenda, 31
relations, 158, 160 Sirks, L., 221
speakers, 165, 168 Sithole, Ndabaningi
speakers learning, 167 founder president Reverend, 31
INDEX 443
included, 31 Social movements

nationalist Reverend, 58, 93 civil society-based, 57
Situated activity, 226 powerful, 64, 65
Sixty women members, 332 Social policy
Slabbert, Z., 309 inclusive transformative, 17, 277
Sloan, B., 262 radical transformative inclusive, 294
Sloganeering, 146, 218 transformative, 17, 276, 277,
Slogans, 332, 340, 341, 343, 347 293, 294
Smallholders, 225, 287 Social problems resonate, 123
Smokescreen, 170 Social progress, 301
Snapchat, 74 Social quagmire, 3
Social Amenities, 312 Social safety nets exacerbates, 317
Social base, 74, 76 Social Sciences, 283
limited, 77 Social scientists, 119
Social bases new, 77 Social services, 69, 74, 98, 316
Social changes, 73, 147, 249, 390 delivery, 69
Social conditions, 69, 395 reliable, 175
Social destitution general, 166 Social Studies, 192
Social empowerment, 28 Socialism, 59, 60
Social fabric, 18 Socialist, 59, 62, 217, 281, 290, 302
Social interactions, 226 Societal issues interpreting, 251
computer-mediated, 226 Society
Social media -media, 251
activism, 72, 73, 75 barbaric, 30
activists, 70, 72, 75 bourgeois, 227
activities, 224 burial, 69
and dissidence, 223 civic, 105, 150, 238, 300
dissidence, 222, 226, 231–233, 238 civilized prosperous, 30
dissidents, 222–226, 233 colonial, 59, 61
effects, 221 complete integrated, 59
memes, 352 democratic, 314, 316, 322
platforms, 345 egalitarian, 290
protests, 52 embryonic indigenous, 56
social media dissident moments, 222 ethnic-based, 55
spaces, 75 given, 338
trolling, 232 manifests, 123
uprisings, 222 media and civil, 117–132
use, 76, 224 misogynistic, 354
utilized, 73 non-racial, 62
Social movement building, 71, 72 organised, 102
Social movement building patriarchal, 338, 345
processes, 71 patriarchal heteronormative, 345
444 INDEX
Society (cont.) members, 376

polarised, 264 Tribunal ruling, 201
political, 56, 105 Southern European, 129
postcolonial, 65 Southern Rhodesia, 26, 59
recede, 87 Southern Rhodesia African National
traditional, 335 Congress (SRANC), 59, 143, 145
vulnerable, 360 Sovereign state, 6
Socio-economic gains, 302 particular, 316
Socio-economic rights, 69, 71, 77 Sovereignty
important, 316 international, 6
Socio-economic rights issue(s), 69 national, 4, 53, 54
Socio-economic stress, 165 unpopular, 56
Socioe-conomic issues, 77, 107, 110 Soviet military, 161
Sociologist Roger Southall, 5 Spain, 137
SOEs, see State owned enterprises Spandler, H., 338
Soil conservation, 29 Sparks, C., 118, 248–252, 254, 256,
Soil patriots, 228 263, 265, 268
Sokwanele, 43, 231 Spatial arrangements, 337
Soldiers Speakers, 158, 165, 167, 168, 304
addressing Second Brigade, 150 Spearheading, 52
host Tanzanian, 169–170 Spontaneity, 73
machine gun-wielding, 305 little, 72
Solidarity, 198, 334 SRANC, see Southern Rhodesia
Solomon, Mustswairo, 175 African National Congress
Songs of decolonisation struggles, 141 State
Songs sung, 164 autonomous, 159
Sotho, 158 central, 57
in relation to Ndebele, 158 crony, 280
South Africa current, 14, 117, 129, 366
and Botswana, 368 deracialized, 56
and Namibia, 104 developing, 13, 86
South African, 393 developmental, 98, 278, 280, 293
South Sudan, 176 failed, 278
Southern Africa, 5, 36, 68, 104, 128, fractured, 189
141, 142, 146, 291, 325 frontline, 28
Southern Africa Development governed, 143
Committee (SADC), 68, 201, hijacked, 334
284, 291, 376 independent, 5
Southern African Development inverted, 280
Community (SADC), 43, 68, kleptocratic, 280
184, 201, 331, 376, 398 liberal, 90
countries, 376 local, 56, 57
Election Observation Mission, 68 monopoly, 126
INDEX 445
nationalism, 56 Stern, E., 346

non-performing, 318–319 Stevens, Douglas E., 364
officials, 213, 215, 216, 280 Stiffer penalties, 312
over-extended, 279 Stranded Warriors, 210
parasitical, 279 Strategic alliances, 77
patrimonial, 279 Strategic objectives, 266
postcolonial, 38, 80, 118, 126, 292 firm, 365
prebendal, 280 Strategic resources, 3, 54
predatory, 5, 279 corridors of power and
rentier, 279 ownership of, 118
securocratic, 7, 196 Strategies
settler, 143 assigned campaign, 196
soft, 280 clear long-term, 197
strong, 280 critical, 126
undemocratic, 279 hidden, 15, 209, 219, 225
State for Information and Publicity macroeconomic turnaround, 11
appointed Minister of, 59, market entry selection, 378
126, 207 mobilisation, 87
State institutions new, 209
fundamental, 183 new media, 210, 219
populating, 195 non-coercive, 209
State media policy and practices, 209 party’s media, 207
State opposition civil society repressive, 219
relations, 16, 222 three-pronged, 9
mediated, 16 winning, 200
State organisation, 301 Strauss, A., 226
State parasitism bureaucratic, 6, 118 Structural Adjustment Programmes
State policies, 140, 148 (SAPs), 2, 12, 19, 229, 282
State power Struggles
debased, 348 anti-colonial, 55, 56, 58, 60, 66
opposed, 227 anti-colonialism, 13, 86
State president, 10, 11 anti-imperialist, 60
new, 10 armed, 31, 33, 142, 163, 227
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 189, current, 13
278, 292, 312, 318, 319 mutual, 145
Statement nation’s, 52
false, 127 national, 51
political, 158, 267 ongoing, 78
solidarity, 198 people’s, 66, 122
Stereotypes popular, 54
negative, 160 shared, 64
subjective, 266 urban, 76
Stereotyping, 160, 259 Struggles within struggles, 146
446 INDEX
Student grants/loans, 229 Supreme Court tables, 200

Studies on gender and politics in System
Zimbabwe, 335 centralisedcentralized, 26
Study competitive authoritarian, 182–184,
case, 339 191, 194
comparative, 129 devolved, 174, 323
earlier individual behaviourist, 119 devolved local governance, 166
empirical, 367, 368, 370 discriminatory, 32
qualitative content analysis, 222 discriminatory governance, 31
quantitative, 252 economic, 6, 283
seminal, 223 effective administrative, 309
series of, 378, 380 electoral, 183, 195
university, 183 farming, 287
Sub-groups, 374, 379 federal, 174
Subculture, 338 financial, 380
Subservience, 140, 151 foreign exchange, 360
Subsistence grants, 98 formidable, 101
Succeed Robert Mugabe, 333 gender as a binary, 336
Success of social media use in government dominant, 91
elections, 224 hybrid, 183, 209
Succession judicial, 200, 201
debate, 149, 306 key resource allocation, 317
dynamics, 195 monarchical, 26
issue, 109, 189 one-party, 95
planning, 310 one-party state, 63, 64, 95,
Successor, 143, 152, 172, 248, 101, 125, 148, 185, 187,
325, 347 219, 391
Sudan, 1, 394, 397, 398 over-centralised, 321, 323
Support freedom, 128 productive, 280
Support government policies, 308 social, 26, 343
Support ideologies, 150 strong education, 306
Support industries, 366 symbolic, 119
Support research, 378 technological, 375, 376
Supporters technology, 376
ex-ZAPU, 162 telephone, 232
former ZAPU, 163 unaccountable, 63
passive, 184 undemocratic governance, 120
rural, 335 warning, 251
traditional, 182 women quota, 332
white, 34 System of government, 27, 321–324
Supposition, 370 Systems Analysis of Identity politics in
Supreme Court, 92 Zimbabwe, 139
INDEX 447
T Team Lacoste, 181, 264, 266

Tabloid journalism styles Techno-determinism, 222
adopted, 248 Techno-deterministic
Tabloid-size newspapers, 250 biases, 222
Tabloidisation, 16, 224, 245–269 Technocratic, 4, 53
Tabloidization of political news in Technocratic insistence, 53
Zimbabwe, 245–269 Technological advancements, 256
Tabloids Technological process regional, 375
adopted, 248, 262 Technological spillover positive, 373
critic, 250 Technologies
employed, 260 contemporary digital media, 125
journalism techniques, 261 contemporary networked
newspapers, 249, 250, 267 digitalbased media, 125
pictorial, 249 extolling, 222
style, 245, 250, 251, 259, 261, 263, Teece, D.J., 364, 365, 375
268, 269 Tendencies
supermarket, 250 centralist, 14, 118, 129
Tactics, 236, 392 corrupt, 267
shrewd, 343 democratic, 63
Tajamuka campaign, 238 elite continuity, 118
Tajamuka challenges, 240 gerontocratic, 3, 118
Tajamuka curates, 239 secessionist, 157
Tajamuka espouses, 240 Tendi, B.M., 3, 75, 141,
Tajamuka members, 239 147, 188, 332, 333,
Tajamuka/Sesjikile 335, 336
typology, 238–240 Tendi, Blessings-Miles, 3, 75, 141,
Takawira, Leopold, 31 147, 148, 188
Tanzania, 28, 87n1, 141, 163 Tenets
Taxation, 374 fundamental, 136
statutes, 381 identifier, 140
Taxes Tengende, N., 122
avoidance, 287 Thabo Mbeki African Leadership
evasion, 286, 287, 315 Institute (TMALI), 286,
heavy, 29 287, 290
load, 381 The political and economic
reducing, 320 conditions, 68
Taxonomy, 365 Theoretical context, 336–339
of market failures impeding Theoretical framework,
internationalisation, 371 252–255, 377
Taxpayers, 344 Theoretician, 60
Taylor, C., 141 Theorists
Teacher deployment, 167–168 political, 86
448 INDEX
Theory global, 367

competitive general integration, 376
equilibrium, 369 inter-Africa, 291
eclectic, 365 international, 17, 260, 276
firm, 364, 366, 369, 382 invoicing, 287
liberal, 123 liberalization, 379
media framing, 254 liberalize, 278
neoclassical, 369 openness, 367
network, 222 regimes, 376
popular political, 122 relations, 319
reconfigured public sphere, 223 relationship, 370
systems, 136, 138–139, 148, 280 relationships start, 370
Third Chimurenga, 2, 15, unequal, 286, 287
42, 207–219 union movement, 160
Third World, 20, 280 unionist, 228
Threats value, 17, 276
blatant, 95 Trade policies
external, 188 agenda, 376
human security, 305 framework, 376
major, 264 relaxing, 360
renewed, 74 Trade promotion fr0m, 378
repel, 142 Trade regulations, 369, 379
resisting, 150 liberalizing, 360
TIMB, 288 Trade unions, 56, 67, 141, 160
Timberg, C., 109 black, 230
Tinhu, S., 71, 72 Transgressed patriarchal norms, 347
Tinodawo ngwena yedu Transition
itungamire, 343 agrarian, 2
Tipeiwo commander, 341 based, 199
TMALI, 286, 287, 290 blocked democratic, 12
Tobacco decolonisation, 2
raw, 286, 287 economic liberalisation, 2
Towns forge, 146
country’s, 339 incomplete, 52
main urban, 75 military-assisted, 3, 195
Townsend, J., 228 naturalise power, 152
Toyota, 283 neo-liberal, 2
Trade overload, 2, 222
deficiencies, 288 peaceful, 1
economic, 291 politics, 135–152
flows, 370 process, 14, 136
free, 287 Transition in political culture, 147
INDEX 449
Transition trajectories, 140, 141 Turkish tobacco, 29

determined political, 143 Tutu, Desmond, 237
Transitional Stabilisation Twitter Revolution, 222
Programme, 317 Tyranny, 26, 236
Transmedia, 192
Transmission, 224, 392
Transnational corporates, 286 U
Transportation, 319 UANC, see United African
Trevor Ncube’s Tweet, 351 National Council
Tribal distinctiveness, 140 UJ, see University of Johannesburg
Tribal political parties, 140 Umbilical cord, 181
Tribal prism, 161 Umhlahlo Wesizwe, 156
Tribal stronghold, 93 Unauthorised spending, 317
Tribal/ethnic hegemony, 14, 136, UNCTAD, see United Nations
142, 143, 147, 152 Conference on Trade and
Tribalism, 7, 59, 61, 140, 142, 145, Development
147, 278 Under-invoicing, 284
animosity, 146 Underdeveloped world, 174
Tribe, 140 Underdevelopment, 61, 62, 165
rival Ndebele, 151 Understanding
Trickle-down neoliberal, 229 collective, 119
Tripartite negotiating forum comprehensive, 269
(TNF), 106 ideological, 217
Trojan horse, 201 intersections, 336
counterrevolutionary, 230 liberal, 123
Trump, Donald, 224, 286 nationalist, 58
Truth, 37, 160, 264 public, 266, 268
general, 265 sources of FDI, 363–364
Tsvangirai, Morgan, 11, 43, 69, 103, Zimbabwe’s political
109, 151, 186, 198, 199, culture, 117–130
200n20, 228, 230, 234, 259, Unemployment
260, 268, 391, 392, 394 decreasing, 290
party, 234 massive, 166
portrayed, 234 Unequal development
quit labour union, 228 of regions and perceived jobs
Tsvangirai, Morgan Richard((Leader), discrimination, 177
11, 43, 69, 103, 109, 151, perceived, 165–166
198–200, 228, 230, 234, 259, supposed, 171
260, 268, 391, 392, 394 UNESCO, 98
Tswana chiefs, 159 Unfinished Business, Sabelo, 51–80
Tulloch, J., 256 Unilateral Declaration of
Tunisia, 76, 233, 397 Independence, 29, 30, 56, 281
450 INDEX
Unilaterally declared independence University/universities

(UDI), 31 campuses, 236
Union Jack, 172 country’s, 228, 229
Unions, 29, 56, 63, 67, 96, 96n6, Kent, 201
104, 106, 107, 141, 160, 228, lecturers, 71
230, 394, 396 public, 229
UNISA See University of South Africa Unpopular UZ Amendment Act, 124
United African National Council Unprecedented nosedive, 361
(UANC), 92, 93, 101, 102 Unresolved national healing questions,
United Arab Emirates, 286 155, 157
United Kingdom (UK), 5, 36, 37, US, see United States
119, 176, 216, 286, 377,
391, 397
United Nations Conference on Trade V
and Development (UNCTAD), Values
291, 363 basic, 25
United Parties (UP), 102 commercial, 256
United States (US) core, 58
and French governments, 70 democratic, 118
cables, 233 exported, 288
Cold War policy, 146 lesser, 341
dollars, 286, 304, 317, 318, 361 noble, 236
elections, 224 right transaction, 373
firms, 370 shock, 251
United States President, 286 Vambe, L., 344
Unity Vasilchenko, E., 378
agreement, 94 Vast Resources, 286
emphasized monolithic, 61 Veterans
government, 106, 391 deceased liberation, 162
pan-Africa, 290 former ZPRA, 172
Unity Accord, 61, 94, 95, 98, 100, guerrilla, 8
106, 148, 162, 164, 196, stop purging, 192
199, 302 Viber, 74
humiliating, 169–170 Vice-Chancellor, 124
Unity Day, 169 Vice-president, 8, 10, 31, 148, 151,
Universal suffrage established, 118 174, 188, 240, 248, 254, 306,
Universalist, 53 334, 348
University of Zimbabwe (UZ), 71, 98, former, 187, 190, 307
228, 229 Vice-President of Zimbabwe, 31, 248
students, 228 Vicious circle, 294
University of Zimbabwe Dean of Victim
Social Studies, 192 communities, 197
INDEX 451
frames, 260 Virtual ethnography, 226

next, 346 Virtuous circles, 376
rape, 346 VMCZ, 245, 247, 265
Victimhood VOA, 305
common, 104 Voluminous record, 343
the memory of past, 175 Voluntary disclosure mechanisms, 128
Victorious emerged, 55 Vote
Victors, 94, 161, 178 amid, 102
Victory cast, 332
electoral, 183 electoral, 304
ensured, 189 people’s, 95
landslide, 102 presidential, 101
Vigilant eye, 227 Voters
Vilification, 39, 342, 344 black, 30
Villagers, 32, 47, 48, 71, 75, 217 election-weary, 186
poor, 348 separate, 30
Villages Voting, 41, 189, 195, 268, 380
hunger stricken, 197 Voting patterns, 224
protected, 32 tweak, 195
Vindictiveness, 247 Vulnerability, 260, 265
Violence
and intolerance of political
dissent, 12 W
attracted, 332 Wafawarova, R., 311
political, 66, 108n14, 121, 172 Wages
sanctioned, 240 better, 105, 218
sponsored, 231 public-sector, 72
use of, 38, 66 rates, 368
worst, 109 ratio, 368
Violence ridden re-run, 151 set minimum, 97
Violent Walsh, J.P., 380
clashes, 71 War
conflict, 305 all-out, 186
divorce, 176 anti-colonial, 168
explosion, 172 brutal, 33, 163
military intervention, 11 brutal guerrilla, 32
repression, 223 civil, 46, 174, 278
Violent seizure, 15 credentials, 8, 9, 182, 260
ruling party’s, 207 genocidal, 159
Virginia tobacco, 29 guerrilla, 32, 58
Virility, 339, 346 legend false, 255, 257, 261
power dons the face of, 347 low intensity, 61
452 INDEX
War (cont.) memes, 332, 341, 345, 347,

political succession, 333 352, 353
propaganda, 164 Whawha prison, 31
respectively, 28 Whims, 140, 294
spirited bush, 120 White areas
zone, 211, 265 favoured, 165
War veterans White capital, 65
former ZANLA, 168, 201 private, 126
gratuities, 105 White minority, 120, 227
Waste, 162 small, 32
Waters easy, 102 White nationalists
Weak opposition party politics in die-hard, 30
Zimbabwe, 99–103 White-owned farms, 15, 207
Weapon, 93, 166, 290, 352 Whitehead, S.M., 346
Weaponry superior, 27 Whites
Weber, 90 colonial, 62, 118, 120, 129
Weberian, 91 liberal, 30
Welfare man, 58, 145, 149
customer, 374 moderate groups, 29
economics, 370 paternalistic, 161
social, 369 people, 141, 218
student’s, 124 petroleum jellies, 70
Well-oiled scheme, 118 settler colonisers, 2
West Africa, 91 Whitesliberal opposition, 30
West bereft, 80 Wife
Western capital, 218 former president’s, 152
Western countries, 192, 263, 294, WikiLeaks, 240
300, 303, 319, 324 founder, 233
hostile, 257 Willems, W., 221
Western democracies, 120 Williams, K., 256, 268
Western ideology, 294, 295 Williams, Zack, 282
Western inspired regime change Williamson, O.E., 364
agenda, 257 Willowgate Scandal, 35, 302
Western liberal democracies, 122 Willowgate Scar Scandal, 62
Western liberal ideology and Willowvale Motor, 101
values, 217 Woman, 8, 333, 336, 341, 348, 351
Western literature, 121 ambitious, 354
Western standards, 218 Women
Western window, 283 ambitious, 254
Western world, 250 aspiring, 337
Western-backed mercenaries, 121 circumstances, 336
Westphalian template, 292 depicts, 336
WhatsApp, 74, 348 force, 346
INDEX 453
manoeuvring, 332 Young, Andrew (American

marginalizing, 338 diplomat), 161
married, 347 Youth Leagues, 185–188, 190
minimizes, 343 Youths, 64, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 104,
participation, 332 167, 174, 188, 202, 222,
subordinate, 332, 335 240, 391
young, 32 youth wings, 33, 190, 238, 394
Women and Youth Leagues of YouTube, 224, 236
ZANU-PF, 187 Yugoslavia, 361
Women of Zimbabwe Arise, 103 former, 346
Women’s League, 10, 188, 190
vocal ZANU-PF, 333
Work Z
academic, 165, 380 Zambia, 28, 32, 103, 141, 159, 163,
charity, 362 169, 291, 336
clandestine media, 208, 211 neighbouring, 103, 159
daily newsroom, 212 ZANU-led government, 38, 301
equal pay for equal, 58 Zanu-Ndonga, 93, 101, 102, 268
government agencies, 309 ZCP, 161
seminal, 222, 231, 364 Zimbabwe
substandard, 313 and civic society organizations, 238
Workers and South Africa, 286, 288
contract, 310 and Zimbabwean identity, 57
ghost, 310 capital city, 17, 276, 360
militant, 64 Competitive Authoritarian
organised, 124 System, 182–184
poor, 103 Crisis in, 67, 103
renegotiate, 229 critiquing, 281–283
World Bank (WB), 2, 75, 101, 224, development plan, 283
229, 294, 302, 360 developmental prospects, 294
World Investment Report, 380 discourse on democratization, 157
World systems theory, 280 dollar, 318, 396
World War II, 6, 282, 283 dominant political culture in,
117–130, 135, 138–142, 144,
151, 152
X economy; small market size, 281
Xenophobic musings, 175 ethnicization of political
mobilization in, 155–178
export earnings, 289
Y exports, 286
Yahweh, 347 Father of, 5
Years independence, 2 flag in Harare, 173
Years post-independence, 97 fled, 344
454 INDEX
Zimbabwe (cont.) return, 10, 12

founding President, 181 ruled, 9
free, 163 rural, 28, 42
Global Political Agreement, 43, self-published, 160
67, 200n20 shaped, 222
gruelling transition, 3 Shona culture, 222
haunting, 11 sovereign, 2
historiography, 161 state, 171
history, 160 stock market, 380
imports, 289 students, 228
independence, 33–34, 37, 120 studied, 16
independent, 31, 58, 127, 160, trade, 288
164, 248, 314, 315 trade policy, 376, 377
industries, 229, 320, 366 transform, 79, 149
is Open for Business' plan transition, 14, 117, 129, 135–152
signals, 276 transition politics, 139
isolation, 18 vests, 305
journalism, 219, 245, 247 vibrant, 122, 349
liberation struggle, 219, 343 violating, 192
media in, 117, 125, 209, 246, war, 248
264, 269 Zimbabwe African National Liberation
military, 49, 195 Army (ZANLA)
Mtoko District, 60 and ZPRA camp commanders, 170
open, 276 cadres, 163, 217, 336
Operation Restore Legacy, 4, 18, commander, 170, 173
331–354, 389 forces, 196
particular, 354 guerrillas, 164, 169
political culture in, 14, 26, 46, 120, High Command member Cde
129, 136 Arthur Magaya, 192
politics, 98 in Chimoio and Nyadzonia in
population, 29, 31, 40, 42, 367 Mozambique, 169
postcolonial, 53, 64, 66 recruitment, 163
postcolonial government, 118, victorious, 161, 163, 164
120, 123 war veteran, 168, 201
postcolonial states, 80 Zimbabwe African National Union
pre-independence, 227 (ZANU), 28, 59, 140, 301
president doubles, 341 and ZANLA, 33
problem, 52, 300 new, 35, 45
provinces, 155, 157, 165 politicians, 94
reconfigure, 52, 69 State, 59
relations, 158, 303, 316, 319, 324 Zimbabwe African National Union
restoring, 392 Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), 8
INDEX 455
-led government, 118, 321 monopoly of patriotism, 237

architecture, 240, 341 MP former, 201
Central Committee narrative depicts, 141
meeting, 10, 229 nationalism, 136, 143, 147, 149,
commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, 333 150, 164
conference, 189 new, 164, 211
congress, 96, 149, 187, 188, Parliamentary Caucus, 10
228, 333 party and government, 169, 306,
creators, 141, 197 333, 342
drive, 33, 63, 74, 237, 303 party processes and procedures, 10
elite, 35, 44, 45, 62, 92, 118, 152, philosophy, 195, 210
164, 185–191, 208, 300, 302, pitted, 105, 181
324, 395, 397 pitting, 9
faction, 9, 10, 12, 101, 152, 172, policies, 149, 306
182, 183, 186, 188–190, 254, policies and Mugabe, 306
258, 260–262, 264–266, 306, policy of reconciliation, 93
333, 390 politburo, 162, 186–188
fights, 77, 141, 150, 182, 230, 240, politician James Makamba, 344
254, 258, 264, 303, 390, 395 politics, 190, 257
former, 201 portraying, 260, 353
former party, 185 power, 228
founder principle, 8 president, 10, 96
glued, 185 processes, 203
government, 44, 62, 68, 149, 162, provinces, 188
163, 166, 174, 191, 228, 233, rallies, 229, 333, 352, 353
248, 302, 336 regime, 12, 19, 42, 64, 68, 77, 120,
government response, 149 124, 185, 191, 209, 210, 219,
government’s loss, 228 229, 257, 262, 302, 391, 393
handed, 152, 209, 219, 230 regime’s legitimacy, 68
hegemonic rule, 74 Robert Mugabe, 8, 43, 92, 120,
hegemony, 36–38, 187 146, 151, 152, 162, 169, 196,
in selected newspapers, 248, 253 228, 248, 299, 303, 304, 333,
insider, 234 339, 344, 361
liberators, 151 rule, 67, 148, 188, 194
litmus test, 189 ruling, 152, 170, 171, 182, 229,
Member of Parliament for Masvingo 238, 248, 257, 294, 324, 333,
Central, 185 334, 339, 354, 395
members, 101, 170, 185, 190, 342 securocrats system, 44, 195,
military electioneering team, 198 196, 200
military operation Fast Track Land self-praise narratives, 164
Reform Programme, 200 Shona dominated North
military politicking crusade, 183 Korean, 147
456 INDEX
Zimbabwe (cont.) Zimbabwe Arise, 103

strongholds, 93, 196, 197, 257 Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
succession matrix, 264 (ZBC), 191, 192, 334
support, 185, 188 Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
supporters, 257 Television (ZBC TV), 193
terms, 63, 64, 141, 151, 182, 187, Zimbabwe Coalition, 103
247, 257, 259, 265, 354 Zimbabwe Commander, 94n2
unseating, 64 Zimbabwe Congress of Students’
voting, 189, 195 Union (ZICOSU), 106, 107
war veteran campaign Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
machinery, 196n12 Unions (ZCTU), 2, 63, 64, 96,
youth rally, 202 97, 103, 105–107, 124,
youth wing’s derogative attacks, 228–231, 282
190, 238 membership, 96
ZANLA side, 164 Zimbabwe Defence Forces
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZDF), 9, 150, 192, 192n5,
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party 197, 334
ruling, 195, 342 commander, 192, 197
Zimbabwe African People’s Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
Revolutionary Army (ZEC), 99, 100, 110, 199
(ZIPRA), 335 chairperson, 110
Zimbabwe African People’s Union Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act,
(ZAPU), 5, 28, 31, 32, 36, 38, 99, 100, 199
45, 59, 79, 93–95, 96n6, 140, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply
143, 145, 146, 161–164, 169, Authority, 319
170, 181, 182, 196, 301, 302, Zimbabwe Federation of Trade
335, 391 Unions (ZFTU), 105–107
and ZANU politicians, 94 Zimbabwe Gender Commission, 315
and ZPRA leaders, 163, 164 Zimbabwe Grounds, 339, 340
Dumiso Dabengwa, 79, 162, 176 Zimbabwe Human Rights
heroes, 162 Commission, 315
major liberation parties, 163 Zimbabwe is Open for Business, 4, 17,
mass graves, 169 275, 276, 282, 287, 291, 292,
military wing, 93, 182 294, 307, 320
president, 162 Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP),
properties and allegations of planned 104, 107
military overthrow, 164 Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill,
split, 146 127, 128
strongholds, 196 Zimbabwe musician Mapfumo,
Zimbabwe Amendment, 124, 202 348, 350
Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), 46,
Commission (ZACC), 311, 315 193, 199
INDEX 457
Zimbabwe National Liberation crisis, 300

War Veterans Association diaspora labour migrants, 77
(ZNLWVA), 105, 107, dollar, 361
189, 201 economy, 19, 165, 359, 367
Zimbabwe National Students’ Union elections, 171
(ZINASU), 105, 228 experience, 53, 67
membership, 103 flag, 236, 238
Zimbabwe Newspapers Group football stadia, 342
(ZIMPAPERS), 191 government, 2, 37, 70,
Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), 163 101, 126, 165, 230, 257,
Zimbabwe People’s Army failed, 145 294, 369
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary government’s enemies, 70
Army (ZIPRA), 5, 28, 32, 93, history, 58, 136, 161, 164
147, 161, 182, 196, 196n2, identity, 57, 147
196n12, 335–336 mainstream, 126
forces, 196 media, 125, 129, 209,
former, 147 262, 268
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary media scene, 268
Army (ZPRA), 105, 189, 201 media scholars, 129
and ZANLA cadres, 163 media system, 129
and ZANLA’s recruitment, 163 media’s polarization, 129
Zimbabwe Prison Service Retired military, 47, 48
Major General Paradzai nationalism, 58, 61, 145
Zimondi, 198 nationality, 149
Zimbabwe Programme for Economic native, 227
Transformation (ZIMPREST), newspapers, 129, 253, 257, 264
276, 281 ordinary, 124, 236, 304, 398
Zimbabwe Republic Police, 176, 334 pastor, 236
Zimbabwe Review, 166, 167 people, 10, 45
Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe, politics; dissidence in, 16, 221–241
1–20, 332 Politics Shepherd Mpofu,
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) 221–241
formed, 100, 185, 391 polity, 226
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 196 President, 286
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe,
black, 149, 369 14, 76, 96n7, 109, 120, 162,
body politic, 139 181, 193, 199, 248, 299,
borders, 163 303, 334
citizens corruption, 74 problem, 78, 300, 304,
constitution, 9 307–324
context, 167, 233 prodemocracy website, 126
court, 156 schoolbooks, 160
458 INDEX
society, 16, 37, 52, 223, 354 Zimbabwean Civil Society,

values, 150, 197 122, 125–129
white, 149 Zimbabwean Literature, 67, 175
women, 332, 335 Zimbabwean National
women’s struggles, 336 Question, 51–80
Zimbabwean citizens Zimbabweanist literature, 208
defined, 51, 66 ZNA, Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, 199
disenchanted, 72 Zululand, 26

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AFRICAN HISTORIES

The History and

More information about this series at

The History and

African Histories and Modernities

Cover illustration: Getty images

Zimbabwe’s sole political leader since independence in 1980, Robert

remains an important and productive intellectual pursuit, even if it has

St Antony’s College, Oxford

1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert

Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture 23

2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and

3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components

4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in

5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and

Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133

6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition

7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe:

8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe,

Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205

9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third

10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in

11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End

Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation

12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted

13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299

14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in

15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359

Tinashe C. Chigwata is a senior researcher at the Dullah Omar Institute

(ed., 2001) and A Beautiful Strength: A Journal of Eighty Years of Women’s

Crimes Tribunal. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked with the UN in

Would We Be Without Them?” Rural Intellectuals in the State and NGOs

Stanley Tsarwe is a senior lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at

Fig. 6.1 A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition

Table 4.1 Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections

Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe:

It would seem that the age of revolutions is over, to be succeeded by the

© The Author(s) 2020 1

that led Thandika Mkandawire (2016) to write of ‘transition overload’.

government was in charge, as ‘Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition’. This was

The concept of entanglement, as articulated by Sarah Nuttall (2009:

• The invention of a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party-nation’ (see Kriger 2003);

• Naturalised and routinised rule by violence and coercion;

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it, in

Blaming and railing against imperialism became a key trope of

he meditated on questions of liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe. But

I refuse to accept that we cannot do better than we have so far done, or to

Mugabeism’s mantra of ‘I died for you’ (by ‘right of liberating you’),

The November 2017 Military Coup and the Rise

In an ironic political twist, the veteran leader of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe,

Brian Raftopolous (2019) summarised the three-pronged strategy that

The Mnangagwa Regime: Second Republic or

following an increase in the price of petrol. The health sector is character-

change. Chapter 2 is by Rudo B. Gaidzanwa—a leading Zimbabwean

ZANU–PF. Three national dailies with different owners, The Herald,

1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert

Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture 23

2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and

3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components

4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in

5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and

Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133

6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition

7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe:

8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe,

Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205

9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third

10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in

11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End

Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation

12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted

13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299

14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in

15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359