Design For Safety

7
Design for safety

Margareta Lützhöft and Viet Dung Vu
Introduction
Design plays an important role in the maritime industry and is vital to the
construction of ships, maritime equipment, management systems, as well as rules
and regulations. Back in the great days of sail, vessels were designed and built
on the basis of practical experience; ship construction was predominantly a skill.
The advance of science and technology changed ship design into a complicated
combination of art and science, delivering a dramatic increase in the size, speed
and technical complexity of ships.
Throughout the history of shipbuilding, naval architects have looked at ships
mainly from technical and economical points of view. Generations of ship designers
have done a great job in making seagoing vessels more seaworthy, faster and with
an increased transport capacity and lower fuel consumption. Great effort has also
been made in improving maritime safety. Seafarers are now assisted by highly
advanced automated systems and sensors, which logically should allow for safer
shipboard operations and navigation. However, the high numbers of accidents
and casualties at sea, with 3,296 cases in 2016 alone (European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA), 2016), indicate a different picture.
Reports suggest that human errors are blamed for most maritime accidents,
which raises the question: why do humans still make errors despite countless
improvements in design and technology to assist them?
The design of technology influences the way people work and can have a
big impact on how people perform. There are many cases where design issues
actually bring negative effects to marine operations, as seen in the grounding of
the CFL Performer (2008) and the Ovit (2013) as well as many other accidents.
In the case of the CFL Performer, the complexity of the operation of the ECDIS
(Electronic Chart Display and Information System) with regard to the number of
user settings required led to the mistake of the officer in not setting up a watch
vector. Consequently, although the safety contour was set at 30m, its associated
alarm did not activate when the vessel crossed into shallow water (Marine
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), 2008). Similarly, the MAIB also found
‘several of the features of the … ECDIS on board Ovit were … difficult to use’,
Design for safety 107
Most
effective
Design the problem out
Reduce risks by substituting less

hazardous methods
Guard/barrier against
the problem
Provide warning
systems
Administrative
controls
PPE
Least
effective
Figure 7.1 Hierarchy of HF issues control measures
(Note: PPE = Personal Protective Equipment)
which rendered the system ineffective and contributed to the grounding (MAIB,
2014). These accidents raise awareness on the issues in the interaction between
individuals, technology, systems and organizations in maritime systems, which
are also referred to as Human Factors (HF) issues.
Following the hierarchy of hazard controls, HF issues can be addressed using
the control measures shown in Figure 7.1.
Warning the operators of the issues in the systems is required under the
provision of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code but is the least
effective control measure on the scale. The issues remain in the system, and,
due to the mental and physical demands of their work, crew members cannot be
continually aware of the existence of a problem.
Training programmes such as Bridge Resource Management (BRM), ECDIS
and type-specific training courses aim to implement best practice among crew
members. However, similar to warning the crew of the problems, training does
not completely eliminate the problems as we are merely adding to the workload
of the crew.
A more effective solution would be installing barriers to isolate the hazards.
With this approach, the crew are protected from being accidentally exposed to
hazards. However, these barriers can be bypassed, removed or subject to failures.
108 Margareta Lützhöft and Viet Dung Vu
The ultimate control measure is eliminating or removing the risk. Designing
systems without HF issues is not only the most effective risk control measure but
also required by maritime rules and regulation, as seen in the SOLAS (Safety
Of Life At Sea) regulation V/15 regarding the design of ship bridges, bridge
equipment and procedures:
All decisions which are made for the purpose of applying the requirements
of regulations 19, 22, 24, 25, 27 and 28 and which affect bridge design, the
design and arrangement of navigational systems and equipment on the bridge
and bridge procedures shall be taken with the aim of:
1.1 facilitating the tasks to be performed by the bridge team and the pilot in
making full appraisal of the situation and in navigating the ship safely
under all operational conditions;
1.2 promoting effective and safe bridge resource management;
1.3 enabling the bridge team and the pilot to have convenient and continuous
access to essential information which is presented in a clear and
unambiguous manner, using standardized symbols and coding systems
for controls and displays;
1.4 indicating the operational status of automated functions and integrated
components, systems and/or sub-systems;
1.5 allowing for expeditious, continuous and effective information
processing and decision-making by the bridge team and the pilot;
1.6 preventing or minimizing excessive or unnecessary work and any
conditions or distractions on the bridge which may cause fatigue or
interfere with the vigilance of the bridge team and the pilot; and
1.7 minimizing the risk of human error and detecting such error if it occurs,
through monitoring and alarm systems, in time for the bridge team and
the pilot to take appropriate action.
The influence of HF design on safety has been acknowledged (Earthy &

Sherwood Jones, 2011), and relevant parties have started taking steps in developing
a new approach to design systems free from the HF issue, or in simpler words,
to ‘design the problem out’. We acknowledge that the SOLAs regulation (V/15)
is difficult to quantify and design for in the traditional engineering fashion. This
chapter will discuss the importance of design in relation to maritime safety and
explore methods that can be used to help achieve safer life and work at sea through
improved designs and design processes.
Background
Design is everywhere. Take a look around you: the outfit you are wearing is designed,
the pen you write with every day is designed, the computer software you use daily
is designed, this book chapter was also designed; design is everywhere. This
phenomenon explains why there are countless definitions among both the research
and design communities and why it is so hard to clearly define what ‘design’ is.
Ralph and Wand (2009, p. 6) introduce a formal definition of design as ‘a
specification of an object, manifested by an agent, intended to accomplish goals,
in a particular environment, using a set of primitive components, satisfying a
set of requirements, subject to constraints’. This definition is neutral, and when
applied to the ship design context, we can establish the appropriate understanding
of its particular process.
Within the maritime domain, the design objects are variable. They can be
the ships, shipboard equipment or port facilities; they can also be management
systems, regulations, rules, guidelines and procedures. Let us take a cargo ship
as an example. A modern ship is an extremely sophisticated piece of engineering,
due to both its size and functional complexity. Typically, a ship consists of
several compartments, the largest of which are the cargo holds. Holds can have
different forms, built and coated with various materials and equipped with
several devices and sensors depending on the type of cargo the ship carries. The
machinery space of the ship is the location of the main and auxiliary engines,
generators, pumps, steering gears and other mechanical equipment. The crew
inhabit the accommodation area, and the navigation bridge is located on top of
the superstructure. Ships are built at the shipyards, and because of their size and
technical difficulty, they have to be carefully designed before the building starts –
a work which takes months or even years to complete.
The design of a ship is her specification, created by naval architects in
the form of technical drawings. These drawings are the model of the ship,
including her exterior as well as interior structure together with locations and
details of compartments and equipment. Using Ralph and Wand (2009) as
a guide, such specifications must ensure that the future ship can safely and
economically transport cargo (goals) under the specific maintenance state
and the conditions of the trading area (environment). At the same time, the
naval architects must also ensure their design can satisfy the ship owner’s
requirements such as the type of cargo, cargo capacity, desired speed or area
of operation while complying with relevant rules and regulations (constraints),
e.g. for environment and safety.
The shipyard carries out the construction of the ship based on the design, and the
design will remain the guiding star throughout the process of building. Should the
design be modified, so is the future ship. This principle applies to all design objects,
whether it is a ship, a radar system, a training programme or a set of regulations.
The specification should determine the characteristics of the design object. Thus,
a good design will result in a product which smoothly helps us perform our duties
while a bad design will make work harder to perform efficiently. However, even if
your equipment is designed well, the installation onboard can have an influence.
Outfitting and installation is done by subcontractors working to relatively general
requirements. They have to make on the spot ‘design’ decisions which can depend
on something as mundane as the length of cable they brought on board. Thus,
the influence on ergonomics of arrangements should not be underestimated. This
chapter will focus mainly on the design of the hardware in shipping – ships and
maritime technologies.
Design can enhance safety
This section begins with a discussion of the impact of design on safety and
follows with the introduction of factors to consider promoting safety by design
and examples of their application in the industry.
The impact of design on safety

Safety should be one of the primary concerns of the maritime community, due to the
hazardous and unpredictable nature of the maritime working environment. We can
assume that this is a concern for seafarers, but it is not clear that it is so for owners
– unless we also include the ship and cargo. Through the years, non-governmental
organizations and state authorities have made efforts to improve safety in the
industry. The development of science has made technology a key instrument in
making the sea a safer place. Despite the fact that all technology designs are safety-
prioritized and many designs are even created with the sole purpose of improving
safety, accidents still happen. The most common explanation for accidents and
casualties at sea is human error. Setting aside factors beyond human control, several
researchers have suggested that human error is the most contributing factor in
maritime accidents (Dhillon, 2007; Macrae, 2009; Rothblum, 2000). As a result,
safety would be significantly improved if human erroneous action could be avoided.
The maritime system is a people system. People interact with technology, the
environment and organizational factors (Grech, Horberry, & Koester, 2008; Rothblum,
2000). Safety is decided by the way humans interact with other system components
and, most of the time, this has been predetermined in designs. The human as a living
component is expected to provide necessary adaptation and interact with other
components in the requested manner. Traditionally, this has been facilitated through
training, familiarization and following procedures. The marine radar is one example.
It was designed to assist human vision in poor visibility and, ultimately, improve
safety at sea. The seafarers are trained to operate marine radar and must follow
proper practice when working with them. When the human fails to comply with the
procedure and carries out erroneous actions, the faulty interaction breaks the link
between elements and the cooperation breaks down. This is a common scenario of
accidents in the maritime domain, and whenever this happens, the human is blamed.
Demonstration of such deviation from standard practice can be observed in the
case of the Seastreak Wall Street allision. On 9 January 2013, while approaching
berth at lower Manhattan, New York, the high-speed ferry Seastreak Wall Street
struck a pier. The investigation found that the captain had forgotten to return the
propulsion system to Combinator mode after switching to Backup mode earlier in
the voyage. Consequently, when the captain moved the engine order levers astern
to reduce speed, his action actually resulted in forward acceleration. This allision
is a typical example of human erroneous action. The captain should have been
aware of the active propulsion control mode. He should have carried out the correct
action, which would be slowing down the ship instead of accelerating. His actions
resulted in injuries to 80 people on board and damage to both the ship and the pier.
However, the investigation did not end there and the mistakes of the captain
revealed much more complicated issues in the man–machine cooperation on
board the Seastreak Wall Street. The report also points out that the propulsion
system onboard the ship used poorly designed visual and audible cues and
failed to provide the captain with critical information about mode and control
transfer status. Such faulty design can lead to mistakes in operator performance,
especially in intense traffic conditions as in this case (National Transportation
Safety Board, 2014).
All human beings have capabilities and limits. For instance: humans are not
very good at multi-tasking. The ability to stay focused is largely affected by the
surrounding environment, and our physique determines reach, strength, agility and
resistance to fatigue. Time and training can help improve skills and competencies,
but only to a certain level and there will always be limits to our physical, sensory
and mental abilities.
Many maritime technologies designs overlook this matter because they are
designed by people with a purely technical mindset who were trained to deal with
problems from technical perspectives. Consequently, many designs are logically
functional but lack usability. The operators are left struggling to fill the gap
between their duties’ requirements and the predetermined interactions (Lützhöft,
2004). Occasionally, this additional work exceeds human abilities and the human
component fails, leaving the system exposed to hazards. The underlying cause,
however, is not human error but rather the designs which are incompatible with
human capabilities, leading to a system failure.
In fact, design aspects can have a significant impact on fatalities at sea. The main
contributors are well known in shipping: slips/trips/falls, mooring and enclosed
spaces. A sample of 66 deaths in British shipping 2003–12 (Roberts, Nielsen,
Kotłowski, & Jaremin, 2014) was analysed from an ergonomics perspective and
found that 64 per cent of the cases (42 persons) could have been mitigated by
design (Sherwood Jones, 2016).
To sum up, in order to maintain safety, minimize environmental impact and
achieve expected performance it is vital to maintain proper interaction between
the human and other components of maritime systems. A faulty design can make
such interaction complicated and occasionally impossible for the human to
uphold proper interaction, resulting in human errors. Thus, it is faulty design,
not ‘human error’, that is the primary, or latent, reason behind accidents in the
maritime industry.
Human factors in design

As discussed in the previous section, bad design may increase the risk of accidents.
This fact was strongly emphasized by Miller (2000, p. 7):
You cannot overcome human errors induced by poor Design of the workplace
with more training, more Manuals or written procedures, exhortations to
work more safely, or threats of punitive actions for job accidents.
Hence, the best safety solution lies with the design itself, so the underlying
question is: how should the ship and shipboard equipment be designed to
improve safety?
As the human is the only living, adapting component in a ship system, it is
important that human–system issues are carefully considered by designers to
produce a design which can accommodate the needs, capabilities and limitations
of humans. The ‘scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of
interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession
that applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to design in order to
optimize human well-being and overall system performance’ is defined as ‘human
factors’ or ‘ergonomics’ (International Ergonomics Association, 2012). A design
taking into account human factors will facilitate the interaction between humans
and other system components, significantly reduce the probability of erroneous
actions, and thus improve safety (Abeysiriwardhane, Lützhöft, & Enshaei, 2014).
Within the specific scope of the maritime industry, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) adopted the term ‘human element’ to describe the complex
multi-dimensional issue that ‘involves the entire spectrum of human activities
performed by ship’s crews, shore-based management, regulatory bodies,
recognized organization, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant parties’
(International Maritime Organization [IMO], 2003, p. 3).
Despite the usage of different wording, all three terms – ergonomics, human
factors and human element – mean the same approach in designing with due
consideration to human needs and abilities to improve effectiveness and efficiency
and improve overall system performance. For this reason, these three terms will
be used interchangeably.
There are many methods of addressing the human element in the maritime
domain. Within this chapter, we will use the framework of addressing the human
element, which was introduced by Earthy, Sherwood Jones, and Squire (2016)
in the Human Element Alert! Project bulletin issues 11 and 40: see Figure 7.2.
Following the framework, the human element can be addressed through human
resources, social and organizational and human factors considerations. The first
two groups can and should be addressed at management and operational levels
while human factors considerations can generally be addressed in system/vessel
design phase. These considerations are connected; the more effort put into the
design phase, the less should be needed in operations.
The framework divides human factors into nine aspects: Habitability,
Maintainability, Security, Occupational Health and Safety, Manoeuvrability,
Controllability, Survivability, System safety, and Workability. Each of these aspects
will be explained below with reference to the introduction by Myles (2015).
Habitability
Habitability represents the quality of a vessel that allows people to live and work
in a safe and productive manner. On board ships, habitability is expressed by the
acceptability in terms of whole-body vibration, noise, indoor climate, lighting,
Addressing the human element
Human resources Social & organisational Human factors considerations

considerations considerations
Achieved through Human Factors Engineering (HFE)
Recruitment Organisational Habitability Maintainability Security Occupational Health

· Crew nationality Confguration · Shipboard maintenance policy · Company/ship physical, docu- and Safety
· Language onboard · International conventions and · Need for privacy · Through-life support mentary and cyber security policies · Company/ship occupational health
· Selection criteria regulations · Bathroom facilities · Onboard expertise · Human threat landscape (error, and safety policies
· Physical characteristics for the · Industry best practice · Messing arrangements · Accessibility misuse and abuse) · Health and well-being
tasks to be done · Company structure · Facilities for personal recreation · Provision and location of tools · Relationship between security · Personal health
· Terms and conditions of service · Roles and responsibilities and study · Location of heavy spare parts and safety · Health awareness – mental
· Appropriate competencies · Company standing orders · Communications connectivity · Bench space · Updating of security knowledge and physical
· Appropriate experience · Organizational culture · Need for natural light · Removal routes · Seafarer role in protective measures · Short/long term hazards to health
· Disciplinary and complaints process · Noise protected communications · Safe working practices
· Leave and travel arrangements · Communication and connectivity · Furnishing, interior design · Policy for onboard spares and knowledge · Tripping/falling/bumping/crashing
· Medical screening · Job design and decoration · Storage of spare parts and supplies · Awareness of, and response hazards
· Career development · Cleanability · Handling all heavy parts to, threat · Provision, maintenance, access
· Surface coverings · Disposal of parts and equipment · Team cohesion and use of PPE
· Management of security risks · Accident recording, reporting,
investigation and feedback
Manning Social environment Manoeuvrability
· Minimum safe manning · Intended role · Potential weather conditions
compliance · Security as practised · Communications Controllability Survivability System safety
· Tasks, duties and responsibilities · Safety as practised · Minimum/maximum/manoeuvr- · Control room, workstation, · Availability of manpower · Hazards to/from crew
· Numbers, grades and roles · Trust ing speed display screen layout · Emergency response systems · Human element in analysis of risks
· Watchkeeping patterns · Ethos, core values, pride, · Propulsion/manoeuvring systems · Computer dialogue design and procedures · Human element in treatment of risks
· Hours of work and rest allegiance · Controls and switches · Ability to respond
· Fatigue management · Individual habits and personality · Critical system redundancy · System integration · Ability to monitor
· Retention measures · Leadership styles · Available harbour services · Communications systems and equipment · Ability to learn
· Continuity at handover · Health and well-being · Through-life costs · Alarm philosophy and · Lifesaving appliances · Ability to anticipate
· Succession planning awareness – mental and physical · Protection of the environment management · Personal survival and medical kits · Business imperative
· Promotion paths · Risk awareness · Fuel economy · Direct and peripheral vision · Search and rescue · Potential for human and
· Communication/working language · Daytime/nighttime vision communications organizational error
· Team dynamics · Dazzle · Escape and evacuation routes · Potential for environmental
· Crisis management plans damage and pollution
· Glare · Training and familiarization
Education & Training Ways of working Workability
· Required knowledge, skills and abilities · Environmental/capability stressors · The users
· STCW competencies · Impact of fatigue/stress · Tasks
· Degree of automation · Fitness full task
· In-house/onboard training facilities · Policies, processes and procedures · Equipment Human element considerations will raise human To download this centrespread together
· Management/leadership training · Guidelines and practices · Accessibility element issues which if not addressed can become with associated centrespreads, go to:
system hazards. www.he-alert.org/docs/published/he01355
· Technical training · Working hours · Communications or scan the QR code:
In ship design and operation this list of Human Element
· Safety and security training · Methods of communication · Signage considerations should be examined for issues.
· Induction · Information sharing · Protective equipment
· Onboard familiarisation · Recording, reporting and feedback · Size, shape and gender
· Safety drills procedures · Strength and stamina should be assessed and addressed as appropriate.
· Onboard continuation training · Easy to understand the operating · Posture
· Distance learning instructions and procedures
· CPD
Figure 7.2 Addressing the human element

and physical and spatial characteristics, according to prevailing research and
standards (American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), 2016), the most notable of which
is the Maritime Labour Convention (International Labour Organization, 2006).
The design of the vessel must be able to provide comfortable, clean (cleanable)
and convivial accommodation, washing and toilet facilities, mess rooms, group
meeting and exercise areas and recreational spaces with due consideration to the
crew’s variation in anthropometric characteristics, genders and culture diversity
(Alert! Project, 2006).
Poor lighting, whether too bright or too dim, can have an adverse effect on human
performance and physiological as well as psychological well-being. Similarly,
whole-body vibration can lead to discomfort, degraded performance, and in some
cases can even lead to chronic health problems such as back pain, musculoskeletal
disorders and temporary physiological changes (Grech et al., 2008).
Inappropriate levels of noise can decrease vigilance during watchkeeping
duties, affect sleep and rest quality and consequently lead to fatigue and degraded
performance. Noise and vibration require special attention since routine shipboard
operations involve working around noisy machinery, and therefore it is essential
that measures are taken to minimize the effects of noise, such as insulation, noise
absorbent flooring, large diameter propeller, shock absorbers engine and rubber
suspension exhaust system (Alert! Project, 2014).
Furthermore, the design of working and accommodation areas must also
consider the impact of climatic conditions on human performance and health,
particularly the temperature, humidity and the quality and circulation of air. The
purpose is to provide an environment which is suitable to promote optimal task
performance and crew physiological well-being.
Maintainability
From the engineering point of view, maintainability is defined to be the probability
that a failed component or system will be restored to the condition of operational
effectiveness within a period of time when maintenance is performed following
prescribed procedures (Ebeling, 2004; Smith, 2011). Thus, maintenance is
essential for the safe and efficient operation of all systems.
From the operators’ perspective, however, maintenance is a complex task often
involving the removal and replacement of several components, which requires high
vigilance and skills and is commonly performed in difficult working conditions
under time pressure. As a result, maintenance work is especially vulnerable to
error (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).
Design plays an important role in deciding the outcome of maintenance tasks.
Bad ergonomic features such as lack of access, restricted space to manoeuvre,
or components that can be incorrectly fitted will hinder the ability to perform
effective maintenance duties and under certain conditions can even trigger critical
events, as seen in the accident that led to the death of a crew member while
carrying out routine lifeboat maintenance onboard the passenger ship Volendam
in Lyttelton, New Zealand (Transport Accident Investigation Commission, 2011).
To promote the conduct of maintenance duties in safe and effective manners,
it is essential that the design of the ship and shipboard equipment provide design
solutions to allow for operational maintenance tasks to be rapid, safe and effective.
Such consideration should include habitability factors as well as the nature of
the tasks, equipment access and the requirements and capabilities of the crew
members performing the tasks.
Manoeuvrability
Statistics of accident data suggest that most collision and grounding accidents
originate from actions performed on the navigation bridge (ABS, 2006). The
success of collision avoidance and safe navigation of ships largely depends on the
safe handling of ships, which requires the effective interaction between the human
operators – the seafarers – and the manoeuvring characteristics of the ship. While
every ship regardless of her manoeuvrability can be handled, some ships with
poor manoeuvrability can be very difficult to handle under certain circumstances
such as high traffic density or restricted area to manoeuvre and can pose a threat
to navigation safety.
Therefore, for the safety of ships, people onboard and the marine environment,
vessels must be designed and constructed in a way to have the most appropriate
manoeuvring capabilities consistent with the intended role, manning and operating
pattern of the ship, taking into account propulsion and manoeuvring configuration,
communication, critical system redundancy, weather conditions and harbour
services, with the aims of cost efficiency, fuel economy and environmental
protection (Alert! Project, 2016).
Controllability
A consideration of the integration of a working system which takes into account
human capabilities and limitations as well as technologies can help achieve efficient
control of systems and ship. This includes knowledge of human physiology and
psychology but also design spanning from layout to dialogue design levels. The
following points are included in controllability:
• Control room, workstation, display screen layout

• Computer dialogue design
• Controls and switches
• System integration
• Communications
• Alarm philosophy and management
• Direct and peripheral vision, daytime/night-time vision, dazzle, reflection
and glare.
The issue of design for controllability has become more important because
of increased complexity of marine equipment, particularly with the application
of automation and computer-based systems. Resources for achieving this are
mainly found in the ISO 9241-series of standards on the ergonomics of human–
system interaction and in guidelines from classification societies, for example, the
ABS (Australian Bureau of Shipping) 86 Guidance Notes on the applications of
ergonomics to marine systems.
Workability
Workability represents the capacity of the vessel and her equipment suitable for
the intended work situation. Due consideration should be given to the users, tasks,
equipment, materials and procedures and the physical and social aspects of the
working environment (Lloyd’s Register, 2008), including:
• The users, their tasks and their fitness for task

• Equipment and accessibility
• Communications and signage
• Protective equipment
• Size, shape and gender, strength and stamina, and posture.
In order to make something for someone, you need to know who they are and
what they are trying to do. In one Japanese management theory, this is addressed by
‘going to the gemba’. This means finding out what is going on by going ‘to the floor’.
Consult users about their jobs, find out about their capabilities, and let them show
you how they work. Do not ask them what they want to have; users are not designers
– it is their professional skills we want to support, not their ship design skills.
Security
This consideration has evolved from mainly physical security as addressed by the
ISM and ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Security) codes to the cyber
landscape. Areas include the following (Alert! Project, 2016).
• Company/ship physical, documentary and cyber security policies

• Human threat landscape (error, misuse and abuse)
• Relationship between security and safety
• Updating of security knowledge
• Seafarer role in protective measures
• Training for confidence and knowledge
• Awareness of, and response to, threat
• Team cohesion
• Management of security risks.
A number of resources are available, mainly in the form of training, awareness

and policy. The central aim is naturally to protect the seafarer and the ship, but
also the business and the environment. Not many of these issues are addressed in
design, but we would suggest that seafarers can be protected to some degree by
physical design and, not least, by having a plan for addressing cyber security in
the design phase.
Survivability
Survivability is not just about the adequacy of firefighting, damage control,
lifesaving and security facilities; it is also about having the correct resources,
training and procedures in place to ensure the safety of the ship and to protect the
health, safety and well-being of its seafarers (Alert! Project, 2015a). Survivability
includes:
• Availability of manpower
• Emergency response systems and procedures
• Ship layout and equipment fit
• Firefighting and damage control systems and equipment
• Lifesaving appliances
• Personal survival and medical kits
• Search and rescue communications
• Escape and evacuation routes
• Crisis management plans.
This area is critical, and one where many unfortunate accidents happen to
crew trying to manage an emergency. An unacceptable number of fatalities
result from drills, especially with lifeboats and rescue boats. Between 1989 and
1999 lifeboats and their launching systems have cost the lives of 12 professional
seafarers or 16 per cent of the total lives lost on merchant ships. Additionally,
87 seafarers were injured (MAIB, 2001). A notable accident occurred in 2014
on board the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier Aquarosa while the ship was in the
Indian Ocean on her voyage from Singapore to Fremantle, Western Australia.
The ship’s freefall lifeboat was inadvertently released during a routine
inspection, causing serious injuries to the second engineer, who was the only
person in the lifeboat at the time. Subsequent investigation by the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found the design of the lifeboat’s on-load
release system to be a contributing factor to the accident (Australian Transport
Safety Bureau, 2015). In addition, statistics show lifesaving appliances to be
one of the ten most focused-on areas of safety recommendations issued by
maritime investigative bodies of EU States between 2011 and 2015 (EMSA,
2016), making survivability a crucial factor to consider in addressing the human
element in the maritime industry.
Occupational health and safety

Designers must take into account the effect of work, the working environment
and living conditions on the health, safety and well-being of the person. The
MLC (Maritime Labour Convention) emphasizes the rights of every seafarer to
a safe and secure workplace that complies with safety standards; to fair terms of
employment; to decent working and living conditions on board ship; and to health
protection, medical care, welfare measures and other forms of social protection.
The considerations include:
• Company/ship occupational health and safety policies

• Health and well-being
• Personal health
• Health awareness – mental and physical
• Short/long-term hazards to health
• Safe working practices
• Tripping/falling/bumping/crushing hazards
• Provision, maintenance, access, and use of personal protective equipment
(PPE)
• Accident recording, reporting, investigation and feedback.
Further support is available in the ILO (International Labour Organization)

Guidelines for implementing the occupational safety and health provisions of
MLC 2006 (Alert! Project, 2015b). Additionally, there are a number of ILO codes
on worker protection and health and an IMO guideline on an occupational health
and safety (OHS) programme.
System safety
This consideration is about the effect of people and their behaviour on the safety
of systems. It is the interface between risk management and human factors and
concerns the effect human behaviour may have on the safety of systems. It is
important to include a judgement of risk when planning the design and taking into
account hazards in underlying task descriptions and analyses. In this consideration,
it is prudent to perform human reliability analyses and to consider resilience of the
system. Resilience is briefly described as supporting safe operation as opposed to
minimizing risk, by ensuring that an organization can continue operating in the
face of threats. An organization’s resilience can be operationalized by auditing
and strengthening the ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate – which can
all be supported by good user-centred design.
• Hazards to/from crew

• Human element in analysis of risks
• Human element in treatment of risks
• Ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate
• Business imperative
• Potential for human and organizational error
• Potential for environmental damage and pollution
• Training and familiarization.
Although not all the human factors aspects in the framework are equally
applicable to design and sometimes overlap, their implementation will nevertheless
help create better workplaces with enhanced usability. The following section will
discuss notable success stories of ship design cases to explain further the positive
influence human factors inclusion may have.
Notable ship design cases

The framework of addressing the human element can be applied to all design
projects. The actual application, however, varies among different cases. This
section considers the implementation of human factors dimensions in three design
projects, namely the development of the Tamar-class lifeboat, operated by the
Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI); the Service Operations Vessel 9020,
designed by Damen Shipyards Group; and the Pure Car/Truck Carrier (PCTC)
Harvest Leader, designed by Andreas Shipping Ltd.
The Tamar lifeboat class

The Tamar lifeboat design (see Figure 7.3) is an early initiative to involve users
and design a vessel to their needs. The main motivations were championing
organizational support and a higher duty of care than the merchant sector. The
crew members are volunteers and therefore have greater protection under law,
and a safe and comfortable work environment is also needed in order to retain
manpower supply. Lifeboats are often called out in adverse weather conditions
and under time-critical circumstances. Furthermore, their size and shape
make them subject to severe effects of heavy pitching and rolling which can
significantly hinder the crew’s performance and bring risks and potential health
issues. Additionally, the crew consists of up to 90 per cent volunteers with little or
no maritime professional background. Therefore, to promote the success of search
and rescue operations as well as to protect the well-being of people on board, it is
required of the designers to ensure the technology on board is safe, effective and
intuitive for these ‘ordinary people’ to use (Chaplin & Nurser, 2007).
The decision was to bring the boats to the crew members by applying
ergonomics, and the process started with a risk assessment based on operational
feedback and a task hazard analysis (Chaplin & Nurser, 2007). It was found that
the primary concern in the lifeboat’s design was the potential of lumbar spinal
injury caused to the operator by the lifeboat’s motion under heavy sea conditions –
so the seat became a major focus. The design team employed computer-modelling
techniques to model boat and wave motion and the motion of the human lumbar
spine to identify different types of injury sustained on different sea states and
seat design. The results of this research led to new seat design for comfort, shock
absorption and to improve the ability to control the vessel.
Given the stationary position of the operators, the Tamar lifeboat is fitted with
an integrated electronic Systems and Information Management System (SIMS),
appropriately described as ‘Safety In My Seat’ by lifeboat crew. The functions
Figure 7.3 A Tamar-class lifeboat of the RNLI fleet
include: the navigation of the lifeboat, including direction finding, radar and
charting; radio communications and CCTV; and the mechanics of the lifeboat
including the engines, bilge and electrics (Royal National Lifeboat Institution,
2014). The integration of functions and data greatly reduce the need for the operator
to move around the boat at sea. In addition, this system allows for flexibility in task
sharing which makes it possible to have a crew of mixed experience and expertise.
RNLI staff and crew are involved in all stages during the development of the
Tamar class. During the operation of the vessel, crew feedback is continuously
collected to generate data for future improvements. A number of examples of how
human factors dimensions were implemented are shown in Table 7.1.
As said by Neil Chaplin, the RNLI’s principal naval architect: ‘Seven years
is indeed a long time to develop one boat; however, with the seats and SIMS we
now have components that can be applied to future lifeboat designs and perhaps
retrofitted to current ones to enhance the safety of our volunteer crews’ (Alert!
Project, 2006, p. 7). The RNLI Tamar boats are an example of augmenting human
capability with usable technology that combines with their values and training to
achieve the very best solution for people in danger.
Damen Service Operations Vessel 9020

The Damen Service Operations Vessel 9020 (see Figure 7.4) is an example of how
human element issues can be addressed in operational design. The ship was built
for the deployment and retention of offshore support and maintenance engineers.
This design used a new operational concept which needed iterative involvement
of stakeholders. The development of this vessel has been driven by functional
equipment, based on feedback from potential end-users. Human element issues
have been included in all levels of design, from hull form through the general
arrangement and the selection and design of systems, to detailed ergonomics. How
this operational design addresses human element issues is shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.1 Results of implementing human factors dimensions in the design of the Tamar
lifeboat class
Aspect Comment
Design process User and stakeholder involvement through iteration, from concept to
operation. With station trials across the country to take any ideas in for
the next Tamar (continual improvement).
Seakeeping The Tamar class is self-righting, returning to an upright position in the
ability event of capsize.
Workability SIMS supports task sharing among the crew and saves space by
replacing separate systems and equipment. Space layout includes PPE,
grab rails, slip-resistant coatings, signage, etc. Guard rails, two gate
sections on each side to allow different boat/pontoon height. Tamar
carries a daughter boat for accessing difficult areas. To deploy the
daughter boat there is a floodable recess which also allows casualties to
be easily handled on board.
Controllability The seats incorporate controls such as throttles, joystick and a trackball
to operate SIMS. Communication through headsets. If all back-ups
fail, the lifeboat can still be operated using conventional methods. Two
control stations are used for different phases of mission. At the upper
station there are two throttle controls to allow the helm to gain the best
view of the side in use.
Manoeuvrability The Tamar lifeboat is very agile and has a top speed of 25 knots. She
has twin engines and a bow thruster. Out of sea manoeuvrability is
improved by multiple launch and recovery options. Mast section on
hydraulics to allow easy and quick movement between stored and
active states.
Maintainability The Tamar’s propellers and rudders are protected by tunnels and the
keels are steel lined. Engine room floor layout allows complete access
to the whole engine for easy maintenance. Labelling and easy access to
all serviceable components and sampling points.
Habitability The lifeboat can carry 118 survivors standing. Special crew seats for
comfort, shock absorption and control. Layout optimized for safe and
efficient teamwork during rescue missions.
System safety Interface designed for situation awareness, shared task load, safety
through remote monitoring and control, redundancy and simplified
training. The coxswain has control, thus allowing to give control to
who needs it, so no mixed messages.
Occupational The shock-absorbing seats enhance crew comfort and safety. There
health and is belted seating for 10 survivors. Grab rails, layout, best possible
safety protective and survival equipment are provided in combination with
very high levels of training and drilling.
Security SIMS uses an Ethernet local area network architecture for fast and
reliable communication between workstations. If a single point failure
occurs, system data integrity is not affected.
Survivability Design loads are set to higher than expected use, and a safety factor is
used, meaning that even if the lifeboat is taken out beyond expected
performance it will withstand the loads. Secondary buoyance is
built into hull. Additionally, she carries a salvage pump. The control
system is made with rugged and salt water-resistant hardware and
has no moving parts, which makes it robust and shock-resistant. The
architecture is resilient as back-up systems reduce the risk of complete
system failure.
Table 7.2 Results of implementing human factors dimensions in the design of the Damen
vessel 9020
Aspect Comment
Design process User and stakeholder involvement, iteration.
Seakeeping ability The hull form is longer (90m) and shallower (4.6m) than a
comparable conventional PSV (Platform Supply Vessel). The
bow section has been lowered by 1.5m compared to conventional
platform supply vessels, which significantly reduces slamming in
heavy seas.
Workability New context of use for operation further offshore where crew
transfer within a day becomes impractical; voyages may last a
month. 80% weather operability in wave heights of up to 3m.
Power savings compared with conventional PSV. Interior zoned
to assist workflow and storage. Walking distances minimized.
Facility locations match activity sequences. User tasks considered
for logistical flows. Air-conditioned workshop facilities to store
sensitive parts and tools.
Controllability Single deckhouse for bridge and site management.
Manoeuvrability DP (dynamic positioning) available, but designed to be largely
used non-DP.
Maintainability Separation of clean and dirty areas.
Habitability Longer hull, shallower draught for more comfortable motion.
Worker accommodation midships to reduce pitch motion effects.
Single-occupancy cabins, fitness centre and internet/movie services.
Maximum use of natural light. Comfortable décor scheme.
Connectability Offices, conference room, recreation dayrooms, reception room,
hospital, drying room, all cabins provided with internet telephone
and satellite TV.
System safety For a high level of redundancy, alternative transfer methods are
included such as helicopter, crane or a Damen-designed rigid hull
inflatable boat (RIB).
Occupational Crew transfer hazards reduced by motion-compensated gangway
safety and health from a stable DP2 platform.
The PCTC Harvest Leader

Cargo ships account for the majority of the world fleet (Equasis, 2015). Therefore,
an attempt to implement human factors and engineering in the design of merchant
ships can have a powerful effect on the maritime industry. The PCTC vessel
Harvest Leader (see Figure 7.5) designed by Andreas Shipping Ltd for NYK Line
is an example of such effort (Bialystocki, 2016).
The process of designing the ship followed an unusual practice in the industry,
where crew feedback was gathered and subsequently analysed by the design
team alongside the owner’s designers, the managers and the shipyard, in order
to find a solution to apply on the design. Such practice resulted in various design
improvements on the ergonomic aspects of the vessel: see Table 7.3. Personal
communication with the project leader revealed that, although some of the
changes were made at the later stage, thus leading to some increase of cost, this
Figure 7.4 Damen Service Operations Vessel
Figure 7.5 The Harvest Leader off the coast of Point Lonsdale, Australia, (photograph
Lester Hunt, http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:1120219)
Table 7.3 Results of implementing human factors dimensions in the design of the PCTC
Harvest Leader
Aspect Comment
Design process User and stakeholder involvement through iteration. The
involvement of users was deemed unsuitable and insignificant
at the early design stages but was much more fruitful at the
subsequent detailed design stage.
Seakeeping Due to the commercial purpose of a merchant ship, the Harvest
ability Leader was designed and built to satisfy the seakeeping ability
requirements of the regulations.
Workability Vast improvements were implemented and eventually achieved
positive outcomes regarding workability. Alternation of cargo
hold fans location help preventing obstruction to visibility. The
bridge control console was separated into wing control console and
instruments console. Both were planned to facilitate ease of use and
intuitive operation. The systems were installed with the principle of
being as uncomplicated as possible, notably the removal of unused
equipment usually provided by the shipyard, the design of modules
of ‘plug and play’ type allows for easy and efficient maintenance.
Controllability Cameras were installed at critical locations. Additional telephones
and PA speakers were provided in working and accommodation areas
to improve internal communication. The integration of all alarms
from bridge systems into one Bridge Alarm Monitoring Systems and
the use of a user-friendly Integrated Monitoring, Alarm, and Control
Systems allows for easy monitoring and control of bridge, engine
and machinery systems. The equipment is standardized within the
owner’s fleet to support familiarization and adaptation.
Manoeuvrability The Harvest Leader was designed to achieve service speed of about
20.0 knots and equipped with bow and stern thrusters to improve
manoeuvrability.
Maintainability All machinery in the engine room was arranged with 360° access,
and less frequently attended spaces such as cargo hold ventilation
trunks were also provided with safe and comfortable means of
access to allow for easy maintenance. Workshops in the engine
room were designed and equipped with additional equipment
such as ultrasonic cleaner and lifting devices to further support
maintenance.
Habitability Five extra cabins were provided to accommodate irregular workers.
The illumination level was raised high above the flag requirements
for crew comfort, and in working areas it increases safety through
easier task performance. Moreover, several spaces without any
illumination level requirements were also specified by the owner’s
request such as 300 lux in the wheelhouse and engine control room,
200 lux in the engine room workshop. Additional noise reduction
measures were taken to maintain comfortable noise level on board.
A 5-blade propeller was installed to reduce the effect of propeller
on the vibration level. Crew’s living and common spaces were
enlarged to allow more comfortable habitation.
System safety Bridge and engine control systems are designed to improve
situation awareness, increase ease of use, and many preventative
measures were applied to prevent crew mistakes.
Aspect Comment
Occupational Working and exposed decks are painted with anti-slip coating to
safety and health avoid slipping. Kick plates are installed on each side of fixed ramps
to prevent fittings from rolling and falling. Illumination, noise and
vibration levels were controlled to maintain at high safety level as
required by latest IMO standards. The increase of manning level
helps maintain sufficient resting hours.
Survivability Several improvements were implemented which exceed the
minimum safety standards. Fire detectors were installed in all cabins
and fire hydrants with hoses were provided in the accommodation
area. The crew was provided with additional life jackets at the
muster stations to allow for immediate access in cases of emergency.
Oversize and childsize life-saving appliances were added.
was absorbed by savings in other parts of the build and subsequent expense,
especially maintenance cost. During the ship’s life cycle, crew feedback will
continuously be collected and taken into account when considering changes in
arrangements of equipment or implementation of new technologies.
How shall we design?

In the previous two sections, we discussed the influence of design on the safety
level of the whole system, the necessity of addressing the human element in
design, as well as certain cases of optimal design with due regard to human
factors. This section will summarize the most important aspects of a good design
process, which require serious consideration from ship designers and equipment
manufacturers, including human-centred design (HCD), regulations, standards
and guidelines, as well as challenges in the design process.
Human-centred design
As seen in the cases of the Tamar lifeboat, the Damen Service Operations Vessel
9020 (Walk2Work) wind farm support vessel and the PCTC Harvest Leader,
the designers applied input from users to implement human factors aspects in
the designs, which resulted in the improvement of effectiveness, efficiency,
satisfaction and overall safety. In such cases, the designers follow a process of
‘applying Human Factors and ergonomics knowledge and techniques to minimize
human error, enhance effectiveness and efficiency, improve human working
conditions, and counteract the possible adverse effects of use on the health, safety,
and performance of the mariner’, which is known as human-centred design.
The standard ISO 9241-210:2010 sets out the principles of HCD, which can be
briefly summarized as follows. The future or potential users are involved through the
design and development; the designers cooperate with the users to understand user
needs, the nature of the tasks and the product’s intended working environment. Such
data are combined with human factors and usability knowledge and techniques to
create highly usable systems, which can improve productivity, enhance user well-
being and reduce risk of harm (International Organization for Standardization, 2010).
As described in ISO 9241-210:2010, an HCD process consists of four activities:
• Understand and specify the context of use: Identify the users of the ship or
system under development and determine their characteristics, goals, and
tasks. Define the technical, organizational and physical environments in
which the ship or system in question will operate.
• Specify the user requirements: Identify user needs and specify resulting
functional and other requirements for the ship or system within the intended
context of use.
• Produce design solutions to meet user requirements: Apply user requirements
data and human factors considerations to produce design solutions and
implement in the design.
• Evaluate the design against the requirements: Appraise the design solutions
in order to select the most appropriate, identify defects and alter accordingly
to produce the most optimal design.
Since the standards are not prescriptive rules but rather principles to follow,
the actual activities and tasks, and the order of performance of these activities, as
chosen by designers adopting HCD approaches, may vary greatly due to users’
characteristics, intended operating environments, economic aspects and many
other factors. HCD activities should be done whenever applicable and changed
whenever necessary, e.g. one may evaluate a previous ship for better requirements
or revisit the context of use for more detail on a design solution that is not working
as well as it used to.
Standards, regulations and guidelines

The design and construction of ships and ship systems follow specific
requirements, criteria, standards, rules, regulations, codes and guidelines. In the
maritime industry, there are three primary sources from which those criteria can
be obtained and applied: classification society rules, regulatory requirements and
ship-owner requirements.
The first criterion to consider when starting a design project is the regulations
and standards applied to the project outcomes. Standards and regulations set out
the baseline for the minimum properties a designed object must possess to be able
to enter into use in the industry. Failing to comply with such standards will render
the project outcomes inadequate and jeopardize the whole design process.
Human factors consideration in the design of ships is officially required under the
provisions of standards, rules and conventions issued by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). The IMO regulates human factors consideration in ship design
through several assembly resolutions, resolutions and circulars from the maritime
safety committee and the sub-committee on navigation, communications, search
and rescue (NCSR), and the SOLAS Convention. The ILO Maritime Labour
Convention contains regulations addressing habitability and occupational health
and safety. The IEC and ISO are two international organizations that produce
international standards. IEC covers electrotechnology and related conformity
assessment and ISO covers almost all other fields and conformity assessment
with regard to vessel designs. Human factors dimensions are addressed in ISO/
IEC standards of two fields of activity under the International Classification for
Table 7.4 IMO publications relevant to HF in ship design

Assembly Resolutions (RES)
A.468(XII) Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships
A.601(15) Provision and Display of Manoeuvring Information on Board
Ships
A.708(17) Navigation Bridge Visibility and Functions
A.861(20) Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage Data Recorders

(VDRs)
A.947(23) Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for the
Organization
A.1021 (26) Code on Alerts and Indicators
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Resolutions
64(67) Adoption of new and amended performance standards
128(75) Performance Standards for a Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm
System (BNWAS)
137(76) Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability
190(79) Performance Standards for the Presentation of Navigation-
Related Information on Shipborne Navigational Displays
214(81) Adoption of Amendments to the Performance Standards
for Shipborne Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs) (Resolution
A.861(20)) and Performance Standards for Shipborne
Simplified Voyage Data Recorders (S-VDRs) (Resolution
MSC.163(78))
232(82) Adoption of the Revised Performance Standards for Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)
MSC Circulars
834 Guidelines for Engine-Room Layout, Design and Arrangement
982 Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge Equipment and
Layout
1002 Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for Fire
Safety
1091 Issues to be Considered When Introducing New Technology on
Board Ship
1512 Guideline on Software Quality Assurance and Human-Centred
Design for e-Navigation
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV) Circulars
SN.1/Circ.265 Guidelines on the Application of SOLAS Regulation V/15 to
INS, IBS and Bridge Design
Table 7.5 ISO documents relevant to HF in ship design
ISO Title of document
2631-1:1997 Mechanical vibration and shock – Evaluation of human exposure
to wholebody vibration – Part 1: General requirements
2923:1996 Acoustics – Measurement of noise on board vessels
3797:1976 Shipbuilding – Vertical steel ladders
5488:2015 Ships and marine technology – Accommodation ladders
5489:2008 Ships and marine technology – Embarkation ladders
20283-5:2016 Mechanical vibration – Measurement of vibration on ships –
Part 5: Guidelines for measurement, evaluation and reporting of
vibration with regard to habitability on passenger and merchant
ships
17631:2002 Ships and marine technology – Shipboard plans for fire
protection, life-saving appliances and means of escape
17894:2005 Ships and marine technology – Computer applications – General
principles for the development and use of programmable
electronic systems in marine applications
20283-2:2008 Mechanical vibration – Measurement of vibration on ships – Part
2: Measurement of structural vibration
20283-4:2012 Mechanical vibration – Measurement of vibration on ships –
Part 4: Measurement and evaluation of vibration of the ship
propulsion machinery
24409-1:2010 Ships and marine technology – Design, location and use of
shipboard safety signs, safety-related signs, safety notices and
safety markings – Part 1: Design principles
27991:2008 Ships and marine technology – Marine evacuation systems –
Means of communication
8468:2007 Ships and marine technology – Ship’s bridge layout and
associated equipment – Requirements and guidelines
2412:1982 Shipbuilding – Colours of indicator lights
9241-210:2010 Ergonomics of human–system interaction – Part 210: Human-
centred design for interactive systems
Standards (ICS), namely ICS.13 – Environment, Health Protection, Safety and

ICS.47 – Shipbuilding and Marine Structures. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 provide lists of
major publications from the IMO and ISO.
Alongside the above-mentioned organizations, classification societies provide
guidelines to assist ship designers with the ergonomic design of ships and marine
systems. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Lloyd’s Register (LR), Det
Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL), Bureau Veritas (BV) and the
ClassNK (NK) are classification societies which represent the majority of the ship
classification market. Each society develops their own guidelines addressing human
factors in ship design. Their main guidelines are listed in Figure 7.6 together with
the illustration of the involvement of different regulatory bodies in this issue.
Human factors consideration -
Regulation and Guidelines
Societies
ILO
ABS LR DNV-GL NK
MSC
2006
ABS Guidance The Human Element - DNV Rules for NK Guidelines for
Notes on the An introduction, The the Prevention of
Application of Human-Centered ships - Chapter Human Error
IMO
Ergonomics to Approach - A Best 12, Part 5, Aboard Ships
Marine Systems, Practice Guide for Comfort Class - through the
Assembly MSC ABS Guide for Ship Designers, The Tentative Rules Ergonomic Design
Ergonomic Human-Centered of Marine
Notations, ABS Approach - A Best Machinery
Guidance Notes Practice Guide for Systems
Assembly MSC MSC NCSR SOLAS on Ergonomic Equipment
Resolutions Resolutions Circulars Convention Design of Manufacturers, The
Navigation Human-Centered
Bridges, etc. Approach - Best
NCSR Regulation
Circulars V/15 Practice in Ship and
Equipment Design, LR
ISO / IEC Rules and Regulations
of Ships, etc.
ICS 13 -
Environment,
Health protection,
Safety
ICS 47 - Ship
building and
13.180 - 13.160 - 13.140 - Noise marine structures
Ergonomics Vibration and with respect to
shock with human beings
respect to 47.020 - Ship
ISO 9241-210:2010 - human beings building and
Ergonomics of marine structures
human-system in general
interaction - Part 210:
Human-centered
design for interactive
systems 47.020.80 - 47.020.90 -
Accommodation Marine
spaces ventilation, air
conditioning and
heating systems
Figure 7.6 Human factors consideration in ship design – regulations and guidelines
The role of classification societies is expecting significant changes with
the revolution in rule-making in the maritime industry by transforming
from prescriptive regulations towards goal-based standards (GBS). With the
introduction of GBS, the focus is shifted from the process to the achieved
outcomes, where the designers have settled goals but are free to elect whatever
measures they deem fit to achieve compliance. The structure for goal-based new
ship construction standards have explicit consideration of the human element, as
seen in the following extract from the resolution MSC.287(87) (IMO, 2010, p. 6):
Ship’s structures and fittings shall be designed and arranged using ergonomic
principles to ensure safety during operation, inspection and maintenance.
These considerations shall include, but not be limited to, stairs, vertical ladders,
ramps, walkways and standing platforms used for means of access, the work
environment, inspection and maintenance and the facilitation of operation.
The move towards goal-based standards has the advantage of being highly flexible
to accommodate not only human variability and adaptability but also the dynamics of
the marine system due to changing technology, operations and manning. However,
this novel approach also requires changes in the practice of many stakeholders in
the industry. Explicit activities are expected from classification societies throughout
the design, construction, survey and approval to demonstrate compliance (Earthy
& Sherwood Jones, 2006). Within the framework set at the IMO, it is the role of
classification societies to develop specific criteria to support the goals.
Challenges with human-centred design

It is undeniable that human-centred design helps create good products, but just
like with any other design approach, there are advantages and disadvantages. The
important thing is that the designers understand this and adapt in order to find the
most appropriate design practice.
Applying knowledge of human factors and ergonomics will improve usability,
reduce the likelihood of human errors and enhance system effectiveness and
efficiency. However, there are aspects of human-centred design which designers
must take into consideration. One drawback of HCD is the reallocation of time and
expense. The process of user data collection, subsequent analysis and producing
design solutions requires both specialist human and financial resources. It incurs
some short-term risk to project time and cost. However, this is more than repaid
in reduced long-term risks to safety, efficiency and training costs. This issue will
be further discussed in the section on the economic aspects of design.
An important aspect of HCD is the involvement of users in the design process.
Users may not be aware of their needs or make false assumptions of their actual
needs. Furthermore, acceding to users’ requests instead of finding out what they need
may result in overly complex designs. Users are not designers and their involvement
should reflect this distinction. A common mistake made by designers, when they do
involve end users, is to utilize users as co-designers. It is important to bear in mind
that ‘HCD does not necessarily imply that users perform research or design roles ...
but that they contribute to research or design processes, as experts on their own daily
lives and on their own experiences with products and services’ (Steen, 2008, p. 27).
The economic aspects of design

Another issue when it comes to the implementation of human factors considerations
is the monetary challenge. Since such design practice may require additional
expense in the early phases, it should be considered an investment, and just like
any investment, the managers always pay keen attention to economic justification.
However, it seems there is still a lack of awareness in the industry regarding the
economic benefits that optimal design may bring in the long run. This may be due
to a lack of routines and methods for performing cost and effect estimations of
ergonomics investments (Österman, 2009, 2012; Österman & Rose, 2015).
Costa and Lützhöft (2014) analysed and categorized the benefits of addressing
human factors in ship design and operation. Their study found that implementing
HF in the design stages can result in not only direct benefits for the seafarers but
also several benefits for the ship owners. Among them, the following economic
benefits can serve as a strong justification for the ship owners to invest in HF:
• Reduction of accidents leads to reduction of operational costs

• Less additional cost for adjustment or redesign since everything was done
correctly at the beginning
• Prevention of layday cost due to crew mistakes
• Less stressful working environment results in less sick leave
• Lower training costs if systems are more intuitive
• Lower costs for relocation of hardware if the system is built properly from
the start
• Better public image and reputation for the company, which can also lead to
economic benefits.
There is also an emphasis on the importance of early application of good

design practices. Yet, making such investing decisions can be problematic due
to the fragmented structure of the maritime industry, where one department pays
for the design and another reaps the benefits of less maintenance, less attrition,
safer and more efficient operations. Unfortunately, there are few examples of
cost-effectiveness calculations available for the shipping domain. However, we
can assume that if we wait until we are at operational and management levels to
address human factors issues we tend to increase redesign costs, training costs
and paperwork (e.g. ISM). An example from BMT regarding an oil production
company’s benefits from integrating human factors and engineering early into
design of offshore facilities identifies the following reductions (BMT, 2007):
• Capital expenditure 0.25–5 per cent

• Engineering hours 1–10 per cent
• Design rework 1–5 per cent
• Project duration up to 40 per cent less due to reduced rework and fewer
approval cycles
• Operation and maintenance 3–6 per cent per year.
Despite the current lack of a formal method for evaluating economic benefits
of design investment in the industry, it is suggested that optimal design can
improve user performance and well-being (Petersen, 2010) and ultimately lead
to improved safety.
If people consider the potential cost-reduction and cost-effectiveness behind
the safe operation of ships and shipboard equipment, safety can be perceived
as profit, as added value and as a corporate social responsibility which must be
considered when making investment decisions.
Human factors and design engineering

Through their active engagement in the design process, naval architects have a
direct influence on every aspect of ships’ designs. While their work is influenced
by rules and guidelines from regulatory bodies, it is the professional knowledge
and maritime HF skills of the designers that are essential for the design of ships
and marine systems with high usability. Unfortunately, designers are usually
biased towards the technical aspects and focus exclusively on the ship as a
physical artefact while ignoring work design and human–system integration. It is
necessary that maritime designers become more aware of this issue and employ
design approaches that can employ HF concepts to their full extent (Lützhöft,
Petersen, & Abeysiriwardhane, 2017). To achieve this, we first need to uncover
the reasons behind this phenomenon.
The engineering mindset

Efforts have been made to intervene early in the process, at ship design level
(Abeysiriwardhane et al., 2014; Abeysiriwardhane, Lützhöft, Petersen, & Enshaei,
2015), and at software/equipment level (Petersen, 2010, 2012). The former is a
summary of a project on increasing HF awareness among the community of naval
architects, and the latter is an account of an in-house project using HCD to design
and test a new generation of maritime electronics. Both used the ISO standard
as their starting point. One of the issues found in both studies is the differing
underlying philosophy, culture and mindset in human factors and engineering.
The lack of value assigned to human factors in the professional viewpoint held
by naval architects and maritime designers has its roots in the natural inclinations
of design engineering, the training and education systems, and design engineering
thinking (Lützhöft et al., 2017).
In his theory of multiple intelligences, instead of seeing intelligence as
dominated by a single general ability, Gardner (1998) differentiates intelligence
into eight different abilities. The archetypical design engineer is gifted with
four of these, namely: naturalistic intelligence, spatial intelligence, bodily
kinaesthetic intelligence and logical-mathematical intelligence. Naturalistic
intelligence represents the abilities to recognize and categorize natural objects;
spatial intelligence allows people to form and operate on mental images; bodily
kinaesthetic intelligence provides the capability to control body motion to handle
objects; and logical-mathematical intelligence allows the ability to confront and
assess objects and abstractions and understand their relations and underlying
principles (Gardner, 2006a, 2006b). In combination, these traits provide a person
with the necessary skills to design and construct objects, but also lead to the
design thinking that is based on numbers and logic. Thus, engineering is based on
applied mathematics and physics and their associated principles, which explains
why typical engineering education programmes often focus on technological
subjects rather than the issues of human–machine interaction (Lützhöft et al.,
2017). In the first study mentioned above, Abeysiriwardhane et al. (2014) study
undergraduate naval architecture students at the Australian Maritime College and
find the students lack awareness in maritime human factors issues. None of the
participating students was aware of HF rules and guidelines even though most of
them were familiar with marine regulations and classification societies.
Furthermore, the nature of design engineering thinking urges designers to
approach complex affairs by dividing them into semi-independent components
(Bucciarelli, 1994). The success of this strategy depends upon suppressing potential
issues through the avoidance of qualitative requirements and relying solely on
measurable physical criteria. Also, uncertainty is unavoidable during the process
of creating a new product, and designers have always faced the risk of uncertain
knowledge. Through the years, design engineers have developed strategies to tackle
uncertainty; they often rely on immediate data and employ heuristics rather than
comprehensive analysis to even out the lack of precise information (Lützhöft et al.,
2017). Together, these strategies make it problematic for designers to consider and
apply knowledge on the context of use and user characteristics in their designs.
To address the differing cultures of Human Factors and technical factors,
it is necessary to recalibrate the engineering mindset, which ought to balance
the requirement of technical functions and the needs and satisfaction of the end
users. This re-calibration has to be done in the training of future designers, by
integrating knowledge of human factors in the curriculum. However, it is clear
that one-sided change does not work. Thus, the human factors professional must
adapt the content and dissemination techniques to practice, and not preach. For
undergraduate education, it is recommended that the following key areas are
addressed in the syllabus (Abeysiriwardhane et al., 2014):
• Fundamental principles of HF and HCD

• Development of an understanding of the nature and application of these
principles
• Guidance on HF rules and regulations followed by the industry
• Designers’ responsibility to integrate HF and HCD into designs to avoid
hazards
• Appreciation of the HF and HCD in complex work systems
• Demonstration of the importance for safety and comfort for the life of the
end users
• How to become a usability expert in a working environment where other
employees are not aware or interested in HF/HCD.
Interestingly, when attempting to involve engineers in designing ships and ship

systems for seafarers, both authors of the two studies mentioned in the beginning
of this section come to the same conclusion – that practice bests theory. Instead
of the traditional teaching methods, it is better to expose students to the real
environment of the end users, and to provide them with first-hand experience on
the life and work on board ships. This new approach has been shown to develop the
awareness of maritime HF among students and improve the connection between
the future designers and the end users (Abeysiriwardhane, Lützhöft, Petersen, &
Enshaei, 2016).
Basically, if human factors knowledge and skills are to be accepted in technical
domains, they may have to be reframed to fit the ‘end user’ – couched in a
language that makes sense to technical users and presented in a manner which fits
the engineering mindset.
Ergonomics mindset at the organizational level

Achieving human factors awareness at an individual level is only the first step of the
‘Design for safety’ approach. To achieve safety through design at the industry level,
we need to rebalance the engineering mindset in every organization, and especially
for the design of ships and shipboard equipment, i.e. in ship design firms, shipyards,
and equipment manufacturers. The goal of this transition is to make system usability
and human factors a focus in each organization’s operational policies.
One useful instrument for this process is the Organizational Human-
Centredness Scale, introduced by Lloyd’s Register, which describes levels of
usability maturity (Table 7.6) – the extent to which an organization addresses
human-centred issues.
The descriptions of attributes at each maturity level explain why human-centred
methods developed for high-level organizations are not applicable for lower level
organizations; also, low-level organizations cannot immediately produce solutions
to achieve the highest level of maturity but rather must undertake a steady process
of transition through all levels.
The main usage of the scale is to evaluate and improve an organization’s
capability in addressing human factors and, in due course, improve the quality
of use of that organization’s products. However, besides the primary use in
assessment, the scale can also be used as a model for designing an organization’s
operations or to improve existing operational agendas. For the marine sector the
scale has been developed into the referenced LR Guides (Lloyd’s Register, 2007,
2014a, 2014b) which provide marine-specific capability levels for HCD process
improvement for operators, designers and manufacturers.
Table 7.6 Usability maturity levels and process attributes
Level Description of Levels Process Attributes
Level X Unrecognized No indicators
The need for a human-centred There is no concern with mixed level of
process is not recognized. user satisfaction. There are no positive
attributes at this level.
Level A Recognized A1 – Problem recognition attribute
The organisation recognizes Members of the organization are aware of
the need to improve the the problem with the quality of use of the
quality of use of its systems. systems produced.
A2 – Performed processes attribute
Process are performed to provide input to
make the system human-centred.
Level B Considered B1 – Quality in use awareness attribute
The organization engages in The staff involved in the development
training and awareness raising process are aware of quality of use as an
to make its staff aware that attribute of the system.
quality of use is important B2 – User focus attribute
and can be improved by The staff involved in the process relating to
taking account of end-user the user-facing element of the system take
requirements during the account of the fact that a human being will
development process. need to use it.
Level C Implemented C1 – User involvement attribute
Human-centred processes Information is collected from representative
are fully implemented and users using appropriate techniques
produce good results. throughout the system life cycle.
C2 – HF technology attribute
Human factors methods and techniques are
used in or by human-centred processes.
C3 – HF skills attribute
Human factors skills are used in human-
centred processes.
Level D Integrated D1 – Integration attribute
Human-centred processes Human-centred processes are integrated
are used in the improvement into the quality process and systems life
of work products from other cycle of the organization.
processes. D2 – Improvement attribute
Human-centred process are integrated with
other processes.
D3 – Iteration attribute
The development lifecycle is iterative.
Level E Institutionalized E1 – Human-centred leadership attribute
The quality in use of Human factors/people-centred approach
whole ranges of systems is influences the management of all systems
coordinated and managed for life cycle processes.
business benefit. The culture E2 – Organizational human-centeredness
of the organisation become attribute
benefits from being user Human factors/people-centred approach
and human centred. Human- influences the attitude of the whole
centred skills are regarded on organization.
a par with engineering skills.
This scale is just one of several methods to expand human factors considerations
at an organizational level; other methods such as the Corporate UX Maturity Scale
(Nielsen, 2006), where the level of commitments to user experience (UX) of an
organization is sorted in eight stages ranging from objecting to fully committed,
can also be considered. In practice, each organization should follow the most
appropriate approach, whilst bearing in mind the goal of usability and user needs.
Conclusions and recommendations

The properties of a product are defined by its design. The design of ships
and equipment will directly affect the outcomes of shipboard operations and
thus determine maritime safety. Within the scope of maritime shipping, the
characteristics of ships and shipboard equipment are determined by naval
architects and equipment manufacturers during the design process.
Investigation reports of maritime accidents indicate that the main reasons
behind the majority of accidents are inappropriate design factors resulting in poor
usability, impeding proper interactions between the human and other elements of
the maritime system as well as increasing the probability of human error. Such
faulty designs may be the result of a lack of proper understanding about the
capabilities and behaviours of the actual users among the naval architects and
equipment designers’ communities.
To improve safety, it is necessary to design ships and ship equipment with due
regard to human factors in order to match with users’ abilities and requirements.
This practice is, however, often neglected in the maritime industry. There is a need
for a systematic approach for dissemination of this issue to all stakeholders in the
industry as well as a request, and ideally a requirement, for all relevant parties
to take action to follow human factors design practice. In establishing such an
approach, the following factors have to be considered:
• Design solutions that consider the human element are developed by following
human-centred design approach to provide design solutions based on users’
needs in the intended context of use.
• Project managers, naval architects and equipment designers should take
account of the changes to resource and management requirements associated
with the introduction of human-centred design activities to a project.
• Equipment designers and naval architects need to follow required practices
prescribed in regulations and standards as well as refer to guidelines from
classification societies for recommended applications.
• Besides safety, human-centred design also provides an economic benefit. An
optimal design will increase effectiveness, efficiency, productivity and reduce
maintenance cost. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that higher
safety can also be perceived as monetary profit.
• Design principles need to be rebalanced between human and engineering
factors, with stronger consideration placed on the human element. This issue
needs to be addressed at the individual level through the incorporation of
HF knowledge in the training syllabus for future industry designers, and at
the organization level by enhancing the level of user-centredness among the
industry’s organizations.
With proper understanding of the importance of the design process to safety

and productivity, particularly as seen in recent design projects, we can expect a
transformation in the practice of ship and marine equipment design in the near
future, which will strengthen the contribution of design to safe and effective
operations in the maritime industry.
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7

Design for safety

Design the problem out

Reduce risks by substituting less

The influence of HF design on safety has been acknowledged (Earthy &

The impact of design on safety

Human factors in design

Human resources Social & organisational Human factors considerations

Recruitment Organisational Habitability Maintainability Security Occupational Health

Figure 7.2 Addressing the human element

• Control room, workstation, display screen layout

• The users, their tasks and their fitness for task

• Company/ship physical, documentary and cyber security policies

A number of resources are available, mainly in the form of training, awareness

Occupational health and safety

• Company/ship occupational health and safety policies

Further support is available in the ILO (International Labour Organization)

• Hazards to/from crew

Notable ship design cases

The Tamar lifeboat class

Figure 7.3 A Tamar-class lifeboat of the RNLI fleet

Damen Service Operations Vessel 9020

The PCTC Harvest Leader

Figure 7.4 Damen Service Operations Vessel

How shall we design?

Standards, regulations and guidelines

Table 7.4 IMO publications relevant to HF in ship design

A.861(20) Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage Data Recorders

Standards (ICS), namely ICS.13 – Environment, Health Protection, Safety and

Challenges with human-centred design

The economic aspects of design

• Reduction of accidents leads to reduction of operational costs

There is also an emphasis on the importance of early application of good

• Capital expenditure 0.25–5 per cent

Human factors and design engineering

The engineering mindset

• Fundamental principles of HF and HCD

Interestingly, when attempting to involve engineers in designing ships and ship

Ergonomics mindset at the organizational level

Conclusions and recommendations

With proper understanding of the importance of the design process to safety

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