Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Accounting, Organizations and Society

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/aos

Firm communication and investor response: A framework and

discussion integrating social media*
Elizabeth Blankespoor
Stanford University, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: I provide a general framework of firms’ financial communication process and investor response to in-
Received 20 March 2018 formation, moving from disclosure through dissemination to investor response and management
Accepted 26 March 2018 response. I then discuss the entrance of social media into firm communications, highlighting both classic
Available online 26 May 2018
and unique aspects of social media in the communication process. I place Cade (2018) in this literature
and discuss areas ripe for future research. Finally, I encourage researchers interested in social media to
JEL codes:
acknowledge and embrace the unique opportunities and challenges in this area.
D83
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
G14
G41
M41

Keywords:
Disclosure
Social media
Firm communication
Investor response

1. Introduction social media and on ways in which social media changes the core
interaction. Cade (2018) encompasses both of these approaches by
Firm disclosure is an important and growing area of research in using an experiment to examine public interactions of managers
accounting literature, with numerous studies examining how firms’ and investors on social media, and using newly observable mea-
financial communication choices affect investor response and sures of external validation to show that investor response varies
capital market outcomes.1 Recently, social media has transformed based on the credibility of statements. I discuss Cade (2018) in the
the scope of firm financial communications and created opportu- context of this literature, and I highlight areas ripe for future
nities for unprecedented interactions. As a result, experimental, research.
archival, and analytical research studies increasingly examine the
implications of social media platforms for firm communications. In 2. Components of financial communications
the next sections, I lay out a framework for firm communication
and investor response to communications. I then discuss what so- Capital markets researchers are interested in understanding
cial media could mean for each of these components, focusing on what and how information relevant for firm valuation is passed
ways in which fundamental relations are more easily studied with between firms and their investors, as well as factors that influence
the receipt and use of the information.2 This process can be sepa-
rated into four major components: (1) disclosure, (2) dissemina-
*
I received helpful comments from Ed deHaan, Brooke Elliott, Stephanie Grant, tion, (3) investor response, and (4) management response. See
Bob Libby (editor), Patrick Witz, and participants at the 2017 Accounting, Organi-
zations and Society Conference on New Corporate Disclosures and New Media. This
Fig. 1A for a visual representation.
research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public,
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
2
E-mail address: [email protected]. Although investors may be the primary audience for a financial communication,
1
I use “financial” or “firm” communications throughout the draft to refer to firm disclosure can reach a broad set of stakeholders: employees, customers, sup-
firms' communication of information relevant for firm valuation. This value- pliers, regulators, etc. For parsimony, I focus primarily in this discussion on the
relevant information could include both financial and non-financial information, disclosure choices available to management and investor response to these
but I use the term “financial” to highlight its relevance for financial valuation. disclosures.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2018.03.009
0361-3682/© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 E. Blankespoor / Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87 81

Fig. 1. A e framework of firm financial communication and investor response. B e social media (in red) in the framework of financial communication and investor response. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
82 E. Blankespoor / Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87

2.1. Disclosure 2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2011) and negative tone in a daily
Wall Street Journal column leads to lower stock returns the next day
Before information can be communicated, the firm determines (Tetlock, 2007). Similarly, investors respond to positive and nega-
the composition of the information package: (a) what, (b) how and tive affect in management's voices during conference calls (Mayew
(c) who. & Venkatachalam, 2012), and the vividness of language can affect
investor judgment (Hales, Kuang, & Venkataraman, 2011). Even the
(a) “What,” or information selection: The selection of data to be structure of disclosure matters, with investors responding more
included is the first step of communicating information. For positively (negatively) when positive (negative) tone is more
example, in an earnings announcement, data can include dispersed through the conference call (Allee & DeAngelis, 2015).
disclosures such as current earnings, sales, impairments, Firms' communication choices can also affect investors’ costs of
strategic decisions, and/or forecasts of future performance. extracting information, and these information costs affect investor
Information provided ranges from more objective and veri- response (Bloomfield, 2002; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; Libby &
fiable, such as the amount of sales recorded during the year, Emett, 2014). For example, less sophisticated investors are less
to more subjective and less verifiable, such as the quality of able to process and respond to less readable disclosures (Asay,
sales, internal and external factors affecting sales, or likely Elliott & Rennekamp, 2017; Lawrence, 2013; Miller, 2010;
persistence in the future. Rennekamp, 2012). Greater dissemination of information is asso-
(b) “How,” or information presentation: Firms determine how ciated with lower information asymmetry, more liquidity, and
information will be structured in the disclosure. The first more timely incorporation of information into price, likely because
decision is the medium(s) to be used: text, images, audio, or of the greater accessibility of the information (e.g., Blankespoor,
video. Then the firm chooses the presentation attributes of Miller, & White, 2014; Blankespoor, deHaan, & Zhu, 2018; Bushee,
the given disclosure. For print disclosures, firms' choices can Core, Guay, & Hamm, 2010; Li, Ramesh, & Shen, 2011; Rogers,
affect narrative attributes like affect or tone, readability, Skinner, & Zechman, 2016; Twedt, 2016). Overall, firm communi-
formality of language, vividness or intensity, ordering of the cation choices can affect investor response by changing the infor-
information, and emphasis or focus on each data item. For mation content available and the ease with which it can be
information packages structured as audio or video disclo- extracted.
sures, there are also non-verbal attributes inevitably Once investors extract the information, they assess the credi-
embedded in the information package, such as vocal into- bility of that information. The literature suggests two primary
nation, accent, speed, volume, facial appearance, gestures, factors that affect investors' perception of the credibility of infor-
and other expressive behavior. mation. First, investors estimate the quality of the information,
(c) “Who,” or information presenter: Firms choose the point of assuming they have sufficient knowledge about the topic (Barton &
view of the information presenter, shifting along a contin- Mercer, 2005; Cikurel, Fanning, & Jackson, 2017). External valida-
uum from third-person (“The Company”) to collective first- tion or verifiability of the information quality can also influence the
person (“we”) to individual first-person (“I”) as the CEO, perceived credibility. For example, the inclusion of verifiable
CFO, or other top management. forward-looking statements increases investor response to good
news management forecasts (Hutton, Miller, & Skinner, 2003).
Second, investors assess the credibility of the entity or person
2.2. Dissemination presenting the information, such as their access to information,
experience, and incentives with respect to the information. To
Once the information package has been created, management accomplish this, investors combine prior information about the
chooses what channels to distribute or disseminate the information information presenter with cues in the firm communication, such
package over, e.g., press releases, conference calls, and shareholder as attribution choices, formality of language, and non-verbal
meetings. The choice of channel can be jointly determined with the expressive behavior (Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2004;
medium the firm chooses (i.e., text, images, audio, visual), but firms Blankespoor, Hendricks, & Miller, 2017; Kimbrough & Wang, 2014;
still have substantial flexibility in their choice of number of chan- Rennekamp & Witz, 2017). Prior literature finds that investor
nels and specific channels to use. response varies based on the extent to which the disclosure is
associated with an individual manager, suggesting that investors’
2.3. Investor response relationship with and trust of the information presenter affects the
perceived credibility of the disclosure (Asay, Libby, & Rennekamp,
After information has been disseminated to them, investors can 2018; Elliott, Grant, and Hobson to 2018; Elliott, Grant, & Hodge,
respond to the disclosure through capital market actions and/or 2018; Elliott, Hodge, & Sedor, 2012; Snow & Rasso, 2017).
through written and verbal communications to management (pri- The broader context around the interaction can influence both
vately or publicly). Investors' response is predicated on (1) the interpretation of information and assessment of its credibility.
extracting and interpreting the information from disclosure and (2) In their elaboration likelihood model of persuasion, Cacioppo and
assessing its credibility. Firms’ disclosure and dissemination Petty (1984) propose that individuals engage in systematic, “cen-
choices can affect investor response through both of these tasks. tral” assessment of the information and in heuristic assessments
Information extraction and interpretation includes acquiring influenced by “peripheral” contextual characteristics, such as
and interpreting objective, quantitative information like sales, as background music. Friestad and Wright (1994) delve further into
well as qualitative information, like events during the period that the idea that context matters when they identify persuasion
have implications for future performance. Thus, firms' selection of knowledge, or the understanding that individuals have of potential
which information to include will naturally affect the information tactics employed to persuade them. Persuasion knowledge is an
extracted and interpreted. However, information can also be
extracted from presentation attributes, such as the tone or affect
conveyed by words and non-verbal expressive behavior. Prior
literature finds that the tone of firms' press releases and 10-Ks is
associated with the short-window market reaction to them (Henry,
 E. Blankespoor / Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87 83

attempt to explain why Cacioppo and Petty's peripheral contextual continue to apply to management's disclosure response decision.
characteristics might affect an individual's response in a situation.3
In the firm communication setting, investor response is similarly a 3. A new twist: the entrance of social media in firm
combination of not only the knowledge investors have about the communications
firm, managers, and disclosure event, but also the expectations for
management behavior in the context of the specific firm commu- 3.1. Social media and firm communications
nication. For example, when a disclosure has low readability, so-
phisticated investors do not respond as much to positive tone, In the late 2000s, firm communications underwent a substantial
perhaps because the combination of positive tone and low read- change when social media created additional channels of
ability raises suspicion about management's incentives (Tan, Ying communication. Social media are Internet-based applications that
Wang, & Zhou, 2014). As another example, Grant, Hodge, and encourage users to generate their own content for the application
Sinha (2018) find that investors are more tolerant of managers' (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). For example, on Twitter, users post
self-promoting language when it is given in the context of confer- short messages that are usually publicly available, and they can
ence calls, where managers are expected to discuss good perfor- respond to or “retweet” (resend) others' messages. On YouTube,
mance of the firm. Overall, firm communication choices can users upload videos and comment on others’ videos. On LinkedIn,
influence investor response by affecting the information investors companies and individuals have websites with basic profile infor-
acquire, as well as their interpretation of the information and mation about the company or about their work experience, and
assessment of its credibility. they can post articles and join common interest groups. Social
media plays a vibrant role in non-business communications and in
firm-consumer relationships, and it is also being adopted by a
2.4. Management response
number of firms as part of their financial communications (Q4 Web
Systems, 2013).
Once investors respond to information, management must then
At its core, social media is simply another dissemination channel
choose their reaction to investors' response. The first layer of
for firm communication. However, the characteristics of this
management's response is simply monitoring, e.g., listening to
channel create fundamentally different communication opportu-
investor and analyst questions and comments during conference
nities and risks for management than more traditional channels.
calls, annual meetings, and private conversations. This monitoring
For researchers, the additional opportunities expand the range of
could also include more discreet activities like monitoring media
what can be studied about financial communications, and they also
articles and online chat forums, or tracking the share purchasing
increase the observability of the existing constructs. I describe
behavior of large investors. After observing investors' response,
some of the opportunities and risks of social media in the next
management can choose to ignore the statements or to respond
sections, using the framework for firm communication discussed in
with disclosure e via private communications with investors or
Section 2. See Fig. 1B for a visual representation of social media in
public statements to capital markets e or with changes to opera-
the communication framework.
tional decisions of the firm.
Before choosing a disclosure response, management considers
3.1.1. Disclosure and social media
the potential capital market benefits as well as the costs (e.g., direct
Social media has the potential to affect firms’ information se-
disclosure costs, proprietary costs, and litigation risk), as in any
lection, information presentation and choice of information pre-
disclosure decision (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010). Manage-
senter. As discussed below, these factors increase flexibility of firm
ment naturally has incentives to adjust their information selection,
communications in some ways, and decrease flexibility in other
information presentation attributes, information presenter, and
ways.
dissemination channel because of their potential to influence
investor response and thus many of the disclosure costs and ben-
3.1.1.1. Information selection and social media. Social media appli-
efits to the firm.
cations have the potential to affect the types, subjectivity, and
In the setting of a management response to investor statements,
amount of information disclosed. First, the audience, regulatory
if the initial communication was public, the firm must consider
oversight, and focus of social media can affect firms' disclosure
how investors will interpret a lack of management response.
choices. For example, if the audience is less sophisticated or less
Hollander, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2010) find that investors nega-
able to handle complex information, firms may choose to disclose
tively interpret a lack of response from management to a question
less complex or nuanced information via the social media channel.
during their conference call, presumably because they assume
This behavior is consistent with the findings that the first firms to
management is hiding bad news. However, choosing to respond
hold open conference calls were those more likely to benefit from
can signal the firm's typical monitoring level and increase investor
reaching retail investors through the calls (i.e., those with less
expectations for future management responses. If the initial
complex information and a broader shareholder base (Bushee,
communication was private or was not directed toward the firm,
Matsumoto, & Miller, 2003). In addition, the less established reg-
there is less public expectation of a response and perhaps less risk
ulatory oversight of dissemination via social media means there is
of negative interpretation of no response. As noted above, though,
likely more flexibility in what information is emphasized or
investors assess the credibility of any statement using external
included, as compared to Regulation G requirements around more
validation, among other things. If management response or lack of
traditional disclosure of non-GAAP performance metrics. Second,
response signals management's belief about the credibility of a
social media often encourages informal interactions that enable
third-party criticism, there could be benefits to silence. Overall,
greater use of subjective information rather than objective, verifi-
classic disclosure incentives and factors affecting investor response
able information. Third, social media applications often limit the
length of communications, whether explicitly (e.g., Twitter's char-
3
acter limit for each post) or implicitly by users' expectations for a
In Friestad and Wright’s (1994) model, they describe individual response as a
result of the individual's knowledge about the core topic being discussed (topic
certain length or style of disclosure in that setting (Kolowich, 2017).
knowledge), beliefs about the traits, knowledge, and goals of the communicator The length limits require management to consider whether to
(agent knowledge), and persuasion knowledge. reduce the amount of information disclosed. Overall, the potential
84 E. Blankespoor / Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87

variation in audience sophistication, emphasis on subjective in- communication (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung, Naughton, Tahoun,
formation, and allowed disclosure length creates interesting set- & Wang, 2018).
tings to examine how management responds to different
incentives.

3.1.1.2. Information presentation and social media. Social media 3.1.3. Investor response and social media
affect firms' selection of medium and presentation attributes in By definition, social media applications are designed to
several ways. First, each social media application facilitates and encourage and enable users’ feedback and extended conversations.
encourages specific choices for medium (i.e., text, image, audio, or With traditional communication channels, investors have to call,
video). As compared to more traditional press releases or confer- email or meet management face to face, and there are few oppor-
ence calls, this creates more flexibility in firms’ choices and often tunities to engage with other investors. With social media,
more messages with information-rich mediums like video. Second, responding to management and engaging with other investors is as
narrative attributes of disclosure are affected by the greater range simple as clicking a button, and extended conversations can garner
of informality allowed, with informal words and grammar, a wider attention from media and other intermediaries, expanding the in-
range of language intensity, and application-specific expectations teractions even further.
for presentation style. This greater flexibility could also affect the The factors influencing investor response remain the same for
extent of tone or affect firms can convey, as well as the default level social media, but the different features of social media described
of readability. In addition, the explicit and implicit length re- above could shift investor response through changes to investor
quirements discussed above can also affect how firms choose to extraction and interpretation of information, as well as assess-
group information, increasing the likelihood of multiple smaller ments of its credibility. First, changes in managers' information
disclosures over one large disclosure. Third, with the greater use of selection choices can affect investor response. For example, if firms
non-text mediums, non-verbal attributes are more likely to be tend to release simple, subjective information on social media ap-
embedded in firm disclosure. This increases the opportunity for plications, investor response may vary more based on the sophis-
management to convey nuanced messages and connect with in- tication of the investor (e.g., Tan et al., 2014). Second, the greater
vestors, but it also increases the risk of inadvertent release of in- use of information-rich mediums that include audio and visual
formation through non-verbal behavior (Blankespoor et al., 2017; content would result in more extreme investor response to a given
Hobson, Mayew, & Venkatachalam, 2012). disclosure. For example, Elliott, Loftus, and Winn (2017) find more
positive investor response to good news that is heard rather than
read, and Elliott et al. (2012) find more extreme investor response
3.1.1.3. Information presenter and social media. Social media affect
the point of view of disclosure by providing more opportunities for to management communication in video presentations rather than
text. Third, presentation attributes more common in social media e
personalization outside of physical presence or written quotes from
management. Many social media applications have both firm- such as language with more informality and greater intensity e are
likely to affect investor response. For example, informal language
specific and executive-specific accounts, allowing managers to
cultivate an individual reputation and interact personally with in- combined with more online engagement creates a more personal,
informal relationship with individual management that increases
vestors. Of course, this also creates the possibility of direct public
questions from investors, which presents an opportunity to con- the credibility of management disclosure (Rennekamp & Witz,
2018). Fourth, social media's greater ability to personalize firm
nect with investors as well as the risk of redirecting the public focus
away from the firm's desired message. disclosures as coming from management means a greater ability to
increase investor trust (Elliott et al., 2018).
Social media also inevitably changes investors' social expecta-
3.1.2. Dissemination and social media
tions and thus the optimal disclosure and presentation attributes
Moving to dissemination, social media inevitably increase the
for a given firm, event, and social media channel. Implicit rules
channels available for firms to distribute information over. In
might dictate that firms post breaking news on Twitter and longer
addition, though, the design of the social media application can
engagement campaigns on Facebook (Zhou et al., 2015). Managers
encourage and enable more timely or prolonged processing of the
that post self-promoting messages on Twitter are punished, but
information by investors. For example, user response to firm
managers that make self-promoting statements during conference
disclosure on Twitter is faster than on Facebook, but user engage-
calls are rewarded, suggesting that social media applications bring
ment with a post continues for longer on Facebook than on Twitter
distinct sets of social expectations (Grant et al., 2018). It is an open
(Zhou, Lei, Wang, Fan, & Wang, 2015).4 This differential processing
question whether the level of personalization, the standard
speed could also be a result of different audiences for each appli-
communication style on the social media application, or some other
cation, where information disseminated to more connected in-
factor drives the differences in social expectations. In any case, the
vestors has more rapid information flow (Caskey, Minnis, & Nagar,
current evidence supports the importance of understanding in-
2015). Also, unlike traditional disclosure channels that focus on
vestors’ social expectations, and social media provide a rich setting
investors, social media applications focus jointly investors and
to explore different expectations.
consumers, often mixing advertising and financial communication
Finally, social media include more publicly observable and
messages. While the different audiences can increase the risk of
quantifiable measures of credibility. This could be peer recognition
misinterpretation, advertising has the potential to engage investors
as documented by much of the user-generated content literature
as well (Madsen & Niessner, 2016). More generally, the diverse
(Luca, 2015), or, as in the setting of Cade (2018), management's
nature of the social media channels results in a more diverse
response to a critical tweet acting as a signal of the relevance and
audience and set of potential investors reached by the
credibility of the criticism. Features like the number of retweets on
Twitter, the number of Likes on a Facebook post, or the number of
4
followers on Seeking Alpha all convey some perception of credi-
It is difficult to disentangle whether this is a natural result of differences in
social media application features, or a more direct result of firms meeting users'
bility of a statement by the firm or a third party. These measures are
expectation that breaking news be on Twitter and longer campaigns with more examples of social media that generate more observability for
engagement on Facebook. examining a fundamental economic question.
 E. Blankespoor / Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87 85

3.1.4. Management response and social media that investors incorporate information from multiple sources based
The first step of management response e monitoring of investor on the credibility of the source when deciding on the appropriate
response e becomes more attainable if the response occurs via investment response, and it suggests that management response
social media. More generally, user-generated content can provide has the ability to influence investors’ assessment of the credibility
valuable information to management and be reflected in capital of a third-party message.
market activity (e.g., Bartov, Faurel, & Mohanram 2018; Chen, De, One of the most surprising and interesting results is the partial
Hu, & Hwang, 2014; Curtis, Richardson, & Schmardebeck, 2016; effectiveness of the redirection message from management.
Hales, Moon, & Swenson, 2018; Jame, Johnson, Markov, & Wolfe, Choosing to transparently ignore criticism would be perceived
2016). However, user-generated content on social media creates positively if investors assume management does not see the criti-
several concerns for management choosing the appropriate cism as credible enough to answer. However, management's lack of
response. First, because investor concerns are public, there is more response could also be interpreted negatively (i.e., that the firm
potential for emotional contagion or loss of control over the mes- does not have a legitimate response to provide, consistent with the
sage (Jung et al., 2018; Lee, Hutton, & Shu, 2015). Second, the ease of empirical findings of Hollander, Pronk, and Roelofsen [2010] in the
interaction on social media can also increase the pressure on conference call setting).
management to respond to any concerns voiced on that channel; a This study finds that a redirection message is preferable to no
lack of response by management to an issue is much more visible response. The redirection message used reiterates the quarter's
(Cade, 2018). Third, the greater personalization encouraged by so- good results, reassuring investors that performance was good in the
cial media may divert investor attention toward the interaction current quarter despite criticism. However, a redirection message
with management rather than the incorporation of information could be perceived more negatively if its goal was to redirect
into price (Elliott, Grant, & Hobson, 2018). While distraction might attention by distracting investors rather than reassuring. For
be the goal of management in some cases, it raises general concerns example, a management post highlighting new initiatives or an
about whether management interaction via social media has the unrelated business program could easily result in even more
potential to increase investor misinterpretation or neglect of rele- negative investor response to the redirection due to the perception
vant information. of management trying to deceive investors. An interesting next step
Overall, the broader reach and greater flexibility of presentation for future research is to further classify redirection messages by
and channel in social media enable rich, familiar relationships with their content and nature (e.g., reassurance, distraction, etc.) to
many investors and potential investors at lower cost. However, it disentangle the conflicting predictions.
also increases the potential for misinterpretation of news and In a similar fashion, management explanation messages could
communication crises, as more informal interactions and more vary in their credibility based on the quality and extent of infor-
public discourse brings less professionalism and more emotion. mation provided, consistency of the information with prior beliefs,
corroborating information, management credibility, and features of
3.2. Social media and investor response as examined by Cade the message. Finally, the next step of the interaction is to observe
(2018) not only investor trading response to third-party and management
information, but also written communication. The strength of the
Cade (2018) links social media with firm financial communica- social media setting is the ability to observe both trading and
tions by examining investor response in social media, and specif- written responses from investors, and an interesting future ques-
ically the factors influencing the credibility of third-party messages tion is studying a multi-period game to assess conditions that
in social media, including management response to those mes- encourage negative or positive emotional contagion among in-
sages. She finds evidence in support of investors using peer vestors’ communications on social media.
recognition as a measure of the credibility of the statement. Spe-
cifically, she introduces a measure of the extent of retweeting of a 4. Advice for future research
post to capture the peer recognition and validation of the state-
ment, and she finds that the investment response to a criticism in a I have three thoughts for researchers interested in examining
third-party tweet is greater if the message has been retweeted social media in firms' financial communications. First, to mean-
more. ingfully contribute to the literature, look for unique aspects of social
Cade (2018) then examines the implications of management media platforms that either (1) change a fundamental character-
response to that same third-party criticism. Management has the istic of communication that shifts economic-based predictions, or
choice to remain silent, to post a general message that doesn't (2) allow a fundamental theory or construct to become more
respond to the criticism (“redirection”), or to post a response to the observable. For an example of the first, social media platforms
criticism. She finds that when management does not respond to a enable and even encourage public investor response and within-
more credible criticism (i.e., one with many retweets), investors investor interactions, changing the incentives for management
respond most negatively, consistent with the assumption that they considering the optimal disclosure pattern around crises like
believe management is avoiding bad news. In the second possible product recalls (Lee et al., 2015). As another example, social media
response, management's use of the social media channel to post a platforms introduce a communication setting with potentially
redirection message confirms that they saw the criticism, yet different social norms governing the interactions (Grant et al.,
intentionally and transparently chose to ignore it. In this scenario, 2018). For an example of the second approach to contribute, the
investors' negative response to the information is somewhat format of short messages on Twitter with a link to previously dis-
muted, implying that investors perceive the firm as implicitly dis- closed press releases enables observation of dissemination distinct
missing the credibility of the criticism. When management instead from disclosure (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018). In Cade
posts a response to the credible criticism, investors' negative (2018), the public retweets and management responses in social
response to the information is almost fully muted. This evidence media increase the visibility of peer and management recognition
suggests that investors look not only to peer investors, but also to of third-party criticism, improving researchers' ability to observe
management responses for information about the credibility of changes to perceived credibility of information (and experimental
third-party communications. studies’ ability to create realistic lab settings that capture constructs
Overall, the study contributes to the literature by confirming of interest).
86 E. Blankespoor / Accounting, Organizations and Society 68-69 (2018) 80e87

Second, given the diversity in social media platforms, it is References

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