Solution Manual for 3-2-1 Code It!

, 2020, 8th Edition, Michelle Green

Solution Manual for 3-2-1 Code It!, 2020,

8th Edition, Michelle Green

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 The knowledge of the secrecy problem gained by most of these
lawmakers and lawyers has been understandably confined to their
experiences with one or two committees, whereas I have had the
opportunity to become aware of the day-to-day activities of nearly all the
committees. For that reason, and because of my alarm at the public apathy
over government secrecy, I have decided to set the whole story down in one
place. Most of the story is taken from the official records of congressional
committees—the sworn testimony, the correspondence with government
agencies, and the official reports of Senate and House investigators. As
much as possible, I have put it together in chronological, narrative form so
that the reader may discover, as I did, how the abuse of government secrecy
has spread and just how vast and serious the scope of it has become. At the
end of the book I will make some recommendations that I hope may serve
as a guide to eliminating this serious threat to our democratic form of
government.
 CHAPTER II

The First Century

An Indian uprising along the Indiana-Ohio border in 1791 set the stage for
the first investigation by Congress of decisions in the executive branch.
President Washington, then in his first term, sent Major General Arthur St.
Clair into the wilderness to put a stop to the raids.
General St. Clair and his fourteen hundred American soldiers were
camped along the headwaters of the Wabash River on November 3 when
they were surprised by the attack of a strong force led by Little Turtle, chief
of the Miami.
The Indians killed more than six hundred officers and men and forced the
others to retreat. It was a humiliating defeat, one that still ranks among the
worst in our history. Congress demanded an explanation.
On March 27, 1792, the House of Representatives appointed a select
committee to inquire into the failure of the St. Clair expedition, and “to call
for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their
inquiries.” For the first time, the President and his Cabinet were presented
with the problem of whether to make papers and testimony available to
Congress.
President Washington called a meeting of his full Cabinet to determine
the proper way to proceed, for he was aware that the action taken would set
a precedent on such matters.
Thomas Jefferson wrote the following account of the meeting and the
conclusions drawn by the Washington Cabinet:
“First, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute
inquiries. Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the
Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would
permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the
public; consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the
committee nor House had a right to call on the head of a department, who
and whose papers were under the President alone; but that the committee
should instruct their chairman to move the House to address the President.”
Jefferson also wrote:
“Hamilton agreed with us in all these points except as to the power of the
House to call on the heads of departments. He observed that as to his
department, the act constituting it had made it subject to Congress in some
points, but he thought himself not so far subject as to be obliged to produce
all the papers they might call for. They might demand secrets of a very
mischievous nature. (Here I thought he began to fear they would go on to
examining how far their own members and other persons in the government
had been dabbling in stocks, banks, etc., and that he probably would choose
in this case to deny their power; and in short, he endeavored to place
himself subject to the House, when the Executive should propose what he
did not like, and subject to the Executive when the House should propose
anything disagreeable.)... Finally agreed, to speak separately to the
members of the committee, and bring them by persuasion into the right
channel. It was agreed in this case, that there was not a paper which might
not be properly produced; that if they should desire it, a clerk should attend
with the originals to be verified by themselves.”
Although the Cabinet indicated a need for a discretion to withhold papers
“which would injure the public,” President Washington agreed that in the
case of the St. Clair expedition “there was not a paper which might not be
produced.”
There was no withholding by President Washington in this case, and it
could hardly be regarded seriously as a precedent for any right to arbitrarily
refuse executive papers to Congress.
There was one other instance in Washington’s administration in which
the Congress asked for executive papers. In this case, the House of
Representatives asked for the papers and instructions to United States
ambassadors who negotiated the Jay treaty. This time Washington refused
to deliver the papers to the House on the specific constitutional grounds that
the Senate, not the House, is authorized to advise and consent on treaty
matters.
 A Supreme Court case in the administration of President Thomas
Jefferson raised the question of whether it was possible for the courts to
force the Cabinet to perform certain acts required by law. In the last hours
of the administration of President John Adams a “midnight appointment”
was made of a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia named
William Marbury, a minor Federalist political figure. James Madison, who
became the new Secretary of State in the Jefferson administration, refused
to deliver the commission to Marbury to complete the appointment process.
Marbury asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus under the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to force Madison to deliver the commission. In
February 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the
court. First he dealt with the question of whether Madison had a right to
refuse to deliver the commission to a properly appointed official. The
decision was a rebuke to Secretary of State Madison and stated: “Is it to be
contended that the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of
their country?”
However, the opinion went on to conclude that the Constitution provided
no method for the Supreme Court to issue writs to force the executive
action requested. Chief Justice Marshall stated that the Judiciary Act
providing for a writ was inconsistent with the Constitution, and that “a law
repugnant to the Constitution is void.”
Although Madison was wrong in withholding the commission from
Marbury, the court held that under the Constitution there was no way to
force action. The case did not mean that Madison had a legal right, but only
that Marbury had no remedy. The Marbury appointment was in essence a
political matter and could only have been countered indirectly by the
impeachment of the President.
The specific question of congressional access to executive papers was
raised in one case in the Jefferson administration. In 1807, President
Jefferson was requested to furnish the House “any information in the
possession of the Executive” on the allegation of a conspiracy by Aaron
Burr. However, the request specifically exempted papers “such as he
[Jefferson] may deem the public welfare to require not to be disclosed.”
President Jefferson displayed an awareness of the dangers of arbitrary
withholding of information by carefully explaining the nature of the papers
he did not deliver. He stated that these papers included matters “chiefly in
the form of letters, often containing such a mixture of rumors, conjectures,
and suspicions as to render it difficult to sift out the real facts and
unadvisable to hazard more than general outlines, strengthened by
concurrent information or the particular credibility of the relator.”
Later, when Aaron Burr was actually tried for treason in Richmond,
Chief Justice Marshall issued a subpoena for papers in Jefferson’s custody,
including a private letter from General James Wilkinson to Jefferson. While
Jefferson continued to assert a right to determine which papers he would
produce, he did in fact send all the documents requested in the subpoena.
Also, General Wilkinson appeared at the trial and testified fully about his
communications with President Jefferson. Chief Justice Marshall’s decision
conceded that the President could not be summoned to make a personal
appearance before a judicial body because of the nature of his position and
the dignity of his office. Since Jefferson produced all the documents under
subpoena there was no need for adjudicating the issue of what types of
papers might be withheld. [The trial eventually resulted in a jury acquittal
for Burr.]
Until President Jackson’s term there were no significant controversies
over requests for information. Jackson was involved in a number of
disputes. Although he consistently asserted a right to withhold information
from Congress, he usually sent the requested documents along with his
angry criticism of Congress for making the requests.
A Senate investigation of land frauds in the Jackson administration
resulted in demands for papers dealing with land transactions conducted by
a Jackson appointee. President Jackson refused to deliver the papers to
Congress, but the resulting cover-up of land frauds could hardly be called a
precedent worthy to be followed.
President John Tyler was requested to submit to the House of
Representatives the reports of Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock
concerning an investigation of frauds which were alleged to have been
perpetrated on the Cherokee Indians. President Tyler produced a part of the
information at the time of the request but declined to produce the full
investigative reports in 1843. He argued that to be effective such
investigations must often be confidential.
 “They may result in the collection of truth or falsehood; or they may be
incomplete, and may require further prosecution,” Tyler said. “To maintain
that the President can exercise no discretion ... would deprive him at once
of the means of performing one of the most salutary duties of his office ...
and would render him dependent upon ... [another] branch [of government]
in the performance of a duty purely executive.”
However, in a later message to Congress on the Cherokee Indians matter,
President Tyler directed that all of the reports be made available. He did not
acknowledge the right of Congress to command the Executive to produce
all information. Neither did he claim an unlimited right for the President to
withhold. He declared that there must be some discretion left with the
President when “the interests of the country or of individuals” is to be
affected by production of the records. He enumerated some circumstances
in which he felt the President actually had a duty to withhold—as, for
example, during a pending law enforcement investigation.
After the Civil War there was a flurry of investigations, but these caused
little conflict. The corrupters in the Grant administration were foresighted
enough to bring key members of the Republican Congress into their
dishonest schemes as an insurance against exposure by the committees of
Congress.
A Democratic Congress, elected in 1874, initiated a series of
investigations into the War and Treasury Departments to eradicate the
corruption and to set the stage for the next presidential campaign in 1876.
The frauds were so raw that the feeble efforts to hide them were useless.
The inquiries disclosed how the government was defrauded by a “Whisky
Ring” that evaded millions of dollars in taxes on distilled whisky. The
“ring” operated with co-operation from some Treasury officials as well as
from President Grant’s private secretary, General Orville E. Babcock.
Another congressional investigation of the Grant administration
implicated Secretary of War W. W. Belknap in widespread graft in the
assignment of trading posts in the Indian territory. He resigned from office
in the face of a threat of impeachment, carrying with him a presidential
letter expressing “regret” that he was leaving government. President Grant’s
letter of “regret” to a man who had betrayed a trust set a pattern for
Presidents for a long time to come. The whole ritual, indeed, has remained
the same. First come the accusations, followed by denials of any
improprieties. Then comes the effort to hide the records. This is followed by
the tardy admission of facts but a denial of illegality, and finally the letter
from the President lauding the dishonest public official for his fine service
coupled with “regretful” acceptance of his resignation.
The corruption of the Grant administration is considered by many to be
the worst blot on the nation’s escutcheon. Republican political figures
organized a construction firm, the Crédit Mobilier of America, which was
used to divert lavish profits from the building of the Union Pacific Railway.
An American diplomatic figure lent his name to a huge mine swindle, Navy
contracts were for sale, and there were wholesale frauds in the custom
houses.
The widespread scandals of the Grant administration presented no basic
problem for Congress in obtaining government records because the key
evidence in these cases could be obtained from sources outside the
executive branch.
However, a problem did develop in 1876 when the Democratic House
sought to obtain testimony and records of financial transactions of Jay
Cooke & Company. Jay Cooke & Company was one of the largest financial
institutions of the time, and Jay Cooke was close to the Grant
administration and Republican party politics. When the House of
Representatives discovered that the Secretary of the Treasury had deposited
large sums of money with a London branch of Jay Cooke & Company, it
sought to determine whether there was some impropriety involved in the
decision to make the deposit.
In the course of its investigation, the House issued a subpoena for Hallet
Kilbourn, who managed some real estate operations for Jay Cooke &
Company. Kilbourn refused to produce the documents sought and argued
that the House had no right to investigate private affairs. The House ordered
him arrested for contempt.
Kilbourn was imprisoned by House Sergeant at Arms John Thompson.
Kilbourn immediately obtained a court order for his release and then sued
Thompson for false imprisonment. The U. S. Supreme Court held that
Thompson was liable for damages, and in the decision threw a doubt over
the right of Congress to punish witnesses for refusing to answer questions
or produce records.
The decision upset the long-standing view that the power of Congress to
investigate was as broad as the almost limitless power of inquiry of the
British Parliament. The U. S. Supreme Court stated:
“We are sure no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness of
either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that
House has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of
these bodies possess the general power of making inquiry into private
affairs of the citizen.”
It was not until 1927, when the U. S. Supreme Court decided the case of
McGrain v. Daugherty, that the right of Congress to compel testimony was
firmly reaffirmed. In the intervening thirty-five years two Presidents
successfully resisted the Congress!
President Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, faced a Republican Senate, and
Theodore Roosevelt, an independent-minded Republican, took delight in
testing his strength even against a Republican Congress.
President Cleveland in 1886 backed his Attorney General in refusing to
deliver to the Senate some reports dealing with the administration of the
United States District Attorney’s office in the District of Columbia. The
man who had held the office had been suspended, and Cleveland argued
that the report on the reasons was the business of the executive branch.
Because the Kilbourn case had weakened the position of Congress,
Cleveland was not challenged.
President Theodore Roosevelt refused to allow his Attorney General to
deliver papers to the Senate dealing with the status of investigations
involving the U.S. Steel Corporation. The papers included an Attorney
General’s opinion on the U.S. Steel Corporation case.
Although the papers sought involved a pending case, the Senate insisted
on pursuing the matter. Herbert K. Smith, head of the Bureau of
Corporations, was summoned and was threatened with contempt and
imprisonment if he failed to produce the documents. President Roosevelt
asked Smith for the papers and, after taking them into his possession,
informed the Senate the only way they could get the papers would be by
impeaching him. The Senate then dropped the matter.
The infamous scandals of the Harding administration renewed the will of
the Congress, and proved for all time the need for Congress to investigate
even when a President assures the public that “all is well.”
 CHAPTER III

Teapot Dome to the Tax Scandals

Before Congress completed its investigations of the Harding administration
scandals, cabinet officers had been found to be involved in the
maladministration or corruption. Secretary of Navy Edwin Denby resigned
from office under a barrage of criticism. Attorney General Harry M.
Daugherty, involved in several questionable financial transactions, was
indicted on a charge of having accepted a $200,000 payoff in connection
with handling of Alien Property Custodian affairs. Daugherty was acquitted
of the criminal charge, but reports of Congress established him as corrupt
and incompetent in the handling of his office. Secretary of Interior Albert
Fall was convicted of accepting a bribe and sent to prison.
It was in May 1921, within a year of President Harding’s election, that
Secretary of Interior Fall persuaded the President and Navy Secretary
Denby to transfer certain naval oil reserves from the Navy to the Interior
Department. Once he got them within his domain, Fall then transferred the
oil reserves—at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, and Elk Hills, California—to two
private oil producers, Harry Sinclair and E. L. Doheny. The leases were
signed secretly, without competitive bidding, and Secretary of Interior Fall
conveniently tossed them into a drawer away from public view. He then
proceeded to collect $100,000 from Doheny for the Elk Hills transfer, and
$300,000 from Sinclair for the Teapot Dome transfer.
Months later when the Democrats learned of the oil leases they
demanded explanations and alleged, without substantiation, that the leases
might involve some improprieties. Fall and Denby explained that the
transfers to the Interior Department and the leasings were “in the public
interest.”
When President Harding put his personal stamp of approval on the
leasing of the oil reserves, public sentiment turned against the investigating
Democrats. A big, smiling man with an open face that seemed to project
total integrity, Harding easily gave the impression that all was well with the
oil reserve transactions. Although events later proved that he lacked
understanding of the Teapot Dome scandals as well as many other
important matters that took place in his administration, his reassurances at
this stage were readily accepted by the public and the press.
Nevertheless, the Senate investigating committee persisted. Both
Secretary of Interior Fall and Secretary of Navy Denby were called to
testify. It was essential to question these two high-level government
officials to lay the groundwork for the investigation. It was essential to
explore the conversations between them, as well as the personal financial
transactions between Fall and the Doheny and Sinclair interests. It was also
necessary to explore the opinions and recommendations of subordinate
officials.
Without all of this information, Congress could not have proved the
dishonest use of a government position by Albert Fall. It would have been
naïve to expect that the Justice Department under Harry Daugherty would
have conducted an investigation that was fair and objective, for Daugherty
was already mired in his own corruption.
The Harding scandals should have demonstrated for all time that the
public cannot rely on any administration to police itself. Nor can it rely on
the self-serving declarations of a President, however well-meaning he may
be.
President Harding died on August 2, 1923, a broken and disillusioned
man, still unaware, however, of the full extent of the scandals. Coolidge’s
administration and most of Hoover’s had passed before the investigations
were finally completed, the convictions recorded, the appeals completed,
and Fall imprisoned in 1931.
President Coolidge was faced with a request for a list of the companies in
which his Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon, had an interest. A special
Senate investigating committee was studying the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and wanted to investigate the tax returns of firms with which
Mellon was associated.
President Coolidge said it would be “detrimental to the public service” to
reveal the list of Mellon’s business interests and the tax returns of those
firms. With that, the investigation ended.
 Another request for information was similarly nipped by Hoover. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee had requested that Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson produce the contents of telegrams and letters leading up
to the London Conference and the London Treaty. The committee
contended it had a special right to such papers because of the constitutional
prerogative of the Senate in the treaty-making process. Stimson disagreed
and President Hoover backed him, arguing that in order to maintain friendly
relations with other nations, it would be unwise to give the Senate all of the
information on statements leading up to the treaty.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt was favored with a Congress that was
largely on his side in his first two terms, so that there were no conflicts over
information sought by Congress. Indeed, President Roosevelt preferred
having committees of Congress investigate and dramatize problems in order
to facilitate the passage of various New Deal measures.
Congress did run into opposition to requests for information in
Roosevelt’s third term, however. In 1941 Roosevelt rejected requests for
FBI records and reports, and in 1944 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover refused
to testify or to give Congress a copy of a presidential directive requiring
him, in the interests of national security, to refrain from testifying.
The President was backed by a ruling from his Attorney General, Francis
Biddle. In a letter dated January 22, 1944, Biddle claimed that
communications between the President and the heads of departments were
confidential and privileged and not subject to inquiry by Congress. Another
opinion by the Attorney General had previously supported President
Roosevelt in refusing to make records of the Bureau of the Budget available
to Congress.
The Roosevelt administration also used the secrecy routine to hamper a
House investigation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in
1943 and 1944. The FCC probe involved the basic charge of political
tampering with an independent regulatory agency. There were indications of
improper secret contacts with some commission members while cases were
being decided.
The Roosevelt administration used every political method available to
impede the investigations, including the use of friends in Congress to harass
the investigators. Two men who successively held the title of general
counsel—Eugene L. Garey and John J. Sirica—resigned in the face of the
obstructions and harassment. They charged the investigation was being
turned into a “whitewash.”
The final report of the committee gave the FCC a clean bill of health.
However, the minority report filed by Representative Richard B.
Wigglesworth, Republican of Massachusetts, stated: “It has been impossible
for the committee to conduct anything approaching a thoroughgoing
investigation.”
Congressman Wigglesworth charged that the committee consistently
acted “to suppress indefinitely alleged unsavory facts said to involve high
administration officials and advisers.” He made reference to the “methods
both brutal and shameful” used to force the original chairman of the
investigating committee to resign, and to the general atmosphere that
resulted in the resignations of counsels Garey and Sirica.
The unhealthy conditions, which the House committee had started to
expose, were left to fester, and fourteen years later the full effects burst on
the American public. The investigations of the House Legislative Oversight
Subcommittee in 1957, 1958, and 1959, which will be described in a later
chapter, disclosed that the successful blocking of the FCC investigation in
1944 not only allowed bad practices to continue but thereby encouraged
corruption.
Though President Roosevelt had directed the Secretaries of War and
Navy not to deliver some documents which the FCC investigators had
requested, his stated reason was simply that it would “not be in the public
interest.” No broad claims of a constitutional right to withhold information
were ever invoked. There was no need for them because the cover-up was
that ruthless and that effective. Had the nation not been at war, such a
cover-up would likely have caused a major uproar.
The end of World War II and the election of a Republican Congress in
1946, however, brought the Democrats to heel. From the time the
Republican Congress took control of the committees, the Truman
administration was in almost constant combat with Congress. The first
disputes involved the efforts of Republican committees of Congress to
obtain access to FBI records and loyalty files. Later disputes centered on
efforts to gain access to records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Justice Department.
In 1947, the Republicans were intent on demonstrating that the Truman
administration was “coddling Communists.” Investigators sought access to
personnel records and letters dealing with the retention and promotion of
persons who were alleged to be security risks or of questionable loyalty.
President Truman issued an executive order barring Congress from
access to any of the loyalty or security information in the personnel files of
the government. He said it was to protect the government employees from
abuse by committees of Congress. The unrestrained activities of some
congressional investigators did indeed make the order seem justifiable to
many. However, the Republicans viewed it as a cover-up.
Representative Richard M. Nixon, later the Vice President,
Representative Charles Halleck, later the Republican leader, and a dozen
other prominent Republicans kept a continuous barrage of criticism firing at
President Truman.
Said Representative Nixon on April 22, 1948:
“I say that this proposition cannot stand from a constitutional standpoint
or on the basis of the merits for this very good reason: They would mean
the President could have arbitrarily issued an Executive order in the
[Bennett] Meyers case, the Teapot Dome case, or any other case denying
the Congress of the United States information it needed to conduct an
investigation of the Executive department and the Congress would have no
right to question his decision.”
Again, three years later, Representative Halleck was saying on the House
floor:
“His [Truman’s] censorship order gives every agency and department of
the Government the absolute power to decide what information shall be
kept from them. These agency heads are absolute czars unto themselves.
When they order the iron curtain down it stays down—a gag on the press
and radio of the nation.”
Most of this initial criticism was aimed at the rather limited presidential
order which barred Congress from the government personnel files in the
investigations of loyalty and security cases.
 Although the Truman administration was reluctant to make records
available when the Republicans began looking into allegations of improper
activities and political favoritism in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC), in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and in the Justice Department, no
blanket order was issued refusing testimony or records. The allegations
were followed first by denials. Then there was stalling but finally, under the
pressure of public opinion, the records were made available.
What happened specifically was this: Senator John J. Williams, the
Delaware Republican, produced some fairly well documented cases of
favoritism and bungling in the nation’s number one tax agency. President
Truman, Secretary of Treasury John Snyder, and Attorney General J.
Howard McGrath all denied there was any widespread laxity or corruption
in the administration of the federal tax laws. Daniel Bolich, the Assistant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and T. Lamar Caudle, the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division, went before the
investigating committees and assured the leaders of Congress that all was
well.
The self-serving declarations of the Truman administration did not satisfy
Senator Williams, however, for they were inconsistent with many
documented facts he held in his possession. A subcommittee of the House
Ways and Means Committee was then established to conduct a deeper
investigation into the handling of tax cases in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Later a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee was
organized to conduct some further examination of the way the Justice
Department handled tax cases as well as other matters.
Because tax cases were handled by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, a
branch of the Treasury Department, and prosecuted by the Justice
Department, both departments were involved in the investigation. Tax
cases, it was learned, could be fixed in their initial stages by Internal
Revenue agents, or they could be sidetracked at higher levels in the Bureau
of Internal Revenue; they could be rejected for prosecution by the Justice
Department in Washington, or kicked aside by the United States District
Attorney. There were at least a half-dozen points where a “fix” could take
place, and congressional investigations disclosed that some cases were
manipulated at almost all stages.
 When at first the Justice Department files were not made available, the
stalling was recognized for what it was—an effort to hide records that might
be embarrassing. Newspapers quickly pointed out the cover-up, and Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman was forced to lay down procedural
rules for the committees of Congress to use in requesting access to Justice
Department files.
Perlman stated that the Justice Department would not give Congress
access to open cases, but that closed files would be made available. He also
said that FBI reports and similar confidential information would not be
made available. The closed files and the testimony of high officials were
nevertheless sufficient to enable Congress to document the record of the
mishandling of federal tax investigations and prosecution. Congress
extracted testimony from two cabinet officials—Attorney General J.
Howard McGrath and Secretary of Treasury John Snyder. They revealed
their conversations and communications with their highest subordinates.
Records were produced showing the advice, recommendations, and
conclusions of investigators in the Internal Revenue Service and the staff
lawyers in the Justice Department. It was clear that some of the cases had
not been handled in the normal manner, and that recommendations from
subordinate officials were disregarded at some key points.
Only through this full examination was it possible to prove that some
cases were being “fixed” for money or for political considerations. Without
the full record on the recommendations from lower officials it would have
been impossible to prove that the mismanagement was due to anything
more than “poor judgment” or negligence.
Neither Attorney General McGrath nor Treasury Secretary Snyder was
shown to be involved in illegal tampering with any tax cases. However,
they had contended that the initial allegations of fraud and mismanagement
were untrue.
The investigations by Congress proved that several high officials were
involved in outright fraud, and a good many more were involved in gross
negligence. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Assistant
Commissioner, and the chief counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue all
resigned under fire.
 A former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Joseph Nunan, was
subsequently indicted and convicted on charges of failing to report large
amounts of unexplained income. Assistant Commissioner Daniel Bolich
was indicted and convicted on charges of failing to report more than
$200,000 in income, though the conviction was later upset by the United
States Supreme Court on technical grounds. T. Lamar Caudle, former
Assistant Attorney General, in charge of the Tax Division, was indicted,
convicted, and sent to prison on a criminal charge arising out of his
mishandling of a federal income tax case. Convicted with Caudle was
Matthew Connelly, appointment secretary for President Truman.
In total, dozens of tax officials were ousted from office for questionable
handling of tax cases, and dozens were indicted and convicted on charges of
cheating on their own tax returns. The mismanagement and fraud, which the
Truman administration had sought to deny existed, was more widespread
and sordid than most of the critics of the Bureau of Internal Revenue had
imagined. The damage to the integrity of the nation’s tax system was
incalculable.
If ever a scandal were needed to prove the necessity of a congressional
review to keep our big federal agencies open and clean, the Truman tax
scandal was it. The success of their investigations only goaded the
Republicans to further probing and policing. In their party platform of 1952,
the Republicans pledged “to put an end to corruption, to oust the crooks and
grafters, to administer tax laws fairly and impartially, and to restore honest
government to the people.”
When he accepted the party’s nomination in Chicago on July 11, 1952,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower said:
“Our aims—the aim of this Republican crusade—are clear: to sweep
from office an Administration which has fastened on every one of us the
wastefulness, the arrogance and corruption in high places, the heavy
burdens and the anxieties which are the bitter fruit of a party too long in
power.”
“What the Washington mess must have is the full treatment,” Candidate
Eisenhower declared at Atlanta, Ga., on September 2, 1952. “The only
clean-up that will do the job is the wholesale cleanout of the political bosses
in Washington. I pledge you that ... I shall not rest until the peddlers of
privilege and the destroyers of decency are banished from the nation’s
house.”
Two days later at Philadelphia, he spoke of the need for an open, frank
government:
“We must not minimize the difficulties; neither can we seek with words
and dollars to make the going look easy when it is tough. There will be
mistakes, but the mistakes we make will not be doctored up to look like
triumphs. There will be no curtain of evasion, of suppression, or double talk
between ourselves and the people.”
At Des Moines, Iowa, on September 18: “We are going to cast out the
crooks and their cronies.... And when it comes to casting out the crooks and
their cronies, I can promise you that we won’t wait for congressional
prodding and investigations. The prodding this time will start from the top.
And when we are through, the experts in shady and shoddy government
operations will be on their way back to the shadowy haunts, the sub-cellars
of American politics from whence they came.... The first thing we have to
do is get a government that is honest....”
And at St. Louis, Mo.:
“... we must take the people, themselves, into our confidence and thereby,
restore their confidence in government. We will keep the people informed
because an informed people is the keystone in the arch of free government.”
The crusade against secrecy and corruption stayed at the forefront of the
campaign and swept Eisenhower and Nixon into office on November 4.
When the electoral vote was tallied, it stood 422 Republicans to 89
Democrats—a genuine mandate to clean up “the mess in Washington.”
 CHAPTER IV

Army-McCarthy—A Claim of Secrecy

Unlimited
On the morning of May 17, 1954, the klieg-lighted Senate Caucus Room
was jammed with spectators. Near the end of the huge table at the front of
the room, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy hunched over a microphone,
reviling the Eisenhower administration. He claimed that high officials of the
Eisenhower administration were arbitrarily silencing witnesses from the
executive branch, and in doing so were preventing him from defending
himself.
It was the eighteenth day of the already famous Army-McCarthy
hearings, an exciting political drama that held the attention of an estimated
20 million television viewers. Over the weeks the Senator had sneered at
Army Secretary Robert T. Stevens and anyone else who disagreed with him.
His smirking disrespect and heavy-handed humor had already cooled the
enthusiasm of many of his followers. Some had even turned against him.
Senator McCarthy, in short, had created the worst possible climate in which
to make any appeal to fair play or decency. And yet the Wisconsin
Republican was now making such an appeal and would soon be receiving
some sympathetic comment from Democratic as well as Republican
senators.
The point at issue was simple: Should Army Counsel John Adams be
required to testify as to conversations at a meeting at the Justice Department
on January 21, 1954? Adams had already testified to being present on that
day with Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General
William P. Rogers, Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams, White House
Administrative Assistant Gerald D. Morgan, and United Nations
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. The meeting had been called to try to find
ways to curb Senator McCarthy’s free-wheeling investigation of the loyalty-
security program in the Defense Department.
 When, following this testimony on May 14, the Senate committee
members asked for information about the conversations, Adams balked. He
said that “instructions of the Executive Branch” barred him from telling of
the conversations at that key meeting on January 21. Committee members
were concerned. How could they obtain the evidence necessary to draw a
conclusion on the hearings if they were to be barred from all “high-level
discussions of the Executive Branch”?
The Army-McCarthy hearings centered on charges and countercharges
involving Army Secretary Stevens, John G. Adams, Defense Department
General Counsel H. Struve Hensel, Senator Joseph McCarthy, Roy M.
Cohn, and Francis P. Carr. Cohn was chief counsel for McCarthy’s
Permanent Investigating Subcommittee, and Carr was chief investigator.
The Department of the Army alleged that Senator McCarthy, Cohn, and
Carr had improperly used the power of the McCarthy subcommittee to
obtain preferential treatment for Cohn’s pal, Private G. David Schine. It was
contended that the tough and aggressive little Cohn had tried to intimidate
the Army and Defense officials to get Schine a commission or a special
assignment as an assistant to the Secretary of the Army, or a post in the
Central Intelligence Agency. It was also charged that Cohn had suggested
that Private Schine might be given a special assignment to work with the
McCarthy committee. In fact, Schine had been drafted and after a short time
on regular Army duty was permitted to leave his regular duties to work with
Cohn on the McCarthy committee investigations.
On the other side, Army Secretary Stevens contended that McCarthy and
Cohn had launched a vindictive probe of the Army security programs in
reprisal against those who had not co-operated to grant special treatment to
Private Schine.
Senator McCarthy countercharged that the Army tried to blackmail his
investigating subcommittee into dropping its investigation of the Army
loyalty-security setup by threatening to circulate an embarrassing report
about Cohn and Schine. The Wisconsin Senator declared that his
investigation of the Army loyalty-security program was fully justified, and
reiterated his charge that Major Irving Peress had been promoted by the
Army despite his record as a “subversive.” McCarthy did not deny that he
had criticized Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker as a “disgrace” in uniform.