Whitehead, Alfred North (1920, 1982) The Concept of Nature CS

THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD
THE CONCEPT
OF NATURE
THE TARNER LECTURES
DELIVERED IN TRINITY COLLEGE
NOVEMBER 1919
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE
LONDON NEW YORK NEW ROCHELLE
MELBOURNE SYDNEY
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ISBN o 521 09245 O
First published 1920

Reprinted 1926 1930 1955
First paperback edition 1964
Reprinted 1971 1978 1982
Printed in Great Britain at the

University Press, Cambridge
PREFACE
THE contents of this book were originally delivered at

Trinity College in the autumn of 1919 as the inaugural
course of Tarner lectures. The Tarner lectureship is
an occasional office founded by the liberality of
Mr Edward Tarner. The duty of each of the successive
holders of the post will be to deliver a course on ' the
Philosophy of the Sciences and the Relations or Want
of Relations between the different Departments of
Knowledge.' The present book embodies the endeavour
of the first lecturer of the series to fulfil his task.
The chapters retain their original lecture form and
remain as delivered with the exception of minor
changes designed to remove obscurities of expression.
The lecture form has the advantage of suggesting an
audience with a definite mental background which it is
the purpose of the lecture to modify in a specific way.
In the presentation of a novel outlook with wide rami
fications a single line of communications from premises
to conclusions is not sufficient for intelligibility. Your
audience will construe whatever you say into conformity
with their pre-existing outlook. For this reason the first
two chapters and the last two chapters are essential
for intelligibility though they hardly add to the formal
completeness of the exposition. Their function is to
prevent the reader from bolting up side tracks in pursuit
of misunderstandings. The same reason dictates my
avoidance of the existing technical terminology of
vi PREFACE
philosophy. The modern natural philosophy is shot

through and through with the fallacy of bifurcation
\vhich is discussed in the second chapter of this work.
Accordingly all its technical terms in some subtle way
presuppose a misunderstanding of my thesis. It is
perhaps as well to state explicitly that if the reader
indulges in the facile vice of bifurcation not a word of
what I have here written will be intelligible.
The last two chapters do not properly belong to the
special course. Chapter VIII is a lecture delivered in
the spring of 1920 before the Chemical Society of
the students of the Imperial College of Science and
Technology. It has been appended here as conveniently
summing up and applying the doctrine of the book
for an audience with one definite type of outlook.
This volume on 'the Concept of Nature' forms a
companion book to my previous work An Enquiry con
cerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. Either
book can be read independently, but they supplement
each other. In part the present book supplies points
of view which were omitted from its ·predecessor; in
part it traverses the same ground with an alternative
exposition. For one thing, mathematical notation has
been carefully avoided, and the results of mathematical
deductions are assumed. Some of the explanations have
been improved and others have been set in a new light.
On the other hand important points of the previous
work have been omitted where I have had nothing fresh
to say about them. On the whole, whereas the former
work based itself chiefly on ideas directly drawn from
..
PREFACE Vll
mathematical physics, the present book keeps closer

to certain fields of philosophy and physics to the ex
clusion of mathematics. The two works meet in their
discussions of some details of space and time.
I am not conscious that I have in any way altered my
views. Some developments have been made. Those
that are capable of a non-mathematical exposition have
been incorporated in the text. The mathematical de
velopments are alluded to in the last two chapters. They
concern the adaptation of the principles of mathematical
physics to the form of the relativity principle which is
here maintained. Einstein's method of using the theory
of tensors is adopted, but the application is worked
out on different lines and from different assumptions.
Those of his results which have been verified by
experience are obtained also by my methods. The
divergence chiefly arises from the fact that I do not
accept his theory of non-uniform space or his assump
tion as to the peculiar fundamental character of light
signals. I would not however be misunderstood to be
lacking in appreciation of the value of his recent work
on general relativity which has the high merit of first
disclosing the way in which mathematical physics
should proceed in the light of the principle of relativity.
But in my judgment he has cramped the development
of his brilliant mathematical method in the narro\v
bounds of a very doubtful philosophy.
The object of the present volume and ot its pre
decessor is to lay the basis of a natural philosophy which
is the necessary presupposition of a reorganised specu-
Vlll
...
PREFACE
lative physics. The general assimilation of space and

time which dominates the constructive thought can
claim the independent support of Minkowski from the
side of science and also of succeeding relativists, while on
the side of philosophers it was, I believe, one theme of
Prof. Alexander's Gifford lectures delivered some few
years ago but not yet published. He also summarised
his conclusions on this question in a lecture to the
Aristotelian Society in the July of I918. Since the
publication ofAn Enquiry concerning the Prindples of
Natural Knowledge I have had the advantage of reading
Mr C. D. Broad's Perception, Physics, and Reality
[Camb. Univ. Press, 1914]. This valuable book has·
assisted me in my discussion in Chapter II, though I
am unaware as to how far Mr Broad would assent to
any of my arguments as there stated.
It remains for me to thank the staff of the University
Press, its compositors, its proof-readers, its clerks, and
its managing officials, not only for the technical ex
cellence of their work, but for the way they have
co-operated so as to secure my convenience.
A. N. W.
IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY.
April, 1920.
CONTENTS
CffAP. PAG!
I NATURE AND THOUGHT • I
II THEORIES OF THE BIFURCATION OF NATURE. 26
III TIME •
f9
IV THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION •

74
V SPACE AND 1v10TION 99
VI CONGRUENCE • • 120
VII OBJECTS • • • . 1.of.3
VIII SUMMARY • . 164
IX THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 185
NOTE: ON THE GREEK CoNCEPT OF A PoINT • 197
NOTE : ON SIGNIFICANCE AND INFINITE EVENTS . 197
INDEX 199
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND THOUGHT
THE subject-matter of the Tarner lectures is defined by

the founder to be 'the Philosophy of the Sciences and
the Relations or Want of Relations bet\veen the different
Departments of Knowledge.' It is fitting at the first
lecture of this ne\v foundation to dwell for a few moments
on the intentions of the donor as expressed in this
definition; and I do so the more willingly as I shall
thereby be enabled to introduce the topics to \V hich the
present course is to be devoted.
We are justified, I think, in taking the second clause
of the definition as in part explanatory of the earlier
clause. What is the philosophy of the sciences? It is
not a bad answer to say that it is the study of the rela
tions between the different departments of knowledge.
Then with admirable solicitude for the freedom of
learning there is inserted in the definition after the
word 'relations' the phrase 'or want of relations.' A
disproof of relations between sciences would in itself
constitute a philosophy of the sciences. But we could
not dispense either with the earlier or the later clause.
It is not every relation between sciences which enters
into their philosophy. For exarnp]e biology and physics
are connected by the use of the microscope. Still, I may
safely assert that a technical de�cription of the uses of
the microscope in biology is not part of the philosophy
of the sciences. Again, you cannot abandon the later
W N. I
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH.
clause of the definition; namely that referring to the

relations between the sciences, without abandoning the
explicit reference to an ideal in the absence of which
philosophy must languish from lack of intrinsic interest.
That ideal is the attainment of some unifying concept
which will set in assigned relationships within itself all
that there is for knowledge, for feeling, and for emotion.
That far off ideal is the motive power of philosopru c
research; and claims allegiance even as you expel it.
The philosophic pluralist is a strict logician; the
Hegelian thrives on contradictions by the help of his
absolute; the l\.1ohamm edan divine bows before the
creative will of Allah; and the pragmatist will swallow
anything so long as it 'works.'
The mention of these vast systems and of the age
long controversies from which they spring, warns us
to concentrate. Our task is the simpler one of the ·
philosophy of the sciences. Now a science has already

a certain unity which is the very reason why that body
of knowledge has been instinctively recognised as
forming a science. The philosophy of a science is the
endeavour to express explicitly those unifying charac
teristics which pervade that complex of thoughts and
make it to be a science. The philosophy of the sciences
-conceived as one subject-is the endeavour to exhibit
all sciences as one science, or-in case of defeat-the
disproof of such a possibility.
Again I will make a further simplification, and con
fine attention to the· natural sciences, that is, to the
sciences whose subject-matter is nature. By postulating
a common subject-matter for this group of sciences a
unifying philosophy of natural science has been thereby
presupposed.
I] NATURE .\ND• THOUGHT 3
What do we mean by nature? We have to discuss

the philosophy of natural science. Natural science is
the science of nature. But-'\iV.,.hat is nature?
Nature is that which we observe in perception
through the senses. In this sense-perception we are
aware of something which is not thought and which is
self-contained for thought. This property of being self
contained for thought lies at the base of natural science.
It means that nature can be thought of as a closed
system whose mutual relations do not require the
expression of the fact that they are thought about.
Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought. By
this statement no metaphysical pronouncement is in
tended. What I mean is that we can think about nature
without thinking about thought. I shall say that then
we are thinking ' homogeneously' about nature.
Of course it is possible to think of nature in conjunc
tion with thought about the fact that nature is thought
about. In such a case I shall say that we are thinking
'heterogeneously' about nature. In fact during the last
few minutes we have been thinking heterogeneously
about nature. Natural science is exclusively concerned
with homogeneous thoughts about nature.
But sense-perception has in it an element which is
not thought. It is a difficult psychological question
whether sense-perception involves thought; and if it
does involve thought, what is the kind of thought which
it necessarily involves. Note that it has been stated
above that sense-perception is an awareness of some
thing which is not thought. Namely, nature is not
thought. But this is a different question, namely that
the fact of sense-perception has a factor which is not
thought. I call this factor 'sense-awareness.' Accord-
1-2
4 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH.
ingly the doctrine that natural science is exclusively

concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature
does not immediately carry with it the conclusion that
natural science is not concerned with sense-awareness.
However, I do assert this further statement; namely,
that though natural science is concerned with nature
which is the terminus of sense-perception, it is not con
cerned with the sense-awareness itself.
I repeat the main line of this argument, and expand
it in certain directions.
Thought about nature is different from the sense
perception of nature. Hence the factof sense-perception
has an ingredient or factor which is not thought. I call
this ingredient sense-awareness. It is indifferent to my
argument whether sense-perception has or has not
thought as another ingredient. If sense-perception does
not involve thought, then sense-awareness and sense
perception are identical. But the something perceived
is perceived as an entity which is the terminus of the
sense-awareness, something which for thought is
beyond the fact of that sense-awareness. Also the
something perceived certainly does not contain other
sense-awarenesses which are different from the sense
awareness which is an ingredient in that perception.
Accordingly nature as disclosed in sense-perception is
self-contained as against sense-awareness, in addition
to being self-contained as against thought. I will also
express this self-containedness of nature by saying that
nature is closed to mind.
This closure of nature does not carry with it any
metaphysical doctrine of the disjunction of nature and
mind. It means that in sense-perception nature is
disclosed as a complex of entities whose mutual relations
l] NATURE AND 1,HOUGHT 5
are expressible in thought without reference to mind,
that is, without reference either to sense-a'\\rareness or
to thought. Furthermore, I do not wish to be under
stood as implying that sense-awareness and thought are
the only activities \vhich are to be ascribed to mind.
Also I am not denying that there are relations of natural
entities to mind or minds other than being the termini
of the sense-awarenesses of minds. Accordingly I will
extend the meaning of the terms 'homogeneous
thoughts' and 'heterogeneous thoughts ' which have
already been introduced. We are thinking 'homogene
ously' about nature \\"'hen we are thinking about it
without thinking about thought or about sense-aware
,
ness, and we are thinking 'heterogeneously about
nature when we are thinking about it in con junction
\Vith thinking either about thought or about sense
awareness or about both.
I also take the homogeneity of thought about nature
as excluding any reference to moral or aesthetic values
whose apprehension is vivid in proportion to self
conscious activity. The values of nature are perhaps the
key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence. But such
a synthesis is exactly \vhat I am not attempting. I am
concerned exclusively with the generalisations of widest
scope which can be effected respecting that which is
known to us as the direct deliverance of sense-awareness.
I have said that nature is disclosed in sense-percep
tion as a complex of entities. It is worth considering
what we mean by an entity in this connexion. 'Entity'
is simply the Latin equivalent for 'thing , unless some
arbitrary distinction is drawn between the words for
technical purposes. All thought has to be about things.
We can gain some idea of this necessity of things for
thought by examination of the structure of a proposi
tion.
Let us suppose that a proposition is being communi
cated by an expositor to a recipient. Such a proposition.
is composed of phrases; some of these phrases may be
demonstrative and others may be descriptive.
By a demonstrative phrase I mean a phrase which
makes the recipient a'vare of an entity in a way which
is independent of the particular demonstrative phrase.
You will understand that I am here using 'demonstra
tion' in the non-logical sense, namely in the sense in
which a lecturer demonstrates by the aid of a frog and
a microscope the circulation of the blood for an ele
mentary class of medical students. I will call such
demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remember
ing Hamlet's use of the word ' speculation' when h e
says,
There is no speculation in those eyes.
Thus a demonstrative phrase demonstrates an entity
speculatively. It may happen that the expositor has
meant some other entity-namely, the phrase demon
strates to him an entity which is diverse from the entity
which it demonstrates to the recipient. In that case
there is confusion; for there are two diverse propositions,
namely the proposition for the expositor and the pro
position for the recipient. I put this possibility aside
as irrelevant for our discussion, though in practice it
may be difficult for two persons to concur in the con
sideration of exactly the same proposition, or even for
one person to have determined exactly the proposition
which he is considering.
Again the demonstrative phrase may fail to demon
strate any entity. In that case there is no proposition
I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 7
for the recipient. I think that we may assume (perhaps

rashly) that the expositor knows what he means.
A demonstrative phrase is a gesture. It is not itself
a constituent of the proposition, but the entity which it
demonstrates is such a constituent. You may quarrel
with a demonstrative phrase as in some way obnoxious
to you; but if it demonstrates the right entity, the
proposition is unaffected though your taste may be
offended. This suggestiveness of the phraseology is part
of the literary quality of the sentence which conveys
the proposition. This is because a sentence directly
conveys one proposition, while in its phraseology it
suggests a penumbra of other propositions charged with
emotional value. We are now talking of the one pro
position directly conveyed in any phraseology.
This doctrine is obscured by the fact that in most
cases what is in form a mere part of the demonstrative
gesture is in fact a part of the proposition which it is
desired directly to convey. In such a case we will call
the phraseology of the proposition elliptical. In ordinary
intercourse the phraseology of nearly all propositions
is elliptical.
Let us take some examples. Suppose that the ex
positor is in London, say in Regent's Park and in
Bedford College, the great women's college which is
situated in that park. He is speaking in the college hall
and he says,
'This college building is commodious.'
The phrase 'this college building ' is a demonstrative
phrase. Now suppose the recipient answers,
'This is not a college building, it is the lion-house in
the Zoo.'
Then, provided that the expositor's original proposi-
8 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE fCH.
tion has not been couched in elliptical phraseology, the
expositor sticks to his original proposition when he
replies,
'Anyhow, it is commodious.'
Note that the recipient's answer accepts the specula
tive demonstration of the phrase' This college building.'
He does not say, 'What do you mean ? ' He accepts the
phrase as demonstrating an entity, but declares that
same entity to be the lion-house in the Zoo. In his
reply, the expositor in his turn recognises the success
of his original gesture as a speculative demonstration,
and waives the question of the suitability of its mode of
suggestiveness with an 'anyhow.' But he is now in a
position to repeat the original proposition with the aid
of a demonstrative gesture robbed of any suggestiveness,
suitable or unsuitable, by saying,
'It is commodious.'
The 'it' of this final statement presupposes that
thought has seized on the entity as a bare objective for
consideration.
We confine ourselves to entities disclosed in sense
awareness. The entity is so disclosed as a relatum in the
complex which is nature. It dawns on an observer
because of its relations; but it is an objective for thought
in its own bare individuality. Thought cannot proceed
otherwise; namely, it cannot proceed without the ideal
bare 'it' which is speculatively demonstrated. This
setting up of the entity as a bare objective does not
ascribe to it an existence apart from the complex in
which it has been found by sense-perception. The 'it'
for thought is essentially a relatum for sense-a\vareness.
The chances are that the dialogue as to the college
building takes another form. Whatever the expositor
1] NATURE AND THOUGHT
•
9
originally meant, he almost CJrtainly now takes his

former statement as couched in elliptical phraseology,
and assumes that he was meaning,
'This is a college building and is commodious.'
Here the demonstrative phrase or the gesture, \vhich
demonstrates the 'it' which is commodious, has now
been reduced to'this'; and the attenuated phrase, under
the circumstances in which it is uttered, is sufficient for
the purpose of correct demonstration. This brings out
the point that the verbal form is never the whole phrase
ology of the proposition; this phraseology also includes
the general circumstances of its production. Thus the aim
of a demonstrative phrase is to exhibit a definite 'it' as a
bare objective for thought; but the TtWdus operandi of
a demonstrative phrase is to produce an awareness of
the entity as a particular relatum in an auxiliary complex,
chosen merely for the sake of the speculative demon
stration and irrelevant to the proposition. For example,
in the above dialogue, colleges and buildings, as related
to the 'it' speculatively demonstrated by the phrase
'this college building,' set that 'it' in an auxiliary
complex which is irrelevant to the proposition
' It is commodious.'
Of course in language every phrase is invariably
highly elliptical. Accordingly the sentence
'This college building is commodious'
means probably
'This college building is commodious as a college
building.'
But it will be found that in the above discussion
we can replace 'commodious' by 'commodious as a
college building' without altering our conclusion;
though we can guess that the recipient, who thought
IO THE CONCEPT OF NATURE •
(CH.
he was in the lion-house of the Zoo, would be less likely

to assent to
' ...t\nyho\v, it is commodious as a college building.'
A more obvious instance of elliptical phraseology
arises if the expositor should address the recipient with
the remark,
'That criminal is your friend.'
The recipient might answer,
"He is my friend and you are insulting.'
Here the recipient assumes that the phrase ' That
criminal' is elliptical and not merely demonstrative. In
fact, pure demonstration is impossible though it is the
ideal of thought. This practical impossibility of pure
demonstration is a difficulty which arises in the com
munication of thought and in the retention of thought.
Namely, a proposition about a particular factor in nature
can neither be expressed to others nor retained for
repeated consideration without the aid of auxiliary com
plexes which are irrelevant to it.
I now pass to descriptive phrases. The expositor says,
' A college in Regent's Park is commodious.'
The recipient knows Regent's Park well. The phrase
' A college in Regent's Park' is descriptive for him. If
its phraseology is not elliptical, which in ordinary life
it certainly will be in some way or other, this proposition
simply means,
'There is an entity which is a college building in
Regent's Park and is commodious.'
If the recipient rejoins,
'The lion-house in the Zoo is the only commodious
building in Regent's Park,'
he now contradicts the expositor, on the assumption
that a lion-house in a Zoo is not a college building.
1] NATURE AND THOUGHT II
Thus whereas in the first dialogue the recipient

merely quarrelled with the expositor without con
tradicting him, in this dialogue he contradicts him. Thus
a descriptive phrase is part of the proposition which it
helps to express, whereas a demonstrative phrase is not
part of the proposition vlhich i t helps to express.
Again the expositor might be standing in Green Park
-where there are no college buildings-and say,
'This college building is commodious. '
Probably no proposition \vill be received b y the
recipient because the demonstrative phrase,
'This college building '
has failed to demonstrate o\ving to the absence of the
background of sense-awareness which it presupposes.
But if the expositor had said,
'A college building in Green Park is commodious,'
the recipient would have received a proposition, but a
false one.
Language is usually ambiguous and it is rash to make
general assertions as to its meanings. But phrases which
commencewith 'this ' or' that ' areusuallydemonstrative,
whereas phrases which commence with 'the ' or 'a '
are often descriptive. In studying the theory of pro
positional expression it is important to remember the
wide difference between the analogous modest words
'this ' and 'that ' on the one hand and 'a ' and 'the'
on the other hand. The sentence
' The college building in Regent's Park is com
modious '
means, according to the analysis first made b y Bertrand
Russell, the proposition,
'There is an entity which (i) is a college building in
Regent's Park and (ii) is commodious and (iii) is such
I2 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH.
that any college building in Regent's Park is identical

with it.'
The descriptive character of the phrase 'The college
building in Regent's Park' is thus evident. Also the
proposition is denied by the denial of any one of its
three component clauses or by the denial of any
combination of the component clauses. If we had
substituted 'Green Park' for 'Regent's Park' a false
proposition would have resulted. Also the erection of a
second college in Regent's Park would make the pro
position false, though in ordinary life common sense
would politely treat it as merely ambiguous.
' The Iliad ' for a classical scholar is usually a demon
strative phrase; for it demonstrates to him a well-known
poem. But for the majority of mankind the phrase is
descriptive, namely, it is synonymous with 'The poem
named "the Iliad''.'
Names may be either demonstrative or descriptive
phrases. For example 'Homer ' is for us a descriptive
phrase, namely, the word with some slight difference
in suggestiven� means 'Tlte man who wrote the
Iliad.'
This discussion illustrates that thought places before
itself bare objectives, entities as we call them, which
the thinking clothes by expressing their mutual rela
tions. Sense-awareness discloses fact with factors which
are the entities for thought. The separate distinction of
an entity in thought is not a metaphysical assertion, but
a method of procedure necessary for the finite expression
of individual propositions. Apart from entities there
could be no finite truths ; they are the means by which
the infinitude of irrelevance is kept out of thought.
To sum up : the termini for thought are entities,
1] NATURE AND THOUGHT 13
primarily with bare individuality, secondarily v;ith

properties and relations ascribed to them in the pro
cedure of thought; the termini for sense-awareness are
factors in the fact of nature, primarily relata and only
secondarily discriminated as distinct individualities.
No characteristic of nature which is immediately
posited for knowledge by sense-awareness can be
explained. It is impenetrable by thought, in the sense
that its peculiar essential character which enters into
experience by sense-awareness is for thought merely the
guardian of its individuality as a bare entity. Thus for
thought 'red' is merely a definite entity, though for
a'vareness 'red' has the content of its individuality. The
transition from the 'red' of awareness to the 'red' of
thought is accompanied by a definite loss of content,
namely by the transition from the factor 'red' to the
entity 'red.' This loss in the transition to thought is
compensated by the fact that thought is communicable
whereas sense-awareness is incommunicable.
Thus there are three components in our knowledge of
nature, namely, fact, factors, and entities. Fact is the
undifferentiated terminus of sense-awareness; factors
are termini of sense-awareness, differentiated as elements
of fact; entities are factors in their function as the ter
mini of thought. The entities thus spoken of are natural
entities. Thought is wider than nature, so that there are
·· entities for thought which are not natural entities.
When we speak of nature as a complex of related
entities, the 'complex' is fact as an entity for thought,
to whose bare individuality is ascribed the property of
embracing in its complexity the natural entities. It is
our business to analyse this conception and in the course
of the analysis space and time should appear. Evidently
the relations holding between natural entities are

themselves natural entities, namely they are also factors
of fact, there for sense-awareness. Accordingly the
structure of the natural complex can never be com
pleted in thought, just as the factors of fact can never
be exhausted in sense-awareness. Unexhaustiveness is
an essential character of our knowledge of nature. Also
nature does not exhaust the matter for thought, namely
there are thoughts which would not occur in any homo
geneous thinking about nature.
The question as to whether sense-perception involves
thought is largely verbal. If sense-perception involves
a cognition of individuality abstracted from the actual
position of the entity as a factor in fact, then it un
doubtedly does involve thought. But if it is conceived
as sense-awareness of a factor in fact competent to
evoke emotion and purposeful action without further
cognition, then it does not involve thought. In such a
case the terminus of the sense-awareness is something
for mind, but nothing for thought. The sense-perception
of some lower forms of life may be conjectured t o
approximate to this character habitually. Also occasion
ally our own sense-perception in moments when thought
activity has been lulled to quiescence is not far off the
attainment of this ideal limit.
The process of discrimination in sense-awareness has
two distinct sides. There is the discrimination of fact
into parts, and the discrimination of any part of fact as
exhibiting relations to entities which are not parts of
fact though they are ingredients in it. Namely the
immediate fact for awareness is the whole occurrence
of nature. It is nature as an event present for sense
awareness, and essentially passing. There is no holding
I) NATURE AND THOUGHT
nature still and looking at it. We cannot redouble our

efforts to improve our knowledge of the terminus of our
present sense-awareness; it is our subsequent oppor
tunity in subsequent sense-awareness which gains the
benefit of our good resolution. Thus the ultimate fact
for sense-awareness is an event. This whole event is
discriminated by us into partial events. We are aware
of an event which is our bodily life, of an event which is
the course of nature within this room, and of a vaguely
perceived aggregate of other partial events. This is the
discrimination in sense-awareness of fact into parts.
I shall use the term 'part' in the arbitrarily limited
sense of an event which is part of the whole fact dis
closed in awareness.
Sense-awareness also yields to us other factors in
nature which are not events. For example, sky-blue is
seen as situated in a certain event. This relation of
situation requires further discussion which is postponed
to a later lecture. My present point is that sky-blue is
found in nature with a definite implication in events,
but is not an event itself. Accordingly in addition to
events, there are other factors in nature directly dis
closed to us "in sense-awareness. The conception in
thought of all the factors in nature as distinct entities
with definite natural relations is what I have in another
place1 called the 'diversification of nature.'
There is one general conclusion to be drawn from the
foregoing discussion. It is that the first task of a philo
sophy of science should be some general classification of
the entities disclosed to us in sense-perception.
Among the examples of entities in addition to 'events'
which we have used for the purpose of illustration are
1 Cf. Enquiry.
the buildings of Bedford College, Homer, and sky-blue.
Evidently these are very different sorts of things; and it
is likely that statements which are made about one kind
of entity will not be true about other kinds. If human
thought proceeded with the orderly method which
abstract logic would suggest to it, we might go further
and say that a classification of natural entities should be
the first step in science itself. Perhaps you will be
inclined to reply that this classification has already been
effected, and that science is concerned with the ad
ventures of material entities in space and time.
The history of the doctrine of matter has yet to be
written. It is the history of the influence of Greek
philosophy on science. That influence has issued in
one long misconception of the metaphysical status of
natural entities. The entity has been separated from the
factor which is the terminus of sense-awareness. It has
become the substratum for that factor, and the factor
has been degraded into an attribute of the entity. I n
this way a distinction has been imported into nature
which is in truth no distinction at all. A natural entity
is merely a factor of fact, considered in itself. Its dis
connexion from the complex of fact is a mere abstraction.
It is not the substratum of the factor, but the very
factor itself as bared in thought. Thus what is a mere
procedure of mind in the translation of sense-awareness
into discursive knowledge has been transmuted into a
fundamental character of nature. In this· way matter
has emerged as being the metaphysical substratum of
its properties, and the course of nature is interpreted
as the history of matter.
Plato and Aristotle found Greek thought preoccupied
with the quest for the simple substances in terms of
1] NATURE AND ·THOUGHT 17
,,,.hich the course of events could be expressed. We

may f ormulat. e this state of mind in the question, Wh2.t
is nature made of ? The answers which their genius
gave to this question, and more particularly the con
cepts which underlay the terms in which they framed
their answers, have determined the unquestioned pre
suppositions as to time, space and matter which have
reigned in science.
In Plato the forms of thought are more fluid than in
Aristotle, and therefore, as I venture to think, the more
valuable. Their importance consists in the evidence
they yield of cultivated thought about nature before it
had been forced into a uniform mould by the long
tradition of scientific philosophy. For example in the
T£maeus there is a presupposition, somewhat vaguely
expressed, of a distinction between the general becoming
of nature and the measurable time of nature. In a later
lecture I have to distinguish between what I call the
passage of nature and particular time-systems which
exhibit certain characteristics of that passage. I will not
go so far as to claim Plato in direct support of this
doctrine, but I do think that the sections of the Timaeus
which deal with time become clearer if my distinction
is admitted.
This is however a digression. I am now concerned
with the origin of the scientific doctrine of matter in
Greek thought. In the Timaeu.s Plato asserts that nature
is made of fire and earth with air and water as inter
mediate between them, so that 'as fire is to air so is air
to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth.' He
also suggests a molecular hypothesis for these four
elements. In this hypothesis everything depends on the
shape of the atoms ; for earth it is cubical and for fire
W. N. 2
it is pyramidal. To-day physicists are again discussing

the structure of the atom, and its shape is no slight
factor in that structure. Plato's guesses read much more
fantastically than does Aristotle's systematic analysis;
but in some ways they are more valuable. The main
outline of his ideas is comparable with that of modern
science. It embodies concepts which any theory of
natural philosophy must retain and in some sense must
explain.Aristotle asked the fundamental question,
What do we mean by ' substance ' ? Here the reaction
between his philosophy and his logic worked very
unfortunately. In his logic, the fundamental type of
affirmative proposition is the attribution of a predicate
to a subject. Accordingly, amid the many current uses
of the term' substance' which he analyses, he emphasises
its meaning as ' the ultimate substratum which is no
longer predicated of anything else.'
The unquestioned acceptance of the Aristotelian logic
has led to an ingrained tendency to postulate a sub
stratum for whatever is disclosed in sense-awareness,
namely, to look below what we are aware of for the
substance in the sense of the 'concrete thing.' This
is the origin of the modern scientific concept of matter
and of ether, namely they are the outcome of this
insistent habit of postulation.
Accordingly ether has been invented by modem
science as the substratum of the events which are
spread through space and time beyond the reach of
ordinary ponderable matter. Personally, I think that
predication is a muddled notion confusing many different
relations under a convenient common form of speech.
For example, I hold that the relation of green to a blade
of grass is entirely different from the relation of green
I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 19
to the event which is the life history of that blade for

some short period, and is different from the relation
of the blade to that event. In a sense I call the
event the situation of the green, and in another sense
it is the situation of the blade. Thus in one sense the
blade is a character or property which can be predi
cated of the situation, and in another sense the green
is a character or property of the same event which
is also its situation. In this 'vay the predication of
properties veils radically different relations between
entities.
Accordingly 'substance,' which is a correlative term
to ' predication,' shares in the ambiguity. If we are to
look for substance anywhere, I should find it in events
which are in some sense the ultimate substance of
nature.
Matter, in its modern scientific sense, is a return to
the Ionian effort to find in space and time some stuff
which composes nature. It has a more refined signi
fication than the early guesses at earth and water by
reason of a certain vague association with the Aristotelian
idea of substance.
Earth, water, air, fire, and matter, and finally ether
are related in direct succession so far as concerns their
postulated characters of ultimate substrata of nature.
They bear witness to the undying vitality of Greek
philosophy in its search for the ultimate entities which
are the factors of the fact disclosed in sense-awareness.
This search is the origin of science.
The succession of ideas starting from the crude
guesses of the early Ionian thinkers and ending in the
nineteenth century ether reminds us that the scientific
doctrine of matter is really a hybrid through which
2-2
philosophy passed on its way to the refined Aristotelian

concept of substance and to which science returned as
it reacted against philosophic abstractions. Earth, fire,
and water in the Ionic philosophy and the shaped
elements in the Timaeus are comparable to the matter
and ether of modern scientific doctrine. But substance
represents the final philosophic concept of the sub
stratum which underlies any attribute. Matter (in the
scientific sense) is already in space and time. Thus
matter represents the refusal to think �way spatial and
temporal characteristics and to arrive at the bare con
cept of an individual entity. It is this refusal which has
caused the muddle of importing the mere procedure of
thought into the fact of nature. The entity, bared of
all characteristics except those of space and time, has ac
quired a physical status as the ultimate textl!re of nature;
so that the course of nature is conceived as being merely
the fortunes of matter in its adventure through space.
Thus the origin of the doctrine of matter is the out
come of uncritical acceptance of space and time as
external conditions for natural existence. By this I do
not mean that any doubt should be thrown on facts of
space and time as ingredients in nature. What I do
mean is 'the unconscious presupposition of space and
time as being that within which nature is set.' This is
exactly the sort of presupposition which tinges thought
in any reaction against the subtlety of philosophical
criticism. My theory of the formation of the scientific
doctrine of matter is that first philosophy illegitimately
transformed the bare entity, which is simply an ab
straction necessary for the method of thought, into
the metaphysical substratum of these factors in nature
which in various senses are assigned to entities as their
I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 2I
attributes; and that, as a second step, scientists (includ

ing philosophers who were scientists) in conscious or
unconscious ignoration of philosophy presupposed this
substratum, qua substratum for attributes, as never
thele s in time and space.
This is surely a muddle. The whole being of substance
is as a substratum for attributes. Thus time and space
should be attributes of the substance. This they
palpably are not, if the matter be the substance of
nature, since it is impossible to express spatio-temporal
truths without having recourse to relations involving
relata other than bits of matter. I waive this point
however, and come to another. It is not the substance
which is in space, but the attributes. What we find in
space are the red of the rose and the smell of the jasmine
and the noise. of cannon. \Ve have all told our dentists
where our toothache is. Thus space is not a relation
between substances, but between attributes.
Thus even if you admit that the adherents of sub
stance can be allo\\·ed to conceive substance as matter,
it is a fraud to slip substance into space on the plea
that space expresses relations between substances. On
the face of it space has nothing to do with substances,
but only with their attributes. '\\That I mean is, that
if you choose-as I think wrongly-to construe our ex
perience of nature as an awareness of the attributes of
substances, we are by this theory precluded from finding
any analogous direct relations b�tween substances as
disclosed in our experience. What we do find are
relations between the attributes of substances. Thus if
matter is looked on as substance in space, the space in
which it finds itself has very little to do with the space
of our experience.
22 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH.
The above argument has been expressed in terms of

the relational theory of space. But if space be absolute
-namely, if it have a being independent of things in it
-the course of the argument is hardly changed. For
things in space must have a certain fundamental relation
to space which we \vill call occupation . Thus the ob
jection that it is the attributes which are observed as
related to space, still holds.
The scientific doctrine of matter is held in conjunc
tion with an absolute theory of time. The same argu
ments apply to the relations between matter and time
as apply to the relations between space and matter.
There is however (in the current philosophy) a difference
in the connexions of space with matter from those of
time with matter, which I will proceed to explain.
Space is not merely an ordering of material entities
so that any one entity bears certain relations to other
material entities. The occupation of space impresses a
certain character on each material entity in itself. By
reason of its occupation of space matter has extension.
By reason of its extension each bit of matter is divisible
into parts, and each part is a numerically distinct
entity from every other such part. Accordingly it
would seem that every material entity is not really one
entity. It is an essential multiplicity of entities. There
seems to be no stopping this dissociation of matter into
multiplicities short of finding each ultimate entity
occupying one indivis:lual point. This essential multi
plicity of material entities is certainly not what is meant
by science, nor does it correspond to anything disclosed
in sense-awareness. It is absolutely necessary that at
a certain stage in this dissociation of matter a halt should
be called, and that the material entities thus obtained
I) NATURE AND THOUGHT 23
should be treated as units. The stage of arrest may be

arbitrary or may be set by the characteristics of nature ;
but all reasoning in science ultimately drops its space
analysis and poses to itself the problem, ' Here is one
material entity, what is happening to it as a unit
entity ? ' Yet this material entity is still retaining its
extension, and as thus extended is a mere multiplicity.
Thus there is an essential atomic property in nature
which is independent of the dissociation of extension.
There is something which in itself is one, and "rhich is
more than the logical aggregate of entities occupying
points within the volume which the unit occupies.
Indeed we may vvell be sceptical as to these ultimate
entities at points, and doubt whether there are any such
entities at all. They have the suspicious character that
we are driven to accept them by abstract logic and not
by observed fact.
Time (in the current philosophy) does not exert the
same disintegrating effect on matter which occupies it.
If matter occupies a duration of time, the whole matter
occupies every part of that duration. Thus the connexion
between matter and time differs from the connexion
between matter and space as expressed in current
scientific philosophy. There is obviously a greater
difficulty in conceiving time as the outcome of relations
between different bits of matter than there is in the
analogous conception of space. At an instant distinct
volumes of space are occupied by distinct bits of matter.
Accordingly there is so far no intrinsic difficulty in
conceiving that space is merely the resultant of relations
between the bits of matter. But in the one-dimensional
time the same bit of matter occupies different portions
of time. Accordingly time would have to be expressible
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH ..
in terms of the relations of a bit of matter with itself..

My own view is a belief in the relational theory both of
space and of time, and of disbelief in the current form
of the relational theory of space which exhibits bits
of matter as the relata for spatial relations. The true
relata are events. The distinction which I have just
pointed out between time and space in their connexion
with matter makes it evident that any assimilation of
time and space cannot proceed along the traditional line
of taking matter as a fundamental element in space
formation.
The philosophy of nature took a wrong turn during
its development by Greek thought. This erroneous
presupposition is vague and fluid in Plato's Timaeus.
The general groundwork of the thought is still un
committed and can be construed as merely lacking due
explanation and the guarding emphasis. But in
Aristotle's exposition the current conceptions were
hardened and made definite so as to produce a faulty
analysis of the relation between the matter and the form
of nature as disclosed in sense-awareness. In this phrase
the term ' matter ' is not used in its scientific sense.
I will conclude by guarding myself against a mis
apprehension. It is evident that the current doctrine of
matter enshrines some fundamental law of nature. Any
simple illustration will exemplify what I mean. For
example, in a museum some specimen is locked securely
in a glass case. It stays there for years : it loses its colour,
and perhaps falls to pieces. But it is the same specimen ;
and the same chemical elements and the same quantities
of those elements are present within the case at the end
as were present at the beginning. Again the engineer
and the astronomer deal with the motions of real per-
I] NATURE AND THOUGHT
manences in nature. Any theory of nature which for

one moment loses sight of these great basic facts of
experience is simply silly. But it is permissible to point
out that the scientific expression of these facts has be
come entangled in a maze of doubtful metaphysics ;
and that, when we remove the metaphysics and start
afresh on an unprejudiced survey of nature, a new light
is thrown on many fundamental concepts which domi
nate science and guide the progress of research.
CHAPTER I I
THEORIES O F THE B I FU RCAT I O N

O F NATU RE
IN my previous lecture I criticised the concept of matter

as the substance whose attributes we perceive. This way
of thinking of matter is, I think, the historical reason
for its introduction into science, and is still the vague
view of it at the background of our thoughts which
makes the current scientific doctrine appear so obvious.
Namely we conceive ourselves as perceiving attributes
of things, and bits of matter are the things whose
attributes we perceive.
In the seventeenth century the sweet simplicity of
this aspect of matter received a rude shock. The trans
mission doctrines of science were then in process of
elaboration and by the end of the century were un
questioned, though their particular forms have since
been modified. The establishment of these transmission
theories marks a turning point in the relation between
science and philosophy. The doctrines to which I am
especially alluding are the theories of light and sound.
I have no doubt that the theories had been vaguely
floating about before as obvious suggestions of common
sense ; for nothing in thought is ever completely new.
But at that epoch they were systematised and made
exact, and their complete consequences were ruthlessly
deduced. It is the establishment of this pr9cedure of
taking the consequences seriously which marks the
real discovery of a theory. Systematic doctrines of
light and sound as being something proceeding from
CH.II] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 27
the emitting bodies were definitely established, and in

particular the connexion of light with colour was laid
bare by Newton.
The result completely destroyed the simplicity of the
' substance and attribute ' theory of perception . What
we see depends on the light entering the eye. Further
more we do not even perceive what enters the eye. The
things transmitted are waves or-as Newton thought
minute particles, and the things seen are colours. Locke
met this difficulty by a theory of primary and secondary
qualities. Namely, there are some attributes of the
matter which we do perceive. These are the primary
qualities, and there are other things which we perceive,
such as colours, which are not attributes of matter, but
are perceived by us as if they were such attributes.
These are the secondary qualities of matter.
Why should we perceive secondary qualities ? It
seems an extremely unfortunate arrangement that we
should perceive a lot of things that are not there. Yet
this is what the theory of secondary qualities in fact
comes to. There is now reigning in philosophy and in
science an apathetic acquiescence in the conclusion that
no coherent account can be given of nature as it is
disclosed to us in sense-awareness, without dragging in
its relations to mind. The modern account of nature is
not, as it should be, merely an account of what the mind
knows of nature ; but it is also confused with an account
of what nature does to the mind. The result has been
disastrous both to science and to philosophy, but chiefly
to philosophy. It has transformed the grand question
of the relations between nature and mind into the petty
form of the interaction between the human body and
mind.
Berkeley's polemic against matter was based on this

confusion introduced by the transmission theory of
light. He advocated, rightly as I think, the abandon
ment of the doctrine of matter in its present form. He
had however nothing to put in its place except a theory
of the relation of finite minds to the divine mind.
But we are endeavouring in these lectures to limit
ourselves to nature itself and not to travel beyond
entities which are disclosed in sense-awareness.
Percipience in itself is taken for granted. We consider
indeed conditions for percipience, but only so far as
those conditions are among the disclosures of percep
tion. We leave to metaphysics the synthesis of the
knower and the known. Some further explanation and
defence of this position is necessary, if the line of argu
ment of these lectures is to be comprehensible.
The immediate thesis for discussion is that any meta
physical interpretation is an illegitimate importation into
the philosophy of natural science. By a metaphysical
interpretation I mean any discussion of the how (beyond
nature) and of the why (beyond nature) of thought and
sense-awareness. In the philosophy of science we seek
the general notions which apply to nature, namely, to
what we are aware of in perception. It is the philosophy
of the thing perceived, and it should not be confused
with the metaphysics of reality of which the scope
embraces both perceiver and perceived. No perplexity
concerning the object of knowledge can be solved by
saying that there is a mind knowing it1•
In other words, the ground taken is this : sense
awareness is an awareness of something. What then is
the general character of that something of which we
1 Cf. Enquiry, preface.
n] THEORIES OF BIFURCA'TION OF NATURE 29
are aware ? We do not ask about the percipient or

about the process, but about the perceived. I emphasise
this point because discussions on the philosophy of
science are usually extremely metaphysical-in my
opinion, to the great detrin1ent of the subject.
The recourse to metaphysics is like thro\ving a match
into the powder magazjne. It blo\vs up the whole arena.
This is exactly what scientific philosophers do when
they are driven into a corner and convicted of inco
herence. They at once drag in the mind and taJk of
entities in the mind or out of the mind as the case may
be. For natural philosophy everything perceived is in
nature. We may not pick and choose. For us the red
glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as
are the molecules and electric waves by which men of
science would explain the phenomenon. It is for natural
philosophy to analyse how these various elements of
nature are connected.
In making this demand I conceive myself as adopting
our immediate instinctive attitude towards perceptual
knowledge which is only abandoned under the influence
of theory. We are instinctively willing to believe that by
due attention, more can be found in nature than that
which is observed at first sight. But we will not be
content with less. What we ask from the philosophy of
science is some account of the coherence of things
perceptively known.
This means a refusal to countenance any theory of
psychic additions to the object known in perception.
For example, what is given in perception is the green
grass. This is an object which we know as an ingredient
in nature. The theory of psychic additions would treat
the greenness as a psychic addition furnished by the
perceiving mind, and would leave to nature merely the

molecules and the radiant energy which influence the
mind towards that perception. My argument is that this
dragging in of the mind as making additions of its own
to the thing posited for knowledge by sense-awareness
is merely a way of shirking the problem of natural
philosophy. That problem is to discuss the relations
inter se of things known, abstracted from the bare fact
that they are known. Natural philosophy should never
ask, what is in the mind and what is in nature. To do so
is a confession that it has failed to express relations
between things perceptively known, namely to express
those natural relations whose expression is natural
philosophy. It may be that the task is too hard for us,
that the relations are too complex and too various for
our apprehension, or are too trivial to be worth the
trouble of exposition. It is indeed true that we have
gone but a very small w-ay in the adequate formulation
of such relations. But at least do not let us endeavour
to conceal failure under a theory of the byplay of the
perceiving mind.
What I am essentially protesting against is the bi
furcation of nature into two systems of reality, which,
in so far as they are real, are real in different senses.
One reality would be the entities such as electrons which
are the study of speculative physics. This would be the
reality which is there for knowledge ; although on this
theory it is never known. For what is known is the
other sort of reality, which is the byplay of the mind.
Thus there would be two natures, one is the conjecture
and the other is the dream.
Another way of phrasing this theory which I am
arguing against is to bifurcate nature into two divisions,
u] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 3 1
namely into the nature apprehended in awareness and
the nature which is the cause of awareness. The nature
which is the fact apprehended in awareness holds within
it the greenness of the trees, the song of the birds, the
warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the
feel of the velvet. The nature which is the cause of
awareness is the conjectured system of molecules and
electrons which so affects the mind as to produce the
awareness of apparent nature . The meeting point of
these two natures is the mind, the causal nature being
influent and the apparent nature being effluent.
There are four questions which at once suggest
themselves for discussion in connexion with this bi
furcation theory of nature. They concern (i) causality,
(ii) time, (iii) space, and (iv) delusions. These questions
are not really separable. They merely constitute four
distinct starting points from ""�hich to enter upon the
discussion of the theory.
Causal nature is the influence on the mind which is
the cause of the effluence of apparent nature from the
mind. This conception of causal nature is not to be
confused with the distinct conception of one part of
nature as being the cause of another part. For example,
the burning of the fire and the passage of heat from it
through intervening space is the cause of the body, its
nerves and its brain, functioning in certain ways. But
this is not an action of nature on the mind. It is an
...
interaction within nature. The causation involved in this

interaction is causation in a different sense from the
influence of this system of bodily interactions within
nature on the alien mind which thereupon perceives
redness and warmth.
The bifurcation theory is an attempt to exhibit
natural science as an investigation of the cause of the

fact of knowledge� Namely, it is an attempt to exhibit
apparent nature as an effluent from the mind because of
causal nature. The whole notion is partly based on the
implicit assumption that the mind can only know that
which it has itself produced and retains in some sense
within itself, though it requires an exterior reason both
as originating and as determining the character of its
activity. But in considering knowledge we should wipe
out all these spatial metaphors, such as ' within the
mind ' and ' without the mind.' Knowledge is ultimate.
,
There can be no explanation of the ' why of knowledge ;
we can only describe the ' what ' of knowledge. Namely
we can analyse the content and its internal relations,
but we cannot explain why there is knowledge. Thus
causal nature is a metaphysical chimera ; though there is
need of a metaphysics whose scope transcends the
limitation to nature. The object of such a metaphysical
science is not to explain knowledge, but exhibit in its
utmost completeness our concept of reality.
However, we must admit that the causality theory of
nature has its strong suit. The reason why the bifurca
tion of nature is always creeping back into scientific
philosophy is the extreme difficulty of exhibiting the
perceived redness and warmth of the fire in one system
of relations with the agitated molecules of carbon and
oxygen, with the radiant energy from them, and with the
various functionings of the material body. Unless we
produce the all-embracing relations, we are faced with a
bifurcated nature ; namely, warmth and redness on one
side, and molecules, electrons and ether on the other
side. Then the two factors are explained as being re
spectively the cause and the mind's reaction to the cause.
11] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 33
Time and space would appear to provide these all
e1nbracing relations which the advocates of the philo
sophy of the unity of nature require. The perceived
redness of the fire and the warmth are definitely related
in time and in space to the molecules of the fire and the
molecules of the body.
It is hardly more than a pardonable exaggeration to
say that the determination of the meaning of nature
reduces itself principally to the discussion of the charac
ter of time and the character of space. In succeeding
lectures I shall explain my own view of time and space.
I shall endeavour to show that they are abstractions
from more concrete elements of nature, namely, from
events. The discussion of the details of the process of
abstraction will exhibit time and space as interconnected,
and will finally lead us to the sort of connexions between
their measurements which occur in the modem theory
of electromagnetic relativity. But this is anticipating
our subsequent line of development. At present I wish
to consider how the ordinary views of time and space
help, or fail to help, in unifying our conception of nature.
First, consider the absolute theories of time and
space. We are to consider each, namely both time and
space, to be a separate and independent system of
entities, each system known to us in itself and for itself
concurrently with our knowledge of the events of
nature. Time is the ordered succession of durationless
instants ; and these instants are known to us merely as
the relata in the serial relation which is the time
ordering relation, and the time-ordering relation is
merely known to us as relating the instants. Namely,
the relation and the instants are jointly known to us in
our apprehension of time, each implying the other.
W.N. 3
This is the absolute theory of time. Frankly, I con

fess that it seems to me to be very unplausible. I cannot
in my own knowledge find anything corresponding to
the bare tirn.e of the absolute theory. Time is known to
me as an abstraction from the passage of events . The
fundamental fact which renders this abstraction possible
is the passing of nature, its development, its creative
advance, and combined with this act is another charac
f
teristic of nature, namely the extensive relation between
events. These two facts, namely the passage of events
and the extension of events over each other, are in my
opinion the qualities from which time and space originate
as abstractions. But this is anticipating my own later
speculations.
Meanwhile, returning to the absolute theory, we are
to suppose that time is known to us independently of
any eveJ?.tS in time. What happens in time occupies time.
This reiation of events to the time occupied, namely
this relation of occupation, is a fundamental relation of
nature to time. Thus the theory requires that we are
aware of two fundamental relations, the time-ordering
relation between instants, and the time-occupation
relation between instants of time and states of nature
which happen at those instants .
There are two considerations which lend powerful
support to the reigning theory of absolute time. In
the first place time extends beyond natur�. Our thoughts
are in time. Accordingly it seems impossible to derive
time merely from relations between elements of nature.
For in that case temporal relations could not relate
thoughts. Thus, to use a metaphor, time would ap
parently have deeper roots in reality than has nature.
For we can imagine thoughts related in time without
11] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 3 5
any perception of nature . For example we can imagine

one of Milton's angels with thoughts succeeding each
other in time, who does not happen to have noticed
that the Almighty has created space and set therein a
material universe. As a matter of fact I think that Milton
set space on the same absolute level as time. But that
need not disturb the illustration. In the second place
it is difficult to derive the true serial character of time
from the relative theory. Each instant is irrevocable. It
can never recur by the very character of time. But if
on the relative theory an instant of time is simply the
state of nature at that time, and the time-ordering
relation is simply the relation between such states , then
the irrevocableness of time would seem to mean that
an actual state of all nature can never return. I admit
it seems unlikely that there should ever be such a
recurrence down to the smallest particular. But
extreme unlikeliness is not the point. Our ignorance is
so abysmal that our judgments of likeliness and un
likeliness of future events hardly count. The real point

is that the exact recurrence of a state of nature seems
merely unlikely, while the recurrence of an instant of
time violates our whole concept of time-order. The
instants of time which have passed, are passed, and can
never be again.
Any alternative theory of time must reckon with these
two considerations which are buttresses of the absolute
theory. But I will not now continue their discussion.
The absolute theory of space is analogous to the
corresponding theory of time, but the reasons for its
maintenance are weaker. Space, on this theory, is a
system of extensionless points which are the relata in
space-ordering relations which can technically be com-
3-:1
THE COKCEPT OF NATURE (CH.
bined into one relation. This relation does not arrange
the points in one linear series analogously to the simple
metho d of the time-ordering relation for instants. The
essential logical characteristics of this relation frorn
which all the properties of space spring are expressed
by mathematicians in the a..xioms of geometry. From
these axioms 1 as framed by modern mathematicians
the whole science of geometry can be deduced by the
strictest logical reasoning. The details of these axioms
do not no\v concern us. The points and the relations
are j ointly knovvn to us in our apprehension of space,
each implying the other. What happens �j.n space,
occupies space. This relation of occupation is not
usually stated for events but for objects. For example,
Pompey,'s statue would be said to occupy space, but not
the event which was the assassination of Julius Caesar.
In this I think that ordinary usage is unfortunate, and
I hold that the relations of events to space and to time
are in all respects analogous . But here I am intruding
my own opinions which are to be discussed in subse
quent lectures. Thus the theory of absolute space
requires that we are aware of two fundamental relations,
the space-ordering relation, which holds between points,
and the space-occupation relation between points of
space and material objects.
This theory lacks the two main supports of the corre
sponding theory of absolute time. In the first place space
does not extend beyond nature in the sense that time
seems to do. Our thoughts do not seem to occupy space
in quite the same intimate way in which they occupy
time. For example, I have been thinking in a r�om, and
1 Cf. (for example) Projective Geometry by Veblen and Young,

vol. i. 1910, vol. ii. 1917, Ginn and Company, Boston, U.SA.
n] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 3 7
to that extent my thoughts are in space. But it seems

nonsense to ask how much volume of the room they
occupied, whether it \Vas a cubic foot or a cubic inch ;
whereas the same thoughts occupy a determinate dura
tion of time, say, from eleven to twelve on a certain date.
Thus whereas the relations of a relative theory of
time are required to relate thoughts, it does not seem so
obvious that the relations of a relative theory of space
are required to relate them. The connexion of thought
with space seems to have a certain character of indirect
ness which appears to be lacking in the connexion of
·
thought with time.

Again the irrevocableness of time does not seem to
have any parallel for space. Space, on the relative theory,
is the outcome of certain relations between objects
commonly said to be in space ; and whenever there are
the objects, so related, there is the space. No difficulty
.
seems to arise like that of the inconvenient instants of

time which might conceivably turn up again when we
thought that we had done with them.
The absolute theory of space is not now generally
popular. The kno\vledge of bare space, as a system of
entities known to us in itself and for itself independently
of our knowledge of the events in nature, does not seem
to correspond to anything in our experience. Space,
like time, would appear to be an abstraction from events.
According to my own theory it only differentiates
itself from time at a somewhat developed stage of the
abstractive process. The more usual way of expressing
the relational theory of space would be to consider space
as an abstraction from the relations between material
objects.
Suppose now we assume absolute time and absolute
space. What bearing has this assumption on the con

cept of nature as bifurcated into causal nature and
apparent nature ? Undoubtedly the separation between
the two natures is now greatly mitigated. We can pro
vide them with t\\�o systems of relations in common ; for
both natures can be presumed to occupy the same space
and the same time. The theory now is this : Causal events
occupy certain periods of the absolute time and occupy
certain positions of the absolute space. These events
influence a mind 'vhich thereupon perceives certain
apparent events which occupy certain periods in the
absolute time and occupy certain positions of the
absolute space ; and the periods and positions occupied
by the apparent events bear a determinate relation to
the periods and positions occupied by the causal events.
Furthermore definite causal events produce for the
mind definite apparent events . Delusions are apparent
events which appear in temporal periods and spatial
positions without the intervention of these causal
events which are proper for influencing of the mind to
their perception.
The whole theory is perfectly logical. In these dis
cussions we cannot hope to drive an unsound theory t o
a logical contradiction. A reasoner, apart from mere
slips, only involves himself in a contradiction when he
is shying at a reductio ad absurdum. The substantial
reason for rejecting a philosophical theory is the ' ab
surdum ' to which it reduces us. In the case of the
philosophy of natural science the ' absurdum ' can only
be that our perceptual knowledge has not the character
assigned to it by the theory. If our opponent affirms
that his knowledge has that character, we can only
after making doubly sure that we understand each
11] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 39
other-agree to differ. Accordingly the first duty of

an expositor in stating a theory in which he disbelieves
is to exhibit it as logical. It is not there where his
trouble lies.
Let me summarise the previously stated ; objections
to this theory of nature. In the first place it seeks for
the cause of the knowledge of the thing known instead
of seeking for the character of the thing known :
secondly it assumes a knowledge of time in itself apart
from events related in time : thirdly it assumes a know
ledge of space in itself apart from events related in
space. There are in addition to these objections other
flaws in the theory.
Some light is thrown on the artificial status of causal
nature in this theory by asking, why causal nature is
presumed to occupy time and space. This really raises
the fundamental question as to what characteristics
causal nature should have in common with apparent
nature. Why-on this theory-should the cause which
influences the mind to perception have any character
istics in common with the effluent apparent nature ?
In particular, why should it be in space ? Why should
it be in time ? And more generally, What do we
know about mind which would allow us to infer any
particular characteristics of a cause which should in
fluence mind to particular effects ?
The transcendence of time beyond nature gives some
slight reason for presuming that causal nature should
occupy time. For if the mind occupies periods of time,
there would seem to be some vague reason for assuming
that influencing causes occupy the same periods of
time, or at least, occupy periods which are strictly
related to the mental periods. But if the mind does not
occupy volumes of space, there seems to be no reason

why causal nature should occupy any volumes of space.
Thus space would seem to be merely apparent in the
same sense as apparent nature is merely apparent.
Accordingly if science is really investigating causes
which operate on the mind, it would seem to be entirely
on the wrong tack in presuming that the causes which
it is seeking for have spatial relations. Furthermore
there is nothing else in our knowledge analogous to
these causes which influence the mind to perception.
Accordingly, beyond the rashly presumed fact that they
occupy time, there is really no ground by which we can
determine any point of their character. They must
remain for ever unkno�-n.
Now I assume as an axiom that science is not a
fairy tale. It is not engaged in decking out unknowable
entities with arbitrary and fantastic properties. What
then is it that science is doing, granting that it is
effecting something of importance ? My answer is that
it is determining the character of things known, namely
the character of apparent nature. But we may drop the
term ' apparent ' ; for there is but one nature, namely
the nature which is before us in perceptual knowledge.
The characters which science discerns in nature are
subtle characters, not obvious at first sight. They are
relations of relations and characters of characters. But
for all their subtlety they are stamped with a certain
simplicity which makes their consideration essential in
unravelling the complex relations between characters
of more perceptive insistence.
The fact that the bifurcation of nature into causal and
apparent components does not express what we mean
by our knowledge is brought before us when we realise
u) THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 41
our thoughts in any discussion of the causes of our

perceptions. For example, the fire is burning and we
see a red coal. This is explained in science by radiant
energy from the coal entering our eyes. But in seeking
for such an explanation we are not asking what are the
sort of occurrences which are fitted to cause a mind to
see red. The chain of causation is entirely different. The
mind is cut out altogether. The real question is, When
red is found in nature, what else is found there also ?
Namely we are asking for an analysis of the accom
paniments in nature of the discovery of red in nature.
In a subsequent lecture I shall expand this line of
thought. I simply draw attention to it here in order to
point out that the wave-theory of light has not been
adopted because waves are just the sort of things which
ought to make a mind perceive colours. This is no part
of the evidence which has ever been adduced for the
wave-theory, yet on the causal theory of perception, it
is really the only relevant part. In other words, science
is not discussing the causes of knowledge, but the
coherence of knowledge. The understanding which is
sought by science is an understanding of relations
within nature.
So far I have discussed the bifurcation of nature in
connexion with the theories of absolute time and of
absolute space. My reason has been that the intro
duction of the relational theories only weakens the case
for bifurcation, and I wished to discuss this case on
its strongest grounds.
For instance, suppose we adopt the relational theory
of space. Then the space in which apparent nature is set
is the expression of certain relations between the appa
rent objects. It is a set of apparent relations between
THE CONCEPT O F NATURE (CH.
apparent relata. Apparent nature is the dream, and the
apparent relations of space are dream relations, and the
space is the dream space. Similarly the space which
in
causal nature is set is the expression of certain rela
tions between the causal objects . It is the expression
of certain facts about the causal activity which is going
on behind the scenes. Accordingly causal space belongs
to a different order of reality to apparent space. Hence
there is no pointwise connexion between the two and
it is meaningless to say that the molecules of the grass
are in any place which has a determinate spatial relation
to the place occupied by the grass which we see. This
conclusion is very paradoxical and makes nonsense of
all scientific phraseology. The case is even worse if we
admit the relativity of time. For the same arguments
apply, and break up time into the dream time and causal
time which belong to different orders of reality.
I have however been discussing an extreme form of
the bifurcation theory. It is, as I think, the most
defensible form. But its very definiteness makes it the
more evidently obnoxious to criticism. The intermediate
form allows that the nature we are discussing is always
the nature directly known, and so far it rejects the
bifurcation theory. But it holds that there are psychic
additions to nature as thus known, and that these
additions are in no proper sense part of nature. For
example, we perceive the red billiard ball at its proper
time, in its proper place, with its proper motion, with
its proper hardness, and with its proper inertia. But
its redness and its warmth, and the sound of the click
as a cannon is made off it are psychic additions, namely,
secondary qualities which are only the mind's way
of perceiving nature. This not only the vaguely
is
n] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 43
prevalent theory, but is, I believe, the historical form of

the bifurcation theory in so far as it is derived from
philosophy. I shall call it the theory of psychic additions.
This theory of psychic additions is a sound common
sense theory which lays immense stress on the obvious
reality of time, space, solidity and inertia, but distrusts
the minor artistic additions of colour, warmth and sound.
The theory is the outcome of common-sense in
retreat . It arose in an epoch when the transmission
theories of science were being elaborated. For example,
colour is the result of a transmission from the material
object to the perceiver's eye ; and what is thus trans
mitted is not colour. Thus colour is not part of the
reality of the material object. Similarly for the same
reason sounds evaporate from nature. Also warmth is
due to the transfer of something which is not tempera
ture. Thus we are left with spatio-temporal positions,
and what I may term. the ' pushiness ' of the body. This
lands us to eighteenth and nineteenth century material
ism, namely, the belief that what is real in nature is
matter, in time and in space and with inertia.
Evidently a distinction in quality has been presup
posed separating off some perceptions due to touch from
other perceptions. These touch-perceptions are per
ceptions of the real inertia, whereas the other perceptions
are psychic additions which must be explained on the
causal theory. This distinction is the product of an
epoch in which physical science has got ahead of medical

pathology and of physiology. Perceptions of push are
just as much the outcome of transmission as are per
ceptions of colour. When colour is perceived the nerves
of the body are excited in one way and transmit their
message towards the brain, and when push is perceived
THE CONCEPT O F NATURE [CH.
other nerves of the body are excited in another way and

transmit their message to\vards the brain. The message
of the one set is not the conveyance of colour, and the
message of the other set is not the conveyance of push.
But in one case colour is perceived and in the other
case the push due to the object. If you snip certain
nerves, there is an end to the perception of colour ; and
if you snip certain other nerves, there is an end to the
perception of push. It would appear therefore that any
reasons which should remove colour from the reality of
nature should also operate to remove inertia.
Thus the attempted bifurcation of apparent nature
into two parts of which one part is both causal for its
own appearance and for the appearance of the other
part, which is purely apparent, fails owing to the failure
to establish any fundamental distinction between our
ways of knowing about the two parts of nature as thus
partitioned . I am not denying that the feeling of
muscular effort historically led to the formulation of
the concept of force. But this historical fact does not
warrant us in assigning a superior reality in nature to
material inertia over colour or sound. So far as reality
is concerned all our sense-perceptions are in the same
boat, and must be treated on the same principle. The
evenness of treatment is exactly what this compromise
theory fails to achieve.
The bifurcation theory however dies hard. The
reason is that there really is a difficulty to be faced in
relating within the same system of entities the redness
of the fire with the agitation of the molecules. In another
lecture I \vill give my own explanation of the origin_ of
the difficulty and of its solution .
Another favourite solution, the most attenuated form
nj THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 45
which the bifurcation theory assumes, is to maintain

that the molecules and ether of science are purely
conceptual. Thus there is but one nature, namely
apparent nature, and atoms and ether are merely names
for logical terms in conceptual formulae of calculation .
But what is a formula of calculation ? It is presum
ably a statement that something or other is true for
natural occurrences. Take the simplest of all formulae,
Two and t\vo make four. This-so far as it applies to
nature-asserts that if you take two natural entities,
and then again t��o other natural entities, the combined
class contains four natural entities. Such formulae
which are true for any entities cannot result in the
production of the concepts of atoms. Then again there
are formulae which assert that there are entities in
nature with such and such special properties, say, for
example, with the properties of the atoms of hydrogen.
Now if there are no such entities, I fail to see how
any statements about them can apply to nature. For
example, the assertion that there is green cheese in the
moon cannot be a premiss in any deduction of scientific
importance, unless indeed the presence of green cheese
in the moon has been verified by experiment. The
current answer to these objections is that, though atoms
are merely conceptual, yet they are an interesting and
picturesque way of saying something else which is true
of nature. But surely if it is something else that you
mean, for heaven's sake say it. Do away with this
elaborate machinery of a conceptual nature which
consists of assertions about things which don't exist in
order to convey truths about things which do exist.
I am maintaining the obvious position that scientific
laws, if they are true, are statements about entities
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH.
which we obtain knowledge of as being in nature ; and

that, if the entities to which the statements refer are
not to be found in nature, the statements about them
have no relevance to any purely natural occurrence.
Thus the molecules and electrons of scientific theory
are, so far as science has correctly formulated its laws,
each of them factors to be formd in nature. The elec
trons are only hypothetical in so far as we are not quite
certain that the electron theory is true. But their hypo
thetical character does not arise from the essential nature
of the theory in itself after its truth has been granted.
Thus at the end of this somewhat complex discussion,
we return to the position which was affirmed at its
beginning. The primary task of a philosophy of natural
science is to elucidate the concept of nature, considered
as one complex fact for knowledge, to exhibit the funda
mental entities and the fundamental relations between
entities in terms of which all laws of nature have to be
stated, and to secure that the entities and relations thus
exhibited are adequate for the expression of all the
relations between entities which occur in nature.
The third requisite, namely that of adequacy, is the
one over which all the difficulty occurs . The ultimate
data of science are commonly assumed to be time, space,
material, qualities of material, and relations between
material objects. But data as they occur in the scientific
laws do not relate all the entities which present them
selves in our perception of nature. For example, the
wave-theory of light is an excellent well-established
theory ; but unfortunately it leaves out colour as per
ceived. Thus the perceived' redness--or, other colour
has to be cut out of nature and made into the reaction
of the mind under the impulse of the actual events of
u) THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 47
nature. In other words this concept of the fundamental

relations within nature is inadequate. Thus we have
to bend our energies to the enunciation of adequate
concepts .
But in so doing, are we not in fact endeavouring to
solve a metaphysical problem ? I do not think so. We
are merely endeavouring to exhibit the type of relations
which hold benveen the entities which we in fact per
ceive as in nature . \Ve are not called on to make any
pronouncement as to the psychological relation of
subjects to objects or as to the status of either in the
realm of reality. It is true that the issue of our endeavour
may provide material which is relevant evidence for a
discussion on that question. It can hardly fail to do so.
But it is only evidence, and is not itself the metaphysical
discussion. In order to make clear the character of this
further discussion which is out of our ken, I will set
before you two quotations. One is from Schelling and
I extract the quotation from the work of the Russian
philosopher Lossky which has recently been so ex
cellently translated into English 1 ' In the " Philosophy
-
of Nature " I considered the subject-object called nature

in its activity of self-constructing. In order to under
stand it, we must rise to an intellectual intuition of nature.
The empiricist does not rise thereto, and for this reason
in all his explanations it is always he himself that proves
to be constructing nature. It is no wonder, then, that
his construction and that which was to be constructed
so seldom coincide. A Natur-philosoph raises nature to
independence, and makes it construct itself, and he
never feels, therefore, the necessity of opposing nature
1 The Intuitive Basis of Kno'Wledge, byN. 0. Lossky, transl. by
Mrs Duddington, Macmillan and Co., 1919.
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH. II
as constructed (i.e. as experience) to real nature, or of
correcting the one by means of the other.'
The other quotation is from a paper read by the Dean
of St Paul's before the Aristotelian Society in May of
1919. Dr Inge's paper is entitled ' Platonism and
Human Im.mortality,' and in it there occurs the following
statement : ' To sum up. The Platonic doctrine of im
mortality rests on the independence of the spiritual world.
The spiritual 'vorld is not a world of unrealised ideals,
over against a real "'·orld of unspiritual fact. It is, on
the contrary, the real world , of which we have a true
though very incomplete knowledge, over against a world
of common experience which, a complete whole, is
as
not real, since it is compacted out of miscellaneous data,

not all on the same level, by the help of the imagination.
There is no '\Vorld corresponding to the world of our
common experience. Nature makes abstractions for us,
deciding what range of vibrations we are to see and hear,
what things we are to notice and remember.'
I have cited these statements because both of them
deal with topics which, though they lie outside the range
of our discussion, are always being confused with it.
The reason is that they lie proximate to our field of
thought, and are topics which are of burning interest
to the metaphysically minded. It is difficult for a
philosopher to realise that anyone really is confining
his discussion within the limits that I have set before
you. The boundary is set up just where he is beginning
to get excited. But I submit to you that among the
necessary prolegomena for philosophy and for natural
science is a thorough understanding of the types of
entities, and types of relations among those entities,
which are disclosed to us in our perceptions of nature.
C HAPTER I I I
T i l\! E
THE two previous lectures of this course have been
mainly critical. In the present lecture I propose to
enter upon a survey of the kinds of entities which are
posited for knowledge in sense-a"\-vareness . l\!y purpose
is to investigate the sorts of relations which these entities
of various kinds can bear to each other. A classification
of natural entities is the beginning of natural philosophy.
To-day we commence with the consideration of Time.
In the first place there is posited for us a general
fact : namely, something is going on ; there is an oc
currence for definition.
This general fact at once yields for our apprehension
two factors, which I will name, the ' discerned ' and the
' discernible.' The discerned is comprised of those
elements of the general fact which are discriminated
with their own individual peculiarities. It is the field
directly perceived. But the entities of this field have
relations to other entities which are not particularly
discriminated in this individual way. These other
entities are known merely as the relata in relation to the
entities of the discerned field. Such an entity is merely
a ' something ' which has such-and-such definite rela
tions to some definite entity or entities in the discerned
field. As being thus related, they are-owing to the
particular character of these relations-known as
elements of the general fact which is going on. But we
are not aware of them except as entities fulfilling the
functions of relata in these relations.
Thus the complete general fact, posited as occurring,
comprises both sets of entities, namely the entities
W. N. 4
perceived in their own individuality and other entities
merely apprehended as relata without further definition.
This complete general fact is the discernible and it
comprises the discerned. The discernible is all nature as
disclosed in that sense-awareness, and extends beyond
and comprises all of nature as actually discriminated
or discerned in that sense-awareness. The discerning
or discrimination of nature is a peculiar a'vareness of
special factors in nature in respect to their peculiar cha
racters . But the factors in nature of which we have this
peculiar sense-awareness are known as not comprising
all the factors \vhich together form the whole complex
of related entities within the general fact there for
discernment. This peculiarity of knowledge is what I
call its une:xhaustive character. This character may be
metaphorically described by the statement that nature
as perceived always has a ragged edge. For example,
there is a world beyond the room to which our sight is
confined known to us as completing the space-relations
of the entities discerned within the room. The junction
of the interior world of the room with the exterior world
beyond is never sharp. Sounds and subtler factors
disclosed in sense-awareness float in from the outside.
Every type of sense has its own set of discriminated
entities which are known to be relata in relation with
entities not discriminated by that sense. For example we
see something which we do not touch and we touch
something which we do not see, and we have a general
sense of the space-relations between the entity dis
closed in sight and the entity disclosed in touch. Thus
in the first place each of these two entities is known as
a relatum in a general system of space-relations and
in the second place the particular mutual relation of
III) TI1\1E 51
these two entities as related to each other in this general

system is determined. But the general system of space
relations relating the entity discriminated by sight
with that discriminated by sight is not dependent on
the peculiar character of the other entity as reported
by the alternative sense. For example, the space
relations of the thing seen would have necessitated an
entity as a relatum in the place of the thing touched
even although certain elements of its character had not
been disclosed by touch. Thus apart from the touch
an entity with a certain specific relation to the thing seen
would have been disclosed by sense-awareness but not
otherwise discriminated in :respect to its individual
character. An entity merely known as spatially related
to some discerned entity is what we mean by the bare
idea of ' place.' The concept of place marks the dis
closure in sense-awareness of entities in nature known
merely by their spatial relations to discerned entities.
It is the disclosure of the discernible by means of its
relations to the discerned.
This disclosure of an entity as a relatum without
further specific discrimination of quality is the basis of
our concept of significance. In the above example the
thing seen was significant, in that it disclosed its spatial
relations to other entities not necessarily otherwise
entering into consciousness. Thus significance is re
latedness, but it is relatedness with the emphasis on one
end only of the relation.
For the ·sake of simplicity I have confined the argu
ment to spatial relations ; but the same considerations
apply to temporal relations. The concept of ' period of
time ' marks the disclosure in sense-awareness of entities
in nature known merely by their temporal relations to
·-�
discerned entities. Still further, this separation ef the

ideas of space and time has merely been adopted for the
sake of gaining simplicity of exposition by conformity
to current language. What we discern is the specific
character of a place through a period of time. This is
what I mean by an ' event. ' We discern some specific
character of an event. But in discerning an event we
are also a\vare of its significance as a relatum in the struc
ture of events. This structure of events is the complex
of events as related by the two relations of extension and
cogredience. The most simple expression of the proper
ties of this structure are to be found in our spatial and
temporal relations. A discerned event is known as related
in this structure to other events whose specific characters
are othenvise not disclosed in that immediate awareness
except so far as that they are relata within the structure.
The disclosure in sense-awareness of the structure
of events classifies events into those which are discerned
in respect to some further individual character and those
which are not otherwise disclosed except as elements
of the structure. These signified events must include
events in the remote past as \vell as events in the
future. We are aware of these as the far off periods of
unbounded time . But there is another classification of
events which is also inherent in sense-awareness. These
are the events which share the immediacy of the im
mediately present discerned events. These are the events
whose characters together with those of the discerned
events comprise all nature present for discernment .
They form the complete general fact which is all nature
now present as disclosed ·in that sense-awareness. It is
in this second classification of events that the differentia
tion of space from time takes its origin. The germ of
III] TIME 53
space is to be found in the mutual relati9ns of events

within the immediate general fact \Vhich is all nature
now discernible, namely within the one event which is
the totality of present nature . The relations of other
events to this totality of nature form the texture of time.)
The unity of this general present fact is expressed by
the concept of simultaneity. The general fact is the
whole simultaneous occurrence of nature \vhich is now
for sense-awareness. This general fact is \vhat I have
called the discernible. But in future I will call it a
' duration,' meaning thereby a certain 'vhole of nature
which is limited only by the property of being a simul
taneity. Further in obedience to the principle of com
prising within nature the \\·hole terminus of sense-aware
ness, simultaneity must not be conceived as an irrelevant
mental concept imposed upon nature. Our sense
awareness posits for immediate discernment a certain
whole, here called a ' duration ' ; thus a duration is a
definite natural entitv. A duration is discriminated
_,
as
a complex of partial events, and the natural entities
which are components of this complex are thereby said
to be ' simultaneous with this duration . ' Also in a
derivative sense they are simultaneous with each other
in respect to this duration. Thus simultaneity is a
definite natural relation. The word ' duration ' is perhaps
unfortunate in so far as it suggests a mere abstract
stretch of time. This is not what I mean. A duration is
a concrete slab of nature limited by simultaneity which
is an essential factor disclosed in sense-awareness..
Nature is a process. As in the case of everything
directly exhibited in sense-awareness there can be no
explanation of this characteris��
"
;l
nature . All that
can be done is to use language w_jKch may speculatively
demonstrate it, and also to express the relation of this

factor in nature to other factors.
It is an exhibition of the process of nature that each
duration happens and pass�s. The process of nature can
also be termed the passage of nature. I definitely refrain
at this stage from using the word ' time,' since the
measurable time of science and of civilised life generally
merely exhibits some aspects of the more fundamental
fact of the passage of nature. I believe that in this
doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson, though he
uses ' time ' for the fundamental fact which I call the
' passage of nature.' Also the passage of nature is ex
hibited equally in spatial transition as well as in temporal
transition. It is in virtue of its passage that nature is
always moving on. It is involved in the meaning of this
property of ' moving on ' that not only is any act of sense
awareness just that act and no other, but the terminus
of each act is also unique and is the terminus of no other
act. Sense-awareness seizes its only chance and presents
for knowledge something which is for it alone.
There are two senses in which the terminus of sense
awareness is unique. It is unique for the sense-aware
ness of an individual mind and it is unique for the
sense-a�areness of all minds which are operating under
natural conditions. There is an important distinction
between the two cases. (i) For one mind not only is the
discerned component of the general fact exhibited in
any act of sense-awareness distinct from the discerned
component of the general fact exhibited in any other
act of sense-awareness of that mind, but the two corre
sponding durations which are respectively related by
simultaneity to the two discerned components are
necessarily distinct. This is an exhibition of the temporal
III) TIME 55
passage of nature ; namely, one duration has passed into

the other. Thus not only is the passage of nature an
essential character of nature in its role of the terminus of
sense-a\.vareness, but it is also essential for sense
awareness in itself. It is this truth which makes time
appear to extend beyond nature. But what extends
beyond nature to mind is not the serial and measurable
time, which exhibits merely the character of passage in
na�ure, but the quality of passage itself which is in no
'vay measurable except so far as it obtains in nature .
That is to say, ' passage ' is not measurable except as
it occurs in �ature in connexion with extension. In
passage we reach a connexion of nature \vith the ultimate
metaphysical reality. The quality of passage in dura
tions is a particular exhibition in nature of a quality
which extends beyond nature . For example passage is
a quality not only of nature, which is the thing known,
but also of sense-awareness which is the procedure of
knowing. Durations have all the reality that nature has,
though what that may be we need not now determine.
The measurableness of time is derivative from the
properties of durations. So also is the serial character
of time. We shall find that there ar� in nature competing
serial time-systems derived from different families of
durations. These are a peculiarity of the character of
passage as it is found in nature. This character has the
reality of nature, but we must not necessarily transfer
natural time to extra-natural entities. (ii) Fortwo minds,
the discerned components of the general facts exhibited
in their respective acts of sense-awareness must be
different. For each mind, in its awareness of nature is
aware of a certain complex of related natural entities
in their relations t� the living body as a focus. But the
associated durations may be identical. Here we are

touching on that character of the passage nature which
issues in the spatial relations of simultaneous bodies.
This possible identity of the durations in the case of
the sense-a\vareness of distinct minds is what binds
into one nature the private experiences of sentient
beings. We are here consi4ering the spatial side of the
passage of nature. Passage in this aspect of it also seems
to extend beyond nature to mind.
It is important to distinguish simultaneity from in
stantaneousness. I lay no stress on the mere current
usage of the two terms. There are two concepts which
I want to distinguish, and one I call simultaneity and
the other instantaneousness. I hope that the words are
judiciously chosen ; but it really does not matter so
long as I succeed in explaining my meaning. Simul
taneity is the property of a group of natural elements
which in some sense are components of a duration.
A duration can be all nature present the immediate
as
fact posited by sense-awareness. A duration retains

within itself the passage of nature. There are within it
antecedents and consequents which are also durations
which may be the complete specious presents of quicker
consciousnesses. In other words a duration retains
temporal thickness. Any concept of all nature as imme
diately known is always a concept of some duration
though it may be enlarged in its temporal thickness
beyond the possible specious present of any being known
to us as existing within nature . Thus simultaneity is an
ultimate factor in nature,immediate for$ense-awareness.
Instantaneousness is a complex 16gical concept of a
procedure in thought by which constructed logical
entities are produced for the sake of the simple ex-
III] TI:l\iE 57
pression in thought of properties o f nature. Instan
taneousness is· the concept of all nature at an instant,
\vhere an instant is conceived as deprived of all tem
poral extension. For example we conceive of the dis
tribution of matter in space at an instant. This is a very
useful concept � science especially in applied mathe
matics ; but it is � complex idea so far as concerns
its connexions with the immediate facts of sense
awareness. There is no su �hing as nature at an instant
posited by sense-aware�e � What sense-awareness
delivers over for knowledge is nature through a period.
Accordingly nature at an instant, since it is not itself
a natural entity, must be defined in terms of genuine
natural entities. Unless we do so, our science, which
employs the concept of instantaneous nature, must
abandon all claim to be founded upon observation.
I will use the term ' moment ' to mean ' all nature at an
instant.' A moment, in the sense in which the term is
here used, has no temporal extension , and is in this re
spect to be contrasted with a duration which has such
extension. What is directly yielded to our knowledge by
sense-awareness is a duration. Accordingly we have now
to explain how moments are derived from durations, and
also to explain the purpose served by their introduction.
A moment is a limit to which we. approach as we
confine attention to durations of minimum extension.
Natural relations among the ingredients of a duration
gain in complexity as we consider durations of increasing
temporal extension . Accordingly there is an approach
to ideal simplicity as we approach an ideal diminution
of extension.
The word ' limit ' has a precise signification in the
logic of number and even in the logic of non-numerical
one-dimensional series. As used here it is so far a mere

metaphor, and it is necessary to explain directly the
concept which it is meant to indicate.
Durations can have the two-termed relational pro
perty of extending one over the other. Thus the duration
which is all nature during a certain minute extends over
the duration which is all nature during the 30th second
of that minute. This relation of ' extending over '
' extension ' as I shall call it-is a fundamental natural
relation whose field comprises more than durations. It
is a relation which two limited events can have to each
other. Furthermore as holding between durations the
relation appears to refer to the purely temporal ex
tension. I shall however maintain that the same relation
of extension lies at the base both of temporal and spatial
extension. This discussion can be postponed ; and for
the present we are simply concerned with the relation
of extension as it occurs in its temporal aspect for-the
limited field of durations.
The concept of extension exhibits in thought one side
of the ultimate passage of nature. This relation holds
because of the special character which passage assumes
in nature ; it is the relation which in the case of durations
expresses the properties of ' passing over.' Thus the
duration which was one definite minute passed over the
duration which was its 30th second. The duration of the
30th second was part of thedurationof theminute. I shall
use the terms ' whole ' and ' part ' exclusively in this sense,
that the ' part ' is an event which is extended over by the
other event which is the ' whole., Thus in my nomencla
ture ' whole' and ' part ' refer exclusively to this funda
mental relation of extension ; and accordingly in this
technical usage only events can be either wholes or parts.
III] TIME 59
The continuity of nature arises from extension. Every

event extends over other events, and every event is
extended over by other events. Thus in the special case of
durations which are now the only events directly under
consideration, every duration is part of other durations ;
and every duration has other durations which are
parts of it. Accordingly there are no maximum dura
tions and no minimum durations. Thus there is no
atomic structure of durations, and the perfect definition
of a duration, so as to mark out its individuality and
distinguish it from highly analogous durations over
which it is passing, or which are passing over it, is an
arbitrary postulate of thought. Sense-awareness posits
durations as factors in nature but does not clearly enable
thought to use it as distinguishing the separate indi
vidualities of the entities of an allied group of slightly
differing durations. This is one instance of the in
determinateness of sense-awareness. Exactness is an
ideal of thought, and is only realised in experience by
the selection of a route of approximation.
The absence of maxin1um and minimum durations
does not exhaust the properties of nature which make
up its continuity. The passage of nature involves the
existence of a family of durations. When two durations
belong to the same family either one contains the other,
or they overlap each other in a subordinate duration
without either containing the other ; or they are com
pletely separate. The excluded case is that of durations
overlapping in finite events but not containing a third
duration as a common part.
It is evident that the relation of extension is transitive ;
namely as applied to durations� if duration A is part of
duration B, and duration B is part of duration C, then A
is part of C. Thus the first rnTo cases may be combined

into one and we can say that two durations which
belong to the same family either are such that there are
durations which are parts of both or are completely
separate.
Furthermore the converse of this proposition holds ;
namely, if two durations have other durations which are
parts of both or if the two durations are completely
separate, then they belong to the same family.
The further characteristics of the continuity of
nature-so far as durations are concerned-which has
not yet been formulated arises in connexion with a
family of durations. It can be stated in this way : There
are durations which contain as parts any two durations
of the same family. For example a week contains as
parts any two of its days. It is evident that a containing
duration satisfies the conditions for belonging to the
same family as the two co�tained durations.
We are now prepared to proceed to the definition of
a moment of time. Consider a set of durations all taken
from the same family. Let it have the following pro
perties : (i) of any two members of the set one contains
the other as a part, and (ii) there is no duration which
is a common part of every member of the set.
Now the relation of whole and part is asymmetrical ;
and by this I mean that if A is part of B, then B is not
part of A . Also we have already noted that the relation
is transitive. Accordingly we can easily see that the
durations of any set with the properties just enumerated
must be arranged in a one-dimensional serial order in
which as we descend the series we progressively reach
durations of smaller and smaller temporal extension.
The series may start with any arbitrarily assumed
III] TI�E 61
duration of any temporal extension, but in descending

the series the temporal extension progressively con
tracts and the successive durations are packed one within
the other like the nest of boxes of a Chinese toy. But
the set differs from the toy in this particular : the toy
has a smallest box which forms the end box of its series ;
but the set of durations can have no smallest duration
nor can it converge towards a duration as its limit. For
the parts either of the end duration or of the limit would
be parts of all the durations of the set and thus the
second condition for the set would be violated .
I will call such a set of durations an ' abstractive set '
of durations . It is evident that an abstractive set as we
pass along it converges to the ideal of all nature with
no temporal extension, namely, to the ideal of all nature
at an instant. But this ideal is in fact the ideal of a
nonentity . What the abstractive set is in fact doing is
to guide thought to the consideration of the progressive
simplicity of natural relations as we progressively
diminish the temporal extension of the duration con
sidered. Now the whole point of the procedure is that
the quantitative expressions of these natural properties
do converge to limits though the abstractive set does
not converge to any limiting duration. The laws relating
these quantitative limits are the laws of nature ' at an
instant,' although in truth there is no nature at an
instant and there is only the abstractive &et. Thus an
abstractive set is effectively the entity meant when we
consider an instant of time without temporal extension.
It subserves all the necessary purposes of giving a
definite meaning to the concept of the properties of
nature at an instant. I fully agree that this concept is
fundamental in the expression of physical science. The
difficulty is to express our meaning in terms of the imme

diate deliverances of sense-awareness, and I offer the
above explanation as a complete solution of the problem.
In this explanation a moment is the set of natural
properties reached by a route of approximation. An
abstractive series is a route of approximation. There are
different routes of approximation to the same limiting
set of the properties of nature. In other words there
are different abstractive sets which are to be regarded
as routes of approximation to the same moment.
Accordingly there is a certain amount of technical detail
necessary in explaining the relations of such abstractive
sets with the same convergence and in guarding against
possible exceptional cases. Such details are not suitable
for exposition in these lectures, and I have dealt with
them fully elsewhere1•
It is more convenient for technical purposes to look
on a moment as being the class of all abstractive sets of
durations with the same convergence. With this defini
tion (provided that we can successfully explain what
we mean by the ' same convergence ' apart from a
detailed knowledge of the set of natural properties
arrived at by approximation) a moment is merely a class·
of sets of durations whose relations of extension in
respect to each other have certain definite peculiarities.
'
We may term these connexions of the component

durations the ' extrinsic ' properties of a moment ; the
' intrinsic ' properties of the moment are the properties
of nature arrived at as a limit as we proceed along any
one of its abstractive sets. These are the properties of
nature ' at that moment,' or ' at that instant.'
1 Cf. An Enquiry concerning the Pn.nciples of Natural Knozcledge,

Cambridge University Press, 1919.
III] Til\lE
The durations \vhich enter into the composition of

a moment all belong to one ffu-iily. Thus there is one
family of moments corresponding to one family of
durations. Also if we take two moments of the same
family, among the durations which enter into the com
position of one moment the smaller durations are
completely separated from the smaller durations which
enter into the composition of the other moment. Thus
the two moments in their intrinsic properties must
exhibit the limits of completely different states of nature.
In this sense the two moments are completely separated.
I will call two moments of the same family ' parallel.'
Corresponding to each duration there are two
moments of the associated family of moments which
are the boundary moments of that duration. A
' boundary moment ' of a duration can be defined in
this way. There are durations of the same family as the
given duration which overlap it but are not contained
in it. Consider an abstractive set of such durations.
Such a set defines a moment which is just as much
without the duration as within it. Such a moment is a
boundary moment of the duration. Also we call upon
our sense-awareness of the passage of nature to inform
us that there are two such boundary moments, namely
the earlier one and the later one. We will call them the
initial and the final boundaries.
There are also moments of the same family such that
the shorter durations in their composition are entirely
separated from the given duration . Such moments will
be said to lie ' outside ' the given duration. Again other
moments of the family are such that the shorter dura
tions in their composition are parts of the given dura
,
tion. Such moments are said to lie ' within the given
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE " (CH.
duration or to ' inhere ' in it. The whole family of parallel

moments is accounted for in this way by reference to
any given duration of the associated family of durations.
Namely, there are moments of the family which lie
without the given duration, there are the two moments
which are the boundary moments of the given duration,
and the moments which lie within the given duration.
Furthermore any nvo moments of the same family are
the boundary moments of some one duration of the
associated family of durations.
It is now possible to define the serial relation of
temporal order among the moments of a family. For
let A and C be any two moments of the family, these
moments are the boundary moments of one duration d
of the associated family, and any moment B which lies
within the duration d will be said to lie between the
moments A and C. Thus the three-termed relation of
' lying-between ' as relating three moments A , B, and C
is completely defined. Also our knowledge of the passage
of nature assures us that this relation distributes the
moments of the family into : a serial order. I abstain
from enumerating the definite properties which secure
this result, I have enumerated them in my recently
published book1 to which I have already referred.
Furthermore the passage of nature enables us to know
that one direction along the series corresponds to
passage into the future and the other direction corre
sponds to retrogression towards the past.
Such an ordered series of moments is what we mean
by time defined as a series. Each element of the series
exhibits an instantaneous state of nature. Evidently this
serial time is the result of an intellectual process of
1 Cf. Enquiry
III) TIME
abstraction. What I have done is to give precise defini

tions of the procedure by which the abstraction is
effected. This procedure is merely a particular case of
the general method which in my book I name the
' method of extensive abstraction.' This serial time is
evidently not the very passage of nature itself. It
exhibits some of the natural properties which flow from
it. The state of nature ' at a moment , has evidently lost
this ultimate quality of passage. Also the temporal
series of moments only retains it as an extrinsic relation
of entities and not as the outcome of the essential being
'
of the terms of the series.
Nothing has yet been said as to the in�asurement of
time. Such measurement does not follow from the
mere serial property of time ; it requires a theory of
congruence which will be considered in a later lecture.
In estimating the adequacy of this definition of the
temporal series as a formulation of experience it is
necessary to discriminate between the crude deliverance
of sense-awareness and our intellectual theories . The
lapse of time is a measurable serial quantity. The whole
of scientific theory depends on this assumption and any
theory of time which fails to provide such a measurable
series stands self-condemned as unable to account for
the most salient fact in experience. Our difficulties only
begin when we ask what it is that is measured. It is
evidently something so fundamental in experience that
we can hardly stand back from it and hold it apart so
as to view it in its own proportions.
We have first to make up our minds whether time is
to be found in nature or nature is to be found in ti.me.
The difficulty of the latter alternative-namely of
making time prior to nature-is that time then becomes
W. H. .5
a metaphysical enigma. What sort of entities are its

instants or its periods ? The dissociation of time from
events discloses to our immediate inspection that the
attempt to set up time as an independent terminus for
knowledge is like the effort to find substance in a shadow.
There is time because there are happenings, and apart
from happenings there is nothing.
. It is necessary however to make a distinction. In
some sense time extends beyond nature. It is not true
that a timeless sense-awareness and a timeless thought
combine to contemplate a timeful nature. Sense-aware
ness and thought are themselves processes as well as
their termini in nature. In other words there is a
passage of sense-awarenes� a�d a passage of thought.
Thus the reign of the quality of p�sage extends beyond
nature. But now the distinction arises betWeen passage
which is fundamental and the temporal series which is
a logical abstraction representing some of the properties
of nature. A temporal series, as we have defined it,
represents merely certain properties of a family of
durations-properties indeed which durations only
possess because of their partaking of the character of
passage, but on the other hand properties which only
durations do possess. Accordingly time in the sense of a
measurable temporal series is a character of nature only,
and does not extend to the processes of thought and of
sense-awareness except bya correlation of these processes
with the temporal series implicated in their procedures.
So far the passage of nature has been considered in
connexion with the passage of durations ; and in this
connexion it is peculiarly associated with temporal
series. We must remember however that the character
of passage is peculiarly associated with the extension of
III] TIME
events, and that from this extension spatial transition

arises just as much as temporal transition. The dis
cussion of this point is reserved for a later lecture but
it is necessary to remember it now that we are pro
ceeding to discuss the application of the concept of
passage beyond nature, othenvise we shall have too
narrow an idea of the essence of passage.
It is necessary to dwell on the subject of sense-aware
ness in this connexion as an example of the way in
which time concerns mind, although measurable time is
a mere abstract from nature and nature is closed to mind.
Consider sense-awareness-not its terminus which
is nature, but sense-awareness in itself as a procedure
of mind. Sense-awareness is a relation of mind to
�
nature. Accordingly we are now considering mind as

a relatum in sense-awareness .. For mind there is the
immediate sense-awareness and there is memory. The
distinction between memory and the present immediacy
has a double bearing. On the one hand it discloses that
mind is not impartially aware of all those natural
duratiohs to which it is related by awareness. Its
awareness shares in the passage of nature. We can
imagine a being whose awareness, conceived as his
private possession, suffers no transition, although the
terminus of his awareness is our own transient nature .
There is n o essential reason why memory should not
be raised to the vividness of the present fact ; and then
from the side of mind, What is the difference between
the present and the past ? Yet with this hypothesis we
can also suppose that the vivid remembrance and the
present fact are posited in awareness as in their temporal
serial order. Accordingly we must admit that though
we can imagine that mind in the operation of sense-
s-2
awareness might be free from any character of passage,

yet in point of fact our experience of sense-awareness
exhibits our minds as partaking in this character.
On the other hand the mere fact of memory is an
escape from transience. In memory the past is present.
It is not present as overleaping the temporal succession
of nature, but it is present as an immediate fact for
the mind. Accordingly memory is a disengagement of
the mind from the mere passage of nature ; for what has
passed for nature has not passed for mind.
Furthermore the distinction between memory and
the immediate present is not so clear as it is conventional
to suppose. There is an intellectual theory of time as a
moving knife-edge, exhibiting a present fact without
temporal extension. This theory arises from the concept
of an ideal exactitude of observation. Astronomical
observations are successively refined to be exact t o
tenths, to hundredths, and to thousandths of seconds.
But the final refinements are arrived at by a system of
averaging, and even then present us with a stretch of
time as a margin of error. Here error is +uerely a con
ventional term to express the fact that the character of
experience does not accord with the ideal of thought.
I have already explained how the concept of a moment
conciliates the observed fact with this ideal ; namely,
there is a limiting simplicity in the quantitative ex
pression of the properties of durations, which is
arrived at by considering any one of the abstractive
sets included in the moment. In other words the
extrinsic character of the moment as an aggregate of
durations has associated with it the intrinsic character
of the moment which is the limiting expression of
natural properties .
III) TIME
Thus the character of a moment and the ideal of

exactness which it enshrines do not in any \Vay weaken
the position that the ultimate terminus of a\vareness is
a duration with temporal thickness. This immediate
duration is not clearly marked out for our apprehension.
Its earlier boundary is blurred by a fading into memory,
and its later boundary is blurred by an emergence from
anticipation. There is no sharp distinction either bet\veen
memory and the present immediacy or bet\.veen the
present immediacy and anticipation. The present is a
wavering breadth of boundary between the two ex
tremes. Thus our own sense-awareness with its extended
present has some of the character of the sense-awareness
of the imaginary being whose mind was free from passage
and who contemplated all nature as an immediate fact .
Our own present has its antecedents and its consequents,
and for the imaginary being all nature has its ante
cedent and its consequent durations. Thus the only
difference in this respect between us and the imaginary
being is that for him all nature shares in the immediacy
of our present duration.
The conclusion of this discussion is that so far as
sense-awareness is concerned there is a passage of
mind which is distinguishable from the passage of
nature though closely allied with it. We may speculate,
if we like, that this alliance of the passage of mind with
the passage of nature arises from their both sharing in
some ultimate character of passage which dominates
a11 being. But this is a speculation in which we have
no concern. The immediate deduction which is suffi
cient for us is that--so far as sense-awareness is con
cerned-mind is not in time or in space in the same
sense in which the events of nature are in time, but
that it is derivatively in time and in space by reason of

the peculiar alliance of its passage with the passage
of nature. Thus mind is in time and in space in a sense
peculiar to itself. This has been a long discussion to
arrive at a very simple and obvious conclusion. We all
feel that in some sense our minds are here in this room
and at this time. But it is not quite in the same sense
as that in which the events of nature which are the
existences of our brains have their spatial and temporal
positions. The fundamental distinction to remember is
that :ilnmediacy for sense-awareness is not the same as
instantaneousness for nature. This last conclusion bears
on the next discussion with which I will terminate this
lecture. This question can be formulated thus, Can
alternative temporal series be found in nature ?
A few years ago such a suggestion would have been
put aside as being fantastically impossible. It would have
had no bearing on the science then current, and was
akin to no ideas which had ever entered into the dreams
of philosophy. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
accepted as their natural philosophy a certain circle of
concepts which were as rigid and definite as those of
the philosophy of the middle ages, and were accepted
with as little critical research. I will call this natural
philosophy ' materialism.' Not only were men of science
materialists, but also adherents of all schools of philo
sophy. The idealists only differed from the philosophic
materialists on question of the alignment of nature in
reference to mind. But no one had any doubt that the
philosophy of nature considered in itself was of the
type which I have called materialism. It is the philo
sophy which I have already examined in my two
lectures of this course preceding the present one. It
III) TIME
can be summarised as the belief that nature is an aggre
gate of material and that this material exists in some
sense at each successive member of a one-dimensional
series of extensionless instants of time. Furthermore
the mutual relations of the material entities at each
instant formed these entities into a spatial configuration
in an unbounded space. It would seem that space-on
this theory-would be as instantaneous as the instants,
and that some explanation is required of the relations
between the successive instantaneous spaces. The
materi�listic theory is however silent on this point ;
and the succession of instantaneous spaces is tacitly
combined into one persistent space. This theory is a
purely intellectual rendering of experience which has
had the luck to get itself formulated at the dawn of
scientific thought. It has dominated the language and
the imagination of science since science flourished in
Alexandria, vii.th the result that it is now hardly possible
to speak without appearing to assume its immediate
obviousness.
But when it is distinctly formulated in the abstract
terms in which I have just stated it, the theory is very
far from obvious . The passing complex of factors which
compose the fact which is the terminus of sense-aware
ness places before us nothing corresponding to the
trinity of this natural materialism. This trinity is com
posed (i) of the temporal series of extensionless instants1
(ii) of the aggregate of material entities, and (iii) of
space which is the outcome of relations of matter.
There is a wide gap between these presuppositions
of the intellectual theory of materialism and the im
mediate deliverances of sense-awareness. I do not
question that this materialistic trinity embodies im-
72 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH
'
portant characters of nature. But it is necessary to

express these characters in terms of the facts of
experience. This is exactly what in this lecture I have
been endeavouring to do so far as time is concerned ;
and we have now come up against the question, Is
there only one temporal series ? The uniqueness of the
temporal series is presupposed in the materialist
philosophy of nature. But that philosophy is merely a
theory, like the Aristotelian scientific theories so firmly
believed in the middle ages. If in this lecture I have
in any way succeeded in getting behind the theory to
the immediate facts, the answer is not nearly so certain.
The question can be transformed into this alternative
form, Is there only one family of durations ? In this
question the meaning of a ' family of durations ' has
been defined earlier in this lecture. The answer is now
not at all obvious. On the materialistic theory the
instantaneous present is the only field for the creative
activity of nature. The past is gone and the future is
not yet. Thus (on this theory) the immediacy of per
ception is of an instantaneous present, and this unique
present is the outcome of the past and the promise of
the future. But we deny this immediately given in
stantaneous present. There is no such thing to be found
in nature. As an ultimate fact it is a nonentity. What
is immediate for sense-awareness is a duration. Now a
duration has within itself a past and a future ; and the
temporal breadths of the immediate durations of sense
awareness are very indeterminate and dependent on the
individual percipient. Accordingly there is no unique
factor in nature which for every percipient is pre
eminently and necessarily the present. The passage of
nature leaves nothing between the past and the future.
III] TIME 73
What we perceive as present is the vivid fringe of
memory tinged with anticipation. This vividness lights
up the discriminated field "within a duration. But no
assurance can thereby be given that the happenings of
nature cannot be assorted into other durations of alter
native families. We cannot even know that the series
of immediate durations posited by the sense-a\'\-"areness
of one individual mind all necessarily belong to the
same family of durations. There is not the slightest
reason to believe that this is so. Indeed if my theory of
nature be correct, it will not be the case.
The materialistic theory has all the completeness of
the thought of the middle ages, which had a complete
answer to everything, be it in heaven or in hell or in
nature. There is a trimness about it, with its instan
taneous present, its vanished past, its non-existent
future, and its inert matter. This trimness is very
medieval and ill accords with brute fact.
The theory which I am urging admits a greater
ultimate mystery and a deeper ignorance. The past and
the future meet and mingle in the ill-defined present.
The passage of nature which is only another name for
the creative force of existence has no narrow ledge of
definite instantaneous present within which to operate.
Its operative presence which is now urging nature
forward must be sought for throughout the whole, in
the remotest past as well as in the narrowest breadth of
any present duration. Perhaps also in the unrealised
future. Perhaps also in the future which might be as
. well as the actual future which will be. It is impossible
to meditate on time and the mystery of the creative
passage of nature without an overwhelming emotion
at the limitations of hl.Uilan intelligence.
CHAPTER IV
THE M E T H O D O F EXT E N S I VE
ABSTRACTION
To-DAY'S lecture must commence with the consideration

of limited events. We shall then be in a position to
enter upon an investigation of the factors in nature
which are represented by our conception of space.
The duration which is the immediate disclosure of
our sense-awareness is discriminated into parts. There
is the part which is the life of all nature within a room,
and there is the part which is the life of all nature
within a table in the room. These parts are limited
events. They have the endurance ofthe present duration ,
and they are parts of it. But whereas a duration i s an
unlimited whole and in a certain limited sense is all

that there is, a limited event possesses a completely
defined limitation of extent which is expressed for us
in spatio-temporal terms .
We are accustomed to associate an event with a certain
melodramatic quality. If a man is run over, that is an
event comprised within certain spatio-temporal limits .

We are not accustomed to consider the endurance of
the Great Pyramid throughout any definite day as an
event. But the natural fact which is the Great Pyramid
throughout a day,.meaning thereby all nature within it,
is an event of the same character as the man's accident,
meaning thereby all nature with spatio-temporal limita
tions so as to include the man and the motor during the
period when they were in contact.
CH. iv] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 75
We are accustomed to analyse these events into three

factors, time, space, and material. In fact, we at once
apply to them the concepts of the materialistic theory
of nature. I do not deny the utility of this analysis for
the purpose of expressing important laws of nature.
What I am denying is that anyone of these factors is
posited for us in sense-awareness in concrete inde
pendence. We perceive one unit factor in nature ; and
this factor is that something is going on then-there.
For example, we perceive the going-on of the Great
Pyramid in its relations to the goings-on of the sur
rounding Egyptian events. We are so trained, both by
language and by formal teaching and by the resultjng
convenience, to express our thoughts in terms of this
materialistic analysis that intellectually we tend to
ignore the true unity of the factor really exhibited in
sense-awareness. It is this unit factor, retaining in
itself the passage of nature, which is the primary
concrete element discriminated in nature. These
primary factors are what I mean by events.
Events are the field of a t'vo-termed relation, namely
the relation of extension which was considered in the
last lecture. Events are the things related by the
relation of extension. If an event A extends over an
event B, then B is ' part of' A , and A is a ' whole · of
which B is a part. Whole and part are invariably used
in these lectures in this definite sense. It follows that
in reference to this relation any two events A and B
may have any one of four relations to each other,
namely (i) A may extend over B, or (ii) B may extend
over A, or (iii) A and B may both extend over some
third event C, but neither over the other, or (iv) A
and B may be entirely separate. These alternatives can
obviously be illustrated by Euler's diagrams as they

appear in logical textbooks.
The continuity of nature is the continuity of events.
This continuity is merely the name for the aggregate
of a variety of properties of events in connexion with
the relation of extension.
In the first place, this relation is transitive ; secondly,
every event contains other events as parts of itself ;
thirdly every event is a part of other events ; fourthly
given any two finite events there are events each of
which contains both of them as parts ; and fifthly there
is a special relation between events which I term
'junction.'
Two events have junction when there is a third event
of which both events are parts, and which is such that
no part of it is separated from both of the two given
events. Thus two events with junction make up exactly
one event which is in a sense their sum.
Only certain pairs of events have this property. In
general apy event containing two events also contains
parts which are separated from both events.
There is an alternative definition of the junction of
two events which I have adopted in my recent book 1•
Two events have junction when there is a third event
such that (i) it overlaps both events and (ii) it has no
part which is separated from both the given events. If
either of these alternative definitions is adopted as the
definition of junction, the other definition appears as
an axiom respecting the character of junction as we
know it in nature. But we are not thinking of logical
definition so much as the formulation of the results
of direct observation. There is a certain continuity
1 Cf. Enquiry.
1v] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 77
inherent in the observed unity of an event, and these

two definitions of junction are really axioms based
on observation respecting the character of this con
tinuity.
The relations of whole and part and of overlapping
are particular cases of the junction of events. But it
is possible for events to have junction when they are
separate from each other ; for example, the upper and
the lower part of the Great Pyramid are divided by some
imaginary horizontal plane.
The continuity which nature derives from events
has been obscured by the illustrations which I have
been obliged to give. For example I have taken the
existence of the Great Pyramid as a fairly well-known
fact to which I could safely appeal as an illustration.
This is a type of event which exhibits itself to us as the
situation of a recognisable object ; and in the example
chosen the object is so widely recognised that it has
received a name. An object is an entity of a different
type from an event. For example, the event which is
the life of nature within the Great Pyramid yesterday
and to-day is divisible into two parts, namely the Great
Pyramid yesterday and the Great Pyramid to-day. But
the recognisable object which is also called the Great
Pyramid is the same object to-day as it was yesterday.
I shall have to consider the theory of objects in another
lecture.
The whole subject is invested with an unmerited
air of subtlety by the fact that when the event is the
situation of a well-marked object, we have no language
to distinguish the event from the object. In the case
of the Great Pyramid, the object is the perceived unit
entity which as perceived remains self-identical through-
out the ages ; while the whole dance of molecules and

the shifting play of the electromagnetic field are
ingredients of the event. An object is in a sense out
of time. It is only derivatively in time by reason of its
having the relation to events which I term ' situation. '
This relation of situation will require discussion in a
subsequent lecture.
The point which I want to make now is that being the
situation of a well-marked object is not an inherent
necessity for an event. Wherever and whenever some
thing is going on, there is an event. Furthermore
' wherever and whenever ' in themselves presuppose an
event, for space and time in themselves are abstractions

from events. It is therefore a consequence of this
doctrine that something is always going on everywhere,
even in so-called empty space. This conclusion is in
accord with modern physical science which presupposes
the play of an electromagnetic field throughout space
and time. This doctrine of science has been thrown into
the materialistic form of an all-pervading ether. But
the ether is evidently a mere idle concept-in the phraseo
logy which Bacon applied to the doctrine of final
causes, it is a barren virgin. Nothing is deduced from
it; and the ether merely subserves the purpose of
satisfying the demands of the materialistic theory. The
important concept is that of the shifting facts of the
fields of force. This is the concept of an ether of events
which should be substituted for that of a material
ether.
It requires no illustration to assure you that an event
is a complex fact, and the relations between two events
form an almost impenetrable maze. The clue discovered
by the common sense of mankind and systematically
.
utilised in science is what I have elsewhere 1 called the

law of convergence to simplicity by diminution of
extent.
If A and B are two events, and A' is part of A and
B' is part of B, then in many respects the relations
between the parts A' and B' will be simpler than the
relations between A and B. This is the principle which
presides over all attempts at exact observation.
The first outcome of the systematic use of this la'v
has been the formulation of the abstract concepts of
Time and Space. In the previous lecture I sketched
how the principle was applied to obtain the time-series.
I now proceed to consider how the spatial entities are
obtained by the same method. The systematic pro
cedure is identical in principle in both cases, and I
have called the general type of procedure the ' method
of extensive abstraction.'
You will remember that in my last lecture I defined
the concept of an abstractive set of durations. This
definition can be extended so as to apply to any events,
limited events as well as durations. The only change
that is required is the substitution of the word ' event '
for the word ' duration.' Accordingly an abstractive set
of events is any set of events which possesses the two
properties, (i) of any two members of the set one con
tains the other as a part, and (ii) there is no event which
is a common part of every member of the set. Such a
set, as you will remember, has the properties of the
Chinese toy which is a nest of boxes, one within the
other, with the difference that the toy has a smallest
box, while the abstractive class has neither a smallest
1Cf. Organisation of Thought, pp. 146 et seq. Williams and
Norgate, 1917.
8o THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH.
event nor does it converge to a limiting event which is

not a member of the set.
Thus, so far as the abstractive sets of events are con
cerned, an abstractive set converges to nothing. There
is the set '\\ith its members growing indefinitely smaller
and smaller as we proceed in thought towards the
smaller end of the series ; but there is no absolute
minimum of any sort which is finally reached. In fact
the set is just itself and indicates nothing else in the
Vt"aY of events, except itself. But each event has an
intrinsic character in the \vay of being a situation of
objects and of having parts which are situations of
objects and-to state the matter more generally-in the
way of being a field of the life of nature. This character
can be defined by quantitative expressions expressing
relations between various quantities intrinsic to the
event or between such quantities and other quantities
intrinsic to other events. In the case of events of con
siderable spatio-temporal extension this set of quanti
tative expressions is of bewildering complexity. If
e be an event, let us denote by q (e) the set of quanti
tative expressions defining its character including its
connexions with the rest of nature. Let e1, e2, e3, etc.
be an abstractive set, the members being so arranged
that each member such as ell extends over all the suc
ceeding members such as e.+1, en+2, and so on. Then
corresponding to the series
el, e2, e3> • • • , en., en+1 , • • . ,
there is the series
q {e1), q (e2), q (e3), • • •

, q (e11,), q (en+1), • • • •
Call the series of events s and the series of quanti

tative expressions q (s). The series s has no last term and
rv] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 8 1
no events which are contained in everv

.. member of the
series. Accordingly the series of events converges to
nothing. It is just itself. Also the series q (s) has no
last term. But the sets of homologous quantities
running through the various terms of the series do
converge to definite limits . Q1 be a For example if
quantitative measurement found in q (e1 ) , and Q2 the
homologue to Qi to be found in q (e2), and Q3 the
homologue to Qi and Q2 to be found in q (e3) , and so on,
then the series
Ql, Q2, Q3, . . . , Q n, Q n+l' . . . ,
though it has no last term, does in general converge to

a definite limit. Accordingly there is a class of limits
l (s) which is the class of the limits of those members of
q (en) which have homologues throughout the series q(s)
as n indefinitely increases. We can represent this state
ment diagrammatically by using an arrow (--) to mean
' converges to.' Then
el> e2 , ea, • . • , e1,., en+i' • • • -- nothing,
and
q (ei), q (e2), q (ea), . . • , q (en), q (en+i), . . . -- l (s).
The mutual relations between the limits in the set
l (s), and also between these limits and the limits in
other sets l (s'), l (s"), . . . , which arise from other
abstractive sets s', s", etc., have a peculiar simplicity.
Thus the set s does indicate an ideal simplicity of
natural relations, though this simplicity is not the
character of any actual event in s. We can make an
approximation to such a simplicity which, as estimated
numerically, is as close as we like by considering an
event which is far enough down the series towards the
small end. It will be noted that it is the infinite series,
W. N. 6
as it stretches away in unending succession towards

the small end, which is of importance. The arbitrarily
large event v,.ith which the series starts has no importance
at all . We can arbitrarily exclude any set of events at
the big end of an abstractive set without the loss of
any important property to the set as thus modified.
I call the limiting character of natural relations which
is indicated by an abstractive set, the ' intrinsic character '
of the set ; also the properties, connected with the
relation of vrhole and part as concerning its members,
by which an abstractive set is defined together form what
I call its ' extrinsic character.' The fact that the ex
trinsic character of an abstractive set determines a
definite intrinsic character is the reason of the import
ance of the precise concepts of space and time. This
emergence of a definite intrinsic character from an
abstractive set is the precise meaning of the law of
convergence.
For example,, w�e see a train approaching during a
minute. The event which is the life of nature within
that train during the minute is of great complexity and
the expression of its relations and of the ingredients
of its character baffles us. If we take one second of
that minute, the more limited event which is thus
obtained is simpler in respect to its ingredients, and
shorter and shorter times such as a tenth of that second,
or a hundredth, or a thousandth-so long as we have a
definite rule giving a definite succession of diminishing
events-give events whose ingredient characters con
verge to the ideal simplicity of the character of the train
at a definite instant. Furthermore there are different
types of such convergence to simplicity. For example,
we can converge as above to the limiting character
rv] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 83
expressing nature at an instant within the whole volume

of the train at that instant, or to nature at an instant
within sorrie portion of that volume-for exan1ple
within the boiler of the engine-or to nature at an
instant on some area of surface, or to nature at an instant
on some line within the train, or to nature at an instant
at some point of the train. In the last case the simple
limiting characters arrived at \Vill be expressed as
densities, specific gravities, and types of material.
Furthermore \v·e need not necessarily converge to an
abstraction which involves nature at an instant. \Ve
may converge to the physical ingredients of a certain
point track throughout the whole minute. .4.\ccordingly
there are different types of extrinsic character of con
vergence which lead to the approximation to different
types of intrinsic characters as limits.
We now pass to the investigation of possible con
nexions between abstractive sets. One set may ' cover '
another. I define ' covering ' as follows : An abstractive
set p covers an abstractive set q when every member of
p contains as its parts some members of q. It is evident
that if any event e contains as a part any member of
the set q, then owing to the transitive property of ex
tension every succeeding member of the small end of q
is part of e. In such a case I will say that the abstractive
set q ' inheres in ' the event e. Thus '"rhen an abstractive
set p covers an abstractive set q, the abstractive set q
inheres in every member of p.
Two abstractive sets may each cover the other. When
this is the case I shall call the two sets ' equal in ab
stractive force.' When there is no danger of misunder
standing I shall shorten this phrase by simply saying
that the two abstractive sets are ' equal. ' The possibility
6-2
of this equality of abstractive sets arises from the fact

that both sets, p and q, are infinite series towards their
small ends. Thus tht! equality means, that given any
event x belonging to p, we can always by proceeding
far enough towards the small end of q find an event y
��hich is part of x, and that then by proceeding far
enough to\vards the small end ofp we can find an event z
which is part of y, and so on indefinitely.
The importance of the equality of abstractive sets
arises from the assumption that the intrinsic characters
of the t\vo sets are identical. If this were not the case
exact observation would be at an end.
It is evident that any two abstractive sets which are
equal to a third abstractive set are equal to each other.
An ' abstractive element ' is the whole grdup of ab
stractive sets which are equal to any one of themselves.
Thus all abstractive sets belonging to the same element
are equal and converge to the same intrinsic character.
Thus an abstractive element is the group of routes of
approximation to a definite intrinsic character of ideal
simplicity to be found as a limit among natural facts.
If an abstractive set p covers an abstractive set q, then
any abstractive set belonging to the abstractive element
of which p is a member '\\·ill cover any abstractive set
belonging to the element of which q is a member.
Accordingly it is useful to stretch the meaning of the
term ' covering,' and to speak of one abstractive element
' covering' another abstractive element. If we attempt in
like manner to stretch the term ' equal ' in the sense of
' equal in abstractive force,' it is obvious that an . ab
stractive element can only be equal to itself. Thus an
abstractive element has a unique abstractive force and is
the construct from events which represents one definite
iv] METHOD O F EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 85
intrinsic character which is arrived at as a limit bv the

.,
use of the principle of convergence to simplicity by

diminution of extent.
When an abstractive element A covers an abstractive
element B, the intrinsic character of A in a sense
includes the intrinsic character of B. It results that
statements about the intrinsic character of B are in a
sense statements about the intrinsic character of A ;
but the intrinsic character of A is more complex than
that of B.
The abstractive elements form the fundamental
elements of space and time, and we now turn to the
consideration of the properties involved in the formation
of special classes of such elements. In my last lecture
I have already investigated one class of abstractive
elements, namely moments. Each moment is a group
of abstractive sets, and the events which are members
of these sets are all members of one family of durations.
The moments of one family form a temporal series ;
and, allowing the existence of different families of
moments, there will be alternative temporal series in
nature. Thus the method of extensive abstraction ex
plains the origin of temporal series in terms of the
immediate facts of experience and at the same time
allows for the existence of the alternative temporal
series which are demanded by the modern theory of
electromagnetic relativity.
We now tum to space. The first thing to do is to
get hold of the class of abstractive elements which are
in some sense the points of space. Such an abstractive
element must in some sense exhibit a convergence to
an absolute minimum of intrinsic character. Euclid
has expressed for all time the general idea of a point,
86 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (cH.
as being \\ithout parts and V\.�thout magnitude. It is

this character of being an absolute minimum whi�h we
\\·ant to get at and to express in terms of the extrinsic
characters of the abstractive sets which make up a point.
Furthermore, points which are thus arrived at repre
sent the ideal of events \Yithout any extension, though
there are in fact no such entities as these ideal events.
These points will not be the points of an external time-.
less space but of instantaneous spaces. We ultimately
\vant to arrh-e at the timeless space of physical science,
and also of common thought which is now tinged with
the concepts of science. It will be convenient to reserve
the term ' point ' for these spaces when we get to
them. I will therefore use the name ' event-particles '
for the ideal minimum limits to events. Thus an
event-particle is an abstractive element and as such is
a group of abstractive sets ; and a point-namely a point
of timeless space-\\ill be a class of event-particles.
Furthermore there is a separate timeless space corre
�ponding to each separate temporal series, that is to
each separate family of durations. We will come back
to points in timeless spaces later. I merely mention
them no·w that W"e may understand the stages of our
investigation. The totality of event-particles will form a
four-dimensional manifold, the extra dimension arising
from time-in other words-arising from the points of
a timeless space being each a class of>event-particles.
The required character of the abstractive sets which
form event-particles would be secured if we could define
them as having the property of being covered by any
abstractive set which they cover. For then any other
abstractive set which an abstractive ��t of an event
particle covered, would be equal to it, and would
iv] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 87
therefore b� a member of the same event-particle.

Accordingly an event-particle could cover no other
abstractive element. This is the definition which I
originally proposed at a congress in Paris in 1 9 1 41 •
There is however a difficulty involved in this definition
if adopted without some further addition, and I am now
not satisfied with the way in which I attempted to get
_oyer that difficulty in the paper referred to.
- The difficulty is this : When event-particles have once
been defined it is easy to define the aggregate of event
particles forming the boundary of an event ; and thence
to define the point-contact at their boundaries possible
for a pair of events of which one is part of the other.
We can then conceive all the intricacies of tangency.
In particular we can conceive an abstractive set of
which all the members have point-contact at the same
event-particle. It is then easy to prove that there will
be no abstractive set with the property of being
covered by every abstractive set which it covers. I state
this difficulty at some length because its existence guides
the development of our line of argument. We have got
to annex some condition to the root property of being
covered by any abstractive set which it covers. \Vhen
\Ve look into this question of suitable conditions we find
that in addition to event-particles all the other relevant
spatial and spatio-temporal abstractive elements can
be defined in the same way by suitably varying the
conditions. Accordingly we proceed in a general way
suitable for employment beyond event-particles.
Let a be the name of any condition which some
abstractive sets fulfil. I say that an abstractive set is
i Cf. ' La Theorie Relationniste de l'Espace,' Reo. de J.°lleta
physique et de Morale, vol. xx1n, 1916.
'a-prime , when it has the two properties, (i) that it

satisfies the condition a and (ii) that it is covered by
every abstractive set which both is covered by it and
satisfies the condition a.
In other words you cannot get any abstractive set
satisfying the condition a which exhibits intrinsic
character more simple than that of a a-prime.
There are also the correlative abstractive sets which
I call the sets of a-antiprimes. An abstractive set is a
a-antiprime \Vhen it has the two properties, (i) that it
satisfies the condition a and (ii) that it covers every
abstractive set which both covers it and satisfies the
condition a . In other words you cannot get any ab
stractive set satisfying the condition a which exhibits
an intrinsic character more complex than that of a
a-antiprime.
The intrinsic character of a a-prime has a certain
minimum of fullness among those abstractive sets which
are subject to the condition of satisfying a ; whereas
the intrinsic character of a a-antiprime has a corre
sponding maxifuum of fullness, and includes all it can
in the circumstances.
Let us first consider what help the notion of anti
primes could give us in the definition of moments
which we gave in the last lecture. Let the condition
a be the property of being a class whose members are
all durations. An abstractive set which satisfies this
condition is thus an abstractive set composed wholly
of durations. It is convenient then to define a moment
as the group of abstractive sets which are equal to some
u-antiprime, where the condition a has this special
meaning. It 'Will be found on consideration (i) that
each abstractive set forming a moment is a a-antiprime,
where a has this special meaning, and (ii) that we have

excluded from membership of moments abstractive
sets of durations which all have one common boundary,
either the initial boundary or the final boundary. We
thus exclude special cases which are apt to confuse
general reasoning. The new definition of a moment,
which supersedes our previous definition, is (by the aid
of the notion of antiprimes) the more precisely drawn
of the two, and the more useful.
The particular condition which ' er ' stood for in the
definition of moments included something additional
to anything which can be derived from the bare notion
of extension. A duration exhibits for thought a totality.
The notion of totality is something beyond that of
extension, though the two are interwoven in the notion
of a duration.
In the same way the particular condition ' er ' required
for the definition of an event-particle must be looked for
beyond the mere notion of extension. The same remark
is also true of the particular conditions requisite for the
other spatial elements. This additional notion is ob
tained by distinguishing between the notion of ' posi
tion ' and the notion of convergence to an ideal zero of
extension as exhibited by an abstractive set of events.
In order to understand this distinction consider a
point of the instantaneous space which we conceive
as apparent to us in an almost instantaneous glance.
This point is an event-particle. It has two aspects. In
one aspect it is there, where it is. This is its position in
the space. In another aspect it is got at by ignoring the
circumambient space, and by concentrating attention on
the smaller and smaller set of events which approximate
to it. This is its extrinsic character. Thus a point has
three characters, namely, its position in the whole

instantaneous space, its extrinsic character, and its
intrinsic character. The same is true of any other spatial
element. For example an instantaneous volume in
instantaneous space has three characters, namely, its
position, its extrinsic character as a group of abstractive
sets, and its intrinsic character which is the limit of
natural properties which is indicated by any one of
these abstractive sets.
Before \Ve can talk about position in instantaneous
space, we must e"idently be quite clear as to what we
mean by instantaneous space in itself. Instantaneous
space must be looked for as a character of a moment.
For a moment is all nature at an instant. It cannot b e
the intrinsic character of the moment. For the intrinsic
c:haracter tells us the limiting character of nature in
space at that instant. Instantaneous space must be
an assemblage of abstractive elements considered in
their mutual relations. Thus an instantaneous space is
the assemblage of abstractive elements covered by some
one moment, and it is the instantaneous space of that
moment.
We have now to ask what character we have found in
nature which is capable of according to the elements of
an instantaneous space different qualities of position.
This question at once brings us to the intersection of

moments, which is a topic not as yet considered in
these lectures.
The locus of intersection of two moments is the
assemblage of abstractive elements covered by both of
them. Now two moments of the same temporal series
cannot intersect. Two moments respectively of different
families necessarily intersect. Accordingly in the in-
1v] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 9 1
stantaneous space of a moment we should expect the
fundamental properties to be marked by the inter
sections with moments of other families. If �f be a
given moment, the intersection of !vl with another
moment A is an instantaneous plane in the instan
taneous space of JJ1; and if B be a third moment
intersecting both JJ1 and A , the intersection of M and B
is another plane in the space 1vl. Also the common
intersection of A, B, and M is.the intersection of the
two planes in the space 1't1, namely it is a straight line
in the space JJ.f. An exceptional case arises if B and J.l-1
i �tersect in the same plane as A and J.lf. Furthermore
if C be a fourth moment, then apart from special cases
which we need not consider, it intersects lvl in a plane
which the straight line (A , B, Jlt!) meets. Thu� there
is in general a common intersection of four moments
of different families. This common intersection is an
assemblage of abstractive elements which are each
covered (or ' lie in ') all four moments. The three
dimensional property of instantaneous space comes to
this, that (apart from special relations between the four
moments) any fifth moment either contains the whole
of their common intersection or none of it. No further
subdivision of the common intersection is possible by
means of moments . The ' all or none ' principle holds.
This is not an a priori truth but an empirical fact of
nature.
It will be convenient to reserve the ordinary spatial
terms ' plane,' ' straight line, ' ' point ' for the elements
of the timeless space of a time-system. Accordingly an
instantaneous plane in the instantaneous space of a
moment will be called a ' level ,' an instantaneous straight
line will be caIIed a ' rect,' and an instantaneous point
..
92 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH.
will be called a ' punct.' Thus a punct is the assemblage

of abstractive elements which lie in each offour moments
whose families have no special relations to each other.
Also if P be any moment, either every abstractive
element belonging to a given punct lies in P, or no
abstractive element of that punct lies in P.
Position is the quality which an abstractive element
possesses in virtue of the moments in which it lies. The
abstractive elements 1i'hich lie in the instantaneous
space of a given moment M are differentiated from each
other by the various other moments \vhich intersect M
so as to contain various selections of these abstractive
elements. It is this differentiation of the elements which
constitutes their differentiation of position. An ab
stractive element which belongs to a punct has the
simplest type of position in M., an abstractive element
which belongs to a rect but not to a punct has a more
complex quality of position, an abstractive element
which belongs to a level and not to a rect has a still
more complex quality of position, and finally the most
complex quality of position belongs to an abstractive
element \:\-hich belongs to a volume and not to a level.
A volume however has not yet been defined. This
definition will be given in the next lecture.
Eyidently levels, �ects, and puncts in their capacity
as infinite aggregates cannot be the termini of sense
awareness, nor can they be limits which are approxi
mated to in sense-awareness. Any one member of a
level has a certain quality arising from its character as
also belonging to a certain set of moments, but the level
as a whole is a mere logical notion without any route of
approximation along entities posited in sense-awareness.
On the other hand an event-particle is defined so as
to exhibit this character of being a route of approxi

mation marked out by entities posited in sense-aware
ness. A definite event-particle is defined in reference
to a definite punct in the following manner : Let the
condition a mean the property of covering all the
abstractive elements which are members of that punct ;
so that an abstractive set which satisfies the condition a
is an abstractive set which covers every abstractive
element belonging to the punct. Then the definition
of the event-particle associated with the punct is that
it is the group of all the a-primes, where u has this
particular meaning.
It is evident that-with this meaning of a-every
abstractive set equal to a u-prime is itself a a-prime.
Accordingly an event-particle as thus defined is an
abstractive element, namely it is the group of those
abstractive sets which are each equal to some given
abstractive set. If we write out the definition of the
event-particle associated with some given punct, which
we will call '1T , it is as follows : The event-particle as
sociated with 1T is the group of abstractive classes each
of which has the two properties (i) that it covers every
abstractive set in '11' and (ii) that all the abstractive sets
which also satisfy the former condition as to '1T and which
it covers, also cover it.
An event-particle has position by reason of its
association with a punct, and conversely the punct
gains its derived character as a route of approximation
from its association with the event-particle. These two
characters of a point are alw-ays recurring in any treat
ment of the derivation of a point from the observed
facts of nature, but in general there is no clear recogni
tion of their distinction.
The peculiar simplicity of an instantaneous point has
a twofold origin, one connected with position, that is
to say v.�ith its character as a punct, and the other con
nected with its character as an event-particle. The
simplicity of the punct arises from its indivisibility by
a moment.
The simplicity of an event-particle arises from the
indivisibility of its intrinsic character. The intrinsic
character of an event-particle is indivisible in the sense
that every abstractive set covered by it exhibits the
same intrinsic character. It follows that, though there
are diverse abstractive elements covered by event
particles, there is no advantage to be gained by con
sidering them since we gain no additional simplicity
in the expression of natural properties.
These tv.ro characters of simplicity enjoyed respec
tively by event-particles and puncts define a meaning for
Euclid's phrase, ' '\\;thout parts and without magnitude.'
It is obviously convenient to sweep away out of our
thoughts all these stray abstractive sets which are
covered by event-particles v.·ithout themselves being
members of them . They give us nothing new in the
way of intrinsic character. Accordingly we can think
of rects and levels as merely loci of event-particles.
In so doing we are also cutting out those abstractive
elements which cover sets of event-particles, without
these elements being event-particles themselves. There
are classes of these abstractive elements which are of
great importance. I will consider them later on in this
and in other lectures . Meanwhile we will ignore them.
Also I will always speak of ' event-particles ' in pre
ference to ' puncts,' the latter being an artificial word
for "·hich I have no great affection.
rv] METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 95
Parallelism among rects and levels is now explicable.
Consider the instantaneous space belonging to a
moment A, and let A belong to the temporal series of
moments which I will call a. Consider any other
temporal series of moments which I will call fJ. The
moments of f3 do not intersect each other and they
intersect the moment A in a family of levels. None of
these levels can intersect, and they form a family of
parallel instantaneous planes in the instantaneous space
of moment A . Thus the parallelism of moments in a
temporal series begets the parallelism of levels in an
instantaneous space, and thence-as it is easy to see-
the parallelism of rects. Accordingly the Euclidean
property of space arises from the parabolic property of
time. It may be that there is reason to adopt a hyper
bolic theory of time and a corresponding hyperbolic
theory of space. Such a theory has not been worked out,
so it is not possible to judge as to the character of the
evidence which could be brought fonvard in its favour.
The theory of order in an instantaneous space is
immediately derived from time-order. For consider the
. space of a moment M. Let a be the name of a time
system to which M does not belong. Let A1, A2, A3, etc.
be moments of a in the order of their occurrences. Then
A1, A2, A3, etc. intersect M in parallel levels 11, 12, 13, etc.
Then the relative order of the parallel levels in the
space of M is the same as the relative order of the corre
sponding moments in the time-system a. Any rect in
M which intersects all these levels in its set of puncts,
thereby receives for its puncts an order of position on it.
So spatial order is derivative from temporal order.
Furthermore there are alternative time-systems, but
there is only one definite spatial order in each instan-
THE CONCEPT OF KATURE [CH.
taneous space. ....\.ccordingly the various modes of

deriving spatial order from diverse time-systems must
harmonise \vith one spatial order in each instantaneous
space. In this way also diverse time-orders are com
parable.
We have two great questions still on hand to be
settled before our theory of space is fully adjusted.
One of these is the question of the determination of the
methods of measurement within the space, in other
words, the congruence-theory of the space. The
measurement of space will be found to be closely
connected with the measurement of time, with respect
to which no principles have as yet been determined.
Thus our congruence-theory will be a theory both for
space and for time. Secondly there is the determination
of the timeless space which corresponds to any particular
time-system "With its infinite set of instantaneous spaces
in its successive moments. This is the space--or rather,
these are the spaces-of physical science. It is very
usual to dismiss this space by saying that this is con
ceptual. I do not understand the virtue of these phrases.
I suppose that it is meant that the space is the concep
tion of something in nature. Accordingly if the space
of physical science is to be called conceptual, I ask,
What in nature is it the conception of? For example,
when we speak of a point in the timeless space of
physical science, I suppose that we are speaking of
something in nature. If we are not so speaking, our
scientists are exercising their wits in the realms of
pure fantasy, and this is palpably not the case. This
demand for a definite Habeas Corpus Act for the pro
duction of the relevant entities in nature applies whether
space be relative or absolute. On the theory of relative
space, it may perhaps be argued that there is no timeless

space for physical science, and that there is only the
momentary series of instantaneous spaces.
An explanation must then be asked for the meaning
of the very common statement that such and such a
man walked four miles in some definite hour. How can
you measure distance from one space into another
space ? I understand walking out of the sheet of an
ordnance map. But the meaning of saying that Cam
bridge at I o o'clock this morning in the appropriate
instantaneous space for that instant is 52 miles from
London at I I o'clock this morning in the appropriate
instantaneous space for that instant beats me entirely.
I think that, by the time a meaning has been produced
for this statement, you will find that you have constructed
\Vhat is in fact a timeless space. What I cannot under
stand is how to produce an explanation of meaning
without in effect making some such construction. Also
I may add that I do not know how the instantaneous
spaces are thus correlated into one space by any method
which is available on the current theories of space.
You will have noticed that by the aid of the assump
tion of alternative time-systems, we are arriving at an
explanation of the character of space. In natural science
' to explain ' means merely to discover ' interconnexions.'
For example, in one sense there is no explanation of the
red which you see. It is red, and there is nothing else
to be said about it. Either it is posited before you in
sense-awareness or you are ignorant of the entity red.
But science has explained red. Namely it has dis
covered interconnexions between red as a factor in
nature and other factors in nature, for example waves of
light which are waves of electromagnetic disturbances.
W. N. 1
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH. IV
There are also various pathological states of the body

which lead to the seeing of red without the occurrence
of light waves. Thus connexions have been discovered
between red as posited in sense-awareness and various
other factors in nature. The discovery of these con
nexions constitutes the scientific explanation of our
vision of colour. In like manner the dependence of
the character of space on the character of time con.:
stitutes an explanation in the sense in which science
seeks to explain. The systematising intellect abhors
bare facts. The character of space has hitherto been
presented as a collection of bare facts, ultimate and
disconnected. The theory which I am expounding
sweeps away this disconnexion of the facts of space.
CHAPTER V
S PA C E A N D MOTION
THE topic for this lecture is the continuation of the

task of explaining the construction of spaces as ab
stracts from the facts of nature. It was noted at the
close of the previous lecture that the question of
congruence had not been considered, nor had the con
struction of a timeless space ·\vhich should correlate
the successive momentary spaces of a given time-system .
Furthermore it was also noted that there \Vere many
spatial abstractive elements which we had not yet
defined. v..re will first consider the definition of some
of these abstractive elements, namely the definitions
of solids, of areas, and of routes. By a ' route ' I mean
a linear segment, whether straight or curved. The ex
position of these definitions and the preliminary ex
planations necessary will, I hope, serve as a general
explanation of the function of event-particles in the
analysis of nature.
We note that event-particles .have 'position ' in respect
to each other. In the last lecture I explained that
' position ' was quality gained by a spatial element in
virtue of the intersecting moments which covered it.
Thus each event-particle has position in this sense.
The simplest mode of expressing the position in nature
of an event-particle is by first fixing on any definite
time-system. Call it a. There will be one moment of
the temporal series of a which covers the given event
particle. Thus the position of the event-particle in the
temporal series a is defined by this moment, which we
1-2
100 THE CONCEPT O F NATURE (CH.
'"'·ill call 111. The position of the particle in the space

of ill is then fixed in the ordinary way by three levels
\\·hich intersect in it and in it only. This procedure of
fixing the position of an event-particle shows that the
aggregate of event-particles forms a four-dimensional
manifold. A finite event occupies a limited chunk of
this manifold in a sense which I now proceed to explain.
Let e be any given event. The manifold of event
particles falls into three sets in reference to e. Each
event-particle is a group of equal abstractive sets and
each abstractive set to\vards its small-end is composed
of smaller and smaller finite events. When we select
from these finite events '\\rhich enter into the make-up
of a given event-particle those which are small enough,
one of three cases must occur. Either (i) all of these
small events are entirely separate from the given event e,
or (ii) all of these small events are parts of the event e,
or (iii) all of these small events overlap the event e but
are not parts of it. In the first case the event-particle
will be said to ' lie outside ' the event e, in the second
case the event-particle will be said to ' lie inside ' the
even� e, and in the third case the event-particle will be
said to be a 'boundary-particle' ofthe event e. Thus there
are three sets of particles, namely the set of those which
lie outside the event e, the set of those which lie inside
the event e, and the boundary of the event e which is
the set of boundary-particles of e. Since an event is
four-dimensional, the boundary of an event is a three
dimensional manifold. I:or a finite event there is a
continuity of boundary ; for a duration the boundary
consists of those event-particles which are covered by
either of the two bounding moments . Thus the boundary
of a duration consists of two momentary three-dimen-
v] SPACE AND MOTION 101
sional spaces. An event will be said to ' occupy' the

aggregate of event-particles which lie within it.
Two events which have 'junction ' in the sense in
which junction was described in my last lecture, and
yet are separated so that neither event either overlaps
or is part of the other event, are said to be ' adjoined.'
This relation of adjunction issues in a peculiar relation
between the boundaries of the two events. The two
boundaries must have a common portion which is in
fact a continuous three-dimensional locus of event
particles in the four-dimensional manifold.
A three-dimensional locus of event-particles which
is the common portion of the boundary of two adjoined
events will be called a ' solid.' A solid may or may not
lie completely in one moment. A solid which does not
lie in one moment will be called 'vagrant.' A solid
which does lie in one moment will be called a volume.
A volume may be defined as the locus of the event
particles in which a moment intersects an event, pro
vided that the two do intersect. The intersection of a
moment and an event will evidently consist of those
event-particles which are covered by the moment and
lie in the event. The identity of the two definitions of a
volume is evident when we remember that an intersect
ing moment divides the event into two adjoined events.
A solid as thus defined, whether it be vagrant or be
a volume, is a mere aggregate of event-particles illus
trating a certain quality of position. We can also define
a solid as an abstractive element. In order to do so we
recur to the theory of primes explained in the preceding
lecture. Let the condition named u stand for the fact
that each of the events of any abstractive set satisfying it
has all the event-particles of some particular solid lying
in it. Then the group of all the a-primes is the abstractive

element \\·hich is associated with the given solid. I will
call this abstractive element the solid as an abstractive
element, and I will call the aggregate of event-particles
the solid as a locus. The instantaneous volumes in
instantaneous space \vhich are the ideals of our sense
perception are volumes as abstractive elements. What
we really perceive ·with all our efforts after exactness
are small events far enough down some abstractive
set belonging to the volume as an abstractive element.
It is difficult to know how far we approximate to any
perception of vagrant solids. We certainly do not think
that we make any such approximation. But then our
thoughts-in the case of people who do think about
such topics-are so much under the control of the
materialistic theory of nature that they hardly count
for evidence. If Einstein's theory of gravitation has any
truth in it, vagrant sol�.ds are of great importance in
science. The whole boundary of a finite event may be
looked on as a particular example of a vagrant solid
as a locus. Its particular property of being closed pre
vents it from being definable as an abstractive element.
When a moment intersects an event, it also intersects
the boundary of that event. This locus, which is the
portion of the boundary contained in the moment, is
the bounding surface of the corresponding volume of
that event contained in the moment. It is a two
dimensional locus.
The fact that every volume has a bounding surface is
the origin of the Dedekindian continuity of space.
Another event may be cut by the same moment in
another volume and this volume will also have its
boundary. These two volumes in the instantaneous
space of one moment may mutually overlap in the

familiar way which I need not describe in detail and thus
cut off portions from each other's surfaces. These por
tions of surfaces are ' momental areas.'
It is unnecessary at this stage to enter into the com
plexity of a definition of vagrant areas. Their definition
is simple enough \vhen the four-dimensional manifold
of event-particles has been more fully explored as to
its properties.
Momenta! areas can evidently be defined as abstrac
tive elements by exactly the same method as applied
to solids. We have merelv to substitute ' area ' for a
.,
' solid ' in the '\Vords of the definition already given.

Also, exactly as in the analogous case of a solid, what
we perceive as an approximation to our ideal of an area
is a small event far enough do�11 to\vards the small end
of one of the equal abstractive sets which belongs to
the area as an abstractive element.
Two momenta! areas lying in the same moment can
cut each other in a momenta! segment which is not
necessarily rectilinear. Such a segment can also be
defined as an abstractive element. It is then called a
' momenta! route.' We will not delay over any general
consideration of these momental routes, nor is it
important for us to proceed to the still wider investiga
tion of vagrant routes in general. There are however two
simple sets of routes which are of vital importance. One
is a set of momenta! routes and the other of vagrant
routes. Both sets can be classed together as straight
routes. We proceed to define them without any re
ference to the definitions of volumes and surfaces.
The two types of straight routes '\\ill be called
rectilinear routes and stations. Rectilinear routes are
TI-IE CONCEPT OF NATURE (cH.
momenta! routes and stations are vagrant routes.

Rectilinear routes are routes which in a sense lie in
rects. Any two event-particles on a rect define the set
of event-particles which lie between them on that rect.
Let the satisfaction of the condition u by an abstractive
set mean that the two given event-particles and the
event-particles lying between them on the rect all lie
in every event belonging to the abstractive set. The
group of a-primes, where a has this meaning, form an
abstractive element. Such abstractive elements are recti
linear routes. They are the segments of instantaneous
straight lines which are the ideals of exact perception.
Our actual perception, however exact, will be the per
ception of a small event sufficiently far down one of
the abstractive sets of the abstractive element.
A station is a vagrant route and no moment can inter
sect any station in more than one event-particle. Thus
a station carries with it a comparison of the positions
in their respective moments of the event-particles
covered by it. Rects arise from the intersection of
moments. But as yet no properties of events have been
mentioned by which any analogous vagrant loci can
be found out.
The general problem for our investigation is to
determine a method of comparison of position in one
instantaneous space with positions in other instantaneous
spaces. We may limit ourselves to the spaces of the
parallel moments of one time-system . How are positions
in these various spaces to be compared ? In other words,
What do we mean by motion ? It is the fundamental
question to be asked of any theory of relative space,
and like many other fundamental questions it is apt to
be left unanswered. It is not an answer to reply, that
v] SPACE AND !\10TION 105
we all know what we mean by motion. Of course we

do, so far as sense-awareness is concerned. I am asking
that your theory of space should provide nature with
something to be observed. You have not settled the
question by bringing forward a theory according to
which there is nothing to be observed, and by then
reiterating that nevertheless \Ve do observe this non
existent fact. Unless motion is something as a fact in
nature, kinetic energy and momentum and all that
depends on these physical concepts evaporate from our
list of physical realities. Even in this revolutionary age
my conservatism resolutely opposes the identification
of momentum and moonshine .
Accordingly I assume it as an a."riom, that motion
is a physical fact. It is something that we perceive as
in nature. Motion presupposes rest. Until theory arose
to vitiate immediate intuition, that is to say to vitiate
the uncriticised judgments which immediately arise
from sense-awareness, no one doubted that in motion
you leave behind that which is at rest . Abraham in his
wanderings left his birthplace \\"here it had ever been.
A theory of motion and a theory of rest are the same
thing viewed from different aspects with altered em
phasis.
Now you cannot have a theory of rest without in some
sense admitting a theory of absolute position. It is
�
usually assumed that relative space implies that there is

no absolute position. This is, according to my creed, a
mistake. The assumption arises from the failure to
make another distinction ; namely, that there may be
alternative definitions of absolute position. This possi
bility enters with the admission of alternative time
systems. Thus the series of spaces in the parallel
moments of one temporal series may have their own

definition of absolute position correlating sets of event
particles in these successive spaces, so that each set
consists of event-particles, one from each space, all
with the property of possessing the same absolute
position in that series of spaces. Such a set of event
particles will form a point in the timeless space of that
time-system. Thus a point is really an absolute position
in the timeless space of a given time-system.
But there are alternative time-systems, and each
time-system has its own peculiar group of points-that
is to say, its own peculiar definition of absolute position.
This is exactly the theory which I will elaborate.
In looking to nature for evidence of absolute position
it is of no use to recur to the four-dimensional manifold
of event-particles. This manifold has been obtained by
the extension of thought beyond the immediacy of
observation. We shall find nothing in it except what we
have put there to represent the ideas in thought which
arise from our direct sense-awareness of nature. To
find ev;dence of the properties which are to be found
in the manifold of event-particles we must always
recur to the observation of relations between events.
Our problem is to determine those relations between
events which issue in the property of absolute position
in a tim�less space. This is in fact the problem of the
determination of the very meaning of the timeless
spaces of physical science.
In reviewing the factors of nature as immediately
disclosed in sense-awareness, we should note the
fundamental character of the percept of ' being here.'
We discern an event merely as a factor in a determinate
complex in which each factor has its own peculiar share.
v] SP ACE AND 1\10TION
There are two factors which are always ingredient in

this complex, one is the duration which is represented
in thought by the concept of all nature that is present
now, and the other is the peculiar locus standi for mind
involved in the sense-awareness. This locus standi in
nature is what is represented in thought by the concept
of ' here,' namely of an ' event here.'
This is the concept of a definite factor in nature. This
factor is an event in nature which is the focus in nature
for that act of awareness, and the other events are
perceived as referred to it. This event is part of the
associated duration. I call it the ' percipient event.'
This event is not the mind, that is to say, not the per
cipient. It is that in nature from which the mind
perceives. The complete foothold of the mind in nature
is represented by the pair of events, namely, the present
duration which marks the ' when' of awareness and the
percipient event which marks the ' where ' of awareness
and the ' how ' of awareness. This percipient event is
roughly speaking the bodily life of the incarnate mind.
But this identification is only a rough one. For the
functions of the body shade off into those of other events
in nature ; so that for some purposes the percipient event
is to be reckoned as merely part of the bodily life and
for other purposes it may even be reckoned as more than
the bodily life. In many respects the demarcation is
purely arbitrary, depending upon where in a sliding
scale you choose to draw the line.
I have already in my previous lecture on Time dis
cussed the association of mind with nature. The difficulty
of the discussion lies in the liability of constant factors
to be overlooked. We never note them by contrast
with their absences. The purpose of a discussion of such
factors may be described as being to make obvious

things look odd. We cannot envisage them unless we
manage to invest them with some of the freshness which
is due to strangeness.
It is because of this habit of letting constant factors
slip from consciousness that we constantly fall into the
error of thinking of the sense-awareness of a particular
factor in nature as being a two-termed relation between
the mind and the factor. For example, I perceive a
green leaf. Language in this statement suppresses all
reference to any factors other than the percipient mind
and the green leaf and the relation of sense-awareness.
It discards the obvious inevitable factors which are
essential elements in the perception. I am here, the
leaf is there ; and the event here and the event which is
the life of the leaf there are both embedded in a totality
of nature which is now, and within this totality there
are other discriminated factors which it is irrelevant to
mention. Thus language habitually sets before the mind
a misleading abstract of the indefinite complexity of
the fact of sense-awareness.
What I now want to discuss is the special relation of
the percipient event which is ' here ' to the duration
which is ' now.' This relation is a fact in nature, namely
the mind is aware of nature as being with these two
factors in this relation.
Within the short present duration the ' here ' of the
percipient event has a definite meaning of some sort.
This meaning of ' here ' is the content of the special
relation of the percipient event to its associated duration.
I will call this relation ' cogredience.' Accordingly I ask
for a description of the character of the relation of
cogredience. The present snaps into a past and a present
v) SPACE AND MOTION IO<)
,
when the ' here of cogredience loses its single deter
minate meaning. There has been a passage of nature
from the ' here ' of perception within the past duration
to the different ' here ' of perception within the present
duration. But the two ' heres ' of sense-awareness
within neighbouring durations may be indistinguishable.
In this case there has been a passage from the past to
the present, but a more retentive perceptive force might
have retained the passing nature as one complete present
instead of letting the earlier duration slip into the past.
Namely, the sense of rest helps the integration of dura
tions into a prolonged present, and the sense of motion
differentiates nature into a succession of shortened
durations. As we look out of a railway carriage in an
express train, the present is past before reflexion can
seize it. We live in snippits too quick for thought. On

the other hand the immediate present is prolonged
according as nature presents itself to us in an aspect of
unbroken rest. Any change in nature provides ground
for a differentiation among durations so as to shorten
the present. But there is a great distinction between
self-change in nature and change in external nature.
Self-change in nature is change in the quality of the
standpoint of the percipient event. It is the break up
of the ' here ' which necessitates the break up of the
present duration. Change in external nature is com
patible with a prolongation of the present of contem
plation rooted in a given standpoint. What I want to
bring out is that the preservation of a peculiar relation
to a duration is a necessary condition for the function
of that duration as a pres.ent duration for sense-aware
ness. This peculiar relation is the relation of cogredi
ence between the percipient event and the duration.
110 THE CONCEPT O F NATURE [CH.
Cogredience is the preservation of unbroken quality of

standpoint "'.;.thin the duration. It is the continuance
of identity of station within the whole of nature which
is the terminus of sense-awareness. The duration may
comprise change within itself, but cannot-so far as it
is one present duration�omprise change in the quality
of its peculiar relation to the contained percipient event.
In other \Vords, perception is always ' here, ' and a
duration can only be posited as present for sense-aware
ness on condition that it affocds one unbroken meaning
of ' here ' in its relation to the percipient event. It is
only in the past that you can have been ' there ' with a
standpoint distinct from your present ' here.'
Events there and events here are facts of nature, and
the qualities of being ' there ' and ' here ' are not merely
qualities of awareness as a relation between nature and
mind. The quality of determinate station in the duration
which belongs to an event which is ' here ' in one deter
minate sense of ' here , is the same kind of quality of
station which belongs to an event which is ' there , in
one determinate sense of ' there.' Thus cogreciience has
nothing to do with any biological character of the event
which is related by it to the associated duration. This
biological character is apparently a further condition
for the peculiar connexion of a percipient event with
the percipience of mind ; but it has nothing to do with
the relation of the percipient event to the duration
which is the present whole of nature posited as the
disclosure of the percipience.
Given the requisite biological character, the event in
its character of a percipient event selects that duration
with which the operative past of the event is practi
cally cogredient within the limits of the exactitude of
v] SPACE AND MOTION III
observation. Namely, amid the alternative time-systems

which nature offers there will be one with a duration
giving the best average of cogredience for all the sub
ordinate parts of the percipient event. This duration
will be the \vhole of nature which is the terminus posited
by sense-awareness. Thus the character of the percipient
event determines the time-system immediately evident
in nature. As the character of the percipient event
changes with the passage of nature-or, in other words,
as the percipient mind in its passage correlates itself
\vith the passage of the percipient event into another
percipient event-the time-system correlated with the
percipience of that mind may change. When the bulk
of the events perceived are cogredient in a duration
other than that of the percipient event, the percipience
may include a double consciousness of cogredience,
namely the consciousness of the VY·hole within which the
observer in the train is ' here,' and the consciousness of
the whole within which the trees and bridges and
telegraph posts are definitely ' there.' Thus in per
ceptions under certain circumstances the events dis
criminated assert their own relations of cogredience.
This assertion of cogredience is peculiarly evident when
the duration to which the perceived event is cogredient
is the same as the duration which is the present whole
of nature-in other words, when the event and the per
cipient event are both cogredient to the same duration.
We are now prepared to consider the meaning of
stations in a duration, where stations are a peculiar
kind of routes, which define absolute position in the
associated timeless space.
There are however some preliminary explanations.
A finite event \vill be said to extend throughout a
I I2 THE CONCEPT OF KATURE [CH.
duration when it is part of the duration and is inter

sected by any moment ��hich lies in the duration. Such
an event begins \\ith the duration and ends with it.
Furthermore everv event which begins with the dura-
...
tion and ends ·with it, extends throughout the duration .

This is an axiom based on the continuity of events. By
beginning with a duration and ending with it, I mean
(i) that the event is part of the duration, and (ii) that
both the initial and final boundary moments of the
duration cover some event-particles on the boundary of
the event.
Every event which is cogredient with a duration
extends throughout that duration.
It is not true that all the parts of an event cogredient
with a duration are also cogredient with the duration.
The relation of cogredience may fail in either of two
ways. One reason for failure may be that the part does
not extend throughout the duration. In this case the
part may be cogredient with another duration which is
part of the given duration, though it is not cogredient
"�ith the given duration itself. Such a part would be
cogredient if its existence were sufficiently prolonged
in that time-system. The other reason for failure arises
from the four-dimensional extension of events so that
there is no determinate route of transition of events in
linear series. For example, the tunnel of a tube railway
is an event at rest in a certain time-system, that is to say,
it is cogredient with a certain duration. A train travel
ling in it is part of that tunnel, but is not itself at rest.
If an event e be cogredient with a duration d, and
d' be any duration which is part of d. Then d' belongs
to the same time-system as d. Also d' intersects e in
an event e' which is part of e and is cogredient with d' .
Let P be any event-particle lying in a given duration

d. Consider the aggregate of events in \�rhich P lies
and which are also cogredient with d. Each of these
events occupies its own aggregate of event-particles.
These aggregates will have a common portion, namely
the class of event-particle lying in all of them. This class
of event-particles is what I call the ' station ' of the
event-particle P in the duration d. This is the station in
the character of a locus. A station can also be defined in
the character of an abstractive element. Let the pro
perty a be the name of the property which an abstractive
set possesses when (i) each of its events is cogredient
with the duration d and (ii) the event-particle P lies
in each of its events. Then the group of a-primes, where
u has this meaning, is an abstractive element and is the
station of P in d as an abstractive element. The locus
of event-particles covered by the station of P in d as
an abstractive element is the station of P in d as a
locus. A station has accordingly the usual three
characters, namely, its character of position, its ex
trinsic character as an abstractive element, and its
intrinsic character.
It follows from the peculiar properties of rest that
two stations belonging to the same duration cannot
intersect. Accordingly every event-particle on a station
of a duration has that station as its station in the duration.
Also every duration which is part of a given duration
intersects the stations of the given duration in loci which
are its own stations. By means of these properties we can
utilise the overlappings of the durations of one family
that is, of one time-system-to prolong stations in
definitely backwards and forwards. Such a prolonged
station will be called a point-track. A point-track is a
W.N 8
locus of event-particles. It is defined by reference to

one particular time-system, a say. Corresponding to
any other time-system these will be a different group
of point-tracks. Every event-particle will lie on one
and only one point-track of the group belonging to any
one time-system. Tht: group of point-tracks of the time
system a is the group of points of the timeless space of a .
Each such point indicates a certain quality of absolute
position in reference to the durations of the family
associated \Vith a, and thence in reference to the suc
cessive instantaneous spaces lying in the successive
moments of a. Each moment of a will intersect a
point-track in one and only one event-particle.
This property of the unique intersection of a moment
and a point-track is not confined to the case when the
moment and the point-track belong to the same time
system. Any two event-particles on a point-track are
sequential, so that they cannot lie in the same moment.
Accordingly no moment can intersect a point-track
more than once, and every moment intersects a point
track in one event-particle.
Anyone who at the successive moments of a should
be at the event-particles where those moments intersect
a given point of a will be at rest in the timeless sp�ce
of time-system a. But in any other timeless space
belonging to another time-system he will be at a
different point at each succeeding moment of that time
system. In other words he will be moving. He will b e
moving in a straight line with uniform velocity. We
might take this as the definition of a straight line.
Namely, a straight line in the space of time-system fJ is
the locus of those points of p which all intersect some
one point-track which is a point in the space of some
v] SPACE AND lVIOTION 1 15
other time-system . Thus each point in the space of a

time-system a is associated with one and only one
straight line of the space of any other time-system f3.
Furthermore the set of straight lines in space f3 which
are thus associated with points in space a form a com
plete family of parallel straight lines in space f3 . Thus
there is a one-to-one correlation of points in space a
"'"ith the straight lines of a certain definite family of

parallel straight lines in space f3 . Conversely there is
an analogous one-to-one correlation of the points in
space f3 with the straight lines of a certain family of
parallel straight lines in space a. These families will be
called respectively the family of parallels in f3 associated
with a , and the family of paraIIels in a associated with f3 .
The direction in the space of f3 indicated by the family
of parallels in f3 will be called the direction of a in space
f3, and the family of parallels in a is the direction of f3
in space a. Thus a being at rest at a point of space a
will be moving uniformly along a line in space f3 which

is in the direction of a in space f3, and a being at rest
at a point of space f3 will be moving uniformly along a
line in space a which is in the direction of f3 in space a .
I have been speaking of the timeless spaces which are
associated with time-systems. These are the spaces of
physical science and of any concept of space as eternal
and unchanging. But what we actually perceive is an
approximation to the instantaneous space indicated by
event-particles which lie within some moment of the
time-system associated with our awareness. The points
of such an instantaneous space are event-particles and
the straight lines are rects. Let the time-system be
named a, and let the moment of time-system a to
which our quick perception of nature approximates be
8-.2
1 16 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH.
called M. Any straight line r in space a is a locus of

points and each point is a point-track which is a locus
of event-particles. Thus in the four-dimensional geo
metry of all event-particles there is a two-dimensional
locus w·hich is the locus of all event-particles on points
lying on the straight line r. I will call this locus of
event-particles the matrix of the straight line r. A
matrix intersects any moment in a rect. Thus the matrix
of r intersects the moment M in a rect p . Thus p is the
instantaneous rect in M '\\rhich occupies at the moment
M the straight line r in the space of a . Accordingly
when one sees instantaneously a moving being and its
path ahead of it, what one really sees is the being at
some event-particle A lying in the rect p which is the
apparent path on the assumption of uniform motion.
But the actual rect p which is a locus of event-particles
is never traversed by the being. These event-parti
cles are the instantaneous facts which pass with the
instantaneous moment. What is really traversed are
other event-particles which at succeeding instants
occupy the same points of space a as those occupied by
the event-particles of the rect p . For example, we see a
stretch of road and a lorry moving along it. The in
stantaneously seen road is a portion of the rect p-of
course only an approximation to it. The lorry is the
moving object. But the road as seen is never traversed.
It is thought of as being traversed because the intrinsic
characters of the later. events are in general so similar
to those of the instantaneous road that we do not
trouble to discriminate. But suppose a land mine under
the road has been exploded before the lorry gets there.
Then it is fairly obvious that the lorry does not traverse
what we saw at first. Suppose the lorry is at rest in
space f3 . Then the straight line r of space a is in the

direction of f3 in space a, and the rect p is the repre
sentative in the moment M of the line r of space a.
The direction of p in the instantaneous space of the

moment M is the direction of f3 in M, where M is a
moment of time-system a. Again the matrix of the
line r of space a will also be the matrix of some line s
of space f3 which will be in the direction of a in space {3.

Thus if the lorry halts at some point P of space a. which
lies on the line r, it is now moving along the line s of
space {3 . This is the theory of relative motion ; the
common matrix is the bond which connects the motion
of f3 in space a with the motions of a in space f3.
Motion is essentially a relation between some object
of nature and the one timeless space of a time-system .
An instantaneous space is static, being related to the
static nature at an instant. In perception when we see
things moving in an approximation to an instantaneous
space, the future lines of motion as immediately per
ceived are rects which are never traversed. These
approximate rects are composed of small events, namely
approximate routes and event-particles, which are
passed away before the moving objects reach them.
Assuming that our forecasts of rectilinear motion are
correct, these rects occupy the straight lines in timeless
space which are traversed. Thus the rects are symbols
in immediate sense-awareness of a future which can
only be expressed in terms of timeless space.
We are now in a position to explore the fundamental
character of perpendicularity. Consider the two time
systems a and f3, each with its own timeless space and
its own family of instantaneous moments with their
instantaneous spaces. Let M and N be respectively a
1 18 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH.
moment of a and a moment of f3 .

In M there is the
direction of f3 and in J\r there is the direction of a .
But M and .lv, being moments of different time-systems,
intersect in a level.. Call this level A. Then A is an
instantaneous plane in the instantaneous space of M
and also in the instantaneous space of N. It is the locus
of all the event-particles which lie both in M and in N.
In the instantaneous space of M the level A is per
pendicular to the direction of f3 in M, and in the
instantaneous space of N the level A is perpendicular
to the direction of a in N. This is the fundamental
property '\\:hich forms the definition of perpendicularity.
The symmetry of perpendicularity is a particular in
stance of the symmetry of the mutual relations between
two time-systems. We shall find in the next lecture
that it is from this symmetry that the theory of con
gruence is deduced.
The theory of perpendicularity in the timeless space
of any time-system follows immediately from this
a
theory of perpendicularity in each of its instantaneous

spaces. Let p be any rect in the moment M of a and
let 1' be a level in M which is perpendicular to p. The
locus of those points of the space of a which intersect
M in event-particles on p is the straight line r of space a,
and the locus of those points of the space of a which

intersect M in event-particles on A is the plane l of
space a. Then the plane l is perpendicular to the line r.
In this way we have pointed out unique and definite
properties in nature which correspond to perpen
dicularity. We shall find that this discovery of definite
unique properties defining perpendicularity is of
critical importance in the theory of congruence which
is the topic for the next lecture .
v] SPACE AND MOTION 1 19
I regret that it has been necessary for me in this

lecture to administer such a large dose of four-dimen
sional geometry. I do not apologise, because I am really
not responsible for the fact that nature in its most
fundamental aspect is four-dimensional. Things are
what they are ; and it is useless to disguise the fact that
' what things are ' is often very difficult for our intellects
to follow. It is a mere evasion of the ultimate problems
to shirk such obstacles.
CHAPTER VI
CONGRUENCE
THE aim of this lecture is to establish a theory of con

gruence. You must understand at once that congruence
is a controversial question. It is the theory of measure
ment in space and in time. The question seems simple.
In fact it is simple enough for a standard procedure to
have been settled by act of parliament ; and devotion to
metaphysical subtleties is almost the only crime which
has never been imputed to any English parliameat.
But the procedure is one thing and its meaning is
another.
First let us fix attention on the purely mathematical
question. When the segment between two points A
and B is congruent to that between the two points C
and D, the quantitative measurements of the two seg
ments are equal . The equality of the numericalmeasures
and the congruence of the two segments are not always
clearly discriminated, and are lumped together under
the term equality. But the procedure of measurement
presupposes congruence. For example, a yard measure
is applied successively to measure two distances between
two pairs of points on the floor of a room. It is of the
essence of the procedure of measurement that the
yard measure remains unaltered as it is transferred from
one position to another. Some objects can palpably
alter as they move-for example, an elastic thread ;
but a yard measure does not alter if made of the proper
material. What is this but a judgment of congruence
applied to the train of successive positions of the yard
CH. VI) CONGRUENCE 121
measure ? We know that it does not alter because we

judge it to be congruent to= itself in various positions.
In the case of the thread we can observe the loss of
self-congruence. Thus immediate judgments of con
gruence are presupposed in measurement, and the
process of measurement is merely a procedure to extend
the recognition of congruence to cases where these
immediate judgments are not available. Thus we cannot
define congruence by measurement .
In modern expositions of the axioms of geometry
certain conditions are laid down which the relation of
congruence between segments is to satisfy. It is
supposed that we have a complete theory of points,
straight lines, planes, and the order of points on planes
in fact, a complete theory of non-metrical geometry.
We then enquire about congruence and lay down the
set of conditions-or axioms as they are called-which
this relation satisfies. It has then been proved that
there are alternative relations which satisfy these con
ditions equally well and that there is nothing intrinsic
in the theory of space to lead us to adopt any one of these
relations in preference to any other as the relation
of congruence which we adopt. In other words there
are altem�tive metrical geometries which all exist .by
an equal right so far as the intrinsic theory of space is
concerned.
Poincare, the great French mathematician, held that
our actual choice among these geometries is guided
purely by convention, and that the effect of a change of
choice would be simply to alter our expression of the
physical laws of nature.. By ' convention ' I understand
Poincare to mean that there is nothing inherent in
nature itself giving any peculiar rdk to one of these
congruence relations, and that the choice of one par

ticular relation is guided by the volitions of the mind at
the other end of the sense-awareness. The principle of
guidance is intellectual convenience and not natural
fact.
This position has been misunderstood by many of
Poincare's expositors. They have muddled it up with
another question, namely that owing to the inexactitude
of observation it is impossible to make an exact state
ment in the comparison of measures. It follows that a
certain subset of closely allied congruence relations can
be assigned of which each member equally well agrees
with that statement of observed congruence when the
statement is properly qualified with its limits of
error.
This is an entirely different question and it pre
supposes a rejection of Poincare's position. The absolute
indetermination of nature in respect of all the relations
of congruence is replaced by the indetermination of
observation with respect to a small subgroup of these
relations.
Poincare's position is a strong one. He in effect
challenges anyone to point out any factor in nature
which gives a preeminent status to the congruence
relation which mankind has actually adopted. But un
deniably the position is very paradoxical. Bertrand
Russell had a controversy with him on this question,
and pointed out that on Poincare's principles there was
nothing in nature to determine whether the earth is
larger or smaller than some assigned billiard ball.
Poincare replied that the attempt to find reasons in
nature for the selection of a definite congruence relation
in space is like trying to determine the position of a
VI) CONGRUENCE 123
ship in the o�ean by counting the crew and observing

the colour of the captain's eyes.
In my opinion both disputants were right, assuming
the grounds on which the discussion was based.
Russell in effect pointed out that apart from minor
inexactitudes a determinate congruence relation is
among the factors in nature which our sense-awareness
posits for us. Poincare asks for information as to the
factor in nature which might lead any particular con
gruence relation to play a preeminent role among the
factors posited in sense-awareness. I cannot see the
answer to either of these contentions provided that you
admit the materialistic theory of nature. With this
theory nature at an instant in space is an independent
fact. Thus we have to look for our preeminent con
gruence relation amid nature in instantaneous space ;
and Poincare is undoubtedly right in saying that nature
on this hypothesis gives us no help in finding it.
On the other hand Russell is in an equally strong
position when he asserts that, as a fact of observation,
we do find it, and what is more agree in finding the same
congruence relation. On this basis it is one of the most
extraordinary facts of human experience that all man
kind without any assignable reason should agree in
fixing attention on just one congruence relation amid
the indefinite number of indistinguishable competitors
for notice. One would have expected disagreement on
this fundamental choice to have divided nations and to
have rent families. But the difficulty was not even dis
covered till the close of the nineteenth century by a
few mathematical .philosophers and philosophic mathe
maticians. The case is not like that of our agreement
on some fundamental fact of nature such as the three
124 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE . (CH.
dimensions of space. If space has only three dimensions

we should expect all mankind to be aware of the fact,
as they are aware of it. But in the case of congruence,
mankind agree in an arbitrary interpretation of sense
awareness when there is nothing in nature to guide it.
I look on it as no slight recommendation of the theory
of nature which I am expounding to you that it gives
a solution of this difficulty by pointing out the factor
in nature which issues in the preeminence of one
congruence relation over the indefinite herd of other
such relations.
The reason for this result is that nature is no longer
confined '\\ithin space at an instant. Space and time
are now interconnected ; and this peculiar factor of time
which is so immediately distinguished among the
deliverances of our sense-awareness, relates itself to
one particular congruence relation in space.
Congruence is a particular example of the fundamental
fact of recognition. In perception we recognise. This
recognition does not merely concern the comparison of
a factor of nature posited by memory with a factor
posited by immediate sense-awareness. Recognition
takes place within the present without any intervention
of pure memory. For the present fact is a duration with
its antecedent and consequent durations which are
parts of itself. The discrimination in sense-awareness
of a finite event with its quality of passage is also
accompanied by the discrimination of other factors of
nature which :do not share in the passage of events.
Whatever passes is an event. But we find entities in
nature which do not pass ; namely we recognise same
nesses in nature. Recognition is not primarily an
intellectual act of comparison ; it is in its essence merely
VI) CONGRUENCE 1 25
sense-awareness in its capacity of positing before us

factors in nature which do not pass. For example,
green is perceived as situated in a certain finite event
within the present duration. This green preserves its
self-identity throughout, whereas the event passes and
thereby obtains the property of breaking into parts.
The green patch has parts. But in talking of the green
patch we are speaking of the event in its sole capacity of
being for us the situation of green. The green itself is
numerically one self-identical entity, '\\i.thout parts
because it is without passage.
Factors in nature which are \Vithout passage will be
called objects. There are radically different kinds of ob
jects which will be considered in the succeeding lecture.
Recognition is reflected into the intellect as comparison.
The recognised objects of one event are compared with
the recognised objects of another event. The com
parison may be between two events in the present, or
it may be between two events of which one is posited
by memory-awareness and the other by immediate
sense-awareness. But it is not the events which are
compared. For each event is essentially unique and
incomparable. \Vhat are compared are the objects and
relations of objects situated in events. The event con
sidered as a relation between objects has Jost its passage
and in this aspect is itself an object. This object is not
the event but only an intellectual abstraction. The same
object can be situated in many events ; and in this sense
even the whole event, viewed as an object, can recur,
thbugh not the very event itself with its passage and its
relations to other events.
Objects which are not posited by sense-awareness
may be known to the intellect. For example, relations
between objects and relations between relations may

be factors in nature not disclosed in sense-awareness
but known by logical inference as necessarily in being.
Thus objects for our knowledge may be merely logical
abstractions. For example, a complete event is never
disclosed in sense-awareness, and thus the object which
is the sum total of objects situated in an event as thus
inter-related is a mere abstract concept. Again a right
angle is a perceived object \vhich can be situated in
many events ; but, though rectangularity is posited by
sense-awareness, the majority of geometrical relations
are not so posited. Also rectangularity is in fact often
not perceived when it can be proved to have been there
for perception. Thus an object is often known merely
as an abstract relation not directly posited in sense
awareness although it is there in nature.
The identity of quality between congruent segments
is generally of this character. In certain special cases
this identity of quality can be directly perceived. But
in general it is inferred by a process of measurement
depending on our direct sense-awareness of selected
cases and a logical inference from the transitive character
of congruence.
Congruence depends on motion, and thereby is
generated the connexion between spatial congruence
and temporal congruence. Motion along a straight line
has a symmetry round that line. This symmetry is ex
pressed by the symmetrical geometrical relations of the
line to the family of planes normal to it.
Also another symmetry in the theory of motion arises
from the fact that rest in the points of fJ corresponds to
uniform motion along a definite family of parallel
straight lines in the space of a . We must note the three
VI) CONGRUENCE 127
characteristics, (i) of the uniformity .of the motion

corresponding to any point of f3 along its correlated
straight line in a , and (ii) of the equality in magnitude
of the velocities along the various lines of a correlated
to rest in the various points of {J, and (iii) of the
parallelism of the lines of this family.
We are now in possession of a theory of parallels and
a theory of perpendiculars and a theory of motion, and
from these theories the theory of congruence can be
constructed. It will be remembered that a family of
parallel levels in any moment is the family of levels in
which that moment is intersected by the family of
moments of some other time-system. Also a family of
parallel moments is the family of moments of some one
time-system. Thus we can enlarge our concept of a
family of parallel levels so as to include levels in diffe
rent moments of one time-system. With this enlarged
concept we say that a complete fanuly of parallel levels
in a time-system a is the complete family of levels in
which the moments of a intersect the moments of {J.
This complete family of parallel levels is also evidently
a family lying in the moments of the time-system fJ.
By introducing a third time-system y , parallel rects are
obtained. Also all the points of any one time-system
form a family of parallel point-tracks. Thus there are
three types of parallelograms in the four-dimensional
manifold of event-particles.
In parallelograms of the first type the two pairs of
parallel sides are both of them pairs of rects. In parallelo
grams of the second type one pair of parallel sides
is a pair of rects and the other pair is a pair of point
tracks. In parallelograms of the third type the two pairs
of parallel sides are both of them pairs of point-tracks.
The first axiom of congruence is that the opposite

sides of any parallelogram are congruent. This axiom
enables us to compare the lengths of any t:Wo segments
either respectively on parallel rects or on the same rect.
Also it enables us to compare the lengths of any two seg
ments either respectively on parallel point-tracks or on the
same point-track. It follows from this axiom that two
objects at rest in any two points of a time-system f3 are
moving with equal velocities in any other time-system a
along parallel lines. Thus we can speak of the velocity
in a due to the time-system /3 without specifying any
particular point in f3. The axiom also enables us to
measure time in any time-system ; but does not enable
us to compare times in different time-systems .
The second axiom of congruence concerns parallelo
grams on congruent bases and between the same
parallels, which have also their other pairs of sides
parallel. The axiom asserts that the rect joining the
two event-particles of intersection of the diagonals is
parallel to the rect on which the bases lie. By the aid
of this axiom it easily follows that the diagonals o f a
parallelogram bisect each other.
Congruence is extended in any space beyond parallel
rects to all rects by two axioms depending on perpen
dicularity. The first of these axioms, which is the third
axiom of congruence, is that if ABC is a triangle of rects
in any moment and D is the middle event-particle o f the
base BC, then the level through D perpendicular to BC
contains A when and only when A.B is congruent to
AC. This axiom evidently expresses the symmetry of
perpendicularity, and is the essence of the famous
pons asinorum expressed as an axiom.
The second axiom depending on perpendicularity,
VI] CONGRUENCE 129
and th� fourth axiom of congruence, is that if r and A

be a rect and an event-particle in the same moment and
AB and A C be a pair of rectangular rects intersecting
r in B and C, and AD and AE be another pair of rect
anguiar rects intersecting r in D and E, then either D

or E lies in the segment BC and the other one of the
two does not lie in this segment. Also as a particular
case of this axiom, if AB be perpendicular to r and in
consequence AC be parallel to r, then D and E lie on
opposite sides of B respectively. By the aid of these
two axioms the theory of congruence can be extended
so as to compare lengths of segments on any two rects.
Accordingly Euclidean metrical geometry in space is
completely established and lengths in the spaces of
different time-systems are comparable as the result of
definite properties of nature which indicate just that
particular method of comparison.
The comparison of time-measurements in diverse
time-systems requires two other axioms. The first of
these axioms, forming the fifth axiom of congruence,
- will be called the axiom of ' kinetic symmetry.' It
expresses the symmetry of the quantitative relations
between two time-systems when the times and lengths
.. in the two systems are measured in congruent units.
The axiom can be explained as follows : Let a and f3
be the names of two time-systems. The directions of
motion in the space of a due to rest in a point of fJ is
called the ' ,8-direction in a ' and the direction of motion
in the space of P due to rest in a point of a is called the
' a-direction in ,8.' Consider a motion in the space of
a consisting of a certain velocity in the fj-direction of a
and a certain velocity at right-angles to it. This motion

represents rest in the space of another time-system-
W.N. 9
call it 'TT . Rest in 'TT will also be represented in the space

of p by a certain velocity in the a-direction in f3 and a
certain velocity at right-angles to this a-direction. Thus
a certain motion in the space of a is correlated to a
certain motion in the space of ft, as both representing
the same fact which can also be represented by rest in
'" · Now another time-system, which I will name a ,
can be found '\vhich is such that rest in its space is
represented by the same magnitudes of velocities
along and perpendicular to the a-direction in f3 as those
velocities in a , along and perpendicular to the ,8-direc
tion, which represent rest in 'TT . The required axiom of
kinetic symmetry is that rest in u \vill be represented in
a by the same velocities along and perpendicular to
the ,8-direction in a as those velocities in f3 along and

perpendicular to the a-direction which represent rest
.
m 7T .
A particular case of this axiom is that relative velocities

are equal and opposite. Namely rest in a is represented
in P by a velocity along the a-direction which is equal
to the velocity along the ,B-direction in a which repre
sents rest in P.
Finally the sixth axiom of congruence is that the
relation of congruence is transitive. So far as this
a.uom applies to space, it is superfluous. For the
property follows from our previous axioms. It is
however necessary for time as a supplement to the axiom
of kinetic symmetry. The meaning of the axiom is that
if the time-unit of system a is congruent to the time
unit of system P, and the time-unit of system f3 is
congruent to the time-unit of system y , then the time
un its of a and y are also congruent.
By means of these axioms formulae for the trans-

VI] CONGRUENCE 131
formation of measurements made in one time-system

to measurements of the same facts of nature made in
another time-system can be deduced. These formulae
will be found to involve one arbitrary constant which
I will call k.
It is of the dimensions of the square of a velocity.
Accordingly four cases arise. In the first case k is
zero. This case produces nonsensical results in opposi
tion to the elementary deliverances of experience. We
put this case aside.
In the second case k is infinite. This case yields the
_ordinary formulae for transformation in relative motion,
namely those formulae which are to be found in every
elementary book on dynamics.
2
In the third case, k is negative. Let us call it - c ,
where c will be of the dimensions of a velocity. This

case yields the formulae of transformation which
Larmor discovered for the transformation of Maxwell's
equations of the electromagnetic field. These formulae
were extended by H. A. Lorentz, and used by Kmstein
and Minkowski as the basis of their novel theory of
relativity. I am not now speaking of Einstein's more
recent theory of general relativity by which he deduces
his modification of the law of gravitation. If this be the
case which applies to nature, then c must be a close
approximation to the velocity of light in vacuo. Perhaps
,
it is this actual velocity. In this connexion in ' fltlCUiJ
must not mean an absence of events, namely the absence

of the all-pervading ether of events. It must mean the
absence of certain types of objects.
In the fourth k is positive. Let us call it h2,
case,
where hwill be of the dimensions of a velocity. This gives
a perfectly possible type of transformation formulae,
9-'2
but not one which explains any facts of experience.

It has also another disadvantage. With the assumption
of this fourth case the distinction between space and
time becomes unduly blurred. The whole object of
these lectures has been to enforce the doctrine that
space and time spring from a common root, and that
the ultimate fact of experience is a space-time fact. But
after all mankind does distinguish very sharply between
space and time, and it is owing to this sharpness of
distinction that the doctrine of these lectures is some
what of a paradox. Now in the third assumption this
sharpness of distinction is adequately preserved. There
is a fundamental distinction between the metrical pro
perties of point-�racks and rects. But in the fourth
assumption this fundamental distinction vanishes.
Neither the thii"d nor the fourth assumption can
agree with experience unless we assume that the
velocity c of the third assumption, and the velocity h
of the fourth assumption, are extremely large compared
to the velocities of ordinary experience. If this be the
case the formulae of both assumptions will obviously
reduce to a close approximation to the formulae of the
second assumption which are the ordinary formulae of
dynamical textbooks. For the sake of a name, I will
call these textbook formulae the ' orthodox ' formulae.
There can be no question as to the general approxi
mate correctness of the orthodox formulae. It would be
merely silly to raise doubts on this point. But the
determination of the status of these formulae is by no
means settled by this admission. The independence
of time and space is an unquestioned presupposition
of the orthodox thought which has produced the ortho
dox formulae. With this presupposition and given the
VI] CONGRUENCE 1 33
absolute points of one absolute space, the orthodox

formulae are immediate deductions. Accordingly,
these formulae are presented to our imaginations as
facts which cannot be otherwise, time and space being
what they are. The orthodox formulae have therefore
attained to the status of necessities which cannot be
questioned in science. Any attempt to replace these
formulae by others was to abandon the r�le of physical
explanation and to have rerourse to mere mathematical
formulae.
But even in physical science difficulties have accumu
lated round the orthodox formulae. In the first place
Maxwell's equations of the electromagnetic field are
not invariant for the transformations of the orthodox
formulae ; whereas they are invariant for the trans
formations of the formulae arising from the third of the
four cases mentioned above, provided that the velocity c
is identified with a famous electromagnetic constant
quantity.
Again the null results of the delicate experiments
to detect the earth's variations of motion through the
ether in its orbital path are explained immediately by
the formulae of the third case. But if we assume the
orthodox formulae we have to make a special and ar
bitrary assumption as to the contraction of matter during
motion. I mean the Fitzgerald-Lorentz assumption.
Lastly Fresnel's coefficient of drag which represents
the variation of the velocity of light in a moving medium
is explained by the formulae of the third case, and
requires another arbitrary assumption if we use the
orthodox formulae.
It appears therefore that on the mere basis of
physical explanation there are advantages in the formulae
13 4 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH.
of the third case as compared with the orthodox for

mulae. But the \vay is blocked by the ingrained belief
that these latter formulae possess a character of necessity.
It is therefore an urgent requisite for physical science
and for philosophy to examine critically the grounds
for this supposed necessity. The only satisfactory
method of scrutiny is to recur to the first principles of
our knowledge of nature. This is exactly what I am
endeavouring to do in these lectures. I ask what it is
that \Ve are a\\'are of in our sense-perception of nature.
I then proceed to examine those factors in nature which
lead us to conceive nature as occupying space and
persisting through time. This procedure has led us to
an investigation of the characters of space and time. It
results from these investigations that the formulae of
the third case and the orthodox formulae are on a level
as possible formulae resulting from the basic character
of our kno\vledge of nature. The orthodox formulae
have thus lost any advantage as to necessity which they
enjoyed over the serial group. The way is thus open to
adopt \vhichever of the two groups best accords with
observation.
I take this opportunity of pausing for a moment from
the course of my argument, and of reflecting on the
general character which my doctrine ascribes to some
familiar concepts of science. I have no doubt that some
of you have felt that in certain aspects this character
is very paradoxical.
This vein of paradox is partly due to the fact that
educated language has been made to conform to the
prevalent orthodox theory. We are thus, in expounding
an alternative doctrine, driven to the use of either strange
terms or of familiar \Vords with unusual meanings. This
VI) CONGRUENCE 1 35
victory of the orthodox theory over language is very

natural . Events are named after the prominent objects
situated in them, and thus both in language and in
.thought the event sinks behind the object, and becomes
the mere play of its relations. The theory of space is
then converted into a theory of the relations of objects
instead of a theory of the relations of events. But objects
have not the passage of events . Accordingly space as a
relation between objects is devoid of any connexion
with time. It is space at an instant without any deter
minate relations between the spaces at successive in
stants . It cannot be one timeless space because the
relations between objects change.
A few minutes ago in speaking of the deduction of
the orthodox formulae for relative motion I said that
they followed as an immediate deduction from the
assumption of absolute points in absolute space. This
reference to absolute space was not an oversight. I know
that the doctrine of the relativity of space at present
holds the field both in science and philosophy. But
I do not think that its inevitable consequences are
understood. When we really face them the paradox of
the presentation of the character of space which I have
elaborated is greatly mitigated. If there is no absolute
position, a point must cease to be a simple entity. What
is a point to one man in a balloon with his eyes fixed on
an instrument is a track of points to an observer on the
earth who is watching the balloon through a telescope,
and is another track of points to an observer in the sun
who is watching the balloon through some instrument
suited to such a being. Accordingly if I am reproached
with the paradox of my theory of points as classes of
event-particles, and of my theory of event-particles as
groups of abstractive sets, I ask my critic to explain

exactly '\\that he means by a point. \Vhile you explain
your meaning about anything, however simple, it is
always apt to look subtle and fine spun. I have at least·
explained exactly \Vhat I do mean by a point, what
relations it involves and what entities are the relata.
If you admit the relativity of space, you also must
admit that points are complex entities, logical constructs
involving other entities and their relations. Produce
your theory, not in a few vague phrases of indefinite
meaning, but explain it step by step in definite terms
referring to assigned relations and assigned relata. Also
show that your theory of points issues in a theory of
space. Furthermore note that the example of the man
in the balloon, the observer on earth, and the observer
in the sun, shows that every assumption of relative rest
requires a timeless space with radically different points
from those which issue from every other such assump
tion. The theory of the relativity of space is incon
sistent with any doctrine of one unique set of points of
one timeless space.
The fact is that there is no paradox in my doctrine
of the nature of space V."hich is not in essence inherent
in the theory of the relativity of space. But this doctrine
has never really been accepted in science, whatever
people say. What appears in our dynamical treatises is
Ne\.vton's doctrine of relative motion based on the
doctrine of differential motion in absolute space. -When
you once admit that the points are radically different
entities for differing assumptions of rest, then the
orthodox formulae lose all their obviousness. They
were only obvious be.cause you were really thinking of
something else. \Vhen discussing this topic you can
v1] CONGRUENCE 137
only avoid paradox by taking refuge from the flood of

criticism in the comfortable ark of no meaning.
The new theory provides a definition of the con
gruence of periods of time. The prevalent view pro
vides no such definition. Its position is that if we
take such time-measurements so that certain familiar
velocities which seem to us to be uniform are uniform,
then the laws of motion are true. Now in the first place
no change could appear either as uniform or non
uniform without involving a definite determination of
the congruence for time-periods. So in appealing to
familiar phenomena it allows that there is some
factor in nature which we can intellectually construct
as a congruence theory. It does not however say any
thing about it except that the laws of motion are then
true. Suppose that with some expositors we cut out
the reference to familiar velocities such as the rate of
rotation of the earth. We are then driven to admit that
there is no meaning in temporal congruence except
that certain assumptions make the laws of motion true.
Such a statement is historically false. King Alfred the
Great was ignorant of the laws of motion, but knew
very well what he meant by the measurement of time,
and achieved his purpose by means of burning candles.
Also no one in past ages justified the use of sand in
hour-glasses by saying that some centuries later in
teresting laws of motion would be discovered which
would give a meaning to the statement that the sand
was emptied from the bulbs in equal times. Uniformity
in change is directly perceived, and it follows that
mankind perceives in nature factors from which a theory
of temporal congruence can be formed. The prevalent
theory entirely fails to produce such factors.
The mention of the laws of motion raises another

point \\·here the prevalent theory has nothing to say
and the ne\v theory gives a complete explanation. It is
well known that the laws of motion are not valid for
any axes of reference which you may choose to take
fixed in any rigid body. You must choose a body which
is not rotating and has no acceleration. For example
they do not really apply to axes fixed in the earth
because of the diurnal rotation of that body. The law
which fails \\·hen you assume the ·wrong axes as at rest
is the third law, that action and reaction are equal and
opposite. With the wrong axes uncompensated centri
fugal forces and uncompensated composite centrifugal
forces appear, due to rotation. The influence of these
forces can be demonstrated by many facts on the earth's
surface, Foucault's pendulum, the shape of the earth,
the fixed directions of the rotations of cyclones and
anticyclones. It is difficult to take seriously the sug
gestion that these domestic phenomena on the earth
are due to the influence of the fixed stars. I cannot
persuade myself to believe that a little star in its
twinkling turned round Foucault's pendulum in the
Paris Exhibition of 186r . Of course anything is believ
able when a definite physical connexion has been
demonstrated , for example the influence of sunspots.
Here all demonstration is lacking in the form of any
coherent theory. According to the theory of these
lectures the axes to which motion is to be referred are
axes at rest in the space of some time-system. For
example, consider the space of a time-system a . There
are sets of axes at rest in the space of a . These are suitable
dynamical a-xes. Also a set of axes in this space which
is moving with uniform velocity without rotation is
VI] CONGRUENCE 139
another suitable set. All the moving points fixed in

these moving axes are really tracing out parallel lines
with one uniform velocity. In other words they are
the reflections in the space of a of a set of fixed axes in
the space of some other time-system f3. Accordingly
the group of dynamical axes required for Newton's
Laws of Motion is the outcome of the necessity of
referring motion to a body at rest in the space of some
one time-system in order to obtain a coherent account
of physical properties. If we do not do so the meaning
of the motion of one portion of our physical configuratien
is different from the meaning of the motion of another
portion of the same configuration. Thus the meaning
of motion being what it is, in order to describe the motion
of any system of objects without changing the meaning
of your terms as you proceed with your description,
you are bound to take one of these sets of axes as axes
of referenee ; though you may choose their reflections
into the space of any time-system '\\"'hich you wish to
adopt. A definite physical reason is thereby assigned for
the peculiar property of the dynamical group of axes.
On the orthodox theory the position of the equations
of motion is most ambiguous. The space to which they
refer is completely undetermined and so is the measure
ment of the lapse of time. Science is simply setting out
on a fishing expedition to see whether it cannot find
some procedure which it can call the measurement of
space and some procedure which it can call the measure
ment of time, and something which it can call a system
of forces, and something which it can call masses, so
that these formulae may be satisfied. The only reason
on this theory-why anyone should want to satisfy
these formulae is a sentimental regard for Galileo,
Newton, Euler and Lagrange. The theory, so far from

founding science on a sound observational basis, forces
everything to conform to a mere mathematical pre
ference for certain simple formulae.
I do not for a moment believe that this is a true ac
count of the real status of the Laws of Motion. These
equations \vant some slight adjustment for the new
formulae of relativity. But with these adjustments,
imperceptible in ordinary use, the laws deal with funda
mental physical quantities which we know very well
and \\ish to correlate.
The measurement of time was known to all civilised
nations long before the laws were thought of. It is this
time as thus measured that the laws are concerned with.
Also they deal with the space of our daily life. When we
approach to an accuracy of measurement beyond that
of observation, adjustment is allowable. But within the
limits of observation we know what we mean when we
speak of measurements of space and measurements of
time and uniformity of change. It is for science to give an
intellectual account of what is so evident in sense-aware
ness. It is to me thoroughly incredible that the ultimate
fact beyond which there is no deeper explanation is that
mankind has really been swayed by an unconscious
desire to satisfy the mathematical formulae which we
call the Laws of l\1otion, formulae completely unknown
till the seventeenth century of our epoch.
The correlation of the facts of sense-experience
effected by the alternative account of nature extends
beyond the physical properties of motion and the
properties of congruence. It gives an account of the
meaning of the geometrical entities such as points,
straight lines, and volumes, and connects the kindred
VI] CONGRUENCE
ideas of extension in time and extension in space. The

theory satisfies the true purpose of an intellectual
explanation in the sphere of natural philosophy. This
purpose is to exhibit the interconnexions of nature, and
to show that one set of ingredients in nature requires
for the exhibition of its character the presence of the
other sets of ingredients.
The false idea which \Ve have to get rid of is that of
nature as a mere aggregate of independent entities, each
capable of isolation. According to this conception these
entities, whose characters are capable of isolated defini
tion, come together and by their accidental relations
form the system of nature. This system is thus thoroughly
accidental ; and, even if it be subject to a mechanical
fate, it is only accidentally so subject.
With this theory space might be without time1 and
time might be without space. The theory admittedly
breaks down when we come to the relations of matter
and space. The relational theory of space is an admission
that we cannot know space without matter or matter
without space. But the seclusion of both from time is
still jealously guarded. The relations between portions
of matter in space are accidental facts owing to the
absence of any coherent account of how space springs
from matter or how matter springs from space. Also
what we really observe in nature, its colours and its
sounds and its touches are secondary qualities ; in
other words, they are not in nature at all but are acci
dental products of the relations between nature and
mind.
The explanation of nature which I urge as an alter
native ideal to this accidental view of nature, is that
nothing in nature could be what it is except as an
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH. VI
ingredient in nature as it is. The whole which is present

for discrimination is posited in sense-awareness as
necessary for the discriminated parts. An isolated event
is not an event, because every event is a factor in a
larger whole and is significant of that whole. There can
be no time apart from space ; and no space apart from

time ; and no space and no time apart from the passage
of the events of nature. The isolation of an entity in
thought, ",.hen we think of it as a bare ' it,' has" no
counterpart in any corresponding isolation in nature.
Such isolation is merely part of the procedure of intel
lectual knowledge.
The la�Ts of nature are the outcome of the characters
of the entities which we find in nature. The entities
being what they are, the la\vs must be what they are ;
and conversely the entities follow from the laws. We
are a long way from the attainment of such an ideal ;
but it remains as the abiding goal of theoretical science.
CHAPTER V I I
O BJ E C T S
THE ensuing lecture is concerned '\\i.th the theory of

objects. Objects are elements in nature '\\�hich do not
pass. The awareness of an object as some factor not
sharing in the passage of nature is what I call ' recogni
tion.' It is impossible to recognise an event, because
an event is essentially distinct from every other event ..
Recognition is an awareness of sameness. But to call
recognition an awareness of sameness implies an in
tellectual act of comparison accompanied with judgment.
I use recognition for the non-intellectual relation of
sense-awareness which connects the mind with a factor
of nature without passage . On the intellectual side of
the mind's experience there are comparisons of things
recognised and consequent judgments of sameness or
diversity. Probably ' sense-recognition ' would be a
better term for what I mean by ' recognition .. ' I have
chosen the simpler term because I think that I shall be
able to avoid the use of ' recognition ' in any other
me.aning than that of ' sense-recognition .' I am quite
willing to believe that recognition, in my sense of the
term, is merely an ideal limit, and that there is in fact
no recognition '\\ithout intellectual accompaniments of
comparison and judgment. But recognition is that
relation of the mind to nature which provides the
material for the intellectual activity.
An object is an ingredient in the character of some
event. In fact the character of an event is nothing but
the objects which are ingredient in it and the ways in
which those objects make their ingression into the
event. Thus the theory of objects is the theory of the
comparison of events . Events are only comparable
because they body forth permanences. We are com
paring objects in events whenever \Ve can say, ' There
it is again.' Objects are the elements in nature which
can ' be again.>
Sometimes permanences can be proved to exist
which evade recognition in the sense in which I am
using that term . The permanences which evade recogni
tion appear to us as abstract properties either of events
or of objects . All the same they are there for recognition
although undiscriminated in our sense-awareness. The
demarcation of events, the splitting of nature up into
parts is effected by the objects which we recognise as
their ingredients. The discrimination of nature is the
recognition of objects amid passing events. It is a
compound of the awareness of the passage of nature,
of the consequent partition of nature, and of the defini
tion of certain parts of nature by the modes of the
ingression of objects into them.
You may have noticed that I am using the term
' ingression ' to denote the general relation of objects
to events. The ingression of an object into an event is
the way the character of the event shapes itself in virtue
of the being of the object. Namely the event is what it
is, because the object is what it is ; and when I am th inking
of this modification of the event by the object, I call
the relation between the two ' the ingression of the
object into the event.' It is equally true to say that
objects are what they are because events are what they
are. Nature is such that there can be no events and no
objects without the ingression of objects into events.
vu] OBJECTS
:- Although there are events such that the ingredient

objects evade our recognition. These are the events in
empty space. Such events are only analysed for us by·
the intellectual probing of science.
Ingression is a relation which has various modes.
There are obviously very various kinds of objects ;
and no one kind of object can have the same sort of
relations to events as objects of another kind can have.
We shall have to analyse out some of the different
modes of ingression which different kinds of objects
have into events.
But even if we stick to one and the same kind of
objects, an object of that kind has different modes of
ingression into different events. Science and philo
sophy have been apt to entangle themselves in a simple
minded theorythat an object is at one place at any definite
time, and is in no sense anywhere else. This is in fact
the attitude of common sense thought, though it is not
the attitude of language which is naively expressing the
facts of experience. Every other sentence in a work of
literature which is endeavouring truly to in,terpret the
facts of experienoe expresses differences in surrounding
events due to the presence of some object. An object
is ingredient throughout its neighbourhood, and its
neighbourhood is indefinite. Also' the modification of
events by ingression is susceptible of quantitative
differences. Finally therefore we are driven to admit
that each object is in some sense ingredient throughout
nature ; though its ingression may be quantitatively
irrelevant in the expression of our individual experi
ences.
This admission is not new either in philosophy or
science. It is obviously a necessary axiom for those
W.N. 10
philosophers who insist that reality is a system. In

these lectures '\\·e are keeping off the profound and
vexed question as to what we mean by ' reality.' I am
maintaining the humbler thesis that nature is a system.
But I suppose that in this case the less follows from
the greater, and that I may claim the support of these
philosophers. The same doctrine is essentially interwoven
in all modern physical speculation. As long ago as 1847
Faraday in a paper in the Philosopfzical Magazine
remarked that his theory of tubes of force implies that
in a sense an electric charge is everywhere. The modi
fication of the electromagnetic field at every point of
space at each instant owing to the past history of each
electron is another "\\·ay of stating the same fact. We
can ho\vever illustrate the doctrine by the more familiar
facts of life \\;.thout recourse to the abstruse speculations
of theoretical physics.
The \\·aves as they roll on to the Cornish coast tell
of a gale in mid-Atlantic ; and our dinner witnesses to
the ingression of the cook into the dining room. It is
evident th�t the ingression of objects into events in
cludes the theory of causation.. I prefer to neglect this
aspect of ingression, because causation raises the
memory of discussi�ns based upon theories of nature
which are alien to my own. Also I think that some new
light may be thrown on the subject by viewing it in
this fresh aspect.
The examples which I have given of the ingression
of objects into events remind us that ingression takes
a peculiar form in the case of some events ; in a sense,
it is a more concentrated form. For example, the electron
has a certain position in space and a certain shape.
Perhaps it is an extremely small sphere in a certain
vn) OBJECTS
test-tube. The storm is a gale situated in mid-..\tlantic

with a certain latitude and longitude, and the cook is in
the kitchen. I will call this special form of ingression
the ' relation of situation ' ; also, by a double use of the
word ' situation,' I "�11 call the event in \\·hi ch an object
is situated ' the situation of the object.' Thus a situation
is an event \\"hich is a relatum in the relation of situation.
Now our first impression is that at last we have come to
the simple plain fact of where the object really is ; and
that the vaguer relation which I call ingression should
not be muddled up with t"he relation of situation, as if
including it as a particular case. It seems so obvious
that any object is in such and such a position, and that
it is influencing other events in a totally different sense.
Namely, in a sense an object is the character of the
event which is its situation, but it only influences the
character of other events. Accordingly the relations of
situation and influencing are not generally the same sort
of relation, and should not be subsumed under the same
term ' ingression.' I believe that this notion is a mistake,
and that it is impossible to draw a clear distinction
between the two relations.
For example, Where was your toothache ? You went
to a dentist and pointed out the tooth to him. He pro
nounced it perfectly sound, and cured you by stopping
another tooth. Which tooth was the situation of the
toothache? Again, a man has an arm amputated, and
experiences sensations in the hand which he has lost.
The situation of the imaginary hand is in fact merely
thin air. You look into a mirror and see a fire. The flames
that you see are situated behind the mirror. Again at
night you watch the sky ; if some of the stars had vanished
from existence hours ago, you would not be any the
Io--2
wiser. Even the situations of the planets differ from

those \Vhich science would assign to them.
Anyhow you are tempted to exclaim, the cook is in
the kitchen. If you mean her mind, I will not agree
with you on the point ; for I am only talking of nature.
Let us think only of her bodily presence. What do you
mean by this notion ? We confine ourselves to typical
manifestations of it. ).,.ou can see her, touch her, and
hear her. But the examples which I have given you
show that the notions of the situations of what you see,
what you touch, and what you hear are not so sharply
separated out as to defy further questioning. You
cannot cling to the idea that we have two sets of ex
periences of nature, one of primary qualities which
belong to the objects perceived, and one of secondary
qualities which are the products of our mental excite
ments. All we know of nature is in the same boat, to
sink or s\vim together. The constructions of science
are merely expositions of the characters of things per
ceived. Accordingly to affirm that the cook is a certain
dance of molecules and electrons is merely to affirm
that the things about her which are perceivable have
certain characters. The situations of the perceived
manifestations of her bodily presence have only a very
general relation to the situations of the molecules, to
be determined by discussion of the circumstances of
perception ..
In discussing the relations of situation in particular
and of .ingression in general, the first requisite is to note
that objects are of radically different types. For each
type ' situation ' and ' ingression ' have their own special
meanings which are different from their meanings for
other types, though connexions can be pointed out.
VII] OBJECTS
It is necessary therefore in discussing them to deter

mine what type of objects are under consideration.
There are, I think, an indefinite number of types of
objects. Happily we need not think of them all. The
idea of situation has its peculiar importance in reference
to three types of objects \vhich I call sense-objects,
perceptual objects and scientific objects. The suitability
of these names for the three types is of minor import
ance, so long as I can succeed in explaining what I mean
by them.
These three types form an ascending hierarchy, of
which each member presupposes the type belov,-. The
base of the hierarchy is formed by the sense-objects.
These objects do not presuppose any other type of
objects. A sense-object is a factor of nature posited
by sense-awareness which (i), in that it is an object, does
not share in the passage of nature and (ii) is not a
relation between other factors of nature. It will of
course be a relatum in relations ";hich also implicate
other factors of nature. But it is always a relatum and
never the relation itself. Examples of sense-objects are
a particular sort of colour, say Cambridge blue, or a
particular sort of sound, or a particular sort of smell,
or a particular sort of feeling. I am not talking of a
particular patch of blue as seen during a particular
second of time at a definite date. Such a patch is an
event where Cambridge blue is situated. Similarly I am
not talking of any particular concert-room as filled with
the note. I mean the note itself and not the patch of
volume filled by the sound for a tenth of a second. It is
natural for us to think of the note in itself, but in the
case of colour we are apt to think of it merely as a
property of the patch. No one thinks of the note as a
property of the concert-room. We see the blue and we

hear the note. Both the blue and the note are im
mediately posited by the discrimination of sense-aware
ness "Thich relates the mind to nature. The blue is
posited as in nature related to other factors in nature.
In particular it is posited as in the relation of being
situated in the event 'vhich is its situation.
The difficulties which cluster around the relation of
situation arise from the obstinate refusal of philosophers
to take seriously the ultimate fact of multiple relations.
By a multiple relation I mean a relation which in any
concrete instance of its occurrence necessarily involves
more than two relata. For example, when John likes
Thomas there are only two relata, John and Thomas.
But when John gives that book to Thomas there are
three relata, John, that book, and Thomas.
Some schools of philosophy, under the influence of
the Aristotelian logic and the Aristotelian philosophy,
endeavour to get on without admitting any relations at
all except that of substance and attribute. Namely all
apparent relations are to be resolvable into the con
current existence of substances with contrasted at
tributes. It is fairly obvious that the Leibnizian monad
ology is the necessary outcome of any such philosophy.
If you dislike pluralism, there will be only one monad.
Other schools of philosophy admit relations but
obstinately refuse to contemplate relations with more
than t\vo relata. I do not think that this limitation is
based on any set purpose or theory. It merely arises
from the fact that more complicated relations are a
bother to people without adequate mathematical training,
when they are admitted into the reasoning.
I must repeat that we have nothing to do in these
vu] OBJECTS
lectures with the ultimate character of realitv. It is

quite possible that in the true philosophy of reality
there are only individual substances with attributes,
or that there are only relations with pairs of relata.. I do
not believe that such is the case ; but I am not concerned
to argue about it now. Our theme is Nature. So long
as we confine ourselves to the factors posited in the
sense-awareness of nature, it seems to me that there
certainly are instances of multiple relations between
these factors, and that the relation of situation for sense
objects is one example of such multiple relations.
Consider a blue coat, a flannel coat of Cambridge
blue belonging to some athlete. The coat itself is a
perceptual object and its situation is not �·hat I am
talking about. We are talking of someone's definite
sense-awareness of Cambridge blue as situated in some
event of nature. He may be looking at the coat directly ..
He then sees Cambridge blue as situated practically in the
same event as the coat at that instant. It is true that the
blue which he sees is due to light which left the coat
some inconceivably small fraction of a second before.
This difference would be important if he were looking at
a starwhose colour was Cambridge blue. The star might
have ceased to exist days ago, or even years ago. The
situation of the blue will not then be very intimately
connected with the situation (in another sense of
' situation ') of any perceptual object. This disconnexion
of the situation of the blue and the situation of some
associated perceptual object does not require a star for
its exemplification. Any looking glass will suffice.. Look
at the coat through a looking glass. Then blue is seen
as situated behind the mirror . The event \Vhich is its
situation depends upon the position of the observer.
The sense-a\vareness of the blue as situated in a

certain event which I call the situation, is thus ex
hibited as the sense-awareness of a relation between the
blue, the percipient event of the observer, the situation,
and intervening events. All nature is in fact required,
though only certain intervening events require their
characters to be of certain definite sorts. The ingression
of blue into the events of nature is thus exhibited as
systematically correlated. The awareness of the observer
depends on the position of the percipient event in this
systematic correlation. I will use the term ' ingression
into nature ' for this systematic correlation of the blue
with nature. Thus the ingression of blue into any definite
event is a part statement of the fact of the ingression
of blue into nature.
In respect to the ingression of blue into nature events
may be roughly put into four classes which overlap and
are not very clearly separated. These classes are (i) the
percipient events, (ii) the situations, (iii) the active
conditioning events, (iv) the passive conditioning events.
To understand this classification of events in the general
fact of the ingression of blue into nature, let us confine
attention to one situation for one percipient event and
to the consequent roles of the conditioning events for
the ingression as thus limited. The percipient event is
the relevant bodily state of the observer. The situation
is where he sees the blue, say, behind the mirror. The
active conditioning events are the events whose charac
ters are particularly relevant for the event (which is the
situation) to be the situation for that percipient event,
namely the coat, the mirror, and the state of the room
as to light and atmosphere. The passive conditioning
events are the events of the rest of nature.
VII] OBJECTS 1 53
In general the situation is an active conditioning
event ; namely the coat itself, when there is no mirror
or other such contrivance to produce abnormal effects.
But the example of the mirror shows us that the situation
may b e one of the passive conditioning events. \Ve are
then apt to say that our senses have been cheated,
because we demand as a right that the situation should
be an active condition in the ingression.
This demand is not so baseless as it may seem when
presented as I have put it. All we know of the characters
of the events of nature is based on the analysis of the
relations of situations to percipient events. If situations
were not in general active conditions, this analysis
would tell us nothing. Nature would be an unfathom
able enigma to us and there could be no science. Ac
cordingly the incipient discontent when a situation is
found to be a passive condition is in a sense justifiable ;
because if that sort of thing went on too often, the role
of the intellect would be ended.
Furthermore the mirror is itself the situation of other
sense-objects either for the same observer with the
same percipient event, or for other observers with
other percipient events. Thus the fact that an event is a
situation in the ingression of one set of sense-objects
into nature is presumptive evidence that that event is
an active condition in the ingression of other sense
objects into nature which may have other situations.
This is a fundamental principle of science which it has
derived from common sense.
I now tum to perceptual objects. When we look at
the coat, we do not in general say, There is a patch of
Cambridge blue ; wpat naturally occurs to us is, The�e
is a coat. Also the judgment that what we have seen lS
1 54 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH
a garment of man's attire is a detail. What we perceive
is an object other than a mere sense-object. It is not a
mere patch of colour, but something more ; and it is
that something more which we judge to be a coat. I
will use the word ' coat ' as the name for that crude
object which is more than a patch of colour, and without
any allusion to the judgments as to its usefulness as an
article of attire either in the past or the future. The coat
which is perceived-in this sense of the word ' coat ' -
is what I call a perceptual object. We have to investigate

the general character of these perceptual objects.
It is a law of nature that in general the situation of a
sense-object is not only the situation of that sense
object for one definite percipient event, but is the
situation of a variety of sense-objects for a variety of
percipient events. For example, for any one percipient
event, the situation of a sense-object of sight is apt also
to be the situations of sense-objects of sight, of touch,
of smell, and of sound. Furthermore this concurrence
in the situations of sense-objects has led to the body
i.e. the percipient event-so adapting itself that the
perception of one sense-object in a certain situation
leads to a subconscious sense-awareness of other sense
objects in the same situation. This interplay is especially
the case between touch and sight. There is a certain
correlation between the ingressions of sense-obj ects
of touch and sense-objects of sight into nature, and in a
slighter degree between the ingressions of other pairs
of sense-objects. I call this sort of correlation the ' con
veyance ' of one sense-object by another. When you
see the blue flannel coat you subconsciously feel yourself
wearing it or otherwise touching" it. If you are a
smoker, you may also subconsciously be aware of the
VII] OBJECTS 1 55
faint aroma of tobacco. The peculiar fact, posited by

this sense-awareness of the concurrence of subconscious
sense-objects along with one or more dominating sense
objects in the same situation, is the sense-awareness of
the perceptual object. The perceptual object is not
primarily the issue of a judgment. It is a factor of nature
directly posited in sen.se-a\vareness . The element of
judgment comes in when \Ve proceed to classify the
particular perceptual object. For example, we say,
That is flannel, and we think of the properties of flannel
and the uses of athletes' coats . But that all takes place
after we have got hold of the perceptual object. Anti
cipatory judgments affect the perceptual object per
ceived by focussing and diverting attention.
The perceptual object is the outcome of the habit of
experience. Anything which conflicts with this habit
hinders the sense-awareness of such an object. A sense
object is not the product of the association of intellectual
ideas ; it is the product of the association of sense-objects
in the same situation. This outcome � not intellectual ;
it is an object of peculiar type with its own particular
ingression into nature.
There are m·o kinds of perceptual objects, namely,
' delusive perceptual objects ' and ' physical objects.'
The situation of a delusive perceptual object is a
passive condition in the ingression of that object into
nature. Also the event which is the situation will have
the relation of situation to the object only for one
particular percipient event. For example, an observer
sees the image of the blue coat in a mirror. It is a blue
coat that he sees and not a mere patch of colour. This
shows that the active conditions for the conveyance
of a group of subconscious sense-objects by a dominating
THE CO�CEPT OF NATURE (CH.
sense-object are to be found in the percipient event.

�amely \Ve are to look for them in the investigations
of medical psychologists. The ingression into nature of
the delusive sense-object is conditioned by the adapta
tion of bodily events to the more normal occurrence,
\Vhich is the ingression of the physical object.
A perceptual object is a physical object when (i) its
situation is an active conditioning event for the in
gression of any of its component sense-objects, and
(ii) the same event can be the situation of the perceptual
object for an indefinite number of possible percipient
events. Physical objects are the ordinary objects which
\Ve perceive '\\·hen our senses are not cheated, such as
chairs, tables and trees. In a "\vay physical objects have
more insistent perceptive power than sense-objects.
Attention to the fact of their occurrence in nature is the
first condition for the survival of complex living or
ganisms. The result of this high perceptive power of
physical objects is the scholastic philosophy of nature
which looks on the sense-objects as mere attributes of
the physical objects. This scholastic point of view is
directly contradicted by the wealth of sense-objects
\Yhich enter into our experience as situated in events
\vithout any connexion with physical objects. For
example, stray smells, sounds, colours and more subtle
nameless sense-objects. There is no perception of
physical objects \\ithout perception of sense-objects.
But the converse does not hold : namely, there is
abundant perception of sense-objects unaccompanied
by any perception of physical objects. This lack of
reciprocity in the relations between sense-objects and
physical objects is fatal to the scholastic natural philo
sophy.
vu] OBJECTS 1 57
There is a great difference in the roles of the situa

tions of sense-objects and physical objects. The situa
tions of a physical object are conditioned by uniqueness
and continuity. The uniqueness is an ideal limit to
which we approximate as \Ve proceed in thought along
an abstractive set of durations, considering smaller
and smaller durations in the approach to the ideal limit
of the moment of time. In other words, \\"hen the
duration is small enough, the situation of the physical
object \vithin that duration is practically unique.
The identification of the same physical object as
being situated in distinct events in distinct durations is
effected by the condition of continuity. This condition
of continuity is the condition that a continuity of passage
of events, each event being a situation of the object in
its corresponding duration, can be found from the earlier
to the later of the two given events. So far as the t\\"O
events are practically adjacent in one specious present,
this continuity of passage may be directly perceived .
Otherwise it is a matter of judgment and inferenee.
The situations of a sense-object are not conditioned
by any such conditions either of uniqueness or of con
tinuity. In any durations ho,vever small a sense-object
may have any number of situations separated from each
other. Thus two situations of a sense-object, either in
the same duration or in different durations, are not
necessarily connected by any continuous passage of
events which are also situations of that sense-object.
The characters of the conditioning events involved in
the ingression of a sense-object into nature can be
largely expressed in terms of the physical objects \vhich
are situated in those events. In one respect this is also
a tautology. For the physical object is nothing else than
the habitual concurrence of a certain set of sense-objects

in one situation. -�ccordingly when we know all about
the physical object, we thereby know its component
sense-objects. But a physical object is a condition for
the occurrence of sense-objects other than those which
are its components. For example, the atmosphere causes
the events '\\�hich are its situations to be active con
ditioning events in the transmission of sound. A mirror
which is itself a physical object is an active condition for
the situation of a patch of colour behind it, due to the
reflection of light in it.
Thus the origin of scientific knowledge is the en
deavour to express in terms of physical objects the
various roles of events as active conditions in the in
gression of sense-objects into nature. It is in the progress
of this investigation that scientific objects emerge. They
embody those aspects of the character of the situations
of the physical objects which are most permanent and
are expressible without reference to a multiple relation
including a percipient event. Their relations to each
other are also characterised by a certain simplicity and
uniformity. Finally the characters of the observed
physical objects and sense-objects can be expressed in
terms of these scientific objects. In fact the whole
point of the search for scientific objects is the endeavour
to obtain this simple expression of the characters of
events. These scientific objects are not themselves
merely formulae for calculation ; because formulae must
refer to things in nature, and the scientific objects are
the things in nature to which the formulae refer.
A scientific object such as a definite electron is a
systematic correlation of the characters of all events
throughout all nature. It is an aspect of the systematic
VII] OBJECTS 1 59
character of nature. The electron is not merely v;here

its charge is. The charge is the quantitative character
of certain events due to the ingression of the electron
into nature. The electron is its \Vhole field of force.
Namely the electron is the systematic \Vay in which all
events are modified as the expression of its ingression.
The situation of an electron in any small duration may
be defined as that event \Vhich has the quantitative
character which is the charge of the electron. \Ve may
if we please term the mere charge the electron. But
then another name is required for the scientific object
which is the full entity which concerns science, and
which I have called the electron.
According to this conception of scientific objects, the
rival theories of action at a distance and action by
transmission through a medium are both incomplete
expressions of the true process of nature. The stream
of events which form the continuous series of situations
of the electron is entirely self-determined, both as
regards having the intrinsic character of being the series
of situations of that electron and as regards the time
systems with which its various members are cogredient,
and the flux of their positions in their corresponding
durations. This is the foundation of the denial of action
at a distance ; namely the progress of the stream of the
situations of a scientific object can be determined by an
analysis of the stream itself.
On the other hand the ingression of every electron
into nature modifies to some extent the character of
every event. Thus the character of the stream of events
which we are considering bears marks of the existence
of every other electron throughout the universe. If we
like to think of the electrons as being merely what I call
160 THE CO�CEPT OF NATURE [CH.
their charges , then the charges act at a distance . But

this action consists in the modification of the situation
of the other electron under consideration. This con
ception of a charge acting at a distance is a wholly
artificial one. The conception which most fully expresses
the character of nature is that of each event as modified
by the ingression of each electron into nature. The ether
is the expression of this systen1atic modification of events
throughout space and throughout time. The best expres
sion of the character of this modification is for physicists
to find out. l\·Iy theory has nothing to do \Vith that and
is ready to accept any outcome of physical research.
The connexion of objects with space requires eluci
dation. Objects are situated in events. The relation of
situation is a different relation for each type of object,
and in the case of sense-objects it cannot be expressed
as a nvo-termed relation. It \vould perhaps b e better
to use a different \Yord for these different types of the
relation of situation. It has not however been necessary
to do so for our purposes in these lectures . It must be
understood however that, when situation is spoken of,
some one definite type is under discussion, and it may
happen that the argument may not apply to situation of
another type. In all cases however I use situation to
express a relation between objects and events and not
between objects and abstractive elements. There is a
derivative relation between objects and spatial elements
which I call the relation of location ; and when this
relation holds, I say that the object is located in the
abstractive element. In this sense, an object may be
located in a moment of time, in a volume of space, an
area , a line, or a point. There will be a peculiar type of
location corresponding to each type of situation ; and
vu] OBJECTS
location is in each case derivative from the corresponding

relation of situation in a \vay which I ""ill proceed to
explain.
Also location in the timeless space of some time-system
is a relation derivative from location in instantaneous
spaces of the same time-system. Accordingly location
in an instantaneous space is the primary idea '\.vhich we
have to explain. Great confusion has been occasioned
in natural philosophy by the neglect to distinguish be
t\veen the different types of objects, the different types
of situation, the different types of location, and the
difference bet'\\-"een location and situation. It is im
possible to reason accurately in the vague concerning
objects and their positions \Vithout keeping these dis
tinctions in vie\v. An object is located in an abstractive
element, \vhen an abstractive set belonging to that ele
ment can be found such that each event belonging to
that set is a situation of the object. It will be remem
bered that an abstractive element is a certain group of
abstractive sets, and that each abstractive set is a set
of events. This definition defines the location of an
element in any type of abstractive element. In this
sense \Ve can talk of the existence of an object at an
instant, meaning thereby its location in some definite
moment. It may also be located in some spatial element
of the instantaneous space of that moment.
A quantity can be said to be located in an abstractive
element when an abstractive set belonging to the element
can be found such that the quantitative expressions of
the corresponding characters of its events converge to
the measure of the given quantity as a limit when \Ve
pass along the abstractive set towards its converging
end.
W. N. II
By these definitions location in elements of instanta

neous spaces is defined. These elements occupy corre
sponding elements of timeless spaces. An object located
in an element of an instantaneous space \Vill also be said
to be located at that moment in the timeless element of
the timelessspacewhichis occupied bythat instantaneous
element.
It is not every object ·w·hich can be located in a moment.
An object \Vhich can be located in every moment of some
duration will be called a ' uniform ' object throughout
that duration. Ordinary physical objects appear to us
to be uniform objects, and we habitually assume that
scientific objects such as electrons are uniform.. But
some sense-objects certainly are not uniform. A tune
is an example of a non-uniform object. We have per
ceived it as a whole in a certain duration ; but the tune
as a tune is not at any moment of that duration though
one of the individual notes may be located there.
It is possible therefore that for the existence of
certain sorts of objects, e.g. electrons, minimum quanta
of time are requisite. Some such postulate is apparently
indicated by the modem quantum theory and it is per
fectly consistent with the doctrine of objects maintained
in these lectures.
Also the instance of the distinction between the
electron as the mere quantitative electric charge of its
situation and the electron as standing for the ingression
of an object throughout nature illustrates the indefinite
number of types of objects which exist in nature. We
can intellectually distinguish even subtler and subtler
types of objects. Here I reckon subtlety as meaning
seclusion from the immediate apprehension of sense
awareness. Evolution in the complexity of life means an
VII] OBJECTS 1 63
increase in the types of objects directly sensed. Deli
cacy of sense-apprehension means perceptions of objects
as distinct entities �·hich are mere subtle ideas to cruder
sensibilities. The phrasing of music is a mere abstract
subtlety to the unmusical ; it is a direct sense-appre
hension to the initiated. For example, if \Ve could
imagine some lowly type of organic being thinking and
aware of our thoughts, it would wonder at the abstract
subtleties in \vhich we indulge as we think of stones
and bricks and drops of water and plants. It only knows
of vague undifferentiated feelings in nature. It would
consider us as given over to the play of excessively
abstract intellects. But then if it could think, it would
anticipate ; and if it anticipated, it would soon per
ceive for itself.
In these lectures we have been scrutinising the
foundations of natural philosophy. We are stopping at
the very point where a boundless ocean of enquiries
opens out for our questioning.
I agree that the view of Nature "'·hich I have main
tained in these lectures is not a simple one. Nature
appears as a complex system "'·hose factors are dimly
discerned by us. But, as I ask you, Is not this the very
truth ? Should we not distrust the jaunty assurance with
which every age prides itself that it at last has hit upon
the ultimate concepts in which all that happens can be
formulated ? The aim of science is to seek the simplest
explanations of complex facts.. We are apt to fall into
the error of thinking that the facts are simple because
simplicity is the goal of our quest. The guiding motto
in the life of every natural philosopher should be,
Seek simplicity and distrust it.
I l-2
C HA P T E R \TI I I
S U M M A RY
THERE is a general agreement that Einstein's investiga

tions have one fundamental merit irrespective of any
criticisms \vhich we may feel inclined to pass on them.
They have made us think. But 'vhen we have admitted
so far, we are most of us faced with a distressing per
plexity. \Vhat is it that \Ve ought to think about ? The
purport of my lecture this afternoon will be to meet this
difficulty and, so far as I am able, to set in a clear light
the changes in the background of our scientific thought
which are necessitated by any acceptance, however
qualified, of Einstein's main positions. I remember that
I am lecturing to the members of a chemical society
who are not for the most part versed in advanced
mathematics. The first point that I \vould urge upon you
is that what immediately concerns you is not so much
the detailed deductions of the new theory as this general
change in the background of scientific conceptions
which will follow from its acceptance. Of course, the
detailed deductions are important, because uriless our
colleaguas the astronomers and the physicists find these
predictions to be verified we can neglect the theory
altogether. But we may now take it as granted that in
many striking particulars these deductions have been
found to be in agreement with observation. Accord
ingly the theory has to be taken seriously and we are
anxious to kno'v what will be the consequences of its
final acceptance. Furthermore during the last few weeks
CH. VIII] SUM:\1ARY
the scientific journals and the lay press have been filled
'vith articles as to the nature of the crucial experiments
\vhich have been made and as to some of the more
striking expressions of the outcome of the ne"1 theory.
' Space caught bending ' appeared on the ne\vs-sheet
of a 'vell-kno\vn evening paper. This rendering is a
terse but not inapt translation of Einstein's o\vn \Vay of
interpreting his results . I should say at once that I am
a heretic as to this explanation and that I shall expound

to you another explanation based upon some \Vork of
my o\\n, an explanation \vhich seems to me to be more
in accordance \vith our scientific ideas and '\\·ith the
whole body of facts which have to be explained. \:re
have to remember that a new theory must take account
of the old \\·ell-attested facts of science just as much as
of the very latest experimental results \\·hich have led

to its production.
To put ourselves in the position to assimilate and to
criticise any change in ultimate scientific conceptions we
must begin at the beginning. So you must bear with me
if I commence by making some simple and obvious
reflections. Let us consider three statements, (i) ' Yes
terdava man was run over on the Chelsea Embankment, '
.,
(ii) ' Cleopatra's Needle is on the Charing Cross Em-

b ankment,' and (iii) ' There are dark lines in the Solar
Spectrum. ' The first statement about the accident to
the man is about what we may term an ' occurrence,'
a ' happening,' or an ' event. ' I will use the term
' event ' because it is the shortest. In order to specify an
observed event, the place, the time, and character of the
event are necessary. In specifying the place and the time
you are really stating the relation of the assigned event
to the general structure of other observed events. For
166 THE CO�CEPT OF NATURE (CH.
example, the man was run over between your tea and
your dinner and adjacently to a passing barge in the
river and the traffic in the Strand. The point which I
want to make is this : Nature is known to us in our
experience as a complex of passing events. In this
complex we discern definite mutual relations between
component events, which we may call their relative
positions, and these positions we express partly in terms
of space and partly in terms of time. Also i n addition
to its mere relative position to other events, each par
ticular event has its own peculiar character. In other
words, nature is a structure of events and each event
has its position in this structure and its own peculiar
character or quality.
Let us now examine the other two statements in the
light of this general principle as to the meaning of
nature. Take the second statement, ' Cleopatra's
Needle is on the Charing Cross Embankment .. ' At
first sight we should hardly call this an event . It seems
to lack the element of time or transitoriness. But does
it ? If an angel had made the remark some hundreds of
millions of years ago , the earth was not in existence,
twenty millions of years ago there was no Thames,
eighty years ago there was no Thames Embankment,
and when I \Vas a small boy Cleopatra's Needle was
not there. And now that it is there, we none of us expect
it to be eternal. The static timeless element in the rela
tion of Cleopatra's Needle to the Embankment is a
pure illusion generated by the fact that for purposes of
daily intercourse its emphasis . is needless.. What it
comes to is this : Amidst the structure of events which
fonn the medium within which the daily life of Lon
doners is passed we know how to identify a certain
VIII] SU1\1MARY
stream of events which maintain permanence of charac

ter, namely the character of being the situations of
Cleopatra's Needle. Day by day and hour by hour \Ve
can find a certain chunk in the transitorv life of nature
"'
,
and of that chunk we say, < There is Cleopatra's �eedle.
If we define the Needle in a sufficiently abstract manner
we can say that it never changes. But a physicist who
looks on that part of the life of nature as a dance of
electrons, will tell you that daily it has lost some mole
cules and gained others, and even the plain man can
see that it gets dirtier and is occasionally \vashed. Thus
the question of change in the Needle is a mere matter of
definition. The more abstract your definition, the more
permanent the Needle. But whether your Needle change
or be permanent, all you mean by stating that it is
situated on the Charing Cross Embankment, is that
amid the structure of events you know of a certain con
tinuous limited stream of events, such that any chunk
of that stream, during any hour, or any day, or any
second, has the character of being the situation of
Cleopatra's Needle.
Finally, we come to the third statement, ' There are
dark lines in the Solar Spectrum.' This is a la,vof nature.
But what does that mean ? It means mereIv this. If anv
J -
event has the character of being an exhibition of the

solar spectrum under certain assigned circumstances, it
will also have the character of exhibiting dark lines in
that spectrum.
This long discussion brings us to the final conclusion
that the concrete facts of nature are events exhibiting
a certain structure in their mutual relations and certain
characters of their own. The aim of science is to express
the relations between their characters in terms of the
1 68 THE CONCEPT OF N.ATURE (CH.
mutual structural relations between the events thus

characterised. The mutual structural relations between
events are both spatial and temporal. If you think of
them as merely spatial you are omitting the temporal
element, and if you think of them as merely temporal
you are omitting the spatial element. Thus when you
think of space alone, or of time alone, you are dealing
in abstractions, namely, you are leaving out an essential
element in the life of nature as known to you in the
experience of your senses. Furthermore there are
different v..-ays of making these abstractions which "re
think of as space and as time ; and under some circum
stances we adopt one \Vay and under other circumstances
we adopt another way. Thus there is no paradox in
holding that what we mean by space under one set of
circumstances is not what we mean by space under
another set of circumstances. And equally what we
mean by time under one set of circumstances is not
what we mean by ..time under another set of circum
stances. By saying that space and time are abstractions,
I do not mean that they do not express for us real facts
about nature. What I mean is that there are no spatial
facts or temporal facts apart from physical nature,
namely that space and time are merely ways of expressing
certain truths about the relations between events. Also
that under different circumstances there are different
sets of truths about the universe which are naturally
presented to us as statements about space. In such a
case what a being under the one set of circumstances
means by space will be different from that meant by a
being under the other set of circumstances. Accord
ingly when we are comparing two observations made
under different circumstances we have to ask ' Do the
VIII) SUl\f�IARY
two observers mean the same thing by space and the

same thing by time ? ' The modern theory of relativity
has arisen because certain perplexities as to the con
coi:dance of certain delicate observations such as the
motion of the earth through the ether, the perihelion
of mercury, and the positions of the stars in the neigh
bourhood of the sun, have been solved by reference to
this purely relative significance of space and time.
I want now to recall your. attention to Cleopatra's
Needle, which I have not yet done \\'ith . As you are
walking along the Embankment you suddenly look up
and say, ' Hullo, there's the Needle.' In other words,
you recognise it. You cannot recognise an event ;
because \\"'hen it is gone, it is gone. You may observe
another event of analogous character, but the actual
ch.unk of the life of nature is inseparable from its unique
occurrence. But a character of an event can be recog
nised. We all know that if \Ve go to the Embankment
near Charing Cross we shall observe an event having the
character which we recognise as Cleopatra's Needle.
Things which \\"e thus recognise I call objects . An
object is situated in those events or in that stream of
events of which it expresses the character. There are
many sorts of objects. For example, the colour green
is an object according to the above definition. It is the
purpose of science to trace the laws which govern the
appearance of objects in the various events in which they
are found to be situated . For this purpose we can
mainly concentrate on two types of objects, which I will
call material physical objects and scientific objects .
A material physical object is an ordinary bit of matter,
Cleopatra's Needle for example. This is a much more
complicated type of object than a mere colour, such as
the colour of the Needle. I call these simple objects,

such as colours or sounds, sense-objects. An artist
will train himself to attend more particularly to sense
objects where the ordinary person attends normally to
material objects. Thus if you were walking with an
artist, when you said ' There's Cleopatra's Needle','
perhaps he simultaneously exclaimed ' There's a nice
bit of colour.' Yet you were both expressing your
recognition of different component characters of the
same event. But in science we have found out that
when we know all about the adventures amid events of
material physical objects and of scientific objects we
have most of the relevant information which will enable
us to predict the conditions under which we shall
perceive sense-objects in specific situations. For ex
ample, when we know that there is a blazing fire (i.e.
material and scientific objects undergoing various
exciting adventures amid events) and opposite to it a
mirror (which is another material object) and the
positions of a man's face and eyes gazing into the mirror,
we know that he can perceive the redness of the flame
situated in an event behind the mirror-thus, to a large
extent, the appearance of sense-objects is conditioned
by the adventures of material objects. The analysis of
these adventures makes us aware of another character
of events, namely their characters as fields of activity
which determine the subsequent events to which they
will pass on the objects situated in them. We express
these fields of activity in terms of gravitational, electro
magnetic, or chemical forces and attractions. But the
exact expression of the nature of these fields of activity
forces us intellectually to acknowledge a less obvious
type of objects as situated in events. I mean molecules
VIII] SUMMARY
and electrons. These objects are �ot recognised in

isolation. We cannot well miss Cleopatra's Needle, if
we are in it-s neighbourhood ; but no one has seen a single
molecule or a single electron , yet the characters of
events are only explicable to us by expressing them in
terms of these scientific objects. Undoubtedly molecules
and electrons are abstractions . But then so is Cleo
patra's Needle. The concrete facts are the events 1them
selves-I have already explained to you that to be an
abstraction does not mean that an entity is nothing. It
merely means that its existence is only one factor of a
more concrete element of nature. So an electron is
abstract because you cannot wipe out the \vhole structure
of events and yet retain the electron in existence. In
the same way the grin on the cat is abstract ; and the
molecule is really in the event in the same sense as the
grin is really on the cat's face. No\v the more ultimate
sciences such as Chemistry or Physics cannot express
their ultimate laws in terms of such vague objects as
the sun, the earth, Cleopatra's Needle, or a human
body. Such objects more properly belong to Astro
nomy, to Geology, to Engineering, to Archaeology,
or to Biology. Chemistry and Physics only deal with
them as exhibiting statistical complexes of the effects
of their more intimate laws. In a certain sense, they
only enter into Physics and Chemistry as technological
applications. The reason is that they are too vague.
Where does Cleopatra's Needle begin and where does
it end ? Is the soot part of it ? Is it a different
object when it sheds a molecule or when its surface
enters into chemical combination with the acid of a
London fog ? The definiteness and permanence of the
Needle is nothing to the possible permanent definiteness
of a molecule as conceived by science, and the per

manent definiteness of a molecule in its tum yields to
that of an electron. Thus science in its most ultimate
formulation of law seeks objects with the most per
manent definite simplicity of character and expresses
its final laws in terms of them.
Again when we seek definitely to express the relations
of events which arise from their spatio-temporal
structure, we approximate to simplicity by progressively
diminishing the extent (both temporal and spatial) of
the events considered. For example, the event which
is the life of the chunk of nature which is the Needle
during one minute has to the life of nature within .a
passing barge during the same minute a very complex
spatio-temporal relation .. But suppose we progressively
diminish the time considered to a second, to a hun
dredth of a second, to a thousandth of a second, and
so on. As we pass along such a series we approximate
to an ideal simplicity of structural relations of the pairs
of events successively considered, which ideal we call
the spatial relations of the Needle to the barge at some
instant. Even these relations are too complicated for us,
and we consider smaller and smaller bits of the Needle
and of the barge. Thus we finally reach the ideal of an
event so restricted in its extension as to be without ex
tension in space or extension in time. Such an event is
a mere spatial point-flash of instantaneous duration.
I call such an ideal event an ' event-particle.' You must
not think of the world as ultimately built up of event
particles. That is to put the cart before the horse. The
world we know is a continuous stream of occurrence
which we can discriminate into finite events forming by
their overlappings and containings of each other and
VIII] SUM1\1ARY 1 73
separations a spatio-temporal structure. \Ve can express

the properties of this structure in terms of the ideal
limits to routes of approximation, which I have termed
event-particles. Accordingly event-particles are abstrac
tions in their relations to the more concrete events. But
then by this time you will have comprehended that you
cannot analyse concrete nature \\·ithout abstracting.
Also I repeat, the abstractions of science are entities
which are truly in nature, though they have no meaning
in isolation from nature.
The character of the spatio-temporal structure of
events can be fully expressed in terms of relations
between these more abstract event-particles. The ad
vantage of dealing with event-particles is that though
they are abstract and complex in respect to the finite
events which we directly observe, they are simpler
than finite events in respect to their mutual relations.
Accordingly they express for us the demands of an ideal
accuracy, and of an ideal simplicity in the exposition of
relations. These event-particles are the ultimate elements
of the four-dimensional space-time manifold which the
theory of relativity presupposes. You will have observed
that each event-particle is as much an instant of time as
it is a point of space. I have called it an instantaneous
point-flash. Thus in the structure of this space-time
manifold space is not finally discriminated from time,
and the possibility remains open for diverse modes of
discrimination according to the diverse 'circumstances
of observers. It is this possibility which makes the
fundamental distinction between the new way of con
ceiving the universe and the old way. The secret of
understanding relativity is to understand this. It is of
no use rushing in with picturesque paradoxes, such as
' Space caught bending,' if you have not mastered this

fundamental conception which underlies the whole
theory. When I say that it underlies the whole theory,
I mean that in my opinion it ought to underlie it, though
I may confess some doubts as to how far all expositions
of the theory have really understood its implications and
its premises.
Our measurements \'\"hen they are expressed in terms
of an ideal accuracy are measurements which express
properties of the space-time manifold. Now there are
measurements of different sorts. You can measure
lengths, or angles, or areas, or volumes, or times. There
are also other sorts of measures such as measurements
of intensity of illumination, but I ·will disregard these
for the moment and will confine attention to those
measurements which particularly interest us as being
measurements of space or of time. It is easy to see that
four such measurements of t_he proper characters are
necessary to determine the position of an event-particle
in the space-time manifold in its relation to the rest of
the manifold. For example, in a rectangular field you
start from one corner at a given time, you measure a
definite distance along one side, you then strike out
into the field at right angles, and then measure a definite
distance parallel to the other pair of sides, you then rise
vertically a definite height and take the time. At the
point and at the time which you thus reach there is
occurring a definite instantaneous point-flash of nature.
In other words, your four measurements have deter
mined a definite event-particle belonging to the four
dimension space-time manifold. These measurements
have appeared to be very simple to the land-surveyor
and raise in his mind no philosophic difficulties. But
VIII] SUMl\IARY 1 75
suppose there are beings on !vlars sufficiently advanced

in scientific invention to be able to watch in detail the
operations of this survey on earth. Suppose that they
construe the operations of the English land-surveyors
in reference to the space natural to a being on 1\1ars,
namely a Martio-centric space in which that planet is
fixed. The earth is moving relatively to Mars and is
rotating. To the beings on 1\:Iars the operations, con
strued in this fashion, effect measurements of the greatest
complication. Furthermore, according to the relati
vistic doctrine, the operation of time-measurement on
earth will not correspond quite exactly to any time
measurement on Mars.
I have discussed this example in order to make you
realise that in thinking of the possibilities of measure
ment in the space-time manifold, we must not confine
ourselves merely to those minor variations which might
seem natural to human beings on the earth .. Let us
make therefore the general statement that four measure
ments, respectively of independent types (such as mea
surements of lengths in three directions and a time),
can be found such that a definite event-particle is
determined by them in its relations to other parts of
the manifold.
If (p1, p2, p3, p4) be a set of measurements of this
system, then the event-particle which is thus deter
mined will be said to have p1, p2, p3, p4 as its co-ordi
nates in this system of measurement. Suppose that we
name it the p-system of measurement. Then in the same
p-system by properly varying (p1, p2, P3> P4) every
event-particle that has been, or will be, or instantane
ously is now, can be indicated. Furthermore, according
to any system of measurement that is natural to us,
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE . (CH.
three of the co-ordinates will be measurements of space

and one will be a measurement of time. Let us always
take the last co-ordinate to represent the time-measure
ment. Then we should naturally say that (p1, p2, p3)
determined a point in space and that the event-parti�le
happened at that point at the time p4• But we must riot
make the mistake of thinking that there is a space in
addition to the space-time manifold. That manifold is
all that there is for the determination of the meaning of
space and time. \Ve have got to determine the meaning
of a space-point in terms of the event-particles of the
four-dimensional manifold. There is only one way to
do this. Note that if we vary the time and take times
with the same three space co-ordinates, then the event
partjcles, thus indicated, are all at the same point. But
seeing that there is nothing else except the event
particles, this can only mean that the point (p1 , p2, p3)
of the space in the p-system is merely the collection of
event-particles (p1, p2, p3, [p4]), where p4 is varied and
{p1, p2, Pa) is kept fi.�ed. It is rather disconcerting to
find that a point in space is not a simple entity ; but it
is a conclusion which follows immediately from the
relative theory of space.
Furthermore the inhabitant of Mars determines
event-particles by another system of measurements.
Call his system the q-system. According to him
(q1, q2, q3, q4) determines an event-particle, and
(q1 , q2, q3) determines a point and q4 a time. But the
collection of event-particles which he thinks of as a
point is entirely different from any such collection
which the man on earth thinks of as a point. Thus the
q-space for the man on Mars is quite different from the
�-space for the land-surveyor on earth.
VIII] SUl\11\IARY 1 77
So far in speaking of space \\·e have been talking of

the timeless space of physical science, namely, of our
concept of eternal space in '\-\·hich the \VOrld adventures.
But the space which \Ve see as \\·e look about is insta..TJ
taneous space. Thus if our natural perceptions are
adjustable to the p-system of measurements '\\'e see
instantaneously all the event-particles at some definite
time p4, and observe a succession of such spaces as time
moves on. The timeless space is achieved by stringing
together all these instantaneous spaces. The points of
an instantaneous space are event-particles, and the
points of an eternal space are strings of event-particles
occurring in succession . But the man on :\Jars will
never perceive the same instantaneous spaces as the
man on the earth . This system of instantaneous spaces
will cut across the earth-man's system . For the earth
man there is one instantaneous space which is the
instantaneous present, there are the past spaces and the
future spaces. But the present space of the man on
Mars cuts across the present space of the man on the
earth. So that of the event-particles which the earth
man thinks of as happening now in the present, the
man on Mars thinks that some are already past and are
ancient history, that others are in the future, and others
are in the immediate present. This break-do\'\n in the
neat conception of a past, a present, and a future is a
serious paradox. I call two event-particles which on
some or other system of measurement are in the same
instantaneous space ' co-present ' event-particles. Then
it is possible that A and B may be co-present, and that
A and C may be co-present, but that B and C may not
be co-present. For exampl�, at some inconceivable
distance from us there are events co-present with us
W. N. 12
now and also co-present with the birth of Queen
Victoria. If A and B are co-present there will be some
systems in which A precedes B and some in which B
precedes A . Also there can be no velocity quick enough
to carry a material particle from A to B or from B to A .
These different measure-systems with their divergences
of time-reckoning are puzzling, and to some extent
affront our common sense. It is not the usual way in
which we think of the Universe. vVe think of one
necessary time-system and one necessary space. Ac
cording to the ne\v theory, there are an indefinite
number of discordant time-series and an indefinite
number of distinct spaces. Any correlated pair, a
time-system and a space-system, will do in which to fit
our description of the Universe. We find that under
given conditions our measurements are necessarily made
in some one pair which together form our natural
measure-system. The difficulty as to discordant time
systems is partly solved by distinguishing between what
I call the creative advance of nature, which is not
properly serial at all, and any one time series. We
habitually muddle together this creative advance, which
we experience and know as the perpetual transition of
nature into novelty, with the single-time series which
we naturally employ for measurement. The various
time-series each measure some aspect of the creative
advance, and the whole bundle of them express all the
properties of this advance which are measurable. The
reason why we have not previously noted this difference
of time-series is the very small difference of properties
between any two such series. Any observable pheno
mena due to this cause depend on the square of the
ratio of any velocity entering into the observation to
VIII) SUMMARY 1 79
the velocity of light. Now light takes about fifty minutes

to get round the earth's orbit ; and the earth takes
rather more than 1 7 ,53 I half-hours to do the same.
Hence all the effects due to this motion are of the order
of the ratio of one to the square of 1 o,ooo. Accordingly
an earth-man and a sun-man have only neglected
effects whose quantitative magnitudes all contain the
factor 1/108. Evidently such effects can only be noted
by means of the most refined observations. They have
been observed however. Suppose we compare rn·o
obser\rations on the velocity of light made "·ith the
same apparatus as we tum it through a right angle.
The velocity of the earth relatively to the sun is in one
direction, the velocity of light relatively to the ether
should be the same in all directions. Hence if space
when we take the ether as at rest means the same thing
as space when we take the earth as at rest, we ought to
find that the velocity of light relatively to the earth
varies according to the direction from which it comes.
These observations on earth constitute the basic
principle of the famous experiments designed to detect
the motion of the earth through the ether. You all
know that, quite unexpectedly, they gave a null result.
This is completely explained by the fact that, the space
system and the time-system which we are using are
in certain minute ways different from the space and the
time relatively to the sun or relatively to any other body
with respect to which it is moving.
All this discussion as to the nature of time and space
has lifted above our horizon a great difficulty which
affects the formulation of all the ultimate laws of physics
-for example, the laws of the electromagnetic field,
and the law of gravitation. Let us take the law of
1 2-2
gravitation as an example. Its formulation is as follows :

Two material bodies attract each other \vith a force
proportional to the product of their masses and uni
versely proportional to the square of_ the!r distances. In
this statement the bodies are supposed to be small
enough to be treated as material particles in relation to
their distances ; and we need not bother further about
that minor point. The difficulty to which I want to
draw your attention is this : In the formulation of the
law one definite time and one definite space are pre
supposed. The nvo masses are assumed to be in simul
taneous positions.
But what is simultaneous in one time-system may not
be simultaneous in another time-system. So according
to our new views the law i$ in this respect not formulated
so as to have any exact meaning. Furthermore an
analogous difficulty arises over the question of distance.
The distance between two instantaneous positions,
i.e. bet\veen two event-particles, is different in different
space-systems. What space is to be chosen ? Thus again
the law lacks precise formulation, if relativity is accepted.
Our problem is to seek a fresh interpretation of the
law of gravity in which these difficulties are evaded. In
the first place we must avoid the abstractions of space
and time in the formulation of our fundamental ideas
and must recur to the ultimate facts of nature, namely
to events. Also in order to find the ideal simplicity of
expressions of the relations between events, we restrict
ourselves to event-particles. Thus the life of a material
particle is its adventure amid a track of event-particles
strung out as a continuous series or path in the four
dimensional space-time manifold. These event-particles
are the various situations of the material particle. We
VIIIj SUMMARY 181
usually e'xpress this fact by adopting our natural space

time system and by talking of the path in space of the
material particle as it exists at successive instants of time.
We have to ask ourselves what are the laws of nature
which lead the material particle to adopt just this path
among event-particles and no other. Think of the path
as a \vhole. What characteristic has that path got which
would not be shared by any other slightly varied path ?
\Ve are asking for more than a law of gravity. \Ve want
laws of motion and a general idea of the way to formulate
the effects of physical forces.
In order to answer our question \Ve put the idea of the
attracting masses in the background and concentrate
attention on the field of activity of the events in the
neighbourhood of the path. In so doing we are acting
in conformity with the whole trend of scientific thought
during the last hundred years, which has more and more
concentrated attention on the field of force as the im
mediate agent in directing motion, to the exclusion of
the consideration of the immediate mutual influence
between two distant bodies. We have got to find the
way of expressing the field of activity of events in the
neighbourhood of some definite event-particle E of the
four-dimensional manifold. I bring in a fundamental
physical idea which I call the ' impetus ' to express this
physical field. The event-particle E is related to any
neighbouring event-particle P by an element of impetus.
The assemblage of ·an the elements of impetus relating
E to the assemblage of event-particles in the neighbour
hood of E expresses the character of the field of activity
in the neighbourhood of E. \Vhere I differ from Einstein
is that he conceives this quantity which I call the impetus
as merely expressing the characters of the space and
time to be adopted and thus ends by talking of the

gravitational field expressing a curvature in the space
time manifold. I cannot attach any clear conception to
his interpretation of space and time. My formulae
differ slightly from his, though they agree in those
instances where his results have been verified. I need
hardly say that in this particular of the formulation of the
law of gravitation I have drawn on the general method
of procedure which constitutes his great discovery.
Einstein showed how to express the characters of the
assemblage of elements of impetus of the field sur
rounding an event-particle E in terms of ten quantities
which I will call J11, ]12 ( ]21), J22 , ]23 ( J32), etc.
= =
It will be noted that there are four spatio-temporal

measurements relating E to its neighbour P, and that
there are ten pairs of such measurements if we are
allowed to take any one measurement twice over to
make one such pair. The ten J's depend merely on the
position of E in the four-dimensional manifold, and the
element of impetus between E and P can be expressed
in terms of the ten J's and the ten pairs of the four
spatio-temporal measurements relating E and P. The
numerical values of the J's will depend on the system
of measurement adopted, but are so adjusted to each
particular system that the same value is obtained for
the element of impetus between E and P, whatever be
the system of measurement adopted. This fact is ex
pressed by saying that the ten J's form a ' tensor.' It is
not going too far to say that the announcement that
physicists would have in future to study the theory
of tensors created a veritable panic among them when
the verification of Einstein's predictions was first
announced.
VIII) SUl\11vlARY
The ten J's at any event-particle E can be expressed in

terms of two functions which I call the potential and the
' associate-potential ' at E. The potential is practically
what is meant by the ordinary gravitation potential,
when we express ourselves in terms of the Euclidean
space in reference to \Vhich the attracting mass is at
rest. The associate-potential is defined by the modifi
cation of substituting the direct distance for the inverse
distance in the definition of the potential, and its calcu
lation can easily be made to depend on that of the old
fashioned potential . Thus the calculation of the J's-the
coefficients of impetus, as I will call them-does not
involve anything very revolutionary in the mathematical
knowledge of physicists. We now return to the path of
the attracted particle. We add up all the elements of
impetus in the whole path, and obtain thereby "�hat I
call the ' integral impetus.' The characteristic of the
actual path as compared with neighbouring alternative
paths is that in the actual paths the integral impetus
would neither gain nor lose, if the particle wobbled out
of it into a small extremely near alternative path. 1\1athe
maticians would express this by saying, that the integral
impetus is stationary for an infinitesimal displacement.
In this statement of the law of motion I have neglected
the existence of other forces. But that would lead me
too far afield.
The electromagnetic theory has to be modified to
allow for the presence of a gravitational field. Thus
Einstein's investigations lead to the first discovery of
any relation between gravity and other physical pheno
mena. In the form in which I have put this modification,
we deduce Einstein's fundamental principle, as to the
motion of light along its rays, as a first approximation
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH. VIII
wnich is absolutely true for infinitely short waves.

Einstein's principle, thus partially verified , stated in my
language is that a ray of light always follows a path such
that the integral impetus along it is zero. This involves
that every element of impetus along it is zero .
In conclusion, I must apologise . · In the first place
I have considerably toned down the various exciting
peculiarities of the original theory and have reduced it
to a greater conformity with the older physics. I do not
allow that physical phenomena are due to oddities of
space. Also I have added to the dullness of the lecture
by my respect for the audience. You would have enj oyed
a more popular lecture with illustrations of delightful
paradoxes. But I know also thCJt you are serious
students who are here because you really want to know
how the new theories may affect your scientific re
searches.
C H APTE R I X
T H E U L T i l\iATE P H Y S I CAL C O N C E P T S
THE second chapter of this book lays do\\'Il the first

principle to be guarded in framing our physical concept.
We must avoid vicious bifurcation Nature is nothing
else than the deliverance of sense-awareness. \\7e have
no principles whatever to tell us what could stimulate
mind towards sense-awareness. Our sole task is to
exhibit in one system the characters and inter-relations
of all that is observed. Our attitude towards nature is
purely' behaviouristic,' so far as concerns the formulation
of physical concepts.
Our knowledge of nature is an experience of activity
(or passage). The things previously observed are active
entities, the ' events.' They are chunks in the life of
nature�· These events have to each other relations which
in our kno\\·ledge differentiate themselves into space
relations and time-relations. But this differentiation
between space and time, though inherent in nature, is
comparatively superficial ; and space and time are each
partial expressions of one fundamental relation between
events which is neither spatial nor temporal. This
relation I call ' extension.' The relation of ' extending
over ' is the relation of ' including,' either in a spatial or
in a temporal sense, or in both. But the mere ' inclu
sion ' is more fundamental than either alternative and
does not require any spatio-temporal differentiation ..
In respect to extension two events are mutually related
so that either (i) one includes the other, or (ii) one over
laps the other without complete inclusion,, or (iii) they
are entirely separate. But great care is required in the

definition of spatial and temporal elements from this
basis in order to avoid tacit limitations really depend
ing on undefined relations and properties.
Such fallacies can be avoided by taking account of
two elements in our experience, namely, (i) our ob
servational ' present,' and (ii) our ' percipient event.'
Our observational ' present ' is what I call a ' duration.'
It is the whole of nature apprehended in our immediate
observation. It has therefore the nature of an event,
but possesses a peculiar completeness which marks out
such durations as a special type of events inherent in
nature. A duration is not instantaneous. It is all that
there is of nature with certain temporal limitations. In
contradistinction to other events a duration will be
called infinite and the other events are finite1• In our
knowledge of a duration we distinguish (i) certain
included events which are particularly discriminated
as to their peculiar individualities, and (ii) the remai�g
included events \vhich are only known as necessarily in
being by reason of their relations to the discriminated
events and to the whole duration. The duration as a
2
whole is signified by that quality of relatedness (in
respect to extension) possessed by the part which is
immediately under observation ; namely, by the fact
that there is essentially a beyond to whatever is observed .
I mean by this that every event is known as being related
to other events which it does not include. This fact,
that every event is known as possessing the quality of
exclusion, shows that exclusion is as positive a relation
as inclusion. There are of course no merely negative
1 Cf. note on 'significance,' pp. 197, x98.
2 Cf. Ch. III, pp. 51 et seq.
1x) THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 187
(I
relations in nature, and exclusion is not the mere

negative of inclusion, though the two relations are
contraries. Both relations are concerned solely with
events, and exclusion is capable of logical definition in
terms of inclusion.
Perhaps the most obvious exhibition of significance
is to be found in our knowledge of the geometrical
character of events inside an opaque material object.
For example \Ve know that an opaque sphere has a
centre . This kno\vledge has nothing to do with the
material ; the sphere may be a solid uniform billiard
ball or a hollow lawn-tennis hall. Such knowledge is
essentially the product of significance, since the general
character of the external discriminated events has in ...
formed us that there are events within the sphere and

has also infarmed us of their geometrica] structure.
Some criticisms on ' The Principles of Natural
Knowledge ' show that difficulty has been found in
apprehending durations as real stratifications of nature.
I think that this hesitation arises from the unconscious
influence of the vicious principle of bifurcation, so
deeply embedded in modem philosophical thought.
We observe nature as extended in an immediate present
which is simultaneous but not instantaneous, and there
fore the whole which is immediately discerned or
signified as an inter-related system forms a stratification
of nature which is a physical fact. This conclusion
immediately follows unless we admit bifurcation in the
form of the principle of psychic additions, here rejected.
Our ' percipient event ' is that event included in our
observational present which we distinguish as being in
some peculiar way our standpoint for perception. It is
roughly speaking that event which is our bodily life
•
within the present duration. The theory of perception

�s evolved by medical psychology is based on signifi
cance. The distant situation of a perceived object is
merely known to us as signified by our bodily state,
i.e. by our percipient event. In fact perception requires
· sense-awareness of the significations of our percipient
event together with sense-awareness of a peculiar re
lation (situation) between certain objects and the events
thus signified. Our percipient event is saved by being
the whole of nature by this fact of its significations.
This is the meaning of calling the percipient event
our standpoint for perception. The course of a ray of
.light is only derivatively connected with perception.
What we do perceive are objects as related to events
signified by the bodily states excited by the ray.
These signified events (as is the case of images seen
behind a mirror) may have very little to do with the
actual course of the ray. In the comse of evolution those
animals have survived whose sense-awareness is con
centrated on those signifiootions of their bodily states
which are on the average important for their welfare.
The whole world of events is signified, but there are
some which exact the death penalty for inattention.
The percipient event is always here and now in the
associated present duration. It has, what may be called,
an absolute position in that duration. Thus one definite
duration is associated with a definite percipient event,
and we are thus aware of a peculiar relation which
finite events can bear to durations. I call this relation
'cogredience.' The notion of rest is derivative from that
of cogredience, and the notion of motion is derivative
from that of inclusion within a duration without cogre
dience with it. In fact motion is. a relation (of varying
ix] THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 1 89
character) between an observed event and an observed

duration, and cogredience is the most simple character
or subspecies of motion. To sum up, a duration and a
percipient event are essentially involved in the general
character of each observation of nature, and the per
cipient event is cogredient \,,.ith the duration .
Our knowledge of the peculiar characters of different
events depends upon our power of comparison . I call
the exercise of this factorin our knowledge ' recognition,'
and the requisite sense-awareness of the comparable
characters I call ' sense-recognition.' Recognition and
abstraction essentially involve each other. Each of them
exhibits an entity for k.no,,rledge which is less than the
concrete fact, but is a real factor in that fact. The most
concrete fact capable of separate discrimination is the
event. We cannot abstract without recognition, and
we cannot recognise without abstraction. Perception
involves apprehension of the event and recognition of
the factors of its character.
The things recognised are what I call ' objects.' In
this general sense of the term the relation of extension
is itself an object. In practice however I restrict the
term to those objects which can in some sense or other
be said to have a situation in an event ; namely, in the
phrase ' There it is again ' I restrict the ' there > to he the
indication of a special event which is the situation of the
object. Even so, there are different types of objects, and
statements which are true of objects of one type are not
in general true of objects of other types .. The objects
with which we are here concerned in the formulation
of physical laws are material objects, such as bits of
matter, molecules and electrons. An object of one of
these types has relations to events other than those
belonging to the stream of its situations. The fact of its

situations within this stream has impressed on all other
events certain modifications of their characters. In
truth the object in its completeness may be conceived
as a specific set of correlated modifications of the charac
ters of all events, with the property that these modifica
tions attain to a certain focal property for those events
which belong to the stream of its situations. The total
assemblage of the modifications of the characters of
events due to the existenc� of an object in a stream of
situations is what I call the ' physical field ' due to the
object. But the object cannot really be separated from
its field. The object is in fact nothing else than the
systematically adjusted set of modifications of the field.
The conventional limitation of the object to the focal
stream of events in which it is said to be ' situated ' is
convenient for some purposes, but it obscures the
ultimate fact of nature. From this point of view the
antithesis between action at a distance and action by
transmission is meaningless. The doctrine of this para
graph is nothing else than another way of expressing the
unresolvable multiple relation of an object to events.
A complete time-system is formed by any one family
of parallel durations. Two durations are parallel if
either (i) one includes the other, or (ii) they overlap so
as to include a third duration common to both, or
(iii) are entirely separate. The excluded case is that of
two durations overlapping so as to include in common
an aggregate of finite events but including in common
no other complete duration. The recognition of the
fact of an indefinite number of families of parallel
durations is what differentiates the concept of nature
here put forward from the older orthodox concept of
1x] THE ULTI1\i1ATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 191
the essentially unique time-systems. Its divergence from

Einstein's concept of nature will be briefly indicated later.
The instantaneous spaces of a given time-system are
the ideal (non-existent) durations of zero temporal
thickness indicated by routes of approximation along
series formed by durations of the associated family .
Each such instantaneous space represents the ideal of
nature at an instant and is also a moment of time. Each
time-system thus possesses an aggregate of moments
belonging to it alone. Each event-particle lies in one
and only one moment of a given time-system. An event
particle has three characters1 : (i) its extrinsic character
which is its character as a definite route of convergence
among events, (ii) its intrinsic character which is the
peculiar quality of nature in its neighbourhood, namely,
the character of the physical field in the neighbourhood.,
and (iii) its position.
The position of an event-particle arises from the
aggregate of moments (no two of the same family) in
which it lies. We fix our attention on one of these
moments which is approximated to by the short dura
tion of our immediate experience, and we express
position as the position in this moment. But the event
particle receives its position in moment M in virtue of
the whole aggregate of other moments M', M", etc.,
in which it also lies. The differentiation of M into a
geometry of event-particles {instantaneous points) ex
presses the differentiation of M by its intersections with
moments of alien time-systems. In this way planes and
straight lines and event-particles themselves find their
being. Also the parallelism of planes and straight lines
arises from the parallelism of the moments of one and
1 Cf. pp. 82 et seq.
the same time-system intersecting M. Similarly the

order of parallel planes and of event-particles on straight
lines arises from the time-order of these intersecting
moments. The explanation is not given here1• It is
sufficient no\v merely to mention the sources from \Vhich
the whole of geometry receives its physical explanation.
The correlation of the various momentary spaces of
one time-system is achieved by the relation of cogre
dience. Evidently motion in an instantaneous space is
unmeaning. l\Iotion expresses a comparison between
position in one instantaneous space with positions in
other instantaneous spaces of the same time-system.
Cogredience yields the simplest outcome of such com
parison, namely, rest.
Motion and rest are immediately observed facts.
They are relative in the sense that they depend on the
time-system which is fundamental for the observation.
A string of event-particles whose successive occupation
means rest in the given time-system forms a timeless
point in the timeless space of that time-system. In this
way each time-system possesses its own permanent
timeless space peculiar to it alone, and each such space
is composed of timeless points which belong to that
time-system and to no other. The paradoxes of rela
tivity arise from neglecting the fact that different as
sumptions as to rest involve the expression of the facts
of physical science in terms of radically different spaces
and times, in which points and moments have different
.
meanings.
The source of order has already been indicated and
that of congruence is now found. It depends on motion.
1 Cf. Principles of .J.Vatural. KnOfJ:ledge, and previous chapters
of the present work.
rx] �HE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 193
From cogredience, perpendicularity arises ; and from

perpendicularity in conjunction with the reciprocal
symmetry between the relations of any rn;o time-systems
congruence both in time and space is completely defined
(cf. Zoe. dt.).
The resulting formulae are those for the electro
magnetic theory of relativity, or, as it is now termed, the
restricted theory'. But there is this vital difference : the
critical velocity c which occurs in these formulae has
now no connexion whatever with light or with any
other fact of the physical field (in distinction from the
extensional structure of events). It simply marks the
fact that our congruence determination embraces both
times and spaces in one universal system, and therefore
if two arbitrary units are chosen, one for all spaces and
one for all times, their ratio will be a velocity which is a
fundamental property of nature expressing the fact that
times and spaces are really comparable.
The physical properties of nature are expressed in
terms of material objects (electrons, etc.). The physical
character of an event arises from the fact that it belongs
to the field of the whole complex of such objects. From
another point of view we can say that these objects are
nothing else than our way of expressing the mutual
correlation of the physical characters of events.
The spatio-temporal measurableness of nature arises
from (i) the relation of extension between events, and
(ii) the stratified character of nature arising from each of
the alternative time-systems, and (iii) rest and motion,
as exhibited in the relations of finite events to time
systems. None of these sources of measurement depend
on the physical characters of finite events as exhibited
by the situated objects. They are completely signified
W.N. 13
for events whose physical characters are unknown . Thus

the spatio-temporal measurements are independent of
the objectival physical characters. Furthermore the
character of our knowledge of a whole duration, which
is essentially derived from the significance of the part
within the immediate field of discrimination, constructs
it for us as a uniform whole independent, so far as its
extension is concerned, of the unobserved characters
of remote events. Namely, there is a definite whole of
nature, simultaneously now present, whatever may be
the character of its remote events. This consideration
reinforces the previous .conclusion. This conclusion
leads to the assertion of the essential uniformity of the
momentary spaces of the various time-systems, and
thence to the uniformity of the timeless spaces of which
there is one to each time-system.
The analysis of the general character of observed
nature set forth above affords explanations of various
fundamental observational facts : (a) It explains the
differentiation of the one quality of extension into time
and space. (f3) It gives a meaning to the observed facts
of geometrical and temporal position, of geometrical
and temporal order, and of geometrical straightness and
planeness. (y) It selects one definite system of congruence
embracing both space and time, and thus explains the
concordance as to measurement which is in practice
attained. (8) It explains (consistently with the theory of
relativity) the observed phenomena of rotation, e.g.
Foucault's pendulum, the equatorial bulge of the earth,
the fixed senses of rotation of cyclones and anticyclones,
and the gyro-compass . It does this by its admission of
definite stratifications of nature which are disclosed by
the very character of our knowledge of it. ()
£ Its ex-
1x] THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 195
planations of motion are more fundamental than those

expressed in (8) ; for it explains what is meant by motion
itself. The observed motion of an extended object is
the relation of its various situations to the stratification
of nature expressed by the time-system fundamental to
the observation. This motion expresses a real relation
of the object to the rest of nature. The quantitative
expression of this relation will vary according to the
time-system selected for its expression .
This theory accords no peculiar character to light
beyond that accorded to other physical phenomena such
as sound. There is no ground for such a differentiation.
Some objects we know by sight only, and other objects
we know by sound only, and other objects we observe
neither by light nor by sound but by touch or smell or
otherwise. The velocity of light varies according to its
medium and so does that of sound. Light moves in
curved paths under certain conditions and so does
sound. Both light and sound are waves of disturbance
in the physical characters of events ; and (as has been
stated above, p. 188) the actual course of the light
is of no more importance for perception than is the
actual course of the sound. To base the whole philo
sophy of nature upon light is a baseless assumption.
The Michelson-Morley and analogous experiments
show that within the limits of our inexactitude of
observation the velocity of light is an approximation to
the critical velocity c , which expresses the relation
'
between our space and time units. It is provable that

the assumption as to light by \Yhich these experiments
and the influence of the gravitational field on the light
rays are explained is deducible as an approxi.mation
from the equations of the electromagnetic field. This
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH
completely disposes of any necessity for differentiating

light from other physical phenomena as possessing
any peculiar fundamental character ..
It is to be observed that the measurement of extended
nature by means of extended objects is meaningless
apart from some observed fact of simultaneity inherent
in nature and not merely a play of thought . Otherwise
there is no meaning to the concept of one presentation
of your extended measuring rod AB. Why not AB'
where B' is the end B five minutes later ? Measurement
presupposes for its possibility nature as a simultaneity,
and an observed object present then and present now.
In other '\vords, measurement of extended nature re
quires some inherent character in nature affording a
rule of presentation of events. Furthermore congruence
cannot be defined by the permanence of the measuring
rod. The permanence is itself meaningless apart from
some immediate judgment of self-congruence. Other
wise how is an elastic string di:fferentiated from a rigid
measuring rod ? Each remains the same self-identical
object. Why is one a possible measuring rod and the
other not so ? The meaning of congruence lies beyond
the self-identity of the object. In other words measure
ment presupposes the measurable, and the theory of the
measurable is the theory of congruence.
Furthermore the admission of stratifications of nature
bears on the formulation of the laws of nature. It has
been laid down that these laws are to be expressed in
differential equations which, as expressed in any general
system of measurement, should bear no reference to
any other particular measure-system . This requirement
is purely arbitrary. For a measure-system measures
something inherent in nature ; otherwise it has no
ix) THE ULTilVIATE PHYSICAL CO�CEPTS 1Q7
connexion with nature at all. And that something which

is measured by a particular measure-system may have a
special relation to the phenomenon "�hose law is being
formulated. For example the gravitational field due to
a material object at rest in a certain time-system may
be expected to exhibit in its formulation particular
reference to spatial and temporal quantities of that
time-system. The field can of course be expressed in
any measure-systems, but the particular reference will
remain as the simple physical explanation.
NOTE : ON THE GREEK CONCEPT OF A POINT

The preceding pages had been passed for press before I had
the pleasure of seeing Sir T. L. Heath's Euclid in Greek1•
In the original Euclid's first definition is
,. , ' ? , '8'
<J''l}P,€£0V €<J'TtV, OU µepor;; ov EV.
I have quoted it on p . 86 in the expanded form taught to me
in childhood, ' without parts and without magnitude.' I should
have consulted Heath's English edition-a classic from the
moment of its issue-before committing myself to a statement
about Euclid. This is however a trivial correction not affecting
sense and not worth a note. I wish here to draw attention to
Heath's own note to this definition in his Euclid in Greek. He
summarises Greek thought on the nature of a point, from the
Pythagoreans, through Plato and Aristotle, to Euclid. IVIy
analysis of the requisite character of a point on pp. &J and
9 0 is in complete agreement with the outcome of the Greek
discussion.
NOTE: ON SIGNIFICANCE A-'N"D INFINITE EVENTS

The theory of significance has been expanded and made more
definite in the present volume. It had already been introduced
in the Principles of Natural Knowledge (cf. subarticles 3·3 to
3·8 and 16·1, 16·2, 19·4, and articles 20, 21). In reading over the
proofs of the present volume, I come to the conclusion that in the
1 Camb. Univ. Press, 1920.
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (CH. IX
light of this development my limitation of infinite events to dura...
tions is untenable. This limitation is stated in article 33 of the
Prindples and at the beginning of Chapter IV (p. 74) of this book.
There is not only a significance of the discerned events embracing
the whole present duration, but there is a significance of a cogre
dient event involving its extension through a whole time-system
backwards and fonvards. In other words the essential ' beyond'
in nature is a definite beyond in time as \vell as in space [cf.
pp. 53, 1 94]. This follows from my whole thesis as to the assimila
tion of time and space and their origin in extension. It also has
the same basis in the analysis of the character of our knowledge
of nature. It follows from this admission that it is possible to
define point-tracks [i.e. the points of timeless spaces] as abstrac
tive elements. This is a great improvement as restoring the
balance ben\·een moments and points. I still hold however to the
statement in subarticle 35·4 of the Pri:nciples that the intersection
of a pair of non-parallel durations does not present itself to us as
one event. This correction does not affect any of the subsequent
reasoning in the two books.
I may take this opportunity of pointing out that the ' stationary
events , of article 57 of the Principles are merely cogredient
events got at from an abstract mathematical point of view.
INDEX
In the case of terms of frequent occurrence, onlv those occ21,,rences are

indexed which aye of peculia1' importance for the.etucidatio1' of meaning.
A [01' an], I I Character, extrinsic, 82, 89, 90, I 13,

Abraham, 105 191 : intrinsic, tso, 82, 90, I 13, 191
Absolute position, 105, 106, l r4, Charge, I6o
188 C..losure of nature, 4
Abstraction, 33, 37, 168, 1r1, 173 ; Coefficient of dra� 133
.
extensive, 65, 79, 85 Coefficients of impetus, 183

Abstractive element, 84; set, 61, Cogredience, 110, 188
79 Coherence, 29
Action at a distance, r 59, 190 Comparison, 124. 125, 143, 189
Action by transmission, 159, rgo Complex, 13
Active conditions, 158 Conceptual nature, 45; space, 96
Activity, field of, 1 70, r81 Concrete facts, 167, l ] I , 109
Adjunction, 101 Conditioning events, 152
Aggregate, 23 Conditions, active, 158
Alexander, Prof., viii Congruence, 65, 96, 118, 1 20, 127,196
Alexandria, 7 l Continuity, 157; Dedekindia.n, 102;
Alfred the Great. 137 of events, 76; of nature, 59, 76
Anticipation 69
, Convention, 1 2 1
Anti-prime, 88 Convergence, 62, 7 9 ; law of, 82
Apparent nature, 31. 39 Conveyance, 154, 155
Area, 99; momenta.I. xo3; vagrant, Co-present, 1 7 7
103 Covering, 83
Aristotelian logic, I 50 Creative advance, 178
Aristotle. 16, 1 7, 18, 24, 197 Critical velocity, 193, 195
Associate-potential, 183 Curvature of spa.cc-time, 182
Atom, 17 Cyclone, 194
Attribute, 21, 26, 150
Awareness, 3 Dedekindian continuity, I0.2
Axiom, 36, 1 2 1 Definite, 53, 19 4, 1 98
Axioms o f congruence. 128 et seqq. Delusions, 3I , 38
Delusive perceptual object, 153
Bacon, Francis, 78 Demarcation of events, 144
Behaviouristic, 185 Demonstrative phra.se, 6
Bergson, 54 Descriptive phrase. 6, 10
Berkeley, 28 Differential equations. 196
Between, 64 Discrimination, 14, 50, 144
Beyond, 186, 198 Diversification of nature, 1 5
Bifurcation, vi., 30. 185. 187 Duddington. Mrs, 4 7
Boundary. 100; moment, 63; par- Duration, 37, 53, 55. 186
ticle, 100 Durations, families of, 59, 73. 190
Broad. C. D., viii Dynamical axes, 138
Calculation, formula of, '45· 158 Einstein, vii, xo2, 131, x64, 165,
Cambridge, 97 181, t82, 183, I84, 191
Causal nature, 31, 39 Electromagnetic field, 179
Causation. 31, 146 Electron, 30, 146, 158, 1 7 1
Centrifugal force, 13S Element, I 7 : abstractive, 84
Change, uniformity of, I 40 Elliptical phraseology. 7
200 l�DEX
Empty space, 145 Infinite events, 197, 198
Entity, 5, 13 Inge, Dr, 48
Equal rn ab:.tractivc force, 83 I n gred ient, r 4
Error, 6i} Ingression, 144, 145, 148, 152
Ether, Id, i�· It>o; material, 78; lnhenmce, 83
of events, 7:$ Inside, 106
Euclid, 85, 9·4. 197 Instant, 33, 35, 57
Euler, 140 Instantaneous plane, 9 l ; present, 72;
Event, 15, 52, 75, 1&5; percipient, spaces, 86, 90, I 77
107, 152, 18') Instantaneousness, 56, 57
Event-particle, 86, 93, 94, I 72, I9I Intersection, locus of, 90
Events . conditioning, 152; con Intrinsic character, 80, 82, 90, I 13,
tinuity of, 70; demarcation of, l 9 I ; properties, 62
1 4 4 ; ether of, 78; iniirute, 197, Ionian thinkers, 19
19� : hmited, j4 ; passage of, 34 ; I rrelevance, infinitude of, 12
signified, 5 2 ; stationary, 198; Irrevocableness, 35, 3 7
stream of, 167; structure of, 52, It, 8
100
Exclusion, 186 J nlius Caesa.r, 36
Explanation, 97, 1 4 1 J unction, 76, 101
Extended nature, 196
Extension, 22, 58, 75, 185 Kinetic energy, 105; symmetry, 129
Extensive abstraction , 65, 79, 85 Knowledge, 28, 32
Extrinsic character, 82, 89, 90, II3,
l9I; properties, 62 Lagrange, 140
Larmor, 1 3 1
Fact, 12, 1 3 Law of convergence, 82
Factors, 1 2 , 13, 1 5 Laws of motion, 137, 1 3 9 ; of nature,
Facts, concrete, 167, z 7 1 196
Fa.mily of durations, 59, 63, 73; of Leibnizian monadology, r50
moments, 63 Level, 91, 92
Faraday, 146 Light, 195; ray of, 188; velocity of,
Field, gravitational, 197; of activity, IJI
I ]O, I 8 I ; physical, 190 Limit, 57
Finite truths, 1 2 Limited events, 74
Fitzgerald, 133 Location, x6o, 161
Formula. of calculation, 45, 158 Locke, 27
Foucault, 138, 194 Locus, 102: of intersection, 90
Four-dimensional manifold, 86 London, 97
Fresnel, 133 Lorentz, H. A., 131, 133
Future, the, 72, 177 Lossky, 47
Galileo. r39 Manifold, four-dimensional, 86;

Geometrical order, r94 space-time, 173
Geometry, 36; metrical, 129 Material ether, 78; obj ect, l6g
Gravitation, 179 et seqq. Materialism, 43, 70
Gravitational field, 197 Matrix, l I 6
Greek philosophy, 16; thought, 197 �latter, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26
Gyro-compass, 1 9-i. Ma...e ."CW ll, 1 3 1 , 133
Measurableness, 196; of nature, 1 93
Heath, Sir T. L., r97 Measurement, 96, 120, 1 74, 196; of
Here, 107 time, 65, 140
Measure-system, 196
Idealists, 70 Memory, 68
Immediacy. 52; of perception, 72 Metaphysics, 28, 32
Impetus, 1 8 1 , 182; coetn cients of, Metrical geometry, 1 2 9
183; integral, 183 .Michelson-.Morley, 1 9 5
Inclusion, 186 Milton, 3 5
lndi\:iduality, 13 Mind, 27, 28
INDEX 201
Minkowski, viii, 131 Point-track, u3, 198

Molecule, 32, 171 Pompey, 36
Moment, 57, 60, 88 Position, b9, 90, 92, 9 3, 9Q, r 1 :l· 19 1 ;
Momenta} area, 103; route, 103 absolute, 105, xc..6, 1 1 4, v .. ;
Momentum, 105 Potential, 18 3 ; associatt:-, 1b3
Motion, 105, u4, n7, 1 2 7, 188, 192 Predicate, 18
Multiplicity, 2 2 Predication, 1 8
Present, the, 69. 72, I -; 7 ; instan-
Natural philosophy, 29, 30 taneous, 7 2 ; observational, 186
Natural science, philosophy of, 46 Primary '1ualities, 27
Nature, 3 ; apparent, 3 1 , 3 9 ; causal , Pnme, 8&
3 1 , 39 ; conceptual, 4 5 ; continuity Process, 53. s-1; of na.ture, 54
of, 59, 76; discrimination of, 144 ; Psychic add;.tions, 29, 1 � 7
extended, 196; laws of, 196; Punct, 9 2 , 93, 94
passage of, 54 ; stratificatiqn of, Pythagoreans, r 97
194, 196; system of, x46
Newton. 27, 136, 139, r40 Quality, 27
Quantum of time, 162
Object, 77, 125, 143, 169, 1 89 ; Qua.ntum theory, 162
delusive perceptual, 1 5 5 ; material,
169; perceptual, 153 ; physical, Ray of light, 1 8 :3
155, z57; scientific, 158, 169; uni Reality, 3 o ; of durations, 55, 187
form, 162 Recognition, 124, 143, 189
Occupation, 22, 34, 36, 100, 101 Rcct, 91, 92
Order, source of, 192 ; spatial, 95, Recurrence, 35
1 9 4 ; temporal, 64, 95, 194 Relative motion, u 7 ; velocity, 130
Organisation of thought, 79 Relativity, 169; restricted thecry
Outside, 63, 100 of, 193
Rest, 105, n4, 188, 192
Paradox, I92 Rotation, 138, It H
Parallel, 63, 127; durations, 190 Route, 99; momenta!, 103: straight,
Parallelism, 95, 19I 103
Parallelogram, l 2 7 Rnssell, Bertrand, I I , 122, 123
Paris, 87, 138
Parliament, 120 Schelling, 4 7
Part, I4, 15, 58 Science, 2 ; metaphysical, 32
Passage of events, 34 ; of nature, 54 Scientific objects, I 49, l 5i' 169
Past, the, 72, 177 Secondary qualities, 2 7
Perception, 3 Self-con �ruence, r9tl
Perceptual objects, 1 49 , 153 Self-containedness of nature, 4
Percipience, 28 Sense-awareness, 3, t>7
Percipient event, 107, 152, 186, 187 Sense·object, 149, l 70
Period of time, 51 Sense·perception, 3, 1 4
Permanence, 144 Sense-recognition, 1 4 3 . 18'>
Perpendicularity, 1 1 7 , 127, 193 Series. temporal, 66. 70, 85, 178
Philosophy, l ; natural. 29, 30; of Set, abstractive, 61, ;9
natural science, -4-6; of the sciences, .,
Significance, 51, 186, 187, 1 88, 19.
2 197, 198
Physical field, 190; object, 155, 156, Signified events, 52
157 Simplicity, 163, 173
Physics, speculative, 30 Simultaneity, 53, 56, 196
Place, 5 1 Situation, 15, 78, 147, I48, 152, I6o,
Plane, 191 ; instantaneous, 91 18<)
Plato, 16, 17, 18, 24, 197 Solid, 99, IOI, 102; vagrant. IOI
Poincar�, 121, 122, 123 Sound, 195
Point, 35, 89, 91, I 14, 173, 176 Space, 16, l7, 3 1 , 3 3, 79 ; enipty, 1 4 5 ;
Point-flash, 172, 173 timeless, 8t>, 1o6, I I 4 : umfonmty
Point of space, 85 of, 194
Point, timeless, 192 Spaces, instantaneous, 86, 90
202 INDEX
Space-system, I 79 Timaeus, the, I7, 20, 24

Space-time manifold, 173 Time, 16, 17, 31, 33, 49, 79 ;
Spatial-order, 95 measurement of, 140; quantum of,
Spatio-temporal structure, 173 16z; transcendence of, 39
Speculative demonstration, 6 Time-series, 178, also cf. Temporal
Speculative physics, 30 series
Standpoint for perception, Io7, 188 Time-system, s�11 Time-series, also
Station, 103, xo4, 1 1 3 9 1 , 97, 104, 179, 192
Stationary eveDts, 198 Timeless "'"lnt, 192; space, 86.. 106..
Straight line, 91, 114, 19 1 ; route. 114, 177
103 Totality, 89
Stratification of nature, 187, 194, Transcendence of time, 39
196 Transmission, 26, 28; action by, 159,
Stream of events, 167 190
Structure of events, 52, 166 Tubes of force, 146
Structure, spatio-temporal, 1 73
Subject. 1 8 Unexhanstiveness. 50
Substance, I6, 18, 19, 150 Uniform obj ect, 162
Substratum, 16, 18, .2I Uniformity of change, 140; of space,
Symmetry, n8, 126; kinetic, 129 194
System of nature, 146
System, time-, 192 Vagrant area, 103; solid, 101
Veblen and Young, 36
Tamer, Edward, v, I Velocity, critical, 193, 195; of light,
Temporal order, 64, 95, 194 131, 195; relative, 130
Temporal series, 66, 70, 85 Volume, 92, IOI
Tensor, 182
Terminus, '4 'When, 107
The, I I \\'here, 107
Theory, quantum, 162 \Vhole, 58
There, 1 10, 189 Within. 63
This, I I
Thought, 3, 14 Young, Veblen and, 36

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THE CONCEPT OF NATURE

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON NEW YORK NEW ROCHELLE

ISBN o 521 09245 O

First published 1920

Printed in Great Britain at the

THE contents of this book were originally delivered at

philosophy. The modern natural philosophy is shot

mathematical physics, the present book keeps closer

lative physics. The general assimilation of space and

IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE

I NATURE AND THOUGHT • I

II THEORIES OF THE BIFURCATION OF NATURE. 26

IV THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION •

V SPACE AND 1v10TION 99

VII OBJECTS • • • . 1.of.3

VIII SUMMARY • . 164

IX THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 185

NOTE: ON THE GREEK CoNCEPT OF A PoINT • 197

NOTE : ON SIGNIFICANCE AND INFINITE EVENTS . 197

NATURE AND THOUGHT

THE subject-matter of the Tarner lectures is defined by

clause of the definition; namely that referring to the

philosophy of the sciences. Now a science has already

What do we mean by nature? We have to discuss

ingly the doctrine that natural science is exclusively

for the recipient. I think that we may assume (perhaps

originally meant, he almost CJrtainly now takes his

he was in the lion-house of the Zoo, would be less likely

Thus whereas in the first dialogue the recipient

that any college building in Regent's Park is identical

primarily with bare individuality, secondarily v;ith

the relations holding between natural entities are

nature still and looking at it. We cannot redouble our

,,,.hich the course of events could be expressed. We

it is pyramidal. To-day physicists are again discussing

to the event which is the life history of that blade for

philosophy passed on its way to the refined Aristotelian

attributes; and that, as a second step, scientists (includ­

The above argument has been expressed in terms of

should be treated as units. The stage of arrest may be

in terms of the relations of a bit of matter with itself..

manences in nature. Any theory of nature which for

THEORIES O F THE B I FU RCAT I O N

IN my previous lecture I criticised the concept of matter

the emitting bodies were definitely established, and in

Berkeley's polemic against matter was based on this

are aware ? We do not ask about the percipient or

perceiving mind, and would leave to nature merely the

interaction within nature. The causation involved in this

natural science as an investigation of the cause of the

This is the absolute theory of time. Frankly, I con­

any perception of nature . For example we can imagine

likeliness of future events hardly count. The real point

1 Cf. (for example) Projective Geometry by Veblen and Young,

to that extent my thoughts are in space. But it seems

thought with time.

attributes; and that, as a second step, scientists (includ

This is the absolute theory of time. Frankly, I con

space. What bearing has this assumption on the con

difficulty is to express our meaning in terms of the imme

abstraction. What I have done is to give precise defini

Call the series of events s and the series of quanti

to exhibit this character of being a route of approxi