A BUDDH IST DOCTRINE

OF E X P E R I E N C E

A New Translation and Interpretation of the

Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin

THOMAS A. KOCHUMUTTOM

M O T I L A L B A N A R S I D A S S PUBLISHERS
PRI VATE L I M I T E D
DELHI
 First Published: Delhi, 1982
Reprinted'. Delhi, 1989

© 1989 p Y M O T I L A L B A N A R S ID A S S P U B L ISH E R S P V T . L T D .
A ll R ig h t s R e s e r v e d .

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FOR MY FATHER
 CONTENTS

Pre fa c e xi-xxii

A b b r e v ia t io n s xxiii

CHAPTER

O ne IN TR O D U C T IO N : A GENERAL STATE­
M ENT OF TH E THESIS AND ARGU M EN TS 1-26

1. Realistic Pluralism, Not Monistic Idealism 1

2. What is Denied is Duality, not Plurality 2
3. What is Imagined is the Graspable-Grasper
Duality, Not the Thing-in-itself 4
4. A Theory o f Experience, Not a System o f
Ontology 5
5. The Motive is Practical Rather Than Theore­
tical 11
6. The Things-in-themselves Are Covered U p by
Mental Constructs 14
7. The Same Old Realistic Pluralism 17
8. More Arguments from VimSatika 21
9. In the Light o f the Later School o f Logic 25

T w o D ISC R IM IN A T IO N BETWEEN M IDDLE 27-89

AND EXTREM ES (MADHrANTA -
VIBHAGA)

1. Introduction 27
2. The Imagination o f the Unreal 29
Terms explained 29
Neither void nor non-void 41
Forms o f the imagination o f the unreal 45
 The imagination o f the unreal in relation to the
three natures 58
The negative definition further explained 60
The store-consciousness and the active conscious­
ness 65
The life-circle 67
The summary meaning o f the imagination o f
the unreal 72
3. The Emptiness 72
T hree A TREATISE O N THE THREE NATURES 90-126
( TRISVABHAVA-MRDESA)

1. Introduction 90
2. The Three Natures 91
3. The Other-dependent Nature 94
4. Different, yet Non-different 97
Existent and non-existent 99
Dual and unitary 100
Not mutually different in definition 104
5. How to Evaluate and Understand the Three
Natures 107
6. How Real and Unreal Are the Three Natures 111
7. Towards the Realization o f the Reality 119
F our A TREATISE IN T H IR Y STANZAS ( TRI- 127-163
MSATIKA)

1. Introduction 127
2. Atman and Dharma as Subjectivity and Objecti­
vity 128
3. The Transformation o f Consciousness 134
The store-consciousness (alaya-vijnana) 135
The thinking consciousness ( manana-vijnana) 136
The active consciousness (pravrtti-vijnana) 138
4. All Is Mere Representation o f Consciousness 145
5. The Origin otVikalpa and Alaya-mjnana 147
6. The Triple Nature o f Reality 151
The imagined nature 151
 The other-dependent nature 153
The absolutely accomplished nature 154-
7. The Threefold Naturelessness 156
8. The Realization o f Mere Representation o f Con­
sciousness 158
9. Conclusion 161

F iv e A TREATISE IN TW EN TY STANZAS
( VIM SATlKl) 164-196
1. Introduction 164
2. Vasubandhu’s Thesis 165
3. Argument from Illusory Experience 166
An objection 167
Vasubandhu’s reply 167
4. Non-substantiality o f Atman and Dharma 170
5. Vasubandhu’s Criticism o f Realism 174
6. Refutation o f the Correspondence Theory o f
Knowledge 181
7. Inter-action and Inter-relation Between Indivi­
duals 188
8. Conclusion 195

Six IDEALISM O R REALISM ? 197-234

1. Introduction 197
2. The Meaning o f Vijnapti-mdtra 198
3. The Transformations o f Consciousness 214
4. The Psychic Complex 219
5. The Imagination o f the Unreal (Abhuta-pari-
kalpa) 222
6. The Ineffable ( Anabhilapya) 224
7. Pluralism Rather Than Monism 227
8. Vimiatika : Critique o f the Correspondence
Theory o f Knowledge 228
9. The Doctrine o f Three Natures (Trisvabhava-
nirdeSa) 231
10. Idealism or Realism ? 232
TR A N SLA TIO N OF THE TEXTS
APPENDIX I
The Verses on Discrimination between
Middle and Extremes 235-246
APPENDIX II
A Treatise on the Three Natures 247-253
APPENDIX III
A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas 254-259
APPENDIX IV
A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas 260-275

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 276-280

INDEX 281-287
 PREFACE

The name Vasubandhu has been associated generally with

two significant events in the history o f Buddhism : the composi­
tion o f Abhidharma-koSa on the one hand, and the founding o f
theYogacara system on the other. More precisely, Vasubandhu
is known as the author o f Abhidharma-koSa, and also as the one
who co-founded the Yogacara system with his brother Asanga.
As these two events— the composition o f Abhidharma-kofa and the
founding o f the Yogacara system— represent two different
traditions within Buddhism, one begins to wonder if Vasubandhu
the author o f A bhidharma-kofa and Vasubandhu the co-founder
o f the Yogacara system really are one and the same person. The
traditional answer to this question has been that Vasubandhu
the author o f Abhidharma-koSa was later converted by his brother
Asanga to the latter’s Yogacara line o f thinking. That could
very well be the case. But when it comes to deciding how to
date Vasubandhu, the problem seems to reappear with a greater
complexity. This is because the tradition gives as many as three
dates for Vasubandhu : the year 1100 after the nirvStta o f the
Buddha given in The Life o f Vasubandhu by the historian
Paramartha, the Year 900 after the mrvSna o f the Buddha given
in the commentary o f Madhya.nta-vibha.ga by the same historian
and the year 1000 after the nirvdtfa o f the Buddha given by the
Chinese pilgrim Hsuan-tsang. Based on the very fe\y historical
clues available from various sources, and taking into account
the different ways o f reckoning the year o f the nirv&na o f the
Buddha, many scholars have tried to reconcile these three
dates, and to arrive at; a probable, if not definite, date for
Vasubandhu. The dates so proposed range roughly from the
early third century A.D. to the early sixth century A .D .1 None

1. J. Takakusu in his “ T he Date o f Vasubandhu, the Great Buddhist

Philosopher” , Indian Studies in Honour o f Charles Rickwell Lanman, (Cambridge
Mass. : 1929), pp. 79-88, repeating ‘A .D . 420-500’ for the date o f Vasu­
bandhu which he had proposed as early as 1905, has summarised the findings
o f different scholars in the meantime.
 ( )

o f them, however, has been universally accepted, although

many o f the opinions would agree on the fifth century as an
approximate period for the life and works o f Vasubandhu.
Then in 1951 Professor E. Frauwallner proposed his new
theory o f ‘ two Vasubandhus’ as a way out o f the three conflicting
dates mentioned above : the years 900, 1000, and 1100 after
the nirv&na o f the Buddha.* His basic assumption is that the
two dates given by Paramartha, namely the years 900 and 1100
after the nirvana o f the Buddha, refer to two different persons,
namely Vasubandhu the elder and Vasubandhu the younger
respectively. H e then argues that the date given by the Chinese
pilgrim Hsuan-tsang, namely the year 1000 after the nirvana o f
the Buddha, is the same as the year 1100 after the nirvana o f
the Buddha given by Paramartha, only they are arrived at by
different ways o f reckoning the date o f the nirodna o f the
Buddha. Thus, for Professor Frauwallner, the traditionally
given three dates can be reduced to two, namely 900 and
1000/1100 after the nirvdija o i the Buddha, and these two dates,
he further said, correspond respectively to a time prior to 400
A.D. and the period 400—500 A.D. His final conclusion, there
fore, is that there have been two Vasubandhus, o f whom the
elder who lived prior to 400 A.D., co-founded the Yogacara
system with his brother Asanga, and the younger who lived
between 400— 500 A.D ., wrote Abhidharma-kofa.
The above theory o f ‘two Vasubandhus’, possible as it is, does
not seem to have received much support from scholars. On the
contrary, P. S- Jaini, for one, on the evidence o f the
manuscript o f Abhidharma-dipa (together with a commentary—
the Vibhasd-prabha-vrtti), discovered in 1937, “ throws some doubt
on Professor Frauwallner’s thesis and confirms the older and
universal tradition about the conversion o f the Kosakara
Vasubandhu to Mahayana,” 3 Some o f the recent studies,

2. E. Frauwallner, On the Date o f the Buddhist Master o f the Law Vasubandhu

(R o m e : Serie Orientate Rom a, I I I , 1 951).
3. P. S. Jaini, “ O n the Theory o f T w o Vasubandhus” , Bulletin o f the
School o f Oriental and African Studies, X X I ( 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 49.
 ( )

notably those by Stefan Anacker4 and D.N.G. Macleod,5 also

see little point in Frauwallner’s theory o f ‘ two Vasubandhus’ .
What is more, the latter himself is suggested to have later given
up this theory.6
As far as the present work is concerned, as it is strictly a
textual analysis, the questions o f Vasubandhu’s date and other
biographical details are o f little importance. I may, however,
point out by way o f a suggestion that an almost spontaneous
transition from Abhidharma.-k.oia. to the Yogacara system is not
altogether unwarranted. For instance, the theory o f store
consciousness (alaya-vijnana) which is universally recognized as
a basic innovation by the Yogacarins, is after all only the
“ christening” o f the theory o f the seeds (bija) in the Abhidharma-
kofa. This latter theory has been given there in answer to
questions such as : how are defilements associated with a
previous moment o f consciousness carried over to the next
moment o f consciousness ? How does a past deed produce its
effect in the future ? How is it possible that a past experience
can be recalled in the future ? In answering these questions, all
o f which concern the continuity between the past, present
and future, Vasubandhu the author o f Abhidharma-kofa, following
the Sautrantika point o f view, drew on the imagery o f the seed-
fruit relationship, and said that the present and future are
determined by the seeds left behind by the past : the seeds o f
the defilements associated with a previous moment o f conscious­
ness are carried over to the next moment o f consciousness; the
seeds o f the past deeds produce their fruits in the future; and
the seeds o f the past experiences enable one to recall those
experiences.7 Then what the Yogacarins later called alaya-vijnana,
is for all practical purposes just the collection o f those seeds o f
the past determining the present and future behaviour o f an

4. S. Anacker, “ Vasubandhu : Three Aspects, A Study o f a Buddhist

Philosopher” (Ph. D . Dissertation, University o f Wisconsin), 1970.
5. D . N . G . M acleod, “ A Study o f Yogacara Thought : The Integral
Philosophy o f Buddhism” (Ph. D . Dissertation, University o f D undee), 1978
6. Ibid., p. 29.
7. Ibid., pp. 212 ff.
 individual. In other words, the alaya-vijn&na o f the Yogacarins
is in effect only a collective name for what was described in the
Abhidharma-koia as the seeds (bijas) o f past experience. I f so, it
is not impossible that the author o f Abhidharma-koia himself
worked out, on his own or in collaboration with others, the
theory o f alaya-vijnana and other allied theories o f the Yogacara
system. This sounds still more plausible when one considers
that already in writing his commentary on his own Abhidharma-
koia he had shown his openness to new doctrines and formula­
tions : although he wrote Abhidharma-koia from the Vaibhasika
point o f view, later finding the Vaibhasika position unacceptable
he wrote his commentary (bha$ya) on the same Abhidharma-koia
from the Sautrantika point o f view. A possible conversion o f
the author o f Abhidharma-koia to the Yogacara line o f thinking is
further confirmed by the above mentioned manuscripts o f
Abhidharma-dipa and the Vibh&}a-prabhavrtti, which, as P. S. Jaini
has pointed out, cirticize the author o f Abhidharma-koia for his
leanings towards the Sautrantika and Mahayana positions,
and thus ‘allude to the conversion o f the kosakara to Mahayana
Buddhism’ .8
So much, very briefly, for the personal identity o f Vasubandhu.
Now, coming to the scope o f the present study, it proposes to
analyse the following four texts : (i) Madhycmta- vibhaga-karika-
bhafya, (ii) Trisvabhava-nirdeia, (iii) Triniiatika and (iv) Vim-
iatika. These four texts are definitely among the basic works in
the Yogacara tradition, and are generally attributed to
Vasubandhu. Whether this Vasubandhu was himself the author
o f Abhidharma-koia or not, is no concern o f mine here. What is
important for the present purpose is the fact that these four
texts do have, besides a fairly uniform style o f language, a single,
consistent, underlying system o f thought so that one can safely
take them as belonging to a single author, who is traditionally
called Vasubandhu. T o avoid confusion one may call him
Vasubandhu the Yogacarin. Moreover, when I refer to the
Yogacara system, I am thinking o f it particularly as it is
presented in those four texts, which may or may not correspond
to the Yogacara system as it is presented in the other works o f

8. P. S. Jaini, op. cit„ p. 51.

the same school. However, considering the very high degree o f
systematization and comprehensiveness o f those texts, one may
reasonably take them as representing the orthodox form o f the
Yogacara system. What is significant about this particular set
o f texts is that it gives a complete picture o f the Yogacara
system.
The present work consists mainly o f a new translation and
interpretation o f the texts under reference. I have taken the
utmost care to make the translation literal and uniform through­
out. However, I am aware that there are some minor instances
where I had to give up this rule o f ‘literalism’ and uniformity,
either for the sake o f clarity or convenience. For example, the
Sanskrit terms Skara, prakara and bhava have all been translated
by the single English term ‘ form’ ; similarly the single Sanskrit
term abhava has been translated differently as ‘unreality’ and
‘ non-existence’ . But for these and similar minor instances, I have
all through this work insisted on the rule o f ‘ literalism’ and
uniformity, at the same time, however, trying to av&id clumsy
or far-fetched English expressions and constructions. I hope to
have succeeded in this attempt at least as far as the key terms
and concepts are concerned. T o help the reader I have ahyays
made a point o f reproducing the original texts in transliteration,
by way o f footnotes, on the same pages as their translation
occurs, even when it meant repeating some o f the previous notes.
Again, I have spared no efforts in giving the corresponding
English or Sanskrit expressions, as the case may be, within
brackets in the body o f the work. All these devices are expected
to help the reader locate the original passage or expression
with the minimum possible effort. Futher, for a continuous
reading o f the texts, I have added an appendix giving the
complete translation o f them at a stretch, at the same time
referring back to the pages where the respective passages are
interpreted and explained.
Incidentally, my translation, new as it is, is not the first for
those texts. They have already been translated by others, and
there exists at least one translation for each text. However, for
one reason or another, my translation happens to be almost
altogether different from those done previously. For one thing,
I have been trying to look at those texts from a different
 perspective : the previous translators have looked at them
from the point o f view o f monistic idealism, while I have ]00ifec|
at them from the point o f view o f realistic pluralism. -phis j
think, is enough justification, too, for my new translation.
As for the interpretation o f the texts, as I have suggested
above, it is an exploration into the possibility o f looking at them
from a perspective different from the traditionally accepted one.
It has been the belief that the Yogacarins had broken away from
the early Buddhist schools by replacing the latter’s realistic plura­
lism with a monistic idealism. In contrast to this traditional belief,
my contention is that the Yogacara position need not be inter­
preted as a total rejection o f the realistic pluralism o f the early
Buddhism. M y conviction is that the Yogacara metaphysics is
basically the same as that o f the early Buddhism. The same old
categories are retained but, classified under new terms and con­
cepts. Such new terms and concepts under which the Yoga­
carins have classified the old categories are mainly: alaya-vijnana
(store-consciousness), para-tantra-svabMva (other-dependent
nature), parikalpita-svabhava (imagined nature), parinispanna-sva-
bhava (absolutely accomplished nature), anabhilapya (ineffable),
abhSta-parikalpa (imagination o f the unreal), and iunyata (empti­
ness), this latter term being one that was borrowed from the
Madhyamikas, but reinterpreted.
M y thesis, however, is much more modest than it might sound.
My ultimate aim is not so much to convince the reader that the
Yogacara position is definitely realistic pluralism (although I
have done my best to do so ), as to point out that there is a real
possibilityof interpreting the Yogacara writings, atleast the ones I
have analysed, in terms o f realistic pluralism. It is an invitation
to a re-evaluation o f the traditional interpretation rather than a
categorical rejection o f it. All the same, in building up my argu­
ments for a realistic pluralism in the Yogacara writings. [ have
generally used confident expressions and a r a t h e r asserti tone.
This is because, on the one hand, for my part I am convinced
o f my arguments, and, on the other, because I felt that to present
an argument against a widely accepted position a convincing
style o f language was necessary.
An important suggestion o f the present thesis for an historian
o f religion is that Buddhism, throughout its long history o f deve­
 lopment, has ever retained the original inspiration o f its founder,
the Buddha. The latter believed in a multiplicity o f real, indi­
vidual, beings, a belief that has never been seriously questioned
by any o f his followers. The different stages in the history o f
Buddhism mark, if anything, the different ways o f looking at the
same teaching o f the Buddha. Consequently, the different schools
within Buddhism distinguish from each other not so much in
their philosophy a^ in their practices. If, for example, there has
been a movement from the non-theistic Theravada school of
Buddhism to the theistic Mahayana school o f the same, it is a
change only in the religious practices, and not a change in the
philosophical convictions. Therefore, I fully endorse the words
o f Dr. Walpola Rahula, “ The great Buddhist doctors likeNagar-
juna, Asanga or Vasubandhu, as has been noted earlier, were
not presenting a system o f their own which could be called Naga-
rjuna’s or Asanga’s or Vasubandhu’s philosophy, but they were
only explaining and interpreting anew, putting the old teaching
found in the Canonical texts into new garb.” 9 One thing re­
markable about the entire history o f the Buddhist thought is
that, at none o f its stages, is any concept or term belonging to
the former stages totally denied. The arrival o f a new school is
signalized almost always by the introduction o f some new con­
cepts and terms rather than by the denial o f the old ones. The
new concepts and terms are thus introduced as if they were the
missing links in the original Buddhism, and, therefore, under
the pretext of, or with the intention of, making explicit what was
already implicit in it. The genius o f each school then consists
in fitting the new concepts and terms into the original scheme
o f thought by reinterpreting or readjusting it.
As for the procedure o f my work, the first chapter is a
general introduction to my line o f interpretation o f the texts.
This is presented by way o f stating my thesis and outlining the
arguments for it in rather general terms. This chapter is intended
to put the whole work into perspective.
Chapters II to V are translation along with my interpretation,
respectively, o f the four texts chosen for this study. Each o f

9. W alpola Rahula, Z on an^ ^ Taming o f the Bull, Towards the

Definition o f Buddhist Thought, ( L'ondon : Gordon Fraser} 1978), p. 81.
 these chapers includes translation o f the complete text concerned
and my interpretation o f it. These chapters are meant to
substantiate the ‘ thesis’ , and to elaborate the ‘arguments’ , which
were rather hypothetically stated in the first chapter.
The second chapter, “ Discrimination Between Middle and
Extremes” , is the translation and the interpretation o f the first
chapter o f Madhyantavibhaga-karika-bha$ya (A Commentary on the
Verses on Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes). This
is a commentary (bh&sya) , unanimously attributed to Vasu­
bandhu, on the verses (karikas) on discrimination ( vibhaga)
between middle (madhya) and extremes ( anta). The authorship
o f these verses is, however, disputed : according to some they
belong to Vasubandhu’s brother Asanga, and according to
others they belong to Maitreya, whose historicity itself is again
under dispute. Vasubandhu’s commentary has a sub-commentary
( tika) called Agama-anusarini by Sthiramati. All these three
texts, Karikas, Bhasya and Tika, have now been critically edited
by Professor Ramchandra Pandeya (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna :
Motilal Banarsidass, 1971). But before coming to this stage o f
being critically edited, these texts had a long history o f discovery,
restoration, and translation into Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan,
details o f which are given by Professor Ramchandra Pandeya
in the introduction to his critical edition. The whole work has
been divided into five chapters, o f which the first has been
translated into English by Th. Stcherbatsky (Bibliotheca Bud-
dhica X X X , 1936) and by D.L. Friedmann (Amsterdam,
1937) ;10 and the third chapter o f the Karika and Bh&gya has been
translated and annotated by Paul Wilfred O ’Brien (Monumenta
Nipponica, vols. I X and X , 1953-54). At any rate, Madhyanta-
vibhaga, including the Karika, Bhasya and Tika, is a very
important work for any study o f the Yogacara system. First o f
all, it presents the whole system in all its aspects in a very
organized form, and, secondly, it represents the ideas o f the
three official spokesmen o f the system : Asahga/Maitreya,
Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.
My study includes, besides general references appearing in
the first chapter, the translation and my interpretation o f the

10. I have not seen D . L . Freidmann’s translation myself.

first chapter o f the Karika and Bh&sya. I thought it better to
limit myself to this one chapter for two reasons. First o f all, as
I have been concentrating on the theoretical side o f the Yoga­
cara system, this is the only chapter that is directly concerned
with my present study. Secondly, consideration o f the space-
limit would not allow me to add analysis o f more sections. In
fact, I have made a translation o f the third chapter, too, which
has indeed some theoretical implications. However, for want
o f space I decided not to include it in the present work. Instead,
I contented myself by summarily referring to its central idea o f
‘ basic truth o f fact’ ( mula-tattva) in the first chapter o f this
study (pp. 19-21).
My third chapter, “ A Treatise on the Three Natures (Tri-
svabhava-nirdeia)” , is the translation and analysis o f a small
treatise consisting o f thirty-eight stanzas, called Trisvabhava-
nirdeta. A critical edition, that I know o f this text, is by Sujit-
kumar Mukhopadhyaya ( Calcutta, 1939), which gives also
an English translation. The text had already been translated
twice into Tibetan. The original Sanskrit text as well as the
first Tibetan translation mentions Vasubandhu as the author
o f this text. But the second Tibetan translation is said to ascribe
it to Nagarjuna, which seems to be a mistake. In any case,
judged from the undisputably Yogacara contents o f the text,
it cannot possibly be a work o f Nagarjuna, the founder o f the
Madhyamika school. That it belongs to the Yogacara system
o f Vasubandhu is beyond dispute. Its style might appear a
little different from the other Works o f Vasubandhu. I f that
can be ignored, one would reasonably say that this text forms
an integral part o f his independent works, with Trimsatikd (A
Treatise in Thirty Stanzas) and Viijiiatika (A Treatise in
Twenty Stanzas). That is, the three main areas, namely meta­
physics, psychology and epistemology, which were all briefly
discussed in Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya, are now discussed each
m detail respectively in Trisvabhava-nirdesa, Trimfatika and
VimSatika.
The translation and interpretation o f “ A Treatise in Thirty
Stanzas” ( Trimfatika), which is, as suggested above, mainly
an analysis o f the psyche, are the contents o f my fourth
 chapter. Together with VimSatika (A Treatise in Twenty
Stanzas) it is often called Vijnapti-matrata-siddhi. That Vasuban­
dhu is its author, has never been questioned by anybody. This
small treatise has been subsequently commented upon by as
many as ten writers. The Chinese author Hsiian-tsang in hjs
Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun ( later translated into English by W ei Tat
under the title The Doctrine o f Mere-Conscionsness, ( Hong Kong,
1973) is an exposition o f TrimSatika synthesizing all those ten
commentaries on it. With regards to my interpretation, I have
made frequent reference to Sthiramati’s commentary (bhasya)
on this text.
The fifth chapter, “ A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas (VirnSatika)”
is the translation and interpretation o f VimSatika, which is for
the most part a presentation o f Vasubandhu’s theory o f know­
ledge. Like its sister-treatise TrimSatika, this text, too, is unani­
mously ascribed to Vasubandhu. There is, further, an explana­
tory work, called Vrtti, on it by Vasubandhu himself. Both
VimSatika and Vrtti have been translated from Chinese into
English by C.H. Hamilton under the title Wei Shih Er Shih Lun
Or The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation only (New
Haven : American Oriental Society, 1938).The present chapter
o f my work contains the full translation o f VimSatika, and
interprets it following very closely Vasubandhu’s own explanatory
work, Vrtti. The full translation o f this latter work is, then, added
in the appendix.
The sixth and final chapter, “ Idealismor Realism ?” , is a re­
statement and re-examination o f the thesis that was proposed in
the first chapter, “ A General Statement o f the Thesis and
Arguments” . This is done mainly by asking myself, ‘what might
have led the traditional interpreters to take Vasubandhu’s
system for a monistic idealism ?’. In answer to this question I
have analyzed certain terms, phrases and texts which on the
face o f it might sound idealistic, but on deeper analysis prove
otherwise : such are the cases, for example, o f the terms or
phrases like vijnapti-matra, vijnana-parinama, abhutaparikalpa, and
the apparently idealistic tone o f the text, VimSatika. I have also
discussed some points to which the traditional interpreters seem
to have paid very little attention, such as Vasubandhu’s clear
distinction between the ineffable ( anabhilaphy) and the imagined
( parikalpita) nature o f things, and his understanding o f emptiness
(Sunyata). This final chapter has been so designed that it may
also bring together all the central terms and concepts o f Vasu­
bandhu’s Yogacara system, such as vijnapti-matrata, vijnSna-
parinama, alaya-vijnana, abhuta-parikalpa, para-tantra-svabhdva,
parikalpita-svabhdva, pannifpanna-svabhdva, anabhilapya, SUnyatd,
grahya-grahaka-vikalpa and lokottara-jnana. Thus it also provides
a complete picture o f the theoretical framework o f Vasubandhu’s
Yogacara system.
I may add a word about the phrase ‘realistic pluralism’ ,
which I have used to describe Vasubandhu’s system o f thought.
I am well aware that it is too vague a phrase for this purpose.
As a matter o f fact Vasubandhu’s understanding o f reality
defies all descriptions, because for him reality is ineffable
{anabhilapya). Therefore Vasubandhu himself would not have
any label put on his view o f reality. Hence my choice o f the
phrase ‘realistic pluralism’ means only that it is the nearest
possible description I can find for Vasubandhu’s system o f
thought.
Finally, this study could be further pursued by comparing
Vasubandhu’s system with some relevant systems in the Western
tradition. For example, one could make a fruitful comparison
between Kant’s distinction between the ‘noumenon’ and the
‘phenomenon’ on the one hand, and Vasubandhu’s distinction
between the ‘ ineffable’ and the ‘samsaric’ on the other, and
between Descartes’ theory o f ‘transcendental dream’ and that o f
Vasubandhu. However, to make such comparisons was not within
the scope o f the present study, and therefore I have contented
myself with occasional references to Kant’s distinction between
the ‘noumenon’ and the ‘phenomenon’ .
This study under the title, Vasubandhu the Togdcarin : A Mew
Translation and Interpretation o f Some o f His Basic Works, was
originally submitted in 1978 to the University o f Lancaster,
U .K ., in fulfilment o f the requirements for my degree o f Doctor
o f Philosophy. I should like to express my sincere gratitude to all
those who, at different times and in various ways, have helped
me in preparing this work. M y very special thanks are due to
Professor Ninian Smart, and Ur. Andrew Haw'nnsou, iul tutIT
guidance. It has been very kind o f them to spend so much time
going through the manuscripts, and giving me very helpful
suggestions and comments. Above all, the encouragement I
received from them throughout this work has been most valuable.
 ABBREVIATIONS

M V. Madhyanta-vibhaga (which includes Madhyanta-vibhaga-

karika, Madhydnta-vibhaga-karika-bhafya and Madhydnta-
vibhdga-kdrikd-bhdfya-tika)
MVK. Madhyanta-vibhaga-karika
MVKB. Madhyanta-vibhaga-karika-bhSfya
MVKBT. Madhydnta-vibhaga-kdrikd-bhafya-tikd
TSN. Trisvfibhava-nirdeSa
TrimS. TrimSatika
VimS. VimSatika
VimS. Vr. VimSatika-vrtti
 C hapter O ne

IN TR O D U C TIO N : A GENERAL STATEM ENT OF

THE THESIS AND ARGUM ENTS

1. Realistic Pluralim, Not Monistic Idealism

M y minimum contention is that the Yogacara writings, espe*
cially those under discussion, are open to interpretation in term?
o f realistic pluralism. Here I am obviously disagreeing witl1
those who describe the Yogacara system as“ absolute idealism” ,1
as “ spiritual monism” ,2 as “ idealism par excellence” 3 or as “ meta*
physical idealism” .4 I do not, however, mean to say that those
descriptions are entirely without foundation. There are indeed
passages in the Yogacara literature, which apparently support
an idealistic monism. But I maintain that the entire system,
when understood in terms o f realistic pluralism, makes better
sense and that, therefore, even those passages which apparently
support idealistic monism, have to be interpreted in accordance
with realistic pluralism. By realistic pluralism I mean a theory
that recognizes a plurality o f beings which really exist and
operate independently o f each other. It positively holds that
individuals are real as well as mutually independent beings-
What it denies are: (i) that the absolute mode o f reality »s

1. For example, see C. D . Sharma, A Critical Survey o f Indian Philosophyy

(Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidas, 1 964). p. 121.
2. See T h . Stcherbatsky, trans., Madhyanta-vibhaga: Discourse on Discrimi­
nation Between Middle and Extremes, (Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. X X X , 193^>
reprint ed., (Calcutta: Indian Studies, Past and Present, 1971) p. 8.
3. See T . R . V . Murti, The Central Philosophy o f Buddhism, (Londof1:
George Allen and Uuwin Ltd., 1955; 2nd ed., 1 9 6 0 ), p. 316.
4. See Edward Conze, Thirty Tears o f Buddhist Studies, (O xford: Brui10
Cassirer L td ., 1967) p. 7 8 ; see also C . H . Hamilton, Wei Shih Er Shin Z.«n
Or the Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-only, (New Haven: America11
Oriental Society 1938) p. 6.
consciousness/mind/ideas, (ii) that the individual beings are
transformations or evolutes o f an absolute consciousness/mind/
idea, ( iii) that the individual beings are but illusory appear­
ances of a monistic reality.
However, a realistic pluralism does not rule out the possi­
bility o f having a transcendental unity o f beings which will not
endanger their individual identity. By transcendental unity o f
beings I mean a unity which is implied by the concept o f ‘uni­
versal’ , to take just one example. A ‘universal’, although it
conceptually unifies and embraces all the ‘particulars’ coming
under it, is not anything existential, or concrete. It is rather an
‘ ideal’ or an ‘epistemological requirement’ . It does not endanger
the identity o f the particulars, either. In fact, in contrast to
the ‘universal’ , the particulars are the only real, concrete and
existential beings. It is worth noticing that the Buddhist logi­
cians immediately following the Yogacarins, and themselves
belonging to the Yogacara school, classified ‘universals’ (soman-
yalaksana) as mental constructs ( vikalpa or kalpana). For them
‘universal’ is what the mind imposes on, or constructs over, the
particulars,1 the latter alone having own-nature (sva-laksana).
By saying that a realistic pluralism does not rule out the
possibility o f having a transcendental unity o f beings, I do not
mean that the Yogacara writings positively speak o f such a
transcendental unity o f beings. On the contrary, in my interpre­
tation no such possibility figures, and I believe that one can
very well understand the Yogacara writings without bringing
in the idea o f a transcendental unity o f beings. However, if
someone feels that the idea o f such a unity is necessarily part
o f the Yogacara system, I can easily concede his point, as it
does not contradict my thesis o f realistic pluralism.

2. What is Denied is Duality, Not Plurality

What made me disagree with the traditional interpretation
o f the Yogacara system as monistic idealism is firstly the fact

1. Samanyena iakfattam samanyalaksanam. Sadhdrartam rupam-iti-arthah Sama-

ropyamanam hi rupam sakala-vahni-sadharanam. Tatah tat-samanya-laksaifam.
(D h arm akirti, Nydya-bindu, The C how kham ba Sanskrit Series, Banaras,
1 9 5 4 ,1 . 16).
that nowhere in the texts I have analysed, which are in any case
the basic works in this system, is there an explicit statement o f
such a position. Moreover, the only sort o f distinction the
authors object to is that between graspable and grasper (grahya-
grdhaka-vikalpa). For example, the whole o f Madhyanta-vibhaga
in general, and particularly its first chapter, is devoted to show
that the distinction between graspable and grasper is unreal or
rather non-existent (abhuta). That the dualism between gras­
pable and grasper is merely mental construction (parikalpa) and
that ft is, therefore, non-existent (nasti or na vidyate or na bhavati)
is repeated time and again, while not even once is there a posi­
tive denial o f a plurality o f beings. That means, what the
Yogacarins are concerned about is the problem o f duality, not
o f plurality. That there is a plurality o f beings is taken for
granted, while the dualistic view o f reality is emphatically
denied.
It should be emphasized that for the Yogacarins dualism
means basically the dualism between grahya (graspable) and
grahaka (grasper),1 which being merely mental construction,2
is nothing existent.3 To say that duality is denied while accept­
ing plurality, might sound a contradiction in terms. However,
it should be by now clear that the ‘plurality’ and ‘duality’ under
discussion refer to two different universes o f discourse: the for­
mer refers to the ontological universe o f discourse and stands
for plurality o f beings, while the latter refers to the epistemolo-
gical/experiential universe o f discourse and stands for duality
o f understanding. Therefore, there is no contradiction in accept­
ing plurality o f beings while denying duality o f understanding.
For the Yogacarins, there can be and there is, a plurality of
beings, although they do not tolerate the distinction o f those
beings into graspable and grasper, enjoyable and enjoyer,
experience-able and experiencer, knowable and knower, or object
and subject. Each o f those many beings has to be understood
as characterized neither by subjectivity nor by objectivity; it
is empty o f both subjectivity and objecfivity as well. This

1. Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca. M V K B . I. 2

2. Tatra-ahhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. Ib id .
3. Dvayam tatra na vidyate. M V K . I. 2.
indeed is the meaning o f “ emptiness” (Sunyata) for the Yoga­
carins, namely the emptiness o f subject-object characterization1
with reference to each individual being.

3. What is Imagined is the Graspable-Grasper

Duality, Not the Thing-in-Itself
Another strong case for my refusal to recognize monistic
idealism in the Yogacara writings is the fact that what the
authors attribute to the operation of imagination (parikalpa) is
only the distinction between graspable and grasper, not the
entire external world, as a monistic idealism would have one
believe. Right in the beginning o f his Madhyanta-vibhaga-karika-
bhafya Vasubandhu makes it unquestionably clear that “ the
imagination o f the unreal [abhuta-parikalpa] means the discri­
mination between graspable and grasper [ grahya-grahaka-
oikalpah] .* Then the text goes on to say how the whole world
o f experience, including the experiences o f inanimate and
animate beings, self and ideas, is mere imagination o f the
unreal,3 and how it rests on the unreal distinction between
graspable and grasper.4 Thus the basic experience o f samsara is
the illusory consciousness o f grahya-grahaka distinction, the
cessation o f which will automatically result in one’s liberation
( mukti).6 Thus, graspable-grasper distinction is the only factor
the Yogacarins attribute to the operation o f imagination. Is it
reason enough to call their system idealism ? All that they
characterize as illusory (bhranti) is the experience o f graspable-
grasper distinction.® Is it, again, reason enough to call their
system monism ? The answer to these questions being defini­
tively negative, the Yogacara system is neither monism nor
idealism.

1. Sunyata tasya-abhuta-parikalpasya grahya-grdhaka-bhdvena virahitata. M V K B .

I . 2 ; for more explanation o f thij statement see below pp. 30 ff.
2. Taira-abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M V K . I . 2.
3. See M V K . I . 4 -5 , and my analysis o f these stanzas below pp. 56 ff.
4. For more details see m y analysis o f M V K . I . 4 -5 below p p. 45 ff.
5. Tat-ksayan-mukti-risyati. M V K . I. 5.
6. Tatha grahya-grdhakatvena bhranli-rudbhdvita-api. . . M V K B T . I . 5.
 It is true that the Yogacarins themselves have described their
system as iy7wPZ-~£;?ts-vSda> a theolT which saVs that a11 is
mere representation o f consciousness. However, the application
o f this description is much more restricted than traditionally
believed. From the above paragraph it follows that the factors
which the mind contributes to the picture o f the universe are
basically ‘graspability’ , ‘grasperhood’, and the distinction
between them. Hence, those factors are rightly described
as the externalization o f ideas or as mere representations o f
consciousness. That is, but for the constructive imagination
( parikalpa) , characterizations o f individual streams o f existence
as ‘ graspable' or ‘grasper’ would make no sense. Thus the
graspable-grasper characterizations are entirely imagined
(parikalpita), and are, therefore, mere representations o f
consciousness (vijnapti-matra). This indeed is what the Yoga­
carins mean when they describe their system as vijnapti-
mdtrata-vadat a theory which says that all is mere repre­
sentation o f consciousness.
However, the fact is that the effect o f the superimposed dis­
tinction between graspable and grasper is so far-reaching that it
makes the whole universe appear ( abhasa) in a way much differ­
ent from what it really is. Consequently the entire cosmos as
it appears is rightly called a mental construction (parikalpita),
and is, therefore, described as mere representation o f conscious­
ness ( vijnapti-matra). Hence in the final analysis the phrase
vijnaptimatrata-vada means a theory which says that the world
as it appears to the unenlightened Ones is mere representation o f
consciousness. Therefore, any attempt to interpret vijhapti-
matrata-vdda as idealism would be a gross misunderstanding
o f it.

4. A Theory o f Experience, Not a System o f Ontology

It should then be noticed that the theory o f vijnapti-matrata in
the Yogacara writings is meant to be an explanation o f experi­
ence, rather than a system o f ontology. Contrasting the citta-
mdtrata theory o f the Lankavatara and the vijnapti-matrata theory
o f the Yagacarins D. T . Suzuki has pointed out that “ The
philosophy, if there is any such thing in the Lankavatara, is ontology
and not epistemology. Whereas the doctrine o f Vijnapti-matrata
is epistemological” .1 The point is that the Lankavatara has
explicitly identified the absolute state o f reality with citta,2 and
has positively said that in the final analysis “ there is nothing
but citta.” 3 But not even once in the four Yogacara works I am
studying has the term vijnapti been used to describe the absolute
state o f reality, nor is there any indication that the final state
o f existence has to be defined in terms o f vijnana. Instead, as
already observed, the absolute state o f reality is defined simply
as emptiness, namely the emptiness o f subject-object distinction.
Once thus defined as emptiness (Sunyata), it receives a number
o f synonyms,4 none o f which betrays idealism. The synonyms
enumerated in Madhyanta-vibhdga are tathata (suchness), bhiita-
koti (limit o f existence), animittam (uncaused), paramarthata
(absoluteness) and dharma-dhatu (source-reality5).6 It is obvious
from this list o f synonyms for emptiness— emptiness which is
the same as the thing-in-itself ( Tathabhuta-vastu)—-that tocon-
ceive the latter in idealistic terms does not occur to the Yoga­
carins. I have o f course come across a few instances which a
casual reader might take to mean idealism. For example, Vasu­
bandhu in his Madhyanta-vibhaga-karikd-bhtifya says that sunyata
is the subject-object distinctionless state o f the imagination o f

1. D . T . Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, (London and Boston:

Routledge and Kegan Paul L td ., 1972) p. 280.
I cannot, however, agree with Suzuki if he is arguing on the basis o f
terminology, for the phrases citta-matra and vijnapti-matra have been synony­
mously used both by Lankavatara and the Yogacarins. Suzuki himself has
quoted three instances o f vijnapti-matra and four instances o f prajnapti-matra
from Lankavatara used in the same sense as citta. (See p. 181). And right
in the very beginning of his Vimiatika-vrtti Vasubandhu declares that for him
vijnapti is synonymous with citta. See also his T S N . 36.
2. “ Suchness, emptiness, the limit, Nirvana, Dharmadhatu, variety o f
will-bodies— they are nothing but M ind {citta) “ Lankavatara, 31, quoted and
translated by Suzuki, Ibid.. p. 242.
3. Lankavatara 29-33.
4. paryayah.
5. M y translation o f dharma-dhatu as source-reality is based on the follow­
ing commentary of Vasubandhu: Arya-dharma-hetutvat dharmadhatu, arya-
dharmartam tad-alambana-prabhavatvat. Hetu-artho hi-atra dhatu-arthah. M VKB.
I. 16.
6 M V K . I. 15.
 the unreal (abhuta-parikalpa).1 It could be taken to suggest
idealism, if the imagination o f the unreal in its subject-object
distinctionless state could still be called ‘ imagination’ , or ‘mind’ ,
or ‘conciousness’ , or some other idealistic name. But the fact is
that reality is called, in the Yogacara writings, ‘ [creative]
imagination’, or ‘mind’ , or ‘ imagination’, only in its creative
aspect, when it is capable o f discriminating between subject and
object. Once it is freed o f the subject-object prejudice, it is just
suchness, or emptiness, or the thing-in-itself.
Another instance o f apparent idealism is found in Sthiramati’s
commentary on the Trimtotika. Speaking o f the purpose o f the
treatise Trimiatika, he says : “ The present treatise has been com­
posed to repudiate two exclusive claims : one, that vijneya [ the
knowable or the object ] is as much a reality[ dravyatafi] as vijnana
[knowledge or consciousness] itself; two, that vijnana [knowl­
edge or consciousness is as much a convention [ samvrtitah ] as
vijneya [the knowledge or the object] itself.” 2 This statement
does apparently imply that what is real is vijnana and that
vijneya is only conventional. M y reaction, however, is that
Sthiramati is either misinterpreting Vasubandhu, or means only
that vijnana is more real than vijneya, without implying that the
former is the only real. That the subjective element (i.e.
vijnanam or vijnapti or abhuta-parikalpa) is more real than the
objective one (i.e. vijneya or vifaya or artha or parikalpita) and,
therefore, more difficult to get rid o f is certainly the general
thesis o f the Yogacarins.3 In any case I cannot accept Sthiramati
if he means that for the previous Yogacarins vijnana marks the
ultimate state o f reality or existence. For, M V 1.4 clearly says
that vijnana is the name o f reality when the latter is born in the
form o f inanimate and animate beings, self and representations
of consciousness.4 That means, vijnana is not the ultimate state
o f reality, but only one o f its “ born” states. One might argue

1. Sunyata tasya-abhiita-parikulpasya grakya-grahaka-bhdaena virahitata. M V B .

I. 2.
2. . . . vijnana-vad-vijheyam-api drdvynta esa iti kecin-manyata vijneya-vad
vijndnam-api samvrtita eva na paramarthata iti-asya dviprakarasya-api-ekantavadasya
pratisedhartah prakararidrambliafi. ( Trimiatika-bhasyam, I n tr o d u ctio n ).
3. T h is is clear from passages like M V K I . 7 ; I S \ . 36 etc.
4. Artha-sattva-atma-vijnapti-pratibhasam prajayale vijnanam. M V K . I. 4.
that the verse under reference could be differently translated to
mean that “ vijnana, [the ultimate realty], is born [i.e. manifests
itself] in the forms o f animate and inanimate beings, self and
representations o f consciousness” . This translation, although
grammatically correct, does not fit in with the context, for the
latter part o f the verse is an unambiguous denial o f any ultimate
reality to vijnana. It says that the knowable objects being non­
existent, the knowing vijnana, too, is non-existent.1 This state­
ment implies that the term vijnana, which means nothing ultimate,
would make sense only as long as one is under the illusion o f
subject-object distinction.
I have been saying that the vijnapti-matrata theory of the
Yogacarins is more an explanation o f experience that a system
o f ontology. T o pursue this point further, I must point out that
the terms vijnapti as well as vijnana have been employed not to
describe any ontological state o f reality, but to denote the
subjective part o f an experience ( grahaka), and are always con­
trasted with its objective part ( grahya) which is denoted by
terms like artha and vijneya. I may refer to one or two typical
passages to this effect. First o f all there is M V K 1.7:

Depending upon perception

There arises non-perception,
And depending upon non-perception
There arises non-perception.2

And its commentary by Vasubandhu, which may be paraphrased

as follows:

That is, from the perception that there is only vijnapti,

arises the perception that there is no artha [ object ] ; and
then from this non-perception o f artha arises the perception
that there is not even mere vijnapti?

1. . . . nasti ca-asya vijnanasya arthas-tad-abhavat tad-api asat. Ib id .

2. Upalabdhim samasritya nopatabdhih prajayate.
Nopalabdhim samaintya nopalbdhih prajayate. M V K . 1.7
3. Vijnapti-matropalabdhim niiritya-artha-anupalaldhir-jayate. Arthanupalabdhim
nisritya-vijnapti-matra-armpalabdhir jdyate. M V K B . I. 7. F or literal translation
an d explanation o f this text see b e lo w p . 61.
These passages clearly show that the terms vijnapti and artha do
not stand for any ontological states o f reality, but merely denote
two polar concepts, namely those o f subjectivity and objectivity
respectively. I call them ‘polar concepts’ in the sense that “ each o f
them is essentially contrasted with the other; indeed, it gets its
sense by way o f this contrast” .1 In other words, they do not make
sense without referring to each other. If, therefore, any one o f them
could be proved to be non-sensical, the other one, too, is at once
proved to be non-sensical. This is exactly what the above quoted
passages get across: vijnapti and artha are contrasted to each
other as standing for the polar concepts o f subjectivity and
objectivity; then the non-sensical character o f the concept o f
artha is established from the fact that there is only vijnapti; then,
finally, from the non-sensical character o f the concept o f artha,
is established the non-sensical character o f the concept o f vijnapti
itself.2 Thus the concepts o f both vijnapti and artha turn out to
be non-sensical and, therefore, irrelevant, too. Incidentally, it
must be noted that this is the whole point and central argument
o f the Yogacara philosophy: the entire lot o f samsara experience
hinges on the polar concepts o f subjectivity and objectivity
(grahakatva and grahyatva) namely that one is the subject o f
experience (bhok.tr),. while all else are object o f one’s experience
(bhojya); then the concept o f objectivity is proved to be mere
imagination, which will in turn prove the concept of subjectivity
as well to be mere imagination;3 thus the concepts o f subjectivity
and objectivity collapsing, the whole samsara experience, too,
collapses, and there automatically results release (mok$a or mukti
or nirvana). I shall return to this point a little later. What in­
terests me at the moment are the following facts: (i) the terms
vijnapti and artha under discussion do not refer to anything onto­

1. T h is is h o w a p air o f p o la r con cep ts is d escribed b y D . W . H a m ly n ,

The Theory o f Knowledge, (L o n d o n an d B asingstoke: T h e M a cm illa n Press
L td ., 1970; reprin t e d ., 19 7 4 ), p . 16.
2. F ro m the lo g ica l p o in t of view , this argum ent im plies a viciou s
circle, an d is, therefore, fallacious. T h e fact, h ow ever, is that it is m eant to
be a process o f realization rather than a log ica l argu m en t: on e first realizes
that the c o n c e p t o f artha is non -sen sical, w h ich w ill lead on e to the realiza­
tion that the co n c e p t o f vijnapti itself is non-sensical. F or m ore explanation see
b e lo w , p . 61.
3. Grahya-grahakayoh paraspar-nirapeksatvat. M V K B T . I. 7.
logical (vastu), but only to the epistemological concepts o f
subjectivity and objectivity; (ii) therefore the denial o f existence
( satta or bhavatva) to vijnapti and artha does not amount to the
denial o f the concepts o f subjectivity and objectivity as something
more than mere imagination; (iii) hence the main concern o f
the Yogacarins, in contexts such as that referred to above, is
not about the multiplicity o f beings, but about unwarrantedly
categorizing them as subjects and objects.
A similar analysis could be carried out with Trisvabhava-nirdesa,
36, where the polar concepts o f citta and jneyartha are contrasted
with each other, and then the meaningfulness o f each o f them is
denied using the same argument as that used in the case o f
vijnapti and artha.1 Again, in MV- 1.4 the concept o f vijnana is
contrasted with that o f artha, (which in this instance includes
the concepts of inanimate and animate beings, self and represen­
tations o f consciousness), and subsequently the validity o f both o f
them is denied.2 In fact there are many more instances o f this
kind.
Thus speaking in an epistemological context the Yogacarins
are seeking to find out what are the contents o f one’s experi­
ence, rather than what are things-in-themselves. The question
before them is what things are got at through experience, rather
than what things are there in fact. That there are many
things or many individual streams o f existence is taken for grant­
ed. But does one’s epistemological experience reach them ? The
answer is negative. All that one reaches through experience are
one’s own mental constructions (kalpana or parikalpa), or rather
appearances (pratibhasa) o f one’s own consciousness, which have
nothing to do with things-in-themselves (parinispama-svabhava or
tathata) . This is to my mind the message of, for example, M V.
1.4, which on the one hand says that the categories o f inanimate
and animate things, self and representations o f consciousness as

1. Citta-mdtra-upalambhena jfleya-artha-anupalambhata, jneya-artha-anupalam-

bhena sydc-citta-anupalambhata. T I N . 36.
2. Artha-sattva-atma-vijnapti-pratibhdsam prajayate, vijnanam nasti ca-asya-
arlhas-tad-abhavat tadapi-asat. M V K . I . 4 ; see also the subsequent com m en ­
taries o f V a su b a n d h u an d Sthiram ati.
 experienced are nothing but different appearances (pratibhasa)
o f consciousness itself, and, on the other hand, that they are
either deprived o f objectivity (akaratva or prakaratva) or are
different from what they appear to be. After making a detailed
analysis o f this stanza elsewhere,1 I came to the following con­
clusion. The categories o f consciousness, self, representations o f
consciousness, living beings and inanimate beings, in so far as
they fall within the range o f experience, are nothing but sub­
jective constructions, and for that reason non-beings, too.
Neither o f these categories ever reaches the thing-in-itself. The
thing-in-itself is thus beyond the range o f experience. Those
categories, subjective forms as they are, are experienced either
as subjects or objects. The categories o f inanimate and living
beings, in so far as they are objects o f experience, are non­
beings, because they do not represent any objective form, but
only subjective forms. The categories o f self and representations
o f consciousness, in so far as they are objects o f experience, are
only mentally constructed forms, and are, therefore, non-beings,
having nothing to do with things-in-themselves. Self and
representations o f consciousness, in so far as they are subjects
o f experience, are likewise mentally constructed forms and non­
beings, and as such are false appearances o f consciousness.
Consciousness itself, in so far as it is subject o f experience, is
non-being. Thus, in short, whatever is referred to as subject or
object is mere subjective construction and therefore non-being;
the thing-in-itself is neither subject nor object. Above all, what
is described as ‘subjective construction and therefore non-being’
is only the concept o f subjectivity and objectivity, not in any
case the thing-in-itself.

5. The Motive is Practical Rather Than Theoretical

The next point I want to emphasize is the fact that the ulti­
mate motive o f the Yogacarins in building up their system is
religious rather than merely philosophical. Their primary
interest is to explain the samsara experience and to suggest a way
out o f it. As Sthiramati puts it, they are concerned about the

1. See below pp. 54-55*

ways and means o f “ producing the totally intuitive knowledge
proper to the Buddhas” .1 Or, in the words o f M V , they are
trying to find out what must be extinguished to result in one’s
mukti (release or liberation) -2 Hence, the whole system has to
be viewed as converging on the main themes o f samsara and
mukti.
What then is the characteristic mark o f samsara ? Early
Buddhism characterized it as duhkha arising from trsna (desire)
or upadana ( clinging = passionate attachment). The Yogacarins
now go further and trace trsna or upadana itseu tC lllC
idiosyncrasy for discrimination between graspable and grasper.
Sthiramati says, ‘ upadana which is the same as craving for pudgala
and dharma, is based on graspable-grasper duality, and is, therefore,
o f imagined nature’ .3 It is quite understandable why desire
( trsna or upadana or abhinivesa) and other allied passions should
be attributed to the graspable-grasper distinction, for desire
obviously presupposes a subject who desires and an object which
is desirable. Without making a distinction between subject and
object one cannot speak o f either desire or clinging or attach­
ment or enjoyment, which are all, for the Buddhists, basic
experiences o f samsaric existence. Therefore, as I have already
suggested, discrimination between graspable and grasper ( grahya-
grahaka-vikalpa) is the arch-idiosyncrasy to which one in the state
o f samsara is subject, and to which all other perverted distinctions
and the consequent distorted picture o f the universe are all to
be traced. The experience o f samsara consists basically in one’ s
being forced to view oneself as the grasper (.grahaka), the enjoyer
( bhoklr), the knower (jnatr) o f all other beings, which then are
viewed as the graspable (grahya), the enjoyable (bhojya) , the
knowable (jiieya ). There one cannot help mentally constructing
the distinction between the subject and the object, the grasper
and the graspable, the enjoyer and the enjoyable. There one

1. Kim atlham-idam sastram firanitam, Buddhanam bhagaoatam samyag-nirvikal-

pajRana-utpadanarthatn. M V K B T . I- '•
9 ....... M V K . 1 .5 ; yat-ksayan-muktir-isyate, M V K -

H ’ 3 7 S aca (pudaala dharma-abhinioesah - upadanam) dvayapalitatvdt parikalpitah

svabhavah. M V K B T . H I- 6. Here dvayam means grahya and grahaka.
is led to believe that one is the subject knowing and enjoying all
other streams o f existence around one, which then inevitably
appear as the objects o f one’s knowledge and enjoyment.
Now, therefore, all that an aspirant to buddhahood should
be warned against is the idiosyncrasy for the graspable-grasper
distinction. And this indeed is the central message o f the
Yogacarins. That the graspable-grasper distinction is mere
imagination,1 and that, therefore, it is non-existent2 and illusory,®
is repeated time and again. M V. I. 7 is particularly worth
noticing in this respect.4 It shows the illusory nature o f every
experience that involves a distinction between graspable and
grasper. Introducing this stanza Vasubandhu says that it
suggests a means (upaya) o f understanding the nagative defini­
tion ( asal-laksana) o f the imagination o f the unreal (abhuta-
parikalpa) ,5 Sthiramati further makes it clear that by the nega­
tive definition o f the imagination o f the unreal Vasubandhu
means the non-existence o f graspable and grasper.6 An indivi­
dual in the state o f samsara, when he is endowed with, and
almost identified with,7 the power o f the imagination o f the
unreal, is bound to think o f himself as the subject knowing and
enjoying other things which he takes for objects. So he must be
warned against the non-existence (asattvam) o f the objectivity
(graspability) and subjectivity ( grasperhood). He must be told
that the objectivity and subjectivity are merely his own imagina­
tion, and that, therefore, he should not cling to such deceptive
fancies. I f he is not so warned, “ The imagination o f the unreal
[abhuta-parikalpa], unaware o f the negative definition, works in
favour o f the defilements o f kleSa, karma and janma” .9 Thus the

1. Tatra-abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M V B . I. 2.
2. Dvayam ( = grdhyam grahakam ca) tatrana vidyate. M V K . I . 2.
3. grahya-grahakatvena bhrantir-udbhasita. M V K B T . I. 5.
4. For a detailed analysis o f this text see below pp. 61 ff.
5. Idanlm tasmin-neva-abhuta-parikalpe-asal-lakasarfam pradipayati. M V K B .
I- 7.
6. grahya-grahakayor-asattvam-eva asal-laksariam. M V K B T , I. 7 .
7. Such an identification is suggested, for example, by the passage quoted
below under note 8-
8. Aparijnata-asal-laksario hi-abhuta-parikalpah kleSa-karma-janma-sankleSaya
sampravartate. M V K B T . I. 7.
ultimate motive o f the authors is moral or religious, namely to
dissuade the disciples from indulging in the enjoyments o f samsara.
Therefore, what they are attacking is the graspable-grasper
dualism, not the ontological pluralism.

6. The Things-in-Themselves Are Covered Up by

Mental Constructs
As already explained, according to the Yogacarins one in the
state o f samsara does not experience the things-in-them-
selves, but only the subjective forms o f one’s own consciousness.
Such forms are basically those o f subjectivity and objectivity.
Constructed and projected by the consciousness they cover up
the things-in-themselves in such a way that the latter are pre­
vented from being perceived or experienced. This leads to the
Yogacarins’ concept o f “ coverings” ( avaranas) discussed at great
length in Madhyanta-vibhaga, chapter II. Avaranas include all
the limitations to which one in the state o f samsara is subject,
and “ from the cessation o f which issues liberation” .1 T o describe
the state o f samsara in terms o f avarana, meaning ‘covering’ or
‘veiling’ , is typical o f the Yogacara tradition. Usually the Indian
systems, including the early Buddhist systems, look at samsara
as a state o f avidya (ignorance). But, for the Yogacarins even
this avidya is basically a ‘covering’ . For example, in M V. I. 11
the first link o f the dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada),
which was traditionally called avidya, has been interpreted as
acchadana, literally meaning “ covering” . Then Vasubandhu com­
ments, “ here acchadana means avidya., which prevents the vision
o f reality as such [ yathd-bhuta-darsanay\2 Sthiramati then adds,
“ avidya by nature is non-vision [ = non-seeing]. Therefore by it
is covered [ = concealed] the object o f bhuia-darsana. Bhuta-
darSana is mainly supra-mundane wisdom . . . avidya, impeding
the bkuta-darsana becomes the source [ = condition ] o f samskaras,
and thus by it is the jagat tormented.” 3 The theory o f avaranas,

1. Tat-ksayan-muktir-isyale M V K . I I . 17.
2. Tatra acchadanad-aoidyaya yatha-bhuta-darsana-avabandhanat. M V K B . I .11.
3. Avidya hi-adariana-almakatvad bhutadarSana-visaye pracchadite bhuta-
darSanam notpadyate' to bhuta-darfana-utpatti-vibandhanad-avidya bhufa-darsana-
mbandhah. M V K B T . I . 11.
 then, should be considered as an extension o f the view o f avidya
as ‘covering’, and accordingly there are its descriptions such as
“ that which prevents knowledge from coming into being” ,1
“ covering which obstructs the vision o f truth” ,2 “ covering o f
non-illusory vision” ,3 and so on. In short, avarana is that which
makes the experience o f things-in-themselves impossible, which
for the Yogacarins is none other than one’s bias towards subject-
object distinction. Such a bias towards subject-object distinction
not only prevents one from seeing things as they really are, but
also arouses one’s selfish interests and passions, and makes one
cling to the so-called objects o f enjoyments. So what have been
traditionally called as kiesas, upaklesas, trsna, samyojandni, utpada-
satya etc. etc. are all subsumed under the heading kle$a-avarana.
They are avaranas ‘consisting o f klesas themselves, including
upaklesas as well’.4 It should be noticed that under the heading
klesa-avaranas the Yogacarins are not introducing any new topic,
but are only interpreting the old list o f klesas and upakleias as
avaranas. But they ingeniously speak o f a second group o f avara­
nas, namely jneya-avaranas, which can hardly find a place in early
Buddhism. “ Jneya-avaranas consist o f knowables [jneyas ] them­
selves.” 6 The whole idea is that for the Yogacarins belief in
jneyas, namely that there are knowable objects, is a serious
impediment in understanding things-in-themselves. Sthiramati
says: “ Jneya-avaranas are so called becausc jneyas themselves are
avaranas. It means that the really knowables being covered by it
[i.e. by jneya-avarana~\, there is no object o f real knowledge” .6
In this passage, the term jneya is used in two different meanings.7

1. jnanotpatti-pratibandhaka M V K B T - 11. 1.
2. tattva-dar&anasya avarawm M V K B T . I I . 3.
3. abhranti-darfanasya dvaranam M V K B T . II. 3.
4. Kleia eva-avara$am-iti-avara#asya kleja-dharmatvena saxupyad-iha-upakleio*-
p i kleia-iabdena grhyate. M VKBT. II. 1.
5. Jheya eva-avarariam-iti jneydvarariam. M V K B T . II. 1.
6. Tend jheya-prdvrtatvdl jnanasya vis aya eva ndsti. M V B T . II. 1.
7. The reason why I suggest two meanings for the ttrm jneya is simply
that otherwise the passage under reference would make no sense. Besides,
to use a term in different meanings, and that, too, without any warnings,
is not unusual in M V . and its commentaries. A typical example is the term
artha, used very often to me^n ‘object’ in general, or ‘ meaning* o f a term,
and in few cases also to mean ‘inanimate beings* (e.g. see M V . I . 4 ).
 This term means, on the one hand the mentally constructed
forms o f knowables (parikalpita-jneya) , and, on the other, the
really knowables ( parinifpanna-jneya) . In the phrase jneyavarana
the term jneya is used in the former meaning, and in the phrase
jneya-pravrtatvat it is used in the latter meaning. As the mentally-
constructed-knowables cover the real-knowables, vision o f
reality as it is, (yatha-bhuta-darfana) , is made impossible. Jneya
as mentally-constructed-forms are false objects and as such lead
to illusion ( bhrdnti) , while jneya as really-knowables are things-
in-themselves ( tathata or tatha-bhuta-vastu), and as such are
objects o f realization ( sakfat-kara) oryatha-bhuta-darsana.
What I make o f the above discussion on the avaranas is that
they are all different expressions o f the idiosyncrasy for subject-
obj ect distinction. Consequently, freedom from this idiosyncrasy
is the essential mark o f the state o f nirvana. There one sees indivi­
dual beings not as subjects and objects, nor as enjoyers and
enjoyed, but as mutually independent streams o f existence. They
are related to each other neither as knower and known, nor as
cause and effect, nor as enjoyer and enjoyed. T o the unenlightened
the streams o f existence would never appear in their suchness
(tathata) , but as essentially related to each other in one way
or another, criss-crossing each other, and thus blurring the
identity o f each other. But seen through the yogic eyes o f the
enlightened, they will appear in their suchness, mutually unrela­
ted and independent, never liable to the categories o f subject
and object. Madhyanta-vibhaga, chapter III and its commentaries
by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati examine the categories o f skandha,
dhatu, ayatana, pratitya-samutpada, sthana-asthana, indriya, adhva,
satya, yama and samskrta-asamskrta, and show how seen through
yogic intuition they bring out the non-sensical and irrelevant
character o f the language o f relations. The skandhas are, thus,
mere collections o f discrete, momentary, elements which are
neither objects nor subjects o f any experience; the eighteen dhatus
are reduced to independently evolving seeds ( bijas) ; the ayatanas
are explained in such a way that the myth o f an experiencing
subject is exploded; the principle o f pratitya-samutpada is under­
stood as meant to dispense with the belief in causality; the rule
o f sthana and asthana is explained as implying moral retribution
without recourse to a retributor, or creator; indriyas are explained
 in such a way that the individual beings are objects o f no
other power than themselves : everyone determines and controls
himself.1

7 • The Same Old Realistic Pluralism

Let me once again make my position clear : I hold that the

Yogacarins retain the Buddha’s pluralistic and realistic concep­
tion o f reality. The Buddha and his immediate disciples analysed
existence into an interplay o f a plurality o f subtle, ultimate, not
further analysable elements ( dharma) o f matter ( rupa), mind
(nama —citta) and force(samskdra). For the Yogacarins, too, exist­
ence is composed o f so many discrete, mutually independent,
further unanalysable elements. As already mentioned, nowhere
in the Yogacara writings does one come across a conclusively
monistic conception o f the world. Instead, there are many
passages which are unintelligible without presupposing a plural­
istic view o f reality. For example, a repeatedly raised question
is how the same objects are experienced differently by different
individuals : objects appearing in dreams are seen only by the
dreamer, not by others;2 extraordinary objects are seen by
people having bad eyes, not by others;3 rivers in hell appear to
ghosts as filled with putrid stuffs, excrements and urine, whereas
the same rivers appear to ordinary human beings as filled with
clear, cool, water with nothing unpleasant about it.4 In all these
instances the basic presupposition is that there are different
individuals having different experiences. Then the question is
how, the circumstances and objective conditions being the same,
they come to have different experiences. Unless one supposes
that there are different experiencing individuals, this question
would be redundant. On the other hand, supposing that there
are different individuals, the Yogacarins have very cleverly
answered it saying that experience differs from one' individual
to another according to his psychological disposition and his­
torical past. Sthiramati says : “ Each individual stream o f mind

1. Cf. M V . I l l , 17-20.
2. See Vims. 4.
3. Ibid.
4. M V K B T . I. 4.
from its own seeds produces consciousness appearing in different
forms o f objects, which are consequently perceived by the same
individual. This explains how one and the same thing can be
experienced by different individuals in-different ways” .1 So are
to be explained the extraordinary experiences! o f the yogins who
perceive objects which are not perceived by ordinary people.2
Again, frequent reference to different streams o f existence is
clear indication that the Yogacarins do believe in the mutually
independent and irreducible individuals. For examplfc, Sthira­
mati in the above quoted passage refers to ‘different individual
streams o f mind each o f which produces its own subjective forms
o f consciousness’,3 and Vasubandhu while interpreting the term
sattva makes a distinction between one’s own and other people’s
streams o f existence.4 Again in Vasubandhu’s VimSatika-vrtti
there is an explicit admission o f a plurality o f beings ( sattvas) ,
which are each a separate, real, stream (santana), influencing
each other through their respective representations o f conscious­
ness ( anyonya-vijnapti-Sdhipatyena) . 8 One might object that the
‘mutual influencing o f individuals’ referred to in the latter
instance applies only at the conventional ( samorti) level O f
it is true that the Yogacarins do not mean that the
individuals interact at the noumenal level. Even so, my thesis
stands, namely that the Yogacarins admit the existence o f
'fen t individuals, although the ‘representations o f conscious-
itffSS "pmCCctuiAg 1* -- f- ----- - - 4
(samvrti) or practical ( vyavaharika) value.

1. ... bhirmartha-svarupam-asannapi citta-santdna-pratiniyamena svabljst

pratyeka-atma-grhitam bbirma-artha-adi pratibhdsam vijh&nam prasiyaU. M V K B T .
I . 4.
2. CX. M V K B T . I. 4.
3. See above note 1.
4. Sattoa-pralibhdsam yat paHca-indriyatuena sva-para-santdnayoh. M V K B .
1 . 4.
5. Anynya-adhipatitvena vijRapti-niyama mithah (Vitps. 18). Commenting on
these words o f his own, Vasubandhu says: Sarvam hi sattvanam anyonya-
vijfapti-adhipatyena mitho-vijftapter-niyamo bhavati yathayogam___ atah santdna-
untara-vijRapti-viSefdt santana-anlare vij fiapti-viStfa utpadyate . . . (Vims. V j,
18.)
 Considering all that. I have been saying so far, I hold that
whatever the Yogacarins say about reality applies to, and only
to, each individual stream o f existence. They are looking into
the meaning o f individual streams o f existence making up a
pluralistic cosmos. Each o f those individuals, for them, has a
beginningless past, an empirical present and is a potential
Buddha. It is each o f those individuals that is said to take on
the three natures (svabhava), namely para-tantra, parikalpita and
parinifpanna. Similarly, all other concepts discussed in the Yoga­
cara writings can rightly be understood as referring to indivi­
duals taken separately, rather than to reality conceived in
monistic terms. To suggest one more example, far from being a
“ cosmic unconscious” , the alaya-vijnana1 ;n the Yogacara writings
is a ‘ ‘personal unconscious” , a storage ofthe idiosyncratic ideas
nf the: resnective individual-
Perhaps the concept o f mSla-tattsa, appearing in M V. I l l
requires a special comment. Translating that term as
“ basic reality” a random reader can be very easily led to take
it as betraying a monistic view o f .reality. The fact, however,
is that mula-tattva in this context is just another name for the
HZZlSly pdra-ianira, parikalpita and parinifpanna,
all of them referring, as I have already suggested, to different
phases of an individual's life, not to any monistic reality. Com­
menting on M V K . III. 1, Vasubandhu says: “ There mUla~tattva
is ‘ the threefold nature’ [ M V K . III. 3 ], namely parikalpita,
paratantm and par'mifpanna, for on it [i.e. the threefold nature]
are established the other tattvas” .2 Moreover, it should be parti­
cularly noticed that here the term tattva does not at all mean
any ‘ontological reality’ , but ‘an abstract truth’ or ‘ a fact’..
Sthiramati has consistently defined tattva as .“ unchanging” . In
M VKBT. I, he says, “ tattvam aviparyasah [ = tattva is that which
does not change] ” .3 Then again commenting on M VK . III.3
he says, “ aviparito hi tattvarthah [ *=the term tattva is used in the

1. References to alaya-vijil&na are found, for example, in M V . I. 10;

I II. 2 2 ; Trims. 2.
2. Tatra mula-tattoam svabhavas-trividhah : parikalpitah, para-tantrafr, parinis-
pannas-ca. Tatra-anya-tattva-vyavasthapanat. M V K B . I . 3.
3. M V K B T . I. 1
sense o f ‘unchanging’] -” 1 Therefore the question in M V III,
which is entitled ‘A Chapter on Tattoo.’ , is what is ‘unchanging’ .
Again, that it is a question concerning ‘the truth about reality’
(which, incidentally, is pluralistic), rather than about reality
' _ •i .i •__ ie__L _ x
itself, becomes clear wnen one consiucis me
is the tattva in those three natures [i.e. paratantra, parikalpa and
parinifpanna] ?” 2 This latter issue has been raised by the authors
immediately after the above quoted statement that “ There mula-
tattva is‘ the threefold nature’ [M V K . III.3] , namely parikalpita,
paratantra and parinifpanna. . .” 3 In other words, after having
established the three natures as the basic tattva, the authors are
then asking about the tattva o f those three natures themselves.
The term tattva in this latter instance cannot mean anything other
than ‘truth’ . Otherwise the question, “ what indeed is the tattva
in those three natures ?” would make no sense. On the contary,
translating tattva as ‘truth’ the question could be meaningfully
recast as “ What is the truth about each o f those three natures ?” ,
or as “ What are the unchanging factors in them ?” . That this
is exactly the question at issue is further confirmed by the sub­
sequent answer.4 An observation o f P. W. O ’Brien is worth
quoting : “ The meaning o f tattva must swing from reality to
truth, errorlessness . . . But the difficulty is still not cleared up.
What is true? One o f the natures ? Rather, some statement
about the natures^ . . . The imaginary nature is not true, but
the statement ‘the nature is non-existence’ is true. The relative
nature is not true, but the statement ‘ the relative nature exists
yet not absolutely’ is true. In the same way we might say ‘head­
less horses are true or real’ meaning that the statement ‘headless
horses have no heads’ is true. There is question, then, not o f the
reality o f the three natures, but o f the truth o f three aspects o f
one reality.” 5 In short, M V . I ll, ‘ ‘A Chapter on Tattva” , is

1. M V K B T . I I I . 3.
2. Kim-atra svabhava-traye tattvam-isyaU? M V K B . III. 3.

miyarn) , gAiaiv*iw ------------- / \ 4 't

eXi1 entp !i W alO ’B r i « V '‘‘A 1 Chapter on Reality from the Madhyantavi-
bhagasastra” , Mmumenta Nipponica, V o l. I X (1 9 5 3 ), p. 289.
 dealing with various ‘ truths’ or ‘factors’ about reality, which is
basically the individual rather than a monistic whole. And, the
basic truth or fact ( mula-tattva) about this reality is that is takes
on three natures.1 Having said that, the authors then proceed to
discuss the various ‘ truths’ or ‘facts’ about those three natures
themselves looked at from different angles. That is all “ A
Chapter on Tattva” is about. Therefore, it is unwarranted to
say that this chapter in general, or the concept o f mula-tattva
therein, advocates a monistic view o f world.

8. More Arguments from ViipSatika

It may be noticed that I have been so far referring mainly to
the Madhyanta-vihhaga. However, I can ensure that my thesis of
realistic pluralism applies equally to fhe other texts under dis­
cussion, as well, O f them Trimfatika which presents a detailed
analysis o f the psyche, is at the same time an abridged version
o f Madhyanta-vibhaga, while Trisvabhava-nirdesa is an elabora­
tion on the theme o f ‘three natures’ . Vasubandhu’s VimSatika
can, however, be a little confusing to a casual reader. A strong
polemic against beliefin objects (artha), it is very easily mistaken
for a polemic against belief in things as such,2 The central thesis
o f the text is that the objects experienced by an unenlightened
man are like those experienced by one in a dream or one with
bad eyes : just as the objects experienced by one in a dream or
one with bad eyes, are merely one’s own mental constructions,
so are those experienced by an unenlightened one in the state of
samsara.3 The ultimate conclusion o f the text, therefore, is that
in the state o f samsara every individual is in a transcendental
dream.4 It does not imply that there is only one dreaming

1. Tatra mula-tattvam‘svabhavas-trividhah’ : parikalpitah, para-tantrah parini-

spannai-ca. Tatra anya-tattva-vyavasthapanat. M V K B . III. 3.
2. In phrases like ‘ asad-artha-avabhasanat*, (Vims. 1 ), na so'rtho driyate,
(Ibid. 16) etc. the term artha stands for object o f experience, not for thing-in-
itself. Moreover, artha is never found used to mean things in general.
3. Vijnapti-malra-eva-etad-asadartha-avabhdsandt; Yatha taimirikasya-asat-keia-
candradi-darianam. Vims. 1* Svapna-upaghatavat-krtya-kriyd. Vims. 4.
4. Svapne drgvisaya-abhavam na-aprabudho*avgacchati. Vims. 17 Vasu­
bandhu then comments on this line : Evam vitatha-vikalpa-abhydsa-vasana-
nidraya prasuptalokah svapna iva-abhutam-artham pasyan-na prabudhas-tad-abhavam
individual. On the contrary, there are clear indications that there
is a plurality o f individuals undergoing the transcendental dream
o f sarrisara : for example, there are references to individuals,
who by virtue o f their mental representations,1 influence each
other,2 and injure each other.3 In fact, a major part o f the text,4
taking for granted the plurality o f individuals who in their
inexpressible nature6 do notfall within the range ofmutual experi­
ence, is trying to justify the commonsense language o f action
and reaction involving different sorts o f relations. T o a great
extent, therefore, this treatise is an attempt to establish a
practical (vyavaharika) bridge between the noumenal (paramartha)
and phenomenal (sarrivrti) worlds.
Speaking about ‘knowledge o f other minds’ Vasubandhu
makes it clear that every individual has an ineffable nature
perceived only by the enlightened ones.6 and that, therefore,
nobody in the state o f samsara knows anybody’s mind, not even
one’s own.7 T o explain it further, he says that the
reason why one in the state o f samsara does not know indi­
viduals, whether oneself or others, in their ineffable nature, is
that one is still subject to the idiosyncrasy o f graspable-grasper
distinction,8 which is responsible for the appearance o f false
forms.® Here, again, it should be noted that the basic ‘evil’ o f
samsara experience is one’s idiosyncrasy for graspable-grasper

yathiffm-navagacchati. Yada tu tat-pratipakfa-lokottara-nirvikalpa-jfiana-labhat-

prabudho bhavati tadd tat-pra}lha-labdha-aSudha-laukika-jMna-sammu-khibhavad-
visayabhavam yathd-vaH&ivagacchati-iti-samanam-etat. (Vims. V r. 17).
1. Sarvefamhi sattvanam anyonya-vijflapti-ddhipatyena mitho vijRapter-niyamo
bhavati. Vims. Vr. 17.
2. See Ibid.
3. See Vims. 18-20.
4. See, for example, V im s. J$-21.
5. anabhilapyena-almana. V i^ i/. V r. 10.
nirabhilapyena-atmana. V im s. V r. 10.
6. . . . anabhilapyena-atmana yo buddhanam visayah iti. V im s. V r. 10.
nirabhilapyena-atmana buddhanam gocarah. V im s. V r. 21.
7. Para-cittavidam jndnam-ayathartham katham yatha sua-citta-jHdnam. Vims.21.
8. ... tad-ubhayam [para-citta-jhanati-ca sva-citta-jnanahca] na yathartham
vitatha-pratibhasataya grahya-grdhaka-vikalpasya-aprahinatvat. V im s. V r. 21.
9. See vitatha-pratibhasataya in note 8.
 distinction, which constructs false appearances1 o f objects and
subjects.2
Again, more than once does Vasubandhu refer to a mutiplicity
o f enlightened ones ( buddhas)s, implying that the individuals,
once emancipated from the spell o f transcendental dream, retain
their individuality in the nirvana state as well. There they
remain, and recognize each other in their ‘ ineffable nature’ .4
Another illuminating point brought out by VimSatika is that
the theory o f vijnapti-matrata is just another way o f putting the
old theories o f pudgala-nairatmya and dharma-nairatmya; or rather
that it explains the real meaning o f the latter theories :

“ The theory o f dharma-nairatmya does not mean that dharma

is non-existent in all respects, but only in its ‘imagined
nature’ (kalpita-atmana, VimS. 10). The ignorant imagine
the dharmas to be in the nature o f grahya, grahaka etc. Those
dharmas are non-substantial ( nairatmya) with reference to
that imagined nature ( tena parikalpitena atmand) , not with
reference to their ineffable nature (natu anabhildpyena-dtmand) ,
which is object o f the knowledge o f the enlightened ones
alone. Similarly the non-substantiality (nairatmya) o f
vijnapti ( =pudgala), too, is to be understood with referenc to
the self imagined (and super-imposed) by other vijnaptis
( = b y other pudgalas). Thus through the theory o f vijnapti-
matra the non-substantiality o f all dharmas is taught, not the
denial o f their existence.” 5

1. asad-artha-avabhasana. V im s. 1.
2. (same as preceding three notes).
3. Some examples are : anabhilapyena-atmana yo buddhanam visayah iti.
(V im s. V r. 1 0 ) ; nirabhilapyena-atmana buddhanam gocarah (Ib id. 2 1 ). I am ,
however, aware that the plural form buddhah need not necessarily refer to a
plurality o f beings, but that it may well be just a reverential way o f
addressing the enlightened one. So a plural form like buddhsh cannot be by
itself a conclusive argument for a plurality o f beings. It can, however, servo
as a persuasive argument.
4. anabhilapya-atman (Vim s. V r. 10) ; nirabhilapya-atman (Ibid. 2 1 ).
5. Na khalu sarvatha dharmo nasti-iti-evam dharma-nairatmya-praveio bhavati_
Api-tu, ‘kalpita-atmana’ (Vim s. 1 0). To bdlair-dharmanam svabhavo grahya-
grahakadih parikalpitas-tena kalpitena-atmana tesam nairatmyam na tu-anabhilapyena»
atmand y o buddhanam vifaya iti. Evam vijftapti-matrasya-api vijHapti-antara-
 I feel that this passage alone is sufficient to si/bstantiate my
thesis o f realistic pluralism : it admits a plurality o f dharmas,
pudgalas, and buddhas : it distinguishes between the ineffable
and imagined natures o f things; o f them the ineffable nature is
totally beyond the realm o f the experience o f an ordinary
individual, it is perceived by the enlightened ones alone; on the
contrary, the imagined nature is what is experienced by an
individual on the samsara level, it is characterized by the
subject-object distinction, the old theory o f nairatmya is thus
explained as meaning the non-substantiality o f the imagined
nature, not o f the ineffable nature; finally, and most important
o f all, the identification o f the theory o f nairatmya with that o f
vijnapti-matrata clearly indicates that the Yogacarins do not
want to conradict the realistic pluralism o f original Buddhism.
It is in the light o f his distinction between the “ ineffable”
and “ imagined” natures that Vasubandhu’s ‘refutation o f
realism’ occurring in VimSatika 11-15 should be understood.
His objection is directed mainly to the atomic realism o f the
Vaisesikas, who without making a distinction between the
‘ineffable’ and the ‘imagined’, claim abolute reality to all
objects (vifaya) o f experience. And then by implication his
arguments apply to any system which holds that the object
( vi$aya) o f experience should be accepted as real at its face value.
Thus Vasubandhu’s objection is only to those who refusing to
distinguish between the ‘ineffable’ and the ‘imagined’, claim
reality even to the phenomenal object. It is clear from the
fact that his ‘refutation o f realism’ appears immediately after
his clear statement that the non-substantiality ( nairatmya)
applies only to the imagined nature, not to the ineffable
one.1 It should again be noted that his ‘refutation o f realism’
is given in reply to the opponent’s insistence that ‘whatever
rupa etc. happen to be the objects o f one’s vijnapti, each should
be considered as really existent being’ .* And, finally, right
from the beginning o f the refutation what Vasubandhu calls

parikalpitena-atmand nairatmya-praveSat vijfiapti-matra-vyavasthapanaya sarva-

dharmdnam nairatmya-praveio Bhavati na tu tad-astitvt-apavadat. Vims. V r. 10.
1. Cf. V im s, and Vim s. V r. 10.
2. Katham . . . na punah sanii-eva tani yani rupadi-vijnaptinam pratyekam
vifayi-bhavanti-iti. Yasmat. . . V im s. V r. 10.
into question is the reality o f objects (vifaya) o f vijnapti, not o f
things in general.1 From all these I conclude that what Vasu­
bandhu is fighting against, is the ‘indiscriminate realism,
■which does not take the trouble to distinguish between the phe­
nomenal and the noumenal, the imagined and the real, the
parikalpita and the parinifpanna.

9 . In the Light o f the Later School o f Logic

A final, but very convincing, argument for my position refers
to the Yogacara school o f logic founded by Dinnaga and
developed by his disciple Dharmaklrti.2 Dinnaga was himself a
student o f Vasubandhu. Now one must naturally expect that
Dinnaga and Dharmaklrti, as the immediate followers and
disciples o f Vasubandu, subscribed to the latter’s teaching.
In fact some authors do agree with me on this point. A.K.
Chatterjee for one in his The Togacara Idealism says, “ Their
essential teaching was that of the Yogacara as is evident from
Dinnaga’s Alambanapariksd and Dharmaklrti’s section on the
Vijnaptimatrata-cinta, in his Pramanavarttika” * Then, if two
systems claim to have the same teaching, it is only reasonable
to interpret the less clear one o f them in the light o f the other.
And, o f the two systems under reference, that o f Dinnaga is
obviously clearer than that o f Vasubandhu. Therefore, I propose
to interpret the latter in the light of, and in accordance with,
the former. What then is the teaching o f the school o f Dinnaga
on reality ? T o start with, Dinnaga and Dharmaklrti were
staunch defenders o f the old theory o f momentariness (ksanika-
vada). Then they based the entire edifice o f their epistemology
on a clear-cut distinction between the realms o f things-in-
themselves and commonsense-experience, which they named
respectively as svalakfatia and samdnya-lakfana. The former is the
sphere o f first order reality (paramartha-sat), whereas the latter
is the sphere o f empirical reality (samvrti-sat). The most

1. JVa tad-ekam na ca-anekam visayah paramariuSah . . . Vims. 11 Note that

Vasubandhu is here using the term visayah.
2. Dharmakirti’s teacher was Isvarasena, a student ofDinnaga.
3. A. K. Chatterjee, The Togacara Idealism, 2nd rev. ed., (Delhi,
Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), p. 41.
 important point about the distinction between sva-lak$ana and
samanya-lak}ana is that they are contrasted respectively as the
non-constructed, and the constructed1, the non-artificial and the
artificial,2 the non-imagined and the imagined,® the unutter­
able and the utterable,4etc. In short, whatever comes within the
range o f empirical experience is characterized as mentally cons­
tructed, artificial, imagined, linguistically expressible and, finally*
unreal (avastu) ; whereas the things-in-themselves (sva-lakfanani)
are characterized as untouched by mental construction, artificia­
lity, imagination, as beyond the realm oflanguage, and, finally,
as real (vastu).5 What I am suggesting, therefore, is that the
distinction between samanya-laksana and sva-laksana, and the
entire philosophy behind it, were already implied and meant by
Asanga and Vasubandhu when they distinguished between
parikalpita and parinispanna, or parikalpita-atma and anabhilaya-
atma. In other words, the central insight o f the school o f Dinnaga
was inspired by the school o f Asanga and Vasubandhu: the
central theme o f the former school has kept clear continuity
with that o f the latter school. This implies a continuity o f
essential details o f the same theme too. Now, Dinnaga and his
followers thought that a realistic pluralism was essential to
their central theme, namely the distinction between samanya-
lakfana and sva-lakfana. Similarly Asanga and Vasubandhu, too,
must have felt it necessary to maintain a realistic pluralism;
indeed it should be from them that the school o f Dinnaga
borrowed its realistic pluralism.

1. nirvikalpaka and kalpita.

2. akrtrima and krtrima.
3. anaropita ( = akalptta) and aropita ( =kalpita) . dropita and anaropita
could be better translated as ‘superimposed’ and ‘not superimposed’ .
4. anabhilapya and abhilapya.
5. Some relevant passages are : Tad-sva-laksanam. Tad-eva paramartha-sal
(Dharmakirti’s Nyayabindu, 13-14). Paramdrtho’krtrimam ana-ropitam rupam.
Tena-axti-iti paramartha-sat. . . tad-eva sva-laksanam (Dharmottara’s Tika on the
above passage) . . . atas-tad-eva sva-laksanam na vikalpa-visayam ( Dharmottara
on Nyayabindu, 15) Anyat-sdmanyalaksanam . . . (Nyayabindu, 1 6). For more
details see m y A Study o f the Buddhist Epistemology According to Dharmakirti's
Nyayabindu (M . A . Dissertation, of Poona, 1974), especially pp. 9ff.
 C hapter T wo

D ISCRIM IN ATION BETWEEN MIDDLE AND EXTREM ES

(MADHYANTA-VIBHAGA)

1. Introduction
Having paid homage to the founder o f this science,
Son o f the well-gone,
And also to its expositor for people like me,
May I now endeavour to analyse its meaning.1

This is how Vasubandhu opens his commentary (bha$ya) on

Madhyanta-vibhaga-karika. T o begin a literary work with a prayer,
or paying homage to one’s teachers, or, at least, with a noble
thought, is traditional in India. Accordingly, Vasubandhu
right in the beginning o f his commentary devotes {his stanza to
the honour o f the founder (pranetr) and the expositor (vaktr) o f
this science (sastra). By the term pranetr Vasubandu means
Maitreya,2 who is generally accepted as the founder o f the
Yogacara system. The same Maitreya is then qualified as “ son
o f the well-gone” (sugata-atmaja) , an epithet o f any Bodhisattva.
“ The well-gone” (sugata) refers to the Buddha himself, and
therefore suguta-atmaja means the son o f the Buddha. According
to Sthiramati, Maitreya is called “ son o f the Buddha” either
because he shares the intuitive knowledge (nirvikalpaka-jnana)
o f the Buddha, or because he is born in the latter’s lineage.3

1. Sdstrasya-asya pratfetaram-abhyarhya sugata-atmajam

Vaktaram ca-asmad-adibhyo yatisye’rtha-vivecane. M V K B . (Introduction)
2. Karika-idstrasya-drya-maitreyah praneta. M V K B T . (Introduction)
3. . . . nirvikalpaka-jnana vilesa-atmakah sugatah, taj-janitalvannirvikalpasya
jhanasya. Tasmat-tasmin vd jdtah sugata-dtmajah. Athaaa sugata-atmana jatah iti
sugata-dtmajah. Tatha-uktam sutra-antarejato bhavati tathd-gata namse tad-dtmaka-
vastu pratilabhad-iti. M V K B T (Introduction).
 By the expositor (vaktr) o f this science is meant Vasubandhu’s
own brother Asanga. As legend has it, the Yogacara system was
revealed to Asanga by Maitreya, and the former then wrote it
down in the form o f verses.1 Thus he is aptly called the vaktr
(expositor or spokesman) o f this science (Sastra), contained in
the Madhyanta-vibhaga-karika. The central thesis o f this text
claims to be a middle position between the two extreme views,
namely, the extreme realism of the Sarvistivadins and the extreme
relativism o f the Madhyamikas. Hence the title Madhyanta-
vibhaga-karika, which means “ The Verses on Discrimination
between Middle and Extremes” .
The various topics discussed in this book are stated in M V K
I. 1:

[M V K I. 1] The definition,
The coverings,
The truth,
Meditation o f the opposite,
Its stages,
Attainment o f result,
And the pre-eminence o f the path.2

Commenting on this stanza Vasubandhu says:

These are the seven topics discussed in this science.
They are namely the definition, the coverings, the truth,
meditation o f the opposite, stages o f that meditation, attain­
ment o f result, and, seventhly, the pre-eminence o f the path.3

O f these seven topics the first one makes the subject-matter

o f the first chapter o f Mrdhyanta-vibhaga-karika, entitled “ A
Chapter on Definitions” .1 which, along with its commentary

1. Vaktaram-iti . . . sa punar-arya-asangah. Tasya hi-idam Sastram abhivyaktam,

akhyatam ca-arya-maitreya-adhiffhanal-dharma-santdnena. Ibid.
2. Laksanam hi-avrtis-tattvam pratipak$asya bhapana
Tatra-avastha phala-praptir-yana-anuttaryam-eva ca. M V K 1.1.
3. Iti-ete sapta-artha hi asmin sastra upadiSyante. Tad-ula— laksanam, avaranam,
taitvam, pratipaksasya bhavand, tasyam-eva ca pratipaksa-bhavanayam-avastha,
phalapraptih, yana-anuttaryam ca saptamo'rthah. M V K B 1. 1
4. laksatfa-pariccheda. The term laksaria, literally meaning a “ sign” ,
“ mark” or “ characteristic” , is technically used to mean a “ definition’* or a
“ scientific description” .
by Vasubandhu, I propose to analyse in the following pages.
This chapter tries to define, or rather describe, reality in its
phenomenal as well as absolute aspects. Consequently this
chapter may be subdivided into two main sections:

(i) Verses 2-11, dealing with reality in its phenomenal aspects.

This section may be entitled ‘ the imagination o f the
unreal’ ( abhuta-parikalpa) . The central theme o f this
section is that reality as it is experienced by one in the
state o f samsara is there owing to ‘ the imagination o f the
unreal’ (abhuta-parikalpa). In other words, it establishes
that the form o f subjectivity and objectivity, under which
alone things are experienced, are ‘imagination o f the
unreal’ .
(ii) Verses 12-23, dealing with reality in its absolute aspects.
This section may be entitled ‘ the emptiness’ (Sunyata).
The central theme o f this section is that reality in its
absolute state, is empty (sunya) of subject-object distinc­
tion, or rather th a t, it is beyond subject-object charac­
terization.

2. The Imagination o f the Unreal

Terms explained
Verse 2, which opens the main discussion, makes a few
crucial statements, which along with Vasubandhu’s commentary
on them, should be considered the key-stones o f the whole
system. “ There, beginning with the definitions, [the text]
says” :

[ M V K 1 .2 ] There exists the imagination o f the unreal,

There is no pair,
But there is emptiness,
Even in this there is that.1

This stanza contains four clear statements which I consider to

be the key-stones o f the entire system. Those statements are:

1. Abh uta-parikalpo'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate

Sunyata vidyate tu-atra tasyam-api sa vidyate. M V K 1.2
 (i) an assertion o f the imagination o f the unreal: abhUta-
parikalpo’sti,
(ii) a negation o f duality: dvayam tatra na vidyate,
(iii) an assertion o f emptiness: Sunyata vidyate tu-atfa,
(iv) an assertion o f the co-existence o f the imagination o f the
unreal (abhuta-parikalpa) and the emptiness (Sunyata) :
tasyam-api sa vidyate.

These four statements involve three key-terms, namely:

(i) the imagination o f the unreal (abhUta-parikalpa),

(ii) pair (dvayam), and
(iii) emptiness (Sunyata).

A correct understanding o f these three key-terms leading up to

a correct understanding o f the above four key-statements will
provide all necessary clues to the understanding o f the entire
system o f Vasubandhu. Now Vasubandhu himself has explained
those terms and statements In his subsequent commentary as
follows:

There, the imagination o f the unrea1 means the discrimination

between the graspable and the grasper. The pair is the
graspable and the grasper. Emptiness means that state o f
the imagination o f the unreal which is lacking in the form
o f being graspable or grasper. Even in this [emptiness]
there is that, namely, the imagination o f the unreal. Thus,
when something is absent in a receptacle, then one, [ seeing ]
that receptacle as devoid o f that thing, perceives that recep­
tacle as it is, and recognizes that receptacle, which is left
over, as it is, namely as something truly existing here. Thus,
the definition o f emptiness is shown to imply no contradiction.1
I may now reconstruct verse 2 along with Vasubandhu’s

1. Tatra-abhuta-parikalpograhya-grahaka-vikalpah. Dvayam grahyam grahakam

ca. Sunyata tasya-abhuta parikalpasya grahya-grdhaka-bhavena virahitata. Tasyam-api
savidyata iti-abhuta-parikalpah. Evam yad yatra nasti tat tena Sunyam-iti yatha-
bhutam samanupaiyati, yat punar-alra-ava£if{am bhavati tat sad-iha-asti-iti yatha-
bhutamprajanati-iti-aviparitam iunyata-lakfanam-udbhdvitam bhavati. M V K B . 1.2.
 commentary on it as follows:

There exists the imagination o f the unreal,1

namely, the discrimination
between the graspable and the grasper.2
However, there is no pair,3
such as the graspable and the grasper.4
There is instead emptiness,5
which means that state o f the imagination o f the unreal,
which is lacking in the form o f being graspable or grasper.4
Even in such emptiness
there exists the imagination o f the unreal.7
Thus, when something is absent in a container,
the latter is then perceived as such;
also, what is left over there, namely the container,
is then recognized as such,
namely, as uncontradictably existing there:
this indeed is the defining characteristic o f emptiness.8

The meaning o f the three terms, abhutaparikalpa, dvayam and

Sunyata, is now unambiguously clear:
Abhuta-parikalpa, the imagination o f the unreal, means the
discrimination ( vikalpa) between the graspable (grahya) and the
grasper (grahaka). This implies that whatever Vasubandhu
traces to imagination (parikalpa) is the discrimination ( vikalpa)
between the graspable and the grasper, and whatever he
describes as mental construction (kalpita) and therefore unreal
( abhuta) , is primarily such discrimination, and the consequent

1. Abhuta-parikalpo'sii. M V K 1.2.
2. Tatra-abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M V K B I . 2.
3. Dvayam tatra na vidyate. M V K I. 2.
4. Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca. M V K B 1.2.
5. Sunyata vidyate tu-atra. M V K 1.2.
6. Sunyata tasya abhuta-parikalpasya grahya-grahaka-bhavena virahitata.
M V K B 1.2.
7. Tasyam-api sa vidyate. M V K I. 2 ; tasyam-api sa vidyata iti-abhuta-
parikalpah. M V K B 1.2.
8. Evamyadyatra nasti tat tena Sunyam-iti yatha-bhvXam samanupaiyati, yat
punar atra-avaiiftam bhavati tat sad iha-asti-iti yatha-bhutam prajananti-iti-aviparitam
i unyata-lakfypam-udbhdvitam bhavati. M V K B I. 2.
forms o f graspability (grahyatva) and grasperhood (grahakatva).
In other words, the distinction between graspable and grasper,
and the forms o f graspability and grasperhood, under which
things are experienced* are all mere imagination, and therefore
unreal (abhuta) , too. Then, ultimately what Vasubandhu will
describeas “ mere representation o f consciousness” (vijnapti-matra)
turn out to be the graspable-grasper forms and the distinction
between them.
Dvaya, the pair, means the graspable and the grasper. Hence,
wherever Vasubandhu uses the term dvaya, it must be taken to
mean the duality between graspable and grasper. There are
many instances in which Vasubandhu has used the term dvayam
without giving any explanation.1 In all such cases dvayam means
the duality between grasper and graspable. Consequently,
denial o f duality (dvayam or dvitva) in Vasubandhu’s system
does not all mean denial o f the multiplicity o f beings, as is the
case in Sankara’s advaita-system. In this latter system, for exam­
ple, the statement ekam-eva advitiyam (one only without a second),
means that there is only one being having no other being than
itself. Here, therefore, the denial o f duality, expressed by the
term a-dvitiya amounts to the denial o f the multiplicity ( bahutva)
o f beings. But in Vasubandhu’s system the denial o f duality
(expressed by terms like dvayam tatra na vidyate M V K I. 2,
advayatvena yac-ca asti TSN 13, dvaya-abhava-svabhava TSN 16,
asaddvaya-svabhana TSN 18, etc.) means only that a thing in
its absolute state o f existence is devoid (Siinya) o f subject-object
duality, or that it is lacking in the forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity (grdhya-grdhaka-bhdvena virahitata). Sankara is speaking
about the absence o f a second being (advitiya-vastu), while
Vasubandhu is speaking about the absence o f a dual nature (asad-
dvaya- svabhava) referring to each individual being. Incidentally,
it might have been the tendency to read Sankara’s meaning o f
advitiya into Vasubandhu’s use o f asad-dvaya-svabhavd that Ld
many later interpreters to understand Vasubandhu’s system as
monistic idealism.
Sunyta, the emptiness, means basically the state o f existence,
which is empty o f grasper-graspable characterizations. Sunyata,

1. For example, T S N 4, 10, 13. etc.

therefore, refers to the thing as it is (yatha-bhuta) , and is
otherwise called ‘suchness’ (tathata) . Thus, Sunyata, meaning
the thing unqualified by subjectivity an<i objectivity, is far
from suggesting any kind o f nihilism. Again, what is denied
of r e a lity in its absolute state o f existence, is not plurality o f
beings, but only the duality between subjects and objects, or
rather the dualistic mode o f apprehension that is based on
graspable-grasper characterization. Also, what is attributed to
mental construction is this duality between subjects and objects,
not the plurality of beings. Vasubandhu in his commentary
has interpreted Sunyata with reference to abhuta-parikalpa'.
“ Emptiness means that state o f the imagination o f the unreal
which is lacking in the form o f being graspable or grasper.” 1
But ‘ the imagination o f the unreal’ itself has been defined
as “ the discrimination between the graspable and the grasper.” 2
Therefore, the state in which ‘ the imagination o f the unreal’
is lacking in the forms o f the graspable and the grasper, would
mean the cessation o f the ‘ imagination o f the unreal’ itself.
Thus Sunyata, ultimately means that state o f existence which is
empty o f ‘ the imagination o f the unreal’ and o f the consequent
subject-object distinction. Therefore to realize the absolute
state o f existence, namely, Sunyata, one has only to stop imagin­
ing (i.e. mentally constructing) the unreal forms o f subjecti­
vity and objectivity.
Let me now explain the meaning o f the four statements
mentioned above :
Firstly, there is an assertion o f the imagination o f the unreal:
abhuta-parikalpo’sti. This in effect is a strong declaration o f the
fact that the imagination o f the unreal is an undeniably real
experience for one in the state o f samsara, namely that one in
the state o f samsara is bound to construct mentally the unreal
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, and then to see every­
thing as endowed with those forms.
Secondly, there is an emphatic negation o f duality: dvayam
tatra na vidyate. This implies that the imagination o f the unreal,
which means the discrimination between the graspable and the

See note 6 on p. 31.

2. See note 2 on p. 31.
grasper,1 has only phenomenal value, and therefore is real only
on the level o f samsara. As long as one is in the state o f samsara
one goes on discriminating between graspable and grasper, and
treats things as if they are endowed with the forms o f graspabi­
lity and grasperhood. But in fact graspability and grasperhood
are only subjective forms o f experience, and therefore do not
belong to things as such (yatha-bhuta) , and for that matter
there is no duality between graspable and grasper.
Thirdly, there is an assertion o f emptiness: Sunyata vidyate
tu-atra. This refers, as already explained, to the suchness
( tathata) o f things, which is empty o f subject-object character­
izations. While the imagination o f the unreal, and the conse­
quent subject-object duality are inevitable parts o f samsaric
experience, in the state o f nirvana one no more imagines the
unreal forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, and no more
perceives things as grouped into subjects and objects. Thus in
the absolute state o f existence there is emptiness o f subjectivity
and objectivity.
Fourthly, there is an assertion o f the co-existence o f the
imagination o f the unreal and the emptiness : tasyam-api sa
vidyate. A literal translation o f this statement would be, “ Even
in this [emptiness] there is that [imagination o f the unreal
■subjectivity and objectivity]” . This is, as Sthiramati says,2
an explanation o f the “ mystery” o f samsara as follows: that
things in their pure nature are neither subjects nor objects is a
fact; but in the state o f samsara the pure nature o f things is
obscured by the imagination o f the unreal; therefore, even in
this emptiness, i.e. inspite o f the fact that things are empty o f
subject-object characterizations, there is that imagination o f
the unreal, which obscuring the real nature o f things accounts
for samsaric experience, namely the experience o f things as
discriminated into subjects and objects.
According to Sthiramati there are four ways o f understand­
ing the present stanza:
First o f all, it is a refutation o f the blanket-denial o f every­
thing (sarva-apavada-pratisedhartham). The propounders o f this

1. Tatra abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M V K B 1.2

2. See below from the next paragraph onwards.
 latter theory, whom Stcherbatsky identifies as the Madhya-
mikas,1 held that all elements are devoid o f own-nature in all
respects (sarva-dharmali sarvatha nih.svabha.vah), just as the horn o f
a hare is devoid o f own-nature.2 Against this view the present
stanza asserts the reality o f ‘ the imagination o f the unreal’ and
o f ‘ the emptiness’, both having own-nature in one way or
another. The imagination o f the unreal has own-nature,3
which will be later identified as para-tantra svabhdva;* and the
emptiness has own-nature in the absolute sense o f the term,5
which will be later identified as parinifpanna-svabhava.B The
emptiness though always, present is obscured by the imagina­
tion o f the unreal. Therefore one in the state o f samsara does
not realize it, and this inability to realize it explains the
bondage in which one is.7
Secondly, it is directed against those who held that colour
etc. are substances (dravyatvena santi) existing independently
o f mind and mental factors (citta-caiUdh) . 8 According to
Stcherbatsky the reference here is to the Sarvastivadins.9
Against them the first line o f the stanza should be interpreted
to ^mean that what substantially exists is the imagination o f
the unreal, not colour etc. Why ? Because there is no pair o f
subjects and objects.10 Here Sthiramati is making a very

1. T h . Stcherbatsky, trans., Madhyanta-vibhaga : Discourse on Discrimina­

tion between Middle and Extremes, (B ibliotheca B u d d h ica X X X , 1936; reprint,
C alcutta : In d ian Studies, Past an d Present, 19 71), p . 41
2. Kecit-virudhanti sarva-dhc,rm,^ sarvatha nihsvabhdvali Salavisaiia-vad-ityatah
saTva-apavdda-prati;edhdrthamaha abhuta-parikalpo'sti-iti. M V K B T 1.2
3- Abnuta-parikaipo’sti-iti. Svabhavatah iti vakyasesah. Ib id
4- Abhuta-parikalpali para-tantra-svabhavah. M V K B 1,6
5. Paramarthatah svabhavah. M V K B T 1.2
6. Grahya-grahaka-abhaoah [=Siinyatd] parinispannah svabhavah. Ib id
7. . . . yasmdc-cchunyataydm-api-abhutaparikalpo vidyate tasmad bhavanto na
muktah. M V K B T 1.2
8. Citia-caittebhyo'nyatra rtipadayo dravyatvena santi iti ya d darsanam tad-
pratisedhartham-aha . . . Ib id
9 T h . S tcherbatsky, (rans., Madhyanta-vibhaga : Discourse on Discrimina­
tion between Middle and Extremes, (B iblioth eca B uddhica X X X , 1936; reprint,
C alcu tta : Ind ian Studies, Past an d Present, 19 71), p p . 42-43
10. . . .nasti rupam tad-abhutaparikalpa-iyatiriktam dravyata iti. Kim karandt ?
yasmat “ dvayam tatra na vidyate” . Ib id
important point : the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity in
which things are experienced, are mental constructions, and
therefore are not substances existing independent o f mind and
mental factors-. Colours etc., which are experienced as objects,
are only different modes o f objectivity under which things are '
experienced, and for that matter have no reality independent
o f mind and mental factors. Here what is to be particularly
noted is that when Sthiramati says that colour etc. are not
substances (dravya) other than mind and mental factors (citta-
caittebhyo ’nyatra) , by colour’ etc. he means the different modes
of objectivity under which things are experienced, and not those
things themselves. That this is his meaning is clear from the
fact that the reason he gives for saying that colour etc. are not
substances existing independent o f mind and mental factors, is
that “ there is no pair” o f subjectivity and objectivity.1 In
other words, what he says is that colour etc., since they
belong to the categories o f subjectivity and objectivity, do not
have any reality independent o f mind and mental 'factors. T o
make the point clear I may formulate his argument as follows:

All forms of subjectivity and objectivity are but mental

forms, and therefore have no reality independent o f mind
and mental factors.
Colour etc. are forms o f objectivity under which things are
experienced.
Therefore, they, too, do not have any reality independent o f
mind and mental factors.

In short, whenever reality is denied to something, it invari-

aljly refers to some o f subjectivity or objectivity. So
Sthiramati continues his explanation in the following manner.
The imagination o f the unreal is itself neither grasper o f any­
thing nor is grasped by anybody. On the contrary, objectivity
and subjectivity are but abstract concepts. For colour etc. are
not grasped outside consciousness. Just as a dream, consciousness
produces the appearance o f colour etc. . . . The graspable being
absent there cannot be the grasper either, for in the absence of the

1. See note 10 on p. 35
 graspable there is also the absence o f the grasper. Therefore,
colour as an object o f experience does not exist apart from the
imagination o f the unreal. This does not mean that there is
nothing apart from the imagination o f the unreal. For there
is indeed the emptiness which is the basis of purity. However, it
is obscured by the imagination o f the unreal forms o f subjecti­
vity and objectivity. Hence the state o f bondage.1
Thirdly, the stanza endeavours to portray the middle position
between, the above-mentioned extremes. On the one hand it is
not an outright denial o f everything ( sarva-apavada), for there is
the assertion o f the imagination o f the unreal; on the other
hand it is not an indiscriminate assertion o f everything, for the
pair o f subjectivity and objectivity, which includes the sense-
objectssuch as colour etc. has been denied. Further, the assertion
o f emptiness, which means the unreality o f subject-object distinc­
tion, explains the meaning of non-substantiality ( nairatmya) .
This latter theory does not mean “ the absence o f a person who
acts from within” (antar-vyapara-puru$a-rahitata), but only the
absence o f subject-object characterization.2 However, the state
o f emptiness is obscured by the imagination of the unreal, and
therefore the state o f bondage.3
Fourthly, the stanza brings home the distinction between the
two realms o f existence, namely the realms o f defilement (san-
klesa) and o f purity (vyavaddna) .4 The imagination o f the unreal
belongs to the realm o f defilement, for it is characterized by
illusion (bhranti) ,5 That is, the imagination o f the unreal is

1. jVa hi abhuta-parikalpah. kasyacid grshako na-api kenacit grhyate. Kim tarhi

grdhya-grahakatsam bham-matram-eva. Tato vijnanat bald rupadayo na grhyante.
Svapna-adivad vijnanam rupadydbhasam-utpadyate. . . .Grahya-abhave grahakasya-
abhavad grahye'sati grdhako bhavitum nayujyate. Tasman-narupam-abhuta-parikalpat-
prthag-asti. . . . Sunyata vidyate tu-atra. . .Sunyata hi msuddhi-dlambana. Sa ca
grahya-grdhaka-rahitata. . .abhutaparikalpa-dvrtatvan-na grhyate. M V K B T 1.2
2. Anyair-antar-vydpara-purusa-rahitata dharmanatn sunyata-ili-ucyate. Atah
sunyatd-apavada-pratisedhartham bhuta-nairatmya-khyapandrthan-ca-dha : Sunyata
vidyate tu-atra iti. M V K B T 1.2
3. F or full text see M V K B T 1.2
4. Laksariam sankleSa-vyavadanad-anyan-nasti-iti-atah sankleia-vyavadana-laksa-
riapradarsandrtham-dha. M V K B T 1.2
5. Abhuta-parikalpa-svabhavah saiikleso bhrdnli-laksanalvat. Ibid
 o f illusory’ character in the sense that the forms o f graspable and
grasper ( grahya-grdhaka-akara) in which things appear (prakhydna)
do not belong to those things themselves (sva-atmani-avidya-
mana) -1 Emptiness o f subject-object characterization, however,
is the very form (svarupa) o f purity (vyavadana) ,2 Conversely, too,
the very nature (svabhdva) o f purity is such emptiness, for
purity means the absence o f subject-object duality ( dvaya-
abhava-svabhava) ,3 Thus, in short, abhuta-parikalpa and Sunyata.
respectively stand for sankleSa and vyavadana. Hence the follow­
ing equation may be made :
abhuta-parikalpa = grahya-grahaka-vikalpa = sanklesa = samsara.
SBnyata= grahya-grdhaka-vikalpa-abhava = vyavadana = nirvana.
In the state o f samsara one is under the illusion that the
subject-object duality is a genuine characteristic o f things,4 and
this exactly is one’s bondage.
Sthiramati has drawn two analogies to help one understand
the theory o f abhuta-parikalpa, the imagination o f the unreal.
One is that o f an illusory elephant made to appear by the
working o f mdyd. He says: “ the graspable-grasper discrimina­
tion is like the [ unreal ] form o f an elephant in mdyd in which
there is no such form” .5 That is, mdyd produces the form o f an
elephant so that a piece o f wood, for example, will appear
like an elephant. Mdyd, which is one’s power to produce such
illusory forms, as such is devoid o f the form o f an elephant
\futsti-dkdra-s unya-maya ), for as such mdyd is the power to produce
such forms, not those forms themselves, nor does it exist in such
forms. However, sutfi forms are within mdyd ( . . .mdydydm-iva hasti-
akdrah), in the sense that their seeds (bija) or rather the ten­
dency ( vasana) to create such forms, were already there within
oneself. The form o f an elephant does not belong to the piece

1. Sva-atmani-avidyamanena grahya-grahaka-akarerja prakhydmd-bhrdnti-svarupepa

jnayate. I b id
2. Vyavadana-svarupa-pradarsandrtharn-aha-Sunyatd vidyate tu-atra-iti. Ib id .
3. -Vunyatd-svabtmro hi vyavadanam dvaya-abhdva-svabhavatvat. Ib id
4. Yadi dvayam nasti katham tasydm vidyamandydm toko bhranta iti aha— tasyam-
api sa vidyate— iti. Ib id
5. Grahya-grahaka-vikalpo hasti-dkdra-sunya-maydydm-iva hasli-akdra-adayah.
M V K B T 1.2
o f wood, either, which appears as an elephant. In other
words, the piece o f wood does not exist in the form in which it
appears to exist, namely in the form o f an elephant.
Then, the working o f abhuta-parikalpa should be understood
on the above analogy. Abhuta-parikalpa is one’s power to
produce unreal forms, namely the forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity. “ It is called the abhuta-parikalpa, [ the imagination
o f the unreal, ] because by it, or in it, is imagined [ = mentally
constructed ] the unreal pair. By the term abhuta is meant
that it [ = abhutaparikalpa] does not exist as it is imagined,
namely in [ terms ] o f Subjectivity and objectivity. By the term
parikalpa is meant that the thing does not exist as it is imagined,
[namely in the form o f a subject or object]. Thus its
definition that it is free o f subject-object characterization, is
made clear.” 1 Thus the theory o f abhuta-parikalpa is meant to
shatter one’s belief in the subject-object characterization o f things.
About what comes under abhuta-parikalpa Sthiramati continues:

Abhuta-parikalpa includes the entire range o f citta and caitta

which are in accordance with samsara. In particular, however,
it means the graspable-grasper discrimination. There, the dis­
crimination o f the graspable refers to the consciousness which
appears as non-living and living beings; and the discrimina­
tion o f the grasper refers to the consciousness which appears
as self and representation o f consciousness.2

These words o f Sthiramati may be explained as follows : The

abhuta-parikalpa includes everything (aviSefena) that is called
mind and mental factors, under the influence o f which one
finds oneself in the state o f samsara. They cease to operate at
the attainment o f nirvana ( nirvana-paryavasanah) . All such citta
and caittas can be subsumed under the fontis o f subjectivity,
and objectivity, and, therefore, abhuta-parikalpa particularly

1. Abhutam-asmin dvayam parikalpyate’ nena va-iti abhuta-parikalpah. Abhuta-

vacanena cayaihd-ayam parikalpyate grahya-grahakalvena tatha ndsti-iti pradarsayati.
Parikalpa-vacanena tu-artho yathd parikalpyate talha-artho na vidyate iti pradarfayati.
Evam-asya grdhva-grdhaka-vinirmukttm laksajiam paridipitam bhavati. M V K B T 1.2
2. . . . sarnsdra-anurupas-citta-caitta avisesena-abh uta-parikclpah. Viseseria tu
grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. Tatra grdhya-vikalpo’ arthasattva-pratibhdsam. Grdhaka-
vikalpa dtma-vijnapti-pratibhdsam. I b id
means the graspable-grasper distinction (grahya-grahaka-vikalpah).
Graspable-discrimination (grahya-vikalpa) refers to the form o f
objectivity under which consciousness appears as non-living
and living beings ( artha and sattva), and the grasper-discrimina-
tion refers to the form o f subjectivity under which conscious­
ness (vijnana) appears (pratibhasa) as self and representations
o f consciousness ( atma and vijnapti) -1
Explaining the terms grahya and grahaka Sthiramati again
says: “ Grahya means colour etc., and grahaka means eye-con-
sciousness etc.2 This is an important clue to the understanding
o f the whole system. Colour etc., namely colour, taste, touch,
smell and sound, are the forms under which things are
experienced : they are mere forms o f objectivity, and as such
they are unreal ( abhuta) ; eye-consciousness etc., namely the
eight types o f consciousnesses, are forms o f an experiencing
subject: they are mere forms o f subjectivity, and as such they
are unreal too. What I am trying to say is that unless colour
etc. and eye-consciousness etc. are summarized respectively as
forms o f objectivity and subjectivity, their distinction into
grShya and grahaka, and the subsequent denial o f their reality
will make no sense. Therefore Sthiramati’s statement means:

Colour etc. being mere forms under which things become

knowable (grahya), are mere imagination (parikalpa) and
therefore unreal (abhuta), too. Similarly, eye-consciousness
etc. being mere forms under which one becomes a knower
(grahaka), are mere imagination (parikalpa), and therefore
unreal (abhuta), too.

Thus, as I have already made it clear, whenever something

is denied reality, it is treated under the aspect o f being a
knowable (grahya) or a knower (grahaka).
The second o f the two analogies mentioned above is that o f
a rope appearing under the form o f a snake. The message o f
this analogy is that what is unreal (abhuta) in this case is the
nature o f the snake ( sarpa-svabhava) while the rope as such is
real. Similarly, the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, under

1. T h is p o in t w ill b e fu rth er ex p la in e d u n d er M V K 1.4

2. Tatra grahyam rupadi. Grdhakam cakswr-vijn&nadi. M V K B T 1.2
which abhuta-parikalpa appear, are unreal, but not abhuta-
parikalpa itself.1 That is, abhuta-parikalpa as such, i.e. short o f
the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, is real. This state­
ment has two meanings: (i) abhuta-parikalpa, namely, that one
mentally constructs unreal forms, is an undeniably real fact
of samsaric existence, although those forms are themselves
unreal; (ii) what remains once the forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity have been negated, namely Sunyata, otherwise called
tathata,, is eternally (sarvakalam) real. Thus having exploded
the myth o f subject-object distinction two assertions can be
made about any individual: (i) as long as he is in the state
o f samsara he is subject to the imagination o f the unreal
(abhuta-parikalpa); (ii) in the state o f nirvana he realizes the
emptiness ( Sunyata) o f subjectivity and objectivity.2

Neither void nor non-void

Thus all that can be said with reference to any individual in
the state o f samsara can be reduced to two statements : (i) an
assertion o f the imagination o f the unreal and o f the absolute
state o f emptiness; (ii) a negation o f subjectivity and objecti­
vity. T o understand any individual these two statements, one
affirmation and the other negation, have to be put together.
Nothing is exclusively void ( Sunya) nor exclusively non-void
( asunya) .3 It is in avoiding these two extremes4 that the Yoga­
carins claim to be holding a middle position.8 Hence the next
stanza says:

[M V K 1.3] Neither void nor non-void :

So is everything described,
That indeed is the middle path,

1. Grdhya-grahaka-bhdvena virahitata viviktata hi-abhuta-parikatpasya Sunyata.

.Na iu-abhuta-parikalpo'pi-abhavah yatha Sunya rajjuh. sarpa-svabhavena-atat-svabhavat
sarvakalam Sunya, na tu rajju-svabhavena tatha-iha-api. Ib id
2. Tat punar-avaSisfam tat-sat. Kim-punariha-avasisjam ? Abhuta-porikalpah
Sunyata ca. Ib id
3. Sarvam na ekantena Sunyam na ekantena aSunyam. M V K B 1 .3
4. antah, as in the title o f the b o o k , Madhya-anla-vibhaga.
5. Sa ca madhyama-pratipad ya d sarvam na-ekantena Sunyam na-ekantena-
asunyam. M V K B 1.3
 For there is existence as well as non-existence,
And again existence.1

Commenting on this stanza Vasubandhu says :

On account o f the existence o f emptiness, on the one hand,

and that o f the imagination o f the unreal, on the other, it
is .not void. And on account o f the non-existence o f the
pair o f graspable and grasper, it is not non-void, either.
This description applies to everything whether conditioned
or unconditioned. The term ‘ conditioned’ goes for what is
called the imagination o f the unreal, while the term ‘un­
conditioned’ goes for what is called the emptiness. That
indeed is the middle path, for, on the one hand, there is the
existence o f emptiness within the imagination o f the unreal,
and, on the other, the existence o f the imagination o f the
unreal within the emptiness. It is therefore neither exclusively
void nor exclusively non-void. This reading is thus in accord­
ance with the scriptures such as Prajnd-pdramitd, [ where it is
said]: ‘all this is neither void nor non-void.’2

The statement, “ So is everything described” ,3 deserves spe­

cial attention. It implies that the description that it is “ Neither
void nor non-void” applies to every single being separately,
not to reality in general. In other words, here there is an
indication that the text is speaking about individual beings,
not about a cosmic, monistic, reality. The Sanskrit term
translated as “ every” is sarva. It could also be translated
as “ all” . In either case the term jarva stands for a multi­
plicity o f beings. This observation o f mine is confirmed by
Vasubandhu’s subsequent commentary. He says that the

1. N a Sunyam na-api ca aSunyam tasmat sarvam vidhiyate

Satlvad-asattvat sattvac-ca madhyama pratipac-ca sd. M V K 1.3
2. N a Sunyam Sunyataya ca-abhiita-parikalpena ca. N a ca-aSunyam dvayena
grahyena grahakena ca. Sarvam-saniskrtam ca-abhuta-parikalpakhyam, asamskrtam ca
tfinyata-akhyam. Vidhiyate nirdiSyate. Sattvad-abhuta-paril^lpf, tasyam ca-abhuta-
parikalpaSya sd ca madhyama pratipat. Ta( sarvam tia-ekdntena Sunyam, na-ekantena
asunyam. Evam-ayam pa(hah prajndpuramitdtisu-dnulamito bhavati.— Sarvamidam na
Sunyam na-api ca-aSunyam-iti. M V K B 1.3
3. Tasmat. sarvam vidhiyate. M V K 1.3
 term sarvam in the verse stands for everything whether “ condi­
tioned” (samskrta) or “ unconditioned” (asamskrta) . Division o f
the entire (sarvam) range o f elements ( dharmah) into “ condi­
tioned” and “ unconditioned” goes back to the time o f the
Buddha. Therefore, Vasubandhu’s interpretation o f the term
sarvam as covering both the conditioned and the unconditioned
elements implies that he retains the original analysis o f reality
into so many individual elements. Then it is to each o f those
individual elements that the description “ neither void nor non­
void” applies. Therefore, eveiy individual element is envisaged
as having two aspects, one positive (aSunya) and the other nega­
tive (Sunya).
The terms SUnya and asunya, here translated respectively as
“ void” and “ non-void” , too, need explanation. Linguistically
they are just opposites. However, in the present context they
are not quite so. Sunya evidently refers to the absence o f subject-
object characterizations. Then one could rightly expect aSunya
to mean the presence o f such characterizations. That is not the
case, though. Instead, it refers to the existence o f that to which
the subject-object characterizations are denied. In other words,
sunya means that something is devoid o f subject-object charac­
terizations, while asunya means that the same thing, although
devoid o f such characterizations, still exists. Similarly, accord­
ing to the present stanza, everything (sarvam) conditioned
(samskrta) as well as unconditioned ( asamskrta) is devoid o f
subject-object characterizations,1 but still is an existing reality,
either as abhuta-parikalpa or as Sunyata. The conditioned ele­
ments exist as abhuta-parikalpa while the unconditioned ones
exist as Sunyata,2 Abhuta-parikalpa, as has been explained in the
previous stanza, exists as an undeniable factor o f samsara, although
the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, in which it manifests'
itself, do not exist.3 Consequently, the conditioned elements,

1. Na-Sunyam Sunyataya ca-abhuta-parikalpena ca. Na ca aSunyam dvayena

grahyena grahakena ca. Sarvam samskrtam ca-abhuta-parikalpa-akhyam, asamskrtam
ca sunyatakhyam. M V K B 1.3
2. Sarvam samskrtam ca-abhuta-parikalpdkhyam, asamskrtam ca iunyata-akhyam
M V K B 1.3.
3. Abhuta-parikalpo'sti, dvayam tatra na vidyate. M V K 1.2
 too, which make ujj the realm o f abhuta-parikalpa,'1 are undeni-
ablefactors o f samsara, although the forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity, in which they manifest themselves, do not exist, and
therefore are unroll (abhuta). The point at issue will be clearer
if one remepfbers that “ the abhuta-parikalpa includes everything
tnST; is'-CaTlpd citta and caitta under the influence o f which one
fiafSfcaaeseif in the state o f samsara, and which cease to operate
at the attainment o f nirvana’” .2 That is, what is presently treated
as “ conditioned” should be referred to the same citta-caitta
complex. So ultimately it is those citta-caittas that are described
as samskrta-dharmas and as abhuta-parikalpa and finally as both
Sunya as well as asunya : they exist {asunya) as undeniable
factors o f samsara, but are devoid (sunya) of the forms o f sub­
jectivity and objectivity in which they manifest themselves.
Similarly, Sunyata. exists in the absolute sense o f the term, but
is eternally devoid o f subject-object characterizations. Conse­
quently, the unconditioned elements, which make up the realm
o f Sunyata,3 exist in the absolute sense o f the term, but are eter­
nally devoid of subject-object characterizations.
Thus everything (sarvam), whether conditioned (samskrta) or
unconditioned (asamskrta), the former under the aspect o f abhuta-
parikalpa and the latter under the aspect o f Sunyata, is rightly
described as “ neither void nor non-void” (na Sunyam na-api ca
aSunyam).
Abhuta-parikalpa and Sunyata, theoretically speaking, refer to
mutually excluding modes o f existence, namely samsara and
nirvana. But in a concrete individual undergoing the samsara
experience those two modes co-exist, so to speak, abhuta-parikalpa
overshadowing and obscuring (avarana) Sunyata. An individual
undergoing the state o f samsara combines in himself abhuta-
parikalpa and Sunyata, samskrta-dharmas and asamskrta-dharmas,
sankleSa and vyavadana, samsara and nirvana. All dharmas, samskrta
as well as asamskrta, which constitute his being, are each Sunya
as well as aSunya, as explained above. At the dawn o f nirvana,

1. samskrtam ca-abhuta-parikalpakhyam. M V K B 1.3

2. . . .nirvatfa-paryavasanah samsara-anurupaS-citta-caitta amiisena-abhula-
parikalpah. M V K B T 1.2
3. Asamskrtam ca iunyata-akhyam. M V K B 1.3
 samskrta-dharmas, which are the same as citta-caittas cease to
exist, and for that matter so do abhuta-parikalpa, sanklesa and
samsara. It is this co-existence o f abhuta-parikalpa and Sunyata,
a point already emphasized in stanza 1.2, that Vasubandhu has
in mind when he says: “ On the one hand, there is the existence
o f emptiness within the imagination o f the unreal, and, on the
other, the existence o f the imagination o f the unreal within the
emptiness.” 1 Then by shedding the covering (avarana) o f abhuta-
parikalpa one attains the state o f Sunyata, which is the same as
nirvana.

Forms o f the imagination o f the unreal

The next stanza is a further inquiry into the particular forms
o f the imagination o f the unreal. It has already been said that
the imagination o f the unreal expresses itself in two primary
forms, namely the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity. How­
ever, each o f those primary forms may have different secondary
forms. What are such secondary forms ? This is the question
discussed in the next stanza. Vasubandhu calls it the “ own-
definition” (svalakfana) o f the imagination o f the unreal. The
previous two stanzas gave a positive definition ( sal-lakfana) and
a negative definition (asal-lakfana) o f the same imagination o f
the unreal. Positively it was defined (or rather described) as an
existing reality,2 and negatively as not having within itself the pair
o f subjectivity and objectivity.® However, what particular forms it
takes was not clearly discussed, except that Vasubandhu in his
commentary said that “ the imagination o f the unreal means the
discrimination between the grasper and the graspable” .4 Hence,
“ thus having stated the positive and negative definition o f the
imagination o f the unreal, now [ the author ] gives its own defini­
tion.” 6 As for the distinction between the positive definition

1. See n ote 2 o n p . 42.

2. I dam sattvena laksyate iti sattvam-eva sal-laksanam. Abhuta-parikalpo vidyata
iti-anena-abhuta-parikalpasya sattvam pradarSayati-iti-arthah. M V K B T 1.4
3. Evam-asativena laksyate m agattvam-eva-aml-laksariam. Tat punar-yad
grahya-grahaka-bhdvem-asattva^.yasmad-abhuta-parikalpe dvayam nasti tasmad-
abhutaparikalpo’p i dvayitmana nasti-iti-utkam bhavati. M V K B T 1.4
4. Tatra-abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M V K B 1.2
5. Evam abhuta-parikalpasya sal-lak;anam-asal-laksanam ca khyapayitoa sva--
laksanam khyapayati. M V K B 1.4
and the own-definition Sthiramati says that the former is
only a general ( samanya) assertion while the latter is a parti­
cular ( visesa) one,1 implying that the positive definition was
concerned with only a general assertion o f the reality o f the
imagination o f the unreal, while the own-definition is going to
give more particulars about the same imagination o f the unreal.
Now, the first part o f the stanza reads as follows:

[M V K 1.4] Under the appearance o f things inanimate,

Living beings, self and representations o f con­
sciousness
Is born the consciousness.2

Commenting on these lines Vasubandhu says:

In the form o f colour etc. the consciousness appears as inani­
mate things, and in that o f five senses it appears as living
beings. These five senses refer to one’s own as well as others’
streams o f existence. The appearance o f consciousness as self
is the same as defiled thought, because it is associated with
self-delusion etc. The representations o f consciousness are
otherwise called the sixfold consciousness.3
According to Sthiramati this passage answers two questions.
The first one is concerned with the possibility o f having sense-
knowledge. It has been said in the previous stanzas that
although there is the imagination o f the unreal, there is no
graspable-grasper duality. How then could there be sense-knowl-
edge, which necessarily presupposes the duality between grasp­
able objects and grasping subjects ? This question, says Sthira­
mati, is answered by the present stanza saying that it is the
abhuta-parikalpa itself which appears in the different forms o f

1. Ko viSeso'sti sal-laksai?a-svalaksanayoh ? Sal-laksariam hi samanyam. Sva-

laksaxiam tu viiesati- M V K B T 1.4
2. Artha-saitva-atma-vijhapti-pratibhdsam prajayate Vijnana. . . M V K 1.4
3. Tatra-artha-pratibhdsam yad rupadi-bhavena pratibhasate. Sattva-pratibhdsam
yat paHca-indnyattvena-sva-para-sanlanayoh. Atma-pratibhdsam klis(am tnanah, dtma-
mohadi-samprayogat. Vijnapti-pratibhasam sad uijrtanani■ Nasti ca-asya-artha-iti artha-
sattvapratibhdsasya-anakaratvat, atma-vijhapti-pralibhdsasya ca vitatha-pratibhasatvat.
Tadabhavat tad-api-asad-iti ya t grahyam rupadi, panca-indriyam, manah, sad-vijhana-
sahjnakam caturvidham tasya grdhyasydbhavat tadapi grahakam vijhanam asat.
M V K B 1.4
subjectivity and objectivity.1 Here Sthiramati obviously means
that the above said four appearances of consciousness, namely
artha, sattva, alma and vijnapti, and the consciousness itself, are
different forms o f subjectivity and objectivity in which the
abhuta-parikalpa ex.presses itself. I shall return to this point later.
The second question which Sthiramati thinks the present
stanza answers is the following. It has been positively, said that
there exists the imagination o f the unreal. But its own-nature
remains to be explained. It has also been said that there is no
subject-object duality at all. If so it remains to be explained
how one has still the passion for making a distinction between
the graspable and the grasper, and how one can be led to believe
that there is no duality.2 These problems are solved, says
Sthiramati, by the present stanza as follows. The own-nature
o f abhuta-parikalpa is consciousness (i.e. the abhuta-parikalpa is
o f the nature o f consciousness). The same consciousness is to
be understood together with its associates. However, primarily
it is consciousness. The same consciousness, which is bound up
with the appearances o f artha, sattva etc., is itself the passion
for the graspable-grasper distinction.3 What Sthiramati says
may be put in other words: abhuta-parikalpa for all practical
purposes is the same as consciousness (vijnana), including its
associates (samprayoga), namely, citta and caittas. This conscious­
ness, or more specifically, the citta and caittas, is always the
consciousness o f something, either artha, or sattva or atma or
vijnapti, and therefore appears as if split into two parts, one of
subjectivity and the other o f objectivity, and thus accounts for

1. Yadi sva-laksanam-anakhydlam-alra kim syat ? . . .grahya-grahaka-rahitata-

abhuta-parikalpa-matrata-iti-uddistam. Tasya-abhuta-parikalpa-matratayam-indriya-
vifaya-vijnanam yatha-vyavasthitam ( tatha) na jnayata (iti). Abhuta-parikalpa-
pratibhasa-bhedena tad-vyavasthili-jhapanartham-abhuta-parikalpasya sva-laksanam
khyapayati. M V K B T I A
2. . . . abhuta-parikalpo'sti-iti-anena tat-sattva-matram jnayate, na tu tat-
svabhavah. Dvaya-abhave'pi yad grahya-grahaka-abhiniveia-karariam na jnayate,
dvayam ca nasti-iti yatah pratiyate tad-api na-uktam-iti-atah-tat-pratipadanarlham-
aha. Ib id
3. Tatra vijnanasvabhavo’ bhutaparikalpah. Tac-ca vijnanam sa-samprayogam-
abhipretam. Pradhanena tu vijnanam grhltam. Sa eva grahya-grahaka-abhiniveSo-
■artha-sattva-adi-pratibhasa-nibandhah. I b id
one’s passion for graspable-grasper distinction (grahya-grahaka-
abhiniveSa), and leads one to believe that there is really the dis­
tinction between the subjects and objects.
Before proceeding further I must make one point clear. That
consciousness appears in the form o f different objects is the basic
contention o f the present stanza. This should not be understood
to mean that there are no things other than consciousness. On
the contrary, it means only that what falls within the range o f
experience are different forms o f consciousness, while the things-
in-themselves remain beyond the limits o f experience. For
example, when a rope is mistaken for a snake, it is the form o f
snake, which is being experienced, that can be explained as a
mental form, while the rope itself rerrtains outside that expe­
rience. That just the same is the m essage o f the present stanza
is clear from a similar example cited by Sthiramati which is as
follows. One may mistake a stump for a man. There, one is
projecting one’ s past experience of man on to the stump before
one, and thus making oneself unable to recognize the stump as
such. Similarly, says Sthiramati, ‘ the ignorant people mistake
the different forms o f consciousness for things other than con­
sciousness, just as people with bad eyes rpistake their own mental
images for hair, egg etc.’1
- It is obvious that the present stanza is dealing with the ordi­
nary categories o f experience/thought, namely consciousness
(vijnana), non-living beings (artha), living beings (sattva), self
( atma), and representations o f consciousness (vijnapti). Analyz­
ing those categories the stanza says that they are different forms
o f subjectivity and objectivity, and as such being different
appearances o f consciousness itself they do not represent things
in themselves. I shall now explain hovsr those categories can be
interpreted as different forms o f subjectivity and objectivity.
The central point is that they present themselves to thought/
experience either as subject or as object o f some experience.
Thus, first there appears consciousness as the subject o f all the

1. Katham asati-arthadau vijnanam tad-abhasam-udpadyate ? JVa hi puruse asati

sthanuh bhavati-iti. N a esah dosah. Artha-adi-abhasatfl hi vijnanam balah vijnanat
prthag-arlha-astitvena-abhiniviiante taimirikasya kesandukddiuat. I b id
other four categories.1 That is, consciousness is invariably the
consciousness o f either self or ideas or living beings or non­
living beings. Apart from being the subject o f those other cate­
gories consciousness is nothing, and therefore it makes sense
only as an experiencing subject. Again, self and the representa­
tion o f consciousness are contrasted with living beings and non­
living beings as subjects and objects. Self defined as defiled
thought ( klisfam manah, literally meaning impassioned thought)*
is described as the subject o f passions such as ego-delusion, ego-
belief, ego-desire and ego-pride,3 all these passions having living
and non-living beings as their objects.4 In other words, self is
a bundle o f passions which presuppose external beings as their
objects. The representations o f consciousness stand for the six­
fold consciousness, namely the five sense-consciousnesses (indriya-
vijnanani) and the thought-consciousness (rnano-vijndnam). Being
consciousness none o f them has any meaning without reference
to the respective objects, either animate or inanimate. So they
are essentially in the form o f subjects. Finally, living and non­
living beings are there as objects o f either self, or one or another
form o f consciousness. By living being are meant those which
are endowed with five senses. Such beings ultimately represent
one’s own as well as other people’s streams o f existence.5 What
is important here is that those “ persons” (or streams o f existence)
are experienced only as objects o f one’s consciousness and
passions. Similarly the non-living beings, which can be reduced
to sense-data (i.e., colour etc.), are presented to consciousness
through the senses.6 As they appear, they, too, have the form of
objects o f consciousness, the latter appearing either as self or as
representations o f consciousness.

1. Cf. . . .tad-grahyam riipadi, panca-indriyam, manah, sad-vijnana-sanjftaka-n

catur-vidham tasya grahyasya . . . tadapi grahakam vijnanam . . . Ibid.
2. atma-pratibhasam klistain manah. M V K B 1.4
3. Atma-pratibhasam ktisfam manah, atma-mohadi-samprayogad-iti kliftasya
manasa dtma-mohena-dtmadrsfyd-atma-trsyayd-asmimdnena ca nityam samprayuktatvat,
le§am-ca Mma-alambanatvad-yuktam atma-pratibhasatvam klisfasya manasah.
M V K B T 1.4
4. Because underlying these passions (klesas) is the I-consciousness as
opposed to other objects. ,
5. Sattva-pratibhasam ya t panea-indriyattvena sva-para-santanayoh. M V K B 1.4
6. Tatra artha-pratibhdsam yad-rupadi-bhavena pratibhasate. Ibid
 The remaining part o f the stanza under discussion, and its
commentaries by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, evaluate those
categories and show how, under the aspects o f subjectivity and
objectivity, they are false and unreal:

[M V K 1.4 cont’d .] There is nothing as its [i.e. consciousness’s]

object,
And thus that object being absent
That [consciousness], too, is non-existent.1

What the author says here could be differently put as follows:

Consciousness makes sense only with reference to its object

(artha).
There are no such objects.
Therefore there is nothing called consciousness either.
Vasubandhu now in his commentary on the above lines
examines and explains the minor premise o f the argument,
namely that there are no such objects. The objects (artha)
referred to are evidently the categories o f self, representations
o f consciousness, living beings and inanimate things, all o f
which have been spoken o f in the former part o f the stanza as
appearances (pratibhasa) o f consciousness itself. Now, then,
what is meant by saying that there are no such objects ? In
what sense are those four objects absent ? Here is the answer
given by Vasubandhu:

The appearances o f inanimate things as well as o f living

beings are devoid o f form; likewise the appearances o f
self and representation o f consciousness are not in the way
they appear to be. This is why it is said that there is indeed
nothing as its [ i.e. consciousness’s ] object. That is, the four
kinds o f graspables— namely, (i) colour etc., (ii) the five
senses, (iii) thought, and (iv) the sixfold consciousness—are
absent. Thus the graspable being absent, the grasper,
namely the consciousness, too, is non-existent.2

1. . . . nasti ca-asya-arthas-tad-abhavat tad-api-asat. M V K 1.4

2 . Nasti-ca-asya-artha iti artha-sattva-pratibhdsasya-anakaratvat, qtma-
vijnapti-pratibhasasya ca vitatha-pratibhasalvat. Tad-a.bha.vat tadapi-asad-iti ya t tad-
grahyam riipadi, panca-indriyam, manah, sad-vij nana-sanjiiakam catur-vidham tasya
giahyasya-abhavat tadapi-grahakam vijnanam-asat. M V K B 1.4
 The main concern o f this passage is to show in what sense
the five categories o f experience are unreal. And the whole
thrust o f the argument derives from contrasting conscious­
ness as the grasper with the other four categories as the
graspables. And the argument itself may be summarized as
follows: graspability being a fake concept, grasperhood, too,
does not make sense. How is then graspability a fake
concept ?
First o f all Vasubandhu distinguishes between inanimate and
living beings on the one hand, and self and representations o f
consciousness on the other. Then he says that the former pair
is absent/non-existent (abhava) because they have no form. The
Sanskrit term translated here as ‘form’ is akara. In the
ordinary language it means ‘form’, or ‘shape’ or ‘frame’ .
But in an epistemological context, such as the present one,
it stands for the form in which a thing is perceived or grasped,
and therefore can be better translated as ‘objective frame’
or ‘objectivity’. That in the present context akara means
‘objectivity’ is clear from Sthiramati’s subsequent commentary.
He gives two interpretations:
(i) In the first instance, for him akara means ‘ the mode in
which an object is grasped’.1 In other words, for him akdra
means prakara, this latter term being the one employed by
Indian logicians to denote ‘ the way or mode in which . an
object is experienced.’2 Sthiramati then says that both inani­
mate and living beings do not have such a prakara (objectivity)
in which they could be grasped. W hy? Because they only
appear in the form o f graspables (grahyarupena prakhyanat).3
Here are Sthiramati’s own words:

A form [ akara ] indeed is the mode in which an object

[ dlambana ] is grasped, for example, as an impermanent
thing etc. Neither o f them [i.e. inanimate and living beings],

1. grahfitia-prakdrah. See n o te 1 o n p. 52.

2. F or e x a m p le A n n a m b h a tta ’s Tarka-sarigraha, (V a ra n a si : T h e
C h ow k h am ba Sanskrit Series, I 9 6 0 ), p p . 14-15, defines true exp erien ce as
“ that w h ich presents the o b je ct in the form in w h ich it really is” ( tad-vati
tdd-prakarako nubhavayathdrthah) .
3. sa [akdrah] ca anayoh ( artha-sattva-pratibhasayoh] nasti gidhva-rupena
prakhydndt. M V K B T I. 4
 however, has such a mode, because they only appear in the
form o f graspables. Therefore, the phrase ‘because they
have no form’ means ‘because they have no graspability’ .1

This denial o f akaratva has to be understood in the light of,

and on the model of, the denial o f the pair ( dvayam) in the
second stanza. In the light o f it, for my analysis o f the
denial o f dvaya showed that “ whenever reality is denied to
something, it invariably refers to some form o f subjectivity and
objectivity” (see above p. 36), or that “ whenever something is
denied reality, it is treated under the aspect o f being a knowable
{grahya) or a knower {grahaka) ” (see above p. 40). Therefore
in the present case, too, the denial o f akaratva has to be
understood with reference to forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity, and, as I have already explained, it definitely
refers to the form o f objectivity. Again, on the model o f the
denial o f dvaya, for denial o f dvaya means that neither abhuta-
parikalpa nor Sunyata has within itself the duality between
subjectivity and objectivity, and that such a duality is altogether
illusory just as the form o f a magical elephant. Similarly, the
denial o f akaratva (i.e. the form o f objectivity, which is one o f
the above-mentioned pair, dvaya), too, should be understood to
mean that neither appearances o f consciousness as living and
non-living beings, nor the things (no matter living or non­
living) in themselves have akaratva, and that akaratva is
altogether illusory as the form o f a magical elephant.
( ii) A Second interpretation o f akara given by Sthiramati
is that “ akara is the experience o f subject. But no such experience
o f either of them [i.e. inanimate or living beings] is there.
Therefore, they are formless in the sense that there is no per­
ception o f them.” 2 These words o f Sthiramati imply a down­

1. Akaro hi-alambanasya-anityddi-Tupena grahaka-prakarah. Sa anayor-nasti

grahya-rupena prakhyanat. Ato-anakaratvad-agrahakatvfid-iti- arthah. M VKBT 1.4.
In this passage agrdhakatoat h as b e e n translated as “ becau se they have no
grasp ability.” Grahakatva in n orm al situations w o u ld m ean ‘g ra sp erh ood ’
w h ich does not fit in w ith the present co n te x t. A s the suffix ka c a n also refer
to o b je ctiv ity it is h ere a c c o rd in g ly translated, as in the term karartaka.
2. Atambema-samvedanam va akdrah. Tac-ca tayor nasti iti upatabdhi-abhdvait
andkdrah. M V K B T I . 4 .
 right denial o f experience o f a thing, whether inanimate or
living, as it is in itself. What is thought to be experienced is
only the appearance (pratibhdsa) o f consciousness (vijnana),
which under the aspect o f knowable ( grahya) is as illusory as
the form o f a magical elephant, and therefore docs not alto­
gether exist ( alyanta-abhdva Cf. TSN. 11).
Thus the above two interpretations o f akara amount to the
same conclusion, namely that the form in which a thing is
thought to be grasped is purely imagined ( parikalpita) , and
therefore is no sure guide to the thing-in-itself. It is in this
sense, and only in this sense, that Vasubandhu’s system can
be called idealism. It by no means implies that there is nothing
apart from ideas or consciousness.
Now coming to Vasubandhu’s evaluation o f the categories o f
self and the representations o f consciousness, he has said that
they are ‘false appearances’. The Sanskrit term translated
as ‘false appearance’ is vitatha-pratibhdsa, which literally means
‘ appearance o f something in a false manner’ . That means, the
appearance o f self and the representations o f consciousness as
objects (artha) o f consciousness is false. Why ? Sthiramati
explains: ‘The other two objects, namely self and representa­
tions o f consciousness manifest (prakhyana) themselves as graspers
(grahaka-rupena), but take on the false appearance o f graspables,
and for that matter are absent ( abhdva ).x In other words self,
and representations o f consciousness stand for forms o f subjecti­
vity, as I have already explained above on pp. 48ff. Therefore,
their appearance (pratibhdsa) as objects ( artha) o f consciousness
( vijnana) is false ( vitatha), and for that reason (kdranam) is
said to be absent, too. How their manifestation as graspers
(grahaka), too, are illusory is already made clear, for all forms
o f subjectivity have been described as altogether non-existent.
Further, for them to be graspers there should be some objects
which they can grasp. Living as well as non-living beings
could be such graspable objects. But it has already been said
that the graspability o f living and non-living beings just does
not exist. As graspable objects the living and non-living beings

1. Natu-anyayor-grahya-rupena pralchyanad-anakarah; iilathapral:':ihasatvam-

eva-artha~abhave karanam-uktam. M VKBT 1.4
are altogether non-existent (atyanta-abhava). Thus the graspable
objects being absent, the term “ grasping subjects” becomes
meaningless and redundant. It is in this sense that self and
representations o f consciousness are said to be absent. Sthira­
mati says: “ The graspable objects being absent, the appear­
ances o f both self and representations o f consciousness, which
manifest themselves as grasping subjects, are false.” 1
Sthiramati has one more explanation for the false appearance
o f self and representations o f consciousness as graspables. He
says:
False appearance means the absence o f the objects in the
way they are imagined to be there by the consciousness. False
appearance is thus owing to false basis [ = ob ject], just as a
false rumour about the presence o f a tiger etc. is owing to
false basis.2
Thus there are things independent o f consciousness, although
they are not in the manner they are imagined by the grasp­
ing subject.
After having thus established the non-beingness (absence) o f
the categories o f self, representations o f consciousness, inani­
mate beings and living beings, the authors now call one’s
attention to consciousness, o f which the former four are seem­
ingly the objects. However, now that those objects (artha) are
proved to be absent (abhava) , it is no longer sensible to call
consciousness a subject.3 Hence consciousness as a subject,
too, is so much absent. It does not get at anything other than
its own forms. In a way its own subjectivity itself is one o f its
own constructions. Sthiramati says:

The objects being absent, there is no consciousness o f them

either. Consciousness is that which knows objects. Therefore
in the absence o f objects there cannot be the act o f knowing
as well. Thus, since objects are absent, consciousness, too,
as a knowing subject, is non-existent.4
1. Grahya-abhdve dvayor-atma-vijnapli-pratibhasayor-grahaka-akarena prakhyanat
vitatha-pratibhdsalvam. M V K B T 1.4
2. Yathd vijHanena-arlhah parikalpyate tatha-arthasya-abhavo vyaghradi-sruti-iva
vitalha-dlambanatvdd-vitatha-pratibhdsata. Ibid .
3. Artha-abhdvdd-vijnntrtrena lijndnam-asat. M V K B T 1.4
4. Artha-abhavat-tad-vijmnam-asat. Vijdndti-iti-vijfidnam grahya-abhdve vija-
nand-api ayuktam. Tasinad-artha-abhavad-vijnatrtiena vijiidnam-asat. Ibid.
 The above analysis could be summarized as follows. The
categories o f consciousness, self, representations o f consciousness,
living beings and inanimate beings, insofar as they fall with­
in the range o f experience, are all but subjective constructions,
and for that reason unreal, too. Those categories are experienc­
ed as one or other form o f subjectivity and objectivity, and as
such do not represent the things-in-themselves ( things in their
suchness). The things-in-themselves (i.e. the things in their
suchness) are beyond the range o f experience, because they do
not have the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, under which
alone experience is possible. Those categories, subjective forms
as they are, are experienced either as subject or as objects.
Categories o f inanimate and living beings, insofar as they are
objects o f experience are absent/unreal, because they do not
have objectivity (anakaratvat). Categories o f self and the re­
presentations o f consciousness insofar as they are objects o f
experience, are likewise only mentally constructed forms and
are therefore unreal, having nothing to do with things-in-them­
selves. Self and representations o f consciousness insofar as
they are subjects o f experience, too, are mentally constructed
forms, and therefore unreal, and as such are false appearances
o f consciousness. Consciousness itself insofar as it is subject
o f experience is unreal and non-existent. Thus, in short,
whatever is referred to as subject or object is mere subjective
construction, and therefore unreal; things-in-themselves are
neither subjects nor objects.
Summarizing the discussion so far stanza 1.5 says:

[M V K I .5 ] Therefore its being the imagination o f the unreal

Remains established.1

For Vasubandhu the meaning o f these lines are so clear

that he does not bother to elaborate it. According to Sthiramati’s
commentary the term “ its” ( asya) stands collectively for the
four appearances o f consciousness mentioned in the previous
stanza.2 The term “ therefore” (atah) refers to what has been

1. Abhiita-parikalpatvam siddham-asya bhavati-atah. M VK 1.5

2. Abhiita-parikalpatvam-ca tesdm calurnam lijiiananam siddham. M V K B T 1.5
said in the previous stanza, namely that ‘ the objects being
absent, the knowing consciousness, too, is non-existent’ .1 Thus
the meaning o f the above lines turns out to be as follows :

On the basis o f what has been said in the previous stanza

It becomes established that the four objective categories,
Namely, artha, sattva, atma and vijnapti,
Insofar as they are thought to be objects,
Are but imagination pf the unreal.

According to Sthiramati the term “ therefore” (<zto#) may

refer also to what is subsequently said in the same stanza,
namely,

[M V K 1.5 cont’d ] For it is not so,

It is not altogether absent, either.2

commenting on which Vasubandhu says,

For its existence is not the way it appears to be. It is not

totally absent, either, because there is the production o f
illusion only.3

Here the pronoun “ it” evidently refers to the fourfold appear­

ance o f consciousness. It appears to be objects (artha) o f
consciousness, which it is not (na tatha). It is not altogether
absent, either (na ca sarvatha-abhavah). Why not ? “ Because
there is the production of illusion-only” says Vasubandhu.
Illusion ( bhranti) does not mean the absence o f the appear­
ance o f a particular form, says Sthiramati, but the absence o f
its essence (atmatvem-abhava).4 For example, when a rope
appears in the form o f a snake, that it appears in that form is a
fact, while it does not have the essence o f a snake. Similarly
that there are appearances o f consciousness as objects is an
undeniable fact, while they do not really exist as objects. In

1. Ata iti anantaroktad-kelor-artha-abhavat-tadapi-asad’ iti. Ib id

2. Na tatha sarvatha-abhavat. M VK 1.5
3. Yasman-na tatha-asya bhavo yatha pratibhasa utpadyate. Na ca sarvatha
abhavo bhranti-matrasya-utpadat. M VKB 1.5
4. dtmatvena-abkavo na tu yad-akarena pratibhasate tena bhranlir-ncyate maya-vat.
MVKBT 1.5
other words, there is illusion o f objects,1 although there is no
objectivity itself. Why should one recognize, the existence o f illu­
sion at all ? Vasubandhu himself has raised this question: “ why
not admit the absence o f that illusion itself ?” 2 His answer is,
“ For otherwise there would be neither bondage nor liberation,
which would imply the denial of the facts of defilement and
purity.” 3 This is, according to Vasubandhu, the interpreta­
tion o f the final part o f the stanza, which says,

[M V K 1.5 cont’d. ] From its cessation results liberation.4

The entire discussion can be summarized as follows: That

there is the imagination o f the unreal, which gives rise to the
illusion that there are graspable, enjoyable, objects,5 is a
fact. And this has to be accepted as a fact, so that the
distinction between samsara and nirvana may be explained:
cessation o f the imagination o f the unreal, and o f the conse­
quent illusion o f objectivity, explains nirvana/mukti, and the non­
cessation ( aparikfina) o f the same explains samsara!bandha.6
Facts o f defilement and purity, too, are similarly explained:
state o f samsara/bandha is characterized by defilement (sankleSa)
while that o f nirvanajmukti is characterized by purity ( vyava
d a r n ) ‘ ‘Therefore” , concludes Sthiramati, “ the imagination
o f the unreal as well as the absence of the pair [ of subjecti­
vity and objectivity] should necessarily be recognized” .8

1. Bhrdnli-vijfianasya sad-bhavan-na sarvathd-abhAva. Ibid.

2. Kim-artham punas-tasya [bhrantimatrasya] abhdva eva na isyate ? M VKB
1.5
3. Yasmad-anyatha na bandho na moksah prasidhyed-iti sanklesa-apavada-
dosah syat. M VKB 1.5
4. . . Tat-ksayan-muktir-isyate. MVK 1.5
'5 . grahya-grahakatvena bhrdntir-udbhasita. .M V K B T 1.5 grdhya-grahaka-
pratibhasam-utpadyate. Ibid
6. Tat-ksayan-muktir-isyate. Tasmin-ca-aparikslrie bandha iti-arthad-uktam
bhavati. Ib id
7. . .evam sati nityah sankleSa syat. Tatha ca nirvdna-abhavah. Evam
ca bhrdnti-mdtrasya-api-abhave sanklesa-abhdvo vityam-ca vyavaddnam prasajyate.
M V K B T . 1.5
8. Ato’i'asyam-abhuta-parikalpa-bhdvo'bhyupagantavyo dvaya-abhavas-ca. M V K B T .
Thus, observes Sthiramati, on the one hand denying the grasp­
able-grasper duality, and, on the other, asserting the fact o f the
imagination of the unreal, the present stanza is simply restat­
ing what has already been said in M V K 1.2: “ There exists the
imagination o f the unreal; however there is no pair” .1

The imagination o f the unreal in relation to the three natures

The next stanza relates the idea o f the imagination of the
unreal to that o f the three natures, •namely, the absolutely
accomplished, the other-dependent and the imagined.
According to Vasubandhu the very purpose o f this stanza is
to show that the idea o f the imagination o f the unreal includes
that o f the three natures. He says: “ Thus having stated the
own-definition o f the imagination o f the unreal, now the
[author] states its inclusive definition. It shows, how,
there being only the imagination o f the unreal, there could be
the inclusion o f the three natures.” 2 The stanza reads:

[ M V K 1.6 ] The imagined, the other-dependent,

And the absolutely accomplished,
Are derived respectively from
The objects, the imagination o f the unreal,
And the absence o f the pair.3

In other words, the imagined, the other dependent, and the

absolutely accomplished natures refer respectively to the objects
(artha), the imagination o f the unreal (abhuta-parikalpa) and the
absence o f the pair (dvaya-abhava) o f subjects and objects. So
Vasubandhu has the following commentary on this stanza:

The object is the imagined nature, the imagination o f the

unreal is the other-dependent nature, and the absence o f the

1. Evam grahya-grahaka-abhavat-tat-pratibhasa-vijnana-sad-bhavac-ca yat-

purvam praiijnatam, abhuta-parikalpo'sti dvayam tatra na-vidyate (1 .2 ), iti tat-
prasiddham-iti-pradarsayan-aha- M VKB 1.5
2. Evam-abhuta-parikalpasya sva-laksapam khyapayitva sangraha-laksatfam
khyapayati. Abhuta-parikalpa-matre sati yatha trayanam svabhavanam saiigraho
bhavati. Ib id . 1.6
3. Kalpitah para-tantras-ca parinispanna-eva ca.
Arthad-abuta-kalpac-ca dvaya-abhavac-ca deSitah. M V K 1.6
 graspable-grasper duality is the absolutely accomplished
nature.1

This is an explanation o f the three natures in terms o f the

imagination o f the unreal. Sthiramati puts it clearly as follows:

That the imagination o f the unreal is lacking in the graspable-

grasper duality has already been said. But it is not just the
absence o f such duality. The same imagination o f the unreal
is, moreover, the other-dependent, because it depends on
causes and conditions. The same imagination o f the unreal,
again, is the imagined, because it manifests itself in the forms
o f graspables and graspers, forms which do not exist within
the imagination o f the unreal itself. Also, the same imagina­
tion o f the unreal is the absolutely accomplished, because it is
lacking in the graspable-grasper duality. Thus the three
natures are included in the same imagination o f the unreal.
Thus, by referring to the imagination o f the unreal,
is shown that reality which should first be known, then
abandoned, and finally realized.2
What the three natures stand for is now quite clear :

First, there is the fact o f the imagination o f the unreal, which

in effect is the act o f discriminating between subjects and
objects. It is this act o f discrimination between subjects and
objects that is described as the other-dependent nature,
“ because” , says Sthiramati, “ its birth depends on causes and
conditions” .3 It means that one is forced to discriminate between
subjects and objects because o f the forces ( samskaras) and

1. Arthah parikalpitah svabhavah. Abhuta-parikalpah paratantrah svabhavah.

Grahya-grahaka-abhavah parinispamah svabhavah. M VKB 1.6
2. Atra hi-abhuta-parikalpasya dvaya-rahitata grahya-grahaka-abhava xiktah.
Na tu ivayasya abhava-matram. Evam-abhuia-parikalpa-eva hetu-pratyaya-paratan-
tryat paratantrah. Sa eva grahya-grahaka-rupena sva-atmani-avidyamanena prakhyanat
parikalpitah. Sa eva grahya-grahaka-rahitatvat parinispamah. Evam abhuta-
parikalpe trayah svabhavah sangrhitah. Etena-abhuta-parikalpam-anudya parijneyam,
parijftaya prahatavyam, parijftaya saksat-kartavyam ca vastu sandarsitam bhavati
M VKBT 1.6
3. Para-tantrah, para-vasah, hetupratyaya-pratibaddha-janmakatvat. MV­
K B T 1.6
habits (vasanas) o f one’s past deeds (karma), which function
as the causes (hetu)and conditions ( pratyaya) o f the imagination
o f the unreal.
Secondly there are the appearances o f the same imagination
o f the unreal as graspable and grasper (grdhya-grahaka-pralibhasam) .
It is such appearances o f the graspables and graspers that are
called the imagined nature. “ For” , says Sthiramati, “ the
graspable as well as the grasper are devoid o f own-nature, and
therefore unreal too. However, they are imagined to be exist­
ing, and therefore called the imagined. Again, although subs­
tantially non-existent, still they do exist from the practical
point o f view, and therefore are said to have own-nature.” 1
What exactly, then is the imagined nature ? It is the objects
( artha) , 2 or rather those which are thought to be objects of
consciousness. Here the reference is clearly to the fourfold
appearance o f the consciousness referred to in stanza I. 4.
Hence Sthiramati says, “ Here artha stands for colour etc., eye
etc., self and the representations o f consciousness. They do not
exist within the imagination of the unreal, and thus being non­
existent they are called the imagined nature.” 3
Thirdly, there is that state o f the same imagination o f the
unreal, which is lacking in the duality between subjects and
objects. It is this subject-object distinctionless state that is called
the absolutely accomplished nature, “ because” , says Sthiramati,
“ this state o f existence is unconditioned and unchangeably
accomplished” .4

The negative definition further explained

The negative definition ( asal-laksana) o f the imagination o f
the unreal, namely that it is lacking in subject-object duality,
Abhuta-parikalpah para-tantra-svabhavah iti, parair-hetu-pratyayais-tantryate, jan -
yate, na tu svayain bhavati iti paratantrah. Ib id
1. Grahyam grdhakam ca svabhdva-sunyatvdd-abhutam-api astitvena iti
parikalpyata ucyate. Sa punar-draiyato'san-api lyavah&rato’sti iti svabhava ucyate.
Ib id
2. Arthah parikalpitafi svabhavah. M VKB 1.6
3. ..a rth o’tra r upadayas-caksuradaya-dtma vijnaptayai-ca kalpitena sva-
bhdvena-abhuta-parikalpe ndsti-iti-asan parikalpitah svabhdva ucyate. M V K B T 1.6
4. Ta-abhuta-parikalpasya dvaya-rahitatd sa parinispanna-svabhdvah, tasya-
asamskrtatvdt, nirvikdratvena parinispannatvat. Ibid.
 has already been stated. Now the question is how one can realize
it. The next stanza answers this question. Introducing it Vasu­
bandhu says, “ Now is shown a definition which can be used as
an instrument in comprehending the negative definition o f the
same imagination o f the unreal.” 1 Sthiramati further comments,
“ The imagination of the unreal, unaware o f the negative defini­
tion, works in favour o f the defilement o f klesa, karma and janma.
Hence the present stanza to show an instrument o f knowing the
negative definition.” 2 The stanza says:

[M V K 1.7] Depending upon perception

There arises non-perception,
And depending upon non-perception
There arises non-perception.3

Vasubandhu interprets these lines as follows:

Depending upon the perception that there are only represen­
tations o f consciousness, there arises the non-perception o f
knowable things. Depending upon the non-perception o f
knowable things, there arises the non-perception o f the mere
representations o f consciousness, too. Thus one understands
the nagative definition o f graspable and grasper.4

This is rather the intellectual process whereby one attains to

the realization o f the emptiness o f subjectivity and objectivity.
First, one realizes that what have been taken to be objects ‘ are
only representations o f consciousness. This realization o f mere-
representations shatters one’s belief in objectivity. Then the
realization that there is no objectivity makes one give up one’s
belief in subjectivity as well, for this latter term makes sense
only with reference to objectivity. Absence o f subjectivity means

1. Iddnim tasmin-eva-abh uta-pankalpe'sal-laksaw-anvpraveia-upaya-lakmnam

paridipayati. M VKB 1.7
2. Aparijnata-asal-laksario hi-abhu.ta-parikalpah klesa-karma-janma sanklesaya
sampravartate. M V K B T 1.7
3. Upalabdhim-samasritya nopalabdhih prajayate
Nopalabdhim samasritya nopalabdhih prajayate. M VK 1.7
4. Vijhapti-matra-upalabdhim nisrilya-artha-anupalabd.hirja.yate. Artha-anupalabdhim
nisritya vijnapti-matrasya api-anupalabdhirjayate. Evam-asallaksanam grahya-
grahakayoh pravisati. M VKB 1.7
that there are not even mere-representations o f consciousness,
because consciousness is meaningful only as a knowing subject.
Thus one finally realizes the emptiness o f graspability and
grasperhood.

Sthiramati, too, makes the same point in a different way:

It [i.e. the object ] is mere-representation o f consciousness.

That is, the consciousness, which has no supporting object,
due to the maturing o f its own seeds, appears in the form o f
colour etc. There is no object like colour etc. actually existing.
Depending on such perception o f the grasper, one compre­
hends the non-perception o f the graspable...Just as the mind,
knowing that the imagined-graspable-does not exist outside
the consciousness, comprehends the absence o f the graspable,
so on the basis o f the absence o f the graspable, the absence
o f mere-consciousness, too, is obtained. In the absence of
graspables, grasperhood does not make sense. For, the con­
ception of grasper is relative to that o f the graspable . . . For
the graspable and the grasper are never independent of each
other.1

“ Thus” , concludes Sthiramati, “ one comprehends the nega­

tive definition, not o f the imagination o f the unreal, but o f the
imagined forms, namely the forms o f the graspable and the
grasper” .2
The next stanza is almost a repetition o f the previous one in
another fashion. The first half o f the stanza reads:

[ M V K I. 8 ] Therefore it remains established

That perception has the same nature
As non-perception.3

1. ldatn-vijrmbti-mi.tram-dlambana-artha-rahilam sva-bJjaparipakad ru-

padi-abhasam vijnanam pravartate na tu nlpadiJicniho' sti-iti-evam grdhaka-upa-
labdhim niSritya grahya-anupalabdhim pravisati. .Yatha na vijnanad bahih pari-
kalpitam grahyam-asii-iti vijhapti-matrala-balena tnano grahya-abhdvam praviiati,
tatha grahya-abhdva-balena vijnapti-malrasya-api abhdvam-pratipadyate. JVa
grahya-abhdve grdhakatvam yujyate. Grahyam apeksya lad-grahakasya vyapasthd-
panat. . . Grdhya-grahakayoh paraspara-nirapeksatvdt. M V K B T I
2. Evam-asal-laksanam grdhya-grahakayoh. parikalpita-rupayoh pravUati,
na-abhutaparikalpasya-iti darsanam bhavati. Ib id
3. Upalabdhes-latah siddha nopalabdhi-svabhdvata. M V K 1.8
Wherefore ? “ Because"’, says Vasubandhu, “ there being no per­
ceivable things, there is no possibility o f having perception
either” .1 It must be particularly noted that Vasubandhu is
speaking about the absence o f “ perceivable objects” (upalabhya-
artha-abhava) , not o f things-in-themselves. There could well be
things-in-themselves, independently o f the perceiving subject, but
they are not perceivable. And what are thought to be perceived
are not things as they are, but only one’s own mental
constructions. Hence the second half o f the stanza:

[ M V K I. 8 cont’d. ] Therefore the sameness

O f non-perception and perception
Should be recognized.2

Wherefore ? “ Because” , says Vasubandhu, “ perception as such

is not obtained” .3 He means that a perception is properly so
called ( upalabdhir-upalabdhitvena) only when it reaches real objects
existing independently of the perceiving subject. As there is no
perception that reaches real objects, i.e. things-in-themselves,
no perception can be properly so called. Hence what is usually
called perception is in fact non-perception. Why then is it called
perception at all ? Vasubandhu continues his commentary,
“ Though not having the own-nature. o f perception, still it is
called perception because there are the appearances o f unreal
objects.” 4 That is, the so-called perceptions perceive the
unreal objects (abhuta-artha-pratibhasa), and thus the name
‘perception’ is somehow justified, too. What is ultimately
conveyed by this stanza is that, as Sthiramati notes, “ to say
that one does not perceive objects is the same as to say that
one perceives only representation o f consciousness.” 5
The next stanza is a further look at the contents o f the
imagination o f the unreal. Vasubandhu calls it the classification

1. Upalabhya-artha-abhave upalabdhyayogal. M VK 1.8

2. •Tasmac-ca samata jneya nopalambha-upalambhayoh. M VK 1.8
3. Upalabdhir-upalabdhitnena-asiddlid
4. Abhuta-artha-pratibhasaiaya tu-upalabdhir-ili-ucyate’ nupatabdhi-svabhava-
api salt. M VKB 1.8
5. Artha-anupalambhasya viiflapti-matrata-upalambhasya ca-satvad-avisesatah.
M VKBT 1.8
definition (prabheda-lakfanam). Introducing the first half o f
the stanza he says, “ Now follows the classification-definition o f
the same imagination o f the unreal” .1 The first half o f the
stanza reads:

[ M V K 1.9 ] The imagination o f the unreal

Is citta as well as caittas,
Belonging to all three worlds.2

Commenting on it Vasubandhu says that the three worlds,

refer to “ the distinction between the worlds o f passion, forms,
and formless beings” .3 That the imagination o f the unreal
(abhuta-parikalpa) includes whatever is called ‘mind’ and
‘mental’ in western thought has already been repeatedly said.
The above lines are a clear statement o f the same point: the
imagination o f the unreal is nothing but the mind (citta) and
the mental factors ( caittas), no matter to which o f the three
modes of existence they belong.
Introducing the second half o f the stanza Vasubandu
says, “ Now follows the synonym-definition” .4 It says how
citta and caittas operate, and therefore serves as a synonymous
description o f the imagination o f the unreal. Hence the name
‘synonym-definition’ (parydya-laksanam). It reads as follows:

[M V K 1.9 cont’d .] There, perception o f objects is con­

sciousness, And perception o f their qualities
is mental factors.5

Vasubandhu then comments :

Consciousness is perception o f just the objects. The mental

factors, namely, feeling etc., are the perception o f the quali­
ties of the same objects.6

1. Tasya-eva-iddmm-abhuta-parikalpasya prabheda-laksanam khyapayati.

MVKB 1.9
2. Abhuta-parikalpas-ca citta-caittas-tridhdtukah. M VK 1.9
3. Kama-rupa-arupya-avacara-bhedena.
4. Paryaya-lahartam khyapayati. M VKB 1.9
5. Tatra-artha-drslir-vijnanam tad-visese tu caitasah. M V K 1.9
6. Tatra-artha-matre drstir-vijnanam. Arthavisese drsfis-caitasah vedana-
dayah. MVKB 1.9
 Here one or two terminological clarifications are required.
First o f all, what are referred to as consciousness (vijnana) and
mental factors (caitasah) are respectively the mind (citta) and
mental factors (caittah) mentioned in the first half o f the same
stanza. Secondly, what are referred to as objects (artha) and
their qualities (viSefa) are respectively what are otherwise
called bhuta and bhautikas. BhStas are just the objects (artha-
matra) in the sense that they do not refer to the qualities
(vtiefas, characteristics) such as being pleasant, unpleasant
etc., while bhautikas are such qualities. Perception o f bhuta/
artha-mdtra is what is called vijnana/citta, while perception o f
their bhautikasjartha-viksa is called cetasajcaitta.1 In both cases
it is just the imagination o f the unreal (abhuta-parikalpa-matra),
for the object (artha) perceived (drffa), no matter whether it
is bhuta/artha-mdtra or bhautika/artha-viie$a, is only imaginary or
rather mentally constructed (parikalpita-svabhava). So Sthiramati
says, ‘Citta and caittas operate with reference to the own-
nature and qualities o f the things which though unreal are
imaginable. Citta and caittas, which are respectively the percep­
tion o f the own-nature and qualities o f objects, are themselves
the imagination o f the unreal, and therefore are synonyms o f
the latter.’2

The store-consciousness and the active consciousness

The next stanza introduces the distinction between the store-
consciousness (alaya-vijnana) and the active consciousness
(pravrtti-vijnana). They are both viewed as functions o f the
imagination o f the unreal, and in that sense Vasubandhu has
named this stanza the activity-definition (pravrtti-lakfanam) o f
abhuta-parikalpa. Introducing the stanza • he says, “ [T h e next
verse] states the activity-definition.” 3 The stanza reads:

1. . . . malra-sabdo visesa-nirasarthah. Tena-agrhita-viiesa vaslu-svarupamdtra-

upalabdhir-iti-arthah. . .tatra-ahladaka-paritdpakatvaviieso yas-tasya bhavasya yat-saum-
anasyadislhanam tad-grahariam vedarn. Stri-purusa-vyavahara-laksano yo'rtha-viiesas-tad-
grahariam sanjM . Evam-anye’p i yatha-yogam yojyah. M V K B T 1.9
2. Abhuta-parikalpya-vastunah svabhava-viiesa-parikalpanayd citta-caittanam pravrt-
tatvat. Arlha-svar upa-viSesa-drslii-citta-cailta-abh uta-parikalpai-ca-iti par -ya ya - antar-
bhutah. M VKBT 1.9
3. Pravrtti-laksanam ca khyapayati. M VKB 1.10
 [M V K I. 10] One is the source-consciousness,
And the other is the enjoyment-consciousness,
There, the mental factors are
Enjoyment, determination and motivation.1

Vasubandhu commenting on this stanza says:

The store-consciousness being the source o f other conscious­

nesses is called the source-consciousness. The active conscious­
ness, which has the latter as its source, is called the enjoy­
ment-consciousness. Enjoyment refers to feelings etc.,
determination to concept, and motivation to the conditioning
forces such as volition, attention etc., o f consciousness.2

Sthiramati places this stanza and the following one in the

context o f life-process. Pravrtti for him means process/movement.
When it is applied to life, he recognises two levels o f move­
ment: (i) movement from one moment t o t h e n e x t f o r m i n g a
series o f moments which is responsible for defilements and
enjoyments in the present life; (ii) movement from one life to
the next, which is responsible for the defilements o f kleia, karma
and janma. The present stanza, says Sthiramati, “ deals with the
former type o f movement, leaving the latter for the next stanza.
The concept o f movement involves that o f cause-effect rela­
tionship. In Buddhism, causality means, to put it rather naively,
one moment giving way to the next, or, in technical terms, the
rising o f one moment depending on the previous one (pratitya-
samutpada) . In any case such a view o f causality presupposes
the distinction between the causal moment and the resultant
moment. There being only the imagination o f the unreal
( abhUta-parikalpa-matra) how could one account for the distinc­
tion between cause and result (heiu-phala-prabhedam)? This,
according to Sthiramati, is the concern o f the present stanza.3

1. Ekam pratyata-vijndnam dsitiyam aupaihogikan

Upabhoga-pariccheda-prerakas-tatra cnitamh. M VK 1.10
2. Alaya-vijrumam-anyesam vijUdndndm pratyayatvdt pratyaya-vijndnam. Tat-
pralyayam pravrlti-vijrldnam-aupabhogikam. Upabhogo vedana. Paricehedah sanjhd.
Prerakah sarriskara vijndnasya cetand-manaskarddayah. M V K B 1.10
3. A bhuta -pirikalpa-mdtre 'nyasya ca-abhave hetu-phala-prabhedam na vijhdyala iti
tad-pratipadanartham pravrtti-lakfmmm-ca khyapayati. M V K B T 1.10
 According to him this stanza must be interpreted so as to
mean that it is the imagination o f the unreal itself that appears
as both cause and result ( hetuphal-bhdvena) J1 That is, the imagi­
nation o f the unreal on the one hand appears as the store-
consciousness, which functions as the causal source (hetu-pratyaya)
o f the active consciousnesses;2 the same imagination o f the unreal
appears on the other hand as the resultant active-consciousness.3
The sevenfold active consciousness is called enjoyment conscious­
ness (aupabh.ogik.am vijnanam) because it leads to enjoyment
(upabhoga-prayojakatvat) .* The mental factors (caitasajcaitta), too,
are part o f the resultant consciousness.5
Thus what the whole stanza is trying to establish is that
every sort o f consciousness, whether alaya-vijnana or pravrtti-
vijnana or caitta, is an expression o f the same imagination o f the
unreal. The imagination o f the unreal, transforming itself into
various types o f consciousness, each involving the subject-
object distinction, keeps one*s empiricaf life going from
moment to moment. A stream o f consciousness is what consti­
tutes the stream o f samsaric existence, and this is made possible
by the continuous imagination o f the unreal forms o f subjectivity
and objectivity.

The life-circle
Now it remains to explain in terms o f the same imagination
o f the unreal how one moves from one life to the next (janma-
mtara-pravrtti). This is done in the next two stanzas, which
according to Vasubandhu, “ state the defilment-definition” 8 o f
the imagination o f the unreal. It shows how by the operation o f
the imagination o f the unreal the defilements (sanklesa), namely
klesa, karma and janma, bring about the sufferings o f the world.7

1. Artena hetu-phda-bhavena-abhuta-parikalpa iti laksanam. M V K B T 1.10

2. Talra-ekam-iii-alaya-vijftdnam Sesamm vijndndnam hetu-praiyayabhdvena hetur-iti
pratyaya-vijiianam. Ibid .
3. Dvitiyam-aupabhogikam. .phalam iti vnkya-Sesah. Ib id
4. Sapta-vidham pravrlU-vijndnam-upabhoga-prayojakalidl aupabhogikam. Ibid
5. Tatra vijftime y e caitasds-U'pi tat-phalam-iti sambaiidhah. Ibid
6. Samkleia-laksartam-ca khyapayati. M VKB 1 .11
7. Klesa-harma-janma-sanklesa yatha pravartamdna jagdtaU pariklesdya bhavanli
. tat-saiikUsa-lakmnam. M V K B T 1.11
 Thus it shows “ how, although there is no substantial self, solely
from the imagination o f the unreal there arises the samsara" .1
The stanzas under reference may be translated as follows:

[M V K 1.11-12] The world is oppressed/defiled2

(1 ) By being concealed,
(2) By being raised,
( 3) Be being led,
(4) By being seized,
( 5 ) By being completed,
(6) By being trebly determined,
( 7 ) By enjoying,
(8) By being attracted,
( 9 ) By being bound,
(10) By being orientated, and
(11-12) By being subjected to suffering.'

This clearly is the Yogacarin’s version o f the twelve links

( iddana) o f the chain o f dependent origination (pratilya-samut-
pada) , which explain the ever-reverting process o f samsara. The
Sanskrit word translated here as “ world” is jagat. This term
literally means “ moving” or “ going” . So it is just another
word for sams&ra, meaning “ going round” . Sthiramati says,
“ Jagat is that which keeps going” .4 Just like the term samsara,
the term jagat, too, although it ordinarily refers to the world as
a whole, for all practical purposes refers to the individual
beings who constitute that world. Therefore the above-described
process o f oppression/defilment (sankleSa) by the twelve-linked

1. Tathd-ca asati-api-atmani abh uta-parikalpa-mdlrat samsarah prajayate

iti pradarianarlham khyapayati. Ib id .
2. Sthiramati points out that the verb klifyate in this context may be
taken either to mean pidyate(is oppressed)or to mean na vyavadayatc (is made
im pure): “ klifyata iti. .pidyata iti arthah. KlUyata iti na vyavaddyata iti-apare”
M V K B T I .'ll. Sthiramati personally. seems to prefer the first meaning,
namely, pidyate.
3. Chadanad-roparmc-ca nayandt samparigrahdt
Puranal tri-paricchedad-upabhogac-ca karfan&t. M V K 1 .11
jNlbandhanad-dbhimukhyad duhkhanat klisyate jagat. M V K 1.12
4. Gacchati-iti jagat. M V K B T .. 1.12
process o f dependent-origination should be understood as apply­
ing to each individual undergoing the experience o f samsara.
Vasubandhu interprets those twelve links as follows:
There,
(1) ‘by being concealed’ means ‘by being impeded by ignor­
ance from seeing things as they are’,
(2 ) ‘by being raised’ means ‘by the installation o f the
impressions o f deeds on consciousness by the condition­
ing forces’,
(3) ‘by being led’ means’ ‘by being taken by consciousness
to the place o f re-birth’,
(4) ‘by being seized’ means ‘ [b y being seized] by the nama
and rBpa o f egohood,
(5) ‘ by being completed’ means ‘ [b y being completed] by
the six organs’ ,
(6) ‘by being trebly determined’ means ‘ [b y being trebly
determined] by contact’ ,1
(7) ‘by enjoying’ means ‘by feeling’,
(8) ‘by being attracted’ means ‘ [b y being attracted]by
the desire for a new existence the seeds o f which have
already been sown by previous deeds’,
(9) ‘by being bound’ means ‘ [b y being bound] by the
inclinations towards sense-pleasure etc., which are con­
ducive to a new birth o f the consciousness’ ,
(10) ‘by being orientated’ means ‘by making the deeds o f
former existence tend to manifest their matured fruits
in a new existence’,
(11-12) ‘by being subjected to suffering’ means ‘ [b y being
subjected ] to birth, old age and death’ .
By all these is the world oppressed/defiled.2

1. H ere ‘ contact’ (sparsa) m eans ‘sensation’ w h ich is trebly determ ined

( pariccheda) by indriya, visaya an d vijnana: (See M V K B T 1.1)
2. Tatra-
Chadanad— avidyaya yaiha-bh uta-darSana-avabandhanat.
Ropanat— samskarair-vijnane karma-vdsandyali pralisthupanat.
Nayandt— vijndnena-upapatli-sthdna-samprdpandt.
Samparigrahandt— nama-rupena-dtmabhdvasya.
puranat— sad-ayatanena.
 [ The same stanza continues: ]

[M V K 1.12 The oppressives/defilements,

cont’d. ] All proceeding from the imagination o f the
unreal,
Could be classified
Either into three groups,
O r into two groups,
O r into seven groups.1

Vasubandhu’s commentary on these lines reads as follows:

The classification o f the oppressives/defilements into three
groups is as follows:
1.
Oppressive opressors, namely ignorance, desire and
inclinations;
2. Deed-oppressives, namely conditioning forces and exist­
ence/birth;
3. Birth-oppressives, namely the remaining members.
The classification o f the oppressives/defilements into two
groups is as follows:
1. Causal oppressives/defilements which include the groups
o f oppressive oppressors, and deed-oppressives;
2. Resultant oppressives which are the same as the birth-
oppressives.
The classification o f tlie oppressives/defilements into seven
groups refer to the seven kinds o f causes such as:
1. cause o f error, namely ignorance,
2. cause o f sowing o f seeds, namely conditioning forces,
3. cause o f direction, namely consciousness,
4. cause o f seizure, namely nama-rupa and the six bases,
5. cause o f enjoyment, namely contact and feeling,

Tri-paricchedat— sparlena.
Upabhogat— vedanaya.
Karsanat— Trsnayd karma-aksiptasya punar-bhavasya.
Nibandhandt-—updddnair-vijiUinasya-utpatti-anukuUsu kamadisu.
Abhimukhyat— bhavena krtasya karmamh punar-bhme vipakaddnaya-abhimukhi-
karanat.
Duhkhanat—jatyd jara-maramna ca parikliSyate jagat.
1. Tredha dvedha ca sankleSah sapladha-abhutakalpan&t V K 1.12
 6. cause o f attraction, namely desire, inclination
existence,
7. cause o f unrest, namely birth, old age and death.
All these oppressives/defilements operate due to the imagina­
tion o f the unreal.1
What is to be particularly noticed here is the fact that the
entire sankleSa, which is just another name for samsara,2' is traced
to the imagination o f the unreal.® This is so, because, as already
explained, the experience o f sarrisdralsankleSa is ultimately the
passion for graspable-grasper distinction,4 which depends
entirely on the imagination o f the unreal.8 Sthiramati derives
the same conclusion in a different way:

All these oppressives/defilements operate due to the imagina­

tion o f the unreal, because the oppressives/defilements depend
on citta and caittas, about which it has been said:

The imagination o f the unreal

Is citta as well as caittas
Belonging to all three worlds. (M V K 1.9)4

1. Tredhd sankleSah— kUSa-sanklesah, karma-sankleiah janma-sankleiaS-ca. Tatra

klesa-sankleio’ vidya-trsnopdddndni. Kanma-sankUfah samskara-bhavaS ca. Janma-sankleSan
sesdni-angdni.
Dvedhd sankleiah— Hetu-sanklesah phala-sankleSaS-ca. Tatra hetu-sankleSah kUSa-
karma-svabhdvair-afigaih. Phala-sankleias-ca Sesaih.
Saptadhd sanklesah saptavidho hetuh : viparyasa-hetuh, akfepa-hetuh, upanaya-
hetuh, parigraha-heluh, upabhoga-hetuh, dkarfana-hetuh, udvega-hetuS-ca. Tatra mparyasa-
hetur-avidya. Aksepa-hetuh samskarah. Upanaya-hetur-vijiidnam. Parigraha-hetur-ndma-
rupa-sad-ayatane. Upabhoga-hetuh sparia-vedanc. Akarsatia-hetus-tr}nopdddndbhdvah.
Udvega-hetur-jali-jara-maraiie.
SarvaS-ca-esa sankleso'bh uta-parikalpat pravartata iti. M V K B 1.12
2. See the equation above on page 38
3. Sarvasca esasankleso'bhuta-parikalpiit pravartate. M V K B 1.12
Also, Tredhd dvedhd ca sanklesah saptadhd-abh uta-parikalpanat. M V K 1.12
4. For example, see above pp. 38 ff
5. Abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M VKB 1.2
6. Sarve-ca-ete sanklesd abhitta-parikalpdt pravartante iti dtta-caitta-
asrayatvat sankleSasya. Uktam hi tat, abhuta-parikalpaS-ca citta-caittas-tridhdtukah
{Ka. 1.9) it,. M V K B T 1.12
The summary-meaning o f the imagination o f the unreal
Vasubandhu now winds up the discussion on the imagination
o f the unreal by recalling the various definitions o f it:

The ninefold definition, giving the summary-meaning o f the

imagination o f the unreal, has f now ] been explained. Those
definitions are, namely, positive definition, negative definition,
own-definition, inclusive definition, instrumental definition,
classification-definition, synonym-definition, activity-definition
and the defilment-definition.1

3. The Emptiness

From the next stanza onwards one has the discussion on the
emptiness (Sunyata), which has already been described as “ that
state o f the imagination o f the unreal which is lacking in the
form o f being the graspable and grasper.” 2 Introducing the next
stanza Vasubandu says, “ Thus having explained the imagina­
tion o f the Unreal, the author now shows how the emptiness
should be understood.” 3

[ M V K 1.13] About the emptiness

One should summarily know
Its definition,
Its synonyms along with their meaning,
Its classification,
And the reason4 for its classification.5

1. Pindarthah punar-abk uta-parikalpasya navavidham laksartam paridipitam bhavati.

Sal-laksatfam, asal-laksanam, sva-lakfariam, sahgraha-laksanam, asallaksana-anupraveSa-
updya-laksartam, prabheda-laksanam, paryaya-lakfatiam, pravrttilakfanam, saM eia-
lakfanaH -ca. M VKB 1.^2
2. M V K B 1.2 See above page 30 and note 1 for the text.
3. Evam abhiitaparikalpam khyapayitvd yatha Sunyata vijneya tan-nirdisati.
M VKB 1.13
4. The term translated here as ‘reason’ is sadhanam, which ordinarily
means ‘a proof’. However, as Sthiramati has pointed out, in the present
context it means ‘reason’ (yukti) : sadhanam Sunyataprabheda-pradarianeyuktih.
M VKBT 1.13
5. Lak}anam-ca-athaparyayas-tadartho bheda eva ca
Sadharum-ca-iti vijHeyam Junyatdyah samasafah. M VK 1.13
 This is just an enumeration o f the various topics that are
going to be dealt with in the subsequent stanzas. First o f all
the author attempts a definition o f the emptiness. “ How the
definition o f the emptiness is to be understood P” 1

[M V K 1.14] The negation o f the pair

Is indeed the assertion o f such negation;
This is the definition o f the emptiness.2

That is, when one denies the existence o f the pair o f subject
and object, it amounts to the assertion that there is no such
pair. In other words, to say that there is the absence o f the
pair (dvaya-abhavah) is the same as to say that there is the
presence o f such absence ( abhavasya bhavah). Thus, by emptiness
is meant the positive state o f existence in which there is no
place for the duality between subjects and objects. Vasubandhu
comments.

There is the negation o f the pair o f the graspable and gras­

per. The definition o f emptiness then, is the assertion o f
that negation. Thus, it is showA how the emptiness is to be
defined in negative terms. And, what those negative terms are,®

is further stated:

[ M V K 1.14 It is neither [ total] assertion,

cont’d .] Nor [to ta l] negation.4

“ W hy not [tota l] assertion ? Because there is the negation

o f the pair o f subject and object. Why not [ total ] negation ?
Because there is the assertion o f the negation o f that pair.
This indeed is the definition o f the emptiness. Therefore, Wlth
reference to the imagination o f the unreal” 5 the emptiness is:

1. Katham lakfapam mjfleyam ? M V K B 1.14

2. Dvaya-abhavo hi-abhdvasya bhavah Sunyasya laksartam. M V K 1.14
3. Dvaya-gr&hya-grdhakasya-abhavah. Tasya ca-abhavasya bhavah iunya-
tayah lakfanam-iti-abhiiva-svabhdva-Lakfa(udvam Sunyatayah paridlpitam bhavati. TaS-
ca-asau tad-abhava-svabhavah sa— M V K B 1.14
4. Na bhdvo na-api ca-abhanah. M V K 1.14
5 . Katham na bhavah ? Tasmad dvayasya-abhavah. Katham na-abhavah ?
Yastnad dvaya-abhavasya bhavah. Etac-ca iunyatayah laksanam. Tasmad-abhiita-
parikalpat— M V K B 1.14
 [M V K 1.14 Neither different [from the imagination o f
cont’d .] the unreal],
Nor identical [w ith the imagination o f the
unreal].1

Vasubandhu explains it as follows:

I f different, it would imply that the ‘universal’ [ dha.rm.ata J

is other than the particular thing [dharmas], which is un­
acceptable. For example, ‘impermanence’ is not other than the
impermanent things, and the state o f suffering is not other
•than suffering itself. I f identical, there would be no place for
purifying knowledge, nor would there be the commonplace
knowledge. Thus is shown a definition which states that
emptiness is that which is free from being different from
thatness.2

Thus, Sunyata stands to abhuta-parikalpa just as dharmata stands to

dharma, or anityata to anityadharma, or duhkhata to duhkha. The
terms o f these pairs are not quite different from each other, nor
quite identical with each other. Similarly Sunyata. and abhuta-
parikalpa are neither quite different ( na-prthak) from each other,
nor quite identical ( na-eka) with each other. They are instead
just two different modes o f existence o f the same individual:
Sunyata refers to one’s mode o f existence in the state o f nirvana,
while abhUta-parikalpa refers to one’ s mode o f existence in the
state o f samsara. Thus both Sunyata and abhuta-parikalpa refer to-
the same individual. They are not, however, identical with each
other. If, for example, Sunyata were identical with abhuta-pari­
kalpa, it would mean either that one is always in the state o f
samsara, characterized by abhuta-parikalpa and that, therefore,
the idea o f purifying knowledge (viSuddhi-alambanamjnanam), which
is believed to lead one to the state o f nirvana, would make no
sense; or that one is always in the state o f nirvana, and
that, therefore, commonplace/empirical/conventional knowledge

1. Na-prthaktva-eka-laksariaTn. MVK 1.14

2. Prthaktve sati dharmad-anya dharmatd-iti na yujyate, anityata-duhkhata-
vat. Ekatve sati visuddhi-alambanam jnanam na syat sdmanya-laksanam-ca. Etena
taltva-anyatva-vinirmuktam laksartam paridipitam bhavati. M V K B 1.14
(sdmanya-lakfanam jndnam) , which is characteristic o f samsara
experience cannot occur at all.1 Sunyata, then is the bare reality
( tattvam) , characterized neither as subject nor as object. It
should be defined as nothing other than thatness.2
The next question is, “ how is the synonym [ o f emptiness]
to be understood?” ® Hence the next stanza:

[M V K 1.15] Suchness, the extreme limit o f existence,

The uncaused, absoluteness,
The source-reality:
These are summarily the synonyms of
emptiness.4

The next stanza explains, “ how is the meaning o f these

synonyms to be understood ?” *

[ M V K 1.16] The synoyms respectively mean [that the empti­

ness is]
Never otherwise,
Never falsified,
Never admitting a cause,
The object intuited by the sages,
And [that it is]
The source o f the powers o f the sages.8

Vasubandu interprets the above two stanzas as follows:

The emptiness is called suchness in the sense that it is never
otherwise insofar as it remains ever the same way. It is
called the extreme limit o f existence in the sense that it is never
falsified, because it is never an object o f doubts It is called
the uncaused, because it does not admit for itself any cause,
for it is far from having any cause whatsoever. It is called the

1. C f. M VKBT 1.14
2. Sunyata. . lallva-anyatva-vinirmukta-laksand. M VKBT 1.14
3. Katham paryayo vijneya ft ? MVKB 1.15
4. Tathata bh utakotii-ca-animittam paramdrthata
Dharma-dhatuS-ca paryaya iunyatayah samasatah. MVK 1.15
5. Katham paryaya-artho vijneyah ? M V K B 1 .16
6. Ananyatha-aviparyasa-tan-niroddha-arya-gocaraih
Hetutvac-ca-arya-dharmanam paryayartho yathakramam. M VK 1.16
 absoluteness/the ultimate object, because it is the object o f the
knowledge o f the sages, meaning that it is the object o f the
ultimate knowledge. It is called the source-reality, because
it is the source o f the powers o f the sages, meaning that
the powers o f the sages have their origin depending upon it:
here the term dhatu is used in the sense o f hetu, indeed.1

As I have already pointed out here there is no attempt to

describe emptiness in terms o f consciousness, which would
justify the interpretation o f the Yogacara system as idealism.2
Next, “ how is the classification o f the emptiness to be
understood” .3

[ M V K 1.17] It is defiled and purified;4

“ So is its classification. In what condition is it defiled, and

in what condition is it purified?” 6

[M V K 1.17 It is with and without impurities.9

cont’d. ]

That is, “ when it is with impurities, then it is defiled, and

when it is rid o f the impurities then it is purified.” 7Here the empti­
ness is considered as defiled ( sanklifta/samald) and pure ( viiuddha]
prahinamala) . However, this classification of the emptiness raises
a problem, which Vasubandhu formulates as follows: “ Getting
rid o f the impurities once associated with it [i.e. emptiness]

1. Arumyathdrthena tathata, nityam tatha-iti krtva. Aviparyasd-rthena bhuta-kotih,

viparyasa-avastutvat. Nimitta-noirodharthena animittatvam, sarva-nimitta-abhavat. Arya-
jflana-gocaratvat paramdrthah, parama-jMna-visayatvat. Arya-dharma-hetutvdd dharma-
dhatuh, arya-dharm&nam tadalambana-prabhavatvdt. Helu-artho hi-atra dhatu-arthah.
MVKB 1.16
2. See ab ove p age 6.
3. Katham sunyatayah prabhedo jHeyah ? M VKB 1.17
4. Sanklisfa ca vUuddha ca. MVK 1.17
5. Iti-asyah prabhedah. Kasydm-avasthdyam sanklisfa, kasyam-visuddha ? M V K B
1.17
6. Samala nirmald ca sd. M V K 1.17
7. Tada saha medena vartate lada sanklisfa. Yada prahinamala tada visuddhH.
MVKB 1.17
 implies that it [i.e. emptiness] is changing in character. How
is it then that it is still not impermanent ? Because its” 1—

[M V K 1.17 Purity is understood

cont’d. ] As the purity o f elemental water,
Gold and space.2

That is, elemental water (abdhatu), gold, and space are pure
by nature. However, they can be made impure by the addition
o f foreign matter. Such foreign matter cannot, however, change
their inner nature, but can only externally cover it, so to speak.
Moreover, to recover their original, pure, nature, one needs only
to remove that foreign matter, which will not imply any change
in the character o f water or gold or space. Similarly, the
stanza argues, the factors which are thought to constitute the
impurities o f the emptiness are only externals or accidentals
( agantuka) which do not affect it substantially. Nor does the
removal o f these accidental impurities (agantuka-malah) imply
any change in the character (dharma) o f the emptiness. Vasu­
bandhu, interpreting the above lines says, “ [T h e purity o f the
emptiness is recovered ] by shaking off the accidental impurities,
which does not mean a change in its own-nature” .3
The next stanza is trying to classify the emptiness from
another point o f view. Introducing it Vasubandhu says,

Here is another classification according to which there are

sixteen kinds o f emptiness:

(1) emptiness o f internal [elements],

(2 ) emptiness o f external [elements],
(3 ) emptiness o f internal as well as external [elements],
(4) emptiness o f the great,
(5) emptiness o f emptiness,
(6) emptiness o f the absolute object,
(7) emptiness o f the conditioned [ elements ],

1. Tadi samald bhutva nirmalS bhavati, katham vikara-dharmi(iitvddanityd na

bhavati? Tasmad-asyah— M V K B 1.17
2. Abdhatuka-naka-akasa-hddkivac-chuddhir-ifyate. M VK 1.17
3. Agantuka-mala-apagamdt, na tu tasydh svabhaua-anyatvam-bhavati. M VKB
1.17
 (8 ) emptiness o f the unconditioned [elements],
(9) emptiness o f the ultimate [elem ent],
(10) emptiness o f the eternal [ element ],
(11) emptiness o f the unforsaken [ element ],
(12) emptiness o f nature,
(13) emptiness o f defining marks,
(14) emptiness o f every power,
(15) emptiness o f negation,
(16) emptiness o f negation as own-nature.1

This enumeration o f the sixteen kinds o f emptinesses is an

attempt to show that all kinds o f characterizations are bound
to be only approximations, when they are applied to things in
themselves. There are different elements (dharmas), but their
characterizations as internal (adhyatma), external (bahya) etc., are
empty o f meaning. The elements in their suchness are just
things (vastuni) without any qualification. Their multipli­
city is accounted for not by different, predications, but merely
by numerical distinctions. “ That all elements are o f non-dual
form, is the general definition o f emptiness. The multiplicity
is shown on account o f the numerical multiplicity o f things, not
otherwise.” 2 This observation o f Sthiramati is important.
Right in the beginning o f this chapter it was made clear that
emptiness essentially consists in the absence o f the duality bet­
ween subjects and objects. In other words, emptiness means
that nothing can be characterized as subject or object. A strict
application o f this concept o f emptiness will demand that all
characterizations o f things as such and such are to be avoided.
For, any characterization o f a thing implies attribution o f some
kind o f objectivity to that thing. For example, when one says,
“ This is good” , one is characterizing “ this” as “ good” . In so

1. Ayam-aparah prabhedah— sodaiavidha sunyata. Adhyatma-sunyata, bahirdha-

Sunyatd, adhydtma-bahirdha-iunyatd, mahd-Sunyatd, iunyala-sunyatd, paramarlha-Sunyatd,
samskrta-Siinyatd, atyanta-sunyata, anavaragra-sunyatd, anavakara-funyata, prakrti-
lunyata, laksana-sunyatd, sarva-dharma-Sunyata, abhava-s unyatd,abhava-svabhava-Sunyatd
ca. M VKB 1.18
2. Sandnya-laksariam Sunyatayih sarva-dharmaya-advaya-svariipalvam. Nanyathd
ndnatvam sakyatc darSayitum-iti-ato vastu-naimtverm tan-ndndtvam darsayaii. M V K B T
1.18
 doing one is first o f all envisaging a distinction between the
subject “ this” and its predicate “ good” , which is just another
form o f subject-object distinction. Secondly, one is claiming
that one has experienced “ this” as “ good” , which again,
presupposes the distinction between the experiencing subject and
the experienced object. Thus the characterization o f “ this” as
“ good” violates the definition o f emptiness as the absence o f
duality in two ways: first by making a distinction between the
subject (i.e. “ this” ) , and the predicate (i.e. “ good” ) , and
secondly by making a distinction between the experiencing
subject, and the experienced object. This applies to all the
sixteen characterizations mentioned by Vasubandhu. All those
characterizations may be valid and useful from a commonplace
( samvrtijsamdnya-laksana/vyavahdrika) point o f view. But in the
abolute state o f existence one cannot think o f any characteriza­
tions which will distinguish the individual things ( vastuni)
from one another, although they are numerically different
things ( vastu-nanatvam).
“ All those kinds o f emptiness should be briefly understood” .1
Hence the next four stanzas.

[M V K I. 18] There is the emptiness o f the enjoyer,

Emptiness o f the enjoyed,
Emptiness o f the body [o f the enjoyer and
enjoyed],
Emptiness o f the basic thing,
Emptiness o f that by whichit [i.e. the emptiness
o f the enjoyer etc.] is perceived,
Emptiness o f the way in which it is perceived,
and
Emptiness o f that for which it is perceived.2

Here the first six kinds o f emptinesses correspond to the first

six o f the sixteen emptinesses enumerated above by Vasubandhu,
He, therefore, says:

1. Sa-esa samdsato veditavya. M V K B 1.18

2. Ifiio'ictr-btwjana-tad-deha-pratista-vastu-sunyaia
T a c -c a yena yalha drsfam yad-artham tasya Junyata. M V K 1.18
 Here, the emptiness o f the enjoyer means the emptiness o f the
internal senses etc., the emptiness o f the enjoyed means the
emptiness o f the external elements, the emptiness o f their
bodies, namely the Sariras which are the basis o f both the
enjoyer and the enjoyed, means the emptiness o f the internal
and the external elements. The basic thing means the uni­
verse which is the basis [ o f the enjoyer, the enjoyed and
their bodies]. Its emptiness is called the emptiness o f the great
because o f the vastness o f the universe. The emptiness o f the
internal senses etc. is perceived by the knowledge o f empti­
ness, whose emptiness is called the emptiness o f emptiness.
The emptiness o f internal senses is perceived as the absolute
object, whose emptiness is the emptiness o f the absolute
object.1

The last kind o f emptiness mentioned in the above stanza

(1.18) covers the last ten kinds o f emptinesses on Vasubandhu’s
list. Explaining it Vasubandhu says,

The emptiness o f that for which the Bodhisattva attains [ the

emptiness o f the internal senses etc.] is the [final] kind o f
emptiness. For what, indeed, is the emptiness o f the internal
senses etc. attained ?2

This question is answered as follows :

[ M V K 1.19 ] For the attainment o f the twofold prosperity.3

That is, for the attainment o f “ the conditioned as well as

the unconditioned fortune” .4 The emptiness o f the conditioned
as well as the linconditioned fortune corresponds respectively

1. Tatra bhoktr-Sunyatd adhyatmikani-ayatananyarabddha, bhojana-Sunyata

bahyani. Tad-dehas-tayor-bhokrlr-bhojanayor-yad-adhisthanam Sarvam lasya Sunyatd-
adhyatma-bahirdha Sunyata-iti-ucyate. Pratista-vastu bhajana-loka, lasya vislirna-
tmc-chunyata maha-iunyata-iti-iuyate. Tac-ca-adhydtmika-dyatanadi yena Sunyam drsjarn
Sunyatd-jSdnma, tasya Sunyata Sunyata-Sunyata. Tatha ca dr/fam paramartha-akarena
lasya Sunyata paramdrtha-Sunyata. M V K B 1.18
2. Tadartham-ca bodhisatvah prapadyate tasya ca Sunyata. Kimartham-ca prapadyate ?
M V K B I. 18-19
3. Subha-dvayasya praptyartham. M V K 1.19
4. KuSaiasya sartiskrtasya-asam^krtasya ca. M V K B 1.19
to “ the emptiness o f the conditioned” and “ the emptiness o f
the unconditioned” on Vasubandhu’s list.

[M V K 1.19 For the everlasting benefit o f the living beings.1

cont’d.]

That is “ for the ultimate benefit o f the living beings” 2, the

emptiness o f which has been referred to by Vasubandhu as “ the
emptiness o f the ultimate element” .

[ M V K 1.19 And for not leaving the samsara,3

cont’d. ]

That is, if one does not perceive the emptiness o f the internal
senses etc., then “ not seeing the emptiness o f the eternal samsara,
one, being depressed, would rather leave the world.” 4 The
emptiness o f ‘not leaving the samsara' has been referred to as
‘ ‘the emptiness o f the eternal [elem ent]” .

[ M V K 1.19 For the non-cessation o f fortune.®

cont’d. ]

“ Even in the absolute state o f nirvana there is something that

one does not give up, the emptiness o f which is called the empti­
ness o f the unforsaken.” 6

[M V K 1.20] For the purity o f the lineage.7

‘ ‘Lineage means nature, for it belongs to one’s own-nature.” 8

Its emptiness has been referred to as “ the emptiness o f nature” .

1. Sada sattva-hitaya ca. M V K 1.19

2. Atyanta-sattva-hitartham. M V K B 1.19
3. Samsara-atyajamrtham. M V K 1.19
4. Anavaragrasya hi samsarasya Sunyaiam-apaSyan khinnah samsaram parityajate.
M V K B 1.19
5. KuSalasya-aksa.ya.ya. M VK 1.19
6. NirupadhiSese nirvdne'pi yan-na-avikirati notsrjati tasya Sunyata anava-
kdra-Smyatd-iti-ucyate. M V K B 1.19
7. Gotrasya ca viSudhyartham. M VK 1.290
8. Gotram-hi prakrtih, svabhasikatndt. M V K B 1.20
 [M V K 1.20 F or attaining the defining marks.1
cont’d. ]

That is, “ for attaining the marks that are characteristic o f

great men.” 2 Its emptiness has been referred to as “ the empti­
ness o f defining marks” .

[M V K 1.20 And for the purity o f the powers o f an enlight-

cont’d.] ened one.
Does the Bodhisattva attain the emptiness o f
internal senses etc.*

Namely, for the purity o f the powers such as “ strength,

fearlessness, special endowments etc.” ,4 the emptiness o f which
has been referred to as “ the emptiness o f every power” . “ Thus,
indeed, the fact o f the fourteen kinds o f emptiness should be
known.” 5
The last two kinds o f emptiness are still to be explained,
which the next stanza does. “ What other kinds o f emptiness
are still there?” 6

[ M V K 1.21 ] The negation o f pudgala and dharmas,

Is indeed one kind o f emptiness there,
The existence o f that negation in it [ i.e. in
the enjoyer etc.]
Is another kind o f emptiness.7

Vasubandhu explains this stanza as follows:

The negation o fpudgala and dharmas is one emptiness. Another

kind o f emptiness is the existence o f that negation in the
above said enjoyer etc. These two kinds o f emptiness are
explained at the end in order to make the definition o f the

1. Lakfana-vyaKjana-dptaye. M V K 1.20
2. Mahdpurusa-lakafaodnam sa-amwyaf^anandm-prdptaye. M V K B 1.20
3. Suddhayc Buddha-dharamamm bodhisattvah prapadyate. M V K 1.20
4. BalavaiSdradya-avettikadindm. M V K B 1.20
5. Evam tdvac-caturdaSdndm Sunyatdndm vyasasthSnam veditavyam. M V K B 1.20
6. Ka punar-atra Sunyata ? M V K B 1.21
7. Pudgalasya-atha dharmdpdm-abhdoah Swryata-atra hi
Tadabhduasya sad-bhdms-tasmin sd Sunyatd-apard, M V K 1.21
 emptiness clear: in order to avoid the exaggeration of
pudgala and dharmas the emptiness is explained, on the one
hand, as the negation o f pudgala and dharmas, and in order to
avoid the underestimation o f their negation the emptiness is
explained, on the other hand, as having the negation o f
[pudgala and dharmas] for its own-nature. This is how the
classification of emptiness is to be understood.1 «

Here, as it is clear from Sthiramati’s commentary, pudgala and

dharma stand respectively for the subjective (bhoktr-sammata) and
objective ( bhogya-sammata) aspects o f experience. These two
aspects are merely imaginary (kalpita-lakfana) . Therefore they
are to be negated, and their negation is one kind o f emptiness.
However, their negation does not mean nihilism. On the
contrary, it points to a positive state o f existence which cannot
be characterized either as pudgalajbhoktr or as dharma/bhogya.
This positive state o f existence, which has negation for its own-
nature (abhava-svabhava) is the last and final sort o f emptiness.2
These two kinds o f emptiness have to be put together to cons­
truct a complete definition o f emptiness. Why ? Sthiramati
answers as follows:

If Sunyata as the negation [o f pudgala and dharmas ] is not

mentioned [in the definition], it would mean that there is
indeed the existence o f pudgala and dharmas, which in fact
are only o f imagined forms. If, on the other hand, SRnyati as
having the negation [ o f pudgala and dharmas] for its own-
nature is not mentioned, it would mean that there is not
even' the emptiness. Such negation o f the emptiness itself

1. Pudgala-dharma-abhavaS-ca Sunyata. Tad-abhavasya ca sad-bhauastasmin

yathokte bhoktradau sa anya Simyaia-iti Smyata-laksana-akhyanaartham dvividham-ante
Sunyatam vyavasthapayati-abhdm-SunyaUim-abhdoa-svabhdvaSunyatam-ca, pudgala-dharma
samaropasya tac-chunyata-apamdasya ca parihdrartham yathdkramam. Evam Simyatayah
prabhedo vijneyah. M V K B 1.21
2. Tatra-adhyatmikesu-ayatanesu vipaka-vijiiana-svabhavesu balandm bhoktrsammatesu
bhoktr-pudgalasya kalpitalaksandnam ca caksuradinam-abhavas-tadabhdvasya ca sad-
bluho'adhyiltnm-iurryata. . M V K B T 1.21
 would mean the existence o f the same pudgala and
dharmas.1

Therefore, it is necessary that the definition o f the emptiness

includes both abhava-Sunyata and abhava-svabhava-Sunyata as well.
O f the four topics mentioned in stanza 1.13, the last one,
namely, ‘the reason for the classification o f Sunydta’, now remains
to be discussed. This is what the next stanza does by showing
why Sunyata has to be classified into defiled (sanklisfa) and
purified (viSuddha), a classification mentioned in stanza 1.17.
“ How is the reason [ for such clasification ] to be understood ?” 2

[ M V K 1.22 ] I f it were not [ever] defiled,

Then all living beings would be [ ever]
liberated;
I f it were not [ever] purified,
Then all efforts for liberation would be futile.

The meaning o f this stanza is clear enough: it is necessary to

distinguish between the defiled and the purified aspects o f the
emptiness, in order to explain the distinction between samsara.
and nirvana. One is in the state o f samsara when one experiences
reality, which is otherwise called emptiness, as defiled, and
one is in the state o f nirvana when one experiences the same real­
ity as pure. So, S&nyata is considered defiled or purified depending
upon whether it is looked at from the sphere o f samsara and
nirvana. Interpreting the above stanza Vasubandhu says :

I f the emptiness o f elements would not be defiled by the

accidental ajid secondary defilments, even when.no remedy is
applied, then, since there are no defilements whatsoever, all
living beings would become liberated without any effort at
all. Again, if it would not become purified, even when some

1. Yadi-abhava-Sunyata ruxyeta parikalpita-svarupqyor-dharma-pudgalqyor-astitvam-

sva prasajyeta. Yadi-abhava-svabhava-Sunyata nqtyeta Sunyatayah abhdva eva prasajyeta.
Tad-abhavac-ca pudgda-dharmayoh purvavad bhavah syat. M VKBT 1.21
2. Katham sadhanam vijneyam? M V K B 1.22
3. Sahklisfa-ced bhaven-na-asau muktas-syuh sarva-dehinah
ViSuddha ced bhaven-na-asau vyayamo nifphalo bhavet. M V K 1.22
 remedy is applied, then the efforts towards liberation would
prove fruitless.1

In other words, the fact that some are not liberated while
others are, shows that the emptiness is looked at as defiled and
purified.
However, Sunyata, considered in itself, is neither defiled nor
purified. It is defiled or purified only with reference to the
way it is looked at. As Sthiramati says:

There, the defilement is on account o f the inclusion o f the

sankleSa-dharma, and the purity is on account of the grasping o f
the viSuddhi-dharma. On the contrary, neither defilement nor
purity issues directly from Sunyata, for the substance \dharmata]
depends for its manifestation on its attributes [ dharmas].2

What Sthiramati means by these words may be expressed

differently as follows; A substance (dharmata, reality) as such
is not perceived, but only in accordance with the attributes
( dharmas) imposed on it by the perceiver. If attributes o f defile­
ments are imposed on it, then it will be perceived as defiled
( sanklisfa), and if attributes o f purity are imposed on it, then
it will be perceived as purified ( viSuddha) . It then follows that
the distinction between the defiled and purified modes o f empti­
ness is only an epistemological one, and that the emptiness in
itself is neither defiled nor purified. This is explicitly stated in
the next stanza, which Vasubandhu introduces with the conjunc­
tion “ however” 3 to suggest its contrast from the previous
stanza.

[M V K 1.23] It is neither defiled nor undefiled,

Also, it is neither purified nor unpurified;4

1. Yadi sarva-dharmatfam Sunyata agantukair-upakleSair-anutpanne’p i pratipakse

na sanklisfa bhavet, sankleia-abhavad-ayatnata eva muktah sarva-sattva bhaveyuh.
Atha-utpanne’p i pratipakse na visuddha bhavet, moksdrthamarambho nisphalo bhavet.
M VKB 1.22
2. Aira sanklesadharma-upadanat sankleSo, viSuddhi-dharma-grahanad visuddhih.
N a tu Sunyatayah saksat sankleso viSuddhir-va-isyate, dharma-paratantratvad-dharm-
atayah. M VKBT 1.22
3. Evam-ca krtva. M V K B 1.23
4. N a klisfa na-api va-akliffa suddha-asuddha na ca-eva sd M V K 1.23
 “ How is it that it is neither defiled nor unpurified ? It is
so by its very nature.” 1

[M V K 1.23 Because o f the shining nature o f citta;2

cont’d]

Evidently, this line does not fit in with the context, because
it abruptly suggests citta to be another name for Sunyata, the
absolute state o f reality. Nowhere before, not even on the list o f
the synonyms o i SUnyata? was citta mentioned as another name
for Sunyata. On the contrary Vasubandhu has always used
the term citta to mean alaya-vijnana, or in conjunction with
caitta. Therefore, the present line sounds very much out o f
context. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that this is part o f
the original text. S. Yamaguchi, in his edition o f Madhyanta-
vibhaga-tika (Nagoya 1934) does not in fact consider it as part
o f the original stanza. Th. Stcherbatsky treats it as a Scrip­
tural quotation cited by Vasubandhu.5 It is quite possible,
indeed, that the original line is lost, and that the present
one is only a Scriptural quotation occurring in Vasu­
bandhu’s commentary, as Stcherbatsky’s translation suggests
Even so the problem about considering citta as another name for
SUnyata remains unsolved. Is it possible that Vasubandhu really
means that citta is another name for Sunyata? No, because it would
contradict his other passages which treat citta only as alaya-
vijnana, whiph operates only on the samsaric sphere. So, how
is one to understand the present line? Sthiramati, as if sensing
the problem, says that the term citta in the present context
should be taken to mean citta-dharmata.* This interpretation

1. Katham na ktiffa na-api ca-aSuddha? prakrtya-eva. M V K 1.23

2. Prabhasvaratvac-cittasya. M V K 1.23
3. Cf. M V K 1.15-16; (see above pages 75-76)
4. Cf. R . C. Pandeya, ed., Madhyanta-vibhdga-idstra, (Delhi, Varanasi,
Patna : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), p. 49, note 4.
5. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, trans., Madhyanta-vibhaga: Discourse on
Discrimination between Middle and Extremes, (Bibliotheca Buddhica X X X ,
1936; reprint, Calcutta ; Indian Studies, Past and Present, 1971), p. 215.
T h e reference is possibly to Anguttara-nikaya 1.10 : Prabhdsaram idam cittam ..
6. Atra ‘ca citta-dharmata-eva citta-Sabdena-ukta, cittasya-eva maltdaksanatvat.
M V K B T 1.23
solves the problem partly, for any element (dharma) in its abstract
state ( dharmata) is for the Yogacarins another name for the
absolute state o f Sunyata. Consequently, the element citta, in its
abstract state o f existence is no more the phenomenal intellect nor
the alayavijnana, but is the absolute state o f Sunyata. It is just
like the case o f abhuta-parikalpa which, once it is rid o f the
subject-object characterizations, turns out to be identical with
Sunyata..1 Thus, Sthiramati’s interpretation o f citta as citta-dhar-
mata somehow solves the problem at issue. However, it may be
still asked how the attribute ‘shining’ {prabhasvara) can be validly
applied to citta, which here means citta-dharmatajSunyata, for the
explanation o f the different kinds o f Sunyata (stanzas 18-22)
implied that no attribute whatsoever can validly be applied to
the thing-in-itself, for which the term Sunyata stands.2 I f so, how
can the attribute ‘shining’ (prabhasvara) be meaningfully
applied to citta-dharmataiSunyata. A possible answer to this
question may be that Vasubandhu, while quoting a traditional
passage, does not take the attribute ‘ shining’ in its literal sense,
but only in its metaphorical sense o f ‘par excellence.’ However,
I feel that the entire line under discussion can be interpreted in
a much simpler way. That ‘ the citta is o f shining nature can
be understood literally to mean that citta, i.e. alaya-vijnana,® is o f
shining nature (prabhasvara) sd that it leaves its reflections on
the things around, which consequently would look different
from what they really are. Then the first three lines o f the
present stanza would mean, the following:

Sunyata is neither defiled nor undefiled,

Also, it is neither purified nor unpurified,
It is neither defiled nor unpurified
Because the defilements and impurities,
Which are attributed to Sunyata,

1. Sunyata lasya abhuta-parikalpasya grdhya-grdhaka-bhavena virahitata. M V K B

1.2; see above pages 29 ff
2. See above pages 7 8 ff
3. In fact in one o f the Tibetan versions o f this stanza the term used
is st’ms. which means ataya-vijiidna. Cf. T h . Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 215,
note 162.
 Are only reflectiqps from citta,
Which is otherw^e called alaya-vijnana.
This latter is shining in nature, and, therefore,
Can cause'its ewn defiled and impure contents to reflect on
snnysrn,
Which will consequently appear as defiled and unpurified.

The final line o f the same stanza explains “ how is it [i.e.

sunyata] neither undefiled nor purified ?x

[M V K 1.23 Because o f the accidental character o f the

cont’d .] defilements.2

That is, the defilements attributed to sunyata are only some

accidentals which by no means affect it substantially. So the
Sunyata never really gets defiled or impure. Consequently the
removal o f those defilements, which means only a change in
the perceiver, rather than in the perceived Sunyata, cannot be
said to be an undefiling or purification o f Sunyata
“ Thus, the above-mentioned classification o f emptiness [into
defiled and purified] is justified.” 3
Finally Vasubandhu summarises the discussion on the empti­
ness as follows:

There, the summary-meaning o f emptiness is to be under­

stood under two heads: one, the definition [ o f emptiness], and
the other, the establishment [ o f the same definition]. There,
definition is, again, twofold: positive and negative. The
positive definition is likewise twofold: one, [ the assertion
that emptiness is ] neither assertion nor negation, two, [ the
assertion that emptiness is] that which is free from being
different from thatness. By the establishment [o f definition]
is to be understood the establishment o f synonyms o f emptiness

1. Katham na-aklisfa na Suddhd ? M V K B 1.23

2. KleSasya-agantukatvatah. M V K 1.23
3. Evam Sunyatdyah uddisfah prabhedah sadhito bhavati. M V K B 1.23
 etc. There, by the fourfold introduction o f the emptiness
the following four definitions o f it are intended : its own-
definition, operative-definition, defilement-purity-definition and
rationality-definition; these definitions help one respectively
to get rid o f uncertainty, fear, indolence and doubt.1

1. Tatra Sunyatdyah pinddrtho laksanato vyavasthdnalaS-ca vedilavyah. Tatra

laksanato bhdva-laksanato'bhdbva-laksa$ataS-ca. Bhava-tak$anam punarbhava-abhava-
vinirmukta-laksanatas-ca talva-anyatva-vinirmukta-laksanataS-ca. Vyavasthdnam punah
parydyadi-vyavasthanato veditavyam. Tatra-etayd caturprakara-deSanayd Sunyatdyah
sva-laksanam, karma-laksaoam, sankleSa-vyavadana-laksariam, yukti-laksariam-ca udbhavi-
tam bhavati : vikalpa-trasa-kausidya-vicikitsdnpasdntaye. M V K B I. (con clu sion )
 A TREATISE ON THE THREE NATURES
{TRI-SVABHIVA-NIRDESA)

1. Introduction
Tri-svabhava-nirdesa is a small treatise of thirty eight stanzas con­
centrating on the doctrine o f three natures. A theoretical expla­
nation o f the doctrine o f three natures, it sheds light on many
otherwise obscure points o f Vasubandhu’s view o f reality. It
states clearly what each o f the three natures stands for.
What interests me most in this text is that the entire doctrine
o f three natures hinges on the subject-object duality: That is,
the text explains each o f the three natures with reference to the
subject-object duality. Thus, for example,

(i) parinifpanna-svabhava (the absolutely accomplished

nature) is that state o f existence in which the indi­
vidual is characterized neither as a subject nor as.
an object;
(ii) paratantra-svabhava ( the other-dependent nature) is-
that state o f existence in which the individual is
bound to see things as distinguished into subjects-
and objects o f experience;
(iii) parikalpita-svabhava (the imagined nature) is that
state o f existence in which the individual is seen as an.
object or subject o f experience.

In other words, every individual in his absolutely accomplished

state o f existence (parinispanna-svabhava) is neither a subject nor
an object o f experience, but is reality as such ( tathata) ; then
h e slips into the unfortunate situation called samsara, where he
is led to find himself as the suject enjoying all else as objects o f
e x p e r ie n c e : this state o f existence being conditioned by the
 forces o f one’s own past deeds and habits, is called the other-
dependent [paratantra-svabhava); the forms o f sujectivity and ob­
jectivity that are projected on to the things by the individual in
the other-dependent state o f existence, are the imagined nature
(parikalpita-svabhava).
O f the three natures only parinifpanna and parikalpita have
any ontological pretensions. The former is the absolute state
o f existence, while the latter is the samsaric (phenomenal) state
ui cxYsVeiTce. in e paratantra svabhaoa, on the contrary, refers
essentially to the very act o f projecting the forms o f subjectivity
and objectivity, which every individual in the samsaric state is
bound to do. Hence it is variously called as parikalpa (the act
o f imagination), abhuta-parikalpa (the act o f imagining the un­
real forms), or simply as asat-kalpa (the act o f imagining the
non-existent). M y point is further confirmed by the fact that the
terms parinifpanna and parikalpita are past participles indicating
something concretely accomplished, while the term parikalpa is
only a verbal noun referring to an action.
However, in the last analysis, parinifpanna-svabhava alone has
any ontological status. Para-tantra-svabhava is but a character­
istic with which one’s samsaric existence is marked, and parikal-
pitasvabhava refers to the imaginary forms o f subjectivity and ob­
jectivity superimposed on things. Therefore, para-tantra-svabhava
and parikalpita-svabhava are both far from being ontological,
while parinispanna-svabhava is the ontological mode o f things.

2. The Three Natures

With these introductory remarks I shall now analyse the text.
I may start with a summary o f stanzas 1-5 as follows:
There are three natures such as the other-dependent (para­
tantra), the imagined (parikalpita) and the absolutely accomplished
(parinifpanna) ( Stanza 1). The other-dependent is citta which
imagines (i.e. mentally constructs) the non-existent ( asat-kalpa)
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity (stanza 5 ); it manifests
itself (khyati) (stanzas 2, 3 and 4) under the double form ( khyati-
doayatmana) (stanza 4) o f subjectivity and objectivity.
The imagined (parikalpita) is the form in which the other-
dependent manifests itself (yatha khyati sa kalpitah) (stanza 2 );
the form in which the latter manifests itself is evidently the
dual form (dvayatmana) o f subjectivity and objectivity; there­
fore it follows that the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava)
refers to the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity; its reality
depends entirely on its cause (i.e. the other-dependent nature,
which is the same as citta) and therefore is mere imagination
(pratyaya-adhina-vrttitvdt-kalpana-matra-bhdvatah) (stanza 3), and
as such it is totally non-existent (yatha ca Kaipayaii-annwii \uiuZ-
atyantam na vidyate) (stanza 5).
The absolutely accomplished nature (parinispanna-svabhava)
is the perpetual absence (sada-avidyamanata) o f the form in which
the other-dependent manifests itself ( tasya khyatur-yatha-akhyanam
yd sada-avidyamanata) ( stanza 3 ); it has already been said that
the form in which the other-dependent manifests itself is the dual
form o f subjectivity and objectivity; therefore it follows that
wherever there is the perpetual absence o f the forms o f subjec­
tivity and objectivity, there is the absolutely accomplished
nature o f things; in other words, in the realm o f the absolutely
accomplished nature o f things the subject-object distinction does
not apply at all; therefore, the absolutely accomplished nature
is characterized on the one hand by the absence o f the imagina­
tion o f unreal forms ( tasya asatkalpasya kd ndstita) and on the
other hand it is the very non-duality (advaya-dharmata) o f
subjectivity and objectivity (stanza 4 ); fixrther, the absolutely
accomplished nature can never be otherwise (parinifpanna-
svabhavo’ nanyathatvatali) (stanza 3).
What I want to point out here is this : what Vasubandhu
describes as imaginary (kalpita) or merely mental construction
(kalpana-matrabhava) or non-existent (fisat) or unreal (abhuta) or
phenomenal (pratibhasika) is just the subject-object duality, and
not by any means the plurality o f beings. Therefore there is no
sufficient reason to call his system monism. Again, what
Vasubandhu traces to thought (citta) or imagination (parikalpa),
is the same subject-object distinction, not the things in
themselves; the latter are there independent of any mental
activity by any being. Therefore, again, there is no sufficient
reason to call his system idealism.
A literal translation o f stanzas 1-5 would be as follows:
[TSN. 1] The imagined,
The other-dependent, and
 The absolutely accomplished:
These are the three natures,
Which should be thoroughly known by the wise.1

[TSN. 2] That which appears is the other-dependent,

For it depends on causal conditions;
The form in which it appears is the imagined,
For it is merely an imagination.2

[TSN . 3 ] The perpetual absence o f the form

In which the other-dependent appears,
Is to be understood as
The absolutely accomplished nature,
For it is never otherwise.3

[TSN. 4] What is it that appears ?

It is the imagination o f the non-existent.4
How does it appear?
In the form o f duality.
What will result from its non-existence ?
There will be the state o f non-duality.®

[TSN. 5] What is meant by the imagination o f the non­

existent ?
It is thought,
For by it (the subject-object duality) is imagined.
The form in which it imagines a thing,
Never at all exists as such.®

1. Kalpitah paraianlrai-ca parinispanna eva ca

Trayah svabhava dhlranam gambhira-jHeyam-isyate. TSN. 1
2. Yat-khyati paratantro'sou yatha khyati sa kalpitah
Pratyaya-adhina-vrttitvdt-kalpand-matra- bhdvatah. TSN. 2
3. Tasya khyatur-yatha-akhyanam y d sada-avidyamdnatd
Jheyah sa parinispanw-svabhavo'nanyathatvatah. TSN. 3
4. Abhuta-parikalpa, translated as ‘ the im agination o f the unreal’, appear­
ing in M V , is here replaced b y asat-kalpa, translated as ‘ the im agination o f the
non-existent’ . B oth terms, h ow ever, fo r the sam e con cept.
5. Tatra kim khyati-asatkalpah katham khyati dvayalmana
Tasya ka nastitd tern y d tatra’dvayadharmata. TSN . 4
6. Asat-kalpo’tra kaS-cittam yatas-tena hi kalpyatc
Yatha ca kalpayati-artham tathd-atyantam na vidyate. TSN . 5
 3. The O th e r-d e p e n d e n t Nature
Thus after having explained what each o f the three natures
refers to Vasubandhu now takes u p a short analysis o f the para-
t a n t r a -s v a b h a v a , which he said is the saine as «(ta. T h * analyse

L , throueh the next four stanzas. The contents o f these stanzas

----------------------------w --------- 1 -----■‘-1- * .* U ^ 1 ,1

have been discussed elsewhere2 unuct me uuc w

consciousness. So Vasubandhu is not introducing any new topic
here. But the present context has something special to say. For
the eight-fold consciousness is discussed here under the title
paratantra-svabhava, thereby showing that the latter includes
nothing more than the eight-fold consciousness. It could be
said, therefore, that paratantra-svabhava stands for what in the
Western terminology ‘mind’ and ‘mental activity’ stand for.
Consequently, just as mind and mental activities are not things
by themselves, so paratantra-svabhava, too, is not a thing by
itself. It rather indicates a disposition or a tendency or a charac­
teristic or an activity o f an individual in a particular mode o f
existence, namely, samsara.
Now, the translation o f the four stanzas under reference:

[TSN . 6 ] The citta takes on two modes, as cause and effect,

It is then respectively called
The store-consciousness and the active conscious­
ness,
The latter being seven-fold.3

[TSN. 7 ] The first is called citta, meaning ‘ collected’ ,

Because in it are collected the seeds
O f defilements and habits;
The second, however, is called citta,
Because it acts in diverse ways.4

1. TSN. 5
2. See b e lo w C hapt. 4 , see 3.
3 . Tad-hetu-phala-bhavma cittam dm-vidham isyale
Tad-aiaya-akhyam vijMnam pravrtti-akhyam ca saptadha. TSN.6
4 . SamkleSa-vdsana-bijais-cilaivdc-citlam-ucyate
Cittam-ddyam dviliyam tu citra-akara-pravrttilah. TSN.7
 [TSN. 8] Collectively [i.e. as a collection o f store-
consciousness and seven active conscious­
nesses]
It is the imagination o f the unreal [forms o f
subjectivity and objectivity];
That, too, is said to be three-fold :
Maturing, caused and phenomenal.1

[TSN. 9] O f them, the first, [namely the maturing one,]

Is the basic consciousness,
Because its nature is to become matured;
The others, [namely the caused and the pheno­
menal ones],
Are the active consciousness,
For, the latter for its reality, depends
On the knowledge o f the perceived-perceiver
distinction.2

Thus it becomes clear that paratantra-svabhava looked at from

one angle is the same as citta (stanza 6), and, looked at from
another angle it is the same as the imagination o f the unreal
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity ( abhuta-kalpa or abhuta-pari­
kalpa or asat-kalpa) (stanza 8).. In other words, para-tantra-svabhava
is treated hereunder two titles : citta and abhuta-parikalpa.
The title citta says, what the paratantra-svabhava is, so to say,
namely that it includes all sorts o f consciounesses and the mental
associates (Stanzas 6-7), and the title abhuta-parikalpa says, how
it functions, namely by constructing and projecting the subjective
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity (stanza 8 ). The abhuta-
parikalpa has three stages o f development : maturing (vaipakika),
caused (naxmittika) and phenomenal (pratibhasika). The vaipakika
stage evidently refers to the alaya-(or mula-) vijnana. What the
other two stages, naimittika and pratibhdsika, refer to becomes
clear in the light o f a parallel passage from Trirrdatika, which
says that the transformation o f consciousness happens in three
stages: vipSka, manana, and vijnaptir-vifayasya (maturing, thinking

1. Sanasato'bhutakalpah sa ca-esa trividho matah

Vaipdkikas-talha naimittiko’anyah pralibhasikah. T S N .8
2. Prathamo mula-vijflanam tad-vipakatmakam yatah
Anya/i pravrtti-vijHanam drSya-drg-vitti-vrttitah. T S N .9
and representation o f consciousness o f objects) ,r Here, too,
vipaka stands for alaya-vijnana.* And, manana and vijnaptir-vifayasya
in the last analysis turn out to be respectively self-consciousness
and object-consciousness.3 Correspondingly, in the present case
naimittika and pratibhdsika, too, have to be understood as self-
consciousness and object-consciousness. That naimittika refers to
self-consciousness is further suggested by a different reading in
one o f the Tibetan versions o f the text, which has ahankarika,
which literally means self-consciousness, instead o f naimittika.4
Then it is quite reasonable to argue that pratibhdsika, just as its
counterpart vijnaptir-vifayasya, refers to object-consciousness.
Thus it is more or less certain that naimittika and pratibhdsika in
the present context correspond respectively to self-consciousness
(manana) and object-consciousness ( vijnaptir-vifayasya) in TritnJa-
tika. It may be further asked, however, why self-consciousness
is described as naimittika ( caused), and object-consciousness as
pratibhdsika ( phenomenal). The answer to this question would
make the correspondence between the two sets o f concepts (naimit­
tika and pratibhdsika on the one hand, and manana and vijnaptir-
vifayasya on the other) complete. What I am trying to point out
is the fact that the description in TrirriSatikd has emphasized the
caused ( naimittika) nature o f manana (or mono nama vijnana) on the one
hand, and the phenomenal(prdtibhasi/ca) nature o f vijnaptir-vifayasya
on the other: it is clearly said there that the manana has dlaya-vijndna
for its ahaya and dlambana,5and that the vijnaptir-vifayasya (i.e. the
remaining six active consciousnesses) manifests itself, as it were,
under certain circumstances.6 However, this distinction should not
be stretched too far. For, in the last analysis Vasubandhu holds,
that both self-consciousness and object-consciousness are caused

1. . .paritfdmah sa ca tridha
Vipfiko mananahhyaS-ca vijfldplir-vifayasya ca. T rim s 1-2
2. Tatra-alaya-akhya vijHanam vipakak sarva-bijakam. Ib id . 2
3. See b e lo w C h a p . 4, S ec. 3.
4. See S. M u kh opadh yaya, The Trisvabhava-nirdeSa of Vasubandhu,
Sanskrit Text and Tibetan Versions Edited zvith an English Translation, Introduction»
and Vocabularies, (C alcu tta: V isvabharati, 1939), p . 2, note 5.
5. . . tad-aSritya pravartate
Tad-alambanam mano-nama vijHanam mananatmakam. T rim s. 5
6. PaRjandm mulavijhane yatha-pratyayam-udbhavah. Ib id . 15
Mano-vijnana-sambhutih sarvada . . . Ib id . 16
 as well as phenomenal. What the distinction ultimately says
may be this : self-consciousness is caused entirely from within by
the working o f the ‘ unconscious’, namely alaya-vijnana, while
object-consciousness emerges not entirely from within, but depend­
ing upon various conditions, external as well as internal.
There is one more significant remark to be made in this con­
texts ' active consciousness, whether it -s seif_consciousness or
objcct-consciousness, invariably depends on “ the knowledge o f
p e r c e iv e r -p e r c e iv e d d is tin c tio n -1 I t ls w o r th n o tic in g that
paratantra-svabhava, no matter whether it is considered as citta
or abhuta-parikalpa, ends up in active consciousness (pravrtti-
vijnana). And this active consciousness rests on the distinction
between perceiver and perceived, a distinction, unreal (abhuta or
asat) as it is, supplied by the para-tantra-svabhava. In other words,
paratantra-svabhava, which is essentially the act o f imagining the
unreal forms (abhuta-parikalpa), constructing and projecting the
unreal forms of subjectivity and objectivity, paves the way for
active consciousness.

4. Different, Yet Non-different

In the next few stanzas Vasubandhu shows how the three
natures are different from each other, but at the same time non-
different from each other. This is shown mostly by applying the
same terms to all three natures, but with different meanings or
senses. So apparently the description turns out to be a play on
words, although behind those words there are certain basic
convictions o f Vasubandhu. The central point seems to be that
an individual going through the three natures, does not ever
lose his continuity o f existence, only he is assuming different
modes o f existence. So it is the same individual, but different
modes o f existence. Again, the difference is more a question o f
the way in which one looks at things, than any substantial change
o f being : one in parinispanna-svabhava looks at things as they are
(yatha-bhuta), while one in para-tantra and parikalpita-svabhdvas
looks at them as subjects and objects. This in turn means that
the distinction between nirvana and samsara is basically only a

1. .pravrtti-oijm nam drjya-drg-vitli-vrtlilah. TSN.9

 matter o f view-point : one in the state o f nirvana views things
as they are in themselves, while one in the state o f samsara is
bound to view them as endowed with the forms o f subjectivity
and objectivity. Hence, the attainment o f nirvana turns out to
be a matter o f enlightenment (buddhata). That nirvana and samsSra
are ontologically the some reality, was already declared by
Lankavatara-sutra.1 Now Vasubandhu in the present text is
only stating the same thesis in his own way :

[TSN. 10] The profundity o f the three natures

Is indeed recognized, because
The defiled and the pure are each
Existent as well as non-existent,
Dual as well as unitary;
Also because
The three natures are not mutually different
In definition.®?8

Here “ the defiled” (sankleSa, literally meaning, defilement)

refers, as will be said later in stanza 17, to the para-tantra-svbhava
and pankalpitarsvabhava together, while “ the pure” ( vyavadana,
literally meaning, purity) refers to parinispanna-svabhava. So what
the stanza says is this : the three natures are all

(i) existent as well asnon-existent,

(ii) dual as well as unitary, and
(iii) not mutually different in definition,

and are, therefore, not really different from each other. How
this is so, is explained in the stanzas that follow.

1. StDnsara-mrv&rui-samatd. Lanka, p. 42, line 7.

2. The term ‘ definition’ (lakfaya) appearing here and in the subsequent
stanzas need not b e taken in the strict logical sense, but only as meaning
‘description’ .
3. Sad-maitvat-dxwya-ekatuai-sa/Odeia-vyaijaddnayoh.
Lakfapa-abhetfataS-ca-i}f& svabhavandm gambhirald. TSN.10
 Existent and non-existent
[ TSN. 11] The imagined nature is said
T o be defined both as existent and as non­
existent,
For, on the one hand it is grasped as existent,
While, on the other,
It is totally non-existent.1

That is, one in the state o f sarrisara takes imagined nature as

something really existing by itself, while in fact it is only one’s
own imagination, and therefore totally non-existent ( atyanta-
abhdva). As I have already explained,2 by imagined nature is
meant the subject-object duality. This subect-object duality,
although it is one’s own mental construction, is understood
by one as something that exists independently o f one’s mental
activity. Thus as an invariable factor o f samsaric experience
it exists, but not otherwise.

{TSN. 12] The other-dependent nature is said

T o be defined both as existent and as non­
existent,
For, it exists as an illusion,
It does not exist, though, in the form in which
it appears.3

The other-dependent nature is the act o f imagination whereby

one projects the unreal forms o f subjectivity and objectivity.4
Thus, as an act o f imagination it is a reality, illusory as it is,
and in that sense it exists, too. But the way it expresses itself,
namely the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, is totally non­
existent ( atyanta-abhdva) , as was said in the previous stanza. In
other words, the imagination o f the unreal forms ( abhuta-
parikalpa) is a fact o f samsaric existence, although those forms

1. Svatoena grhyate yasmad-atyanta-abhaua eva ca

Svabhavah kalpitas-tena sad-asal-laksam matah. TSN. 11
2. See above, pp. 91-92
3. Vidyate bhranti-bhdvena yathd-ahhyanam na vidyate
Paratantra yatas-tena sad-asat-laksapo matah. TSN. 12
4. See above, p. 91
have no extramental reality. This was stated already in M V K .
I. 2, which along with Vasubandhu’s commentary on it, I
paraphrased as follows

There exists the imagination o f the unreal,2

Namely the discrimination
Between the graspable and the grasper.3
However, there is no pair,4
such as the graspable and the grasper.5

[TST. 13] The absolutely accomplished nature is said

T o be defined both as existent and as non­
existent,
For, it exists as a state of non-duality,
It is also the non-existence o f duality.6

Here evidently Vasubandhu is playing with words. All that

he is saying in this stanza is that the absolutely accomplished
nature is unaffected by the duality between subject and object.
This same fact he expresses in negative as well as positive terms
so that one can say that the absolutely accomplished nature
exists as well as does not exist : it exists as non-duality, and it
does not exist as duality.

Dual and unitary

Thus after having shown how all three natures are both exis­
tent as well as non-existent, Vasubandhu nowproceeds to explain
how they are also both dual (dvaya) as well as unitary (eka).

[TSN. 14] The nature that is imagined by the ignorant

is said
To be both dual and unitary,

1. See above, p . 31
2. Abhuta-parikalpo’sti. M VK. 1.2
3. Talra-abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M VKB. 1.2
4. Dvayam tatra na vidyate. M VK 1.2
5. Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca. M VKB. 1.2
6. Advayatvena-yac-ca-asti dvayasya-abhava-eva ca
Svabhavas-tena nispannah. sad-asal-laksaiio matah. T S N . 13
 For, as it is imagined
A thing has two forms,
But as those two forms do not exist,
It is unitary.1

That is, the imagined nature is real only for the ignorant ( balah),
for it is just their mental creation. They imagine it as divided
into subjects and objects, and in this sense the imagined nature
is dual (dvaya). But as already established,2 subject-object
duality has no extra-mental reality, and therefore the imagined
nature is unitary (eka).

[TSN. 15] The other-dependent nature is said

T o be dual as well as unitary,
For, it appears in dual form,
While it has an illusory unity as well.3

That is, the other-dependent nature, which is just the imagina­

tion o f the unreal (abhuta-parikalpa) forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity, can be described in terms of duality as well as unity.
As said above, it appears in the forms o f duality4 between
subjectivity and objectivity,5 and therefore can be described as
dual. But in itself it is only a unitary act o f imagining the
illusory forms, and therefore, as M V K declares, there is no
duality within it.6 Thus in this latter sense it can be described
in terms o f unity, too.

[TSN. 16] The absolutely accomplished nature is said

T o be dual as well as unitary,
For, on the one hand,
It is by nature the absence o f duality,

1. Dvaividhyat-kalpita-arthasya tad-asatva-eka-bhavatah
Svabhavah kalpito balair-dvaya-ekatvatmako matah. T S N . 14
2. Yathd-ca kalpayati-artham tatha-atyantam na vidyate. TSN. 5
3. Prakhyanad-dvaya-bhavena bhrantimdtra-ekabhavatah
Svabhava paratantra-akhyo dvaya-ekatva-atmako. T S N . 15
4. Katham khyati ? dvaydtmana. T S N .4
5. Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca. M VKB. 1.2
6. Dvayam tatra na vidyate. MVK. 1.2
 And, on the other hand,
It is in the nature o f unity without duality.1

This stanza, too, is mostly a play on words, even a poor play on

words. The message o f the whole stanza is just that the abso-
lutely accomplished nature is absolute unity without any taint
o f duality. This Vasubandhu expresses in two ways, namely,
(i) that it is negation o f duality (dvaya-abhava-svabhava),
and
(ii) that it is unity without duality ( advaya-eka-svabhava) .
Thus he somehow manages to describe the absolutely accom-
lished nature in terms o f duality (i.e. dvaya-abhava-svabhava),
a n d also in terms o f unity (i.e. advaya-eka-svabhava). But from
stanza 10 one expected him to show that the absolutely accom­
plished nature is both dual and unitary, which he fails to do.
The text itself is very ambiguous, having two different,
contradictory, readings :2

(i) Mahayana-sutra-alankara and one o f the Tibetan versions

read ‘dvaya-bhava-svabhavd' instead o f ‘dvaya-abhava-sva­
bhava'', the former reading being obviously unacceptable.
(ii) Another Tibetan version reads it ‘dvaya-abhava.’, which
in meaning is not substantially different from ‘ dvaya-
abha.va-svabha.vd. This latter phrase is the one re­
constructed by S. Mukhopadhyaya,3 and I have
accepted it for my interpretation.

The next stanza further clarifies the distinction between the

defiled (sanklefa-lakfana) and pure (vyavadana-lakfatia) already
mentioned in stanza 10.

[TSN. 17] What is to be known as being defined

As defilement are the imagined and the other-
dependent natures,

1. Dvaya-c&hava-svabhavatoad-advaya-eka-svabhamlah
Svabhavah parinispanno dvaya-ekatva-atmako month. T S N . 16
2. S. M ukh opadh yaya, op .cit., p . 3, n.6
3. Ibid.
 While the absolutely accomplished nature
Is recognized as the definition o f purity.1

What is conveyed by this stanza is simply that (i) the imagi­

ned nature(parikalpila-svabhava) and other-dependent nature (para­
tantra-svabhava) are defined as (i.e., characterized by) defilement
(saftklefa-lakfanam), while (ii)the absolutely accomplished nature
is defined as (i.e. characterized by) purity (vyavadana-lakfanam).
The text, o f course, has this second part in a different way. In­
stead o f saying that the absolutely accomplished nature is defined
as purity, it says in effect that the absolutely accomplished
nature is the definition o f purity ( vyavadanasya lakfanam). It
implies that purity is defined as the absolutely accomplished
nature rather than the other way round. However, I feel that
Vasubandhu is not very serious about this change o f words:
whether he says that the absolutely accomplished nature is de­
fined as purity, or that purity is defined as the absolutely accom­
plished nature, he should be meaning the same thing, because
with reference to the absolute state o f existence, which the
absolutely accomplished nature refers to, one cannot possibly
make a clear distinction between the subject and predicate o f a
statement.
However, by distinguishing the three natures into just two
groups, namely, sankleSa-lakfana and vyavadana-lakfana, the present
stanza makes an important point. It thereby suggests that
although one can speak o f three natures, as a matter o f fact there
are only two o f them: parikalpita and paratantra, which are
sankleSa-laksana on the one hand, and parinifpanna, which
is vyavadanalakfana on the other. In other words, by describing
both parikalpita-svabhava and paratantra-svabhAva equally as
sanklefa-lakfana, Vasubandhu is somehow admitting that the
distinction between paratantra-svabhava and parikalpita-svabhava is
not to be taken too seriously, but only in an operational sense.
I have already pointed this out above on page 91.

1. Kalpitah paratantrai-ca jHeyam sankleSa-laksanam

Parinispanna isfas-tu vyavadanasya laksanam. TSN .17
Not mutually different in definition
So far Vasubandhu has been trying to show that each o f the
three natures can be described as both existent and non-existent
on the one hand, and as both dua] and unitary on the other.
Now in the next four stanzas he says how the three natures
are not mutually different in definition (abhinna-lakfana) . This
discussion is only an extension of, or conclusion from, the above
one, and says that all three natures being describable using the
same terms such as ‘existent and non-existent’ and ‘dual and
unitary’ , cannot be mutually different in definition :

[T§N . 18] The absolutely accomplished nature

Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the imagined
nature,
For, the latter being in the nature o f unreal
duality,
Is by nature the absence of that duality.1

Stanza 3 described the absolutely accomplished nature as the

perpetual absence (sada-avidyamanata) o f the dual form,2 arid
stanza 5 described it as the very state o f non-duality ( adaaya-
dharmata) .• Now the present stanza shows that the duality
o f the imagined nature is unreal ( asat), and that, therefore,
the imagined nature, too, “ is by nature the absence o f that
duality” . Thus Vasubandhu is showing that the absolutely
accomplished nature and the imagined nature are not different
from each other in definition, both being defined as ‘ the absence
o f duality’ . However, what Vasubandhu is trying to get across
should be that in the final analysis there is only the absolutely
accomplished nature, the imagined one being only a miscons­
truction o f it. In other words, one should not understand that
those two natures are two separate levels o f reality, but as one
-and the same reality, which is essentially non-dual, but mis-

1. Asad-dvaya-suabhavatvat-tad-abhava-svabhavatah
Svabhaval-kalpitaj-jrkyo parinispanno’ bhinna-laksanah. T S N . 18
2. See a b o v e , p a g e 93
3. See above, page 93
constructed as having two forms, namely subjectivity and
objectivity.
The next stanza is making the same point as above in another
way. It says how the imagined nature is not different from
the absolutely accomplished one, while the previous stanza puts
it the other way round.

[TSN. 19] The imagined nature, too,

Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the absolutely
accomplished one,
For, the latter being in the nature o f non­
duality,
Is by nature the absence o f duality.1

The next two stanzas show how the other-dependent nature

and the absolutely accomplished nature are not mutually differ­
ent in definition. Here, too, the absence o f duality is the point
o f comparison.

[TSN. 20] The absolutely accomplished nature

Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the other-
dependent nature,
For, the latter being non-existent in the form
in which it appears,
Is by nature the non-existence o f that form.2

Here the emphasis is on the form in which the other-dependent

nature manifests itself (yatha-akhyanam). It is this form that
makes the other-dependent somehow different from the abso­
lutely accomplished one. But this form being just imaginary
(kalpita) , and therefore non-existent ( asat), the stanza says, the
difference between those two natures turns out to be nil. What is
the formin which the other-dependent manifests itself ? Stanza 4

1. Advayatva-svabhavatvad-dvaya-abhava-svabhavatah
Nispannai-kalpitai-ca-eva vijneyo’ bhinna-laksanah. T S N .1 9
2. Yatha-akhyanam-asad-bhavdt-tatha’satva-svabhavatah
Svabhavat-para-tantrdkhyan-nispanno’bkmna-laksanah. T S N .20
above says that the form in which the other-dependent appears is
duality,1 and also that from the non-existence (nastita) o f
that form there results the state of non-duality ( advaya-dhar-
mata),2 which is the same as the absolutely accomplished nature.
Thus the present stanza Vs wmf o f stanza 4 ‘
A remark that I made above3 about the reality o f the other-
dependent nature becomes all the clearer in the present stanza,
namely, that the other-dependent nature is only the act o f im­
agining the unreal forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, and
that therefore it has no reality apart from those forms, which
are the same as the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava).
Further, what I said about the non-difference between the
absolutely accomplished nature and the imagined nature, namely
that they are not ju^t non-different, but one and the same real­
ity,4 applies also to the non-difference between the absolutely
accomplished nature and the other-dependent nature. That is,
the latter two natures are not two separate realities, not even
two separate levels o f reality, but just one reality, the other-
dependent nature being only an operational form o f the abso-
'lU eiv, i kIi ed o n e.
The next stanza repeats differently what was said in the pre­
vious one

[TSN. 21] The other-dependent nature, too,

Is to be undrstood
As not different in definition from the absolutely
accomplished one,
For, the former being in the nature o f non­
existent duality,
Is b y nature non-existent in the form m w hich
it appears.5

1. Katham khyati ? dvaydtmana. T S N .4

2* Tasya ka nastita tena y a tatra’dvaya-dharmatd. T S N .4

3. See a b o v e , p age 91

4. See a b o v e , p age 1 . <j.akhyam-abhavatah,

5. Asat-dmya-smbhavatvat-yatha-akhyana-asvaonavaiari1
Nifpanndt-pa
 5. How to Evaluate and Understand
the Three Natures P

In the next five stanzas Vasubandhu discusses the three

natures from a practical point o f view, first in terms o f conven­
tion ( vyavahara), and then in terms o f understanding (praveSa).
How are the three natures to be explained in terms o f conven­
tion ( vyavahara) ? And how does one treading the path towards
enlightenment come to realize the reality or unreality o f each
nature ? These are the two questions Vasubandhu is going to
discuss briefly now. Introducing them he says :

[TSN. 22] For the sake o f proficiency

A particular order o f the natures
Is recommended, which takes into account
The conventions [about them] , and
How one understands them.1

Here Vasubandhu is suggesting a particular order (krama-

bheda) o f considering the three natures (svabhavanam), which he
thinks will be convenient for those who want to acquire pro­
ficiency ( vyutpatti) in the science o f the three natures. The term
krama-bhedah, here translated as ‘a particular order’ , ordinarily
would mean ‘ a change in the order’, which obviously does not
fit in with the context. T o be sure, here Vasubandhu does not
at all introduce any detectable ‘change o f order’ in dealing with
the three natures. Hence I have taken the term bheda to mean
‘particularity’ or ‘speciality’ , rather than ‘ change’ or ‘difference’ .
T o attach the term bheda to nouns to indicate that what is under
reference is something particular or special or different, is not
unusual in Sanskrit literature. Thus, for example, ‘artha-bheda'
would mean ‘a particular thing’ or ‘a particular meaning’ .
Similarly, in the present case krama-bheda means the particular
order, in which Vasubandhu is going to speak o f the three
natures. This is suggested also by a different reading in one o f
the Tibetan versions. It reads krama bhava instead o f krama-bhedah

1. Krama-bhedah svabhavanam vyavahara-adhikaratah

Tad-praveSa-adhikarac-ca vyutpatlyartham vidhiyate. T S N . 22
2. See S. M u k h op a d h ya y a, o p . cit. p . 4 , n . 4
The former reading can be very well taken to mean ‘ the appa­
rent order’ in which tne inree fia?Jres are to be treated.
Vasubandhu adoots this oarticular or<^er ln dealing with the
three natures, in the first place, with a view to helping those
who want to acquire proficiency ( vyutpatti) in this matter.
Secondly, the order is based on two considerations : (i) how
the three natures are to be explained in terms o f convention
(:vyavahara-adhikaratah), and (ii) how one can gradually come
to realize the facts about the three natures (pravela-adhikaratah).
How can one explain the three natures
tion (vyavahara-adhikaratah) ? The answer is

[TSN. 23] The imagined nature is essentially o f conven­

tional values
The other, [namely the other-dependent
nature],
Is essentially that which brings about such con­
ventional values
And the third, [namely the absolutely ac­
complished nature],
Is the nature freed o f all conventional values.1

The term vyavahara, literally meaning -Denavium’ Z",

or ‘usage’, is a technical term used in philosophy to mean
■
“convention’ or ‘ practice’ . Thus* the phrase vyavahara-salya would
mean ‘truthwhich has only a conventional or practical applica­
tion.’ Similarly, in the present staza Vasubanhu is considering the
natures from a conventional or practical point o f view. And this
enables him to make the idea o f the three natures much
clearer than ever before. Thus the picture o f the three natures,
that comes out o f the present stanza, is as follows :
The imagined nature, which has already been established as
none other than the subject-object distinction, is only a con­
ventional reality. That means, it is what the common man out
o f ignorance takes for granted. However, as long as he is in the
state o f samsara, it is not only useful for him, but also is the very

“ — W parah
1. tialpito vyavandra-atma vyavananr-umn . TSN 23
raison d'etre o f his existence in the state o f samsara. For, as I have
already explained,1 on the one hand, the basic experience o f
samsara is that o f subject-object distinction, and, on the other
hand, all other experiences in the state o f samsara can be reduced
to that basic experience. Therefore, the imagined nature, name­
ly the subject-object distinction, is real for all practical and
conventional purposes. However, it is totally unreal except from
a practical or conventional point o f view. Hence, it is essen­
tially o f conventional values (vyavahara-atma).
The other-dependent nature is that which is responsible for
the creation o f the conventional values (zyavahartr). In the final
analysis it turns out to mean that the other-dependent nature
is that which creates the imagined nature which is essentially
o f conventional values. What is it that creates the imagined
nature along with its conventional values ? It is obviously the
imagination o f the unreal ( abhuta-parikalpa) forms o f sub­
jectivity arid objectivity. In other words, the imagined nature,
as well as its conventional values, is the creation o f the imagi­
nation o f the unreal ( abhuta-parikalpa) . It has already been
repeatedly pointed out that the other-dependent nature is the
same as the imagination o f the unreal (abhuta-parikalpa), which
in turn consists essentially in imagining the unreal (or rather
conventional) forms o f subjectivity and objectivity. Thus the
other-dependent nature is essentially the creator o f the conven­
tional values ( vyavahartr-atmd) o f the imagined nature.
Now, the absolutely accomplished nature is free o f all conven­
tional values (vyavahara-samuccheda-svabkava), for, it is beyond
the realm o f the imagined distinction between subject and
object, to which the conventional values are attached. That is,
the absolutely accomplished nature is real in the absolute sense
of the term, not merely from the conventional point o f view.
The next two stanzas are concerned with the order in which
one comes to realize the three natures.

[TSN. 24] First, the other-dependent nature,

Which is essentially the absence o f duality
Is understood;

1. See, for exam ple, a b o v e , p p . 12 ff.

 Then, the unreal duality,
Namely, the duality that is mere imagination,
Is understood.1

Again, the emphasis is obviously on the falsity o f duality

between subject and object, and, therefore, the real knowledge
o f the three natures is obtained only when they are understood
{praviSyate) in their non-dual, unitary, aspect. Accordingly, the
Trumping o f the above stanza may be expressed as follows:

First, one has to understand

that the duality in which the other-dependent
appears,
is unreal;
this will lead one to understand
that the subject-object duality,
which constitutes the imagined nature,
too, is unreal.

It m aybe recalled that in stanzas 11-16 Vasubandhu has been

trying hard to establish that all threenatures can be understood
in terms o f non-duality and unity. Now, therefore, it is easy for
him to say that one aspiring for buddhahood should understand,
or more literally, penetrate (firmiS), the non-dual, unitary]
aspect o f the three natures. Perhaps it was to come to this point
that he took Dains first to exnlain W all thrr* nati,m
understood in terms o f non-duality and unity.
Vasubandhu continues, referring to the realization o f the
absolutely accomplished nature :

[TSN. 25] Then is understood

The absolutely accomplished nature,
Which is positively the absence o f duality,
For, that very nature is then said
T o be both existing and non-existing.2

1. DvayS-bhava-atmaka-p urvam para-tantrah praviSyate

Tatah praviSyate tatra kalpa-mairam-asad-dvayam. T S N . 24
2. Tato dvaya-abh&va-bhavo tiifpanno’ tra praviSyate
Tatha ki-asau-eva tada asti-ndsti-iti ca-ucyate. T S N . 25
 It has already been explained how the absolutely accompli­
shed nature is “ positively the absence o f duality” ( doaya-abhdva-
bhava) (see above, for example, TSN. 16), and how it is “ both
existing and non-existing” (asti-nasti-iti ca ucyate) (see above
TSN. 13).
The next stanza is a clear summary o f the discussion on the
three natures in terms o f ‘existence and non-existence’ on the
•one hand, and ‘duality and unity’ on the other :

[TSN. 26] All these three natures

Depend for their definition
On [the concept of] non-duality;
For, [with reference to the imagined nature],
There is the unreality o f duality,
[With reference to the other-dependent nature],
It is not in the dual form in which it appears,
And, [with reference to the absolutely ac­
complished nature],
It is by its nature the absence o f that duality.1

In other words, all the three natures can be defined it terms

o f non-duality : the imagined nature is non-dual, because it
consists o f unreal / imaginary (abhsta j parikalpita) distinction
between subject and object (abhavat) ; the other-dependent is
non-dual, because it does not exist in the dual form in which it
manifests itself (a-tatha-bhavat); the absolutely accomplished
nature is non-dual, because it is by its very nature the absence
o f duality between subjectivity and objectivity (tad-abhaaa-svabha-
vatah).

6. How Real and Unreal Are the Three Natures ?

In the next four stanzas Vasubandhu makes use o f an illustra­
tion to explain further the reality (or unreality) o f the three
natures. The illustration is as follows. A magician, for example,
can by the working o f certain incantations (mantra-vaSat) make
his magical power (maya)appear (khyati) in the form (akara) o f an

1. Trayo-api-ete svabhava hi aduaya-filamba-lakfOQah

Abhavid-atathO-hhavSt-tad abhavasvabhivatah. TSN . 26
elephant (hasti), which form he wilJ subseaue.ntlv c,
on a piece o f w ood , » thatthe

w m k i l j ' i r ' ' . S,mi'arly’ “ « ’» Vasubandhu one can by ,h”

working o f the 'unconscious’ (alava-vimanr, r,
mUa-ci.,0) make o n e ', 2 1 2 ’’ ,t " ' ’ "*''' "
imagine unreal forms (asat~ka1hn\ • power to
( A ® * * * . ) , which fa ™ one i ll ° { '3™ 'i,y
* * * « * « . h e W w i , , b e „ i!ta t T r ^ : " r o b “ c”

[TSN. 27] It is like the magical power,

Which by the working o f incantations
Appears in the nature o f an elephant;
There is altogether no elephant at all,
But only its form.1

The term, here translated as ‘magical power’ is maya-krtarn.

Literally it would mean ‘something made o f ( or by) magical
power’, or simply ‘something illusory’ . However, when it is
compared to its counterpart ‘ asat-kalpa’ occurring in stanza 29,
it becomes clear that by the term mdya-krtam Vasubandhu means
nothing other than the magical power. He is comparing one’s
power to imagine unreal forms (asat-kalpa) with the magician’s
magical power to create unreal forms.
M y traslation o f the present stanza bagins with the phrase “ It is
like” . The Sanskrit term for that is the correlative conjunction
yatha. This latter term should have been accurately translated
as “ just as” , a l t h o u g h for convenience’ s sake I have translated
it as “ it is like” . Therefore, I want to remind myself that the
present stanza having begun with the correlative conjunction
yatha ( “ just as-..), is not complete, grammatically as well as
conceptually, without its correlative stanza below (namely,
TSN. 29) which begins with the correlative tatha ( “ so...). This
latter stanza describes the appearance o f subject-object duality
exactly on the same lines as the appearance o f the elephant
described in the present stanza. I will discuss the details o f this
correlation later when I come to stanza 29. Before that there

1. Afaya-krtam mantravalat-khyati hasti-almana yatha

Akara-matram tatra-asti hasti nasti tu sarvatha. T S N . 2 ?
is one more stanza to be analyzed, in which Vasubandhu gives
an interpretation o f the above illustration : -

[TSN. 28] The elephant stands for the imagined nature,

Its form for the other-dependent nature,
And, that which remains when the elephant
has been negated,
Stands for the absolutely accomplished nature.1

The magical elephant, as its reality is totally imaginary, is

o f imagined nature (svabhavah kalpitah); its form (akrti), as it
depends on magical power and incantation, is o f other-depen­
dent nature; when the imaginary elephant has been negated
one sees the real thing, for example, a piece o f wood upon
which the form o f the elephant was superimposed; this real
thing, as it is absolutely free o f all mental constructions, stands
for the absolutely accomplished nature.
The next stanza, to which I referred above as the correlative
o f TSN. 27, describes the appearance o f subject-object reality
on the same lines as the appearance o f the magical elephant:

[TSN. 29] So, the imagination o f the unreal

By the working o f the basic thought
Appears in the nature o f duality;
There is altogether no duality at all,
But only its form.2
*
Just as (yatha) the magical power appears in the nature o f an
elephant described above in TSN. 27, so ( tatha) the imagination
o f the unreal ( asat-kalpa, which is the same as the creative mind
having the power to imagine unreal forms), by the working o f
basic thought (mulacitta, i.e., alaya-vijnana or mulavijnana), appears
(khyati) in the nature o f duality ( doaya-dtmana) ; this duality is
totally non-existent (dvayam atyanto nasti), but is only a mental
form ( tatra-asti-akrti-mdtrakam), just as the magical elephant

1. Svabhavah kalpito hastiparatantras-tad-ikrtih

Yas-tatra hasti-abhavo'sau parinifpanna isjatc. TSN. 28
2. Asat-kalpas-tatha khyati mula-ciitad-dvaya-atmand
Dvayam-atyanto nasti tatra-asti-akrti-mdtrakam. TSN. 29
being totally non-existent ( hasti nasti tu sarvatha) is only mental
(o r rather magical) form. T o make the correspondence between
TSN. 2 7 and 29 clear, I present them side by side as follows:

TSN. 27: TSN. 29:

Just as the magical power So the imagination o f the unreal
(yatha maya-krtam) (tatha asat-kalpah)
By the working o f incantations By the working o f the basic
thought
( mantra-vaSat) (mula-cittdt)
Appears in the nature o f an Appears in the nature o f duality;
elephant,
{khyati hasti-atmand); (khyati dvaya-atmand) ;
There is altogether no elephant, There is altogether no duality,
(hasti nasti tu tatra sarvatha), (dvayam atyanto nasti tatra) ,
But only its [mental] form. But only its [mental] form.
(akdra-mdtram tatra-asti). (asti-akrti-mdtrakam).

This parallel presentation o f these two stanzas brings out the

points o f comparison between the two cases at issue. I will
return to those points after discussing the next stanza in which
Vasubandhu himself makes a list, so to say, o f those points:

[TSN. 30] The basic consciousness is like the incantations,

Suchness is like the piece o f wood,
The [ subject-object] discrimination is like the
form o f the elep&ant.
And the duality is like the elephant.1

That is, just as the incantations in the case o f magic operate

as the efficient cause in producing the magical elephant, so does
the basic consciousness ( mula-vijnanam) in producing the duality
between subject and object; just as the piece o f wood ( kdffha) in
the case o f magic is what remains when all mental constructions
are removed, so the same applies to the case o f the suchness
( tathata); just as the form o f the elephant ih the case o f magic

1. Mantrauan-mulavijHanam kdffhaval-Lathata mala

Hasti-akirauad-tf(avyo vikatpo hastivad-dvayam. TSN . 30
is only a mental form (or construction), so is the subject-object
discrimination ( vikalpa) ; just as the elephant in the case o f magic
is altogether unreal, so is the subject-object duality (dvayam) in
ordinary experience. Now it may be useful to make a dia­
gram o f all the points o f comparison between the instances o f
the magically appearing elephant on the one hand, and the phe­
nomenally appearing subject-object duality on the other, as
they come out o f the four stanzas above :

magical appearance phenomenal appearance

o f elephent o f subject-object
duality

mantra mulacittal (the efficient source)

(incantation) alayavijnanal
miilavijnana
(unconscious)

m&ya asatkalpaj
(magical power) abhuta-parikalpa
(creative (the ma­
imagination/ terial
mind) source)

hasti-atmanaf dvaya-atmanal
hasti-akaraj vikalpa

PARATANTRA hasti-Skrti (mental form (theresult-

( mental form, or or construc­ tant form)
construction, o f tion, o f sub­
elephant) ject-object dua­
lity)

hasti dvaya
PARIKALPITA (magically (phenomenally
manifested manifested dua­
elephant) lity between sub­
ject and object)
 magical appearance phenomenal appearance
o f elephant o f subect-object
duality

hasti-abhdvaj dvaya-abhavaj
PARINISPANNA kaftha tathata
( piece o f w ood) (suchness)

The picture o f the three natures emerging from the above

analysis is as follows. What is precisely described as the other-
dependent nature (para-tantra-svabhava) is the mental form
( akara or akrti, call it mental construction or concept or idea)
o f the subject-object duality ( vikalpa or dvaya-atmatS]. It is a
transformed mode (parinama) o f the mind,1 which is the faculty
o f imagining the unreal forms o f subjectivity and objectivity
[asat-kalpa or abhuta-parikalpa). Seeds of these forms are already
there embedded in the ‘unconscious’ ( alaya-vijnana). Thus the
three terms, alaya-vijnana, abhuta-parikalpa and vikalpa, are not
quite the same, but are closely interconnected with each other.
One may roughly and safely say that although strictly speaking
para-tantra-svabhava refers only to the akara o f vikalpa (the con­
ceptual form o f the discrimination between subject and object),
in a less strict sense it covers whatever is meant by ‘mind’ in the
Western thought. It can sometimes mean the very disposition
o f an individual in the state o f samsara, whereby he is bound to
discriminate between subject and object; sometimes it can mean
the very mental act o f discriminating (vikalpa) between subject
and object; sometimes it can mean strictly the metal conception
{akara) o f subject-object duality (vikalpa).2The imagined nature

1. See b e lo w , p p . 128 ff
2. I t m a y b e recalled that M V . has a d ifferen t version o f the inter­
relation betw een the three term s, alaya-vijnana, abhuta-parikalpa an d vikalpa.
T h ere abhuta-parikalpa is d escribed o n the o n e h a n d as grahya-grahaka-vikalpa
(M V K B . I . 2 ), and, on the other, as para-tantra-svabhava (M V K B . I . 6 ) .
A g ain , M V . I . 9-10 gives the im pression that alaya-vijnana is a su bdivision o f
abh uta-parikalpa.
refers to a thing as it is experienced. In the case o f magic, the
piece o f wood experienced under the aspect o f an elephant illus­
trated the imagined nature. Strictly speaking, here too, it is the
elephant so experienced that is described as the imagined nature
{svabhavah kalpito hasti, TSN. 28). Similarly, in the ordinary
experience things experienced under the aspects o f subjects and
objects are in a less accurate sense the imagined nature, and
the duality {dvayam) between subjectivity and objectivity so
experienced is in the strict sense the imagined nature {hastivad-
dvayam).
Here it may be noted that the distinction between the other-
dependent nature and the imagined nature is so narrow that
it is difficult to put it in so many words. The other-dependent
nature refers to the subject-object distinction as a mental form
{akara), a concept, an idea, a mental reality. The imagined
nature refers to the same distinction as an extra-mental struc­
ture in which things are believed to exist. In other words, the
subject-object distinction considered as an abstract concept or
form {akara) is other-dependent nature, while the same distinc­
tion considered as, or mistaken for, an extra-mental dimension of
things is imagined nature. This is what the distinction between
hasti-akrti and hasti mentioned in the stanza suggests: hasti-akrti
says Vasubandhu, stands for the other-dependent nature, while
hasti stands for the imagined nature.1
That the term akara stands for the conceptual form in which
something is perceived, has already been explained elsewhere.2
The absolutely accomplished nature is the thing as such
{tathata), free o f the subject-object-duality structure that was
superimposed on it. It is like the piece o f wood underlying the
magical appearance o f the elephant. Just as once the superim­
posed form o f the elephant is removed the piece o f wood reveals
itself, so once the superimposed form o f subject-object duality is
removed the thing as such {tathata) reveals itself. Just as the
negation o f the superimposed form o f theelephent {hasti-abhava)
resuls in the revelation o f the real thing, namely the piece o f wood,

1. Svabhdah kalpito hasti para-tantras-tad-akrtih. T S N . 28

2. See ab ove, p p . 5 I f f
so the negation o f subject-object duality (dvaya-abhava) reveals the
thing in itself, which is the absolutely accomplished nature. As
M VKB clearly puts it, the absolutely accomplished nature is the
negation o f the grasper-graspable duality.1
Now there is an important question calling for an answer : in
what relation does the absolutely accomplished nature stand to
the imagined ? Or, in what relation does the thing as such
(tathata, suchness) stand to the thing as empirically perceived ?
Negatively, the relation in which the absolutely accomplished
nature stands to the imagined nature is not like that in which
-the soul stands to the body in Western tradition. For, in the
latter case both soul and body are considered to be real, while
in the former case only the absolutely accomplished nature is
considered real, the imagined nature being totally-unrea] (nasti-
tu sarvatha, TSN. 27; atyanto nasti, TSN. 28). The distinction
•between body and soul is considered to be real or extra-mental;
while that between the imagined nature and the absolutely ac­
complished nature is only a matter o f understanding/misunder­
standing. T o talk about the imagined nature and the absolutely
accomplished nature does not imply that they are two realities;
on the contrary there is only one reality viewed from two different
angles : viewed as endowed with subject-object forms, it is
called imagined nature, and viewed in itself (i.e. as such), it is
called the absolutely accomplished nature. Thus the distinction
between those two natures depends on the way in which one
looks at a thing; while the distinction between body and soul is
never thought to depend on the perceiver.
Kant’s distinction between noumenon and phenomenon seems
to be closer to the distinction between the absolutely accomplished
nature and the imagined nature. For Kant noumenon is the
thing-in-itself, unqualified by any category o f experience, and,
therefore, even beyond the reach o f experience; while pheno­
menon is the thing as it appears to the perceiver, necessarily
qualified by the categories o f experience superimposed by the
perceiver. Similarly, the absolutely accomplished nature is the
thing as such, unqualified by the mental forms o f subjectivity

1. Grahya-grdhaka-abhavah parinispamah svabhavah. M V K B . I. 6

 and objectivity; the only categories o f experience recognized by
Vasubandhu, and, therefore also beyond the reach o f ordinary,
samsaric, experience; while the imagined nature is the thing
as it appears to the ordinary perceiver, necessarily qualified by
the categories o f subjectivity and objectivity superimposed by
the perceiver. Both for Kant as well as Vasubandhu, the mode
in which a thing is experienced, depends on the perceiver, who
o f necessity imposes his subjective forms on the thing-in-itself. A
difference between Kant’s position and that o f Vasubandhu is
this : according to the former one never comes to realize the
noumenon, the thing-in-itself, while according to the latter one
definitely comes to realize the absolutely accomplished nature
in the state o f enlightenment (Buddhandm gocarah, Vims. 21).

7. Towards the Realization o f the Reality

The rest o f the treatise deals with more practical aspects o f
the doctrine o f three natures.

[TSN. 31] In comprehending the truth o f things

All three definitions have to be taken together,
[Although methods o f] knowledge, rejection
and attainment
Are to be employed respectively.1

First o f all, the three definitions referred to here are the three
natures, namely the imagined, the other-dependent and the abso­
lutely accomplished. Then, the term translated here as ‘ truth
of things’ is artha-sattva. Discussing the concept o f mula-tattva in
M V . H I I have explained why the term tattva has to be under­
stood as meaning ‘ truth’ .2 Further, in the same chapter it was
said that the basic truth about things is that they take on three
natures, namely the imagined, the other-dependent and the ab­
solutely accomplished.® Or, more precisely, “ the threefold
nature is the basic truth about things.” 4 This makes the former

1. Artha-tattva-prativedhe yugapal-laksana-trayam
Parijtta ca prahaiiam-ca praptis-ca-iffa yatha-kramam. T S N . 31
2. See ab ove, p p . 19ff
3. Tatra mula-tattvam svobhivas-trividhah, parikalpitah para-tantrah parinifpa-
nnal-ca. M V K . an d a / t v v r TIT 3
4. Ib id .
half o f the present stanza intelligible. In other words, if the
three natures are the basic truth about things, then it is obvious
that to understand the truth about things, one has to take all
those three natures together. Or, rather, as the stanza has it,
the three-fold definition should be taken together in order to
comprehend the truth o f things.
However, in dealing with the three natures one’s approach
has to differ from nature to nature. In the case o f the imagined
nature one must acquire a correct knowledge (parijna) o f it, for
it is sheer ignorance that makes one believe that there is such a
nature. In the case o f the other-dependent nature one must
reject/destroy/stop it; as already said, the other-dependent nature
is essentially the act o f imagining the subject-object duality, or
the very mental imagination o f such duality; the mental act or
imagination should be stopped, so that one can be free o f the
subject-object idiosyncrasy, and o f the consequent samsara-, thus
the other-dependent nature should be approached by rejecting
it or destroying it or stopping(^raAana)it. In the case o f the abso­
lutely accomplished nature one must aim at attaining it, or rather
realizing it (prapti), for attaining the absolutely accomplished
nature Constitutes the state o f enlightenment or nirvana. Thus,
knowledge (parijna), rejection (prahana) and attainment (prapti)
are respectively the methods one should employ in approaching
the three natures.
The next stanza is a further explanation o f the three concepts
o f parijna, prahana and prSpti :

[TSN. 32] There, knowledge is non-perception,

Rejection/destruction is non-appearance,
Attainment, effect by perception,
Is direct realization.1

Correct knowledge (parijna) o f the imagined nature would

mean the non-perception ( anupalambha) o f subject-object dual­
ity, which constituted the imagined nature. That anupalambha

1. Parijna anupalambha’tra hanir-akhyanam-isyate

Upalambha-nimitta tu praptiIf saksat-kriya-api sa. T S N . 32
refers to the non-perception o f subject-object duality is clearly
said in the next stanza.1 That is, as a result o f the correct under­
standing o f the imagined nature one will cease to perceive, or
rather to believe in, the subject-object duality. Now, the rejec­
tion or destruction ( hanih) o f the other-dependent nature means
the non-appearance ( akhyana) o f the mental forms o f subjecti­
vity and objectivity ( dtoa.ya-aka.ro vigacchati as the next stanza
puts it ). It may be remembered that right in the beginning o f
this treatise it was said that the other-dependent nature is that
which appears in the form o f subject-object duality.2 This ap­
pearance o f the other-dependent nature has to be made to cease,
and that is done by stopping the imagination o f the unreal
subject-object duality ( asat-kalpa or abhuta-parikalpa). Finally,
attainment o f the absolutely accomplished nature means the
direct realization (sak$at-kriya) o f that nature. This is effected
by perception (upalambha-nimitta), as the text says. Perception
o f what ? It means the perception that there is no subject-
object duality. Or it may be a reference to M GK. I. 7 which
says that ‘the perception (upalabdhi) that there is only mental
representations will lead to the non-perception ( anupalabdhi) o f
objectivity, which in turn will lead to the non-perception o f
subjectivity as well, thus finally effecting the realization o f the
absolutely accomplished, non-dual, nature.’3 Here the realiza­
tion o f the absolutely accomplished nature is ultimately effected
by the perception (upalambha-nimitta) that there is no subject-
object duality.
As already suggested, the next stanza is providing a clearer
explanation o f the previous One :

[TSN. 33] By the non-perception o f duality

The form o f duality disappears;
The non-duality resulting from its disappearance
Is then attained.4

1• Dvayasya-anupalambhena. . . T S N . 33
2. Tat-khyati para-tantro’sau. TSN . 2 ; Katham khyati? dvaya-atmana. T S N . 4
3. Upalabdhim samaSritya nopalabdhih prajayate
Nopalabdhim samaSritya nopalabdhih praj&yate. M V K . I. 7
R e a d it a lo n g w ith V asu ban dh u ’ s bh&sya, an d m y analysis a b o v e , p p . 6 1 ff
4. Dvayasya-anupalambhena dvaya-akaro vigacchati
Vigamat-tasya nifpanno dvaya-abhavo’dhigamyate. T S N . 33
 From this stanza it is now clear that (i) the non-perception
( anupalambha) mentioned in the previous stanza means the non­
perception o f duality (dvayaiya-anupalambha), (ii) the non-percep­
tion (akhyana) mentioned in the previous stanza means the dis­
appearance o f the form o f duality ( dvaya-akaro vigacchati), mean­
ing the cessation o f the appearance o f the mental forms o f sub­
jectivity and objectivity, and that (iii) the direct realization
(sakf&t-kriya) tnentioned in the previous stanza means the attain-
m entof the state o f non-duality(dvaya-abbSvo’ dhigamyate), namely
the absolutely accomplished nature.
A clear distinction between duality (dvaya) and the form o f
duality (dvaya-akara), made also in this stanza, is worth notic­
ing. I have already explained the importance o f this distinction
in understanding the distinction between the imagined nature
and the other-dependent nature.1
Vasubandhu once again refers to the example o f the magical
appearance o f the elephant to show that the way it disappears
revealing the real piece o f wood behind it exemplifies the pro­
cess by which the subject-object illusion is undone, and the
absolutely accomplished nature is realized :

[TSN. 34] It is just as the case o f magic,

In which the non-perception o f the elephant,
The disappearance o f its form, and the percep­
tion o f the piece o f wood
Take place all at once.2

Vasubandhu is hinting that, although the non-perception o f

duality, the disappearance o f the form o f duality, and realization
o f the absolutely accomplished nature are theoretically distin­
guishable processes, in actuality they take place all at once
instantaneously. Further,

1. See a b o v e , p . 117.
2. Hastino’ nupalambhaS-ca vigamaS-ca tad-akrteh
XJpdambhai-ca kaffhasya miyayam yugapad-yatha. T S N . 34
H e re the te rm maySydm I h a ve translated as ‘ in the case o f m a g ic ’ .
 [TSN. 35] The attainment o f liberation becomes effortless
By getting rid o f misunderstanding,
Intellectually seeing the meaninglessness,
And following the three-fold knowledge.1

Here, too, the three points advocated as means o f easily ( aya-

tnatah) attaining liberation (mofadpatti) are probably to betaken
with reference to the three natures. Thus, ‘getting rid o f mis­
understanding’ will mean ‘getting rid o f misunderstanding about
the imagined nature’ . The reality o f the imagined nature rests
on one’s misunderstanding that the subject-object duality is real
in its own right. Therefore one’s first step towards liberation has
to be the getting rid o f this misunderstanding. Here the term
translated as misunderstanding is viruddha-dhi. Its literal transla­
tion would have been ‘opposite understanding’ or ‘contrary
thought’ . However, as the term ‘misunderstanding’ sounds more
fitting in the context, I have preferred it.
‘ Intellectually seeing the meaninglessness’ ( buddhya vaiyyarthya-
darsana) has to be understood with reference to the other-depen­
dent nature, which is meaningless in the sense that being just
the mental forms o f subjectivity and objectivity it has no reality
other than mental. In one o f the Tibetan versions the term vaiy­
yarthya is replaced by nairatmya, which suggests that one must
‘intellectually see the non-substantiality’ o f the other-dependent
nature. This latter version is quite understandable, because the
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, which are the constituents
o f the other-dependent nature, are literally non-substantial
( nairatmya).
Finally ‘following the threefold knowledge’ (jnanatraya-anuvrtti)
applies to the absolutely accomplished nature. The three knowl­
edges are cintd-mayd-panna, suta-maya-pannd and bhavand maya-
panna mentioned in DighaNikdya (33) and VisuddhiMagga (X I V ) .2
The next stanza is just a slightly different, but clearer, version

1. Viruddha-dhi-varanatvad budihyt vaiyyarthya-darSanat

Jftana-traya-anuvrlteS-ca moksa-apattir-ayalnatah. T S N . 35
2. See, N yanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary : Manual o f Buddhist Terms and
Doctrines, rev. and enl. e d ., (C o lo m b o : F rew in a n d C o ., L td ., 1972) p . 122.
o f M V K . I.7,1 and includes what Vasubandhu said there in
interpretation o f that verse.

[TSN. 36] Through the perception

That there is only thought,
There arises the non-perception o f knowable
things;
Through the non-perception of knowable
things,
There arises the non-perception o f thought,
too.2

This is exactly what Vasubandhu said in interpretation o f

M V K . I. 7: “ Depending upon the perception that there are
only representations o f consciousness, there arises the non-percep­
tion o f knowable things. Depending upon the non-perception o f
knowable things, there arises the non-perception o f mere repre­
sentations o f consciousness, too” .® The meaning o f this text, and
for that matter also o f the present stanza, I have already explai­
ned above, which in summary is as follows : the realization
that the objects o f one’s experience are only the representations
o f one’s own consciousness, makes one realize that one does not
perceive real, knowable objects, or rather that what one comes
to know are not real objects,^but only one’s own mental repre­
sentations. This realization that one’s experience does not reach
real objects, makes one realize that one is no more a knowing
subject or an experiencer, and that therefore even the representa­
tions o f one’s own consciousness make no sense. Thus, in short,
one no more entertains the belief in the objectivity o f things,
nor in the subjectivity o f oneself. As Sthiramati says, “ In the

1. Q u o te d a b o v e o n p a g e 121, n o te 3
2. Citta-mdtra-upalambhenajneya-artha-artha-anupalambhata
Jfieya-artha anupalambhena syac-citta-anupalambhata. T S N . 36
3. Vijflapti-matropalabdhim niSritya-artha-anupalabdhir-jayate. Arlha-anupdabdhim
nUritya vijnapti-matrasya-api-anupalabdhir-jayate. Evam-asal- laksarian grdhya-
rahakuvoh praviSati. M V K B . I . 7
absence o f graspable objects, a grasping subject makes no sense.
For, the conception o f a grasping subject is relative to that o f a
graspable object. . . .For, the graspable and the grasper are
never independent o f each other.” 1
Thus there is the non-perception o f subjectivity and objecti­
vity ( doayor-anupalambhah). What o f it ? Vasubandhu says :

[TSN. 37] From the non-perception o f duality

There arises the perception o f the essence o f
reality;
From the perception o f the essence o f reality
There arises the perception o f unlimitedness.2

From the non-perception o f duality (dvaya-anupalambhena), that

is, once the idiosyncrasy for subject-object duality is destroyed,
one comes to realize the essence o f reality ( dharma-dhatu). This
realization o f reality will reveal the unlimitedness (vibhutoa) o f
things. The term vibhutva is usually employed to mean ‘infinity’,
or ‘unlimitedness’ or ‘all-pervasiveness’ .8 In the present context
it may mean ‘ the state unlimited by subject-object categories’ .
Therefore, “ perception o f unlimitedness” {vibhutva-upalambhata)
can very well be taken to mean the perception that things, in­
cluding oneself, are beyond subject-object considerations, and
that, therefore, one should no more remain bound by such
considerations.

Thus, finally,

[TSN. 38] The wise man, having perceived the unlimited­

ness,

1. N a grahya-abhdve grahakatvam yujyate. Grahyam-apekfya tadgrahakasya

vyavasthapanat . . . grdhya-grahakayoh paraspara-nirapekfatoat. M V K B T I . 7
2. Dvayor-anupalambhena dharma-dhatu-upalambhata
Dharma-dhatu-upalambhena syad-vibhutva-upalambhata. T S N . 37
3. F o r exam ple Nyaya-sutra defines vibhutoa as Sarva-murtta-dravya-samyogi-
ivam vibhutvam.
 And seeing the meaning o f oneself and others,
Attains the unsurpassed enlightenment,
Which is in the nature o f the three bodies.1

Thus everybody, not only Gautama the Buddha, if he only

realizes the voidness ( S&nyata) o f subjebt-object duality, can
attain to the height o f enlightenment (anuttaram bodhim) includ­
ing the triple-body characteristics.

1. Upalabdha-vibhutvai-ca sva-para-artha-prasiddhitah
Pr&ptioti-anuttaram bodhim dkiman ka.ya-traya-atm.ikam. T S N . 38
 A TREATISE IN T H IR T Y STANZAS
( TRIMSATIKA)

1. Introduction
Trim§atikd, a treatise in thirty stanzas, is the epitome o f
Vasubandhu’s view o f life. T o be sure, it is an analysis o f
■consciousness throughout. Traditionally it is interpreted as
dealing with the process o f the evolution o f the world from
•consciousness.1 I cannot agree with that interpretation, though.
Instead I am suggesting that this text should be understood as
an investigation into the origin, contents and operation o f an
individual consciousness. Far from being an analysis o f the world
process, it is an attempt to explain the experience o f an indivi­
dual in the state o f samsara, and then to suggest a way out o f it.
It is an analysis o f mind, not o f the cosmos; again, it is an
analysis o f the individual mind, not o f any cosmic mind. It is
the individual mind that is said to be subject to evolution, not
the world. This evolution o f mind is said to result in the con­
struction o f a world-picture. But that does not imply that there
is no real world apart from this mentally constructed (pari­
kalpita.) world-picture.
The question before the author o f TrimSatika, therefore, is,
*what is consciousness made o f ? ’ , or ‘what are the contents o f

1. For example, P. T . Raju says, “ The ‘Trimsatika’ deals with the

process o f the evolution o f the world, the nature o f Buddha, and so forth” .
(Idealistic Thought o f India, [George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953; reprinted
with the subtitle “ Vedanta and Buddhism in the Light o f Western Idealism” ,
N ew York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1973], p. 2 6 9 ). Later, on the same
page, apparently referring again to TrimSatika, he says, “ Vasubandhu main­
tains that the world is due to the paripdma or transformation o f the pure
Vijnana” .
consciousness ?’ , or ‘what is the consciousness o f ? ’ , or ‘what is
it that the consciousness grasps ?’ On the contrary, the question
‘what is the world ?’ , never occurs to him. In other words, the
reality o f the world as such is never the point at issue, but only
in so far as it is grasped by consciousness. With this point in
mind I shall now make a detailed analysis o f the text under
reference.

2- Atm an and Dharma as Subjectivity and Objectivity

The text opens with the statement that the various usages
(upacara) o f the terms atman and dharma refer to the transforma­
tions (parinama) o f consciousness ( vijnana) :

[Trims. 1] Various indeed are the usages

O f the terms atman and dharma :
Thay [all] refer
T o the transformations o f consciousness;1

The first remark to be made about this statement is that the

terms atman and dharma stand respectively for the categories of
subjectivity and objectivity. It has aireaay DeSi tl"?
that subjectivity and objectivity (grahakatva and grdhyatva) are
the basic categories o f thought recognized by the Yogacarins.
All other categories can be classified under them. In other
words, all imaginable categories present themselves to the mind
either as subjects or as objects.2 Everything that presents itself
as a subject o f experience is referred to in the present stanza as
atman, and everything that presents itself as an object o f experi-
fni-p is to a? dharma. F.ven a snnerficial readme o f the

all that neither Stman nor dharma is meant in its ordinary sense.
Further, commenting on those terms Sthiramati says, “ Theusages

1. Atma-dharma-upacaro hi vividho yah pravartate

yijjlana-parinamo’sau...TrimS. 1
2 gankara opens his Brahma-s utra-bhdfya with a similar classification o f
categories under the terms yuftnat and asmat ( = thou and I), the former
standing for objectivity and the latter for subjectivity (see his introduction to
Brahm as utra-bhdfya).
o f the term atman include atman, jiva, jantu, manuja, manava etc., and
those o f dharma include skandha, dhdtu, ayatana, rupa, vedana, sanjnd,
samskara, vijnana etc.” 1 This grouping implies that whatever can
become the subject o f some sort o f experience is denoted by
atman, and that whatever can become the object o f some sort
o f experience, is denoted by dharma. This does not mean that
one and the same being cannot become both subject and object
o f experience. For example, I am obviously the subject o f so
many experiences. But I am also the object o f many experiences
o f other people. But my subjectivity and objectivity refer to two
different aspects o f my being : I become the subject o f ex­
perience only under the aspect o f a living (jiva), sentient (jantu),
human ( manuja) etc. being. On the other hand, to become a
subject o f experience it is not enough for me to be just a bundle
o f elements ( skandha or dhdtu) or o f sense-data ( ayatana etc.).
On the contrary, I become the object o f experience only under
the aspect o f a bundle o f elements (skandha or dhdtu) or o f
sense-data ( ayatana etc.). That is, although I am a living,
sentient, human being, nobody is able to experience me as such.
As an object o f experience I am only a bundle o f elements or
sense-data, and as such I become the object o f touch, sight, taste
and hearing. On the other hand, that I am a living, sentient
human being is only inferred by others, it is not experienced by
them. Thus, the above quoted classification o f categories into
atman and dharma is evidently based on what is capable o f
becoming a subject or object o f experience : anything that can
become a subject o f experience is an atman, and anything that
can become an object o f experience is a dharma. O r rather, the
terms atman and dharma stand for two aspects, namely subjecti­
vity and objectivity respectively, in which things appear in one’s
experience. Things just appear in those aspects, because
the latter are, as it shall be explained later, mere mental
constructions ( parikalpa) or transformations o f consciousness.
(vijnana parinama).

1. Atma jivo jantur-manujo manava iti-evam-adika atma-upacarah. Skandha

dhatava ayatanani rupam vedana sanjna samskara vijnanam-iti-evam-adiko dharma-
upacarah. Trims'. Bh. 1.
 There is still another reason why I feel that the terms atman
and dharma should be understood as standing for subjectivity and
objectivity. It is undeniable that Vasubandhu has really meant
to bring all imaginable concepts under the two terms : atman
and dharma. It should be particularly noted that he mentions
these two, and only these two, terms. They have, however,
various usages, as he says. What are those usages ? Ordinarily
‘various usages o f a term’ means that it is employed in different
\senses. But that is not what Vasubandhu means by ‘various
usages’ . For him different usages o f atman and dharma mean different
terms standing for what is meant by atman and dharma. What are
these terms ? I have quoted above a list o f some of them enumerat­
ed by Sthiramati.1 In fact Vasubandhu himself has made a long
list o f such terms in the subsequent stanzas. His list covers all
imaginable terms, and refers to all imaginable concepts. All o f
them, he says, are just transformations (parinama) o f consciousness
( vijnana) , and in the final analysis come under the two categories:
atman and dharma. I will return to this point later while analysing
some o f the next stanzas. The question in which I am interested
at the moment is what made Vasubandhu choose atman and
dharma to represent all the terms / concepts referring to experi­
ence. The only possible answer I can imagine is that according
to Vasubandhu atman and dharma stand for two concepts which
adequately explain all kinds o f experience. And from the
previous chapters o f this study it is more than clear that the two
concepts with which Vasubandhu explains all kinds o f experi­
ence are those o f grahya and grahaka (the graspable and grasper).
Therefore it can be reasonably concluded that in the present
context Vasubandhu is replacing grahya and grahaka with dharma
and atman. It may be noted that even in ordinary langauge
atman is generally associated with the idea o f an enjoyer, experi-
encer or grasper. It is also interesting to note that even before
Vasubandhu on certain occasions the term dharma has been
used to mean ‘object’ o f experience. Classical examples o f such
usages occur in phrases like dhammayatana, meaning the object
perceived by manayatana, and dhammadhatu, meaning the object
perceived by manodhatu. Hence using the terms atman and dharma

1. See above note 1 on page 129.

 to mean subject and object o f experience respectively, Vasubandhu
is not really deviating from tradition.
.Again, that Vasubandhu is purposefully referring to the
subjectivity and objectivity o f experience is clear also from the
fact that he mentions both atman and dharma, and not just one o f
them, for example, dharma. On the contrary, had he wanted to
refer just to all concepts standing for the transformations o f
consciousness, without bringing in their distinction between
subjectivity and objectivity, he could very well have done so by
mentioning just one term, namely dharma. For, as Stcherbatsky’s
analysis testifies,1 dharma is a term that can be used for each
and every concept / element in Buddhism. Therefore, if Vasu­
bandhu is particular to mention both atman and dharma, and not
just the latter, it means that he is referring not only to all
concepts, but also to their distinction as subjective and objective
with reference to experience. Hence my conclusion : the terms
atman and dharma in the first stanza o f TrimSatika stands respec­
tively for subjectivity (grahakatva) and objectivity (grahyatva).
Another point I want to emphasize is that what Vasubandhu
refers to as ‘transformations’ (parinama) , are not any thing
(padartha), but only the usages (upacara) o f the terms atman and
dharma, or rather the concepts expressed by such usages. The
term upacara, which I have translated as ‘ usage’, is never used
in Sanskrit or other Indian languages with reference to things
(padartha) or substances (dravya). Etymologically this term
means ‘conventional behaviour’ (upacara) , and is very often
used with reference to social and linguistic behavioural patterns.
For example, upacara is very commonly used to mean ‘good
manners’, and the phrase acara-upacara is still more commonly
used to mean ‘ the respect and manners’ proper for guests,
teachers, etc. Similarly, in linguistic contexts, upacara means
‘ behaviour o f words’ or ‘ usage’ o f words, or ‘employment’ o f
words;2 and more generally it means secondary or figurative or

1. He has made an analysis o f the term dharma in his The Central Concep­
tion o f Buddhism and the Meaning o f the W ord ‘Dharma', 2nd ed., (Calcutta:
Susil Gupta (India) Ltd., 1956).
2. For example, V. S. Apte, The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary, 3rd
rev. enl. ed., (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965), p. 283
quotes from ftamdyana: vdkyopacare kuiala, and translates it as ‘skilled in the
employment o f words’.
metaphorical use or application o f words as opposed to their
primary or literal (mu.kh.ya) use or application.1 F. Edgerton in
his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary has pointed out two
unusual meanings o f upacara rarely occurring in Buddhist
Writings. They are (1) environs, neighbourhood; and(2) access.
Now, from the above discussion one arrives at four meanings
for the term upacara : (i) social manners, (ii) (secondary) use
o f terms, (iii) environs, and (iv) access.2 O f them the last two
— environs and access—may be said to be referring to ‘ things’
(padartha) or ‘substances’ (dravya). But they would make no
sense when associated with the terms atman and dharma, and,
therefore, do not fit into the context o f Trimiatika,s The first
meaning, i.e., social manners, too, has nothing to do with the
context, and, therefore, can be left out o f consideration. Thus,
in the end there is only one meaning o f the term upacara that is
relevant to the context, and that is ‘ (secondary) use o f terms’ .
Hence m y translation o f upacara as ‘usage’. Thus latma-dharma-
upacdra' in the text means ‘ the usage o f the terms atman and
dharma’ .
What, therefore, could be the implication that Vasubandhu
had in mind when he said that ‘ the various usages o f the terms
atman and dharma are all transformations (parindma) o f vijnana
(consciousness)’ ? As such his words sound meaningless. For,
neither words nor their usages could possibly be transformations
o f consciousness. The only way, therefore, to make sense o f his
statement is to say that for him ‘the various usages o f the term
atman and dharma’ means ‘ the various concepts implying atman and
dharma’.* Therefore, in the final analysis o f Vasubandhu upacara
means “ concepts” 6and the final meaning ofthe opening statement

1. For examples, see Ibid.

2. F. Edgerton, Buddhist H ybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, Vol. II, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1953, reprint ed., Delhi, Varanasi, Patna : Motilal
Banarsidass 1972), p. 134.
3. Or, perhaps, ‘ environs o f atman and dharma’ would mean secondary
uses of those terms, which then would not be different from meaning (ii).
4. T o put it clearly, they are concepts all o f which imply what atman and
dharma stand for, namely subjectivity and objectivity, and, therefore, are not
just concepts o f atman and dharma.
5. In fact Wei Tat has translated ‘dtma-dharma-upacara’ as “ Concepts o f
Atman and dharmas” . (See Hsiian-tsang, The Doctrine o f Mere-Contciousness,
trans. Wei Tat [H ong Kong: 1973] p. LVII)
 o f Trimsatika turns out to be : “ The various concepts implying
atman and dharma are all transformations o f consciousness” . That
is, what is said to "be the transformation o f consciousness is not
things existing outside consciousness, but concepts apart from which
there can be no consciousness itself. Such concepts can be
grouped under two t^rms, namely atman and dharma, the former
standing for subjectivity and the latter for objectivity. A list of
such concepts, part o f which I have already quoted above from
Sthiramati,1 will eventually emerge in the course o f this analysis.
The term parinama, which I have translated as ‘ transformation’
too, needs an explanation. It! should be remembered that the
Indian thinkers do make a distinction between parinama and
vivartta, the latter term meaning ‘unfolding’ . For example,
brahma-parinama-vada means the theory which says that Brahma
transforms itself into the world o f multiplicity, so that the latter
(i.e. the transformations) is not essentially different from
Brahma itself; on the other hand brahma-vivartta-vada means the
theory which says that itself remaining unchanged Brahma just
makes the world o f multiplicity appear, so that what thus
appears is mere illusion and, therefore, unreal.2 Thus parinama
implies transformation o f a substratum into different modes o f
existence, while vivartta implies making some illusions appear.
Thus by vijnana-parinama Vasubandhu means that vijnana ( =
consciousness) transforms itself into different modes o f existence,
which are not essentially different from vijnana itself. Such trans­
formations o f vijnana are what one calls concepts. Ip other
words, concepts being transformations o f vijnana, are not essen­
tially different from it. Therefore in the final analysis, as I have
already said, consciousness has no existence apart from its
tranformations, namely concepts.
About the term vijnana I need only to recall what has been
already said in a previous chapter o f this study, namely that it does
not denote the absolutely accomplished nature (parinifpanna-

1. See above note 1 on page 129.

2. For a treatment o f this distinction see M. Hiriyanna, Outlines o f Indian
Philosophy, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1932; 1st Indian
reprinted., 1973) pp. 62-63.
svabhava) o f an individual,1 but only the first stage, so to say, o f
his psychic development.
The discussion so far may be summed up as follows: Trinrfa-
tika is basically an analysis o f an individual consciousness. The
samsaric experience o f an individual starts with the emergence
o f consciousness which bifurcates itself into subjectivity and
objectivity. All transformations o f consciousness can be grouped
under those two terms.2 I may put these ideas in a diagram:

Consciousness (vijnana)

Subjectivity (atman) Objectivity (dharma)

concepts implying subjectivity concepts implying objectivity ( dhar-

(atma-upacaras) ma-upacaras)

3. The Transformation o f Consciousness

Now Vasubandhu proceeds to examine the transformations
o f consciousness (vijnana). The self-transformation o f conscious­
ness results in three different derivatives o f the same conscious­
ness. Or rather, transforming itself the consciousness takes on
three different modes o f existence. They are store-consciousness
alaya-vijnana), thought-consciousness (mano-vijnana) and active
consciousness (pravrtti-vijnana) : they respectively represent three
stages in the development o f consciousness, namely, maturing,
thinking, and knowing o f objects:

[Trims. 1 Threefold is such transformation:

cont’d.]

[Trims. 2] They are, namely,

Maturing, thinking, and representation o f con­
sciousness o f object.3

1. See, for example, above pages 48-49

2. The same discussion is found in other words also in M V K . I. 4 and
Vasubandhu’s commentary on it. See my analysis o f it above pp. 46ff
3. . . . parinama ft sa ca tridhd
Vipako mananakhyasca mjnaplir-visayasya ca. Trims. 1-2
 Vasubandhu now describes each o f those derivatives or
modes o f consciousness.

The store-consciousness
(alaya-vijnana)
[Trims. 2 There the maturing [consciousness]
cont’d.] Is otherwise called the store-consciousness,
Which carries the seeds o f all [past experiences] -1

[Trims. 3] It has [within itself)

The representations o f consciousness
O f unknown objects and places;2
It is always associated with
Touch, attentiveness, knowledge,
Conception, and volition.®

[Trims. 4] The feeling therein is that o f indifference;

It [i.e. store-consciousness] is unobscured and
undefined ;4
Similarly indifferent are touch etc.,
And it [i.e. the store-consciousness] is like a
torrent o f water;

[Trims. 5] And it ceases to exist at the attainment o f arhattva.5

T o paraphrase the above lines, alaya-vijnana (store-conscious­

ness) is the individual unconscious, which carries within it the
seeds o f all past experiences. It has within itself the representa­
tions o f consciousness o f unknown objects ( upadi, literally mean­
ing ‘what one grasps’ , or ‘clings to’ ) and places (sthana). It is
invariably associated with the experiential categories such as
touch (sparSa), attentiveness ( manaskara), knowledge {vid =
awareness), conception (safijna = idea), volition (cetand) and

1. Tatra-alayakhya vijnanam vipakah sarvabijakam. Ibid. 2

2. Asamviditakopadisthana-vijRaptikam ca tat. Ibid. 3
3. Sada sparSa-manaskara-vit-safijM-cetana-anvitam. Ibid. 3
4. Upeksa vedana tatra-anivrtd-avyakrtam ca tat. Ibid. 4
5. Tatha sparSa-ddayas-tacca vartate srotasaugha-vat
Tasya vyavrtir-arhattve. . . Ibid. 4-5
feeling ( vedana —sensation). None o f those experiences at this
stage is particularly pleasant ( sukha) or unpleasant ( dulikha).
Therefore, they are all equally indifferent ( asukha-aduhkha =
upeksa). The alaya-vijnana is not yet obscured by avaranas, whether
kleSa-avaranas or jneya-avaranas, and, therefore, is described as un­
obscured ( anivrtam). Nor can it be defined as either good ( kufala)
or as bad ( akusala), and, therefore, it is described as undefined
( avyakrtam). The alaya-vijnana, which is like a torrent o f water
(srotasaugha-vat), ceases to exist only at the attainment o f arhattva.

The thinking consciousness

( manana-vijnana)
[Trims. 5 The consciousness called manas
cont’d.] Has the store-consciousness for its support and
object.
It is essentially an act o f thinking.1

[Trims. 6] It is always associated with four defilements,

Which are themselves obscured and undefined;
Those four defilements are, namely,
Belief in self, ignorance about self,
Pride in self, and love o f self.2

[Trims. 7] It [i.e. mano-nama-vijnana] is associated

Also with others like touch etc.,
Which are all o f the same nature
As the region in which one is born.3
It does not belong to one in the state o f arhat-
ship;
Nor does it operate
In the state o f suppressed consciousness,
Nor in the supra-mundane path.

1. . . . tad-asritya pravartate
Tad-alambam mano-nama vijnanam mananatmakam. Trims. 5
2. Klesais-caturbhih sahitam nivrta-avyakftai sada
Atma-drsti-atma-moha-atma mana-atma-meha-sanjhitai. Ibid. 6
3. Yatrajas-tanmayair-anyaih sparta-adyais-ca. Ibid. 7
 [Trims. 8] It is the second transformation [o f consciousness]-1

The above lines describe the second mode or derivative o f

consciousness, which is called manas. T o be sure, it is not what
goes by the name mano-vijhana. The latter is one o f the six active
consciousnesses, which belongs to the third transformation o f
consciousness. What is being discussed by the above quoted lines
is described as simply the “ consciousness called manas” (mano-
nama vijnanam). Sthiramati in his commentary refers to it as
defiled consciousness (kliffam manah).2 He has described it using
the same expression, i. e. kliffam manah, in his commentry on
M V K . I. 4.® According to Trimsatika, which is being examined
here, this consciousness called manas is an act o f thinking or
cogitation (mananatmakam). Hence I have named it as manana-
vijnandm, the thinking consciousness. For its origin and operation
it depends on the store-consciousness ( tad alaya-vijnanam ahitya
pravartate). It has the same store-consciousness for its object
(tad-alambam), too. For, its thinking activity consists basically in
mistaking the store-consciousness for self (atma) ,4 and for that
reason it is always associated with belief in self (atma-dr}ti) ,
ignorance about self (atma-moha), pride in self (atma-mana), and
love o f self (atma-sneha). These latter associates are all obscured
but undefined. It is also associated with touch (jparSa), attentive­
ness ( manaskara), knowledge (vit), conceptions ( safijna) and
volition ( cetana) . These associates are o f the same nature as the
region ( dhatu-bhumi) in which one is born (yatrajas-tan-maya) .5
The consciousness called manas (mano-nama vijnana or mananakhya
vijfidna) does not exist for an arhat ( arhato na tat), and does not
operate in the state o f suppressed consciousness ( nirodha-sama-

1. . . .arhato na tat
N a nirodha-samapattau marge lokottare na ca.
Dvitiyah pantt.amo'yam. . . Ibid. 7-8
2. See Sthiramati’s commentary on TrimS. 5
3. Atma-pratibhasam klistam manah, atma-mohadi-samprayogat. MVKB. I. 4
4. Alaya-vijndna-alambanam-eva sat-kaya-drsti-adibhih samprayogad-aham-mama-
iti-alayavijnana-dlambanatvdt. Trims. Eh. 5
5. Tan-mayair-iti yatra dhatau bhumauvd jdtas~tad-dhatitkaih tad- bhumikair-
eva ca samprayujyate, na-anya-dhdtiikair-anya-bhumikair-vd. Ibid. 7
pattau), nor on the supra-mundane path (marge lokottare). Such,
indeed is the second transformation o f consciousness.

The active consciousness

(pravrtti-vijnanam)
[Trims. 8 The third transformation o f consciousness
con’d.] Is the same as the perception o f the sixfold
object;
It could be good or bad or indifferent in
character.1

[Trims. 9] It is associated with three kinds o f mental

factors :
Universal, specific and good;
It is associated, similarly,
With primary as well as secondary defilements;
It is subject to three kinds o f feelings, too.2

[Trims. 10] O f those associates the first, [namely the

universal] ones,
Are touch etc.,
[The second, namely ] the specific ones,
Are desire, resolve and memory,
Together with concentration and knowledge;
Faith, sense o f shame, fear o f censure,

[Trims. 11] The triad o f non-covetousness etc., courage,

Composure, equanimity along with alertness,
And harmlessness are [the third, namely] the
good ones.3

1. . . .tritiyah fad-vidhasyaya
Visayanya-upalabdhik sa kuSala-akuiala-adva y a . Trims. 8
2. Sarvatra-gair-viniyataih kuSalaii-cetasair-asau
Samprayuktd tatha kleSair-upakleSais-trivcdana. Ibid. 9
3. Adyah spariadayaf-chanda-adhimokfa-smrtayah saha
Samadhi dhibhyam niyatah Sraddha-atha hrir-apatrapa. Ibid. 10
Alobha-adi trayam viryam praSrabdhih sa apramadika
Ahimsa kusalah . . . Ibid. 11
 [Trims. 11 The defilements are passionate attachment,
cont’d.] Grudge, stupidity,

[Trims. 12] Pride, [false] views and doubt.

Aoger, hatred, hypocrisy, envy, jealousy, spite
along with deceit,

[Trims. 13] Dishonesty, arrogance,

Harmfulness, shamelessness, defiance o f censure,
Sluggishness, conceit, unbelief, indolence,

[Trims. 14] Carelessness, bad memory,

Distraction o f mind,
Thoughtlessness, remorse, sleepiness,
Reasoning and deliberation,
Are the secondary defilements.
The latter two couples, [namely,
Remorse and sleepiness, reasoning and delibera­
tion],
Can be of two kinds, [namely, defiled and
undefiled] -1

[Trims. 15] Depending on the conditions available

The five sense-consciousnesses,
Together or separately,
Originate on the root-consciousness,
Just as waves originate on water.2

[Trims. 16] The thought-consciousness, however,

Manifests itself at all times,
Except for those [i] who are born

1. . ..kleSa raga-praligha-mudhayah
Mana-drk-vicikitsas-ca krodha-upanahane punah
M rksah pradaSa irsya-atha matsaryam saha mayaya
asatyam mado’ vihimsa-hrir-atrapa styanam-uddhavah
ASrddharn-atha kausldyam pramado musita smrtih
Viksepo'samprajanyam ca kaukrtyam middhameva ca
VitarkaS-ca vfcaras-ca-iti-upaklefa dvaye dvidha. Ibid. 11-14
2. Pancanam mula-vijndne yatha-pratyayam-udbhavah
Vijndnandm saha na va taranganam yatha jale. Ibid. 15
 Into the region where the beings are in a
sta,te o f unconsciousness,
[ii] who have entered either o f the two trances,
In which there is no operation o f conscious­
ness,
[iii] who are unconscious by reason
O f sleepiness or faint.1

What I make o f the above description o f the threefold trans­

formation o f consciousness, is that all such transformations and
their associates refer only to psychological and epistemological
categories, not to any ontological categories, and that, therefore, it
is not warranted to say that consciousness evolves into the exter­
nal world o f multiplicity. There is no indication at all that the
transformations o f consciousness include any o f the ontological
categories (padartha). While describing the third transformation
o f consciousness, namely, the sixfold active consciousness, Vasu­
bandhu did have real occasion to refer to external things, i f he
wanted to do so. That is, a sense-consciousness involves a sense
and its object, the latter being in most cases an external thing.
Therefore, to be a real idealist Vasubandhu should have said
that the sense and its object are both transformations o f con­
sciousness. But he makes no such remarks. Instead o f saying
that the sense and the object involved in a sense-perception are
both transformations o f consciousness, he says just that ‘ the re­
presentation o f consciousness o f objects’ ( vijnaptir-vifayasya) 2 or
‘ the perception o f the sixfold object’ (sadl-vidhasya ya visayasya-
upalabdhih),3 is the third transformation o f consciousness. In
other words, it is the representations o f consciousness ( vijnapti)
or perception (upalabdhi) that Vasubandhu says is one o f the
transformations o f consciousness, not either the sense-organ or
the object. And there is nothing idealistic about such a view.
Another point that throws doubt upon the idealistic interpre­
tation o f Trirjiiatika, is Vasubandhu’s statement that ‘ the five

1. Mano-vijfiana-sambhutih sarvada-asanjhikad-rte,
Samapatti-dvayan-murchanad-api acittakat. Ibid. 16
2. Trims. 2; see above p. 134, note 3.
3. Trims. 8; see above p. 138 note 1.
 nce), avihirfisa (harmlessness), etc., etc.
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sense-consciousnesses originate on the root-consciousness ( mula-
vijndne).1 What he does not want to say is that the five sense-
consciousnesses originate from the root-consciousness [inula
vijndndt).2 The latter is the way an idealist would look at sense-
consciousness. For him sense-consciousness is not only built upon
the root-consciousness, but also is built out of it. For him, again,
the root-consciousness is the only source o f sense-consciousness,
the sense-organ as well as its object being what the former
projects out o f itself. But Vasubandhu at least leaves it open
that sense-consciousness could arise from some other sources,
and then be built onto the root-consciousness. He is probably
referring to M V .I .ll, where the sensation is described as ‘ the
threefold determination’ ( tripariccheda) o f the individual
concerned. Here ‘the three-fold determination’ means, says
Vasubandhu, the ‘contact’ ( sparia),3 which according to
Sthiramati’ s commentary, means the coming together (sanni-
pdta) of sense-organ ( indriya), object ( visaya) and consciousness
(vijnana) resulting in pleasant or unpleasant or indifferent
feeling’ .4 Thus the author of M V K ., Vasubandhu and
Sthiramati explicitly admit that sense, object and consciousness
are all involved in the generation of sense-consciousness. Thus
they admit things existing outside and independent o f conscious­
ness, a position that cannot by any means be reconciled with
idealism !
If sense-consciousness is the result of the co-operation o f sense,
object and consciousness, how can it still be called a transfor­

1. T rim s. 15; see a b o v e p . 139 n ote 2.

2. H o w e v e r, on e should n o t m ake m uch o f V asu ban dh u ’s use o f the
loca tiv e mula-vijRdne rather than the ablative mula-vijnanat. It m ay very well
b e a p rin tin g m istake. M o re o v e r, Sthiram ati, in his subsequent com m entary,
uses the ablative dlaya-vijnanat rather than the locativ e dlaya-vijUdne (see b elow
p . 143, note 1 ). H e n ce m y argum ent in this paragra ph is not a conclusive,
bu t only a tentative, one.
3. Tri-paiicchedat sparSena. M V B K . I . 11
4. Traydmdm hi-indriya-vi$aya-vijnana-satmipate indriyasya sukhadi-vedana-
utpatti-anukulo yas-lriprakdro vikaras-tat-paricchedah spariah. M V K B T . I. 11. In
literal translation it w o u ld m ean: “ W h en the three, nam ely, sense-organ,
ob je ct an d consciousness co m e together, the sense-organ is subjected to three
kinds of ch an g e, w h ich w ill lead to the threefold feeling such as pleasure
■etc. Sparsa m eans to b e determ in ed b y those three kinds o f c h a n g e.”
mation o f consciousness ( vijna.na-parina.ma) ? The answer to this
question is implied in the analogy o f ‘ the waves on water’ ( taran-
gdnamyatha jale). Waves arise on water only under certain atmos­
pheric conditions. In other words, the arising o f waves depends
not only on water but also on the atmospheric conditions. But,
that the waves arise depending on the atmospheric conditions,
does not make it impossible to say that those waves are just
modifications (parinama) o f water on which they arise. Similarly,
consciousness depending on certain factors such as sense-organ
and object, transforms itself into sense-consciousness. However,
that the sense-organ and object co-operate with the conscious­
ness in producing the sense-consciousness, does not in any way
contradict the fact that the latter is a transformation of
consciousness.
Sthiramati, too, finds it necessary to refer to objects (alambana)
for adequately explaining the emergence o f sense-consciousness.
According to him the point o f comparison between ‘five sense-
consciousnesses on mula-vijndna’ and’ ‘waves on water’ is that
just as waves can together or separately arise on the same water, so
the five sense-consciousnesses can arise together or separately on/from
the same mula-vijnanat There are two kinds of causes at work
in both cases: antecedent causes ( samanantara-pratyaya) and ob­
jective causes (alambana-pratyaya). The former o f these, for
example, water or mula-vijndna, remaining always the same, the
latter keep changing. It is according to the number and nature
o f the [objective]causes available (yathd-pratyayam),2 that waves
or sense-consciousnesses arise together or separately. By the ob ­
jective cause (alambana-pratyaya) o f any consciousness is meant
the object o f that consciousness. But in the case o f sense-con­
sciousness it has got to be external objects, not the so-called internal
objects such as seeds (bija) left behind in the alaya-vijnana by
past experiences, samskaras and vdsanas. For, while those internal
objects remain always the same, the external objects can keep

1. Taranganamyatha ja le iti. Alaya-vijmnat-pravrtti-vijnanamyugapad-amgapac-

ca-ulpattau drsfantah. T rim s. Bh. 15 (see a b o v e p . 142 n ote 2 ) .
2. Ttatha-pratyayam-udbhavah. Trim s'. 15
Yatha-pratyayam-udbhavah iti yasya yasya yah pratyayah sannihitas-tasya
tasya niyamena-udbhavah atma-labhah. T rim s. Bh. 15
changing from time to time,and from place to place, and thus can
provide for different and multiple sense-consciousnesses. M y con­
clusion that the object (vifaya or alambana)oi sense-consciousness-
is an external object, is sufficiently justified by the way Vasuban­
dhu and Sthiramati introduce this point. In the case o f alaya-
vijnana and manana-vijnana they specified the respective objects:
alaya-vijnana has for its object what it carries within itself, and
the place where it is located,1 while manana-vijnana has alaya-
vijnana itself for its object.2 But they do not at all specify the
object o f sense-consciousnesses. Instead, they use the general
term such as ‘vi$aya’ and ‘ alambana’ ,8 thereby implying that the
reader should understand those terms in their usual, ordinary,
sense as when a layman says, ‘object (visaya) o f eye. ’4 Having
said that, I must recall what was said under M V.I. 4 : namely,
that what the consciousness apparently grasps are the forms con­
structed and imposed by it on the things concerned. In other
words, although there are external things, the consciousness
never succeeds in reaching and grasping them as they are in
themselves, but only as they appear (pratibhasa). Being con­
ditioned by innate bijas, vasanas and samskaras, the consciousness
can make only approximations o f things, and that too under
the aspects o f subjectivity and objectivity.
I have mentioned above that all transformations o f conscious­
ness refer either to psychological or to epistemological categories.
They are citta and caittas, not bhuta and bhautikas. T o sub­
stantiate this I shall now produce a list o f the transformations
and their associates mentioned in the text. It is only a list o f
all the terms involved in their English alphabetical, hot any
conceptual, order :

1. Upadi-sthana—vijnaptikam. T rim s. 3
2. T a d ( =dlaya-vijndna)-atambam mano-nama vijnanam. Ib id . 5
3. vijftaptir-visayasya ca. I b id . 2; sad-vidhasya yd visayasya-upalabdhih.
Ib id . 8 ; alambana-sadbhavepaHcanam-api ca-utpattir-iti abhyupeyam. T rim s. Bh. 15
4. H su an T san g, the great C hinese interpreter o f TrimSatika c om m en tin g
o n stanza 15 says, “ T his m eans that th e five consciousnesses are d epen den t
internally upon the m u la-vijn an a (A la y a ), a n d that, externally, th ey ca n
o n ly m anifest themselves b y co n fo rm in g to a con caten ation of condition s,
su ch as the a c t o f attention (manaskdsa) , the five sense-organs ( indriyas) , th e
adhimoksa alobha avihimsa dtma-moha
advefa amoha aSraddha atrapa
ahimsa apatrapa atma-drffi cetana
alaya-vijnana apramadika atma-mana chanda
( = vipaka)
asamprajanya atma-sneha dhl
drk mrksa Sraddha
hri mudhi styana
irsya musita uddhava
kaukrtya praddsa upahana
kausidya pramada upekfd
krodha prasrabdhi vedana
mada pratigha vicara
mana pravrtti-vijnana vicikitsa
( = vijnaptir-visayasya)
( =visayasyaupalabdhih) vid
manana-akhyam-vij-
nana ( = mano-
nama-vijndna)
raga vijnaptir-vifayasya
mano-nama-vijnana ( = pravrtti-vijnana)
( = manana-akh- samadhi ( = visayasya upalabdhih)
yam-vijndna)
manaskara sahjfid iksepa
matsarya sdfhya vipaka
( = alaya-vijnana)
maya sparSa virya
miidha smrti visayasya upalabdhih
( = vijnaptir-visayasya)
( —pravrtti-vijnana)
vitarka

4. A ll is Mere Representation o f Consciousness

That all citta and caittas are transformations o f consciousness
has been said. Now the text proceeds to say that all citta and
caittas invariably involve the distinction ( vikalpa) between subject

external objects (italics m ine) sensed b y these organs ( visaya) s e tc.”

( Hsuan-tsang, The Doctrine o f M ere Consciousness, trans. W e i T a i [H o n g
K o n g , 19 73], p. 47 9)
and object, but that this distinction having no extra-mental
basis is a mere representation o f consciousness. The next stanza,
therefore, is a re-affirmation o f what the first one stated,
namely that all upacaras (usages / concepts) o f atma and dharma
( subjectivity and objectivity) are transformations o f consciousness.

[Trims. 17] This [threefold] transformation o f consciousness

Is [just] the distinction [between subject and
object] ;
What is thus distinguished,
Does not exist as [subject and object]
Therefore this is all mere representation o f
consciousness.1

Introducing this stanza Sthiramati says : what has been said

above, namely that all upacaras o f atma and dharma being just
transformations o f consciousness, have no independent existence,
is further clarified here.2 This is what he means : the upacaras
o f atma and dharma, namely, citta and caittas, are transformations
o f consciousness, and, therefore, do not have extra-mental
existence. In any case, what the stanza describes as representa­
tions o f consciousness cannot include anything more than (i)
subjectivity and objectivity (atma and dharma), (ii) the distinc­
tion (vikalpa) between them, and (iii) citta and caittas. It does
not include any o f the bhutas and bhautikas. However, citta and
caittas may belong to any o f the three worlds depending on where
the individual concerned happens to be : “ The above mentioned
threefold transformation o f consciousness is just the distinction
[between subject and object]. They [subjects and objects] are
citta and caitta belonging to three worlds, and have for their
objects mentally constructed forms” , says Sthiramati.3

1. Vijnana-parinamo'yam vikalpo ya d vikalpyate

Tena tan-nasti tena-idam sarvam vijnapti-mdtrakam. T rim s. 17
2. ldanitn atma-dharma-upacaro y a h prajnapyaie. sa vijhana-parijtama eva na
vijhana-panuamat-sa prthag-asti-atma dharma va-iti yal-pratijridtam tat-prasadhanar-
tham-dha. T rim s. Bh. 17
3. Jo'yam vijndna-parindmas-tri-vidho'nantaram-abhihitah so'yam vikalpah.
Adhyaropita-artha-akarah trai-dhatukas-citta-caitta vikalpa ucyate. Tathoktam—
Abhiita-parikalpastu cilta-caittas-tridhalukah ( M V K I . 9 ) . T riin s. B h. 17
Again, the emphasis is on the subject-object dualism, as Hsuan
Tsang observes :

We have examined the three categories o f consciousness that

are capable o f evolution and manifestation, namely, the
Alayavijnana, Manas, and the first six consciousnesses, and
explained that each o f these eight consciousnesses is the
basis or infra-structure for a twofold manifestation, the percei­
ved division and the perceiving division (nimittabhaga and
darsanabhaga). We have said that Atman and dharmas are
merely conventional designations o f this double manifesta­
tion o f consciousness, o f its Nimittabhaga and Darsanabhaga;
that they are not real entities apart from these two Bhagas;
and that, in consequence, ‘ all is mere consciousness’ or
nothing exists but consciousness.1
5. The Origin o f Vikalpa and Alayavijnana
The self-transformation o f consciousness starts with alaya-
vijnana, and results in vikalpa, so to say. However, nothing has
been so far said about the origin o f those two terms o f evolution.
As for the other two forms o f transformation, namely mano-nama-
vijnana and pravrtti-vijnana, Vasubandhu did mention how they
come into being. But while introducing alaya-vijnana he made
no mention o f how it originates Similarly, how vikalpa, the
bifurcation o f consciousness into subjectivity and objectivity,
which is the end-result o f vijhana-parinama, takes place, has not
been touched upon. Hence the next two stanzas, o f which the
first one deals with the origin o f vikalpa.
[Trims. 18] The consciousness contains all seeds;
Its such and such transformations
Proceed by mutual influence,
On account o f which such and such [subject-
object] discriminations arise.2
1. H suan-tsang, o p . cit., p . 503. H suan T san g’s version o f T rim s. 17 is
equ ally interesting:
T h e various consciousnesses m anifest themselves in what seem to be
tw o divisions:
P erception (Darsanabhaga) a n d the object o f perception (nimittabhaga) .
Because o f this, A tm an and dh arm a d o not exist.
For this reason, all is m ere consciousness. (I b id ., p p. C X X X I - I I I )
2. Sarva-bijam hi vijnanam parindmas-tatha tatha
Yati-any onya-vaiad yena vikalpah ■sa sa ja y ale. T rim s. 18
 According to Sthiramati this stanza says how the various kinds
o f subject-object distinctions in the absence o f any extra-mental
means come to actuality from alaya-vijnana, which is itself with­
out a basis.1 The stanza does so by referring to the context in
which the subject-object distinctions arise, namely the inter­
action between alaya-vijnana and pravrtti-vijnana. “ The conscious­
ness that contains all seeds” is obviously alaya-vijnana-,2 and ' ‘its.
such and such transformations” refer to pravrtti-vijnana?
The latter keep arising by the mutual influence o f itself and
alaya-vijnana. This statement might sound a vicious circle.
But the point is that the actual origination o f pravrtti-
vijnana is occasioned by the coming-together ( sannipata =
sparta) o f indriya, visaya and vijnana, as explained above.4
The pravrtti-vijnana thus originated will subsequently strengthen
the alaya-vijnana so that the latter can again co-operate
in the production o f further pravrtti-vijnanas.5 Thus the
continuous production (implied by the verb yati) o f pravrtti-
vijnana has to be attributed to the mutual influence o f itself and
alaya-vijnana. Now, the ‘such and such subject-object distinc­
tions arise on account o f the mutually influencing alaya-vijnana
and pravrtti-vijnana.’ This means : the inter-action between
alaya-vijnana and pravrtti-vijnana leads to the production o f a new
pravrtti-vijnana, which being ‘knowledge o f something’ should
necessarily involve the distinction between subject and object.
This distinction, although arising in the context of the inter-action
between alaya-vijnana and pravrtti-vijnana, derives solely from the
former, which in this respect is supported by nothing else ;
“ Thus on account o f the mutual influence of alaya-vijnana and
pravrtti-vijnana.. .the various kinds o f [subject-object] distinctions

1. Katham mula{-dlaya)-vijHdnad anadhisthitad asati karate vikalpah pravartante

iti-aha. Trims. Bh. 18
2. Tatra sarva-dharma-utpadana-Sakti-cmugamat sarva-bijam vijnanam-iti-alaya-
vijnanam. Ibid.
3. It is clear from Sthiramati’s siatement quoted below under note 5.
4. See above pp. 140-142
5. Anyonya-vasdd-iti tatha hi caksuradi-vij ndnam sva-saktiparipose vartamane Sakti-
msislasya-dlays-vijiidna-parindmasya nimittam so'api alaya-vijhana-pariifdmah cakfu-
rddi-sijnanasya nimittam bhavati. Trims. Bh. 18
 arise from alaya-vijnana, which is supported by nothing else.” 1
Thus, to conclude, the subject-object distinction ( vikalpa) is
essentially associated with pravrtti-vijnana, but is supplied solely
from within by alaya-vijnana, and, therefore, does not at all
belong to the extramental things in themselves.
Incidentally, let me say a word about the multiplicity or variety
o f subject-object distinctions. Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati
have suggested that the subject-object distinction may take on
more than one form. For example, the former speaks o f ‘such
and such vikalpa’ ,2 and the latter o f ‘various kinds o f vikalpas’ .3
How could there be a multiplicity or variety o f subject-object
distinctions ? It is possible, because the subject-object distinction
can appear in various forms such as the distinction between
‘ knower and knowable’, (jnatr and jneya) , grasper and graspable
( grahaka and grahya), enjoyer and enjoyable ( bhoktr and bhojya),
etc., etc.
The next stanza deals with the origin of alaya-vijnana. More
precisely, it says how alaya-vijMna continues from birth to birth.
The alaya-vijnana, as already indicated, is the individual uncon­
scious in which seeds ( bijas) o f all past experiences are stored
up. But once those seeds develop and express themselves in
various deeds, there can no longer be the alaya-vijnana. The
extermination or exhaustion o f alaya-vijnana means the end o f the
present life. But it can result either in nirvana or in another birth
in samsara, depending on how the alaya-vijnana has been exhaus­
ted. Exhaustion o f alaya-vijnana by yogic practices, which would
make the seeds therein defunct, will lead to nirvana. On the
contrary, if its exhaustion takes place by the natural development
o f seeds into deeds engendering new experiences, it will
inevitably lead to another birth in samsara. For, those deeds
contain fresh seeds o f experiences, which will collect to build up
a new alaya-vijnana ensuring another samsaric existence for the
individual concerned. This is what the stanza says :

1. Evam-anyonya-vasad-yasmad-ubhayam pravarttate tasmad-alayavijnanad anyena-

anadhisthitad aneka-prakdro vikalpah sa sajdyate. Ibid.
2. Vikalpah sa sa jayate. Trims'. 18
3. . . . aneka-prakdro vikalpah sa sajdyate. T rim s. Bh. 18
 Trims. 19 Once the previous stage o f maturation
Has been exhausted,
The impressions o f deeds
Along with those o f the twofold grasping
Engender the next stage o f maturation.1
The vipaka, here translated as ‘ the stage o f maturation’ evident­
ly refers to alaya-vijnana, as already mentioned above in the
second stanza.2 It gets exhausted (ksina) in the course o f time.
But it continues to exist, so to say, through the vasanas (habit-
energies) left behind by the deeds ( karma) it promoted, and by
the graha-dvaya (the twofold grasping) it exercised. Vasanas are
the impressions or habits, or characters, or traces, or habit-
energies, left behind by past experiences. They are also capable
( samartha) o f producing future experiences. They are like seeds
( bijas) which are produced by trees, and are also capable o f
producing future trees. For Sthiramati vasana means ability
( samarthyam) .3
There are two factors that produce vasana, namely karma (deed)
and graha-dvaya (the twofold grasping). O f them graha-dvaya
means the idiosyncrasy for subjectivity and objectivity. “ The
two graspings are (i) the grasping o f graspable, and (ii) the
grasping of grasper. Among them the grasping o f the graspable
is the belief that there are graspables independent o f cons­
ciousness, although in fact they are what the stream o f
consciousness projects itself. The belief that such graspables
are apprehended or known or grasped by the consciousness
is the grasping o f the grasper. And the habit-energies o f the
twofold grasping are the seeds, which being produced by
the earlier graspings o f graspable and grasper, are now
capable the engendering fresh graspings of graspable and
grasper o f the same kind.” 4 All that is being said in this

1. Karmano vasana graha-dvaya-vasanaya saha

Ksine purva-vipdke ’ nyad uipakam janayanti tat. T rim s. 19
2. Tatra-dlaya-akhyam mjHanam vipakah sarva-bijakam. T rim s. 2
3- Tena kannana yad-anagata-atmabhava-abhinivrttaye alaya-vijnane samarthyam-
ahitam Sa karma-vasana. T rim s. Bh. 19
4. Graha-dvayam. Grdhya-graho grahaka-grahai-ca. Tatra vijnanat-prthag-eva
sva-santdna-adhydsitam grdhyam-asti-iti-adhyavasayo grahya-grahah. Tac-ca vijnanena
pratiyale vijnayate grhyate itiyo'yam niscayah sa grahaka-grahah. Purvotpanna grahya-
grahaka-grdha-aksiptam-andgata-taj-jaUya-grahya-grdhaka-graha-utpatti-bijam graha-
dvaya-vdsana. Ibid.
passage is that subject-object idiosyncrasy belonging to one
birth leaves its impressions behind, which getting itself
attached to the next alaya-vijnana will eventually develop into
the same sort o f idiosyncrasy.
What particularly interests me at this point is Vasubandhu’s
suggestion that the habit-energies o f karma can produce the
next alaya-vijnana only in collaboration (saha) with the habit-
energies o f the twofold grasping. “ The habit-energies o f deeds
along with those o f the twofold grasping engender the next stage
o f maturation” ,1 says the text. Commenting on it Sthiramati
says, “ So, too, the habit-energies o f deeds alone, without the
help o f the habit-energies o f the twofold grasping, do not
engender the next stage o f maturation. Hence the text specifies,
‘along with the habit-energies o f the twofold grasping.’ ” 2 This
implies that the continuity o f alaya-vijnana and o f the consequent
samsaric existence depends decisively on the subject-object
idiosyncrasy. Therefore no wonder that Vasubandhu is advocating
its eradication as the means o f attaining nirvana.

6. The Triple Nature o f Reality

The imagined nature

Having discussed the process o f vijhana-parinama (transforma­
tion o f consciousness), Vasubandhu is now making an evaluation
o f experience. This he does by bringing in the theory o f the
triple nature o f reality (tri-svabhdva-vada). It is th e theory which
says that reality can take on three different natures ; parikalpita-
svabhava (the imagined nature), and para-tantra-svabhava (the
other-dependent nature), and parinispanna-svabhava (the absolutely
accomplished nature). The following stanza deals with the pari­
kalpita-svabhava :

[Trims. 20] The subject-matter that is liable

T o [subject-object] distinction
By whatsoever sort of [Subject-object]
discrimination,

1. See a b o v e , p . 150 n ote 1 fo r the text.

2. graha-dvaya-vasanaya saha. T rim s. 19
 Is all just imagined nature;
It does not exist.1

The term vastu, here translated as ‘subject-matter’ is often

used to mean something abstract as distinguished from concrete
things. For example, the phrase ‘kathd-vastu’ means the theme
(vastu) o f a story (katha). T o use it to mean a concrete thing is
not uncommon, though. However, in the present context it
cannot mean anything concrete or existential. For, here Vasu­
bandhu is evidently dealing with mentally constructed (parikal­
pita) nature.
The vastu that are distinguished into subject and object, are
the subjective forms o f living and non-living beings, self and re­
presentations o f consciousness all o f which are referred to in
M V K . 1.4, and have been discussed above.2 These forms may
refer to anything external or internal, falling within the sphere
o f experience, including even buddha-dharma, as Sthiramati obser­
ves.3 But the point is that they are not the things themselves,
but the forms (akdra or prakara) that one mentally constructs
and projects on to those things. Again, while those things in
themselves are neither subjects nor objects, the subjective forms
o f them can be, and are, categorized into various kinds o f
subjects and objects, such as graspable and grasper, enjoyable
and enjoyer etc. These forms are just mentally constructed
nature, having no extra-mental existence. “ The vastu that is
liable to subject-object distinction, as it has no existence [sattS\
is imagined nature, and not a nature that is subject to external
causes and conditions” , says Sthiramati.4 He then illustrates his
point as follows : One and the same thing is often subjected to
different kinds o f subject-object distinctions by different people.
For example, a man with bad eyes and another with normal eye­
sight will see the same thing differently. Or, something may be

1. Yenayena vikalpena y a d y a d vastu vikalpyate

Parikalfita-eva asau svabhavo na sa vidyate. T rim s. 20
2. See ab ove, p p . 46ff.
3. Yad ya d vastu vikalpyate— adhyatmikam bahyam va antaso buddha-dharma api.
T rim s. Bh. 20
4. Yad vastu vikalpa-visayas-tadyasmat satta-abhavan-na vidyate tasmat tad-vastu
parikalpita-svabhavam-eva, na hetu-pratyaya pratipadya-svabhavah. Ibid .
seen by some people as an object of knowledge, while by others
as an object o f enjoyment, etc. This difference o f form under
which something is seen or perceived or experienced cannot
come from the extra-mental thing, which remains always the
same. It must, therefore, come from the mind, which differs
from individual to individual. Thus it is the forms o f experience
that are described as imagined nature, and as having no extra­
mental existence.

The other-dependent nature

[Trims. 21] The other-dependent nature, however,
Is the [act o f graspable-grasper] discrimi­
nation;
It depends for its origin on conditions.1

The other-dependent nature is the very source o f the samsaric

existence o f an individual. In Western terminology it may be
called the mind. But, for the school o f Vasubandhu it is just the
aggregate— may be a purposeful aggregate— o f citta and caittas, 2 all
o f which have already been described as transformations o f con­
sciousness. They are essentially the act o f graspable-grasper dis­
crimination (vikalpa), and depend for their continued opera­
tion on various conditions, as explained above.3 By reason o f
their dependence on conditions it is described as the other-
dependent nature. Sthiramati summarizes all these points as
follows : “ There the [graspable-grasper] discrimination is the
own-form [ = the very essence] o f the other-dependent nature.
It is named the ‘other-dependent’ , because it comes into being
depending upon conditions. There the imagination [of the gras­
pable-grasper discrimination] is the same a.s the citta and caittas,
good as well as bad, belonging to all three worlds. It has been
said : the imagination o f the unreal [graspable-grasper discrimi­
nation] , however, is citta and caittas belonging to three worlds
[M VK . 1.9.] .” 4 More details about the nature and reality o f the

1. Para-tantra-svabhavas-tu vikalpah pratyaya-udbhavah. T rim s. 21

2. See below , note 4
3. See a b o v e pages 145ff
4. Atra vikalpa-iti para-tantra-svarupam aha. Pratyaya-udbhava-iti-anena-apipara-
other-dependent nature, which is variously called vikalpa or pari­
kalpa or abhuta-parikalpa, are given elsewhere.1

The absolutely accomplished nature

[Trims. 21 The [absolutely] accomplished [nature]
cont’d] Is the latter’s [i.e. the other-dependent nature’s
Perpetual devoidness
O f the former [i.e. the imagined nature].2

In plain language it means : if one can neutralize/stop the

graspable-grasper-discriminating activity o f the mind, there one
has the absolutely accomplished nature. It should no more be
called mind, though. On the contrary, it is then just the thing-in-
itself, the suchness (tattva), the devoidness o f graspability and
grasperhood (grdhya-grdhakaTbhdvena virahitata) .3 As all this has
been said before,4 here I need only to reproduce Sthiramati’s
commentary to the above lines: “ This nature is called the abso­
lutely accomplished, because it is unchangeably accomplished.
‘The former’ means the imagined nature and ‘ the latter’ means
the other-dependent nature. Where there is the [graspable-
grasper] discrimination, there the graspability and grasperhood
are imagined. It is said to be imagined because the graspability
and grasperhood, which in fact are non-existent, are simply
imagined to exist where there is the [graspable-grasper]
discrimination. The absolutely accomplished nature is the
other-dependent nature’s eternal and absolute devoidness o f
graspability and grasperhood” .5

tantra-abhidhana-pravrtti-nimittam-aha. Tatra parikalpah kusala-akusala-aryakrta -

bheda-bhinnah trai-dhatukas-citta-caittahyatha-uktam : Abh iita-parikalpas-tu citta-caittds
trai-dhatukah. (M V .I .9 )
1. See, for exam ple, a b o v e p p . 9 0 ff; 94fT
2. Nispannas-tasya purvena sada rahitatd tu y a . T rim s. 21
3. Sunyata tasya-abhutaparikalpasya grahva-grdhaka-bhavena virahitata. M V K B .
1. 2 .
4. S ee a b o v e note 1.
5. Avikara-parinispattya sa parinispam ah. T asya-iti paratantrasya purveria-iti
parikalpitena. T asm in vikalpe grahya-grahakabhavah parikalpitah. T atha hi tasmin
vikalpe grahya-grdhakatvam avidyamanam-eva parikalpyate iti parikalpitam ucyate*
Tena grahya-grahakena paratantrasya sadd sarvakalam atyanta-rahitata y d sa parinis-
panna-svabhavah. T rim s. Bh.21
 At this point Vasubandhu considers also the relationship
between the paratantra and parinispanna. He says that they are
not really two different beings, but only two phases o f the same
being: as paratantra-svabhava it is infatuated by the subject-object
idiosyncrasy, while as parinifpanna-svabhava it is free o f it.

[Trims. 22] For that reason, indeed,

It is said to be neither different,
Nor non-different
From the other-dependent nature.
It is like impermanence etc.1

This last line adequately explains the relation between parini-

fpanna and para-tantra as that between an abstract concept (e.g.
impermanence)and an existing individual (e.g. an impermanent
thing). In concrete experience one cannot have ‘impermanence’
as separate from ‘impermanent things’, although in fact they are
different from each other. Similarly, the parinispanna-svabhava is
not entirely different from the para-tantra-svabhava, but is not quite
non-different either. The simile o f ‘impermanence etc.’ should
not, however, be stretched too far to say that one can never
have parinispanna-svabhava as such. For, the realization o f parini­
spanna-svabhava is the ultimate aim of the Yogacarin. Therefore,
the comparison applies only to the ‘neither different nor non-
different’ aspect in both cases.
I may now summarize, as follows, what Sthiramati has to say
by way o f commentary on the above lines. Parinispanna is para­
tantra’ s eternal devoidness o f parikalpita. Devoidness (rahitatd)
is an abstraction (dharmata), which can be neither different (na-
anya) nor non-different (na-ananya) from the individual dharma
from which it is abstracted. Similarly, parinispanna, too, is an
abstraction of/from para-tantra-dharma, and, therefore, cannot be
either different or non-different from the latter. If parinispanna
were different from para-tantra, it would make no sense to say
that it is the same para-tantra devoid o f parikalpita. Again, if it
were non-different, it would be intrinsically defiled, just as the

1. A ta h eva sa na-eva-anyo na-ananyah paratantratah

A nityatd-adi-vad vacyo. ..T r im s.2 2
para-tantra is, and, therefore, could never to purified. Conversely,
the para-tantra, being non-different from parinispanna, would
never be intrinsically impure, either. It is, therefore, like anityata,
duh.kh.ata and andtmata, which are neither different nor non-different
from the corresponding samskaras. If anityata were different from
samskaras, it would mean that the latter are nitya, which is not
the case. On the contrary, if anityata were non-different from
samskaras, it would mean that the latter, too, just as anityata,
have lost their own-nature, which is not, again, the case.1
Another consideration that is brought in here is how para­
tantra divested o f subject-object forms can ever be known, and if
it is not ever known at all, how can one know that there is such
a state o f reality at all.2 The answer is :

[Trims. 22 As long as this [absolutely accomplished nature]

cont’d. ] Is not seen,
That [other-dependent nature], too,
Is not seen.3

The message o f this statement is that to be able to see that

para-tantra svabkdva in its absolute nature is neither an object nor
a subject, one has got first to see( = realize)the parinispanna-sva-
bhdva.i And the realization of the parinispanna-svabhava is possi­
ble, as Sthiramati observes, only through intuititve and supra-
mundance knowledge.5

7. The Threefold Naturelessness

Having explained the three natures o f reality, the author is
now turning to the negative aspects o f the same natures. Accord­
ing to Sthiramati, he is thereby trying to reconcile the theory of
three natures with the view that every dharma is without own-
nature, origin and destruction.6

1. See Trims.Bh.22
2. Tadi grahya-grahaka-bhava-rahitah para-tantrah katham-asau grhyate,
agrdhyamdno va katham -asti-iti vijndyate ? Trims.Bh.22
3. N a-adrste asmin sa drSyate. Trims'.22
4. JVa-adrste asm in-iti. Parinispanna-svabhdve sa drsyate iti para-tantra
svabhavah. Trims. Bh. 22
5. N irvikalpa-lokottara-jnana-drsye parinispanne svabhave.. Ibid.
6. T adi dravyam eva para-tantrah katham sutre sarva-dharma nihsvabhava
anutpanna aniruddhd iti nirdisyate. N a sti virodhah yasm at Trims. Bh.23
 [Trims. 23] Corresponding to the threefold nature
There is also a threefold naturelessness;
Referring to this fact it has been said
That there is the naturelessness o f all elements.1

[Trims. 24] The first nature is natureless by its very defi­

nition;
The second nature, again, does not come into
being by itself,
And this constitutes the second kind o f nature -
lessness.

[Trims. 25] That from which all elements have their ultimate
reality,
[Is the third naturelessness,]
It is also called suchness,
Because it remains always as such;
That is itself the state [in which one realizes
the meaning]
O f mere representation o f consciousness, too.2

Following the commentary o f Sthiramati, I may summarize

the theory o f threefold naturelessness as follows. Naturelessness
( nihsvabhavata) means that something lacks certain defining
marks, although it may appear to have them.3 There are three
such cases o f naturelessness: naturelessness by definition ( lakfana-
nihsvabhavata.), naturelessness with reference to origin ( utpatti-
nihsvabhavata), and the naturelessness o f elements in their abso­
lute state o f existence (paramdrtha-nihsvabhavata). The first one,
namely, laksana-nihsvabhavata, applies to parikalpita-svabhava
because the latter lacks a definition ( lakfana) by its own charac­
teristics ( sva-rupa); whatever characteristics it is believed to

1. Tri-vidhasya svabhavasya tri-vidham nihsvabhdvatam

Sandhaya sarvadharmanam desita nihsvabhavata. Trims.23
2. Prathamo laksanena-eva niksvabhavo*parah punah
Na-svayam-bhava etasya ili-apara nihsvabhavata . Trims. 24
Dharmanam paramarihas-ca sa yatas-tathata-api sah
Sarva-kalam tatha-bhavdt sa eva vijnapti-m atrata. Trims.25
3. Svena svena laksanena vidyamanavad bhavati. Trims.Bh.23
have, are all imaginary ones ( utprekfita), and it has no defin" g
characteristics (svarupa-abhava) o f its own, it is; as nature e ^
an imaginary flower in the sky.1 The second kind ot natureless­
ness applies to para-tantra-svabhava, which lacks the power o f self-
origin and self-existence (svayam.-bhd.vah) ,■ for its origin as well
as existence it depends on other conditions (pratyaya), and, is,
therefore, like the illusion created, for example, by a magician.2
The third kind o f naturelessness is the very essence o f the abso­
lutely accomplished nature, namely that it is absolutely devoid
o f all subject-object characterization.3 It always remains as such,
and never either as subject or as object.4 What is ultimately
meant by the theory o f mere representation o f consciousness is
that subject-object designations are merely representations of
consciousness, and that they do not at all belong to the abso­
lutely accomplished nature.5

8. The Realization o f Mere Representation o f

Consciousness
It has been thus established that all subject-object designations
are mere representations o f consciousness. Therefore, the next
consideration is how to realize that they are mere representations
o f consciousness, and how one can be sure to have realized it.

[Trims. 26] As long as consciousness does not abide

In the realization [that the subject-object
designations]
Are mere representations o f consciousness,
The attachment to the twofold grasping
Will not cease to operate.

1. Tri-vidha nihsvabhavata laksaxia-nihsvabhdvatd utpattinihsvabhavata para -

marlha-nihsvabhavatd ca. Trims.Bh.23
Prathamah parikalpitah svabhavah ayarn ca laksariena-eva nihsvabhavah taU
laksanasya-utpreksitatvat rupa-laksand ru p a m ...iti-a d i . Atas-ca svarupa-abhavat kha-
puspavat svaruperta-eva nihsvabhavah. Ibid.24
2. A parah punar-iti para-tantra-svabhavah. Na-svayam-bhavah etasya mdyd-
vat para-pratyayena-utpatteh. A tai-ca-yatkd prakhydti tathd-asya-utpattir-nasti-iti
ato'sya utpatti-nihsvabhdvata-iti-ucyate. Ibid.
3. T asm at parinispanna; eva svabhavah paramartha-nihsvabhdvata parinispan -
nasya-abhdva-svabhavatvdt. I bid. 25
4. Sarva-k&lam tathd-bhavat. Trims.25
Sarva-kdlam tatha-eva bhavati na-anyathd-iti tathatd-iti-ucyate. Trims.Bh. 25
5. Sa eva vijftapti-m atrata. Trims.25
 [Trims. 27] One does not abide in the realization
O f mere representation o f consciousness
Just on account o f the [theoretical] perception
That all this is mere representation o f conscious­
ness,
I f one places [ = sees] something before oneself.1

What the above stanzas insist is that (i) only the eradication
o f subject-object idiosyncrasy (graha-dvaya-anufaya) can effect the
realization o f the fact that all forms o f subjectivity and objecti­
vity are merely mental representations and (ii) that it can be
eradicated not by merely fancying (upalambhalah =grahanatah
citrikaranatah)2 that the objects, as they are perceived, are only
mental representations. When can, then, one be assured o f the
realization that all subject-object designations are mental
representations ?

[Trims. 28] One does abide in the realization

O f mere [representation of] consciousness
When one does not perceive also a supporting
consciousness,
For, the graspable objects being absent,
There cannot either be the grasping o f that,
[Namely, the grasping o f the supporting
consciousness].3

Here the realization o f mere representation o f consciousness is

equated with ‘seeing the thing as such’ (yalka-bhuta-darfana),4
not under the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity. The process
leading to such realization is : first there is the realization that
the form o f objectivity ( grahyatva) , which was believed to be the

1. Tavad vijHapti-matratve vijnanam na-avatisthati

Graha-dvayasya-anusayas-tavan-na uinivartate. Trims.26
VijRapti-matram-eva-idam-iti-api hi-upalambhatah
Sthapayan-agratak kim-cit tanmatre na-avatisthate. Ibid.27
2. See Trims.Bh.27
3. Tada tu-dlambanam jhanam na-eva-upalabhate tada
Sthito vijnana-matratve grahya-abhave tad-agrahat. Trims.28
4. See below p. 160 note 1
basis (alambana) o f knowledge, is merely a mental construction ;*■
then, the belief in objectivity being thus falsified, the belief in
subjectivity, too, becomes non-sensical;2 finally, having thus
abandoned the idiosyncrasy for objectivity and subjectivity
(graha-dvayasya-anutoya), one attains the intuitive ( nirvikalpa)
and supramundane ( lokottara) knowledge, whereby one sees
things as such (yatha-bhuta-darJana) .3
The next two stanzas further describe the state o f realization :

[Trims. 29] That indeed is the supramundane knowledge

When one has no mind that knows,
And no object for its support ;
It follows the revulsion o f basis
Through the twofold removal o f wickedness;

[Trims. 30] That itself is the pure source-reality,

Incomprehensible, auspicious and unchange­
able;
Being delightful, it is the emancipated body,
Which is also called the truth [-body] o f the
great sage.4

The first characteristic o f enlightenment is the supra-mundane

knowledge, which operates without depending on the subject-
object distinction.5 Such knowledge is beyond the reach o f
ordinary man, and intuitive in character. Hence the name

1. Tasm in ka le . . alambanam jhanam bahU-cittat na-upalabhate na pasyati

na grhnati na-abhiniviSate, y a th a bhuta-artha-darsanat na tu jatya-andhavat, tasmin
kale vijhana-grahasya prahariam sva-citta-dharmatayam ca pratisfhito bhavati. Trims.
Bh.28
2. Grahye sati grahako bhavati na tu grahya-abhava iti. Grahya-abhave
grahaka-abhavam-api pratipadyate na kevalam grahya-abhavam. Trims.28
3. E vam h i samam-analambya-alambakam nirvikalpakam lokottaram jhanam -
utpadyate, grahya-grahaka-abhiniveSa-anuiaya prahiyante sva-citta-dharmatayam
cittam-eva sthitam bhavati. Ibid.
4. A citto’nupalambho’sau jhanam lokottaram ca tat
ASrayasyaparavrttir-dvidha daustulya-hanitah; Trims.29
Sa eva-anasravo dhatur-acintyah kuialo dhruvah
Sukho vim ukti-kayo’sau dharma- akhyo-’ya m maha-muneh. Trims.30
5. T a tra grahaka-citta-abhavat grahya-artha-anupalambhac-ca acitto’nupa-
lambho’sau. Trims.Bh.29
‘ supra-mundane’ .1 It follows the revulsion o f the basis, namely
the store-consciousness.2 The revulsion o f the basis ultimately
means that the seeds o f experience that were implanted in the
store-consciousness, have been exterminated by yogic practices.*
The revulsion o f the basis takes place through the twofold re­
moval o f wickedness, namely the jneya-avarana and kleia-avarana.*
How jheya-avarana and kleia-avarana correspond respectively to
one’s attachment to objectivity and subjectivity has been else­
where explained.5
The final stanza is describing the reality o f an individual in his
absolutely accomplished nature. It is source-reality (dhdtu) in
the sense that it is the source o f all noble qualities.® It is the
emancipated body (vimukti-kaya) , also called the truth-body
( dharmakaya), o f the great sage ( mahS-muni): Interpreting the
term mahamuni Sthiramati says that it refers to Bhagavan Buddha
( = the enlightened lord).7 What I want to point out here is that
the ‘enlightened lord’ ( bhagavan buddha) need not necessarily be
Gautama Buddha, the founder o f Buddhism. He can be any
individual who attains enlightenment. Therefore, reference to
mahd-tnuni or bhagavan buddha at this point should not be interpre­
ted as supporting some kind o f monism.

9. Conclusion
I may conclude this analysis o f Trimiatika by referring to the
introductory remarks o f Sthiramati. Explaining the purpose o f
the entire text he said : This text is intended to explain the
meaning o f pudgala-nairatmya and dharma-nairatmya,8 How has the

1. Aparicitatvat (a klisfa tva t) lokc samudacara-abhavat nirvikalpakatvat-ca

lokad-uttim am -iti jM panartham lokottaram ca tad-iti. Ibid.
2. ASrayo atra sarva-bijakam-alaya-vijHanam. Ibid.
3. See above page 149
4. D v iih a -iti klela-avararia-daustulyam jheya-avarana-dauftulyam ca. Ibid.
5. See above pp. 14 ff.
6. Arya-dharma-hetutvad dhatuh. Hetu-artho hi-atra dhatu-Sabdah. Trims.
Bh.30
7. M aha-m uner-iti parama-mauneya-yagat buddho bhagavan maha-munir-
iti. Ibid.
8. Pudgala - dharma- nairdtmyayor-apratipanna-vipratipanndndm-aviparita-pud-
gala-dharma-nairatmya-pratipadanartham trimfatika-vijnaptipti-prakarana-drambhah^
Trims Bh. Introduction.
 text achieved that purpose? Referring to a passage in Vimfatikd-
vrtti I have elsewhere said that ‘ ‘ the old theory o f nairdtmya is
thus explained as meaning the non-substantiality o f the imagined
nature, not o f the ineffable nature” .1 Then, what TrimSatika
has done is just to explain that meaning o f nairatmya further.
According to this text pudgala-nairatmya and dharma-nairatmya
would mean respectively the non-substantiality o f subjectivity
(Stmah) and objectivity (dharma) in their various usages
(upacaras).2 All the usages o f atman (subjectivity) and dharma
(objectivity) are transformations o f consciousness,3 and, therefore,
non-substantial.
Sthiramati continues : the correct understanding of pudgala-
nairatmya and dharma-nairatmya will help one to destroy the kleSa-
avararm and jneya-avarana, and thus will lead one to liberation
(mokfa) and omniscience (sarvajnatva) ; the knowledge o f pudgala-
nairatmya counter-acts satkaya-drfti, and thereby destroys the
kleSas, while the knowledge o f dharma-nairatmya counter-acting
the jfoya-Smrom destroys it; the destruction o f kleSa-amrana and
jneya-avarana respectively results in the attainment o f mokfa and
sarvajnatva.* When read in the light o f Trimsatika, what Sthiramati
says should make the following equations : belief in pudgala —
sat-kaya-drfpi = kle$as=bondage o f samsara = belief in atman (sub­
jectivity). Therefore, belief in pudgala-nairatmya —removal o f
sat-kaya-drffi= destruction o f kleSa-avarana = attainment o f mofoa
(liberation) = th e belief that atman (subjectivity) is but trans­
formation o f consciousness, and, therefore, non-substantial.
Similarly, belief in dharma ( objectivity) ==belief in jneya = aklisfam-
ajnanam. B Therefore, belief in dharma-nairatmya = removal o f

1. See above p.23

2. See above pp. 94ff. for m y explanation o f atma-dharma-upacaras.
3. Atma-dharma-upaearo hi vividho yah pravartate
Vijhana-parinamo’sau. Trim s. 1
4. Pudgala-dharma-nairStmya-pratipadanam punah kleSa-jfteya-avararia-pra-
hapa-artham. Tatha hi-atma-drjti-prabhava raga-adayah kleiah. Pudgala-nairat-
mya-avabodhaS-ca satkaya-drfteh pratipakfatvat tat-prahdtiaya pravarttamdnah sarva-
kleSan prajahati. Dharma-nairatmya-jftanad-api-jfieya avaraya-pratipakfatvat jheya -
avaranam prahiyate. KleSa-jKeya-dvarana-prahdtiam-api moksa-sarvajHatva-adhigamd-
rtham Trims. Bh. Introduction.
5. Jheya-avaranam-api sarvasmin jheye jH/ina-pravrlti-pratibandha-bhutam-
4kli$pam-ajhanam. Ibid.
jneya-avarana = omniscience (sarvajnatva). The removal o f kleSa-
Svarana and jneya-avarana, which leads to liberation and omni­
science is definitely referred to in stanza 29,1 and, therefore,
Sthiramati’s contention is certainly borne out by the text.
Another objective, says Sthiramati, that Vasubandhu could
have in composing Trimtotika, is to repudiate the two exclusive
claims : one, that vijneya ( knowable = object) is as much a
substance (dravyatah) as vijnana (knowledge = consciousness =
subject) ; two, that vijnana is as much a convention ( samvrtitah)
as vijneya.2 The text has disproved both o f these claims by
establishing that both vijnana and vijneya are neither substance
(dravyatah) nor convention (samvrtitah), but transformations o f
consciousness ( vijnana-parinama).

1- F or this text an d ex p la n a tion see a b o v e p p . 160-161

2. VijMnavad-vijHeyam-api dravyata eva-iti kecin-manyante, vijneyavad vijHa-
nam-api samvrtita eva na paramarthata iti-asya dviprakarasya-api-ekanta-vadasya
pratisedharthah prakaraparambhah. T rim s. Bh. In tro d u ction .
 A TREATISE IN TW ENTY STANZAS
{VIMSATIKAY

1. Introduction
VimSatika, a treatise in twenty stanzas, is a thorough defence
o f Vasubandhu’s own theory o f knowledge against the cor­
respondence theory o f knowledge. By this latter theory I mean
“ the thesis that everything that we perceive is part o f the surface
o f a material object— a thesis that is too naive even to warrant
consideration” .* ViijiSatika is often interpreted as providing
‘answers to realism’ and thus as showing ‘that the universe as
representation-only is still a serious and tenable conception’ .s
But I am suggesting that far from providing ‘answers to realism’
it provides answers to the ‘realistic theory o f knowledge’, which
says that there is one-to-one correspondence between concepts
and extra-mental obiects. What Vasubandhu is trying to
show is not that the universe is ‘representation-only’ but
that what are taken to be the objects o f experience are
‘representation-only’ . In short, VimSatika is polemics not against
realism, but against the realistic theory o f knowledge.

1. T h is ch a p ter in clu d es translation o f VimSatika-karika, a n d m y inter­

p re ta tio n o f it based o n V a su b a n d h u ’s o w n Vrtti (c o m m e n ta r y ) o n the sam e
text. A fu ll translation o f the Vrtti is g iv e n in the a p p en d ix .
2 . D . W . H a m ly n , The Theory o f Knowledge, (L o n d o n a n d B asin gstoke:
T h e M a c m illa n Press L td ., 1970; reprin t e d ., 1 9 7 4 ), p . 147.
3. C f. C . H . H a m ilto n , W ei Shih Er Shih Lun Or The Treatise in Twenty
Stanzas on Representation-only, (N e w H a v e n ; A m e r ic a n O rien ta l S ociety , 1 9 3 8 ),
p . 6.
F o r o th e r sim ilar interpretation s se e : S. D . S harm a, A Critical Survey o f
Indian Philosophy, (D e lh i, V aran asi, P a tn a : M o tila l Banarsidass, 1 9 6 4 ), p p .
1 1 4 -1 1 6 ; a n d P. T . R a ju , Idealistic Thought o f India, (G e o r g e A lle n & U n w in
L td ., 1 9 53; reprin t ed . w ith the su btitle ‘V e d a n ta an d B u d d h ism in the L ig h t
o f W estern Id ealism ’ , N e w Y o r k : J o h n so n R e p rin t C o r p o r a tio n , 1 9 7 3 )p . 2 6 9 .
 Vasubandhu’s theory o f knowledge may be named as the
<transformation-theory o f knowledge’ in so far as t holds that
knowledge results from the self-transformation o f consciousness
which carries within it the seeds o f subjectivity and objectivity.
He establishes his theory :
(i) by showing the unwelcome consequences o f the cor­
respondence theory of knowledge, namely that it cannot
explain illusory experiences such as dreams and
hallucinations;
(ii) by providing a new interpretation to the theory o f atma-
dharma-nairatmya;
(iii) by arguing that no possible conception o f extra-mental
objects will justify the correspondence theory o f knowl­
edge; and
(iv) by answering the objections to his transtormation-
theory o f knowledge, namely : How can it explain the
difference between waking consciousness and dream-
consciousness? How can it explain the inter-action and
inter-relation between individuals ? How can it explain
moral retribution, and how can it explain the knowl­
edge o f other minds ?

2. Vasnbandlra’s Thesis
Vasubandhu opens his Vrtti by stating that “ in the Mahay^na
system it has been established that those belonging to the three
worlds are mere representations o f consciousness” .1 What are
‘ those’ ? From the analysis o f TrimSatikS, which I did in the
previous chapter, it is clear that ‘ those’ are citta and caittas, and
not bhuta and bhautikas.2 M V K , too, confirmed that view, when
its author declared that “ the imagination o f the unreal is citta
as well as caittas, belonging to all three worlds” .3 Hence what
Vasubandhu describes as “ mere representations o f consciousness”
are not the three worlds or things therein, but only citta and
caittas. Hence I refuse to accept such translations o f the above
quoted statement o f Vasubandhu as “ In the Mahayana it is

1. Mahayane traidhatukam vijHapti-matram vyavasthapyate. V im s .V r .l

2. See above pp. 140ff
3. Abhuta-parikalpaS-ca citta-caittas-tridhalukah. M V K .1 .9
established that the three worlds are representation-only” .1 This
latter translation ignores the fact that the term ‘traidhatuka' is an
adjective meaning belonging to the three worlds’ , and that it is
not a substantive meaning ‘ the three worlds’. Thus, being an
adjective the term ‘ traidhatuka’ should qualify a noun or nouns,
which the reader has to supply; and from the context o f Trityfa-
tika and M V it is clear that the noun under reference is citta-
cailtas. Hence I understand the above statement as meaning
that the citta and caittas belonging to the three worlds are all
mere representations o f consciousness. Hence the thesis o f
Vasubandhu :

[Vims. 1] It is all mere representation o f consciousness*

Because there is the appearance o f non-existent
objects ;2

What the above lines imply may be expressed in other words:

Whatever are taken to be the objects o f various experiences are
all mere appearances, and, therefore, mere representations o f
consciousness, too. It means, things-in-themselves being neither
.objects nor subjects, the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity
can come only from consciousness— these forms are stored up in
the unconscious, and present themselves at appropriate times.

3. Argument from Illusory Experience

T o substantiate his position Vasubandhu points to the experi­
ence o f a man with bad eyes:

[Vims. 1 Just as a man with a cataract

cont’d.] Sees hairs, nioons etc.,
Which do not exist in reality.3

That is, the objects experienced by a man with a cataract,

do not correspond to extra-mental realities. His experience,
thus, suggests that there could be experiences having no one-to-
one correspondence with extra-mental objects, which thus
makes a case for Vasubandhu’s position.

1. G. H . H am ilton, op.cit., p.19

2. VijOapti-matram-etad-asadartha-avabh&sanat. V im s.l
3. Tatha taimirakasya-asatkeSa-candra-adi darSanam. Ib id .l
An objection
The proponents o f the correspondence-theory immediately
raise the following objection :

[Vinis. 2] I f the representations o f consciousness

Are without [extra-mental] objects,
Then there would be no determination o f experi­
ence with regard to space and time,
Nor would there be indeterminacy o f it with
regard to streams [i.e. individuals]1
Nor would there be determination o f actions
prompted [by a particular experience].4

Normally an experience is determined by the place where, and

the time when, its object is given; it is not, however, determined
with regard to the individuals enjoying it, in the sense that
anybody present at that place and time inevitably has that ex­
perience; finally, it is also observed that a particular experience
always prompts the same sort o f actions. All this is so, it is argued,
because the experience corresponds to extra-mental objects. On
the contrary, if such correspondence between the experience
and objects, is denied, then an experience might nappen at any
place and time, but not necessarily to everybody present; again,
an experience invariably leads to an action in accordance with
the nature o f its object, which would not happen if the experience
did not have to correspond with the object.

Vasubandhu's reply
[Vims. 3] Determination o f space etc., is obtained
Just as [in] the case o f a dream;
Again, indeterminacy [of experience] with regard
to streams [i. e. individuals] is obtained
Just as [in] the case [of the experience] o f ghosts :
All o f them have the same vision o f pus-river etc.®

1. T h e term santana, literally m eaning ‘ a stream’ , for all practical pur­

poses stands fo r an individual.
2. Tadi vij&aptir-anartha niyamo deSa-kalayoh
Santanasya aniyamaS-ca yukta krtya-kriya na ca. Vims.2
3. DeSa-adi-niyamah siddhah svapnavat pretavat-punah
Santana-aniyamah sarvaih puya-nadi-adi-darSane. Vim s.3
 The dream o f certain objects occurs only at certain places,
and that too, only at certain times. Thus, dream-experience,
too, even though it does not correspond to extra-mental objects,
is determined by space and time. Again, all ghosts are believed
to have the same experience o f pus-river ( p Uya-nadi) etc.,
although the latter are not extra-mental objects. So experience
shared by all individuals present does not necessarily guarantee
reference to extra-mental objects.

[Vims. 4] Determined actions [resulting from experience]

Are obtained as those [obtained] by a dreamer.1

That certain fixed actions result from an experience is no

guarantee that there is an extra-mental object corresponding to
that experience. This view is proved by the fact that even
dream experiences produce fixed action. For example, says
Vasubandhu, sexual dreams can lead to the discharge o f semen.

[Vims. 4 Again, all those four factors are obtained

cont’d.] As in the case o f hells;
There all [its inhabitants without exception]
Behold the infernal guards etc.,
And experience the torments by them.2

It implies that : (i) the infernal guards are only imaginary

beings; however, (ii) experience o f them by the inhabitants o f
hell is spatially and temporally restricted to hell, (iii) this
experience is shared by all the inhabitants, and, therefore, is
not determined with regard to individuals, (iv ) this experience
also produces fixed results, namely, torments. Thus the experi­
ence in hell refutes all the objections raised by the proponents
o f the correspondence theory o f knowledge.
According to Vasubandhu the infernal guards cannot be real
beings born in hell. For, if they were, they also should be
undergoing the torments and sufferings o f hell. In that case
they cannot be themselves tormentors as well. On the contrary,
i f they do not deserve the punishments o f hell, i.e. if they are

1. Svapna-upaghatavat krtya-kriya. Ib id.4

2. . . narakavatpunah,
Sarvam naraka-paladi-darSane taiS-ca-badhane. Ibid.4
not sinners condemned to hell, there is no reason why they
should be there at all. In the face o f these difficulties Vasuban­
dhu argues that the so called infernal guards are just psycho­
logical projections o f those condemned to hell. This is the
message conveyed by the next stanza :

[Vims. 5] Animals are born in heaven,

However, they are not similarly born in hell,
Nor are the infernal guards1 born in hell,
For, they do not experience the sufferings o f hell.2

Animals could be bom in heaven provided they deserve it by

their good deeds. However, the infernal guards cannot deserve
hell, through their deeds, for in that case they would be all in
the same boat as those condemned to hell, and, therefore, would
not be tormentors. Now the opponent, admitting that the
infernal guards are not real beings, wants to suggest that they
are what the hell-inhabitants by virtue o f their deeds project.
This suggestion, too, does not satisfy Vasubandhu. Instead o f
saying that the infernal guards are what the hell-inhabitants by
virtue o f their deeds project, Vasubandhu holds that they are
transformations o f the consciousness o f the hell-inhabitants :

[Vims. 6] I f the birth o f [special] beings3 in hell

Can be traced to the deeds o f the hell-inhabi­
tants,
Why not say that they are transformations o f the
latter’s consciousness.4

1. H ere the term translated as infern al guards is preta. The usual

translation o f this term is ‘ g h ost’ , w h ich ca n m ean o n e co n d e m n e d to hell
and th erefore u n d e rg o in g the sufferings o f h ell. H o w e v e r, in the present
con tex t this term refers to the torm en tors o f hell as is clea r from Vrtti, an d
h en ce m y translations o f it as ‘ in fern al guard s’ .
2. firascam sambhavah svarge yatha na narake tatha
N a pretanam yatas-tajjam duhkham na-anubhavanti te. V im s .5
3. Bhuta, usually m e a n in g ‘ b e in g ’ , is often used to m ean ev il spirit,
in fern a l gu a rd s, satan, etc.
4. Tadi tat-karmabhis-tatra bhutanam sambhavas-tatha
Isyate parinamaS-ca kirn, vijnanasya na ifyate. V im s.6
 Vasubandhu further finds an additional difficulty in accept­
in g thIJt |he iififemal guarcfe could be projections o f one’s own
defies : namely, that such a|view implies that the deeds do not
prOovjce their fruits in /tne ^ m e place as where they were done ;

[ Vi^S.'TJ --rPRe yri^ession o f deed is imagined to be ip one

place,
And its fruit in another place :
Why not instead recognize the fruit
In the same place as the impression P1

By implication Vasubandhu is saying that it is not the impres­

sions o f deeds that are ultimately responsible for the projection
o f the so called objects o f experience, but the consciousness
which carries within it the seeds o f subjectivity and objectivity.
Vasubandhu has made the same point in Trimfatika, too, when
he said :

The impressions o f deeds

Along with those o f the twofold grasping
Engender the next stage o f maturation.2

All that Vasubandhu has been saying so far (Stanzas 1-7}

could be summarized as follows: Experience does not guarantee
one-to-one correspondence between concepts and extra-mental
objects. Dream-experience disproves the correspondence
theory o f knowledge. Experience starts not with extra-mental
objects, but with consciousness, which alone can supply the
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, which are necessary
presuppositions o f any experience in the state o f sanisara.

4. Non-substantiality o f Atm an and Dharma

In the next two stanzas Vasubandhu is interpreting the old
theory o f ayatanas ( = bases o f knowledge) in his own way. The
Buddha is reported to have said that there are twelve bases o f
knowledge, namely the sense-organs and their objects. This, the

1. Karmano vasand-anyatra phalam-anyatra kalpyate

Tatra-eva na-isyate yatra vasana kim nu kaTarum. V im s. 7
2. T rim s.1 9 . See a b o v e p . 150
opponents argue, is an indication that, according to the Buddha,
knowledge arises from extra-mental objects (rupa-adi-ayatana).
Vasubandhu’s answer to them is that the Buddha’s statement
that there are twelve ayatanas, has to be understood in such a
way that as knowable objects ( sprsfavya etc.) and knowing senses
(caksus etc.) they are transformations or representations o f
consciousness. That is, the ayatanas are the externalization o f
the seeds o f subjectivity (represented by sense-organs) and
o f objectivity (represented by the so called objects). Indeed,
Vasubandhu is not saying that there are no extra-mental things
at all. Instead, speaking in the context o f knowledge, he is
saying that what is taken to be subjects and objects o f
knowledge are only transformations or representations o f con­
sciousness. And according to him, by ayatanas the Buddha
meant such transformations o f consciousness :

[Vims. 8] It was with a hidden meaning

That he [the Buddha] spoke to his disciples,
About the existence o f the bases like colour
etc.,
Just as he spoke about things that are [appar­
ently] born by metamorphosis.1

The Buddha spoke o f beings that are apparently born by­

metamorphosis (upapSduka-sattva), thereby meaning that there
is continuity o f the stream o f consciousness.2 Similarly his
statement that there are bases o f knowledge, too, has to be
understood in its hidden meaning. What is that hidden
meaning ?

[Vims. 9] What the sage spoke o f as the two bases [of

knowledge]
Are (i) the own-seed
From which a representation o f consciousness
[develops],

1. Rupadi-ayatana-astitvam tad-vineya-janam prati

Abhipraya-vaSad-uktam-upapaduka-sattvavat. V im s.8
H e r e upapaduka-sattva is a te ch n ica l term referrin g to beings b o r n b y m eta­
m orphosis, o r su dden ch a n g e o f organism .
2. Yatha-asti sattva upapaduka iti-uktam bhagavata, abhipraya-vaidc-citta-
santati-anucchedam-ayatydm-abhipretya. V im s. V r .8
 And (ii) the form in which [that representa­
tion] appears.1

Vasubandhu explains it further as follows : There is, for

example, a representation o f consciousness (vijnaptik) which
appears in the form o f colour ( rupa-pratibhasa). It develops from
its own seed (svabijdt. . .utpadyate), which was there in the un­
conscious, namely alaya-vijnana. Then at the proper times it
externalizes itself in the form o f colour. The seed in this case
functions as the sense-organ, namely, the sense o f vision, and the
form that has been projected functions as a perceivable object
(draffayya) .2

The above interpretation o f the theory o f the bases o f knowl -

edge leads to a new look at the theory o f the non-substantiality
o f atman and dharma (atma-dharma-nairatmya). It has been else­
where3 observed that for Vasubandhu atman and dharma stand
respectively for subjectivity and objectivity. It becomes still
clearer in the present context. For, after having established
in the previous two stanzas that subjectivity and objectivity,
represented by ayatanas, are forms o f consciousness, now
he is going to say that the non-substantiality o f the same
subjectivity and objectivity is what is meant by the non-substan­
tiality o f atman and dharma. Thus the next stanza :

[Vims. 10] By this one is definitely initiated

Into the theory o f the non-substantiality o f
self [pudgala\>
Again, on the other hand,
By this instruction one is initiated
Into the non-substantiality o f objects \dharmd\'.

1. Yatah sva-bijad-vijfiaptir-yadabhasa pravartate

Dvi-vidha-ayatanatvena te tasya munir-abravit V im s.8

2. R upa-pratibhasa-vijfiaptir-yatah ssabijdt-parindma-vtfejaprdptdd-utpadyate
tac-ca bljam yat-pratibhasa ca sa te tasya vijilapteicaksu-rupa-ayatanatvena yatha-
kramam bhagavan-abravit. V im s .V r.9
3. S ee a b o v e p p . 9 4 ff
 [The self and the objects are non-substantial ]
With regards to their imagined nature.1

It means, the doctrine (deSana = instruction) that the ayatanas,

representing subjectivity and objectivity, are projections o f con­
sciousness, explains the non-substantiality o f Atman and dharma.
The indriya-ayatanas (sense-organs) make up what is called self
(pudgala), and is a collective name for subjectivity; and they
being mere representations o f consciousness, pudgala, too, turns
out to be non-substantial ( nairatmya). Similarly, the vi}aya~
ayatanas (knowable forms) being mere representations o f con­
sciousness, the objectivity which they represent, too, is non-
substantial, this being the meaning o f dharma-nairatmya.
The last part o f the above stanza, which says that the non­
substantiality (nairatmya) o f self (pudgala) and object ( dharma)
applies only to their imagined nature (kalpita-atma), is very
significant in understanding Vasubandhu’ s view o f reality. Read
along with Vasubandhu’s subsequent commentary, it points
right at the heart o f his philosophy, and puts the whole o f it in
the right perspective. As I have already explained the passage
concerned in one o f the previous chapters,2here I may just summa­
rize it as follows: Vasubandhu makes a clear distinction between
the imagined (kalpita) and ineffable (anabhilapya) aspects o f reality.
It is the imagined aspect o f reality that becomes either subject
or object o f on ordinary man’s experience, while its ineffable
aspect is far beyond the range o f his experience. Consequently,
it is the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity that are traced to
imagination (parikalpa or vikalpa), and, therefore, called the
transformation o f consciousness (vijnana-parinama), and character­
ized as non-substantial (nairatmya). On the contrary, the ineff­
able aspect o f reality, which becomes neither subject nor object
o f experience, is the suchness ( tathata), the thing as it is (yatha-
bhuta-vastu), and therefore, substantial (dravyatah). Only the
enlightened ones can know the ineffable aspect of reality as such
(anabhilapyena atmand yo buddhanam visayah).

1. Tatha pudgala-nairatmya-prCtvtio hi anyatha punah

Deiana-dharma-nairatmya-praveSah kalpita-atmana. Vims. 10
2. See above pp. 23ff
 Now, the distinction between the imagined and ineffable
aspects o f reality has decisive application to Vasubandhu’s theory
o f knowledge, too. For, it explains his contention that there is
no one-to-one correspondence between the objects known and the
extra-mental realities. The objects known refer to the imagined
aspect o f reality, which is subject to graspable-grasper distinc­
tion, while the extra-mental realities refer to the ineffable aspect
o f reality. Hence there is no chance o f having correspondence
between the objects known and the extra-mental realities.

5. Vasubandhu’ s Criticism o f Realism

A realist as he is, Vasubandhu criticises that sort o f realism,
which does not distinguish between the imagined and ineffable
aspects o f reality. Stanzas 11-15 contain such a criticism o f
realism. One can very easily be tempted to interpret these
stanzas as a blanket refutation o f realism.1 Read out o f context
they do yield such an interpretation. But if one takes into ac­
count what Vasubandhu says immediately before and alter tnose
stanzas, one will find it impossible to. interpret them as unquali­
fied refutation o f realism. For, his criticism o f realism follows
the distinction between the imagined and the ineffable aspects
o f reality, and the clear admission that beings in their ineffable
nature are beyond the experience o f ordinary men.2 In other
words, before starting his criticism o f realism, he made it clear
that there is a plurality o f beings, each o f them having an in­
effable nature. Therefore, his criticism o f realism cannot by any
means imply a denial o f extra-mental reality. On the contrary,
28 Referring to those stanzas H am ilton (op.cit., p. 10), for oik:, says:
-V a su b a n d h u ’ s reply, extending through several stanzas, is a powerful des­
tructive dialectic against the concept o f an exte rnal w orld .
2? Even Hamilton, who described Vasubandhu’ s pos.tion as a powerful
J * f- ^ d ia le ctic again st the co n c e p t o f an extern al w orld (o p .c it., p .1 0 ),
' “ " w ” .o Vasubandhu, “ T h . n ..u ,e o f ele.n..... . „ l ,h in
h „ , . l b e y o n d w o r d ., b u . i. is n o . I n . * .

^ That ’
of ^ . . i n * '.h = n a tu re o f e l.m e n .s v h ic h

” ^ „I d n a m e ly , .h a . 1. « * » » r e a l™ .
all it can mean is that : things-in-themselves being ineffable
are not experienced by ordinary men; what are being experien­
ced are one’s own mental constructions; hence no possible con­
ceptualization o f reality can correspond to the extra-mental
world.
The stanzas following the criticism o f realism, too, are such
that they cannot be understood without presupposing a plural­
ity of real beings, who influence, and interact on, each other. I
shall return to this point later.1
Let me now examine Vasubandhu’s criticism o f realism. For
the most part it is directed against the atomic realism o f the
Vaisesika system. However, Vasubandhu’s aim seems to be to
point out that no possible conceptualization o f reality can adequ­
ately represent the extra-mental world. In most cases, he shows,
such conceptualizations are self-contradictory. According to his
description, the reality could be conceived either as (i) a
single being endowed with qualities, or ( ii) as a multiplicity o f
atoms, or as an aggregate o f atoms. Each o f these conceptions
Vasubandhu finds contradictory, and, therefore, unacceptable :

[Vims. 11 ] The object is [experienced]

Neither as a single entity,
Nor as many discrete atoms,
Nor as an aggregate o f them,
Because not a single atom is obtained [in ex­
perience at all].2

Here, in the first place, Vasubandhu is not speaking about

things-in-themselves, but about objects ( vifaya) o f experience. In
one o f the previous stanzas it was said that the Buddha’s state­
ment that there are twelve bases o f knowledge, has to be under­
stood in such a way that, as knowable objects and knowing sen­
ses, those bases are only transformations o f consciousness. The
present stanza, says Vasubandhu, further explains, how one can
conclude that according to the Buddha the objective bases

1. See below pp. 188 ff.

2. N a tad-ekam m ca-anekam visayah paramapusah
N a ca te samhatayasmat paramatfur-na sidhyati. V im s .ll
(rupa-adi-Syatanas) o f knowledge are not things existing by them-
selves.1 Hence the discussion is definitely about things inas­
much as they become objects o f knowledge. In what mode are
they known or experienced : as a single entity, or as many dis­
crete atoms, or an aggregate o f atoms ? Vasubandhu finds that
neither o f those modes is part o f one’s experience. Commenting
on the above stanza he says :

‘The objective bases, namely riipa etc., supposedly ucGGmC

objects (vi$aya) o f the concept o f colour etc., respectively. Is
each o f them [namely, the objective bases o f colour etc.]
experienced as a single whole, just as the Vaisesikas speak o f
the colour-whole etc. ? Or are they experienced as many
discrete atoms ? or as an aggregate o f atoms ? One cannot
speak o f a single whole-object, because there is never the
experience o f the whole-colour as distinct from parts. Nor are
the objects experienced as many discrete atoms, because there
is never the experience o f single atoms. Nor are they experi­
enced as aggregates o f atoms, because not a single atom is
obtained [in experience].2
All that Vasubandhu is saying here is that the objects as they
are experienced cannot be described as a single entity, nor as a
plurality o f discrete atoms,' nor as an aggregate o f atoms. H e
then proceeds to say that an atom cannot possibly be obtained
in experience because the concept o f atom involves so many
contradictions, such as:

[Vims. 12] One atom joined at once to six other atoms

Must have six parts.
O n the other hand, if they are said

1. K a t h a m p u n a r -id a m p r a ty e ta v y a m -a n e n a -a b h ip r a y e jia

adi-ayatana-astiivam-uktam na pum h santi-eoa tani yoni y r . 11

pratyekam visayibhavanti-iti. Tasmat— [n o w follow s stanza 1 1 .] ' , sya t-
2. Yad-rupadikam-ayatanam rupadi-vijnaptinam pratyekam vl- ^ p aratfl6'
tad-ekam va sySd-yatha avaytwl riipam kalpyate vailesikaih. Anekam ^vay anebhy0
rmiah samhata va ta-eoa paramanavah. N a tavad-ekam visayo bhasati p f a-
'nyasya-mayavi-rupasya kvacid-api-agrahandt. Na-api-anekam
tyekam agrahanat. N a-api te sanihata visayibhavanti. Tasmat P a r

dravyam na sidhyati. V im s .V r . 11
 T o occupy the same place,
Then their aggregate would mean
Nothing more than a single atom.1

This stanza is suggesting two alternatives, which would make

aggregates o f atoms possible : either atoms join to each other
a n d thus form an extended body, or they join to each other in
such a way that even their aggregates remain atomic, needing
no more space than a single atom. Both o f these alternatives
are contradictory : the first one is contradictory because it
implies that an atom has parts, which no atom has by definition;
the second one is contradictory, because it does not explain the
distinction between a single atom and a collection o f them.
Hence the concept o f aggregates o f atoms does not make sense.
Now the Kasmlra-Vaibhasikas argue that, though the atoms
cannot join to each other, their aggregates can join, and that,
thus, there is no problem involved in having aggregates o f
atoms. Vasubandhu’s reply to them is simply that, if the atoms
cannot join, neither can they make aggregates, which would
subsequently join to each other.2

[Vims. 13] As there is no joining o f atoms,

Whose joining can be attributed on their
aggregates.3

In other words, when the aggregates are said to join to one

another, they should do so by the joining o f their component
atoms. But as atoms do not ever join together, it is non-sensical
to say that their aggregates join to each other.

Further,
[Vims. 13 There can be no joining o f atoms,
cont’d.] Not because they have no parts.4

1. Salkena ytigapad-yogiil-parmnaiioh sadamsata

Samidm samana-desatval-pindah syad-anumatrakah. V im s .12
2. M d bhud-esa dnsa-p/asaiigah samhalas-tu parasparam samyujyanta iti
kasmira-vaibhiisikas-ta idam prsjan'dh. Yah paramanunam sanghdto na sa tebhyo’
rtha-antaram-iti. V im s. Y i . 13
3. Paramdnor-asamyogc tat-sanghdle'sti-kasya sah. V im s .13
4. ,Xa ca anavamvatrena tat-samyogo na sidhyati. V im s. 13
 Vasubandhu illustrates his point as follows : The aggregates
o f atoms cannot join to one another, not just because they do
not have parts, but because there cannot be aggregates o f atoms
at all. Similarly, the atoms do not join to each other, not just
because they do not have parts, (but because the very concept
o f atom is contradictory) .*
What ultimately Vasubandhu means may be expressed as
follows. That the world is composed o f atoms is only a concep­
tual image o f the world. Such a conceptual image does not
guarantee that the world in reality is composed o f atoms. More­
over, one cannot consistently argue that the world is composed
o f (unextended) atoms, because this position involves self-
contradictions such as have been explained above. This does
not, however, in any case mean that the world is non-existent
o r illusory. It means only that ordinary human conception is
inadequate to reach the world as it is, which is known only to
the enlightened ones.
Now Vasubandhu proceeds to point out some more inconsis­
tencies presented by the atomic conception o f the world: atoms
are either with or without extension, both cases, however,
having practical difficulties, such as,

[Vims. 14] That which has different parts

Cannot make a unity,
[On the contrary, if it has no parts,]
How come it is subject to shadow and
concealment ?
. It cannot be argued that they [i.e. shadow and
concealment]
Belong to the aggregate o f atoms,
Unless the aggregate is admitted to be
Different from atoms.2

An atom by definition is an indivisible unit, and therefore can­

not have parts or extensions. If, however, the world is composed

1. N a tarhi paramanunam niravayavatvdt samyogo na sidhyati-iti vaktavyam.

Savayavasya-api hi sanghatasya samyoga-anabhyupagamat. V im s .V r.1 3
2. Dig-bhaga-bhedo yasya-asti tasya-ekatvam na yujyate
Chaya-dvrti katham va anyo na pindaS-cet-na-lasya te. V im s . 14
o f such indivisible, partless and extensionless units, then, at sun­
rise, for example, it would not have one side with shadow and
another without shadow. Similarly, atoms having no parts,
there could be no case o f one atom being obscured by another,
for no atom has an “ other” side which would be obscured by
the arrival o f another atom. Nor can it be said that aggregates
o f atoms are responsible for the phenomena o f shadow and
obscuration, for it is meaningless to say that extensionless atoms
can form extended aggregates.1
The next consideration is what would happen if the whole
world were conceived as a single, indivisible, extensionless unit.
Vasubandhu finds that such a position will leave a number o f
questions unanswered:

[Vims. 15] [I f it is assumed that the earth is] a single unit

Then there would be no progressive movement,
Nor simultaneous grasping and non-grasping,
Nor would there be discrete states o f many
[beings],
Nor would there be subtle and invisible
[beings].2

I f the earth were a single unit, there would be no progressive

movement, because just one step would cover the entire earth;
there would be no simultaneous grasping and non-grasping,
because if anything is grasped at all, it would amount to
grasping the entire world; there would be no discrete states o f
many beings, because all o f them would be occupying the only
single unit o f space available; there would be no subtle and
invisible beings, because all beings being o f equal size, there
would be no point in distinguishing between gross and subtle
beings, and between visible and invisible beings.3
Vasubandhu’s criticism o f realism ends here. Nowhere during
the discussion does he say that there is no extra-mental world.

1. See V im s. Vr.14
2. Ekatve na kramexia-elir-yugapan~na grdha-agrahau
Vicchi.nna-aneka-vrttti-ca suksma-aniksa ca no bhavet. V inis. 15
3. See V im s.V r.15
Instead he has thrice said that “ an atom is not obtained” .1
lu e term translated here as ‘is obtained’ is sidhyati. T o be sure,
this term does not mean ‘ to exist’ (asti). Therefore, to translate
the above sentence as “ an atom does not exist” would be a
gross mistake. The usual meanings o f the term sidhyati are ‘ to be
obtained (in experience),’ ‘ to be given (in experience)’ o r ‘ tobe
proved to be true’ etc.2 So Vasubandhu’s main criticism against
the atomic realism is that the atoms are neither given in
experience nor proved. Therefore he does not really say that
there are no atoms at all, although he is not prepared to
admit that things-in-themselves which are ineffable, could be
conceived in .terms o f atoms.
Let me once again recall that the entire discussion takes
place in the context o f knowledge. What Vasubandhu is pri­
marily concerned about is to show that no mode o f existence
suggested by atomic realism can stand the test o f experience.
The objects experienced are never in the mode o f a single atom,
nor o f many discrete atoms, nor o f aggregates o f atoms. So
atomic realism cannot be defended on the basis o f experience.
Further, even if atomic realism' were the correct way o f
conceiving the extra-mental world, it does not justify the corres­
pondence theory o f knowledge. For, the objects attained ia
knowledge do not correspond to any o f the modes suggested by
atomic realism: that is, the objects are never experienced
either as a single atom or as many discrete atoms or as aggregates,
o f atoms. So no matter whether atomic realism is correct or
not, Vasubandhu’s thesis that the objects insofar as they are
experienced, are subjective forms o f consciousness, and therefore
comparable to objects experienced in dreams, stands.
Vasubandhu has also brought out the practical difficulties
involved in conceiving the world as composed o f indivisible
atoms. The Vaisesikas, who hold such an atomic realism, also
claim that an ordinary man’s experience o f the world, too, is
realistic. It would mean that an ordinary man’s experiences o f

1. Paramanur-na sidhyati. Vims. 11

Paramdriur-ekam dravyam na sidhyati. Vims.Vr. 11 and 13
2. See V. S. Aptc, The Student’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi, Patna,
Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, (1965), p. 603. Hamilton (op. cit., p. 43,
45 & 49) has translated sidhyati as “ is proved” .
 extension, movement, partial knowledge, shadow and conceal­
ment, quantity, difference, relation etc. , etc. , have all to be
real, and corresponding to the extra-mental world. But, as
Vasubandhu has shown, atomic realism cannot in any way
explain, or account for, such experiences. Thus atomic realism
suffers seriously from internal inconsistencies, and therefore
cannot be accepted as a valid explanation o f the extra-mental
world.
Finally, Vasubandhu’s criticism o f atomic realism does not
amount to the denial o f an extra-mental world. Instead, it
means only that he refuses to conceive the extra-mental world
in terms o f atomic realism. And in fact, he refuses to accept
any sort o f theoretical formulation about the extra-mental
world, because for him the extra-mental world, which consists
o f things-in-themselves, is ineffable (ambhilapya.), and there­
fore beyond all human formulations. What one can think of
and speak o f is one’s own mental construction (parikalpita =
kalpita-atma), which has little correspondence with the extra­
mental world.
Again, that Vasubandhu believes in an extra-mental world
is beyond doubt. For, just before starting the criticism of
realism, he made it absolutely clear- that there is an extra-mental
world of beings, whose ineffable nature is perceived only by the
enlightened ones.1 Therefore it would be unreasonable to think
that Vasubandhu’s criticism o f realism is meant to deny the
existence o f an extra-mental world.

6. Refutation o f the Correspondence

Theory o f Knowledge
Now Vasubandhu squarely faces the supporters o f the corres­
pondence theory o f knowledge. The latter, as already mentioned,
maintain that every piece o f knowledge corresponds to an extra­
mental reality. From this they argue that the fact that one has
knowledge o f something can be taken as a proof for the extra­
mental existence o f that thing. And conversely, too, according to
them there would be no knowledge, especially sense-perception,
if there were no extra-mental realities. Vasubandhu formulates

1. See a b o v e p p . 231T
their arguments as follows: “ Existence or non-existence [o f
something] is proved using the means o f knowledge. O f all the
means o f knowledge sense-perception is the strongest one. If so,
there being no object, how does one get the awareness such as
‘ this thing is being perceived by me ?” ’1 I may reformulate this
argument as follows. Existence or non-existence o f something
is established on the basis o f the evidence o f knowledge. And
the most valid form o f knowledge is sense-perception. So when­
ever there is a sense-perception, it is most certain that there is
an extra-mental reality corresponding to that sense-perception.
And, again, that there are sense-perceptions, is a fact. There-
ore, that there are extra-mental realities corresponding to those
sense-perceptions, too, is a fact.
Interestingly enough, Vasubandhu’s reply to the above argu­
ment does not at all attempt to deny the existence o f extra­
mental realities. On the contrary, what he does is to falsify the
premise that every piece o f knowledge testifies the existence o f an
extra-mental reality, and thus to show that existence o f an extra­
mental reality cannot be established on "the basis o f the evidence
o f knowledge. In other words, what he is interested in is to
refute the correspondence theory o f knowledge. Here, again,
his argument against the correspondence theory o f knowledge
is drawn from illusory experiences. It just says that dream-
experience is a case against the claim that every perception
necessarily refers to an extra-mental reality:

[Vims. 16] Perception [can occur without extra-mental

objects],
Just at it happens in a dream etc.2

The rest o f the above stanza makes an analysis o f perception

and concludes that even in waking experience perception does
not get at extra-mental objects. He says that at the time o f
perception there is no longer the presence o f extra-mental object,
which would be the object o f that perception: .

1. Pramaria-vaiad-astitvam nastitvam va nirdharyate. Sarvesam ca prama-

nanam pratyaksam pramanam garis(ham-iti-asati-arthe katham-idam buddhir-bhavati
pratyaksam iti. Vims.Vr. 16
2. Pratyaksa-buddhih svapnadau yatha. Vims.16. Commenting on it
Vasubandhu says : vina-api-arthena-itipurvam-evajnapitam. Vims.Vr.16
 [Vims. 16 At the time when that [perception occurs],
cont’d.]
The [corresponding external] object is not
found;
How can then one speak o f its perception P1

In other words, by ths time perception arises, the perceptive

faculty will have already lost touch with the object in question,
so that the perception cannot be o f that object. Vasubandhu
gives two arguments to this effect, (i) He distinguishes two
moments in the process o f perception: one, the moment o f
contact between the sense and the object; two, the moment o f
reflection whereby one realizes that one has the preception o f
something. For Vasubandhu perception occurs at this second
moment o f reflection, when the sense no longer has to be in
contact with its object. For example, in the first moment there
is contact between the sense o f vision and its object. In the
second moment one can close one’s eyes, and still reflect to
realize that one perceives such and such an object. This
reflective awareness is what is called perception. Hence, it is
evident that at the moment when perception takes place, there
is no contact between the sense and the object. If so, o f what
is the perception ? Or, what is the object o f perception ? It is
nothing other than the image constructed by the mind. Vasu­
bandhu’s own words in this context may be paraphrased as
follows: Perception is the reflective awareness that !I have per­
ception o f such and such an object’ . However, when it occurs,
the object is not seen at all. For, the eye-consciousness is
obstructed at that time. Hence the perception is determined
only by though t-consciousness. So how can it be said that an
external object is perceived ?2
(ii) The second argument is based on the theory of moment­
ariness, which says that everything is momentary.3 The objects

1 ... sa ca yada tadd

Na so'rtko drsvate tasya pratyaksatvam katham matam, V im s. 16

2. Tadd ca sa pratyksa-buddhir-bhavati-idam me pratyaksam iti-tada na

so'rtho drsvate mano-vijhdnena-eva pariccheddc-caksurvijhanasya ca tadd niruddhatvad-
iti katham tasya pratyaksatvam istam. V im s .V r.1 6
3. Sarvam ksartikam
 as well as senses being momentary, they may still come into
contact with each other for a single moment. But in the second
moment o f reflective awareness, when perception takes place,
there will be neither the same object nor the same sense-organ
( = subject). Therefore, perception cannot have for its object
an extra-mental reality.1 Instead, what is being perceived is
just an image constructed by the mind.
Thus the question that interests Vasubandhu is not whether
there are external objects or not. He almost takes it for granted
that thete are such objects. Then the question before him is
whether they are as such obtained in perception. He answers
this question negatively; namely, that the object arrived at in
perception is never the thing-in-itself, but only the image
constructed by the mind. It is interesting to rrote how the later
logicians, Dinnaga and Dharmaklrti, took over this idea and made
it the central thesis o f their epistemology. They distinguished
between the moment o f pure sensation and o f conceptualization.
A perception is complete only when the moment o f sensation is
followed by an act o f conceptualization.2 The moment o f pure
sensation is marked by a momentary contact between the object
and the sense-faculty, which creates just a sense-impression. This
sensation is momentry,3 and, therefore, not subject to mental
construction.4 Being a moment o f experience it is neither
conceivable nor communicable, it is not even worth the name o f
knowledge. It becomes knowledge or perception only when it
is associated with certain conceptual forms (kalpana) supplied by
the mind. Such conceptual forms are defined as a distinct cogni- “
tion o f what appears, which ( = cognition) is capable o f being

1. Visesena tu ksartikasya visayasya tadanlm nimddham-eia tadrupam rasadikam

va. Vims.Vr 16
2. Pratyaksasya sdksat-karitva-vyaparo vikalpena-anugamyate. (Nyaya-bindu-
tika. 3.12)
3. Pyalyaksasya hiksaija ekograhyah. (Ibid. 1.12)
4. Kalpana-apodham-abhrantam pratyaksam. This is the definition given
by Dharmakirti in his Nyaya-bindu, 1.4. In Dirinaga’s definition the term
abhrantam does not appear. However, for various reasons Dharmakirti and
his commentators thought this term to be essential to the definition o f prat-
yaksa. For details see my “ A Study o f the Buddhist Epistemology according
to Dharmakirti’s Nyaya-bindu” , (M .A. dissertation, University o f Poona,
1974), pp. 30ff.
expressed in words.1 So it is the conceptual forms ( kalpana) that
make a sense-experience a piece of knowledge, which is con­
ceivable and expressible in words. Thus knowledge in the
empirical sense o f the term must involve mental construction,
and therefore, cannot guarantee an accurate representation of
things-in-themselves. And this is all that Vasubandhu, too, says.
The defenders of the correspondence theory o f knowledge
still insist that there has to be an invariable connection between
knowledge and external realities. They are now prepared to
concede that knowledge in its final form is far removed from,
and out o f touch with, extra-mental realities. But they argue
that every knowledge presupposes a ‘first moment’ o f real
contact with extra-mental realities. They cite particularly the
instance of memory: at the time when memory takes place,
mind is not at all in touch with the external object concerned.
But it was once in the past in direct touch with that object,
which experience alone makes the present memory possiple.2
So, they conclude, even those experiences which have no
apparent contact with external realities, are ultimately based
on some extra-mental reality.
Vasubandhu’ s answer is the same as ever: What appear to
be obiects o f knowledge are no more than representations o f
consciousness. Memory is possible because such representations
o f consciousness occurring at one time may be later recalled.
Therefore, memory is not based on external objects any more
than knowledge or perception itself is:

[Vims. 17] It has [already] been said

That there is a representation o f consciousness,
Which appears as that, [namely the respective
object];
From’ it [i.e. from -a representation o f
consciousness]
Does the memory arise.3

1. Abhilapa-samsarga-yogya-pralltih kalpana. (Nydya-bindu, 1.5).

2. Na-ananubhutam-mano-vijnanena smaryala iti-auasyam artha-anubhavena
bhavitavyam tac-ca darianam-iti-evam tad-visayasya rilpadeh pratyaksatvam matam.
Vims.Vr.17
3. Uktam yatha tad-abhasa vijnaptih smaranam tatah. Vims. 17
 Commenting on those lines Vasubandhu says: It has already
been said that even in the absence o f extra-mental objects there
arise representations o f consciousness, which appear as objects
o f visual consciousness etc. From those representations there
can arise thought-representations, which associated with
memory-power will appear as the same objects^ namely colour
etc., hence the fact o f memory does not prove the experience
of [extra-mental] objects.1
The next objection raised by the opponents gives Vasubandhu
an opportuntiy to make an important point. Their objection is
as follows. Everybody knows that his dream experiences do not
have extra-mental realities for their objects. Similarly, if the
waking experiences, too, did not have extra-mental realities for
their objects, then everybody would naturally know that their
experiences did not correspond to any extra-mental realities.
But it is not the case. Therefore, on the basis o f dream-experi-
ence one cannot argue that waking experiences, too, do not
correspond to extra-mental realities.2 Vasubandhu’s answer is:

[Vims 17 Those who are not awake

cont’d.] Do not realize that the objects they see in a
dream
Do not exist.3

What Vasubandhu suggests here is that the dream-experience

is to be taken only as a model towards understanding the
entire samsaric experience. It is true that everybody knows that
the objects experienced in dreams are not real, but only mental
images. But one comes to realize it only once one wakes up from
sleep. Similarly, as long as one is in the state o f samsara, one is
in a transcendental sleep, under the influence o f which one

1. Vind-api-arthena yatha-artha-dbhdsa caksur-vijnana-ddika vijnaptir-utpad-

yate tatha-uktam. Tato hi vijnapteh smrti-samprayukta tat-pratibhasa-eva rupddi-
vikalpika mano-vijnaptir-utpadyat iti na smrtyutpadad-artha-anubhavah sidhyati.
Vims.Vr.17
2. Yadi yatha svapne vijnaptir-abhuta-artha-visaya tathd jdgrato'pi sydt-tatha-
eva tad-abhavam lokaih svayam-avagacchet. A a ca-evam bhavati. Tasmdn-na svapna
iva-artha-upalabdhih sarva nirarthikd. Vims.Vr. 17
3. Svapne drg-visaya-abhavam na-aprabuudho'vagacchat'i. Vims. 17
dreams o f so many objects, which are mistaken for real, extra­
mental, realities. One will not realize that those objects are
only his own mental images, as long as one is in that transcen­
dental sleep, namely, samsara. But the moment one attains en­
lightenment, one will spontaneously realize that what one so far
took for realities, were only imaginary dream-objects, and that
things-in-themselves are nothing like those images. Commenting
on the obove lines Vasubandhu says: The world is fast asleep.
It is a sleep characterized by the habit o f vainly distinguishing
between subject and object. The world so asleep sees unreal
objects, just as in a dream. As long as it is not awoken it can­
not properly realize the unreality o f those objects. The supra-
mundane-intuitive knowledge will act as a remedy to this
sleepiness. When through such knowledge one is awakened, the
previously attained impure, mundane, knowledge will vanish,
and consequently one will properly realize the unreality o f the
mistaken objects. Thus, the dream-experience and the waking
experience are similar to each other.1

Here all o f a sudden it becomes clear that the example of

dream-experience for Vasubandhu means much more than an
argument against the correspondence theory of knowledge. It
is now a model explaining the samsara-experience itself. Thus,
what he ultimately says is that the individuals in the state o f
samsara. are in a cosmic slumber, which makes them dream so
many objects. Mental images as they are, those dream-objects
are mistaken for things-in-themselves by the unenlightened.
This does not mean that there are no things-in-themselves at all,
only they are not as such perceived by the unenlightened people.
Once the latter are enlightened by the supra-mundane-
intuitive knowledge, they will come out o f their slumber, and
will on the one hand realize the unreality o f those dream-objects,
and, on the other, see things-in-themselves as they are.

1. Evam litatha-i'ikalpa-i'asana-nidraya prasupto lokah svapna iva abhutam

artham pasyan-na prabuddhas-tadabhdvam yathavan-na-avagacchati. Tada tu tat-prati-
paksa-lokottara-nirvikalpa-jMna-labhat-prabuddho bhavati tada tad-prasta-labdha-
osuddha-laukika-jnana-samnkhibhavat-t'isaya-abhavam yathdvad-aiagacchati-iti samd-
nam-etat. Vims.Vr. 17
 7. Inter-action and Inter-relation Between Individuals

Now it comes about that all experiences and happenings in '

this samsaric realm are only phenomenal and, therefore, affect
nobody in a substantial manner. Consequently, it would appear
that people, as long as they live in this realm, never get to
know each other, nor can influence each other, nor can help
each other, nor can even injure each other. Thus Vasubandhu’s
philosophy seems to call into question the meaning o f social life.
It also seemingly fails to explain the moral merits and demerits
o f actions, these actions being no better than those done by a
dreamer. Vasubandhu’s answer to these difficulties is given in
the remaining stanzas o f the treatise.
Before starting to analyse the text, let me recall what I
already mentioned in the introductory chapter.1 That is, this
final section o f the treatise cannot be understood without presup­
posing a plurality o f individuals. I f Vasubandhu did not believe
in a plurality o f individuals, he could very easily dismiss the
above difficulties, saying that there being only one being the
questions about social relations are irrelevant. Therefore, the
very fact that he takes those questions seriously, and that he
tries to solve them satisfactorily, is clear evidence that he admits
a plurality of beings. One might argue that Vasubandhu’ s
admission o f a plurality o f beings applies only to the phenomenal
realm ofexistence, just as the non-dualist Sankara’s admission o f ;
a plurality o f beings does. But I should say that there is a great :
difference between the ways these two authors speak. First o f all
Vasubandhu never even once positively says that there is only
one being, and that plurality is only apparent; while the
basic thesis o f Sankara is that ‘ ‘being is only one, without a
second” .2 Secondly, Vasubandhu more than once refers to a
plurality o f enlightened beings (buddhas), who evidently belong
to the noumenal realm o f existence, and who alone know the
ineffable nature ( anabhilapya-atma) o f each other and of other
beings ;3 while Sankara all through his writings is positively fighting
against the possibility o f having a plurality o f liberated (mukta)

1. See above,
2. Eham-eva advxtiyam
3. For example, see Vimf. 10 and 21 along with Vrtti.
beings. Thirdly, assumption o f a plurality o f beings makes no
part of Vasubandhu’s writings meaningless, but, on the contrary,
makes many passages much more meaningful than they would
be from a monistic point o f view; while assumption o f a plurality
of beings (in the noumenal level) would contradict the very
basic thesis o f Sankara, and would make most o f his writings
absolutely meaningless. Therefore it is no use comparing the
systems o f Sankara and Vasubandhu in establishing that the
latter is a monist. On the contrary, taking the whole context
into account, I feel that the admission o f a plurality o f beings,
even in the noumenal level o f existence, is Vasubandhu’s basic
assumption, and that such an assumption has one o f its clear
applications in interpreting the following stanzas.
The objector says : It has been said that the objects experienced
by sentient beings are representations o f consciousness which
appear as objects. These representations, again, are said to arise
from transformations o f the stream-consciousness o f the respec­
tive individuals, not from particular, external, objects. (It
implies that nothing external can influence or determine those
representations o f consciousness). I f so, how come that sentient
beings have their representations o f consciousness determined by
acquaintance with good or bad friends, or by listening to good
or bad discourses. In fact there could be neither contact with
good or bad friends, nor such discourses.1

Vasubandhu replies:
[Vims. 18] The representations o f consciousness
Are determined by mutual influence
O f one [individual] on another.2

Vasubandhu explains it : The representations o f consciousness

o f all sentient beings are determined by mutual influence o f one
[individual] on another, according as it is fitting. Thus, a
particular representation arises on a certain stream-consciousness

1. Tadi sva-santana-parinama-visesdd-eva sattvdnam arlhapratibhasa vijhaplaya

utpadyante na-artha-visesat, tada ya papa-kalydna-initra-samparkdt sad-asad-dharma-
Sravaijac-ca vijnapti-niyamah sattvdnam sa katham sidhyati asati sad-asat-samparke
tad-desanaydm ca. Vims.Vr.18
2. Anyonya-adhipatitvena vijnapti-niyamo mithah. Vims.18
by the influence o f a particular representation on another stream-
consciousness, not on account o f any particular external object.1
Here is a point worth mentioning. The discussion so far has
been mostly about how people know each other, or experience
each other. In that case the reality o f the subject who knows or
experiences was mostly taken for granted, and then always the
question was about the reality o f the objects known or experi­
enced. Here, on the other hand, the question is about how
people influence each other, and how their character is affected
by mutual friendship, conversation etc. This question inevitably
presupposes a multiplicity o f really existing individuals. The
only genuine problem in this regard is how those individuals,
whose ultimate natures are ineffable and incommunicable, can
reach each other in order to influence each other. About objects
o f knowledge Vasubandhu said that they are nothing extra­
mental, but only mental images. But when he says that two
individuals influence each other in one way or another, he must
mean that they are really existing beings. For example, to say
that I am affected by someone else, I must first believe that
there is someone else than myself. Thus, Vasubandhu clearly f
admits that there are different individuals inter-acting and
influencing each other. But since he believes that the real nature
o f each individual is inaccessible and incommunicable, he must
explain how the inter-action and mutual influencing o f indi­
viduals is possible. This is what he does in the stanzas under
discussion. His explanation may be put as follows. The real
nature o f individuals is ineffable, inaccessible, and incommunic­
able. But in their phenomenal nature they are, and act, like indi­
vidual streams o f mental energy, which can influence and affect
each other. In other words, each individual is somehow determin­
ed by other individual streams o f mental energy, although the
ultimate nature of all o f them would always remain untouched.
Another question is about what makes one more responsible
for one’s actions done while one is awake than for one’s actions
done in dream. Vasubandhu says that one’s experiences in dream-

1. Sarvesam hi saltvanam anyonya-vijnapti-adhipatilvena mitho vijHapler-niyamo

bhavati yatha-yogam. Miiha iti parasparatah. Atah sanlana-antara-vijnapti-
viSesat-santdna-antare vijhapti-visesa ulpadyale na-artha-visefdt. Vims.Vr.18
ing and waking states are equally without corresponding objects.
I f so, one’s reactions to such experiences, no matter whether one is
dreaming or awake, should all have the same moral worth. But
evidently nobody holds himself responsible for what he happens
to do in dreams, while everybody readily accepts responsibility
for what he does in a waking state. How would Vasubandhu
account for these different ways o f looking at actions done in
a dream on the one hand, and at those done in a waking state,
on the other. Vasubandhu replies :

[Vims. 18 In a dream mind is overpowered by sleepiness,

cont’d.] And, therefore, fruits [of the actions done in a
dream]
Are not on a par with [the fruits o f the actions
done in a waking state].1

For Vasubandhu, an ordinary dream happens within the

transcendental dream, namely the state o f samsara; or sleep in the
ordinary sense o f the term takes place within the transcendental
sleep, namely the very state o f samsdra. One is more responsible
for what he does in the transcendental dream or sleep, than for
what he does while dreaming or sleeping in the ordinary sense
o f those terms. For in the former cases one is capable o f having
more control over one’s actions than in the latter cases. In fact
Vasubandhu would not say that man is ever fully responsible for
what he does while in the state o f samsdra, because, for him, the
state o f samsara is characterized by ignorance, which makes man
unable to evaluate his actions properly. However, Vasubandhu
admits that through yogic practices man can get rid o f this
ignorance, and thus can come out o f his transcendental sleepiness
a fully enlightened man.
The next question is how one can possibly bring about a
biological change in another being. For example, how can one
kill another being? The being that is killed, in so far as it is
experienced by the killer,' is only a mental representation, not
a real being with a real body. If so, how can a butcher, for

1. Middhena-upahatam cittam svapne tena-asamam phalam. Vims. 18

example, be accused o f killing animals, while all that he is
dealing with is his own mental representation ?l
I f Vasubandhu were an idealist ora monist or both, he should
not have taken this objection seriously. Instead he could very
easily dismiss it saying that nobody kills anybody in the real
sense o f the term. But that is not the way Vasubandhu faces
this question. On the contrary, tacitly admitting that there are
real beings who can kill each other, he js now trying to give a
new explanation to the phenomenon o f death—an explanation
that will fit in well with his philosophical system. It runs
through the next two stanzas :

[Vims. 19] Death is a change o f course caused by

A particular mental representation o f another
being,
Just as the loss o f memory etc. o f other beings
Are caused by the thought-power o f demons
etc.4

[Vims 20] Otherwise how can it be said that

The Dandaka-forest was destroyed by the anger
o f the sages ?
Or, how could mental torture be considered
T o be a great punishment ?3

In these and the previous stanza Vasubandhu considers mind,

designated variously as manas or citta or vijnapti, as a real
power, which can influence or even alter minds, and on whose
controlling power depends the moral worth of an action. O f
course, minds for him are not real things-in-themselves, but
only phenomenal streams o f energy, so to speak. But every mind
points to a real being behind it. Again Vasubandhu seems to
believe that the phenomenal world is an interplay o f such minds,

1. Tadi-vijnapti-mitram-eva-idam na kasya-cit kayo-asti navak. Katham..

aurabhrikadibhir-urabbradinam maranam bhavati ? Atatkrte va tan-marane katham-
aurabhrikadinam pranatipatavadvena yoga bhavati ? V im s. V r .1 9
2. Maranam para-vijnapti-viksad-vikriya yatha
Smrti-lopadika-anyesam pisacadi-manovasat. V im s. 19
3. Katham va dandakaranya-sunyatvar.i-rsikopatah ?
Mano-dando mahavadyah katham va tena sidhyati ?. V im s.2 0
and that representations issuing from one mind can act on those
issuing from other minds, the real nature o f the individuals still
remaining unaffected.
Even the phenomenon o f death is explained along the same
line o f thought. Vasubandhu describes death as the disruption
o f the individual stream-consciousness, which would otherwise
keep flowing homogeneously ( sabhaga-santati-viccheda-akhyam mara-
nam). Such a disruption o f the stream-consciousness is caused
by a fatal alteration o f the vital organ (jivita-indriya-virodhint
kacid-vikriya). Such a fatal alteration o f the vital organ, again,,
says Vasubandhu, can be effected by the mental representations
issuing from other individuals (para-vijnapti-vihfa-adhipatyat) -1
Thus, Vasubandhu maintains that death as well as the fact that
it can be caused by others, is real experience o f the phenomenal
level o f existence, namely samsara. An individual stream o f con­
sciousness, if left to itself, will keep flowing homogeneously.
But it can be interrupted, and its momentum disturbed, by
external forces. Y ogic practices can stop it a\together, which witt
mean liberation and enlightenment o f the individual concerned.
Or, some inimical force, issuing from other individual streams,
can interfere and break it o ff abruptly, which will mean death
resulting in another birth on the phenomenal level itself.
To show that mental power is something really effective on the
phenomenal level, Vasubandhu cites various scriptural stories r
stories o f demons causing loss o f memory, dream-visions etc.,
the story of a certain magician who worked wonders by his
thought-power, the story o f a certain king, who under the mental
influence o f a sage had dream-visions, the story o f another king
put to flight by the mental power o f some sages, the story o f
the evacuation o f Dandaka forest attributed to the mental rage
o f the sages therein, and, finally the belief that mental torture
is the greatest o f punishments.2 It may be further noted that in
the yogic tradition o f India, mental power is the greatest force
that can be used for the advantage or disadvantage o f others. So
it is quite natural for Vasubandhu to make so much o f it.

1. P a r a - v i jf ia p t i- v i s e s a -d d h ip a t y a t p a r e s a m j i v i t a - i n d r i y a - v i r o d h i n i k a c id -

v ik r iy a - u t p a d y a t e y a y a s a b h a g a -s a n t a t i -v ic c h e d a - a k h y a m m a r a n a m b h a v a t i . Vims.
Vr.19
2. Cf. Vims, and Viins. Vr. 19-20.
 A final question discussed by Vasubandhu is about the
knowledge o f other minds. In a way it is a very fitting con­
clusion to the whole treatise, which started off with the question
o f knowledge, but towards the end was slightly diverted to
some other related questions. Now, once again Vasubandhu’s
attention is called directly to the question o f knowledge which
gives him one more opportunity to make his position absolutey
clear. The question, when plainly expressed, is i f people can know
each other’s mind. Or, can'they know what is going on in each
other’s mind ? It may be recalled that Vasubandhu positively
defended the idea that minds can influence each other, that the
freedom o f mind determines the moral worth o f actions, and
that minds can cause harm to each other. But now, when it
comes again to the question o f knowledge, his enthusiasm
suddenly drops, and he re-assumes the rather negative view
that knowledge o f ordinary men cannot ever reach the extra­
mental realities as they are.
The objector puts his question about the knowledge o f other
minds as follows : People claim to know other minds. But if
■what they come to know are only their own mental representa-
tions'i how can their claim be true P1 Vasubandhu’s answer is
that no such claim can be true :

[Vims. 21] Knowledge o f those,

[W ho claim] to know other minds,
Is unreal,
Just as one’s knowledge o f one’s own mind
[ Is unreal].
For, in the manner in which [the mind] is
known
T o the enlightened ones,
It is unknown [to ordinary m en].2

Vasubandhu then explains it further : the ineffable nature o f

minds is known to the enlightened ones ( buddhanam gocarafi),

1. Yadi vijhapti-matram-eva-idam paracitta-vidah kim paracittam jananti-

atha na. Kim-ca-atah. Yadi na jananti katham paracitta-vido bhavanti ? Atha
Jananti. Vims.Vr.21
2. Para-citta-vidam jftdnam-ayathartham katham yatha
Svacitta-jMnam ajhanad-yatha buddhasya gocarah. ' Virus.21
while the ordinary people are ignorant o f it. Therefore, the
ordinary people’s knowledge of minds has got to be unreal.
They can only fancy unreal appearances ( vitatha-pratibhasataya),
because their idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction has not
yet been destroyed.1 In these few lines Vasubandhu seems to
have summarized the whole system o f his thought : that every
being has an ineffable and a phenomenal aspect o f existence;
that there are a multiplicity o f enlightened beings, who alone
can know things in their ineffable aspect o f existence; that the
samsaric existence is characterized by the idiosyncrasy for
subject-object distinction, due to which one in the state o f
samsara can perceive only the unreal forms (vitatha-pratibhasa)
o f one’s own consciousness.

8. Conclusion
Vasubandhu concludes the treatise with a note o f warning
that the theory o f representations-only is so incomprehensible
that it can be properly understood only by the enlightened ones,
and that, therefore, his own presentation o f it is subject to
limitations :

[Vims. 22] This treatise on the theory

O f mere representation o f consciousness
Has been composed by me
According to jny ability;
It is not possible, however, to discuss
This [theory] in all its aspects;
It is known [only] to an enlightened one.2

Vasubandhu then adds : People like me cannot work out this

doctrine in all its implications because it is beyond the limits of
logical thinking. Who could then possibly comprehend it in its

1. Tatha tan-nirabhilapyena-atmana buddhanam gocarah. Tatha tad-ajhanat-

tad-ubhayam na yathdrtham vitatha-pratibhasataya grahya-grahaka-vikalpasya-apra-
hinatvdt. Vims. Vr.21
2. Vijnapti-matrata-siddhih sva-Sakti-sadrSl mayd
Krta-iyam sarvatha sd tu na cintya buddha-gocara. Vims.22
 totality ? Indeed the enlightened lords can comprehend it in all
its aspects, for they have no more any impediment to the
real knowledge ofall knowable objects.1
In this last stanza and the subsequent explanation is Vasu­
bandhu asking to be excused for any inconsistencies that might
have crept into his treatise ?

1. Sarva-prakara tu sa m&drSaiS-cintayitum na Sakyate. Tarka-avisayatvaU

Kasya puna1) sa sarvatha gocara ?. .BuddhSnam hi sa'Jbhagavatam sarva-prakaram
gocara sarva-akara-sarva-jiieya-jMna-avighitad-iti. Vims.Vr.22
 IDEALISM O R REALISM ?

1. Introduction
Now that I have finished analysing some o f the basic texts of
the Yogacara school, it is time I checked on my initial statement
that “ the Yogacara-writings, especially those under discussion,
are open to interpretation in terms o f realistic pluralism” .1 I
feel that my analysis o f the text has undeniably, proved the
validity o f this statement. However, I do not mean to censure
outright other possible ways o f looking at the same texts. All
that I positively claim is that the four texts I have chosen for
my study are open to interpretation in terms o f realistic plu­
ralism, and this I have shown in the previous four chapters by
giving an analysis o f those texts. To say the least, to make sense
o f those texts one does not have to assume that consciousness or
idea is the final mode o f existence, nor that ultimately there is
only one being. On the contrary, it is quite possible, and at some
points even easier, for one to make sense o f them assuming that
consciousness or idea is not the final mode o f existence, and that
there is a plurality o f beings, even in the state o f nirvana. This
is what I have been trying to establish in the previous four
chapters, and 1 hope to have achieved my goal.
To make my own position clearer it may be useful at this
stage if I consider the points on which I disagree with other
interpreters o f Vasubandhu. All through this work I have been
rather diffident in saying that the many interpreters o f Vasu­
bandhu in the past have all gone wrong, however explicit might
be the difference between my findings and theirs. Even now I
do not mean to say that their interpretations are totally
unacceptable. Instead, I am only interested to find out how my

1. See above, p. 6, note 1

conclusions happen to be different from theirs, and vice versa.
It may be a question o f difference in approach, or a question o f
difference in terminology. At least in some cases, however, there
have been misinterpretations o f the texts, either by way o f
reading them out o f context, or by way o f reading unwarranted
meanings into them.

2. The Meaning o f Vijnapti-matra

The Yogacara system has always been interpreted, invariably
by all commentators and historians, as idealism o f one kind or
another. And this is the most basic point on which I explicitly
disagree with the past interpreters. I do not see any reason
whatsoever why the Yogacara system, especially as it is found
ip Vasubandhu’s writings, should be described as idealism.
Vasubandhu spares no effort in making it clear that reality as
such (yatha-bhUta) cannot be described at all in terms o f
consciousness (vijnana.),l Then how is it that the Yogacara
system came to be regarded as an idealism ? The basic reason
for this seems to be a gross misunderstanding, and the conse­
quent misinterpretation, o f the phrases vijnapti-matra, prajnapti-
matra and citta-matra. By the way, as I have already pointed
out, for Vasubandhu, these three phrases are synonymous with
each other, and therefore, interchangeable.2They are commonly
translated as follows:
vijnapti-matra/prajnapti-mdtra = mere-consciousness/
representation-only
citta-matra = mind-only
Linguistically these renderings are sufficiently justified indeed.
But, as to what is described as vijhapti-matrajprajnapti-matraj
citta-matra, most o f the interpreters seem to have been misled.
They have mistaken these phrases for descriptions o f the final
mode o f existence. The following are some instances o f this
mistake:
A. K. Chatterjee, in the introduction to his Readings on Yogacara
Buddhism says,

1. See, for example, my analysis o f M V K .I.4 above, pp. 45ff and o f

M VK.I.15-16, above pp. 75ff
2. See above, P. 6, note 1
 Parinispanna is the Absolute, the undefiled, undifferentiated,
non-dual consciousness ( vijnaptimatrata) .*
Again in his The Yogacara Idealism he says,
Once this idea o f objectivity is eradicated, all the three
Vijnanas revert to the pristine purity o f Vijnaptimatra ta.2
Th. Stcherbatsky in his Madhyanta-vibhaga: Discourse on
Discrimination between Middle and Extremes, which is a translation,
o f the first chapter o f Madhyanta-vibhaga, says,
There is a transcendent Absolute Reality o f the Pure Spirit
( vijnaptimatratS), Hegel’s Absolute Idea.3
Dr. C. D. Sharma in his A Critical Survey o f Indian Philosophy
says,
Reality, says the Trimsatika, is pure Consciousness. This
Reality (Vij naptimatra) on account o f its inherent power
(shakti) suffers threefold modification . . . Behind these three
modifications is the permanent background o f eternal and
unchanging Pure Consciousness (Vijnana or Vijnaptimatra).4
P. T. R aju in his Idealistic Thought o f India says,
This Vijnaptimatra is some supra-mundane consciousness
beyond mind and picturing thought. It is the pure element
called Dharma, that is Dharmadhatu, o f Buddha and is the
same as his Dharmakaya.5
S. N. Dasgupta in his Buddhist Idealism says,
As a ground o f this alayavijnana we have the pure conscious­
ness called the iijnaptimatra, which is beyond all experiences,

1. A. K. Chatterjee, Readings on Togacara Buddhism, (Banaras Hindu

University, 1970), p. 31
2. A . K. Chatterjee, The 1 ogacdra Idealism, 2nd rev. ed., (Delhi, Vara­
nasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), p. 87
3. Th. Stcherbatsky, Madhyanta-vibhaga: Discourse on Discrimination
between Middle and Extremes, (Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. X X X , 1936, reprint,
ed., Calcutta: Indian Studies, Past and Present, 1971) p. 8
4. C. D. Sharma, A Critical Survey o f Indian Philosophy, (Delhi: Varanasi,
Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), P. 117
5. P. T . Raju, Idealistic Thought o f India, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1953; reprint ed. with the subtitle ‘ Vedanta and Buddhism in the Light o f
Western Idealism’ , New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1973) p. 269
 transcendent and pure consciousness, pure bliss, eternal,
unchangeable and unthinkable. It is this one pure being as
pure consciousness and pure bliss, eternal and unchangeable
like the Brahman o f the Vedanta, that forms the ultimate
ground and ultimate essence o f all appearances; . . -1
All the above quoted passages clearly show that their authors
almost unanimously accept vijnapti-mdtrata or pra.jnapti-mdtra.ta or
citta-matratd as the Yogacarin’s description o f the absolute, unde­
filed, undifferentiated, non-dual, transcendent, pure, ultimate,
permanent, unchanging, eternal, supra-mundane, unthinkable,
Reality, which, according to them, is the same as Parinifpanna-
svabhava, or Nirvana, or Pure Consciousness, or Dharma-dhatu or
Dharma-kdya, or the Absolute Idea o f Hegel, or the Brahman o f
Vedanta. This is a totally misinformed interpretation o f what the
Yogacarins, particularly Vasubandhu, meant by vijnapti-mdtrata/
prajnapti-matratd/citta-mdtratd, and consequently it cannot pass
the test o f textual analysis. T o support the view that these
phrases describe the absolute state o f existence, one may quote
such passages as:

It is all mere representation o f consciousness,

Because there is the appearance o f non-existent objects.2
In the Mahayana system it has been established that those
belonging to the three worlds are mere representations o f
consciousness.3
Depending upon the perception that there are only represent­
ations o f consciousness, there arises the non-perception o f
knowable things.4

Through the perception

That there is only thought
There arises the non-perception o f knowable objects.5

1. S. N . D a sgu p ta , Indian Idealism, (C a m b rid g e, T h e Syndics o f the

U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 6 2 ), p p .119-120
2. Vij&apti-matram-eva-etad-asad-artha-avabhasanat. V im s .7
3. Mahaydne traidhatukam vijnapti-malram vyavasthdpyate. Vims'. V r .l
4. Vijnapti-matropalabdhim nUritya-artha-anupalabdhir-jayate. M V K .I .7
5. Citta-matra-upalambhena jHeya-artha-amipalambhcta.XSN.30
 These quotations from Vasubandhu, if they are read out o f
context, would easily give the impression that ‘mere represent­
ation o f consciousness’ ( vijnapti-matra) or ‘ thought-only’ ( citta-
mdtra) is the absohite reality for Vasubandhu. But the fact is
that when one carefully analyses these texts within the context
o f their occurrence, one will realize that the phrases vijnapti-
matra and citta-matra in them do not at all refer to the absolute
reality, or to the final mode o f existence. What is more,
nowhere does Vasubandhu use these phrases to describe the
absolute state o f existence. Instead, whenever he uses these
phrases, he means that whatever falls within the reach o f one’s
samsaric experience, is mere representation o f consciousness or
thought-only or mind-only. In other words, far from being a
description o f the absolute state o f existence, vijnapti-matraj
prajnapti-matrajcitta-matra is an evaluative description o f the
objects o f one’s experiences in the state o f samsara. This is clear
from the textual analyses in the previous four chapters. However,
to illustrate my point still more clearly, I shall once again recall
the instances in Vasubandhu’s writings where the phrase vijnapti■
matra/prajnapti-matra/citta-matra occurs.

(i) The first obvious instance o f vijnapti-matra is M V K . 1.7,

and its commentary by Vasubandhu:

Depending upon perception

There arises non-perception,
And depending upon non-perception
There arises non-perception.1

[Vasubandhu’s commentary]:

Depending upon the perception that there are mere-represent-

ations o f consciousness [ vijnapti-matra] there arises the non­
perception o f knowable things. Depending upon the non­
perception o f knowable things there arises the non-perception
o f the mere representation of consciousness [vijnapti-mdtrasjya].

1. Upalabdhim samasritya nopalabdhih prajayate

Nopalabdhim samairitya nopalabdhih prjayate. M V K .I .7
 Thus one understands the negative definition o f graspable and
grasper.1
Here, obviously, the phrase vijnapti-matra does not at all refer
to anything absolute or ultimate. On the contrary, the percep­
tion o f vijnapti-matra is presented only as the first step towards
the realization o f the unreality o f graspable-grasper duality.
Thus the reality o f vijnapti-matra is introduced in the first half
o f the stanza only then to be denied in the second half. I sha11
explain it further.
Vasubandhu understands this stanza as a further illustration
o f the negative definition o f the abhuta-parikalpa, namely that
it is lacking in graspable-grasper duality ( abhuta-parikal-
pasya grahya-grahakabhavena virahitata M VK B.I.2; grahya-graha-
kayor-asattvam-eva asal-lakfanam M V K B T .I.7).2 So, what this
stanza wants to get across ultimately is the unreality o f the
graspable-grasper duality.3 As it is, the unreality o f such duality
is a fact that has already been established in the previous stanza;
and the present stanza is only suggesting a technique ( upaya)
o f realizing the same ( . . . asal-lak$ana-anuptave$a-upaya-lak§aiiam
paridipayati M VKB. 1.7). What is that technique ?
First o f all one must realize the fact that whatever is experi­
enced as an object, is mere representation o f consciousness
( vijnapti-matra). This is, indeed, a fact that has already been
indirectly established by stanza 1.4, which says that all objective
categories are just appearances ot consciousness.- T ne sau~
stanza clearly says also that there are no perceivable objects
11 there are n ° perceivable objects (upalabhya-artha-abhave MVK1
1 .7 ), what else, then, is experienced by the ordinary people ;
objects ( balanam asatyarthe’ rtha-upalambhah M V K B T.I.8) ? The
are all, as stanza 1.5 says, ‘imagination o f the unreal’6 or, ;
stanza 1.8 says, ‘appearance o f unreal obients’ („hhr,t».„lth.
1. Vijnapti-matra-upalabdhim niiritya-artha-anupalabdhir-jayate. Artha-
anupalabdhim niSritya vijnapti-matrasya-api-anupalabdhir-jayate. Evam asal- tak-
fanam grahya-grahakayoh praviSati. M V K B .I .7
2. .. t a s m i n -e v a -a b h u t a - p a r i k a lp e 's a l-l a k s a r i a -a n u p r a v e s a -u p a y a l a k s a n a m p a r i d i ­

p a y a t i . M V K B .I .7
3. Evam-asal-laksanam grahya-grahakayoh praviSati. M V K B .I .7
4. Artha-sattva-atma-vijnapti-pratibhasam prajdyate vijiianam,. I b id .
5. Nasti-ca~asya vijnanasya arthah. I b id .
6. Abhuta-parikalpatvam siddham-asya. . M V K .I .5
Abhuta-parikalpatvam-ca tesam calumarn vijhananam sid d h a m M V K B T . 1 .5 ’
pratibh&sa). This ‘ imagination o f the unreal’ or the ‘appearance
of the unreal object’ , the present stanza calls vijnapti, the
representation o f consciousness, and starting with this idea it
recounts the whole process o f realization once again.
Thus the first step towards the realization o f the unreality o f
the graspable-grasper duality is the perception that there are
only representations o f consciousness (vijnapti-matra-upalabdhi) .
This perception, or rather the conviction, that there are only
representations o f consciousness for the objects o f one’s experience,
will at once lead to the second step, namely that there are no
o b ject/ falling within the reach o f one’s experience. This is the
non-perception o f objects ( artha-anupalabdhi), as Vasubandhu
says, which arises depending upon the first perception o f vijnapti-
matra : “ Depending upon perception, there arises non-percep­
tion” , as the first half o f the stanza has put it.
Now comes the third, and, as far as the present discussion is
concerned, the decisive step in the process of the realization of
the unreality o f the subject-object duality. This is the non­
perception o f even the mere representation o f consciousness
( vijnapti-matrasya-api-anupalabdhih). In other words, as the third
step one realizes that there is not even the mere representation
o f consciousness. How ? The representations o f consciousness
( vijnaptayah) are after all forms o f consciousness itself, and, there­
fore, are forms o f subjectivity as well. But, the term conscious­
ness will not make sense unless it is consciousness o f some object,1
nor will the term subjectivity make sense unless it is contrasted
with objectivity.2 That there are no perceivable objects, and
that, therefore, the name ‘objectivity’ is a misnomer, was the
point made by the second step o f one’s realization o f the unrea­
lity o f the subject-object duality. This second step (i.e. artha-
anupalabdhi) then naturally leads one to the third, namely ‘ the
non-perception o f even the mere representation o f consciousness
( vijnapti-matrasya api-ariupalabdhih) ’ . Or, in Vasubandhu’s own
words, “ Depending on the non-perception o f objects there arises

1. Vijandti-iti vijnanam grahya-abhdve vijanana-api ayuktam. Tasmat artha-

abhavat-vijnatrtvena vijMnam-asad. M V K B T .I .4
2. Grahya-grahakayoh paraspara-nirapeksatvat. M V K B T .1 .7
the non-perception o f even the mere representation of conscious­
ness” .1 Thus, he concludes, “ one comprehends the negative
definition o f the graspable and grasper” .2That is, through the
non-perception o f the objects (artha-anupalabdhi) one compre­
hends the unreality o f the graspable, and through the non­
perception o f even the mere representation o f consciousness
( vijnapti-matrasya-api-anupalabdhih) one comprehends the unreality
o f the grasper. Thus finally one attains to the realization o f the
unreality o f the graspable-grasper duality.
The above analysis makes the following points undeniably
clear, (i) Vijnapti-matra does not stand for the absolute state o f
reality / existence / realization. On the contrary, (ii) it means
only that what one in the state o f samsara experiences as objects
are mere representations o f consciousness, (iii) The realization
o f vijnapti-matra, far from being itself an absolute state, is only an
intermediary step towards final enlightenment, and, therefore,
should eventually be transcended. In other words, the belief in
vijnapti-matra is the same as the belief in subjectivity, which is as
much a hindrance to enlightenment as the belief in objectivity.
Therefore, there is no justification in this context for interpret­
ing vijnapti-matra as a description o f the absolute state o f reality
I existence / realization. A similar analysis can be carried out
also with TSN. 36, which is an instance o f citta-matra :

Through the perception

That there is only thought
There arises the non-perception o f knowable things;
Through the non-perception o f knowable things,
There arises the non- perception o f thought, too.3

As I mentioned in my analysis o f this stanza above,4 here, too,

one is led to the same conclusions as the ones from M V .I.7,
only the term Vijnapti-matra in this latter case is replaced by the
term citta-matra (thought-only).

1. Artha-anupalabdhim niSritya vijriapti-matrasya-api-anupalabdhir-jayale.

M V K B .1 .7
2. Evam-asat-laksapam grahya-grahakayoh pravUati. I b id .
3. Citla-matra-upalambhena jiieya-artha-upalambhata
JHeya-arthanupalambhena syac-citta-anupalambhata.
4. S e e a b o v e , p p . 124-125.
 (ii) In Trirniatika one comes across a more comprehensive
use o f the term vijnapti-matra. In the two instances quoted above
(M V .I.7 and TSN. 36) vijnapti meant the subjective forms o f
consciousness which the ordinary people mistake for objects, and
thus it ultimately meant forms o f subjectivity. But in TrimJatika
it includes not only forms o f subjectivity but also forms o f
objectivity, although in the final analysis all o f them will turn
out to be just appearances / transformations o f consciousness. In
other words, in Trimfatikd, vijnapti is the general term for grasp­
able-grasper distinction. Hence here vijnapti-matra means that the
forms o f graspability and grasperhood on the one hand, and the
distinction ( vikalpa) between them on the other, are all mere
representations o f consciousness. Let me illustrate this usage
with the following passage from Trimhtika :

This [threefold] transformation o f consciousness

Is [just] the distinction [between subject and object];
What are thus distinguished,
Does not exist [as subject and object]
Therefore they are all mere representation o f consciousness.1

I have already given a detailed analysis o f this stanza above.2'

Here I need to give only a summary o f my findings there : The
transformations o f consciousness include the citta and caittast
and nothing more than them. These citta and caittas invariably
involve the distinction (vikalpa) between the subject and object.
This distinction, however, having no extra-mental basis is but
mere representation o f consciousness (tena idem sarvam vijnapti-
matrakam). Further, as Sthiramati suggests,3 all citta and caittas,
and the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity in which they appear,
too, are here referred to as mere representation o f consciousness.
“ In any case, what the stanza describes as mere representation
o f consciousness cannot include anything more than(i) subjecti­
vity and objectivity (atman and dharma),* (ii) the distinction

1. Vijhdna-parindma'yam vikalpo yad-vikalpyate

Tena tan-nasti teaa-idam sarvam vijftapti-matrakam. T r im s . 17
2. S ee a b o v e , p p . 145-147
3. See a b o v e , p . 146, a n d p . 144 n o te 4 in th e sam e ch ap ter.
4. S ee a b o v e , p p . 12 8ff fo r th e e x p la n a tio n o f atman an d dharma as forms-
o f su bjectivity an d o b je ctiv ity respectively.
between them [ v i k a l p a ) , and (iii) c itta and c a itta s . It does not
include any o f the bh U ta s and b h a u t i k a s In short, what is
described as v ijn a p ti-m a tra in this context are the contents o f
one’s epistemological / empirical / psychological experience, and
not anything supra-mundane or transcendental or absolute or
ultimate.
(iii) However, v ijn a p ti-m a tra ta , as against v ijn a p ti-m a tra , can
also mean the state in which one realizes that the entire contents
o f one’s samsaric experience are mere representation o f conscious­
ness. Here I am obviously making a distinction between v ijn a p t i-
m a tr a and v ijn a p ti-m a tra ta . Whenever Vasubandhu uses the term
v ijn a p ti-m a tr a he means to say that the contents o f samsaric
experience, (such as the subject-object distinction, the forms o f
subjectivity' and objectivity), are all merely representations o f
consciousness. But whenever he uses the term v ijn a p ti-m a tra ta he
refers to the state in which one realizes ( s a k fa t - k a r o t i ) the fact
that the contents o f o n e ’ s s a m s a r i c e x p e r i e n c e a r e , or rather were,
mere representations o f consciousness. V ijn a p ti-m a tr a ta -s id d h ih ,
which happens to be the general title for Vasubandhu’s two
treatises, T rirriSatika and V im S a tik a , thus would mean ‘the attain­
ment (sid d h i) o f the state in which one realizes that whatever is
experienced in the state o f s a m s a r a is mere representation o f
consciousness’ . The point I am trying to maKe may 'ZZ
differently: v ijn a p ti-m a tr a refers to the fact that the contents o f
one s experience are mere representation o f consciousness, while
v ijn a p ti-m a tr a ta refers to the state o f n irv a n a in which one r e a liz e s ,
the same fact. This does not mean that the state of n irv a n a is i
itself m e r e representation o f consciousness. T o take an example J
frorfi ordinary life, one wakes up from sleep to realize that what I
one was experiencing in sleep was all m e r e dream. This does n o t!
mean that the wakefulness in which alone one has this realiz*!
ation, is itself mere dream.2 |
A few instances o f v ijn a p ti-m a tr a ta meaning the state in whicfcj
one realizes that the contents o f samsaric experience are mere|
represen tation o f consciousness, may be cited from T r im S a tik a :

1. See a b o v e , p . 146

2. See V im s.1 7
 That from which all elements have their ultimate reality
[Is the third naturelessness],
It is also called suchness,
Eecause it remains always as such,
That is itself the state [in which one realizes
That what one experienced in the state o f samsara
Was] mere representation o f consciousness.1

Literally understood this stanza would mean just that the

ultimate reality ( dharmanam paramarthali), which is otherwise
called suchness ( tathata), is itself the state o f mere representation
o f consciousness ( sa-eva vijnapti-matrata). Then one might easily
argue that here vijnapti-matrata is obviously a description o f the
ultimate state o f reality, which is called suchness, a view
undoubtedly worth the name idealism. However, one cannot
subscribe to this interpretation without accusing Vasubandhu of
being inconsistent, for to describe suchness as a state o f mere
representation o f consciousness is just the opposite to what he
said a few stanzas above in the same treatise, namely that what
is described as mere representation o f consciousness, is only the
contents o f samsaric experience, including the threefold trans­
formation o f consciousness, citta and caittas, and the subject-object
distinction ( vikalapa) (Cf. Trims. 17).2 It will also contradict
many other texts including M V K . 1. 7, and TSN. 36, both o f
which I have shown above as using the term vijnapti to mean
the subjective forms o f consciousness which ordinary people
mistake for objects (arthah) .3 On the contrary, if vijnapti-matrata
is understood to mean the state (of nirvana) which is the same as
suchness, and in which one realizes that what one experiences
in the state o f samsara is mere representation o f consciousness, it
will not, on the one hand, contradict any texts, and, on the
other, it will positively make the above quoted stanza (Trims.
25) intelligible. The same interpretation o f vijnapti-mdtrata
applies also to TrimSatika 26, 27, and 28:

1. Dharmanam paramarthaS-ca sa jiatas-tathata-api-ca

Sarva-katam tatha-bhavat sa-ev vijHapti-matrata. T rim s.2 5
2. S ee a b o v e p p . 2 0 5 ff
3. See a b o v e p p . 2 0 1 ff
 As long as consciousness does not abide
In vijnapti-matrata,
The attachment to the twofold grasping
Will not cease to operate.1
One does not abide in it [i.e. vijnaptimatrata]
Just on account o f the [theoretical] perception
That all this is vijnapti-matra,
I f one places [ = sees] something before oneself.2
One does abide in vijnapti-mdtrata3
When one does not perceive also a supporting consciousness,
For, the graspable objects being absent,
There cannot either be the grasping o f that,
[Namely, the grasping o f the supporting consciousness] .4

In these stanzas vijnapti-matrata (or vijnana-matrata, in stanza

28)® stands for the state (of nirvana) in which one realizes the
fact that the contents o f the samsaric experience are vijnapti-
matra. This realization alone will stop one’s passion/attachment
(anuSaya) for the two-fold grasping (graha-dvaya) , namely the
passion for subjectivity and objectivity, which is characteristic
o f any samsaric experience. How to attain this realization ?
Stanzas 27 and 28 answer this question, by expressing differently
what was said in M V K .I. 7 and TSN. 36. These latter two
stanzas explained the process leading to the realization o f the
unreality o f graspable-grasper duality as follows: the perception
o f vijnapti-matra leads to the non-perception o f objects,
then this latter non-perception leads to the non-perception
o f even vijnapti-matra. This same process is recommended
by Trims. 27-28, too. Stanza 27 says that for the attainment
o f the state o f vijnapti-mdtrata mere perception o f vijnapti-
matra is not enough, but that one must also stop placing
1. Tdvad-vijnapti-matratve vijnanam na-aimtisthati
Grahya-dvayasya-anuiayas-tdvan-na vinivartate. T rim s.2 6
2. Vijnapti-matram-eva-idam-ityapi-hi-upalabhatah.
3. N o te that h ere the phrase is vijnana-matrata, rath er than vijnapti-
matrata o r citta-matrata. It m a y b e a m isprin t fo r vijnapti-mdtrata. I n a n y case,
th at it m eans th e sam e as vijnapti-matrata is o b v io u s fr o m th e co m p a riso n o f this,
stanza w ith M V K . I . 7 a n d T S N .3 6 , w h ic h is b r o u g h t o u t b e lo w .
4. Tada-dlambanam vijnanam na-upalabhate tadd
Sthitam vijhdna-matratve grahya-abhdve tad-agrahat. T rim s.2 8
5 . S ee a b o v e n o te 3.
 before oneself something ( kirlcit) as an object (artha).
That is, in terms o f M V K . I. 7 and TSN. 36, besides the per­
ception o f vijnapti-matra one should also come to the non-per­
ception o f objects (artha-anu.palabd.hih). Then stanza 28 says that
one should stop perceiving the supporting-consciousness ( alam-
banam vijnanam). Here, the supporting consciousness ( alambanam
vijnanam),when it is seen in the light o f M V K . 1.7 and TSN. 36,
should be understood as standing for vijnapti-matra, and, there­
fore, non-perception o f the supporting consciousness turns out
to be the same as the non-perception o f vijnapti-matra ( vijnapti-
mdtrasya-api anupalabdhih M VKB. 1.7) .Thus there, too, one finds
the same process as in M V K . 1.7 and TSN. 36: perception o f
vijnapti-matra followed by the non-perception o f kincid-artha(some-
thing as an object), which again is followed by the non-percep­
tion o f the supporting consciousness(dlambanam-vijnanam, which is
the vijnapti-mtitra o f M VKB. 1.7 and the citta-matra o f TSN. 36).
The result o f this process, too, is the same as that envisaged in
M V K . 1.7 and TSN. 36: in these latter cases it was said to be
the realization o f the unreality o f the graspable-grasper duality
(asal-laksanam grahya-grahakayoh pravUati M VKB. 1.7), and in
the present case it is said to be the realization o f the slate o f
vijnapti-matrata (vijnapti-matratve. . . avatifthati Trims. 26) which
stops one’s passion for graspable-grasper duality (graha-dvayasya-
anuSayo vinivartate Trims. 26).
Thus, once again it becomes clear that neither vijnapti-matra
nor vijnapti-mdtratd can be cosntrued as being a description o f
the absolute state o f reality/existence.
(iv) I shall now examine the occurrences o f the term vijnapti
on its own, without being in combination with matra or mdtrata.
In such occurrences its application seems to be much restricted.
A typical case is found in M VK. 1.4 where vijnapti stands for
one o f the four appearances (pratibhasa) o f consciousness (vijnana),
the other three being artha, sattva and atman.1 Normally one
would expect the Yogacarin to say that all appearances o f
consciousness are vijnaptis. However, according to the present
stanza, vijnapti does not include all appearances o f consciousness,
but only a particular one o f them. Which is that particular

1. Artha-sattva-atma-vijhapti-pratibhasam prajayate vijnanam. M V K .I .4 -

one? Vasubandhu’s answer is that “ the appearance o f conscious­
ness as vijnaptis is the sixfold consciousness (sadvijndndniy\'Lthat is
the five sense-consciousness plus the mind-consciousness. In this
context, it may be said that only these six kinds o f consciousness
are properly called the representations o f consciousness ( vijnapt-
ayah), while the other three categories (i.e. artha, sattva and atman)
may be so called only in an indirect sense insofar as they
are equally appearances (pratibhasa) o f consciousness. Conse­
quently the doctrine o f vijnapti-matrata would imply only that the
six kinds o f consciousness are only different representations o f
consciousness, which does not sound anything extraordinary,
still less idealistic. Here the Yogacara system may be better
called a system o f vijnana-matrata, not, however, meaning that it
[is idealism, but that it] reduces all categories o f experience2 to
appearances o f vijhana. This may be an explanation, too, for
Vasubandhu’s use o f the term vijnana-matrata in TrifrtSatika 28.®
Sthiramati in his M VK BT uses the term vijnapti to define
iastra, (this latter term usually meaning a ‘sacred science’ ). He
says: “ Sastra is the vijnaptis expressed in a body o f nouns [ndma-
pada)and symbols ( vyahcana)-. Or, Sastra is the vijnaptis expressed
in words conducive to the supra-mundane knowledge” .4 Here
vijnaptis may mean ideas or concepts which the sages expressed
in words and symbols with a view to leading their disciples to
the supra-mundane knowledge. This meaning o f vijnapti does
not seem to have anything to do with the doctriiie o f vijnapti-
matrata. Or else it may imply that the Yogacara system consists
solely o f the respresentations o f the consciousness o f the sages,
which, too, does not have anything idealistic about it.
TrimSatika 2 uses the phrase vifayasya vijnaptih to mean one o f
the three transformations o f consciousness (vijndna-parindma) ,5
Later in stanza 8 Vasubandhu further explains that vifayasya

1. Vijftapti-pratibhdsam fatf-vij&andni. M VKB.I.4

2. See above, my analysis o f Madhyanta-vibhdga, pp. 45ff
3. See above note 3 on page 208
4. Nama-pada-vyaficana-kaya-prabhasa vijfLaptayah. fastram. Athava loko-
ttara-jHdna-prdpaka-Sabda-viSesa-prabhdsd vijhaptayah iastram. M VK BT. Intro­
duction
5. VijMnaparinamo'sau parinamah sa ca tridhd
Vipako-manana-akhyaS-ca vijSaptir-vifayasya ca. Trims.1-2
vijnaptih means fad-vidhasya vifayasya-upalabdhih.1 This implies
that here vijnaptih is synonymous with upalabdhih, the latter
meaning ‘perception’ . In other words, in this context, vijnaptir
(vifayasya) means the perception (o f objects). T o call the
perceptions o f the six kinds o f objects (fad-vidhasya vifayasya
upalabdhih) representations o f consciousness ( vijnaptayah) is in
line with M V K . 1.4, which called the sixfold consciousness vijnapti.
Again, it is quite understandable that the perceptions o f objects
are after all mere representations o f consciousness, for to perceive
an object is to become conscious o f it. Therefore, in this context,
too, Vasubandhu’s use o f the term vijnapti does not imply any­
thing worth the name idealism.
(v) That the perceptions o f objects are all representations
o f consciousness ( vijnaptayah) is an appropriate introduction to
the treatise called Virfi^atika, and its use o f the phrase vijnapti-matra.
By saying that the perceptions o f the sixfold object ( fad-vidhasya
visayasya upalabdhih) are all representations o f consciousness
Vasubandhu is registering his strong objection to the corres­
pondence theory o f knowledge, according to which there is
invariably a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and
extra-mental objects. Against this Vasubandhu argues that the
perceptions o f objects are representations o f consciousness in the
sense that they are by and large determined by one’s psycho­
logical dispositions, especially one’s idiosyncrasy for subject-
object distinction, the seeds o f which are already stored up in
the unconscious called alaya-vijnana. This is in general the thesis
o f VimSatika, and consequently its opening stanza,

This is mere representation o f consciousness,

Because o f the unreal appearance o f objects,2
means that the perception o f the sixfold object (fad-vidhasya
vifayasya upalabdhih) is mere representation o f consciousness.
In other words, in perception one’s psychological dispositions,
especially the idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, makes
the object (artha)appear in a way in which it does not really
exist (asat). Thus the way an object is perceived is mere

1. . .tritiyah fad-vidhasya yd visayasya upalabdhih. .Trims'.8

2. Vijnapli-matram-eva-etad-asad-arlha-avabhasanal. Virps.l
representation o f consciousness {vijnapti). This applies to all
epistemological experiences. For example, Vasubandhu later in
the same treatise explains ‘memory’ in terms o f vijnapti:

It has [already] been said

That there is a representation o f consciousness,
Which appears as that, [namely the respective object] j1
From it [i.e. from a representation o f consciousness]
Does the memory arise.*

Here Vasubandhu is saying that memory is not necessarily to

recall a past experience o f a real object, but is to recall one o f
the past representations o f consciousness.3
Vasubandhu then says that the fact that all experiences are
basically representations o f consciousness . does not imply that
communication between individuals is impossible, for he says
that the individuals can influence each other through the
representations o f consciousness :

The representations o f consciousness

Are determined by mutual influence o f one [individual] on
another.4

That is, the individuals in the society can influence each

other’s thinking, inspite o f the fact that all experiences are mere
representation o f consciousness.5 This may sound a dogmatic
assertion, but it indicates that Vasubandhu is not subscribing to
the idealistic position that would lead to solipsism. Sthiramati,
too, has touched on this problem o f social communication. De­
fining Sastra in terms o f vijnapti,® he emphasised that the fact that
the contents o f Sdstra are representations o f consciousness, does
not prevent its being effectively expressed in written as well as
spoken words.7 Sthiramati seems to imply that the representations

1. Yatha tad-abhasa =yathd-artha-abhasa. See Vims. Vr. 17

2. Uktam tatha tad-abhasa vijhaplih smaranam tatah. Vims. 17
3. See Vims. Vr.17, see also my analysis o f it, pp. 186-187
4. Anyonya-adhipatitvena vijOapti-niyamo mithafi. Vims. 18
5. For details see my analysis o f VimSatikd, pp. 190fF
6. See above, pp. 209-210
7. Katham vijfiaptayah praniyanta ucyate va? Prarietr-vaktr-vijnapti-prabhavatiat
prajhaptinam na-atra dofah. . M VK BT. Introduction
o f consciousness are somehow under the control o f the individual
to whom they belong, so that they can freely express them in
words. Vasubandhu, towards the end o f his treatise VimSatika,
speaks o f vijnaptis1 as if they are one’s psychic power, which one
may use for the advantage or disadvantage o f others.2
(vi) I have now referred to all the important instances o f vij­
naptiIvijnapti-matrafvijnapti-matrata/ citta-matra/ vijnana-matra occur­
ring in the four texts under discussion. What clearly comes out
o f this survey is that the theory o f vijnapti-matrata in Vasuban­
dhu’ s writings is not an ontological theory worth the name ideal­
ism : it does not say that reality in its ultimate form is in the
nature o f consciousness. On the contrary, for the most part it is
an epistemological theory, which says that one’s (empirical)
experience o f objects is determined by one’s psychic dispositions,
especially the idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, and
that, therefore, one in the state o f samsdra does not at all come
to know the things in their suchness (tathata) . Things in their
suchness are ineffable, and as such are known only to the
enlightened ones ( buddhas) ? Even the theory o f vijnapti-matrata
cannpt be adequately known by the unenlightened ones, but
only by the enlightened ones :

It is not possible, however, to discuss

This [doctrine o f vijnapti-matrata\ in all its aspects,
Which can be perceived only by an enlightened one.4

Therefore, the state ofenlightenment, in which alone one fully

realizes this doctrine, can itself be indirectly called vijnapti-
matrata, which is not however a description c f the own-nature
of the enlightened one. T o be sure, vijnapti is definitely an em-
pirical/phenomenal/samsaric factor, which should be given up
for one to attain to the state o f nirvana. One has to come out o f
the dream to realize that one was dreaming; similarly one has

1. E.g., Marariam para-vijHapti-viSesad-vikriya. Vims. 19

2. See Vims'. 19-21, and m y analysis o f the same, above pp. 192 ff
3. anabhilapyena-atmana y o buddhanam visayah iti. Vims.VrlO
nirabhilapyena atmand buddhanam gocarah. Ibid.21
See also below note 4.
4. Vijnapti-matrata-siddhih. .
. .sarvatha sa tu na cintya, buddha-gocara. Vims.22
to get out o f samsara to realize that what c>ne was experiencing
there was all representations o f consciousness.
(vii)M y point is all the more obvious from VirnSatika-vrtti 10,1
where Vasubandhu equates the theory o f vijnapti-matrata with
the theory o f nairatmya. The theory o f riairatmya, according to
this text, means that the dharmas and pudgalas are non-substantial
(nairatmya) with respect to their mentally constructed nature
(kalpitena-atmana) , not with respect to tfaeir ineffable nature
( anaphilapyena-atmana) : thus through the theory o f vijnapti-
mdtrata the non-substantiality o f all dhtPmas ( and pudgalas) is
taught, not the denial o f their existence.2 Here, if the theory o f
nairatmya means only a denial o f substantiality/existence to the
mentally constructed nature ( kalpita-atmarta) , and if the theory
o f vijnapti-matrata is the same as the theory o f nairatmya, then the
theory o f vijnapti-matrata also can mean only that the mentally
Constructed nature o f dharmas and pudgalfls are mere representa­
tions o f consciousness, and that the sanie nature o f theirs is
unreal. Therefore, the theory o f nairatmya does not concern
the ineffable nature ( anaphilapya-atma) o f things, nor does the
theory o f vijnapti-matrata. It may be expressed in the following
equation :
The theory o f nairatmya —the theory o f the non-substantiality/
non-existence o f the mentally constructed nature (kalpita-atma) o f
things, not o f the ineffable nature (anaphilapya-atma) —the theory
o f vijnapti-matrata. = the theory that the mentally constructed
nature o f things, not their ineffable nature, is mere representation
o f consciousness.

3. The Transform ations o f Consciousness

Another term that is decisive in interpreting Vasubandhu’ s
writings is certainly vijnana, which I have consistently translated
as ‘ consciousness’ . The discussion so far has shown that a
‘representation o f consciousness’ (vijnapti) refers to no extra­
mental thing(vastu) , but to the contents o f one’s samsaric experi­
ence, and that, therefore, the theory o f ‘mere representation

1. Tatha pudgala-nairalmya-praveio hi, anyathi punah

DeSana dharma-nairatmya-praveSah katpita-atmana. Vims. 10
2. . . vijMpti-ma.tra-vyavasthdpanaya saTvadharma$&m nairattnya-praveso bha­
vati, na tu tadastitva-apavadat. V im s. V r . 10
of consciousness’ (vijnapti-matra) cannot be interpreted in ideal­
istic terms. Then the natural question is what status does
Vasubandhu ascribe to consciousness (vijnana) itself. I f he were
an idealist, then for him, the term ‘consciousness’ would be the
most adequate description o f the thing as such [tathata.). And, in
fact, that is how many people in the past have understood this
term in Vasubandhu’s writings.1 For them, cousequently, the
phrase vijhana-vada, meaning idealism, would adequately describe
Vasubandhu’s view o f reality. The fact, however, is that Vasu­
bandhu himself has never used this phrase to describe his system
o f thought. The common usage o f this phrase to describe Vasu­
bandhu’s system may be taken, therefore, as a clear example o f
the general tendency to read the Western idealism into his
writings.
For my part I am convinced that for Vasubandhu the term
vijnana, especially as it occurs in the text I have analysed,
stands for what ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ would mean in the West.
Or, to use tVie traditional "Buddhist terms, Vasubandhu's use of
the term vijnana covers the entire range o f citta and caitta, and
nothing else. Referring to the tranditional analysis o f an individual
into nama and rupa, standing respectively for the psychic and
physical make-up o f an individual, the former alone comes
under the term vijnana, the latter does not. That is, what
Vasubandhu describes as vijnana ( ^-consciousness) or transforma­
tions (parinama) o f it, is not the whole individual, let alone the
whole reality, as an idealist would have it, but only his psychic
make-up. It is true that at Vasubandhu’s hands the term
vijnana has received a much wider meaning than it had in the
early Buddhism. In the latter case, for example, vijnana was
only one of the five aggregates [skandha) into which the entire
psyco-physical phenomena were analysed, the other four aggre­
gates being rupa, vedana, saiijna and samskara. But according to

I. F o r e x a m p le , P. T . R a ju , o p .c it ., p . 270, referrin g to V a su b a n d h u ’ s
Vijnapti-matrata-siddhi, says, “ as e veryth in g origin ates from V ijn a n a , the latter
must b e taken as substantially e xistin gr that is, existin g like the S u b sta n ce o f
S p in o za ” ; an d P rof. S m art in his Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy
( L o n d o n : G e o r g e A lle n an d U n w in L td ., 1 9 6 9 ), p. 57, says, “ . . b u t the
p sy ch o lo g ic a l interests o f the Y o g a -P ra ctitio n e rs [in clu d in g V a s u b a n d h u ]
led them to d e scrib e th e A b so lu te in term s o f consciousness [ vijnana ] ” .
traced to consciousness. In other words, things as they are experi­
enced, and only as they are experienced, are products of'
consciousness, not otherwise.
So much for what vijnana produces. What does the present
context say about the status o f consciousness itself ? The remain­
ing part of-the stanza under discussion has the answer to this
question :

There is nothing as its [i.e. consciousness’s] object,

And thus that object being absent
That [consciousness], too, is non-existent.1

This text along with its commentary by Vasubandhu has-

already been analysed in detail.2 Its meaning may be summar­
ized as follows. The appearances o f living and non-living beings,
self and representations o f consciousness, which are taken to be
the objects {artha) o f consciousness do not really exist [nasti),
for after all they are only different forms o f consciousness itself.
If, then, there are no objects, there cannot be consciousness,
either, for consciousness makes sense only with reference to
objects. The same argument was used to show that an aspirant
to Buddhahood should eventually give up the belief in mere-
representations o f consciousness, too.3 Here the text goes further
and says that one must give up one’s belief in consciousness
itself. I feel, the statement that “ that consciousness too is non­
existent” (tadvijnanam api-asat M V. 1.4), alone is enough to prevent
one from interpreting the Yogacara system in terms o f idealism,
for it unconditionally denies any ontological status to conscious­
ness. I f anything, consciousness is only an epistemological/psy-
chological/empirical category accounting for the samsaric experi­
ence o f the subject-object duality. Consequently, far from being
the Absolute, consciousness is only part o f one’s samsaric experi­
ence, which should eventually be transcended for one to attain
to the state o f Nirvana.
The fact that consciousness (vijnana) is only an empirical
factor, forces one to take the statement that ‘consciousness is

1. Nasti-ca-asya [vijnanasya] arthas-tadabhavat tad [vijnanam ] api-asat~

MVK.I.4 .
2. S ee a b o v e , p p . 5 0 ff
3. See a b o v e , p p . 2 0 1 ff
born (prajayate) under the appearance o f objects’1 rather literally.
That is, consciousness is not an eternal reality, but is one that is
born (prajayate) under certain circumstances. T o say the least,
it is a valid category only as long as one experiences the subject-
object duality. Therefore at the dawn o f the final realization,
where one will no longer distinguish between subject and object,
there will be no more consciousness either.
4. The Psychic Complex
That the representations o f consciousness (vijnapti), and the
consciousness ( vijnana) itself, are only empirical factors rather
than transcendental, phenomenal rather than noumenal, acci­
dental rather than absolute, samsaric rather than nirvanic, re­
minds one o f a parallel position o f the Sankhya system, which
in turn confirms the possibility o f my interpretation o f Vasu­
bandhu. The point I am referring to is that according to the
Sankhya system also, the psychic complex, including intellect
( buddhi) , ego-consciousness (aham-kara), mind (manas) and sen­
ses (jnana-indriyani) , is all exclusively part o f the empirical princi­
ple called prakrti, and not o f the transcendental principle called
purusa. It belongs to the phenomenal prakrti, not to the noumenal
purusa. What is more, according to the Sankhya system, too, the
bondage o f samsara consists basically in the purusa's accident­
ally getting himself associated with the psychic complex belong­
ing to prakrti : mistaking the psychic functions o f prakrti, he
imagines himself to be an enjoyer, an experiencer, a knower or
a grasper (grahaka) o f the physical world, which he takes to be
an enjoyable, experiencable, knowable or graspable ( grahya)
object. Consequently, final liberation consists in freeing the
purusa from his association with the psychic complex o f prakrti,
which will happen only when purusa stops thinking o f himself
as a grasper (grahaka) and the physical world as a graspable
(grahya).
I am inclined to believe that the Yogacara system is an improve­
ment on the Sankhya one. The former retains the latter’s view
that the psychic complex, which in the case o f the Yogacara
system includes alaya-vijnana, manana-vijnana and the sixfold pravrtti-
vijnana,2 is on the empiric side o f existence, and that it, being
1. See a b o v e , p . 217 n o te 1
2. S ee the list a b o v e p p . 145-146
 the limiting force o f samsara, disappears at the dawn o f the final
realization. As I mentioned above, the psychic complex for the
Yogacarins includes alaya-mjnana ( store-consciousness), manana-
vijnana (thinking consciousness) and the sixfold pravrtti-vijnana
(active consciousness). I am specifying these items primarily
with a view to pointing out a common misunderstanding that
for the Yogacarins consciousness by itself is a separate item on
the list o f the psychic factors. The fact is that nowhere in the
text has it been said that consciousness ( vijnana) by itself is a
factor added to the other items on the list. Instead, there are
statements to the effect that every single item making up the
psychic complex is a transformation o f consciousness,1 and that
consciousness appears in the form o f various objects,2 and so
on. What one may make out, therefore, is that consciousness
is an abstract noun denoting the entire range o f the psychic
complex. Consciousness as such is nowhere given, while what is
given in actuality are the particular expressions o f consciousness,
just as humanity as such is nowhere given, while what is given
in actuality are the particular human individuals. T o turn once
again to the Sankhyan model, the conception o f consciousness in
the Yogacara system may be compared to that o f prakrti in the
Sankhya system : prakrti, although it is the underlying substance
o f the entire phenomena, is nowhere found as such, while what
is given in actuality are its particular manifestations. An impor­
tant difference, however, between the Sankhyan prakrti and the
Yogacarin’s consciousness is that the former is an ontological
principle while the latter is a psychic principle.
A comparative presentation o f the evolutionary process o f the
phenomena as seen respectively by Isvarakrsna’s Sankhya-karika
and Vasubandhu’s Trimsatika may be helpful at this point:

Sankhyakarika (20) Trimtatika (1-16)

Prakrti Vijnana
''
Buddhi x I •
Alaya-vijnana
I I
Ahankara Manana-vijnana

1. S ee m y analysis o f TrimSatika 1-16 a b o v e , p p . 12 8ff

2. See M V . 1.4
 I 1 “ I..
Maitm 5 Jna (, 5 Karma- 5 Tan- Mano-vijnana 5 Indriya-vijnana
indriyc indriya matras
1
5 BhUtas

I bring )ut the comparison still more clearly I may once

agajn reorg inize the two schemes as follows:

Saftyihya-kari a (20) Trimiatika (1-16)

Prakrti.................................... Vijnana
Buddhi.....................................Alya-vijnana
Ahankara............................... Manana-vijnana
Manas.................................... Mano-vijnana
Jfiana-indriya..........................5 Indriya-vijnana
Karma-indriya
Tanmatras
BhUtas

The poin is I am making out o f the above comparison are

the; followin j The ontological principle o f prakrti in the Sankhya
system has >een replaced by the psychic principle o f vijnana in the
Yogacara system. Prakrti being a neutral principle, so to
speak, cou d explain the whole phenomena, psychic as well as
physical; 1 ut vijnana being itself a psychic principle, could
explain on y the psychic phenomena. Consequently, while
the evoluti >n o f prakrti stretches right down through the gross
physical el :ments (bhuta), the evolution o f vijnana stops
short at it>driya-vijnana (sense-consciousness) where the psychic
phenomena ends. Strictly speaking there is a real sense in
which the { ankhya system could be called idealism, namely that
fori it the e itire phenomena, psychic as well as physical, derive
from the intellect (buddhi) through the ego-consciousness
(ahankara). Still it is not called idealism. There seem to be two
reasons for its not being called idealism : first, it maintains a
real distinc}ti<
ion between the knowing faculties on the one hand,
and the km >wn objects, on the other, although all o f them— the
knowing fa :ulties as well as the known objects— derive from
the same s yurce; second, outside, and totally distinct from, the
evolving prakrti there exists a number o f real beings called purufas.
I f so, there are still greater reasons why Vasubandhu’s system
should not be called idealism. First o f all, the evolving conscious­
ness (vijnana) about which he speaks, does not cover the
physical world o f bhtttas and bhautikas, but only the psychic
world o f citta and caittas. Secondly, besides the psycho-physical
phenomena Vasubandhu does admit the noumenal (yatha-bhuta)
realities called simply suchness {tathata) >which are inexpressible
(anabkilapya) even in terms o f consciousness. This latter point I
have referred to several times,1 and I will return to it again
shortly.2
As it is, therefore, Vasubandhu’s discussion o f consciousness,
far from having any idealistic claims, is only an analysis o f the
psyche, which may be compared to any o f the psychological
systems o f the modern times. It is a depth analysis o f the
psyche with a view to identifying the dynamics ( such as sarriskaras
and vdsanas) o f motivation (trsna) , which the Buddha had long
ago said to be the root cause (samudayasatya) o f the human malaise
(dtthkha). The factors into which the Yogacarins analysed the
psyche are not very different from those suggested in the early
Buddhism. It was, however, an original contribution on the
part o f the Yogacarins that they traced all the psychic variations
to the unconscious level called alaya-vijnana (store-consciousness),
from where given the opportunities they rise to the conscious
level called pravrtti-vijhana (active consciousness) through the
medium o f the pre-conscious level called manana-vijnana (thinking
consciousness). Here I am obviously suggesting a rough com­
parison between the Yogacara and Freudian models o f psycho­
analysis, without, however, claiming any expert knowledge o f
the latter.

5. The Imagination o f the Unreal (Abhuta-parikalpa)

Another concept that might have led some people to interpret
the Yogacara system in terms o f idealism seems to be that o f
abhuta-parikalpa (the imagination o f the unreal). That “ there

1. See, fo r ex a m p le , the analysis o f VimSatika 10, 21 an d 22, above,

p p . 172 f f and 194 ff. S ec also p p . 23 ff.
2. See b e lo w p . 22 4.
exists the imagination o f the unreal” ,1 is the impeccable declar­
ation o f Madhyantavibhaga. It may look only a short step from
here to saying that the entire physical phenomena issue from
this imagination of the unreal, and that, therefore, they are all
imaginary. The fact, however, is that the Yogacarins do not
take such a step. What they mean, instead, by the imagination
o f the unreal, I have already explained above2 in some detail.
Here I need only to recall the central line o f their thought. The
main point that the theory o f the imagination o f the unreal
makes is that one’s experience in the state o f samsdra is largely
controlled by the imagination o f the unreal. Hence the assertion
that “ there exists the imagination o f the unreal” .3 T o be sure,
the function o f the imagination o f the unreal is not to create
things, but only to classify them as subjects and objects o f
experience : “ The imagination o f the unreal means the discrimi­
nation between the graspable and the grasper” .4 That is, grasp­
ability and grasperhood (grahyatva and grahakatva) do not belong
to the very nature (svabhava) o f things as such, but are imposed
on them by the imagination(j&aH&aZ/ia), and are, therefore, unreal
(abhuta). Therefore, what the Yogacarins describe as imaginary,
and, therefore, unreal, are not the things as such, but the forms
o f subjectivity and objectivity, and the distinction between them.
The subject-object duality, unreal as it is,5 is a basic require­
ment o f every piece o f experience in the state o f samsdra.
Therefore, the samsaric experience always invariably involves
the imagination o f the unreal subject-object duality. What is
more, anything that is experienced, either as an object or as a
subject, as far as the form in which it is experienced goes, is
an imagination o f the unreal. Thus referring to the fourfold
appearance o f consciousness the text says that “ its being the
imagination o f the unreal remains established” ,8 for the four

1. Abhuta-parikalpo’sti M V K . 1.2.
2. See a b o v e , p p . 29 ff.
3. S ee a b o v e n ote 1.
4. Abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grahaka-vikalpah. M V K B . 1.2.
5. Dvayam tatra na vidyate MVK 1 .2 ; Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca.
M V K B . 1.2. F or m ore details o n this p o in t see p p . 32 ff.
6. Abhuta-parikalpatvam siddham-asya bhavati-atah. M V K . 1.5.
Abhuta-parikalpatvafica tefam caturpam vijhdnanam siddham M V K B T . 1.5.
appearances o f consciousness as living and non-living beings,
self and representations o f consciousness, are invariably experi­
enced either as subjects or as objects o f experience.1
So much for the imagination o f the unreal as an activity and
for what it produces. It can also be considered as a faculty
which discriminates between graspable and grasper. Then, the
imagination o f the unreal becomes the name for the citta-caitta
complex, collectively or individually : “ The imagination o f the
unreal is citta as well as caittas, belonging to all three worlds.” 2
It implies that any psychic factor presupposes for its existence
as well as operation, the distinction between subject and object.
Therefore, to discriminate between subjects and objects, and
for that matter also to construct the forms o f subjectivity and
objectivity, is the very inner dynamic o f the psyche, and this
explains one’s persistent idiosyncrasy for the graspable-grasper
distinction to which I have already referred.
Thus, in short, the concept o f the imagination o f the unreal
(abhuta-parikalpa), neither as an activity, nor as a faculty, nor
in its effect, implies idealism. Instead, it amounts to a theory
o f knowledge arrived at by the analysis o f the psyche which
the Yogacarins did. They discovered that the basic urge o f the '
psyche was to discriminate between subject and object, an urge
so strong that anything that is experienced, is experienced only
under the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity. In other words,
their analysis o f the psyche led them to the conclusion that what
one experiences in the state o f samsara, is never the thing as
such but the forms of subjectivity and objectivity constructed
and projected by the psyche. Here one may recall Kant’s theory
o f categories— categories, which he said, the mind imposes on
the sense-data, and under \vhich alone the latter can be
understood.

6. The Ineffable (Anabhilapya)

The distinction between the ineffable and the imagined nature
o f things seems to have received little attention from those who
interpret the Yogacara system as an idealism. Vasubandhu

1. See a b o v e , p p . 45 ff.
2. Abhuta-parikalpaS-ca citta-caittas-tridhatukah. M V K . 1.9.
refers to the distinction between the ineffable (anabhilapya) and
the imagined natures o f things twice in Vimsatika-vrtti, which I
have paraphrased as follows :

‘The ignorant imagine the dharmas to be in the nature o f

grahya, grahaka etc. Those dharmas are non-substantial (naira-
tmya) with reference to that imagined nature (tena parikalpi-
tena atmana), not with reference to their ineffable nature (na
tu anabhilapyena atmana), which is object o f the knowledge o f
the enlightened ones alone.’1
‘The ineffable nature o f minds is known to the enlightened
ones ( buaananam gocarah), while the ordinary people are
ignorant o f it. Therefore,' the ordinary people’s knowledge o f
minds has got to be unreal. They can only fancy unreal appear­
ances ( vitatha-pratibhasataya), because their idiosyncrasy for
subject-object distinction has not yet been destroyed’ .2

The first o f these two passages distinguishes between the

ineffable and imagined natures o f dharmas, while the second
distinguishes between the ineffable and imagined natures of
minds. In both cases the imagined nature (parikalpita-atma) is
characterised by the subject-object duality, which the ignorant
ones impose on things; and the ineffable nature, which is beyond
the limit o f the ordinary experience, is said to be the object o f
the enlightened ones. Thus these two passages clearly show that
Vasubandhu did recognize a realm o f reality, which is not only
independent o f the thinking mind, but also is beyond the reach
o f samsaric, empirical knowledge. This admission o f reality
independent o f consciousness is one o f the strongest cases for my
believing that Vasubandhu was not an idealist. The distinction
between the ineffable and the imagined natures o f things far
from sounding idealistic reminds me o f Kant’s distinction between
phenomena and noumena.
The ineffable nature o f things is discussed in Madhyanta-
vibhaga under the title sunyata (emptiness).3 Sunyata has been

1. V im s. V r . 10 ; see a b ove p p . 23 -24, a n d p p . 172 ff

2. V im s . V r . 21, an d see a b o v e p . 194
3. M V . I. 14-23
 ■defined as being given when the abh uta-parikalpa stops constructing
the forms o f subjectivity and objectivity.1 In other words,
Sunyata refers to the graspable-grasper distinctionless state o f
things (grahya-grahaka-bhavena virahitata M V B .I.2). That is, if
•ever one can perceive things without characterizing them as
subjects and objects, there one has Sunyata. But such a vision o f
the things as such is not possible for one in the state o f samsara,
for there one cannot see anything at all except under the
aspects o f subjects and objects o f experience. Therefore, what
one experiences in the state o f samsara is the imagined nature
(parikalpita-atma) o f things, while what one experiences in the
state o f nirvana is the ineffable nature (anabhilapya-atma) o f
things.
Madhyantavibhaga 1.14-23 is a detailed description o f Sunyata.
'What I found most interesting in that discussion is the fact
that there has been no attempt at all to describe, let alone to
define, Sunyata, the reality as such, in terms o f consciousness.
This is once again a proof for the fact that the Yogacarins have
not thought o f absolutizing consciousness. M V K .I. 15 gives a
list o f synonyms for Sunyata,2 which, as I have already pointed
out, does not include ‘consciousness’ nor any such idealistic terms.
I f the Yogacarins had an idealistic conception o f reality, terms
like vijnana, vijnapti or citta should have appeared at the top o f
their list o f synonyms for Sunyata. So the logical conclusion is
that they have no conception o f reality as consciousness, nor do
they believe that consciousness is the absolute mode o f reality.
However, Vasubandhu does recognize a higher mode of knowl­
edge, which he calls the supra-mundane knowledge ( lokottara-
jhana) in contrast with the ordinary man’s knowledge of things.
Thus,

That indeed is the supramundane knowledge

When one has no mind that knows,
And no object for its support. . .*

1. Sunyata tasya-abh uta-parikalpa y a grahya-grahaka-bhavena virahitata.

M V K B . 1.2.
2. Tathata bhutako[iS-ca-animittam paramarthata
DharmadhatuS-ca paryayah Sunyatayafr samasatah. M V K . I . 15 . See also
a b o v e , p p . 75-76.
3. Acitto'nupalambho'saujnanam lokottaram ca tat. T rim s 29.
 This reference to supramundane knowledge (lokottaram jnanam)
should not be mistaken for a reference to belief in consciousness
as the absolute mode o f existence. The supramundane knowledge
on the contrary means the intuitive knowledge (nirvikalpakam
jnanam) which enables the enlightened ones to see things as
such (yatha-bhutam) , not under the aspects o f subjects and
objects1. The same intuitive knowledge is again referred to as the
unsurpassed enlightenment ( anuttara bodhih),2 to which one will
attain at the dawn o f nirvana. Thus, in short, the supramundane
knowledge referred to by Vasubandhu is not a being by itself,
but the supreme endowment o f the enlightened ones.

7. Pluralism Rather Than M onism

I may now consider the possibility o f a pluralistic conception
o f reality within the Yogacara system. My arguments for an
interpretation o f the Yogacara texts in terms o f pluralism are
not many, nor quite positive. Therefore, all I am claiming is
that there is a clear possibility o f such an interpretation. First
o f all, the traditional understanding that the Yogacara system
is monistic seems to have followed from the assumption that it is
idealistic, for, as the history o f philosophy has it, monism has
been more often than not a corollary o f idealism. I f so, once
the Yogacara texts are proved to be open to interpretation in
terms o f realism, it immediately calls for a reviewing o f their
traditional understanding in terms o f monism, too.
As I have already indicated,3 there is nowhere in the texts a
statement to the effect that the Yogacarins believed in monism.
On the contrary, there are a few passages which are difficult to
understand without presupposing a belief in a plurality o f beings.
Such is the case, for example, with the passage dealing with
the problem of knowing other minds.4 Moreover, an assumption
o f pluralism, instead o f rendering any part o f the text difficult

1. Evam hi samam-andlambhya-alambakam nirvikalpakam lokottaram jflanam-

utpadyale, grahya-grahaka-abhiniveia-anuSaya prahiyanU. T r. Bh. 2 8 ; . . . nirvikal-
pakatvacca lokad-uttirnam-iti jftapanartham lokottaram ca tad-iti. T r. Bh. 29
2. Prapnoti-annttaram bodhim dhiman kdya-traya-utmikdm. T S N . 38
3. See above p. 23
4. VimSatika, 21
to understand, makes the entire text more intelligible. Above all,
there are some positive references, however scanty they may be,
to a plurality o f the enlightened ones (buddhah).1 I am well aware
that the plural forms such as buddhah and bhagavantah in these
cases need not necessarily refer to a purality o f beings, but that,
instead, they may be just a reverential form o f addressing an
enlightened one. However, it is not impossible that Vasubandhu
in using such plural forms was really suggesting a plurality
o f enlightened ones.

8. Vim satika : Critique o f th e

Correspondence Theory o f Knowledge
Vimfatika, a treatise in twenty stanzas, taken by itself is likely
to appear as a plain case for idealism. It will be little surprising
if a random reader o f this text rushes to the conclusion that'
Vasubandhu is an idealist. On the contrary, if one reads it in the
overall perspective o f Vasubandhu’s other writings such as
Madhyanta-vidhaga-bha$ya, Trisvabhava-nirdeia and Trimfatika,
one will easily see that it is only a critique o f the correspon­
dence theory o f knowledge, which says that every bit o f knowl­
edge necessarily refers to an extra-mental object, and that,
therefore, a knowledge o f something is a valid proof for the
extra-mental existence o f that thing. Therefore, what I am
suggesting, and what I have followed in my study o f Vasu­
bandhu, is that in evaluating Vimsatika one should take into
account that

(i) the theory o f vijnapti-matrata is only an explanation o f

one’s samsaric experience,2
( ii) the theory o f the transformation o f consciousness ( vijnana-
parinama) covers only the citta-caitta complex and that
it does not cover the bhuta-bhautika complex, too,3

1. ... anabhilapyena atmand yo buddhanam visaya iti. Vims. Vr. 10.

nirabhilapyena atmand buddhanam gocarah. Vims. Vr. 21
Buddhanam hi sa bhagavatam sarvaprakaram gocarah. Vims. Vr. 22
2. See above pp. 201 ff.
3. See above pp. 214 ff.
 (iii) Vasubandhu’s analysis o f consciousness provides only
a depth analysis o f the psyche, not o f the entire psycho­
physical complex,1
(iv) the theory o f abh uta-parikalpa( imagination o f the unreal)
is after all only a theory o f knowledge,2
(v) what is imagined or constructed (parikalpita) by the mind
is only the graspable-grasper distinction (grahya-grahaka-
vikalpa) ,3
( vi) Vasubandhu clearly recognizes an ineffable ( anabhilapya)
realm o f reality, which for its existence and operation
does not at all depend on the thinking mind or
consciousness,4
(vii) Vasubandhu has never described the absolute mode of
existence in terms o f consciousness,5
(viii) and that an assumption o f a plurality o f beings does not
contradict any part o f the texts.6
Seen against the above principles, the points Vimsatika makes
are the following, the details o f which are found in my analysis
o f the same text.7
( i) Knowledge or experience need not necessarily refer to
extra-mental realities. This is confirmed by the dream-
experiences, the sufferings o f the hell inhabitants, and
other illusory experiences.
(ii) Therefore one cannot argue for the existence o f extra­
mental realities on the basis o f knowledge.
(Iii) The atomic conception o f reality cannot be proved from
knowledge : one does not have an experience o f atoms,
neither collectively, nor singly, nor as a single reality.

1. See above pp. 219 ff.

2. See above pp. 222 ff.
J. See above p. 223.
4. See above pp. 224 ff.
5. See above p. 226.
6. See above pp. 227-228.
7. See above Chapter Five
 (iv) The conception o f reality in terms o f atoms involves
many logical contradictions, too. For example, it cannot
explain concepts like ‘movement’, ‘ relation’, ‘unity’ ,
‘quantity’ etc.
( v) Without having recourse to the correspondence theory o f
knowledge one can meaningfully explain the concepts o f
social interactions between individuals, moral retribution
etc.
(vi) In the ultimate analysis reality as such is inaccessible
to ordinary minds, for it is ineffable and is revealed
only to the enlightened ones.
(vii) Consequently, samsaric experience is comparable to a
dream-experience.' As the dream-experiences do not
refer to extra-mental realities, so neither do the samsaric
experiences reach extra-mental things as such. What one
experiences in the state o f samsara, are mostly representa­
tions o f one’s own consciousness. Samsdra is therefore a
transcendental dream. T o have the vision o f things as
such one must wake up from this transcendental dream.
Thus Vimtatikd is not a polemic against realism, as many seem
to have thought, nor is it a defence o f idealism, but is only a
polemic against the correspondence theory o f knowledge, and a
defence o f the view that samsdra experience is comparable to
dream experience.
It is remarkable that a recent study o f Vasubandhu by Dr.
Stefan Anacker, University o f Wisconsin, has come up with the
same conclusion as mine. His words are worth quoting at
length :

It has been assumed that since the store-consciousness is held

responsible for the other consciousnesses and the manner in
which they perceive, Vasubandhu’s Yogacara represents a form
o f idealist philosophy. The peculiar slant o f Dharmapala and
Hsuan-tsang, which focused philosophical attention on the store-
consciousness, has done much to support this view. However,
when one reads the Yogacara works o f Vasubandhu, one can
easily see that the notion ofa “ Yogacara idealism” is thorough­
ly misleading in his case. In the Mahayanasangrahabha<ya,
 Vasubandhu makes it clear that the inter-reaction o f the
store-consciousness and the six consciousnesses needs in addition
some sort o f external stimulus. When Vasubandhu lambasts the
idea o f an external object in the Vimfatika, this seems to
mean that the object-of-consciousness, the perceived datum,
is internal, and that whether we can infer an object which
refers to it exactly is highly dubious. The external stimuli are
only inferrable— what we see directly is always our own
cognition, coloured by our particular psychic “ seeds” . What
is involved here is that these stimuli may be interpreted by
different psychic series in quite different ways.
Rather than pointing towards an idealistic system, the
theory o f the store-consciousness is used for totally different
purposes by Vasubandhu. It is the recognition that one’s
normal mental and psychic impressions are constructed
[italicized by the author himself], i.e. altered and seemingly
statisized by our consciousness-complexes, that makes •the
actual main point o f the TrimSatika. “ Cognition-only” involves
primarily the doctrine o f the three natures o f reality and their
interrelationships. . -1

9. The Doctrine o f Three Natures (Trisvabhava-nirde£a)

Finally I should add a word about Vasubandhu’s doctrine o f
three natures -(svabhava), namely the other-dependent nature
{para-tantra-svabhava), the imagined nature {parikalpita-svabhava)
and the absolutely accomplished nature (parinispanna-svabhava).
What each o f them stands for should be by now more or less self-
evident from my analysis o f the concepts o f vijnapti-matra, vijnana,
abhuta-parikalpa, anabhilapya and Sunyata. Roughly speaking, the
whole psyche is the other-dependent nature, for it depends for
its reality as well as operation on the seeds o f habits left by the
past deeds. Consequently, the entire citta-caitta complex has been
described as the other-dependent nature.2 Similarly, abhuta-
parikalpa (the imagination o f the unreal) has been described as
the other-dependent nature, because, as a faculty o f discrimina­
tion between the graspable and the grasper, it is the same as the

1. Stefan A n a ck e r, Vasubandhu : Three Aspects : A Study o f a Buddhist

Philosopher (P h . D . Dissertation. U niversity o f W isconsin^ 1 9 7 0 ). pp. 69-70.
2. See T S N . 6-7, an d m y analysis o f it a b o v e p p . 94 f f
citta-caitta complex,1 and, as an activity it is the very function
o f the same citta-caitta complex. In a way the very mode o f the
samsaric existence, in which one is bound to discriminate between
the graspable and the grasper, an activity that depends on seeds
o f past experiences, is the other-dependent nature.
The imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava) is what the imagina­
tion o f the unreal ( abhuta-parikalpa) produces, namely the false
forms o f subjectivity and objectivity, and the distinction between
them.2
The absolutely accomplished nature (parinifpanna-svabhava)
is the suchness (tathata) o f things, perceived neither as subject,
nor as object o f experience,3 but intuited ( nirvikalpaka) through
the supramundane knowledge (lokottara-jnana) o f the enlightened
ones.
I have mentioned above4 that Vasubandhu’s system can be
seen as an improvement on the Sankhya system. The improve­
ment is effected through the introduction o f the concept o f the
three natures and their relationship. In Sankhya system, the
two principles, prakrti and purufa are envisaged as mutually
independent, excluding, and conradictory principles. Hence it
had to leave unanswered the question o f how the interaction o f
these two principles could be explained. Vasubandhu has solved,
or rather avoided, this question by suggesting that the paratantra-
svabhava and parikalpita-svabhava, which together roughly replace
the Sankhyan prakrti are only adventitious functions, so to speak
o f the parinifpanna-svabhava.

10. Idealism or Realism

I may conclude this chapter, and thus the whole o f this study,
by referring to the latest work o f Dr. Walpola Rahula, J^en and
the Taming o f the Bull, Towards the Definition o f Buddhist Thought
(London : Gordon Fraser, 1978), which has just come out while
I was writing these last pages o f my thesis. Dr. Rahula’s central
position is that the Buddhist philosophy all through its history
has always remained the same :

1. Abhula-parikalpaSca citla-caittas-traidhatukah. M V K . 1.9

2. See fo r ex am p le ab ove p. 91
3. See fo r e x a m p le ab ove p . 92
4. See a b o v e p p . 219
 Some scholars seem to have thought that great Buddhist
doctors like Nagarjuna, Asanga or Vasubandhu were expound­
ing their own systems of philosophy in contradiction with
each other. This was not so. They were all expounding the
teaching with their own new interpretations, explanations,
arguments and theories, according to their own genius, ability,
knowledge and experience. What is more, they always sup­
ported their new theories and interpretations with quotations
from Canonical texts. Their contribution to Buddhism lay not
in giving a new philosophy, but in providing, in fascinatingly
different ways, brilliant new interpretations of the old
philosophy.1

Secondly, he strongly objects to the view that according to the

Yogacarins mind {citta) or consciousness {vijnana) is lhe only
reality, the ultimate reality :

Some scholars have maintained that, according to the vijnapti-

matrata or cittamatrata philosophy in the Yogacara (-Vijnana-
vada) system, the mind {citta) or consciousness {vijnana) is
the only reality, the ultimate reality. It must be categorically
stated at the very outset that this is wrong, a serious mistake,
and that it is against all fundamental teaching, whether
Theravada or Mahayana.2

Thirdly, according to him both the Madhyamikas and the

Yogacarins were all presenting the same old theories o f nairatmya,
Sunyata, tathata. and pratityasamutpada, in different terms.

The Sunyata philosophy elaborated by Nagarjuna and the citta-

matra philosophy developed by Asanga and Vasubandhu are
not contradictory, but complementary to each other. These two
systems known as Madhyamika and Yogacara or Vijnana-
vada, explain and expound, in different ways with different
arguments, the very same doctrines o f nairatmya, Sunyata, tathata,
pratitysamutpada, but are not a philosophy o f their own, which

1. W a lp o la R ah u la, Z en ar,d the Taming o f the Bull, Towards the Definition

o f Buddhist Thought, (L o n d o n : G o r d o n Fraser, 1 9 7 8 ), p . 79.
2. I b id . p . 79.
 can properly be called Nagarjuna’ s or Asanga’ s or Vasuban­
dhu’s philosophy. It can only be said that they are Nagarjuna’ s
or Asanga’s or Vasubandhu’s explanations, arguments and
theories, postulated to prove and establish the Canonical
teaching o f Sunyata, cittamatra or nairatmya. I f any difference
o f opinion existed between them, these arise only with regard
to the arguments and theories designed to establish the old
fundamental Canonical teaching, but not with regard to the
teaching itself.1
Consequently he would not consider the Yogacara system to
be an idealism,2 any more than the early Buddhism is. If so, the
answer to the question whether the Yogacara system is an
idealism or realism-, would depend upon whether the early
Buddhism was an idealism or realism.

1. W a lp o la R a h u la , Z en an& the Taming o f the Bull, Towards the Definition

o f Buddhist Thought, (L o n d o n : G o r d o n Fraser, 1 9 7 8 ), p p . 82-83.
2. In fact he has clearly o b je cte d to co m p a rin g it to Berkeley’ s
idealism . (Ib id . p p . 8 3 -8 4 ).
 A p p e n d ix I

THE VERSES ON
D ISCRIM IN ATIO N BETWEEN MIDDLE AND EXTREM ES
AND
VASUBANDHU’S CO M M EN TARY ON TH EM

A CHAPTER ON DEFINITIONS

Having paid homage to the founder o f this science,

[ 27 ] * Son o f the well-gone,
And also to its expositor for people like me,
May I now endeavour to analyse its meaning.

1. The definition,
[2 8 ] The coverings,
The truth,
Meditation o f the opposite,
Its stages,
Attainment o f results,
And the pre-eminence o f the path.

These are the seven topics discussed in this science. They are
namely the coverings, the truth, meditation o f the opposite,
stages o f that meditation, attainment o f results, and, seventhly,
the pre-eminence o f the path. There, beginning with the defini­
tions, [the text] says :

2. There exists the imagination o f the unreal,

[ 29 ] There is no pair,
But there is emptiness,
Even in this there is that.

* T h e num bers in square brackets refer to pages a b o v e w h ere the respective

stanzas an d passages are analysed.
 There, the imagination o f the unreal means the discrimination
between the garspable and the grasper. The pair is the grasp-
able and the grasper. Emptiness means that state of the imagina­
tion o f the unreal which is lacking in the form o f being graspable
or grasper. Even in this [emptiness] there is that, namely, the
imagination o f the unreal. Thus, when something is absent in a
receptacle, then one, seeing that receptacle as devoid o f that
thing, perceives that receptacle as it is, and recognizes that
receptacle, which is left over, as it is, namely as something truly
existing here. Thus, the definition o f emptiness is shown to imply
no contradiction.
3. Neither void nor non-void :
[41 ] So is everything described,
That indeed is the middle path,
For there is existence as well as non-existence,
And again existence.
On account o f the existence o f emptiness, on the one hand,
and that o f the imagination o f the unreal, on the other, it is not
void. And on account o f the non-existence o f the pair o f
graspable and grasper, it is not non-void, either. This descrip­
tion applies to everything, whether conditioned or unconditioned.
The terjn ‘conditioned’ goes for what is called the imagination
o f the unreal, while the term ‘unconditioned’ goes for what is
called the emptiness. That indeed is the middle path, for, on
the one hand, there is the existence o f emptiness within the
imagination o f the unreal, and, on the other, the existence o f
the imagination o f the unreal within the emptiness. It is
therefore neither exclusively void nor exclusively non-void.
This reading is thus in accordance with the scriptures such
as Prajna-paramila, [ where it is said ] : “ all this is neither V Q id
nor non-void” .
Thus having stated the positive and negative definition o f the
imagination o f the unreal, now the [ author] gives its own-
definition :

4. Under the appearance o f things inanimate,

[46] Living beings, self and representations o f con­
sciousness,
Is born the consciousness.
 There is nothing as its [ i.e. consciousness’s] object,
And thus that object being absent
That [consciousness] , too, is non-existent.

In the form o f colour etc. the consciousness appears as inani­

mate things, and in that o f five senses it appears as living beings.
These five senses refer to one’s own as well as other’s streams o f
existence. The appearance o f consciousness as self is the same as
defiled thought, because it is associated with self-delusion etc.
The representations o f consciousness are otherwise called the
sixfold consciousness. The appearance o f inanimate things as
well as o f living beings are devoid o f form; likewise the
appearances of self and representations o f consciousness are not
in the way they appear to be. This is why it is said that there is
indeed nothing as its [i.e. consciousness’s] object.'That is, the
four kinds o f graspables— namely, (i) colour etc., (ii) the five
senses, (iii)thought, and (iv) the sixfold consciousness—are
absent. Thus the graspable being absent, the grasper, namely
the consciousness, too, is non-existent.

5. Therefore its being the imagination o f the unreal

[55] Remains established,
For it is not so,
It is not altogether absent, either.

For its existence is not the way it appears to be. It is not

totally absent, either, because there is the production o f illusion
only, for
From its cessation results liberation.
For otherwise there would be neither bondage nor liberation,
which would imply the denial o f the facts o f defilement and
purity.
Thus having'stated the own-definition o f the imagination o f
the unreal, now [ the author ] states its inclusive definition. It
shows how, there being only the imagination o f the unreal, there
could be the inclusion o f the three natures.

6. The imagined, the other-dependent,

[5 8 ] And the absolutley accomplished,
• Are derived [respectively] from
 The objects, the imagination o f the unreal,
And the absence o f the pair.

The object is the imagined nature, the imagination o f the

unreal is the other-dependent nature, and the absence o f the
graspable-grasper duality is the absolutely accomplished nature.
Now is shown a definition which can be used as an instrument
in comprehending the negative definition of the same imagina­
tion o f the unreal :

7. Depending upon perception

[6 1 ] There arises non-perception,
And depending upon non-perception
There arises non-perception.

Depending upon the perception that there are only representa­

tions o f consciousness, there arises the non-perception o f know-
able things. Depending upon the non-perception o f knowable
things, there arises the non-perception o f the mere representa­
tions o f consciousness, too. Thus one understands the negative
•definition o f graspable and grasper.

8. Therefore it remains established

[ 62 ] That perception has the same nature
As non-perception.

Because, there being no perceivable things, there is no possi­

bility o f having perception either.

Therefore the sameness

O f non-perception and perception
Should be recognized.

Bacause perception as such is not obtained. Though not

having the own-nature o f perception, still it is called perception
because there are the appearances o f unreal objects.
Now follows the classification-definition o f the same imagina­
tion o f the unreal :
9. The imagination o f the unreal
[64] Is citta as well as caittas,
Belonging to all three worlds.
 [T h e three worlds refer to] the distinction between the worlds
o f passion, forms, and formless beings.
Now follows the synonym-definition :

There, perception o f objects is consciousness,

And perception o f their qualities is mental factors.

Consciousness is perception o f just the objects. The mental

factors, namely, feeling etc., are the perception o f the qualities
o f the same objects.
The next verse states the function-definition :

10. One is the source-consciousness,

[ 66 ] And the other is the enjoyment-consciousness. .
There, the mental factors are
Enjoyment, determination and motivation.

The store-consciousness being the source o f other conscious­

nesses is called the source-consciousness. The active conscious­
ness, which has the latter as its source, is called the enjoyment-
consciousness. Enjoyment refers to feeling etc., determination
to concept, and motivation to the conditioning forces such as
volition, attention etc., o f consciousness.
[ The next two verses ] state the defilement-definition :

11. The world is oppressed / defiled

[68 ] (1 ) By being concealed,
(2) By being raised,
(3) By being led,
(4) By being seized,
(5) By being completed,
(6) By being trebly determined,
(7 ) By enjoying,
(8) By being attracted,

12. (9 ) By being bound,

[6 8 ] (10) By being orientated, and ,
(11-12) By being subjected to suffering.

There, (1 ) ‘by being concealed’ means ‘ by being impeded by

ignorance from seeing things as they are’ , (2) ‘by being raised’
means ‘by the installation o f the impressions o f deeds on con­
sciousness by the conditioning forces’, (3) ‘by being led’ means
‘by being taken by consciousness to the place o f re-birth’, (4)
‘by being seized’ means ‘ [b y being seized] by the nama and
rupa o f egohood’, (5) ‘by being completed’ means ‘ [by being
completed] by the six organs’ , (6) ‘by being trebly determined’
means ‘ [by being trebly determined] by contact’, (7) ‘by enjoy­
ing’ means ‘by feeling’ , (8) ‘by being attracted’ means ‘ [by
being attracted ] by the desire for a new existence, the seeds o f
which have already been sown by previous deeds’, (9) ‘ by being
bound’ means ‘ [by being bound] by the inclinations towards
sense-pleasure etc., which are conducive to a new birth o f the
consciousness’ , (10) ‘by being orientated’ means ‘by making the
deeds o f former existence tend to manifest their matured fruits
in a new existence’ , (11-12) ‘by being subjected to suffering’
means ‘ [b y being subjected] to birth, old age, and death’ . By
all these is the world oppressed / defiled.
This [ list o f]

The oppressives / defilements,

All proceeding from the imagination o f the unreal,
Could be classified
Either into three groups,
Or into two groups,
O r into seven groups.

The classification o f the oppressives/defilements into three

groups is as'follows : (1) oppressive oppressors, namely ignor­
ance, desire and inclinations; (2) deed-oppressives, namely
conditioning forces and existence/birth; (3 ) birth oppressives,
namely the remaining members.
The classification o f the oppressives/defilements into two
groups is as follow s: (1 ) causal oppressives/defilements which
include the groups o f oppressive oppressors, and deed-oppres­
sives; (2) resultant oppressives which are the same as the birth-
oppressives.
The classification o f the oppressives/defilements into seven
groups refer to the seven kinds o f causes such as, (1) cause o f
error, namely ignorance, (2) cause o f sowing o f seeds, namely
 conditioning forces, (3) cause o f direction, namely consciousness,
(4) cause o f seizure, namely ndma and rupa and the six bases,
(5 ) cause o f enjoyment, namely contact and feeling, (6 ) cause
o f attraction, namely desire, inclinations and existences/birth,
and (7) cause o f unrest, namely birth, old age and death.
All these oppressives/defilements operate due to the imagination
o f the unreal.
The ninefold definition, giving the summary-meaning o f the
imagination o f the unreal, has [now ] been explained. Those
definitions are, namely, positive definition, negative definition,
own-definition, inclusive definition, instrumental definition,
classification definition, synonym-definition, activity-definition
and defilement-definition.
Thus having explained the imagination o f the unreal, the
author now shows how the emptiness should be understood :

13. About the emptiness

[ 72 ] One should summarily know
Its definition,
Its synonyms along with their meaning,
Its classification,
And the reason for its classification.

H ow the definition o f the emptiness is to be understood ?

14. The negation o f the pair

[ 73] Is indeed the assertion o f such negation;
This is the definition o f the emptiness.

There is the negation o f the pair o f the graspable and grasper.

The definition o f emptiness, then, is the assertion o f that neg­
ation. Thus, it is shown how the emptiness is to be defined in
negative terms. And, what those negative terms are, [is further
stated] :
It is neither [total] assertion,
Nor [total] negation.

W hy not [total ] assertion ? Because there is the negation o f

the pair o f subject and object. Why not [total] negation ?
Because there is the assertion o f the negation o f that pair. This
indeed is the definition o f the emptiness. Therefore, with
reference to the imagination o f the unreal, the emptiness is :

Neither different from the imagination o f the

unreal,
Nor identical with the imagination o f the unreal.

I f different, it would imply that the ‘universal’ \dharmata\ is

other than the particular things [dharmas] , which is unaccept­
able. For example, ‘ impermanence’ is not other than the
impermanent things, and the state o f suffering is not other than
suffering itself. I f identical, there would be no place for
purifying knowledge, nor would there be the commonplace
knowledge. Thus is shown a definition which states that empti­
ness is that which is free from being different from thatness.
How is the synonym [o f emptiness ] to be understood ?

15. Suchness, the extreme limit o f existence,

[75] The uncaused, absoluteness,
The source-reality :
These tire summarily the synonyms o f emptiness.

How is the meaning o f these synonyms to be understood ?

16. The synonyms respectively mean that the empti­

ness is
[75] Never otherwise,
Never falsified,
Never admitting a cause,
The object intuited by sages,
And that it is
The source o f the powers o f the sages.

The emptiness is called suchness, in the sense that it is neve#

otherwise, and insofar as it remains ever the same way. It is
called the extreme limit o f existence in the sense that it is never
falsified, because it is never an object o f doubt. It is called the
uncaused, because it does not admit for itself any cause, for it
is far from having any cause whatsoever. It is called the abso­
luteness/the ultimate object, because it is the object o f the
knowledge o f the sages, meaning that it is the object o f the
ultimate knowledge. It is called the source-reality, because it
is the source o f the powers to the sages, meaning that the powers
o f the sages have their origin depending upon it : here the term
dhatu is used in the sense o f hetu, indeed.
How is the classification o f the emptiness to be understood ?

[76] 17. It is defiled and purified;

So, is its classification. In what condition is it defiled, and in

what condition is it purified ?

It is with and without impurities.

When it is with impurities, then it is defiled, and when it is
rid o f the impurities, then it is purified. Getting rid o f the
impurities once associated with it, implies that it is changing in
character. How is it then that it is still not impermanent ?
Because its
Purity is understood
As the purity o f elemental water,
Gold and space.

[The purity o f the emptiness is recovered] by shaking off

the accidental impurities, which does not mean a change in its
own-nature.
Here is another classification according to. which there are
sixteen kinds o f emptiness: (1 )emptiness o f internal [elements],
(2 ) emptiness o f external [elements] , (3) emptiness o f internal
as well as external [elements] , (4 ) emptiness o f the great, (5 )
emptiness o f emptiness, (6) emptiness o f the absolute object,
(7) emptiness o f the conditioned [elements], (8) emptiness ofthe
unconditioned [elements] , (9) emptiness o f the ultimate [ele­
ment] , (10) emptiness o f the eternal [element] ,( 1 1 ) emptiness
o f the unforsaken [element], (12) emptiness o f nature, (13)
emptiness o f defining marks, (14) emptiness o f every power,
(15) emptiness o f negation, (16) emptiness o f negation as
own-nature.
All those kinds o f emptiness should be briefly understood :

18. There is the emptiness o f the enjoyer,

[79] Emptiness o f the enjoyed,
 Emptiness o f the body o f the enjoyer and enjoyed,
Emptiness o f the basic thing,
Emptiness o f that by which it
[i.e. the emptiness o f enjoyer etc.] is perceived,
Emptiness o f the way in which it is perceived,
and
Emptiness o f that for which it is perceived.

Here, the emptiness o f the enjoyer means the emptiness o f

the internal senses etc., the emptiness o f the enjoyed means the
emptiness o f the external elements, the emptiness o f their bodies,
namely the Sarirds which are the basis o f both the enjoyer and
the enjoyed, means the emptiness o f the internal and the
external elements. The basic thing means the universe which
is the basis o f the enjoyer, the enjoyed and their bodies. Its
emptiness is called the emptiness o f the great because o f the
vastness o f the universe. The emptiness of the internal senses etc.,
is perceived by the knowledge o f emptiness, whose emptiness is
called the emptiness o f emptiness. The emptiness o f internal senses
is perceived as the absolute object, whose emptiness is called the
emptiness o f the absolute object. The emptiness o f that for which
the Bodhisattva attains the emptiness o f the internal senses etc.,
is the final kind o f emptiness.
For what, indeed, is the emptiness o f the internal senses etc.
attained ?

[80] 19. For the attainment o f the twofold prosperity,

[namely], the conditioned as well as the unconditioned
fortune,
For the everlasting benefit o f the living beings,
[ namely ], for the ultimate benefit o f the living beings,
And for not leaving the samsara,

[that is, otherwise], not seeing the emptiness o f the eternal

samsara, one., being depressed, would rather leave the world.

For the non-cessation o f fortune,

Even in the absolute state o f nirvana there is something that
one does not give up, the emptiness o f which is called the empti­
ness o f the unforsaken.
 [ 81] 20. For the purity o f the lineage,
Lineage means nature, for it belongs to one’s
!own nature.
For attaining the defining marks,

[th a tis], for attaining the marks that are characteristic o f

great men.
And, for the purity o f the powers o f enlightenment,
Does the Bodhisattva attain the emptiness of
internal senses etc.

[nam ely], for the purity o f the powers such as strength,

fearlessness, special endowments etc. Thus, indeed, the fact o f
the fourteen kinds o f emptiness should be known.
What other kinds o f emptiness are still there ?

21. The negation o f pudgala and dharmas

[82] Is indeed one kind o f emptiness there,
The existence o f that negation in it [i.e. in the
enjoyer etc.]
Is another kind o f emptiness.

The negation o f pudgala and dharmas is one emptiness. Another

kind “o f emptiness is the existence o f that negation in the above
said enjoyer etc. These two kinds o f emptiness are explained at
the end in order to make the definition o f the emptiness clear :
in order to avoid the exaggeration o f pudgala and dharmas the
emptiness is explained, on the one hand, as the negation o f
pudgala and dharmas, and in order to avoid the underestimation
o f their negation the emptiness is explained, on the other hand,
as having the negation of pudgala and dharmas ter its own-nature.
This is how the classification o f emptiness is to be understood.
How is the reason [fo r such a classification] to be
understood ?

22. I f it were not ever defiled,

[84] Then all living beings would be ever liberated;
I f it were not ever purified,
Then all efforts for liberation would be futile.
 I f the emptiness o f elements would not be defiled by the
accidental and secondary defilements, even when no remedy is
applied, then, since there are no defilements whatsoever, all
living beings would become liberated without any effort at all.
Again, if it would not become purified, even when some remedy
is applied, then the efforts towards liberation would prove
fruitless. •
However,
23. It is neither defiled nor undefiled,
[85] Also, it is neither purified nor unpurified;
How is it that it is neither defiled nor unpurified ? It is so by
its very nature,
Because o f the shining, nature o f citta;
How is it neither undefiled nor purified :
Because o f the accidental character of the
defilements.
Thus, the above-mentioned classification o f emptiness into
defiled and purified is justified.
There, the summary-meaning o f emptiness is to be understood
under two heads : one, the definition [of emptiness], and the
other, the establishment [o f the same definition] . There, defini­
tion is again, twofold : positive and negative. The positive
definition is likewise twofold : one, [the assertion that empti­
ness is] neither assertion nor negation; two, [the assertion that
emptiness is] that which is free from being.different from that-
ness. By the establishment [o f definition] is to be understood
the establishment o f synonyms o f emptiness etc. There, by the
fourfold introduction o f the emptiness the following four defini­
tions o f it are intended: its own-definition, operative-definition,
defilement-purity-definition and rationality-definition; these
definitions help one respectively to get rid o f uncertainly, fear,
indolence and doubt.
 A TREATISE ON THE THREE NATURES

1. The imagined,
[ 92 ] The other-dependent,
The absolutely accomplished:
These are the three natures,
Which should be thoroughly known by the wise.
•
2. That which appears is the other-dependent,
[ 93 ] For it depends on causal conditions;
The form in which it appears is the imagined,
For it is merely an imagination.

3. The perpetual absence o f the form

[ 93 ] In which the other-dependent appears,
Is to be understood as
The absolutely accomplished nature,
For it is never otherwise.

4. What is it that appears ?

[ 93 ] It is the imagination o f the non-existent.
How does it appear ?
In the form o f duality.
What will result from its non-existence ?
There will be the state o f non-duality.

5. What is meant by the imagination o f the non­

existent ?
[ 93 ] It is thought,
For by it [the subject-object duality] is imagined.
The form in which it imagines a thing
Never at all .exists as such.
 6. The citta takes on two modes, as cause and
effect,
[ 94 ] It is then respectively called
The store-consciousness and the active conscious­
ness,
The latter being seven-fold.

7. The first is called citta, meaning ‘collected’ ,

[94 ] Because in it are collected the seeds
O f defilements and habits;
The second, however, is called citta,
Because it acts in diverse ways.

8. Collectively [i.e. as a collection o f store-con­

sciousness and seven active consciousnesses ]
[9 5 ] It is the imagination o f the tinreal forms [o f
subjectivity and objectivity ] ;
That, too, is said to be three-fold:
Maturing, caused and phenomenal.

9. O f them, the first, [namely the maturing one],

[ 95] Is the basic consciousness,
Because its nature is to become matured;
The others, [namely the caused and the pheno­
menal ones ],
Are the active consciousness,
For, the latter for its reality, depends
On the knowledge o f the perceived-perceiver
distinction.

10. The profundity o f the three natures

[ 98 ] Is indeed recognized, because
The defiled and the pure are each
Existent as well as non-existent,
Dual as well as unitary;
A lso because
The three natures are not mutually different
In definition.
 11. The imagined nature is said
[99] T o be defined both as existent and as non­
existent,
For on the one hand it is grasped as existent,
While, on the other,
It is totally non-existent.

12. The other-dependent nature is said

[99] T o be defined both as existent and as non­
existent,
For, it exists as an illusion,
It does not exist, though, in the form in which it
appears.

13. The absolutely accomplished nature is said

[ 100 ] T o be defined both as existent and as non-existent,
For, it exists as a state o f non-duality,
It is also the non-existence o f duality.

14. The nature that is imagined by the ignorant is

said
[1 0 0 ] T o be both dual and unitary,
For, as it is imagined
A thing has two forms,
But as those two forms do not exist,
It is unitary.

15. The other-dependent nature is said

[ 101 ] T o be dual as well as unitary,
For, it appears in dual form,
While it has an illusory unity as well.

16. The absolutely accomplished nature is said

[ 101 ] T o be dual as well as unitary,
For, on the one hand,
It is by nature the absence o f duality,
And, on the other hand,
It is in the nature o f unity without duality.
 17. What is to be known as being defined
[1 0 2 ] As defilement are the imagined and the other-
dependent natures,
While the absolutely accomplished nature
Is recognized as the definition o f purity.

18. The absolutely accomplished nature

[1 0 4 ] Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the imagined
nature,
For, the latter being in the nature o f unreal
duality,
Is by nature the absence o f that duality.

19. The imagined nature, too,

[ 105 ] Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the absolutely
accomplished one,
For, the latter being in the nature o f non-duality,
Is by nature the absence o f duality.

20. The absolutely accomplished nature

[1 0 5 ] Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the other-
dependent nature,
For, the latter being non-existent in the form in
which it appears,
Is by nature the non-existence o f that form.

21. The other-dependent nature, too,

[1 0 6 ] Is to be understood
As not different in definition from the absolutely
accomplished one,
For, the former being in the nature o f non­
existent duality,
Is by nature non-existent in the form in which it
appears.

22. For the sake o f proficiency

[107] A particular ot-der o f the natures
Is recommended, which takes into account
 The conventions [about them], and
How one understands them.

23. The imagined nature is essentially o f conven­

tional values,
[108] The other, [namely the other-dependent nature],
Is essentially that which brings about such con­
ventional values,
And the third, [namely the absolutely accom­
plished nature ],
Is the nature freed o f all conventional values.

24. First, the other-dependent nature,

£ 109] Which is essentially the absence o f duality
Is understobd;
Then, the unreal duality,
Namely the duality that is mere imagination,
Is understood.

25. Then is understood

[110] The absolutely accomplished nature,
W hich is positively the absence o f duality,
For, that very nature is then said
T o be both existing and non-existing.

26. All these three natures

[111] Depend for their definition
On [ the concept of] non-duality;
For, [ with reference to the imagined nature],
There is the unreality o f duality,
[With reference to the other-dependent nature],
It is not in the dual form in which it appears,
And, [ with reference to the absolutely accom­
plished nature],
It is by its very nature the absence o f that
duality.

27. It is like the magical power,

[112] Which by the working o f incantations
Appears in the nature o f an elephant;
 There is altogether no elephant at all
But only its form.

28. The elephant stands for the imagined nature,

[113] Its form for the other-dependent nature,
And, that which remains when the elephant has
been negated,
Stands for the absolutely accomplished nature.

29. So, the imagination o f the unreal

[113] By the working o f the basic thought
Appears in the nature o f duality;
There is altogether no duality at all,
But only its form.

30. The basic consciousness is like the incantations,

[114] Suchness is like the piece o f wood,
The [subect-object] discrimination is like the
form o f the elephant
And the duality is like the elephant.

31. In comprehending the truth o f things

[119] All three definitions have to be taken together,
[Although methods of] knowledge, rejection and
attainment
Are to be employed respectively.

32. There, knowledge is non-perception,

[120] Rejection/destruction is non-appearance,
Attainment, effected by perception.
Is direct realization.

33. By the non-perception o f duality

[121] The form o f duality disappears;
The non-duality resulting from its disappearance
Is then attained.

34. It is just as the case o f magic,

[ 122] In which the non-perception o f the elephant,
 The disappearance o f its form, and the perception
o f the piece o f wood,
Take place all at once.

35. The attainment o f liberation becomes effortless

[123] By getting rid o f misunderstanding,
Intellectually seeing the meaninglessness,
And following the threefold knowledge.

36. Through the perception

[124] That there is only thought,
There arises the non-perception o f knowable
things;
Through the non-perception o f knowable things,
There arises the non-perception o f thought, too.

37. From the non-perception o f duality

[125] There arises the perception o f the essence o f
reality;
From the perception o f the essence o f reality
There arises the perception o f unlimitedness.

38. The wise man, having perceived the unlimited-

ness,
[125] And seeing the meaning o f oneself and others,
Attains the unsurpassed elightenment,
Which is in the nature o f the three bodies.
 A p p e n d ix III

A TREATISE IN T H IR T Y STANZAS

1. Various indeed are the usages

O f the terms atman and dharma :
They [a ll] refer
T o the transformations o f consciousness;
Threefold is such transformation :

2. They are, namely,

Maturing, thinking, and representation o f
consciousness o f object.
There the maturing [consciousness]
Is otherwise called the store-consciousness,
Which carries the seeds o f all [past experiences] .

3. It has [ within itself]

The representations o f consciousness
O f unknown objects and places;
It is always associated with
Touch, attentiveness, knowledge,
Conception and volition.

4. The feeling therein is that o f indifference;

It [ i.e. the store-consciousness] is unobscured
and undefined;
Similarly indifferent are touch etc.,
And it [i.e. the store-consciousness] is like a
torrent o f water;

5. And it ceases to exist at the attainment o f

arhattva.
The consciousness called manas
Has the store-consciousness for its support and
object.
It is essentially an act o f thinking.
 It is always associated with four defilements,
[136] Which are themselves obscured and undefined;
Those four defilements are, namely,
Belief in self, ignorance about self,
Pride in self, and love o f self.

7. It [i.e. the consciousness called manas\ is

associated
[136] Also with others like touch etc.,
Which are all o f the same nature
As the region in which one is bom .
It does not belong to one in the state ofarhatship;
Nor does it operate
In the state o f suppressed consciousness,
Nor in the supra-mundane path.

8. It [i.e. the above described] is the second

[137] transformation [o f consciousness] .
The third transformation o f consciousness
Is the same as the perception o f the sixfold object;
It could be good or bad or indifferent in
character.

9. It is associated with three kinds o f mental factors:

[138] Universal, specific and good;
It is associated, similarly,
With primary as well as secondary defilements;
It is subject to three kinds o f feelings, too.

10. O f those associates the first, [namely the

universal]
[1 3 8 ] ones,
Are touch etc., •
[ The’ second, namely ] the specific ones,
Are desire, resolve and memory.
Together with concentration and knowledge.
Faith, sense o f shame, fear o f censure,

11. The triad o f non-covetousness etc., courage,

[138] Composure, equanimity along with alertness.
 And harmlessness are [ the third, namely ] the
good ones.
The defilements are passionate attachment,
Grudge, stupidity,

Pride, [false] views, and doubt.

Anger, hatred,
Hypocrisy, envy, jealousy, spite along with
deceit,

13. Dishonesty, arrogance,

[139] Harmfulness, shamelessness, defiance o f censure,
Sluggishness, conceit, unbelief, indolence,
Carelessness, bad memory,

14. Distraction o f mind,

[1 3 9 ] Thoughtlessness, remorse, sleepiness,
Reasoning and deliberation,
Are the secondary defilements.
The latter two couples, [nam ely
Remorse and sleepinesss, reasoning and
deliberation],
Can be o f two kinds, [namely defiled and unde­
filed] .

15. Depending on the conditions available

[139] The five sense -consciousnesses,
Together or separately,
Originate on the root-consciousness,
Just as waves originate on water.

16. The thought-consciousness, however,

Manifests itself at all times,
Except for those [ i ] who are born
Into the region where the beings are in a state o f
unconsciousness,
[ ii ] W ho have entered either o f the two trances,
In which there is no operation o f consciousness,
[ iii ] Who are unconscious by reason
O f sleepiness or faint.
 17. This [ threefold ] transformation o f consciousness
[ 146] Is just the distinction [between subject and
o b je c t];
What is thus distinguished,
Does not exist as [subject and object].
Therefore this is all mere representation o f con­
sciousness.

18. The consciousness contains all seeds;

[147] Its such and such transformations
Proceed by mutual influence,
On account o f which such and such [ subject-
object] discriminations arise.

19. Once the previous stage o f maturation

[150] Has been exhausted,
The impressions o f deeds
Along with those o f the two-fold grasping
Engender the next stage o f maturation.

20. The subject-matter that is liable

[151] T o subject-object distinction
By whatsoever sort o f subject-object discrimi­
nation,
Is all just imagined nature;
It does not exist.

21. The other-dependent nature, however,

[153] Is the act o f graspable-grasper discrimination;
It depends for its origin on conditions.
The absolutely accomplished nature
Is the latter’s [i.e. the other-dependent nature’s]
Perpetual ' devoidness o f the former [i.e. the
imagined nature].

22. For that reason, indeed,

It is said to be neither different,
N or non-different
From the other-dependent nature.
It is like impermanence etc.
 As long as this absolutely accomplished nature
Is not seen,
That other-dependent nature, too,
Is not seen.
23. Corresponding to the three-fold nature
[157] There is also a three-fold naturelessness ;
Referring to this fact it has been said
That there is the naturelessness o f all elements.

24. The first nature is natureless by its very

[157] definition,
The second nature, again, does not come into
being by itself,
And this constitutes the second kind o f natureless­
ness.
25. That from which all elements have their ultimate
[157] reality,
Is the third naturelessness,
It is also called suchness,
Because it remains always as such;
That is itself the state in which one realizes the
meaning
O f mere representation o f consciousness, too.

26. As long as consciousness does not abide

[158] In the realization [that the subject-object designa­
tions]
Are mere representations o f consciousness,
The attachment to the twofold grasping
W ill not cease to operate.

27. One does not abide in the realization

[159] O f mere representations o f consciousness
Just on account o f the [theoretical] perception
That all this is mere representation o f conscious­
ness,
I f one places [ = sees] something before oneself.
One does abide in the realization
O f mere [representation o f] consciousness
 When one does not perceive also a supporting
consciousness,
For, the graspable objects being absent,
There cannot either be the grasping o f that,
[Namely, the grasping o f the supporting con­
sciousness].

29. That indeed is the supramundane knowledge

[160] When one has no mind that knows,
And no object for its support;
It follows the revulsion o f basis
Through the twofold removal o f wickedness;

30. That itself is the pure source-reality,

Incomprehensible, auspicious, and unchangeable;
Being delightful, it is the emancipated body,
Which is also called the truth [-body] o f the
great sage.
 A TREATISE IN TW ENTY STANZAS AND ITS
EXPLANATION

In the Mahayana system it has been established that those

belonging to the three worlds are mere representations o f con­
sciousness. This is clear from the aphorism, ‘ Oh ! Jinaputra,
those belonging to the three worlds are mere mind’ . The terms
mind [citta] , thought-consciousness, [mano-vijnana] and rep­
resentation o f consciousncss [vijnapti] are synonyms. Here mind
should be understood along with its associates [samprayoga].
The term‘mere’ indicates the exclusion o f the [external] objects.

1. It is all mere representation o f consciousness,

[166] Because there is the appearance of non-existent
objects.
Just as a man with a cataract
Sees hairs, moons etc.,
Which do not exist in reality.

Here it is asked,

2. I f the representations o f consciousness

[167] Are without [extra-mental] objects,
Then there would be no determination [of
experience] with regard to space and time,
Nor would there be indeterminacy o f it with
regard to streams [i.e. individuals]
Nor would there be determination o f actions
prompted [ by a particular experience].

What is being said ? If a representation o f colour etc. arises

without the corresponding external objects like colour etc., then
the former is not determined by the latter. Why is it, then, that
a representation o f colour etc. does not arise everywhere, but only
in some particular places ? Even then it does not always occur,
but only sometimes. Again, it occurs to the streams o f all present
in those places and at those times, not just to the stream o f a
single person .The latter, for example, is the case with regard to the
appearance o f hair etc., which occurs only to the streams o f the
cataract-ridden people, not o f others. Why is it, again, that the
hairs, flies, etc. seen by the cataract-ridden people do not func­
tion as hair etc., while those seen by others do ? Food, drink,
clothes, poison, weapons etc., seen in a dream do not function
as food etc., while those seen in a waking state do. The city o f
Gandharva does not function as a city, while other [cities] do.
Therefore in the absence o f [external] objects it does not make
any sense to speak o f the spatio-temporal determination [of
experience], the indeterminacy o f streams [to which their rep­
resentations o f consciousness occur], and the fixed ways o f their
functioning. This objection does not hold, because

3. Determination o f space etc., is obtained

[167] Just as [in] the case o f a dream;

The term svapna-vat in the stanza means svapna iva, both

meaning ‘ ‘just as [in] the case o f a dream” . How ? In a dream,
without [corresponding external] objects, things like flies,
gardens, ladies and men, are seen. They are not seen every­
where, but only in some particular places [for example where
the dreamer sleeps]; even in those places they are not seen
always, but only sometimes [for example, only when one
dreams]. Thus the spatio-temporal determinations are obtained
even when there are no corresponding external objects.

Again, indeterminacy [ o f experience ] with

regards to streams [ i.e. individuals ] is obtained
Just as [in ] the case [ o f the experience] of
ghosts :

In this line, the term “ obtained” [ siddha J is understood

[ from the previous line ] ; and the term preta-vat means preta-iva,
[ both meaning ‘ ‘justas in the case o f the experience o f ghosts” ].
How is the analogy obtained ?
 All o f them [ i.e. the ghosts ] have the same vision
o f pus-river etc.

‘Pus-river’ means ‘a river full o f pus’ , just as ‘ghee-jug’

would mean ‘a jug full o f ghee’ . The ghosts having the same
kind o f matured [seeds of] deeds see, all o f them, the pus-river,
and not just one o f them. “ Etc.” means that, similar to the river
full o f pus, there are also rivers full o f urine, excrement etc., and
places inhabited by people carrying spears and swords, all o f
which are seen by the ghosts. Thus, the indeterminacy o f
streams to which the representations o f consciousness occur is
obtained even when there are not [corresponding external]
objects.

4. Determined actions [resulting from experience]

[168] Are obtained as those [obtained] by a dreamer.

The term ‘ obtained’ [siddha] is understood from the previous

stanza. For instance, a dreamer experiences the discharge o f
semen, although in a dream there is no [ sexual ] union o f two
persons. Thus, indeed, the fourfold factor, namely the spatio-
temporal determination etc., is obtained in different instances.

Again, all those [ four factors are obtained ]

As in the case o f hells;

The term ‘obtained’ [ siddha ] is understood from the previous

line. Naraka-vat means narakefu iva, [ both meaning “ as in the
case o f hells” ]. How are [the four factors] obtained [in the
case o f hells ] ?

There all [its inhabitants without exception ]

Behold the infernal guards etc.,
And experience the torments by them.

The sight o f the infernal guards in hells experienced by the

hell-inhabitants is obtained with spatio-temporal determinations,
indeed. ‘ ‘Etc.” includes similar sights o f dogs, birds, iron-balls
and mountains coming in and going out. They are the experi­
ences equally o f all the inhabitants o f hells, not merely o f one.
Similarly, the torments [ inflicted] by the infernal guards are
also experienced by all the inhabitants. All these experiences
are obtained inspite o f the fact that in reality there are no
infernal guards etc. [If, therefore, all the inhabitants o f hells
have similar experiences], it is owing to their own matured
[seeds o f] deeds o f the same kind. Thus in places other than
hells, too, the four factors, namely spatio-temporal determin­
ations etc., should be understood as obtained.
Why is it, again, that the beings like the infernal guards, dogs,
and birds, are said to be non-existent [ in hells ]? [ This is ] because
they do not fit in with the context. They cannot possibly be
some o f the hell-inhabitants, [w h o are condemned to hell], for
it would mean that they, too, are experiencing the sufferings o f
hell. It cannot also be the case that the beings in hells torture
each other, for then it will be impossible to determine which of
them are hell-inhabitants, and which are infernal guards. Nor
is it possible for them to torture each other, because being of
equal strength o f action, stature and valour they cannot frighten
each other. [ I f the infernal guards etc. were real beings in h ell],
they would themselves be unable to bear the heat o f the flaming
iron-like ground. How then would they torture others ? Or
supposing that they are not some o f those hell-inhabitants, [ who
are condemned to h ell], why should they, then, be born there ?
How indeed are the animals born in heaven ? The animals,
ghosts, infernal guards etc. are also bom in hells, in the same
manner.
5. Animals are bom in heaven;
[1 6 9 ] However, they are not similarly bom in hell,
Nor are the infernal guards born in hell,
For they do not experience the sufferings o f hell.

The animals bom in heaven enjoy there the pleasures accruing

from the deeds due to which they are born there. Thus they are
enjoyers o f the pleasure o f that world. But as for the infernal
guards etc., they do not experience the infernal sufferings.
Therefore, neither the birth o f animals nor o f infernal guards in
hell does make sense.
[ It may then be argued that ] due to the deeds o f the hell-
inhabitants, some special beings are bom there— beings which
are endowed with such colour, figure, size and strength that they
get the title o f infernal guards etc. In order to generate fear in
others these beings transform themselves so that they seem to
perform actions such as [ extraordinary ] manual gestures etc.
They also take on the appearances o f ram-mountains rushing
in and out, and o f thorns turning up and down in an iron forest.
It is not that they [ i.e. the infernal guards etc. ] are not
born at all [ in the manner, described above ]. [ However ],

6. If the birth o f [ special ] beings

[1 6 9 ] Gan be thus recognized [as issuing]
From their [i.e. the hell-inhabitants’ ] deeds,
Why not then recognize
The transformation o f their consciousness ?

That is, why not recognize the transformation o f conscious­

ness itself as issuing from their deeds ? Why should again
[ special ] beings be imagined to be born ? Moreover,

7. An impression o f deed is imagined to be in one

place,
[ 170 ] And its fruit in another place !
Why not instead recognize [ the fruit]
In the same place as the impression ?

The birth o f [ special ] beings, and their transforma­

tion, is imagined [ to take place] due to the deed o f the hell-
inhabitants. The impression o f [ that ] deed is embedded in their
stream o f consciousness, not elsewhere. Why not then recognize
that its [ i.e. the impression’s ] fruit being a similar transforma­
tion o f consciousness, is in the same place as the impression
[ itself]?
[It may be argued that] the fruit has been [rightly] imagined
to exist where the impression does not. For what reason ? For
reason o f the Scriptures. I f it were consciousness itself that
appears as colour etc., then there would not be things like
colour etc. In that case the existence o f the bases [ o f knowl­
edge ] such as colour etc., would not have been stated by the
Lord. This is no reason. Because,
8. It was with a hidden meaning
[1 7 1 ] That the existence o f the bases o f knowledge
 Sucli as colour etc. was stated
[B y the Buddha] to his disciples,
Just as [the existence o f] beings
[Apparently] born by metamorphosis
[ Was stated by him].
It has been stated by the Lord to the effect that there are
beings apparently born by metamorphosis. However, his hidden
meaning is that there is an unbroken continuity of the stream
o f mind. This is confirmed by the saying, “ There is no being,
neither atman not dharmas; they are all caused [i.e. accidental].”
Similarly, what has been stated by the Lord to his disciples, who
were listening to his instructions, about the existence o f the
bases [ofknow ledge] such as colour etc., also has rather a
hidden meaning. What is that hidden meaning ?

9. What the sage spoke of as the two bases o f knowl­

edge
[1 7 1 ] Are (i) theown-seed
From which; a representation of consciousness
develops,
And (ii) the form in which that representation
appears.

What is being said ? A representation o f consciousness appears

as colour. [ This representation o f consciousness] ari ses from
its own duly matured seed This seed, and the form in which
it appears [namely the form o f colour], are respectively what
the Lord spoke o f as the [ two] bases, namely, eye and colour,
o f the same representation o f consciousness. Similarly indeed,
[ another] representation o f consciousness appears as an object o f
touch. [ This representation of consciousness ] arises from its own
duly matured seed. This seed, and the form in which it appears,
are respectively what the Lord spoke of as the [ two ] bases,
namely sense o f touch, and object of touch. This is the hidden
meaning [mentioned in this stanza]. What, again, is the use
o f thus instructing with a hidden meaning ?
10. By this one is definitely initiated
[172] Into the theory o f the non-substantiality o f self
[ pudgala] ,
 Being thus instructed, the disciples get initiated into the
theory o f the non-substantiality o f self [pudgcda-nairatmya]. The
eightfold consciousness works on the assumption o f the pair of
subject and object. But, knowing that there is neither a percei-
ver, nor a thinker, the disciples come to understand the instruc­
tion about the non-substantiality o f self, and thus they get
initiated into the theory o f the non-substantiality o f self.

On the other hand, again,

By this instruction one is initiated
Into the non-substantiality o f objects [dharmas ] :

Starting with the phrase “ on the other hand [anyatha],” the

stanza further says how, by the instruction about mere represen­
tation o f consciousness, one is initiated into the theory o f the non­
substantiality o f objects [dharmas] . How ? Namely, knowing
that mere representations o f consciousness produce the appear­
ance o f objects like colour etc., and that there are no objects
like colour etc. as such. If, therefore, there is no object at all,
then there would not be even that mere representation o f con­
sciousness. Therefore, how could [the theory o f mere representa­
tion o f consciousness itself] be established ? The initiation into
the theory o f the non-substantiality o f dharmas does not at all
mean that there are no dharmas altogether. On the contrary

[T h e self and the objects are non-substantial]

With regard to their imagined nature.

The ignorant people imagine that dharmas are in the nature of

being graspable and grasper etc. The non-substantiality o f the
dharmas is with regard to this imagined nature, not with regard
to the ineffable nature, which is the object [ o f the knowledge ]
o f the enlightened ones. Similarly, a representation o f conscious­
ness is non-substantial with regard to the nature imagined by
another representation o f consciousness. This is how one is
initiated into the theory o f the non-substantiality o f the repre­
sentation o f consciousness; and it is through this initiation, which
establishes the doctrine o f mere representation o f consciousness,
that one is initiated into the theory o f the non-substantiality o f
all dharmas, not t hrough the denial o f their [ i.e. dharmas’ ] existence.
Otherwise a representation o f consciousness would -have an
object which would be other than the representation o f conscious­
ness itself, and thus, the representation o f consciousness having
objects, the theory o f mere representation would not be
obtained.
How again is one to understand that the existence o f the
bases, [ o f knowledge ] such as colour etc., was stated by the Lord
with this hidden meaning, and that there are no such things
that would become separate objects o f the representations o f
consciousness o f colour etc.? Because,

11. The object is experienced

[ 175 ] Neither as a single entity,
Nor as many discrete atoms,
Nor as an aggregate o f atoms,
Because not a single atom is obtained in experi­
ence at all.

What is being said ? The bases of knowledge like colour etc.

supposedly become separately, the objects o f the representations
o f consciousness o f colour etc. Do they do so as one single
entity, like the colour-whole suggested by the Vaisesikas ? or as
many atomic entities ? or as aggregated atoms ? As objects [ of
knowledge] they are not a single entity, because never does one
grasp [ = k n ow ] a colour-whole as different from [its] parts.
Nor are they many atomic entities, because one does not ever
grasp the atoms separately. Nor are they an aggregated object
o f [knowledge], because not even a single atom is obtained [ in
experience]. W h y?

12. One atom joined at once to six other atoms

[ 176 ] Must have six parts,

I f six sides o f an atom are joined at once by six [ other ] atoms,

then it is proved that an atom has six parts, because one atom’s
place cannot be another’s.

On the other hand, if they are said

T o occupy the same place,
 Then their aggregate would mean
Nothing more than a single atom.

[Let one suppose ] that the place o f a single atom becomes

the place o f six atoms [a t once]. Then all of them having the
same place, the whole aggregate [ o f them] would be nothing
more than a single atom, and there being no mutual distinction
[ between those seven atoms ] there would not be any aggregate
[ of them], either, to be seen. In fact the atoms do not join [ to
each other] at all, for they have no parts. The Kasmira Vai-
bhasikas [ say ] that there is no problem o f atoms joining [ to
each other], because it is the aggregates [o f atoms] that join to
each other. To them it should be said, namely, that an aggre­
gate o f atoms is not something different from them [ i.e. from
the constituent atoms],

13. As there is no joining of atoms,

[1 7 7 ] Whose joining can be attributed on their
aggregates ?
The term ‘joining’ [ samyoga ] is understood
[from the context].
There can be no joining o f atoms,
Not because they have no parts.

Otherwise the aggregates [o f atoms] would join [ to each

other]. Therefore it should not be said that, it is because they
[ = atoms] do not have parts that there is no joining o f them.
For, there is no joining o f even the aggregates o f atoms, which
do have parts. Therefore, not even a single atom is obtained [ in
experience ]. Whether the joining o f an atom is recognized or not,

14. That which has different parts

[ 178 ] Cannot make a unity,

[ This is ] another [ problem ] indeed. If an atom has different

parts such as an upper part and a lower part, then how can
such an atom still have unity ?

[ On the contrary, if it has no parts, ]

How come it is subject to shadow and conceal­
ment ?
 I f each atom did not have different parts, then how is it that
at sunrise there is shadow in one place, and sunshine in another
place ? For, it [ i.e. an atom ] does not have an ‘other’ side
where there would not be any sunshine. If, again, difference o f
sides is not recognized, how can there be concealment o f one
atom by another? No single atom has indeed an other side
where, the arrival o f one [ atom ] would cause the obscuration
o f another. It amounts to saying that there being no obscuration
[ o f any atom ], an aggregate o f atoms would not be anything
more than a single atom, because all atoms would occupy the
same place at once.
Why not, then, recognize that the shadow and concealment
belong to the aggregate [ o f atoms ], rather than to an atom. Is
then the aggregate o f atoms, to which they [ i.e. shadow and
concealment] would belong, recognized as different from those
atoms ? It is said,

It cannot be argued that they [i.e. shadow

and concealment ]
Belong to the aggregate o f atoms,
Unless the aggregate is admitted to be
Different from atoms.

I f the aggregate o f atoms is not recognized as different from

the atoms, they [ i.e. shadow and concealment ] cannot be ob­
tained as belonging to the aggregate. No matter whether it is
an atom or an aggregate, it is an induced imagination. What
use, then, is this thought, if what is defined as colour etc. is not
obtained? What indeed is their definition ? It is, on the one hand,
their being the object o f eye etc., and, on the other, their being
blue. That precisely is the [ problem] to be solved. ‘Blue’ ,
‘white’ etc. are recognized as an object of eye etc. Is that
[ object ] a single entity, or many entities ? The impossibility o f
its being many entities has already been said.

15. [ I f it is assumed that the earth is] a single unit

[ 179 ] Then there would be no progressive movement,
Nor simultaneous grasping and non-grasping,
 Nor would there be discrete states o f many
[bein gs],
Nor would there be subtle and invisible [beings].

If the object o f the eye etc. is imagined to be a single entity,

rather than many discrete entities, then there would be no
progressive walking, which means movement, on earth, for
with just one step one will have covered the whole [ earth].
Nor would there be the simultaneous grasping [ = perception ]
o f the front side [ o f one thing ] and the non-grasping [ non­
perception] o f [its] hind side. Nor would there be the occupa­
tion o f different places by many discrete elephants, horses etc.;
instead where one [ animal] is, there can be also another. How
then can their discreteness be recognized ? How can there be one
place reached by those two animals and yet another not reached
by them— [o r rather how can one establish it] on the basis of
the perception o f an empty space between those [ two places,
because there can be no such empty space].
I f two things are distinguished only on the basis o f definition,
and not otherwise, then the tiny aquatic bacteria being equal
in size with the huge animals, would not be invisible. Therefore,
o f necessity, the difference between atoms should be recognized.
[But it has already been stated that] not a single [atom ] is
obtained in experience. That being unobtained, it becomes proved
that colour etc. are not obtained as object o f the eve etc., and
that there is mere representation o f consciousness.
Existence or non-existence [ o f something] is proved using the
means o f knowledge [ pramana-vatat] . O f all the means o f knowl­
edge sense-perception is the strongest one. If so, there being no
object, how does one get the awareness such as ‘ this thing is being
perceived by me’ ?

16. Perception [can occur without extra-mental

object],
[ 182 ] Just as it happens in a dream etc.

The phrase ‘without extra-mental object’ [vina-api-arthena] is

understood from the above discussion.
 At the time when that perception occurs,
The [corresponding external ] object is not
found;
How can then one speak o f its perception ?

At the time when in a dream one has the awareness that ‘ this
is being perceived by me’ , that object is not really seen by one;
because, on the one hand, that awareness is determined solely
by the thought-consciousness, and on the other hand, at that time
the eye-consciousness is obstructed; therefore how can that
awareness be recognized as sense-perception at all ? What is
more, the respective colour or taste o f a momentary object is
definitely obstructed at that time.
Something not experienced before is not remembered by the
thought-consciousness. Therefore, that vision [i.e. memory]
should be traced to an experience. Thus, it is admitted that
colour etc., become its [i.e. memory’s] object.
It is not proved that a memory is o f previously experienced
object. Because,
17. It has [already] been said
[1 8 5 ] That there is a Representation o f consciousness,
Which appears as that, namely the respective
object;

It has already been said that even without a corresponding

object, there arises a representation o f consciousness, such as eye-
consciousness etc., which appears as the respective object.

From it [ i.e. from a representation o f con­

sciousness ]
Does the memory arise.

From a representation o f consciousness arises a thought-

representation of consciousness, which discriminates between the
object such as colour etc., and the subject. The same thought-
representation o f consciousness, which has with it the memory
associate, appears as memory. So an experience o f an external
object is not proved from the fact that a memory arises.
I f in a waking state also a representation o f consciousness
were o f an unreal object, as it is in a dream, then the common
man would naturally realize the absence o f it [ i.e. o f an object ]■
But it is not so [i.e. the common man does not realize the
absence o f an object]. Therefore, all perceptions are not without
objects, as a dream-perception is.
This argument does not make any pc>int. Because,

Those who are not awake

Do not realize that the objects they see in a
dream
Do not exist.

Similarly, the common man fast asleep by the sleep o f the

habit o f vainly discriminating between subject and object, as
long as he is not awoken, sees, as if in a dream, unreal objects,
and does not properly realize their absence. When, however, he
is awoken through the acquisition o f the supramundane knowl­
edge, which, being non-discriminative, acts as a remedy to the
habit o f discriminating between subject and object, then,
the previously acquired impure, mundane, knowledge being put
down, he properly realizes the absence o f object. Thus the
dream-experience and the waking experience are similar.
If, therefore, the representations o f consciousness, which appear
as objects, arise out o f the particular transformations o f the
stream o f the respective beings, and not out of the particular
external objects, then how is it obtained that a representation
o f consciousness is determined by contacts with bad or good
friends, or by listening to right or wrong teachings, for there
would be neither contacts with good or bad friends, nor their
teaching.

18. The representations o f consciousness

[189] Are determined by mutual influence
O f one individual on another.

The determination o f a representation o f consciousness o f all

beings is due to the mutual influence o f the representations of
consciousness o f one individual on another’s, as the case may be.
The term mithah means paraspara, both meaning ‘mutual’ .
Therefore, due to a particular representation o f consciousness
o f one stream [i.e. individual] there arises a particular
representation o f consciousness on another stream, not due to
a particular external object.
If, a representation o f consciousness in a waking state also
were without an external object, as it is in a dream, why is it
then that the good and bad actions o f a dreamer and non-
dreamef, do not have similar desirable or undesirable fruits in
the future ? Because

In a dream mind is overpowered by sleepiness,

And, therefore, fruits o f the actions done in a
dream
Are not on a par with the fruits o f those done in
a waking state.

This is the reason, not the presence o f the external objects.

I f it were all mere representation o f consciousness, there would
b e no one’ s body nor word. How then could death happen to
sheep etc. at the hands o f butchers who have no body to move
about ? I f it is said that the death o f sheep etc. does not happen
at their [ i.e. the butchers’ ] hands, why are the butchers blamed
for committing the sin o f murder ?

19. Death is a change o f course caused by

[ 192 ] A particular mental representation o f another
being,
Just as the loss o f memory etc. o f other beings
Are caused by the thought-power o f demons etc.

Due to the thought-power o f demons etc., changes like loss o f

memory, dream-vision and possession o f evil spirits, occur in
other beings; by the thought-power o f a magician there occurs
an increase o f things; the king Sarana had dream-vision by the
influence o f Arya Mahakalyana; and, again, the defeat ofVem a-
citra was caused by the distress induced by the thought o f the
forest-sages. Similarly, by the influence o f a particular represen­
tation o f consciousness o f some beings, there arises in other
beings a certain change, which will stop the functioning o f their
vital organ. By this does death, which means the cutting off o f
the continuous stream o f existence, take place.
 '< / \

20. OtHepvise how can it be said that

[1 9 2 ] The jDandaka-forest was destroyed by the anger
/Q f )(he sages ?

‘if death o f other beings is not recognized

as-~heing the influence o f others’ representation o f
CQnseiousggsS'.
The householder Upala was asked by the Lord, who wanted
to prove that mental torture is a great punishment, “ Have
you heard, householder, how the Dandaka-forest and the
Kalinga-forest were evacuated, and made fit for sacrificial
rites ?” . It was then said by him in reply, “ Oh ! Gautama,
I have heard that it was by the mental rage o f the sages.”

Or, how could mental torture be considered

T o be a great punishment ?

I f it is imagined that the creatures living in those forests

were destroyed by the suprahuman beings, who were pleased
by the sages, and that therefore those creatures were killed not
by the sages’ mental rage, then how by that incident could it
be proved that the mental torture is a punishment greater than
bodily as well as oral tortures ?O n the contrary it can be proved,
by maintaining that the death o f so inany creatures happened
solely due to the mental rage o f the sages.
I f it is all mere representation o f Consciousness, then do the
knowers o f other minds [really] know other minds or not ?
[Whether they really know or n ot], what ofit ? I f they [really]
do not know, how are they called knowers o f other minds ?
Therefore, they do know.

21. Knowledge o f those,

[ 194 ] [ W ho claim ] to know other minds,
Is unreal,
Just as one’s knowledge o f one’s own mind
[Is unreal].

How that [i.e. knowledge o f ontj’s own m ind] even is

unreal ?
 For, in the manner in which [the mind] is known
T o the enlightened ones,
It is unknown [ to ordinary men].
A mind is known to the enlightened ones in its ineffable
nature. A mind, both [other’s and one’s ow n], is not known as
it is to the ordinary men, because [for them], as [their habit
o f] discriminating between graspable and grasper is not yet
destroyed, there is the false appearance [ o f subject-object
distinction].
The theory o f mere representation o f consciousness being
. infinite, with incalculable divisions, deep and subtle,
22-. This treatise on the theory
[ 195] O f mere representation o f consciousness
Has been composed by me
According to my ability;
It is not possible, however, to discuss
This f tfteoryj in aff its aspects,
This [theory] cannot be discussed in all its implications by
people like me, because it is beyond the limits o f logic. To
whom it is known in all its aspects, is being said,
It is known [ only] to the enlightened ones.
It is indeed known in all its aspects to the enlightened Lords,
for they no longer have any kind o f impediment to the [ real
knowledge ] o f all knowable objects.

A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on the Theory of

Mere Representation o f Consciousness
Written by Master Vasubandhu
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 IN D EX OF SANSKRIT EXPRESSIONS

a b d h a tu , 77 a la m ba pa rik sa, 25
abhasa, 5 a la ya -v ijn a n a , 19, 65, 67 , 8 6 -8 , 95 -7,
a b h a v a , 51-4 112-3, 115-6, 134-6, 141, 1 4 3 -5 ,1 4 7 -
a b h av a-su n y ata , 84 51, 172, 21 1, 219-22
ab h ava-svabh ava, 83
a lo b h a , 141, 145
a bhtiva-svabhava-sun yata, 84
am pha, 141, 145
abhavasya b h a v a , 73 a n abh ilap y 2 173, 181, 22 2, 225, 229,
ab h avat, 111 231
a b h in ivesa , 12
an abh ilap ya -atm a , 26 , 188, 214, 226
abhinn a-laksan a, 104
a n abh ilap yen a-a tm an a, 2 1 4
ab h ran ti-d arsan a, 15
a n abh ilap yen a-a tm an a y o b u d d h a -
abhuta, 3, 31 -2, 40, 44, 92, 97, 111,
riam visay ah , 173
223
an akaratvat, 55
ab h u ta-arth a-p ratib h asa, 6 3 , 202-3 an atm ata, 156
abhuta-k alpa, 95
a n im itta m , 6
ab h u ta-pa rik a lp a, 4 , 7, 13, 29 , 30-1,
a n ity a -d h a rm a , 74
33, 35, 38 -9, 41 , 43 -7 , 52, 58, 64-5, an ity a ta , 74, 156
7 4 ,8 7 ,9 1 ,9 5 ,9 7 ,9 9 ,1 0 1 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 5 - 6 ,
121, 154, 202, 222, 224, 22 6, 229, a n ivrtam , 136
231-2 an tar-vya para-pu ru sa-ra h itata, 37
a n u p a la b d h i, 121
a b h u ta-pa rik a lp a-m a tra, 6 5 -6
a n u p a la m b h a , 120, 122
abhuta-parikalpasya g rahya-grah aka- an u sa ya , 208
bh av en a virahitata, 202
an u tta ra m b o d h im , 126, 227
abh iita -p arik alp o'sti, 33 an yath a, 266
a cara-u p acara, 131
a n y o n y a -v ijn a p ti-a d h ip a ty en a , 18
a cch a d a n a , 14
ap arik sina, 57
ad h i-m ok sa , 141, 145
ap a tra p a , 141, 145
ad hva, 16
ap ra m a d ik a , 141, 145
a d h y atm a, 78
advaita, 32 arhat, 137
a rh a to n a tat, 137
ad v ay a-d h arm ata, 92, 104, 106
arhattva, 136, 254
ad vaya-ek a-svab h ava , 102
artha, 7-1 0 , 21, 40, 47 -8, 50, 53-4,
advayatvena y a c -c a asti, 32
56, 58 , 60 , 65, 20 9-11 , 218
ad vesa, 141, 145
ad vitiya, 32 arth a-an u p a labd h i, 2 0 3 -4 , 209
ad vitiya-vastu, 32 a rth a-bh ed a, 107
agantuka, 77 arthah , 207
agantuka-m alah, 77 artha-m atra, 65
ah ankara, 219-21 artha-sattva, 119
ahankarika, 96 artha-vis'esa, 65
ahim sa, 141, 145 asa d-arth a-avabhasan at, 21
akalpita a sa d-dvaya -svab h ava, 32
akara, 51-3, 111, 116-7, 152 asal-laksana, 13, 45 , 60
akara-m atram tatra-asti, 114 a sa l-lak sana-anu p ravesa-u paya-laksa-
akaratva, 11, 52 n a m p a rid ip a y a ti, 202
akhyana, 121-2 asal-lak sanam grah ya-grah ak a yoh
aklistam -ajnanam , 162 p ra visati, 209
akrti, 113, 116 asam pra.janya, 145
akusala, 136 asamskrta, 4 3 -4
ala m ba n am vijn a n a m , 51, 96 , 143-4, asam skrta-dharm a, 44
160, 209 asat, 9 2 , 97 , 104-5
a la m b a n a -p ra ty a y a , 143 asa t-k alp a, 9 1 , 9 5 , 112-3, 11 5-6, 121
asattva, 13 b h u ta -d a rsa n a , 14
asatyam , 141 b h u ta -k o fi, 6
asrad d ha, 145 b h u ta -b h a u tik a , 228
asraya, 96 b ija , 16, 3 8 , 143-4, 149-50
asthana, 16 b ra h m a -p a riria m a -v a d a , 1.^3
asti, 180 b u d d h a -d h a r m a , 152
asti-akrti-m atram , 114 b u d d h a h , 2 3 -4 , 188, 2 1 3 , 228
asti nasti-iti ca ucyate, 114 bu d d h a n a m g o ca ra h , 119, 194, 225-
asukha-aduhkha, 136 b u d d h a ta , 98
asunya, 4 1 -4 b u d d h i, 21 9, 220-1
asya, 55 b u d d h y a v a iy y a rth y a -d a rsa n a , 123
atah, 55-56
a tath a-bh a v at, 111 caitasah , 65, 67, 141
atm a -d h arm a-n airatm ya, 165, 172 ca itta , 39, 4 4 , 4 7 , 6 4 -5 , 67 , 71, 86,
a tm a -d h a rm a -u p a ca ra , 132 14 4-6, 153, 165-6, 2 0 5 -7 , 2 1 5 -6 ,
a tm a -d rs(i, 137, 145 22 2, 2 2 4 , 238
atm a -m an a , 137, 145 ca k su r-v ijn a n a , 141
atm a -m o h a , 137, 145 caksu s, 171
atm an, 40, 4 7 -8 , 56, 128-34, 13 7,14 6, ce ta n a , 135, 137, 141, 145
162, 172-3, 2 0 5 ,2 0 9 - 1 1 ,2 1 6 ,2 5 4 , c h a n d a , 141, 145
265 cin ta m a y a -p a n n a , 123
atm a -sn eh a, 137, 145 c itrik a ra n a ta h , 159
a tm a tv e n a -a b h a v a , 56 citta , 6 , 10, 17, 39 , 4 4 , 4 7 , 6 4 -5 , 71,
a tm a -u p a c a r a , 133 8 6 -8 , 9 1 -2 , 9 4 -5 , 97, 144-6, 153,
a tra p a , 145 165-6, 192, 20 5 -7 , 2 1 5 -6 , 222,
a ty a n ta -a b h a v a , 53 -4, 99 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 , 23 3, 23 8, 24 6, 24 8, 2 6 0
a ty a n to n a sti, 118 citta -c a itta h , 35, 4 4 -5 , 22 4, 228,
a u p a b h o g ik a m v ijn a n a m , 67 23 1-2
av aran a, 14-6, 4 4 -5 , 136 citt a -c a it t e b h y o ’n y a tr a , 36
avastu, 26 c itta -d h a rm a ta , 86-7
a v id y a , 14-5 c itta -m a tr a , 6 , 198, 2 0 1 , 20 4, 209,
avihim sa, 141, 145 21 3 , 2 3 3 -4
a v ip a r ito h i tattvarth ah , 19 citta -m a tra ta 5, 200, 233
a v isesen a , 39
av y a k rta m , 136 d a rsa n a -b h a g a ,
ayatan a, 16, 129, 170-3 d h a m m a -a y a ta n a , 130
a y a tn a ta h , 123 d h a m m a -d h a tu , 130, 200
d h a rm a , 12, 17, 2 3 -4 , 43, 74, 77-8,
82 -5 , 8 7 , 128-34, 156, 162, 17 2-3,
ba h u tv a , 32 199, 20 5, 21 4, 21 6, 2 2 5 , 24 2, 245,
b a h y a , 78 25 4, 2 6 5 -6
b a la h , 101 d h a rm a -d h a tu , 6, 125
b a la n a m a sa ty a rth e’ r th a -u p a la m b h a h d h a rm a -k a ya , 161, 199-200
202 d h a rm a -n a ira tm y a , 23, 161, 162,
b a n d h a , 57 173
b h a g a v a n b u d d h a h , lS l dh arm an a m p aram arth ah , 207
b h a g a v a n ta h , 228 d h arm ata, 74, 85 , 87, 155, 242
bh a u tik a , 6 5 , 144, 146, 165, 2 0 6 , 222 d h a rm a -u p a ca ra , 134
b h a sy a , 27 d h a tu , 16, 76, 129, 161, 243
bh a v a d h a tu -b h u m i, 137
b h a v a n a m a y a -p a n iia , 123 dhi, 141, 145
b h a v a tv a , 10 d ra sfa v y a , 172
b h e d a , 107 d ra v y a , 36, 131-2
b h o g y a -sa m m a ta , 83 d ra vy a ta h , 7, 163, 173
b h o jy a , 9, 12, 83, 149 dra vy a tv en a santi, 35
b h o k tr, 9 , 12, 8 3 , 149 d rk , 141, 145
b h o k tr-sa m m a ta , 83 d rsfa, 65
b h ra n ti, 4, 16, 3 7 , 56 d u h k h a, 12, 74, 136, 222
b h u ta , 6 5 , 1 4 4-6, 165, 2 0 6 , 2 2 1-2 du h k h ata, 74, 156
d v a y a , 29 -3 2 , 52, 100-1, 115, 117, 122 h a sti-a tm a n a , 115
d v a y a -a b h a v a , 58, 73, 102, 116, 118 hasti na sti tu tatra sarvath a , 114
d v a y a -a b h a v a -b h a v a , 1 11 h a s ti-v a d -d v a y a m , 117
d v a y a -a b h a v o ’ d h igam yate, 122 h e tu , 6 0 , 76, 243
d va y a -a b h a v a -sv a b h a v a , 32, 38, 102 h e tu -p h a la -b h a v e n a , 67
d v a y a -a k a ra , 122 h e tu -p h a la -p r a b h e d a . 66
d va y a -a k a ro v ig a cch a ti, 121-2 h e tu -p r a ty a y a , 67
d v a y a -a n u p a la m b h a , 122 h ri, 141, 145
d va y a -a n u p a la m b h e n a , 12 5
d va y a -a tm a n a , 92 , 113, 115
d va y a -a tm a ta , 116 in d r iy a , 16, 142, 148
d v a y a -b h a v a -sv a b h a v a , 102 in d r iy a -a y a ta n a , 173
d va y a m atyan to nasti, 113-4 in d r iy a -v ijn a n a , 221
d vayara tatra n a v id y a te, 30-3 in d r iy a -v ijn a n a n i, 4 9
d v a y o r-a n u p a la m b h a h , 125 irsy a , 145
d vitv a, 32

ja g a t, 14, 68
eka, 100 ja n m a , 13, 6 1 , 66-7
ekam ev a ad v itiy a m , 32 ja n m a -a n ta r a -p r a v rtti, 67
ja n t u , 129
iih v a -v ijn a n a m , 141
ghran a-v ijn an a, 141 jiv a , 129
g rah a -d v a ya , 150, 208 jiv it a -in d r iy a -v ir o d h in i k a c id -
g ra h a -d v a ya -a n u sa ya , 159 v ik r iy a , 193
g rah a -d v a ya sy a anusaya, 160 jn a n a -in d r iy a , 21 9, 221
g rah a -dv a ya sy a an usayo vin ivartate, jn a n a -tr a y a -a n u v r tti, 123
209 jn a t r , 12, 149
grahaka, 3, 8 -9 , 12, 23, 30-1, 40, jn e y a , 12, 15 -6, 149, 162
52-3, 130, 149, 219, 225 jn e y a -a r t h a , 10
grahakatva, 9, 32, 128, 131, 223 jiie y a -a v a r a n a , 15 -1 6 , 136, 161-3
g rahanatah , 159 jn e y a -p r a v r ta tv a t, 16
grahya, 3, 8 -10, 12, 23, 30-1, 40, 52-3,
130, 149, 21 9, 225
g rahya-grah aka, 4 k a lp a n a , 2 , 10, 184-185
grah ya-grah aka -abh in ivesa, 48 k a lp a n a -m a tra -b h a v a , 92
g rahya-grah aka-akara, 38 k a lp ita , *31, 92, 105, 173
g rah y a-grah ak a -bh av a, 7, 30 k a lp ita -a tm a , 173
grah ya-grah ak a -bh aven a vira h itata, k a lp ita -a tm a n a , 2 3 , 181, 214
32, 154, 226 k a lp ita -la k s a n a , 83
g r a h y a -g r a h a k a -p r a tib h a sa , 60 k a lp ite n a -a tm a n a , 214
g ra h y a -g r a h a k a -v ik a lp a , 3 -4 , 12 k a ra n a m , 53
30, 38 , 4 0 , 2 2 9 , k arm a, 13, 6 0 -6 1 , 6 6 -7 , 150-1
g r a h y a -g r a h a k a -v ik a lp a -a b h a v a , k a r m a -in d r iy a , 221
38 k a s fh a , 1 1 2 -3 , 115
g ra h y a -g r a h a k a y o r -a sa ttv a m -e v a k a th a , 152
a sa l-la k sa n a m , 202 k a th a -v a stu , 152
g r a h y a -ru p e n a , 53 k a u k rty a , 145
g r a h y a -ru p e n a p ra k h y a n a t, 51 kau sid ya , 145
g r a h y a tv a , 9 , 3 2 , 128, 131, 159, k a y a -v ijn a n a , 141
223 k h y a ti, 9 1 , 111, 113
g r a h y a -v ik a lp a , 40 k h y a ti-d v a y a -a tm a n a , 9 1 , 114
k h y a ti-h a sti-a tm a n a , 114
k in c id -a r th a , 209
h a n i, 121 k in cit, 209
h a sti, 115, 117 klesa, 13, 15, 61 , 6 6 -7 , 162
h a sti-a b h a v a , 116-7 k le sa -a v a ra n a , 15, 136, 161-3
ha sti-a k a ra , 115 k le sa -u p a k le sa , 141
h a sti-a k a ra -su n y a -m a y a , 38 k lisja m m a n a h , 49 , 137
h a sti-ak rti, 115, 117 k r a m a -b h a v a , 107
k r a m a -b h e d a , 107 n a prthak , 74
k r o d h a , 141, 145 na ra ka-vat, 262
k sa n ik a -v a d a , 25 n a ra k esu -iva , 262
k sin a , 150 nasti, 3, 218
k u sa la , 136 nastita, 106
k u s a la -ca ita sa , 141 nasti tu sarvatha, 118
n a su nyam n a -a p i c a asu n yam , 4 4
laksanam , 157
n a tatha, 56
la k sa n a-n ih sv abh av ata, 157
lo k o tta ra , 160 n a tu an a b h ila p yen a -a tm a n a , 23,
lo k o tta ra -jn a n a , 2 2 6 -7 , 232 225
n a v id y a te , 3 , 29
m a d a , 141, 145 n id a n a , 68
m a h a -m u n i, 161 nih svabh avata, 157
m a n a , 141, 145 n im itta -b h a ga , 147
m a n a -a y a ta n a , 130 nirod h a -sa m a p a tta u , 137-8
m a n a n a , 9 5 -6 n irv a n a , 9, 16, 23, 34, 3 8 , 4 1 , 44-5,
m a n a n a -a k h y a -v ijn a n a m , 137, 145 57, 74, 81, 84 , 9 7 -8 , 120, 149,
m a n a n a-atm ak a , 137 151, 197, 200,. 2 0 6 -8 , 213, 218,
m an a n a -v ijn a n a , 136-7, 144, 219-22 2 2 6 -7 , 244
m anas, 136-7, 192, 21 9, 22 1, 254-5 nirvan a-p aryavasa n ah , 38
m anaskara, 135, 137, 141, 145 n irv ik alp a-jn a n a, 27, 227
n irvikalp aka, 160, 232
m an a va , 129
n ity a , 156
m a n o -d h a tu , 130
m a n o -n a m a -v ijn a n a , 96, 136-7, 141,
p a d a rth a , 131-2, 140
145, 147
p a ra m a rth a , 6
m a n o -v ijn a n a , 49, 122, 134, 137, 260
m an tra-vasa t, 111, 114 p aram arth a-n ih sv abh av ata, 157
p aram arth a-sa t, 25
m an u ja, 129
p aram arth ata , 22
m arge Iokottare, 138
p arasp ara, 272
m atra, 109
p a ra -ta n tra , 19-21, 9 1 , 9 7 , 103,
m atrata, 109
155-6
m atsarya, 141, 145
p a ra -ta n tra -d h a rm a , 155
m a y a , 38, 111, 115, 141, 145
p a ra -ta n tra -sva b h a v a , 35, 90-1,
m a y a y a m -iv a hasti-akarah, 38
9 4 -5 , 9 7 -8 , 103, 116, 151, 155-6,
m id d h a , 145
158, 23 1-2
m ith ah , 272 - *
p a ra -v ijn a p ti-v isesa -a d h ip a ty a t, 193
m oksa, 9, 162
m ok sa-a pa tti, 123 p a r ijn a , 120
m rksa, 141, 145 p a rik a lp a , 3 -5 , 10, 3 9 -4 0 , 9 1 -2 , 129,
m u d h i, 141, 145 154 173 29 ?
m ukhya, 132 p a rik a lp ita ,' 5, 7, 19 -21, 2 5 -6 , 53,
m uktalj, 188 9 1 , 103, 111, 127, 152, 155, 181,
m ukti, 4 , 9 , 12, 57 22 9
m u la-citta , 112-3, 115 p a rik a lp ita -a tm a , 2 6 ,-2 2 6
m u la -citta t, 113 p a rik a lp ita -jn ey a , 16
m u la-tattva , 19-21, 119 p a rik a lp ita -sv a b h a v a , 6 5 , 90 -2,
m u la -vijn a n a , 95, 112-5, 141-3 9 7 -8 , 103, 106, 151, 157, 2 3 1-2
m u la -vijiia n a t, 142 p a r in a m a , 116, 12 8, 1 3 0-3, 143,
m usita, 145 2 1 5 -6
p a r in is p a n n a , 1 9 -2 1 , 2 5 -6 , 91, 9 7 -8 ,
n a b h av ati, 3 1 5 5-6
n a ca sarvath a -abh avah , 56 p a r in is p a n n a -jiie y a , 16
na-eka, 74 p a r in is p a n n a -s v a b h a v a , 10, 35,
naim ittik a, 95, 96 9 0 -2 , 103, 1 3 4 -5 , 15 1, 1 5 5 -6 , 2 0 0 ,
n a ira tm y a, 23 -5, 37, 123, 162, 173, 231-2
214, 225, 233-4 p a r in is p a n n a -s v a b h a v o ’ n a n y a th a t-
nam a, 17, 69, 215, 240-1 v a ta h , 92
n a m a -p a d a , 210 p a r y a y a -la k s a n a , 6 4
n a m a -ru p a , 70 p ra b h a s v a r a , 87
p ra d a s a , 14 1, 145 sak sat-karoti, 209
p ra h a n a , 120 saksat-kriya, 121-2
p r a h in a -m a la , 76 sam adhi, 141, 145
p ra ja y a te , 2 1 7 , 219 sam an antara-pratyaya, 143
p r a jn a -m a t r a ta , 200 sam anya, 46
p r a jn a p t i-m a t r a , 6 , 198, 201 sam anya-laksana, 2, 25 -6, 79
p ra k a ra , 5 1 , 152 sam anya-laksanam jn a n a m , 75
p ra k a r a tv a , 11 sam artha, 150
sam arthyam , 150
p ra k h y a n a , 3 8 , 53
sam ata, 76
p ra k rti, 2 1 9 -2 2 , 232
sam p rayoga, 47, 260
p r a m a d a , 145
p r a m a n a -v a s a t, 270 samsara, 4 , 9, 11-4, 21-2, 24, 29,
p ra n e tr, 27 3 3 - 5 ,3 8 - 9 , 4 1 ,4 3 - 5 ,5 7 , 68 -9, 71,
p r a p t i, 120 74-5, 81, 84 , 90, 94, 9 7 -9 , 108-9,
p r a s r a b d h i, 1 4 1 , 145 116, 127, 149, 162, 170, 186-7,
p ra tib h a sa , 1 0 -1 , 4 0 , 50, 53, 144, 191, 193, 195, 204, 20 6-7, 213, 220,
2 0 9 -1 0 , 217 223-4, 226, 230, 244
p ra tib h a sik a , 9 0 , 9 5 -6 samskara, 14, 17, 59, 129, 143-4,
p r a tib h e d a -la k s a n a m , 6 4 156, 21 5-6, 222
p ra tig h a , 14 1, 145 sam skrta, 4 3 -4
p r a tity a -s a m u tp a d a , 14, 16, 6 6 , samskrta-asam skrta, 16
6 8 , 23 3 sam skrta-dharm a, 44-5
p ra ty a y a , 6 0 , 158 sam udaya-satya, 22
p r a ty a y a -a d h in a -v r tt itv a t k a lp a n a - sam vrti, 18, 22, 79
m a tr a -b h a v a ta h , 92 sam v rti-sat, 25
p ra v e s a , 107 sam v rtitah , 7, 163
p r a v e s a -a d h ik a r a ta h , 108 s a m y o g a , 268
p r a v is , 110 s a m y o ja n a n i, 15
p ra v is y a te , 110 san jn a, 129, 135, 137, 141, 145
p ra v r tti, 66 2 1 5 -6
p ra v r ttila k s a n a m , 65 sa n k le sa , 3 7 -8 , 4 4 -5 , 5 7 , 6 7 -8 , 71, 98
p r a v r t ti-v ijn a n a m , 6 5 , 6 7 , 9 7 , 134, sa n k le sa -d h a rm a , 85
138, 145, 1 4 7 -9 , 2 1 9 -2 0 , 222 sarikles'a-laksana, 102-3
p r e ta -iv a , 261 sa n k lisfa , 76, 8 4 -5
p r e t a -v a t, 261 s a n n ip a ta , 142, 148
p u d g a la , 12, 2 3 -4 , 8 2 -4 , 162, 172- sa n ta n a , 18
3, 2 1 4 , 2 4 5 , 265 sarira, 8 0 , 244
p u d g a la -n a ir a t m y a , 2 3 , 1 6 1 -2 , 2 6 6 s a rp a -s v a b h a v a , 40
p u r u s a , 2 1 9 , 2 2 2 , 232 sa rv a , 4 2 -4 4
p u y a -n a d i, 168 s a r v a -a p a v a d a , 37
s a r v a -a p a v a d a -p r a tis e d h a r th a m , 34
r a g a , 141, 145 sa r v a -d h a r m a h sa rv a th a n ih sv a b h a -
ra h ita ta , 155 v a h , 35
ru p a , 17, 2 4 , 6 9 , 129, 176, 2 1 5 , s a rv a jn a tv a , 162-3
240-1 s a r v a -k a la m , 41
r u p a -a d i-a y a t a n a , 171, 176 sa rv a tra g a -ca ita sa , 141
r u p a -p r a tib h a s a , 17 2 sastra, 2 7 -8 , 21 0, 212
sath ya , 145
sa t-k a y a -d rs {i, 162
s a b h a g a -s a n ta ti-v ic c h e d a -a k h y a m satta, 10, 18, 152
m a r a n a m , 193 sattva , 4 0 , 4 7 -8 , 5 6 , 2 0 9 -1 0
s a d a -a v id y a m a n a ta , 9 2 , 104 satya, 16
s a d -p r a v r tti-v ijn a n a m , 141 sh akti ( = s 'a k t i ) , 199
sa d -v id h a sy a y a v isa y a s y a u p a la b - s id d h a , 2 6 1-2
d h ih , 137, 211 sid d h i, 20 6
sad-vijnan ani, 210 s id d h v a ti, 180
sa-eva vijn ap ti-m atrata , 207 sk a n a h a , 16, 129, 215
saha, 151 sm rti, 141, 145
saksat-kara, 16 sp arsa, 135, 137, 14 1 -2 , 145, 148
 s p r s(a v y a , 171 u p a k le s a , 15
sra d d h a , 141, 145 u p a la b d h i, 121, 140, 211
s'rotasa u gh a -vat, 136 u p a la b d h ir -u p a la b d h itv e n a , 63
s r o tr a -v ijn a n a , 141 u p a la b h y a -a r th a -a b h a v a , 63
sth a n a , 16, 135 u p a la b h y a -a r th a -a b h a v e , 202
sth a n a -a sth a n a , 16 u p a la m b h a -n im itta , 121
sty a n a , 145 u p a la m b h a ta h , 159
su ga ta , 27 u p a n a h a , 141, 145
s u g a ta -a tm a ja , 27 u p a p a d u k a -sa ttv a , 171
su k h a, 136 u p a y a , 13, 202
su n y a, 2 9 , 32, 4 1 , 4 3 -4 u p e k sa , 136, 141, 145
su n y a ta , 4 , 6 , 2 9 -3 3 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 4 3 -5 , u tp a d a -sa ty a , 15
52 , 72, 7 4 -5 , 8 3 -8 , 126, 2 2 5 -6 , 231, u tp a tti-n ih sv a b h a v a ta , 157
2 3 3 -4 u tp re k sita , 158
su n y a ta v id y a te tu -a tr a , 3 0 , 34
s v a -a tm a n i-a v id y a m a n a , 38 v a ip a k ik a , 95
s v a b h a v a , 19 -20, 38, 2 2 3 , 231 v a iy y a r th y a , 123
sv a b h a v a -k a lp ita h , 113 v a k tr, 2 7 -8
s v a b h a v a -k a lp ito h a sti, 117 v a sa n a , 3 8 , 6 0 , 1 4 3 -4 , 150, 222
sv a b h a v a n a m , 107 v a stu , 10, 2 6 , 152, 2 1 4
s v a b ija t. ..u tp a d y a t e , 172 v a stu -n a n a tv a m , 79
s v a -la k sa n a , 2 , 2 5 -6 , 45 v a stu n i, 78-9
sv a p n a -iv a , 261 v e d a n a , 129, 136, 145, 2 1 5 -6
s v a p n a -v a t, 261 v ib h u tv a , 125
s v a -ru p a , 38 , 157 v ib h u tv a -u p a la m b h a ta , 125
s v a r u p a -a b h a v a , 158 v ic a r a , 145
s v a y a m -b h a v a h , 158 v icik itsa , 141, 145
v id , 135, 141, 145
ta d -a b h a v a -s v a b h a v a ta h , 111 v ijn a n a , 6 -1 0 , 4 0 , 4 7 -8 , 53, 65,
ta d -a la m b a m , 137 128-30 , 132-4, 142, 148, 163, 198-
t a d -a la y a -v ijn a n a m -a s r ity a p ra - 9 ,2 1 0 , 2 1 4 -2 2 2 , 2 2 6 , 2 3 1 , 233
v a r ta te , 137 v ijn a n a -m a tr a , 213
v ijn a n a -m a tr a ta , 2 1 0
t a d -v ijn a n a m a p i-a sa t, 21 8
v ijn a n a -p a r in a m a , 12 9, 133, 1 4 3 ,
ta n m a tra , 221
147, 151, 163, 173, 2 1 0 , 2 1 6 , 228
ta ra iig a n a m y a th a ja l e , 143
ta sy a -a sa t-k a lp a s y a ka n a stita , 92 v ijn a n a -v a d a , 215
ta sy a -k h y a tu r -y a th a a k h y a n a m y a v ijn a p ta y a h , 2 0 3 , 210-11
s a d a -a v id y a m a n a ta , 92 v ijn a p ti, 6 -1 0 , 2 3 -2 5 , 4 0 , 4 7 -8 , 56,
ta sy a m -a p i sa v id y a te , 3 0 , 34 140, 1 7 2 ,1 9 2 , 2 0 3 , 2 0 5 , 2 0 7 ,2 0 9 -
ta th a , 112-3 14, 219, 226, 260
ta th a -a sa t-k a lp a h , 114 v ijn a p ti-m a tr a , 5 -6 , 2 3 , 3 2 , 19 8 -9 ,
ta th a ta , 6 , 10, 16, 3 3 -4 , 4 1 , 90 , 2 0 1 -6 , 2 0 8 -9 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 , 231
1 1 4 -5 , 117, 2 3 2-3 v ijn a p ti-m a tr a s y a , 201
ta tra -a sti-a k rti-m a tra k a m , 113 v ijn a p ti-m a tr a s y a -a p i-a n u p a la b d h ih ,
ta ttv a , 19, 2 0 , 119 2 0 3 -5
t a ttv a m a v ip a ry a sa h , 19, 75 v ijn a p ti-m a tr a ta , 8 , 2 3 -4 , 19 9-20 0,
te n a -id a m -s a r v a m v ijn a p tim a tra - 2 0 6 -1 0 , 2 1 3 -4 , 2 2 8 , 233
k am , 205 v ijn a p ti-m a t r a ta -c in t a , 25
ten a p a r ik a lp ite n a a tm a n a , 2 3 , 225 v ijn a p ti-m a t r a ta -v a d a , 5
tra id h a tu k a , 166 v ijn a p ti-m a tr a tv e -a v a tis th a ti, 20 9
t r i-p a r ic c h e d a , 142 v ijn a p ti-m a t r a -u p a la b d h i, 203
t r i-s v a b h a v a -v a d a , 151 v ijn a p tir -v isa y a s y a , 9 5 -6 , 140, 145
trsn a , 12, 15, 222 v ijn e y a , 7 -8 , 163
v ik a lp a , 2, 31, 1 1 5 -6 , 14 5-7, 1 4 9 ,
u d d h a v a , 145 1 5 3 -4 , 173, 2 0 5 -7
u p a b h o g a -p r a y o ja k a t v a t, 67 v ik se p a , 145
u p a c a r a , 128, 13 1-2, 14 6, 162 v im u k ti-k a y a , 161
u p a d a n a , 12 v in a -a p i-a r th e n a , 2 7 0
u p a d i, 135 v in iy a ta -c a ita sa , 141
v ip a k a , 9 5 -6 , 145, 150 v y a v a h a ra -a d h ik a ra ta li, 108
v iry a , 141, 145 v y a v a h a ra -a tm a , 109
v ir u d d h a -d h i, 123 v y a v a h a ra -s a m u cc h e d a -s v a b h a v a ,
v is a y a , 7, 2 4 -5 , 142, 144, 148, 175-6 109
v is a y a -a y a ta n a , 173 v y a v a h a ra -sa ty a , 108
v isa y a s y a , 211 v y a v a h a rik a , 18, 2 2 , 79
v is a y a s y a -u p a la b d h ih , 145 v y a v a h a rtr , 109
v isa y a sy a v ijn a p tih , 210-11 v y a v a h a rtr -a tiA a , 109
v ise sa , 4 6 , 65 v y u tp a tti, 1 0 7-8
v is'u d dh a, 7 6 , 8 4 -5
visuddhi-alambanam jnanam, 74 y an a .16
v is u d d h i-d h a r m a , 85 y a th a , 11 2-3
v is u d d h i-m a g g a , 123 y a th a -a k h y a n a m , 105
vit, y a th a -b h u ta , 3 3 -4 , 9 7 , 198, 22 2, 227
v ita rk a , 145 y a th a -b h u ta -d a r s a n a , 14, 16, 159-60
v ita th a , 53 y a th a -b h u ta -v a stu , 6, 16, 173
v ita th a -p r a tib h a s a , 53, 195 y a t h a -c a k a lp a y a ti-a r th a m ta th a -
v ita th a -p r a tib h a s a ta y a , 195, 22 5 a ty a n ta m n a v id y a te , 92
v iv a r tta , 133 y a th a k h y a ti sap arik alp ita, 91
v y a n ca n a , 21 0 y a th a -m a y a -k r ta m , 114
v y a v a d a n a , 3 7 -8 , 4 4 , 5 7 , 9 8 y a th a -p r a ty a y a m , 143
v y a v a d a n a -la k sa n a , 10 2-3 y a ti, 148
v y a v a h a ra , 107-8 y a tra ja s -ta n -m a y a , 137
Excerpts from reviews

Here is another publication on the Philosophy o f Vasubandhu

....... but in the nature o f reinterpretation.
The translation is faithful to the letter as well as to the spirit of
the original texts, and is eminently readable.
The learned author merits words o f praise for the fresh outlook
that he has brought to bear on the subject.

Bulletin o f the Indian Institute S. K. R a m a c h a n d r a R ao

o f World Culture
Vol. 5, No. 12
December, 1985

We are fortunate to have available now the study on Vasubandhu

by Kochumuttom. Kochumuttom’s style as evidenced in his own
commentarial notes and in his translations, is simple and lucid. •
Kochumuttom offers his readers in unencumbered and lucid
prose a number o f interesting insights into Vasubandhu’ s thought.
With regard to the translation Kochumuttom’s is the more fluid
and easily readable overall while remaining true to the Sanskrit.

The Vajradhatu Sun

December, 1985

Here is a good example o f painstaking study and exercise in

hermeneutics which might recover for us the right letter and
spirit o f ancient texts which have long become obfuscated if not
obsolete.
A stimulating and thought provoking b ook .

Mountain Path
Vol. 21 N o. IV
October, 1984 ,

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PVT. LTD.