REPORT OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN

WORKING GROUP ON EU INSTITUTIONAL

REFORM

Sailing on High Seas:

Reforming and
Enlarging the EU
for the 21 Century
st

Paris-Berlin - 18 September 2023

The opinions expressed are those of the authors only

and should not be considered as representative of the French
and/or German official position
The Group of Twelve
 Olivier Costa (Rapporteur)
 Daniela Schwarzer (Rapporteur)
 Pervenche Berès
 Gilles Gressani
 Gaëlle Marti
 Franz Mayer
 Thu Nguyen
 Nicolai von Ondarza
 Sophia Russack
 Funda Tekin
 Shahin Vallée
 Christine Verger
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................... 5
Main Recommendations ................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 11
1. The Union and the urgency of change .........................................................................11
2. Approach and principles of institutional reform .........................................................12
A hybrid political system ................................................................................................13
The three goals of reforms ............................................................................................14
I. Protecting a fundamental principle: the rule of law ........................................... 16
II. Addressing institutional challenges: five key areas of reform .......................... 20
1. Making the EU institutions enlargement-ready ..........................................................20
2. Decision-making in the Council .....................................................................................23
3. EU-level democracy ........................................................................................................26
4. Powers and competences ..............................................................................................31
5. EU resources ...................................................................................................................32
III. How to manage progress: Deepening and widening the EU ............................... 35
1. Options for treaty change .............................................................................................35
2. Differentiation .................................................................................................................38
3. Managing the enlargement process ............................................................................43
Conclusion and outlook: Two windows to reform the EU .......................................... 47
1. Short-term measures before the EU elections (October 2023-June 2024)................47
2. Medium-term measures during the next institutional cycle (2024-29) .....................48
Annex 1: Joint press release of the German Federal Foreign Office and the French
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (23.01.2023) ................................................. 50
Annex 2: Overview of recommendations and the need for treaty change ............. 52
Annex 3: Overview of the options for treaty change.................................................. 57
Annex 4: Members of the Group of Twelve and acknowledgements ....................... 58

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Executive Summary
The European Union (EU) faces a critical juncture marked by geopolitical shifts,
transnational crises, and internal complexities. For geopolitical reasons, EU enlargement is
high on the political agenda, but the EU is not ready yet to welcome new members, neither
institutionally nor policy wise. Against this backdrop, a ‘working group on EU institutional
reforms’ was convened by the French and German governments. In September 2023, after
several months of deliberation, ‘The Group of Twelve’ submitted the results of its work
with this report.

Recognising the complexity of aligning diverse Member States' visions for the EU, the
report recommends a flexible EU reform and enlargement process. It highlights the need
for immediate action to improve the EU's functionality, proposing a list of initial steps
before the next European elections. More substantial reforms – including preparations for
treaty revisions – should be implemented during the new legislative term (2024 to 2029).

The report’s recommendations are aimed at achieving three goals: increasing the EU’s
capacity to act, getting the EU enlargement ready, and strengthening the rule of law and
the EU’s democratic legitimacy. The report is structured into three main sections, dealing
with the rule of law, institutional reforms, and the process to reform, deepen and enlarge
the EU.

I. Protecting the rule of law

The rule of law is a non-negotiable constitutional principle for the EU’s functioning and a pre-
condition for joining the EU. Ultimately, the EU cannot function without reciprocity, mutual
trust and without all its members adhering to its principles. The report makes several
recommendations to strengthen the EU's ability to protect and bolster the rule of law -
strengthening budgetary conditionality, and refining Article 7 TEU via a treaty revision.

II. Addressing institutional challenges

The report addresses five key areas, all of which are crucial to serve the three defined
reform goals. While it acknowledges other subjects in the debate on the future of EU, it
focuses on these areas due to their significance and feasibility.

1.The EU's current institutions lack agility and are penalised by complexity and an
abundance of players. The report suggests the report suggests that the number of MEPs
should not be increased beyond the current 751, and a new system to allocate seats, as well
as modifying the ’trio’ system for the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in favour
of ‘quintets’ and either reducing the size of the Commission's College to two-thirds of Member
States or developing a hierarchical model.

2. The report highlights the need to reform the decision-making processes within the

5
Council. Before the next enlargement, all remaining policy decisions should be transferred from
unanimity to QMV. Additionally, except for in foreign, security and defence policy, this should
be accompanied by full co-decision with the EP (through the OLP) to ensure appropriate
democratic legitimacy. If this is not possible, it suggests mainstreaming QMV via three
packages grouped by policy areas to allow for a fair balance of concessions between
individual Member States. To make QMV more acceptable, three further recommendations
are made: the creation of a ‘sovereignty safety net’ allowing Member States to voice their
vital national interests in QMV decisions; a rebalance of voting shares, to address the
concerns of smaller to medium-sized Member States; and an opt-out mechanism.

3. The report underscores the significance of democratic legitimacy in EU decision-making

and proposes four sets of measures to bolster it. It first recommends the harmonisation of
electoral laws across Member States for EP elections. It then discusses the ‘lead candidate’
procedure for the appointment of the Commission President and advocates for a political
agreement between the EP and the European Council to prevent conflict. Third, it
recommends closer ties between existing participatory instruments and EU decision-
making and to use them to prepare for enlargement by involving citizens and stakeholders
from candidate countries. Finally, the report stresses the importance of probity,
transparency, and anti-corruption measures within EU institutions and suggests the
establishment of a dedicated new independent office equipped with large competences
and the means to undertake them.

4. The report discusses several key aspects related to the powers and competences of the
EU. It recommends clarifying EU competences, strengthening provisions for addressing
unforeseen developments and better involving the EP. It proposes the creation of a 'Joint
Chamber of the Highest Courts and Tribunals of the EU' to enhance judicial dialogue
without binding decisions.

5. To address the challenges of reforming EU policies and distribution of funding in the context
of enlargement and to equip the EU with the financial means to react quickly to emerging
crises, the report recommends increasing the EU budget in size and relation to GDP and to
make it more flexible. This includes creating new own resources, moving towards QMV for
spending, and enabling common EU debt issuance in the future.

III. Deepening and widening the EU

1. The report discusses six options for Treaty change. The default option is a Convention,
followed by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). If no agreement for this is reached,
the report considers a 'simplified revision procedure’ as being a second best alternative. It
explores three alternative scenarios reforming the EU as part of a package with the accession
treaties. In the absence of unanimity on Treaty change, a supplementary treaty among
willing Member States would allow for differentiation within the EU.

2. The report recalls that the EU already has various differentiation mechanisms and that
they will be needed to accommodate the diverse preferences of over 30 EU Member

6
States. However, differentiation has its limits, especially concerning the rule of law and
core values. It should thus be used under the five following conditions: respect the EU's
rules and policies, use EU institutions and instruments, ensure openness to all Member
States, share decision-making powers and costs among participants, and allow willing
Member States to move forward. In Treaty revision, differentiation should respect the
following principles: opt-outs should only be granted when deepening integration or
extending QMV, and exemptions from core EU values should not be allowed.
Differentiation could lead to four tiers of European integration, made of an inner circle
(deep integration in areas like the eurozone and Schengen), the EU itself, a larger circle of
Associate Members, involving participation in the single market and adherence to
common principles, and finally the European Political Community (EPC), as an outer tier for
political cooperation without having to be bound to EU law.

3. The report finally discusses how to manage the EU enlargement process. It has already
been restructured, with negotiations organised into six clusters and the possibility for
candidate countries to phase into specific EU policies and programmes. It recommends
setting a goal for both sides (EU and candidate countries) to be ready for enlargement by
2030. It calls for breaking down accession rounds into smaller groups of countries
('regatta') to ensure a merit-based approach and to manage potential conflicts. It finally
highlights nine principles for future enlargement strategies that all aim to make the
process more effective, credible, and politically guided.

7
Main Recommendations
I. Better protect a fundamental principle: the rule of law

Budgetary conditionality
 make the rule of law conditionality mechanism an instrument to sanction breaches
of the rule of law and, more generally, systematic breaches of the European values
enshrined in Article 2 TEU
 if no agreement: extend the scope of budgetary conditionality to other behaviours
detrimental to the EU budget
 introduce conditionality, similar to NGEU, for future funds

Refine the Article 7 TEU procedure

 replace unanimity minus 1 by a majority of four-fifths at the EUCO
 reinforce the automaticity of the response by including time limits to force the
Council and the EUCO to take a position when the procedure is triggered
 automatic sanctions five years after a proposal to trigger the procedure

II. Addressing institutional challenges: five key areas of reform

1. Making the EU institutions enlargement-ready

The European Parliament
 sticking with the limit of 751 or fewer MEPs
 adoption of a new system for seat allocation, based on the Cambridge formula

The Council of the EU

 trio format extended to a quintet of presidencies, each spanning half of an
institutional cycle

The Commission
 decisions on the size and organisation of the College:
 Option 1: reducing the size of the College (Article 17(5) TEU)
 Option 2: differentiation between ‘Lead Commissioners’ and ‘Commissioners’,
with potentially only the ‘Lead Commissioners’ voting in the College

2. Decision-making in the Council

Generalisation of QMV
 before the next enlargement, transfer all remaining ‘policy’ decisions from
unanimity to QMV. Except for foreign, security and defence, Ordinary Legislative
Procedure applies
 if no agreement: create of three linked packages forming the basis of a transition
towards QMV: 1. Enlargement and the rule of law; 2. Foreign policy and defence; 3.
Fiscal and tax policy

8
Making more QMV acceptable
 creation of a ‘sovereignty safety net’ inspired by Article 31(2) TUE
 calculation of QMV voting shares rebalanced: 65/55 to 60/60
 opt-out for policy areas transferred to QMV

3. EU-level democracy
The harmonisation of EU electoral laws
 harmonisation of the conditions under which the EP elections take place, at least
for 2029

The appointment of the Commission President

 the EUCO and the EP need to agree before the next EP elections on how to appoint
the Commission President: interinstitutional agreement (IIA) or, second best, a
political agreement

Participatory democracy
 existing participatory instruments need to be tied more closely to EU decision-
making
 citizens’ panels institutionalised with high visibility to accompany major choices
 participatory instruments employed to prepare for enlargement

Probity, transparency, and the fight against corruption

 new independent Office for Transparency and Probity (OTP) in charge of
monitoring the activities of all the actors working within the EU institutions or for
them

4. Powers and competences

 strengthen provisions on how to deal with unforeseen developments,
competency-wise, and better inclusion of the EP (Article 122 TFEU)
 create a ‘Joint Chamber of the Highest Courts and Tribunals of the EU’ (non-binding
dialogue between European and Member States’ courts)

5. EU resources
 Increase the EU budget in the coming budgetary period both in nominal size and
in relation to GDP
 new own resources to limit tax optimisation, avoidance and competition within the
EU
 budget decisions moved towards QMV for spending. If not possible: more
enhanced cooperation between smaller groups of Member States to finance
policies together
 . establish a thorough spending review to reduce the size of some spending areas
and to increase others
 enable the EU to issue common debt in the future
 each institutional cycle (EP term) sets a new MFF (five years)

9
III. How to manage progress: Deepening and widening the EU

1. Six options for Treaty change

 1: Article 48(6) TEU (Convention and IGC)
 2: if no agreement: ‘simplified revision procedure’ (IGC only)
 3: reform as part of the accession treaties modifying the founding treaties (Art 49
TEU)
 4: Member States draft a ‘framework enlargement and reform treaty’ containing all the changes needed for
the EU's functioning in the future, decoupled from accession treaties
 5: involvement of a Convention in the drafting of the ‘framework enlargement and
reform treaty’
 6: if deadlock: ‘supplementary reform treaty’ between willing Member States

2. Differentiation
Principles for differentiation within the EU
 use of existing flexibility instruments under five principles: 1. Respect for the acquis
communautaire and the integrity of the EU’s policies and actions; 2. Use of the EU
institutions; 3. Openness to all EU members; 4. Sharing decision-making powers,
costs, and benefits; 5. Make sure the willing can move ahead

Use of differentiation in the framework of treaty revisions

 uncooperative/unwilling state(s) offered opt-outs in the new treaty, but no
exemptions from the existing acquis communautaire or EU core values

United in diversity in Europe

 envision the future of European integration as four distinct tiers:
1. The inner circle; 2. The EU; 3. Associate members; 4. The EPC

3. Managing the enlargement process

 set the goal for the EU to be ready for enlargement by 2030; candidate countries
should work to fulfil all accession criteria by then
 the new political leadership after the EU elections in 2024 should commit to the
goal of 2030 and agree how to make the EU enlargement ready by then
 break down the accession rounds into smaller groups of countries (‘regatta’)
 Nine principles that should guide future enlargement strategies:
 on the qualification for accession: 1. ‘Fundamentals first’; 2. Geopolitical;
3. Conflict resolution; 4. Additional technical and financial support; 5. Democratic
legitimacy
 on the dynamic of the accession procedure: 1. Equality; 2. Systematisation;
3. Reversibility; 4. QMV

10
Introduction

1. The Union and the urgency of change

Fundamental questions are back on Europe’s agenda: The European Union (EU) is
reconsidering its geography, institutions, competencies, and funding.

Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine, rising tensions within and across regions and the
weakening of global order structures have shattered the certainties on which the EU was
built. Transnational challenges, such as climate change, security threats and food and
health crises urgently require cooperative solutions. With Russia’s war on Ukraine, the
geostrategic role of the EU has dramatically changed through the large-scale military,
humanitarian, financial and diplomatic support it provides. The debate about the EU’s
capacity to act and its overall sovereignty has intensified and the continent’s architecture
and the EU’s relationship with its neighbours in the East and South need to be thoroughly
rethought due to the grave threats posed to the European security order.

European leaders have renewed their commitment to enlargement against the backdrop
of the increasingly adverse international context. Ukraine and Moldova have recently
joined the group of now eight candidate countries, with two more possibly following later1.

However, the EU itself is not ready to welcome new members. The institutions and
decision-making mechanisms were not designed for a group of up to 37 countries and as
they are currently constituted, they make it difficult even for the EU27 to manage crises
effectively and take strategic decisions. Delivering public goods to citizens has become an
increasing challenge for the EU and its Member States’ governments and has made
democracy vulnerable. Some EU members question the rule of law, the primacy of EU law
over national law and the shared values outlined in the EU treaty. The EU needs to work on
itself to improve its functioning and to better protect the interests of future generations.

Against this backdrop, the French and German governments invited 12 independent
experts2 to form a ‘working group on EU institutional reforms3’. We were asked to develop
reform proposals that help maintain the EU’s capacity to act, protect its fundamental
values, strengthen its resilience, and bring it closer to European citizens in preparation for
potential future enlargement and as a follow-up to the Conference on the Future of
Europe (CoFoE)4. Through several exchanges with the two Ministers of State for Europe,
Laurence Boone and Anna Lührmann, about the evolving political and security situation in
the EU and its neighbourhood, our group’s mandate was set as the following: How can the

1
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye (negotiations on hold), and Ukraine. Georgia and
Kosovo are also potential candidate countries.
2
The list of experts is in Annex 4. They all worked pro bono.
3
See the joint press release of the German Federal Foreign Office and the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs in Annex 1.
4
Ibid.

11
EU be made enlargement ready while also improving its capacity to act, protecting the rule of
law, enhancing democracy and preserving fundamental European values?

The Group of Twelve, as we call ourselves, has worked through at least biweekly digital two-
hour sessions and several in-person meetings over the past seven months. While the
working group was Franco-German in composition, our approach was trans-European. We
invited experts, former and active decision-makers as well as advisors from other EU and
candidate countries to numerous confidential exchanges, considering that new energy for
the European project is also emanating from our neighbours. Throughout our work,
officials, policymakers, and experts also pro-actively offered to engage with us or sent us
their own valuable input, which we are extremely grateful for.

We are fully aware that progress will not be easy to achieve. Governments and citizens
have different visions of what the EU should be, and the political situation within the EU
and within some Member States is anything but simple.

In the past, major progress on integration was achieved thanks to packages that balanced
different political interests. Today, this has become more difficult, both for deepening the
EU and for increasing the number of its members. Not all governments agree that
expanding the EU to the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova is really a geopolitical
necessity. Likewise, improving the EU’s capacity to act or to protect the EU’s fundamental
principles do not necessarily garner support across the EU.

Given the varying sensitivities across Member States and the manifest difficulty of
reaching a compromise among the 27, we suggest a reform and enlargement process that
comes with flexibility. We show how progress can be made, without pressuring any
Member State to be part of an EU that it dislikes. Conversely, no single country or a small
minority of countries should be able to hold up progress if others want to move ahead.

The EU may face its own moment of truth: if progress for 27 members is not possible, it
may be mutually beneficial for all to design a path towards different levels of integration
or some form of looser association for new or current Member States. In any case, work
on improving the EU’s functioning should start immediately: We suggest a list of steps that
can be implemented before the next European elections. Further reforms, part of which
require treaty revisions, should be tackled during the new European legislative term. The
gradual ‘phasing in’ of current candidate countries into selected EU policies should likewise
be set out in the EU’s Strategic Agenda for 2024-2029 and feed into the negotiations over
the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) in 2028.

2. Approach and principles of institutional reform

Today’s situation differs decisively from that of the early 2000s, when 12 countries were
negotiating their accession to the EU. While the geopolitical pressure to move ahead is
much higher, governments have acknowledged that further enlargement without proper

12
institutional reforms would make it even harder – if not impossible – for the EU to take
decisions.

Indeed, increasing divergence and polarisation between EU governments render forward-

looking and rapid decision-making more and more difficult. The extension of veto rights to
up to 10 new Member States over time could cripple the EU into paralysis. Additionally,
there is a risk that its core values and the protection of democracy and the rule of law will
erode further if states with weak institutions are allowed to join expeditiously.

The basic assumption of this report, in line with the group’s mandate, is that while EU
enlargement has become a top priority, it needs to go hand in hand with reforms that
increase its efficiency, its capacity to act and its democratic legitimacy, as well as
empowering the rule of law. Concrete steps should be adopted before or when new
countries join the EU.

Although many things have changed profoundly in the past two decades, we see a lasting
value in the EU legal framework, its institutional system, and its procedures, which have
allowed for joint progress and inclusive decision-making that serve EU citizens’ and
countries’ interests. This is why our report does not rethink European integration ‘from
scratch’ but proposes adjustments to fit the new realities, both in terms of deepening and
in terms of flexibility.

 A hybrid political system

We assume that institutional reform proposals, of which many are being discussed, should
be consistent with a chosen model of the EU as a decision-making system. If the axioms
are not made explicit, proposals cannot be coherently evaluated, and debates could
become confused. Controversies about reform proposals in the political and academic
debates are usually anchored in disagreements over the nature and future of the EU as a
political system.

Some critics thus see the EU as just another international organisation and argue that it
has extended its competencies too far. The EU should not further encroach on national
sovereignty and should not directly involve its citizens since preconditions for a classical
democracy (a demos, a public sphere and a common language) are missing. From this
perspective, Member State representatives remain central in EU decision-making – via the
Council, the European Council (EUCO), and national parliaments.

Others see the EU as a parliamentary democracy evolving towards a federal state, a

perspective embraced for instance by the CoFoE. The European Parliament (EP) should
thus be further empowered, the Commission should become the EU’s politicised executive
and the Council a high chamber. From this perspective, politicisation of the EU is
considered a good thing, democratic decision-making should replace technocracy, and a
European public sphere should be fostered.

13
Our group sees the EU as a hybrid system in which the European general interest is put
forward in three ways: by the European Commission, by citizens’ representatives in the EP,
and by government representatives in the European Council and Council. These three
sources of legitimacy correspond to different modes of European action. The ‘Community
method’ applies to the definition and management of the most integrated policies in
which the European Commission still plays a central role5. The EP commands major policy
decisions and ensures democratic control. Choices that remain very important for national
sovereignty are made in an intergovernmental way.

We think that, given the political realities in Europe today, this threefold and hybrid logic
should continue to provide the EU with a stable and effective political system. While our
report seeks to help overcome shortcomings in decision-making and to further clarify the
rules of the game, it does not include proposals that would shift the EU away from this
balance.

 The three goals of reforms

The EU’s internal functioning and its capacity to act should not only be improved because
enlargement is back on the agenda. Given new challenges, it should be improved to
deliver better results for its citizens. Its responses to the various crises have stretched the
EU’s competences to their limits. Whether in health, energy, migration or financial crisis
management, the EU has acted by invoking emergency powers or has resorted to
intergovernmental arrangements as European instruments were lacking. While ad hoc
approaches were justified by time pressure, the EU should learn from the multiple crises to
refine its set up so it can take effective measures within the EU framework, ultimately
allowing for more democratic deliberation and control.

So, against the backdrop of the geopolitical and internal challenges outlined above, and in
view of preparing for enlargement, the EU should improve its functioning and achieve a
triangle of three core aims, as visualised below.

5
In the European Communities’ original design, the European Commission was given a central role as a neutral arbiter and in
proposing legislation. Policymaking was supposed to follow an evidence-based and technocratic approach. The ‘Community
method’ reconciled preferences expressed by the different Community institutions and Member States. This model has developed
further over the decades.

14
The first goal is to strengthen the EU’s capacity to take and implement decisions across all
policy areas based on EU primary law, including those areas of cooperation which –
because of the various crises – have de facto become EU powers. Given external and
internal challenges, speedy decisions are of the essence.

The second is to strengthen the protection of the rule of law, its fundamental values and
democratic legitimacy in the EU.

The third is to make the EU’s institutions ‘enlargement ready’. While this third goal is
central to this report, the Group of Twelve is convinced that reforms aiming to strengthen
the EU’s capacity to act, the rule of law and fundamental values and democratic legitimacy
should be pursued even if enlargement was substantially delayed.

15
I. Protecting a fundamental
principle: the rule of law
The rule of law is not just one of the values on which the EU was founded. It is a non-
negotiable constitutional principle for the EU’s functioning, mentioned in Article 2 of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU). Most of the EU's policies, including all those related to
the internal market, judicial cooperation and the recognition of judgments in civil and
commercial matters, are based on the premise that national courts are independent.
Similarly, the use of the European budget and funds presupposes that national
administrations are not subverted by corruption. And lastly, respect for the rule of law is a
prerequisite for a functioning democracy.

Applying the principles of the rule of law is thus a precondition for joining the EU. And, as
it is a non-negotiable principle in the EU, disagreement over rule of law standards cannot
be solved by differentiation within the EU. A country that does not respect the rule of law
ultimately cannot be part of the Single Market and cannot receive EU funding.

However, respecting the rule of law and what this actually entails and means is not
universally agreed upon by the Member States. European instruments did not prevent
backsliding in several Member States. Article 7 TEU, which allows for the suspension of
rights deriving from the Treaties in the event of a serious and persistent breach of the
Union's values, was drafted at a time when nobody thought that it would have to be used.
The Treaties in particular mention the suspension of voting rights in the Council, but in line
with the treaty, penalties could also include precluding a Member State from taking over
the presidency of the Council. Other instruments at the EU’s disposal have had little
tangible impact, such as the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework. The Annual
Rule of Law Reports and Dialogue create transparency but have not changed incentives for
governments to correct breaches of rule of law standards. Finally, we note the absence of
a Member State exclusion clause in the Treaties. This limits the EU’s ability to enforce the
rule of law and other values under Article 2 TEU if all other instruments fail.

Meanwhile, the increasing use of budgetary conditionality has had some impact. Likewise,
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) rulings provide an effective base to defend the rule of
law. The CJEU has ruled that it is an integral part of the EU’s very identity as a common
legal order and is given concrete expression in principles containing legally binding
obligations for the Member States. As a result, if a Member State does not respect it, this is
considered an infringement of treaty obligations which can be brought before the CJEU
and result in financial penalties.

Moreover, the CJEU’s case law has offered some palliatives that allow Member States to
protect themselves against other EU countries’ infringements. It permits Member States,

16
under certain strict conditions, not to apply instruments based on the principle of mutual
trust with a Member State that does not respect EU values, in particular the rule of law.
This is the case, for example, with the European Arrest Warrant, where Member States
may refuse to execute a warrant issued by a Member State in which there are systemic or
generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the judiciary. The CJEU could
extend this to other policies based on mutual trust and mutual recognition, in particular
those around the internal market. But deciding individual cases is not the same as
enforcing general standards on infringing governments. It may still lead to de facto
excluding infringing countries from EU policies and limit their access to the internal
market, but this will of course also have adverse effects on its general functioning.

In sum, there are limits to the EU’s ability to enforce the rule of law. In the current setup,
the conditions required of candidate countries cannot be effectively imposed on Member
States once they have joined (the so-called ‘Copenhagen dilemma’). This situation
undermines the Union’s credibility vis-à-vis its citizens, national governments and
internationally. It endangers the legitimacy of its decisions, the effectiveness of EU policies
and ultimately threatens its foundations. Credibility is also at stake vis-à-vis accession
countries – if the EU cannot uphold rule of law standards among its own Member States,
then this disincentivises candidate countries to transform themselves.

This is one of the key dilemmas of the EU today: while the geopolitical situation provides
strong arguments for rapid enlargement, both Member States and the EU need to be fully
prepared for this. This is especially true since external intervention by hybrid means,
including the spread of corruption, aims to destroy the effective functioning of the rule of
law. Improving ways to enforce EU principles and to staunchly support governments and
civil society in candidate countries to ensure a deep transformation leading to the respect
of rule of law principles should hence be a priority.

Recommendations
We recommend strengthening the EU’s instruments to protect the rule of law in two areas: budgetary
conditionality and Article 7 TEU.

 Budgetary conditionality

The scope of the Budgetary Conditionality Regulation, drafted as an instrument for

protecting the EU budget rather than the rule of law, is limited by the need to prove a
sufficiently direct link between the violation of the rule of law and the EU budget. We
recommend making this regulation an instrument to sanction breaches of the rule of
law and, more generally, systematic breaches of the European values enshrined in Article
2 TEU (such as democracy, free and fair elections, freedom of the media, or the systematic
abuse of fundamental rights, as expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights). This will
broaden its scope of application and sharpen its teeth by lifting the strict requirement of
proof with a link to the budget. Such a modification would require another legal basis,

17
though6. Article 352 TFEU may provide one, but it requires unanimity in the Council. It
would be better to amend Article 7 TEU to add a new Article 7(6) that authorises the
Council and the EP, acting in accordance with the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), to
adopt regulations aimed at protecting the EU’s founding values.

Alternatively, if no agreement can be found to use Article 352 TFEU or amend Article 7, we
recommend extending the scope of budgetary conditionality to other behaviours that
are detrimental to the sound financial management of the European budget. This
should include, for example, the fight against money laundering. It would not require a
treaty change since the current legal basis – Article 322 TFEU – could be used. Only
Regulation 2022/2092 establishing a conditionality mechanism would have to be modified
through the OLP.

Until such changes have been made, the Budgetary Conditionality Regulation should be
used more effectively as a preventative and automatic tool. It should be activated as early
as possible to ensure that the mechanism does not become a tool of last resort. To make
sure that citizens do not pay the price for their governments’ undermining of the rule of
law, the Commission should ensure that any amount due by government entities is
effectively paid to final recipients. To this effect, it should be allowed to recover payments
made to an intermediary public entity to transfer them back to the EU budget and to re-
programme them for the direct benefit, to the furthest possible extent, of the final
recipients or beneficiaries.

Making the release of NextGenerationEU funds conditional upon compliance with the rule
of law has proven effective, especially due to the scale of the funds being distributed. We
recommend that all future EU funds, whether inside or outside the MFF, should be
designed with a similar model of conditionality. The Commission should have the
power to withhold the approval of EU funds (rather than suspending them) if rule of law
standards are not met. Moving to rule of law conditionality does not only serve to enforce
this principle, it is also a prerequisite for EU spending to be considered legitimate and in
line with the EU’s basic principles.

 Refining the Article 7 TEU procedure

The inefficiency of Article 7 TEU stems not only from its excessively high threshold to be
activated (unanimity minus one) but also from the fact that the Council has no obligation
to act, even if the procedure is initiated by the EP or the Commission. We recommend
correcting these limitations in two ways.

First, Article 7(2) TEU should be modified to replace unanimity -1 by a majority of four-
fifths at the European Council. Second, the principle of an automatic response in the
event of a serious and persistent breach or risk of breach of EU values by a Member
State should be reinforced. Article 7(1) and (2) TEU could be amended to include time
limits of six months to force the Council and the European Council to take a position.

6
cf. ECJ, 16 February 2022, C-156/21 and C-157/21.

18
Moreover, Article 7 TEU should include automatic sanctions five years after a
proposal to trigger the procedure, in the event of inaction by the Council and where
breaches of Article 2 values continue to exist. Sanctions would be automatically increased
after 10 years under the same conditions. In the case of a dispute over the persistence of
the breaches, the CJEU would be the final arbiter.

Ultimately, the EU cannot function without reciprocity, mutual trust and without all its
members adhering to the principles of the rule of law. This implies that at a certain level
of persistency and gravity of violations, countries can no longer remain an EU
Member State. The goal of EU instruments is first and foremost to incentivise recalcitrant
governments to abide by the jointly agreed rule of law principles. However, without access
to funds and voting rights in the Council and limited participation in single market policies,
full EU membership may become less attractive for Member States in breach of EU
principles, and they may seek a lesser integrated form of association (see section III.2).

19
II. Addressing institutional
challenges: five key areas of
reform
This report focuses on five areas of institutional reform. We consider each of them crucial
to achieve the three goals for reform which we have defined in line with our mandate. The
current political and academic debate on the future of Europe includes subjects that our
report does not cover. We discussed many more points at length, but set them aside,
either because they do not fall within the scope of our mandate, are incompatible with our
understanding of the EU as a hybrid political system and thus would negatively affect the
balance that underpins its stability and legitimacy, or because they for now seem politically
too unrealistic.

1. Making the EU institutions enlargement-ready

Since the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, the political leaders of the Member States
have been trying to reform the European institutions in response to concerns about the
democratic deficit and to prepare the Union for further enlargements. Revisions have been
carried out, but the EU still functions with institutions whose internal organisation has not
been fundamentally revised since the 1950s. Consequently, they suffer from a lack of
agility, too many players and excessive complexity.

The entry of up to 10 new Member States7 will massively change the composition, the
make-up, and the decision-making processes in all institutions. Every negotiation in an
intergovernmental setting would become more complex and the functioning of the
supranational institutions would be impaired. Institutional reforms to make the EU
enlargement ready will have to find a delicate balance between the increased capacity to
act, the power and influence of small, medium, and large Member States, the democratic
legitimacy of decision-making, and the protection of legitimate national interests.

Recommendations
 The European Parliament: Number and allocation of seats

The EP is already one of the largest parliamentary assemblies in the world, which implies
more difficult deliberation and reduced individual rights for members. As with previous

7
In terms of scale, the current candidate countries provide challenges on both sides of the spectrum. Ukraine would
be the EU’s fifth largest member and the largest new country since the UK joined in 1973. The other candidate
countries would rank amongst the smallest Member States. Both would affect the EU’s institutions in their own way.

20
enlargements, their number is likely to grow further with any new enlargements.
Alongside this, the current system of politically negotiating the number of seats between
Member States is problematic – it incentivises them to add rather than adapt seats
wherever possible, while distorting citizens’ representation between different Member
States.

To retain a workable EP, we recommend sticking with the limit of 751 or fewer
Members of the EP (MEPs). According to Article 14(2) TEU, the decision on the EP’s size
and composition requires a proposal from the EP and a unanimous decision by the EUCO,
which allows for a reform without modifying the treaties.

We also recommend the adoption of a new system for seat allocation, based on a
mathematical formula balancing the right for each Member State to be represented and
the necessity to reduce demographic distortions. The EP has proposed such a system, the
‘Cambridge formula’, that would also ease the negotiations on limiting the overall number
of seats.

 The Council of the EU: The semestrial presidency

Despite the reforms contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, presiding over the Council of the EU
retains an important function for Member State engagement with the EU. However, the
enlargement to potentially 35+ Member States poses several challenges. The chance to
hold the rotating presidency will become both rarer and more demanding, thus
decreasing the use of the presidency as an instrument for engaging the EU with its
citizens, politicians, and administrations. On top of this, the institutional memory retained
from one presidency to the next will become even more limited. Conducting negotiations
with 30+ counterparts and finding the necessary majorities will become more and more
difficult for the presidency and the national administration in charge. Also, differences in
style and the objectives between presidencies need to be reduced, to ensure that the
decision-making process does not depend on a country’s ability to manage the role
effectively.

The presidency of the Council should be reformed in two ways. First, the trio format
should be extended to a quintet of five presidencies, each spanning half of an
institutional cycle. This would allow for longer-term agenda setting and coordinating
across decision-making cycles. In an enlarged EU, it would also ensure that each quintet
has at least one larger Member State with greater administrative capacity and experience
as this would enhance horizontal relations between Member States. Within each quintet,
Member States could divide responsibilities for chairing individual Council configurations
and working groups for longer than six months, or switch responsibilities in the case of
national elections. Second, efficient decision-making and the prospects of further
enlargement would also require a reform of the voting rules in the Council, which will
be discussed in detail in section II.2.

21
  The Commission: The size and organisation of the College of Commissioners

In view of future enlargement, but also of current coordination problems, decisions on the
size and organisation of the College of the European Commission must be taken. The
rotational system enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 17(5) TEU) that would reduce the
number of Commissioners was never implemented. Commission Presidents have found
other ways to keep the Commission operational.

We do not see it as an option to retain the ‘one-Member-State-one-Commissioner’ logic

without a formal hierarchy in an enlarged EU. While Vice-Presidents that coordinate the
work of Commissioners have kept the College afloat in the past, this does not seem viable
for a College with potentially 35 members. Operational efficiency would be compromised,
and a significant imbalance between substance-heavy and relatively light portfolios would
be created. Two options should be considered:

Option 1: Reducing the size of the College

As Article 17(5) TEU has not been amended, a simple decision by the EUCO would allow for
a transfer to the system provided for by the Lisbon Treaty and reduce the size of the
College to a number corresponding to two-thirds of Member States8.

We are aware that the political will for this solution has declined even further in the
intervening years. Despite the Commission being a supranational institution, Member
States are very attached to the principle of national representation. The representation of
all of them is, however, not only a matter of symbolism or influence, but it also serves to
increase acceptance and legitimacy of EU action vis-à-vis the respective Member States
(i.e., government, legislature and the wider public). Nonetheless, a smaller College would
obviously meet operational efficiency and internal coherence needs and would also ensure
that all Commissioners are given meaningful and substantial portfolios. It would preserve
the principle of collegiality, which implies collective decision-making and responsibility-
taking.

Option 2: Introducing hierarchy inside the College

Since it is unlikely that the EUCO will agree to implement the rotation system, the
Commission will have to operate with 30 or 35 members in an enlarged EU. With this in
mind, they should no longer remain equal. We thus recommend the establishment of a
clear hierarchical differentiation between ‘Lead Commissioners’ and ‘Commissioners’.
In short, half the College would be given the role of a Lead Commissioner, the other half
as a corresponding Commissioner. One Lead Commissioner and one Commissioner would
build one team and work on the same portfolio. Either only the Lead Commissioner would
have the right to attend the formal College and vote, or they both participate in College

8
Article 17(5) TEU: ‘As from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its President and
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member
States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number.’

22
meetings, including equal voting rights. Both the Lead Commissioners and the
Commissioner should be given access to the portfolio-corresponding DG. Ideally, the two
Commissioners should not belong to the same political family.

An option would be to switch roles at the midterm mark (i.e. after 2.5 years). While this
may complicate institutional relations and disturb procedural continuity, it could soothe
those Member States that cannot accept not having a Commissioner role for a whole term.
Either way, Member States would have to accept that they would only be given the leading
role for half a term or every other term. In exchange, they will be physically represented in
every Commission term. This design would facilitate meaningful portfolio allocation,
efficiency, and coherence, and potentially revive the debate in a (half-sized) College
meeting. Treaty change would be necessary if some Commissioners were to be deprived
of their voting right in the College.

2. Decision-making in the Council

Today, most decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council,
especially when utilising the OLP. This is one of the prerequisites for a strong EU – not
because Member States are continuously outvoted, but because the use of QMV gears
negotiation dynamics towards compromise and coalition-making. Indeed, on average over
80 % of decisions taken by QMV in the Council are still taken by consensus, with no vote,
and thus no loser. By contrast, acting in policy areas decided by unanimity has become
more and more difficult. Some decisions are blocked by vetoes unconnected to the policy
decision at hand and linked to other negotiations. Every accession to the EU adds more
potential veto players, making unanimity exponentially harder to reach.

The use of QMV has always been seen as the most obvious solution for overcoming
blockages in the Council. Its extension should be pursued. Yet it should be regarded as a
contribution, but not as a panacea to solving the EU’s challenges in terms of its capacity to
act. Indeed, it can change the negotiation dynamics towards compromise, but it is no
solution to political challenges if the Union is split into two or more larger (and opposing)
groups of Member States. It should also be stressed that QMV is an instrument best used
sparingly; for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in particular, striving for
consensus should still be the main goal and QMV only used as a last resort.

Finally, the EU needs to find a balance between increasing its capacity to act and
protecting legitimate national interests – every Member State has a set of issues over
which it would prefer to preserve a veto right. The policy areas still decided by unanimity
also generally touch more critical parts of national sovereignty – such as foreign policy,
defence, tax or the EU budget. There is therefore a need to find a trade-off here.

23
Recommendations
 The generalisation of QMV

Before the next enlargement, all remaining policy decisions should be transferred from
unanimity to QMV. Additionally, except for in CFSP, this should be accompanied by full co-
decision with the EP (through the OLP) to ensure appropriate democratic legitimacy.
Constitutional decisions, such as changing the EU treaties, accepting new members or
adapting the EU institutions, should continue to be taken through unanimity.

At best, the decision towards a generalisation of QMV should be taken through the
passerelle clause before enlargement, as currently discussed in CFSP. If an agreement on a
generalisation of QMV is not possible, we recommend creating three distinct packages
grouped by policy areas coming together and forming the basis of a gradual transition
towards QMV. Negotiations must cover all three packages simultaneously and avoid
making progress on just one policy area. They should achieve both a transition that is
coherent within each policy area and a fair balance of concessions between individual
Member States.

1. Enlargement and the rule of law: Validating each negotiation chapter should be
moved to QMV to streamline the enlargement process but the final ratification of an
accession treaty would remain under unanimity. At the same time, Member States should
accept the stricter enforcement of the rule of law by launching sanctions against any
violation with a majority of four-fifths in the EUCO, as outlined in the above section on the
rule of law.

2. Foreign policy and defence: While a group of Member States is indeed currently
pushing for more QMV in CFSP, the treaty excludes decisions with defence or military
implications. However, foreign and security policy cannot be completely separated from
defence. Potentially with the use of super-majorities (see below), EU decisions on defence
initiatives (such as the use of the European Peace Facility or the European Defence Fund)
should be transferred to QMV as part of CFSP. This would require an ordinary treaty
change. This move to majority voting would not breach national sovereignty over the use
of military force in the form of whether to contribute to EU military operations as this
should remain a sovereign national decision9.

3. Fiscal and tax policy: The current treaty gives Member States veto rights for both policy
decisions on tax harmonisation and EU fiscal decisions. This contributes to the inflexibility
of the EU budget as well as difficulties in reaching any decision on tax policy. The EU
should create the basis for both greater tax policy harmonisation for Member States but
also a greater pool of common EU resources, which would be required to finance an
enlarged EU and can only be achieved by matching decision-making on resources and

9
QMV in CFSP will however not solve the problem that the EU often does not produce consolidated positions across policy areas
which makes managing its external relations difficult, including for the European External Action Service. This issue needs to be
tackled within the Commission across DGs and the EAD.

24
spending.

 Making more QMV acceptable

In addition, in order to address the legitimate concerns of Member States regarding QMV
and the protection of national interests as core state powers, the method for voting should
be reviewed. For this, we make three recommendations:

First, if QMV is extended to additional policy areas, a ‘sovereignty safety net’ should
be included. It could be modelled after Article 31(2) TEU10 that allows Member States to
voice their vital national interests in the very few decisions in CFSP which can already be
taken by QMV. In new areas of QMV, if a Member State considers its vital national interest
at stake, it could make a formal declaration and call for a transfer of the issue to the EUCO,
in order to voice its reservations and find an agreement at the highest political level by
consensus. In Article 31(2) TEU, the decision on whether to transfer a matter to the EUCO
is taken by QMV in the Council. In our view, this provides a good balance between giving
Member States the opportunity to voice their vital national interests and concerns, and the
aim to find political consensus and increasing the EU’s capacity to act. This safety net could
be included both within a limited transfer towards QMV as part of a passerelle decision,
and as a general instrument as part of a wider transfer to QMV in preparation for
enlargement.

Second, if part of a wider treaty change, the calculation of QMV voting shares should be
rebalanced. Smaller to medium-sized Member States fear domination by the larger ones,
as they can organise blocking minorities much more easily. The share of Member States
and the population they represent should thus be adjusted. For instance, from the current
system of 55 % of Member states representing 65 % of the EU population, it could be
changed to 60 % of Member States representing 60 % of the population. For the most
sovereignty-critical policy decisions, a ‘super majority’ requirement could be created, of
‘unanimity minus one’. It would need to be negotiated as part of a treaty change, in which
EU policy decisions that currently fall under unanimity are so ‘sovereignty sensitive’ that
they are transferred to ‘unanimity minus one’. This does not relate to constitutional
decisions as these should remain under regular unanimity (see above).

Third, Member States should be able to opt-out of policy areas transferred to QMV, and
potentially the OLP. This is only possible via a treaty revision and not with the use of the
passerelle clause. Conceptually, this approach follows the UK model in the Treaty of Lisbon.
As part of the transfer to the OLP in justice and home affairs, the UK was granted a
protocol allowing it to opt-out of the decisions thus transferred after an examination

10
Article 31(2) TEU: ’If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose
the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close
consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting
by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.’

25
period of five years. Unlike the UK protocol, however, new opt-outs should be limited to a
block and not to individual measures, as this would create a highly fragmented ‘Europe à la
carte’. The use of ‘constructive abstention’ in CFSP decisions is no substitute for this policy,
as this form of abstention is purely voluntary and does not address the challenges of the
EU’s capacity to act.

3. EU-level democracy
The democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making is crucial, particularly as European
politics becomes more contentious. The EU has taken important steps to improve it, most
notably through the introduction of direct elections to the EP and the gradual
strengthening of its powers. The enhanced role of national parliaments and participatory
instruments also reach for this goal, with the recent CoFoE being the largest participatory
transnational exercise ever held.

And yet the question of the EU's democratic quality remains at the heart of the debate. We
suggest four sets of measures to improve democratic legitimacy without changing the
EU’s political system or the relations and balance between its institutions.

 The harmonisation of EU electoral laws

Even if the EU is not a fully-fledged parliamentary democracy, it has been increasingly
‘parliamentarized’ to make it more democratic and to allow it to expand its competences.
Developments in European integration have led to greater voter mobilisation, but the
European elections remain largely focused on national issues with low visibility. Legally
speaking, there are 27 national elections, and the common electoral framework offers only
a bare minimum in harmonised rules, despite continuous efforts by the EP. The current
proposals on the table – namely, the Hübner-Leinen (2015) and the Ruiz Devesa (2022)
reports – will not be approved and ratified before the 2024 elections. As a result, the next
EP elections will take place under the same electoral law as previous ones.

It is regrettable that no further harmonisation has happened since 2002, as it is a crucial

step towards strengthening the European dimension of EP elections. It is also unfortunate
that many national parties make little effort to explain the transnational dimension of
these elections. While it is understandable that they campaign more successfully under
their own party name and logo, they should step up their game in contributing to the
visibility of European political parties11.

11
Transnational lists could strengthen the European dimension of the EP elections and their introduction was supported by a Franco-German
non-paper in 2019. But given that this is a highly controversial issue in the Council, which blocked negotiations on other files, transnational lists
do not feature in our recommendations. If the political context changes, the idea should be reconsidered.

26
Recommendation
Member States' governments and national parties should harmonise the conditions
under which the EP elections take place, to facilitate a transnational electoral space, at
least for the elections in 2029 and beyond. An agreement should be found on this in the
next legislative cycle. The Act adopted in 2018 by the Council should be swiftly ratified and
we recommend that the Council examines the 2022 EP proposals considering the points
outlined above.

 The appointment of the Commission President

The main European parties and many MEPs have argued that a so-called lead candidate
procedure would improve EU democracy12. It is to be expected that several European
parties will once again appoint their lead candidates for the elections in 2024; indeed,
some have already started this process. Supporters of the lead candidate approach argue
that giving people a choice over who leads the executive and over the policy agenda for
the coming term raises the stakes in EP elections and bolsters electoral accountability. This
effect, however, is difficult to concretely measure.

In our view, the top priority for 2024 is to avoid another damaging institutional turf battle
between the EP and the EUCO which harms the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Article 17(7)
TEU in fact leaves too much room for interpretation and creates tensions between the two
institutions. The launch of the lead candidate system in 2014 and its semi-failure in 2019
ultimately led to post-electoral messiness.

The procedure to appoint the Commission President must do justice to the EU's unique
institutional framework in which the Member States' governments (represented in the
EUCO) and European citizens (represented by the MEPs) both provide legitimacy to the EU.
Neither the EUCO imposing its candidate on the EP, nor a fully-fledged lead candidate
system, in which the European parties represented in the EP would solely nominate the
candidate with no input from the EUCO, is thus suitable.

Recommendations
Consequently, we do not recommend the legal institutionalisation of the so-called lead
candidate system, as requested by the EP. But the EUCO and the EP need to find an
agreement before the next EP elections on how to appoint the Commission’s President to
avoid institutional conflict. Ideally, this should take the form of a binding
interinstitutional agreement (IIA) by the end of 2023. A political agreement at the
highest level (between the President of the EUCO, semestrial presidency of the Council,
President of the EP, and leaders of the main European political parties) would be a second-

12
We intentionally refer to the 'lead candidate' instead of 'Spitzenkandidaten' procedure because the latter term only speaks to those who
understand German. It further recalls the failed attempts in 2014 and 2019 and thereby adds to the negative perception of this principle.

27
best option.

We see three possible options:

1. The newly elected EP clearly supports a candidate (as in 2014): Political groups
representing a majority of MEPs agree on which political family won and support its
lead candidate. The EUCO must then consider this ‘proposal,’ as the EP could vote
down any other nominee and create a deep institutional crisis. The EUCO should do
so unless there is a major obstacle – for instance, if the candidate does not meet
standards of probity, competence, or experience, or if their appointment would
contradict the principle of balance between Member States in terms of access to
leadership positions. In this case, the EUCO, represented by its President, should
open a formal dialogue with the leaders of the main European political parties to
seek an agreement.
2. The EP is divided over whom to support: Several political groups claim to have won the
elections, alone or in a coalition and support different candidates. The EUCO should
then offer one of the candidates the possibility to try and win the support of the
European political parties/groups. If that person succeeds in establishing a coalition
with a clear majority, he or she is formally appointed. If not, another candidate is
offered the chance to forge a majority. As in Scenario 1, the EUCO could claim that
there are major problems with the proposed candidates and then exchange with the
leaders of the main European political parties to find another agreement. The same
would apply if no candidate is able to find a majority.
3. The situation is very unclear on the side of the EP: The EUCO then has more leeway to
determine which political family has ‘won’ the EU elections and whom to appoint.
Nevertheless, to ensure that the candidate wins a majority vote in the EP, the EUCO
nonetheless conducts political exchanges with representatives of the European
parties.

The potential talks between the EUCO and the leaders of the main European parties after
the EP elections may or may not include negotiations on other leadership positions.
However, to ensure institutional independence, we do not advise bringing the positions of
the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) or the President of the EP into the
negotiation package.

 Participatory democracy
In addition to strengthening representative democracy in the EU, participation
instruments have been developed to address democratic deficiencies. Today, the EU has
more of them than many Member States, such as the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI),
petitions to the EP, citizens’ dialogues, public consultations, and complaints to the EU
Ombudsman. More recently, the CoFoE (2021-2022) was the largest transnational
participatory exercise ever undertaken.

28
While we agree that participatory instruments are essential, the existing ones have not
been used effectively. They are little known and mainly used by actors already very active
in EU affairs. Most of them are not directly connected to the EU’s regular decision-making
process and there is a lack of political will to take their results into account and to draw
serious policy consequences. The CoFoE was, moreover, overshadowed by
interinstitutional rivalry and its conclusions have not shaken up the EU agenda.
Subsequent Citizens' Panels conducted by the Commission are a major innovation in the
EU’s political system, but they received little attention. And like in other participatory
instruments, it seems that the Commission uses the panels to rubberstamp what it had
already planned, rather than to facilitate the upstreaming of innovative policy ideas.

Yet we see the interface between participation and representation today as one of the
most interesting challenges for our democracies, and citizens should be offered more
meaningful involvement in democratic life at every level of government. Emerging
technologies such as artificial intelligence will create new opportunities for multilingual
pan-European citizen’s exchanges.

Recommendations
Existing participatory instruments need to be tied more closely to EU decision-
making. We recommend strengthening them (including the Citizens’ Panels) rather than
designing new ones, also by effectively using digital tools. In particular, how the ECI is
conducted needs to be improved and its potential needs to be better communicated to
European citizens. This will only be effective if the Commission takes ECI results into
account more transparently. This should also apply to EU-wide citizens' panels.

Citizens’ panels should be institutionalised with high visibility to meaningfully

accompany major choices such as reorienting existing policies, treaty reform or
enlargement. An IIA could ensure a stronger commitment from the EU institutions to
work with the results. Panels could be organised regularly, for instance every year, around
the State of the Union address by the Commission President on key issues on the
European agenda, alongside additional topics identified by citizens. The rotating Council
presidencies could organise panels on their priorities which would strengthen their public
outreach. But all this only makes sense if the panels have a tangible impact on EU policy.

Participatory instruments should be employed to prepare for enlargement. Inviting

citizens, parliamentarians, representative of civil society organisations, youth movements
and trade unions from candidate countries, together with their EU counterparts, would
bring their views to the table, support mutual understanding and instil a sense of
ownership before formal accession takes place.

 Probity, transparency, and the fight against corruption

Guaranteeing probity and transparency and fighting corruption in the European

29
institutions and in the implementation of EU policies within the EU and in its
neighbourhood is fundamental in three regards.

Firstly, to increase legitimacy: in most countries, EU institutions do not enjoy the same
degree of support by citizens as national institutions, which are often underpinned by a
strong national sentiment and narrative. If they are not seen as promoting and protecting
the general European interest, in a difficult political context, highly influenced by populist
discourse and challenges to representative democracy, the acceptance of EU decisions
may be greatly affected.

Secondly, with regards to independence: EU institutions need to be shielded from

influence and pressure e.g., from foreign states, the private sector, and other lobbies. New
forms of hybrid intervention which include the strategic use of corruption aim at
undermining democratic institutions and processes as well as democratic transformation.
This is especially important from a security and democratic resilience perspective, and
when it comes to enlarging the EU.

Thirdly, to enhance credibility: European institutions and their representatives must be

exemplary if they want to credibly enforce the respect for EU principles and values in the
Member States and to ensure that candidate countries make major efforts in the fight
against corruption and in bolstering the rule of law. This is also crucial if the EU wants to
continue arguing in favour of the rule of law, a rules-based international order and the
principles enshrined in the UN Charter at the global level.

Recommendations
The EU institutions have so far not implemented sufficiently ambitious measures to
guarantee probity, transparency and good governance in their own actions. We
recommend the creation of a new Office for Transparency and Probity (OTP) in charge
of monitoring the activities of all the actors working within the EU institutions or for
them. Action could be taken via Article 15 TFEU (good governance and the participation of
civil society) and 298 TFEU (good administration), under the OLP. However, an ambitious
reform would require the use of Article 352 TFEU (subsidiary powers) under unanimity. To
allow the OTP to bring a case to the CJEU, it would be even better to include entirely new
provisions in the treaty and make it a fully-fledged EU institution.

In any case, the OTP should be independent from the EU institutions, and not composed of
‘delegates’ of the latter, but of independent experts, selected from academia, civil society
organisations and within similar bodies at national level. Otherwise, like the existing
organs within the Commission and the EP, its propensity to sanction misconduct or to
constrain the behaviour of EU actors, both during and after their term (especially in the
case of ‘revolving doors’), would remain low. The OTP should be granted sufficient legal,
budgetary, and human resources and important competences in control, enquiry, and
sanction so that its actions can be efficient and dissuasive. Its role should not be limited to
examining infractions and complaints. It must have the capacity to analyse the behaviour

30
of actors and to define a proactive policy in view of probity and transparency. It should, for
instance, be allowed to check the evolution of EU actors’ assets through time.

The centralisation of competencies relating to EU institutions’ good governance in the

hands of the OTP would have three advantages. First, it would enable the uniform and
consistent application of the rules to the various EU actors and institutions which is not
currently the case. Second, it would clearly affirm the EU's desire to be exemplary in this
area. Third, the OTP would have the means to actively promote transparency and probity,
without waiting for complaints or allegations of misconduct, as is often the case with
existing organs.

4. Powers and competences

The powers and competences at EU level have increased since 1957, by now extending to
a vast array of policy areas beyond the original areas of integration. Criticism that the EU is
stretching or even exceeding its competences, that it does ‘too much’ and disregards the
subsidiarity principle, has come up on a regular basis, but it has not been backed up by
substantive legal arguments.

Several reviews of the allocation of EU competences, including the most comprehensive

one conducted by the British government 2012-14 in the context of Brexit13, ultimately did
not find any indication of a European pretension of competences beyond what the treaties
foresee. We also note that the provisions and mechanisms in place to enforce the
subsidiarity principle work rather well, which explains the absence of subsidiarity cases at
the CJEU. Nevertheless, we do not rule out the repatriation of competencies from the EU to
the national level as a matter of principle if they can be better handled on the national or
subnational level with positive effects for legitimacy, efficiency or the quality of decisions
made. We are equally open to extending EU competences for the same reasons14.

In several consecutive crises since the mid-2000s, the EU has successfully used the existing
competence framework to cater for emergencies and entirely new situations. But even
treaty provisions such as Article 114 TFEU (the general legal basis for legislative
harmonisation), Article 122 TFEU (a legal basis for measures in an emergency) or Article
352 TFEU (a reserve legal basis for measures that are in line with the objectives set out in
the Treaties) that were general enough to accommodate unforeseen situations have their
limits.

Recommendations
While we think that it is useful to clarify certain provisions related to powers and
competencies, this alone does not justify a major formal treaty revision. However, if the EU

13
See UK Government Services, ʻReview of the balance competencies’, 2012-24.
14
It is beyond this report’s mandate to suggest areas in which the EU should or should not be active in the future. We focused on
aspects that could be usefully consolidated with an upcoming treaty revision. Other studies e.g. on the provision of public goods
in the EU provide a policy-oriented assessment.

31
does decide to change the treaty for other reasons, lessons taken from the various
crises should be expressed in the wording of competence provisions. This ranges from
a clearer legal basis for the ECB in the context of the banking union, to more health
competences for the EU, or the integration of crisis response instruments that – for
reasons of timing and political considerations – were created outside the formal treaty
framework (such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)).

Secondly, the EU should strengthen provisions on how to deal with unforeseen

developments, competency-wise, and including the EP. Policy areas that are
particularly likely to be hit by a crisis with transnational effects (e.g., finance, health,
security, climate, the environment) should be reviewed to determine whether the treaty
base for emergency measures is sufficient. Indeed, crisis responses should not undermine
EU law (e.g., the single market and its four freedoms) or democracy. Power transfers to the
EU would require formal treaty change, though. In case the treaty is opened, Article 122
TFEU should be amended to include the EP in the decision-making on measures to address
emergencies or crises.

Almost as old as the debate on European powers and competences is the one on who is
the ultimate arbiter of the reach and the limits of EU competence. The CJEU is the court of
competence, but its ultimate legal authority has been challenged on multiple causes, the
most trivial being discontent with an actual or anticipated ruling. An additional forum for
judicial dialogue between courts at different levels, but without the authority to take
binding decisions, could accommodate institutional concerns of not being heard without
endangering the CJEU’s authority. We recommend the creation of a ‘Joint Chamber of
the Highest Courts and Tribunals of the EU’, structuring the dialogue between European
and Member States’ courts. It would place the numerous existing informal contacts
between the courts into a more formal setting, but without the authority to take binding
decisions, nor the authority to strengthen mutual understanding, cultivate a joint
European outlook, and provide for more transparency.

5. EU resources
The reform of EU policies – and hence the distribution of funding – is among the largest of
EU internal political challenges. Enlarging the EU will amplify this challenge. It is thus
highly relevant to consider the inevitable impact of enlargement as well as governance
and competence reforms on the EU budget. This adds to the growing demands on the EU
in the fields of financial stability, health, energy and decarbonisation, digital and research,
and defence and security, which have created new demands on EU funding. Equipping the
EU with the financial means to have the capacity to react quickly and substantively to
changing economic circumstances requires profoundly modifying the governance and the
negotiation process of the EU budget and the MFF.

32
Recommendations
First and foremost, the EU budget must grow over the coming budgetary period in
nominal size as well as in terms of a proportion of GDP. The ongoing mid-term review
has already exposed the extent to which the 2021-2027 budget was stretched beyond its
limit by asking for additional contributions from the Member States. The prospect of
enlargement and the reconstruction of Ukraine, as well as the fact that EUR 600 billion
every year will be needed to meet the EU’s emission reduction objectives, all call for a
substantially larger EU budget. Additionally, the debt issued under the NextGenerationEU
programme will need to be repaid progressively as of 2027. A larger MFF is better agreed
and transparently debated earlier rather than later, where it is likely that holes in the
budget would have to be fixed.

The Commission has proposed the creation of new statistical own resources that would
raise revenues without forcing tax harmonisation. While effective in principle, we believe
the EU should create truly new own resources for the EU budget that would limit tax
optimisation, avoidance, and competition within the EU. This could be achieved
through enhanced cooperation or even via a smaller coalition of willing countries. In the
absence of such progress, the EU will be confronted with a ‘fiscal cliff’ that will either force
new contributions from Member States’ national budgets, or a sharp reduction in EU
spending.

We also believe that the EU budget negotiations are marred by the ‘juste retour’ logic that
will be increasingly difficult to manage as the budget funds more and more European
public goods. This calls for a profound reform of how the EU budget is adopted, which
should move towards QMV for spending. The own resources decision, or any transfer of
taxation power to the EU, would still be voted for under unanimity. In the absence of a full
move to QMV, there should be more enhanced cooperation or other forms of
cooperation between even smaller groups of Member States to agree to finance
policies together. This would simplify budgetary negotiations but also provide for the
flexibility that the EU needs to enable ‘coalitions of the willing’ to integrate further.

The enlargement process, greater security and defence needs, and the energy and climate
transition are all expected to profoundly impact the EU budget. It is critical that this does
not come at the expense of delivering true European policies and common goods, in
particular the EU’s climate and environment goals. We thus recommend establishing a
thorough spending review to reduce the size of some spending areas and increase
others. We would also draw on the positive experience of NextGenerationEU by
enabling the EU to issue common debt in the future.

The possibility of an EU budget fit for operating with smaller groups of Member States
depending on policy areas would also allow for the integration of existing inter-
governmental financing agreements into the EU budget. They should be brought under
community law and the EP’s control to centralise and improve the EU’s financial might. A

33
new package combining the integration of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund should
be an integral part of the next MFF.

Finally, each institutional cycle should set a new MFF based on its strategic agenda
and popular mandate. Accordingly, within its first six months, a new Commission should
propose a five-year MFF, to be voted upon by the Council/European Council and the new
EP. Reducing the MFF’s length would moreover result in greater flexibility, both when it
comes to moving spending around on an annual basis and to redefining long-term
priorities.

34
III. How to manage progress:
Deepening and widening the EU
1. Options for treaty change
Many of the recommendations we make above do not require treaty change, such as
extending the mechanism for protecting the rule of law through budgetary conditionality
or applying QMV to new areas through the passerelle clause. Annex 2 gives an overview.

The treaties contain numerous provisions below formal treaty change, such as the
passerelle clauses, emergency powers, and the use of enhanced cooperation or Article 352
TFEU. Using these instruments is politically more feasible than needing to secure a ’double
unanimity’, i.e., an agreement on the actual changes in the EUCO plus ratification of a new
treaty by all Member States with all the risks and delays that come with national
ratifications.

Relevant reforms that are possible without treaty change include shifting decision-making
from unanimity to QMV, giving the EP more powers and even extending policy areas.
Article 352 TFEU offers a legal base to decide if EU action is necessary, within the
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in
the Treaties, and if they do not provide the necessary powers. A roadmap of such a sub-
treaty reform should be agreed by the Member States before the European elections.

Nevertheless, for reasons of democratic legitimacy, transparency, coherence and ambition

of change, we recommend the more challenging route of treaty revision, and there is
more than one option to do this. The standard option is the ordinary revision procedure,
which normally requires the convening of a Convention (Option 1). However, the
experience of the previous Convention (2002-03) and the history of treaty revisions teach
us that unforeseen political obstacles are more than likely. We thus also consider
alternative options and fallback solutions (Options 2 to 6) (see also Annex 3). Which of
these options is most suitable is a political choice and must be carefully balanced.

Recommendation
We suggest adopting the proposed amendments in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 48(6) TEU, the default option for treaty change (convening of a
Convention followed by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)) (Option 1). This would be
the logical follow-up to the CoFoE. It could enhance the legitimacy of the treaty revision,
especially if it included representatives of the candidate countries. The prospect of a
Convention could also have mobilising and legitimising effects for the 2024 elections, as
political parties could campaign on the desired treaty changes. Member States, the
‘Masters of the Treaties’, would not lose control over the content of the amendments as

35
they would decide on the changes through an IGC after the Convention.

If there is no agreement to convene a Convention, the ‘simplified revision procedure’

is the alternative (Option 2). Under Article 48(6) TEU, the EUCO can decide (by a simple
majority vote and with the consent of the EP) that a Convention is not justified by the
scope of the amendments sought. But this choice could be challenged, if not before the
CJEU then at least before national courts, creating a risk that treaty changes are not
ratified. Moreover, it is not certain that the EP would give its consent since it voted on 9
June 2022 in favour of convening a Convention. Finally, the ‘simplified’ revision does not
escape the need for ‘double unanimity’, and creates even more risk of a deadlock, as seen
in Nice (2000).

 Alternative scenarios: Treaty revision through an accession Treaty or Ttreaties

The reform of the EU could be formally linked to the accession treaties which modify
the founding Treaties (Option 3). Article 49(2) TEU states that this is a separate special
treaty revision procedure. This would streamline the revision process by formally linking it
to the (next) accession treaty, allowing for a package deal in the Council between the pro-
deepening and the pro-enlargement camps. National parliaments or citizens via a
referendum would only have to vote once for both operations (revision and accession(s)),
which can facilitate the amendments’ entry into force. As enlargement will require at least
the formal adjustment of the treaties, it is a plausible starting point to link EU reform with
enlargement and treaty amendment.

However, according to the wording of the provision, this possibility of revising the treaties
is, in principle, limited to only those ‘adjustments to the treaties […] which such admission
entails’. Anything that maintains or improves the functioning of the EU after an
enlargement could though be part of an accession treaty. But there may be limits to this
approach. Firstly, some reform proposals are difficult to link to accession: an extension of
EU competences, such as in public health, do not seem logically viable, although a
candidate with specific public health issues may offer such a link.

Linking EU reform to an accession treaty raises issues in terms of timing, since this makes
it dependent on the speed of accessions, and therefore on the progress made by the
candidate countries. In addition, if accession does not take place ‘en bloc’, the treaty
amendments would have to be included in the first accession treaty, making it difficult to
involve the other candidate states in the discussions. Finally, the democratic legitimacy of
this solution is questionable, given that the EP is not fully involved in negotiating the
accession treaty.

A solution for the above-mentioned problems could be a sequenced approach (Option 4).
In a first step, Member States would draft a ‘framework enlargement and reform treaty’.
This framework treaty would contain the changes deemed necessary for the EU’s
functioning in the future. This treaty would be negotiated with the view to accession,
though decoupled from actual accession treaties, which would still be negotiated by the

36
Commission. Thus, there would be no need to have all candidate countries joining at the
same time with the same accession treaty that also contains amendments to the EU
treaties. Institutional provisions in the framework treaty could be conditioned on the
number of Member States changing. The reform would thus be in place before the actual
accession of the first candidate countries. A concern with Option 4 may be, once more, the
issue of democratic transparency since the EP does not take part in negotiating accession.

This leads to Option 5: the involvement of a Convention in a reform based on Article 49

TEU (an enlargement treaty). It is not explicitly provided for, but it is also not excluded. A
Convention could be mandated to draft the ‘framework enlargement and reform treaty’
mentioned before. Unlike Option 1 there would be a link with the accession process,
meaning that no accession could become effective without reform having first taken place.
It would also be easier to include the candidate countries in the process.

 Fallback solution: revision through a supplementary treaty (coalition of the willing)

Whichever route is chosen – ordinary revision or accession treaty-related – the entry into
force of amendments to the treaties is subject to ‘double unanimity’. There are numerous
ways to react to any deadlock resulting from a Member State's refusal or inability to sign
or ratify the revision treaty or even to launch the ordinary revision procedure: opt-outs can
be negotiated, or a Member State can decide to leave, accompanied by the negotiation of
a treaty granting it a special status with the EU. All this still needs the consent of the
Member State(s) unwilling to reform.

But even if there is no consent to overcome deadlock, there may still be a path forward
(Option 6): A supplementary reform treaty (such as the ESM Treaty) between the
Member States willing to move forward. This option would be available in the case of a
failed Convention or a ratification deadlock in the context of the ordinary treaty revision
procedure (Options 1 and 2) or a lack of consensus on a framework enlargement and
reform treaty (Options 4 and 5). Any preparatory work could still serve as a starting point
for a revision through a supplementary treaty among the Member States willing to reform.
Such additional treaty law would supplement existing treaty law, not deny it. It would
create a ‘coalition of the willing’, paving the way for more differentiation within the EU.

For instance, QMV could be introduced through a supplementary reform treaty: Member
States can agree to exercise their veto rights only under certain conditions, e.g. only
together with at least one other Member State. The supplementary treaty would amend
the relevant legal bases for the States’ parties only, specifying the new decision-making
rules – the others would retain their individual veto right.

A supplementary treaty could also be used to change the EU budget. Only the Member
States party to this new supplementary treaty would benefit from the proposed changes,
the non-signatories would not. This would mean designing two separate budgets, one
general, and another operating according to the new rules (adoption procedure, resources
etc.). Regarding the rule of law, the Member States party to this supplementary treaty

37
would accept that Article 7 could be applied to them, if necessary, by a majority of four-
fifths.

Moreover, policies and EU competences can be governed by such distinct rules. But there
are also limits: it is not possible, for instance, to reduce the number of Commissioners.

A supplementary treaty would further increase the complexity of the EU legal system,
while de facto creating a ‘core Europe’. It would raise problems of articulation between the
obligations of EU Member States that remain bound by the Lisbon Treaty and those bound
by the new supplementary treaty.

Figure 2: Six options of Treaty change

2. Differentiation
In an EU of over 30 Member States, flexibility tools are required to retain and enhance the
EU’s capacity to act. The EU already has a large toolbox, such as transition clauses after
new Member States’ accession, temporary derogations, enhanced cooperation, permanent
structured cooperation (PESCO) or conditional participation. And yet, differentiation
creates institutional and normative complexity: a ‘Europe à la carte’ is what the Community
Method was designed to avoid.

38
Differentiation moreover has clear limits. Within the EU, it cannot be used to solve
disagreements over the respect for the primacy of EU law or rule of law issues on the
Member State level. The principles and values enshrined in Article 2 TEU are non-
negotiable for EU membership.

Differentiated integration has an internal and an external dimension. Internally, multiple

instruments help to facilitate circumstances in which some Member States wish to deepen
integration in certain areas by carrying out joint projects within the EU’s institutional
framework and in compliance with its fundamental principles and values and the acquis
communautaire, while others do not. The EU has always extensively used internal
differentiation, including opt-outs from certain steps to deepen integration, even central
ones such as acceding to the monetary union.

In addition to safeguard clauses, the procedure of enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU) is

a crucial tool that should be expanded. Some of the recommendations made in this report
could also be implemented in this way. For others, enhanced cooperation would not be
sufficient or unlikely to replace a proper reform of the treaties.

Externally, differentiation has thus far allowed non-EU states to participate in individual EU
policies, such as Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein being a part of the
Schengen area. The latter three also participate in the internal market via the European
Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland partially via bilateral treaties, and Turkey is in a customs
union with the EU.

In more general terms, external differentiation also relates to the EU’s enlargement and
neighbourhood policy. The European Political Community (EPC) could serve as an
important venue for this purpose and could be developed accordingly. External
differentiation could become relevant for the future of the (enlarged) EU if individual
Member States either block necessary treaty reforms and consequently negotiate new opt-
outs, or even prefer a less committed status regarding European integration. In these
cases, a special association status with the EU could be envisioned or even just simple
participation in the EPC.

Recommendations
 Principles for differentiation within the EU

Member States should be more ready to make use of existing flexibility instruments.
However, differentiation is not without risk for European integration, for the coherence of
the EU’s actions and the integrity of the principles that govern it. Thus, we recommend the
use of flexibility instruments under the five following principles:

 Respect for the acquis communautaire and the integrity of the EU’s policies and
actions: Differentiation shall aim to further the EU’s objectives, respect its principles,
protect its interests, and reinforce its integration process. Respecting the rule of law
principle applies to all EU Member States, no matter which differentiated formats they

39
 participate in. Depending on the policy area, additional criteria may apply (e.g.,
Schengen).
 Use of the EU institutions: Differentiation should remain within the EU framework,
making use of EU instruments and institutions such as Enhanced Cooperation, PESCO,
or even treaty based opt-outs and supplementary treaties. This preserves the EU’s
institutional integrity and ensures that non-participating Member States can join in the
future.
 Openness to all EU members: Participation in the deeper areas of integration should
be open to all Member States. External differentiation should be designed so that it
does not impact the question of EU membership – it is not an alternative, not a
precondition, and does not create rights for automatic accession.
 Sharing decision-making powers, costs, and benefits: Only those countries
participating in deeper integration should have the corresponding decision-making
powers (e.g., in the Council), as well as share the costs and benefits. This could entail
the creation of specific budgets only for participating Member States.
 Make sure the willing can move ahead: If a Member State which had joined a
pioneer group created to deepen integration suddenly no longer subscribes to the
goals of the group, it shall not be able to prevent the group from moving ahead with
deepening integration and must not limit its capacity to act. A mechanism needs to be
provided to suspend a Member State from a core group if it no longer supports its
objectives. While exiting from the core group, the Member State’s EU membership as
such would remain in place.

 Use of differentiation in the framework of treaty revisions

As already stated above, any kind of treaty revision is likely to require differentiation. This
is a very likely scenario and opt-outs are a meaningful tool to dissolve blockages. So, in
such a case, the uncooperative/unwilling state(s) could be offered opt-outs to be
included in the new treaty. It should only be possible to grant an opt-out where the
revision deepens integration, either by adding new competences or by extending QMV.
Yet exemptions from the existing acquis communautaire or EU core values (the rule of law,
democracy, and fundamental rights) should not be possible. In the future, the euro should
be considered as part of the non-negotiable elements of European integration.

In more practical terms, Member States could be exempted from participating in new
areas of EU competences if the prospect of utilising enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU)
is not sufficient. Those opposed to extending QMV could be offered an exemption from
the policies affected. In budgetary matters, it should be possible to develop fiscal
capacities through enhanced cooperation, in the form of new own resources, budgets
based on Member States’ contributions and/or borrowing capacities (see below)15.

15
This option differs from the possibility of a supplementary treaty mentioned above. A supplementary treaty is open to Member States that
want to deepen integration between them – the non-willing have nothing to say. Here, it is a possibility offered to Member States that do not
want to reform the treaties or face problems in ratifying it to be granted opt-outs to allow the others to move on.

40
  United in diversity in Europe

Not all European states will be willing and/or able to join the EU in the foreseeable future.
Even some current Member States may prefer looser forms of integration. We therefore
recommend envisioning the future of European integration as four distinct tiers,
each with a different balance of rights and obligations.

1. The inner circle: Internally, the members of the Eurozone and Schengen Area already
participate in forms of deeper integration, with either permanent or temporary
exemptions for the non-participating countries. In addition, there are already several uses
of Enhanced Cooperation as well as PESCO in defence. These coalitions of the willing could
be further used in a wider range of policy areas (climate, energy, taxation etc.), as seen
previously. This inner circle should be submitted to the above-mentioned five principles.

2. The EU: All current and future EU Member States are bound by the same political
objectives, required to comply with Article 2 TEU and they benefit from cohesion funds and
redistributive policies. Current EU competences remain at the heart of EU integration.

3. Associate Members: A first outer tier could allow for streamlining the different forms of
association with the EEA countries, Switzerland or even the UK. Associate members would
not be bound to ‘ever closer union’ and further integration, nor would they participate in
deeper political integration in other policy areas such as Justice and Home Affairs or EU
citizenship. Still, the basic requirement would be the commitment to comply with the EU’s
common principles and values, including democracy and the rule of law. The core area of
participation would be the single market. Institutionally, associate members would not be
represented in the EP or the Commission but have speaking without voting rights in the
Council and would be offered associate membership in relevant EU agencies. They would
fall under the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Associate members would pay into the EU budget
but on a lower level (e.g., for common institutional costs), with lower benefits (e.g., no
access to cohesion and agricultural funds).

4. The EPC: A second outer tier would not include any form of integration with binding EU
law or specific rule of law requirements and would not allow access to the single market.
Instead, it would focus on geopolitical convergence and political cooperation in policy
areas of mutual importance and relevance such as security, energy or the environment
and climate policy etc. The recently established EPC’s institutional underpinning could be
upgraded to provide more structured cooperation. The EPC would have to evolve from its
current loose form into an arrangement with stronger institutional ties that could enable
the Commission to play a greater coordinating role and the EU budget to mobilise some
funding. Economic relations within the EPC could be structured by Free Trade Agreements
and in certain policy areas, such as energy or defence, a mixed treaty could provide a
stronger legal and institutional framework for policy coordination, very much like the
Energy Union. There should still be a minimum common basis for all participants,

41
including membership in the Council of Europe and the European Convention of Human
Rights.
Figure 3. The four Europe circles

These two outer tiers – although open to any European country, including accession
candidate countries – would be distinct from the accession procedure as membership in
them can be permanent. EPC membership can be a useful step towards EU membership,
but is not a prerequisite, as it could also involve countries from the southern shore of the
Mediterranean, which could be granted guest status or even permanent guest status.

Countries would join one or the other outer tier out of their own political will, either
because they withdraw from the EU or because they have no intention of joining it in the
first place. Careful negotiations will be needed to find the right balance between a looser

42
form of integration and institutional participation while retaining the highest benefits for
full EU Member States.

3. Managing the enlargement process

The next enlargement will be different from previous ones, not only because geopolitical
challenges have added Ukraine and Moldova to the group of candidates. The accession
process has been revised with the aim to making it ‘more predictable, more credible
(based on objective criteria and rigorous positive and negative conditionality, and
reversibility), more dynamic and subject to stronger political steering16’. Negotiations are
now restructured along six clusters instead of 35 individual chapters and candidate
countries can phase into individual EU policies and programmes.

The recent reform of the enlargement process might have had an impact on the technical
level but has not created strong political momentum within the EU’s enlargement policies.
For the next enlargement to happen, concrete steps need to be taken, not only to get the
EU ready for enlargement, but also to re-dynamize a merit-based accession process and
support candidate countries’ transition.

Recommendations
To regain credibility, the EU should set the goal to be ready for enlargement by 2030
and accession candidates should work to fulfil the criteria to accede to the EU on this
earliest entry date. This mutual commitment would increase trust in the accession
process that has been undermined by a lack of commitment and progress over the past
few years. It makes clear that there is no free entry into the EU and that the timeframe is
an objective rather than a set date. The new political leadership after the European
elections in 2024 should fully commit to this goal and the reform process required to
reach it. A joint summit with the political leadership of all candidate countries could also
add to a renewed sense of dynamism.

It is unclear whether there will be a second Big Bang enlargement, with many candidates
joining ‘en bloc’, or a ‘regatta’, with different accession dates for different candidates. Both
options have their pros and cons. The ‘en bloc’ option expects the candidate countries to
motivate and support each other’s reform process. But it conflicts with the merit-based
approach that makes each candidate the pacemaker of its own accession. This means that
either the more advanced need to wait for the latecomers, or that they define the speed of
accession, which implies the admission of countries that are not yet ready to join.

A ‘regatta’ approach would better comply with the merit-based principle. However, it would

16
European Commission: Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2020) 57 final, Brussels, 5.2.2020, p. 1. Important contributions
that lead to this communication were non-papers from France (2019) as well as Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia (2020).

43
allow Member States, including newcomers, to block the accession of some countries due
to bilateral conflicts. This risk could be mitigated by clauses in their accession treaties on a
transitory period that takes away their right to vote on future enlargements for a jointly
agreed timeframe. Also, accession could be considered only after conflicts between
candidate countries are resolved. In view of these considerations, our second
recommendation is to break down the accession rounds into smaller groups of
countries (a ‘regatta’) in full compliance with the merit-based approach and in
consideration of potential bilateral conflicts.

Our third set of recommendations concerns the accession process itself. We take note of
the EUCO having invited ‘the European Council, the Commission, the High Representative
and the Council to further advance the gradual integration between the European Union
and the region already during the enlargement process itself in a reversible and merit-
based manner17.’ Given the focus of our mandate, this report does not discuss concepts of
‘accelerated’, ‘gradual’ or ‘staged’ accession in greater detail or develop another concept or
other conclusions to be drawn from previous enlargement experiences. We yet
recommend nine principles that should guide future enlargement strategies and their
connection to EU reform.

On the qualification for accession:

 ‘Fundamentals first’ principle: Regardless of any new flexibility in the accession

process, compliance with the political accession criteria and EU principles is the
precondition for accession to the EU. The Copenhagen criteria need to be rigorously
applied in the accession process and ongoing compliance needs to be ensured. Even
any partial integration into the single market as a basic form of accession would
require adherence to rule of law and democratic principles. Stronger instruments, as
outlined in the rule of law section, are thus necessary before any enlargement takes
place.
 ‘Geopolitical’ principle: Geopolitical considerations, which are currently the strongest
drivers for the EU’s enlargement, should be taken into account. Accession countries
should fully align themselves with the EU's CFSP, notably its sanctions policy and the
principles of the United Nations Charter. For this, the strategic dialogue, within the EPC
and between candidates and EU Member States and the institutions should be
strengthened.
 ‘Conflict resolution’ principle: For security and stability reasons, countries with lasting
military conflicts cannot join the EU. The same applies to countries with a territorial
conflict with another candidate country or an EU Member State. However, if managed
well, the accession process can be a vehicle for easing tensions and resolving conflicts
between candidate countries and should therefore be seen in this light. The accession
of countries with disputed territories with a country outside the EU will have to include

17
European Council, Conclusions, June 2022, p. 5.

44
 a clause that those territories will only be able to join the EU if their inhabitants are
willing to do so.
 ‘Additional technical and financial support’ principle: The EU should provide more
technical assistance to accelerate domestic reforms and to increase administrative and
absorption capacity. Financial support to encourage the most challenging and security-
relevant reforms should be increased. If helpful to candidate countries, more EU and
national experts should support progress within candidate countries.
 ‘Democratic legitimacy’ principle and participation: Democratic legitimacy during
the entire process should be encouraged through regular dialogue between the EP
and national parliaments of both Member States and candidate countries. Citizens of
accession countries should be invited to join EU participatory mechanisms to get
involved in EU debates and to potentially create understanding and support for
fulfilling the accession criteria. Communications initiatives, including the fight against
disinformation, should encourage a greater sense of ownership of the enlargement
process in the EU and candidate countries.

On the dynamic of the accession procedure:

 ‘Equality’ principle: Accession procedures and criteria need to be equal for all
candidate countries. Fast-tracking would damage EU integration and will erode trust in
the other candidate countries.
 ‘Systematisation’ principle: The revised accession methodology already foresees the
phasing-in of candidate countries. Additionally, some have been integrated into
selected EU programmes based on the Association Agreements and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTAs). A more structured and conditional
methodology for sectoral integration, and a staged approach to participation rights in
EU institutions still needs to be developed.
 ‘Reversibility’ principle: If phasing-in and staged participation in EU institutions takes
place, it must be possible to reverse this partial integration if the EU’s principles,
values, and strategic orientation – that is the prerequisite for partial integration – are
no longer met. A candidate country experiencing backpedalling on participation
criteria needs to feel the consequences in order to preserve reform momentum in all
accession countries.
 The ‘QMV’ principle: The dynamic of the accession process not only depends on
candidate countries’ progress, but also the EU’s capacity to take decisions on opening
and/or closing negotiation chapters that are shielded from particular national self-
interests. New stages should be approved by QMV to avoid individual Member States
blocking progress for national reasons. The final decision on the actual accession of a
Member State, however, must be taken with ‘double unanimity’ of all Member States in
the EUCO and national ratifications of the accession treaty.

45
Conclusion and outlook: Two windows
to reform the EU
Two observations are widely shared across the EU today. The first is that the inclusion of
new Member States is a geostrategic imperative – the stability of the continent and the
security of the EU and candidate countries require rapid progress in this area, whatever
the scale of the task. The second observation is that the EU’s institutions, policies, and
budget must be reformed before any further enlargement, or at the very moment of the
next one. If this does not happen, the EU’s ability to function well will be at risk. Reforms
after enlargement will be more difficult and very unlikely. The new Member States will be
preoccupied with managing the acquis communautaire and their integration into the single
market and the Union in general. At the same time there is no reason why the current 27
should not be in a better position to agree on post-enlargement reforms than now.

Paradoxically, although this twofold observation is broadly shared, timidity reigns when it
comes to reform, particularly concerning a treaty revision. It may seem hard to argue that
the EU urgently needs to reform as it has managed to survive so many crises over recent
years. Yet reform is imperative to prepare the EU for its future challenges, which will make
it even harder for the EU and national governments to deliver for their citizens, and time is
running out. If the next enlargement is to take place as early as 2030, it is essential to take
the initiative and launch what will be a long and complex process.

This report has set out what is at stake, makes a series of recommendations, and proposes
a roadmap on how to get there. It is one contribution to a broader debate which will
hopefully gain further ground over the next few months.

It is important that governments decide to begin the process with no further delay. Some
reforms can be implemented in the short term without treaty change in a first phase as of
autumn 2023 and before the 2024 European elections. Reforms that require treaty change
should be tackled during the next institutional cycle (2024-29). A further set of reforms will
be needed after the next enlargement occurs.

1. Short-term measures before the EU elections

(October 2023-June 2024)
Before the European elections of June 2024, governments should implement measures
that improve the functioning of the EU’s institutions in line with the three principles set out
in this report. These measures should be practical, achievable, and have a tangible impact
on the EU’s functioning. They can be implemented under the current framework of the
treaties and lay the groundwork for the next institutional cycle.

47
The EUCO and the Spanish and Belgian Council Presidencies should work with other
governments to make sure a damaging political stalemate and lack of direction is
prevented when the new European leadership will be selected following the European
elections. Related procedural and substantive decisions should be taken before the
election.

Moreover, they should tackle immediate deficiencies which have lasting damaging effects
and set the stage for deeper reforms. They should include:

 a calendar and framework regarding the appointment of the next Commission;

 a reform of the organisation of the Council Presidency – a quintet is better than a trio –
as of the next term;
 a redesigned accession process, including decisions on intermediate phases, is
adopted by QMV;
 a clarification of the ‘phasing-in’ option for accession candidate countries;
 the implementation of QMV based on the passerelle clause in some policy areas;
 a strengthening and more stringent use of the rule of law conditionality mechanism;
 the creation of a dedicated Office for Transparency and Probity (OTP);
 mutual commitment by the EU and the candidate countries for preparing for
enlargement by 2030; this declaration should be taken during the December 2023
EUCO meeting, on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria;
 a more systematic and coordinated use of participatory democracy tools.

2. Medium-term measures during the next

institutional cycle (2024-29)
The next institutional cycle (the 10th EP term, 2024-2029) should be used to introduce a
series of necessary changes to the treaties and to EU policies to prepare the EU for the
next enlargement. We propose that the new EU leadership works on the target date of
2030 set by the EUCO in December 2023 and defines the obligations for both sides. This
should be the deadline for completing the necessary adoption and ratification of the
modified EU treaties, if reforms are not included in the accession treaties. The candidate
countries which want to be part of the next wave of enlargement should also be ready by
2030.

Regarding the EU, changes and reforms should include:

 the better protection of the rule of the law, via a reform of Article 7 TEU;
 the harmonisation of EU Member States’ electoral laws concerning EP elections;
 the adoption of a new mechanism to allocate seats in the EP and to limit their number;
 transition to QMV and OLP in all ‘policy’ areas;
 changing voting weights within QMV in the Council;

48
 limiting the use of unanimity in the Council;
 extending EU competences;
 the creation of a ‘Joint Chamber of the Highest Courts and Tribunals of the EU’;
 a reform of the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework;
 increasing the EU budget in nominal size and in relation to GDP;
 the creation of an ‘associate member’ status.

The path towards treaty change needs to include a broader public debate, picking up on
the results of the CoFoE. Projects for the future of the EU and reform proposals should
feature prominently in the electoral campaign for the 2024 EP elections and the new
Commission’s political guidelines should reflect these priorities. Various participatory
democracy tools should be mobilised to involve the citizens of both Member States and
candidate countries in this process.

The EU has successfully muddled through over the past couple of decades and very often
achieved progress or managed crises more diligently than expected, only to come out
stronger. Given the current external and internal conditions, it would be of high risk to
assume that this will continue.

We highly recommend thinking in terms of ‘the cost of non-action’. Given that neither
global changes nor internal challenges will become lighter, time and decisiveness is of the
essence. Choosing to not reform the EU or not to integrate candidate countries with a
strong commitment to the EU and its principles and values would come at an even higher
price for the EU, its Member States and its citizens. The EU could be in very real danger if
not enough is done to prepare it for the future.

This report proposes flexible solutions to manage the challenges the EU is facing as it is
sailing on high seas. If it fails to reform and enlarge, the European continent may face an
even deeper political crisis. For this eventuality, we cannot propose a legal or technical
solution upfront.

49
Annex 1: Joint press release of the
German Federal Foreign Office and the
French Ministry for Europe and
Foreign Affairs (23.01.2023)
German-French working group of experts on EU institutional reforms

On the occasion of the German-French Council of Ministers, a working group of experts

has been launched in order to make recommendations for EU institutional reforms. In the
follow-up of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the working group has been initiated
by German Minister of State for Europe and Climate, Anna Lührmann, and French
Secretary of State for European Affairs, Laurence Boone. It is composed of twelve non-
governmental experts from both countries. To include a wider European perspective, the
working group will also reach out to other member states and candidates.

It is obvious that the EU needs an institutional overhaul to maintain its

capacity to act. This is especially important with the perspective of
future enlargements. To identify potential ways for reforms, we bring
together German and French experts at one table. We thereby gather
valuable ideas on how to strengthen our common European project.
Anna Lührmann

The mission of the working group is to elaborate, within the next

months, concrete recommendations on how to strengthen the EU’s
capacity to act, to protect its fundamental values, to strengthen its
resilience, especially in light of the Russian war of aggression against
Ukraine, and bring it closer to European citizens.
Laurence Boone

The conclusions, elaborated by the group, will be handed over to Ms. Lührmann and
Boone by autumn 2023. The members of the working group are committed to include
perspectives from other European countries in their analysis.

The members of this joint working group of experts are:

 Pervenche Berès, Fondation Jaurès

50
 Olivier Costa, CNRS CEVIPOF
 Gilles Gressani, Grand Continent
 Gaëlle Marti, Université de Lyon III
 Franz Mayer, Universität Bielefeld
 Thu Nguyen, Jacques Delors Centre
 Nicolai von Ondarza, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
 Sophia Russack, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
 Daniela Schwarzer, Open Society Foundations
 Funda Tekin, Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP)
 Shahin Vallée, DGAP
 Christine Verger, Institut Jacques Delors

51
Annex 2: Overview of
recommendations and the need for
treaty change
This table provides an overview of the recommendations in this report, including a
preliminary high-level assessment on which avenues could be used for implementation
and whether a change of EU primary law would be required. The final assessment on the
need for treaty change would be subject to the exact implementation.

I. Better protect a fundamental principle: the rule of law

Recommendation Potential avenue for Is Treaty Notes

implementation change
required?

Make the rule of law Secondary legislation No Possible based on Art.

conditionality 352 TFEU, but would
mechanism an be stronger with
instrument to sanction change of Art. 7 TEU
breaches of the rule of
law and EU values

If no agreement: Secondary legislation No

Extend the scope of the

budgetary conditionality

Introduce conditionality, Secondary legislation / No

similar to NGEU for all MFF
future EU funds

Change decision-making Change of Art 7 TEU Yes

on Art. 7 (2) TEU to 4/5
majority

Reinforce automaticity of Change of Art 7 TEU Yes

response in the event of
a serious and persistent
breach

Automatic sanctions five Change of Art 7 TEU Yes

years after a proposal to
trigger the procedure

52
II.1 Making the EU institutions enlargement-ready
Recommendation Potential avenue for Is Treaty Notes
implementation change
required?

Stick with the limit of 751 EUCO decision based on No In the past, this has
or fewer seats in the EP proposal from the EP been part of
and redistribute seats accession
according to agreements
mathematical formula

Trio format extended to Rules of Procedure of No

a quintet of presidencies the Council

Decision on the size and Option 1: Use Art 17(5) No

organisation of the to introduce rotation
College of the system
Commission

Option 2: Differentiation Potentially Treaty Change

between ‘Lead required if only ‘Lead
Commissioners’ and Commissioners’
‘Commissioners’ retain voting rights in
the College

II.2 Decision-Making in the Council

Recommendation Potential avenue for Is Treaty Notes
implementation change
required?

Generalisation of QMV E Passerelle clause or Potentially Treaty change

treaty change required for defence

Sovereignty Safety Net Passerelle decision or Potentially

on new QMV areas change in treaties

Rebalancing of QMV Treaty change yes

voting system

Opt-outs on new QMV Treaty change Yes

areas

53
II.3 EU-level democracy
Recommendation Potential avenue for Is Treaty Notes
implementation change
required?

Harmonisation of EU Secondary legislation No

electoral law for 2029

Agreement on IIA or political No

Commission President agreement
Appointment Procedure

Existing participatory Secondary legislation, No

instruments need to be political practice
tied more closely to EU
decision-making

Institutionalisation of Secondary legislation, No

citizen panels to political practice
accompany major
choices

Participatory Secondary legislation No

instruments employed to
prepare for enlargement

New independent Office Secondary Legislation No

for Transparency and
Probity

II.4 Powers and Competences

Recommendation Potential avenue Is Treaty Notes

for implementation change
required?
Strengthen provisions on Treaty change Yes
how to deal with
unforeseen
developments, including
EP role in Art. 122 TFEU

Create a “Joint Chamber No No

of the Highest Courts
and Tribunals of the EU”

54
II.5 EU resources

Recommendation Potential avenue Is Treaty Notes

for implementation change
required?
Increase the overall EU MFF decision No
budget

New own resources Own resources decision No

Change EU budgetary Treaty changes or No

decision-making enhanced cooperation
procedure with special budgets

Enable the EU to issue Treaty change No

common debt in the
future

Each institutional cycle MFF decision No According to Art. 312

(EP term) sets a new MFF TFEU, the MFF should
of five years be ‘for a minimum of
five years’,

III.1 How to manage progress: Deepening and widening the EU

Recommendation Potential avenue Is Treaty Notes

for implementation change
required?
1st Option: Regular Treaty Convention, then IGC Yes
Change with Convention and nat. ratification
and IGC according to Art
48 (6) TEU

2nd Option: Simplified IGC only Yes

Revision Procedure

3rd Option: Reform via Accession Treaties Yes No convention

Accession Treaty

4th Option: Member Accession Treaties, Yes No convention

States draft a ‘framework ‘Framework
enlargement and reform enlargement and
treaty’ reform treaty’

5th Option: Involvement Accession Treaties, Yes

of Convention in drafting ‘Framework
of ‘framework enlargement and
enlargement and reform reform treaty’
treaty’

If deadlock, 6th Option: Supplementary Treaty No

‘Supplementary reform
treaty’ between willing
Member States

55
III.2 Differentiation

Recommendation Potential avenue Is Treaty Notes

for implementation change
required?

Make use of existing Enhanced Cooperation, No

flexibility instruments PESCO
under five principles
Offer Opt-outs as part of Treaty Change Yes
treaty change

Create status of Treaty change Yes Part of the idea might

associate members be explored without
treaty change based
on bilateral
agreements with the
partner countries

III.3 Managing the enlargement process

Recommendation Potential avenue Is Treaty Notes

for implementation change
required?
Target date of 2030 for EUCO conclusion No Accession itself
the EU to be ready for remains merit-based
depending on
progress in candidate
countries

Break down the Political agreement on No

accession rounds into Accession Process, e.g.,
smaller groups of in EUCO conclusions
countries
(‘regatta’)accession

Reform the accession Secondary legislation No As long as basic

process, inter alia with criteria and decision-
introduction of QMV making at the end via
unanimity remain
untouched, no treaty
change required

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Annex 3: Overview of the options for
treaty change
PROs and CONs of the six options for treaty change

Treaty change PROs CONs

option

1. Ordinary treaty  Standard procedure,  Risk of friction between CONV

revision with CONV  High degree of democratic and IGC,
and IGC transparency with EP and  Lengthy process with uncertain
national parliaments involved outcome
2. Ordinary treaty  Faster without a CONV  Intergovernmental reform
revision with IGC only  Member States assume their deliberation has reached its
role as 'Masters of the limits with the Nice Treaty
Treaties’  Without CONV less democratic
transparency
 Risk of legal challenges
3. EU reform related-  Tailored and conditioned  Without EP and a CONV less
treaty changes primarily to changes that are democratic transparency
included in next related to enlargement  Risk of legal challenges
Accession Treaty No enlargement without
  Difficulty of timing if different
reform waves of accession
 Difficult to include other
candidates in reform
deliberation
4. Framework ‘Reform  Tailored and conditioned  Without EP and a CONV less
and Accession Treaty’ primarily to changes that are democratic transparency
with IGC related to enlargement  Risk of legal challenges
 No enlargement without
reform
5. Framework ‘Reform  Tailored and conditioned to  Risk of legal challenges
and Accession Treaty’ changes that are primarily
with CONV and IGC related to enlargement
 EP will be represented in a
CONV
 Participation of candidate
states in reform debate
easier to organize in a CONV
 No enlargement without
reform
6. ‘Coalition of the  circumvents ‘double  Increased complexity
Treaty-willing’ unanimity’ problem  Not all reforms possible
Supplementary Treaty  Future development of Risk of legal challenges
/Treaties European integration not
defined by the most reluctant
Member State(s)

57
Annex 4: Members of the Group of
Twelve and acknowledgements
Pervenche Berès, Member of the Board, Fondation Jean Jaurès, Paris
Olivier Costa (Rapporteur), CNRS Research Professor, CEVIPOF, Sciences Po, Paris, and
Director of European Political and Governance Studies, College of Europe, Bruges
Gilles Gressani, President of the Group of Geopolitical Studies (GEG), Director of Le Grand
Continent, Paris
Gaëlle Marti, Professor of Public Law at Lyon 3 University, Director of the Center for
European Studies
Franz Mayer, Professor for Public Law, European Law, Public International Law,
Comparative Law, and Legal Policy, Universität Bielefeld
Thu Nguyen, Senior Policy Fellow for EU Institutions and Democracy, Jacques Delors
Centre, Berlin
Nicolai von Ondarza, Head of Research Division EU/Europe, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Sophia Russack, Researcher, Centre for European Policies Studies (CEPS), Brussels
Daniela Schwarzer (Rapporteur), Member of the Executive Board, Bertelsmann Stiftung,
Berlin, Honorary Professor, Freie Universität Berlin
Funda Tekin, Director at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP), Honorary Professor,
Universität Tübingen
Shahin Vallée, Senior Fellow, Centre for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology,
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin
Christine Verger, Vice President, Jacques Delors Institute, Paris
The Group of Twelve would like to express their warmest thanks to all those who accepted
our invitation to share expertise with the group or who spontaneously contacted us to
share their insights. This allowed us to have a truly trans-European debate about the
issues at stake.
We would also like to kindly thank Laurence Boone and Anna Lührmann for their trust and
support, and for the complete independence we had in carrying out our work.
The Group's work has received logistical and financial support from the following
organisations to which its members belong:
 - Bertelsmann Stiftung
 - CEPS (Brussels)
 - CEVIPOF, Centre for Political Research at Sciences Po (Paris)
 - College of Europe (Bruges)
 - German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
 - Jacques Delors Institute (Paris) and Jacques Delors Center (Berlin)

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© MEAE - septembre 2023. Impression : DIL, reprographie de La Courneuve.