PLOS ONE

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing

platform: A hybrid sharing mode
Tingting Tang ID*
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, People’s Republic of
China

* [email protected]

Abstract
With the rapid development of global technology, many firms have entered the product-shar-
ing market, where business-to-consumer (B2C), peer-to-peer (P2P), and hybrid rental ser-
vices are the three most common business models. The difference between these models
lies in the product provider. The product provider in B2C mode is enterprises, while in P2P
a1111111111
mode, individuals provide the products, and both enterprises and individuals provide the
a1111111111
a1111111111 products in hybrid mode. We employ a game model to analyze the influence of a B2C plat-
a1111111111 form introducing P2P sharing service by comparing the profit of the platform and the original
a1111111111 equipment manufacturer (OEM) under each of the three models. Our findings indicate that
introducing P2P service always benefits the B2C platform but sometimes harms the OEM.
Our findings also indicate that as the quality of the platform’s products improves, the profit
improvement brought to the B2C platform by introducing P2P sharing decreases. We find
OPEN ACCESS that the impact of introducing P2P service also varies with consumer behaviors. For exam-
Citation: Tang T (2022) Introducing P2P service to ple, with increasing consumer usage level, the B2C platform’s profit improvement brought
a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode. by introducing P2P sharing increases. Furthermore, we determine the optimal pricing strate-
PLoS ONE 17(12): e0279615. https://doi.org/ gies of the OEM and sharing platform in B2C mode and in hybrid mode.
10.1371/journal.pone.0279615

Editor: Hua Wang, Victoria University, AUSTRALIA

Received: July 19, 2022

Accepted: December 9, 2022

Published: December 30, 2022 1. Introduction

Copyright: © 2022 Tingting Tang. This is an open As sustainability becomes more important, consumers have explored more effective ways of
access article distributed under the terms of the using resources and products. Collaborative consumption is one way to improve sustainability.
Creative Commons Attribution License, which In the context of consumer-owned products not being fully used, an increasing number of
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and platforms are entering the product-sharing market. The sharing economy can help consumers
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
who own products obtain a portion of the benefits through sharing transactions when the
author and source are credited.
products are underutilized, while consumers who do not own products trade to meet their
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are own needs. Many sharing models do not allow changes in the commodity’s ownership; they
within our paper.
only share the commodity’s usage right. The sharing economy prioritizes usage rights over
Funding: The author received no specific funding ownership.
for this work. As the sharing economy increasingly grows, platforms have adopted various business mod-
Competing interests: The authors have declared els, among which the three most common are B2C, P2P, and hybrid rental services. (1) In the
that no competing interests exist. Business-to-Consumer (B2C) mode (e.g., Hello-bike), merchants or enterprises directly

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

provide services or items to users. (2) In the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) mode (e.g., Uber), the rental
products are owned by the platform’s individual product owners, and the renters are the plat-
form’s individual users. (3) In the Hybrid mode (e.g., GoFun), both enterprises and individual
owners provide services or items to users. Due to the common use of all three models, it is
worthwhile to study how these sharing business models impact the market.
GoFun was founded as a B2C car rental sharing platform by the Shouqi Group, offering car
rental services using cars provided by Shouqi. In September 2019, it introduced its P2P sharing
service, which means the rental cars could also be provided by buyers of Shouqi Automobiles.
With this change, GoFun transformed into a hybrid mode platform in which the rental cars
come from both car companies and private car owners. Along with the sharing model change
that Gofun has adopted came an adjustment to its rental car prices, illustrating that changes in
the sharing mode will bring about changes in pricing strategies. We are curious about why
GoFun introduced the P2P service and what impact the introduction had on GoFun, the
Shouqi Group, and consumers. We investigate the following questions in this paper: (1) How
does introducing a P2P sharing service affect a B2C sharing platform? (2) What factors influ-
ence a B2C sharing platform’s introduction of P2P sharing service, such as consumer prefer-
ences regarding rent and product quality? (3) What are the optimal pricing strategies for the
OEM and platform in B2C mode and in hybrid mode?
Our investigation yielded interesting results. Introducing P2P service always benefits the
B2C platform but sometimes harms the OEM. When consumer usage is high, the introduction
of P2P sharing service will harm the OEM’s profits. The OEM’s profit margin increases when
the product’s competition is greater because introducing P2P sharing will increase the rental
utility for purchasing consumers, and it also improves the demand for the OEM’s product.
The lower the quality of the platform’s products, the lower the OEM’s profit margin. This hap-
pens because P2P sharing encroaches on the demand for purchasing. The increase in the plat-
form profit margin occurs when the platform’s product advantage decreases. On the contrary,
the platform profit margin decreases when the platform’s product advantage increases.
Overall, our paper makes three contributions. First, we introduce P2P sharing service to the
B2C sharing platform and employ a game model to analyze the consequences. As shown in
later sections, this model considers the consumer usage level and rental discount. Second, we
show that when the usage level is not too high, both the OEM and platform can get higher
profits in hybrid mode. Finally, this paper contrasts the B2C mode with the hybrid mode by
considering changes in the participants’ profits.

2. Literature review
Numerous theoretical studies have focused on the sharing economy [1–3]. Our paper relates
to three streams of the sharing economy research: development and benefits, operation mod-
els, and pricing strategies (Table 1). Our goal is to highlight the significance of our work by
reviewing, summarizing, and analyzing previous research efforts.

Table 1. Contributions and differences from previous literature.

Category Contribution of our work Other Literature
Development and benefits of the Studies a sharing scenario consisting of an OEM and a Discusses the challenges and opportunities presented by the sharing
sharing economy sharing platform with B2C and hybrid modes. economy from both macro and micro perspectives.
Operation models in the sharing Studies the pricing strategy for a B2C platform introducing Examines issues under the sharing economy operating model from
economy P2P sharing service. different perspectives.
Pricing strategies Studies the situation assuming rental and purchase options Focuses on pricing strategy in different scenarios.
in the sharing economy.
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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

The first stream focuses on literature about the development and benefits of the sharing
economy in various scenarios [4–6]. After Felson and Spaeth [7] proposed the concept of the
sharing economy, interest in it spread to all aspects of society, and it attracted increasing atten-
tion among scholars. Some scholars have used empirical methods to conduct research, such as
Sundararajan [8], who considered how this new model benefits the future of economic growth.
Others used modeling methods to study, such as Jiang and Tian [9], who found that transac-
tion costs in sharing markets had nonmonotonic effects on firm profits. The characteristics of
the sharing economy were also described by scholars at the beginning of its development. Bots-
man and Rogers [10] considered the sharing economy to have three characteristics: the acqui-
sition of products or services without owning the assets, the redistribution of goods, and the
exchange of intangible assets. Based on these characteristics, Acquier et al. [11] elaborated on
the contradictory and controversial nature of the sharing economy, providing an organiza-
tional framework with three basic cores. They demonstrated how each core has different
promises and paradoxes.
In addition to empirical research methods, scholars use mathematical modeling methods to
conduct research in this field and investigate the impact on ownership, usage, social welfare,
and sharing platforms. Focusing on consumer behavior, Benjaafar et al. [12] solved the supply
and demand matching problem in a two-sided market. Xie and Sun analyzed the impact of dif-
ferent service stages on customer satisfaction by characterizing perceived quality [13]. Focus-
ing on service, studies have researched cloud service [14], investigated secure m-services [15],
and designed a generic Internet of Things architecture for scalable service cooperation [16].
Recommendation services for privacy-preserving tasks is also studied [17, 18]. Some studies
used an intergenerational overlap model to analyze product pricing in the presence or absence
of sharing. For example, Weber [19] modeled the impact on ownership demand, product
prices, and returns of all participants, and Feng et al. [20] investigated the effects on luxury
brands. The preceding literature discusses the challenges and opportunities presented by the
sharing economy from both macro and micro perspectives, as well as the impact on society,
enterprise production, and consumption, which reflects the sharing economy’s broad develop-
ment prospects and academic research prospects. In our work, we study a sharing scenario
consisting of an OEM and a sharing platform with B2C and hybrid modes.
The second stream explores operation models in the sharing economy, such as B2C mode,
P2P mode, and hybrid mode [21, 22]. Abhishek et al. [23] firstly investigated the interaction of
rental markets and OEMs in the P2P mode under alternative market structures. They focused
on OEM pricing in the sharing economy from the standpoint of consumer usage heterogeneity
decision-making and the business model choice of the manufacturer. Studying social welfare,
Jiang and Tian [24] conducted extensive research investigating the impact of sharing platforms
on manufacturers, consumers, and social welfare. Furthermore, Tian and Jiang [25] analyzed
the issue from a channel perspective, arguing that P2P product sharing benefits retailers more
than manufacturers. Tian et al. [26] also considered the entry of a manufacturer into the prod-
uct sharing market. According to this paper, the production cost and C2C (Customer-to-Cus-
tomer) shared transaction cost are the most important factors in determining the optimal
usage quantity. Similarly, Wang et al. [27] characterized consumer heterogeneity along two
dimensions—consumer usage level and product value preference—to study the impact of P2P
sharing on enterprise participation in product sharing and enterprise product quality strategic
decision-making.
Then, Bardhi and Eckhardt [28] conducted empirical research on Zipcar consumers, argu-
ing that the sharing platform is critical to the sharing economy model. Later, scholars consid-
ered the competitive environment. For example, Guo et al. [29] empirically evaluated the
impact of market entry of car-hailing platforms on new car purchases in the presence of

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

platform competition. Additionally, Bryan and Gans [30] examined competition among ride-
sharing platforms that compete on price and wait times induced by idle drivers. These articles
examine issues under the sharing economy operating model from different perspectives. How-
ever, we study the pricing strategy on a B2C platform that has introduced a P2P sharing
service.
The third stream addresses the specific topic of pricing strategies. This topic has gained
extensive attention recently, including research on static and dynamic pricing strategies in
competitive scenarios [31–36]. Xie and Sirbu [37] firstly studied incumbents’ and latecomers’
dynamic pricing behavior. Considering competition as well, Alptekinoğlu and Corbett [38]
studied the competition between two multiproduct companies (mass customization and mass
production) with different production technology. Similarly, scholars have studied markets in
which customers have different preferences for product attributes. For example, Mendelson
and Parlaktürk [39] focused on the competition of prices and product types between tradi-
tional manufacturing enterprises and personalized customization manufacturing enterprises.
They analyzed the characteristics of duopoly competition between them and compared it with
monopolistic competition.
Based on consumer preference, Porteus et al. [40] studied three scenarios: high-to-low cus-
tomer arrival order (the later customers arrive, the lower their willingness to pay), independent
order (customers’ arrival times are independent of their willingness to pay), and low-to-high
customer arrival order (the later customers arrive, the higher their willingness to pay). They
analyzed product differentiation competition and pricing decision problems for leaders and
followers in the market. Also considering different products, Subramaniam and Gal-Or [41]
extended the standard Hoteling model of product differentiation. They focused on the prob-
lem of quantity discounting in differentiated consumer product markets. Similarly, Nasser and
Turcic [42] used the Hoteling model as a benchmark to analyze a multistage game under a
duopoly from the perspective of commitment decision-making. The symmetrical equilibrium
allows two companies to avoid the intense price competition associated with low product dif-
ferentiation. For asymmetric firms, Wu and Lai [43] considered price competition in a multi-
stage game. This research shows that launching new products later than competitors is often a
dominant strategy for companies. The above studies all focus on pricing strategy in different
scenarios, whereas we study the situation under the rental and purchase options of the sharing
economy.
Our research analyzes why a B2C sharing platform introduces P2P sharing service. In other
words, why will a sharing platform adopt the hybrid sharing mode of including B2C and P2P
sharing service? This paper differs from other research in the following ways. First, we analyze
the B2C sharing mode, and we concentrate on the platform rather than the OEM. Second, we
explore the optimal pricing decisions of the platform and OEM in B2C sharing mode and
hybrid sharing mode. Third, in an extension, we further consider the situation of the platform
deciding the rental price. This broadens the applicability of our management discoveries.

3. Model and analysis

The market contains one B2C sharing platform (labeled P). It has its own product (Product 2)
for sharing-rental, the quality of which is λ(λ2(0,1)). A competing OEM (labeled O) is also in
this market, and it produces Product 1 for selling, the quality of which is normalized to 1. A
unit of Product 1 produced by the OEM costs c1. The cost of the sharing platform to own its
unit product is c2. We assume that c1, c22(0,1).
We consider a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their product quality
preference θ(θ~U[0,1]). The total number of consumers is normalized to 1. We use u(u2(0,1))

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

to describe the product’s use frequency per consumer, also called the usage level, and we
assume it is homogeneous. When a consumer (she) rents a product, she will have a discount β
(β2(0,1)) on the rental product’s quality. Factors such as her lack of ownership of the product
and the inconvenience of using the rental product will make her perceive the quality of the
product at a discount compared to buying the product. This means her valuation of renting a
product is lower than her valuation of buying the same product.
In the case of no P2P sharing service (case N), a consumer who wants to use the product
has two choices: one is spending p to buy (B) a Product 1 from the OEM, and the other is
spending r2 to rent (R) a Product 2 from the B2C sharing platform.
In the presence of P2P sharing service (case P), a consumer who wants to use the product
has one more choice: using r1 to rent a Product 1 from the sharing platform with P2P sharing.
The model of Jiang and Tian [24] assumes that demand and supply are balanced in the P2P
sharing market through a market-clearing price, as does our model. The rent is r1 per unit,
and that is decided with no matching friction. Typically, the platform sets a commission t as a
service charge, where t<r1, so that owners can get r1−t income by renting out one unit of
usage. This paper’s key notation is summarized in Table 2.

3.1 Benchmark: B2C sharing scenario (case N)

In this section, we consider case N, in which the platform only uses the B2C sharing mode (Fig
1). We assume that the platform provides unlimited products to meet all needs. When the con-
sumer buys Product 1, her utility can be expressed as U1NB ¼ uy p. For renting Product 2,
her utility is U2NR ¼ uðbyl r2 Þ. For choosing the outside option, her utility is normalized to
0.
Based on the parameter θ, the population can be segmented into owners, renters, and nei-
ther. By considering U1NB > U2NR and U1NB > 0, we can determine that the owners will be the
p ur2
consumers with y > uð1 blÞ
. By considering U1NB < U2NR and U2NR > 0, we can get the renters
p ur2 r2
will be the consumers with uð1 blÞ
> y > bl , and the rest of the consumers choose an external

Table 2. Summary of notation.

Notation Description
i = B, R Buy or Rent
j = 1,2 Product 1 or Product 2
m = N, P, D, E Case N or case P or case D or case E
n = O, P OEM or Platform
θ Consumer’s product quality preference, θ~U[0,1]
u Product usage level, u2(0,1)
β Consumer value discounts on the quality of rental products, β2(0,1)
λ Quality of platform’s own products, λ2(0,1)
p Price of OEM’s product
r1 OEM’s product sharing price (rental price)
r2 Platform’s own product sharing price (rental price)
t Transaction service fee for each unit rent out of the platform’s own products
c1 Cost of OEM’s product, c12(0,1)
c2 Cost of platform’s product, c22(0,1)
mi
U j Consumer’s utility of i Product j in case m
Dmi
j Consumer’s demand of i Product j in case m
m
P n Profit of n in case m
�
Equilibrium (optimal) results
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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

Fig 1. Model structure of benchmark.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.g001

p ur2
option. Therefore, the demand to own Product 1 is DNB
1 ¼ 1 uð1 blÞ
, and the demand for rent-
NR p ur2 r2
ing Product 2 is D 2 ¼ uð1 blÞ bl
.
In this basic model, the question is how the OEM should optimally price its products. The
� �
p ur2
profit of the OEM is PNO ¼ ð p c1 Þ 1 uð1 blÞ
. The platform profit is
� �
p ur2 r2
PNP ¼ ðr2 c2 Þ uð1 blÞ bl
.
Lemma 1. In case N, when the OEM and platform are in the B2C sharing scenario, the
�
OEM’s optimal selling price pN , the demands DNB�
1 and DNR� N�
2 , the profit of the OEM PO , and
the profit of the platform PN�
P are as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Equilibrium results in B2C sharing scenario (case N).

Variable Value
�
pN c1 þuð1 blþr2 Þ
2

DNB�
1
u ubl c1 þur2
2uð1 blÞ

DNR�
2
blðu ublþc1 Þþuð 2þblÞr2
2ublð1 blÞ

PN�
O
ðc1 þuð 1þbl r2 ÞÞ2
4uð1 blÞ

PN�
P
ðr2 c2 Þðblðu ublþc1 Þþuð 2þblÞr2 Þ
2ublð1 blÞ

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.t003

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

The proofs of all lemmas and propositions in this paper are provided in the S1 Appendix.
We analyze the results in the equilibrium solution in Section 4.

3.2 Hybrid sharing scenario (case P)

We have analyzed the prices, demands, and equilibrium outcomes for the benchmark case N.
In this section, we consider case P, where owners rent their products through the platform
when they are not using them (Fig 2). In case P, we study how P2P sharing affects the two com-
panies’ profits. We assume that the platform product’s sharing price r2 is exogenously deter-
mined to focus on the optimal price of Product 1. In Section 4, we will discuss the situation
when r2 is endogenous.
The consumer’s utility of buying Product 1 can be expressed as U1B ¼ uy þ ð1 uÞðr1
tÞ p. If she rents Product 1, her utility is U1R ¼ uðby r1 Þ.
Based on the parameter θ, the population can be segmented in equilibrium: By considering
U1 > U1R and U1B > 0, we find that consumers with y > pþtð1
B uÞ r1
uð1 bÞ
are owners. Considering
U1R > U2R and U1R > U1B shows that consumers with pþtð1
uð1
uÞ r1
bÞ
r1 r2
> y > bð1 lÞ
are renters for Prod-
r1 r2 r2
uct 1. Considering U2R > U1R and U2B > 0 shows that consumers with bð1 lÞ
> y > bl are renters
for Product 2. The remaining consumers choose external options.
We use P to indicate the market with P2P sharing service. The profit of the OEM is
� � � �
PO ¼ ð p c1 Þ 1 pþtð1
P uÞ r1
uð1 bÞ
. The platform profit is PPP ¼ tu pþtð1 uÞ r1
uð1 bÞ
r1 r2
bð1 lÞ
þ ðr2
� �
r1 r2 r2
c2 Þ bð1 lÞ bl
.
By matching the supply and demand of Product 1 ð1 uÞDB1 ¼ uDR1 , we can obtain the
ð 1þuÞðtþuð 1þbÞÞÞbð 1þlÞþu2 ð 1þbÞr2
sharing market clearing price: r1 ð p; t Þ ¼ ðp u2 ð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞ
.

Fig 2. Model structure of hybrid sharing scenario.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.g002

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

Table 4. Equilibrium results in hybrid sharing scenario (case P).

Variable Value
�
pP uðuþb ub blÞþ2uc1 þc2 þð 1þuÞr2
3u
�
tP uðuð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞÞþuc1 þ2c2 ð2þuÞr2
3ð 1þuÞu

r1P� bð 1þlÞðuðuð 1þ3uÞð 1þbÞ 2bþ2bl c1 Þþc2 Þþð3u3 ð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞþ2ubð 1þlÞÞr2
3ðu3 ð 1þbÞþubð 1þlÞÞ

DPB�
1
uðuð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞÞþuc1 c2 ð 1þuÞr2
3ðu2 ð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞÞ

DPR�
1
ð 1þuÞðuðuð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞÞþuc1 c2 ð 1þuÞr2 Þ
3ðu3 ð1 bÞþubð1 lÞÞ

DPR�
2
blðuðuð 1þ3uÞð 1þbÞ 2bþ2bl c1 Þþc2 Þ ð3u3 ð 1þbÞþblþubð 3þ2lÞÞr2
3ubðu2 ð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞÞl

PP�
O
ðuðuþb ub blÞ uc1 þc2 þð 1þuÞr2 Þ2
9ðu3 ð1 bÞþubð1 lÞÞ

PP�
P ðð u2 blðu þ b ub blÞ
2
ð9u3 ð 1 þ bÞ 9ub þ ð1 þ uð7 þ uÞÞblÞr2 2 þ ð9u3 ð 1 þ bÞ þ 2bl þ ubð 9 þ 7lÞÞc2 þ blð u2 c1 ð2uð 1 þ bÞ þ 2bð 1 þ lÞ þ c1 Þþ
uð uð 2 þ 9uÞð 1 þ bÞ þ 7b 7bl þ 2c1 Þc2 c2 2 Þ þ ðublð11u2 ð 1 þ bÞ þ 2uð1 þ bð 2 þ lÞÞ þ 7bð 1 þ lÞ þ 2ð 1 þ uÞc1 ÞÞ=ð9ubðu2 ð 1 þ bÞ þ bð 1 þ lÞÞlÞ

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.t004

To solve this optimization problem, we can substitute r1(p, t) into the above formulas and
consider the first-order condition with respect to p and t. This allows us to calculate the profits
and optimal prices of both parties.
Lemma 2. In case P, when the OEM and platform are in the hybrid sharing scenario, the
�
OEM’s optimal selling price pP , the OEM’s optimal retail price r1P� , the platform’s optimal ser-
vice charge tP, the demands (DPB� PR� PR� P�
1 ; D1 ; and D2 ), the OEM profit PO , and the platform
P�
profit PP are as shown in Table 4.
Lemma 2 shows that equilibrium solutions for both P2P sharing and B2C sharing exist. We
analyze the results under the equilibrium solution in Section 4.
We can substitute the equilibrium solution back into the profit functions, and the result is a
high-order analytical formula that is difficult to analyze theoretically. Therefore, to obtain
management inspiration, we use numerical analysis. The following subsection compares the
supply chain with and without P2P sharing service, and we analyze the impact on the B2C plat-
form and OEM.

4. Discussion and numerical analysis

In this section, we firstly analyze the results under the above two equilibrium solutions. Then,
we examine the impact of product sharing on the OEM profit and platform profit.
Proposition 1. In case N, when the OEM and platform are in the B2C sharing scenario:
N�
1. pN� ; DNB� NR�
1 , and PO increase in u, whereas D2 and PN�
P decrease in u.
�
2. pN decreases in β and in λ. When c1<ur2, DNB� 1 increases in β and in λ; when c1>ur2, DNB�1

decreases in β and in λ. When c1 > uð2þblð 4þblÞÞr2

b2 l2
; D NR�
2 and P N�
P increase in β and in λ;
P decrease in β and in λ. When c1>u(r2+1−βλ) or
uð2þblð 4þblÞÞr2
when c1 < b 2 l2
; DNR�
2 and PN�
c1<u(r2−1+βλ), P increases in β and in λ; when u(r2−1+βλ)<c1<u(r2+1−βλ), PN�
N�
O O
decreases in β and in λ.
In a two-player supply chain, the impact of the OEM decision-making on a supply chain
using P2P mode has been shown in the literature. Whether the same conclusions hold when
the platform can make the decisions is not obvious, but our research will unveil these results.
Proposition 1 (1) shows that when the usage level u increases, the OEM profit rises in the
�
B2C sharing mode. This happens because both the Product 1 price pN and the demand for

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

owning it DNB�1 increase as the usage level increases. Moreover, the demand for renting Product
2 DNR�
2 and the platform profit PN�
P decrease in the usage level u.
Proposition 1 (2) shows that depending on the quality of Product 2 λ and the rental dis-
count β, B2C sharing can result in either lower or higher OEM profit PN� O and platform profit
N�
PP . When the cost of Product 1 c1 is sufficiently low, the platform’s profit decreases when
either β or λ increases. When the cost of Product 1 c1 is moderate, the profit of the OEM PN� O
�
decreases with increasing β or λ. Moreover, the price of Product 1 pN is decreasing in both λ
and β. The fact that the ownership of Product 1 DNB� 1 increases or decreases in the quality of
Product 2 λ and the rental discount β is perhaps surprising. It shows that an increase in the
value of renting Product 2 (λ or β) is likely to lead to less demand for this product DNB�
1 when
the cost of Product 1 c1 is high. This can be explained as follows. The increase in Product 2’s
quality λ will intensify the competition between the two products, so the OEM’s equilibrium
�
price pN will be set lower to increase competitiveness. When the cost is high, having only the
usage of Product 2 increase is nonsense because increased usage through buying Product 1
leads to less demand for Product 2 DNR� 2 . In contrast, when the cost is low, the competitiveness
of Product 1 can be increased by price reduction, but Product 2 achieves no better competi-
tiveness by improving usage value (quality λ or rental discount β). In the following, we discuss
the question of whether hybrid sharing reduces profits.
Proposition 2. In case P, when the OEM and platform are in the hybrid sharing scenario:
�
1. pP increases in u. When c1 < ð4u 2Þðr2 c2 Þ
u2
þ1 bl þ r2 ; t P� increases in u; when c1 >
ð4u 2Þðr2 c2 Þ
u2
þ1 bl þ r2 ; tP� decreases in u.
� � � �
2. When u<1−λ, pP and tP increase in β; when u>1−λ, pP and tP decrease in β.
� �
3. pP and tP decrease in λ.
Proposition 2 (1) shows how changes in the exogenous parameter impact the decision vari-
�
ables under hybrid sharing. As the usage level u increases, the price of Product 1 pP increases.
�
Depending on the cost of Product 1 c1, the commission of P2P sharing tP can be either lower
�
or higher. When the cost c1 is sufficiently high, the commission tP decreases with increasing
u.
Proposition 2 (2) shows that when the usage level u is sufficiently high, the price of Product
P� �
1 p and the commission tP decrease when the rental discount β decreases. In this case, the
lower usage level means lower use frequency. When the frequency of use is lower, consumers
�
are more inclined to rent rather than buy. Also, the price of Product 1 pP and the commission
� �
tP decrease as the quality of Product 2 λ increases. The reason that pP is decreasing in λ can
be explained as follows. The Product 2 quality increase means the Product 2 usage value
increases, so the competition between Product 1 and Product 2 intensifies. To improve the
competitiveness of Product 1, the OEM must lower its price to maximize profit, which is mani-
�
fested as a decrease in pP .
We substitute the equilibrium solution back to the profit functions, and each result is a
high-order analytical formula, which is difficult to analyze theoretically. Therefore, to obtain
management insights, we use numerical analysis.
Let DP1O denote the difference in the OEM profits PP�O PN�
O . We denote the difference in
P� N� 1
platform profits PP PP as DPP . Fig 3 summarizes the profit comparison under different
exogenous parameters.
Fig 3 depicts the profit gaps (between hybrid mode and B2C mode) of the OEM and the
platform as parameters u, β, and λ vary. When the curve is over the abscissa, the margin is pos-
itive, which is when the OEM or platform prefer the hybrid mode. The following summarizes

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Fig 3. Impact of exogenous variables on ΔΠ 1O and ΔΠ 1P :. (a) Impact of u, (b) Impact of β, (c) Impact of λ.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.g003

how profits, prices, and demands under B2C mode compare to those under hybrid mode to
explain the figures above.
First, we analyze the effect of usage level u on the profit margin, as seen in Fig 3(A). As the
usage level u increases, the increase in profit from the platform’s P2P sharing DP1P is on the
rise because renting Product 1 brings more revenue to the platform. The OEM profit margin
DP1O decreases because P2P sharing brings more choices and encroaches on the profits of the
OEM. Although the OEM’s profit is also increasing in hybrid mode, it does not increase as sig-
nificantly as under B2C mode. As a result, the profit margin decreases. We can interpret the
image in more depth by analyzing the change in profit of B2C mode and hybrid mode sepa-
rately. Under B2C mode, as the usage level rises, the OEM profit rises and the platform profit
falls because when the usage level is high, consumers prefer to own the product rather than
rent. With P2P sharing, as the usage level increases, more consumers buy Product 1, which
increases corporate profit. P2P sharing service brings more rentable products to the P2P rental
market for Product 1, greatly increasing the platform’s service fee income.
Next, we analyze the effect of rental discount β on the profit margin, which is illustrated in
Fig 3(B). With the improvement of rental discount β, the profit increase brought by the plat-
form’s P2P sharing declines, which is equivalent to increasing the platform’s product value.
P2P sharing makes the platform’s profit DP1P smaller because the competition between rented
and purchased products becomes more intense. The increase in the OEM profit margin DP1O
is due to the increase in rental income from purchased products, which promotes the purchase
of products and increases the income from the sale of products. Through analysis of the plat-
form and OEM profits in the two modes, we have a more detailed understanding: Under B2C
mode, the OEM profit falls as the rental discount rises because when the platform’s product
rental discount increases, the OEM’s produce price and profit decrease due to increased com-
petition. In the presence of P2P sharing, as the rental discount increases, the OEM’s profit
decreases. Also, because the competition is more intense, both demand and optimal pricing
decrease. In particular, the profit of the platform fluctuates. Due to the increase in the quality
perception of rental Product 2, the revenue from the demand for renting increases. However,
the number of products available for rent becomes smaller, and the shrinking size of this part
of the market reduces revenue.
We now proceed to analyze the effect of quality difference λ on the profit margin, which is
illustrated in Fig 3(C). As the quality of Product 2 λ improves, the profit margin of the platform
DP1P decreases. Although the revenue of the rental business increases, the service fee revenue
is reduced. The increase in the OEM profit DP1O is due to the increase in rental income from
purchased products, which promotes the demand for owning products and increases income

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

from sales. Now let us conduct a more in-depth analysis of the image with the conclusions
obtained in Section 3. Under B2C mode, as the difference in product quality decreases, the
OEM profit decreases because the closeness of the quality intensifies the competition between
the two products. In the presence of P2P sharing, the amount by which the rising Product 2
quality improves the OEM’s profit decreases because the competition is more intense. Note
that the profit of the platform decreases. In particular, the revenue from Product 2 increases.
Intuitively, the revenue of Product 1 is reduced due to the decrease in the number of products
available for rent. The market for renting Product 1 is encroached upon by rentals of Product
2, and the final loss is not offset.
The increase in the OEM’s profit margin occurs when the product’s competition is greater
because the P2P sharing will increase the rental utility for purchasing consumers, and it also
improves the demand for Product 1 compared to the case of no P2P sharing. The more advan-
tageous Product 1 is to sell, the lower the OEM’s profit margin; this happens because the P2P
sharing takes away some of the market demand for purchases. The increase in the platform
profit margin occurs when the platform’s own product advantage decreases. Note that the plat-
form profit margin decreases when the platform’s own product advantage increases.

5. Extension: Endogenous rental price

As observed in practice, many platforms decide the rental price by themselves. In this exten-
sion, we study the situation where the platform can decide the rental price of its product. Paral-
leling the analysis of the main model, we first explore the results in the B2C mode (case D),
then solve the results of adding the P2P sharing (case E), and finally compare the two modes.

5.1 B2C sharing scenario (case D)

In this subsection, we analyze and discuss the robustness of letting r2 be a decision variable set
by the platform. The question is how the OEM can optimally price its product and how the
platform should set r2. Under this scenario, the OEM decides the price of Product 1 p, while
the platform decides the rental price of Product 2 r2.
Lemma 3. In case D, when the OEM and platform are in the B2C sharing scenario and
�
the platform decides the rental price, the OEM’s optimal selling price pD , platform’s optimal
D� D�
rental price r2D� , demands DDB�
1 and DDR�
2 , OEM profit PO , and platform profit PP are as
shown in Table 5.
Proposition 3. In case D, when the OEM and platform are in the B2C sharing scenario and
the platform decides the rental price:

Table 5. Equilibrium results in B2C sharing scenario with deciding r2 (case D).
Variable Value
�
pD 2c1 þuð2 2blþc2 Þ
4 bl

r2D� ublð 1þblÞ blc1 2uc2

uð 4þblÞ

DDB�
1
ð 2þblÞc1 þuð2 2blþc2 Þ
uð 4þblÞð 1þblÞ
DR� blðu ublþc1 Þþuð 2þblÞc2
D 2 ublð 4þblÞð 1þblÞ
D� ðð 2þblÞc1 þuð2 2blþc2 ÞÞ2
P O
uð 4þblÞ2 ð1 blÞ

PD�
P
ðblðu ublþc1 Þþuð 2þblÞc2 Þ2
u2 blð 4þblÞ2 ð1 blÞ

Lemma 3 shows that the equilibrium solution of the problem exists, and so we proceed to analyze the results under
the equilibrium solution.

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

1. pD� , DDB�
1 and PD� D� DR� D�
O increase in u, whereas r2 ; D2 , and PP decrease in u.
�
2. pD decreases in β and in λ. When c1 > uð4þblð 8þblÞþ2c2 Þ
4
; r2D� increases in β and in λ; when
uð4þblð 8þblÞþ2c2 Þ
c1 < 4
; r2� decreases in β and in λ.

3. pD� ; r2D� ; DDR�

2 and PD� DB�
P increase in c1, whereas D1 and PD�
O decrease in c1.

4. pD� ; r2D� ; DDB�

1 and PD� DR�
O increase in c2, whereas D2 and PD�
P decrease in c2.
�
Proposition 3 (1) shows that the Product 1 price pD , demand for buying Product 1 DDB� 1 ,
D�
and OEM profit PO all are increasing in the usage level u. In contrast, the rent for Product 2
D�
r2D� , demand for renting Product 2 DDR�
2 , and platform profit PP are all decreasing in the usage
level u. Compared to case N, where the platform cannot decide the rent of Product 2 r2, the
platform can raise its profit by setting r2.
�
Proposition 3 (2) shows that the price of Product 1 pD decreases in the rental discount β
and in Product 2’s quality λ. This can be explained as follows. When Product 2’s usage value
increases, the OEM will increase the competitiveness by reducing Product 1’s selling price to
obtain the optimal profit at equilibrium. Depending on the Product 1 cost c1, the rental price
r2D� can increase or decrease with the increase in the rental discount β and the Product 2 quality
λ. When the cost is sufficiently low, the fact that r2D� is increasing in β and in λ is perhaps sur-
prising as it shows that an increase in the product’s usage value can reduce its rental cost. This
is caused by changes in the demand for the product itself DDR� 2 and for its competitor DDB�
1 . The
pricing of a product is not only affected by the product itself but also by its demand. The fol-
lowing subsection discusses whether it is optimal to add P2P sharing in case D.
�
Proposition 3 (3) shows that the Product 1 price pD , rent for Product 2 r2D� , demand for
D�
renting Product 2 DDR� 2 , and platform profit PP are all increasing in Product 1’s cost c1. In
contrast, the demand for buying Product 1 DDB� 1 and the OEM profit PD� O are decreasing in
Product 1’s cost c1.
�
Proposition 3 (4) shows that the Product 1 price pD , rent for Product 2 r2D� , demand for
buying Product 1 DDB� 1 and OEM profit PD� O are all increasing in Product 2’s cost c2. In con-
trast, the demand for renting Product 2 DDR� 2 and the platform profit PD� P are decreasing in
Product 2’s cost c2.

5.2 Hybrid sharing scenario (case E)

In this subsection, we consider how P2P sharing in the B2C sharing mode impacts the equilib-
rium results with endogenous product rental price decisions. Our profit function and con-
sumer utility are expressed in the same way as in Section 3.2. In this scenario, the OEM
decides Product 1’s price p, while the platform decides both the rental price of Product 2 r2
and the transaction service fee t at the same time. By calculation, we can get the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. In case E, when the OEM and platform are in the hybrid sharing scenario and
�
the platform decides the rental price, the OEM’s optimal selling price pE ; OEM’s optimal retail
�
price r1E� ; platform’s optimal service charge tE ; platform’s optimal rent r2E� ; demands
E� E�
DEB� ER� ER�
1 ; D1 ; and D2 ; OEM profit PO ; and platform profit PP are as shown in Table 6.
Lemma 4 shows that the equilibrium solution of the problem exists, so we can analyze the
results under the equilibrium solution. Due to the complexity of the above results, we demon-
strate their properties by numerical analysis, with the results shown in Fig 4.
Fig 4 shows the OEM and platform profit curves with varying parameters u, β, or λ. From
Fig 4(A), we can easily find that both PE� E�
O and PP increase as the usage level u increases. The

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

Table 6. Equilibrium results in Hybrid sharing scenario with deciding r2 (case E).
Variable Value
�
pE ð4u3 ð 1þbÞ 4ubþð1þuÞ2 blÞc1 ðu2 ð 1þbÞþbð 1þlÞÞð2u2 ð 1þbÞþubð 2þlÞþbl ð1þuÞc2 Þ
6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞbl
�
tE 2uðu2 ð 1þbÞ bÞð uþð 1þuÞbÞþbðuð 1þð 1þuÞuð 1þbÞ bÞþbÞl b2 l2 þð2u3 ð 1þbÞþubð 2þlÞþblÞc1 þð ð 2þuÞðu2 ð 1þbÞ bÞþblÞc2
ð 1þuÞð6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞblÞ

r2E� ublðuþ4u2 ð 1þbÞþubð 2þlÞþ2bð 1þlÞþð 1þuÞc1 Þþð3u3 ð 1þbÞþblþubð 3þ2lÞÞc2

6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞbl

r1E� ubð 2u2 ð 1þbÞð 3þlÞþuð 1þbÞð 2þlÞ bð 4þlÞð 1þlÞþð 2þlþulÞc1 Þþð3u3 ð 1þbÞþbþubð 2þlÞÞc2
6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞbl

DEB�
1
uð2u2 ð 1þbÞþubð 2þlÞþblþ2uc1 ð1þuÞc2 Þ
6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞbl

DER�
1
ð 1þuÞð2u2 ð 1þbÞþubð 2þlÞþblþ2uc1 Þþð 1þu2 Þc2
6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞbl

DER�
2
ublðuþ2u2 ð 1þbÞþbð 2þlÞ ð1þuÞc1 Þþuð 3u2 ð 1þbÞ bð 3þlÞÞc2
blð6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞblÞ

PE�
O
uðu2 ð1 bÞþbð1 lÞÞð2u2 ð 1þbÞþubð 2þlÞþblþ2uc1 ð1þuÞc2 Þ2
ð6u3 ð 1þbÞ 6ubþð1þuð4þuÞÞblÞ2

PE�
P ðuðblð 4u2 ðu2 ð 1 þ bÞ bÞðu þ b
2
ubÞ þ ubð6u3 ð 1þ bÞ þ 4u4 ð 1 þ bÞ
2
6ub þ 4b2 þ u2 ð 1 8ð 1 þ bÞbÞÞl þ b2 ð b þ uð1 8b þ uð1 uð7 þ uÞ þ uð8 þ uÞbÞÞÞl2 þ ð1 þ uð3þ
2 2
uÞÞb3 l3 Þ ublð4u3 ð 1 þ bÞ 4ub þ ð1 þ uÞ blÞc21 blð4u3 ð 1 þ bÞ 4ub þ ð1 þ uÞ blÞc1 ð2u2 ð 1þ bÞ þ ubð 2 þ lÞ þ bl ð1 þ uÞc2 Þ þ c2 ðblð 2uðuð2 þ 7uð 1 þ bÞÞ 7bÞ �
ðu2 ð 1 þ bÞ bÞ þ bð3b þ uð 1 þ u þ 18b þ u2 ð17 þ 3u 3ð6 þ uÞbÞÞÞl 2ð1 þ uð3 þ uÞÞb2 l2 Þþ
2 2
ð9uðu2 þ b u2 bÞ þ 2ð1 þ uð5 þ uÞÞðu2 ð 1 þ bÞ bÞbl þ ð1 þ uð3 þ uÞÞb2 l2 Þc2 ÞÞÞ=ðblð6u3 ð 1 þ bÞ 6ub þ ð1 þ uð4 þ uÞÞblÞ Þ

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.t006

reason the OEM’s profit PE�O rises is that as the product’s frequency of use increases, the Prod-
uct 1 price and demand both increase. The reason for the rising platform profit PE� P is more
complex. First, we analyze the gain from renting Product 2, which is declining. In detail, as the
frequency of use increases, the consumers’ desire to rent decreases. To slow the decline in the
rental demand for Product 2, its rental price decreases. Next, we analyze the commission
income obtained by the Product 1 rental, which is rising. As the frequency of use increases, the

O and Π P . (a) Impact of u, (b) Impact of β, (c) Impact of λ, (d) Impact of

Fig 4. Impact of exogenous variables on Π E� E�

c1, (e) Impact of c2.

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

increase in the Product 1 purchase volume drives down its rental price, which in turn drives
the increase in its rental demand. Finally, we combine the above analyses to characterize the
results of the struggle between the incomes of Products 1 and 2; the former is higher than the
latter, so the platform’s income shows an upward trend.
Fig 4(B) shows that as the rental discount β increases, the platform profit PE� P increases and
the OEM profit PE� O decreases. The reason for the reduced OEM profit P E�
O is that as the fre-
quency of use by consumers increases, Product 1’s price rises and the demand for it increases.
As the consumers’ perception of the value of rented products increases, the demand for pur-
chased products declines. To slow down the downward trend in demand, the Product 1 price
decreases. To better illustrate this phenomenon, we divide the analysis of platform profit PE� P
into two parts. First, we analyze the gain from renting Product 2, which is higher. We see that
as the rental discount increases, consumer desire to rent increases. The Product 2 rental
demand increases, so its rental price also increases. Next, we analyze the commission income
obtained by Product 1 rentals, which first increases and then decreases. In detail, as the rental
discount increases, the higher rental value of Product 1 causes fewer purchases of Product 1.
Note that the rental price of Product 1 rises, and Product 1’s rent demand falls. When the
rental discount is small, increasing the price has a greater impact on profit. Overall, the Prod-
uct 1 rental income first increases and then decreases. Finally, we combine the above analysis
to characterize the struggle between the incomes of Products 1 and 2; the latter is higher than
the former, so the income of the platform rises.
Fig 4(C) shows that as the Product 2 quality λ increases, the platform profit PE� P increases
and the OEM profit PE� O decreases. The reason for the OEM profit P E�
O drop is that as Product
2’s quality increases, the Product 1 price and demand both increase. Next, we analyze the rea-
sons for the change in platform profit PE� P ; as before, we look at it from two aspects. First, we
analyze the gain from renting Product 2, which is up. Specifically, as the Product 2 quality
increases, its rental demand increases, and its rental price also increases. Second, we analyze
the revenue portion from renting Product 1, which is declining. In detail, as the quality of
Product 1’s competing products increases, the rental demand for Product 1 decreases. Because
Product 1 competes with the platform’s product, the rental service fee set by the platform
increases. The increase in fees is lower than the decrease in demand. To finish, we combine the
above analyses to characterize the outcome of the struggle between the incomes of Products 1
and 2; the latter is higher than the former, so the platform’s income rises.
Fig 4(D) shows that as Product 1’s cost c1 increases, the platform profit PE� P and OEM profit
PE�
O decrease. The reason for the OEM profit P E�
O drop is that as Product 1’s cost increases,
Product 1’s price increases, and this reduces the demand for buying Product 1. Next, we ana-
lyze the reasons for the change in platform profit PE� P ; as before, we look at it from two aspects.
First, we analyze the gain from renting Product 2, which is up. Specifically, as the Product 1
cost increases, its rental demand increases, and its rental price also increases. Second, we ana-
lyze the revenue portion from renting Product 1, which is declining. In detail, as the cost of
Product 1 increases, the rental demand for Product 1 and the fee both decrease. Overall, the
total decrease in incomes from Product 1 is higher than the total increase in income from
Product 2, so the platform’s income falls.
Fig 4(E) shows that as Product 2’s cost c2 increases, the platform profit PE� P decreases and
the OEM profit PE� O increases. The reason the OEM profit P E�
O increases is that as Product 2’s
cost increases, the Product 1 price and demand both increase. Next, we analyze the reasons for
the change in platform profit PE� P ; as before, we look at it from two aspects. First, we analyze
the gain from renting Product 2, which is down. Specifically, as Product 2’s cost increases, its

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

Fig 5. Impact of exogenous variables on ΔΠ 2O and ΔΠ 2P :. (a) Impact of u, (b) Impact of β, (c) Impact of λ, (d), Impact
of c1, (e) Impact of c2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279615.g005

rental price increases, which leads to its rental demand decreasing. Second, we analyze the rev-
enue portion from renting Product 1, which is up. In detail, as the cost of Product 1 increases,
the rental demand for Product 1 increases. The rental service fee set by the platform decreases.
The decrease in fees is lower than the increase in demand. Overall, the decrease in incomes of
Product 1 is higher than the increase in income of Product 2, so the platform’s income
declines.
In the next subsection, we compare the equilibrium results in the previous two subsections
to gain managerial implications for platform mode selection.

5.3 Comparative analysis

We compare the two model cases in which the platform decides the rental price of Product 2
by considering the profit difference. Let DP2O denote the difference in the OEM profits PE� O
PD�
O and DP 2
P denote the difference in platform profits P E�
P P D�
P . Since the expressions of
profit are quite complicated, we use a set of typical values to analyze the properties of the two
modes; Fig 5 shows the results.
Fig 5 shows the profit curves as parameters u, β, λ, c1, and c2 vary. When the curve is over
the abscissa, the margin is positive, and the OEM or platform prefer the hybrid sharing mode.
From Fig 5, we can see that DP2P decreases in the usage level u, whereas DP2O increases. Also,
DP2P decreases in rental discount β, whereas DP2O increases in rental discount β. We note that
DP2P and DP2O both decrease in Product 2’s quality λ. Moreover, DP2P decreases in Product 1’s
cost c1, whereas DP2O increases. Also, DP2P and DP2O increase in Product 2’s cost c2.
An important implication from the above analysis is that P2P sharing can result in higher
OEM profit when the consumer usage level is low. Our findings indicate that when the rental
discount is smaller, adding P2P sharing benefits the B2C platform more. Our findings also
indicate that the sharing platform always benefits from hybrid sharing, and the platform

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

benefits more from adding P2P sharing when the quality difference between the platform’s
product and the OEM’s product is larger.

6. Conclusion
The sharing economy is booming in the fields of travel, residences, and clothing. Some plat-
forms use the B2C mode, such as Hello-bike, and some use the P2P mode, such as Uber. There
are also platforms employing the hybrid mode, such as Didi. Our research compares the B2C
mode and hybrid mode, examining the differences in optimal decision-making and profits of
the OEM and platform.
Our research reveals important and interesting results. First, introducing P2P service
always benefits the B2C platform but sometimes harms the OEM. When consumer usage is
high, introducing P2P sharing service will harm the OEM’s profits. Second, the profits of the
platform and OEM are significantly affected by the usage level of consumers, quality differ-
ences of market products, and consumers’ rental discounts for the valuation of rented prod-
ucts. The platform’s optimal choice between B2C mode or hybrid mode also depends on
changes in these factors. Specifically, when the usage level is low, the consumer rental discount
is large, and the quality of the two products is close, the OEM can obtain higher income using
B2C mode. When the usage level is high, the rental discount is small, and the quality difference
between the two products is great, the OEM profit will be damaged by switching to hybrid
mode. This finding may explain why the Didi platform uses the hybrid mode: handling
requests for both personal vehicles and platform vehicles: the quality of platform vehicles and
personal vehicles is relatively close, consumers have a good experience when riding a rental
vehicle, and the frequency of use of such vehicles is not high. Third, in some cases, compared
to in B2C mode, consumers have increased purchasing demand for the OEM’s product in
hybrid mode. Specifically, that demand increases when the usage level is low, the rental dis-
count is large, and the differences in product quality are small. Finally, our result shows that
when the platform can set the rental price, the platform is more inclined to choose the hybrid
mode, and the OEM will get more profit in hybrid mode.
While our research provides managerial implications for OEMs and platforms, certain limi-
tations suggest further study. First, our research does not consider competition among multi-
ple platforms. For example, three platforms currently provide sharing of bicycles in China:
Hello-bike, Meituan Bike, and Didi Bike. Whether the choice of mode makes a difference in
this competitive context is a question well worth investigating. Moreover, our research mainly
aims at the comparison of B2C mode and hybrid mode. If we study these issues from the per-
spective of P2P mode and hybrid mode, there may be different findings. Whether the findings
are analogous or dissimilar, they would have interesting practical implications.

Supporting information
S1 Appendix.
(DOCX)

Author Contributions
Writing – original draft: Tingting Tang.
Writing – review & editing: Tingting Tang.

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PLOS ONE Introducing P2P service to a B2C sharing platform: A hybrid sharing mode

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