The Nature of The Linguistic Sign by Saussure

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PART ONE
General Principles
Chapter I

NATURE OF THE LINGUISTIC SIGN

1. Sign, Signified, Signifier


Sone people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as
a naming-process only--a list of words, each corresponding to the
thing that it names. For example:

ARBOR

EQUOS

etc. etc.

This conception is open to criticism at several points. It assumes


that ready-made ideas exist before words (on this point, see below,
p. 111); it does not tell us whether a name is vocal or psychological
in nature (arbor, for instance, can be considered from either view
point); finally, it lets us assume that the linking of a name and a
thing is a very simple operation--an assumption that is anything
but true. But this rather naive approach can bring us near the
truth by showing us that the linguistic unit is a double entity, one
formed by the associating of two terms.
We have seen in considering the speaking-circuit (p. 11) that
both terms involved in the linguistic sign are psychological and are
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66 COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

united in the brain by an associative bond. This point must be


emphasized.
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept
and a sound-image.' The latter is not the material sound, a purely
physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the
impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory,
and if I happen to call it "material, " it is only in that sense, and by
way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept,
which is generally more abstract.
The psychological character of our sound-images becomes ap
parent when we observe our own speech. Without moving our lips
or tongue, we can talk to ourselves or recite mentally a selection of
verse. Because we regard the words of our language as sound
images, we must avoid speaking of the "phonemes" that make up
the words. This ternm, which suggests vocal activity, is applicable
to the spoken word only, to the realization of the inner image in
discourse. We can avoid that misunderstanding by speaking of the
sounds and syllables of a word provided we remember that the
names refer to the sound-image.
The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity that
can be represented by the drawing:

Concept
Sound
image

The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the
other. Whether we try to find the meaning of the Latin word arbor
or the word that Latin uses to designate the concept tree," it is
1The term sound-image may seem to be too restricted inasmuch as beside
the representation of the sounds of &word there is also that of its articulation,
the mucular image of the phonational act. But for F. de Saussure language is
essentially a depository, a thing received from without (see p. 13). The sound
image is par excellence the natural representation of the word as a fact of
potential language, outside any actual use of it in speaking. The motor side is
thus implied or, in any event, occupies only a gubordinate role with respect
to the sound-image. (Ed.]

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NATURE OF THE LINGUISTIC SIGN 67

clear that only the associations sanctioned by that langusge sppea


to us to conform to reality, and we disregard whatever others
might be imagined.
Our definition of the linguistic sign poses an important question
of terminology. I call the combination of a concept and a sound
image a sign, but in current usage the term generally designates
only &sound-image, &word, for example (arbor, eto.). One tends
to forget that arbor is called a sign only because it carries the con
cept "tree," with the result that the idea of the sensory part
implies the idea of the whole.

"tree"

arbor orbor

Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here


were designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the
others. I propose to retain the word sign (signe] to designate the
whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by
signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant]; the last two terms have
the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them
from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As
regards sign, if Iam satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not
know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting
no other.
The linguistic sign, as defined, has two primordial character
istics. In enuncisting them I am also positing the basic principles of
any study of this type.
2. Principle I: The Arbitrary Nature of the Sign
The bond between the signifier and the signiied is arbitrary.
Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of
the signifer with the signified, Ican simply say: the linguistic sign
is arbitrary.
The idea of "sister" is not linked by any inner relationship to
the succession of sounds &-ö-r which serves as its signifier in French;

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68 COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

that it could be represented equally by just any other sequence is


proved by differences among languages and by the very existence
of different languages: the signified ox" has as its signifer b-o-f
on one side of the border and o-k-s (Ochs) on the other.
No one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign,
but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its
proper place. Principle I dominates all the linguistics of language;
itsconsequences are numberless. It is true that not all of thenm are
equally obvious at first glance; only after many detours does one
discover them, and with them the primordial importance of the
principle.
One remark in passing: when semiology becomes organized as
a science, the question will arise whether or not it properly includes
modes of expression based on completely natural signs, such as
pantomime. Supposing that the new seience welcomes them, its
main concern will still be the whole group of systems grounded on
the arbitrariness of the sign. In fact, every means of expression used
in society is based, in principle, on collective behavior or-what
amounts to the same thing-on convention. Polite formulas, for
instance, though often imbued with a certain natural expressive
ness (as in the case of a Chinese who greets his emperor by bowing
down to the ground nine timnes), are nonetheless fixed by rule; it is
this rule and not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one
to use them. Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the
others the ideal of the semiological process; that is why language,
the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is als0
the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the
master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is
only one particular semiological system.
The word symbol has been used to designate the linguistic sign,
or more specifically, what is here called the signifier. Principle I in
particular weighs against the use of this term, One characteristic
of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary ; it is not empty,
for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier
and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not
be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a chariot.
The word arbürary also calls for comment. The term should not

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NATURE OF THE LINGUISTIC SIGN 69

imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker
(we shall see below that the individual does not have the power to
change a sign in any way once it has become established in the
linguistic community);I mean that it is unmotivated,i.e. arbitrary
in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified.
In concluding let us consider two objections that might be raised
to the establishment of Principle I:
1) Onomatopoeia might be used to prove that the choice of the
signifer is not always arbitrary. But onomatopoeic formations are
never organic elements of a linguistic system. Besides, their number
is much smaller than is generally supposed. Words like French
fouet 'whip' or glas 'knell' may strike certain ears with suggestive
sonority, but to see that they have not always had this property
we need only examine their Latin forms (fouet is derived from fagus
beech-tree,' glas from classicum 'sound of a trumpet'). The quality
of their present sounds,or rather the quality that is attributed to
them,is a fortuitous result of phonetic evolution.
As for authentic onomatopoeic words (e.g. glug-gug, tick-tock,
ete.), not only are they limited in number, but also they are chosen
somewhat arbitrarily, for they are only approximate and more or
less conventional imitations of certain sounds (cf. English bou-bow
and French ouaoua). In addition, once these words have been intro
duced into the language, they are to a certain extent subjected to
the same evolutionphonetic, morphological, ete.that other
words undergo (cf. pigeon, ultimately from Vulgar Latin pipio,
derived in turn from an onomatopoeic formation) : obvious proof
that they lose something of their original character in order to
assume that of the linguistie sign in general, which is unmotivated.
2) Interjections, closely related to onomatopoeia, can be at
tacked on the same grounds and come no closer to refuting our
thesis. One is tempted to see in them spontaneous expressions of
reality dictated, 8o to speak, by natural forces. But for most inter
jections we can show that there is no fixed bond between their sig
nified and their signifier. We need only compare two languages on
this point to see how much such expressions differ from one lan
guage to the next (e.g. the English equivalent of French aie! is
ouch!). We know, moreover, that many interjections were once

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70 COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

words with specifie meanings (cf. French diable! darn!' mordieu!


'golly! from mort Dieu 'God's death,' eto.).
Onomatopoeic formations and interjections are of secondary
importance, and their symbolic origin is in part open to dispute.
3. Principle II: The Linear Nature of the Signifier
The signifier, being auditory, is unfolded solely in time from
which it gets the following characteristics: (a) it represents &span,
and (b) the span is measurable in a single dimension;it is a line.
While Principle II is obvious, apparently linguists have always
neglected to state it, doubtless because they found it too simple;
nevertheless, it is fundamental, and its consequences are incal
culable. Its importance equals that of Principle I; the whole
mechanism of language depends upon it (see p. 122 f.). In contrast
to visual signifiers (nautical signals, ete.) which can offer simul
taneous groupings in several dimensions, auditory signifiers have
at their command only the dimension of time. Their elements are
presented in succession; they form a chain. This feature becomes
readily apparent when they are represented in writing and the
spatial line of graphic marks is substituted for succession in time.
Sometimes the linear nature of the signifier is not obvious. When
Iaccent a syllable, for instance, it seems that I am concentrating
more than one significant element on the same point. But this is an
illusion; the syllable and its accent constitute only one phonational
act. There is no duality within the act but only different op
positions to what precedes and what follows (on this subject, see
p. 131).
Cf. English goodness! and zounds! (from God's wounds). [Tr.]

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