SENATORS FRANCIS “KIKO” N. PANGILINAN, ET AL. VS. ALAN PETER S.

CAYETANO, ET Al., G.R. No. 238875 PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (PCICC) ET AL. VS OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL., G.R. NO. 239483, MARCH 16, 2021 (TREATIES)

DOCTRINE

Treaties may effectively implement the constitutional imperative to protect

human rights and consider social justice in all phases of development—but so can a
statute, as Republic Act No. 9851, the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, does.

The president, as primary architect of our foreign policy and as head of state, is
allowed by the Constitution to make preliminary determinations on what, at any given
moment, might urgently be required in order that our foreign policy may manifest our
national interest.

Absent a clear and convincing showing of a breach of the Constitution or a law,

brought through an actual, live controversy and by a party that presents direct, material,
and substantial injury as a result of such breach, this Court will stay its hand in
declaring a diplomatic act as unconstitutional.

FACTS
On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the
International Criminal Court. On March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of
Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de
Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March
17, 2018.
On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin
Drilon, Paolo Benigno Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros, and Antonio Trillanes IV
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,20 assailing the executive's unilateral act
of withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being unconstitutional. This Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 238875.
Meanwhile, on June 13, 2018, the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of
the International Criminal Court, and its members, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora
Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn Balais-Serrano, among others, also filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 239483.
 In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a treaty that the
Philippines validly entered into the Rome Statute "has the same status as an enactment
of Congress," as "a law in the Philippines." They claim that the President "cannot repeal
a law." They aver that the country's withdrawal from a treaty requires the concurrence of
at least two-thirds of the Senate.

In G.R. No. 239483, petitioner Philippine Coalition for the International

Criminal Court and its members assert that their rights to life, personal security, and
dignity were impaired by the withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Citing a decision of the
South African High Court, they also claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a
multilateral treaty require the Senate's concurrence. According to them, contrary to the
President's assertion, the Rome Statute is effective in Philippine jurisdiction by virtue of
the Constitution's incorporation clause, despite lack of publication.

ISSUE

Is the withdrawal of the Philippines by President Duterte from the International

Criminal Court valid and effective?

RULING

Yes, The International Criminal Court acknowledged the withdrawal of the

Philippines as effective and the Philippine laws did not provide any mechanisms or
conditions on how such withdrawal must be affected, therefore any manner of
withdrawal by the president is sufficient accordingly;

“On March 19, 2019, the International Criminal Court itself, through Mr. O-Gon
Kwon, the president of the Assembly of States Parties, announced the Philippines’
departure from the Rome Statute effective March 17, 2019. It made this declaration with
regret and the hope that such departure “is only temporary and that it will re-join the
Rome Statute family in the future.”

This declaration, coming from the International Court itself, settles any doubt on
whether there are lingering factual occurrences that may be adjudicated. No longer is
there an unsettled incident demanding resolution. Any discussion on the Philippines’
withdrawal is, at this juncture, merely a matter of theory. X x x Moreover, while its text
provides a mechanism on how to withdraw from it, the Rome Statute does not have any
proviso on the reversal of a state party’s withdrawal. We fail to see how this Court can
revoke-as what petitioners are in effect asking us to do-the country’s withdrawal from
the Rome Statute, without writing new terms into the Rome Statute.”
GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO VS. COMELEC, ET AL., GR 246679, MARCH 2,
2021 (COMELEC/PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION/EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)

DOCTRINE
When an elective local public officer is administratively dismissed his penalty
subsequently modified to another penalty the period of dismissal cannot just be
nonchalantly dismissed as a period for preventive suspension considering that, in fact,
his term is effectively interrupted. During said period, Tallado cannot claim to be
Governor as his title is stripped of him despite the pendency of his appeal. Neither does
he exercise the power of the office. Said title and power are already passed to the Vice
Governor. He also cannot claim that the exercise of his power is merely suspended since
it is not. Hence, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on the interruption of his term despite
the ex post facto redemption of his title following the OMB rule.
FACTS
The petitioner was duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte
in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016
terms. It is the turn of events in respect of the petitioner’s 2016-2019 term that has
spawned the controversy under review.
On November 4, 2015, several persons initiated cases against the petitioner. In
the decision dated April 18, 2016, and approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio
Morales on September 13, 2016, the OMB held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
and oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service.
The third OMB case concerned the petitioner’s re- assumption of the office of the
Governor after the CA had initially reduced the penalty imposed in the first OMB case to
suspension for six months. The complainant thereat initiated another complaint on the
basis that the petitioner had violated the first OMB decision by re-assuming office
without having fully served his suspension.
On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding the petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service.
On September 26, 2018, the CA ruled on the petitioner’s appeal by modifying the
penalty of dismissal to six months suspension.
On October 29, 2018, the DILG issued its memorandum directing the
implementation of the decision of the CA, and the reinstatement of the petitioner as
Governor if he had already served the six-month suspension.
On October 30, 2018, the petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of
Camarines Norte. In the meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Camarines Norte for the May 2019
elections.
 This prompted respondents Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to
file their separate petitions with the COMELEC praying for the denial of due course to
and/or for the cancellation of the petitioner’s COC, which petitions were consolidated
and predicated on the application of the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE
Whether or not a penalty of dismissal imposed on an elective official by the
Ombudsman which was later reduced to suspension by the Court of Appeals constitutes
to interruption of the term of office thereby circumventing the three-term limit rule as
provided by the Constitution.

RULING
Yes, Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while
interruption of the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position
equates to failure to render service.
The provision of the OMB’s Rules allowing the petitioner to re–assume on the
basis of the interim being considered as a period of preventive suspension after his
appeals resulted in the imposition of lesser penalties did not alter the reality that he had
actually been ousted from office. In other words, there was still an interruption of the
term of office. As aptly put in Latasa v. COMELEC, the interruption, to be considered as
interruption of the term, “contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”
Conformably with said ruling, the period during which the petitioner was not
serving as Governor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because
he had then ceased to exercise power or authority over the people of the province.
Indeed, it was Pimentel who then held title to the office and exercised the functions
thereof. As such, the petitioner did not fully serve his entire third term even if his re-
assumption to office subsequently occurred.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the resolution issued on March 29, 2019 by the Commission on Elections First
Division and the resolution issued on May 9, 2019 by the Commission on Elections En
Banc in SPA No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA No. 18- 137 (DC); DISMISSES the consolidated
petitions in SPA No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA No. 18-137 (DC) for the cancellation of
petitioner Edgardo A. Tallado’s Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Provincial
Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2019 Local Elections; DECLARES this decision
immediately executory; and ORDERS respondents Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro
M. Jalgalado to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
HO CHING YI VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 227600, JUNE
13, 2022 (NATURALIZATION)