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BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT

TASK FORCE IN WEST AFRICA

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 AFRICAN SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL JOURNAL
FACULTY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
IMO STATE UNIVERSITY
NIGERIA
VOL. 10 NO. 1 MARCH 2021
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK
FORCE IN WEST AFRICA
ADETAYO OLAMIDE SOWALE
Department of International Relations, McPherson University,
Ogun State
And
OLANIKE FOLUSO OROGUN
Department of International Relations, McPherson University,
Ogun State
Abstract
The study examines issues and challenges of security community with a particular
focus on the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MJTF) in combating Boko Haram
insurgency in West Africa. The choice to examine these armed forces against Boko
Haram is significant for a number of reasons. One, the threat of Boko Haram
insurgency in West Africa emanates from the inherited irregular and poorly
delineated colonial borders. Two, armed forces are deployed to safeguard the
territorial integrity and national borders of the affected countries against external
aggression. Third, issues of Boko Haram insurgency prominently features in the
bilateral relations of Nigeria and its neighbouring states. Fourth, the government of
Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad established MNJTF as a form of collective
security architecture against Boko Haram insurgency. Despite the establishment of
MJTF, Boko Haram continues to wreck devastations in the Northeast Nigeria and
other neighbouring states. Utilising secondary sources of data, the study concludes
defective bilateral relations of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBCs) countries
adversely affect the functionality of MNJTF. It is therefore recommended that Lake
Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs) need to correct problematic bilateral relations in order
to successfully combat Boko haram menace in the West Africasub-region.
Keywords: Security, Collective Security, Bilateral Relations, Multinational Joint Task
Force.

Introduction
The operations of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) since its creation
in 1998 and re-creation in 2014 have expanded to track Boko Haram's violent
extremism in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Musa, 2013). The MNJTF has
helped to minimize the corrosive attacks of Boko Haram and has rendered the
group toothless bulldogs with limited capacity to attacks Nigerians in the

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Northeast. The MNJTF, following those successes in its mission against Boko
Haram faces several challenges in combating violent extremism (Onuoha, 2014). It
is worth remembering that Boko Haram's explicit objectives is to destabilize the
regimes of the countries affected, enforce Sharia law and create a Caliphate in
their region of control. Commanding the attention of people especially youths as
foot soldiers is made easier by the extreme level of poverty, unemployment and
religious fundamentalism among the youth in the polity. Egoistic political
ambitions, porous borders, the acquisition and use of illicit wealth, poor handling
of crises and inadequate determination to check the sect's excesses also
prolonged the menace of violent attacks in the Northeast Nigeria. The choice to
examine issues and challenges of security community with a particular focus on
Multinational Joint Task Forces (MJTF) in West Africa is significant for a number of
reasons. One, the threat of Boko Haram insurgency in West Africa emanates from
the inherited irregular and poorly delineated colonial borders. Two, armed forces
are deployed to safeguard the territorial integrity and national borders of the
affected countries against external aggression.
Third, issues of Boko Haram insurgency prominently features in the
bilateral relations of Nigeria and its neighboring states. Fourth, the government of
Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad established MNJTF as a form of collective
security architecture against Boko Haram insurgency. Despite the fact that
governments of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger have significantly curbed
Boko Haram's operations, the sect still lingers to launch intermittent attacks
(Kindzeka, 2014).
The study concludes that defective bilateral relations of Lake Chad Basin
Commission (LCBCs) countries adversely affect the functionality of MNJTF. It is
therefore recommended that Lake Chad Basin Countries (LCBCs) need to correct
problematic bilateral relations in order to successfully combat Boko Haram’s
menace in the West Africa sub-region. It is argued that to completely annihilate
Boko Haram terrorist, bilateral relations must be straightened to ameliorate the
challenges that confront the Multinational Joint Task Force in the quest to
safeguard peace and security in West Africa.
Bilateral Relations of LBC Countries and the Challenges of Multinational Joint
Task Force
At the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria saw it as a
domestic imbroglio that does not require the mediation of other state-actors.
Neighbouring states of Lake Chad Basin saw it from that point of view as well
(Ifabiyi, 2013). Despite the fact that the MNJTF was set up as far back as 1994, it

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 ADETAYO OLAMIDE SOWALE & OLANIKE FOLUSO OROGUN
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK…………………….
didn't assume any dynamic role in combating Boko Haram insurgency with the
contribution of different countries until 2012 – four years after the Boko Haram
sect unleashed violent and psychological assaults on Nigeria polity (Kindzeka,
2014). The historical backdrop of security issues propels other states of LCB to
join the missions to keep the peace and stability of West Africa. If not for the
internationalisation of the violent attacks, Nigeria and other proximate would
have commonly not had anything to do with each other in finding lasting solution
to the issue of Boko Haram. Consequently, the established MNJTF does not
command the needed quality of trust between the LCB states (Ifabiyi,2013).
Nigeria finds it unpalatable and disturbing with the manner in which Chad
encouraged the inflow of monstrous arms and ammunition into its territory,
particularly from France and US. This made Nigeria be doubtful of Chad's
innocence concerning the mayhem caused by the insurgent’s goup. Be that as it
may, the most upsetting issue to Nigeria was the help that Chad got from
Mohammad Ghadafi's Libya. The Libyan chief was known in the course of his life
to be a genuine companion of Chad. Until his demise, the Libyan head progressed
in the direction of inciting Islamic movement in Nigeria; utilizing diverse Islamic
groups, most particularly a Libyan Muslim association known as Jam'yat ad-Da'wa
al-Islamiya (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The security difficulty compels Nigeria to
back United Nations Resolution Council 1973 (of 17 March 2011) which approved
every vital measure to ensure citizens' protection in the Libyan crises including
the need to cripple the hostility acts of the Libyan armed force. NATO's execution
of the Resolution led to the demise of Ghadafi on 20 October 2011 (Nte, 2011).
Chad assumed a spectator role as the Boko Haram sect inflicts agony on the
borders of West Africa: claimed to be uninformed of how the agitators utilized its
territory as refuge for damaging Nigeria's stability. In December 2011, the
administration of President Goodluck Jonathan acted on Section 305(1) of the
1999 Constitution to close Nigeria's borders with all its contiguous neighbors
aside from Benin Republic (Onuoha, 2013). In 2012, Nigeria's international
borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger were shut, in view of allegations that
Boko Haram individuals were utilizing these nations as hideout for violent
destruction in Nigeria. There was another border shutdown between Nigeria,
Cameroon, Niger and Chad in May 2013 (Kindzeka, 2014).
The fourth case was recorded in February 2014 when Nigeria completely
shut down it border zone with Cameroon in Adamawa State as a major step in the
direction to conquer the violent exercises of the Islamic fundamentalist in the
North-east. It was essentially intended to end illegal inflow of jihadist in and out

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of the nation (This day, 2014).In spite of counterterrorism measure, Boko Haram
insurgent still continues unabated. The alternative was to work together with the
nations to deal decisively with the Boko Haram insurgency.
As a result of Nigeria's constant accusation that its Francophone neighbors
were supporting Boko Haram, Cameroon and Chad began to take military
offensives against individuals from the group in their nations (Stohl and Tuttle,
2009). The other spurring factor was that the violent extremist had begun to
launch some shrewd assaults on residents of these francophone nations. Boko
Haram reacted by including these nations among its foes. This implied the
internationalization of the insurgency as it crossed borders to all the LCB nations
(Albert and Danjibo, 2004). The nations currently turned out to be progressively
prepared to counter terrorism cooperatively with Nigeria in the MNJTF. As it
were, the MNJTF as a security network didn't appear to help Nigeria essentially;
however it was to stand as collective’s armed force to safeguard LCB countries
against a common enemy (Liolio, 2013).
The old doubts between the nations still exist in spite of the presence of
the MNJTF. Nigeria doesn't trust either Cameroon or Chad; the nations also are
suspicious of Nigeria. This most likely obstructs the dedication of the nations to
the operation of the multilateral armed force (Agbiiboa, 2013). An instance of
disunity among the LCB countries was evident in the decision of MNJTF to target
December 2015 to completely get rid of Boko Haram sect, but by November 2015,
Chadian soldiers were yet to be deployed as a major aspect of around 8,700
soldiers that should make up the MNJTF. In his report on deployed multinational
armed forces, Olonisakin only mentioned that Nigerien soldiers have been
deployed against Boko Haram insurgency without mentioning soldiers from Chad
and Cameroon. This is concomitant to lack of commitment from side of Cameroon
and Chad (Information Nigeria, 2015).
Nigeria additionally frowns with Cameroon for pursuing Boko Haram sect
directly into the Nigerian territory. To Nigeria, it is a violation of the territorial
integrity. The nation would prefer a circumstance where the Islamic extremists
are pursued to the borderlines and the Nigerian soldiers are left to complete the
annihilation of the sect. Language differences among the soldiers in the MNJTF
are another clog in the wheel of battling Boko Haram insurgency (Roggio, 2015).
Nigerian Armed Forces are not French speakers and that other LCB armed forces
are francophone makes strategic planning and operation a difficult thing. A
security network incapable of self-funding is certifiably not solid and reasonable.
This is one of the principal issues considered by the MNJTF today (Eji, 2017).

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BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK…………………….
Security network in Africa is confronted with similar issue that forestalled either
the AU or RECs (ECOWAS and ECCAS) from doing what the MNJTF is currently
doing: protecting the nations from physical and psychological oppressors. In
February 2015, the Institute for Security Studies reviewed the operationalization
effort of the MNJTF. It was discovered that while the establishment of MNJTF was
prepared for the endorsement of the Peace and Security Council of the AU,
adequate finance remained the central challenge of the mission. To proffer
solution, the AU intended to address the issue of finance in March 2015 (Institute
for Security Studies 2015).
The Daily Post paper of 28 July 2016 announced a similar issue. Like the AU,
the UN was deficient of enough assets to aid the efficiency of the multilateral
security forces. This more likely than not hindered effective military activities or
restricted the degree to which the MNJTF could go (Albert,2009).
Challenges of Multinational Joint Task Force: Offshoot of Defective Bilateral
Relations
That the MNJTF is a fraction of a more extensive reaction to Boko Haram
insurgency renders it difficult to assess. Accomplishment against the devilish
insurgency group around Lake Chad Basin depends to a huge degree on the
approaches of affected states themselves, of which joint activities are just a single
part. The MNJTF scored a few triumphs against activists of the Islamic sect
(Assanvo et al 2016). It has on some occasions liberated people captured in the
territories controlled by insurgent groups. Through cooperation, Lake Chad Basin
states have enjoyed the opportunity to learn from one another, and work with
the guideline and framework for transnational collaboration against the Islamic
militant group (Thurson, 2017). Victories have, notwithstanding, been lost in a
short while due to the capacity of Boko Haram sect to adjust with the inconsistent
activities of joint security forces. The somewhat absence of ensuring security in
the courses of operations affords the jihadist groups the opportunity to pull and
reinforce their attacks (Audu and Manag,2017).
Contradictions among authorities of the four nations about whether Boko
Haram is a local or a basically Nigeria's peculiar issue is one major cause for the
protracted insurgency (Buchanan and Knoope 2017). Numerous senior military
actors and eyewitnesses in Chad, Niger and Cameroon consider their states to be
experiencing inadvertent blow-back; a difficulty that generally stems, in their
view, from Nigeria's ineptitude (Cave and David, 2016). Conversely, a portion of
their Nigerian partners highlight the foothold that Boko Haram has gained in
neighbouring nations as a sign of seriousness on the part of security agents,
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officers and other officials. The blame game among the countries (Nigeria, Niger,
Chad and Cameroon) undermines sub-regional solidarity and its ability to contain
the insurgency (Thurson, 2017).
The differing danger that Islamic extremist present to the four nations
likewise obstructs lucid regional partnership. In spite of the fact that the four
nations are battling a shared adversary, each country has sought after an
alternative arrangement of achieving the objective of conquering the insurgency,
which are themselves liable to change (Falode, 2016). The Nigerian government
have been combating extremist that controls vast areas of the nation's northeast.
Interestingly, Cameroon managed the trans-border threat, and in some occasion
thwarts a very much arranged and organised assaults on its border zones (Jacob
and Akpan, 2015). As far as it concerns, Chad has concentrated on occasional
encounters on the lake and securing flexible border routes through Cameroon.
Niger at diverse times, attempted to contain Boko haram attacks along its border
areas and, at times launched bigger offensives against the fundamentalist. The
unique targets muddle the multilateral reaction as officials from every nation
were on the mission with diverse strategies that lack the harmony to drive home
the desired result – from restricted containment task in one country to
continuous counter-terrorism in another (Kouma, 2017).
The deficient operation of MNJTF additionally mirrors the four nations'
fairly whimsical attitudes to battling Boko Haram. In the post 2016 and 2017
tasks, effort to launch a counter-attacks on the Boko Haram melted away for
almost two years. ISWAP's resurgence in late 2018 prompted another more
coordinated reaction, with the drawn out 2019 mission hailed by concerned
observers and MNJTF officials as a deviation from past short-lived efforts. But it is
far-fetched whether that activity did in certainty speak to a move in the right
direction for a more efficient participation, evident in intelligence sharing and
joint operations (Obialor and Ugochukwu, 2017). The reality of defective bilateral
relations became glaring in the unilateral Chadian counter-offensive strikes in
2020 against Boko Haram insurgency and the swift action the Chadian President
Idris Déby without the affected neighbouring Lake Chad Basin Countries
delineate the steady troubles states have in cooperating (Okolie and
Ugwuweze2015).
There are difficulties with both hardware and work force. Disagreements
about financing have regularly hindered the conveyance of vital equipment’s for
operations. At the point when such hardware shows up, MNJTF ill-prepared for
arrangements and utilization because of poor internal communications (Robert,

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 ADETAYO OLAMIDE SOWALE & OLANIKE FOLUSO OROGUN
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK…………………….
2014). Although affected states have pledged a fragment of their armed forces to
the MNJTF to battle Boko Haram, they have often times failed to send them into
MNJTF units in their particular divisions for continued period. The aftermath is the
inconsistent number of armed forces that make up the MNJTF's troop. At the
point when MNJTF recover an area from Boko Haram, they lack the teething
capacity to sustain the victories as insurgent groups have frequently won back lost
ground. As noted by senior officer in the MNJTF, the armed forces experienced
helplessly poor equipment (Tar and Mustapha, 2017).
Lake Chad Basin Countries and top military officers have their fair share of
blame in the dysfunctionality of MNJTF as they have often times refused to share
counter-insurgency plans for effective multilateral arrangements. In spite of the
presence of an intelligence unit, supported by the UK, the U.S. furthermore,
France, and staffed by Western and territorial officials, information sharing
between MNJTF is apparently poor (Zagga et al 2017). Obviously hence, in mid-
2019 the top military officer of the MNJTF beckon on the AU convince Lake Chad
states to release vital information that can help surmount insurgency to the
MNJTF. Even past intelligence sharing and collaboration within the MNJTF were
inconsistent and uncoordinated. The coalition of states against Boko Haram
Insurgency is limited to joint operations without integrating their diverse
strategies. As a result, the armed forces don't generally do what they have
consented as responsive collaboration against the insurgency (Tar and
Mustapha,2017).
The MNJTF has hardly been able influenced the actions of troops deployed
in it. Since the beginning of assignments against Boko Haram, human right abuse
by security forces have been reported and, in some occasion instigated
community support for militancy (Obialor and Ugochukwu, 2017). Report on
human right abuses in the Lake Chad Basin shows that military personnel are
responsible for about 40 per cent of abuse in the zone occupied by Boko Haram.
The difficult thing is stating the number of security actors working under the
MNJTF. MNJTF. Study by the UN Development Program alludes abuses alludes by
transnational security actors as an essential factor driving youths into violent
groups (Cave and David, 2016).
Even more widely, MNJTF has not been able to properly monitor or
improve human right protection in its areas of operation. Diverse reasons account
for the weakened performance of MNJTF: its staffing levels are unnecessarily low
and resources excessively very few to try and think about going into the field;
headway of a typical civilian-military contact office has been hampered; (Zagga et

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al 2017) it has encountered resistance from the four countries' military

institutions; and outfitted armed forces have planted disorder by dismembering
themselves from MNJTF in an unprepared manner as ordered by the national
headquarters. In 2019, the MNJTF made some progress with the help of African
Union in sorting out framework of handling captured Boko Haram warriors and
shared database of those surrendered. Whether or not these guidelines heed a
positive result is difficult to articulate (Obialor and Ugochukwu, 2017).
Conclusion and Recommendation
The effort by West African states to combat Boko Haram insurgency by
forming Multinational joint task force is a aftermath of the resolution of African
states that African problems can only be solve by Africans and the solution
created by the Africans. It has dawn on African states that African device solution
to solving their own problems would be more potent as it would be fashioned
from the knowledge of the local terrain that surround, reinforce, and drive the
problem arising from the territory of African Countries. To the international
institutions, the MJTNF is another security regimen but to Africans it has formed
the reality of African government to always rise to the occasion as there is no help
that can be timely and accurate as the ones that come from within Africa. The
MNJTF has made some giant strides. They recovered the territory under the siege
of the Islamic fundamentalist.
However, Heads of States in Africa must collectively channel their energies
to the course of combating Boko Haram insurgency. It is important that
politicisation of the multilateral security agency will have a negative effect on the
functionality of the security forces. Working according to plan is pivotal. It would
enable efficiency that ensures wiping out Boko Haram insurgency in West Africa.
The African states need to also create a channel by which ideologies of the Boko
Haram sect is changed.
The killing of the terrorist though could spell apparent victory for the
countries; it is imperative for African states to start DE radicalizing the mind of
their populace. Ideologies are powerful. They continue from generation to
generation and as constructivist would think- actions of actors in the international
system are governed, directed and propelled by ideas, notion and thought. The
underlining ideologies of Boko Haram insurgency must be fought to the latter.
The effective collaboration of the African states that form Multi National Joint
Task Force must become solid. The Boko Haram sect is really taking advantage of
globalisation and the negative effect of globalisation has become horrendous and
enormous for a single to state to combat. This calls for the security effort of all

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 ADETAYO OLAMIDE SOWALE & OLANIKE FOLUSO OROGUN
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK…………………….
African states to ensure that the West Africa and African region become a safe
place for the populace.
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