I.

General Consideration - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military
bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were
a. TORTS
officially terminated on November 26, 1991.
i. History
- AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI
ii. Definition held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived
at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given
iii. Under Philippine Law
P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers
iv. Definition under Philippine Law accepted this but some refused to do so.

• Naguiat vs NLRC, GR 116123, March - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay
13, 1997 v. Elements disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the
National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint
FACTS
against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat
- Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union.
Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi
- The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers
services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the
P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian
president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president.
consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between
Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was
the CFTI and the drivers union. It also rejected the idea that
also a family-owned corporation.
the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial
- Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it
They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not
(for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty award separation pay because to “impose a monetary
from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by obligation to an employer whose profitable business was
the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair
times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and and unjust.”
earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount,
- The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after
they had to make cash deposits to the company which they
respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the
could withdraw every fifteen days.
private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary
should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay
Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16
Naguiat as jointly and severally liable. Petitioners’ Claim: days a month.
- Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due
to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity
ISSUES
when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
Pinatubo. abuse of discretion in granting separation pay
- They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private
grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for respondents
every year of service.
3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin
- They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due Naguiat were liable
process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of
4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process
the appeal to the NLRC.
- They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal
representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter HELD
should be bound by the decision of the drivers union.
1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with
Respondents’ Comments:
abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative
- The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by
Enterprises although their individual applications were the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of
approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at
Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their
Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and
employment. this was not disputed by petitioners.
- There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure
of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses
no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2)
about by the closure of the military bases. the workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal
- Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be
business of the employer.
equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was - Independent contractors are those who exercise
correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work
according to their own methods without being subject to the
2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM
control of their employer except as to the result of their work.
and are held in estoppel.
- Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat
Reasoning
Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers and determining
- NOWM was already representing the respondents before the their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility
labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical as president of CFTI.
personality then.
- Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI
- Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi was in the taxi business.
drivers are themselves parties in the case.
- The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association
states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI
and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is
3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not
also CFTI.
personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable.
- Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability Reasoning - Although he carried
- Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability Reasoning - The
the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he
respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received
had acted in such capacity.
wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that
Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the
employment. They instead submitted documents which had to management or operation of the business was proferred.
do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises.
- Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability Ratio A director or officer may be
- Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision
supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act
only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI
them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance.
direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In
> Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of
the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of
corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation
the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the
of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by
corporation.
law. Tort is a breach of legal duty.
> Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation
pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or
closure of the business not due to serious business
Reasoning
losses or financial reverses which is the condition on
- In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be this case.
exonerated.
- An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest
4. There was no denial of due process.
of an employer, directly or indirectly.
Reasoning
- Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held
that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being - Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties
an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of of the complaint, they could still be held liable because of
proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case).
corporation.
- Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
- Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper.
corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio
stockholders are actively engaged in the management or Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual
business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall respondents of US$120 for every year of service and 2)
be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from
themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate liability.
torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate
 When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo,
the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the
findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver
disease. Thus, based on the medical report submitted by Sto.
Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s employment for
failing the physical examination.
• Garcia vs Salvador, 518 SCRA 568
DOCTRINE: Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment,
the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at the
regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote
Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement, Ranida
the health of the people by preventing the operation of
underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the
substandard, improperly managed and inadequately
result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto.
supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
Domingo of this development but was told that the test
performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their
conducted by CDC was more reliable because it used the
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high
Micro-Elisa Method.
standards of performance are expected from them.
Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and
this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a
FACTS: Respondent, Ranida D. Salvador, started working as a "Negative" result. Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test
trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method.
Terminal, Inc. As a prerequisite for regular employment, she The result indicated that she was non-reactive.
underwent a medical examination at the Community
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors
Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist,
Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of the Company who
conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and
requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-
issued the test result indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag:
employment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted
Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative"
examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as
result. Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of
pathologist.
CDC, issued a Certification correcting the initial result and
explaining that the examining medical technologist (Garcia)
interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.
RULING: YES. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories
Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.
have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote
petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of the health of the people by preventing the operation of
CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation substandard, improperly managed and inadequately
of the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job and supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their
while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities. business is impressed with public interest, as such, high
standards of performance are expected from them.
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the
"false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test. On the other law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his
hand, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to omission or non-performance will render him liable to
CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that he did not whoever may be injured thereby.
examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-
A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and
stamp signature
supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary
TC: Dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in
methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist
CA: Reversed the trial court’s ruling. Ordered Garcia to pay
must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed
Ranida moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s
physician; and that the results of any examination may be
fees. CA also found Garcia liable for damages for negligently
released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it
representative upon the direction of the laboratory
exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of
pathologist. These rules are intended for the protection of the
the results.
public by preventing performance of substandard clinical
examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not
properly supervised. The public demands no less than an
ISSUE: WON Garcia should be held liable liable for damages to
effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory
the respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result.
examinations through compliance with the quality standards
set by laws and regulations.
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Garcia failed to
comply with these standards. First, CDC is not administered,
directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by
law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical
Technologist. Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of
respondent Ranida without the supervision of defendant- vi. Culpa Aquiliana vs Culpa Criminal vs Culpa
appellee Castro. Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was Contractual
released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of
defendant-appellee Castro.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences
which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result.
However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules
promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and
interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or
omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of
Garcia’s failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and
rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for
failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of
the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more
tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper
safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the
clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
 (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding >
CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability
arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from
wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law -
Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability
only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he
too cannot be held responsible.
II. QUASI-DELICT
ISSUE
a. Historical Background
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against
• Barredo vs Garcia, 73 Phil 607
Barredo making him primarily liable and directly responsible
FACTS under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla?

- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death HELD
pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
YES
taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is
- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-
under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily
on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela
liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first
guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the
exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is
carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one
under A1903CC (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the
of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by
negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily
CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed
liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good
action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as
father of the family. The parents simply took the action under
employer of Fontanilla
the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who
apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and is yet to serve his sentence.
at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good
Obiter
father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by
means of indemnification merely repairs the damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only
punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind
of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of
penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of
ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt
4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere
preponderance of evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly
arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in
selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be
rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of
the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior
bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents – need
of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of
motor vehicles.
 • Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he
continued without diminution of speed.
• When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony
to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the right to
avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a
close proximity to the horse that it became frightened and
b. Definition
turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the
• Picart vs Smith, GR L-12219, March 15, 1918 railing.

FACTS • The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
flange of the car and the limb was broken.
• Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank
Smith the sum of Php 31,100 as damages alleged to have been • The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The incident violence.
happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San
• It showed that the free space where the pony stood between
Fernando, La Union.
the automobile and the railing was probably less than one half
• Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he meters.
had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the
• The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused
opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12 miles per
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
hour.
several days.
• Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his
course and made two more blasts. Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise
to a civil obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his
• Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he
pony.
pulled his pony to the right side of the railing.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
• As the automobile approached, Smith guided the
automobile to its left, that being the proper side of the road Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart
for the machine. the amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value
of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel. foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable
consequence of that course.
• In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred
while the automobile was still some distance away. From this
moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being
run down by going to a place for greater safety.
• The control of the situation had then passed entirely to
Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop
or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid
collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not
acquainted with vehicles would react that way.
• The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence.
• The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
• A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court’s
opinion would have recognized that the course which he was
 crossing as required by section 56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor
Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the approach of
the train, and thus, there would have been no collision.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate
cause of the collision

• Cusi, et al vs PNR, GR L-29889, May 31, 1979

FACTS HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No.

• Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. • Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on
After the party which broke up at about 11 o'clock that Torts as "the failure to observe for the protection of the
evening, the spouses proceeded home in their Vauxhall car interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing such other person suffers injury."
that there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle
• All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a
from any coming train, Cusi merely slack ened his speed and
person to use that care and diligence expected of reasonable
proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train bound
men under similar circumstances.
for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision
between the two. • Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad
crossing were manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of
• This accident caused the spouses to suffer deformities and to
guards provided for the operation thereof — one, the 7:00
lose the earnings they used to enjoy as successful career
A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, and the other, the 3:00 P.M. to 11:00
people.
P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena
• The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that
negligence of Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the precise hour, the warning devices were not operating for no
collision; that had he made a full stop before traversing the one attended to them. Also, as observed by the lower court,
the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: "... he
simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing
his whistle. That the train was running at full speed is attested
to by the fact that notwithstanding the application of the
emergency brakes, the train did not stop until it reached a
distance of around 100 meters."
• Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions
required of him as to avoid injury to -himself and to others.
We find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on
his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason
to anticipate the impending danger
• The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of
the existence of the railroad crossing, having stopped at the
guardhouse to ask for directions before proceeding to the
party. At the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no
warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle
from an oncoming train. They safely traversed the crossing. On
their return home, the situation at the crossing did not in the
least change, except for the absence of the guard or flagman.
Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for
passage as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely
slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving
at the proper rate of speed for going over railroad crossings
 operated on. The next day, she lost her speech and 13 days
thereafter, passed away.
• After the burial of Zhieneth, her parents demanded
reimbursment of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake
and funeral expenses, which they had incurred from
petitioners. Upon petitioners’ refusal, the parents filed a
complaint for damages.
• Trial court absolved petitioners. It ruled that the proximate
cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of
clinging to it. Furthermore, Criselda’s negligence contributed
• Jarco Mktg. vs CA, 321 SCRA 377
to her daughter’s accident. Basically, the court reasoned that
FACTS the counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor
as a precautionary measure and hence it could not be
• Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corp is the owner of Syvel’s
considered as an attractive nuisance. The court added that the
Department Store. Petitioners Kong, Tiope and Panelo are the
counter has been in existence for 15 years and its structure
store’s branch manager, operations manager and supervisor,
safe and well-balanced.
respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents
of Zhieneth Aguilar. • Court of Appeals reversed. It found that the petitioners were
negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. (The
• Criselda (mom) and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s
counter was shaped like an inverted L with a top wider than
Department Store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip at
the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion
the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden
was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her
base. Thus the counter was defective, unstable and
and saw her daughter on the floor, her young body pinned by
dangerous.) Moreover, Zhieneth who was below 7 years old at
the bulk of the store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure.
the time of the incident was absolutely incapable of
Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.
negligence since a child under 9 could not be held liable even
• With the assistance of people around, Zhieneth was for an intentional wrong.
retrieved and rushed to the Makati Med where she was
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• W/N death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to • Moreover, Ramon Guevarra, another former employee,
negligence. testified to the effect that the counter needed some nailing
because it was shaky, but that it was not attended to.
• In case of a finding of negligence, whether attributable to
private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to • Undoubtedly, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor
Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due and knew the danger of the unstable counter yet did not remedy
reasonable care while inside the store premises. the situation.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI TRAGEDY, WHICH BEFELL • Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, the conclusive
ZHIENETH WAS NO ACCIDENT AND THAT HER HEATH COULD presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they
ONLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO NEGLIGENCE. are incapable of contributory negligence, applies (criminal
cases- conclusively presumed to have acted without
• Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one
discernment).
cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by • Assuming Zhieneth committed contributory negligence when
fault of any person and which could not have been prevented she climbed the counter, no injury should have occurred if
by any means suggested by common prudence. petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy was
true. Indeed, the physical analysis of the counter reveal
• The test in determining the existence of negligence is
otherwise, i.e. it was not durable after all.
enunciated in Picart vs. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and • Criselda should likewise be absolved from contributory
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used negligence. To be able to sign her credit card, it was
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. reasonable for Criselda to momentarily release her child’s
hand.
PETITIONER NEGLIGENT.
• According to the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales, a former
gift-wrapper, who was at the scene of the incident: While in
the emergency room the doctor asked the child what did you
do to which the child replied nothing, I did not come near the
counter and the counter just fell on me.
 view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine
the real cause of her infertility.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the
procedure, however, and no prior notice of its cancellation was
received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight
from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in,
Manila.
On May 18, 1999, the Ronquillo spouses filed a
complaint 1 against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke’s Medical
Center for breach of professional and service contract and for
• Child Learning vs Tagorio, 426 SCRA 236
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City.
c. Degrees of Negligence They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged
loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the
• Ilao-Oretar vs Ronquillo, 535 SCRA 633
hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, the costs
(Gross Negligence)
In her Answer, 3 Dr. Ilao-Oreta gave her side of the case as
Facts:
follows: She went on a honeymoon to Hawaii and was
Respondents, spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo (Eva Marie) and scheduled to leave Hawaii at 3:00 p.m. of April 4, 1999 for
Noel Benedicto (Noel) Ronquillo (the Ronquillo spouses or the Manila. Aware that her trip from Hawaii to Manila would take
spouses), had not been blessed with a child despite several about 12 hours, inclusive of a stop-over at the Narita Airport in
years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner, Dr. Japan, she estimated that she would arrive in Manila in the
Concepcion Ilao-Oreta (Dr. Ilao-Oreta), an obstetrician- early morning of April 5, 1999. She thus believed in utmost
gynecologist-consultant at the St. Luke’s Medical Center where good faith that she would be back in Manila in time for the
she was, at the time material to the case, the chief of the scheduled conduct of the laparoscopic procedure. She failed to
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section. consider the time difference between Hawaii and the
Philippines, however.
Upon Dr. Ilao-Oreta’s advice, Eva Marie agreed to undergo a
laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be Issue:
inserted through the patient’s abdominal wall to get a direct
Whether or not, Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly neglected her duty.
Ruling:
The doctor’s negligence not being gross, the spouses are not
entitled to recover moral damages.
“Gross negligence” implies a want or absence of or failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care.
It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want or
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in
so far as other persons may be affected.
Although petitioner failed to take into consideration the time
difference between the Philippines and Hawaii, the situation
then did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury
that even a careless person may perceive. Unlike in situations
where the Supreme Court had found gross negligence to exist,
petitioner could not have been conscious of any foreseeable
danger that may occur since she actually believed that she
would make it to the operation that was elective in nature, the
only purpose of which was to determine the real cause of
infertility and not to treat and cure a life threatening disease.
Thus, in merely fixing the date of her appointment with
respondent Eva Marie Ronquillo, petitioner was not in the
pursuit or performance of conduct which any ordinary person
may deem to probably and naturally result in injury, thus
persuades.
 compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter
specified.
Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be
allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the
employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another
person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had
the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same.
Pursuant to these provisions — in so far as pertinent to the
case at bar — three conditions are essential to hold an
employer liable to compensate his employee for a personal
• Amado vs Rio, 95 Phil 33 (Gross negligence)
injury sustained by him from an accident, namely: (1) the
Facts: accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen
in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be
On May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o’clock in the morning
caused by the “notorious negligence” of the employee.
while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his
employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman Issue:
on defendant’s M/S “Pilar II”, which was anchored then about
Whether or not, Filomeno Managuit acted with notorious
1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan,
negligence and will bar his estate’s claim for damages.
his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in
his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was Ruling:
drowned.
Irrespective of whether or not the accident in question arose
Plaintiff’s claim is admittedly predicated upon Act No. 3428, out of, or took place in the course of the employment, was it
otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act. caused by his “notorious negligence”? The phrase “notorious
negligence” has been held to be tantamount to “gross
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee
negligence”, which, in turn, has been defined as follows:
receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness Gross negligence is define to be the want of even slight care
directly caused by such employment, or the result of the and diligence.
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and • Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he
a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the
Filomeno failed to exercise “even slight care and diligence,” opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12 miles per
that he displayed a “reckless disregard of the safety” of his hour.
person, that he could not have been but conscious of the
• Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the
probable consequences” of his carelessness and that he was
man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his
“indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury.
course and made two more blasts.
• Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he
pulled his pony to the right side of the railing.
• As the automobile approached, Smith guided the
automobile to its left, that being the proper side of the road
d. Standard of Conduct
for the machine.
i. General Rule
• Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he
• Picart vs Smith, supra continued without diminution of speed.

(Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that • When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the right to
person would have used the same situation? If not then he is avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a
guilty of negligence.) close proximity to the horse that it became frightened and
turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the
railing.
FACTS • The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
• Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank flange of the car and the limb was broken.
Smith the sum of Php 31,100 as damages alleged to have been • The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The incident violence.
happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San
Fernando, La Union.
• It showed that the free space where the pony stood between collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not
the automobile and the railing was probably less than one half acquainted with vehicles would react that way.
meters.
• The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a
• The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
several days. caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
to a civil obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his
paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in
pony.
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart liability by that.
the amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value
• A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court’s
of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or
opinion would have recognized that the course which he was
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel.
pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have
• In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable
while the automobile was still some distance away. From this consequence of that course.
moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being
run down by going to a place for greater safety.
• The control of the situation had then passed entirely to
Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop
or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid
 occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with obligations must be independent of human will;

(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that

constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid;

(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it

impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a
normal manner; and,

(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in

the aggravation of the injury or loss.

• Sicam vs Jorge, GR 159617, August 8,

2007
FACTS:
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry
foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the
with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
loan.
commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop
impossibility to foresee the same. and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must the pawnshop vault.
concur: On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the
loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the
pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry
for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return the person shall be responsible for those events which could not
jewelry. be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
Sicam with the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the
loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
as AF. commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’
impossibility to foresee the same.
complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim. Respondents
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must
appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC,
concur:
ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value of
the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the
instant petition for review on Certiorari. (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be
independent of human will;
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned
articles in their possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes
liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not
the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible
negligent at all.)
to avoid;

HELD: (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for

the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,
The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: aggravation of the injury or loss.
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence
that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
have occasioned the loss.
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that
**
when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to
of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of
pawnshops and other establishments which are engaged in
safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central
making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and
Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault
regulations concerning them shall be observed, and
inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners
subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of
antichresis.
robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and
anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil
petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event. Code, provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing
pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from
means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a
any negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may
prudent person would as to his own property.
have been occasioned.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event.
provides:
It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part
of herein petitioners.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
Parañaque Police Station on the robbery committed based on
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
the report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to
persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2
petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by the very
shall apply.
evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to not presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim;
be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a not one of petitioners’ employees who were present during
good father of a family shall be required. the robbery incident testified in court.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners’
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the
human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a circumstances justly demanded.
prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop
required by the circumstances.
and they were negligent in not exercising the precautions
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to justly demanded of a pawnshop.
exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily
NOTES:
prudent person would have used in the same situation.
Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found
pawnshop business. Sicam’s testimony revealed that there petitioners negligent for not taking steps to insure themselves
were no security measures adopted by petitioners in the against loss of the pawned jewelries.
operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and
and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the
Regulations for Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973,
pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear
and which was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114,
showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there
Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns pledged
was one, that he had sufficient training in securing a
must be insured, to wit:
pawnshop. Further, there is no showing that the alleged
security guard exercised all that was necessary to prevent any Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The plac e of
untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals business of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it must be
were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful insured against fire and against burglary as well as for the
that there was a security guard, since it is quite impossible latter(sic), by an insurance company accredited by the
that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed Insurance Commissioner.
with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB
the employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was Circular No. 764 which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns – The office Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a
building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer
against fire. (emphasis supplied). Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted
deleted. Obviously, the Central Bank considered it not feasible all the previous surveys for the subdivision’s developer,
to require insurance of pawned articles against burglary. Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during
and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and
conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine
considering the above-quoted amendment, there is no
compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual
statutory duty imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned
of Rules and Regulations of Unfortunately, after the Cuasos
jewelry in which case it was error for the CA to consider it as a
constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz
factor in concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) Corinthian. as builder, their
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87
petitioners failed to exercise the diligence required of them square meters.
under the Civil Code.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the
perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting
• Corinthian Gardens vs Sps.
the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos
Tanjuangco, GR 160795, June 27, 2008
for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Facts:
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint 8 against
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed
(the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and 2829615 specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his
respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby,
Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian exposing them to litigation.
Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand,
Issue:
respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos)
own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
Whether or not Corinthian Gardens Association failed to In sum, Corinthian’s failure to prevent the encroachment of
exercise its due diligence. the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’ property – despite
the inspection conducted – constitutes negligence and, at the
Ruling:
very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the
By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to Tanjangcos.
assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the
approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic
inspections of on-going construction projects within the
subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the
approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter
walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the
Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or equitable to
relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules,
it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that
“no new construction can be started unless the plans are
approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond
and pre-construction fees are paid.” Moreover, Corinthian can
impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the
proposition that the inspection is merely a “table inspection”
and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is
unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a
“table inspection” and the approval granted to every member
is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be
defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and
sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded.
Corinthian’s imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos’
perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured
the Cuasos that everything was in order.
 Facts:
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and
Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla which was
owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the
office, when Completo’s taxi bumped and sideswept him,
causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to
the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was transferred to
the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and
there was no orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital.
He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again
in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a
complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence
against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property
through reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of
the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information
for Albayda’s complaint, and Completo’s complaint [against
Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to
ii. Special Circumstances
file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and
• Hrs. of Completo vs Albayada, GR Abiad.
172200, July 6, 2010
Albayda alleged that Completo’s negligence is the proximate
“ABIAD’S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL cause of the incident. He demanded the following damages
EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE and their respective amounts: Actual damages –
LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE 276,550; Moral damages – 600,000; Exemplary damages –
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.”
200,000; Attorney’s fees – 25,000 + 1,000 per court damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to
appearance. pay Albayda; added legal interest].
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully
driving the taxicab when he heard a strange sound from the
Issues and Holding
taxicab’s rear right side. He found Albayda lying on the road,
holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force 1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one
General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an who caused the collision. NO
experienced driver, and that he already reduced his speed to
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the
20km even before reaching the intersection. In contrast,
diligence of a good father of the family. YES
Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose
control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no 3. WON the award of moral and temperate damages and
cause of action. attorney’s fees for Albayda had no basis. NO / NO / YES
Several people testified for each side, but here are some
notes on the testimony of the owner of the taxi driver,
Ratio
Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also held
franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a On Negligence
taxicab operator, he would wake up early to personally check
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden
the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad
of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s
required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s
breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the
license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since
motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence
he was employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was
required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such
a good driver and good man.
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorist’s
defendants are ordered to pay actual [46k] and moral [400k] negligence is a question of fact. Usually, more will be required
damages, and attorney’s fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr =
the court affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications [no more 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of the
actual damages; awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral physical advantages the former has over the latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
failed to exercise reasonable diligence. documentary evidence.
 He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda’s ABIAD’S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL
bicycle; he did not slow down even when he EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE
approached the intersection LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.
 Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of
the injuries sustained by Albayda On Damages
 It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because
he reached the intersection ahead of Completo Albayda failed to present documentary evidence to establish
the amount incurred. Temperate damages may be recovered
NCC 2180 cited – obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
demandable also for those persons for whom one is
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by
certainty. Moral damages are awarded in QDs causing physical
employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that
injuries, so the award is proper. The award of attorney’s fees is
employers observed the diligence of the good father of the
deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted in bad faith
family in the selection and supervision of employees. The
in refusing to satisfy respondent’s just and valid claim.
burden of proof is on the employer. The responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The
employer’s civil liability for his employee’s negligent acts is
also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in
selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even
if the employer is not in the vehicle at the time of collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. With respect to supervision, employers should
formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for breaches. To establish these
factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious [secondary]
 existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-
access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the
store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they
are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as
what happened in this case.
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for
damages against respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old
student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the
owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag
and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store
• Pacis vs Morales, GR 169467, Feb. 25,
while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed
2010
Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the
gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted
by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. YES
Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting
petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code,
the young Alfred in the head.
petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the
Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for
because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of
Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC. enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed
against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the
action for damages against respondent whom they alleged
criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced
was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
case.
**
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners,
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the
103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for
death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and
that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and
burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory
direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176
damages, MD and AF.
states:
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial
court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
petition. the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a
gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on
Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the
in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
trial court’s Decision reinstated.
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from
Dealership will be suspended or canceled. another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who
For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent
has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons
case whether respondent had a License to Repair which
or substances. Such person in possession or control of
authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and
risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
exercise of a higher degree of care. degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent
has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate
from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for
ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns
accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded
precisely because they are defective and may cause an
accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun
for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring
first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun
should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure
 The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to
have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would
be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the
very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily
depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age
at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences;
and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such
ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by
him.

FACTS
• The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received
the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.
• On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named
Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting
iii. Children one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
• Taylor vs Manila Railroad, 16 Phil 8
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap
the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to
afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run
anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
for Mr. Murphy. burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
• They walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are • Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman
of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of
power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than
and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally
find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried and physically than most boys of fifteen.
them home.
• After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS
Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the
home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners
experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires
into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next
tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked
for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
• No.The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident • True, he may not have known and probably did not know the
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from
putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he
determining factors, he can not recover." well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
• In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say
well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea
and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of
as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
circumstances.
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves
no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness • The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate
which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or in the very nature of things the question of negligence
a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
about by the application of a match to the contents of the understand the character of his own acts and their
caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to
there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be
the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance
at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which
became frightened and ran away. may be done by him.
 • Jarco Mktg., supra
Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, the conclusive
presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they
are incapable of contributory negligence, applies (criminal
cases- conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment).
 was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the
carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil
iv. Experts
mixed with distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture
• Culion vs Philippines, 55 Phil 129 was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the
compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do
with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently
things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for
not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that
do. Reasoning.
already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were
FACTS so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel
to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to
- Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and
start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had
plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner
been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel
Gwendoline.
supply.
- Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline
- It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that
changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He
the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower
had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who
part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to
agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment
Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had
should be made upon completion of the work.
gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear.
- The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of
- The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The
Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to
engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course,
the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of the
owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course
crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston
of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine
to place themselves under Quest's directions.
compartment and occupied himself with making distillate,
- Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two
that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith elements would give best results in the engine.
carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result
- As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or do. Reasoning
engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new
- The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was
mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the
that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure
carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts
in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the
were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of
carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of
the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck,
the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire
when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the
occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already
boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was
saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was
P10,000.
quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material
- CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the
defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either
to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel
improperly mixed.
ISSUE
- Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing
WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not
lack of skill of Quest appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work
on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on
deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his
HELD mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did
not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
YES
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There
Ratio: When a person holds himself out as being competent to was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent
do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to situation is not one where the defense of laches can be
have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense properly invoked. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from
an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for affirmed.
Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not
whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether
Quest was free from blame.
- The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that,
inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the
experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the
position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of e. Negligence as Proximate Cause
proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from
i. Definition
responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the
fault of Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship • Vda. De Bataclan vs Medina, GR L-
in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without 10126, Oct. 22, 1957
taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and
liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under
their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is FACTS:
usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a
consequence of such possession and special property, the
bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30
of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner
to be incompatible with the situation now under
defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public
consideration.
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way
- This action was instituted about two years after the accident to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and Saylon. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while
had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
bases the contention that the action should be considered Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began
stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side
of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the
managed to leave the bus the best way they could,
others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them produces the injury, and without which the result would
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
These men presumably approach the overturned bus, events, each having a close causal connection with its
and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus result of the cause which first acted, under such
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the circumstances that the person responsible for the first
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
and permeating the body of the bus and the ground person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by of his act or default that an injury to some person might
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on probably result therefrom.
fire. Hence, the petitioners sought for the recovery of
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees against the respondent. The proximate cause in the case at bar was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
ISSUE: back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with
Whether or not the respondent is liable.
a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
HELD: was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), The burning of the
YES. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, carrier, through is driver and its conductor because none
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: of them have cautioned or taken steps, with the
circumstances present, to warn the rescuers not to bring
the lighted torch too near the bus.

• Phoenix Construction vs IAC, GR

65295, March 10, 1987
Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private

respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from
cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a
Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector
devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando
Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company.
Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too
late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous
breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against
Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered
the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was
and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent. his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual
circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Issue: Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was
hurrying home that night and driving faster than he
should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump
truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.
Held:

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with
shut off his headlights even before he reached the the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
police precinct which he (being a resident in the area)
knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe
that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which
than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been
he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created
these had in some mysterious if convenient way only a passive static condition which made the damage
malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far
switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe necessary antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result it is quite impossible to The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
the result of other active forces which have gone before. indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the within the scope original risk, and hence of the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces
must refer to the type of case where the forces set in the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when
position of apparent safety, and some new force the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
important but the nature of the risk and the character of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We
the intervening cause. hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio
far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather may recover damages though such damages are subject
an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper to mitigation by the courts.
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the
be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of
although later in point of time than the truck driver's last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
an efficient intervening or independent cause. defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has
been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms,
is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the
defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the
injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions,
is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature
of the negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-
delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of • Fernando vs CA, GR 92087, May 8,
society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend 1992
to weaken the very bonds of society. FACTS:
November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the
Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the
Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon
won

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other

companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso,
Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman. HELD: NO. CA affirmed.
test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case:
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he
expired there.
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
learned they entered the septic tank without clearance prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market not, then he is guilty of negligence standard supposed to
master. be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
pater familias of the Roman law.

Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they

were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in
the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply consequence.
in the body and intake of toxic gas

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a

November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and
RTC: Dismissed the case in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the
poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary
the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages before negligence can be held to exist.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the
injury
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one
of its determining factors, he can not recover.

Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes

only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that
the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for
his own imprudence.

• Benguet Elec. Vs CA, GR 127326, Dec.

23, 1999
FACTS:
January 14 1985 7:50 am: Jose Bernardo , who has been
managing a market stall for 5 years, together with other
meat vendors went to select meat from a jeepney

As he grasped the jeepney bars he suffered from an

epileptic seizure and fell to the ground
Romeo Pimienta who initially thought he was joking saw
him turned black so along with the other vendors they
BENECO was grossly negligent
brought him to the hospital where he died shortly from
cardio-respiratory arrest

It is in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code which

requires a minimum vertical clearance of 14 feet from the
The jeepney's antenna got entangled with the open
level of the ground since the wiring crosses a public
electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall
street - barely 8 or 9 feet

February 6 1985: His widow Caridad O. Bernardo and

Another violation: main line connected to the service line
their minor children , Jojo, Jeffrey and Jo-an, all
was not of rigid conduit wiring but totally exposed without
surnamed Bernardo filed for damages against BENECO
any safety protection.

BENECO filed a third party complaint against the jeepney

Failed to detect, much less to repair, for an inexcusably
owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.
long period of 7 years the uninsulated connection which
caused the death of Jose Bernardo.
CA affirmed RTC: favored Bernardo and ordered
BENECO to pay the damages
Canave was well within his right to park the vehicle in the
said area where there was no showing that any municipal
law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any
ISSUE: W/N BENECO was solely liable for negligence in
foreseeable danger posed by his act.
the electrocution and death of Bernardo

The amount corresponding to the loss of earning capacity

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
is based mainly on two factors: (a) the number of years
the P864,000.00 as net income loss is reduced to
on the basis of which the damages shall be computed;
P675,000.00 and the P100,000.00 as moral damages is
also reduced to P50,000.00.
and, (b) the rate at which the losses sustained by the
widow and her children should be fixed.
The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded
in the complaint because the same cannot be
predetermined.

Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is
awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In
quasi-delict, exemplary damages are awarded when the
act or omission which caused injury is attended by gross
negligence.

Gross negligence ii. The “Cause”

negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, *Proximate
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with • Mercury Drug vs Baking, GR
a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as 156037, May 25, 2007
other persons may be affected. Facts:

Moral damages are not intended to enrich the Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic of Dr.
complainant but to serve to obviate his/her spiritual Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Subsequently, after
suffering by reason of the culpable action of the several tests, Dr. Sy prescribed two medical prescriptions
defendant. – Diamicron for his blood Sugar and Benalize tablets for
his triglyceride.
 Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent, if so,
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug
respondent’s accident?
Store (MDC) to buy the prescribed medicines. However,
the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron for
Dormicrum – a potent sleeping tablet.

Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for three

Ruling:
consecutive days. On the third day, he figured in a
vehicular accident. His car collided with another car
driven by one Josie Peralta. It turned out that
YES. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that
Respondent fell asleep while driving and has no idea
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
regarding the accident. Suspecting that the tablet he took
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
may have caused the accident, he returned to Dr. Sy and
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no re-
the latter was shocked because of the wrong medicine
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
sold to his patient.
a quasi-delict”.

Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court

The Court also enumerated the three (3) elements of
(RTC) complaint for damages against petitioner.
Quasi-delict, to wit:

The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision of which

1. Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
present petition.
2. Fault or negligence of the defendant

3. Connection of the cause and effect between the fault

or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred
by the plaintiff
The Court stressed that there is no dispute that
respondent suffered damages. It is generally recognized
that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if the drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence.

That petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent. The

care required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspondent with
the superior knowledge of the business which the law
demands.

Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate cause of

the accident was the petitioner’s employee’s negligence.
The vehicular accident could have not occurred had the
employee been careful to his job. • Pilipinas Bank vs CA, GR
105410, July 25, 1994
FACTS:
- FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks.
These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount
of P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount
of P11.4T due Oct.12.
- To cover the face value of the checks, he requested
PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of
P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with
his current account with PILIPINAS BANK.
 P25T attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
- PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made
an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a
ISSUE:
certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus, posted the
deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the WON Art.2179 of NCC is applicable
depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
- On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER
INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the HELD:
ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had NO
only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the
payee was advised to try it for next clearing. - For it to apply, it must be established that private
respondent's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.
- It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The same
thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee then
demanded a cash payment of the check’s face value Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which, in
which REYES did if only to save his name. natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have
- Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen
urged an immediate verification of his account. That was or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case
only when they noticed the error. that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would
result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence."

RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory

damages, P100T moral damages, P25T attorney’s fees, Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the
as well as costs of suit. negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously
posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the
name of another depositor who had a similar first name.
CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and
- The bank employee is deemed to have failed to
exercise the degree of care required in the performance
of his duties. Dispositive Petition denied.

*Concurrent
• Far Eastern vs CA, GR 130068,
Oct. 1, 1998
FACTS:
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under
the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far
Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4
of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine
Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant
- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold,
Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking
he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth
then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was
No. 4.
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that
the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the
"full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel
and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of
damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.
Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and
Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his
its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine
report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International
Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his
Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for
report of the incident.
docking maneuvers.

- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the

- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church
Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.
by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier,
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel
was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District
orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section
anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the
8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the
Order No. 03-85:
vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the
crew members. A brief conference ensued between
Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired
what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. — For entering a
Gavino that there was nothing to it. harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers
or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or proceedings in the light ofthe facts and circumstances of
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign each particular case.
trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.

SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots'

- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties Association. — The duties and responsibilities of the
and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
master have been specified by the same regulation:

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. —
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a
On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot
vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot
providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for
thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely;
the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at
ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be
the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out
absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force
his order.
majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised
prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize
damage.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty
years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
responsibilities of pilots:
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel
even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand
or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on
board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the
to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control
negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal;
liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the
without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his
liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots instructions.
shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate
xxx xxx xxx safety of people and property on the vessel and on the
dock are at stake.
Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or
anchor vessels under their control when requested to do
so by the master of such vessels.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court
found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not
holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too
ISSUE
slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to
WON both the pilot and the master were negligent any such happenings.

MASTER

HELD - In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes

the master of the vessel. The master, however may
YES. intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the
stationary object and a moving object, there is a pilot or if the pilot is drunk.
presumption of fault against the moving object (based on
common sense and logic). It then went on to determine
who between the pilot and the master was negligent. - Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he never sensed
the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and
they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly
PILOT trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was
right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and
licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in hearing.
certain waters. He is an expert who’s supposed to know
the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know
because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged
to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the
- The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness
of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of
FES.

*Remote
• Gabeto vs Araneta, 42 Phil 252
GABETO VS. ARANETA

Facts:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an
near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view to going extent that he set out at full speed up the street.
to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. When
the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and
started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano,
Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his hands had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside
on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had
protesting to the driver that he himself had called this unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway
carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of
the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell
Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which
then in the carromata as the first who had offered he soon died.
employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled
on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control
of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto, in her
on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as
horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which guardian ad litem of the three children, Conchita
it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for
became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the
in order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso
to near the curb, by one or the other — it makes no Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the
difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. defendant Agaton Araneta. Judge awarded damages to
the widow to which decision Araneta appealed.

While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from

the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in
forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the the middle of the street was too remote from the accident
carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya that presently ensued to be considered the legal or
over. After going a few yards further the side of the proximate cause thereof
carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed
to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came
Held: NO. The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too
remote from the accident that presently ensued to be
considered the legal or proximate cause thereof.
Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head
of the horse, the driver was the person primarily
responsible for the control of the animal, and the
defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the
leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to
be easily broken. it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby
causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and
Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle
was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself
free from control, started to go away.

• Manila Elec. Vs Remoquillo, 99

Phil 117
FACTS
- Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to
fix a leaking “media agua,” (downspout). He climbed up
to the media agua which was just below the 3rd floor
window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet
through the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the
he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause
holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila and the injury.
Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to
If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the edge of the media agua, electrocuting him and killing
the independent cause, such condition was not the
him.
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
- His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their
proximate cause.
favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which affirmed
the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now
seeks to appeal.
Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be
held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To
us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
ISSUE
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote
WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno
maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
death without taking any precaution, such as looking back
toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting
said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet.
HELD
No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause - The real cause of the accident or death was the
arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was
occur). called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just
below the third story window, it is to be presumed that
due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so.
Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had
condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury training and experience for the job. So, he could not have
was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a
been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger
lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his
training and experience failed him, and forgetting where
he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both
hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and
throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he
turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his
body, thereby causing his own electrocution

*Intervening
• Phoenix Construction, supra
Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private

respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from
cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was shut off his headlights even before he reached the
proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the
Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of police precinct which he (being a resident in the area)
oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe
devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation
Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that
Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment,
late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous these had in some mysterious if convenient way
breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in
Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds
the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was
and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent. his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual
circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Issue: Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was
hurrying home that night and driving faster than he
should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump
truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.
Held:

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with
the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper
consequence of the truck driver's negligence. parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence,
the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been although later in point of time than the truck driver's
"almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not
only a passive static condition which made the damage an efficient intervening or independent cause.
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far
as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
part in producing the result it is quite impossible to that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk,
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
the result of other active forces which have gone before. within the scope original risk, and hence of the
Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be
must refer to the type of case where the forces set in exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
position of apparent safety, and some new force negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We
important but the nature of the risk and the character of hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
the intervening cause. "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of
due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence may recover damages though such damages are subject
far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather to mitigation by the courts.
 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the
respondent appellate court, except the award of
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as
"last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of
attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private
last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to
plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has
of damages made by the respondent appellate court.
been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms,
is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the
defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the
injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions,
is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature
of the negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-
delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of
society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend f. Proof of Negligence
to weaken the very bonds of society.
• PLDT vs CA, GR 57079, Sept. 29, 1989
FACTS
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are
satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 - July 30, 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The
HELD
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed
to notice the open trench which was left uncovered NO
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
- Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms,
established by competent evidence.
legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek,
while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In
addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
Reasoning
- The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
- PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
the result of their own negligence and that the entity
which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte
and Company, an independent contractor which > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
undertook the said construction work. Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not
have hit the accident mound

- TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA > That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it
swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been
reversed the ruling. corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the
south of the ACCIDEN MOUND.
> Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour
ISSUE
as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he could have
WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
PLDT
> If the accident did not happen because the jeep was
running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason
or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to
climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff
husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the accident.

- The above findings clearly show that the negligence of

respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to
his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very
cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.

Disposition resolutions of respondent CA, dated March

11, 1990 and September 3, 1980, are hereby SET
ASIDE, Its original decision, promulgated on September
25, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

g. Presumption of Negligence
i. Res Ipsa Loquitur
• Africa vs Caltex, GR L-12986, March 31,
1966
FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at
the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It
started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck HELD: the decision appealed from is reversed and
into the underground storage, right at the opening of the respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted appellants,
(a lighted matchstick was thrown by a stranger near the
opening, causing the fire). The fire spread to and burned
several neighboring houses. Their owners, among them Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to
petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that
Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the “as to (its) applicability … in the Philippines, there seems
second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on to he nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not
the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case at
the fire. bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.”

The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to The question deserves more than such summary
prove negligence and that respondents had exercised dismissal. The doctrine has actually been applied in this
due care in the premises and with respect to the jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power
supervision of their employees. Hence this petition. and Development Co

The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies

with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who
ISSUE:
knew or could have known how the fire started were
appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
1. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the reasonable inference that the incident happened because
fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to of want of care.
presume negligence on the part of appellees
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the
neighboring houses were it not for another negligent actor from liability.’ Stated in another way, “The intention
omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient
to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence,
flames from leaping over it.. Defendants’ negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates
therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the with the independent cause in the resulting injury.”
fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the
neighboring houses.

There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his

amended answer to the second amended complaint that
“the fire was caused through the acts of a stranger who,
without authority, or permission of answering defendant,
passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw
a lighted match in the premises.” No evidence on this
point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be
true — certainly any unfavorable inference from the
admission may be taken against Boquiren — it does not
extenuate his negligence. A decision of the Supreme
Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the
present case, states the rule which we find acceptable
here. “It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous
article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the public • F.F. Cruz vs CA, GR 52732, Aug. 29,
proportionate to and commensurate with a danger 1988
involved … we think it is the generally accepted rule as
applied to torts that ‘if the effects of the actor’s negligent FACTS:
conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in
harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially
Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of
simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s
private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private
innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial
respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz,
petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
ISSUE:
constructed between the shop and private respondents'
residence. Whether the of the common law doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable
The request was repeated several times but they fell on
deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire
broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees,
who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, RULING:
but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private Yes. Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing itself speaks”)
respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were
razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation shown to be under the management of the defendant or
found specimens from the burned structures negative for his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
the presence of inflammable substances. course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords
Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof. the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its
for damages against petitioner, praying for a judgment in employees was not merely presumed. The Court of
their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary between its shop and the residence of private
damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire
could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit
cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside
the shop.
(1) CFI - renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and
against the defendant. Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance
(2) CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced
with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
the award of damages
negligence.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be
found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct
a firewall between its property and private respondents'
residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent
city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance
providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the
Court as an act of negligence.
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and
he has received indemnity from the insurance company
for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of
contract complained of, the insurance company is
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. If the
amount paid by the insurance company does not fully
cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing
the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having
been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are
only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.
 from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were
performing their work on board a steel platform with
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the platform came loose
causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall
down to the basement of the elevator core of the building
under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily
jumped out for safety.

- On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the

RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M.
Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

• D.M. Consunji vs CA, GR 137873, April ISSUES

20, 2001
1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to
FACTS prove petitioner’s negligence
- At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
HELD
1. YES No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building
to the basement while performing work in a construction
Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely
established without direct proof and furnishes a
caused the injury is under the
substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based
in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the second requisite is also present. No contributory
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such husband; thus, the last requisite is also present.
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite
and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
available, provided the following requisites are negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
present: loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.

(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily

occur unless someone is negligent;

(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury

was under the exclusive control of the person charged • Capili vs Sps. Cardana, GR 157906,
with negligence; and Nov. 2, 2006
FACTS:
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
February 1, 1993: Jasmin Cardana was walking along the
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a
caimito tree located within the school premises fell on
her, causing her instantaneous death. Her parents appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to
Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa filed a case for damages do the act or to do it in a more careful manner
against the school principal Joaquinita Capili knowing
that the tree was dead and rotting did not dispose of it
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting
RTC: dismissed for failing to show negligence on the part
tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that
of Capili
is foreseeable. As school principal, she was tasked to
CA: reversed. Awarded P50,000 as indemnity for the see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety
death of Jasmin and P15,010 as reimbursement of her of the children within the school and its premises.
burial expenses, moral damages P50,000 and attorney's Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the
fees and litigation P10,000 tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over
her assignee Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and
rotting tree within the school's premises shows that the
ISSUE: tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by
and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa
W/N Capili can be held liable for damages under Res loquitur.
ipsa loquitur

Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all

HELD: requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain.The
YES. presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome
by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances
Negligent act a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
inadvertent(unintentional) act may be merely carelessly innocence, may outweigh the inference.
done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one
which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk
to another because of the expectable action of the other, Under the circumstances, we have to concede that
a third person, an animal, or a force of nature petitioner was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis--
vis respondents' daughter's death.The award of moral
an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the damages is therefore not proper.
same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
 whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other
incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

ii. Respondeat Superior

After the police authorities had conducted the
• Castilex vs Vasquez, GR 132266, Dec.
investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed
21, 1999
against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for
Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counterclockwise, Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez,
(the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital
Student's Permit to Drive at the time. intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical
expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.

Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of

Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable
owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW- for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
company car out of a parking lot but instead of going
around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against
[the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The
General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In the process, the negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance.
motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and
Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the subsequent death caused by ABAD. Petitioner contends
Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It should only apply to instances where the employer is not
was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in
Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is
therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the They perform functions which are beyond their office, title
fourth or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the
call of duty.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to
paragraph should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of the
cases where the employer was engaged in a business or
fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though
industry such as truck operators and banks. The Court of
the former are not engaged in any business or industry"
Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in
Under the fifth paragraph of
any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of
his employee who is acting within the scope of his Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or
assigned task. A distinction must be made between the industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to is necessary to establish the employer-employee
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to
and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting
or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed complained of was committed. It is only then that the
either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense
their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of employee.
their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the
former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable
employer is engaged in a business or industry, are in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater
their assigned task, even though committed neither in the familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the
service of the branches nor on the occasion of their employee is conclusive on his employer as in American
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
different hats. presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee
was acting in his employer's business or within the scope
of his assigned task. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his iii. Violation of Traffic Rules (Arts. 2184-85)
own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the
normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
his overtime work had already been completed. His being in their company.
at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
"haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; their company.
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the occasion of their functions.
perks attached to his position.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a

special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall

be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable

with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have,
by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article stop to avoid an accident;
2180 are applicable. (n)

Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that

a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. 2) he did not sound his horn or whistle or use his voice to
call the attention of Coombs to notify him that he should
stop and avoid being struck by the car; and
• US vs Crame, GR 10181, March 2, 1915
Facts:
3) Crame was driving in the center, or a little to the right
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while
of
driving along Calle Herran in the city of Manila, knocked
down, dragged, and ran over the body of George E. the center of the street instead of on the left side thereof.
Coombs, a private in the US army, who was then
crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, and
bruises. Moreover, such injuries damaged his mental
faculties and incapacitated him from further performance
of his duties as a soldier. Issue:
• W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused
to Coombs.
Crame alleges that he was only going at about 10 miles
per hour, and that since Coombs suddenly appeared in
front of the car, he tried but failed to change the course of Ruling:
the automobile so as to avoid hitting him.
The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car was
very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty,
The trial court convicted Crame of serious physical especially since the street was wide and unobstructed,
injuries by imprudencia temeraria, on the ground that with no buildings on either side from which a person can
dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the street was also well-
lighted, so there is no reason why Crame did not see
Coombs long before he had reached the position in the
1) he did not reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he
street where he was struck down.
attempt to
 one’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care
and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
The presence of the carromata was not corroborated by
sober.
any of the witnesses. Moreover, it would have obscured
his vision only for a moment. Besides, it is the duty of
automobile drivers in meeting a moving vehicle on public
streets and highways to use due care and diligence to
see to it that persons who may be crossing behind the
moving vehicle are not run down by them.

It is clearly established that Crame was driving along the

right-hand side of the street when the accident happened.
According to the law of the road and the custom of the
country, he should have been on the left-hand side of the
street. According to witnesses there was abundant room
for him to drive on such side.

There is no evidence which shows negligence on the part

of Coombs. At the time he was struck, he had a right to
be where the law fully protected him from vehicles
traveling in the direction in which the accused was driving
at the time of injury.

There is no evidence to show that the soldier was drunk

at the time of the accident.And even if he were, mere
intoxication is not negligence, nor does it establish a want
of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered
with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. If
 • BLTB vs IAC, GR 74387-90, Nov. 14, to file an action based on culap contractual, they could
1988 have done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon.
Instead the respondents filed an action against all
FACTS:
defendants based on culpa aquiliana or tort.
A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner
Pon collided with a bus owned by Superlines, when the
former tried to overtake a car just as the Superlines' Bus ISSUES
was coming from the opposite direction.
• WON erred in ruling that the actions of private
respondents are based on culpa contractual
The collision resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo
and Neri, as well as injuries to the wife of Rosales, and
RULING:
Sales. These people were passengers of the petitioner's
bus. IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and
culpa aquiliana
• The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the
Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of
passengers was the negligence of the bus driver Pon,
Pamfilo, Rosales and Neri instituted separate cases ih
who recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that
the CFI against BLTB and Superlines, together with their
the bend of highway he was negotiating on had a
drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers were also filed
continuous yellow line signifying a “no-overtaking” zone.
in a different CFI.

• It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle

CFI ruled that only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
they were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages.
violating any traffic regulation.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI's ruling.

• In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to

Petitioners contended that the CFI erred in ruling that the
act with diligence demanded by the circumstances. Pon
actions of private respondents are based on culpa
should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is
contractual, since if it were private respondents' intention
approaching or rounding a curve there is special
necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the
driver has not the right to drive on
the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the
right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction
comes into view.

• As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable

for his negligence in driving recklessly the truck owned by
BLTB. The liability of the BLTB itself is also primary, direct
and immediate in view of the fact that the deat of or
injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of
its employee.

• The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries

to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to
carry its passengers safely to their destination. They are
presumed to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they have observed extaordinary diligence. In the
case at bar, the appellants acted negligently.

• BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver even though

the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while
that of the bus company from contract.
 Antero... died due to the injuries he sustained from the
collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck
• Guillang vs Bedania, GR 118889, March
sustained minor damage.
23, 1998
Facts:
trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The
trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the
petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety
brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction of other... motorists.
sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway
(highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero),
Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of
Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, respondents.
Dasmariñas, Cavite, and were on their way to Manila. At
the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A.
Bedania (Bedania) was driving a... ten-wheeler Isuzu appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
cargo truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards complaint of the herein appellees in Civil Case No. 95-
Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent 73666 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit
Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva).

Issues:
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard
Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the
truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaro's who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners
car hit the right portion of the truck. The truck dragged
Genaro's car some five meters to the right of... the road.
Ruling:
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was
negligent is not supported by the evidence on record. In
In this case, the report[33] showed that the truck, while
ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals
making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic
gave weight and credence to Videna's testimony.
rules. The police records also stated that, after the
However, we find that Videna's testimony was...
collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the
inconsistent with the police records and report that he
petitioners and his... truck.[34] This is another violation of
made on the day of the collision. First, Videna testified
a traffic regulation.[35] Therefore, the presumption arises
that the car was running fast and overtook another
that Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.
vehicle that already gave way to the truck.[26] But this
was not indicated in either... the report or the police
records. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should
have been skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped The evidence presented in this case also does not
on the brakes to avoid the collision. But the sketch of the support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
accident showed no skid marks made by the car.[27] truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact
Second, Videna testified that the petitioners came from a occurred. If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should
drinking spree because he was able to smell liquor.[28] have been hit on its rear.[36] If the truck had already
But in the report,[29] Videna indicated that the condition negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the
of Genaro was "normal." other side of the highway, then the truck should have
been hit in the middle portion of the trailer or cargo
compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the
Court of Appeals... even declared, that the car hit the
Videna did not indicate in the report that Genaro "had
truck's gas tank, located at the truck's right middle
been drinking liquor" or that Genaro "was obviously
portion, which disproves the conclusion of the Court of
drunk." Third, Videna testified that when he arrived at the
Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn
scene, Bedania was inside his truck.[30] This contradicts
when it was hit by the car.
the police records... where Videna stated that after the
collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims.
[31] The police records also showed that Bedania was
arrested by the police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of
Cavite and was turned over to the police only on 26 impact was on the lane where the car was cruising.
October 1994. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and
the car had the right of way over the truck that was
making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck... encroached upon Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The
the car's lane when it suddenly made the U-turn. truck's sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led
to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and
the injuries of petitioners.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made
the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is not supported
by the evidence on record. The police sketch[37] does
not indicate an intersection and only shows that there
iv. Possession of Dangerous Weapons and
was a road leading to... the Orchard Golf Course near the
Substances (Art. 2188)
place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are generally
not advisable particularly on major streets.[38] Contrary
to Videna's testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make
a U-turn on a highway. We... agree with the trial court Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence
that if Bedania wanted to change direction, he should on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results
seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the from his possession of dangerous weapons or
truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal substances, such as firearms and poison, except when
lights and made sure that the highway was clear of the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
vehicles from the opposite... direction before executing occupation or business.
the U-turn.

Clearly, Bedania's negligence was the proximate cause of

the collision which claimed the life of Antero and injured
the petitioners.

The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act

of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened. The... sudden U-turn of the truck without
signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists.
 - The lower court found upon the evidence that both the
plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their
automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character
and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from
recovering.

ISSUE
III. DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE
WON the parties may recover damages
a. Plaintiff’s Negligence is the PROXIMATE CAUSE
• Bernardo vs Legaspi, 29 Phil 12
Drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally
to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, HELD
neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.
1. NO - Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions,
collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the
evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers
NATURE
thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither
complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages can recover of the other for damages suffered.
for injuries
FACTS
- Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of
Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged
were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said
collision. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint
alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages.
 • Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs
• The Estebans allegedly sustained injuries
• PLDT, denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own
negligence and that the entity which should be held
• bataclan vs CA, GR 57079, Sept. 29, 1989
responsible, Barte an independent contractor which
• The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, undertook the construction
but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the
• LC ruled in favor of Estebans
inside lane. That may explain plaintiff husband's insistence that
he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran • However, the CA found that that the relationship of Barte
into it. and PLDT should be viewed in the light of the contract
between them and, under the independent contractor rule,
• The jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour. At that
PLDT is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor.
speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck
Still, CA affirmed LC decision.
the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the
ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks.
The jeep must have been running quite fast.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
•Plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good
W/N PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by the Estebans
father of a family to avoid the accident.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

FACTS
The accident which befell the Estebans was due to the lack of
• The Esteban’s jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an
diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not
open trench, an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the
imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT
installation of its underground conduit system.
• The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, • A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence
inside lane. That may explain plaintiff husband's insistence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever
ran into it. relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in
the first instance of proving the existence of the same if
• The jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour. At that
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck
the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the
ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks.
• Manila Elec. Vs Remoquillo, supra
The jeep must have been running quite fast.
A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or
• Plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good
gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made
father of a family to avoid the accident.
possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct,
• The negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the
of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining injury. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
• The presence of warning signs could not have completely
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge
of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to
fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving
of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound
• Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident
 • The sagging of the tracks was found to have been caused by
the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. It wasn’t
proved that the company inspected the track after the
typhoon or that it had any proper system of inspecting.

b. Contributory Negligence (Art. 2179) ISSUE & ARGUMENTS

• Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf, GR L-1719, January 23, W/N plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to
1907 exonerate defendant from liability.

FACTS HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

• Plaintiff Rakes was one of the laborers of defendant, No.

transporting iron rails from the barge in the harbor to
• The allegation that plaintiff was at fault for continuing his
defendant’s yard. Piled lengthwise on 2 hand cars were 7 rails
work despite notice of the sagging of the track constituted
such that the ends of the rails protruded beyond the cars. The
contributory negligence that exonerate defendant is
rails lay upon 2 crosspieces or sills secured to the cars but
untenable. Nothing in the evidence shows that plaintiff did or
without side guards to prevent them from slipping off. Near
could see the displaced timber underneath. Plaintiff had
the water’s edge, the tracks sagged, the tie broke, the rails slid
worked on the job for less than two days.
off and caught plaintiff, resulting in a broken leg which was
subsequently amputated. • Where plaintiff contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of the determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
• Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in not provided
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his
side guards on the cars, and that the tracks had no fishplates.
own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
Defendant admitted absence of side guards and failed to
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less the
effectively overcome the plaintiff’s proof that no fishplates
sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
existed.
 • At the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets,
respondent Bithuel Macas, a 15-year old high school student,
was standing on the shoulder of the road.
• He was bumped and ran over by a Ford Fiera, driven by
Chona Cimafranca. Cimafranca then rushed Macas to the
Davao Medical Center.
• Mathas suffered severe muscular and major vessel injuries in
both thighs and other parts of his legs. In order to save his life,
• Taylor vs Manila Electric & Railroad, GR 4977, the surgeon had to amputate both legs up to the groins.
March 22, 1910
• Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. However,
The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name
resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a of Atty. Medardo Cadiente.
match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed
• Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he was
to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
no longer the owner of the said Ford Fiera. He allegedly sold it
he can not recover."
to Engr. Jalipa.
• Cadiente vs Macas, GR 161946, Nov. 14, 2008
• Macas’ father filed a complaint for torts and damages
• The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a against Cimafranca and Cadiente.
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not
• Trial court ruled in favor of Macas. Affirmed by the CA.
be entitled to recover damages in full, but must
proportionately bear the consequences of his own negligence. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually
W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of Macas?
caused by his negligence.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
FACTS
• The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not
be entitled to recover damages in full, but must
proportionately bear the consequences of his own negligence.
The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually
caused by his negligence.
• In this case, when the accident happened, Macas was
standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion
of the highway. The shoulder was intended for pedestrian use.
Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading
passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not
supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the
highway. *Limitations on Contributory Negligence
• However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as • Last Clear Chance
slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
o Picart vs Smith, supra
highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly
bumped and ran over an innocent victim. Macas was just A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court’s
where he should be when the unfortunate event transpired. opinion would have recognized that the course which he was
CADIENTE STILL LIABLE. pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable
• Since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner’s
consequence of that course.
name at the time the misfortune took place, Cadiente cannot
escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the
respondent.
o Lapanday vs Angala, 525 SCRA 229
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties
are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had
the last clear opportunity... to avoid the loss but failed to do so
is chargeable with the loss.
Facts: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants LADECO and Apolonio Deocampo to solidarily pay
On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with the plaintiffs
plate no. PEC-903 driven by Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo)
bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast
owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven while following the pick-up and that the crewcab's speed was
by Bernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday Agricultural... and the proximate cause of the accident. The trial court observed
Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of
which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). impact despite Deocampo's claim that... he stepped on the
Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that
vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao Deocampo had the last opportunity to avoid the accident.
City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The... left
The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he
door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the
was not the owner of the crewcab.
pick-up were damaged.
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and
that Deocampo was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied
Attorney's Fees against LADECO, its administrative officer
the doctrine of last clear chance and ruled that Deocampo had
Henry Berenguel[4] (Berenguel) and Deocampo. Respondent
the responsibility of avoiding the pick-up.
alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn The Court of Appeals also sustained the solidary liability of
preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from LADECO and Deocampo. The Court of Appeals ruled that
behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of the
kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. driver is presumed to be the negligence of the owner of the
Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before vehicle.
the impact.
Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at
Issues:
the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent
testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a Whether the provisions of Section 45(b) of Republic Act No.
blinking light while looking at the speedometer. 4136[12] (RA 4136) and Article 2185 of the Civil Code apply to
this case; and
In its 3 March 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 15 (trial court) ruled: Whether respondent is entitled to the damages awarded.
 Petitioners further allege that since Borres was violating a
traffic rule at the time of the accident, respondent and Borres
Ruling:
were the parties at fault. Petitioners cite Article 2185 of the
The Ruling of this Court Civil Code, thus:
The petition is partly meritorious. Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
Both Drivers are Negligent the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres
Deocampo was at fault because he was driving very fast prior was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following
to the collision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial Section 45(b) of RA 4136, Borres should have stayed at the
court's finding that Deocampo was running more than the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the
normal cruising speed. Both the trial court... and the Court of highway. However, Deocampo was equally... negligent. Borres
Appeals noted that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the U-turn.
the point of impact. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up
the brakes only after the collision. slowed down. Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up
Petitioners allege that Borres did not take the proper lane when it was still about 20 meters away from him.[13]
before executing the U-turn. Petitioners allege that Borres Vehicular... traffic was light at the time of the incident. The
violated Section 45(b) of RA 4136 and it was his recklessness pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road.
that was the proximate cause of the accident. [14] Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not
driving very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial
Section 45(b) of RA 4136 states: court and the Court... of Appeals. We sustain this finding since
Sec. 45. Turning at intersections. x x x factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the
trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court.[15]
(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of
approach such intersection in the lane for traffic to the right of impact. It would not have happened... if Deocampo was not
and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, in turning, driving very fast.
shall pass to the left of the center of the intersection, except
that, upon highways... laned for traffic and upon one-way Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of traffic Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last
in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding. clear chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both Respondent is Entitled to Moral Damages
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity... to
has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action.[20]
avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.
The trial court... found that respondent, who was on board the
[16] In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid
pick-up when the collision took place, suffered shock, serious
the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he
anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. We
had full control of the situation since he was in a position to...
sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that
observe the vehicle in front of him.[17] Deocampo had the
respondent sufficiently showed that he suffered... shock,
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
serious anxiety, and fright which entitle him to moral
[18] A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding
damages.
and overturning, compared to running straight... ahead.[19]
Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any
driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was justification for the award of attorney's fees. Awards of
not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on attorney's fees must be based on findings of fact and of law
the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on and stated in the decision of the trial court.[21] Further, no
the... brakes after the collision. premium... should be placed on the right to litigate.[22]
Hence, we delete the award of attorney's fees.
Petitioners are Solidarily Liable
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 25 July 2001 Decision and 11
LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally
March 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
liable with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the
No. 51134 with MODIFICATION by deleting the award of
supervision and selection of its employees. Aside from this
attorney's fees.
statement, LADECO did not proffer any proof to show how it
exercised due diligence in the... supervision and selection of
its employees. LADECO did not show its policy in hiring its
drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers.
LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that it exercised
due diligence in the supervision and selection of its...
employees.
Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo.
 and egress was easily made because the gates were always
open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also
the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when
Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the
factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While
bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia
secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the
parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to
the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

• Attractive Nuisance ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is

applicable in this case?
o Hidalgo vs Balandan, 91 Phil 488
American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance
doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial RULING: NO.
as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who
artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
death.
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American
FACTS:
Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well
sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In
filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such
doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
death. company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday
afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to
anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked
for Mr. Murphy.
• They walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges
o Taylor, supra
of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
FACTS power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps,
and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could
• The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received
find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a
them home.
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in • After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named
mechanics. Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the
home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of
• On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named
experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires
Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting
tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked
one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap
boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by
while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all • In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a
three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea
away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves
the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with
• Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at
which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments
sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or
and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of
a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought
P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than
about by the application of a match to the contents of the
average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally
caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can
and physically than most boys of fifteen.
there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of
the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him
W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners
at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and ran away.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI • True, he may not have known and probably did not know
the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected
• No.The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident
from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting
did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
a match to the contents of the cap, and that having
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
determining factors, he can not recover."
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would
be going far to say that "according to his maturity and
capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone
else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by
him under such circumstances.
• The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to
have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in
the very nature of things the question of negligence
necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand
the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the • Res Ipsa Loquitur
age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
o Capili, supra
necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences;
and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that
ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once
him. respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the
burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption,
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference.

FACTS
• Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person
the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances,
tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to
instantaneous death. cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful
manner. The probability that the branches of a dead and
• Her parents filed a case for damages against petitioner
rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger
Capili, alleging that a certain Lerios reported on the possible
that is foreseeable.
danger the tree posed. The Cardañas averred that petitioner’s
gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
their daughter. maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of
• RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of respondent
the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the
parents to establish negligence on part of petitioner, BUT the
death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility
CA reversed, reasoning that petitioner should have known of
of her position.
the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as
tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaña. a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s
premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to
• The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a
anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of
nuisance that should have been removed soon after petitioner
res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
had chanced upon it. Hence, this petition for review.
where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
• Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for the management or control of the person charged with the
death of Cardaña. negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
of the person injured.
Petitioner is liable.
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and
while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was
due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or
transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the
thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise
a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents
established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once
respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the
burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or c. Assumption of Risk
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
• Afialda vs Hisole, GR L-2075, Nov. 29, 1949
and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may FACTS
outweigh the inference.
• This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the an animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased,
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as
within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while
the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation on her part tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one
as to why she failed to be vigilant. As school principal, of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that
petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir
posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to depending upon him for support.
exercise the responsibility demanded by herposition.
Petition denied.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS damage. [But the complaint contains no allegation of those
points]
• W/N the Hisole spouses are liable for damages as owners of
the carabaos
o Petitioner: Widow of Afialda contends that the civil
Code provides that the possessor of an animal is liable
for any damage it may cause, even if such animal
should escape from him or stray away.
o Respondent: Spouses posit that there was an
assumption of risk, therefore they are not liable.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO THE SPOUSES ARE NOT LIABLE
• The animal was in the custody and under the control of the
d. Last Clear Chance
caretaker who was paid to work as such. It was his business to
try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to • Picart vs Smith, supra
anyone, including himself.
• Sps. Ong vs MWD, GR L-7664, Aug. 29, 1958
• Being injured by the animal under those circumstances was
• The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the
one of the risks of his occupation, which he had voluntarily
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
• The owner of an animal is only answerable for damages exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
caused to a stranger, and for that damage caused to the injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
caretaker of the animal, the owner would be liable only if he negligence
had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the Civil
• Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
Code
swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there
• It is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of
the defendants as the owners of the animal that cased the appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that
lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the
attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected
body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left
play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of
room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial
appellants to impute liability to appellee. manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they
applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted
FACTS
• Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is
• Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara, asphyxia by submersion in water (pagkalunod)
Quezon City
• The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against
• It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and
pools supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the
last clear chance to revive Ong.
• Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to
the pools along with his 2 brothers • It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety
measures in place: they had a male nurse, six lifeguards, ring
• He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers
buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There
that he would get something to drink. His brothers left him
is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic
and went to the Deep pool
established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also
• Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations
swimming to long under water governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the
swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant.
• Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool
Although defendant does not maintain a full- time physician in
to retrieve Ong’s lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard
the swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a
tried to revive the boy.
sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate
• Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise
assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the
• W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligence inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they
• W/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this
applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were
case
exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they
sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who
however came late because upon examining the body found
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that
No. Metropolitan is not negligent appellee has done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason
• Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid
it is unfair to hold it liable for his death The Last Clear Chance
danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that the
Doctrine is inapplicable in this case
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy
roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine • The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big
kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that
to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to
place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that
the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless
all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply
were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears
way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And notwithstanding his negligence
there are security guards who are available always in case of
• Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
emergency.
swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there
• The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was without any companion in violation of one of the regulations
retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing
appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as
When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving
the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put FACTS
into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that
• Engineer Orlando Calibo, Agripino Roranes and Maximo
there is no room for the application of the doctrine now
Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated
invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee.
Industries Inc.
• Calibo was driving the car as they were approaching the
Lizada Bridge towards the direction going to Davao City.
• At about that time, Paul Zacarias was driving a truck loaded
with cargo. The truck just crossed the said bridge coming from
the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South
Cotabato.
• At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the jeep and the
truck collided and as a consequence of which Calibo died while
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was
unhurt.
• A civil suit was filed by the wife of Calibo against Zacarias and
the owner of the truck
• Glan Peoples Lumber vs IAC, GR 70493, May 18,
1989 • At the lower court, the case was dismissed for the plaintiff
failed to establish the negligence by preponderance of
The respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a
evidence. The court highlighted that moments before the
full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen
collision, the jeep was “zigzagging.”
fit to deny or impugn petitioner’s imputation that they also
admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep • Zacarias immediately submitted himself to police
was still 30 meters away. From these facts the logical investigation while Roranes and Patos refused to be
conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what investigated. Zacarias presented more credible testimony
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance unlike Roranes and Patos.
to avoid the accident.
• The evidence showed that the path of the truck had skid actionable responsibility under the rule of the last clear
marks which indicated that the driver applied brakes. The chance.
court accepted the evidence that even if there was negligence
• From the established facts, the logical conclusion emerges
on the part of Zacarias who intruded about 25 centimeters to
that the driver of the jeep has the clear chance to avoid the
the lane of Calibo, the latter still had the last clear chance to
accident.
avoid the accident.
• The respondents have admitted that the truck was already at
• The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ruled in favor
a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not
of the plaintiff. This was on the grounds that Zacarias saw the
seen fit to deny or impugn petitioner’s imputation that they
jeep already at about 150 meters and Zacarias did not have a
also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the
drivers license at the time of the incident. The Appellate Court
jeep was still 30 meters away. From these facts the logical
opined that Zacarias negligence gave rise to the presumption
conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
of negligence on the part of his employer and their liability is
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance
both primary and solidary.
to avoid the accident. While still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his
jeep away from the truck, either of which the driver of the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
jeep had sufficient time to do while running at 30 kilometers
Whether Zacarias should have an actionable responsibility for per hour.
the accident under the rule of last clear chance.
• In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that
opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right
to expect, as the appellate court would have it, the truck to
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
swerve and leave him in a clear path.
No.
• The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a valid and
• The evidence indicates that it was rather Engineer Calibo’s complete defense to accident liability today as it did when
negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs Smith.
Assuming there was an antecedent negligence on the part of
Zacarias, the physical facts would still absolve him of any
 FACTS
• The spouses Baesa, their four children, the Ico spouses, the
latter’s son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep to go
to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary
of the Baesa spouses. The jeep was driven by David Ico.
• Upon reaching the highway, the jeep turned right and
proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While
they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve,
and collided with it.
• As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for one daughter,
as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries.
Maricar Baesa, the surviving daughter, through her guardian
filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict
against PANTRANCO.
• PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico’s (the
driver)alleged negligence as a proximate cause of the accident,
invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver. The RTC ruled in favor of Baesa, which
was upheld by the CA
• Pantranco vs Baesa, GR 79050-51, Nov. 14, 1989
• The petitioner now contends that the CA erred in not
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
applying the doctrine of the “last clear chance” against the
guilty of a prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant,
jeepney driver. Petitioner contends that under the
who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
circumstances, it was the driver of the jeep who had the last
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences
clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent
in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does
then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. not know or could not have known the existence of the peril.
• In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver
David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his
Does the “last clear chance” doctrine apply? lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the
bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. jeepney approaching form the opposite direction.

• The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff • Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger
was guilty of a prior or antecedent negligence but the a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the opportunity to avoid it. The Court has held that the last clear
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the chance doctrine “can never apply where the party charged is
consequences required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril
• Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the
is or should have been discovered.”
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also
be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.
• It is the petitioner’s position that even assuming arguendo,
that the bus encroached into the lane of the jeepney, the
driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney towards
the spacious dirt shoulder on his right without danger to
himself or his passengers. This is untenable
• For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or
should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
 (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

However, when the action arises from or out of any act,

activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise
of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year.

• Ferrer vs Ericta, GR L-41767, Aug. 23, 1978

FACTS
• Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators
of a Ford pick-up car. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 31, 1970, their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who
was then only sixteen (16) years of age, without proper official
authority, drove the for pick-up, without due regard to traffic
rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary
precaution to prevent injury to persons or damage to property.
The pickup car was overturned, causing physical injuries to
plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein,
which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment
and confinement at different hospitals for more than two (2)
years; that as a result of the physical injuries sustained by
e. Prescription (Art 1146) Annette, she suffered unimaginable physical pain, mental
anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within shock and spent a considerable sum of money for her
four years: treatment.
• The complaint was only filed on January 5, 1975.
• At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. The defense
were present. As such the Pfleiders were declared in default of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in
and the court rendered judgment against them. the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises
issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading
• Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, respondent judge,
without setting aside the order of default, issued an order • It is true that the defense of prescription can only be
absolving defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the
the complaint states no cause of action because it does not defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense
allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the was invoked because the defendants had been declared in
time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence
2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's
incapacity the mother, are only responsible for the damages complaint is based is already barred by the statute of
caused by their minor children who live in their company; and limitations
(b) that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the
• In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of
connection with the question of prescription. Actions for
the accident, and the action to recover damages based on
damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must
quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant
be filed within four years. The four-year period begins from
petition for mandamus.
the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS accident
W/N the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by
private respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION NOT DEEMED WAIVED.
• Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as
to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his
failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not
 • On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by
petitioners Ernest Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer was navigating
its way from Marinduque to Manila.
• Somewhere near the Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago,
the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel (M/V
Asia Philippines) owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
• Due to the collision, F/B Marjolea sank, taking along its fish
catch. • The captains of both vessels filed a protest with the
Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard for the
purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime
collision
• On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the collision
was due to the negligence of the employees of private
respondent (Trans-Asia).
• On the basis of such decision, the Philippine Coast Guard, on
April 29, 1982, suspended M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing
his profession as a marine officer.
• On May 30,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for damages in
the RTC, Pasay City.
• Private respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription
based on Art. 1146 of the Civil Code which provides, ‘An action
based upon quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years from
the day the quasi-delcit was committed.
• Kramer vs CA, GR 83524, Oct. 13, 1989
• The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of the Board’s
FACTS
resolution that there was a need to rely on highly technical
aspects attendant to such collision, hence, the prescriptive
period under the law should begin to run only from April 29, • The occurrence of the last element is the time when the
1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of M/V Asia cause of action arise
Philippines had been finally ascertained.
• Aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
• On appeal to the CA, the said court reversed the RTC’s administrative body that the collision was caused by fault or
decision and granted the MTD, hence the present petition for negligence of the other party before he can file action for
certiorari and prohibition. damages Petition is DISMISSED.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N a complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners
against the private respondent arising from a marine collision
is barred by the statute of limitations.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

YES.
• The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of
action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
o A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created.
o An obligation on the part of defendant to respect
such right.
o An act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff f. Fortuitous Event (Art. 1174)
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or day. However, the processing of the checks was completed
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the only at 3pm. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no them because the Project employees would be waiting for
person shall be responsible for those events which could not their pay the following day. And so, he collected the cash value
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. of the checks. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to
Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early
evening; or (2) take the money with him to his house in
• Hernandez vs COA, GR. 71871, Nov. 6, 1989 Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate
the following morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the
- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said
safer one. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
provisions, something that could not have been reasonably
Bulacan. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two
foreseen although it could have happened, and did. For most
persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he
of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might
was carrying. Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately
happen, based on common sense and our own experiences, or
followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio
our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to peer
Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. Alvarez was
into the future. So it was with the petitioner.
subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the
- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the stolen money
he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made he took with him has not been recovered. - the petitioner,
seemed logical at that time and was one that could be invoking the foregoing facts, filed a request for relief from
expected of a reasonable and prudent person. money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
FACTS
- however, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman
- Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special
Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the petitioner's request,
disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the
observing inter alia: In the instant case, the loss of the
Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. He went to the main
P10,175.00 under the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be
office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the
attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash
employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He
proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park
estimated that the money would be available by 10am and
in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his
that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same
office, which is the normal procedure in the handling of public
funds, the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. —
aborted. When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the
same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty,
- In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the respondent
the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof
COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief
shall immediately notify the Auditor General, or the provincial
and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money.
auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction
He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would
of the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer
have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous
period as the Auditor, or provincial auditor, may in the
event over which he had no control.
particular case allow, shall present his application for relief,
- On his decision to take the money home that afternoon with the available evidence in support thereof. An officer who
instead of returning directly to Ternate, he says that the first fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of
course was more prudent as he saw it, if only because his liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of
home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate; his accounts. contention is that the petitioner should not have
that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew
stronger in Ternate than in Marilao; that what happened was a he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. The memo
fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to
foreseen, especially on that busy highway. Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office,
the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now
- then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent
be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the
in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. Later, however, his
robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed.
successor sided with the petitioner, agreeing that Hernandez
had not committed any negligence or, assuming he was guilty ISSUE
of contributory negligence, had made up for it with his efforts
WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or
to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers,
recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request
who was eventually convicted.
for relief from accountability for the stolen money
- COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from
his money accountability because it was his own negligence
that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to
Ternate but to Marilao. Its 3 Section 638. Credit for loss
HELD
NO • Southeastern College vs CA, GR L-87584
- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said - There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous
provisions, something that could not have been reasonably event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is
foreseen although it could have happened, and did. For most unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care.
of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse
might happen, based on common sense and our own consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other
mystic ability to peer into the future. So it was with the words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not
petitioner. be guilty of negligence.
- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court
feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made
FACTS
seemed logical at that time and was one that could be
expected of a reasonable and prudent person. Disposition -Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College
The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a fourstorey school
the money forcibly taken from him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at
is GRANTED. about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon “Saling” hit
Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away,
landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents’ house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular
inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a
team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Reporti[5]
dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows: “5. One of the
factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the
formation of the buildings in the area and the general
direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an
almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the - In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building
strong winds having a westerly direction, the general had withstood several devastating typhoons and other
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion
the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the responsibility to see to it that said school building, which
roofing, those located on both ends of the building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is
remained intact after the storm. 6. Another factor and perhaps “in tip-top condition”; and furthermore, typhoon “Saling” was
the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings “an act of God and therefore beyond human control” such that
structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought
trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2” diameter steel bars thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss
- The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there
ocular inspection made by the city engineer. Thus, this appeal.
are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses,
thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.”
- It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and
ISSUES
damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the
vicinity,” the fourth floor of subject school building be declared WON the damage on the roof of the building of private
as a “structural hazard.” respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions
of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of
- In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of
typhoon “Saling”, was, within legal contemplation, due to
Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana,
fortuitous event
private respondents alleged that the damage to their house
rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay
temporarily in others’ houses. And so they sought to recover
HELD
from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages,
P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary YES
damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorney’s fees; plus
- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by
costs.
the private respondents. This conclusion finds support in
Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Art 1174.
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the applicable to acts of God.
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
- After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
record, this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the
which, though foreseen, were inevitable.”
general rule that factual findings by the trial court, especially
- The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
in the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place conclusive upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the
by accident and could not have been foreseen.”iii[9] Escriche records and the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find
elaborates it as “an unexpected event or act of God which exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts
could neither be foreseen nor resisted.” Civilist Arturo M. misappreciated the evidence proffered.
Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by
- There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous
two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes,
event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is
storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man,
unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or
such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any
prohibitions, robbery, etc.”iv
adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have
- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In
liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly
have been occasioned.. An act of God cannot be invoked for understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates
the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe
negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs with an circumstances justly demand,[17] or the omission to do
act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by
person is not exempt from liability by showing that the considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a affairs, would do. From these premises, we proceed to
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it
result of the participation of man – whether it be from active were not, the damage caused to private respondents’ house
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the whole could have been avoided?
- At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming - Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city
damages for the negligence of another has the burden of government service since 1974, admitted in open court that
proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has
injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of
affirmatively established by competent evidence, [19] not the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that
merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its
petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and
submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of several typhoons even stronger than “Saling.”
petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the term
- In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing
imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight
evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We
or viewing. [20] What is visual to the eye though, is not always
thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at
reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who
fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school
hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot
building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the
always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim.
proximate cause of the damage suffered by private
It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a
respondents’ house.
stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be
clearly shown. g. Exercise of Diligence (Art. 2180)
- In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. Private the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
and design of said school building were deficient and quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation
from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
conclusively establish that the construction of such building demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
was basically flawed. for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or

incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise h. Mistake and Waiver (LAST CASE in Sept 09, 2023)
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter • Gatchalian vs CA, GR 56487, Oct. 21, 1991
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
FACTS
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their • Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames mini bus owned by
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of Delim. The bus was headed for Bauang, La Union. On the way,
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio
in any business or industry. Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly
heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road,
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. • Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They
were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination,
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
leg, arm and forehead.
• Mrs. Delim paid for all the hospital expenses. She also asked
the passengers to sign a document [Joint Affidavit] stating,
“That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal
or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of suffered injuries signed the document, she too signed
the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety.
treated upon our injuries. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial
doubt whether Gatchalian understood fully the import of the
• Even if Gatchalian signed this document, she still filed this
Joint Affidavit (prepared by Delim) she signed and whether she
case.
actually intended thereby to waive any right of action.
• Moreover, for a waiver to be valid, it must not be contrary to
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS law, pubic policy, morals and good customs. In this case, Delim
was the owner of the minibus which takes passengers around
W/N the document Delim had Gatchalian sign at the hospital
La Union. She has a contract of carriage with them and is
constitutes a valid waiver.
required to exercise extraordinary diligence when fulfilling
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI these contractual duties. To uphold a supposed waiver of any
right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
NO. THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT A VALID WAIVER.
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to
• A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render
as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit that standard unenforceable. The waiver is offensive to pulic
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be policy.
attributed to a person when the terms that do not explicitly
and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in
such person.
• The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed
by Gatchalian need to be considered. Gatchalian was still
reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having
been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported
waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her
for signing, while reading the document, she experienced
dizziness but since the other passengers who had also
i. Damnum Absque Injuria
If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual
damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission
which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is
regarded as damnum absque injuria.
• NAPOCOR vs CA, GR 96410, July 3, 1992
FACTS
• Petition for review on certiorari instituted by the National
Power Corporation (NPC)from the decision of the Court of
Appeals . The appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, which awarded
damages, interest, attorney's fees and litigation expenses
against petitioners
• It appears that in the early morning hours of October 27,
1978, at the height of typhoon "Kading", a massive flood
covered the towns near Angat Dam, particularly the town of
Norzagaray, causing several deaths and the loss and
destruction of houses, farms, plants, working animals and respondents who assumed the risk of residing near the Angat
other properties of the people residing near the Angat River. River, and even assuming that respondents suffered damages,
the cause was due to a fortuitous event and such damages are
• Private respondents recalled that on the said day, they were
of the nature and character of damnum absque injuria, hence,
awakened by the sound of rampaging water all around them.
respondents have no cause of action against them.
The water came swiftly and strongly that before they could do
anything to save their belongings, their houses had HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
submerged, some even swept away by the strong current. A
NAPOCOR LIABLE.
number of people were able to save their lives only by
climbing trees. • The court does not agree with the petitioners that the
decision handed down in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons, supra, is not
• Private respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to the
applicable to the present case. The doctrine laid down in the
reckless and imprudent opening of all the three (3) floodgates
said case is still good law, as far as the concurrent liability of an
of the Angat Dam spillway, without prior warning to the
obligor in case of a force majeure, is concerned.
people living near or within the vicinity of the dam.
• The case of National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals, as a
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
matter of fact, reiterated the ruling in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. In
W/N NAPOCOR is liable. the former case, this Court ruled that the obligor cannot
escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event
o Petitioners: Denied private respondents' allegations and, by
or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or
way of defense, contended that they have maintained the
violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
water in the Angat Dam at a safe level and that the opening of
obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which
the spillways was done gradually and after all precautionary
results in loss or damage.
measures had been taken. Petitioner NPC further contended
that it had always exercised the diligence of a good father in • However, the principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
the selection of its officials and employees and in their strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the
supervision. It also claimed that written warnings were earlier violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from
sent to the towns concerned. Petitioners further contended creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the
that there was no direct causal relationship between the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of
alleged damages suffered by the respondents and the acts and man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or
omissions attributed to the former. That it was the
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. 9
•In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act
of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.
• The evidence shows that as early as October 25, 1978 the
newspapers had announced the expected occurrence of a
powerful typhoon code-named "Kading". On October 26,
1978, Bulletin Today had as its headline the coming of the j. Emergency Rule
typhoon. Despite these announcements, the water level in
• McKee vs IAC, 211 SCRA 519
the dam was maintained at its maximum from October 21,
until midnight of October 26, 1978. "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
• WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in toto, with cost
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
against petitioner.
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.”
FACTS
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned
by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a
Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the
deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the supervising the said employee. - In an MFR, the decision for
car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and the consolidated civil cases was reversed. Hence this petition.
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
ISSUES
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations,
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. – conjectures and presumptions.
Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang
with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was HELD
filed with the trial court. - Judge Capulong found Galang guilty
YES - Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of
of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages.
Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not
Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision.
supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to
- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded consider the material facts which would have led to a
private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages, conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.
and attorney’s fee. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car
consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision
of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages.
occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the
The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was
driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused
presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was
the accident. The appellate court further said that the law
Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants, as
cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which which the result would not have occurred; the proximate legal
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
would not do constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to might probably result therefrom.
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. k. Volenti Non-Fit Injuria
- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one • INERCO vs CA, 179 SCRA 5
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of
required to act without time to consider the best means that
the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source
his own negligence.
of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
- Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without
collision. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause, regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on her way to protect
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may
not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the - Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his
death caused by INELCO’s negligence. efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left
palm of the deceased, there was a hollow wound. In the
afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there.
FACTS
- Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was
- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On
Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged
Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium, to look after wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb
the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in on the left hand was a burned wound. The cause of' death was
waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly ,'circulatory shock electrocution"
sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls)
- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the
attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an
testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought to
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like
prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric
fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon hearing the
service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did
electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall of
not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to
Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric
life and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been
Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body
newly-installed prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety
was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons
- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as
NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain floods, typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged
fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the
abnormalities as grounded or shortcircuited lines. areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented
own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have
- 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC
been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only
Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and
manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly, the deceased could have
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts
died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he could not
negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO
see any INELCO lineman.
because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by
connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has
current whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule,
left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must
tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29, 1967 abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist
or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks
- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys fees -
to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was
CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's
at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood,
death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in
was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased,
compensatory damages, computed in accordance with the
at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where
formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the
she had a right to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as
base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased;
she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence,
P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees
private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
INELCO’s negligence Reasoning
ISSUE
- INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private
floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and
respondents from collecting damages from INELCO
floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be
held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of
HELD
petitioner's negligence that death took place.
NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by
- In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in
petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which
29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and
electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any
brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the
probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence
deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the
does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.
- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the
general public"... considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to
the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence
and care extends to every place where persons have a right to
be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may
not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's
death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of
God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the
injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission"