Blackstone Mortgage Trust, Inc.

(BXMT)

Here Comes the Cliff!

December 6, 2023

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 1

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MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 2

Muddy Waters is Short BXMT

Interest rate swaps and manipulated risk ratings / loss provisions have obscured serious
deterioration in BXMT's loan book. We believe that starting in 2024, as an estimated $16
billion of swaps terminate, the following problems will be evident:

• BXMT will likely significantly cut its dividend as soon as H2 2024. At present SOFR,
we expect BXMT to cut its quarterly dividend by at least half.
• We think large numbers of borrowers will be unable to refinance and repay BXMT.
• BXMT is at risk of a liquidity crisis.
• Even assuming rate cuts, BXMT's losses on its $23.2 billion net book value of loans
could reach ~$2.5 billion to ~$4.5 billion. BXMT's market cap, which is currently $4.0
billion, is at risk of being completely wiped out by these losses. These losses would be in
addition to BXMT's existing loss provisions.

1 Calculations discussed infra.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 3

Contents
BXMT Has Looked Steady, But That's About to Change 8

Our Methodology 12

Many Borrowers Can't Cover Interest Expense 16

We Estimate that ~$16 Billion of Swaps Terminate through 2024 22

Borrowers Unable to Refinance and Repay BXMT 24

BXMT Has Been Obscuring these Issues 29

Dividend Impact and BXMT's Options 35

Appendix: Examples of Problematic Loans 42

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 4

How BXMT Works

• BMXT is a REIT that borrows money and lends it onward to

commercial mortgage borrowers.
• The loans are floating rate (SOFR + spread) interest-only.
• The loans typically have three-year initial terms. If borrowers meet mainly
NOI / debt tests, they may extend for 1 + 1 years.
• BXMT requires that its borrowers enter into interest rate swaps ("rate caps") to
protect their ability to pay interest in a rising rate environment.
• BXMT captures a spread between interest income and interest expense. Its
ability to make distributions depends on its ability to avoid significant defaults.
N.B. Because these are interest-only loans, this model relies on borrowers
being able to refinance to repay the loans.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 5

The Perfect Macro Storm

• In office, NOIs are down because of changes since the pandemic.

o Vacancies are going even higher as existing leases terminate.
o Opex is higher due to inflation.
o Decreased NOIs make it harder to service debt.
• CRE asset values are down because of sharply higher rates.
o Many CRE borrowers owe more than their properties are currently worth.
o Because lenders typically only lend 60% to 70% of a property's value, "upside down" borrowers are
unable to refinance and pay off interest-only loans.
• Anticipated rate cuts would be too little, too late for many CRE borrowers.
o Rates would be cut to address macro weakness – the type of weakness to which much CRE is
exposed.
o CRE asset value changes generally lag rate movements.

Unless SOFR hits ~3.5% in H2 2024 without the economy slowing, we think BXMT
will be hammered by the macro.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 6

 CMBS Market is Reflecting the Stress and Another
Overhang
$1.2 trillion of US CRE maturities
in 2024-2025. Forced sellers
of CMBS providing a picture of
the market

• "Delinquent commercial real estate loans at US banks have hit their highest level in a decade, as higher interest rates,
an uncertain economy and the rise of remote working pile pressure on building owners. The volume of past-due
loans in which owners of properties rented to others have missed more than one payment jumped
30 per cent, or $4bn, to $17.7bn in the three months to the end of September, according to industry tracker
BankRegData. The figure had risen by $10bn in a year."

• “Thanks to deterioration in property-level financial performance, only about 25 per cent of conduit and single
asset/single borrower CMBS loans will be able to refinance in the next two years , GS found. For the
broader CMBS market, that figure is just 40 per cent. GS has to make some assumptions about what
securities can refinance, of course. The strategists settle on an LTV below 60 per cent; an implied mortgage rate from of
at least 7 per cent; and a debt service coverage ratio above 1.3 to 1.5 depending on the property type.”

Source FT "Colliding with CRE's maturity wall" December 1st 2023

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 7

 BXMT Has Looked Steady, But That's About to Change

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 8

Why Hasn't BXMT Yet Shown Signs of Distress?

• Many borrowers have only been able to stay current through the
unprecedented rate hikes of 2022-2023 because of the swaps.
• BXMT has also been giving investors a false sense of security through unrealistic
(and subjective) Risk Ratings and CECL (Current Expected Credit Loss)
provisioning.
• BXMT has been "extending and pretending" by modifying troubled loans that
are already otherwise in default – extending maturities and allowing them to PIK.
oWe believe that at least nine loans totaling $1.6 billion (~6.3% of BXMT's
net book value) have already been modified through Q3 2023.
oWe understand that already ~4% to ~5% of interest income is PIK.1

1 Per discussions with BXMT Investor Relations.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 9

2024 Will Be a Turning Point
• BXMT will likely significantly cut its dividend as soon as H2 2024 because we extrapolate that ~70%-
75% of BXMT's U.S. borrowers are presently unable to cover interest expense from property cash flows
absent interest rate swaps. (U.S. borrowers are 64% of net book value.)
o We estimate ~$16 billion notional of its borrowers' interest rate swaps expire over the next year..1
• Because asset values have fallen, as these interest-only loans begin to mature next year, we think large
numbers of borrowers will be unable to refinance and repay BXMT.
• BXMT is at risk of a liquidity crisis.
o Because many of its loans seemingly exceed collateral values, BXMT's lenders could "hyper-amortize" the loans
if BXMT doesn't post additional collateral.
o BXMT has unfunded loan commitments of $2.7 billion, but with only $1.5 billion of committed or identified
financings for those commitments, making it reliant on borrowers being able to refinance their interest-only
loans.
• Even assuming rate cuts, BXMT's losses on its $23.2 billion net book value of loans could reach
~$2.5 billion to ~$4.5 billion. BXMT's market cap, which is currently $4.0 billion, is at risk of being
completely wiped out by these losses. These losses are in addition to BXMT's existing loss provisions.
• BXMT has concealed the impending problems through under-provisioning and unrealistic Risk Ratings.

1 Calculations discussed infra.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 10

Absent Swaps, Many Borrowers Can't Service BXMT Debt
• BXMT's loans are interest-only floating rate (e.g., 30-day LIBOR/SOFR +
Spread).
• If in 2021, the borrower opened a swap through the initial maturity on a typical
three-year loan (with two one-year extension options) when 30-day SOFR
averaged 0.04%, the swap counterparty has been paying the ~530 bps
difference between current SOFR (5.3%) and the initial rate.1
• The weighted average spread on a BXMT loan is ~343 bps, meaning that
without swaps, the typical borrower would be paying ~8.7% now .
• The average borrower NOI / Debt in the CLO (see infra) is ~6.5%.

We estimate that ~$16 billion of these swaps will terminate in 2024.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 11

 Our Methodology

Delving into BXMT's CLO Data

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 12

Our Methodology / Edge: BXMT Granular Loan Data from CLOs

• From BXMT's three CLOs, we obtained granular information on 37 of

BXMT's 185 balance sheet loans,1 which represent ~$5.0 billion of BXMT's
$23.2 billion balance sheet.
• BXMT Investor Relations has confirmed that the CLO loans are
representative of the U.S. loans on BXMT's balance sheet.
• We then used a leading commercial real estate database
to understand property details, including vacancies and "shadow vacancies"
(i.e., rented but unoccupied space on the market for sublease), and
estimated cap rates at which the properties should trade.
• Our extrapolations are primarily from these 37 loans, but through
identifying three non-CLO loans, we have also gotten a window into non-
U.S. loans, construction loans, and other parts of the book. Certain of these
loans also show indicia of needing impairments.
1 CLO servicer report available from computershare.com

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 13

BXMT CLO Data Example

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 14

Bottom CLO Tranches are Already on the Watchlist

The CLO servicing report for the three CLOs show a total of $1.9 billion
of loans that are on the "watchlist" at "6A", which means "Any Other
Situation that Indicates an Increased Level of Default Risk that
may Create Potential Material Losses to Investors (Lesser of 10% of
UPB or $500,000)"1

1 CLO servicer Watchlist report available from computershare.com

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 15

 Many Borrowers Can't Cover Interest Expense

We extrapolate that ~70% to 75% of U.S. borrowers are unable to pay

interest expense without the swaps.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 16

How to Determine a Property's Debt Service Capacity

• We determine each property's ability to service its interest expense

by dividing LTM NOI (available in CLO data) by the outstanding
principal balance.
o If the result is greater than the combined rate on the loan, we
assume the property can service its interest expense.
o We generally exclude capex needs, which is company favorable.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 17

73% of CLO Borrowers Aren't Covering Interest Expense Absent Swaps

• 10 of the 37 CLO borrowers (27% by number, 29% by NBV) are unable to

cover SOFR at present ("Group A"). On average, they would only be able
to cover interest if SOFR were ~0.5%.1
• 17 of the 37 CLO borrowers (46% by number, 49% by NBV) are unable to
cover their spreads. On average, they would only be able to cover
interest if SOFR were ~3.5%.

1 As shown infra, this calculation excludes two properties that presently have negative NOIs due to construction and / or renovation.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 18

Group A – Seemingly Unable to Cover SOFR Above 3.5%

Not one of these properties could cover interest even if SOFR were only 3.5%.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 19

Group B – Seemingly Unable to Cover Interest Above 3.5% SOFR

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 20

Extrapolating to the Entire Loan Book

• We understand from BXMT Investor Relations that the CLOs are

representative of BXMT's U.S. loan book, ex-construction and very
large loans.
• It seems that ~70% - 75% of the U.S. loan book is unable to
service its debt absent rate swaps, based on the CLOs.
• We also see indicia of stress in international and construction loans,
which we discuss infra.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 21

 We Estimate that ~$16 Billion of Swaps
Terminate through 2024

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 22

Estimating 2024 Swap Maturities
• BXMT's disclosed "Maximum Maturities" in its Loan Portfolio Details table refer to
year in which all extension options have been exercised.
• We assume that borrowers initially enter into swaps that only cover their initial loan
terms, i.e., three years. BXMT does not require borrowers to swap away interest
exposure for renewal terms prior to exercising them.
• Therefore, the 2024 Maximum Maturity amount of $5.1 billion does not capture the
amount of swaps maturing in 2024.
• We also assume that the extensions consist of two one-year options, and that
borrowers only swap away extension period rate exposure one year at a time.
• 2024 Maximum Maturities ($5.1 billion) mostly apply to 2019 vintage loans; 2025
Maximum Maturities ($3.9 billion) mostly apply to 2020 loans that should have one-
year swaps expiring in 2024; and, 2026 Maximum Maturities ($7.0 billion) should
apply to 2021 vintage loans that have initial maturities and swaps terminating in
2024. We add these three groups together to estimate the amount of
swaps terminating in 2024, and the result is $16.0 billion.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 23

 Borrowers Unable to Refinance and Repay BXMT

The Core Problem for Borrowers

in BXMT's Portfolio

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 24

 The Core Issue for BXMT is Whether its Borrowers Can
Refinance Their Loans
• BXMT's loans are interest-only. When the loans mature, the borrowers' interest rate
swaps terminate.
• Group A and B borrowers, which we believe will be unable to cover their interest
payments without swaps, will find it difficult to refinance their loans.
o We estimate the As-Is values of Group A loans to be $0.7 billion, versus
their net book values of $1.4 billion.
o We estimate the As-Is values of Group B loans to be $2.0 billion, versus
their net book values of $2.4 billion.
• Because a subsequent lender seemingly would lend only 60% to 70% of the current
market values of the properties, these borrowers likely will be unable to repay their
loans at maturity. As discussed supra, BXMT has already modified some distressed
loans by extending them and / or allowing them to PIK.
BXMT seemingly will have to choose between bad and worse.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 25

Group A – Loans Appear Significantly Below Asset Values

• We derive As-Is values by using a leading real

estate data provider's estimate of market cap rate
for each property. The LTM NOIs come from the
CLO data.
• Recovery is the difference (if any) between loan
net book value and As-Is value.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 26

Group B – Loans Appear Materially Below Asset Values

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 27

 DBRS Morningstar is Less Company Favorable than MW
in Assessing Collateral Values

Our As-Is values are generally more conservative than are DBRS Morningstar's.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 28

 BXMT Has Been Obscuring these Issues

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 29

BXMT Risk Ratings and CECL Explained

• BXMT classifies loans with Risk Ratings of 1 – 5.

• Risk Rating 5 is the riskiest, with a very high risk of realizing a principal loss
or has already incurred a principal loss. Risk Rating 1 is the least risky.
• When loans reach Risk Ratings of 5, BXMT ascribes CECLs to each RR 5
loan. Currently it reserves for a ~23% impairment.
• For 1-4 rated loans, BXMT provides an overall CECL by region / type, but
not by individual loan.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 30

BXMT Has Been Misleading Investors

• BXMT has been aggressive in its risk ratings of loans.

• BXMT has under-provisioned CECLs, particularly on loans with Risk
Ratings of 3 and 4 where we see likely principal loss or modification (with
modification risking BXMT's dividend).
• CECLs on loans with Risk Ratings of 5 are disclosed to be $322 million,
which we believe understates the impairments that would be realized if
borrowers were forced to repay the loan. Many of these loans are believed
to be worth less than 80% of the loan balance.
• For 1-4 rated loans (~$22.3 billion total loans receivable), BXMT is in
total reserving ~$141 million (0.6%), which is a fraction of the ~$2.5
billion to ~$4.5 billion of underlying impairments we think should be taken.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 31

Manipulation of Risk Ratings

• BXMT seemingly is systematically under-rating the Risk Ratings it gives loans.

• Of the 37 loans into which we have visibility from the CLOs:
o 17 (46%) appear unable to cover their interest rate spreads absent swaps ("Group B"). Of these
17:
▪ 11 of the 17 have Risk Ratings of 2 or 3.
These loans generally can't
▪ One is Risk Rating of 4.
cover interest until SOFR is
▪ Three are 5. 3.5% (see Supra).
▪ Two are too small for BXMT to disclose their risk ratings.
o 10 (27%) appear unable to cover even SOFR absent swaps. Of these 10 ("Group A"):
▪ Four are Risk Rated 3 These loans generally can't
▪ Two are Risk Rated 4 cover interest until SOFR is
0.5% (see Supra).
▪ Four are Risk Rated 5 with specific CECL reserves

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 32

 Remember this Table from DBRS Morningstar? Obviously
Impaired Loans Risk Rated 2 and 3 With No Specific CECLs

2 rated loan

3 rated loan

2 rated loan

BXMT's total non-specific CECLs across the entire U.S. book are $114 million, which this table
shows is unduly low. We estimate that One South Wacker is impaired by $155 million, Colony
Square by $50.7 million, Liberty View by $47 million, and Northbridge by $9.3 million.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 33

Manipulation of CECLs

• Recall that the book value net of CECLs of Group B loans is $2.4 billion,
compared to our estimated recoveries of $2.0 billion.
o The average NOI to debt for these borrowings is 6.7% compared to an average spread of
~300 bps.
• Recall that the book value net of CECLs of Group A loans is $1.4 billion,
compared to our estimated recoveries of $0.7 billion.
o The average NOI to debt for these borrowings is 3.6% compared to SOFR of 5.3% and an
average spread of ~300 bps.
• Outside of the CLOs, BXMT has nine loans totaling $1.9 billion in value Risk
Rated 4, but with no specific CECL reserves. Based on our findings, the CECLs
on these 2 – 4 Risk Rating loans will eventually increase dramatically as swaps
expire and BXMT cannot delay truing up its reserves.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 34

 Dividend Impact and BXMT's Options

Choosing Between Bad and Worse

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 35

 How Does BXMT Get Hurt?

• With loan modifications on about 6.3% of NBV, and ~4% to 5% of interest

income already being PIK, BXMT has been playing the "extend and pretend"
game. These modifications decrease cash flow.
• But with estimated ~$16 billion in swaps terminating in 2024, we believe the
impact of borrower distress will show up in H2 2024.
• At current SOFR, we envisage scenarios in which BXMT's dividend is
cut by ~55% to ~85%.
• At 4.5% SOFR, we see the dividend being cut by ~33% to ~55%.
• BXMT's lenders might require it to post more collateral, potentially squeezing
liquidity.
• BXMT has $2.7 billion of unfunded loan commitments and only $1.5 billion
of available borrowing capacity, potentially creating a liquidity issue.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 36

Dividend Reduction – Base Case

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 37

Dividend Reduction – Bear Case

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 38

Hint of BXMT's Internal Concern: New Dividend CYA Disclosure

A new (as of Q3 2023) CYA disclosure warns investors that GAAP income covers only
27% of the dividend (below), seemingly telegraphing BXMT's recognition of the
unsustainability of its dividend. This disclosure previously wasn't present.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 39

 When Loans Go Bad En Masse: Modification vs. Take the
Keys
• We expect that in most situations, BXMT will first ask sponsors to inject additional
equity. However, we question sponsors' appetites to do so, especially for
older properties.
• BXMT's least bad alternative seems to be modifying the loans by extending
their maturities. It appears to have done this with ~80% of its Risk Rated
4 office loans.
• While this buys time and could result in higher ultimate recoveries, it creates other
issues:
o Modified loans will likely be at least partly PIKing or paying below market interest.
o The lack of cash flow constrains BXMT's ability to pay dividends.
o BXMT's lenders might require more collateral on their loans because of drops in
the collateral values, creating a liquidity crisis for BXMT.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 40

 The Bottom Line

• We see BXMT significantly cutting its dividend by ~33% to ~85%,

beginning in H2 2024.
• BXMT could have a liquidity crisis due to its lenders requiring it to post
more collateral and / or having to fund its unfunded commitments of
$2.7 billion with only $1.5 billion committed or identified financings for
those commitments, leaving $1.2 billion in net unfunded
commitments.
• We believe that BXMT will ultimately recognize significant losses in its
loan book, ranging from $2.5 billion to $4.5 billion. These losses could
wipe out its market cap.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 41

 Appendix: Examples of Problematic Loans

CLO, International, and Atypical

loans

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 42

Chicago – 444 Michigan Ave (Risk Rating Plummeting from 3 to 5)
We believe 444 Michigan Ave, which matures in January 2024, is a harbinger of the near future for BXMT.
• CLO and the real estate data service show that 444 Michigan Ave was a struggling property for at least two years before being
downgraded to a 5. As of FY 2022, it was still rated a 3.
• In Q1 2023, BXMT revised downward to 4.
• In Q2, BXMT revised the Risk Rating to 5.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 43

444 Michigan Ave "Shadow Vacancy"

• The real estate data service shows nominal vacancy of 36% (rough match to CLO report), but an "Availability
Rate" of 53.5%.
• In other words, there is an additional 17.5% of the building available for sub-lease. This loan is now Risk
Rated 5, but when the weighted average sq ft has been on the market for 32 months, why did it take BXMT so
long to downgrade the loan to 5?

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 44

Almaden 488 – Risk Rated 3, White Elephant
BXMT would like you to believe that the only issues are in older office properties, but newer properties in struggling markets also
pose a problem. Apart from PwC, which occupied the building prior to the acquisition, and one other tenant, Almaden 488 appears
to have remained vacant for 2.5 years. We have found a brochure advertising the space. It's been reported that PwC might vacate
the space, of which it appears to currently lease ~45,000 sq ft.

source https://www.cbre.com/resources/fileassets/US-SMPL-66185/a3680558/bf98ab87-d75f-44f7-8840-eeb590a377af.pdf
https://therealdeal.com/sanfrancisco/2023/09/27/pwc-looks-to-exit-downtown-san-jose-for-the-suburbs/

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 45

Colony Square Currently Rated 2 – Myriad Issues

• Overall occupancy is at 83% – from the CLO data (see next page)
they own building 100, 300, 400 & 500
• Our data confirms: 10% of building 100 was occupied by WeWork.
• Stated vacancy of 300 is 51% and shadow vacancy is 68.2%
• Shadow vacancy of building 400 is 25.8%.

• Building 500 looks to be the only one that has no issues, it's almost
100% leased to Jones Day.

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 One South Wacker
One South Wacker is an example of a 4 rated loan that was risk rated a 3 until Q3 2022, when it was marked
down. The property had a 61% occupancy as of the June 2023 CLO report, and currently has a shadow vacancy of
29.2%. It had struggled after key tenant RSM vacated ~160,000 sq ft in 2021. Based on a 4% NOI yield from the
CLO data we believe this loan should have been impaired by ~$154.7m which is more than the entire CECL
reserve for 4 rated loans.* Miraculously a tenant called Invenergy expanded its lease in October 2023 and the
building's occupancy is now closer to 81%. Co-incidentally Invenergy is a company into which another arm of
Blackstone has invested ~$4bn.

*Based on our calculation, If NOI increases by $5m due to new tenant, the impairment would decrease to $96m from
$155m.

MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH 47

48
One South Wacker continued...
We note that despite the increase in tenancy, the NOI situation may not have improved dramatically as during the Q1 and Q2
2023 updates the CLO notes there are rent free periods for recently executed deals in addition to Ti's. The weak negotiating
position is further demonstrated by the removal of the language "asking rents have remained stable"

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 Hollingsworth 980 Avenue of the Americas –
More WeWork exposure
• We believe the Hollingsworth loan is still classed as a level 3 risk weighting, it was classified as a level 2 until Q2 2023
when it was downgraded. Hollingsworth has significant issues, WeWork occupied 75,000 sqft (the entire office space).
• It's described by BXMT as "multi" but the sponsor describes it as "mixed-use" . We struggle to understand how this is a
level 3 category loan when it's just lost it's entire office tenant and the sponsor is flagging potential to evaluate options
including renovation. The below quote is from the building sponsor in the New York Times on November 4th 2023.

WeWork occupies nearly all of the office space at 980

Avenue of the Americas, a mixed-use development
owned by the Vanbarton Group. Joey Chilelli, a
managing director at the company, said the firm could
consider a range of options for the space if WeWork
vacated, including turning it into residences.

“We have tried to do everything we could earlier this

year when they went to every landlord and asked for
rent reductions and concessions,” Mr. Chilelli said. “If
they are able to reduce their footprint, it will hurt the
office market again.”

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 Dublin BXMT's second largest loan – showcased in the
presentation
• The Dublin portfolio has an estimated NOI/debt of 6.6% which is consistent with loans in our US portfolio Group A and B properties. Dublin carries a
$954 million principal balance and is classed as a level 3 loan. It was held as a level 2 as of Q1 2023.
• NOI to debt is estimated to be 6.6%, which implies Dublin can not cover interest when SOFR is 3.6% or more. We estimate the swap on this loan
expires between August and December 2023.
• WeWork represented a 4.2% tenant in Georges Quay back in 2018 so we are concerned the property may no longer be "fully leased".
• The classification of "office and logistics" is generous, we know 85% is office based on when it was a public REIT.

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 Construction lending – Everything is bigger in Texas
• BXMT committed to a $675 million construction loan for a high-end mixed-use development,
called "Waterline", which will have 700,000 sq ft of office. BXMT committed in Q2 2022, citing
strong sponsorship and 62% LTC.2
• This might be poorly timed, 6 million square feet of new office space is scheduled to come
online over the next few years, with Facebook trying to sublease 589,000 sq ft.

"Between spaces completed since 2020

and what's still in the pipeline, the [Austin]
office market will grow nearly 25% – the
fastest rate on the continent...Roughly
87% of new office space is expected to
open vacant, according to data from
Cushman & Wakefield".1

1 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/15/downtown-austin-real-estate-doom-loop/
2 https://austin.towers.net/inside-waterline-downtown-austins-record-breaking-supertall-tower-plan/

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