45

Interplay of Sāṅkhya and Buddhist

Ideas in the Yoga of Patañjali
(with Special Reference to Yogasūtra

and Yogabhāṣya)1

Pradeep Gokhale

Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2

Department of Pali

Savitribai Phule Pune University

[email protected]
 46

The question of the exact characterisation of philosophy in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra

does not seem to be settled as yet. The tradition talks of the dual system namely,

Sāṅkhya-Yoga. Pantañjali’s philosophy of Yoga has been sometimes called

Patañjala-Sāṅkhya, but it is yet differentiated from Kapila’s Sāṅkhya in that the

former incorporates the concept of īśvara which the latter does not. On account

of this difference Patañjali’s Yoga has also been named Seśvara Sāṅkhya2 or

theistic Sāṅkhya.

But the description of Yoga as theistic Sāṅkhya does not seem to be correct

because īśvara in Patañjali’s Yoga is not God in the sense of the creator of the

world or even the efficient or material cause of the world.3 The īśvara of Yoga

carries all the characteristics of Sāṅkhya puruṣa in their ideal form. The puruṣa of

Sāṅkhya system, though free by its very nature, is apparently in bondage due to its
Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2

union with prakṛti. The īśvara of Yoga is puruṣa-viśeṣa (a special conscious being)

(YS 1.24) in that it is not even touched by any possibility of bondage in the form of

afflictions, actions or latent impressions of past actions. In contrast, the īśvara of

Yoga is not even touched by any possibility of bondage in the form of afflictions,

actions or latent impressions of past actions. As a result, the īśvara is an ideal

 Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2 47

puruṣa to whom Patañjali ascribes omniscience (YS 1.25) but not omnipotence.

This īśvara is also supposed to be the teacher of teachers (YS 1.26), because as

the ideal puruṣa free from ignorance, he can be looked upon as a guiding star,

as an exemplar by everyone. But he is not an object of devotion (bhakti) in the

traditional sense of the term. If īśvara-praṇidhāna means devotion to īśvara, then

it is devotion in the sense of meditative surrender. Utterance of the word ‘Om’

which becomes a part of this devotion is for paying attention to its referent viz.

īśvara (YS 1.27-28). The interpretation of īśvara-praṇidhāna, as surrendering all

actions to Him (sarvakriyāṇām arpaṇam)(VB on YS 2.1), as offered by Vyāsa4 and

other commentators, is misplaced because it is contrary to Patañjali’s concept

of īśvara as a being completely untouched by actions. It is possible that these

commentators being themselves under theistic influence have interpreted

īśvara-praṇidhāna as theistic devotion. Some later commentators who were

under the influence of Advaita-Vedānta have also projected their views on

Pātañjali Yoga. The īśvara of Patañjali according to them achieves the status of

omniscient, omnipotent and prime cause Brahman.

But the undesirable consequence of these influences was that the original

conceptual setting of the Yogasūtra was disguised or even distorted by the

commentaries written under these influences. It becomes necessary, therefore,

to unearth the original setting of the sūtras and to analyse its complex structure

anew.

II

Though the legacy of Sāṅkhya in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra is undeniable, it is visible

mainly as forming the transcendental metaphysical framework of Patañjali’s

teaching. We find that the categories of Sāṅkhya system like prakṛti, puruṣa,

mahat, and ahaṁkāra are mostly of transcendental (non-empirical) character.

The Sāṅkhya way to the so-called emancipation (kaivalya: isolation of puruṣa from

prakṛti) goes through the discriminative knowledge of these abstract categories.

This emancipatory knowledge according to the Sāṅkhya is again not empirical or

meditative but intellectual and speculative. The concept of meditative realisation

is absent from the classical Sāṅkhya system. Patañjali’s main teaching which is

enveloped in this framework is, however, empirical and practical to a large extent.
 Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2 48

Patañjali emphasises the goal called samādhi which one has to attain through

practice and make it a matter of experience. The vision (prajñā) which one attains

through the practice of samādhi is again a direct vision. It is not of an abstract or

speculative kind.

In Sāṅkhyakārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa talks of eight forms (bhāva) of the intellect, four of

which are sāttvika and four tāmasa. Dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aiśvarya are

the sāttvika forms (SK 23). Regulation of conduct comes under dharma, whereas

the emancipatory knowledge is jñāna. In this Sāṅkhya system, dharma, though

a sāttvika form of the intellect, is a means to bondage and only jñāna is the way

to emancipation. So, moral regulation of conduct does not have any direct role

to play in Sāṅkhya theory of emancipation. On the other hand moral regulation

of conduct through yamas and niyamas is essential for mastering samādhi

according to Patañjali.

The empirical-practical orientation of Patañjali’s Yoga therefore does not seem

to be rooted in Sāṅkhya. Though it is difficult to trace the exact source of this

orientation, it seems certain that this source does contain many elements which

can be traced to Buddhism and a few which can be traced to Jainism.

Some orthodox scholars of Yoga have a tendency to claim that Patañjali’s

Yoga being prior to Jainism and Buddhism the latter two might have borrowed

many ideas from the former and not vice-versa. It is forgotten that the oldest

commentary of Yoga, namely Vyāsabhāṣya interprets some aphorisms from

the fourth chapter of Yogasūtra as Patañjali’s criticism of Yogācāra Buddhism.5

The modern scholars, on the other hand, accept 2nd to 5th century A.D. as the

possible time of the creation of Yogasūtra. If this view is acceptable then our

study of Yogasūtra will have to take a different form. The more important question,

however, seems to be of identifying the background literature of Yogasūtra. Sūtra

literature of any school is generally understood as crystallization or abbreviation

of the elaborate background literature which is already available. For example,

the background literature of Mīmāṁsā-sūtras is Brāhmaṇa texts and that of

Brahmasūtra is Upaniṣads. Though elaborate literature of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

schools is not found before their sūtras, at least their earlier forms are seen in

works like Carakasaṁhitā. Now coming to Yogasūtra of Patañjali, its metaphysical

 Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2 49

framework can be traced to Sāṅkhya literature which was already available. But

when we search for the background literature of the practical and experiential

aspect of Yogasūtra, we find it rarely in the orthodox (Vedic) tradition.6 On the other

hand, a large number of concepts constituting this aspect are found mentioned,

explained and discussed elaborately in the literature of Śramaṇa tradition in

general and Buddhism in particular. Yogasūtra therefore can be understood

better in the light of Sāṅkhya, as well as, Buddhist (and Jaina) literature.

Both Patañjali in Yogasūtra and Vyāsa in his Bhāṣya use Buddhist terms, concepts

and doctrines while explaining the empirical and practical aspect of Yoga. But they

do not acknowledge the legacy of the Buddha or Buddhist literature anywhere.7

What could be the reason? One might claim here that the Yogic tradition

which was available to Patañjali and Vyāsa already contained many elements

of Buddhism, but they were so assimilated with the Yogic tradition that their

separate identity was blurred or vanished. This explanation is not fully satisfactory

because there are clear indications of the fact that these authors were aware of

the separate identity of Buddhism. They were aware of the Buddhist doctrine of

momentariness and also of the idealist school of Buddhism and they were also

critical about them.8 It seems that they were ready to accept the Buddhist ideas
concerning the theory and practice of meditation but did not want to accept

the theories of ‘mind only’ and momentariness which were associated with them.

There they wanted to stick to Sāṅkhya theory of Realism and two-fold eternality.9
They might have thought that it is possible to accommodate Buddhist practical

theory of meditation and still maintain the Sāṅkhya identity of the system. This

could be the reason why they borrowed many themes from the Buddhist tradition

but did not acknowledge them.10

Another related question is: If Patañjali and Vyāsa borrowed many things from

the Buddhist tradition, what could be the Buddhist text or texts which they might

have followed? They must not have followed Yogācāra or Mādhyamika texts.

Some scholars have compared concepts of Pātañjali-yoga with Pali Buddhism.

For example, La Vallee Poussin (Bhave 1992) has compared aphorisms of Yoga

with Abhidharmakośa, as well as, Pali Buddhism. S. N Tandon (1998), on the other

hand, has focused only on Pali sources. However, though the content of Pātañjali-

yoga is close to Pali Buddhist texts, it is most likely that they did not follow the

texts in Pali/Magadhi language, but some texts in Sanskrit Buddhism. The texts like
 Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2 50

Yogācārabhūmi and Abhdharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga and Abhidharmakośa

and Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu seem to be very relevant in this

context.

It is important to take the points of similarity between Pātañjali-yoga and

Buddhism seriously not only in order to consider how Buddhist background

literature on meditation might have influenced Patañjali and Vyāsa, but also in

order to understand some of the concepts in Pātañjali-yoga in a right perspective.

Take for instance the two technical terms, nirodha and kleśa, they are central to

Pātañjali-yoga. I want to suggest that if these terms are interpreted independently

of Buddhist background, they are likely to mislead us. In classical Sanskrit, nirodha

is generally taken to mean suppression11 and kleśa is taken to mean affliction or

pain.12 If we accept these meanings in the context of Patañjali’s Yoga, then the

definition of ‘yoga’ as ‘citta-vṛtti-nirodha’ will be understood as ‘suppression of

the states of mind’ and the five types of kleśa will be understood as five types

of afflictions or pains. As against this, nirodha in the Buddhist context means

cessation and kleśa13 means defilement or impurity. These meanings throw better
light on the Pātañjali-yoga concepts. Yoga as the state of meditative trance

makes better sense if it is understood as the cessation (which can be natural or

spontaneous) of mental states, rather than their suppression (which is generally

deliberate or forced).14 Similarly it makes better sense to call misconception

and desire as impurities rather than as kinds of pains. In fact there is scope for
interpreting the whole of Pātañjali-yoga in the Buddhist light, as a synthesis of

Sāṅkhya and Buddhism. It will be a big task worth undertaking by the scholars of

Buddhism and Pātañjali-yoga.

Here I would like to focus on the theme in a limited way. I want to show that due

to the dual influence of Sāṅkhya and Buddhism, we many a times find Patañjali’s

thought oscillating between the two systems of thought. Put it differently, we

sometimes find a kind of interplay of Sāṅkhya and Buddhist ideas in Patañjali’s

Yogasūtra. In what follows I will try to understand this interplay of Sāṅkhya and

Buddhist elements with special reference to three notions (a) cittavṛttinirodha,

(b) the cause of suffering, (c) avidyā and prajñā.

 Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2 51

III

(a) The notion of citta-vṛtti-nirodha

Patañjali defines yoga as citta-vṛtti-nirodha. The concept of citta, which is

central to the philosophy of Yoga is not basically a Sāṅkhya concept. Were

Patañjali under the full influence of Sāṅkhya, he would have used the term buddhi

or antaḥkaraṇa in place of citta. The concept of citta, on the other hand, is of

central importance in Buddhism. Patañjali’s concept of cittavṛtti is closely similar

to the Buddhist concept of caitta or cetasika. The difference is that Patañjali

offers two different classifications of cittavṛttis. The five-fold classification15 is

oriented to epistemology, whereas the twofold classification into kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa

(defiled and non-defiled) is oriented to moral psychology and soteriology. The

fivefold classification is partly rooted in Sāṅkhya epistemology which accepts

three means to knowledge namely pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama. But it

also seems to be influenced by the Buddhist epistemology in its acceptance of

vikalpa (mental construction) as a cognitive state. However, unlike Patañjali’s

classification of cittavṛttis, the Buddhist classification of caittas is not primarily

epistemic, but moral-psychological-cum-soteriological. Hence through the

twofold classification of cittavṛttis, Patañjali seems to be synthesising Sāṅkhya

epistemology with Buddhist moral psychology. Having identified cittavṛtti with

caitta we can say that cittavṛttinirodha of Patañjali in Buddhist terminology will

be caittanirodha. The highest state of meditative trance in the Buddhist theory of

meditation is called saṁjñā-vedayita-nirodha (cessation of perception as well as

sensation),16 which according to Vasubandhu is citta-caitta-nirodha (cessation

of mind and mental states).17

Patañjali, however, does not set aside the Sāṅkhya framework completely even

while defining yoga as cittavṛttinirodha. In the very next aphorism (YS, I.3) he brings

in the concept of the seer (draṣṭā) and describes its role in this highest stage of

meditative trance. He points out that the seer, draṣṭā (which the commentators

identify with puruṣa), who otherwise would assimilate the self with modifications

of mind, remains in the original state (that of witness – consciousness) at this

stage.
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The notion of citta-vṛtti-nirodha does not presuppose any eternal entity by itself.

Citta-vṛtti-nirodha in Pātañjali yoga is often identified with samādhi. Samādhi in

Buddhism is defined as single-pointedness of mind (“ekāgratā cittasya”), where

neither the mind nor the single object on which it concentrates is regarded as

eternal. Nirvāṇa, which is identified with nirodha in Buddhism, is described in

Abhidharmakośa as an unconditioned phenomenon (asaṁskṛta-dharma),18 but

it is described not as a positive entity, nor does it presuppose the existence of

any eternal positive entity. As against this, Patañjali’s description of samādhi in

terms of draṣṭā (identified with the Sāṅkhya puruṣa) is eternalistic. Patañjali in this

way tries to synthesise the non-eternalistic Buddhist model with the eternalistic

Sāṅkhya framework.

(b) Duḥkha and its cause

The Buddha said that all composite things are objects of suffering. One of the

explanations was that every composite thing (saṁskāra) is impermanent, and

impermanence makes it unsatisfactory. Sometimes a broader explanation was

given. According to it everything is an object of suffering in any of the three

ways (i) duḥkhaduḥkhatā: certain things are objects of suffering because they

are painful in themselves, (ii) saṁskāraduḥkhatā: certain things are objects

of suffering because they are composite (saṁskāra) in nature (and hence are

subject to destruction), (iii) vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā: certain things are objects

of suffering because they result into suffering. This threefold explanation of

suffering is called the doctrine of trividha-duḥkhatā.19 Following this Buddhist

understanding, Patañjali maintains in Yogasūtra 2.15 that everything is an object

of suffering according to a wise (discriminating) person. Here he supports this

thesis by giving an explanation in terms of trividha-duḥkhatā (“pariṇāma-tāpa-

saṁskāra-duḥkhaiḥ”).

The above explanation of suffering appears to be largely empirical. Though

Patañjali accepts it, he is not fully satisfied with it as he has also accepted at the

same time the metaphysical framework of Sāṅkhya. Hence, in the same aphorism

he supplements the empirical explanation with a typically Sāṅkhya metaphysical

 Sambhāṣaṇ Volume 2 : Issue 1 & 2 53

explanation. He gives the latter in terms of mutual opposition amongst the strands

of prakṛti (guṇavṛttivirodhāt).

Just as Patañjali brings the Buddhist and Sāṅkhya elements together in his

explanation of the unsatisfactory character of all things, he does in his analysis

of the origin of suffering, as well. In Yogasūtra 2.3 to 2.15, he gives a casual

explanation of suffering in terms of kleśas (defects or defilements of mind)

which is largely empirical and influenced by the Buddhist explanation. Asaṅga

in Abhidharmasamuccaya refers to six kleśas (ADS, p. 43). In Abhidharmakośa

Chapter V, Vasubandhu discusses six anuśayas (latent tendencies) which he

identifies with kleśas (defilements).20 They are rāga (desire), pratigha (hatred),

māna (ego, pride), avidyā (misconception), dṛṣṭi (dogmatic view) and vicikitsā

(doubt).21 Except vicikitsā, the remaining five are comparable to the five kleśas

namely raga,22 dveṣa, asmitā,23 avidyā and abhiniveśa24 respectively from

Patañjali’s list. In Patañjali’s explanation in terms of kleśas, avidyā stands for

the fundamental defilement, the root-cause of all sufferings. (We shall see that

Patañjali defines avidyā in a typically Buddhist fashion). The last three kleśas

in Patañjali’s list correspond to the three kinds of tṛṣṇā accepted in Buddhism,

namely, kāmatṛṣṇā, vibhavatṛṣṇā and bhavatṛṣṇā (desire of pleasure, aversion

and desire to be born that is, fear of death) respectively. In Yogasūtra 2.16 to 2.18,

Patañjali comes back to the Sāṅkhya explanation of the cause of suffering. Here

the union of prakṛti (dṛśya) and puruṣa (draṣṭā) is itself regarded as the cause of
suffering that needs to be avoided.

Thus, we find that Patañjali presents Buddhist-style explanation and the Sāṅkhya-

style explanation of the cause of suffering almost separately. He presents them in

juxtaposition but does not relate them or formulate any clear synthesis of them.

It is possible that Patañjali wants to arrive at a synthesis between the two by

distinguishing between subtle and gross defilements. In Yogasūtra 2.10 and 2.11,

he suggests that the gross manifestations of kleśas could be overcome with the

help of meditation, but the subtle kleśas can be overcome only by the reverse

process by which the manifestations of Prakṛti merge into their origin. Thus, the

Sāṅkhya metaphysics seems to operate at a subtle level and the Buddhist theory

and practice of overcoming sufferings at gross level. This the distinction made

by Patañjali has its background in Vasubandhu’s distinction between bhāvanā-

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heya-kleśa and darśana-heya-kleśa.25 For Vasubandhu, gross defilements such

as lust and hatred can be abandoned with the help of meditation. But subtler

defilements such as misconception and dogmatic views can be abandoned with

the help of right vision. This right vision for Vasubandhu is the vision regarding the

four noble truths and impermanence of all things. Though Patañjali accepts the

basic distinction between the two types of kleśas to be abandoned by meditation

and right vision respectively, he replaces the Buddhist conception of right vision

by the Sāṅkhya concept of right vision, which consists in discrimination between

prakṛti and puruṣa (which is followed by the merger of all manifestations into

prakṛti: ‘pratiprasava’). Hence he replaces Vasubandhu’s ‘darśana-heya’ by

‘pratiprasava-heya’. The situation, however, seems to be more complex than

this, because Patañjali’s concepts of avidyā and prajñā are again dominated by

Buddhist-style considerations.

(c) Avidyā and prajñā

The Yoga concept of avidyā has not always been understood very clearly.

Vyāsa and other commentators have identified avidyā with viparyaya, one

of the citta-vṛttis. But though avidyā could be construed as a special kind of

viparyaya, it cannot be identified with viparyaya as such. Any false cognition or

a misidentification is viparyaya. But avidyā which is at the root of all kleśas is a

special kind of misidentification, which is quite different from the misidentification

we come across in our daily life.

Though avidyā cannot be identified with viparyaya, which is a kind of cittavṛtti,

it is not irrelevant to cittavṛttis in general. As we have seen, Patañjali advances

two classifications of citta-vṛttis. One is a two-fold classification into kliṣṭa and

akliṣṭa,26 which has been made from a moral-spiritual point of view. The other is

the five-fold classification into pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā and smṛti (YS

1.6), which has been made from epistemological point of view. That a particular

state of mind is epistemologically veridical or non-veridical does not necessarily

imply that it is morally-spiritually sound or unsound (respectively). Pramāṇa-citta-

vṛtti (true cognition) is epistemologically sound. But a person may be inclined to

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have a true cognition out of some desire or aversion or confusion about what is

permanent and what is impermanent. In that case the same state of mind would

be called defiled (kliṣṭa)– a morally-spiritually unsound state. On the other hand,

certain illusions, though they are epistemologically non-veridical states of mind,

may not be defiled states, as they may not involve desire or aversion. A stick half-

immersed into water, for instance, looks bent even to an emancipated person.

Avidyā, according to Patañjali, is the ground of all other defilements. It is therefore

more correct to include avidyā in the two-fold classification of citta-vṛttis into

defiled and non-defiled (kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa) than in the five-fold classification into

pramāṇa, viparyaya etc.

Though the concept of avidyā cannot be identified with the Yoga concept

of viparyaya, it can be identified with the Buddhist concept of viparyāsa. Both

the concepts, avidyā of Yoga and viparyāsa of Buddhism stand for wrongly

identifying impermanent things as permanent, impure things as pure, unpleasant

things as pleasant and soul-less things as soul-possessing.27 This concept of

avidyā/viparyāsa is a typically Buddhist concept in that it presupposes that all

phenomena are non-eternal and non-substantial (soul-less). On the other hand,

we have typically eternalistic and substantialist versions of avidyā upheld by the

systems like Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. These systems accept the existence of both:

an eternal reality on the one hand and the non-eternal phenomenal world on the
other. They talk of beings possessing the substance called self or soul as against

the empirical phenomena not possessing it. So, wrongly identifying the non-

eternal as the eternal as well as the eternal as the non-eternal would amount to

avidyā in these systems. Similarly, wrongly identifying soul-less things as the soul-

possessing ones and soul-possessing things as the soul-less ones would amount

to it. That Patañjali does not present his concept of avidyā in such an eternalistic

fashion but presents it in a typically Buddhist fashion clearly indicates that there

he is under the influence of Buddhism.

The Buddhist-style conception of avidyā which does not presuppose any eternal

entity would be thought to be inadequate or at least incomplete in an eternalistic

framework. And since Patañjali had accepted the eternalistic framework of

Sāṅkhya, he might have felt unsatisfied with the non-eternalistic conception of

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avidyā which he himself presented. This might have led him to come back to

Sāṅkhya framework in the very next aphorism28 where he defines the second

kleśa namely, asmitā (ego). Patañjali defines it as a false union of dṛkśakti and

darśanaśakti. By dṛkśakti Patañjali means draṣṭā, the seer, that is, puruṣa. By

darśanaśakti he refers to ‘seeing’, which is the active aspect of cognition.

Darśanaśakti thus refers to buddhi of the Sāṅkhya system, which is responsible for

all cognitive activities. Vyāsa, the commentator, substantiates this interpretation

by referring to Pañcaśikha’s statement that the one who does not see puruṣa

as distinct from buddhi regards buddhi as ātman that is, as one’s own self.29 The

concept of asmitā as that of the false union of puruṣa and buddhi, gives us a

typically Sāṅkhya conception of metaphysical misconception.

Patañjali in this way seems to present a two-fold conception of ignorance/

false conception which is at the root of suffering. The first aspect of it is the

false conception of reality that consists in wrongly seeing something eternal,

pure, pleasant and soul-possessing. Patañjali calls it avidyā. The second aspect

consists in the metaphysical confusion between the pure, passive consciousness

of puruṣa and the cognitive activity of the intellect (buddhi). Patañjali calls it

asmitā. Patañjali presents the two aspects one after the other but does not bring

out any clear relationship between them. In the bipolar structure of Patañjali’s

thought we have avidyā and asmitā as the basic forms of ignorance, on the one

hand and prajñā and vivekakhyāti as the forms of wisdom, on the other. Patañjali’s

conception of prajñā as the emancipatory wisdom has its roots in Buddhism.

Three kinds of wisdom (prajñā) were recognised in Buddhism. In early stages of

one’s pilgrimage towards emancipation from suffering one is verbally/scripturally

informed about the impermanent, impure, unpleasant and non-soul-possessing

character of reality. The verbal/scriptural knowledge of this kind is called śrutamayī

prajñā. This wisdom is later on strengthened with the help of reasoning. The form

of wisdom which emerges through it is called cintāmayī prajñā. But even this form

of wisdom is imperfect; it attains perfection through the practice of meditative

concentration. Wisdom in its perfect form is called bhāvanāmayī prajñā. It is a

direct vision of the reality.30

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Patañjali accepts the same classification of prajñā and calls them as śrutaprajñā,

anumānaprajñā and ṛtambharā prajñā (truth-bearing wisdom).

It is interesting to note that the three kinds of prajñā correspond (in reverse order)

to the three pramāṇas, namely pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama accepted

by Patañjali. Interestingly again, these are the same pramāṇas which are

accepted in Sāṅkhya system. But the functions of these three pramāṇas vis à

vis emancipatory knowledge in the two systems namely, Sāṅkhya and Yoga are

fundamentally different. In Sāṅkhyakārikā (verse 5) we are told that the objects

which are subtle or transcendent are not the objects of direct knowledge, but

that they are the objects of speculative reasoning (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna)

or scriptural knowledge (āgama). So the Sāṅkhya-style emancipatory knowledge

which consists in the discrimination between the ultimate transcendent

categories, namely prakṛti and puruṣa, is ultimately intellectual or scriptural. On

the other hand, the emancipatory knowledge according to Patañjali’s Yoga is of

meditative and direct character. Ṛtambharā prajñā of Patañjali’s Yoga shares

this characteristic with bhāvanāmayī prajñā of early Buddhism.

But bhāvanāmayī prajñā of Buddhism consists in seeing things as non-

eternal, impure, unpleasant and soul-less. It represents the radical negation of

viparyāsas (which Patañjali identifies with avidyā). It is clearly non-eternalistic. It

is quite possible that Patañjali was not fully satisfied with it as he had accepted

the eternalistic framework of Sāṅkhya. So, he frequently refers to vivekakhyāti

(discriminative knowledge) which is a typically Sāṅkhya concept of emancipatory

knowledge.

Patañjali introduces the concept of prajñā also in the second chapter of Yogasūtra,

as sevenfold ultimate understanding (saptadhā prāntabhūmiḥ prajñā).31 Vyāsa’s

explanation of this sevenfold understanding exhibits a synthesis of Buddhism and

Sāṅkhya. In fact, here basically Patañjali and then Vyāsa use the framework of

four noble truths in the form of heya, heyahetu, hāna and hānopāya (prospective

suffering which is to be abandoned; cause of the thing to be abandoned;

abandonment of the thing to be abandoned; the means of abandoning the thing

to be abandoned). In Buddhism the four noble truths (suffering, the cause of

suffering, cessation of suffering and the path leading to the cessation of suffering)
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are further elaborated in terms of their nature, the treatment to be given to them

and the state of having given the due treatment to them. In this way the four

noble truths assume twelve forms. The Buddhist tradition holds that the Buddha

had twelve-fold knowledge of the four noble truths.32 The twelve-fold knowledge

can be presented in the tabular form as follows:

Truth: The form The nature of the What is to be done What is to be done
of the truth to be truth (satya) with the truth (kṛtya) is done. (kṛta)
known→
duḥkha 1. Suffering of 5. To be known fully 9. Is known fully
various kinds (parijñeyam) (parijñātam)
samudaya 2. Avidyā or tṛṣṇā 6. To be abandoned 10. Is abandoned
as the cause of (prahātavyaḥ) (prahīṇaḥ)
suffering

nirodha 3. Cessation of 7. To be realised 11. Is realised

suffering (sākṣātkartavyaḥ) (sākṣātkṛtaḥ)
mārga 4. Noble eight-fold 8. To be practised 12. Is practised
path (bhāvayitavyaḥ) (bhāvitaḥ)

This is, thus, the background of Vyāsa’s explanation of the seven-fold ultimate

understanding.

Vyāsa here classifies the emancipatory understanding into two liberations,

cognitive and mental liberation (prajñāvimukti and cetovimukti).33 He includes

four types of understanding under cognitive liberation and three types of

understanding under mental liberation.34 He explains the fourfold cognitive

liberation as: heya is known fully so that nothing of it remains to be known; the

causes of heya are destroyed so that none of them remains to be destroyed;

the abandonment is realised by cessational absorption (nirodha-samādhi); the

means to abandonment in the form of discriminatory knowledge is practised.

The fourfold understanding clearly reflects the fourfold knowledge of the form,

‘what is to be done is done’, which is shown in the last column of the table above.

Vyāsa then explains the threefold mental liberation (cittavimukti) as: the buddhi

has fulfilled its function; the guṇas tend to merge in their causes not to emerge

again; and puruṣa shines as a pure being without any relation to the guṇas. It can

be clearly seen that he explains mental liberation vividly in the terminology of

Sāṅkhya.35
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IV

In the foregoing discussion we have seen that Patañjali while presenting some of

the fundamental ideas of his philosophy is under the dual influence of Sāṅkhya

and Buddhism. The Sāṅkhya influence largely consists in Patañjali’s acceptance of

the transcendent metaphysical framework in which prakṛti (which Patañjali terms

as guṇas, dṛśya etc.,) and puruṣa (which Patañjali terms as draṣṭā, dṛkśakti and

also as puruṣa) are the basic categories. Wrongly identifying puruṣa with prakṛti,

or, to be more specific, with buddhi (which Patañjali calls darśana-śakti), and not

discriminating between them amount to the metaphysical misconception which

manifests itself in the formation of ego (asmitā), whereas the emancipatory

knowledge consists in discriminating between the two categories. In this state of

discriminatory knowledge, puruṣa, the seer, is supposed to perform his basic role

of a passive witness, which he does not perform at other times due to admixture

with the operations of the intellect (buddhi).

On the other hand, there is the Buddhist influence as well, which largely consists

in the empirical-practical message contained in the Yogasūtra. According to

the latter, emancipation from suffering is not achieved through the speculative

knowledge of some metaphysical categories. It is rather realised through the

practical regulation of one’s life with the help of yama-niyamas (moral-spiritual

regulations and observances), dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi (meditation leading

to cessation of the operations of mind) and prajñā (the emancipatory vision

which sees all phenomena as impermanent, impure, unpleasant and soul-less).

We have also seen that the Sāṅkhya approach was eternalistic whereas the

Buddhist approach was non-eternalistic. Patañjali however, brings them together

and tries to bring about a synthesis between the two. He seems to do this by

accepting the former as the framework and fitting the latter into it.

Patañjali’s attempt towards the synthesis between the two elements raises

some philosophical issues. Can eternalism and non-eternalism go together? Is it

necessary to present the empirical/practical way of emancipating from suffering,

(which is the central message of Patañjali’s Yoga) in the eternalistic metaphysical

framework of Sāṅkhya? Or can it be presented independently of it? Have Patañjali

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and Vyāsa succeeded in synthesising the two systems together and creating

a homogenous whole out of them? These issues lead us to a different kind of

enquiry which has philosophical, as well as, practical implications.

Notes

1. This is an updated version of the paper published in Journal of Buddhist Studies, (Sri Lanka and
Hong Kong), Vol. XII, 2014-15, pp. 107-122. The author is grateful to K. L. Dhammajoti, the editor of the
journal for his permission to republish the paper.

2. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha of Sāyaṇamādhava refers to Patañjali’s philosophy as seśvara-sāṁkhya.

However, Bronkhorst rightly has reservations in calling the Yoga of Yogasūtra and Yogabhāṣya as
seśvara-sāṅkhya. See Bronkhorst (1981).

3. Bronkhorst (1981) supports this view. He also argues that the closest approximation to what we
know about the ‘Sāṁkhya with God’ from the Tattvasaṅgraha and Pañjikā seems to be found
among the Pañcarātras.

4. Here I am treating Patañjali and Vyāsa as the two personalities the former being the author of
Yogasūtra and the latter that of Yogabhāṣya as per the tradition. Bronkhorst (1985) argues that
the author of Yogabhāṣya who was either named Patañjali, or wrote Yogabhāṣya in the name
of Patañjali, was himself the compiler of the Yogasūtra. Brnkhorst’s well-argued claim, does not
affect my main line of argument. It would imply, however, that while considering the Buddhist
influence and the synthesis of Sāṅkhya and Buddhism in Yoga school, we have to take into
account Yogasūtra and Yogabhāṣya together.

5. In VB IV.21 and IV.24, Vyāsa criticises Buddhists calling them vaināśika.

6. For example, the concept of Īśvara as an object of meditation, the syllable ‘Om’ as the symbol for
Īśvara, and a few ideas of this kind are found not in Buddhism or Jainism but in orthodox tradition.

7. This attitude of Patañjali and Vyāsa can be contrasted with that of the Vedāntin Gauḍapāda
who in Āgamaśāstra borrows many ideas from Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhism and also
explicitly refers to the Buddha approvingly. See for example ASG IV.83-84, 88, 99.

8. Aphorisms 15 to 21 of YS chapter 4 constitute Patañjali’s criticism of Buddhist idealism and the

doctrine of momentariness. Vyāsa in his commentary of aphorisms 14 to 22 makes the criticism
explicit where he refers to Buddhists as Kṣaṇikavādin and Vaināśika.

9. ‘kūṭasthanityatā’ and ‘pariṇāminityatā’. Vide VB 4.33.

10. The situation can be compared with a traditional Hindu marriage in which the wife loses the
identity given by the earlier family and assumes the husband’s identity. Similarly, here the
Buddhist meditation theory loses its original Buddhist identity and assimilates itself with the
Sāṅkhya identity. How successful this conversion becomes is a different question?

11. Monier Williams’ dictionary gives the following meanings of the verb ‘ni-rudh’: to hold back, stop,
hinder, shut up, confine, restrain, check, suppress and destroy. Here the verb is transitive. The
word nirodha in Buddhism is used generally in intransitive sense such as ceasing, being stopped/
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destroyed, where the agent is generally absent. Nirodha in Buddhism as ‘stoppage’ is also not
transitive (of the form ‘X stops y’), but intransitive (‘y stops’).

12. Monier Williams’ dictionary gives the following meanings of the word kleśa: pain, affliction, distress,
pain from disease, anguish. None of them are applicable to the term kleśa in the Yogasūtra.

13. Namely, Misconception (avidyā), Egoism (asmitā), Desire (raga), Aversion (dveṣa) and Attachment
to existence (abhiniveśa); YS, 2.3.

14. Bronkhorst (1993, 71) too translates the definition of yoga as “the suppression of the activities of
the mind” and associates it with mainstream meditation in Jaina and Hindu scriptures. I however
treat this definition of Yoga as a mark of Buddhist influence.

15. “vṛttayḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ/ pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ/”, YS, 1.5-6.

16. Or saṁjñāveditanirodha. See ADKB, II.44. Bronkhorst (1993:86-7) doubts the generally accepted
view that cessation of ideations and feelings (saṁjñāvedayitanirodha) was the final stage
of meditation according to the Buddha. Bronkhorst’s main concern there is: what must have
been the Buddha’s own view about meditation? Whether Bronkhorst’s argument is acceptable
or not, my suggestion is that the view that saṁjñāvedayitanirodha (what Vasubandhu calls
cittacaittanirodha) was the final stage of samādhi type of meditation according to Buddhism
might have been present before the author of the Yogasūtra. It is possible to argue that the
Buddha shared with the non-Buddhist tradition the technique of concentration meditation
(samādhi or samatha meditation with formed as well as formless objects) after considerable
modification, but the technique which he introduced anew was mindfulness (sati) meditation.

17. So, he asks, “kasmāt punarete cittacaittanirodhasvabhāve satyāv asaṁjñisamāpattiḥ

saṁjñāvedita-nirodhasamāpattiś cocyete?” (“If these stages are of the nature of nirodha of citta
and caitta, why are they called asaṁjñi-samāpatti and saṁjñāvedayitanirodha samāpatti?”), Ibid.

18. “trividhaṁ cāpyasaṁsaṁskṛtam/ ākāśaṁ dvau nirodhau ca…”, ADK, I.4.

19. “tisro hi duḥkhatā, duḥkhaduḥkhatā, saṁskāraduḥkhatā, vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā ca”, ADKB, VI.3.

20. Vasubandhu distinguishes between dormant (prasupta) kleśa and awakened (prabuddha)
kleśa and identifies the former with anuśaya. See ADKB, V.2. Prasupta is a kind or stage of kleśa
according to Yogasūtra (YS, 2.4).

21. Patañjali does not give the status of defilement to doubt (vicikitsā or saṁśaya), but includes it in
the classification of cittavṛttis.

22. There is a striking similarity between Patañjali’s definition of rāga as ‘sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ’(YS, II.7)
and a statement quoted by Vasubandhu, “so’sya bhavati sukhāyāṁ vedanāyām rāgānuśayaḥ.”
ADKB, V.2 (p. 279).

23. Vasubandhu also uses the words asmitā and asmimāna for māna. See ADK, V.11 and ADKB on it.
However, Patañjali assimilates asmitā with the ahaṁkāra of Sāṅkhya system. See the discussion
of asmitā in the next section.

24. Vasubandhu explains dogmatic view as abhiniveśa. See ADK, V.8.

25. Vasubandhu discusses in detail the issue as to which defilements are to be abandoned by
meditation (bhāvanā) and which by vision or insight (dṛk or darśana) in ADK and ADKB, V.4-14.

26. “vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ, kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ”, YS, I.5.

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27. “catvāro viparyāsāḥ. anitye nityamiti, duḥkhe sukhamiti, aśucau śucīti, anātmny ātmeti.”
ADKB, V.8. Patañjali’s definition of avidyā goes parallel to it: “anityāśuciduḥkhānātmasu
nityaśucisukhātmakhyātir avidyā”, YS, II.5.

28. “dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmatā iva asmitā”, YS, 2.6.

29. “buddhitaḥ paraṁ puruṣamākāraśīlavidyādibhirvibhaktamapaśyan kuryāttatrātmabuddhiṁ

mohena.”, VB, 2.6.

30. The three types of prajñā are explained in ADKB, VI.5.

31. “tasya saptadhā prāntabhūmiḥ prajñā”, YS, 2.27.

32. Vasubandhu calls it the twelve-fold path of knowledge (dṛṅmārga) and identifies it as twelve-
fold wheel of dharma (dvādaśākāraṁ dharmacakram). He explains: “Kathaṁ dvādaśākāram?
caturṇāṁ satyānāṁ tridhākaraṇāt. duḥkhaṁ samudayo nirodho mārga iti. parijñeyaṁ praheyaṁ
sākṣātkartavyaṁ bhāvayitavyamiti. parijñātaṁ prahīṇaṁ sākṣātkṛtaṁ bhāvitamiti.” ADKB, VI.54.

33. This two-fold division of liberation is found in Buddhist Sūtras. “dve vimuktī sūtra ukte. cetovimuktiḥ
prajñāvimuktiśca”, ADKB, VI.76.

34. “eṣā catuṣṭayī kārya-vimuktiḥ prajñāyāḥ. cittavimuktistu trayī….”, VB, II.27.

35. See VB, II.27. La Vallee Poussin claims that the last three prajñās resemble what the Arhat calls
kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna. (See Bhave 1992, 9). However, although there is formal similarity
between the two, the use of Sāṅkhya terminology in Vyāsa’s explanation cannot be overlooked.

References with Abbreviations

Primary Sources:
ADK: Abhidharmakośa as in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. Edited by P. Pradhan. Patna: K. P.
Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.

ADKB: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. See above.

ADS: Abhidharmasmuccaya. Edited by P. Pradhan. Sa Visva Bharati, Santiniketan, 1950.

ASG: The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda. Edited and translated by Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya. Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, 1943.

SK: Sāṇkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (with Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra). Benares: Jaya

Krishna das Haridas G, 1937.

YS: Yogasūtra as included in Pātañjalayogadarśanam, Tattvavaiśāradī-saṁvalita-vyāsabhāṣya-

sametam. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1963.

VB: Vyāsabhāṣya on Yogasūtra as included in Pātañjalayogadarśanam, Tattvavaiśāradī-saṁvalita-

vyāsabhāṣya-sametam. See above.
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Secondary Sources:

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1981. “Yoga and Seśvara Sāṁkhya.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, no. 3
(September): 309–320.

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1993. The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India. New Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1984/85. “Patañjali and the Yoga Sūtras.” Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik10,
(January): 191–212.

Hirakawa, Akira. 1973. Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (P. Pradhan Edition), Part One. Tokyo: Daizo
Shuppan Kabushikikaisha.

Bhave, S.M. 1992. “Bauddhamata va Patañjalīcā yoga”, (Marathi translation of La Vallee Poussin’s Le
Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques (1936-37)).’ Parāmarśa 13, no.
4 (February): 1-17

Monier-Williams, Monier. 1976. Sanskrit-English Dictionary. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Tandon, S. N. 1998. A Re-appraisal of Patañjali’s Yogasūtras in the Light of the buddha’s Teachings.
Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute.

Yamashita, Koichi. 1994. Pātañjala Yoga Philosophy with Reference to Buddhism. Calcutta: Firma KLM
Pvt. Ltd.