JC - OM A - Rev00 - Annotated
JC - OM A - Rev00 - Annotated
JC - OM A - Rev00 - Annotated
Any questions with respect to the use of this manual or information contained herein
should be addressed to:
AUTHORITY APPROVAL
Authorized by:
Capt. Li Yan
Flight Operations Manager
Signature / Date __________________________________________________________
Approved by:
Intentionally Blank
1. JC/OM-A/001 JC Master
Hard copies shall be printed in A4 or A5 size for manuals used in the offices, and in A5
size with a ring binder for use in the flight environment, for ease of use and update.
Intentionally Blank
RECORD OF REVISIONS
JC Cambodia International Airlines’ (JC Airlines’) Operations Manual is divided into
different parts. Each part of the Operations Manual has its own:
• Record of Revisions;
• List of Effective Pages;
• Record of Temporary Revisions.
According to that, each part of Operations Manual has its own, separate, revisions system
and it is considered, for revisions (amendments), as independent volume. This means that
each part has its own revision numbering.
Operations Manual Part A and its revisions (amendments) are published and issued by the
JC Airlines’ Flight Operations Department. Flight Operations Manager (FOM) is
responsible for its content (accuracy and adequacy of the information provided in the
manual), keeping the instructions and information up-to-date, notifying the Authority of
proposed changes and working with the Authority on changes requiring approval.
Operations Manual shall be acceptable to the SSCA and shall be amended or revised as
is necessary to ensure that the information contained therein is kept up to date. All such
amendments or revisions shall be issued to all personnel that are required to use this
manual. Operations Manual must be updated by implementing changes made mandatory
or approved by the Authority.
Information taken from an approved documents (e.g. Airplane Flight Manual, etc.), and any
amendment of such approved documentation, must be implemented and reflected
correctly in the Operations Manual, and the Operations Manual must not contain
information that is contrary to any approved documentation. However, this requirement
does not prevent JC Airlines from using more conservative data and procedures.
Hard copy and the subsequent revisions (amendments) will be issued to authorized
holders (refer to Distribution Control List) who shall acknowledge the receipt of revisions
and sign the record of revision sheet. A copy of OM Part A will be available to all
operations personnel in electronic format. Revisions will be issued to operations personnel
and relevant sub-contractors in the form of a new disk or file containing the complete
manual.
Revisions will be numbered consecutively and shall be entered in the revision record sheet
below to ensure that the manual is up-to-date; the compliance is confirmed when signed
under “Signature”. Revisions shall be inserted by all authorized users without delay. A
break in the numbers may indicate that a particular revision has not been received, and
the holder of the manual shall immediately request the missing revision through Flight
Operations Department.
Each revision will include detailed instructions sheet, which shall be used to check the
completeness of the respective revision. If any page is found to be missing, Flight
Operations Department shall be notified immediately.
Hand written revisions (amendments) are not permitted except in situations requiring
immediate amendment in the interest of safety. In such cases hand written revisions shall
be followed by standard formal process as soon as possible.
Entered by
Revision No Effective Date Revision Date Insertion Date
(Signature)
00 10 FEB 2017 10 JAN 2017
00 • New document
Intentionally Blank
00 10 JAN 2017
Intentionally Blank
REVISION HIGHLIGHTS
Revision 00, 10 January 2017.
Intentionally Blank
MASTER INDEX
Reserved.
Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AUTHORITY APPROVAL
DISTRIBUTION CONTROL LIST
RECORD OF REVISIONS
RECORD OF AUTHORITY REVISION APPROVALS
RECORD OF TEMPORARY REVISIONS
RECORD OF AUTHORITY TEMPORARY REVISION APPROVALS
REVISION HIGHLIGHTS
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
MASTER INDEX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
0 GENERAL INFORMATION .................................................................................................................. 0-1
0.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 0-1
0.2 Contents.......................................................................................................................................... 0-5
0.3 Organization and Identification ....................................................................................................... 0-6
0.3.1 Organization ....................................................................................................................... 0-6
0.3.2 Identification ....................................................................................................................... 0-6
0.4 Terminology .................................................................................................................................... 0-7
0.4.1 Terms ................................................................................................................................. 0-7
0.4.2 Synonyms ........................................................................................................................... 0-8
0.5 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. 0-9
0.6 Definitions ..................................................................................................................................... 0-23
1 ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................... 1-1
1.1 Organisational Structure ................................................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 Operations Management ................................................................................................................ 1-2
1.2.1 General ............................................................................................................................... 1-2
1.2.2 Nominated Postholders ...................................................................................................... 1-2
1.2.3 Deputies to Postholders ..................................................................................................... 1-4
1.2.4 Combination of Postholders Responsibilities ..................................................................... 1-5
1.3 Duties and Responsibilities of Operations Management Personnel .............................................. 1-6
1.3.1 Accountable Manager ........................................................................................................ 1-6
1.3.2 Quality Assurance Director ................................................................................................. 1-7
1.3.3 Flight Operations Manager ................................................................................................. 1-8
1.3.4 Safety and Security Manager ............................................................................................. 1-9
1.3.5 Engineering & Maintenance Manager .............................................................................. 1-10
1.3.6 Ground Operations Manager ............................................................................................ 1-11
1.3.7 Training Manager ............................................................................................................. 1-12
1.3.8 Chief Cabin Crew ............................................................................................................. 1-14
1.3.9 Chief Pilot ......................................................................................................................... 1-15
1.3.10 Flight Standard Officer ..................................................................................................... 1-17
1.3.11 Head of Flight Dispatch / Operations Control Centre ....................................................... 1-17
1.3.12 Assistant Flight Operations Manager (Assistant FOM) .................................................... 1-18
1.3.13 Technical Pilot .................................................................................................................. 1-19
1.3.14 Head of Crew Planning .................................................................................................... 1-20
1.3.15 Flight Safety Officer .......................................................................................................... 1-20
Intentionally Blank
0 GENERAL INFORMATION
0.1 INTRODUCTION
JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines) , under the terms and conditions of a valid
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and Operations Specifications, issued by the State
Secretariat for Civil Aviation (SSCA), is approved to operate scheduled and non-scheduled
flights and to carry persons, luggage, cargo or a combination of these.
The Operations Manual (OM) is the basic document governing JC Airlines flight
operations. All information, guidance and operating instructions, which are required to be
complied with by all operating personnel, are published or referenced in the Operations
Manual. Operating personnel means the servants and agents employed by the JC Airlines,
whether or not as members of the crew of the aircraft, to ensure that the flights of the
aircraft are conducted in a safe manner, and includes an operator who himself performs
these functions.
The Operations Manual complies with the terms and conditions of JC Airlines’ Air Operator
Certificate (AOC) and corresponding Operations Specifications. It contains, in addition to
national rules and regulations, valid Company policies, regulations and procedures as well
as relevant ICAO Standards and Procedures for Air Navigation Services. Operations
Manual is structured in accordance with Cambodian Civil Aviation Regulations and is
regarded as a primary indication of the standards to be achieved by the Company.
The Authority (State Secretariat of Civil Aviation - SSCA) must be provided with a copy of
the Operations Manual, and shall receive all its amendments, revisions and temporary
instructions.
All employees shall be familiar and comply with the laws, regulations, standards and
procedures of the states in which operations are conducted and with the contents of
Operations Manual relevant to the performance of their duties.
The rules outlined in the Operations Manual and the above mentioned regulations shall be
adhered to at all times. In the event of wilful or negligent infringement of the rules
contained in this manual personnel concerned may become subject to disciplinary action,
legal or penal action. Furthermore, if such infringement constitutes an offence against
national legal provisions, it may also result in legal action by the appropriate Civil Aviation
Authority.
However, nothing contained in the Operations Manual shall prevent personnel from
exercising their own best judgment during any situation for which the Operations Manual
makes no provisions or in an emergency.
The Commander or the pilot to whom command of flight has been delegated (Pilot-in-
Command) shall, in an emergency situation, take any action he considers necessary under
the circumstances. In such cases he may deviate from rules, operational procedures and
methods in the interest of safety.
Operations Manual comprises a number of separate parts (volumes), listed below, and in
addition includes instructions and information to particular groups of operating staff – e.g.
Cabin Crew Manual, SMS Manual, aircraft crew rostering instructions, information on
weight and balance supplied to handling agents, individual forms (such as prepared
navigational flight plans supplied by the Company to its crew), etc.
Part D – Training
This part comprises all training instructions for personnel requirements for a safe
operation. It includes:
• Details of all relevant training programs, policies, directives and requirements,
including curricula and syllabi, as applicable, for basic operator familiarization, initial
qualification, continuing qualification (including recency of experience),
requalification, upgrade and other specialized training requirements, as applicable;
• Curricula to include ground training, simulator training, aircraft training, evaluation
and certification, line flying under supervision, and any specialized training;
• Comprehensive syllabi to include lesson plans, procedures for training and the
conduct of evaluations;
• The training program for the development of knowledge and skills related to human
performance (Crew Resource Management - CRM).
Procedures and instructions, which are deemed necessary for cabin crew, will be
distributed under separate unit in the Cabin Crew Manual (CCM) and cross-referenced to
relevant basic parts of the Operations Manual, where necessary.
The intent of this provision is to ensure the flight crew will find all information necessary to
perform their functions within the Operations Manual, or within another document
referenced in the Operations Manual, which is identified as a source of operational
information approved or accepted for the purpose by the Company or the Authority.
Company publications, except Operations Manual extracts, that are distributed in the form
of handbooks, info sheets and copies shall be considered to serve for information,
explanation or interpretation purposes only.
Note: In the text of all manuals mentioned in this paragraph, the meaning of AOM refers to
OM Part B and AFM refers for Aircraft Flight Manual issued by the manufacturer. Some
parts from AOM can be substituted with relevant parts of the AFM or FCOM as applicable.
In that case AFM and/or FCOM must be on board the aircraft.
The Authority (State Secretariat of Civil Aviation) approves and/or accepts as applicable all
above mentioned manuals and their amendments (revisions) in accordance with
provisions below:
1. For amendments required to be notified in accordance with CCAR, the operator
shall supply the competent Authority with intended amendments in advance of the
effective date; and
2. For amendments to procedures associated with prior approval items in accordance
with CCAR, approval shall be obtained before the amendment becomes effective.
3. Notwithstanding (1 & 2), when immediate amendments or revisions are required in
the interest of safety, they may be published and applied immediately, provided that
any approval required has been applied for.
4. The operator shall incorporate all amendments and revisions required by the
competent Authority.
5. The operator shall ensure that information taken from approved documents, and
any amendment thereof, is correctly reflected in the Operations Manual. This does
not prevent the operator from publishing more conservative data and procedures in
the Operations Manual.
6. The operator shall ensure that all personnel are able to understand the language in
which those parts of the Operations Manual, which pertain to their duties and
responsibilities, are written. The content of the Operations Manual shall be
presented in a form that can be used without difficulty and observes human factors
principles.
Any suggestion for improving the contents of this part of Operations Manual and advice of
obsolescence is always appreciated. Should any individual consider that all or any part of
a procedure or instruction requires amendment, he should notify the Flight Operations
Manager.
Errors and/or discrepancies within the Operations Manual Part A (OM Part A) or between
the OM Part A and other regulations shall be reported immediately to Flight Operations
Manager.
Responsibility for the contents of the OM Part A and their proper implementation rests with
the Flight Operations Manager. The distribution of content of the OM Part A to
unauthorized persons is strictly prohibited.
0.2 CONTENTS
Operations Manual Part A, referred to as OM Part A, comprises the “General / Basic” part
of Operations Manual. It contains all non-type related operational policies, instructions and
procedures required to assure safe, economic and effective conduct of operation. It details
the duties and responsibilities of all ground and flight operations personnel and their
interrelationship to the operation as a whole.
Detailed references regarding the contents of this manual may be found in Table of
Contents.
The OM Part A may cross-reference information to other parts of Operations Manual (Part
B, C, D, Cabin Crew Manual (CCM)). Additionally, it impacts upon the following manuals or
relevant parts of them, which supplement OM Part A:
• Ground Operations Manual (GOM);
• Flight Dispatch Manual (FDM);
• Quality System Manual (QSM);
• Safety Management System Manual (SMSM);
• Security Manual (SM).
The standard of printing, duplicating, binding, section dividers, indexing of sections, etc
shall be sufficient to enable the Operations Manual to be read without difficulty and to
ensure that it remains intact and legible during normal use. The design of the manual has
observed human factors principles.
The manual is divided into chapters. Each chapter is divided into sections. Sections may
be subdivided into one or more subsections and paragraphs, categorized by the subject or
type of information presented. Within each chapter the pages are numbered.
Additions, changes or deletions are identified by a vertical line on the left hand side of the
revised page, marking the horizontal where changes or deletions occurred. Purely
redactional changes will not be marked.
0.3.2 Identification
Header:
Footer:
0.4 TERMINOLOGY
0.4.1 Terms
When used in the OM Part A, the following terms shall have the following meaning:
• “Shall”, “will”, “must” or an action verb in the imperative sense means that the
application of a rule or procedure or provision is mandatory.
• “Should” means that the application of a procedure or provision is strongly
recommended.
• “May” means that the application of a procedure or provision is optional.
• “No person may...” or “a person may not...” mean that no person is required,
authorised, or permitted to do the act concerned.
• “Approved” means the Authority has reviewed the method, procedure or policy in
question and issued an approval.
• “Acceptable” means the Authority or the Company has reviewed the method,
procedure or policy and has neither objected to nor approved its proposed use or
implementation.
• “Prescribed” means the Authority or the Company has issued a written policy or
methodology which imposes either a mandatory requirement, if it states “shall”,
“will”, “must” or an action verb in the imperative sense, a recommended requirement
if it states “should” or a discretionary requirement if it states “may”.
• “Note” is used when an operating procedure, technique, etc., is considered
essential to be emphasised.
• “Caution” is used when an operating procedure, technique, etc., may result in
damage to equipment if not carefully followed.
• “Warning” is used when an operating procedure, technique, etc., may result in
personnel injury or loss of life if not carefully followed.
• “He/him” is used as a generic term throughout the manual, but applies equally to
persons of either gender.
0.4.2 Synonyms
0.5 ABBREVIATIONS
A
A320 A318/A319/A320/A321
AAL Above Aerodrome Level
ABP Able Bodied Passengers
A/C Aircraft
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACC Area Control Centre
ACM Additional Crew Member
AED Automatic External Defibrillator
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System
AFIS Aerodrome Flight Information Service
AFM Aeroplane Flight Manual
AFOM Assistant Flight Operations Manager
AGL Above Ground Level
AGNIS Azimuth Guidance for Nose-in Stands
AH Alert Height
AIC Aeronautical Information Circular
AIM Aeronautical Information Manual
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIS Aeronautical Information Service
ALS Approach Lighting System
ALTN Alternate
AM Amplitude Modulation
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance
AME Authorized Medical Examiner
AMO Approved Maintenance Organisation
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
AOC Air Operator's Certificate
AOCR Air Operators Certificates Requirements
AOM Aerodrome Operating Minima
AOM Aircraft Operating Manual
AP Auto Pilot
APL Approach Lights
APN Apron
APP Approach Control Office
APR Automatic Power Reserve
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ARO Air Traffic Services Reporting Office
ASAP As Soon As Possible
ASD Accelerate Stop Distance
B
BAL Ballast
BECMG Becoming
BIKE Bicycle
BKN Broken
BLND Blind Passenger
BULK Bulky Baggage
C
C Celsius
C Business Class
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CAO Dangerous Goods “Cargo Aircraft Only”
CAPT Captain
CAS Calibrated Air Speed
CAT Clear Air Turbulence
CAT I Category I Approach
CAT II Category II Approach
CAT III Category III Approach
CAVOK Ceiling and Visibility OK
C/B Circuit Breaker
CB Cumulonimbus
CBBG Cabin Baggage
CBT Computer Based Training
CCM Cabin Crew Manual
CDFA Continuous Descent Final Approach
CDL Configuration Deviation List
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain
CFL Cleared Flight Level
CFP Computerized Flight Plan
CHD Child
CIC Cabin Crew in Charge
CG Centre of Gravity
CL Centerline Lights
C/L Checklist
CPL(A) Commercial Pilot Licence (Aeroplanes)
CRS Certificate of Release to Service
CM1 Left Seat Pilot
CM2 Right Seat Pilot
CMDR Commander
CMV Converted Meteorological Visibility
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COM Communications
CRM Crew Resource Management
CRZ Cruise
CSI Critical Surface Inspection
CTOT Calculated Take-off Time
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder
D
DA Decision Altitude
DBV Diagonal Braked Vehicle
DEAF Deaf Passenger
DEPA Deportee(s) with Escort
DGR Dangerous Goods Regulations
DH Decision Height
DHC Deadheading Crew
DIP Diplomatic Mail
DIST Distance
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DMI Deferred Maintenance Items
DOC Document
DOI Dry Operating Index
DOW Dry Operating Weight
DP Duty Period
E
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
EDP Electronic Data Processing
EFB Electronic Flight Bag
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EIC Equipment in Compartment
ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter
ENG Engine
EOSID Engine Out SID
F
F Fahrenheit
FAA Federal Aviation Authority in U.S.A.
FBS Fixed Based Simulator
FC Friction Coefficient
FCL Flight Crew Licensing
FCOM Flight Crew Operating Manual
FCTM Flight Crew Training Manual
FD Flight Director
FDAS Flight Data Analyses System
FDM Flight Dispatch Manual
FDM Flight Data Monitoring
FDP Flight Duty Period
FDR Flight Data Recorder
FFS Full Flight Simulator
FG Fog
FIC Flight Information Centre
FIR Flight Information Region
FIS Flight Information Service
FL Flight Level
FM Frequency Modulation
FM Flight Manual
FMGC Flight Management and Guidance Computer
FMS Flight Management System
FNPT Flight & Navigation Procedures Trainer
FO First Officer
FOB Fuel On Board
FOD Foreign Object Damage
FOM Flight Operations Manager
FON Flight Operations Notice
FOO Flight Operations Officer
FPM Feet per Minute
FRAG Fragile
FQI Fuel Quantity Indicator
FTL Flight Time Limitation
FWD Forward
FZDZ Freezing Drizzle
G
G Gusts
GAT General Air Traffic
GENDEC General Declaration
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
GOM Ground Operations Manual
GND Ground
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
GR Hail
G/S Glide Slope
GS Ground Speed
H
H Heavy
HAT Height Above Threshold
HEA Heavy Cargo Item
HF High Frequency
HI High Intensity Light
HIL Holding Item List
HOT Hold Over Time
hPa HectoPascal
Hrs Hours
HUM Human Remains
I
IAS Indicated Air Speed
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICE Dry Ice
ID Identity (Number)
i.e. Id Est
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IFV In-flight Visibility
ILS Instrument Landing System
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IMP Interchange Message Procedures
In Inch(es)
INAD Inadmissible Passenger(s)
INF Infant
INFO Information
INOP Inoperative
IOE Initial Operating Experience
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 0 P: 0-14
GENERAL INFORMATION Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
IR Instrument Rating
IRS Inertial Reference System
ISA International Standard Atmosphere
ISO International Standard Organisation
J
JAA Joint Aviation Authorities
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements
JAR-OPS 1 Joint Aviation Requirements – Commercial Air Transportation
(Aeroplanes)
JAR-FCL 1 Joint Aviation Requirements – Flight Crew Licensing (Aeroplane)
JBD James Brake Decelerometer
JUMP Passenger on Jump Seat
K
KCAS Knots Calibrated Airspeed
KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed
kg Kilogram(s)
km Kilometres
km/h Kilometres per Hour
kt Knots - Nautical Miles per Hour
L
L Light
L (LTR) Litre
LANG Language
Lb(s) Pound
LD Landing Distance
LDA Landing Distance Available
LH Left Hand
LHO Live Human Organs
LEP List of Effective Pages
LLZ Localizer
LMC Last Minute Changes
LOFT Line Orientated Flight Training
LOUT Lowest Operational Use Temperature
LPC Less Paper Cockpit
LRC Long Range Cruise
LVC Low Visibility Conditions
LVP Low Visibility Procedures
LVTO Low Visibility Take-Off
LW Landing Weight
M
m Meter
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 0 P: 0-15
GENERAL INFORMATION Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
M Mach Number
M Medium
MAC Mean Aerodynamic Chord
MALS Medium Intensity Approach Light System
MAP Missed Approach Point
MAPSC Maximum Approved Passenger Seating Configuration
MAAS Meet and Assist Passengers
MAX Maximum
mb millibar
MBOH Minimum Break-Off Height
MCT Maximum Continuous Thrust
MDA Minimum Decision Altitude
MDH Minimum Descent Height
MEA Minimum En-route Altitude
MEDA Medical Assistance
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MET Meteorological (Office)
METAR Aviation Routine Weather Report
MHA Minimum Holding Altitude
MHz Megahertz
MI Medium Intensity Lights
MIALS Medium Intensity Approach Light System
MIL Military
MIN Minimum
MIRL Medium Intensity Runway Lights
MLS Microwave Landing System
MLW Maximum Landing Weight
MMEL Master Minimum Equipment List
MMO Maximum Operating Limit Mach
MNPS Minimum Navigation Performance Specification
MOCA Minimum Obstacle Clearance Altitude
MORA Minimum Off-Route Altitude
MOR Mandatory Occurrence Report
MRE Meals Ready to Eat
MRVA Minimum Radar Vectoring Altitude
MSA Minimum Safe Altitude
MSL Mean Sea Level
MSN Manufacturer's Serial Number
MTOW Maximum Take-off Weight
MUM Mu-Meter
MZFW Maximum Zero Fuel Weight
N
N/A Not Applicable
NA Not Available
O
OAT Outside Air Temperature
OBS Observer
OCA Obstacle Clearance Altitude
OCH Obstacle Clearance Height
OCC Operations Control Centre
OCL Obstacle Clearance Limit
OFP Operational Flight Plan
OM Operations Manual
OM Outer Marker
OM Part A Operations Manual Part A
OM Part B Operations Manual Part B
OM Part C Operations Manual Part C
OM Part D Operations Manual Part D
OPC Operator Proficiency Check
OPS Operations
OPS 1 Appendix 3 to COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 859/2008 and/or any
subsequent revisions
OVC Overcast
P
P-RNAV Precision Area Navigation
Pa Pascal
PA Public Address
PAD Passenger Available for Disembarkation
PANS/RAC Procedures for Air Navigation Services
PANS/OPS Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Operations
PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator
PAR Precision Approach Radar
PAS Public Address System
PAX Passenger(s)
Q
QA Quality Assurance
QFE Actual Atmospheric Pressure at Airport Elevation
QFU Magnetic Orientation of Runway
QDM Magnetic Track to a Station
QDR Magnetic Track from a Station (Radial)
QAM Quality Assurance Manager
QNH Actual Atmospheric Pressure at Sea Level
QRH Quick Reference Handbook
QSM Quality System Manual
R
RA Radio Altimeter
RA Radio Altitude
RA Resolution Advisory
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RCL Cryogenic Liquid
RCLL Runway Center Line Lights
RCM Corrosive Material
RDS Biological Substance, Category B (UN 3373)
REDL Runway Edge Lights
REG Registration
RENL Runway End Lights
REP Reported
RF Radio Frequency
S
SAR Search and Rescue
SAT Static Air Temperature
SCT Scattered
SECU Secured Item
SELCAL Selective Calling
SFE Synthetic Flight Examiner
SFI Synthetic Flight Instructor
SFT Surface Friction Tester
SG Snow Grains
SID Standard Instrument Departure
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Report
SITA Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques
T
TA Traffic Advisory
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation
TAF Terminal Aerodrome Forecast
TAP Tapley Meter
TAS True Air Speed
TAT Total Air Temperature
TBC To Be Confirmed
TBD To Be Determined
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TCU Towering Cumulus
TDZ Touchdown Zone
TDZL Touchdown Zone Lights
TEL Telephone
TEMPO Temporary
TERPS United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedure
TGL Temporary Guidance Leaflet (published by JAA)
TL Transition Level
TMA Terminal Control Area
TOC Top of Climb
TOD Top of Descent
TOD Take-off Distance
TODA Take-off Distance Available
TOGA Take-off – Go-around
U
UACC Upper Area Control Center
UFN Until Further Notice
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UIR Upper Flight Information Region
ULD Unit Load Device
ULTD Unlimited
UM Unaccompanied Minor
UN United Nations
U/S Unserviceable
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
V
V1 Critical Engine Failure Speed
V2 Take-off Safety Speed
VAAC Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre
VAL Valuable Cargo
VAPP Final Approach Speed
VAR Volcanic Activity Report
VASI Visual Approach Slope Indicator
VDF VHF Direction Finder
VFE Maximum Speed Flaps/Slats Extended
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VHF Very High Frequency
VIP Very Important Person
VIS Visibility
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VOLMET Meteorological Information for Aircraft in Flight
VOR VHF Omni-directional Range
VRB Variable
VREF Landing Reference Speed
V/S Vertical Speed
VSI Vertical Speed Indicator
VUN Vulnerable Cargo
W
W Weight
WC Wind Component
WCHC Wheelchair Passenger - Cabin
WCHR Wheelchair Passenger - Ramp
WCHS Wheelchair Passenger - Steps
WCLB Wheelchair Lithium-ion Batteries
WEAP Weapons
WHO World Health Organisation
WIP Work in Progress
WOCL Window of Circadian Low
WPT Waypoint
WX Weather
WXR Weather Radar
Y
Y Economy Class
X
XBAG Excess Baggage
Z
Z Zulu (UTC)
ZFW Zero Fuel Weight
Intentionally Blank
0.6 DEFINITIONS
Accountable Manager: The person acceptable to the Authority who has corporate
authority for ensuring that all operations and maintenance activities can be financed and
carried out to the standard required by the Authority and any additional requirements
defined by the Operator.
Accelerate Stop Distance Available (ASDA): The length of the take-off run available
plus the length of stopway, if such stopway is declared available by the appropriate
Authority and is capable of bearing the mass of the aeroplane under the prevailing
operating conditions.
Accepted or Acceptable: Not objected to by the Authority as suitable for the purpose
intended.
Aerodrome: A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and
equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and
surface movement of aircraft.
Aerodrome Elevation: The elevation of the highest point of the landing area.
Aerodrome Operating Minima: The limits of usability of an aerodrome for either take-off
or landing, usually expressed in terms of runway visual range or visibility, Decision
Altitude/Height (DA/H), Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/H) and cloud conditions.
Aeroplane: A power driven, heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from
aerodynamic reactions on surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of flight.
Air Traffic Control Unit: A generic term meaning variously, area control centre, and
approach control office or aerodrome control tower.
Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the
air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface, it includes aeroplanes
and helicopters.
Aircraft Equipment: Articles, other than stores and spare parts of a removable nature, for
use on board an aircraft during flight, including first-aid and survival equipment.
Aircraft Technical Log (ATL): A document carried on an aircraft that contains technical
information to meet ICAO requirements.
Aircraft Variant: as used with respect to the licensing and operation of flight crew, means
an aircraft of the same basic certificated type which contain modifications not resulting in
significant changes of handling and/or flight characteristic, or flight crew complement, but
causing significant changes to equipment and/or procedures.
Airplane Flight Manual: A manual associated with the certificate of airworthiness that
contains information (limits, procedures, data, etc.) required to operate the airplane at the
level of safety established by the aeroplane’s certification basis.
Air Traffic Incident: Air traffic incident is used to mean a serious occurrence involving air
traffic such as near collision or serious difficulty caused either by faulty procedures or lack
of compliance with applicable procedures, or failure of ground facilities.
Airway: A control area or portion thereof established in the form of a corridor equipped
with radio navigation aids.
Take-off Alternate: An alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft can land should this
become necessary shortly after take-off and it is not possible to use the aerodrome of
departure.
Aquaplaning (or Hydroplaning): Situation where the tyres of the aircraft are, to a large
extent, separated from the runway surface by a thin fluid film.
Authority: The competent body responsible for the safety of civil aviation in the state of
the applicant or operator. In Kingdom of Cambodia this authority is State Secretariat of
Civil Aviation (SSCA).
Braking Action: A report on the conditions of the airport movement areas, providing pilots
the quality or degree of braking that may be expected. Braking action is reported in terms
of: good, medium to good, medium, medium to poor, poor, nil or unreliable.
Cabin Crew: A crew member, other than a Flight Crew Member, who performs in the
interests of safety of passengers, duties assigned by the operator or the Commander in
the cabin of the aeroplane.
Cargo: In relation to Commercial Air Transportation, any property, including animals and
mail, carried by an aircraft other than stores and accompanied baggage.
Cargo Aircraft: Any aircraft which, in addition to crew members is solely carrying cargo,
stores and crew baggage.
CAT I: A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height not lower than
200 ft and with either visibility not less than 800 m or a runway visual range not less than
550 m.
CAT II: A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height lower than 200
ft, but not lower than 100 ft, with a runway visual range not less than 300 m (ICAO
definition).
CAT IIIA: A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height lower than
100 ft, or no decision height, and with a runway visual range not less than 175 m.
CAT IIIB: A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height lower than
50 ft or no decision height, and with a runway visual range less than 175 m but not less
than 50 m.
Ceiling: The height above the ground or water of the base of the lowest layer of cloud
below 6000m (20.000 ft) covering more than half the sky.
Circling: The visual phase of an instrument approach to bring an aircraft into position for
landing on a runway, which is not suitably located for a straight-in approach.
Clearway: An area beyond the runway, not less than 152 m (500 ft) wide, centrally located
about the extended centerline of the runway, and under the control of the airport
authorities. The clearway is expressed in terms of a clearway plane, extending from the
end of the runway with an upward slope not exceeding 1.25%, above which no object or
terrain protrudes. However, threshold lights may protrude above the plane if their height
above the end of the runway is 0.66 m (26 inches) or less and if they are located to each
side of the runway.
Commercial Aerial Work: An aerial work operation for remuneration or hire and/or for
which the crew members receive direct compensation, which is of more than a nominal
nature, for their services as crew members.
Commercial Air Transport Aircraft: An aircraft flying, or intended by the operator of the
aircraft to fly, for the purpose of commercial air transportation.
Company: JC Airlines.
Conversion (of a licence): The issue of a Cambodian licence on the basis of a licence
issued by an ICAO contracting State.
Crew Resource Management (CRM): A program designed to improve the safety of flight
operations by optimising the safe, efficient, and effective use of human resources,
hardware, and information through improved crew communication and co-ordination.
Damp Runway: A runway is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the
moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance.
Dangerous goods: Articles or substances which are capable of posing significant risk to
health, safety or property when transported by air and which are classified according to
ICAO Technical Instructions.
Decision Height: With respect to the operation of aircraft, means the wheel height above
the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless required visual
reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been
visually assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety.
Dry Operating Weight: The total weight of the aircraft ready for a specific type of
operation excluding all usable fuel and traffic load.
Dry Runway: A dry runway is one which is neither wet nor contaminated, and includes
those paved runways which have been specially prepared with grooves or porous
pavement and maintained to retain ‘effectively dry’ braking action even when moisture is
present.
Estimated off-block time: The estimated time at which the aircraft will commence
movement associated with departure.
Exemption: A formal authorisation issued by the Authority providing relief from part or all
of the provisions of OPS or other JARs. The authorisation may or may not be conditional.
Flight Crew Member: A pilot, flight engineer, or flight navigator assigned to duty in an
aircraft during flight time.
Flight Plan (Operational Flight Plan): The Operator's plan for the safe conduct of the
flight based on considerations of aircraft performance, other operating limitations and
relevant expected conditions on the route to be followed and at the aerodromes
concerned.
Flight Plan (Repetitive ATS Flight Plan): A Flight Plan related to a series of frequently
recurring, regularly operated individual flights with identical basic features, submitted by an
operator for retention and repetitive use by ATS units.
First Officer: A member of the flight crew acting in any piloting capacity, other than as
Pilot-In-Command or Commander.
Flight Recorder: Any type of recorder installed in the aircraft for the purpose of
complementing accident/incident investigation.
Friction Coefficient: Relationship between the friction force acting on the wheel and the
normal force on the wheel. The normal force depends on the weight of the aircraft and the
lift of the wings.
Glide Path: A descent profile determined for vertical guidance during a final approach.
Heading: The direction, in which the longitudinal axis of an aircraft is pointed, usually
expressed in degrees from North (true, magnetic, compass or grid).
Height: The vertical distance of a level, a point or an object, measured from a specified
datum.
Infant: A person who has not yet reached his second birthday.
Landing Distance Available (LDA): The length of the runway which is declared available
by the appropriate Authority and suitable for the ground run of an aircraft landing.
Low Visibility Procedures (LVP): Ground procedures applied at the aerodrome for the
purpose of ensuring safe operation during CAT II/III approaches and Low Visibility Take-
offs. These procedures are designed to prevent the entry of ground vehicles and taxiing
aircraft into areas protected for take-off and landing. In addition they protect the sensitive
areas of the aerodrome's Instrument Landing System or MLS transmissions and regulate
the flow of air traffic on the approach. Implementation of LVP is announced on ATIS or by
ATC.
Low Visibility Take-off (LVTO): A take-off where the Runway Visual Range (RVR) is less
than 400 m.
Mach Number: The ratio of true air speed to the speed of sound.
Manual: Document edited by the responsible postholder within Company, which contains
set of controlled pages concerning the same subject (e.g. Security Manual).
Maximum Certificated Take-off Weight: The maximum total weight of the aircraft and its
contents at which the aircraft may take off anywhere in the world, in the most favourable
circumstances in accordance with the certificate of airworthiness in force in respect of the
aircraft.
Minimum Equipment List (MEL): A list (including a preamble) which provides for the
operation of aircraft, under specified conditions, with particular instruments, items of
equipment or functions inoperative at the commencement of flight. This list is prepared by
the operator for his own particular aircraft taking account of their aircraft definitions and the
relevant operational and maintenance conditions in accordance with a procedure approved
by the Authority.
Net Flight Path: Flight path determined for engine(s) failure case. It is established in such
a manner that it represents the actual climb performance diminished by a gradient of climb
of:
• Take-off (one engine failure): 0.8% for two-engine aircraft.
• En-route (one engine failure): 1.1% for two-engine aircraft.
Night: The hours between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning
civil twilight or such other period between sunset and sunrise, as may be specified by the
State Authority.
Operational Control: The exercise of authority over the initiation, continuation, diversion
or termination of a flight in the interest of the safety of the flight.
Passenger: A person other than a crew member travelling or about to travel on an aircraft.
Pilot Monitoring (PM): A pilot who is assisting the Pilot Flying in accordance with the
multi-crew cooperation concept, when the required flight crew is more than one.
Pilot-in-Command (PIC): A pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft
during flight time.
Pilot-in-Command under Supervision (PICUS): First Officer occupying the left pilot seat
performing Commander’s duties supervised by the Type Rating Instructor performing first
officer’s duties. In such crew composition the supervising TRI shall be the designated
Commander.
Precision Approach: An instrument approach with lateral and vertical guidance from final
approach point (FAF) to the runway touchdown zone, with system accuracy, integrity and
obstacle clearance (including go-around) guaranteed until the descent limit (decision
altitude or decision height) is reached. For the purpose of this document, instrument
landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS) and precision approach radar
(PAR) are considered precision approaches.
Repetitive Flight Plan (RPL): A flight plan related to a series of frequently recurring,
regularly operated individual flights with identical basic features, submitted by an operator
for retention and repetitive use by ATS.
Required Visual Reference: Descent must not be continued below DA/DH/MDA unless
the required visual reference has been achieved. The required visual reference means that
section of the visual aids on the approach or of the approach area which should be in view
for sufficient time for the pilot to make an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of
change of position in relation to the required flight path.
Runway: A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and
take-off of aircraft.
Runway Visual Range: The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centreline of a
runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or
identifying its centreline.
Separate Runways: Runways at the same aerodrome that are separate landing surfaces.
These runways may overlay or cross in such a way that if one of the runways is blocked, it
will not prevent the planned type of operations on the other runway. Each runway shall
have a separate approach procedure based on a separate navigation aid.
State of the Operator: The State in which the Operator has his principal place of business
or, if he has no such place of business, his permanent residence.
Stopway: An area beyond the takeoff runway, no less wide than the runway and centered
upon the extended centerline of the runway, able to support the aircraft during an abortive
take-off, without causing structural damage to the aircraft, and designated by the airport
authorities for use in decelerating the aircraft during an abortive take-off.
Supplemental Oxygen: The additional oxygen required to protect each occupant against
the adverse effects of excessive cabin altitude and to maintain acceptable physiological
conditions.
Take-off Distance Available (TODA): The length of the take-off run available plus the
length of the clearway available.
Take-off Weight: The take-off weight of the aeroplane shall be taken to be its weight,
including everything and everyone carried at the commencement of the take-off run.
Take-off Run Available (TORA): The length of runway which is declared available by the
appropriate Authority and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane taking off.
Taxiing: Movement of an aircraft on the surface of an aerodrome under its own power,
excluding take-off and landing.
Taxiway: A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxiing of aircraft and
intended to provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another.
Traffic Load: The total weight of passengers, baggage and cargo, including any non-
revenue load.
Transition Altitude: The altitude at or below which the vertical position of an aircraft is
controlled by reference to altitudes.
Transition Level: The lowest flight level available for use above the transition altitude.
Type (of Aircraft): All aircraft of the same basic design, including all modifications except
those modifications which result in a change of handling, flight characteristics or flight crew
complement.
Unintentionally Transmitting PED: Any PED that emits electromagnetic signals as a by-
product of its operation.
UN Number: The four-digit number assigned by the United Nations Committee of experts
on the transport of dangerous goods to identify a substance or a particular group of
substances.
Wet Runway: A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is covered with water
or equivalent, less than specified under “Contaminated Runway” above or when there is
sufficient moisture on the runway surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without
significant areas of standing water.
This chapter clearly defines the duties and responsibilities of managers and all designated
personnel in charge of operational control, together with the chains of responsibility.
Their contract of employment must allow for them to work sufficient hours, in order to be
able to satisfactorily perform the functions associated with the operation of JC Airlines,
apart from any flying duties (if applicable).
Specific requirement for postholder Flight Operations: The nominated postholder for Flight
Operations or his deputy should have experience working in an airline or equivalent
organization and hold an ATPL with 3 years as PIC in commercial air transportation.
Specific requirement for postholder Training: The nominated postholder or his deputy
should hold an ATPL with 3 years as PIC in commercial air transportation and appropriate
ratings for at least one of the aircraft used by JC Airlines. The nominated postholder
should have a thorough knowledge of the AOC holder’s crew training concept for flight
crew, cabin crew and other operations personnel, as relevant.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 0 P: 1-4
GENERAL INFORMATION Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
Specific requirement for postholder Ground Operations: The nominated postholder should
have a thorough knowledge of the AOC holder’s ground operations concept.
Specific requirement for postholder Safety & Security: The nominated postholder should
hold an ATPL and appropriate ratings for at least one of the aircraft used by the Company,
or he should have an AMT licence with working experience in an airline or equivalent
organization.
Specific requirement for postholder Quality Assurance: The nominated postholder should
have:
• Or have held an Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) licence with ratings similar
to the aircraft operated by JC Airlines;
• Three years of experience in maintaining the same category and class of aircraft
operated by JC Airlines including two years of experience in the quality/inspection
department of an AMO or AOC holder.
If two Quality Assurance Managers, one for operations and one for maintenance, are
nominated, they should satisfy the applicable requirements for each area they cover.
A full hand over briefing must be given to the deputy by the postholder for extended
periods of absence.
The responsibility of a nominated postholder shall rest with a single person unless
otherwise permitted by the Authority. If single person holds several posts, the two main
areas of concern are:
• Competence – candidate must fulfil all requirements for all posts that operator
applies for (no credits are allowed);
• An individual’s capacity to meet his responsibilities – operator must declare
minimum working hours for each post. Working hours shall be dependent upon the
scale of the operation. Suggested working hours shall be elaborated in written and
presented to the SSCA for acceptance (together with application). If minimum
working hours dedicated to each post allow single person to hold several posts that
might be acceptable to the SSCA. The complexity of the organization or of the
operation may prevent, or limit, combinations of posts that may be acceptable to the
SSCA.
JC Airlines shall nominate the Accountable Manager who is acceptable to the SSCA. As
part of the acceptance process a nominee for Accountable Manager should be prepared to
demonstrate to the SSCA the appropriate level of knowledge of, understanding of, and
attitudes to regulation and safety management.
• Maintain reporting links to the Company's Quality Assurance Manager, and Safety
and Security Manager, ensuring prompt closure of quality audit non-conformances
and the adoption of safety management practices.
In the regulation of safety the Accountable Manager is a key figure given that his influence
on the standards of an AOC is significant. Therefore the working relationship between the
SSCA and the Accountable Manager plays an important part in the regulatory oversight of
an AOC. As part of the routine regulatory oversight programme, the SSCA’s Flight
Operations Inspectors will normally arrange an annual meeting with the Accountable
Manager in order to discuss any issues associated with the safety management of the
operation.
• Conduct any other duties as and when required by the Accountable Manager.
The Flight Operations Manager shall normally be an active line pilot with the status of
Commander, unless other qualifications constitute the “competency” required and render
him acceptable for both the Company and the SSCA. He is responsible to the CEO
(Accountable Manager), for the effective administration and overall management of JC
Airline’s Flight Operations Department. Apart from flying duties he should generally commit
at least 1 duty day per week to office duties. He shall prove comprehensive knowledge of
aviation regulations, requirements and operational procedures.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define role and discretionary power
of the Flight Operations Manager.
Safety and Security Manager promotes and organizes operational safety as representative
for all related responsibilities of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). He is responsible for
development, implementation, maintenance of the Safety and Accident Prevention
Program, and ensuring the safe and legally compliant operations of JC Airlines’ aircraft
and all related matters, all conforming to laid out regulations, established safety standards
and standard operating procedures. In addition he is responsible for ensuring the legally
compliant and secure operations of Company’s aircraft and all related matters, conforming
to laid out regulations, established aviation security operating procedures.
The Safety and Security Manager shall regularly report to the Chief Executive Officer
(Accountable Manager) and liaise with other departments and SSCA to ensure
maintenance of operational safety. He shall have full and unrestricted access to the
Accountable Manager in such cases as he has not been able to reach an agreement on
remedial action on Safety & Security Issues with the relevant heads of department and
both parties must agree that the intervention of the Accountable Manager is required.
Engineering & Maintenance Manager institutes and maintains an effective and efficient
administrative system to meet the economic and operating targets, while complying with
the company policy and regulatory authority requirements and safety standard.
The Ground Operations Manager is appointed by the Accountable Manager. Before being
appointed he shall prove comprehensive and thorough knowledge of JC Airlines ground
operations processes and applicable regulations.
He reports to the CEO (Accountable Manager) and shall maintain close cooperation links
with Flight Operations Manager.
• Ensure, by regular checks, that ground personnel are being kept updated and
properly instructed and that they are aware of their responsibilities and the
relationship of such duties to JC Airlines operation as a whole;
• Closely cooperate with the Flight Operations Manager when preparing ground
operations related Operations Manual information;
• Hold editorial responsibility for JC Airlines’ Ground Operations Manual (GOM);
• Ensure that all legal requirements and the provisions of the AOC relating to ground
operations are strictly observed;
• Act as JC Airlines representative to all authorities, as far as ground operations are
concerned;
• Ensure that all legal requirements and the provisions of the AOC relating to ground
operations are strictly observed;
• To conduct and maintain training programmes (when applicable) for ground
handling personnel;
• Coordinate, with the other postholders, the contents of the Operations Manual
pertinent to ground operations and the Ground Operations Manual;
• Have due regard for economy when concluding contracts with other companies
providing ground handling services (apart from the overriding aspect of safety);
• Monitor and supervise any contractor employed by JC Airlines and ensure that they
meet the required JC Airlines ground operations standards.
Ground Operations Manual may additionally define role and discretionary power of the
Ground Operations Manager.
The Training Manager (TM) shall be an active Commander and Type Rating Instructor
(TRI).
• Organise and maintain the necessary training and checking for the crew members
to acquire and maintain their legal licenses and qualifications in order to adequately
perform their assigned duties;
• Achieve set goals and objectives needed to elevate productivity and enhance
performance in the area of crew training;
• Coordinate all questions and matters relating to crew training;
• Establish, maintain and update information base for all required crew training and
checking;
• Identify the training requirements within flight operations and ensure that it is
accomplished in a timely manner;
• Standardize and cost-optimise training for all company aeroplane types;
• Establish the professional prerequisites concerning employment, training and
upgrading of crew members in cooperation with the Flight Operations Manager and
Chief Pilot or Chief Cabin Crew;
• Monitor and supervise training provided by third parties, to make sure the facilities
used and the training provided is up to the required JC Airlines standard;
• Monitor and supervise training provided for third parties, to make sure the facilities
used and the training provided is up to the required standard - if applicable;
• Hold editorial responsibility for the OM Part D;
• Establish, maintain and update the list of JC Airlines checking and training
personnel;
• Advise the CEO (Accountable Manager) on matters related to training activities;
• Coordinate with the SSCA on all matters relating to crew training to make sure of
Company compliance with applicable regulations;
• Monitor the flight operation and identifies problems that may require the provision of
extra training or changes in operational procedures;
• Process pilot reports addressed to Training Department; and
• Properly manage all expenditures associated with his area of responsibility.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define role and discretionary power
of the Training Manager.
Chief Cabin Crew shall be or had been an active Cabin Crew in Charge (CIC). Before
being appointed he shall prove thorough and comprehensive knowledge of airline cabin
crew regulations, requirements and procedures. He reports to the Flight Operations
Manager. Apart from flying duties he shall commit at least 1 duty day per week to office
duties.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the Chief Cabin Crew.
The Chief Pilot (CP) shall hold an ATPL and be a PIC holding appropriate rating on the
applicable aeroplane type.
He reports to the Flight Operations Manager. Apart from flying duties he should generally
commit at least 1 duty day per week to office duties.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define role and discretionary power
of Chief Pilot.
Head of Flight Dispatch / Operations Control Centre shall be committed to his area of
responsibility in maximum possible extent.
Before being appointed he shall prove thorough and comprehensive knowledge of flight
operational and dispatch processes, aviation regulations, requirements and procedures,
ATC procedures, meteorology, performance and planning, computerized flight plan,
navigation and radio communication. He should have flight dispatch license/certificate and
have preferably minimum of 2 years' experience as flight dispatcher (flight operations
officer).
• Ensure that the necessary records are maintained as per the Operations Manual.
All the records shall be accurate and within the flight time limitation, and any
abnormality is to be reported;
• Advise Training Manager about the needs and arrange recurrent training for the
flight dispatchers (flight operations officers);
• Advise Flight Operations Manager about the need for new manpower planning
(recruitment of flight dispatchers);
• Ensure that the Flight Dispatch Manual (FDM) is issued and updated whenever
required;
• Keep current on all national and international legal provisions, relating to flight
operations and to advise all concerned of important changes;
• Achieve set goals and objectives needed to elevate productivity and enhance
performance in the area of flight operations support management;
• Manage, control, analyse and store records, flight documents and data, and - by
direction of the Flight Operations Manager - to give access to, and produce such
records, documents and data to any person authorised by the SSCA, within a
reasonable time period after being requested to do so;
• Use all legal and compliant means to optimise flight operational costs without
infringing safety;
• Manage electronic data processing for all flight operations related processes within
Flight Dispatch / Operations Control Centre and to supervise related contracts for
such;
• Manage and supervise performance and flight planning aspects of flight operations;
• Properly manage all expenditures associated with his area of responsibility.
Flight Dispatch Manual and other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define
duties and responsibilities of the Head of Flight Dispatch.
The Assistant Flight Operations Manager shall be an active airline pilot holding an ATPL
with current type rating on the applicable aeroplane type. Before being appointed he shall
prove thorough and comprehensive knowledge of aircraft and civil aviation regulations,
requirements and procedures.
The Assistant Flight Operations Manager is responsible to the Flight Operations Manager
and is in charge of flight standardization.
• Advise Flight Operations Manager of important changes on all legal national and
international provisions, relating to flight operations;
• Prepare and follow-up as well as participate at audits of Flight Operations;
• Establish, in cooperation with the Flight Operations Manager and the Chief Pilot,
standard noise abatement procedures and to coordinate noise related questions for
the company in national or international relations;
• Initiate and manage aerodrome classification procedure as defined in OM Part A,
Chapter 8;
• Support and consult Flight Operations Manager on performance and flight planning
issues;
• Assist, support and consult Flight Operations Manager at determining the usability
of areas and airways to be utilised for JC Airlines’ flight operations;
• Assist, support and consult Flight Operations Manager in determining the usability
of new aerodromes;
• Assist and support Flight Operations Manager in ensuring that the equipment of the
aeroplane to be used meets the requirements for the planned operation;
• Conduct special case studies as requested by the Flight Operations Manager;
• Conduct briefing for newly intake pilots;
• Manage the Operations Manual as well as all other documentations, manuals and
publications regarding Flight Operations;
• Check daily administrations and monitoring of monthly roster - as applicable;
• Do other duties assigned by Flight Operations Manager.
Duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Flight Operations Manager may be performed
by several people. Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties
and responsibilities of the Flight Standard Officer.
The Technical Pilot shall be an active airline pilot holding an ATPL with current type rating
on the applicable aeroplane type. Before being appointed he shall prove thorough
knowledge of technical systems, regulations, requirements and operational procedures on
the applicable aeroplane type. He reports to the Chief Pilot.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the Technical Pilot.
With the approval of JC Airlines Accountable Manager, a Deputy Safety Manager may be
nominated to assume the duties and responsibilities of Safety Manager while he is absent
from work place to ensure the continuity of work. The Flight Safety Officer, or one of the
Flight Safety Officers, if more are designated, replaces the Safety Manager in all duties
when necessary as Deputy Safety Manager.
The Flight Safety Officer designated as Deputy Safety Manager must have sufficient
experience gathered with JC Airlines flight operations as active Commander. The Flight
Safety Officer not designated as Deputy Safety Manager must have sufficient experience
gathered within JC Airlines flight operations as flight crew member.
The Flight Safety Officer participates and supervises implementation of safety standards
and is responsible to the Safety Manager for:
• Maintaining the air safety occurrence reporting database;
• Monitoring and evaluating the Flight Data Monitoring reports and proposing
corrective actions to the Safety Manager;
• Monitoring corrective actions and flight safety trends;
• Publishing, together with Safety Manager, the results of safety reviews,
investigations, surveys, audits, etc.;
• Participating in JC Airlines Safety Review Board;
• Assisting with the investigation of accidents and conducting and coordinating
investigations into incidents;
• Participating in management strategic planning, as appropriate;
• Carrying out safety audits and inspections when instructed;
• Proposing to the Safety Manager adoption of actions in relation to improvement of
the SMS;
• Maintaining good relationship with the aircraft manufacturer’s safety department,
with the aviation authorities and with other flight safety organisations;
• Conducting other duties as anticipated by the SMS.
The Chief Flight Instructor on aircraft type shall be an active PIC holding an ATPL with
current type rating and instructor rating on the applicable aeroplane type. He is appointed
by the Training Manager.
Chief Flight Instructor should normally arrange a meeting of respective flight instructors on
aircraft type for all important matters regarding training checking and standardisation.
The Chief Cabin Crew Instructor shall be an active Cabin Crew Instructor (CCI). He is
appointed by Crew Training Manager. His main duties and responsibilities are to:
• Control, supervise and coordinate cabin crew training activities;
• Establish, maintain and update as necessary training syllabi for all required training
within his area of responsibility;
• Assist the Training Manager in development of cabin crew training and checking
documentation;
• Act as liaison between Training Manager and Cabin Crew Instructors;
• Promote and implement the cabin crew training policy set up by the Training
Manager;
• Support the Training Manager in routine administrative tasks;
• To perform functions, duties and responsibilities of Cabin Crew Instructor.
Reserved.
Wilful and deliberate violation of flight operations organizational policies and/or any of
official regulations and procedures by flight operations personnel shall not be tolerated.
Appropriate policy regarding procedure violations includes Company’s committee for case
review and/or equivalent types of action. The specification of this provision is applicable to
flight operations personnel and is not restricted only to flight crew.
All flight operations personnel are required to abide by all policies and procedures as set
forth in the Operations Manual, all relevant regulations, manuals, instructions,
departmental policies and procedures and other documents associated with the
performance of their duties.
final approach and landing except those duties required for the safe operation of the
aeroplane.
• The Commander shall ensure that, during a particular flight, the entire crew adheres
to duty and rest time limitations as outlined in OM Part A Chapter 7.
• The Commander shall ensure that in the interest of safety, admission of any person
other than the flight crew to the flight deck does not cause distraction and/or
interfere with the flights operation. All persons carried on the flight deck are made
familiar with the relevant safety procedures.
• The Commander shall ensure that all crew members are able to communicate in
common language.
• The Commander shall ensure that the checklists are complied with in detail.
• The final decision regarding refusal of an admission to the flight deck shall be the
responsibility of the Commander.
• The Commander shall ensure that smoking ban is strictly adhered to during his
responsibility over aeroplane.
• The Commander shall be responsible for notifying the nearest appropriate Authority
by the quickest available means of any accident involving the aeroplane, resulting in
serious injury or death of any person or substantial damage to the aeroplane or
property or any situations which endangers the safety of the aeroplane or persons
necessitates the taking of action which involves a violation of local regulations.
• The Commander shall report all known or suspected defects in the aircraft to the
Company at the termination of the flight.
• The Commander shall coordinate the flight deck task sharing and decide on who
acts as Pilot Flying. In order to promote the aeronautical experience and knowledge
of his First Officer, the Commander shall give him the opportunity to plan and
conduct the flight, or portions thereof, under his supervision. First Officer shall carry
out part of the flying and part of the total number of landings. As a guideline, First
Officer shall be given the opportunity to fly at the controls up to 50%, but at least
25% of the total flight time and carry out such take-offs, climb-outs, approaches and
landings which fall within his flying time.
• The Commander shall perform, as pilot flying, those take-offs, approaches, landings
and other phases of flight he considers in any way critical, unless otherwise
specified in OM Part B.
• The Commander shall be responsible for completing the journey log or the general
declaration containing all the information as required by the SSCA.
1.5.2 Leadership
• Check that the prescribed manuals, maps, charts, documents and forms are on
board and cover the aeroplanes intended operation including possible crew
changes until return to a home base;
• Ensure that the prescribed pre-flight maintenance checks and inspections have
been or are being carried out, and decide whether to accept the aeroplane with
unserviceable items allowed by the CDL or MEL;
• Not accept the aeroplane, if dissatisfied with any aspect of airworthiness and/or
maintenance;
• Conduct a cabin crew briefing, relating information and particulars pertinent to the
individual flight;
• Examine the required aeroplane documents and maintenance releases of
authorised personnel;
• As appropriate, check the use of the correct fuel type, supervise the fuelling of the
aeroplane and ensure the proper distribution of fuel;
• Ascertain that fuel on board and fuel assumed for take-off data calculation are
identical, and equal to or higher than the minimum fuel specified by the OFP and to
check, fill and sign the fuelling order;
• Certify by his signature in Aircraft Technical Log and Loadsheet that:
- The aeroplane is airworthy;
- The aeroplane configuration is in accordance with the CDL;
- Instruments and equipment, required for the flight to be conducted, are
available;
- Instruments and equipment are in operable condition except as provided in
the MEL;
- Those parts of the OM which are required for the conduct of the flight are
available;
- Aeroplane documents, required additional information and forms are on
board;
- Current maps, charts and associated documents or equivalent data are
available to cover the intended operation of the aeroplane including any
diversion which may reasonably be expected;
- Ground facilities and services required for the planned flight are available
and adequate;
- Provisions specified in the OM in respect of fuel, oil and oxygen
requirements, minimum safe altitudes, aerodrome operating minima and
availability of alternate aerodromes, where required, are complied with for
the planned flight;
- Traffic load is properly distributed and safely secured;
- Only traffic load authorised by JC Airlines has been taken on board;
- The mass of the aeroplane, at the commencement of taxiing and take-off roll,
will be such that the flight can be conducted in compliance with the OM Part
B and any additional operational limitation.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the Commander prior to taxiing and take-off.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the Commander during the flight.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the Commander after the flight.
In order to make JC Airlines flights safe, efficient and economical, it is expected that all
crew members will closely comply with all procedures, instructions and orders issued for
the various crew duties.
• Co-operate with all other personnel involved in the actual flight, such as the ground
staff, in order to comply with the applicable procedures and instructions;
• In the case of crew shift or relief, give full information to the next crew as to all
aspects of the progress of the flight; report any irregularity, in general or particular,
which are considered to be unsafe, impractical or inconsistent with JC Airlines
standards or which could be improved. Such reporting, including errors made by
crews or individuals, offers the double benefit of sharing experience within JC
Airlines and giving the possibility for adopting corrective measures.
If a crew member becomes aware of anything significant with which he disagrees or that
causes him concern, he shall bring it to the attention of the Commander. This requirement
is to ensure that the Commander is aware of the factors and judgments that could affect
his decisions. Due attention shall be given to all facts, no matter how insignificant they may
appear, which potentially can jeopardize safety or security of the operation.
All crew members are encouraged to report any problematic use of alcohol or
psychoactive substances.
Each crew member shall report any incident or occurrence that has endangered, or may
have endangered the safety of the flight.
• The first officer (co-pilot) is the Commanders deputy. He shall assume the role of
pilot-in-command when so directed by the Commander. If the Commander
becomes incapacitated the first officer assumes the Commanders authority and the
responsibility for the aeroplane and its crew, its passengers and load. Therefore, it
is his duty to responsibly participate in the preparation of the flight and to attentively
monitor its progress in order to be able to assume this authority/responsibility at any
given moment.
• He cooperates, in a responsible manner, as a member of the aeroplanes crew, and
meticulously performs the work routinely assigned to him or delegated to him by the
Commander.
• The first officer shall report to the Commander any fault, failure, malfunction or
defect, which he believes may affect the airworthiness or safe operation of the
aeroplane or aeroplane systems.
• The first officer shall report to the Commander any incident that has endangered, or
may have endangered, safety.
• The first officer shall make use of the company’s incident reporting scheme in
accordance with OM-A Chapter 11. In such cases, a copy of the report should be
communicated to the Commander concerned.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the first officer (co-pilot) prior the flight.
During the flight and by delegation by the Commander the first officer shall:
• Execute (as directed by the Commander) the tasks and functions of either the Pilot
Flying (PF) or the Pilot Monitoring (PM);
• Assist the Commander in the management of the flight deck work by:
- Observing task distribution,
- Systematic cooperation and exchange of information,
- Monitoring the flight progress and the aeroplanes systems,
- Maintaining visual lookout, and
- Monitoring the performance of other cockpit crew members.
• Draw the attention of the Commander to facts, circumstances or unfavourable
variables which may impair the safety of the flight and which may not yet have been
noticed by the Commander; and
• Deal with all documents which have to be completed by him.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the first officer (co-pilot) during the flight.
After the flight and by delegation by the Commander the first officer shall assist the
Commander in/by:
• Closing the aeroplanes documentation;
• Putting into good order, for the use of the aeroplanes next flight crew, all manuals,
maps and charts which form part of the flight deck library;
• Handing over the aeroplane to its next crew or to appropriate maintenance
personnel or, where this is impossible, having the aeroplane secured;
• Handing over the completed documentation to authorised personnel or forwarding
such documents by other means.
Other chapters of Operations Manual may additionally define duties and responsibilities of
the first officer (co-pilot) after the flight.
A pilot may be nominated as the safety pilot for the flight. A safety pilot may be any person
qualified to operate from one or both of the pilot seats on the aeroplane type concerned.
The safety pilot shall act as an additional flight crew member, during aircraft training and
line training.
A safety pilot is not intended to fulfil any training role. However, he is expected to assist
the instructor and trainee in any manner considered appropriate to the circumstances
prevailing during flight or ground operations. The safety pilot must occupy a flight deck
jump seat during all critical phases of flight, and when specifically directed by the
Commander.
The safety pilot shall be briefed by the Commander, on all relevant requirements, prior to
each sector.
The actions associated with the following guidelines may be applied as the actual
emergency dictates, and must be considered in conjunction with the applicable procedures
and requirements specified in the OM Part A and OM Part B.
• Rapid Depressurization
In the event of a rapid depressurization, the cruise relief Pilot-in-Command must
ensure that the aeroplane is operated in accordance with the required procedures
as defined in OM Part B. The cruise relief Pilot-in-Command should not attempt to
summon the Commander to the flight deck, until a safe cabin altitude has been
established. The Commander should remain on oxygen at his rest station until such
time as the cruise relief Pilot-in-Command summons him to the flight deck.
• Engine Failure
In the event of an engine fire warning, the cruise relief Pilot-in-Command must
ensure that the aeroplane is operated correctly, and in accordance with the required
procedures as defined in OM Part B, until the return of the Commander to the flight
deck. A relight should not be attempted until the return of the Commander to the
cockpit.
• Other Emergencies
Other emergencies or non-normal shall be performed in accordance with the
required procedures as defined in OM Part B. Whenever possible, the aeroplane
shall continue to be flown in accordance with the current clearance (i.e. track and
flight level), pending the return of the Commander to the flight deck.
Cabin crew shall be responsible for the proper execution of their duties that are related to
the safety of the aircraft and its occupants.
Whenever more than one cabin crew member is assigned, scheduling department will
designate a Cabin Crew in Charge (CIC) to:
• Direct, co-ordinate and organize the functions and tasks of cabin crew;
• Be responsible for maintaining good discipline among all cabin crew whilst on duty;
• Be responsible to the Commander for the conduct and co-ordination of cabin safety
and emergency procedure(s) as specified in the Operations Manual;
• Provide feedback to the Chief Cabin Crew on all operational matters, product
standards, performance of suppliers and service providers (caterers, cleaning
companies, traffic, engineering, ground handling etc.) suggesting improvements;
• Verify legal and mandatory documents and safety/security knowledge and
standards;
• Delegate positions and working areas;
• Create a happy, warm, welcoming atmosphere, greeting passengers with smile and
cheerfulness during boarding and at any time interacting with passengers during the
flight;
• Be responsible for completing the necessary documentation in the event of any
injury to crew or passengers on board;
• Be responsible to report »Cabin Secured« before take-off and landing;
• Inform the flight crew of any irregularities and malfunctions in the cabin; report any
incidents which occur during flight by using the reporting system (i.e. Air Safety
Reports). In all such cases, a copy of the report shall be communicated to the
Commander concerned; and
• Ensure the orderly handover of the aircraft to the new cabin crew taking charge at
transit stations.
Cabin crew must meet the qualification and recency requirements given in Chapter 5.3.
Cabin crew are individually responsible for ensuring that passport, visas, aircraft type
approval are up to date.
Every crew member must be aware that he is a representative of JC Airlines and that
people will identify his appearance with it. The image of an airline depends largely on the
behaviour of every employee. Crew members are always at the centre of interest, also
when travelling as dead head crew (DHC)/positioning crew.
Therefore:
• Loud welcome ceremonies are prohibited as well as confidential talks about
Company subjects in public or with other crews or other crew members on duty.
• Never make negative statements about JC Airlines or discuss JC Airlines matters
when people other than those of JC Airlines are present.
• Politeness and kindness should be the outstanding characteristics of every crew
member.
• Locations shall not be visited if the possibility exists of creating a wrong impression
which may be detrimental to the reputation and image of JC Airlines. This rule even
applies to crew members not in uniform during night stops.
All crew members should ensure that they themselves and their colleagues always comply
with the above regulations.
For flight duty crew members must carry the following documents:
• Valid licence (flight crew),
• Valid cabin crew licence (if applicable),
• Medical certificate,
• Valid passport,
• Visa - if required,
• Company identity (identification) card,
• Vaccination card - if required.
Each crew member is responsible for the validity of his documents and their timely issue,
renewal, and extension.
At the beginning of employment a Company Identity Card (ID card) will be issued to the
crew member. It shall be visible and always available while on duty. The loss of any
personal document must be reported immediately to JC Airlines.
1.7.3 Uniform
The uniform represents the image of Company and identifies the wearer as its
representative. It is imperative that the best image should be presented to the public at all
times adhering strictly with Company policies. Each crew member shall be in immaculate
appearance. It is the Commanders responsibility to ensure that his crew members are
appropriately attired for the flight.
All flight crew members shall wear epaulettes according to their rank as follows:
First officer becomes senior first officer after accumulating more than 1500 hours total
flight time and successfully completing the ATPL course and associated exams.
All crew members have to pass through local customs, immigration, currency control, etc.
as prescribed. Every person must comply with the local customs and other special
immigration regulations, which may often be more restrictive for crew members than for
passengers. Crew members must declare all goods liable for duty and are responsible for
duty charges. The same policy applies to restrictions on import or export of currencies.
All crew members are obliged to handle all company material with great care. JC Airlines
may claim compensation from a crew member for damage caused by him. Crew members
shall maintain the manuals, handbooks and other documents handed over to them in good
condition.
The crew member shall notify about the expected duration of illness, and any change in
duration.
All crew members shall comply with all instructions required for the specific country before
leaving the aeroplane. After the flight they shall meet the Commander for the debriefing
and in order to receive information for accommodation, transport to the hotel and
departure from the hotel to the aerodrome. Pick up time for crew transportation to the
aerodrome will be advised by the Commander. It should normally be arranged so that the
crew will arrive at the aerodrome for check-in one hour before scheduled time of
departure. Exemptions to this rule are at the Commanders discretion. Usually all crew
members should use accommodation provided by JC Airlines.
Should a crew member not require accommodation he must inform the Commander and
ask for permission prior to departure. He shall leave his contact details with the
Commander. At check-in for flight duty the crew members shall present themselves to the
Commander.
The Commander may, out of operational necessity or in fulfilling his obligation to provide
for the well-being of his subordinates, advise crew members to avoid certain areas (in the
vicinity of the accommodation or elsewhere).
Prior to leaving the accommodation for a longer period of time, the crew member(s) should
inform other colleagues to ensure personal safety.
Hotels for the crew will be provided by the Company. That means the Company will pay for
the room and breakfast. When breakfast cannot be provided in the hotel due operational
circumstances (e.g. early duty start) it will be provided on aeroplane. In case of unforeseen
night stops or when there is no reservation made by the Company the Commander may
decide which hotel is to be taken by the crew. Whenever possible the whole crew shall
stay in the same hotel.
Crew transport will be arranged by JC Airlines or the handling agent. Normally the
Commander is responsible for timely crew transport. Complaints about the transportation
will be made by the Commander to JC Airlines and/or handling agent.
Crew members are expected not to photograph or film passengers in the aircraft or in the
vicinity of it without their full permission.
Crew members shall not be photographed or filmed in the aircraft or in the near vicinity of it
by passengers or other crew members without their full permission.
Crew members are expected not to publish any information - be it text, photographs or film
– which could potentially be used by individuals in order to perform a criminal act against
crews or passengers or would give away confidential information in the Internet.
Despite the modern means of communication and the rising need of it, crews are expected
not to publish anything which could, as a result of unfavourable manipulation in web social
networks, harm the safety and operation of JC Airlines, its employees and passengers.
For more details on the above restrictions refer to Chapter 6, Crew Health Precautions.
Intentionally Blank
JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines) and the State Secretariat of Civil Aviation
(SSCA) should work in harmony towards a common aim of achieving safe conduct of air
operations. The functions of the two bodies are different, well defined, but complementary.
In essence, JC Airlines complies with the standards set through a sound and competent
management structure. The SSCA working within a framework of law sets and monitors
the standards they expect from JC Airlines.
JC Airlines’ AOC is granted by the SSCA on the basis of the rules and requirements
described in JC Airlines’ Operations Manual. JC Airlines operational management
organization, including the quality assurance system, is responsible for exercising control
and supervision over air operations conducted under the terms of the AOC.
The management structure is set out in OM Part A, Chapter 1.1. The Nominated Post
Holders are named in OM Part A, Chapter 1.2 with their duties and responsibilities defined
in OM Part A, Chapter 1.3.
regularity and efficiency of air navigation (NOTAMs and information contained in the
AIP, AIC and AIRAC);
• Ensure that adequate emergency procedures and contingency plans have been
formulated.
Effective safety management oversight is essential for a safe and compliant operation. The
core process components of effective safety management oversight and regulatory
compliances include:
• Monitoring recruitment and induction;
• Training management and supervision of crew qualifications and expiry items;
• Crew control and supervision of flight duty regulations and expiry items;
• Quality control.
The Accountable Manager has overall responsibility for ensuring that this control and
supervision are fully maintained. The Nominated Postholders hold delegated responsibility
for the control and supervision of their respective section.
Scheduling reviews are conducted at the end of each calendar month between commercial
department, flight operations department, ground operations department and engineering
& maintenance department. Result of review is monthly timetable of operations indicating
dates, times and aircraft capacity for scheduled flights. Timetable is then used for flight
and ground preparation, maintenance planning and crew scheduling.
Joint responsibility is delegated to the Training Manager, Chief Pilot, Chief Cabin Crew
and respective crew member to ensure that:
• No crew member shall perform a flying duty unless his licence, rating, medical
certificate, recency and any other qualification that he might require for the
particular flight are appropriate, current and valid for the duration of the flight; and
• The proficiency of crew members to perform their duties is periodically tested in
accordance with OM Part A, Chapter 5.
The final responsibility for maintaining a licence's validity rests with the holder. Whenever
he is aware that any licence, rating, certificate, recency or other requirement is about to
expire, he shall at once notify the applicable department manager and/or Training
Manager.
All JC Airlines employees must be competent for the operation that is promulgated by JC
Airlines’ AOC and their assigned position. They must comply with the laws, regulations
and procedures of those States in which operations are conducted. They must be familiar
with the laws and procedures described in the Operations Manual pertinent to the
performance of their duties.
Training and checking records are kept in the Training Department and all other
documents are kept in a proper storage room/desk. All documentation is accessible to the
SSCA or other auditing organization.
Under the overall responsibility of the Accountable Manager, the supervision of operations
is achieved by ensuring that the operations comply with the content of Quality Policy,
granted AOC and its associated Operations Specifications.
Means of supervision are Quality Assurance Programme, Accident Prevention and Flight
Safety Programme, Operations Management Communication.
Under the responsibility of the Flight Operations Manager, the supervision of flight
operations is achieved by:
• Ensuring that the flight operations comply with the content of the granted AOC and
its associated Operations Specifications;
• Ensuring that all JC Airlines’ aircraft are operated in compliance with the terms of its
Certificate of Airworthiness and within the approved limitations contained in its
Airplane Flight Manual and/or OM Part B;
• Setting up flight operational procedures and instructions which define duty for crew
members and flight operations staff;
• Setting up a checklist system to be used by crew members under normal, abnormal
and emergency conditions to ensure that the operating procedures of the
Operations Manual are adhered to;
• Checking, analysing and storing flight records and crew reports for the required
periods;
• Implementing in conjunction with the Safety and Security Manager, Operations
Quality Assurance Director and Training Manager, corrective action, training
programmes and information dissemination, as necessary, following the discovery
of any deviations from the procedures set in the Operations Manual.
Records, flight documents and data used for the conduct of the flight operations must be
stored in accordance with the storage period defined by the SSCA.
All documents required for the preparation and execution of flight, flight reports and crew
training records will be maintained, for the required period, on Company premises and are
immediately available for scrutiny by the SSCA, where required. Maintenance records are
stored by the maintenance service provider for the required period, and these records are
also available for scrutiny, as required. Appropriate data is extracted from the
documentation to ensure adequate tracking of flight time limitations for flight and cabin
crew and the maintenance of licence and qualification validity.
2.1.5.1 Documents Used for the Preparation and Execution of the Flight
The list of documents to be carried for each flight is mentioned in OM Part A, subsection
8.1.13.
The signatures of both the Commander and the flight dispatcher are required on the
Operational Flight Plan. The Commander’s is obliged to operate the flight according to the
operational flight plan, or to obtain an amended release.
The original documents on board shall be placed in the flight envelope and given to JC
Airlines’ ground staff on the final return to the base. The first officer is responsible for the
submission of the flight documents when the aircraft returns to base. When a crew change
occurs at outstations, the flight envelope should be left on board for the first officer
returning to base.
JC Airlines or its agent or, where no agent is named, the aerodrome authority or other
suitable party, shall retain on the ground, at the aerodrome of departure and for at least
the duration of the flight, a copy of each document relevant to the flight and appropriate for
the type of operation as listed below:
• Copy of the Operational Flight Plan (OFP);
• Copies of the relevant parts of the Aircraft Technical Log (ATL);
• Route specific NOTAM documentation;
• Weight and balance documentation;
• Notification(s) of special loads and/or special categories of passengers.
2.1.5.2 Reports
After each flight the Commander shall ensure completion of the Aircraft Technical Log and
Journey Log. Other reports which may be completed as required are specified in OM Part
A, Chapter 11.
All JC Airlines’ aeroplanes shall be equipped with Flight Data Recording (FDR) system.
Following an accident or serious incident that is subject to mandatory reporting or
whenever Authority so directs, Company shall preserve the relevant original recordings of
a FDR for a period of 60 days or longer if requested by the SSCA. JC Airlines shall, within
a reasonable time of being requested to do so by the SSCA, produce any recording made
by a flight recorder which is available or has been preserved.
All JC Airlines aeroplanes shall be equipped with Cockpit Voice Recording (CVR) system.
CVR data may not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or
serious incident that is subject to mandatory reporting, except with the consent of all crew
members concerned. Following an accident or serious incident that is subject to
mandatory reporting or whenever SSCA so directs, JC Airlines shall preserve the relevant
original cockpit voice recordings for a period of 60 days or longer if requested by the
SSCA.
All documents are a valuable tool for quality control. Training Manager, Chief Pilot, Chief
Cabin Crew, Flight Operations Manager and Ground Operations Manager shall ensure
that documents are randomly checked for their accuracy and correct completion and that
the applicable process has been planned and conducted in accordance with all legal and
Company requirements.
In general, all original flight documents will be returned to their specific flight envelopes
after processing. Flight envelopes will be kept in the Flight Operations Department in a
safe and secure place under lock. The custody of the flight documents remain with the
flight operations administrators. Subject to the SSCA approval, JC Airlines may store some
or all flight documents (trip records) in an electronic format.
2.2.1 General
Basic information promulgation system is defined in Quality System Manual (QSM), and
RoR and LEP Chapters of applicable manuals.
JC Airlines utilizes the communication system which enables and ensures an effective
exchange of operationally relevant information (including safety and security) throughout
the management system for flight operations and among operational personnel. It consists
of utilization of telephone calls or SMS, mailing to a staff member’s email address, faxed
information, SITA teletype messages, ATS (to aircraft in-flight) and paperback, hardcopy
information exchange.
This communication system also includes a variety of channels structured to provide a free
flow of information within flight operations management, between flight operations
management and other departments within the organization, from flight operations
management to line personnel, and from line personnel to management. The system also
includes feedback from the flight crew, cabin crew, other operations personnel, company
representatives abroad, etc. Various forms are at the disposition of flight crew and
operational personnel.
Note: These publications are to be kept until they have become obsolete and
consequently have been cancelled by the department which issued them, or until
incorporated in the documents/manuals.
The following additional operational instructions and information are received by the JC
Airlines Engineering/Maintenance Department and published or distributed to other
departments for publishing, as applicable:
The following additional operational instructions and information are received by the JC
Airlines Flight Operations Department and published accordingly:
FOT may be associated with an OEB and/or a temporary revision to the FCOM
and/or a temporary revision to the AFM.
The system of internal information is made of the following data issued by the concerned
department responsible for its promulgation and the means of issuance. The person
responsible for the issuance of the information is also responsible for its control,
distribution – according to a distribution list –, follow-up and its cancellation if applicable.
In addition to the miscellaneous information listed in section 2.2.1, JC Airlines is using the
Flight Operations Notices system as an information communication tool between Flight
Operations Department (and, if applicable Safety Department and Security Department)
and flight crew as well as cabin crew.
When applicable, the information shall mention the issue date and shall state the
beginning and ending of its applicability. If unable to mention the applicability period, it
shall mention "valid until further notice". The information is dispatched by means of paper
publications and/or by electronic mail. This information will further be used to bring
significant changes in legislation to the attention of staff. They will also be used for the
dissemination of other operational information of general interest found in such
publications as aeronautical information circulars, flight safety reports and notes.
Flight Operations Notices (FONs) include changes, notes and new applications related
with JC Airlines’ operational policies and regulations. They will always override any other
instructions in the Operations Manual. Compliance is mandatory.
Flight Operations Notices are issued by the responsible editor of corresponding basic
manual to promulgate operational information which is supplementary and/or overriding to
that contained in the basic manual and may be either of a permanent, semi-permanent or
of an urgent nature.
Flight Safety Notices are issued by the Safety Department with the purpose of providing
safety information based on airline experience or studies or following aircraft
manufacturers or authorities advise. It also informs the operations personnel about the
incidents and accidents which occur somewhere in the world to pay attention, learn
lessons, etc.
Regularly and at intervals of not more than 6 months, the responsible department will
review its Operator's Internal Information to ensure that, where necessary, action has been
taken to incorporate the contents as amendments to the appropriate manuals and to
remove those which are no longer valid or which in their opinion may be removed as
sufficiently promulgated.
The Accident Prevention and Flight Safety programme are incorporated within JC Airlines
Safety Management System (SMS). Safety management is the process through which the
Company delivers safe, reliable, efficient and predictable operational performance.
The primary purpose of the JC Airlines accident prevention and flight safety programme is
to achieve the safest possible flight operations. In order to realise this goal, the program
aims to create and maintain risk awareness from all personnel involved in the operations.
This is achieved by the careful recording and monitoring of operational, engineering, and
human safety-related occurrences for adverse trends in order to prevent the recurrence of
similar incidents which could lead to an aircraft accident.
Second purpose of the accident prevention and flight safety programme is the evaluation
of information relating to incidents/accidents and the publication thereof.
The overview over the accident prevention and flight safety programme has the Safety
Department, which is managed by the Flight Safety Manager. He reports directly to the
Accountable Manager, but has no executive role and acts in an advisory function. His
experience and background shall permit him to be aware of the possible hazards that
Company aircraft and the personnel involved in their operation, can be exposed to.
Accident prevention will result from the identification of and the protection against
hazardous conditions, policies and procedures. A hazard / risk is any condition, policy or
procedure that has the potential to cause damage or injury. If feasible, these hazards must
be eliminated. If this cannot be realised, the potential risk must be reduced to the lowest
acceptable level.
JC Airlines has committed itself to conduct the safest possible flight operations. Therefore
the Company supports uninhibited reporting of all incidents and occurrences that might
endanger the safety. It is the responsibility of each employee to provide the company with
any information that may affect the integrity of flight safety. The staff members provide the
essential safety link between the Company's aeroplanes, its equipment and its customers.
To promote a timely, unrestricted flow of information, the reporting system shall be free of
reprisal.
While the highest level of safety in all of its operations shall be the primary attribute of JC
Airlines services, the predominant factor in all operational decisions shall be that, which
provides the best means of achieving the required safety objective. Safety takes
precedence over any commercial, operational, environmental or working practice
considerations. Safety implications of any decision must be considered before that
JC Airlines’ culture is that its staff accepts that responsibility and takes an active interest in
air safety. In sharing this responsibility, each staff member is encouraged to be vigilant for
any sign that they believe may impact on air safety and to report accordingly. The Safety
Department, as the central reporting point, is an important element of this culture.
All employees are encouraged to report any safety relevant issues or incidents. All
possible risks will be assessed, and the necessary recommendations will be issued to
prevent further occurrence or development of the hazards.
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) or Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) is the pro-
active use of digital flight data from routine operations with the primary purpose to improve
flight safety. The FDM programme is integrated in the JC Airlines Accident Prevention and
Flight Safety programme as described in the OM Part A. Its aim is to:
• Identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins;
• Identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting when non-standard unusual or
unsafe circumstances occur;
• Use the FDM information on the frequency of occurrence, combined with an
estimation of the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine which
may become unacceptable if the discovered trend continues;
• Put in place appropriate procedures for remedial action once an unacceptable risk,
either flight safety risk actually present or predicted by trending, has been identified;
• Confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.
The Flight Safety Officer is responsible for the administration of the program, for ensuring
system security and for guaranteeing de-identification. Access to the flight data analysis
information is strictly limited to the following persons:
• The Flight Safety Officer, or the his deputy in case of his absence, who is the only
person allowed to obtain the identity of concerned (flight) crew member;
• The FDM Expert/Analyst, who performs the data analysis.
Processed data and analysis data have confidential status and must be treated
accordingly. The data shall be stowed in such way that no unauthorized persons can gain
access.
Digital flight data are retrieved from the aircraft's Data Management Unit (DMU). A card
with proper recording of raw data is removed from an aircraft, enclosed in a sealed
envelope and delivered to the Safety Department by maintenance personnel, from where
the data are transferred for analysis to the contracted third party qualified organisation. On
the basis of the event list and values as defined by the Safety Department, the software
program, used by contracted third party qualified organisation, searches for "events"
where pre-set threshold values of specific parameters have been exceeded.
For specific cases, where the Flight Safety Officer needs more information to understand a
significant event that has been recorded but that is not covered by any other report, he can
obtain information from the involved flight crew members through their interviews with the
Pilot Representative, who is a member of the FDM working group. The tone of the
interviews should be informative, never accusative.
Following such interview, the pilot representative and the Flight Safety Officer will never
pass names of the concerned flight crew members to other departments, managers or
employees. If applicable however, the concerned crew member(s) will be requested to
report the incident via Air Safety Report (ASR) according the Mandatory Occurrence
Reporting (MOR) scheme as laid down in the OM Part A Chapter 11.
Fully identifiable data shall be retained until the action and review processes are complete
(minimum 60 days after the date of flight).
De-identified data, including the data relating to closed issues, shall be retained for a
period of minimum 6 months after the flight. After this period, the data will be destroyed.
FDM working group should meet once monthly. It consists of the following members:
• Safety Manager - chairman;
• Flight Safety Officer;
• Maintenance & Engineering Department Representative:
• Flight Operations Department Representative;
• Pilots Representative.
FDM working group will review analysis, identify hazards and suggest corrective actions.
The implementation of corrective actions, fully or partially, is the responsibility of the
Company’s Post Holders. FDM working group will close the loop by tracking the
effectiveness of the corrective actions.
The Pilots Representative will be the link between the Flight Operations and Training
Managers and flight crew involved in circumstances highlighted by the FDM. This role may
be carried out by the Flight Safety Officer or another trusted individual. If deficiencies in
pilot handling technique are evident, the information is de-identified in order to protect the
identity of the flight crew. The information on specific exceedances may be passed to the
pilot concerned for confidential discussion, in order to clarify the circumstances, obtain
feedback, and give advice and recommendations for appropriate action, such as re-
training for the pilot (carried out in a positive and non-punitive way), revisions to operating
and flight manuals, changes to operating procedures, etc.
Operational control shall be exercised so as to ensure the safety, efficiency, regularity and
economy or all flight operations with prime consideration being given to the safety above
all other aspects. Operational control personnel shall be adequately trained,
knowledgeable and competent in the performance of their duties. The operational control
system shall have an approved flight following system adequate for the proper monitoring
of each flight considering the operations to be conducted.
An operator may delegate the authority for operational control of a specific flight to
qualified individuals, but retains overall authority to operate and control the entire
operation. An operator may also assign the responsibility to carry out specific operational
control functions, duties, or tasks related to the conduct of each flight to identifiable,
qualified and knowledgeable individual(s), but would remain responsible (and accountable)
for the conduct of the entire operation. A qualified person shall be designated by the
operator to exercise the functions and responsibilities for operational control of each flight
in commercial air transport.
An operator will assign the responsibility to carry out functions, duties, or tasks related to
the operational control of each flight to identifiable, qualified and knowledgeable
individual(s), but always retains overall responsibility for operational control.
Any individuals delegated the authority to make specific decisions regarding operational
control would also be responsible (and accountable) for those decisions. Additionally,
individuals assigned the responsibility to carry out specific operational control functions,
duties, or tasks related to the conduct of each flight are also responsible (and accountable)
for the proper execution of those functions, duties, or tasks. In all cases, the authority and
responsibility attributes of operational control personnel are clearly defined and
documented by the operator, and communicated throughout the organization.
It is important to note that when an operator assigns the responsibility for functions, duties
or tasks related to the initiation, continuation, diversion and termination of a flight to
employees (or external service providers, if applicable), an operator retains full
responsibility (and accountability) for the proper execution of those functions, duties or
tasks by ensuring:
• The training and qualification of such personnel meets any regulatory and operator
requirements;
• Personnel are performing their duties diligently;
• The provisions of the Operations Manual are being complied with;
To explain the differences between the two systems, in shared system of operational
control, a flight operations officer/flight dispatcher (or designated member of management,
as applicable) has the authority to divert, delay or terminate a flight if in the judgment of the
flight operations officer/flight dispatcher, a designated member of management or the
Commander, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or
released. In non-shared system of operational control, only the Commander (PIC) has the
authority to terminate, delay, or divert a flight if in the judgment of the Commander (PIC)
the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned.
The Commander (Pilot-In-Command - PIC) has sole authority over any and all decisions
regarding operational control. However, the Commander is assisted by others (e.g. flight
operations officer/flight dispatcher or a member of management) that lack operational
control authority, but are assigned the (Commander-assisted) responsibility to carry out
specific functions, duties or tasks, such as flight planning, flight support, briefing and in-
flight monitoring. Such system also employs flight monitoring as required by the SSCA.
During the time that a flight is being planned or operating, the decision making process
should consider the operational input of any person or department who may have
commercial, financial, or other resource motivations, such as availability of ground and
passenger handling/transfer equipment at an alternate airport. While this entity has the
authority to make suggestions which may impact the operation of the aircraft, this
operational input shall not compromise good operational judgment in the decision making
process. Operation input or request will be presented to the flight dispatcher for
consideration, and the flight dispatcher shall, consistent with safety, attempt to facilitate
such request, by forwarding the information, with the preferred option, to the Commander
for final decision. At no time in this process may operational control be compromised.
During the pre-flight phase of the flight the responsibility for the flight preparation is
delegated to the flight dispatcher. The flight dispatcher’s tasks include preparation of most
items required in pre-planning a flight. The flight dispatcher must take into consideration
weight and balance, aircraft performance, MEL items, weather, NOTAMS and any other
consideration that may affect the safety of the flight. After the Commander accepts the
Operational Flight Plan (OFP), the flight dispatcher shall share with the Commander
pertinent and related flight information, including any proposed changes to the Operational
Flight Plan.
The Commander has the only and final operational control authority of the flight and final
decision on any changes to the Operational Flight Plan shall be taken by the Commander
based on considerations of safety, including deviation from a dispatch release without
obtaining a new release. A flight is deemed to be "commenced" after brake release for
take-off; the flight dispatcher becomes responsible to monitor the flight’s progress and to
forward any information related to the safety of the flight to the Commander, as applicable.
In accordance with the text in previous paragraphs, there are two key flight dispatcher
activities associated with the exercising of operational control support, they being pre-
departure preparation and flight watch. It is the Company's expectation that each flight
dispatcher will prioritize workload responsibilities in such a manner as to guarantee that
the performance of flight watch always takes priority over pre-departure preparation and
planning activities. In the event that operational activities should escalate to a point where
pre-departure preparation activities may begin to adversely affect the flight dispatchers’
ability to perform adequate flight watch, the individual shall initiate the following procedure:
• Reduction in pre-departure activity in order to maintain a safe flight watch;
• Reschedule normal pre-departure activities.
The person exercising responsibility for operational control for an operator shall:
• Authorize the specific flight operation;
• Ensure that only those operations authorized by the AOC operations specifications
are conducted;
• Ensure that an airworthy aircraft properly equipped for the flight is used;
• Ensure that the specified conditions under which a flight may be dispatched or
released (weather minimums, flight planning, aircraft loading, and fuel
requirements) are complied with;
• Ensure that qualified personnel and adequate facilities are available to support and
conduct the flight;
• Ensure that crew members are in compliance with the flight and duty time
requirements when departing on a flight;
• Be provided with access to the necessary information for the safe conduct of a flight
(such as weather, NOTAMS and aerodrome analysis);
• Ensure that proper flight planning and preparation was made;
• Ensure that flight locating and flight following procedures are followed;
• Ensure that each flight has complied with the conditions specified for release before
it is allowed to depart;
• Ensure that when the conditions specified for a release cannot be met, the flight is
either cancelled, delayed, re-routed, or diverted;
• For all flights, ensure the monitoring of the progress of the flight and the provision of
information that may be necessary to safety;
• Coordinate operational instructions involving a change in the ATS flight plan with
the appropriate ATS unit before transmission to the aircraft.
A qualified person performing the operational control duties shall avoid taking any action
that would conflict with the procedures established by:
• ATC;
• The meteorological service;
• The communications service;
• The Operator.
The Commander (PIC) has sole authority over any and all decisions regarding operational
control. The Commander exercises his operational control by maintaining responsibility for
the execution and the safety of the flight.
The flight phase starts when the crew reports for duty and ends 30 min after shutting down
engines on the last flight of the flight duty period. During the flight phase, the Commander
holds ultimate responsibility for:
• Flight preparation including alternate aerodromes, weather and NOTAMs;
• Fuel decision based on actual situation and tactical strategy;
• Crew briefing with relevant information;
• Monitoring weather situation, flight progress and aeroplane technical status and
take appropriate decision when required.
• Providing OCC with updated information regarding actual flight operation and
aircraft status.
The Commander may overrule the delay procedure as set by the Flight Dispatch and/or
handling agent if he considers these directives are in direct conflict with operational and
safety standards.
Flight dispatch is required for the purpose of flight planning and aircraft dispatch, manned
by JC Airlines authorized and SSCA approved flight dispatchers/flight operations officers.
Flight dispatch procedures are the means by which the preparation and supervision of
flight operations will be achieved.
Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre (OCC) has a system that ensures flight
dispatchers have access to information relevant to the safe conduct of each flight, to
include information associated with:
• Operational standards, guidance and procedures (normal, abnormal and
emergencies – ground, cargo and flight;
• The aeroplane (MEL, maintenance and operations procedures, aeroplane
maintenance programme)
• Meteorology (meteorological reports and forecast, weather analysis and prognosis,
SIGMET);
• NOTAMs;
• Volcanic activity reports (VAR/AIREP), volcanic ash advisory messages
(VAA/VAG);
• Safety (current accident and incident notification and reporting procedures,
emergency response plans);
• Aerodromes (navaids, runway, taxiway, ramp, PPR, curfews, field conditions,
lightning, RFF, minima);
• Routes, including over water and critical terrain (NOTAMs, facilities, outages);
• Air Traffic Services (ATS);
• Performance data;
• Flight schedule, movement and status of an aeroplane.
The list of emergency and survival equipment carried on board JC Airlines aeroplanes
which includes the number, colour and type of life-rafts, details of emergency medical
supplies, water supplies and the type and frequencies of emergency portable radio
equipment is included in OM Part B/Cabin Crew Manual and is available for immediate
communication to rescue coordination centres.
• WX analysis – actual weather reports and forecasts, wind charts and SWC
chart;
• Operational Flight Plans – creating the actual flight plans;
• VAA, VAR/AIREP, SIGMET, NOTAM, ASHTAM and other relevant information,
and information from crews, concerning the volcanic ash cloud hazard;
• Performance charts and tables;
• Additional performance data, where applicable (drift-down, escape route, all-
engine climb rate, etc.);
• Airport charts.
3. Supporting, briefing and assisting the Commander.
4. Fulfilling and submitting flight plans to appropriate ATS.
Flight dispatcher on duty shall prepare a briefing package, contained in the “flight
envelope”, for every JC Airlines flight. He shall provide the Commander with an
Operational Flight Plan (OFP), NOTAMs, meteorological reports, known technical status of
the aircraft and all other documentation as required by the OM Part A, Chapter 8, and brief
him accordingly, to enable the Commander to perform briefing of the crew before dispatch.
The Flight Dispatch (Operations Control Centre) and flight dispatcher on duty support
operational control by ensuring, for the planned flight:
• That a Commander has been designated, and that a complete crew has been
scheduled, and that they meet all relevant competency and recency requirements;
• That, for each crew member of the planned flight, the requirements concerning flight
time limitation (FTL), as defined in OM Part A, Chapter 7, have been and are being
observed and applied.
In addition to the above, the Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre with the flight
dispatcher on duty is responsible for the following operational control support:
• Daily traffic change (cancelations, delays, postponing and introducing of new
flights);
• Aircraft leasing on operational basis;
• Creating and implementation of fuel policy taking in consideration fuel availability
and price difference;
• Coordination of delays with inputs by all participants in flight operations (commercial
department, flight operations department, ground operations department,
maintenance & engineering department, handlers, etc.);
• Keeping a constant check on en-route weather, field conditions, en-route navigation
system, air traffic management and security issues.
Flight Dispatch selects the most appropriate and economical flight routing and is
responsible for actively monitoring flight under its jurisdiction until the aircraft arrive at
destinations. This monitoring takes the form of an overview of weather and operational
issues across the area of JC Airlines’ operations.
The flight watch function, assigned to the flight dispatcher on duty, takes in account also
supervision of risks posed by the clear air turbulence, thunderstorms, icing conditions and
volcanic ash, in order to obtain most accurate information regarding airspace forecasts
and temporary danger areas (TDA) for planning (re-planning) best routes and altitudes for
avoiding such occurrences.
• Checking of performance data for the flight profile and, if applicable, additional
performance data when required by special conditions and requirements (drift-
down, escape route, all-engine climb rate, etc.), including volcanic activity.
Flight dispatchers shall also be responsible for advising the Commander (PIC) of
company’s possible needs for cancellation, re-routing or re-planning, should it not be
possible to operate as originally planned, but responsibility for operational control rests
solely with the Commander (PIC).
Note: It is equally important that the Commander tries to convey similar information to the
flight operations officer during the course of the flight (e.g. via ATC, ACARS, if
equipped, etc.), particularly in the context of emergency situations.
The Flight Operations Manager bears the overall responsibility and has the overall
directive authority over JC Airlines’ flight operations (for an actual flight, this responsibility
and authority devolve on the appointed Commander). The Flight Operations Manager is
legally responsible for establishing all operational policies, procedures, instructions and
guidance given in the Operations Manual.
The Crew Planning is tasked with management of the published crew rosters. The Crew
Planning ensures effective manpower use and deployment according to qualifications and
experience. All crew rosters are constantly managed by the Crew Planning to remain
within the constraints of the approved Flight Time Limitations (FTL) scheme.
Engineering & Maintenance Department is responsible for providing to the Flight Dispatch
information whether the aircraft has undergone all maintenance that renders the aircraft
able, from a technical and legal point of view, to finish its tour of duty and return to home
base before a major check becomes due.
Operational irregularities as referred to in the following text are all deviations from the
published schedule. These irregularities may be:
• Early departure of flight;
• Delay of flight;
• Rerouting of flight;
• Diversion of flight en-route;
• Cancellation of flight.
Instructions for deviation from the published schedule may be given by the Flight
Dispatch/Operations Control Centre for special reasons.
Station managers shall take all necessary action locally. Dispositions regarding revenue
passengers, mail and cargo shall be made in accordance with regulations as laid down in
Ground Operations Manual (GOM). Notice shall be given to the Operations Control Centre
in case of release of passengers.
The Operations Control Centre shall provide the departments concerned with immediate
information upon occurrence of an operational irregularity. Commercial department and
ground operations department should be notified as the passengers might have to be
rebooked or reservations cancelled according to the situation. After final coordination, the
flight dispatcher/flight operations officer on duty shall prepare a flight disposition message,
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containing all necessary information and data about flight movements, crew passenger
and/or load disposition.
In order to avoid certain meteorological or other conditions which might adversely affect
further operation of the flight, an early departure of more than 15 minutes can be
considered as an option. Due consideration, however, shall be given to commercial
aspects, i.e. loss of revenue shall be kept to a minimum. Departures ahead of scheduled
departure time exceeding 15 minutes should be coordinated with the Flight
Dispatch/Operations Control Centre. Night flying restrictions, runway closures and other
relevant limitations shall duly be taken into account when considering an early departure.
A delay occurs when the scheduled departure time is exceeded. All flights should be
operated in accordance with the published schedule. In case of unforeseen delays it is the
responsibility of the Company departments, stations and/or flight crew concerned to
reduce delays as much as possible. Flights may, however, be delayed by disposition for
the following reasons:
• To avoid adverse meteorological conditions at the departure aerodrome, en-route or
destination aerodrome;
• To ensure connection for passengers and/or load from other flights operating
behind schedule;
• To take aircraft spare parts on board for (Company) aircraft grounded due to
technical reasons.
The Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre shall have the authority to delay a flight. In
case of adverse meteorological conditions the Commander and flight dispatcher on duty
jointly decide about a delayed departure.
A delay shall be reported in the delay message and/or in the departure message. The
reason for the delay will be determined by the station and confirmed by the crew. Delay
code shall be inserted in the Journey Log in accordance with standard IATA delay codes
table. In the case of crew delays, the Commander shall be informed accordingly prior to
departure.
Meaning of the term re-routing of the flight is: a published scheduled or non-scheduled
flight, planned to another than scheduled destination prior to departure.
Flights may be re-routed for commercial and/or operational reasons (e.g. in order to
accommodate additional revenue load). The authority for re-routing of flights rests with the
Operations Control Centre (OCC). Requests for re-routing of flights for commercial
reasons shall be forwarded to the Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre.
Dissemination of a re-routing of flight shall be made in the form of a flight disposition
message.
Meaning of the term diversion of the flight en-route: a published scheduled or non-
scheduled flight proceeding to another airport than its next planned destination. All flights
shall be operated in accordance with the published schedule. However, flights may divert
en-route for the following reasons:
• Operational conditions at planned destination being prohibitive or rendering a
landing improbable to a high degree;
• Technical defects detected in flight requiring immediate landing at next suitable
aerodrome;
• Passenger on board of flight requiring immediate medical assistance;
• Unruly passenger(s) that pose a threat to the safety and/or security of the flight;
• Meteorological conditions encountered or reported en-route requiring alteration of
intended routing.
Responsibility to divert while en-route rests entirely with the Commander. However
Operations Control Centre should forward recommendations for alteration of route and/or
destination or alternate to the Commander of the flight concerned.
In case of a flight diverting while en-route notification shall be passed to the Operations
Control Centre. Notification shall contain data about reason for diversion of flight, new
planned destination and/or alternate and estimated time of arrival of the flight.
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Cancellation of flights originating at the home base: Before cancelling a flight due to
technical defects, the Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre shall review all
possibilities or an alternative solution in close cooperation with Maintenance & Engineering
Manager. The line stations of the respective flight shall, whenever practicable, be informed
in advance of the possibility of a cancellation and be consulted about chances of
alternative load protection.
When the cancellation of a flight or segment thereof becomes advisable from the
operational point of view (extended delay etc.), the Operations Control Centre shall
communicate such intention to the station(s) concerned. In such case information is
generally required as to number of passengers and load affected, alternative possibilities
of transportation of load and other relevant factors. Offices and station(s) concerned shall
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The State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA) has the power to deliver JC Airlines the right
to operate by means of an Air Operator Certificate (AOC). An AOC may be varied,
suspended or revoked if the SSCA is no longer satisfied that the operation is safe.
The SSCA has the privilege to grant an exemption from any requirement prescribed in
applicable regulations. In such a case, the SSCA is responsible for ensuring that an
acceptable level of safety can be maintained.
The SSCA and civil aviation authorities of the countries into which JC Airlines operates,
have powers to inspect the operation.
Any person authorized by the SSCA shall be granted access to any relevant flight
operations or airworthiness document or record. Any document or record required by the
SSCA shall be provided in reasonable timely manner.
For flight inspections, JC Airlines will ensure that any person authorized by the SSCA is
permitted at any time to board and fly in any JC Airlines’ aeroplane and to enter and
remain on the flight deck. The Commander may however, at any time, refuse access to the
flight deck if, in his opinion, the safety of the aircraft would thereby be endangered.
Commanders are required to fill up the Captain Report immediately after the flight in case
of aircraft/cabin or ramp inspection by foreign civil aviation authority, with the following
details:
• Name of foreign civil aviation authority that conducted the inspection;
• Type of inspection;
• Date of inspection;
• Probable findings;
• Other information deemed necessary.
JC Airlines shall notify the SSCA in written within 7 working days from receiving any
finding from the foreign civil aviation authority.
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3 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
3.1 GENERAL
Organizational standards set out by the decision level are the basis of establishing rules,
principles and operational priorities in accordance with the Company safety and quality
policy. Training is used to influence the human behaviour and performance, while
supervision is used to control the processes for final result. Compliance monitoring
programme should include all administrative and procedural activities up to the point of the
final result. Quality control follows by measuring the output, using a number of practices
and procedures. The output measurement is scrutinized by the upper management level to
make gap analysis comparing the standards the Company planned versus the standards
the Company delivered. Deviant performance is corrected and congruent performance is
stored as rules and procedures.
The overall function is being monitored and controlled by a Safety Management System.
Hazard identification, risk analysis and management of change are the responsibility of the
Safety Action Groups of any company field. Education on safety concept of all people
involved in the operational aspects is being forwarded to manage emergence arise out of a
multiplicity of relatively simple interaction. Safety Review Board adapts Safety
Management System accordingly to ensure its constant adequacy to protect JC Airlines
operations.
Safety and quality/compliance functions are performed under the supervision of the
Accountable Manager and together, they form JC Airlines’ management system.
Senior management has developed the safety and quality policy, which is endorsed by the
Accountable Manager. The safety and quality policy outlines the principles, processes and
methods of JC Airlines’ management system to achieve the desired safety, compliance
and performance outcomes as well as safety reporting principles. The policy reflects the
management commitment to improve towards the highest safety standards, comply with all
applicable legal requirements, meet all additional standards, consider best practices and
provide appropriate resources in all JC Airlines’ activities. To ensure continued relevance,
the policy should be regularly reviewed.
The following text in this chapter describes the general principle of the quality system from
an operational point of view. Information is presented as briefly as needed to understand
its application in the field of flight operations. For more details refer to the Quality System
Manual (QSM).
Quality system, that has been established, shall be acceptable to the State Secretariat of
Civil Aviation (SSCA) and is designed, as a minimum, to meet the requirement of CCAR
AOCR Chapter 8. In JC Airlines, one quality management unit has been designated to
ensure that the quality system is applied uniformly throughout the entire operation,
covering both operations and maintenance.
The Accountable Manager (Chief Executive Officer - CEO) has the overall responsibility
for the quality system, including the frequency, format and structure of the internal
management evaluation activities. Quality Assurance Director is designated to monitor
compliance with, and the adequacy of, procedures required to ensure safe operational
practices and airworthy aeroplanes. Compliance monitoring shall include a feed-back
system to the Accountable Manager to ensure corrective action as necessary.
It is the prime consideration at all times, to recognize the safety aspect as the highest
value to be taken care on. Under no circumstances should anything turn safety aspects
lower than economical or other aspects.
Human factors in all operational departments are trained, to avoid any human factor
caused incidents, accidents or trouble. The requirements, including a quality system, have
been integrated in the operational and maintenance parts of the organization, including
(sub)contractors. Company will dedicate the required financial, material and human
resources to safeguard the system.
It is the postholders’ task to manage their respective part of the quality system.
All personnel are made aware that they shall comply with the laws, regulations and
procedures, issued by the State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA) in addition to the ones
issued by the States in which operations are conducted and which are pertinent to the
performance of their duties. Furthermore, staff are made aware that they shall comply with
the standards and operational procedures defined by JC Airlines. All personnel are also
made aware of the need to facilitate audits and inspections for the purpose of continuous
improvement. Every employee has the responsibility to act in accordance with and to
contribute to the safety and quality goals of JC Airlines.
All personnel are involved in the complete Quality Management System through the
reporting system. Therefore all personnel are encouraged to report any error, irregularity
or event which might result in a loss of safety or quality standards by making use of the
occurrence reporting scheme.
Employees of JC Airlines who are in charge with performing tasks of quality management
(Quality Assurance Director, Safety Manager, auditors, etc.) shall receive the relevant
quality management training. All other employees receive a comprehensive briefing about
the quality system of the company in the form of information events or in briefings.
A suitable work environment satisfies human and physical factors and considers safety
rules and guidance, including the use of protective equipment, workplace location(s),
temperature, humidity, light, air flow, cleanliness, noise and pollution.
The Accountable Manager is responsible for JC Airlines compliance with the applicable
requirements, including the effectiveness of the management system. The Accountable
Manager has delegated the management of quality assurance (compliance monitoring) to
the Quality Assurance Director.
JC Airlines’ flight operations quality system includes Quality Assurance Program that
contains procedures designed to verify that all operations are being conducted in
accordance with all applicable requirements, standards, procedures and instructions.
Quality Assurance Program shall ensure identification of any undesirable conditions and
areas required to be improved and any hazards to the operations.
The Quality Assurance Director is responsible for ensuring that the Quality Assurance
Program is properly established, implemented and maintained.
JC Airlines’ Quality Assurance Program identifies the persons within the Company who
have the responsibility and authority to:
• Perform evaluations, audits and inspections as part of ongoing quality assurance;
• Identify and record any concerns or findings, and the evidence necessary to
substantiate such concerns or findings;
• Initiate or recommend solutions to concerns or findings through designated
reporting channels;
• Verify the implementation of solutions within specific timescales;
• Report directly to the Quality Assurance Director.
The Quality Assurance Program shall include a defined audit schedule and a periodic
review cycle for specific areas. The schedule shall be flexible and allow for unscheduled
audits when trends are identified. Follow-up evaluations may be scheduled when
necessary to verify that corrective action has been carried out and that it was effective in
eliminating any reported findings. The Quality Assurance Department should establish a
schedule of audits to be completed during a specific calendar period. It should expect to
review all aspects of its operation within a period of 12 months in accordance with an
accepted program. When the Quality Assurance Department defines its schedule,
consideration is given to significant changes to the management, organization, operation
or technologies as well as the regulatory requirements.
The Quality Assurance Program includes all planned and systematic actions necessary to
provide confidence to SSCA, JC Airlines corporate management, external parties and
customers, that all operational activities are conducted in accordance with applicable
requirements, standards and relevant operational procedures.
JC Airlines may decide to sub-contract out certain activities to external agencies for the
provision of services related to areas such as maintenance, ground handling, training, etc.
When using sub-contractors the responsibility for quality of the product or service remains
with the Company. There should be a written agreement between JC Airlines and the sub-
contractor that clearly defines the responsibilities. That part of the sub-contractor’s activity
contained within the agreement should be included in the operators Quality Assurance
Program.
The Company shall ensure that the sub-contractor has the necessary authorization or
approval when required, and commands the resources and competence to undertake the
task. If the Company requires the sub-contractor to conduct activity which exceeds the
sub-contractor’s authorization or approval, the Company is responsible for ensuring that
the sub-contractor’s quality assurance takes account of such additional requirements.
Those responsible for managing the Quality System should receive training covering at
least the following topics:
• An introduction to the concept of the Quality System;
• Quality management;
• Concept of quality assurance;
• Quality manuals;
• Audit techniques;
• Reporting and recording.
JC Airlines has established a quality assurance system and has designated Quality
Assurance Director to monitor the compliance with, and adequacy of, procedures required
to ensure safe operational practices and airworthy aircraft. Compliance monitoring
includes a direct feedback system to the Accountable Manager to ensure corrective action
as necessary.
The aim of monitoring within the quality system of flight operations is primarily to
investigate and judge its effectiveness and thereby to ensure that defined policy,
operational, and maintenance standards are continuously complied with. Monitoring
activity is based upon quality inspections (responsibility of the postholders), audits,
corrective action and follow-up. A quality procedure is established and published to
monitor regulatory compliance on a continuing basis. This monitoring activity is aiming at
eliminating the causes of unsatisfactory performance.
The Quality Assurance Program includes procedures to ensure that corrective actions are
developed in response to findings. These procedures monitor corrective actions to verify
their effectiveness and completion.
Subsequent to the quality inspection or audit, at least the following should be established:
• The nature of any findings and the need for immediate corrective action;
• The root cause or causes of the finding, where the auditors should gather sufficient
evidence to produce realistic assessments during an audit;
• The procedure whereby the auditor and the responsible personnel from the audited
area have comprehensive discussions and reach an agreement on findings and
corresponding corrective actions. Clear procedures may be established to resolve
any disagreement between the auditor and audited area;
• Corrective actions required to ensure that the non-compliance (non-conformity)
does not reoccur;
• Schedules for corrective action, where all the items that require follow up are to be
closed out within the appropriate period of time;
• The identification of individuals or sections responsible for implementing corrective
action;
• Information to the Accountable Manager where appropriate.
A report is made up with each audit. It contains particulars of the object of the audit, the
referenced requirements applied as basis and any identified deviation from, or non-
compliance/non-conformity with requirements. Information gained from this audit report
could be used in the management of operational risk. The report is distributed to the
manager concerned, a copy is kept by the Quality Assurance Director and another copy is
retained by the auditor for recording and follow-up of possible corrective actions.
3.3.4 Recording
The Quality Assurance Department maintains accurate, complete and reliable record
documenting the results of the Quality Assurance Program. Records are considered to be
essential data to analyse and determine the root causes of non-conformity, so that areas
of non- compliance can be identified and subsequently addressed.
At least the following records should be retained for a period of five years:
• Audit plans;
• Inspection and audit reports;
• Responses to findings;
• Corrective action reports;
• Follow-up and closure reports;
• Management evaluation reports.
The Quality Assurance Director is responsible to file and store these documents in such a
way that they are readily retrievable in facilities that provide a suitable environment to
prevent damage and/or loss. These documents can be in the form of any type of medium
such as hard copy or electronic media.
A management evaluation is designed to identify and correct trends and to prevent, where
possible, future non-conformities. Conclusions and recommendations made as a result of
an evaluation should be submitted in writing to the responsible manager for action. The
responsible manager should be an individual who has the authority to resolve issues and
take action.
The management evaluation will be carried out by the Flight Operations Manager and
senior managers of the department, at a suitable opportunity shortly after the annual audit
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 3 P: 3-11
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
programme has been completed and mid-way during the annual audit programme. Results
of the management evaluations will be sent to the Quality Assurance Director who will
compile an annual quality report to the Chief Executive Officer (Accountable Manager).
Flight Operations Manager will disseminate the results of the management evaluation of
audit reports to the department staff concentrating on areas where improvement is
needed, as well as those that have done well, with appropriate comments and
congratulations respectively.
A general report of the results of the annual audit programme should be promulgated to
the staff of the Company.
These documents, considered together, comprise the Company's flight safety documents
system. Flight safety documents system comprises of the: Operations Manual, Flight
Manual, Checklists, Maintenance Manual, MEL, SOPs, Cabin Crew Manual, Training
Manual, Ground Operations Manual, Safety Management System Manual, Flight Dispatch
Manual, Security Manual, etc. Concerted efforts have been made by the Company through
a central documents system to maintain compatibility and consistency between these
manuals, which may have different authors and be under different responsibilities, with the
aim of avoiding inconsistencies, ambiguities or different interpretations in the
implementation of procedures. Each manual or document requires similar structure,
consistent location of specific types of information, common terminology, information that
is relevant, standardization across the fleet, etc. The flight safety documents system
maintains consistency in terminology and in the use of standard terms for common items
and actions.
The flight safety documents system ensures standardization across document types,
including writing style, terminology, use of graphics and symbols, and formatting across
documents. This includes a consistent location of specific types of information, consistent
use of units of measurement and consistent use of codes. For easy updating of the
manuals/ documents in circulation it is required that manual is divided in smaller parts and
chapters so that only relevant portion can be changed.
The concept of a flight safety documents system in JC Airlines is that the Company has
adopted an integrated approach and is considering its operational documents as a
complete system. It is important for operational documents to be consistent with each
other, and consistent with regulations, manufacturers' requirements and human factors
principles. It is also necessary to ensure consistency across departments as well as
consistency in application. A flight safety document system includes a verification
mechanism to ensure that, whenever a section of a document is amended, all other
documents likely to be affected are identified and that consequential amendments are duly
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) found that it was possible to see an
association between identified deficiencies in operational documents and accident rates.
Deficiencies in operational documents are considered to have been contributing factors in
a number of accidents and a great many incidents worldwide. This led to the development
of the standards and recommended practices (SARPs) in ICAO Annex 6, to emphasise the
need for operators to adopt an integrated approach and to consider their operational
documents as part of a complete system.
A flight safety documents system is organized according to criteria which ensures easy
access to information required for flight and ground operations contained in the various
operational documents comprising the system and which facilitates management of the
distribution and revision of operational documents.
As part of the flight safety documents system, all regulations related to the contents of the
Operations Manual shall be implemented.
Information contained in a flight safety documents system are grouped according to the
importance and use of the information, as follows:
a) Time critical information, e.g. information that can jeopardize the safety of the
operation if not immediately available - abnormal/emergency checklists, NOTAMs,
etc.;
b) Time sensitive information, e.g. information that can affect the level of safety or
delay the operation if not available in a short time period – weather reports, service
bulletins, SSCA circulars, etc.;
c) Frequently used information – Operations Manual Part A, B, C, D, Cabin Crew
Manual, Flight Dispatch Manual;
d) Reference information, e.g. information that is required for the operation but does
not fall under b) or c) above – AIP, CCAR, AFM, etc.;
e) Information that can be grouped based on the phase of operation in which it is used
– Standard Operating Procedures.
Time critical information are placed early and prominently in the flight safety documents
system.
Time critical information, time sensitive information, and frequently used information are
placed in cards and quick-reference guides.
The flight safety documents system includes a master index in front of each document to
locate, in a timely manner, information included in more than one operational document. It
should consist of no more than three levels of indexing. Pages containing abnormal and
emergency information shall be tabbed for direct access.
Each copy of a manual normally bears a serial number, and a list of holders is maintained
by the person responsible for issuing amendments. Each manual bears a title and list of
contents, giving a clear indication of its scope. At the front there is an amendment page to
indicate amendment number, date of incorporation and the signature or initials of the
person(s) making the amendment. Amended pages are dated. The arrangements of ages,
sections, paragraphs, etc. is orderly and systematic to facilitate immediate identification of
any part of the subject matter. The standard of printing, duplication, binding, section
dividers, indexing of sections, etc. is sufficient to enable the document to be read without
difficulty and to ensure that it remains intact and legible during normal use.
In JC Airlines the flight safety documents system reflects the application of quality
assurance principles and complies with the requirements of the Company’s quality system.
Changes or additions, however slight, are incorporated by the issue of a fresh or additional
page, dated accordingly, on which the amendment material is indicated by a vertical line in
the margin.
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) or Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) or Flight
Data Analysis (FDA) is the process of collecting and analysing data from flights to improve
safety and efficiency of flight operations. Data recordings are done on a regular basis in
order to reveal situations requiring corrective actions before problems occur. FOQA
findings are kept confidential. For more details on FOQA (FDM) refer to SMS Manual.
The goal of FOQA is to improve the Company's overall safety, increase maintenance
effectiveness and reduce operational costs.
FOQA involves collecting flight data, analysing it, reporting any unsafe occurrences using
flight data and flight trends, putting corrective actions into place to reduce or remove
unsafe trends and monitoring flight data in order to make sure that unsafe flight trends are
not occurring and if they are occurring, they need to be accounted for and corrected.
To institute a FOQA program, four basic steps need to be taken. These are:
1) Data recording and retrieval: The first step involves capturing data from the flight
recorder over the duration of a flight. After the flight is conducted, the data is
captured and sent for actual analysis.
2) Data processing and analysis: This process involves taking putting captured data
through processing and analysis equipment in order to decipher it. The parameters
for normal operations are fed as the standard into the software and the software
then juxtaposes the flight data with the standard data to evaluate the extent to
which the flight has conformed to the standard envelope. Special mechanisms are
also put into place in order to remove faulty readings and maintain anonymity.
3) Corrective action: After analysing the flight data and investigating any exceedances,
the Flight Safety Officer will contact the flight crew of the flight or Company pilots’
representative to gather more information on the exceedance. After thoroughly
investigating and reviewing the cause of any exceedances, the Flight Safety Officer
and the Safety Department will place the necessary corrective actions into place.
The team may implement corrective actions after analysing operational trends on a
periodic basis as well.
4) Monitoring: This step involves keeping a watch on flight records to ensure that all
flight operations are within their safe envelopes and any exceedances reported for
correction. This is usually done by reviewing FOQA data over an allotted period of
time.
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4 CREW COMPOSITION
4.1 FLIGHT CREW COMPOSITION
4.1.1 Minimum Flight Crew
Crew Planning (for planning purposes) and Operations Control Centre (OCC) for ad-hoc
operational changes) are responsible for designating the crew for each flight or series of
flights based on the aircraft type, type of operation and flight time limitation.
The method for determining crew composition must take into account:
• Type of aircraft being used;
• The area and type of operation being undertaken;
• The minimum crew requirement and flight duty period planned;
• Experience (total and type), recency and qualification of the crew.
For any flight, the number and composition of the flight crew, taking into account the type
of aircraft, shall never be less than the number required by the applicable aircraft’s
Certificate of Airworthiness, Airplane Flight Manual and Company’s Operations Manual. In
general, aircraft operated by JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines), require a
minimum 2-pilot flight crew, consisting of the captain (being Commander/Pilot-In-
Command) and the first officer (co-pilot). This minimum number may be increased by the
terms of OM Part A, Chapter 7. Any such increase then becomes the essential minimum
for JC Airlines operations.
All flight crew must hold applicable and valid licences acceptable to the SSCA and be
suitably qualified and competent to conduct the duties assigned to them.
For each flight, JC Airlines will designate only one pilot to be the Commander (Pilot-In-
Command – PIC). Under normal circumstances the Commander shall act as CM1 and first
officer (co-pilot) as CM2. JC Airlines will nominate a pilot as Commander only if he meets
the minimum qualification and recency requirements laid down in OM Part A, Chapter 5.
The Commander is the flight crew member holding overall responsibility for the safety of
the aeroplane, its crew, its passengers and its load. The handling of an aeroplane or
conduct of flight may be delegated by the Commander to another suitably qualified pilot
who he deems competent and fit for duty.
The Commander is Pilot-In-Command unless he has been relieved in flight of his duties at
the controls by another pilot (e.g. Cruise Relief Captain) who then assumes the command
of the flight and thus becomes the Pilot-In-Command.
To remove any command ambiguity, the Commander will sign the Aircraft Technical Log
and the Load Sheet as Commander (Pilot-In-Command) of the aircraft. He will then remain
in sole command of the aircraft until he relinquishes command to another pilot or, the
aircraft is handed over authorized personnel on completion of the command period.
When two captains are scheduled to fly the same flight schedule, the most senior captain
should be listed on top line of the crew list on the Journey Log. This captain is empowered,
to decide on a sector-by-sector basis, which Captain shall act as Commander (PIC) for the
given sector. The acting Commander will check that his name is on the flight plan and it is
his responsibility to sign the Aircraft Technical Log and other documents, as applicable.
During line training flights or supervision flights, when two captains are scheduled to fly the
same flight schedule, the captain who is acting as the instructor on that flight should be
listed on top line of the crew list on the Journey Log and act as Commander (PIC). During
line training flights or supervision flights with a qualified instructor in the right hand seat
(RHS), the instructor shall be designated as the Commander of the flight.
On line check flights during which the instructor is observing the conduct of the flight from
the observer’s seat, he may not be the designated as the Commander. He may however
assume command of the said flight if in his judgement the continued safe conduct of the
flight necessitates that he do so. Such changes in command shall be reported to Training
Department as soon as possible.
A flight crew member who is inexperienced following the completion of a type rating or
command course and the associated line flying under supervision shall not be rostered
with another inexperienced flight crew member.
A flight crew member is considered as inexperienced until he has achieved on the type
either:
• 100 block hours and flown 40 sectors within a consolidation of 120 consecutive
days after a line check following the associated line flying under supervision; or
• 150 block hours and flown 20 sectors within a consolidation of 90 consecutive days
after a line check following the associated line flying under supervision.
A higher number of block hours or sectors may be defined by the respective Chief Pilot on
general or individual basis.
In addition to the required cabin crew complement as presented above, at its discretion,
the SSCA may also require an operator to include additional cabin crew members for
special operation flights.
For normal commercial flight operations, the minimum number of cabin crew to be
scheduled for duty on Company aeroplanes shall be as given in OM Part A, section 4.4.
In unforeseen situations the required minimum number of cabin crew may be reduced
provided that the number of passengers has been reduced in accordance with procedures
specified in OM Part A, section 4.4. After completion of the flight with reduced minimum
number of cabin crew, the Commander shall complete an Occurrence Report which shall
be duly submitted by the Company to the SSCA.
All cabin crew members shall wear the cabin crew uniform to be clearly identifiable to the
passengers as cabin crew members.
Where more than one cabin crew member is required to be carried, the Company will
designate one of them to be the Cabin Crew-in-Charge (CIC).
The CIC is responsible for the level of service quality and exercises jurisdiction and direct
supervision over all the cabin crew members on the aircraft concerning their duties and
responsibilities as set forth in Cabin Crew Manual (CCM).
During succession of command the safety of the aircraft and its occupants shall be
assured at all times and the aircraft should land as soon as practicable. The autopilot shall
be used to its full capacity to reduce workload and to ensure the safe outcome of the flight.
Any first officer (co-pilot) taking over the command of the aircraft should remain in his (first
officer) seat.
If the originally designated Commander cannot continue his command of the flight, the
flight will not depart from the aerodrome where it has landed or, if occurring during flight,
from the next aerodrome at which it lands, unless another JC Airlines nominated
Commander on that particular type of aircraft is included in the crew.
A Cabin Crew-in-Charge (CIC) shall be nominated whenever more than one cabin crew
member is assigned.
In the event that CIC is incapacitated of falls ill on a flight before arriving at a crew base
the next senior cabin crew member of that crew will take over and assume the duties of
CIC, with the approval by the Commander.
When scheduling cabin crew for flights, rostering procedures should take into account the
experience of each cabin crew to ensure that there is an even spread of experienced cabin
crew members on all flights.
For normal commercial flight operations the minimum crew complement shall never be
less than:
JC Airlines has documented the following policies and procedures for reduced cabin crew
operations: If unforeseen circumstances (incapacitation of cabin crew member) occur out
of crew base where no qualified replacement cabin crew member is reasonably available,
the number of cabin crew may be reduced. The passenger carrying capacity of the
aeroplane shall be reduced by 50 seats from the manufacturer’s certificated maximum
passenger seating capacity for every cabin crew member below the number of cabin crew
members specified by the manufacturer for that aircraft type. Requirement for minimum
one cabin crew member for every 50 or fraction of 50 passenger seats installed in the
aircraft shall be observed. The reduced minimum cabin crew is applicable only for return
flight to the crew base. Number of passengers/occupied seats has to be reduced in
accordance with the table below.
SSCA is being satisfied that such operation is conducted in a safe and proper
manner);
• All cabin crew members shall be trained and be made familiar with the procedures
for reduced cabin crew operation;
• If the incapacitated crew is the cabin crew-in-charge (CIC), the next most qualified
cabin crew who meets the requirements to be a CIC shall be appointed as the CIC
for that sector.
Before commencing a flight with reduced minimum cabin crew a special briefing by the
Commander (allocation of emergency duties) is compulsory.
For these type of flights, all persons carried on board shall be briefed on safety,
emergency and evacuation procedures. In addition, where more than 19 persons are
carried on board such flights (excluding the flight crew), the operator shall determine the
minimum number of cabin crew members required to effect a safe and expeditious
evacuation of the aeroplane. At least one cabin crew shall be carried on board such flights.
Flight crew members may not operate more than one type of aeroplane.
Flight crew members may operate a maximum three variants of the same aeroplane type
provided the operation on the three variants is not part of the same crew member’s FDP.
Cabin crew members may operate up to three aircraft types provided that safety
equipment and emergency procedures are similar. Cabin crew members should not
operate as CICs on more than one aircraft type unless approved by the SSCA.
Factors taken into consideration by the SSCA to permit cabin crew members to operate up
to 3 aircraft types would include but are not limited to the following:
• Additional training for the CICs;
• A minimum experience level of cabin crew comprising the minimum crew
complement;
• Restriction of the number of trainee cabin crew carried on all flights;
• Meeting a recency requirement as agreed with the SSCA on all aircraft types;
• No change of fleet assignment within the same day except for flight disruptions;
• Arrangements made for cabin crew to review the characteristics of the aircraft type
to be operated on during pre-flight crew briefing.
Variants of an aeroplane type are considered to be different types if they are not similar in
each of the following aspects:
• Emergency exit operation;
• Location and type of portable safety equipment;
• Type specific emergency procedures.
When substantial differences exist between two aeroplanes of the same variant, the
Technical Pilot (or Chief Pilot) should call a meeting between himself and Safety Manager,
Quality Assurance Director, Flight Safety Officer, Flight Operations Manager and the Chief
Pilot of the fleet in order to determine if the two aircraft in question should be considered
as different variants.
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5 QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
5.1 GENERAL
The holder of the licence or rating shall not exercise privileges other than those granted by
that licence or rating. Furthermore, he shall not exercise the privileges granted by any
licence or rating unless he maintains competence by meeting the relevant requirements.
The Company will ensure that crew members and relevant flight operations personnel
undergo all required recurrent training and checking as specified in OM Part D.
The Company will ensure that crew members and relevant flight operations personnel
undergo conversion course (as specified in OM Part D) before being tasked with
applicable flight operational duties in unsupervised manner.
All flight crew members (whether employed or sub-contracted), who operate JC Airlines
aircraft, must be properly licenced and hold valid and appropriate documents as described
in Chapter 1, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this manual. The flight crew member shall not act
in any capacity as a pilot (except on flight simulation training devices) on JC Airlines
(Company) aircraft unless he is able to produce/prove:
• Valid Flight Crew Licence, acceptable to the SSCA, with valid ICAO English
Language Proficiency endorsement (level 4 or higher);
• Valid Medical Certificate;
• Valid Type Rating;
• Valid Operators Proficiency Check;
• Valid Line Check;
• Adequate Recency of Experience;
• Valid LVO certificate, if required by the type of operation;
• Required Route and Aerodrome Qualification;
• Any additional qualification, if required by the type of operation, and adequate status
regarding initial/recurrent training and checking (as defined in OM Part D) of the
following qualification requirements:
- Human Factors and Crew Resource Management (CRM);
- Dangerous Goods Regulation (DGR);
- Safety and Emergency Procedures (SEP);
- Aviation Security;
- EFB (if applicable);
- Cold/Adverse Weather and All Weather Operations;
- Specific aircraft type and type equipment related qualification (PBN, RVSM,
ACAS/CFIT/(E)GPWS/UPRT;
- Differences training, as applicable.
Initial and recurrent training covering the above items, as applicable, shall be conducted
according to requirements in OM Part D.
For specific flight crew duties (i.e. Commander, cruise relief captain, line training captain
and (type rating) instructor) Company’s nomination (refer to OM Part D) is required.
Upon joining the Company the pilots shall complete the Company indoctrination course.
Pilots are required to carry their current licence (and validation, if applicable) and medical
certificate when on duty.
The flight crew member shall not act in capacity of the Commander (PIC) or Cruise Relief
Pilot-in-Command unless he has a valid ATPL issued (or validated) by the SSCA.
The flight crew member shall not act in capacity of the first officer unless he has a valid
ATPL or CPL with ATPL theoretical knowledge issued (or validated) by the SSCA.
A licence holder shall not exercise the privileges granted by any licence or rating unless
the holder maintains competency by meeting the relevant requirements. The validity of the
licence is determined by the validity of the ratings therein and the medical certificate.
In any case, no pilot is permitted to exercise his privileges from the licence, operate as a
flight crew member on JC Airlines aircraft for public transport operations after his 65th
birthday.
The flight crew member shall not act in any capacity as a pilot unless he has a valid
Medical Certificate issued (or validated) by the Authorized Medical Examiner (medical
practitioner approved by the SSCA).
The flight crew member (pilot’s licence holder) shall not act in any capacity as a pilot
unless he has a valid type rating (TR) and valid multi-engine instrument rating for
aeroplanes (IR/ME(A)) issued (or validated) by the Authority.
The flight crew member shall not act in any capacity as a pilot unless he has successfully
completed an Operator Proficiency Check (OPC) by demonstrating his competence in
handling and carrying out normal, abnormal and emergency procedures. The period of
validity of an OPC is 6 months including the remainder of the month of issue. The OPC
revalidation may be combined with the TR/IR/ME(A) revalidation.
The Commander shall not perform his duties as CM2 unless he has successfully
completed additional training and checking (may be concurrent with the OPC) to operate in
either seat as specified in the OM Part D (Right Hand Seat Qualification).
The flight crew member shall not act in any capacity as a pilot unless he has successfully
completed a Line Check (LC). Line check shall be conducted on the aeroplane during
actual line operation. It is a test of a pilot's ability to satisfactorily perform a complete line
operation in safe and efficient manner. It includes the conduct of pre-/post-flight
procedures and the use of the onboard equipment. The period of validity of a line check is
12 months. When credit is given for line checks to alternate between types or variants,
each line check revalidates the line check for the other type or variant.
The annual line check is not intended to determine competence on any particular route.
The requirement is for a test of ability to perform satisfactorily a complete line operation
from start to finish, including pre-flight and post-flight procedures and use of the equipment
provided. The route chosen should be such as to give adequate representation of the
scope of a pilot's normal operations. The line check is considered a particularly important
factor in the development, maintenance and refinement of high operating standards, and
can provide the operator with a valuable indication of the efficacy of his training policy and
methods.
The operator has a statutory obligation to check that his pilots are competent to perform
their duties. As it is Company’s policy that both pilots may carry out either the handling or
the non-handling duties, both the Commander (PIC) and co-pilot (first officer) should be
checked in both roles.
In addition to the above duties, a Commander should also be assessed on his ability to
manage the operation generally and take correct command decisions. This is most readily
achieved if the examiner occupies a jump seat, which will also enable him to sign
certificates for both the Commander and co-pilot (first officer).
When line checks are carried out on sectors which terminate away from base, the operator
should allow for the possibility that on subsequent sectors the examiner may have to act
as substitute for either Commander or first officer. The examiner should therefore be fully
qualified to operate at any crew station over which he acts in an examining capacity.
The flight crew member shall not act in any capacity as a pilot (except on Synthetic
Training Devices) unless he has carried out at least 3 take-offs and 3 landings as pilot
flying in an aeroplane or in an approved simulator of the type to be operated, in the
preceding 90 days.
Additionally the Commander must have carried out at least 1 take-off and 1 landing as pilot
flying in an aeroplane or in an approved simulator of the type to be operated, in the
preceding 35 days.
The 90 days period may be extended up to a maximum of 120 days by line flying under
the supervision of a Type Rating Instructor or Examiner. For periods beyond 120 days, the
recency renewal process shall be applied as defined in OM Part D.
Captains (Commanders) and co-pilots (first officers), after completion of their final line
check, are deemed to be inexperienced until they have achieved 100 hours following the
line check. Inexperienced pilots should not be rostered to operate together during this
period.
The flight crew member shall not act in any capacity as a pilot during actual LVO (LVTO,
Category II, Category III) unless he can produce valid Company LVO Certificate for
applicable aeroplane type.
Before commencing Category III operations, the following additional requirements are
applicable to Commanders, who are new to the aircraft type:
• 50 pilot-in-command hours or 20 sectors on the type, including line flying under
supervision; and
• 100 meters must be added to the applicable Category III RVR minima unless he
has previously qualified for Category III operations with an operator acceptable to
the Authority, until a total of additional 100 hours or 40 sectors after obtaining
Category III qualification, including line flying under supervision, have been
achieved on the type.
Note: Currently, JC Cambodia International Airlines is not approved for low visibility
operations.
JC Airlines shall ensure that, prior to being assigned as Commander or as pilot to whom
the flight may be delegated by the Commander, the pilot has obtained adequate
knowledge of the route to be flown and of the aerodromes, including destinations and
alternates, facilities and procedures to be used.
The period of validity of the route and aerodrome qualification is 12 calendar months in
addition to the remainder of the month of qualification, or the month of the latest operation.
Note: Local authorities may impose more restrictive validity periods.
When the validity of qualification has lapsed, re-qualification is obtained as for initial
qualification.
Depending upon the complexity of the route (as jointly assessed by the Chief Pilot, Flight
Safety Officer and Flight Operations Manager), the following methods of familiarization will
be used:
• For less complex routes: self-briefing with documentation, or programmed
instruction;
• For more complex routes: in addition to the self-instruction, in-flight familiarisation
under supervision or familiarisation in an approved simulator using a database
appropriate to the route concerned.
The Commander certifies adequate knowledge of the route by signing the OFP.
• Procedures applicable to flight paths over heavily populated areas and areas of high
traffic intensity;
• Arrival, departure, holding and instrument approach procedures and applicable
aerodrome operating minima.
The Commander certifies adequate knowledge of the aerodrome(s) by signing the OFP.
Additional qualification requirements may also be prescribed for flight crew members
performing special types of operation (e.g. Cruise Relief Captain, etc.). Processes to
obtain and maintain these additional qualification requirements are defined in OM Part D.
Flight crew members may not operate more than one type of aeroplane.
Flight crew members may operate a maximum three variants of the same aeroplane type
provided the operation on the three variants is not part of the same crew member’s FDP.
If the variants of the same aeroplane type are sufficiently similar and if the SSCA has
approved the use of credit(s), then a differences/familiarisation training program may be
used and checking/recency may be done on either type / variant. Refer to OM Part D for
training and checking requirements.
Variants of an aeroplane type are considered to be different types if they are not similar in
each of the following aspects:
• Emergency exit operation;
• Location and type of portable safety equipment;
• Type specific emergency procedures.
Cabin crew will be trained and checked in accordance with the OM Part D, Chapter 2
Cabin Crew. The qualification requirements for cabin crew are specified in the Cabin Crew
Manual (CCM) and OM Part D.
Cabin crew must complete the following training before undertaking line flying duties as an
assigned cabin crew:
• Initial training;
• Conversion or difference training;
• Familiarization training.
Where an additional cabin crew member is carried for familiarisation training purposes, in
the event of an emergency occurring, the trainer should assume the duties of the cabin
crew member under training, and the trainee should be considered as an able bodied
passenger.
When the aircraft type consists of a minimum crew of only two pilots, cabin crew must be
given training on the following, specific to the aircraft type: use of pilot's oxygen equipment;
fastening and unfastening pilot's seat harness and in the case of inertia reel harness,
locking and unlocking the inertia device; and using the pilot's sliding seat mechanism.
The operator shall ensure that each cabin crew member does not operate on more than 3
aircraft types. In this context, variants of aircraft type are considered to be different types if
they are not similar in all the following aspects:
• Emergency exit operation;
• Location and type of safety equipment;
• Emergency procedures.
Nevertheless, unless subject to the approval of the SSCA, cabin crew member should not
operate on more than one aircraft type as CIC.
Factors taken into consideration by the SSCA to permit cabin crew to operate up to 3
aircraft types would include but not limited to the following:
• Additional training for the CICs;
• A minimum experience level of cabin crew comprising the minimum crew
complement;
• Restriction of the number trainee cabin crew carried on all flights;
• Meeting a recency requirement as agreed with the SSCA on all aircraft types;
• No change fleet assignment within the same day except for flight disruptions;
• Arrangements made for cabin crew to review the characteristics of the aircraft type
to be operated on during pre-flight crew briefing.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 5 P: 5-9
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
The operator shall ensure that any cabin crew member who has not operated as a cabin
crew for more than 60 days but not exceeding 6 months completes an approved course
refresher training and pass a written test.
The operator shall ensure that any cabin crew member who has not operated as a cabin
crew for more than 6 months but not exceeding 12 months before undertaking duties shall:
• Complete refresher training on the type;
• Sit for and pass all initial and appropriate aircraft type tests; and
• Operate 2 sectors as supernumerary crew. The supernumerary cabin crew should
not be counted as part of the minimum crew complement.
An operator shall ensure that any cabin crew who has not operated an aircraft for more
than 12 months be required to complete the full initial and aircraft type rating training and
pass all appropriate tests. The crew must also operate at least 2 sectors as
supernumerary crew.
The cabin crew recency on an aircraft type will expire if the cabin crew does not operate
on an aircraft type for more than 90 days. The crew member will have to successfully
complete the aircraft type test before resuming flying duties on that aircraft type.
For cabin crew member operating on 3 aircraft types, the recency on an aircraft type will
expire if he does not operate on an aircraft type for more than 60 days. However, the
recency requirement can be extended to 90 days if the cabin crew member has within the
60 days operated on an aircraft type built by the same manufacturer where similar features
exist. The crew member will have to successfully complete the aircraft type test before
resuming flying duties on an aircraft type.
CICs will be required to undergo the CIC recurrent training programme in addition to
required training as set in this subsection.
The refresher training for each cabin crew member should include at least the following:
• Emergency procedures including pilot incapacitation;
• Evacuation procedures including crowd control techniques;
• Operation and actual opening of all normal and emergency exits for passenger
evacuation in an aircraft or approved training device;
• Demonstration of the operation of all other exits;
• Location and handling of emergency equipment, including oxygen systems, portable
oxygen, protective breathing equipment and the donning of life-jackets.
To qualify him for operation, each flight operations officer must have completed the
following requirements (as applicable):
• Initial Training,
• Recurrent/Refresher Training, and
• Familiarization Flights.
Appropriate checks shall be conducted for flight operations officers after completion of
required training by suitably qualified persons. Flight Operations Officer training and
checking are detailed in OM Part D.
A flight operations officer should not be assigned to duty unless within the preceding 12
months he has made at least one observation flight on the flight deck of an aeroplane over
the area of operation of the Company.
To maintain currency, a flight operations officer must dispatch at least one flight every 90
consecutive days. A flight operations officer who fails to do so shall be required dispatch at
least one flight under the supervision of another flight operations officer prior to resuming
duties.
A flight operations officer who has not dispatched at least one flight in the preceding 12
months shall be required to attend refresher training, pass a written assessment paper and
dispatch at least one flight under the supervision of another flight operations officer prior to
resuming duties.
Every flight operations officer shall undergo a recurrent training programme approved by
the SSCA and pass a proficiency test conducted by the Operator once every 24 months.
Reserved.
All other operations personnel will receive adequate training for the tasks to be performed
by them and must have demonstrated a sufficient level of knowledge appropriate to their
responsibilities prior to assignment to duty.
No person may serve as a crew member knowing that he has a physical deficiency or
mental condition that would constrain him to meet the requirements of his medical
certificate, to discharge his responsibilities for a safe standard or could endanger the
safety of the aircraft or its occupants.
Crew members shall not undertake flying duties while under the influence of alcohol,
narcotics, drugs or any medicine that has not been approved by for the use. Crew
members shall not perform duties on an aeroplane at any time when they are aware of any
decrease in their medical fitness which might render them unable to safely exercise their
duties.
All crew members who are clearly identified as engaging in any kind of problematic use of
alcohol or psychoactive substances will be removed immediately from safety-critical
functions and from all flying duties.
A crew member shall, without any delay, seek the advice of an aero-medical examiner
(doctor) when becoming aware of:
• Hospital or clinic admission for more than 12 hours, or
• Surgical operation, or
• The regular use of medication, or
• The need for regular use of correcting lenses.
Any crew member who becomes ill or incapacitated while on flight duty or during a
stopover period at an outstation must report to the Commander at the earliest opportunity.
The Commander should be aware that a sudden deterioration in health might be an
indication of the onset of a dangerous or infectious complaint. Carriage of a flight crew or
cabin crew member who is ill is not authorised without permission from the medical
examiner. Carriage of ill crew member could prejudice the Company's position in several
ways:
• International health regulations;
• Liability to the staff member concerned, should a serious illness ensue; and
• Invalidation of the insurance of the aircraft.
The Commander must ensure that a doctor is called at the earliest opportunity to examine
the crew member concerned. A certificate must be obtained stating whether the individual
is fit for duty, or alternatively for travel. The Commander is authorised to arrange any tests
necessary to ascertain the condition of the individual concerned. A written report must be
submitted by the Commander and the crew member as soon as practicable after return to
the main base.
The Commander has an overall responsibility for ensuring that all of the crew are fit for
duty, even if a report of sickness is not received. Where any doubt exists, the Commander
must ensure that the individual concerned is seen by a doctor and that the report from that
doctor is forwarded to the main base, if possible on the flight concerned and, filing this, at
the earliest opportunity. In the case of the Commander being incapacitated the normal
devolution of command applies (refer to OM Part A, Chapter 4).
If the crew member is unfit for duty, Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre has to be
informed immediately.
The Commander / handling agent must report all cases of illness on-board the aircraft
(excluding cases of airsickness and accidents) on landing at an airport. Cases of ill
passengers being disembarked prior departure must also be reported via proper report
form.
When a passenger on-board shows symptoms which might indicate the presence of a
major disease, the Commander (Pilot-In-Command) must ensure that the airport medical
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or health authority has been informed. It is the responsibility of airport medical or health
authority to decide whether isolation of the aircraft, crew and passengers is necessary. On
arrival of the aircraft, nobody shall be permitted to board the aircraft or disembark or
attempt to off load cargo or catering until authorised by the airport medical or health
authority. Each station, in conjunction with the airport medical or health authorities will
devise a plan that would provide, when necessary for:
• Transportation of suspected cases of infectious diseases by selected ambulance to
a designated hospital;
• Transfer of passengers and crew to a designated lounge or waiting area where they
can be isolated from other passengers until cleared by the airport medical or health
authorities;
• Decontamination of the aircraft, passenger baggage, cargo and mail and any
isolation lounges used by passengers or crew suspected of having infectious
diseases.
The prerequisite for a crew member to work for the Company is the ability to maintain
required medical certificate.
Where the Authorised Medical Examiner has reasonable doubt about the continuing
fitness of the holder of a medical certificate, he may require the holder to submit to further
examination, investigation or tests. The reports shall be forwarded to the Authorised
Medical Examiner.
Note: Each crew member is personally responsible for the timely renewal of his medical
certificate.
The effect of alcohol may result in a crew member being incapable or impaired in
discharging his duties. Any crew member not adhering to the alcohol intake policy will be
understood that he has committed gross misconduct which may result in dismissal without
prior notice or warning.
• 8 hours before reporting for a duty or start of standby duty, and only in moderation
during 24 hours preceding such duty.
There shall be no residual alcohol in the bloodstream when reporting for duty, so
considering it may take up to 2 hours for one unit to be removed from the body,
moderation shall be regarded as no more than five units of alcohol over the 16 hours
preceding the 8 hour ban (one unit is equivalent to 0.3 l of beer, a small glass of wine or a
small measure of spirits).
Local state restrictions may be more restrictive than those laid down by the Company and
in such cases the State restriction must be observed.
Company reserves the right to conduct random tests for alcohol consumption at any
station. If a test is to be conducted, the crew shall be notified; they shall then proceed to
the alcohol testing site and will remain ‘on duty’ until the test is complete. Qualified
personnel will carry out the test and the results shall be kept confidential. In the event of a
positive test result, the employee shall be subject to disciplinary action in accordance with
the company’s drug and alcohol abuse policy. Should a crew member refuse to take the
test, he will be assumed to be ‘positive’.
No alcohol or any drink, which might be identified as alcohol (e.g.: alcohol–free beer), is to
be consumed in a public place at any time by any Company employee while wearing full or
partial uniform. At the discretion of the Flight Operations Manager, exemption from this
rule may be given on special occasions and when attending special functions.
Alcoholic beverages must not be served or consumed on the flight deck.
Drugs of addiction and illegal drugs include a wide field ranging from narcotics (heroin,
morphine and codeine), tranquillisers, hallucinogens and so-called recreational drugs such
as marijuana, ‘crack’ and ‘ecstasy’. All have effects on the central nervous system and as
such they are not compatible with the control of an aircraft.
The consumption of narcotics is not allowed for crew members unless approved by the
Authorized Medical Examiner.
Crew members shall not undertake flying duties while under the influence of any drug that
may adversely affect performance. Crew member should know that many commonly used
drugs have side effects liable to impair judgement and interfere with performance. Ideally,
crew member should not fly on duty whilst taking any medication. When in doubt, pilots
should contact Authorized Medical Examiner to establish whether medication being taken
precludes flight duties or not.
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Random testing for psychoactive substances may be performed during recurrent medical
examinations. Affected crew members will be informed on short notice by an Authorised
Medical Examiner if such test is to be conducted. Qualified medical personnel will carry out
the test and the results shall be kept confidential. In the event of a positive test result, the
employee shall be subject to disciplinary action (up to an including termination of
employment) in accordance with the company’s drug and alcohol abuse policy. Should a
crew member refuse to take the test, he will be assumed to be ‘positive’.
The following are some of the types of medication in common use which may impair
reactions. There are many others and when in doubt a crew member shall consult the
Authorized Medical Examiner.
With a lot of analgesics and anti-inflammatory agents, there is risk of gastric irritation or
haemorrhage. Ideally a doctor’s advice should be sought before using them. Stronger
analgesics available of the counter may contain controlled narcotic substances such as
codeine.
6.1.6.2 Antibiotics
The underlying condition for which antibiotics are being taken may prevent a pilot from
flying. However, most antibiotics are compatible with flying. Obviously, where any
hypersensitivity is feared, the suspect antibiotic must not be used. A pilot should have
previous experience of the antibiotic prescribed, or, alternatively, have a trial of it for a
minimum of 24 hours on the ground before using it during flight duties.
6.1.6.3 Anti-diarrhoea
As a lot of medications used in treating symptoms of gastritis and enteritis (diarrhoea) may
cause sedation, blurring of vision, etc., great care must be exercised in their usage by
crew members. In most cases, grounding for a time may be necessary.
6.1.6.4 Antihistamines
All antihistamines can produce side effects such as sedation, fatigue and dryness of the
mouth. Quite commonly they are included in medication for treatment of the common cold,
hay fever and allergic rashes or reactions. Some nasal sprays and drops may also contain
antihistamines.
6.1.6.5 Anti-malarial
Most anti-malarial preparations used for prevention and taken in recommended dosage
are considered safe for flight duties. As with other medications, pilots should have previous
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Certain therapeutic agents are compatible with flying activity. They should be prescribed
only by a doctor experienced in aviation medicine, and sufficient time must be allowed to
assess suitability and freedom from side effects before resuming flight duties.
These preparations can affect the central nervous system and should not be taken during
flight duties.
Use of hypnotics and other sleep inducing medications is not permitted. They may dull the
senses, cause confusion and slow reactions. Crew also need to be wary that certain sleep
inducing agents marketed as “herbal” (e.g. Velerian) may be poorly regulated and often
contain pharmaceutical products such as benzodiazepines.
6.1.6.9 Steroids
Use of steroids (cortisone, etc.) with few exceptions precludes crew member from flight
duties.
All these types of drugs preclude crew member from flight duties because of the
underlying condition for which they are being used, as well as the possible side effects
resulting from them. Flight duties should not be resumed until treatment with these types of
drugs has been discontinued, and until the effects of the drugs have entirely worn off. This
can take several days in some instances.
Alcohol combined with most types of medication is a most undesirable and dangerous
combination.
6.1.7 Immunisation
Vaccination shall be taken at least 24 hours before commencing flying duties. If there is a
strong reaction to the vaccination a doctor shall be consulted who determine the crew
member fitness for flight duty. All crew members are responsible for updating their
immunisation requirement at given time. All data concerning the period of validity of a
vaccination are given in the respective document (Vaccination Card). All crew members
shall present their vaccination certificates to the SSCA when required to do so.
Above limitations do not apply to normal diving to shallow depths when not using
compressed air equipment.
Following a blood donation the volume of blood lost is made up in a matter of some hours
but the cellular content can take some weeks to return to the previous level. Crew member
should not volunteer as blood donors whilst actively flying. If, for any reason, they have
done so, they are to advise the Company immediately following each donation and shall
not undertake flying duties for at least 24 hours after they have given blood.
Cases of acute food poisoning in the air continue to occur sporadically and surveys of
incapacitation of flight crew in flight show that of these cases, gastro-intestinal disorders
pose by far the most common threat to flight safety.
No other illness can put a whole crew out of action so suddenly and so severely, thereby
immediately endangering a flight, as food poisoning.
Any food which has been kept in relatively high ambient temperatures for several hours
after preparation should be regarded with extreme suspicion. This applies particularly to
the cream or pastry, which is commonly part of a set aircraft meal. The re-heating process
usually used in aircraft for the main course of a meal rarely destroys food poisoning
organisms and the toxins they produce. These toxins are tasteless and cause no
unpleasant odours.
Since the most acute forms of food poisoning frequently come on suddenly 1-6 hours after
contaminated food is eaten, common sense rules should be observed as far as practicable
in respect of meals taken within six hours of a flight.
For any crew member, before and during flight it is essential to avoid eating easily
perishable foods as well as foods and drinks served cold. This is most important with milk
and cream products, mayonnaise, sauces, salads, meat pies and other meat products.
In order to eliminate, as far as possible, the risk of food poisoning, the Captain and First
Officer should not consume the same meals before or during a flight.
The character and severity of the symptoms depend on the nature and dose of the toxin
and the resistance of the patient. Onset may be sudden. Malaise, anorexia, nausea,
vomiting, abdominal cramps, intestinal gurgling, diarrhoea and varying degree of
prostration may be experienced. Bed rest with convenient access to bathroom, commode,
or bedpan is desirable. Severe cases should be hospitalised. Treatment is mostly
symptomatic and all cases should be seen by a doctor.
All crew members shall have regular meals while on duty. It is recommended that light
refreshments are taken between meals.
When meals or refreshments are served to the flight deck only one operating crew
member should eat at a time.
Food and drinks must be carefully handled and should not be placed on or around the
controls.
Bottled water must be stowed in a secure position. All bottles are to be removed at the end
of each flight.
Spillages over a vulnerable area must be recorded in the Aircraft Technical Log.
Flight duty should not be carried out on an empty stomach. During duty time crew
members should eat at regular intervals, one meal is recommended at least every 6 hours.
Every crew member is entitled to refreshments during duty time.
Safety and reliability of flight operations requires that every crew member has adequately
rested before operating. The rest time granted to the crew is meant to enable recovery
from the fatigue of the flight. All activities contradictory to that purpose shall be refused.
A crew member shall not commence a flight duty or continue a flight duty after an
intermediate landing if he is aware that he is too fatigued or will be too fatigued before the
next landing.
The basic responsibility in fatigue management rests with the individual crew member who
should report for duty in a well rested state and in an emotionally fit state to perform his
expected duty. This includes attention to such factors as sleep, personal fitness and
health, life style and activities prior to flight. Due allowance for any adverse effects of these
factors should be taken into account to ensure that fatigue which would be significantly
affect operating performance is not encountered. In the case of chronic fatigue crew
member must seek the medical advice.
Mental Symptoms: difficulty concentrating on the current work task, lapses in attention,
difficulty remembering what you are meant to be doing, failure to communicate important
information to a colleague, failure to anticipate events or actions, unintentionally doing the
wrong thing (errors of commission), unintentionally failing to do the right thing (errors of
omission);
Emotional Symptoms: more quiet or withdrawn than normal, lethargic or lacking in energy,
lacking in motivation to do the task well, irritable or bad tempered with colleagues, family
or friends.
Authorized Medical Examiner advice shall be sought prior to returning to flying duties
following any surgical operation.
The crew members should protect their eyes in bright sunshine by wearing sun-glasses. In
flight the lighting in the cockpit should be regulated during dark.
All flight crew members who are required by the Authorized Medical Examiner to wear
corrective lenses in order to satisfy visual requirements laid down for granting of licences,
are required to carry a spare pair of spectacles with them on all occasions whilst operating
their licence.
Spectacles, either corrective or anti-glare, when worn by flight crew during flight should be
of a type of frame that allows maximum peripheral vision. The examination for the
prescription of a spectacle correction should ideally be carried out by an examiner with
some understanding of the problems of vision in aviation.
Where the only correction necessary is for reading, pilots should never use full lens
spectacles while flying because the pilot's task requires frequent changes from near to
distant vision and the latter is blurred by reading glasses. Half moon spectacles or lower
segment lenses with a neutral upper segment should be used in these circumstances.
Where correction for both near and distant vision is required, bifocal lenses are essential
and pilots should discuss with their medical examiner the shape and size most suitable for
each segment. Where triple correction is necessary for reading the instrument panel range
and distant vision, then specialist advice is required.
Crew members undergoing refractive eye surgery shall report the fact in advance to an
Authorized Medical Examiner. The crew member shall be declared unfit for flying duties as
follows:
• For flight crew members, the minimum unfit period after refractive eye surgery shall
be 12 weeks;
• For cabin crew members, the minimum unfit period after refractive eye surgery shall
be 2 weeks.
6.1.14 Humidity
The relative humidity of cabin air is much lower in-flight than that to which humans are
accustomed. Coffee, especially black coffee being a diuretic (kidney stimulant) can
exacerbate the effects of reduced humidity. Symptoms resulting from low humidity are
dryness of the nose, mouth and throat and general tiredness. To avoid this it is advisable
to increase water intake.
It is a well-established fact that our bodies have a diurnal cycle or rhythm. This means that
our chemical, psychological and physiological activities are high during our normal waking
hours, and are low during our normal sleeping hours. They reach the lowest point at about
3 to 5 in the morning. When we fly across time zones, i.e. either East to West or West to
East, we may interrupt our diurnal cycle. To minimise the tiring effects of interruption to our
day-night biological cycle we should when away from home adhere as much as possible to
home time for sleeping, eating and bowel function (if on short layover), and take adequate
rest before flight.
6.1.16 Pregnancy
A crew member who becomes pregnant must immediately, upon becoming aware of such
pregnancy, notify that fact to her management (Chief Pilot or Chief Cabin Crew).
Certification of ‘unfitness to fly’ shall be in writing from the attending physician and shall
indicate the expected date of delivery. Upon receipt of such a notice, the crew member will
be removed from flying duties.
A crew member who has attained the age of 65 years shall not act as a flight crew
member on company aeroplanes.
When operating flight crew member is older than 60 years, any other member of the same
flight crew must be younger than 60 years. Chief Pilot is responsible for updating flight
crew pairing lists accordingly.
In certain cases a crew member may (and should) declare himself as unfit to perform
applicable crew duties and responsibilities. Some examples of such cases are:
• Acute excessive fatigue;
• Sudden nausea or other severe unfavourable physical symptoms;
• Anxiety attacks or other severe unfavourable psychological, mental and/or
emotional symptoms, etc.
After declaring himself unfit to fly, crew member shall explain his case to the applicable
superior manager (Chief Pilot, Chief Cabin Crew). Applicable superior manager shall keep
the record of unfit to fly events.
Where the superior manager has reasonable doubt about continuing fitness of a crew
member, he shall request a crew member to submit himself to unscheduled examination
by the Authorized Medical Examiner/medical practitioner acceptable to the SSCA. In such
a case a crew member shall provide written statement by Authorized Medical Examiner
that conditions causing temporary unfitness to fly are no longer applicable, before acting
as a crew member onboard of Company aeroplane.
Flight personnel are encouraged to use suitable earplugs in noisy environment (i.e. when
performing exterior walkaround).
Flight crew should use the sterilised wipes provided by the Company to clean their
headsets before wearing them. These wipes can be used to clean some commonly used
controls in the flight deck to reduce the risk of contamination. However, these wipes are
not suitable for cleaning navigation displays. Specialised screen cleaning wipes must be
used for this purpose.
The amount, or intensity, of cosmic radiation depends on altitude and latitude, as well as
the stage of the solar cycle. The Earth's atmosphere provides considerable protection from
cosmic radiation. At commercial aircraft altitudes the protective layer of the Earth's
atmosphere is much thinner than it is on the ground and the intensity of cosmic radiation is
approximately 100 times greater at these altitudes than it is on the ground. The Earth's
magnetic field can deflect some of the cosmic radiation away from the Earth. The shielding
ability of the magnetic field is most effective over the equator and least effective over the
poles. The intensity of cosmic radiation at aircraft altitudes around the equator is about
three times less than at the poles.
Cosmic radiation is measured in units called Sieverts (Sv). Unit 1 Sv is a rather large unit
and doses of cosmic radiation are so low that are usually quoted in microsieverts (μSv) -
millionth of a Sievert or milisieverts (mSv) - thousandth of a Sievert (1Sv = 1.000 mSv =
1.000.000 μSv).
In-flight exposure depends mainly on the route and altitude. The maximum acceptable
annual exposure to cosmic radiation, for crew, is considered to be 6 mSv (milli-Sievert).
The Company shall take the following measures for crew members who might be subject
to cosmic radiation exposure of more than 1 mSv per year:
• To assess the exposure of the crew concerned;
• To take into account the assessed exposure when organizing working schedules
with a view to reducing the doses of highly exposed crew;
• To inform the workers concerned of the health risks their work involves;
• To ensure that the working schedules for female crew members, once they have
notified that they are pregnant, keep the equivalent dose to the foetus as low as can
reasonably be achieved and in any case ensure that the dose does not exceed 1
mSv for the remainder of the pregnancy;
• To ensure that individual records are kept for those crew members who are liable to
high in-flight exposure - these exposures are to be notified to the individual on an
annual basis, and also upon leaving the Company.
Where in-flight exposure of crew members to cosmic radiation is likely to exceed 1 mSv
per year, the Company shall arrange working schedules, where practicable, to keep
exposure below 6 mSv per year. Suitable highest point of the cosmic radiation for flight
crew should be 4 mSv. The annual dose of radiation in any case must not exceed 6 mSv.
For flights below 15 km the estimates of annual dose may be carried out using an
appropriate computer program and/or internationally agreed information. Crew members
who are likely to be exposed to more than 6 mSv per year are considered highly exposed
and individual records of exposure to cosmic radiation should be kept for each crew
member concerned. Records for individuals exposed to more than 6 mSv per year must be
kept for a minimum of 30 years from the last annual exposure of more than 6 mSv (even if
the individual concerned is deceased) or until the individual is 75 years of age, whichever
is the longer period of time.
Assessment of exposure level can be made by using the values from the table below, or
other method acceptable to the SSCA – refer also to computer program developed at the
FAA’s Civil Aeromedical Institute (CARI) and calculations at
http://jag.cami.jccbi.gov/cariprofile.asp
Doses from cosmic radiation vary greatly with altitude and also with latitude and with the
phase of the solar cycle. Table below gives an estimate of the number of flying hours at
various altitudes in which a dose of 1 mSv would be accumulated for flights at 60°N and at
the equator. Cosmic radiation dose rates change reasonably slowly with time at altitudes
used by conventional jet aircraft (i.e. up to about 49000 ft/15 km. Note: JC Airlines does
not operate aircraft capable of flying at 49000 ft/15 km). Table can be used to identify
circumstances in which it is unlikely that an annual dosage level of 1 mSv would be
exceeded. If flights are limited to heights of less than 27000 ft, it is unlikely that annual
doses will exceed 1 mSv. No further controls are necessary for crew members whose
annual dose can be shown to be less than 1 mSv.
Note: This table is based on the CARI-6 computer program. The uncertainty on these
estimates is about ± 20%. A conservative conversion factor of 0.8 has been used
to convert ambient dose equivalent to effective dose.
Calculations have been made using FAA computer program on hypothetic worst case
scenario of exposure to cosmic radiation of JC Airlines crews based on following
assumptions:
• Crew members would only fly route VDPP – RKSI – VDPP (one of the longest
possible routes flown from Phnom Penh);
• Number of flights (176) is calculated on maximum yearly allowed block time (1000
hours) divided by average block time (05:40 hours block time per sector on yearly
basis) for this route;
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• Vertical profile of VDPP – RKSI sector assumes cruising level FL370, 25 minutes
climb to reach cruising level, 290 minutes cruise at FL 370 and 25 minutes descent;
• Vertical profile of RKSI – VDPP sector assumes cruising level FL360, 25 minutes
climb to reach cruising level, 290 minutes cruise at FL 360 and 25 minutes descent.
Route Average route dose (mSv) Number of flights Accumulated dose (mSv)
VDPP - RKSI 0.01330 88 1.1704
RKSI - VDPP 0.01259 88 1.1079
Total per year 2.2783
The results show maximum hypothetical exposure of 2.2783 mSv per calendar year, which
is well below the upper limit of 6 mSv per year. However because flight time limitations and
rest requirements have not been taken into account, and because cruising levels
realistically flown are usually lower, this value would be even lower. For comparison, flying
on route VDSR – RCTP and RCTP – VDSR (total block time 03:20 hours per flight), where
flight time at cruise level FL 370 (and FL 380) would be 02:30 hours per flight, to reach
maximum 1000 block hours per year, without using flight time limitations and rest
requirements, the maximum accumulated yearly dose would be 2,064 mSv, gained on 300
flights per year. Hence it has been proved that crews will not reach value of 6 mSv per
year while flying in JC Airlines and the values received are considered negligible for the
normal adult. However, as a matter of precaution, female crew members should disclose
any pregnancy to the Company in order to limit possible exposure to the foetus.
When ionising radiation passes through the body, and energy is transmitted to the tissues,
which affects atoms within individual cells and result in a variety of health effects such as
development of cancer, genetic risk and risk to the health of the foetus (unborn child).
• Development of cancer is that a cell may be altered as a result of being irradiated
and subsequently become cancerous. The likelihood of this happening will depend
on the dose received. It has been calculated that an accumulated dose of 5 mSv
per year for 20 years increases the risk of developing cancer by 0.4%. Compared
with all the other risks encountered during working life, this is very low.
• Genetic risk is that risk which may be present because one or both parents were
exposed to radiation before the child was conceived, the effects of which may be
passed onto future generations.
• With regard to pregnancy, risk to the health of the foetus may occur as a result of
exposure to radiation between conception and birth. The risk of harm depends on
the stage of development at the time of exposure as well as the amount of radiation.
Therefore, radiation exposure should be kept to a level as low as reasonably
achievable.
In the tropical regions two types of climate can be expected; these are:
• Dry desert climate with very high day temperatures and very cold nights;
• Hot, humid climate with high temperatures and humidity around 90% during the day
and at night.
The hot and humid conditions can be extremely tiring and tend to reduce working intensity.
If one perspires a lot, the intake of liquid and salt should be increased. It is important to
protect oneself from ultraviolet radiation of the sun. This radiation can cause sunburn or
snow blindness.
To protect oneself against ultraviolet radiation, it is best to limit sunbathing to short periods
and to use sun block, lotions and reliable sunglasses. Intake of alcohol should be
restricted as it may add to dehydration. Taking rest during midday is recommended.
6.3.2 Hygiene
Tropical diseases are not confined entirely to the tropics but can occur almost anywhere.
However their incidence and frequency are influenced by local factors. Tropical diseases
are mainly transmitted through insect stings or bites, through healthy skin by other
parasites, through food and drink, from the ground or person to person.
Complications:
• Inflammation of the liver.
• Liver abscesses.
• Inflammation of the gall bladder and bile ducts.
Treatment: Consists of rest, diet and a course of therapy, which varies with the type of
case.
6.3.4.2 Malaria
Transmission: Infection takes place through the bite of an infected anopheles mosquito
and transmission of the parasite into the human blood stream.
Prophylaxis: Preventive measures include use of insect repellent sprays to protect skin,
screens on doors and windows, mosquito netting in bedrooms, sufficient clothing to cover
as much as the skin surface as possible against mosquito bites (this is important after
sundown). It is not possible to produce permanent immunity either chemically or by the
use of vaccines. Therefore, chemical prophylactic drugs are only effective as long as they
are taken regularly.
Definition: They are ingestion diseases characterised by high fever and intestinal
symptoms.
Geographical Incidence: The disease is likely to occur wherever the water supply is
impure. Generally speaking the less satisfactory the sanitation, more prevalent is enteric
fever. However, with use of adequate drugs, cases of death are now rare.
Symptoms: Vague symptoms of illness tending to increase in severity throughout the first
week. Lassitude, frontal headache, general aches and pains, disturbed sleep, anorexia
and thirst, abdominal discomfort, temperature rising to 40°C, diarrhoea with or without
bleeding.
Prophylaxis: Vaccination. The vaccination is not an international requirement for entry into
any country. Vaccination is strongly recommended when travelling to regions of poor
general hygiene.
6.3.4.4 Cholera
Geographical distribution: Outbreaks of the disease usually are explosive and limited.
Cholera is endemic in many areas of Asia.
Transmission: Cholera is spread by the ingestion of water and foods contaminated by the
excrement of patients.
Symptoms: Sudden onset. Initial symptoms are nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea, with
variable degrees of fever and abdominal pain. If diarrhoea is severe the resultant
dehydration may lead to intense thirst, muscle cramps and weakness.
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Prognosis: In many cases the outlook depends largely on early and adequate therapy.
Prophylaxis: Strict measures of hygiene (food and drink) should be observed. In many
countries cholera has been controlled by the purification of water supply and proper
disposal of human excreta.
6.3.4.5 Dysentery
Definition: An acute infection of the bowel, characterised by frequent passage of blood and
mucus diarrhoea accompanied by abdominal cramps, malaise and fever.
Symptoms: Depend on severity. May have painful colicky diarrhoea. Raised temperature
and vomiting may occur. The disease usually shows great individual variation.
Prophylaxis: There is no effective inoculation. Strict measures of hygiene (food and drink)
should be observed.
Treatment: There are many effective medicines available for disinfection of the
gastrointestinal tract. It is advised to consult a doctor.
Definition: An acute infectious virus disease occurring in tropical and sub-tropical zones.
Geographical Distribution: Particularly in tropical Africa and South and Central America.
Unknown in Asia.
Causative Organism: The virus that causes the disease is transmitted by the bite of a
female mosquito, which previously has become infected through feeding on the blood of a
patient during the early stages of an attack.
Symptoms: Characterised by sudden onset, fever with relatively slow pulse, the face is
flushed, eyes infected, gums congested, tongue red and pointed. Vomiting and
constipation are common. Jaundice appears after the third day.
Prophylaxis: Effective 10 days after vaccination and the immunity last for about 10 years.
6.3.4.7 Hepatitis A
Incidence: Hepatitis A is a common infection among travellers. The risk of contracting this
viral infection is high wherever the water supply is impure and sanitation is not satisfactory
(mainly outside western and northern Europe, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).
Transmission: Hepatitis A may be acquired from food or water which has been
contaminated by faeces or from direct contact with infected individuals. Person-to-person
transmission is particularly common among children and between sexual partners.
Symptoms: Hepatitis A, formerly called infectious hepatitis, is rarely fatal, although most
infected adults become quite ill, and many are unable to work for several weeks or
months. Typical symptoms include malaise, fever, loss of appetite, gastrointestinal
problems and jaundice and will appear 15 to 55 days after infection.
6.3.4.8 Hepatitis B
Incidence / Prevalence: This infection is worldwide. It is prevalent in men who have sex
with men and intravenous drug users, but the greatest number of cases result from
heterosexual transmission. Persons with chronic Hepatitis B are at substantial risk of
cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma particularly when acquired early in life (up to 25 -
40%).
Symptoms: About 30% of person has no signs or symptoms. Signs or symptoms include
jaundice, fatigue, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting and joint pain.
Prophylaxis / Prevention: Hepatitis B vaccine is the best protection. Do not share personal
care items that might have blood on them (razors, toothbrushes … etc.). Practice safe sex.
Consider the risk if you are getting a tattoo or body piercing. Do not donate blood, organs
or tissue if you are Hepatitis B positive.
In certain countries disinsection of the aeroplane cabin is required and must be carried out
– refer to OM Part C, Airport Briefings. Aircraft disinsection is the use of insecticide on
international flights and in other closed spaces for insect and disease control. The
standard reference aerosol used for the disinsection does not present a health hazard to
humans if inhaled for short period. Protective clothing for the hands and face is not
necessary. Spraying must not be carried out while meals are being served. The best time
for disinsection is 30 minutes before landing, provided this does not conflict with the
requirements laid out of the respective country. The can(s) should be sprayed near the
floor under the seats and/or into the overhead bins.
When a passenger or crew becomes acutely ill and apprehension exists about the
passenger’s ability to survive the flight, diversion to the nearest appropriate facility must be
considered. The Commander should bear in mind that his cabin crew has all been suitably
trained in first-aid, and accept their advice accordingly. In an attempt to limit the number of
diversions to those that are essential, an effort should be made to obtain some medical
opinion on the necessity to divert.
All cabin crew members are required to know the location and use of contents of all first
aid kits and equipment onboard, including any drugs carried. Cabin crew are not expected
or required to act beyond the limits of trained competence. When voluntary professional
assistance is sought from passengers, all reasonable measures must be taken to identify
the professional status of the volunteer. In all inflight medical incidents seek for a doctor /
nurse or similarly qualified person via public address system and advise them of the
Emergency Medical Kit and its contents. Having acquired professional assistance the
overall responsibility for managing the situation remains with the aircraft crew. With or
without professional advice one of these decisions will be required:
1) The situation is satisfactorily resolved.
2) The situation is containable with the facilities available but further professional
assistance will be required after the scheduled landing.
3) Further professional assistance is urgently required and an unscheduled landing is
necessary.
It is the cabin crew’s responsibility to keep the Commander informed at all times. His
decision will rest on the information available, as well as other operational factors and the
ultimate authority and responsibility is his.
The items listed below are only for reference; they are not the only conditions that may
require an unscheduled landing:
• Stoppage of breathing and pulse;
• Unconsciousness;
• Severe shock;
• Uncontrollable bleeding;
• Internal bleeding;
• Heart attack;
• Prolonged or recurrent epileptic fits;
• Complications with emergency childbirth.
Cabin crew shall follow instructions as set out in Cabin Crew Manual (CCM).
First Actions
Upon first notification of the medical situation, the flight crew shall:
• Note the time and the information passed from the cabin crew on the OFP;
• Assess the current situation against the guidelines below and if the warranted, plan
a diversion to a suitable airport;
• Direct the CIC to assign a cabin crew member to act as a liaison between the
involved cabin crew and the flight crew.
Continuing Actions
Landing Preparations
• Determine, with ATC, parking areas and any other special ground handling
requirements.
Inform passengers about the situation and ask not to interfere with the disposition of the
medical case.
From time to time the situation arises whereby the crew attention is drawn to the fact that
one of the passengers has an infectious disease. On many occasions this passenger is a
small child covered in spots that may well be any of the common childhood illnesses such
as measles, chicken pox or rubella.
When making the decision as to whether or not one should carry this passenger the
following points should be taken into consideration:
• With many of the infectious illnesses, by the time the rash has appeared the actual
infective period may be over. This means of course that the people who are
suffering from an infectious illness such as chicken pox are in fact at their most
infectious stage when they have no visible signs of the illness and are mixing with
the general population.
• Many simple viral infections, which are not particularly infectious, cause spots and
rashes that in many ways are similar to the commonly known infectious illnesses. It
is often medically impossible to determine whether the rash is in fact that from a
common infectious illness or that from a simple viral infection.
• Infectious diseases are spread by droplet infection and the infected individual has to
actually cough or sneeze into the face of a non immune individual for there to be
any possibility of infection. If a child or individual is thought to be infectious,
adequate precautions can be taken by sitting the child between parents, preferably
at a bulkhead seat, and telling the parents not to let the child move around the
aircraft unnecessarily. If the infectious individual is boarded first, and remains in
their seat, it makes it virtually impossible for cross transmission of infection to occur.
• Common infectious diseases such as mentioned above are endemic in the
population and consequently most of the population have immunity to this illness
and will not be able to transfer the illness through themselves to a third party.
• The infectious illnesses which Health Authorities are most likely to be interested in
are those which relate to gastro enteritis type illnesses (i.e. generally associated
with vomiting and diarrhoea and hepatitis), and these are rarely associated with a
skin rash. These people should be treated as infectious in the same manner as
those above, and preferably sat beside friends or relatives and requested not to
move around the aircraft unless absolutely necessary.
If cabin crew aboard aircraft suspect that a passenger is running a temperature or may
have an infectious illness or be suffering from food poisoning, they must inform the
Commander. He will relay this information to Handling Agents or ATC (as appropriate),
giving details of the case and asking them to alert the Airport Health Control Officials.
This should be done as soon as possible on Handling or ATC R/T frequency or by relay, in
order to give Health Authorities maximum warning period so that arrangements can be
made for qualified personnel to meet the aircraft as it arrives on stand. International
aviation facilitates the transmission and spread of infectious disease and increasing
incidence of confirmed cases arriving from overseas makes this action particularly
important.
As soon as the Commander becomes aware that he has a passenger on board, suffering
from a suspected communicable disease, the Commander should report this to the air
traffic services unit with which he is currently communicating, with a request that a
message be forwarded to the destination aerodrome control tower. The message should
include the aircraft’s call-sign, departure aerodrome, destination aerodrome, estimated
time of arrival, number of persons affected, number of persons on board, nature of the
public health risk, if known and the words “communicable disease”. For example:
“(ATS unit), (Call sign) REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BE FORWARDED
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO (destination aerodrome) TOWER. ADVISE READY TO
COPY”
“(Call sign), ADVISE (departure aerodrome) TOWER THAT (call-sign) DEPARTURE
AERODROME (departure aerodrome) ESTIMATING (destination aerodrome) AT (time)
PERSONS ON BOARD (number) REPORTING (number) CASE(S) OF COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE ON BOARD”.
To help with the transmission of the requested information, the following form, available on
the flight deck, should be used:
In order to minimize possibility to enter area with known laser activity and/or to avoid
exposure to laser emissions flight crew should:
• Consult NOTAMs for location and operating times of laser activities and alternate
routes should be considered;
• Consult aeronautical sources for permanent laser activities (theme parks, research
facilities).
• All exterior lights (Commander's discretion) should be temporarily turned OFF and
kept OFF until established on short final;
• Autopilot should be engaged;
• Pilot flying should stay on instruments to minimize the effects of a possible
illumination;
• Dome lights should be turned ON;
• Sun shades on side windows shall be deployed.
6.5.4 In-flight Procedures during and after Laser Beam Illumination of the
Cockpit
If a pilot is exposed to a bright light suspected to be a laser beam, the following steps are
recommended to reduce the risk unless the specific action would compromise flight safety:
• Look away from the light source;
• Shield eyes from the light source;
• Transfer control of the aircraft to another pilot;
• Declare visual condition to other pilot;
• Switch over to instrument flight;
• Engage autopilot immediately;
• If possible manoeuvre or position the aircraft such that the laser beam no longer
illuminates the flight deck;
A basic ocular examination should be performed on any person suspected of having been
directly exposed to a laser beam to verify that no permanent damage has occurred and to
confirm normal ocular health. Commander of the flight that was exposed to Laser Beam
Illumination should file Journey Log Report in addition to Air Safety Report (ASR) to enable
crew identification and their scheduling to medical examination. If laser beam did not
directly affect some of flight crew members, these crew members may refuse medical
examination using written statement in ASR.
Reserved.
Intentionally Blank
7.1 GENERAL
JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines) has established flight and duty time
limitations and a rest scheme for all crew members in accordance with the provisions of
this Chapter and any additional provisions that are applied by the SSCA for the purpose of
maintaining safety.
The prime objective of JC Airlines’ scheme of flight time limitations is to ensure that crew
members are adequately rested at the beginning of each flight duty period. Therefore inter-
related planning constraints on individual duty and rest periods, the length of cycles of duty
and the associated periods of time-off, and cumulative duty hours within specific periods
are taken into account. Flights are planned to be completed within the allowable flight duty
period taking into account the time necessary for pre-flight duties, the flight and turn-
around times.
Duty rosters will be prepared and published sufficiently in advance by the Crew Planning
to provide the opportunity for crew members to plan adequate rest.
Flight duty periods as planned in duty rosters shall enable crew members to remain
sufficiently free from fatigue so they can operate to a satisfactory level of safety under all
circumstances.
Efforts are made to prepare crew monthly roster equally. However in case of any change
on the flight schedule roster due to operational requirements, Crew Planning will
endeavour to even-up each crew’s roster according to their availability and general roster
feasibility.
Duties must be scheduled within the limits of the flight time, flight duty period, duty period
and rest period limitations scheme. To allow for unforeseeable delays the aircraft
Commander may, within prescribed conditions, use his discretion to exceed the limits on
the day. Nevertheless, flight schedules must be realistic and the planning of duties must
be designed to avoid, as far as possible, overruns of flight duty limits.
It is recognized that the nature of the Company business is such that the operational crew
roster may be subject to alteration which could require the change of a crew member's
assigned duties. When possible an early notification of any material change will be given,
except that such notification may be reduced to avoid disturbance to the crew member's
sleep.
General considerations in the sensible planning of duties should take the following needs
into account:
• The need to construct consecutive work patterns which will avoid as far as possible
such undesirable rostering practices as alternating day/night duties and the
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 7 P: 7-2
FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
Flight dispatcher on duty shall, upon the return of the filled/written crew Journey Log to the
Operations Control Centre, check the crew flight duty and duty periods, ensuring that
allowed flight duty limitations have not been exceeded and that the crews’ will have
enough rest before their next planned activities. Flight time totals from written crew
Journey Logs shall be expeditiously transmitted to the Crew Planning office, so that weekly
and monthly totals, where required, may be promptly updated.
When flying any aircraft outside the Company, the flight crew member will submit a record
of duty and flight times acquired whilst flying on these aircraft prior each flight duty in the
Company. These records will be inserted in the flight crew member’s duty and flight period
database and will be checked by the Crew Planning to avoid Flight Time Limitation
exceedances.
Whenever flying aircraft outside the Company, each flight crew member is responsible to
ensure that his actions will not have impact on the flight crew’s ability to perform his duties
in the Company.
7.2 RESPONSIBILITIES
7.2.1 Responsibility of the Company
JC Airlines has established flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period
limitations that are in compliance with the State’s fatigue management regulations.
Within the Flight Operations Department, the JC Airlines has established the Crew
Planning division, which mission is to provide all Company’s flights with duly qualified
crews, in respect of all agreements and law regulating flight operations in general, and
flight crews in particular.
The application, monitoring and control of the Company's approved scheme of flight time
limitations and rest periods is carried out by the Crew Planning. It is the responsibility of
this division, controlled by the Flight Operations Manager, to issue instructions and make
decisions on questions of flight duty and rest periods for members of the Flight Operations
Department, and to ensure the scheme is correctly applied, monitored and controlled.
The Crew Planning will search for the most economical solutions, while optimising crew
satisfaction.
The Crew Planning is to ensure that the required workforce is planned to be in place at all
times to perform the planned production (all in coordination with the Chief Pilot and Chief
Cabin Crew). The Crew Planning assures that all duties are covered in pre-operations; so
production will be pre-planned in order to allow an economical operation.
• Ensuring that each departing flight meets the complement of trained crew in
accordance with Operations Manual as well as the Company requirements;
• Allocation of annual leave to all crew members as per the human resources policy
and taking into consideration the crew required for crew planning;
• Liaising with the relevant departments to keep them informed regarding the
problems involved with the roster of crew to new destination and the effects due to
changes in flight schedules;
• Providing the Finance and Human Resource departments with actual information for
payment of crew allowances and statistics of crew rosters respectively;
• Pre-assignment of all flight-duties and all ground duties;
• Control of qualifications - ensuring the timely receipt of all flight and cabin crew
training records. Monitoring of expiries and ensuring that trained crew with valid
licenses and training requirements are utilized for duties;
• Coordination of all ground duties;
• Coordination with Operations Control Centre (OCC) for daily management.
The Company will publish rosters in advance so that operating crew can plan adequate
preflight rest. Crew will normally be given at least 7 days’ notice of their roster, which
usually covers a 15 day period.
The Company shall allocate duty patterns which avoid such undesirable practices as
alternating day/night duties or the positioning of crew members so that a serious disruption
of established sleep/work pattern occurs.
Planned rest periods shall provide sufficient time to enable the crew member to overcome
the effects of the previous duties and to be well rested by the start of the following flight
duty period.
Responsibility for the proper control of flight and duty time may not rest solely with the
Company. Crew members have the responsibility to make optimum use of the
opportunities and facilities for rest provided. They are also responsible for planning and
using their rest periods properly in order to minimise the risk of fatigue.
Crew members shall not act as operating crew if they know, or suspect, that their physical
or mental condition renders them unfit to operate. Furthermore, they must not fly if they
know that they are, or are likely to be, in breach of flight time limitations.
In case a crew member is not able to report for duty, he should inform Crew Planning
and/or Flight Dispatch (Operations Control Centre) as soon as possible.
7.3 DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions shall apply:
Adequate Facility: Facilities, other than on an aircraft, which are adequate for crew
members to take a break and relax. The adequate facility shall provide at least following:
• Comfortable seats for all crew members;
• Separation from the public and other working stations;
• Acceptable ambient temperature and ventilation;
• Isolation from heavy noise.
Augmented Crew: A crew which comprises more than the minimum number required for
the operation of the aeroplane and in which each crew member can leave his post and be
replaced by another appropriately qualified crew member.
Augmented Flight (Cockpit) Crew: A normal operating crew augmented by one or more
pilots and, where the crew includes a flight engineer, one flight engineer.
Available Day: This is not to be considered as a duty day but available for duty. Any
suitable duties may be assigned in place of the available day provided crew is notified well
beforehand, latest by 16:00 LT the day before. If the crew member is informed of his duty
later than 16:00 LT on the previous day, he may deny the duty.
Block Time: The time between an aircraft first moving from its parking place for the
purpose of taking off until it comes to rest on the designated parking position and all
engines or propellers are stopped.
Break: A period free of all duties, which counts as duty, being less than a rest period. It is
taken into account in case of split duty.
Cabin Crew: A person employed to facilitate the safety of passengers, whose duties are
detailed by the Company or the aircraft Commander. Such persons will not act as a
member of the flight crew.
Deadheading: Positioning.
Day Off: A single day off shall be a period of 30 hours free of all duty starting either at
1800 hours or at midnight local time. Consecutive days off shall be consecutive 24 hour
periods immediately following a single day off. A rest period may be included as part of a
day off.
Duty: Any task that flight or cabin crew members are required by the operator to perform,
including, for example, flight duty, administrative work, training, positioning and standby,
when it is likely to induce fatigue.
Duty Period (DP): All time spent on duty can induce fatigue in flight crew members and
cabin crew members, and should therefore be taken into account when arranging rest
period which starts when flight or cabin crew members are required by an operator to
report for or to commence a duty and ends when that person is released from all duties. If
the end of duty period (DP) correlates with the end of a flight duty period (FDP), a DP =
FDP + 30 minutes.
Flight Crew: Those members of the crew of an aircraft who act as pilots.
Flight Duty Period (FDP): A period which commences when a crew member is required
to report for duty that includes a flight or a series of flights and which finishes when the
aircraft finally comes to rest at the end of the last flight on which he is a crew member.
Post flight duty (time from arrival block time to end of duty) is counted into duty period, but
is not part of the flight duty period.
Flight Time (Aeroplanes): The total time from the moment an aeroplane first moves for
the purpose of taking-off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight.
Ground Duty: Any duty other than flight duty assigned or required by the Company, like:
• Simulator training;
• Checks in the simulator;
• Ground instruction/refresher/course;
• Office;
• Meeting;
• Service trip;
• Positioning;
• Waiting time between assigned duties;
• Medical examinations for license renewal.
Home Base: The location nominated by the Company to the crew member from where the
crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or a series of duty periods and
where, under normal conditions, the operator is not responsible for the accommodation of
the crew member concerned.
Local Night: A period of 8 hours falling between 22:00 and 08:00 local time.
Notification Time: The period of time that an operator allows between the time a crew
member on standby or who is holding himself available, receives a call requiring him to
report for duty and the time he reports for that duty.
Operating Crew Member: A crew member who carries out his duties in an aeroplane
during a flight.
Positioning: The transferring of a non-operating crew member from place to place at the
behest of the operator.
Reporting Time: The time at which a crew member is required by the Operator to report
for duty.
Rest Period: An uninterrupted and defined period of time during which a crew member is
free from all duties and airport standby. During a rest period the crew member has the
unrestricted possibility of bed rest at home, or suitable accommodation.
Split Duty: A flight duty period, which consists of two duties, separated by a break.
Standby: A defined period of time during which a crew member is required by the operator
to be available to receive an assignment for a specific duty without an intervening rest
period.
Travelling time: Travelling time is defined as time from home to a designated reporting
place and vice versa or time for local transfer from a place of rest to the commencement of
duty and vice versa.
The Company shall ensure that the total duty periods to which a flight crew member is
assigned do not exceed:
• 190 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days, spread as evenly as practicable
throughout this period; and
• 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days.
These limits include office days, simulator training/checking, medical examinations for the
purpose of license renewal and all other flight and ground duties which are credited
according to actual check-in and check-out times.
When a flight crew member is foreseen for a simulator duty, then the duration of the
simulator plus the time for the briefing and debriefing must be considered for the purpose
of calculating the duty period. For ground courses, the duration of the course must be
considered for the purpose of calculating duty period.
The Company shall ensure that the total block times of the flights on which an individual
flight crew member is assigned as an operating crew member does not exceed:
• 1000 block hours in any consecutive 12 complete calendar months;
• 100 block hours in any 28 consecutive days.
For a limited period of time, under prior specific approval by the SSCA, higher limit may be
accepted for 28 consecutive day’s period. However limitation of 1000 block hours in any
consecutive 12 complete calendar months remains valid.
Table A shall apply when the flight duty period (FDP) starts at a place where the crew
member is acclimatised to local time, and Table B shall apply at other times. To be
considered acclimatised for the purposes of this document, a crew member must be
allowed 3 consecutive local nights free of duty within a local time zone band which is two
hours wide. He will thereafter be considered to remain acclimatised to that same time zone
band until he ends a duty period at a place where local time is outside of it.
Sector
Local time
of start 8 or
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
more
06.00 -
13:00 12:15 11:30 10:45 10:00 09:15 09:00 09:00
07.59
08.00 -
14:00 13:15 12:30 11:45 11:00 10:15 09:30 09:00
14.59
15.00 -
13:00 12:15 11:30 10:45 10:00 09:15 09:00 09:00
21.59
22.00 -
11:00 10:15 09:30 09:00 09:00 09:00 09:00 09:00
05.59
Sector
Length of preceding
rest (hours) 7 or
1 2 3 4 5 6
more
Up to 18 or over 30 13:00 12:15 11:30 10:45 10:00 09:15 09:00
Between 18 and 30 12:00 11:15 10:30 09:45 09:00 09:00 09:00
For the flight duty period calculation the following countries are considered to be within the
same local time zone (up to and including two hours of difference between the local times):
When the flight crew consists only of two pilots, the FDP calculated from Table A or B will
be adjusted by counting long sector as more than one sector in the following manner:
Planned schedules must allow for flights to be completed within the maximum permitted
daily flight duty period. Schedule or crewing arrangements shall be changed where the
actual operation exceeds the maximum FDP on more than 33 % of the flights during a
scheduled seasonal period.
All time spent on positioning is counted as duty, but it shall not count as a sector when
assessing the maximum permissible FDP.
Positioning, any form of ground duty and standby at an airport which immediately
precedes a flight duty shall be included in the FDP but shall not count as a sector.
Positioning and ground duties immediately following a flight duty shall not be part of the
FDP, but shall be counted as duty. The ensuing rest period shall not start until all duty is
finished, and its length shall be based on the total length of FDP plus duty. A positioning
sector immediately following operating sector does not count as a sector from a FDP
perspective but will be taken into account for the calculation of minimum rest.
Positioning which neither immediately precedes nor follows a FDP shall count as half for
the purposes of cumulative duty limits.
When a rostered FDP consists of two or more sectors separated by an off-duty period of
less than the minimum rest period, the limits in Tables A and B from subsection 7.4.3 may
be increased according to the time between scheduled arrival and scheduled departure,
known as the transit period, but not beyond 16 hours, as follows:
When the transit period is not more than 6 hours it will be sufficient if a quiet and
comfortable place is available, not open to the public, but if the transit period is more than
6 hours, a bed must be provided.
When an augmented crew is used to extend the maximum rostered FDP the additional
crew member shall hold qualifications which meet the requirements of the operational duty
he will perform. The qualifications must be specified by the operator and mutually agreed
with the SSCA.
When crew composition meets augmented crew definition, the maximum flight duty period
defined in subsection 7.4.3 may be extended by up to 4 hours if the crew is augmented by
one pilot and there are suitable rest facilities available for one pilot. If there are no suitable
rest facilities available, normal limits of Table A or Table B in subsection 7.4.3, without
applying adjustments for long sector, are valid.
Normal reporting time prior to flight duty is 60 min before scheduled departure time.
Normal reporting time prior to base training flights is 90 min before scheduled departure
time.
Normal reporting time prior to positioning by air on JC Airlines aircraft is 60 min before
scheduled departure time, on other carriers is 90 min before scheduled departure time.
The reporting time prior to positioning by ground transportation – refer to individual duty
plan.
Normal reporting time for simulator duties is 60 min before the starting time of the
simulator.
Normal reporting time for ground courses is the starting time of the ground course.
When crew members are informed of a delay before leaving their place of rest, the FDP
shall start at the new reporting time, or 4 hours after the original reporting time, whichever
is the earlier. The maximum FDP shall be based on the original reporting time. This does
not apply if crew members are given 10 hours or more notice of a new reporting time.
The minimum rest period which must be scheduled prior to a flight duty period shall be:
a) Not less than 10 hours if it includes a local night and not less than 11 hours if it does
not include a local night; and
b) At least as long as the preceding duty rounded up to the next whole hour; and
c) If the preceding duty exceeded 16 hours, not less than 16 hours plus two hours for
every hour or part of an hour that the previous duty exceeded 16 hours.
Suitable accommodation shall be provided by the Company for the crew members when
rest periods are required away from the home base.
When on minimum rest away from home base crew members shall be allowed minimum of
8 hours sleep opportunity taking due account of travelling and other physiological needs.
The Company will ensure that effects on crew members of time zone differences will be
compensated by additional rest, as regulated by the SSCA.
A crew member shall achieve days free of all duties and standby as follows:
Crew members shall be granted an average of 2 days off per week, not counting periods
of leave. A minimum of 6 days off in any consecutive 4 weeks is permissible, provided the
shortfall is made good in the preceding or following 4 weeks.
Whenever possible, days off should be allocated in crew member’s home base.
A Commander on behalf of the crew or an individual on his own behalf may at his
discretion reduce the rest period below the minima, stated in subsection 7.5.1, provided:
a) The safety of the flight or flights will not be prejudiced, and
b) The rest actually taken allows a minimum of 10 hours at the accommodation where
rest is taken.
7.6 STANDBY
7.6.1 General
Standby is a period during which the crew member shall be available and ready to report
for duty upon notification – in case of home standby, within the notification time. Crew
members shall be immediately contactable during the standby period and shall report for
duty as soon as possible when called out.
The Company interests dictate that the report for duty should be such that delay to flight
departure is avoided or minimised but in any case the crew member must report for duty
within 60 minutes. The use of answer-phone or other recording equipment is not an
acceptable means of contact for standby duty. The crew member must be available
personally to answer the telephone.
The time of start, end and nature of the standby duty shall be defined and notified to crew
members. The time a standby duty starts determines the allowable FDP, except that when
the actual FDP starts in a more limiting time band then that FDP limit will apply.
Taking into account the need for careful control of these instances implied underneath,
during the actual flight operation, which starts at the reporting time, the limits on flight duty,
duty and rest periods prescribed in this Chapter 7 may be modified in the event of
unforeseen circumstances. Unforeseen circumstances are circumstances which are not
known by the Commander or by the involved crew member(s) at the time of check-in. Any
such modifications must be acceptable to the Commander after consultation with all other
crew members.
An aircraft Commander after taking note of the circumstances of other members of the
crew may at his discretion extend an FDP beyond the limits permitted by subsection 7.4.3
and subsection 7.4.8 provided that the:
• Safety of the flight will not be prejudiced; and
• Extended FDP shall not exceed by more than 3 hours the maximum FDP permitted
by subsection 7.4.3 and subsection 7.4.8, except in an emergency.
If on the final sector within a FDP unforeseen circumstances occur after take-off that will
result in the permitted increase being exceeded, the flight may continue to the planned
destination or alternate.
The Commander shall, in case of special circumstances, which could lead to severe
fatigue, and after consultation with the crew members affected, reduce the actual flight
duty time and/or increase the rest time in order to eliminate any detrimental effect on flight
safety.
The requirements, as specified for flight crew, are applicable to all cabin crew employed as
crew members.
The limitations which shall be applied to cabin crew are those applicable to flight crew
members contained in this chapter, but with the following differences:
a) A flight duty period (FDP) will be 1 hour longer than that permitted for flight crew.
The FDP for cabin crew will be based on the time at which the flight crew report for
their flying duty period, but that FDP will start at the report time of the cabin crew. In
JC Airlines, cabin crew reporting time for flying duty period is the same as for flight
crew.
b) For cabin crew the minimum rest period which will be provided before undertaking a
flying duty period shall be:
• At least as long as the preceding duty period less 1 hour; or
• 11 hours; whichever is the greater.
c) The sum of the time spent on any standby, and any time on positioning plus
subsequent FDP will be 1 hour longer than that permitted for flight crew.
d) The maximum duty hours for cabin crew will not exceed:
• 60 hours in any 7 consecutive days;
• 105 hours in any 14 consecutive days;
• 210 hours in any 28 consecutive days;
These limits include office days, ground training/checking, medical examinations for
the purpose of license renewal and all other flight and ground duties which are
credited according to actual check-in and check-out times.
e) The annual and 28 day absolute limits on block hours pertaining to flight crew do
not apply to cabin crew.
7.9 NUTRITION
A meal and drink opportunity must occur in order to avoid any detriment to a crew
member's performance:
• Crew meals and drinks shall be provided on every flight duty;
• On a FDP of less than 6 hours, cold meal and drinks shall be provided;
• On a FDP period of 6 hours or more, hot meal and drinks shall be provided.
Records are maintained to ensure compliance with the requirements of this chapter.
Copies of these records will be made available to the crew member upon request. If the
records held by the Company under the above do not cover all of his flight duty, duty and
rest periods, the crew member concerned shall maintain an individual record of his:
• Block times;
• Start, duration and end of each duty or flight duty periods; and
• Rest periods and days free of all duties.
Records shall be preserved for at least 24 calendar months from the date of the last
relevant entry or longer if required in accordance with national laws.
Additionally, the Company shall separately retain all aircraft Commander’s discretion
reports of extended flight duty periods, extended flight hours and reduced rest periods for
at least 6 months after the event.
JC Airlines understands the traumatic effects of the loss of a spouse, partner or other
family member; hence it will give any crew member, faced with such a loss, the necessary
time and support to come to terms with their bereavement.
In the event of the death of an immediate family member, Flight Operations Manager shall
be notified at the earliest opportunity. He shall grant immediately 7 days compassionate
leave of absence. Thereafter, any extension to this compassionate leave of absence will
be assessed on an individual case basis and authorized by Flight Operations Manager,
who will also assess any associated short-notice vacation request for such cases.
In the event of the death of a close family member, Flight Operations Manager should
authorize an immediate 3 days compassionate leave of absence.
The Company recognizes that no definitions can cover every potential case of traumatic
bereavement. Cases other than those defined will be considered on an individual basis.
At the end of any compassionate leave of absence and associated vacation, the crew
member concerned is to meet with a member of the management team to mutually assess
his readiness to return to flight duties before flying again.
Intentionally Blank
8 OPERATING PROCEDURES
Before making any operating decision, in order to maintain required safety of each and
every flight, and economic viability of JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines), the
following basic principles in given order shall be obeyed at all times by all operational
personnel:
1. Safety and Security;
2. Legality;
3. Commercial (punctuality, comfort, minimum cost).
All JC Airlines operating procedures are based on mandatory international, state or local
regulations and shall be used in planning and execution of all flights.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) concept shall be applied to the maximum extent
possible in all JC Airlines’ operating procedures. CRM goal is the maximization of
effectiveness and safety through the effective utilization of all available resources.
Resources in this context refer to hardware, software, printed materials, people power
(your own and that of others), the environment, time, fuel etc. Its purpose is to avoid the
build-up of a fatal chain of events. Consequently, crew members must use sound
judgment and common sense in order to make quality decisions after having accessed all
required resources.
The CRM environment is one in which team members operate under time constraints and
stress. The only way to compensate for stress is its early recognition in oneself and in
other crew members. This is of particular important when it comes to problem solving and
decision making in the cockpit.
All JC Airlines operating procedures shall be designed according human factors principles,
industry standards and safety studies. The specific parts of the Operations Manual
relevant to flight crew shall be clearly identified and defined, and any differences from
procedures and checklists provided by the manufacturer(s) shall be based on operational
considerations.
JC Airlines strives for the highest possible level of standardization to facilitate cooperation
between the staff. Therefore it is Company’s policy to use standard verbiage, terminology,
signals and/or verbal commands used for communication between flight crew and cabin
crew during normal, abnormal and emergency situations in accordance with applicable
regulations and provisions given in the aeroplanes’ documentation.
The multi crew concept regulates the organization of the work and task sharing in the
cockpit. The objectives of this concept are as follows:
• Full availability of PF for the primary job of piloting the aeroplane;
• Clearly defined and balanced job sharing;
• Regulated co-operation by strict adherence to SOPs;
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These objectives are valid for all normal and abnormal conditions.
JC Airlines shall ensure that an Operational Flight Plan (OFP) is completed for each
intended flight by JC Airlines’ approved flight dispatcher or by the Commander (Pilot-In-
Command) when a flight dispatcher is not available. The OFP shall be signed by the
Commander and flight dispatcher, when applicable.
• The flight is planned along ATS routes that remain within the Company, aeroplane
and the crew's operational approvals and qualifications;
• The provisions specified in the Operations Manual in respect of fuel, oil and oxygen
requirements, minimum safe altitudes, aerodrome operating minima and availability
of alternate aerodromes, where required, can be complied with for the planned
flight;
• The load is properly distributed and safely secured and proper weight and balance
documentation prepared;
• The weight of the aeroplane and centre of gravity location, at the commencement of
take-off roll, will be such that the flight can be conducted safely;
• The planned flight will not exceed maximum performance take-off and landing
weight limits, based upon environmental conditions at the times of departure and
arrival;
• When applicable, safety handling instructions regarding special loads such as
dangerous/hazardous goods or heavy cargo are being followed;
• De-icing/anti-icing procedures, if necessary, have been carried out adequately. A
Commander shall not commence take-off unless the external surfaces are clear of
any deposit, which might adversely affect the performance and/or controllability of
the aeroplane, except as permitted in the Flight Manual;
• An exterior aircraft inspection (walk around) is performed by a member of the flight
crew or delegated to a licensed aircraft maintenance technician (engineer). If
delegated, the aircraft maintenance technician shall ensure the flight crew is notified
prior to flight that the inspection has been completed;
• Any operational limitation in addition to those covered by above can be complied
with;
• The operational flight plan and flight release requirements as required by AOCR
have been complied with;
• A check has been completed indicating that the performance requirements of
AOCR Chapter 2 can be complied with for the flight to be undertaken;
• He and his crew have been provided by the Company all the relevant information in
order to conduct a safe flight.
A Commander’s flight brief (Flight Envelope), shall be prepared and passed to the
Commander. The flight dispatcher (flight operations officer) is responsible and shall
provide all the assistance to the Commander, to ensure he gets all the required and
necessary information and documentation for the flight.
The Commander has the authority to reject an aircraft prior to departure of a flight if he is
dissatisfied with any aspect of the airworthiness and/or maintenance status of the aircraft.
He shall briefly state his reasons in a Journey Log report.
Except as provided in MTCP escape routings, minimum flight altitudes for Company
operations are calculated using the Jeppesen Route Manual. All minimum altitude
information can be found in it. The Operational Flight Plan (OFP) contains only the
essential minimum altitudes, which cover all normal operations.
The minimum altitude/flight level at which it is permitted to fly for the purpose of public
transport may be governed by national regulations, air traffic control requirements, or by
the need to maintain a safe height margin above any significant terrain or obstacle en
route. Whichever of these requirements produces the highest altitude/flight level for a
particular route will determine the minimum flight altitude for that route and the
Commander shall not fly below this minimum altitude except for take-off and landing.
JC Airlines normally does not allow VFR operations for revenue flights. If VFR is required
for a specific flight or part(s) of a flight, an authorisation from the Flight Operations
Manager must be obtained. For VFR altitudes requirements refer to ICAO Rules of the Air
- Annex 2, Chapter 4 and to any national regulations applicable to the area overflown.
Minimum flight altitudes on VFR-flights or VFR-flight segments of an IFR-flight should not
be below an altitude where the flight path clears all obstacles or any terrain by at least
1000 feet vertically. Whenever cities or other densely populated areas are overflown, then
the minimum vertical clearance shall be 2000 feet above the highest terrain/obstacle within
a radius of 600 m from the aircraft.
When an aircraft is operated for the purpose of commercial air transport, the minimum
altitude/flight level at which it is permitted to fly may be governed by national regulations,
air traffic control requirements, or by the need to maintain a safe height margin above any
significant terrain or obstacle en-route. Whichever of these requirements produces the
highest altitude/flight level for a particular route will determine the minimum flight altitude
for that route.
The criteria upon which minimum altitudes are based will necessarily be determined to
some extent by the track guidance facilities available to the Commander (Pilot-In-
Command), and by the extent to which the Commander is able in particular circumstances
to accept the directions of radar controllers. The minimum acceptable standards will
normally be as follows:
• For general application: 1500 feet above the highest terrain or obstacle within 20
NM of the intended track, with additional provision where necessary for terrain or
obstacles within 10 degrees of intended track from the last known position;
• For flight in controlled airspace where the track is well defined by two separate aids:
1500 feet above the highest terrain or obstacle within 10 NM of the intended track;
• For radar controlled flight within 25 NM of the aerodrome of departure or intended
landing: 1000 feet above the highest terrain or obstacle within 5 NM of the intended
track. The Commander and other flight crew members should monitor all radar
instructions by reference to other aids and are reminded that radar control does not
relieve them of their responsibility to ensure adequate terrain clearance.
If the specified minimum altitude for a sector is related only to terrain or obstacles within
less than 20 NM of the intended track, special attention shall be drawn to that fact and
prepared navigational flight plans supplied to the flight crew.
Minimum altitudes shall be related, where necessary, to the ability of the aircraft to comply
with the weight and performance requirements (i.e. all engines operating, single engine
failure for two engine aircraft).
JC Airlines uses the minimum safe altitudes provided by the Jeppesen charts. The basis of
Jeppesen calculations gives at least an equal standard to that required by the above
requirements. If necessary corrections will be promulgated by JC Airlines in the manual so
that the required standard is achieved.
The probable effects of the following factors shall be considered when determining
minimum flight altitudes for JC Airlines operations:
• The accuracy and reliability with which the position of the aircraft can be
determined;
• The inaccuracies in the indications of the altimeters used;
• The characteristics of the terrain (e.g. sudden changes in the elevation);
• The probability of encountering unfavourable meteorological conditions (e.g. severe
turbulence and descending air currents);
• Possible inaccuracies in aeronautical charts;
• Airspace restrictions.
If operations are to be conducted over routes for which minimum flight altitudes have not
been established by the State flown over or the responsible State, or in case of incomplete
or lack of safe altitude information, obstacles and reference points have to be located on
topographic maps. The minimum safe en-route altitude must clear all obstacles within 5
NM (9.3 km) of the route centreline by 1000 feet (300 m) if the reference point is not higher
than 5000 feet (1500 m) MSL or 2000 feet (600m) if reference point is higher than 5000
feet MSL. If available and not limiting, the grid MORA may be used as minimum flight
altitude. These minimum altitudes must be respected along the track with all engines
operative unless a procedure has been approved to cope with depressurisation. During
flight preparation, the en-route minimum altitudes must be established for all the route
segments.
• When navigating by the use of a radio navigation aids, descent below the MEA or
GRID MORA to the MSA may be made when overflying the navigation aid from
which an approach-to-land will be conducted, provided the aeroplane's position can
be accurately established as being within 25 NM from the navigation aid upon which
the minimum sector altitude is based.
• When being radar vectored (unambiguously announced by radar controller, e.g.
»RADAR CONTACT, THIS WILL BE (RADAR) VECTORING...«), descent below
the MEA or GRID MORA to the MSA may be made, provided the aeroplane's
position can be accurately established as being within 25 NM from the navigation
aid upon which the minimum sector altitude is based.
Diversion procedures for critical cases are established taking into account the topography
along the route and the requirements mentioned below (engine(s) failure,
depressurisation).
One engine inoperative en-route net flight path for expected weather conditions should be
above the minimum flight altitude or a drift down procedure will be published which will
allow the aeroplane to continue flight from cruising altitude to an adequate alternate
aerodrome if destination cannot be reached. A detailed analysis of all the routes using
published minimum flight altitudes (MEA or MORA) will be done in order to determine
whether it is possible to maintain level flight with one engine inoperative 1000 feet above
the highest point of the crossing. If this is not possible, or if the associated weight penalties
are unacceptable, a drift down procedure will be worked out, based on engine failure at the
most critical point and clearing critical obstacles during the drift down by at least 2000 feet.
Company routes which transit areas of the world with high terrain exceeding 10.000 feet
GRID MORA are assessed for depressurization and drift down compliance. If applicable,
critical segments along a route are identified and an analysis of the terrain is carried out
using topographical and/or aeronautical charts. In those cases instructions will be
published for an escape procedure in case of depressurization or drift down.
All published altitudes are TRUE altitudes above MSL. They do not take into account the
means of measuring aeroplane altitude. All minimum flight altitudes and flight levels
described in OM Part A, Chapter 8.1.1, shall be corrected for the effects of:
• High wind speed in areas of high terrain;
• Temperature variations from standard;
• Pressure variations from standard.
When flights are conducted within 20 NM of terrain that rises over 2000 ft, the minimum
flight altitudes shall be corrected for the wind effect in accordance with the following table:
Wind Speed
Elevation
< 30 kts 31 – 50 kts 51 – 70 kts > 70 kts
2000 ft to 8000 ft Add 500 ft Add 1000 ft Add 1500 ft Add 2000 ft
Above 8000 ft Add 1000 ft Add 1500 ft Add 2000 ft Add 2500 ft
Allowance in Wind Speed Table
Note: When flying En-route, MOC over mountainous areas is normally applied during the
design of the routes and is stated in the AIP. For the Terminal Areas the states
may provide guidance; it is up to the Commander to evaluate whether the
combination of terrain, wind strength and direction are such as to make a
correction for wind. When this is done the controller shall be notified.
The Commander should also consider the effect of mountain waves and take suitable
precautions when such conditions are reported or forecast. The effect of mountain waves
is detailed in paragraph 8.3.8.10. When mountain waves are forecast, reported or
encountered, the minimum flight altitudes shall be further increased when flying over
mountainous terrain in order to provide a vertical clearance over the highest ridge at least
equal to the height of the ridge above the surrounding terrain. Naturally, common sense
suggests that it is preferable, when practicable, to avoid such conditions by choosing an
alternate routing, particularly if significant wind shear or turbulence is forecast.
Temperature Correction
The calculated minimum altitudes must be corrected when the OAT is much lower than
that predicted by the standard atmosphere. The correction has to be applied on the height
above the elevation of the altimeter setting source. The altimeter setting source is
generally the atmosphere pressure at an airport, and the correction on the height above
the airport has to be applied on the indicated altitude. The same correction value is applied
when flying at either QFE or at QNH.
1) Approximate correction:
Increase obstacle elevation by 4% per 10ºC below ISA of the height above the
elevation of the altimeter setting source or decrease aeroplane indicated altitude by 4%
per 10°C below ISA of the height above the elevation of the altimeter setting source.
This method is generally used to adjust minimum safe altitudes and may be applied for
all altimeters setting source altitudes for temperatures above 15ºC below zero.
2) Tabulated corrections:
For colder temperatures, a more accurate correction should be obtained from the
following table calculated for a sea level aerodrome. It is conservative when applied at
higher aerodrome.
Aerodrome
Height above the elevation of the altimeter setting source (feet)
OATºC
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1500 2000 3000 4000 5000
-20º 30 50 60 70 90 100 120 130 140 210 280 420 570 710
-30º 40 60 80 100 120 140 150 170 190 280 380 570 760 950
-40º 50 80 100 120 150 170 190 220 240 360 480 720 970 1210
-50º 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 450 590 890 1190 1500
The graph given hereafter has to be used en-route for high altitude operation. It does not
take into account the elevation of the altimeter setting source. In theory, this correction
applies to the air column between the ground and the aeroplane. When flying above high
terrain, the use of this correction gives a conservative margin.
Example:
Given: MEA = FL200 / ISA - 30ºC;
Find: Minimum FL = ___ (Answer = FL230).
Pressure Correction
When flying at levels with the altimeter set to 1013 hPa, the minimum safe altitude
(MSA/MEA) must be corrected for deviations in pressure when the pressure is lower than
the standard atmosphere (1013hPa).
A conservative correction method of 30 ft per hPa below 1013 hPa shall be used.
Example:
Given: Indicated altitude = 20000 ft, ISA, local QNH = 995 hPa;
Find: Geometrical (True) Altitude = ___ (Answer: 20000 - (18 x 30) = 19460 ft).
The following table gives more accurate data. The correction is to be applied to the
indicated altitude (reference 1013 hPa) to determine the geometrical aircraft altitude.
When the pressure is higher than the standard atmosphere (1013hPa), no correction is
needed; values are presented in the table for information only.
Aerodrome, requiring special skills, may be selected as alternate only if the Commander
has a valid authorization for that aerodrome.
JC Airlines shall only approve aerodromes for use that are adequate.
In this context, adequate infers that the runway dimensions, runway pavement bearing
strength and significant obstacles in the local areas are such that the aeroplane
performance requirements for take-off and landing are met in the conditions which may be
expected to exist at the time of operation.
In addition, it should be anticipated that at the expected time of use, the aerodrome will be
available and equipped with necessary auxiliary services, such as ATS, sufficient lighting,
communications, weather reporting, navaids and emergency services.
The aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) category must be sufficient for the aircraft
type using the aerodrome.
for a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the ETA on that
aerodrome.
ICAO Annex 14 specifies the aerodrome requirements for Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF).
JC Airlines is, as part of its safety management system, assessing the level of rescue and
firefighting service (RFFS) protection available at any aerodrome intended to be specified
in the operational flight plan in order to ensure that an acceptable level of protection is
available for the aeroplane intended to be used.
Requirements regarding RFF aerodrome categories are laid down, depending upon:
• The aeroplane's overall length,
• The max fuselage width, and
• The number of movements of individual aeroplane types.
As per the table below, the following aerodrome RFF categories are applicable:
Aerodrome classification process includes consideration of all relevant aspects that define
adequacy of a certain aerodrome. Process shall be accomplished using team work
principles by the following function holders:
• Chief Pilot;
• Flight Safety Officer;
• Flight Operations Manager.
For specific flights, when no time for standard evaluation is available, a temporary
authorization and categorization may be performed by the Flight Operations Manager.
Such temporary evaluation is normally valid for that particular flight and the normal
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Category A aerodromes
Category B aerodromes
Category C aerodromes
General
The performance regulations state, as a basic principle, that the flight shall be dispatched
in such a way that, in the event of an engine failure, the aircraft can clear all obstacles
throughout all phases of the flight by the margins prescribed by the regulations.
Furthermore, the available runway distances such as TORA, TODA, ASDA or LDA shall
not be exceeded. Whenever the runway is wet or contaminated, the required corrections
shall be applied.
For take-off and landing, the runway which gives the best safety margin under prevailing
conditions shall be used, paying due regard to all relevant factors such as approach and
landing aids, ATC requirements, payload etc.
When possible, take-off and landing shall be performed into the wind, especially if braking
coefficients are reduced (e.g. wet runway). The tail-wind component for take-off and
landing shall not exceed values specified in the AFM and OM Part B.
The crosswind (steady component and gusts) for take-off and landing shall not exceed the
values specified in the OM Part B; due consideration shall be given to the runway
condition and the braking action to be expected.
Any systems failures, which affect the take-off and/or landing distance, must be taken into
account for performance and distance calculations. Supplementary information, such as
tire speed limitations, may be found in applicable FCOM.
For all take-off and landing performance calculation, wind direction and velocities
expressed as ‘light and variable’ should be considered as 5 knots tailwind.
Whenever take-off performance is limited by field length or obstacles, pilots shall use the
maximum available TORA distance.
The Commander should never permit exceedances of weight limitations given in the
manufacturer's documents (AFM, FCOM) for any of the following:
• Maximum structural taxi weight;
• Maximum structural take-off weight;
• Maximum zero fuel weight;
• Maximum landing weight;
• En-route weight limits.
The take-off weight (weight at brake release or at start of take-off roll) may be further
restricted to less than the maximum take-off weight by any of the following requirements:
• Maximum take-off weight for altitude and temperature;
• Take-off field length requirements;
• Tire speed and brake energy limits;
• Obstacle clearance, en-route requirements and landing limitations;
• Drift-down weight requirements;
• Landing field requirements;
• Maximum approach and landing climb weight for altitude and temperature.
Take-off
The Commander shall ensure that the take-off weight does not exceed the maximum take-
off weight specified in the OM Part B for the:
• Pressure altitude and the ambient temperature at the aerodrome at which the take-
off is to be made;
• Structural limit.
The Commander must adhere to the following requirements when determining the
maximum permitted take-off weight:
• The accelerate-stop distance must not exceed the accelerate-stop distance
available;
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• The take-off distance must not exceed the take-off distance available, with a
clearway distance not exceeding half of the take-off run available;
• The take-off run must not exceed the take-off run available;
• Compliance with this paragraph must be shown using a single value of V1 for the
rejected and continued take-off;
• On a wet or contaminated runway, the take-off weight must not exceed that
permitted for a take-off on a dry runway under the same conditions.
When showing compliance with requirements above, the Commander must take account
of the following:
• The pressure altitude at the aerodrome;
• The ambient temperature at the aerodrome;
• The runway surface condition and the type of runway surface;
• The runway slope in the direction of take-off;
• Not more than 50% of the reported head-wind component or not less than 150% of
the reported tailwind component;
• The loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aeroplane prior to take-off.
All above requirements shall be built into approved take-off performance calculations aids
(e.g. RTOW tables ...).
As far as the obstacle accountability is concerned, the following items shall be observed:
1. Net Flight Path begins at 35 ft above the end of the take-off distance and ends at
1500 ft above the take-off surface. Obstacles must be cleared vertically by at least
35 ft. For performance reasons, all obstacles of each side shall be considered if
they are within 90 m on either side of the extended centreline plus 0.125 x the
distance from the end of the take-off distance available or the end of the take-off
distance if a turn is scheduled before the end of the take-off distance available.
The Commander shall ensure that the landing weight of the aeroplane does not exceed:
• The maximum landing weight specified in the OM Part B for the pressure altitude
and the ambient temperature expected for the estimated time of landing at the
destination and alternate aerodrome;
• The maximum structural limit weight.
For instrument approaches with a missed approach gradient greater than 2.5% the
Commander shall verify that the expected landing weight allows a missed approach with a
climb gradient equal to or greater than the applicable missed approach gradient in the one-
engine inoperative missed approach configuration and speed. If requirement cannot be
met, the contingency missed approach procedure shall be pre-planned and executed.
For instrument approaches with decision heights below 200 ft, the Commander must verify
that the landing weight of the aeroplane, taking into account the take-off weight and the
fuel expected to be consumed in flight, allows a missed approach gradient of climb, with
the critical engine failed and with the speed and configuration used for go-around of at
least 2.5%, or the published gradient, whichever is the greater. If requirement cannot be
met, the contingency missed approach procedure shall be pre-planned and executed.
During flight preparation or in-flight re-planning, the Commander shall ensure that the
landing weight of the aeroplane for the estimated time of landing at the destination
aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome allows a full stop landing from 50 ft above the
threshold within 60% of the landing distance available.
When showing compliance with requirement above, the Commander must take account of
the following:
• The altitude at the aerodrome;
• Not more than 50% of the head-wind component or not less than 150% of the
tailwind component; and
• The runway slope in the direction of landing if greater than +/-2%.
During flight preparation or in-flight re-planning when the appropriate weather reports or
forecasts, or a combination thereof, indicate that the runway at the estimated time of
arrival may be wet, in addition to the requirements for dry runways, the Commander shall
ensure that, the landing distance available is at least 115% of the required landing
distance on dry runway.
During flight preparation or in-flight re-planning when the appropriate weather reports or
forecasts, or a combination thereof, indicate that the runway at the estimated time of
arrival may be contaminated, in addition to the requirements for dry runways:
• The Commander shall ensure that, the landing distance available is at least 115%
of the required landing distance on dry runway; or
• The Commander shall ensure that, the landing distance available must be at least
115% of the actual landing distance determined in accordance with approved
contaminated landing distance data or equivalent; whichever is greater.
Approach Climb
This corresponds to an aircraft’s climb capability, assuming that one engine is inoperative
and gear up. The “approach climb” wording comes from the fact that go-around
performance is based on approach configuration, rather than landing configuration. The
minimum gradient to be demonstrated is 2,1% for twin engine aircraft.
Landing Climb
Contrary to all other phases of the flight, the aircraft in its final landing configuration (gear
down and flaps for landing) is not expected to demonstrate a one engine-out climb
performance. Also, air-worthiness requirements require for all aircraft an all engine climb
gradient of 3,2%. In case of a balked landing, a go around with one-engine failed may only
be executed when the height is such as to allow a configuration change from landing climb
into approach climb configuration.
For individual all engine take-off gradient tables for each aeroplane type refer to applicable
OM Part B.
The net flight path is established considering a drift-down procedure taking into account a
given drift-down speed associated with the expected aircraft weight and the remaining
engine being set at Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT). Refer to applicable OM Part B
and QRH.
For the use of bank angles of more than 20° between 200 - 400 ft AGL, or more than 30°
above 400 ft AGL, special procedures, subject to the approval of the SSCA, shall be used.
Such procedures shall meet at least, the following criteria:
• The applicable OM PART B must contain approved data for the required increase of
operating speed and data to allow the construction of the flight path considering the
increased bank angles and speeds;
• Visual guidance must be available for navigation accuracy;
• Weather minima and wind limitations must be specified for each runway and
approved by the SSCA;
• Appropriate simulator training shall be accomplished for applicable Commanders.
For the use of steep approach procedures using glide slope angles of 4° or more and with
screen heights of less than 50 ft (but not less than 35 ft) special procedures, subject to the
approval of the SSCA, shall be used. Such procedures shall meet at least, the following
criteria:
• The applicable OM Part B must state the maximum approved glide slope angle, any
other limitations, normal, abnormal or emergency procedures for the steep
approach as well as amendments to the field length data when using steep
approach criteria;
• A suitable glide path reference system comprising at least a visual glide path
indicating system must be available at each aerodrome at which steep approach
procedures are to be conducted;
• Weather minima must be specified and approved for each runway to be used with a
steep approach.
Departure
Actual weather conditions shall be taken into account at the departure aerodrome.
Take-Off Alternate
When weather condition on departure aerodrome is below the landing minima, a take-off
alternate should be nominated and noted on OFP. This take-off alternate should be within
one hour of flight with one-engine inoperative (330 NM). Terrain and weather en-route to
take-off alternate must permit single-engine operation.
Destination
Destination Alternate(s)
A take-off must not be commenced unless the appropriate weather reports or forecasts, or
any combination thereof, indicate that during a period commencing 1 hour before and
ending 1 hour after the ETA at:
• Destination aerodrome and destination alternate aerodrome, or
• Destination alternate aerodromes (two),
the weather conditions will be at or above the applicable planning minima for destination
and alternate aerodrome. The alternate(s) have to be specified in the OFP.
Flight may be planned and executed without selected destination alternate(s) when a
certainty exists that:
1) The approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions;
and
2) Separate runways are usable at the estimated time of use of the destination
aerodrome with at least one runway having an operational instrument approach
procedure
Important: Runways on the same aerodrome are considered to be separate
runways when they are separate landing surfaces, each having an
approach procedure based upon a separate aid, which may overlay or
cross such that, if one of the runways is blocked, it will not prevent the
planned operation on the other runway.
or
3) The destination aerodrome is isolated and no destination alternate exists.
For destination alternate aerodromes the minima specified in the following table must be
met:
Enroute Alternate(s)
When choosing Enroute Alternates they must comply with 60 minutes maximum diversion
distance for single engine operation (refer to FCOM-PRO-SPO-40-60 Performance).
Planning minima for enroute alternates shall be the same as for destination alternate.
Equitime Point (ETP) is point on the aircraft route, which is located at the same flying time
(in forecasted atmospheric conditions) from two suitable diversion aerodromes. For
extended overwater flights, the ETP position should be determined using a computerized
flight planning, or graphically on a navigation or plotting chart.
The term Aerodrome Operating Minima refers to the minimum weather conditions required
for particular operations at an aerodrome and are expressed in terms of cloud ceiling, RVR
and visibility.
Company's Aerodrome Operating Minima (AOM) are compliant with the AOCR
requirements, however they shall never be below any existing State Minima. The AOM
depicted in OM Part C comply with this policy unless specifically stated otherwise.
Aerodrome Operating Minima defines the limits of usability of an aerodrome for either
take-off or landing, usually expressed in terms of RVR or VIS, DA (H), MDA (H) and cloud
conditions. Unless stated otherwise AOM are depicted on aeronautical charts (refer to OM
Part C) and never below any State minima.
Aeroplane capability given in the OM Part B defines the lowest minima for which an
aeroplane has been certified.
JC Airlines Minima are approved by the SSCA and stated in the AOC Operational
Specifications. They are the lowest minima that JC Airlines is allowed to use on specified
aerodromes. They cannot be lower than the aeroplane capability and the minima required
by the national Civil Aviation Authority of the aerodrome.
Crew minima are the minima to which individual flight crew members are authorised to
use. They are based upon the training and qualification of the flight crew members.
A320 aircraft are classified as Category C aircraft (refer to OM Part B). The criteria taken
into consideration for the classification of aeroplanes by categories is the IAS at threshold
(VAT) in landing configuration at the maximum certified landing weight.
The category is a permanent value and is independent of the changing conditions of day to
day operations.
Take-off minima are generally expressed as VIS or RVR Limits. Where there is a specific
need to see and avoid obstacles, a ceiling or climb gradient will be specified.
• Take-off shall not be commenced unless weather conditions at the airport of
departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that airport,
unless a suitable take-off alternate aerodrome is available is available within 330
NM for jet aeroplanes.
• When the reported visibility VIS is below that required for take-off and RVR is not
reported, a take-off may only be commenced if the Commander can determine that
the RVR along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.
• When no report of VIS or RVR is available, a take-off may only be commenced if
the Commander can determine that the RVR along the take-off runway is equal to
or better than the required minima.
Important: To conduct LVTO in RVR less than 150m special SSCA approval is required.
The approach procedures published in the OM Part C for ILS, PAR, LOC (GS inoperative),
VOR, VOR/DME, SRA, NDB and NDB/DME are authorized, provided:
• All the required navigation aids, as specified in the title of the approach charts are
available during the appropriate phases of an approach;
• The minimum required equipment on board, to use the specified navigation aids is
serviceable.
A visual approach takes place when either part or all of an instrument approach procedure
is not completed and approach is executed by visual reference to the terrain. Visual
approach shall not be attempted unless:
• ATC clearance for visual approach has been issued;
• It is daytime;
• Reported cloud ceiling is higher than MDH specified in approach chart (under circle
to-land) or 1500 ft, whichever is greater;
• Reported visibility is at least 5000 m;
• Reported RVR on applicable parts of landing runway is at least 800 m.
Circling is the term used to describe the visual phase of an instrument approach required
to position an aeroplane for landing on a runway, which is not suitably located for a
straight-in approach. During circling manoeuvres the relevant approach category is
associated with a maximum speed for manoeuvring. In the case of category C this speed
is normally 180 kt. Circle-to-land approach shall not be attempted unless:
• ATC clearance for circle-to-land has been issued;
• Reported cloud ceiling is equal or higher than MDH specified in approach chart
(under circle-to-land) or MDH specified in table Circle-to-land Minima below,
whichever is greater;
• Reported visibility is equal or greater than minimum required specified in approach
chart (under circle-to-land) or visibility specified in table Circle-to-land Minima
below, whichever is greater;
• Reported RVR on applicable parts of landing runway is at least 800 m.
Circle-to-land manoeuvre (circling flight path) shall not be initiated and/or continued
unless:
• The aeroplane is clear of clouds;
• The active runway and/or runway lights and/or approach lights and/or other lights,
markings or objects identifiable with the runway can be kept in sight.
Approach Category C
MDH 600 ft
VIS 2400 m
Circle-to-land Minima
General
Non-precision approach procedures are based on the use of ILS without glideslope (LOC
only), VOR, NDB, SRA, RNAV or VDF.
Flight Crews should aim to fly all Non-Precision Approaches using the Continuous Descent
Final Approach technique (CDFA). To conduct CDFA the pilot must have adequate
information of a distance to the runway threshold or applicable approach navaid.
The MDH on a non-precision approach shall not be less than the highest of:
• The OCH for the category of aircraft;
• The system minimum, as contained in the table below;
• Any state minima if applicable; or
• Where a non-precision approach is flown as a continuous descent approach, 50
feet is to be added to the published minima and it is to be treated exactly as the DA
during a precision approach i.e. if the specified visual references are not achieved
then a go-around is to be initiated.
Note: For operational purposes the MDH calculated must be converted to an MDA.
The lateral part of the missed approach procedure must be flown via the Missed Approach
Point unless otherwise stated on the approach chart.
Non-precision approach shall not be continued below minima unless at least one of the
following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible to and identifiable by
the pilot:
• Elements of the approach light system;
• Threshold, or its markings, lights or identification lights;
• Visual glide slope indicator(s);
• Touchdown zone or zone markings or zone lights;
• Runway edge lights; or
• Other visual references accepted by the SSCA and specified in the OM Part C.
General
Precision approach CAT I shall not be continued below DA unless at least one of the
following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible to and identifiable by
the pilot:
• Elements of the approach lighting system;
• Threshold, or its markings, lights or identification lights;
• Visual glide slope indicator(s);
• Touchdown zone or zone markings or zone lights;
• Runway edge lights.
General
The minimum RVR for particular precision approach Category II is governed by the DH,
aeroplane approach category and the approach lighting and runway lighting/marking
available. Unless stated otherwise, OM Part C (approach charts) shows adequate
minimum RVR information to the flight crew.
Precision approach CAT II shall not be continued below DH unless at least one of the
following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible to and identifiable by
the pilot:
• A segment of at least 3 consecutive lights being:
- The centre line of the approach lights, or
- Touchdown zone lights, or
- Runway centre line lights, or
- Runway edge lights, or
- A combination of these;
is attained and can be maintained; and
• A lateral element of the ground pattern being:
- An approach lighting crossbar, or
- The landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting.
Approval
General
A Category III approach operation is a precision instrument approach and landing using
ILS divided in two subcategories:
• Category IIIA approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with:
- A runway visual range (RVR) not less than 175 m, and
Note: Where the decision height (DH) and runway visual range (RVR) do not fall within
the same Category, the RVR will determine in which Category the operation is to
be considered.
Approval
JC Airlines is approved to conduct Category IIIA approaches with lowest required RVR
200 meters and DH 50 feet. Fleet specific capability is described in the relevant OM Part B
and FCOM.
Decision Height
Note: On a CAT III approved runways it may be assumed that operations with no DH
can be supported, unless specifically restricted, as published in the AIP or
NOTAM.
Precision approach CAT IIIA using fail-passive flight control system shall not be continued
below DH unless a visual reference containing a segment of at least 3 consecutive lights
being:
• The centre line of the approach lights, or
• Touchdown zone lights, or
• Runway centre line lights, or
Precision approach CAT IIIB using fail-operational flight control system shall not be
continued below DH unless a visual reference containing at least 1 centre line light is
attained and can be maintained.
For precision approach CAT IIIB operations with no DH there is no requirement for visual
contact with the runway prior to touchdown. The required RVR depends on the level of
aeroplane equipment.
Take-off: RVR for that part of the runway used to accelerate to V1 followed by a rejected
take-off and deceleration down to a speed of approximately 60 knots.
Landing: RVR for that part of the runway used during the high speed phase of the landing
run down to a speed of approximately 60 knots.
The touchdown RVR is always controlling for any instrument approach. If reported and
relevant, the mid-point and stop-end RVR are also controlling. A summary of lowest
minima, as used in JC Airlines, is given below:
RVR (m)
Category Decision Height (ft) Touchdown Mid point Stop end
Category I above 300 800 N/R N/R
251-300 650 N/R N/R
201-250 600 N/R N/R
200 550 N/R N/R
Category II 141-199 450 75 / 125 75
121-140 400 75 / 125 75
100-120 300 75 / 125 75
Category III 50-99 200 75 / 125 75
AOM are depicted on aeronautical charts (OM Part C) using RVR. If RVR reports are not
available, and only meteorological visibility is reported, then for straight in instrument
approaches only, the reported meteorological visibility may be converted to RVR according
to the table below. The converted meteorological visibility (CMV) may then be compared
with the charted RVR values to determine whether the approach may be commenced or
continued.
Outer Marker (OM) Not allowed, except if replaced by height check at 1000 ft NPA with FAF: no effect
unless used as FAF
Approach Lights (APL) Not allowed for operations Not allowed Minima as for NALS1
with DH > 50 ft
APL except the last 210m No effect Not allowed Minima as for BALS1
CHAPTER 8
1
Note: Any APL other than FALS for Cat I, then RVR ≥ 750 m.
Remarks:
- Multiple failures of RWY lights other than indicated in the table are not
acceptable;
- Deficiencies of approach and RWY lights are treated separately;
- Cat II or Cat III operations: a combination of deficiencies in runway lights and
RVR assessment equipment is not allowed;
- Failures other than ILS affect RVR only and not DH.
8.1.5 En-Route Operating Minima for VFR Flights or VFR portions of an IFR
Flight
VFR flights are generally not allowed except when authorised by the Flight Operations
Manager.
When authorised, VFR flights shall be conducted in accordance with the Visual Flight
Rules and in accordance with the table below (applicable for pre-flight planning and in-
flight IFR cancellation).
Operating minima as presented in the OM Part C (Jeppesen airport and enroute charts)
shall be used unless otherwise stated or specified for a particular flight, aerodrome,
runway or type of operation.
8.1.6.1 Presentation
For precision approaches, minima are listed in terms of DA and RVR. For non-precision
approaches, minima are usually listed in terms of MDA and RVR (or Visibility). For circling
approaches, the MDA will be shown together with a minimum Visibility.
The following philosophy and descent limits apply for different types of instrument
approaches:
1) Decision Altitude (DA) for:
• Precision Category I Approach;
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-40
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
A Decision Height (DH) or Decision Altitude (DA) is a specified height or altitude in the
precision approach at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual
reference to continue the approach has not been acquired. Decision Height or Descent
Altitude (DH/DA) for precision approaches is referenced to the threshold elevation of the
landing runway.
CAT II Decision Heights are referenced to the threshold elevation and are published with
an accuracy of 1 foot.
CAT III Decision Heights are not calculated individually since the standard DH value as
approved for the particular aeroplane type are applicable unless a higher value is shown
on the approach chart as specified by the State concerned.
The following dimensional units shall be used for the expression of aerodrome
meteorological minima:
• Decision Height – feet;
• Decision Altitude – feet;
• Minimum Descent Height – feet;
• Minimum Descent Altitude – feet;
• Ceiling – feet;
• RVR/Visibility – metres.
8.1.6.2 Application
A Commander is not permitted to operate to minima which are lower than those published
in OM Part C (on aeronautical charts), calculated in accordance with Chapter 8.1.3 of this
manual, or notified by the state which controls the aerodrome in question. A Commander
may nevertheless elect to operate to higher minima than those established by any of these
means if he considers that under the circumstances of the flight to do otherwise might
compromise the safety of his aeroplane or the passengers. Once the flight has started, the
Commander must be prepared to amend the intended minima for any aerodrome he is
scheduled to use, in order to take account of any change in status of the relevant
approach aids which occurs during the flight.
The values for DA/DH/MDA/MDHs, published on approach charts, take into account
OCA/OCHs and/or official minima values published by the state Civil Aviation Authority,
and any other particular regulations prescribed by the state Civil Aviation Authority.
Landing minima may sometimes have to be modified on short term basis, but applicable
state Civil Aviation Authorities will publish raised or lowered OCA and/or OCH values only.
If an OCA (OCH) published in NOTAM is higher than DH/DA/MDH/MDA indicated on
approach chart, this higher value shall be used. The applicable VIS/RVR shall be checked
for a possible increase.
Pressure altimeters are calibrated to indicate true altitude under ISA conditions. In case
where the temperature is higher than ISA the true altitude will be higher than the figure
indicated by the altimeter and the true altitude will be lower when the temperature is lower
than ISA. The altimeter error may be significant under conditions of extremely low
temperatures. Refer to OM Part A, Chapter 8.1.2.6 for details on increasing minima.
All flight crews are required to develop and maintain a sound working knowledge of the
system used for reporting aerodrome actual and forecast weather conditions and for the
associated codes. The information provided in the relevant parts of OM Part C (Jeppesen
Airway Manual - General) highlights the different weather reports and their interpretation.
METARS and TAFS are produced by airport meteorological offices and used by the
Commander (Pilot-In-Command) to decide whether actual/forecast conditions would allow
a safe landing within the permitted aerodrome operating minima.
METARS (Aviation routine weather reports), are compiled half hourly or hourly and contain
the following coded information:
• Type of report (METAR) or SPECI (special report);
• ICAO station identifier;
• Time of observation;
• Wind direction (normally degrees true, occasionally degrees magnetic) and speed
(kts or km/h or m/s);
• Gusts;
• Horizontal visibility;
• RVR, if visibility is less than 1500 m;
• Weather phenomena (if any);
• Clouds;
• CB (cumulonimbus) or TCB, (towering cumulus) if any;
• Temperature and dew point (T, DT);
• QNH;
• Supplemental information, if applicable (recent weather, windshear, etc.);
• Trend;
• BECMG (becoming) indicates an expected permanent change;
• TEMPO (temporarily) indicates a temporary fluctuation in weather conditions;
• PROB (probability) indicates a probable (given in percent) change;
• AT – at a specific time;
• FM – from …;
• TL – until …;
• CAVOK (Cloud And Visibility OK) - if visibility is 10 km or more, no clouds are
reported/expected below 1500 m (5000 feet) or below the highest minimum sector
altitude, whichever is greater, and no cumulonimbus is reported or expected;
• Ceiling - the height above the ground or water of the base of the lowest layer of
cloud below 6000 m (20.000 feet) covering more than half of the sky (BKN or OVC);
• NSC – No Significant Clouds;
• NSW – No Significant Weather.
Clouds are reported in six character groups. The first three characters indicate the cloud
amount:
• FEW = 1 to 2 oktas;
• SCT (scattered) = 3 to 4 oktas;
• BKN (Broken) = 5 to 7 oktas;
• OVC (overcast) = 8 oktas;
• SKC = Sky clear.
The next three characters indicate base of the cloud layer in hundreds of feet above
aerodrome level. Note: In some countries the cloud amount may still be given in oktas
instead of FEW, SCT, BKN or OVC.
TAFS (Terminal Aerodrome Forecast) are usually valid for a period of not less than 9
hours but no more than 24 hours. Routine aerodrome forecasts valid for less than 12
hours should normally be issued every 3 hours, all others every 6 hours. The structure is
similar to the METAR but lists forecast weather conditions without dew point, temperature
and QNH.
Meteorological charts are issued four times a day at fixed intervals 00:00, 06:00, 12:00 and
18:00 UTC and are normally available at least 9 hours before such times.
Significant Weather Charts cover the layers between surface to FL 100, FL 100 – FL 250,
FL 100 – FL 450 and FL 250 – FL 630. These charts show significant en-route weather
phenomena such as:
• Thunderstorms;
• Tropical cyclones;
• Severe squalls;
• Moderate or severe turbulence;
• Moderate or severe icing;
• Type of clouds – particularly cumulonimbus type clouds;
• Surface position of convergence zones;
• Tropopause height;
• Jetstreams;
• Information on the location and times of volcanic eruptions.
These charts shall be used to determine hazardous weather conditions en-route and to
check route planning.
Wind charts - the following wind charts should be available to determine the wind en-route
and to the alternate(s):
Note: Full details of weather reports and meteorological data presentation are available in
the Jeppesen Airway Manual – General (section Meteorology).
DESTINATION Applicable from lhe start of the change. Not .appi cable Applicable
at ETA ±1 HR
TAKE-OFF Mean wind : Should
OPERATING PROCEDURES
• The spaoe following 'FM' should alvtays indude a time group e.g. 'FM1031L
An aeroplane shall carry a sufficient amount of usable fuel to complete the planned flight
safely and to allow for deviations from the planned operation. Adequate fuel quantity (block
fuel) to cover the requirements of Trip, Contingency, Alternate, Reserve and Taxi must be
loaded prior to departure.
An Operational Flight Plan (OFP) = Computerized Flight Plan (CFP) is produced using
performance data provided by the aeroplane manufacturer's documentation, navigation
and wind data from the software provider, and fuel required for the flight is calculated,
using the Company fuel policy at the planning stage taking into account:
• Current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts
(anticipated meteorological conditions);
• Anticipated (aeroplane) weight;
• Routings;
• ATS procedures, restrictions and anticipated delays;
• Notices to Airmen;
• Any procedures or limitations contained in the Operations Manual;
• Possibility of the failure of one engine while en-route;
• The effects of deferred maintenance items and/or configuration deviations;
• Minimum cost operation;
• Realistic aircraft fuel consumption data based on data provided by the aircraft
manufacturer. For this purpose a fuel performance factor shall be determined for
each aircraft – refer to OM Part B.
The OFP will include an amount of recommended extra fuel where experience on a route
has shown that flight level restrictions or destination holdings are common.
When weather or other factors dictate the use of an alternate which is not listed in the
OFP, the Commander must request another OFP with the alternate used.
At any time during a flight the fuel quantity remaining on board must be enough to deal
with the planned operation and the possible deviations.
The final authority and responsibility for fuel loads and the fuel management in flight rests
with the Commander (Pilot-In-Command)
.
Taxi Fuel
The fuel expected to be used prior to take-off, including engine start, taxi and APU
consumption.
To define amount of taxi fuel a statistical average taxi time at various departing stations
should be used. If statistical data are not available a minimum of 10 minutes taxi time shall
be applied for calculation.
Maximum ramp weight may not be exceeded with taxi fuel on board.
Trip Fuel
Contingency Fuel
The purpose of contingency fuel (route reserve fuel) is to compensate for any
unforeseeable factors, such as:
• Deviation from forecast meteorological conditions; or
• Deviation from planned routings and/or cruising levels/altitudes.
Contingency fuel shall be 5% of the planned trip fuel or of the fuel required from the point
of re-planning but in any case shall not be lower than the amount required to fly for five
minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1500 ft) above the destination aerodrome in standard
conditions.
Note: Unforeseen factors are those which could have an influence on the fuel
consumption to the destination aerodrome, such as deviations of an individual
aeroplane from the expected fuel consumption data, deviations from forecast
meteorological conditions, extended taxi times before take-off, and deviations from
planned routings and/or cruising levels.
Where a destination alternate aerodrome is required, the amount of fuel required to enable
the aeroplane to:
1) Perform a missed approach at the destination aerodrome;
2) Climb to the expected cruising altitude;
3) Fly the expected routing;
4) Descend to the point where the expected approach is initiated; and
5) Conduct the approach and landing at the destination alternate aerodrome.
If two destination alternates are required, alternate fuel shall be sufficient to proceed to the
alternate which requires the greater amount of alternate fuel.
Final reserve fuel shall be sufficient for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1500 ft above
alternate aerodrome elevation (or destination aerodrome when no alternate is required) in
ISA conditions, calculated with estimated weight on arrival at the alternate or the
destination (when no alternate is required).
Additional Fuel
Additional fuel may include effect of any CDL and/or MEL item if no adjustment has been
made to the fuel calculations. Any ballast fuel carried shall not be included in endurance
calculation.
Extra Fuel
Extra fuel may be uplifted at the discretion of the Commander for operational reasons.
However it should be remembered that carrying too much unnecessary extra fuel
increases the fuel consumption for that sector and therefore reduces the economy of the
operation (lower flex temperature, more tire and brake wear, more time in climb phase,
lower optimum flight level etc.).
To cater for very short sectors, and for alternates which are close to the destination, JC
Airlines has specified the following minimum fuel values:
• Minimum contingency fuel shall not be below 200 kg;
• Minimum destination alternate fuel shall not be below 1000 kg and minimum
diversion fuel (destination alternate fuel + destination contingency alternate fuel +
final reserve fuel) shall not be below 2000 kg.
The contingency fuel may be reduced to 5% of the planned fuel burn from the in-flight re-
despatch/re-planning point (decision point) to the final destination, but not below JC
Airlines’ stated minimum contingency fuel (200 kg).
The total fuel load calculated shall be increased if necessary to not less than the fuel load
needed for flight to the alternate destination, calculated in accordance with paragraph
8.1.8.2 Standard Fuel Calculation Procedure or paragraph 8.1.8.5 Minimum Fuel
Reserves.
The alternate destination must be available for landing at the appropriate time, and its
weather forecast must allow a technical stop to be made.
If the weather forecast for the destination gives a reasonable certainty that the landing may
be made under visual meteorological conditions, the final reserve fuel, destination
alternate fuel and destination alternate contingency fuel may be replaced by minimum fuel
reserve comprising either:
• Alternate fuel from decision height at destination to landing at alternate plus 5%
contingency; or
• 60 minutes holding fuel at 450m (1500ft) above destination aerodrome elevation
whichever is the greater.
The use of minimum fuel reserves to destinations which pose special problems is not
allowed.
Appropriate weather minima refers to appropriate weather reports or forecasts for the
destination aerodrome, or any combination thereof, which indicate that for the period from
one hour before, until one hour after the expected time of arrival (ETA) at destination, the
ceiling will be at least 2000 ft or circling height + 500 ft, whichever is greater, and the
visibility will be at least 5 km.
8.1.8.6 Tankering
Commanders shall base decision for or against economical tankage on fuel index concept
and recommendations and/or limitations stated below.
8.1.8.7 Oil
The minimum oil quantity requested for any flight is equal to the minimum quantity
specified for a particular engine, plus the estimated oil consumption. Adequate oil quantity
to cover the requirements of trip, contingency, alternate, reserve and taxi must be loaded
prior to departure.
Minimum and maximum oil quantities and maximum average estimated oil consumption (if
no data from maintenance available) are indicated in the applicable OM Part B/FCOM.
Fuel records will be retained with the OFP, Journey Log and Aircraft Technical Log. Oil
carriage and consumption will be recorded in the Aircraft Technical Log.
In all JC Airlines documents the term “Weight” is usually used instead of the term “Mass”.
For operational purposes the term Weight (W) is to be considered equal to the term Mass
(M).
8.1.9.1 Definitions
Manufacturer’s Empty Weight (MEW): The weight of the structure, power plant,
furnishings, systems and other items of equipment that are considered an integral part of
the aircraft. It is essentially a “dry” weight, including only those fluids contained in closed
systems (e.g. hydraulic fluid).
Operational Empty Weight (OEW): The manufacturer’s weight empty plus the operator’s
items, i.e. flight and cabin crew and their baggage, unusable fuel, engine oil, emergency
equipment, toilet chemicals and fluids, galley structure, catering equipment, seats,
documents, etc.
Dry Operating Weight (DOW): The total weight of the specific aircraft ready for a specific
type of operation excluding all usable fuel and traffic load. It represents Operational Empty
Weight plus items specific to the type of flight, i.e. catering, pantry equipment, extra crew,
etc.
Dry Operating Index (DOI): The applicable index on the aeroplane index system
corresponding to the specific DOW.
Maximum Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW): The maximum permissible weight of an aircraft
with no usable fuel. The weight of the fuel contained in particular tanks must be included in
the zero fuel weight when it is explicitly mentioned in the Aircraft Flight Manual limitations.
Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW): The weight obtained by addition of the total traffic load and the
dry operating weight.
Maximum Allowed Weight for Take-Off: The maximum allowed weight for take-off for a
specific flight considers:
• The maximum (structural) take-off weight, and
• The maximum permitted take-off weight as limited by performance reasons and the
calculated trip fuel, to assure that the maximum permitted landing weight is not
exceeded.
Maximum (Structural) Take-Off Weight (MTOW): The maximum permissible total aircraft
weight at the start of the take-off run. This is the maximum structural limit and must not be
mistaken with the Maximum Allowed Weight for Take-Off which also considers any
additional performance limitations for a particular route.
Take-Off Weight (TOW): The weight at take-off at the departure aerodrome. It is equal to
the landing weight at destination plus the trip fuel (fuel needed for the trip), or to the zero
fuel weight plus the take-off fuel (fuel needed at the brake release point including
reserves).
Maximum Allowed Weight for Landing: The maximum allowed weight for landing
considers:
• The maximum (structural) landing weight, and
• The maximum permitted landing weight for performance reasons.
Maximum (Structural) Landing Weight (MLW): The maximum permissible total aircraft
weight upon landing under normal circumstances.
Traffic Load (TL): The total weight of passengers, baggage and cargo including
nonrevenue loads (if any).
Payload (PL): The total weight of the revenue load (passengers, cargo or mail).
Last Minute Change (LMC): A late change/amendment to the weight and balance sheet
which does not require the preparation of a new weight and balance sheet if the
changes/amendments to the existing weight and balance sheet do not exceed the limits
specified in the OM Part B.
Passenger Classification:
• Adults (male and female) are defined as persons of an age of 12 years and above;
• Children are defined as persons of an age of 2 years and above, but who are less
than 12 years of age;
• Infants are defined as persons who are less than 2 years of age.
Certified Centre of Gravity Limits (CG): These are the CG limits the aircraft was certified
with. Making full use of the certified limits would assume that the centre of gravity was
correctly computed without any errors.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-54
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
The Weight and Balance Document (i.e. Load and Trim sheet), manual or computerised,
will establish the aircraft’s weight and centre of gravity. It must contain the weight and
disposition of all loaded items, including fuel, indicating whether standard or actual weight
values for passengers have been used.
The Commander shall insure that before each flight a load calculation is prepared on the
correct form and complies with the aircraft weights and CG certified limitations. The ground
handling staff is responsible for ensuring the correct traffic load totals and correct Load
and Trim sheet calculation. The person who prepares the Load and Trim sheet must be
named on it.
The person supervising the loading must confirm by signature that the load and its
distribution are in accordance with Load and Trim sheet.
The correct loading of the aircraft is the legal responsibility of the Commander. He must
satisfy himself that the load is distributed in a correct and safe manner and that it is
properly stowed and secured. Actual weight must be used when taking freight or ballast
into account.
The weight of fuel on board the aircraft is directly given by the Fuel Quantity Indication
(FQI) of the aircraft. The Commander should assess this quantity by comparing this figure
with the quantity on board before refuelling plus the quantity delivered by the tanker. Fuel
measurement through magnetic fuel level indicators (dipsticks) should be used only in
case of FQI failure (dispatch under MEL).
If deemed necessary, the Commander has full authority to modify the aircraft loading.
The method for preparation of the Load and Trim sheet is given in OM Part B, Chapter 6,
Weight and Balance. The CG limits given in the Load and Trim sheet include tolerances to
cope with the combination of the following independent errors and movements:
• Error on initial conditions (dry operating weight and index);
• Error on cargo loading (weight and distribution);
• Error on passenger boarding (weight and distribution);
• Error on fuel (quantity and distribution);
• Error due to graphical method;
• Landing gear, flaps and slats movements;
• Movements in the cabin.
The Load and Trim sheet should be handed over to the Commander not later than 10
minutes prior to the estimated time of departure. The Commander shall thoroughly check
the Load and Trim sheet. Prior to signing it he must specifically check the following:
• Load and Trim sheet calculation shall be based on kilograms;
• Date;
• Route and flight number;
• Crew configuration;
• Passenger totals do not exceed or deviate from the seating and safety equipment
limitations according to the aeroplane certification;
• Actual weight will not exceed the structural and operational limits for Take-off,
Landing and Zero Fuel weight;
• ZFW, ZFW MAC and T/O MAC;
• Stabiliser setting is within limits;
• Fuel figures correspond to the actual amount and distribution in the tanks;
• LMC limits.
By signing the Load and Trim sheet, the Commander certifies on behalf of the Company
that:
• The aeroplane is carrying all necessary legal and operational documents;
• The aeroplane is airworthy and maintenance released;
• All traffic load is authorised, correctly distributed and secured for safe flight.
If Load sheet calculation is not supported by applicable Ground Handling service, the
Commander is authorised to prepare manual Load and Trim sheet.
Load and Trim sheet shall be issued and signed, at least, in triplicate and distributed as
follows:
• The standard weight value to be used for operating flight crew is 85 kg.
• The standard weight value to be used for operating cabin crew is 75 kg.
The standard crew weights include usual hand baggage. Any additional baggage piece
must be taken into account.
Standard Weight Values for Passengers and Persons other than Operating Crew
Standard passenger weights should normally be used for calculation. Alternate weights
may be used, provided that hand baggage is accounted separately and the Commander is
being informed about using those alternate weights.
When using alternate weight values for carry-on baggage, 8 kg should be used per piece.
• Crew baggage: The standard weight value to be used for crew baggage is 15 kg
per crew member.
• Passenger baggage: To determine the total weight of the passenger baggage,
normally the actual weight determined by weighing shall be used. When weighing is
not possible, the Commander shall determine the total baggage weight by means of
the following standard baggage weight values:
Note: Domestic flight means a flight with origin and destination within the borders of one
State.
Flights within the Asian region means flights, other than domestic flights, whose origin and
destination are within the area bounded by rhumb lines as depicted below:
Intercontinental flights, other than flights within the European or Asian region, are flights
with origin and destination in different continents.
LMC is only permitted if the changes of the load (either plus or minus) are within the limits
defined in the applicable OM Part B (+/- 500kg). The changes have to be entered into the
Load and Trim sheet into the ‘LMC’ column.
In exceptional cases - if time does not permit otherwise – changes may be relayed to the
Commander via radio or the ground service interphone. The Commander and Ground
Handling Staff shall amend their copies accordingly. The load message sent to the
destination must contain the corrected figures of passengers, cargo, baggage or mail load.
When entering the weight figures for the take-off fuel and trip fuel (burn off) the correct
specific gravity must be used to convert the volume into mass value. The same applies to
any other fluids, such as oil. Whenever possible and practicable, the specific gravity of fuel
- as obtained from the fuelling crew - must be used. If this is not possible or practicable,
the following specific gravity values may be used:
• Jet fuel A/A1: 0.796 kg/litre;
• Jet fuel B/JP-4: 0.760 kg/litre;
• Oil: 0.880 kg/litre.
The weight and balance sheet is prepared assuming a particular passenger seating
distribution. If a seat allocation system is used in connection with the preparation of the
Load and Trim sheet, any possible errors in the CG position will be covered by the
operational CG envelope – provided the passengers are seated as allocated.
‘Free seating’ however might require a repositioning of passengers in the cabin. The
Commander shall instruct the cabin crew to reseat passengers so that the actual seating
distribution complies with the balance part of the Load and Trim sheet. Alternatively, the
Commander shall adjust the Load and Trim sheet to reflect the actual distribution.
An ATC flight plan must be filed for each Company flight (IFR, VFR, revenue or non-
revenue). Special procedures or manoeuvrability limitations (if any) shall be indicated.
FLIGHT PLAN
PLAN DE VOL
PRIORITY ADDRESSE~~S)
Prio<ite Destinataire(s
<<= FF -+
ORIGINATOR
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k~%G~I~'k.t Ex~~eur
I -+I I I I
SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION OF ADDRESSEE(S) AND/OR ORIGNATOR
I I I I<<-
ldenbfocation prtlcise du(des) destinataire(s) etlou de l'exp6doteur
-D 13 DEPARTURE AERODROME
I I I I TIME
;O - I I I<<=
Aerodrome de dej rt Heure
-1
15 CRUISING SPEED
I I I
LEVEL
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ROUTE
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Vrtesse croisiere Niveau Route
-I I 1-+1
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TOTALEET
Duree l otale estlmee ALTN AERODROME 2ND. ALTN AERODROME
16 DESTINATION AERODROME
Aerodrome de destlnatioro HR. MIN Aerodrome de degagement 2' ae<6drome de degagement
-+[QJ;C]-+1 I
AIRCRAFT COLOUR AND MARKINGS
I 1-+[g-+1 I<<=
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REMARKS
Remarques
-{~}I I<<=
PILOT-IN-COMMAND
Pilote ccmmandant de bord
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FILED BY/Dl!pose par
SPACE RESERVED FOR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Espace rl!serve <\ des fins supplementaires
The procedure to fill an ATC flight plan is defined in ICAO Doc 4444. The ATC flight plan
must be filed at least 1 hour before the ETD, unless national regulations state otherwise.
The ATC flight plan should be amended or a new ATC flight plan submitted and the old
one cancelled, whichever is applicable in the event of a delay of 30 minutes in excess of
the estimated off-block time for which an ATC flight plan has been submitted.
At home base the Flight Dispatch (Operations Control Centre), at outstations the
contracted ground handling company/agent should file the ATC Flight Plan. The
Commander is provided with a copy of the ATC Flight Plan on the OFP.
Commence inserting data in the first space provided. Where excess space is available,
leave unused spaces blank.
Complete also Item 19 as indicated hereunder, when so required by the appropriate ATS
authority or when otherwise deemed necessary.
Note: Provisions for the use of radiotelephony call signs are contained in Annex 10,
Volume II, Chapter 5. ICAO designators and telephony designators for aircraft
operating agencies are contained in Doc 8585 - Designators for Aircraft Operating
Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and Services.
Flight Rules
Insert one of the following letters to denote the category of flight rules with which the pilot
intends to comply:
I if IFR
V if VFR
Y if IFR first and specify in Item 15 the point or points where a change of
Z if VFR first flight rules is planned
Type of Flight
Insert one of the following letters to denote the type of flight when so required by the
appropriate ATS authority:
Insert the appropriate designator as specified in ICAO Doc 8643, Aircraft Type Designator:
or, if no such designator has been assigned, or in case of formation flights comprising
more than one type, insert:
ZZZZ, and specify in Item 18, the (numbers and) type(s) of aircraft preceded by TYP/
Insert an oblique stroke followed by one of the following letters to indicate the wake
turbulence category of the aircraft:
Insert one or more of the following letters to indicate the COM/NAV/approach aid
equipment available and serviceable:
Note:
1) Standard equipment is considered to be VHF RTF, ADF, VOR and ILS, unless another
combination is prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority.
2) If the letter Z is used, specify in Item 18 the other equipment carried, preceded by
COM/ and/or NAV/, as appropriate.
3) If the letter J is used, specify in Item 18 the equipment carried, preceded by DAT/
followed by one or more letters as appropriate.
4) Information on navigation capability is provided to ATC for clearance and routing
purposes.
5) Inclusion of letter R indicates that an aircraft meets the RNP type prescribed for the
route segment(s), route(s) and/or area concerned.
Surveillance equipment
SSR equipment
ADS equipment
Insert the ICAO four-letter location indicator of the departure aerodrome, or, if no location
indicator has been assigned, insert ZZZZ and specify, in Item 18, the name of the
aerodrome preceded by DEP/ or, if the flight plan is received from an aircraft in flight,
insert AFIL, and specify, in Item 18, the ICAO four-letter location indicator of the location of
the ATS unit from which supplementary flight plan data can be obtained, preceded by
DEP/ , then, without a space, insert for a flight plan submitted before departure, the
estimated off-block time, or, for a flight plan received from an aircraft in flight, the actual or
estimated time over the first point of the route to which the flight plan applies.
Insert the first cruising speed as in (a) and the first cruising level as in (b), without a space
between them, then, following the arrow, insert the route description as in (c).
Insert the True Air Speed for the first or the whole cruising portion of the flight, in terms of:
Insert the planned cruising level for the first or the whole portion of the route to be flown, in
terms of:
Insert if the departure aerodrome is located on or connected to the ATS route, the
designator of the first ATS route, or if the departure aerodrome is not on or connected to
the ATS route, the letters DCT followed by the point of joining the first ATS route, followed
by the designator of the ATS route.
Then insert each point at which either a change of speed or level, a change of ATS route,
and/or a change of flight rules is planned (note: When a transition is planned between a
lower and upper ATS route and the routes are oriented in the same direction, the point of
transition need not be inserted).
Follow in each case by the designator of the next ATS route segment, even if the same as
the previous one, or by DCT, if the flight to the next point will be outside a designated
route, unless both points are defined by geographical coordinates.
Insert points normally not more than 30 minutes flying time or 370 km (200 NM) apart,
including each point at which a change of speed or level, a change of track, or a change of
flight rules is planned, or, when required by appropriate ATS authority(ies), define the track
of flights operating predominantly in an east-west direction between 70°N and 70°S by
reference to significant points formed by the intersections of half or whole degrees of
latitude with meridians spaced at intervals of 10 degrees of longitude. For flights operating
in areas outside those latitudes the tracks shall be defined by significant points formed by
the intersection of parallels of latitude with meridians normally spaced at 20 degrees of
longitude. The distance between significant points shall, as far as possible, not exceed one
hour's flight time. Additional significant points shall be established as deemed necessary.
Insert DCT between successive points unless both points are defined by geographical
coordinates or by bearing and distance.
Use only the conventions in (1) to (5) below and separate each sub-item by a space.
The coded designator assigned to the route or route segment including, where
appropriate, the coded designator assigned to the standard departure or arrival route (e.g.
Y711, UB10, BULLS1P).
Note: Provisions for the application of route designators are contained in Annex 11,
Appendix 1, whilst guidance material on the application of an RNP type to a
specific route segment(s), route(s) or area is contained in the Manual on Required
Navigation Performance (RNP) (Doc 9613).
The coded designator (2 to 5 characters) assigned to the point (e.g. NAH, OLMEN), or, if
no coded designator has been assigned, one of the following ways:
• Degrees only (7 characters):
2 figures describing latitude in degrees, followed by "N" (North) or "S" (South),
followed by 3 figures describing longitude in degrees, followed by "E" (East) or "W"
The point at which a change of speed (5% TAS or 0.01 Mach or more) or a change of level
is planned, expressed exactly as in (2) above, followed by an oblique stroke and both the
cruising speed and the cruising level, expressed exactly as in (a) and (b) above, without a
space between them, even when only one of these quantities will be changed.
Examples:
LN/N0284A045MAY/N0305Fl80
HAKAO/N0420F330
4602N07805W/N0500F350
46N078W/M079F330
DUB180040/N0330M0810
The point at which the change of flight rules is planned, expressed exactly as in (2) or (3)
above as appropriate, followed by a space and one of the following:
Examples:
LN VFR
LN/N0284A050 IFR
The letter C followed by an oblique stroke; then the point at which cruise climb is planned
to start, expressed exactly as in (2) above, followed by an oblique stroke; then the speed
to be maintained during cruise climb, expressed exactly as in (a) above, followed by the
two levels defining the layer to be occupied during cruise climb, each level expressed
exactly as in (b) above, or the level above which cruise climb is planned followed by the
letters plus, without a space between them.
Examples:
C/48N050W/M082F290F350
C/48N050W/M082F290PLUS
C/52N050W/M220F580F620
Insert the ICAO four-letter location indicator of the destination aerodrome followed, without
a space, by the total estimated elapsed time, or, if no location indicator has been assigned,
insert ZZZZ followed, without a space, by the total estimated elapsed time, and specify in
Item 18 the name of the aerodrome, preceded by DEST/
Note: For a flight plan received from an aircraft in flight, the total estimated elapsed time
is the estimated time from the first point of the route to which the flight plan
applies.
Insert the ICAO four-letter location indicator(s) of not more than two alternate aerodromes,
separated by a space, or, if no location indicator has been assigned to the alternate
aerodrome, insert ZZZZ and specify in Item 18 the name of the aerodrome, preceded by
ALTN/
Insert: 0 (zero) if no other information, or, any other necessary information in the preferred
sequence shown hereunder, in the form of the appropriate indicator followed by an oblique
stroke and the information to be recorded:
Endurance
After E/ insert a 4-figure group giving the fuel endurance in hours and minutes.
Persons on board
After P/ insert the total number of persons (passengers and crew) on board, when required
by the appropriate ATS authority. Insert TBN (to be notified) if the total number of persons
is not known at the time of filing.
R/ (RADIO):
Cross out U if UHF on frequency 243.0 MHz is not available. Cross out V if VHF on
frequency 121.5 MHz is not available. Cross out E if emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
is not available.
S/ (SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT):
Cross out all indicators if survival equipment is not carried. Cross out P if polar survival
equipment is not carried. Cross out D if desert survival equipment is not carried. Cross out
M if maritime survival equipment is not carried. Cross out J if jungle survival equipment is
not carried.
J/ (JACKETS):
Cross out all indicators if life jackets are not carried. Cross out L if life jackets are not
equipped with lights. Cross out F if life jackets are not equipped with fluorescein. Cross out
U or V or both as in R/ above to indicate radio capability of jackets, if any.
D/ (DINGHIES)
(NUMBER):
Cross out indicators D and C if no dinghies are carried, or insert number of dinghies
carried; and
(CAPACITY):
Insert total capacity, in persons, of all dinghies carried; and
(COVER):
N/ (REMARKS):
Cross out indicator N if no remarks, or indicate any other survival equipment carried and
any other remarks regarding survival equipment.
C / (PILOT IN COMMAND):
Insert name of pilot-in-command.
Filed by
Insert the name of the unit, agency or person filing the flight plan.
If at any point after take-off the Commander wishes to change the flight plan, he must
request the change and obtain the concurrence of ATC in the form of an amended
clearance. Likewise, ATC may initiate an amended clearance for traffic requirement and if
concurrence between the Commander and an ATC controller is not possible, the flight is
continued under the emergency authority of the Commander.
Any request for an amended clearance should be made considering traffic and the
planning and co-ordination requirements of the ATC. A pilot shall not accept a clearance
with which he cannot safely comply with or which exceeds the capabilities of the
aeroplane. The Commander has the final authority as to the operation of the aeroplane.
An ATC clearance is not an authorisation for a pilot to deviate from any regulation or to
conduct an unsafe operation. If, due to severe weather, an immediate deviation is
required, the pilot’s emergency authority will be exercised. A pilot should question any
clearance or any part of a clearance that he does not understand. Each pilot-in-command
who is given priority by ATC in an emergency shall submit a detailed report of that
emergency through an ASR.
Clearance Limits
An ATC clearance issued before take-off normally includes the destination airport as the
clearance limit. A flight may be cleared to a point short of the destination if ATC has no
assurance that co-ordination with a subsequent area control centre will be accomplished
before that flight enters its FIR.
A flight must not continue beyond its clearance limit without further clearance. It is the
controller’s responsibility to furnish further clearance before a flight reaches the clearance
limit. This clearance may change the clearance limit to a point beyond or it may include
holding instruction at the clearance limit. In that case the controller should provide the pilot
with an expected further clearance time.
Departure Procedure
The departure procedure includes the routing and any altitude restrictions during after
take-off to the en-route phase. At most airports, Standard Instrument Departures (SID)
have been established which identify each departure procedure with a name and a
designator. SIDs are charted and used routinely to simplify and shorten clearance delivery.
A pilot is to accept a SID as part of the ATC clearance only if the SID number in the
clearance corresponds with his charted information.
Route of Flight
If the route of flight is different from that filed, or if the flight is an oceanic flight, or if a
clearance is issued en-route, the clearance must include a description of the route using
airway designations and waypoints.
When ATC includes the Mach number as part of the clearance or a route has Mach
number technique that Mach number must be maintained as closely as possible (e.g. in
MNPS airspace), any change in Mach number must be approved by ATC. Additionally,
ETA amendments of more than 3 minutes must also be reported to ATC.
Altitude
A cleared altitude means an assigned altitude or flight level including any climb or descent
restrictions (e.g. altitude constraints). A new clearance is required to leave that altitude or
flight level.
In some part of the world, altitude clearances are based on separation from known air
traffic and may not provide separation from terrain and obstructions. The Commander is
responsible for ensuring that any clearance issued by ATC provides terrain and
obstruction separation.
Upon receiving a clearance containing altitude information, the Commander must verify
that the clearance does not violate any altitude restriction for the route to be flown.
Holding Instructions
If a flight is cleared to hold, ATC holding instructions must be complied with. These
instructions may be issued by the controller or they may be available on the charts.
Arrival Route
Clearance for an arrival route is not issued until a flight is approaching the terminal area.
This is a detailed clearance that fully describes the routing to a point from which the flight
will be manoeuvred for the approach to the airport.
At most airports, Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs) have been established. They
identify each airport arrival route with a name and a designator. STARs are charted and
used routinely to simplify and shorten clearance delivery. A pilot is to accept a STAR as
part of the ATC clearance only if the STAR number in the clearance corresponds with his
charted information.
Communications
The frequency of departure control or the next en-route facility may be included with the
clearance.
Approach Clearance
When ATC issues a clearance, a pilot is expected to comply promptly after acceptance.
ATC may use the term ‘immediate’ to communicate urgency and the requirement for
expeditious compliance.
The PM shall make a visible record of each ATC route clearance or revision hereto on the
OFP. All ATC clearances shall be read back using standard phraseology.
For flights into areas or aerodromes with limited acceptance rate, a departure calculated
take-off time (CTOT/or time SLOT) may be assigned, i.e. a specified time or time period
at/during which the flight may take-off. The CTOT begins 5 Minutes before and ends 10
minutes after the predetermined take-off time. The tolerance is primarily intended for use
by ATC to allow for aerodrome congestion problems. Therefore, flight crew must plan for
an off-block time consistent with the CTOT. If possible, the arrangement for departure shall
ensure that the flight will be ready for departure at the runway at the assigned CTOT
minus 5 Minutes.
Pilots will usually be informed of their assigned CTOT by station personnel/OCC/ handling
agent or ATC.
Assigned CTOT’s are frequently improved (see Ready Message below) at short notice.
For that reason Commanders should not delay the boarding based solely on current CTOT
information – to avoid unnecessary rush or even delay in case of sudden CTOT
improvement.
When the CTOT is clearly behind schedule and the flight is able to depart well before
CTOT, the Commander shall inform Company station personnel/OCC and/or ATC unit to
dispatch a “ready” message and to request a revised CTOT from flow control coordination
centres. A ready message may lead to an improvement.
For production of operational flight plans Jeppesen JetPlan System is being used.
An Operational Flight Plan (OFP) is completed for each JC Airlines operated flight. It shall
indicate that all requirements regarding meteorological conditions and fuel consumption
have been met. The OFP shall include take-off, en-route and destination alternate(s), as
required.
Prior to the completion of the OFP, the flight crew has to check all relevant aspects of the
flight including the regulations considering departure, arrival and alternate minima and any
personal minima before deciding on the feasibility of the flight. The OFP must be approved
by the Commander before the departure.
The printout of the OFP is an official form which becomes a document by the signature of
the Commander (Pilot-In-Command).
Note: With his signature the Commander also certifies adequate knowledge of the route
and aerodromes (Route and Aerodrome Competence Qualification).
A copy of the signed OFP shall remain at the departure station and will be retained on the
ground for at least the duration of each flight or series of flights.
A least one copy (but preferably two) of the OFP shall be carried on the flight deck.
Only entries and records relevant for the flight shall be made on the OFP. All flight crew
entries and records on the OFP shall be made concurrently and permanent in nature. The
OFP shall be comprehensively completed during the flight by PM (PNF), except when
operating in busy areas at lower altitudes (practically below 10.000 ft).
Filled OFP shall be placed into Flight Envelope and returned for storage after the flight.
The OFP/flight release used for JC Airlines flights shall contain the following information:
1) Air Operator's name;
2) Date of flight;
3) Aeroplane registration;
4) Aeroplane type and model;
5) Flight number;
6) Commander’s name and names of each flight crew member;
7) Flight Dispatcher's name, as applicable;
8) Departure aerodrome;
9) Destination aerodrome;
10) Alternate aerodrome(s), as applicable, including destination, departures and
enroute alternate(s);
11) Routing to destination by successive navigational way points and a method to
obtain associated tracks for each;
12) Routing to alternate aerodrome, as applicable;
13) Planned cruise altitudes to destination and alternate, as applicable;
14) Planned cruise true air speed;
15) Planned cruise indicated air speed, ground speed or mach number, as applicable;
16) Winds at planned cruise altitude, expressed in terms of direction/velocity;
17) Temperature at cruise altitude;
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-75
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
NONSTOP COMPUTED 0742Z FOR ETD 0100Z PROGS 0300NWS XUXXX KGS
POA VTBS 0 002475 00/56 0348 0156Z 065270 062813 016000 043516
ALT VDSR 001716 00/40 0189 0233Z
HLD 000000 00/00
COT 000213 00/06
RES 001250 00/30
XTR 000500 00/11
TXO 000120 00/10
TXI 000000 00/00
APU 000105 01/00
TOT 005879 02/23 TRK VDPPVTBS-Cl
VDPP A340 RYN DOLN1C VTBS
DEPARTURE ATIS:
ATC CLEARANCE:
CPT FLT T WIND S TAS GRS MCS DST DSTR ETE ETR FU FR AFR FF/E
FREQ COORDS AW MSA
TOC 380 ..... . .. .. 292. 003 0204 0/01 0/34 017 0042 ..... .
N12198 E102492 A340 080
BISOR 380 5117020 02 457 463 292. 070 0201 0/09 0/33 000 002 ...... 1130
N12211 E102468 A340 080
RYN 380 5119023 02 416 427 317. 042 0131 0/05 0/24 003 0039 ...... 1138
112.5 N12468 E101407 DOLNl 079
ATA .......... .
ENDFUEL ......... .
FIRS VTBB/0021
DESTINATION ATIS:
DESTINATION ALTERNATE
All entries on the OFP shall be made concurrently and shall be permanent in nature.
The Aircraft Technical Log (ATL) is a technical information system used for:
• Recording defects and malfunctions discovered during the aeroplane operation and
for recording details of all maintenance carried out on the particular aeroplane;
• Recording operating information relevant to flight safety and maintenance
information that the operating crew needs to know.
All known defects, suspected defects and irregularities shall be recorded in ATL until flight
crews are advised that maintenance is aware of the problem.
The flight crew and engineering staff have separate responsibilities in the use of the ATL.
The Aircraft Technical Log allows the Commander to satisfy himself that the aircraft is
airworthy in accordance with the approved maintenance system, MEL and CDL.
The ATL is a legal document. Details of any failure, defect or malfunction to the aeroplane
including emergency systems, and any failure, defect or malfunctions in the cabin or
galleys that affect the safe operation of the aeroplane or the safety of its occupants that
are known to the commander must be recorded in the ATL.
The ATL is made out of self-coping paper. A unique sequence number identifies each ATL
page, which comprises one original page and 3 copy pages, all in different colours.
Important: Verbal reporting to maintenance personnel does not substitute the Aircraft
Technical Log system. The Commander shall avoid the temptation to only
verbally pass on information about defects to maintenance personnel no
matter how ‘trivial’ the defects appear to be.
• All Aircraft Technical Log (ATL) entries shall be printed in capital letters (excluding
signature) in black or blue indelible ink and must be legible;
• Signature, not initials, will be followed by a printed surname, authorization number
(if applicable), and the entry date;
• If an error is made, a line will be drawn through the entry and a new entry must be
made - erasures are not permitted;
• All entries shall be made in English;
• An ATL page shall never be destroyed or deleted on account of an error;
• Maintenance action entries shall list any or all work done to correct, defer or
describe troubleshooting accomplished to correct a malfunction or pilot report;
• The Commander shall verify that the ATL is on board the aeroplane and that it
contains a sufficient number of pages for the flights scheduled. At least one spare
Aircraft Technical Log should be on-board the aircraft. If used, the flight crew should
make an entry in the Aircraft Technical Log accordingly;
• The Commander shall review the ATL for defects and the corrective actions taken
on prior flight irregularities, type of service performed, and airworthiness release (if
applicable);
• The Commander will record the oil quantity indicated by the flight deck
instrumentation. Physical checks of engine oil quantity will be carried out by
Maintenance in accordance with the maintenance programme. When this has been
done the engineer will make the Aircraft Technical Log entry and sign.
Correction if required I
1----------------·----·------------
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CHAPTER 8
Nol Parts lion PIN ON PIN OFF I SIN ON SIN OFF Station:
D Wed<ly Check
Start: I Finish:
1 1 I Fluid: I Ratio: IPer/med by:
I I I I Signatu~ Data: ...... ./ .... ./..
Time: .. .... .......... ..... .
Engine Oil Servicing APUOII Hydraulics Servicing Signature or stamp
quarts Servicing quarts Refueling and distribution in 0 Kg I 0 Lbs
qu<rts
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II I hereby cert1fy lhot I he AIC.
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Per/mod by: ............ ..
UPL l UPL l Planed u =L orlue4, the quantity of oil and
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RV!IM Signatull! Servicing performed by Totll
Signature
Namt-!Sign Signature
ompl. 0 HonCompl. D ~
JC lnlomotlonal Alrilno• ATL. form· Rov. 00 I 17.01.2017 Groy arou must bo complotod bolore ftight. Wh~o Copy· Romai"' On Boord: BloJo CoPII· To E&M; Pink Copy· To ATL. copy; Yolla.v Copy· To Stall on of Dopa~uro
All JC Airlines MEL related deferred defects must also be recorded on the applicable
aeroplane Deferred Maintenance Items (DMI) folder. The following information has to be
recorded in the DMI folder:
• Applicable consecutive DMI entry number;
• ATL Sequence Number of the related ATL page in order to cross refer to the origin
of the DMI entry;
• Defect description as defined on the related ATL page;
• Any required spare part number (if applicable);
• Signature and stamping with authorisation number of the authorized maintenance
person, who has transferred the defect to DMI;
• The date when the defect was transfer to the DMI;
• The applicable MEL Code and its applicable repair interval time limit.
When a defect, which has been recorded on the DMI, becomes rectified, a proper ATL
entry has to be performed by the certifying maintenance staff in order to record the
particular maintenance action and to ensure the cross-reference to the particular DMI
entry. In addition the following information has to be recorded in the applicable DMI by the
person who has cleared the particular DMI item:
• ATL Sequence Number of the ATL page on which the related defect rectification
was recorded in order to cross-refer to the origin of the DMI item clearance;
• Signature and stamping with authorisation number of the authorized maintenance
person who clears the applicable DMI item;
• The date when the DMI item has been cleared.
A/C REG :
DEFERRED MAINTENANCE ITEMS ( MEL / CDL )
EXTENSION CLOSE
DEFECT IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION & RECTIFICATION DUE
TAKEN ACTION
DATE : MEL/CDL REF : LOG SHEET : LOG SHEET :
EXTENSION CLOSE
DEFECT IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION & RECTIFICATION DUE
TAKEN ACTION
DATE : MEL/CDL REF : LOG SHEET : LOG SHEET :
EXTENSION CLOSE
DEFECT IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION & RECTIFICATION DUE
TAKEN ACTION
DATE : MEL/CDL REF : LOG SHEET : LOG SHEET :
EXTENSION CLOSE
DEFECT IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION & RECTIFICATION DUE
TAKEN ACTION
DATE : MEL/CDL REF : LOG SHEET : LOG SHEET :
NOTES A: 1. THIS FORM IS CONSIDERED AS INTEGRAL PART OF THE AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL LOG SYSTEM; ONCE THIS SHEET IS
CLOSED BY ALL ITEMS – IT SHALL BE REMOVED FROM AIRCRAFT AND TRANSFERED TO EMO.
2. DMI NUMBER IS CODED AS AIRCRAFT LOG SHEET NUMBER MEL CATEGORY AND ATL ITEM NUMBER
Minor damages to aeroplane exterior such as dents, scratches and visible repairs (e.g.
patches on the fuselage) within acceptable limits shall be marked to avoid repeated
dealing with the same damage. The marking shall be done by the approved line
maintenance staff according to the following guidelines:
• The damaged spots will be marked by a red dot of 5 – 8 mm at the most
characteristic point (e.g. deepest point of a dent, next to a scratch, etc.). For this
purpose a resistant red colour for aeroplane exterior should be used;
• All damages within acceptable limits and all already repaired damages shall be
marked;
• All marked damages shall be documented in the Damage Chart;
• Damage to windscreen shall only be documented in the Damage Chart (not marked
on the windscreen). Windscreen delamination can be marked as a damaged area.
Pilots should check if all defects or damage discovered during walk-around have already
been marked and documented in the Damage Chart. In case of an observed new damage,
Aircraft Technical Log (ATL) entry shall be made by the Commander.
Certain cabin defect may influence aeroplane’s overall safety status and shall be recorded
in Aircraft Technical Log (ATL). All cabin crew members are responsible for informing CIC
and/or Commander (Pilot-In-Command) about cabin defects in the respective areas upon
their discovery before or during a flight. The following list indicates cabin defects that must
be recorded in the ATL. It is not limiting, and Commanders must exercise their judgment
when recording cabin defects to ATL:
• Any MEL related item;
• Any safety related defect;
• PA/Interphone system;
• Portable oxygen system;
• Floor proximity emergency escape path lighting system;
• Cabin emergency lights;
• Emergency slides and rafts;
• Evacuation system;
• No smoking and fasten seat belts signs;
• Lavatory smoke detection and extinguishing system;
• Smoke/fire/sparks or smell of smoke in the cabin;
• Crew and/or passenger seat belts defect;
• Cabin crew seat mechanical defects;
• Passenger seat mounting or recline mechanism;
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-85
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
Journey Log is prepared for each commercial, training or technical flight in JC Airlines as
an integral part of Company flight scheduling information system.
Journey Log is prepared for series of flights delegated to one Commander with following
information to be filled:
• Aircraft type and registration;
• Date/day of month of the departure date;
• Captain and First Officer sectors flown;
• Flight data (ATL number, flight number);
• Sector (departure/arrival place);
• Scheduled times;
• Block and flight times;
• Delay information (time and code);
• Load information (passengers, baggage);
• Fuel record;
• Crew (names of crew members);
• Flight crew records (duty time information for all crew members);
• Captain’s (Commander’s) comments;
• Captain’s (Commander’s) signature.
All Journey Log entries shall be printed in capital letters (excluding signature) in black or
blue indelible ink and must be legible.
The Journey Log is made out of self-coping paper. Each Journey Log page comprises of
one original page and 3 copy pages, all in different colours.
A Commander shall ensure that the Journey Log is properly completed by First Officer
before he signs it and that original (white page) is inserted in the Flight Envelope for later
processing.
Pink copy is removed and retained by the Commander for personal record.
Blue copy must be removed after completion and handed over to CIC for cabin crew
records.
FLIGHT DATA SECTOR SCHEDULED (lJTC) BLOCK AND FliGHT TIMES (IJTC) DELAY PAX
S~C'J'OI( 0 1'1' ON I>LOCK T!U<I!· I'Ll GilT LuJ:gMe
,\TL # F:IGHT # FROM TO STD STA !.A'lDII\'G TIME CODE .'IDULT CHD INF !{(;
TIMI1 n1.or." ni.OCI< TIMF IWfo TIME
1
2
3
4
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S~:<:TOR ]) ~: NS I'I'V \III':'I.IH!j Hf:<:J-:11'1' II
KG
CHAPTER 8
CAl'T SIG N:
FLIGHT DATA: Insert aircraft technical log number (ATL #) and flight number
(FLIGHT #) for relevant sector.
SECTOR: Insert three letter IATA code for departure (FROM) and
destination (TO) aerodrome.
SCHEDULED (UTC): Insert scheduled time of departure (STD), scheduled time of
arrival (STA) – all in UTC and scheduled sector time
(SECTOR TIME).
BLOCK AND FLIGHT Insert block-off time (BLOCK OFF), block-on time (BLOCK
TIMES (UTC): ON), take-off time (TAKE OFF), landing time (LANDING) - all
in UTC and the sum of block time (BLOCK TIME) and flight
time (FLIGHT TIME).
DELAY: If applicable, insert the delay time in hours and minutes
(TIME) and the reason for delay in two numbers code
(CODE).
PAX: Insert the number of passengers: adults (ADULT), children
(CHD), infants (INF); and the baggage boarded on the aircraft
in kilograms (baggage KG).
123456 Each number represents the applicable sector.
FUEL RECORD: Insert the number for applicable sector (SECTOR), remaining
fuel in kilograms from previous sector (REMAINING KG),
uplifted fuel in litres or gallons – mark the appropriate
(UPLIFT LTR/GAL), density of uplifted fuel (DENSITY),
uplifted fuel in kilograms (UPLIFT KG), block fuel in kilograms
(BLOCK FUEL KG), arrival fuel in kilograms (ARR FUEL KG),
fuel used in kilograms (FUEL USED KG), fuel supplier and
receipt number (SUPPLIER/RECEIPT #). In case of multiple
fuel uplifts, insert the sum of all uplifted fuel and the last fuel
receipt number.
CREW: Insert the rank (RANK), name (NAME) and ID of the crew
members (NAME); Ranks: Captain (CAPT), first officer (F/O),
observer (OBS), cabin crew in charge (CIC), cabin crew
member (CC), engineer (ENG), etc.
CREW RECORD Insert check-in time (CHECK-IN) and check-out time (CHECK
(UTC): OUT) in UTC, duty time (DUTY TIME) and sectors flown.
CAPT COMMENTS:
Tick, as appropriate, if mandatory occurrence reports or
Commander's report is attached to the journey log
(MOR/CAPT REPORT ATTACHED G YES G NO) and add
any comments, if applicable.
CAPT SIGNATURE:
Signature of Commander.
The Delay Codes should be used to express the reason for delay, diversion or other
irregularities. The standardization of codes is essential for commonality in handling,
exchange of information, statistical comparison and management analysis.
The flight crew should use the code that, in their opinion, expresses the reason for the
delay. It is essential that these codes be applied impartially and not be considered as
reasons for blame but rather to identify corrective action.
Delay Codes starting with 0 are used for internal airline purposes. Every airline is free to
use these codes and to determine particular application fields.
However the following codes are standard, even if some airlines do not use them:
These Codes are used to describe delays caused by Passenger and Baggage handling.
These Codes are used to describe delays caused by Cargo (21-26) and Mail Handling (27-
29).
These Codes are used to describe delays caused by aircraft and ramp handling.
41 Aircraft defects
42 Scheduled maintenance, late release
Non-scheduled maintenance, special checks and / or additional works beyond
43
normal maintenance
44 Spares and maintenance equipment, lack of or breakdown
AOG (aircraft on ground for technical reasons) spares, to be carried to
45
another station
46 Aircraft change for technical reasons
47 Standby aircraft, lack of planned standby aircraft for technical reasons
48 Scheduled cabin configuration and version adjustment
These Codes are used to describe damage to aircraft and automated equipment failure.
71 Departure station
72 Destination station
73 En route or alternate
75 De-icing of aircraft, removal of ice / snow, frost prevention
76 Removal of snow / ice / water / sand from airport/runway
77 Aircraft ground handling impaired by adverse weather conditions
These Codes are used for Air Traffic Control (ATC) Restrictions (81-84) and Airport or
Governmental Authorities caused delays.
The documentation listed below shall be carried onboard of each JC Airlines aeroplane.
The Commander (Pilot-In-Command) shall produce these documents to a person
authorised by the SSCA or other foreign Civil Aviation Authority within a reasonable time if
requested to do so.
Aeroplane's documents belong permanently to the specific aeroplane and shall be placed
in a special folder (Documents Folder) located on the flight deck, or in the Aircraft
Technical Log. Care must be taken to ensure these files are not damaged, mislaid or
removed from the aircraft.
In case of missing certificates a letter will be added to the Documents Folder detailing
which certificates have been lost or damaged and which replacement certificates have
been applied for. OCC will send out a replacement copy of the certificate to the
appropriate base or destination where the Documents Folder can be updated. Damaged or
worn certificates should also be reported to OCC; they should remain onboard until they
can be replaced.
In addition to the above the following information and forms, relevant to the type and area
of operation, shall be carried on each flight:
• Details of the filed Air Traffic Service flight plan;
• Appropriate NOTAM/AIS briefing documentation;
• Appropriate meteorological information;
• Weight and balance documentation / Load & Trim Sheet (refer to OM Part A,
Chapter 8.1.8 and OM Part C for details);
• Notification of special categories of passenger such as security personnel, if not
considered as crew, PRMs, inadmissible passengers, deportees and persons in
custody;
• Notification of special loads including Dangerous Goods including written
information to the Commander;
• Current maps and charts and associated documents for the routes and aerodromes
to be used (in electronic or paper form);
• Normal checklist(s), as specified in OM Part B;
• Copy of the "ICAO 9481 N/928" Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft
Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods;
• Any other documentation that may be required by the states concerned with this
flight, such as cargo manifest, passenger manifest, etc.;
• Forms to comply with the reporting requirements of the SSCA and JC Airlines;
• Information regarding Search and Rescue procedures.
Each crew member shall carry:Valid passport with appropriate visas (if applicable);
• Certificates of vaccination (if required); and
• Valid Crew Identification Card.
The Flight Envelope (or Flight Return Envelope) contains the various papers assembled
during a given flight. All flight related required documents and forms, as per JC Airlines’
OM Part A requirement, have to be clearly and properly filled, handled, and retained in the
Flight Envelope after the flight for record keeping. It is the responsibility of the first officer
(co-pilot) to organize and submit the envelope. The Commander shall ensure that all
relevant operational documents are available during flight and signed. Used operational
documentation shall, upon completion of the flight or series of flights, be handed over to
authorised JC Airlines personnel (who collect the Flight Envelope either on the aircraft or
in the Flight Dispatch (Operations Control Centre).
On return, the Flight Envelope shall include the following documents/papers as applicable:
• Journey Log (signed by the Commander);
• Operational Flight Plan (signed by the Commander);
• NOTAMS/AIS/MET briefing documentation;
• Weight and Balance Documentation (signed by the Commander);
• Aircraft Technical Log (signed by the Commander);
• Special Categories of Passenger Notification (if applicable);
• Special Loads Notification and/or Dangerous Goods Notification (if applicable);
• Dangerous Goods Transport Document (if applicable);
• General Declaration (if applicable);
• Passenger Manifest(s) (if applicable);
• Cargo Manifest(s) (if applicable);
• Air Mail Documents (if applicable);
• Fuel uplift receipts (if applicable);
• De-/Anti-icing Declaration (if applicable);
• Any irregular event forms (if applicable);
• Air Safety Report (ASR) / Occurrence Report (if applicable);
• Any other document reflecting any operational activity applicable to the flight.
Reserved.
Fuelling/defuelling is considered to start as soon as the filler hoses are connected to the
aircraft and pressurized. The flight crew shall ensure the necessary safety measures
onboard. Fuelling must not commence without clearance from the flight crew. Clearance
may be given verbally, with undoubted hand signals, or via an intercom.
Fuelling/defuelling shall be considered completed only after all filler hoses have been
disconnected from the aircraft. Flight crew shall be informed about the end of the fuelling
process. Details of the fuel uplift have to be correctly entered in the Aircraft Technical Log
and a gross error check shall be carried out, checking of accuracy of fuel uplift and total
contents, particularly for operations in remote areas.
The Commander (Pilot-In-Command) is responsible that sufficient fuel is ordered for the
completion of the planned flight. The flight crew shall calculate and check the sufficient
amount of fuel for the planned flight, based on the current flight preparation procedures.
Planned fuel figures for trip and take-off fuel (together with aircraft weight data) should be
completed in the appropriate form, usually provided by the handling agent.
Supervision of Fuelling/Defuelling
For all fuelling procedures at least one flight crew member must be present in the cockpit
during the entire process (subject that the aircraft was handed over by maintenance and
flight crew is already on board).
The engineer or other qualified station personnel or flight crew, as appropriate, shall
ensure adherence to the safety precautions by spot checks. The Commander is
responsible for observing the correct technical and safety procedures during the
fuelling/defuelling operation but he may delegate the supervision of the fuelling process to
the qualified person(s) listed above.
Fuel Types
Particular care shall be taken in advising the fuel supplier of the type, grade and fuel
quantity required, with special reference to the units of measurement quoted (litres, US
gallons, pounds etc.).
JC Airlines standard fuel type is JET A-1. In addition, the following types are acceptable:
In China equivalent grade to freezing point of JET-A1 fuel is No.3 Jet Fuel.
Fuel Suppliers
Fuel suppliers are published on respective Airport Briefing sheet in OM Part C. Unless
otherwise authorised, fuel should only be obtained from these suppliers, since the (lowest)
contract fuel prices apply with these suppliers.
Fuel-Water Check
Flight crew member or other authorized personnel supervising refuelling should request
that fuel-water test has been accomplished by the fuelling operator at each refuelling.
Safety precautions must be always taken to preclude the possibility of fire during refuelling
and defuelling procedures.
The main causes of risk of fire with fuel deal with sparks due to static electricity and hot
point (engines, APU, ground installations, smoking).
The fuel generally does not catch fire easily, but the risk of fire is increased when the fuel
is sprayed (link, disconnecting pipe) and in the presence of fuel vapour especially when
low flash point fuels are used.
The handling agent or the flight crew, as appropriate, shall ensure strict adherence to the
safety measures listed below during fuelling or defuelling. In addition, local airport
regulations, which may exceed the regulations listed in this sub-chapter, shall also be
considered. If any of these safety measures are not respected the fuelling shall be stopped
immediately.
During refuelling the parking brake should be ON with ACCU PRESS having sufficient
pressure.
The fuelling safety zone is an area extending 3 meters radially (or as specified by local
regulations) from filling and venting points on aeroplane, fuelling vehicle and within the
hydrant pits.
Due to the fire hazard associated with fuel vapours, following items and processes shall
not be used within the fuel safety zone:
• Matches, open flames, welding, use of photographic flashbulbs;
• Portable electronic devices, such as mobile (cell) telephones, portable radios and
pagers.
Venting Areas
Venting area is a spherical zone around the fuel relief valves of an aeroplane, within which
inflammable fuel vapours have to be expected during fuelling. The extension of the venting
area is 3 metres radially for Jet A1 fuel.
Refuelling Vehicle
Refuelling vehicle should, if possible, always move forward into the fuelling position. If a
vehicle has to be reversed, a guidance person shall be used. Vehicle should approach the
aeroplane at walking speed.
Vehicle and their hoses shall not block the access to the cabin and hold doors.
Extreme care shall be taken to position vehicle and equipment correctly, ensuring that
strain is not applied to the fuelling hoses.
The aeroplane and the vehicle shall be electrically bonded together throughout the fuelling
operation to ensure that no difference in electrical potential exists.
Access to the hydrant emergency stop button shall be visible and clear of obstruction and
all ramp staff trained in its location and use.
The fuel operator shall maintain control of fuelling operations using the hand held
deadman device throughout the operation, remaining outside the vehicle cab at all times.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-102
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
The fuel operator should conduct a final walk around the vehicle before driving away from
the aeroplane to ensure all hoses have been disconnected and stowed correctly.
Electrical transients (caused by switching among the APU, the external and the engine
electrical supply) during automatic refuelling may stop the process.
An APU start is not permitted during refuel/defuel procedure if the APU has failed to start
or an automatic shutdown has occurred.
Fuelling vehicles should be positioned to avoid any risk of coming in the path of the
exhaust stream from the APU.
In the event of APU fire during fuelling/refuelling, the operation shall be stopped
immediately. A normal APU shutdown must be completed if a fuel spill has occurred during
refuel/defuel procedure.
Cabin crew shall be warned immediately of any APU emergency condition which might
require the rapid evacuation of passengers from the aircraft.
Ground Power Unit (GPU) may be functioning, but starting or stopping it should be
avoided.
GPU shall be positioned 6 m from the aeroplane fuelling vents and venting points.
If applicable, GPU should be started and electrical connections made before fuelling
begins. The unit should not be disconnected or switches operated during fuelling.
In the event of fuel spillage, if safe to do so, the GPU shall be stopped immediately and
shall remain stationary until the spill is removed and there is no danger from flammable
vapour.
Electrical Equipment
The connection or disconnection of any aeroplane electrical equipment, e.g. batteries and
battery chargers, is not permitted during refuelling.
Equipment shall be positioned so that the fuelling vehicle has a clear exit route and can be
moved away from the aeroplane in a forward direction.
Vehicles, except fuel truck, shall not be positioned within the venting areas/fuelling safety
zones.
A distance of 3 m should be maintained, wherever possible, between GSE and any fuelling
equipment, i.e. vehicles, hoses, hydrant pits.
Equipment shall be positioned so that the ground area beneath the exits intended for
emergency evacuation and slide deployment areas are kept clear.
Smoking is not permitted within 20 meters of the aeroplane (or more, if required by local
regulations).
If thunderstorms are near the aerodrome, flight crew shall be consulted, whether to start,
continue or to interrupt the fuelling. In case of doubt, the fuelling process shall be
suspended.
After fuelling, refuelling operator shall hand over a copy of a Fuel Delivery Sheet with
indicated fuel quantity, specific gravity and OAT to the supervising flight crew or line
maintenance staff.
• Enter correctly the details of the fuel uplift in the Aircraft Technical Log and carry out
the gross error check;
• Keep and file a copy of the Fuel Delivery Sheet in the Flight Envelope.
In case Jet A1 fuel is unavailable, the use of another fuel type may be authorized by the
Commander. Mixing of fuel is only permitted as specified in the ‘Limitations’ section of the
OM Part B.
The various types of fuels available could be mixed in all proportions. When mixing the
fuels:
• The density varies proportional to the percentage of the mixture;
• The flash point of the mixture varies in function of non-straight laws.
A major consideration when mixing fuels at normal temperatures is the fuel air mixture that
develops in the space above the fuel inside the tank. JP4 and JET B develop an ignitable
fuel air mixture at frequently encountered ambient temperatures. When JP4 or JET B and
JET A1 are being mixed, the fuel vapour mixture with air is in the explosive or ignitable
envelope throughout the range of ground temperatures common at the majority of
aerodromes during all or part of the year.
If a situation arises, that only wide-cut fuels are available for refuelling/defuelling, flight
crew should be aware that mixtures of wide-cut fuels and kerosene turbine fuels can result
in the air/fuel mixture in the tank being in the combustible range at ambient temperatures.
The extra precautions set out below are advisable to avoid arcing in the tank due to
electrostatic discharge.
The risk of this type of arcing can be minimized by the use of a static dissipation additive in
the fuel. When this additive is present in the proportions stated in the fuel specification, the
normal fuelling precautions set out in this chapter are considered adequate. When
refuelling/defuelling with fuels not containing anti-static additive, and where widecut fuel
are involved, top-up at fuel filling rates reduced by 50% of the normal filling rate.
When refuelling with wide cut fuels the aeroplane electrical supply should be switched off
before refuelling starts, and remain off until refuelling ceases and the hoses have been
removed.
Fuelling with wide cut type fuel shall not be carried out with passengers onboard/
boarding/disembarking.
When wide-cut fuel has been used, this should be recorded in the Aircraft Technical Log.
The next two uplifts of standard fuel type shall still be considered as if the wide-cut fuel
type is in use.
The only reliable way to obtain an accurate freeze point of a mixture of fuels is to make an
actual freeze point measurement. When this is not possible, to determine the fuel freezing
point, apply the following:
• When the mixture contains less than 10% JET A, the fuel is considered as JET A1;
• When the mixture contains more than 10% JET A, the fuel is considered as JET A.
General
In addition to the safety procedure laid down in OM Part A, Chapter 8.2.1.2, the following
rules apply:
• If required, the Local Airport Authorities/Fire Services shall be informed and/or
permission shall be requested;
• Procedure shall be authorized by the Commander;
• Ground handling staff, passengers and the fuelling company shall be informed
about the procedure;
• Not permitted with wide cut gasoline type fuel (JET B, JP4 or equivalent) or when a
mixture with these types of fuel might occur.
In addition to safety measures laid-down in OM Part A, Chapter 8.2.1.2, the following rules
apply:
• The passengers shall be informed (at the gate) that the fuelling is in progress during
boarding;
• Passengers joining or leaving the aeroplane via the apron shall be moved
immediately under the supervision of a responsible person over a safe route;
• Passengers shall be kept at a safe distance from the fuelling operation and other
hazardous areas such as aeroplane engines, APU exhausts and fuel tank vents;
• Congestion in front of the aeroplane doors shall be avoided;
• Ground activities outside the aeroplane and work within the aeroplane, such as
catering and cleaning, should be conducted in such a manner that they do not
create a hazard or obstruct emergency exits.
Flight Crew
Cabin Crew
Additional Fuel
The airport fire brigade shall be informed about the parking position - if locally required.
The presence of the fire brigade at the aeroplane is not required unless local regulations
rule otherwise. The fire fighting service shall be within extinguishing range or available
within 2 minutes.
In the event of a fuel spillage, fuelling supervisor or supervising flight crew member shall
immediately:
• Ensure that the fuelling process stops;
• Notify the aerodrome fire service and request to mobilize all available fire fighting
equipment as standby protection until the arrival of the aerodrome emergency
services;
• Comply with the appropriate aerodrome procedures;
• Notify the flight crew and/or cabin crew by the quickest means.
Flight crew shall inform ATC of spillage and consider shutting down APU. If fuelling
operation was done with one engine running, that engine shall be shut down immediately.
Fuel spillage is considered to present a fire hazard if greater than 2 metres in diameter.
Normal operations shall not be resumed on the aeroplane or any engines started before
the person in charge of the emergency determines that it is safe to continue. If fuel is
spilled on any load, then such items are not to be loaded into the aeroplane.
The codes shown below are used on JC Airlines flights, to identify passengers that require
special treatment, or baggage that requires special handling. When used on Load Sheet
the codes (and the details) are entered in the ‘Remarks’ box of the respective destination.
Loading position (when needed) is shown in accordance with the numbering of the
aeroplane compartments.
When required, handling agent shall submit to Commander, written or oral information,
containing details about passengers that require special treatment or baggage that require
special handling. Notification to Captain (NOTOC) form is not appropriate means, as it is
intended only for special load transported as cargo.
Whenever any passengers are onboard an aeroplane during ground operations, the
required minimum number of cabin crew for the appropriate aeroplane type shall be
present in the passenger cabin.
The Commander may refuse to carry or may remove any person holding a valid ticket en-
route when he, exercising reasonable discretion, decides that:
• Such action is necessary in the interest of safety;
• Such action is necessary to prevent violation of any applicable law, regulation or
order of any state or country to be flown from, into, or over;
• Conduct, status, age, mental or physical condition of the passenger is so as to:
- Require special assistance of JC Airlines personnel which cannot be
provided,
- Cause difficulties or make himself objectionable to other passengers,
- Constitute or create any hazard or risk to him or to other persons or property;
• The passenger fails to observe instructions issued by Company personnel.
Commander shall not permit any person to be carried onboard aeroplane who is obviously
under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs.
This does not apply to persons under the influence of intoxicating drugs who are subject of
such condition following emergency medical treatment after commencement of flight, or to
persons under medical care accompanied by personnel specifically trained for that
purpose.
Category Age
Infant Younger than 2 years
Child 2 years up to and including 11 years
Adult At or above 12 years
Unaccompanied Minor (UM) 5 to 11 years (not including 12th birthday)
Adults
The allocation of seats to adult passengers is controlled through the weight and balance
system (refer to OM Part A, Chapter 8.1.8.3). Only those passengers who appear
reasonably fit and strong should be seated adjacent to an emergency exit.
Children
Unaccompanied Minors
JC Airlines does not accept unaccompanied minors (UM) under the age of 12 for travel.
Minors under 12 years of age must be accompanied on the same reservation by a
passenger of 16 years or over who will take full responsibility of the minor.
Infants
The following types of passengers should not be seated where they could obstruct floor
level emergency exits, impede the crew in their duties, obstruct access to emergency
equipment or hinder aircraft evacuation:
• Passengers with restricted mobility (PRM), which shall include persons with a
physical or intellectual disability and persons who are impaired due to any other
cause;
• Elderly or frail person who appear to be not capable of operating or assisting with
the operation of exit;
• Accompanied and unaccompanied children and infants;
• Deportees or prisoners in custody;
• Pregnant women;
• Obese passengers;
• Passengers who are unwilling to assist in the event of an emergency.
Seats which form the access route from the cabin aisle to self-help (types III and IV) exits
should only be allocated to passengers who appear capable of operating and/or assisting
with the operation of the exit. Check-in staff shall be mindful of this requirement. On no
account should the types of passengers listed above (PRM, elderly or frail persons,
When passengers are boarding, cabin crew shall give instruction about seat allocation and
hand baggage storage.
All persons onboard aged 2 years or more shall occupy a fixed seat fitted with a safety
belt. The number of passengers on each seat row shall not be higher than the number of
life vests and oxygen masks available on this row. Multiple occupancy of passenger seat is
not allowed except in the case of an infant.
Reseating of Passengers
Seats that permit direct access to emergency exits shall be assigned only to Able-Bodied
Passenger (ABP).
DHC, JC Airlines employees (or other airline staff), security staff and similar should be
preferably designated as ABP.
In all other cases, passengers who because of their condition might hinder other
passengers during an evacuation or who might impede the crew in carrying out their duties
should not be allocated seats that permit direct access to emergency exits.
Refer to CCM.
Definitions
Passenger with Reduced Mobility (PRM): A PRM is a person whose mobility is reduced
due to physical incapacity (sensory or locomotive), an intellectual deficiency, age, illness
or any other cause of disability when using transport and when situation requires special
attention and the adaptation to a person’s need of the service made available to all
passengers.
Wheelchair Passengers:
Where PRM are carried on a flight, the number of PRM shall not exceed the number of
able-bodied persons (ABP) capable of assisting with an emergency evacuation. The
maximum number of PRM permitted to be carried on any particular flight will depend on
the type and configuration of the aircraft as well as extent of the reduced mobility or
disability of the PRM seeking embarkation. If a maximum number has been approved by
the SSCA, that number may not be exceeded. On JC Airlines aircraft, it is permitted to
carry up to a maximum of 20 passengers with reduced mobility (PRM), including maximum
10 WCHC/WCHS/WCHR on any one Company flight. The Commander (Pilot-In-
Command) shall be made aware of the presence of severely disabled persons on board,
and of the precauitions taken to minimize the effect of their carriage on the conduct of an
emergency evacuation of the aircraft.
Passengers requiring special services such as INF, UM, WCH, BLND, etc. shall never be
seated in emergency exit rows or on jump seats.
Escorts
The escort shall:
• Be an able bodied person aged 16 or older;
• Be seated adjacent to the passenger with reduced mobility;
• Assist PRM in all circumstances.
The role of escort in transportation of PRM is essential in assisting the crew in cases of
emergency evacuation of the passenger cabin. Cabin crew shall familiarize him with safety
procedures.
Seating Assignment
should be seated (one in each row) close to emergency exits in a manner neither to
impede the crew members in their duties, nor to obstruct access to emergency exits or
emergency equipment. They are permitted to occupy any seat within the row, provided the
egress to the aisle of any able-bodied passenger, located in the same row, is not blocked
by the mobility impaired passenger.
Wheelchair Passengers
Blind (BLND) or deaf (DEAF/DEAF MUTE) passengers are accepted on JC Airlines flights
and should be given the assistance necessary to ensure a safe and comfortable journey.
Guide dogs may be accepted as PETC (refer to OM Part A, Chapter 8.2.2.11) with the
note SEEING/EYE/DOG.
BLND, DEAF and DEAF MUTE passengers do not need an escort and there is no limit to
the maximum number allowed onboard.
Blind and visually impaired passengers and escorts shall have special briefing onboard by
cabin crew before take-off in order to orientate the passenger to the surrounding and to
acknowledge the procedures in an emergency.
MEDA: Passenger who has a medical incapacitation for which medical clearance will be
required.
Company generally does not accept passengers requiring stretcher. The exception to this
policy is subject to prior written Company approval (Flight Operations Manager consent).
In that case the following regulations apply:
• Stretcher installation may be provided and installed only at home base (subject to
availability and approval);
• Passenger shall be cleared by the airport/airline physician or passenger personal
physician;
• Incapacitated passenger on a stretcher shall be escorted by an adult person (escort
is either a doctor/nurse or a family member to provide the required en-route care);
• The patient shall be transferred to the aeroplane stretcher or vice versa by qualified
medical staff only;
• They will be boarded first, if possible, and disembarking last;
• The patient is always positioned in the aeroplane with the head pointing forward;
• Vacant seat inboard of stretcher shall be left empty.
Cabin crew are responsible to ensure that the patient is secured by medical personnel and
is secured for take-off and landing
Expectant Mothers
Expectant mothers in good health may be accepted for travel up to and including the 35th
week, subject to the following conditions:
• Expectant mothers in good health up to the 35th week of pregnancy who may be
accepted for carriage, should hold a medical certificate of fitness from their
attending doctor;
• Expectant mothers beyond their 35th week of pregnancy will not be carried under
any circumstances.
It is the responsibility of the passenger to consult her doctor before undertaking a flight.
The number of weeks she is pregnant at the time the doctor signs the certificate of her
fitness for air travel, must be clearly stated in the certificate. Expectants mothers shall not
be seated in emergency rows due to safety reasons. Preferably, aisle seat should be
offered to expectant mother.
MAAS and LANG passengers do not need an escort and there is no limit to the maximum
number allowed onboard.
8.2.2.7 Deportees
A deportee is a person who had legally been admitted to a country by its authorities or who
had entered a country illegally, and who later is formally ordered by the authorities to be
removed from that country. Children of age 12 years or less do not count as DEPA/DEPU.
Acceptance of deportees is based on rules in IATA Resolution 701 and ICAO Annex 9,
Standard 3.49.
Acceptance of deportees is based on rules in IATA Resolution 701 and ICAO Annex 9,
Standard 3.49.
Travel Documents
Boarding
Escort
Exceptions to this policy, for a specific flight or series of flights, shall be authorised in
advance by the Flight Operations Manager.
Note: Difference between an inadmissible passenger and a deportee: The deportee has
already entered the country and is than proclaimed undesirable by the authorities.
The inbound carrier (i.e. the airline having carried the INAD passenger to the country
where entry is refused) is always responsible for the outbound (i.e. onward or return)
carriage.
An INAD who is considered to be a harmless does not require an escort. The number of
harmless INADs is not limited.
If an inadmissible passenger physically resists boarding, he/she shall be excluded from the
flight.
The handcuffs / shackles shall be untied before boarding. If during flight, an INAD shows
unruly behaviour he/she is to be treated as an unruly passenger.
The seats of INAD and their escorts on the aeroplane should be in the last row.
JC Airlines has a zero tolerance policy with regard to smoking on board and any assault
on crew members. In order for the Company to pursue this policy, it is essential that the
proper process is followed and the aerodrome authority/police are called to meet the
aeroplane on arrival in case of any incident.
Passengers, who are identified as potentially unruly while at the aerodrome, may be
excluded from transportation.
Exclusion of a passenger from a flight may become necessary when a passenger shows
behaviour which:
• Might cause unacceptable disturbances during the flight;
• Could become a possible threat to other passengers onboard;
• Might interfere with the regular operation of a flight by refusing to follow the
instructions of the cabin crew;
• Is obvious for persons intoxicated by drugs or alcohol (exception: medicated and
escorted).
For unruly behaviour and inappropriate use of electronic equipment, the cabin crew are
first instructed to warn the passenger verbally with information about possible
consequences. If after verbal warnings, the passenger continues to behave contrary to the
warnings given, written warning should be issued (Occurrence Report form). The
Commander must be informed and the police or security guards may be called. The
person filling in the form (CIC) must mark if the passenger obeyed the crew’s requests
(commands/instructions) and if the passenger agreed or refused to sign the document
(final warning). It is crucial to find witness(es) whenever possible. Filling of Occurrence
Report does not necessarily implicate that the police must be called at all times.
For smoking on board and assault of a crew member, the Company has a zero tolerance
policy and the written warning is to be issued immediately upon discovery of the offence.
Thereafter, crews should contact the handling agent before arrival if possible, in order to
arrange for police to meet the aeroplane. The passenger will then be handed over for
further action.
Pilots should not leave the flight deck to deal with any situation involving an unruly
passenger. Doing so might compromise the security of the aeroplane and all those on
board.
A person shall not enter any JC Airlines’ aircraft when drunk or be drunk in any of the JC
Airlines’ aircraft. Drunken passengers constitute not only a possible source of annoyance
to fellow passengers but also a hazard to flight safety. Potentially hazardous incidents
should be reported in the incident occurrence report.
JC Airlines provides instructions, advice and training to all relevant staff on dealing with
passengers who have been drinking excessively. Such advice includes when to deny
boarding rights and reiterate the Commander's prerogative to exercise the powers, to
protect the safety of the aircraft and passengers.
In general, the same rules apply for drunken/drugged passengers as for unruly or
disruptive passengers.
Handling agent is responsible for checking number of pieces, dimensions and weight of
cabin baggage by appropriate means. Baggage unacceptable as cabin baggage shall be
checked-in.
Each seat-occupying passenger may carry on board one piece of hand luggage. The
maximum weight of one piece of cabin baggage shall not exceed 8 kg. Allowable cabin
luggage dimensions are 55 x 40 x 20 cm.
When boarding is in progress, ground staff and crew members shall visually check the
cabin baggage held by passengers. If baggage exceeds the allowance, politely relieve the
passenger of the baggage so that it can be stowed in a cargo hold.
Cabin crew is responsible that each item carried in a cabin shall be stowed in a location
that is capable of restraining it. Cabin baggage may only be stowed in approved locations.
JC Airlines has provided clear and unequivocal advice on which areas are approved. The
aisle, cabin doors and emergency exits shall not be blocked. First row must be completely
clear of baggage. The following shall be observed:
• Overhead lockers and other stowages must be clearly placarded with weight
limitations and enclosed by latched doors - cabin crew must be made aware of the
need to ensure that limitations are not exceeded;
• Underseat stowages may only be used if the seat is equipped with a restraint bar
and the baggage is of a size to fit under the seat.
• Baggage must not be stowed in toilets, immediately forward or aft of bulkhead, or in
such a manner that it will impede access to emergency equipment - particular
attention must be paid to maintaining the integrity of all evacuation routes;
• Baggage placed in lockers shall not prevent doors from being closed securely;
• Baggage shall not be placed where it can impede access to emergency equipment;
• All catering supplies, blankets, pillows, newspapers, etc. are to be securely stowed
in approved areas for take-off and landing;
• Crew effects, including baggage and clothing, must be stowed in approved areas -
particular care must be taken to ensure that doors and exits, including operating
handles, are not obstructed nor ready access to emergency equipment precluded;
• Items carried in a passenger or crew compartment (e.g. hand baggage, galley
equipment, serving carts, any apparatus providing in-flight medical aid for a
passenger... etc.) shall be secured in such a way as not to become a hazard by
shifting under the appropriate load factors corresponding to the ultimate inertia
forces specified in the emergency landing condition of type certification.
Items which do not meet the above criteria shall be loaded in the cargo hold.
Refer to CCM.
In exceptional cases, when a passenger is prepared to pay for an extra seat in order to
carry valuable baggage (e.g. antiques, musical instruments, work of art, etc.), acceptance
is permitted if the safety and comfort of other passengers is not impaired.
For carriage of live animals on board the Company aircraft (including pets in the
passenger cabin), proper notification has to be made at the time of reservation.
The handling agent has to observe the appropriate regulations and shall inform the
Commander on the transport of animals in the cabin.
Only cats and small dogs are accepted as cabin baggage. All other pets, including
rodents, shall be loaded in cargo hold as checked baggage.
One pet crate is allowed per passenger. The table below shows the maximum number of
pets allowed in the cabin:
The maximum weight of a crate including a pet shall not exceed 8 kg.
A dog trained to serve a handicapped passenger (blind, deaf, autistic etc.) being
dependent on such dog during the journey should whenever possible and acceptable to
the passenger be carried in a suitable container as checked baggage in the cargo hold
(AVIH). A trained guide dog may also be carried in the cabin (PETC) if it accompanies a
passenger who is dependent upon it and if it is properly harnessed. The passenger and
the guide dog should be seated where there is sufficient floor space for the dog.
A maximum of one dog is permitted to travel on each flight with the exception of flights
where no dogs are permitted in the cabin due to local regulations.
It is the passenger’s responsibility to hold all documents required by all of the relevant
authorities.
Unrestricted Usage
Phase of Flight
Device Taxi-Out Approach
Cruise Taxi-In
Take-Off Landing
Heart pacemakers
Hearing aids
Electronic wristwatches
TSO certified automatic external
defibrillators (AEDs)
Electronic nerve stimulators
Portable Oxygen Concentrators (POCs)
Compliant with RTCA/DO-160 or later,
section 21, category M
Other approved medical devices (e.g.
insulin pumps, ventilators, cochlear
implants))
Pocket calculators
Electric shavers
Handheld GPS
Non-emissive medical devices
All PEDs listed in this Unrestricted Usage Section may be turned ON during all phases of
flight.
Restricted Usage
Phase of Flight
Device Taxi-Out Approach
Cruise Taxi-In
Take-Off Landing
Personal computers and associated
peripheral devices
Personal handheld electronic games
(e.g. Game Boys)
Audio or video recording and/or
playback systems (e.g. CD, DVD, MP3
players)
Cameras (digital, video or still)
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs),
Tablet computers, Blackberries,
Bluetooth devices without active
transmitting communication interfaces
Electronic toys (excluding remote
controlled)
Mobile phones and related wireless
technologies
Kombi devices (mobile phones
combined with organizer)
Palm Pilots
Computer plug-in modules
PEDs (cruise phase allowed usage) listed in this Restricted Usage Section must be turned
OFF prior to the start of any approach.
PEDs listed in this Restricted Usage Section may be turned ON only after the aeroplane
completely exits the runway after landing.
Phase of Flight
Device Taxi-Out Approach
Cruise Taxi-In
Take-Off Landing
Two-way transmitters (walkie-talkies,
amateur radios and citizen’s band (CB)
radios, two way pagers)
AM/FM radios
Portable televisions
Remote controlled toys
Telemetric equipment
Wireless computer interfaces (except
infrared interfaces)
Big portable stereo sets
Devices transmitting RF intentionally
Palm Pilots
Computer plug-in modules
All PEDs listed in this Prohibited Usage Section must be turned OFF while onboard.
Notes:
Taxi-Out: Aeroplane push-back/Engine start/Taxi.
Taxi-In: Aeroplane completely exits from the runway after landing/Taxi/Parking position.
RF: Radio frequency (RF) is a rate of oscillation which corresponds to the frequency of
electrical signals normally used to produce and detect radio waves.
AM/FM: Radio broadcasting is a one-way sound broadcasting service transmitted over
radio waves. FM refers to frequency modulation and occurs on VHF airwaves in the
frequency range of 88 to 108 MHz. The medium-wave band is used worldwide for AM
broadcasting.
GPS: The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based global navigation satellite
system that provides reliable location and time information when and where there is an
unobstructed line of sight to four or more GPS satellites. It is freely accessible by anyone
with a GPS receiver.
PDA: A personal digital assistant (PDA), also known as a palmtop computer, is a mobile
device that functions as a personal information manager. The vast majority of all PDAs are
smartphones (a cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet access).
Smartphones provide digital voice service as well as text messaging, e-mail, web
browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 player and video and TV viewing. In addition to
their built-in functions, smartphones can run myriad applications, turning the once single-
minded cell-phone into a mobile computer. Popular smartphone brands include Samsung,
Apple, HTC, Nokia, etc.
Additional regulations apply to the specific types of batteries when removed by the user
(e.g. collapsible):
Lithium Batteries:
• The removed battery/batteries shall be protected from damage by placing each
battery in a protective pouch. The battery(s) shall be carried in the passenger cabin;
• The battery shall not exceed 300 Wh;
• A maximum of one spare battery not exceeding 300 Wh or two spares each not
exceeding 160 Wh may be carried.
JC Airlines accepts children travelling in groups provided there is one accompanying adult
(aged 16 years or over) per 10 children. The accompanying adult(s) must seat together
with the group they are responsible for.
Opening and closing of lower compartment doors may only be performed by authorised
personnel:
• OM Part B specifies maximum wind speeds for door operation. If difficulties occur
when attempting to close doors in strong winds, the aeroplane shall be moved in
order to position the concerned door on the downwind side;
• When compartment doors are opened, the door seal depressors should be
inspected for damage. The authorized engineer and/or flight crew shall be informed
if any damage is observed;
• After loading, no loose items or compartment nets should get tangled in the door
seal whilst closing the compartment door;
• It is the duty of the person conducting final pre-engine start walk-around check to
ensure that compartment doors are closed and locked properly after loading has
been completed.
The loading and unloading of aeroplane shall always be performed in accordance with:
• Loading instructions;
• Weight and balance requirements;
• Ground stability requirements for the aeroplane type.
Pre-Loading:
• An effective check shall be made of the holds to ensure that all loads have been
removed at arrival;
• Dimensions and weight of load shall not exceed loading limitations of the aeroplane
compartments;
• The procedures for special loads, cabin loads, loading incompatibilities shall be
observed;
• The Commander shall be informed of the weight, the arrangement and of the nature
of the loads carried.
Loading:
• Loading of baggage, cargo and mail shall be piece by piece (bulk loading);
• The handling instructions for special cargo (e.g. “This Side Up”, heavy items,
segregation of cargo, etc.) shall be observed;
• After the completion of loading, all nets (compartment, door) shall be fastened to
the corresponding attachment fittings and tightened.
Unloading:
• For unloading, the same safety relevant principles are valid as for loading.
Personnel and equipment should be available at the parking position upon arrival of
the aeroplane. Passenger baggage should normally be unloaded first. Cabin load if
any, shall be unloaded after all passengers have disembarked. Mail shall be
unloaded before other cargo;
• After completion of unloading the cargo, compartments shall be carefully checked
for damage, spilled liquids, contamination, etc.
Damage Events:
All types of damage events (aeroplane, passengers, staff or load) occurring during ground
operations shall be reported immediately and Ground Damage Report form shall be
completed by:
• Handling agent;
• Supervision staff; or
• Commander.
Securing of Load:
All loads in cargo holds shall be secured in such a way that they cannot:
• Work loose during the flight and cause hazardous displacement of the centre of
gravity of the aeroplane;
• Damage the aeroplanes interior;
• Move to prevent the hold doors from being opened on arrival;
• Move in case of forced landings;
• Injure passengers or crew members.
Restraint can be achieved by filling the hold, compartment or net section volumetrically to
¾ of their height, or by tiedown. Individual items listed below shall always be restrained:
• Cages with live animals AVI (including kennels);
• Pieces between 50 and 150 kg;
• Heavy pieces weighing 150 kg or more (HEA);
• Barrels or drums filled with liquids;
• Items sensitive to shocks or tilting, fragile items;
• Items, which by their nature, shape or density may constitute a hazard.
Lashing equipment (tiedown straps, lashing rings, etc.) shall conform to the required
industry standards.
Important: Dangerous goods shall not be accepted for transport by air on JC Airlines
flights. Exceptions to this general rule are described in OM Part A, Chapter 9.
Special Load – Notification to Captain (NOTOC) provides detailed information to the flight
crew about handling requirements of special cargo loads during the flight.
The NOTOC form (electronic or manual) shall be prepared by the handling company
respectively and handed over to the Commander. Further information regarding NOTOC
are described in OM Part A, Chapter 9.
The codes shown below are used on JC Airlines flights, to identify loads that require
special handling and/or special treatment. When used on Loadsheet the codes (and the
details) are entered in the “Remarks” box of the respective destination. Loading position
(when needed) is shown in accordance with the numbering of the aeroplane
compartments.
Example of
Code Description Loadsheet NOTOC
“Remarks”
Spare Parts required for Aeroplane on Ground,
AOG AOG/1 YES
followed by the loading position.
Live Animals. Shall not be loaded in close
proximity:
• AVI and of foodstuffs (if not hermetically sealed).
• AVI and HUM.
• Day-old-chicks and HEG. .AVI/3
AVI • Natural enemies, e.g. cats and dogs (provided SI LIVE YES
they are not in sight of each other). BIRDS
Strong smelling animals with EAT or baggage shall
not be loaded in the same hold. Followed by the
loading position. Additionally, name and species
under supplementary information (SI).
BAL Ballast, followed by the loading position and weight. .BAL/4/150 NO
Stretcher installed followed by:
• The number of seats blocked by the stretcher;
• The number of passengers (invalid and medical)
BED travelling on these seats; .BED/9/3M NO
• The class.
These passengers are included in the PAX C/M
distribution.
Stretcher hold loaded followed by the loading
BEH .BEH/3/50 NO
position and the weight of the stretcher.
Company Mail followed by the loading position and
COM .COM/1/16 NO
weight.
Catering equipment and food supply not used on
CSU .CSU/4/200 NO
flight followed by the loading position and weight.
Delivery At Aeroplane baggage (baby strollers,
DAA wheel chairs etc), followed by the loading position .DAA/3/10 NO
and number of pieces.
Crew members positioning to/from duty not directly
involved in the operation of the flight, occupying
DHC passenger seats, followed by the number of seats .DHC/2/4 NO
occupied in each class. DHC are included in the
passenger figures.
Diplomatic Mail, followed by the loading position
DIP .DIP/1/2 NO
and the number of bags.
Foodstuffs for human or animal consumption
EAT .EAT/6 YES
(perishable cargo), followed by the loading position.
Example of
Code Description Loadsheet NOTOC
“Remarks”
Equipment in Compartment, miscellaneous items
not included in DOW/DOI, followed by the loading
EIC .EIC/4/50 NO
position and weight. Not including BAL, BED, COM,
CSU, FKT and BEH.
Undeveloped Film/Unexposed Film, followed by the
FIL .FIL/1 NO
loading position.
Flight Kit additional, not included in DOW/DOI,
FKT .FKT/4/250 NO
followed by the loading position and weight.
Frozen Goods used for cooling purposes, followed
FRO .FRO/1 YES
by the loading position.
Heavy cargo piece of 150 kg or more, followed by
.HEA/1/200
HEA the loading position and weight. Show each heavy YES
.HEA/4/150
piece individually.
HEG Hatching Eggs, followed by the loading position. .HEG/1 YES
Human remains in Coffins, followed by the loading
position and weight. Show each HUM piece
HUM .HUM/4/220 YES
individually. Do not use HUM remarks for funeral
urns.
Live Human Organs, fresh human blood, followed
LHO .LHO/4 YES
by the loading position.
Weapons and Munitions of War. Acceptance of
ammunition and/or other articles and substances
MUW classified as dangerous goods as part of a MUW NO See Note
shipment is prohibited. Note: Notification to
Commander only for cargo shipments.
No items loaded or manifested. NIL on Loadsheet
NIL .NIL NO
indicates no traffic load for the destination.
Newspaper, magazines, followed by the loading
NWP .NWP/4 NO
position.
Obnoxious dead load that produced strong
OBX .OBX/1 YES
offensive odour, followed by the loading position.
Passengers not entitled to a firm booking who may
be off-loaded at a station enroute to their ticketed
PAD destination in order to accommodate joining .PAD/0/3 NO
passengers who have higher priority, followed by
the number of seats occupied in each class.
Hunting trophies, skin, furs, hide and all articles
PEA made from or containing parts of animals (non- .PEA/1 NO
perishable), followed by the loading position.
Flowers and plants (perishable cargo), followed by
PEF .PEF/1 YES
the loading position.
Example of
Code Description Loadsheet NOTOC
“Remarks”
Meat and meat products (perishable cargo),
PEM .PEM/4 YES
followed by the loading position.
Fruits and vegetables (perishable cargo), followed
PEP .PEP/1 YES
by the loading position.
Perishable cargo other than EAT, HEG, LHO, PEF,
PER .PER/4 YES
PEM, PES, PRS followed by the loading position.
Fish and seafood (perishable cargo) for human
PES .PES/4 YES
consumption, followed by the loading position.
Press material, newspapers followed by the loading
PRS .PRS/1 NO
position.
Items removed from a passenger’s possession after
SEC check-in, followed by the loading position and .SEC/4/3 YES
number of pieces
Safe Human Life shipments are highly time-
sensitive cargo. Only blood serum/plasma,
vaccines and medicines are accepted under this
SHL .SHL/1 YES
designation. Loading in the passenger cabin if
space available. If loaded in hold, shall be secured
by straps. Followed by the loading position.
Seats occupied by baggage, cargo or/and mail,
SOC indicate the number of seats occupied in each .SOC/0/2 NO
class.
Live Animals for laboratory use, packed in filter
SPF .SPF/1 YES
containers, followed by the loading position.
Sporting weapons, followed by the loading position.
SWP Note: Notification to Commander only for cargo .SWP/1 See Note
shipments.
Shipments of wet materials not packed in watertight
WET containers, e.g. fish, meat, AVI, followed by the .WET/1 YES
loading position.
Valuable cargo. Note: Notice to Commander for
VAL NO See Note
VAL is done by special Valuable Cargo Receipt.
Vulnerable cargo applies to goods, which obviously
require security handling (SWP, MUW), or goods,
which are particularly vulnerable to theft or pilferage
VUN but are not covered by definition of valuable cargo YES See Note
(gold, platinum articles, coins, narcotics, work of
arts, valid passports). Note: Notification to
Commander only for cargo shipments.
Operating Crew Members requiring passenger
XCR seat(s), followed by the number of seats occupied .XCR/2/2 NO
per class (C/M). Not included in passenger figures.
Load Priorities
The table below shows the load priorities in case of overload of the flight (more load then
available weight or volume limits of compartments). Acceptance of load (when applicable)
shall follow the priority sequence from 1 - 10.
Transit load has always priority over onload of the same category.
Reservations
Priority Load Category Remarks
Status
LHO, SHL, AOG (needed for
Confirmed or not
1 the operation of the return Never offload
confirmed
flight)
Needed for the
Confirmed or not
2 FKT, BEH, CSU operation of this or
confirmed
return flight.
Confirmed or not
DIP Diplomatic mail
confirmed
Not exceeding mail
3 Air mail Confirmed space
allotment for the flight
HUM has priority over
HUM Confirmed space
passenger baggage
Revenue checked-in
baggage
4 Confirmed space
(including confirmed excess
baggage, cabin baggage)
Revenue special cargo: A priority list is set up for
5 Confirmed space
AVI, VAL, DIP, PER, SWP the flight.
Exceeding allotment for
6 Air mail Rebooked
the flight
Short shipped/off-loaded
Rebooked
7 cargo
confirmed space
Other revenue cargo
8 JC service cargo (S1) Confirmed space
SAL Surface air lifted mail Space available
9 JC COM
Company mail (COM) basis
Other unbooked revenue
cargo JC service cargo (EIC) loading material
Space available
10 Other reduced rate cargo not needed for the
basis
(S2) operation of the flight
EIC
General
Safety regulations shall be in place to secure safety of aeroplane, crew, passengers, staff
and load. In addition to any local airport safety regulations, the following shall be observed
while handling the aeroplane:
• No unauthorized person may enter the ramp or an aeroplane;
• Staff on the ramp shall wear clothing and personal protection appropriate to the
weather conditions and handling operations activities;
• The ramp surface shall be checked to avoid accidents, injuries or damage to the
aeroplane caused by oil, ice, snow or FOD (foreign object damage);
• Only the marked walkways and traffic routes shall be used according to the local
airport regulations.
In the following text of this paragraph, JC Airlines provides procedures on the following:
• Use of air bridges and other means of embarkation/disembarkation for the purposes
of evacuation of passengers;
• Allocation of responsibilities between ground handling agent and cabin crew for
passenger safety during embarkation and disembarkation to ensure their individual
emergency procedures are compatible and effective.
JC Airlines personnel should always wear reflective safety west while on the ramp.
Engine intake (suction) area: This is the area in which a running engine exerts a
dangerous and deadly suction force which can ingest people and objects. This hazard
area extends to the front, sides and behind the lip of every engine intake.
This is the area behind the running engines that is impacted by the force of the exhaust
blast. The heat and high velocity exhaust winds generated by the engines can cause
severe injuries to personnel and can severely damage equipment or facilities.
Aeroplane Arrival
Ramp agent is responsible that only trained, qualified and authorized staff is allowed to:
• Operate mobile ground equipment;
• Approach the aeroplane before it has come to a complete stop at the assigned
parking position.
Ground support equipment, including the passenger boarding bridge, is never permitted to
move toward an aeroplane unless:
• The aeroplane has come to a complete stop;
• Chocks and cones are positioned;
• Engines are shut down and anti-collision beacons are OFF;
• Ground-to-flight crew communication is established, if applicable.
Note: It may be necessary to place the nose chocks and to connect external power prior
the engine shut down (if not forbidden by local regulations). Chocking and
connecting the GPU may be performed at the same time.
When, in exceptional cases, one engine shall be kept running (e.g., when no GPU is
available) ground equipment shall only approach that side of the aeroplane where engine
has been cut.
The Commander and the ground handling staff shall, beforehand, have agreed on the
course of action to be followed.
In addition to the general safety rules laid at the beginning of this paragraph, the following
shall be observed when equipment devices approach the aeroplane:
• Steps/air bridges and catering trucks shall principally be positioned at the aeroplane
prior to opening the respective cabin doors;
• When vision is restricted, a second person shall help to ensure safe manoeuvring
around the aeroplane;
• Sufficient distance between ground equipment and the aeroplane shall be
maintained in order to avoid damage caused by vertical movement of
wings/fuselage during unloading/loading/refuelling/defuelling;
• Equipment should never move across the path of taxiing aeroplanes or of
boarding/disembarking passengers;
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Note: Staff or equipment should never be within 5 m of the air intakes of an engine that
is running, or about to be started. When, it is necessary to approach the nose
section of an aeroplane with its engines running, there shall always be voice
communication with the flight crew, by means of a headset.
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The Commander shall be informed about the proper positioning of the wheel chocks, via
the interphone.
Chocks, when positioned, should be parallel to the wheel axle and only lightly touching the
tyres.
In unfavourable ramp surface conditions, including but not limited to icy or sloped ramps,
additional chocks are required to properly secure the aeroplane against movement.
In high wind conditions (steady wind or gusts above 40 knots), all wheel sets shall be
chocked.
To request chock removal, headset communication using agreed upon phraseology is the
preferred method. However, when hand signals are used, the following procedure is to be
followed by ramp agent:
• The »Set Brakes« hand signal must be displayed. The flight crew will confirm
(parking) brakes are set by displaying the »Set Brakes« hand signal in response;
• Then, the »Remove Chocks« hand signal shall be displayed. The flight crew will
okay chock removal by displaying the »Remove Chocks« hand signal;
• The parking brake must be confirmed being set ON (light);
• The chocks shall be removed.
Note: The flight crew shall acknowledge the hand signals by repeating them before
chock removal can be performed. If no acknowledgement is received, the chocks
cannot be removed.
On arrival, before ground handling equipment and staff approach the aeroplane to start
work, cones shall be placed a maximum of 1 metre in front of:
• Each wing tip immediately after the aeroplane is at its parking position;
• All wing-mounted engines;
• Other areas that are in conflict with the normal flow of equipment during ground
handling.
Note: Where conditions are hazardous, for example during high winds, then cones
should not be used.
Note: Unauthorised operation of the cabin doors can result in deployment of the
emergency escape slides, causing serious injury to personnel, damage to
aeroplane, etc.
The passenger route shall be clearly visible, free of any equipment and surface condition
kept clean. Passenger movement on the apron between the aeroplane and terminal
building or bus shall always be supervised and/or escorted (if applicable) by the ground
staff.
Company ground staff or authorized third party ground handling agent staff are
responsible for passengers’ safety during embarkation and disembarkation, when the
passengers are outside the aircraft, and cabin crew is responsible for passengers’ safety
once they are inside the aircraft. Individual emergency procedures between ground staff
and cabin crew shall be compatible and effective.
Note: Before removing ground equipment from the cabin door, the ramp agent shall
advise the cabin crew. Ground support equipment shall not be removed unless a
safety device has been put across the door opening or the door is being closed.
Prior to aeroplane departure, the handling agent/ground crew shall perform an inspection
of the aeroplane exterior and adjacent airside areas.
Note: Inspection of the aeroplane immediately prior to departure has also the purpose of
identifying, documenting and reporting external aeroplane damage. Such
inspection shall take place after most ground handling activities have been
completed prior to the time aeroplane movement will commence for departure.
External damage deemed to have the potential to compromise the airworthiness of
an aeroplane would be reported to appropriately qualified maintenance personnel
for evaluation and action, as appropriate.
Marshalling signals are depicted in the ICAO Annex 2 Rules of the Air.
Engine start procedures are set out in OM Part B, Chapter 2. In order to facilitate the safe
movement of the aeroplane, close co-operation between the pilot and ground personnel is
required. Engine starting during pushback and towing is permitted unless otherwise
instructed by ground handling staff. Communication and phraseology during pushback are
set out in OM Part B, Chapter 2.
At the end of the pushback sequence and before the towbar is disconnected, tension shall
be released from the towbar. A chock may be positioned in front of the nosewheel while
the disconnection of the towbar takes place.
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At the end of the pushback sequence and before the push-back truck/towbar is
disconnected, the flight crew should be instructed to set the aeroplane brakes and hold
position until receipt of visual signals for final clearance to taxi. Brakes set shall be
confirmed to ground staff.
After disconnecting the push-back truck from the nose-gear and before removal of the by-
pass pin, position the push-back truck behind the equipment restraint line in such a way
that it is visible from the cockpit (e.g. at a 90 degrees angle from the aeroplane). All
equipment and personnel shall also be moved clear of the aeroplane.
Important: Before the aeroplane commences taxiing under its own power, ground staff
shall give the final clearance signal and display the by-pass pin (if
appropriate) to the flight crew. This indicates that all equipment and
personnel are clear of the aeroplane and that it is safe to commence taxiing.
An acknowledgement of the signal shall be given by the flight crew.
Low temperatures and freezing precipitation may present specific problems to flight crews.
To deal with these critical weather conditions, special cold weather procedures have been
established, for both flight and ground crews. They supplement the normal procedures and
shall be observed when applicable. The intention of this section is to define general and
specific information. Flight crew should consult the relevant sections of the FCOM for
specific details.
8.2.4.2 Definitions
Active Frost: Condition when frost is forming. Active frost occurs when aeroplane surface
temperature is at or below 0ºC and at or below dew point.
Anti-Icing Fluid:
• Type I fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type I fluid;
• Type II fluid, Type III fluid, or Type IV fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type II fluid, Type III fluid, or Type IV fluid.
Type I fluid or mixture of water and Type I fluid shall be heated to ensure a temperature of
60°C minimum at the nozzle.
Clear Ice: Coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets. It is
formed on exposed objects at temperatures below, or slightly above, freezing temperature,
with the freezing of super-cooled drizzle, droplets or raindrops.
Cold-Soak Effect: Even in ambient temperature between -2°C and at least +15°C, ice or
frost can form in the presence of visible moisture or high humidity if the aircraft structure
remains at 0ºC or below. Anytime precipitation falls on a cold-soaked aircraft, while on
ground, clear icing may occur. The wings of aeroplane are said to be cold-soaked when
they contain very cold fuel as a result of having just landed after a flight at high altitude or
from having been re-fuelled with very cold fuel.
Contamination: This implies all forms of frozen or semi-frozen moisture such as frost,
snow, ice or slush.
Damp Runway: A runway is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the
moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance.
De-Icing: Procedure by which frost, ice, slush or snow is removed from an aeroplane in
order to provide clean surfaces.
De-Icing Fluid:
• Heated water;
• Type I fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type I fluid;
• Type II, Type III, or Type IV fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type II, Type III, or Type IV fluid.
Freezing Fog: A suspension of numerous minute water droplets which freezes upon
impact with ground or other exposed objects; generally reducing the horizontal visibility at
the earth's surface to less than 1 km. Metar code: FZFG.
Freezing Rain: Precipitation of liquid water particles which freezes upon impact with the
ground or other exposed objects, either in the form of drops of more than 0.5 mm (0.02
inch) diameter or smaller drops which, in contrast to drizzle, are widely separated. Metar
code: FZRA.
Friction Coefficient: Relationship between the friction force acting on the wheel and the
normal force on the wheel. The normal force depends on the weight of the aircraft and the
lift of the wings.
Frost/Hoar Frost: Ice crystals that form from ice saturated air at temperatures below 0°C
by direct sublimation on the ground or other exposed objects.
Hail: Precipitation of small balls or pieces of ice with a diameter ranging from 5 to >50 mm,
falling either separately or agglomerated. Metar code: GR.
Hold Over Time (HOT): Estimated time for which an anti-icing fluid will prevent the
formation of frost or ice and the accumulation of snow on the protected surfaces of an
aeroplane, under specified weather conditions.
Ice Pellets: Precipitation of transparent (grains of ice), or translucent (small hail) pellets of
ice, which are spherical or irregular, and which have a diameter of 5 mm or less. The
pellets of ice usually bounce when hitting hard ground. Metar code: PE.
Icing Conditions: May be expected when the OAT (on the ground and for takeoff) or
when TAT (in flight) is at or below 10ºC, and there is visible moisture in the air (such as
clouds, fog with low visibility of one mile or less, rain, snow, sleet, ice crystals) or standing
water, slush, ice or snow is present on the taxiways or runways.
Icy Runway: A runway is considered icy when its friction coefficient is 0.05 or below.
Light Freezing Rain: Precipitation of liquid water particles which freezes upon impact with
the ground or other exposed objects, either in the form of drops of more than 0.5 mm or
smaller drops which, in contrast to drizzle, are widely separated. Measured intensity of
liquid water particles is up to 2.5 mm/hour or 25 grams/dm2/hour with a maximum of 0.25
mm in 6 minutes.
Lowest Operational Use Temperature (LOUT): The lowest operational use temperature
(LOUT) is the higher (warmer) of:
• The lowest temperature at which the fluid meets the aerodynamic acceptance test
(according to AS5900) for a given type (high speed or low speed) of aeroplane, or
• The freezing point of the fluid plus the freezing point buffer of 10°C for Type I fluid
and 7°C for Type II, III or IV fluids.
Moderate and Heavy Freezing Rain: Precipitation of liquid water particles which freezes
upon impact with the ground or other exposed objects, either in the form of drops of more
than 0.5 mm (0.02 inch) or smaller drops which, in contrast to drizzle, are widely
separated. Measured intensity of liquid water particles is more than 2.5 mm/hour or 25
grams/dm2/hour.
Precipitation: Liquid or frozen water that falls from clouds as rain, drizzle, snow, hail, or
sleet.
Continuous Precipitation: Intensity changes gradually, if at all.
Intermittent Precipitation: Intensity changes gradually, if at all, but precipitation stops
and starts at least once within the hour preceding the observation.
Rain or High Humidity on Cold Soaked Wing: Water, visible moisture or humidity
forming ice or frost on the wing surface, when the temperature of the aeroplane wing
surface is at or below 0°C.
Rain: Precipitation of liquid water particles either in the form of drops of more than 0.5 mm
(0.02 inch) diameter or of smaller widely scattered drops. Metar code: RA.
Rain and Snow: Precipitation in the form of a mixture of rain and snow.
Rime: A rough white covering of ice deposited from fog at temperature below freezing). As
the fog usually consists of super-cooled water drops, which only solidify on contact with a
solid object, rime may form only on the windward side or edges and not on the surfaces. It
can generally be removed by brushing, but when surfaces, as well as edges, are covered,
it will be necessary to use an approved de-icing fluid.
Saturation: Maximum amount of water vapour allowable in the air. It is about 0.5 g/m3 at -
30ºC and 5 g/m3 at 0ºC for moderate altitudes.
Shear force: Force applied laterally on an anti-icing fluid. When applied to a Type II or IV
fluids, the shear force will reduce the viscosity of the fluid; when the shear force is no
longer applied, the anti-icing fluid should recover its viscosity. For instance, shear forces
are applied whenever the fluid is pumped, forced through an orifice or when subjected to
airflow. If excessive shear force is applied, the thickener system could be permanently
degraded and the anti-icing fluid viscosity may not recover and may be at an unacceptable
level.
Sleet: Precipitation in the form of a mixture of rain and snow. For operation in light sleet
treat it as light freezing rain.
Slush: Snow or ice that has been reduced to a soft watery mixture.
Snow: Precipitation of ice crystals, most of which are branched, star shaped or mixed with
unbranched crystals. At temperatures higher than -5°C, the crystals are generally
agglomerated into snowflakes. Metar code: SN.
Dry Snow: Snow which can be blown if loose or, if compacted by hand, will fall apart
upon release. Specific gravity: up to but not including 0.35. Dry snow is normally
experienced when temperature is below freezing and can be brushed off easily from
the aircraft.
Wet Snow: Snow which, if compacted by hand, will stick together and tend to or form a
snowball. Specific gravity: 0.35 up to but not including 0.5. Wet snow is normally
experienced when temperature is above freezing and is more difficult to remove from
the aircraft structure than dry snow being sufficiently wet to adhere.
Compacted Snow: Snow which has been compressed into a solid mass that resists
further compression and will hold together or break up into chunks if picked up. Specific
gravity: 0.5 and over.
Snow Grains: Precipitation of very small white and opaque particles of ice that are fairly
flat or elongated with a diameter of less than 1 mm. When snow grains hit hard ground,
they do not bounce or shatter. For hold over time purposes treat snow grains as snow.
Metar code: SG.
Snow Pellets: Precipitation of white opaque particles of ice. The particles are round or
sometimes conical; their diameter range from about 2-5 mm. Snow pellets are brittle,
easily crushed; they do bounce and may break on hard ground. Metar code: GS.
Supercooled Water Droplets: Condition where water remains liquid at negative Celsius
temperature. Supercooled drops and droplets are unstable and freeze upon impact.
Visible Moisture: Fog, rain, snow, sleet, high humidity (condensation on surfaces), ice
crystals or when taxiways and/or runways are contaminated by water, slush or snow.
Source: Transport Canada - Relationship between Visibility and Snowfall Intensity, and
Theoretical Considerations in the Estimation of Snowfall Rate using Visibility.
Using the table as a guideline may help the flight crew in a determination of a snowfall
intensity. This determination may be of assistance when using holdover tables.
JC Airlines has adopted the “Clean Aircraft” concept. This means that a take-off is not
permitted with frost, ice, snow or other contaminants adhering to the lifting surfaces, flight
controls or critical surfaces of the aeroplane. All fuselage vents, engine inlets, control
surfaces, surfaces of the wings and horizontal stabilizer shall be free of any adhering
contaminants.
The accumulation of frost, ice and snow (including freezing rain, water and ice pellets) on
critical aeroplane surfaces will dramatically affect take-off, climb and flight performance.
Therefore, the removal of such contamination prior to take-off is a requirement and shall
be strictly adhered to.
The only exception to this rule is that a light coating frost on the fuselage and up to 3 mm
thickness of frost on the under-surface of the wing in the area of the fuel tanks that has
resulted from cold soaking is permitted.
Fuselage areas in front of the cockpit windows have to be completely free of ice and snow.
8.2.4.5 Handling
Approved sub-contractors at each airport are used to perform the de-ice/anti-ice function.
However, all associated employees share the responsibility for ensuring that no aeroplane
is dispatched unless it is completely free of frost, ice or snow.
The approved sub-contractors employ authorized and trained personnel familiar with
critical aeroplane sections in general and with the equipment available. If deemed
necessary, the Commander should inform the sub-contractor’s ground crew about specific
ground and spray procedures for the aeroplane used.
8.2.4.6 Responsibilities
Commander
The Commander determines the need for de-icing/anti-icing. He is responsible for effective
de-icing/anti-icing and retains overall responsibility for ensuring that all critical surfaces
and components of the aircraft are free from contamination. His request for the treatment
and the fluid mixtures used will always take precedence over locally recommended
procedures.
If at any time prior to take-off, the Commander requires confirmation of the ice free state of
the aircraft, he must carry out or order a visual inspection or return to the ramp.
Whenever de-icing/anti-icing has taken place the Commander must make an appropriate
entry in the Aircraft Technical Log showing the start time, stop time, type of fluid, mix ratio
and sign it.
Qualified Person
Qualified person is ground de-icing personnel or anyone who has received appropriate
training in determining whether or not the aircraft is free of contamination (authorized
engineer, etc.). If any flight crew member or qualified person has determined that critical
surface contamination is present, then aeroplane de-icing/anti-icing is mandatory. The
handling agent is responsible for the availability of personnel equipment and fluids. All
actions in connection with de-icing/anti-icing shall be coordinated with the authorized
engineer (if present) and the flight crew.
Cabin Crew
While the Commander bears the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight, cabin
crew shall have an awareness of their potential to contribute significantly to safety
particularly during ground operation in icing conditions. On the ground cabin crew are often
in the best position to observe the condition of the upper surface of the wing. Cabin crew
are required to report to the Commander any concerns they have with regard to
contamination of the wing surfaces or concerns they may have regarding snow, ice or
frost. They shall also advise the Commander of any passenger concerns of a similar
nature. In this situation the Commander, designated flight crew member, or qualified
person shall conduct a contamination & post de-icing/anti-icing check to determine if the
aeroplane is free of contamination.
Surface contamination means any deposit on the aeroplane surfaces which could degrade
aeroplane performance and control, if not removed. Such contaminants may be in any
solid form of water adhering to the aeroplane surfaces. Snow, ice, frost, frozen water
droplets and ice pellets fall into this category.
“Clean Aircraft” concept may be determined through pre-flight inspections using visual,
tactile (by touch or feel) or sensor based procedures.
Critical surfaces (wings, horizontal stabilizers, control surfaces, high lift devices,
spoilers/speedbrakes, air data probes, static vents, fuselage, landing gear and wheel
bays) are to be checked for possible frost, ice, slush, or snow accumulation. Clear ice,
which is very difficult to detect, may have formed on the upper side of the wing due to:
• Freezing rain,
• Cold fuel causing cold wing surface,
• Precipitation (e.g. rain) freezes above tank area,
• Snow melting on a warm wing, but refreezing as the wing cools down,
• Melted snow running to a colder part of the wing.
If frost or ice has formed on the lower wing surface tank area and the aeroplane’s ground
time has been subject to precipitation conditions (rain, drizzle, fog), or when it is suspected
that clear ice has formed on the wing upper surface, the wings upper surface has to be
thoroughly checked to establish whether or not clear ice is present on the wing.
Ice can build up on aeroplane surfaces when descending through dense clouds or
precipitation during an approach. When ground temperatures at the destination are low, it
is possible for flaps to be retracted and for accumulations of ice to remain undetected
between stationary and moveable surfaces. It is therefore important that these areas are
checked prior to departure and any frozen deposits are removed.
Important: Heavy freezing has been reported during drizzle/rain even at temperatures
up to +15ºC due to cold fuel.
It shall not be assumed that light snow will blow off the wings during acceleration. It can be
anticipated, that partly frozen ice or snow patches on the wing will have a severe effect on
aerodynamic efficiency. It shall always be expected that below a snow/slush layer there
can be clear ice.
As clear ice is very difficult to detect visually, a tactile examination may have to be made of
the surface area to be inspected.
During snow fall, freezing rain and drifting snow, the possibility exists that snow and
melting ice could penetrate into slots, balance bays, drainage openings, hinges and
operating linkage and then refreeze. Therefore the above mentioned areas have to be
checked with special attention especially when the aeroplane has been parked outside for
a long period under freezing conditions. The same is applicable for landing gear areas,
including landing gear-latching mechanism, operating mechanism and electrical switching
elements, inlet scoops, pitot probes, air inlets and outlet, openings of the APU and the air-
conditioning as well as their adjacent areas.
Low wing temperatures associated with Clear Ice build-up normally occur when large
quantities of cold fuel remain in wing tanks during the turnaround/transit and any
subsequent re-fuelling does not cause a sufficient increase in wing temperature.
This check shall cover wings, horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer and fuselage, plus all
other parts of the aeroplane on which a de-icing/anti-icing treatment was performed
according to the requirements identified during the contamination check. The check shall
be performed from points offering sufficient visibility of all prescribed surfaces (e.g. from
de-icer itself or other equipment suitable for gaining access). Any contamination found,
shall be removed by further de-icing/anti-icing treatment and the check must be repeated.
After visual check for any contamination (and/or clear ice check/tactile check) of all critical
surfaces, post de-icing/anti-icing check provides the Commander with all the necessary
information to make an appropriate request for further possible de-icing/anti-icing
treatment of the aeroplane.
The company carrying out de-icing/anti-icing treatment, which is responsible for the
treatment of an aeroplane, shall pass all information about the treatment to Commander.
The Commander shall be notified of the type of the de-/anti-icing treatment performed –
anti-icing code which shall enable him to estimate hold over time (HOT). Anti-icing code
providing by post de-icing/anti-icing check shall be recorded (voice recorder) and
communicated to the Commander referring to the start of the last step of the treatment.
Example: Type II, 75%, 10:40; 10 Jan 2017, (Safewing MP II Flight), Post de/anti-icing
check completed.
Once the post anti-icing inspection has been completed and is satisfactory, the aeroplane
should be released for take-off as soon as possible.
The Commander shall continually monitor the environmental situation after the performed
de-icing/anti-icing treatment. Prior to take-off, he, or a designated flight crew member, shall
assess whether the applied hold over time is still appropriate.
Note: Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high wind velocity or jet blast may
reduce hold over time below the lowest time stated in the range. Hold over time may also
be reduced when aeroplane skin temperature is lower than OAT.
When the minimum hold over time in the HOT block has been exceeded and/or the
Commander cannot effectively assess the condition of the critical surfaces of the
aeroplane from inside the aeroplane just prior departure, the aeroplane has to be checked
to be free of frozen contaminants. This check is performed from the outside of the
aeroplane by qualified ground personnel. If this check cannot be done, take-off shall not be
attempted. Whenever the Commander is in doubt about the aerodynamic cleanliness of
the aeroplane, a visual inspection has to be performed (from inside or outside of the
aircraft) or return to the ramp made.
An aeroplane’s representative surface is a portion of the aeroplane that can be readily and
clearly observed by flight crew from inside the aeroplane and is used to judge whether or
not the surface has become contaminated. By determining the state of the representative
surface, it can then be reasonably expected that other critical surfaces will be in the same
(or better) condition. For the flight crew, the ice indicator in front of the cockpit window is a
good representation and indication of condition of the ice build-up.
Under certain conditions, a clear ice layer or frost can form on the wing upper surfaces
when the aeroplane is on the ground. In most cases this is accompanied by frost on the
underwing surface. Severe conditions occur with precipitation when sub-zero fuel is in
contact with the wing upper surface skin panels. The clear ice accumulations are very
difficult to detect from ahead of the wing or behind during walk-around, especially in poor
lighting and when the wing is wet. The leading edge may not feel particularly cold. The
clear ice may not be detected from the cabin either because wing surface details show
through.
The following factors contribute to the formation intensity and the final thickness of the
clear ice layer:
• Low temperature of fuel that was added to the aeroplane during the previous
ground stop and/or the long airborne time of the previous flight resulting in a
situation that the remaining fuel in the wing tanks is below 0°C.
• Abnormally large amount of remaining cold fuel in wing tanks causing the fuel level
to be in contact with the wing upper surface panels as well as the lower surface,
especially in the wing tank area.
• Temperature of fuel added to the aeroplane during the current ground stop, adding
(relatively) warm fuel can melt dry, falling snow with the possibility of re-freezing.
Drizzle/rain and ambient temperatures around 0°C on the ground is very critical. Heavy
freezing has been reported during drizzle/rain even at temperatures of 8 to 14° C. The use
of thermal leading edge anti-icing may melt falling dry snow that re-freezes later.
A recommended procedure to check the wing upper surface is to place high enough steps
as close as possible to the leading edge and near the fuselage, and climb the steps so that
you can touch a wide sector of the tank area by hand. If clear ice is detected, the wing
upper surface should be de-iced and then re-checked to ensure that all ice deposits have
been removed. It shall always be remembered that below a snow/slush/anti-icing fluid
layer there can be clear ice.
In some cases, ice may form on the aeroplane’s skin even if the OAT is above freezing,
particularly in case of short turnaround:
• Ice can build up on aeroplane surfaces when descending through dense clouds or
precipitation during an approach.
• If fuel has become cold soaked during a long flight and is in contact with the skin,
frost may form after landing.
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• Similar to the fuel tank, heavy pieces of structure can become cold soaked and
promote frost formation after landing.
When ground temperatures at the destination are low, it is possible that when flaps are
retracted accumulations of ice may remain undetected between stationary and moveable
surfaces. It is therefore important that these areas are checked prior to departure and any
frozen deposits removed.
Under freezing fog conditions it is necessary for the rear side of the fan blades to be
checked for ice build-up prior to start-up. Any deposits discovered should be removed by
directing air from a low flow hot air source, such as a cabin heater, onto the affected areas.
When slush is present on runways, inspect the aeroplane when it arrives at the ramp for
slush/ice accumulations. If the aeroplane arrives at the gate with flaps in a position other
than fully retracted, those flaps, which are extended, shall be inspected and, if necessary,
de-iced before retraction.
It is important to note that the rate of ice formation is considerably increased by the
presence of an initial depth of ice. Therefore, if icing conditions are expected to occur
along the taxi and takeoff path, it is necessary to ensure that all ice and frost is removed
before flight. This consideration shall extend the awareness of flight crew to include the
condition of the taxiway, runway and adjacent areas since surface contamination and
blown snow are potential causes for ice accretion equal to natural precipitation.
An aeroplane shall not be operated in expected or actual icing conditions at night unless it
is equipped with a means to illuminate or detect the formation of ice. Any illumination that
is used shall be of a type that will not cause glare or reflection that would handicap crew
members in the performance of their duties.
8.2.4.8 De-Icing/Anti-Icing
The most common techniques for removing frozen precipitation from aeroplane critical
surfaces and protecting the aeroplane against re-contamination are accomplished with
aeroplane de-icing and anti-icing fluids respectively. Any contamination found, shall be
removed by a de-icing treatment. If anti-icing is also required, this treatment may be
performed as a one-step or two-step de-icing/anti-icing of the relevant surfaces.
De-icing is a procedure by which frost, ice, snow or slush (i.e. the frozen contamination) is
removed from an aeroplane to provide uncontaminated surfaces. Anti-icing is a procedure
that provides protection against the formation of frost or ice and accumulation of snow on
treated surfaces of the aeroplane for a limited period of time (hold over time - HOT).
The preferred spray pattern for applying the anti-ice fluid is outwards from the
representative surface. Sprays are never directed at the APU, engine and other
intakes/outlets. They are seldom directed at the cockpit windows; if any spray is directed to
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-159
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
them and leaves a residue, it shall be removed. If applicable, switch OFF the windows
heating prior to the cleaning of cockpit windows. De-icing/anti-icing fluids are only required
until the aeroplane becomes airborne, after which the on-board de-icing/anti-icing system
then operate.
To preserve hold over times, the de-icing/anti-icing process shall be continuous and as
short as possible. Ensure that the de-icing/anti-icing procedures are performed at the
latest possible time prior to take-off.
One-Step De-Icing/Anti-Icing
Generally, the one step process of de-icing is used when there isn’t any active
precipitation occurring during de-icing. One step de-icing is completed with either Type I
(orange in colour) or Type II fluids (clear or pale yellow).
These fluids provide limited anti-ice capability and have very short hold over times in
precipitation. Type I fluid cannot be relied upon during precipitation and should therefore
be used as a de-icing fluid only.
Two-Step De-Icing/Anti-Icing
During conditions of ground icing, with falling precipitation adhering to the critical surfaces,
anti-icing will be required.
Two-step de-icing/anti-icing (when the first step is performed with de-icing fluid): The
correct fluid(s) shall be chosen with regard to ambient temperature.
After de-icing, a separate over-spray of anti-icing fluid shall be applied to protect the
relevant surfaces thus providing maximum possible anti-ice capability.
The second step is performed with anti-icing fluid. The correct fluid concentration shall be
chosen with regard to desired hold over time and is dictated by outside air temperature
and weather conditions (refer to QRH tables). The second step shall be performed before
first step fluid freezes (typically within 3 min), if necessary area by area.
Important: If the colour of the fluid being applied to the aeroplane is NOT the colour
anticipated, the procedure should be stopped and the situation investigated.
Type I
De-icing performance of the fluid is good. However, due to low viscosity it provides only
limited anti-icing protection during freezing precipitation. Due to its properties, Type I fluid
forms a thin, liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied which, under certain
weather conditions, gives a very limited hold over time. It is used predominantly for
removing frozen deposits from aircraft surfaces, either as the first step in a two step
operation or when precipitation has stopped. With this type of fluid no additional protection
is provided by increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix (no extension in
hold over time). This fluid has a high glycol content and low viscosity in its concentrated
form.
Type II
This fluid generally has lower glycol content in its concentrated form than Type I fluid due
to the inclusion of a pseudo plastic thickening agent. This effectively means that when
applied to the surface of an aircraft the viscosity is high, thus allowing the fluid to remain
on and protect against freezing rain for a period of time. However, the increasing effect of
the airflow over the wing surface during the take-off roll will effectively shear the fluid,
reducing its viscosity and allowing it to readily flow off the critical surfaces. With this type of
fluid the hold over time can be extended by increasing the concentration of fluid in the
fluid/water mix.
Type III
Type IV
This type of fluid is similar in both composition and operation to Type II fluids. However,
through the use of advanced thickening systems it is able to provide more holdover time
than Type II fluids, when used in concentrated forms. As with Type II fluids the hold over
time can be extended by increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix.
The current Hold Over Time (HOT) tables for different types of fluid are contained in the
next paragraph, and in GHM and QRH.
Hold over times are provided as a guide. Hold over time ranges are an estimate of the time
that de-icing/anti-icing fluid will prevent the formation of frost or ice and the accumulation
of snow on the unprotected surfaces of an aeroplane. HOT begins when the final
application of de-icing/anti-icing fluid commences and when the de-icing/anti-icing fluid
applied to the aeroplane loses its effectiveness (e.g., when ice begins to form on or in the
fluid). The shortest time represents protection that may be available for medium levels
precipitation and the longest for light precipitation.
It remains the Commander's responsibility to ensure that critical surfaces remain free of
contamination before commencing the take-off roll.
HOT are influenced by a number of factors and the flight crew may need to use their
judgment in their interpretation when considering the weather and other conditions. The
effectiveness of de-icing/ anti-icing fluids is based on a number of variables (e.g.
temperature, moisture content of the precipitation, wind, and the aeroplane skin
temperature). The effects of these variables need to be taken into account by the
Commander when establishing the HOT value.
The time that the fluid remains effective in ensuring a safe take-off is the time from first
application of anti-icing fluid on a clean wing until such time as ice crystals form or remain
in the fluid creating a surface roughness for take-off that deteriorates the performance or
controllability of the aeroplane.
Note that at any time an aeroplane exceeds the HOT, or in the view of the Commander
that aeroplane de-icing/anti-icing is necessary, any residue from the previous treatment
should be removed completely and a new de-icing/anti-icing treatment be applied.
Guidelines for Holdover times in active frost, SAE Type I, II, III and IV fluids:
1) Type I Fluid / Water Mixture must be selected so that the freezing point of the
mixture is at least 10°C (18°F) below outside air temperature.
2) Ensure that the lowest operational use temperature (LOUT) of the fluid is not
exceeded.
3) These fluids may not be used below -25°C (-13°F) in active frost conditions. For
Type II, III, or IV fluids with a LOUT warmer than -25°C (-13F) undiluted or -3°C
(27°F) in the 50/50 dilution, or -14°C (7°F) in the 75/25 dilution, limit usage to the
actual LOUT value.
4) Value in parenthesis is for composite aircraft.
Caution: This table is for departure planning only and should be used in conjunction with
pre take-off check procedures. Fluids used during ground de-icing/anti-icing do
not provide in-flight icing protection.
Guidelines for Holdover times SAE Type I fluid mixtures as a function of weather
conditions and outside air temperature:
1) Use light freezing rain holdover times in conditions of very light or light snow mixed
with light rain.
2) Use light freezing rain holdover times if positive identification of freezing drizzle is
not possible.
3) This column is for use at temperatures above 0 degrees Celsius (32 degrees
Fahrenheit) only.
4) Heavy snow, ice pellets, moderate and heavy freezing rain, hail.
SAE Type I fluid/water mixture must be selected so that the freezing point of the mixture is
at least 10 °C (18 °F) below OAT.
Caution: This table is for departure planning only and should be used in conjunction with
pre take-off check procedures. The time of protection will be shortened in heavy
weather conditions. Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high
wind velocity, or jet blast may reduce holdover time below the lowest time
stated in the range. Holdover time may be reduced when aircraft skin
temperature is lower than OAT. SAE TYPE I fluid used during ground de-
icing/anti-icing is not intended for and does not provide protection during flight.
Guidelines for the application of SAE Type I fluid mixtures minimum concentrations as a
function of outside temperature:
Two-~t~ Proced~
Outside Air Ternper~ttJre One-~p ProCE-dure
{OA1) Dtic~Anti..jcing1
Filsi sti!p: ~~ng SKOnd ste<p; Anti.fci:ng'.t
1) 1'\Jicis mus1 Olliy ~ UMd ;ot ~r.>:~ns abo\19 Uwir Iat~~,.~ Qlllira~on<~l uw tM"Qiira~.mt {lOUT).
2') To l:e aPCJte<l be'are t:rst~ II!Jid freezes. t~ly "";llln 3 mloot"s. !This Ln>e may be hlgi'le< than 3 ml~tes ln 50me cood 11ons, 001 JX>Ii!mlalty Ia.....,. in
t..ovy ~cip":bfon, cddor oo~..-.s. or f<lr ai:iQJ surfXOH ce>Minlc!41d of tOmfX"U m>t.ri>ls. II r9C»Utlil)'. tn~ s00001d •~"P :s.h.> l!o .-.FJ)Iiod >ro> by
3/e<!.l
Guidelines for Holdover times SAE Type IV fluid mixtures as a function of weather
conditions and outside air temperature:
1) Use light freezing rain holdover times in conditions of very light or light snow mixed
with light rain.
2) Use light freezing rain holdover times if positive identification of freezing drizzle is
not possible.
3) This column is for use at temperatures above 0 °C (32 °F) only.
4) Heavy snow, ice pellets, moderate and heavy freezing rain, and hail.
5) No holdover time guidelines exist for this condition below -10 °C (14 °F).
6) For Lyondell Arctic Shield temperature is limited to -9.5 ºC (15 ºF); for Cryotech
Polar Guard temperature is limited to -5.5 ºC (22 ºF).
7) For Cryotech Polar Guard, temperature is limited to -23.5 ºC (-10.3 ºF) and for
Lyondell Arctic Shield temperature limited to -24.5 ºC (-12.1 ºF). If the fluid-specific
brand is unknown, all of the temperature limitations in this and the preceding note
apply.
Caution: This table is for departure planning only and should be used in conjunction with
pre take-off check procedures. The time of protection will be shortened in heavy
weather conditions. Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high
wind velocity, or jet blast may reduce holdover time below the lowest time
stated in the range. Holdover time may be reduced when aircraft skin
temperature is lower than OAT. SAE TYPE IV fluid used during ground de-
icing/anti-icing is not intended for and does not provide protection during flight.
Guidelines for Holdover times Clariant Safewing MP IV Launch Type IV fluid mixtures as a
function of weather conditions and outside air temperature:
1) Use light freezing rain holdover times in conditions of very light or light snow mixed
with light rain.
2) Use light freezing rain holdover times if positive identification of freezing drizzle is
not possible.
3) This column is for use at temperatures above 0 °C (32 °F) only.
4) Heavy snow, ice pellets, moderate and heavy freezing rain, and hail.
5) No holdover time guidelines exist for this condition below -10 °C (14 °F).
Caution: This table is for departure planning only and should be used in conjunction with
pre take-off check procedures. The time of protection will be shortened in heavy
weather conditions. Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high
wind velocity, or jet blast may reduce holdover time below the lowest time
stated in the range. Holdover time may be reduced when aircraft skin
temperature is lower than OAT. Clariant Safewing MP IV Launch Type IV fluid
used during ground de-icing/anti-icing is not intended for and does not provide
protection during flight.
Guidelines for Holdover times Kilfrost ABC-S Plus Type IV fluid mixtures as a function of
weather conditions and outside air temperature:
1) Use light freezing rain holdover times in conditions of very light or light snow mixed
with light rain.
2) Use light freezing rain holdover times if positive identification of freezing drizzle is
not possible.
3) This column is for use at temperatures above 0 °C (32 °F) only.
4) Heavy snow, ice pellets, moderate and heavy freezing rain, and hail.
5) No holdover time guidelines exist for this condition below -10 °C (14 °F).
Caution: This table is for departure planning only and should be used in conjunction with
pre take-off check procedures. The time of protection will be shortened in heavy
weather conditions. Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high
wind velocity, or jet blast may reduce holdover time below the lowest time
stated in the range. Holdover time may be reduced when aircraft skin
temperature is lower than OAT. Kilfrost ABC-S Plus Type IV fluid used during
ground de-icing/anti-icing is not intended for and does not provide protection
during flight.
Guidelines for the application of SAE Type I, II, III and IV fluid mixtures minimum
concentrations as a function of outside air temperature (concentrations in % volume):
!Hi ow ·3 •c (27 •FJ 7!lo'2S Hea:""" s~l~ milt of Ty-pe l.llll et rv.and
:0 ·14''C (7-F} ~:ecf' Tyj16ll, I or IV w-~ .-·~h IS '""':u"O pori not lr(ft ~ ~ 'C 7.Y25 T~ 11,111, ct rv
(5 •;=) il~ ~ii OA-
t.ele.·· ·t•'C(7 •F) 1001) f-'eatt<l sllit;.llle·mil: d Type l.llll « IV. and
W.l:B" w:ll a l'tee:zina pn:r.t ncr. rr.ore :hon 3 'C 10~'0 iype II. II. at W
iQ -2$ "C C·13 •F) Htii:J iYPfi n 1 ariV (5 "'l 3~vt .-J:i OA-
SAETJPI IL'IV !bdtn.l'Jtle uw~t.elov•·2S'C(·ll •F}pnnlllt~II'I:I!IMOAT ~& .al 011 ~boWI!Ie LOUt
Be-:OW-45•<: (·13'il SAE Tn- Rl livid ~ybe uied telo'" ·10'C (Wf] r:<1''•;o'td th011 tilt OA- ;,~ Ci6 ~e:t. LOUT
Ccnsider :lle use d SAE T~ I (Tal;/~ fA) 11flen Typt> ll, ll~oriVftlidcannct~ lt'",ed
I) Flui:fs must o!Wybe used at 12rrpeldtLI'e; <ibi:A•? tl:eir k;1~ 09Efi!tooaluse t~Me ILOU"").
2) To be app!Jed beore 1.1"51 S':i<p llluld In:~. typlca!y w ~In 3 fiVIII'.e5. filii; lime I1U}' be llgler lllan 311V1Jtes tn ·same·CCI"lC.!lOft.~ .hoi! pO(aiLJlly lo-.lil!r 1n lte.lvy
~m;iti:iQn. in c:oldil<r ~blrH.. or far l:l':tic¥1surl'i!;9i ggm~ or CCI"!Ipolilll maltriill5 If~- h s.IOfld ~111p 1hi!ll be ~1td i!rtil br i!IN.
3} Clean a'raalJ11a1 be ;nii-i:E:d wifl ~eiil:ed i ~e rI. II. cr PJ "'lid
.
NOTES:
F~r h.eated iltids.. <~lillie! ti!R'ller.rureno; less 1llan t:(J •c (1-40 •F) z..lhe n='.E is c'si'able..lJWEf t~!'r.l:ll'? frrii: §hall nee ex~ ilu'd and ai~Viti mallliacll:n!r's
. ~~dltJctM.
The lo!.1'fll q:»et3licnJIUM lerrper:lil.n (lOliT} rer 3 ~n T~t· I, 10. « V 5ud s ,..llqH of.
a} Thl' 1~'11'1: tf!J111!!'Uire ill .,tich :t. fli.d ~ fll' Hrod)n il!rio illl01$Qntl' tHI b" a ;'w.l ;~~ type. «
b) Th~ a:::ual freezing J:olrtofme Wd p.\15 a ~...zhg pc«. bu=er cf 7'C ( 1J'F)..
..
CAUl lOttS:
Wt1g sUI tfom4:'1!mll.r'H mal/ di!!cf .rJd In 5Ct'M e.u u INY be Ia\- Uun OA-. A s~ rnb (mere gltcol} e.111 te used lndtr ~ eonci:lms.
As ftllid rrct!l'11 ni)y OI:JOo.l'. ~!II~ -..~s 11. m. Or IV !l;:IJ w:a r.ot bt I.Jit\t reo tl'.t ~b<WIO ~P 01 ~ eo~t<l wing ~ indi;~t<l tli frOil or iot on 1111 II).' *
. su!tat:eahne 'lli~ in ihe <Ra oiW?fllelw
Ail mtit..aat: arr.ou111 <:A ant-ic.ng ·flud. e!Jieeally ~ ile :seconc ~tep of a :o·.o-~tep proo;dL're. ma:1 ut:O~ a sub6uro:allc~ of hoc!O'fe' i'ne, pii!'Jeli3J!y .men
LM\9 .i TJP•I fll.il ilim~.n let IN hN.l i lop (dtiO:tiD) Cf ~ :-.uo-~ f"'OC~
. Rtptad' dtio'I1(J~~~ willl hG:Id :fi:k_tntd ftu>:ls ~ ilil' RiPIIIt vse d T~I~Uo.W;ttr MOOY"fi fer dlichg C<l'l t.ild to lhl b\tQjp rt micflill wtich
c,an rH.J'.:h:l' and fn:&e oo c:oo."roo !IJrfao:.s, l'if1ijes.. anc ~:ed ~«S g 6!;/:A ard r~ rrow-JTtEilt cl these CB'.:o?S. leadrlg to an m:s.afe
t(lfld:.~. r ~" e'tJC:rgipf.i<illg '":n ~t<l ~ fyi~S oc~~ p~ 01!1)~ ~ '*"1)~1 01 ..~, in ~::o~~et w '!h h ~
marr.rfa;t..ef's. instrucaoos and proo;d!Jres sho'*l be fdlcw.d.
8.2.4.12 Communications
In the interest of safety and passenger comfort, during the de-icing/anti-icing procedure,
the flight crew shall maintain contact with the ground crew performing the de-icing
operation. It is important that the de-icing operator be able to relay instructions to the
Commander quickly and clearly.
Before Treatment
When the aeroplane is to be treated with the flight crew onboard, the flight and ground
crews should confirm the following:
• The fluid to be used;
• The extent of treatment;
• Any aeroplane specific procedures to be followed;
• Any other information needed to apply in HOT tables.
After configuring the aeroplane in preparation for de-icing/anti-icing the Commander shall
advise the ground crew: »BRAKES SET, READY FOR DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING«.
After Treatment
The Commander shall be notified of the type of the de-/anti-icing treatment performed.
Following a de-icing/anti-icing treatment of the aeroplane and confirmation that the critical
surface inspection has been completed, and that the aeroplane is free of frozen
contaminants, the Commander will need the following information from the de-icing crew:
• Confirmation that all staff and equipment are clear of the aeroplane.
• Authorization to start engines (if applicable).
• Notification to switch to hand signals (if applicable).
Once it has been determined through the critical surface inspection that the aeroplane is
clean and adequately protected, the aeroplane should be released for take-off as soon as
possible.
On receipt of the post de-icing check report, the Commander will complete the Aircraft
Technical Log by entering all the relevant data including the type of fluid used and
estimated HOT.
Note: The start time applicable, for the purposes of HOT, in the case of a Two-Step
procedure is the start time of the second step.
All revenue flights should be conducted under Instrument Flight Rules. Revenue flights,
operating partially or in full under VFR and non-revenue flights (demonstration, test and
special flights) operating partially or in full under VFR shall be approved by the Flight
Operations Manager in advance.
A flight plan shall be filed for each flight, and full use of air traffic control services and/or
advisory services shall be made.
An aeroplane electing to change the conduct of its flight from compliance with the IFR to
compliance with the VFR shall notify the appropriate ATS unit to specify that IFR flight is
cancelled. No reply other than the acknowledgement »IFR FLIGHT CANCELLED
AT...(time)« would normally be made by the ATC. When an aeroplane operating under IFR
is flown in, or encounters VMC, it shall not cancel its IFR flight. It is prohibited to cancel
IFR flight plans at night or in congested terminal areas.
ATC clearance and authorization shall be obtained when changing a flight operation from
VFR to IFR. Pilots should note that a change from VFR to IFR is not instantaneous, and
may take the ATC some time to accept the flight in the IFR system. The usual time for a
change from VFR to an IFR is when cleared for a VFR departure up to a certain altitude or
waypoint, followed by an IFR flight plan to the destination. In this case, the flight is deemed
to be in IFR the moment it crosses the designated altitude or waypoint.
Instrument departure and approach procedures established by the State in which the
aerodrome is located have to be used (refer to OM Part C).
However, a Commander may accept an ATC clearance which deviates from above,
provided obstacle clearance criteria are observed and full account is taken of the operating
conditions. The final approach must be flown visually or in accordance with the established
instrument approach procedure.
An aircraft should not descend in IMC below the minimum safe (sector) altitude (MSA) as
shown on the instrument approach chart until it is established in the approved approach,
holding procedure, or under positive radar control.
An IFR flight may be cleared to execute a visual approach by day and such a clearance
may be accepted provided the Commander has the aerodrome in sight, can maintain
adequate visual reference and is fully aware of all terrain adjacent to his approach.
Noise abatement procedures ensure that the necessary safety of flight is maintained whilst
minimising exposure to noise on the ground. Crews must ensure that safety has priority
over noise abatement considerations. The Commander retains full authority not to comply
with the specified or published noise procedures if the safety margins may be reduced by
its applications. There are two procedures, one of which shall meet the close-in noise
abatement objective and the other the distant noise abatement objective.
The Noise abatement procedures are described in the relevant OM Part B. Flight crews
shall comply with thrust reduction / acceleration altitude procedure which are specified in
OM Part B, unless specific procedure is published by an aerodrome of operation.
Noise abatement departure procedures (NADP) shall be performed in accordance with (in
order of priority):
• Aerodrome specific NADP (if specified in OM Part C/Navigation Charts);
• NADP as specified in OM Part B.
JC Airlines aircraft are equipped with a comprehensive and high standard of navigation
equipment. The general principle is that for all operations this equipment is checked for
serviceability and normal operation before each flight.
Verification of the accuracy of the navigation system is to be made as per the procedures
in OM Part B. The routine use of all fitted equipment will ensure that errors in performance
or faulty operation will be detected, and rectification can be arranged.
Reliance must not be placed on raw data information derived from ground beacons until
the appropriate coded signal has been identified and confirmed by both pilots. When using
computer display unit installations, particular care is to be taken in ensuring that the
correct numerical sequences are programmed when entering data, via the keyboard, from
the OFP into the FMS.
Navigation accuracy check shall be as per SOP’s during all phases of flight.
Above all, flight crews must remain alert to the possibility of errors in programming or
performance, and be prepared to revert to a lower level of navigation equipment and
procedure.
An aeroplane shall not be operated unless the required navigation equipment is installed.
The failure of a single navigation unit may not result in the inability to operate safely on the
route to be flown. Detailed information about the required operational status of equipment
is provided in OM Part B.
8.3.2.2 Policy
Pilots are responsible for the correct use of the navigation and communication equipment
installed in the aeroplane. Continuous monitoring of the equipment and its performance is
mandatory during its use. Special attention must be paid to the engagement status of
system used in order to avoid late recognition of mode or configuration changes which
could result in abnormal situation (e.g. unscheduled disengagement).
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-174
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
Flight guidance consists of those systems which assist the crew in tracking flight
parameters selected manually or generated by navigation or performance system. They
make use of system and their associated controls (e.g. Autopilot, Flight Director).
Phases of flight requiring compulsory use of the systems (e.g. Autopilot, Flight Director)
are specified in the applicable OM Part B.
Any degradation of on-board equipment which occurs must be taken into consideration for
any in-flight planning/replanning with regard to destination and alternate weather, and for
fuel planning for en-route conditions. Any downgrading of ground facilities which occurs
must be assessed with regard to possible increased landing minima at destination and/or
alternate airports.
8.3.2.6 Navigation
The most important principle governing the performance of all navigation tasks is
redundancy, as navigational errors carry a significant risk potential. Whether navigating on
manually-tuned navigation aids, automatic navigation systems or on radar vectors, cross-
checking of the primary aids is essential. Flight plans activated in the navigation system
shall be checked by both pilots against the OFP. For adhoc in-flight replanning, pilots must
not only check if the fuel requirements for in-flight replanning will be met, but also if the
available navigational aids for the replanned route and/or the replanned destination, as
well as the airborne equipment, will be sufficient for a safe conclusion of the flight.
8.3.2.7 Procedures
Notwithstanding the overall responsibility of the Commander for precise navigation and
proper use of the navigation system, the PF is responsible for the selection of the
navigation aids and the navigation system configuration. The PF, whenever flying
manually, will direct the pilot monitoring (PM) to set the navigation aids. The PM is
responsible for setting, identifying and checking the aids specified by the PF and to
establish the required navigation system configuration.
When flying on autopilot, the PF sets and identifies the navigation aids and checks the
navigation system configuration. Any changes made by the PM shall be made at request
of, and be checked by, the PF.
The pilots shall inform each other of any doubts about the reliability of a navigation aid or
system. For flights or portions of a flight conducted at altitudes where safe terrain
clearance is not contingent upon navigation accuracy, on-board navigation system
redundancy may be considered acceptable as long as the aeroplane’s computed positions
are checked at regular intervals against displayed navigation aids, where these aids are
available. In areas where such aids are not available (e.g. sea, desert), traffic separation
provided by ATC may account for reduced navigation accuracy.
Safe terrain clearance is dependent on navigation accuracy for take-off and climb. If the
departure procedures are stored in the navigation database, the on-board navigation
system must be in the update mode and the system computed positions checked
continuously against displayed navigation aids. If these conditions cannot be met, take-off
and climb must be performed according to conventional radio-navigation. If the arrival
procedures for descent and approach are stored in the navigation database, the on-board
navigation system must be in the update mode and the system-computed positions must
be checked continuously against displayed navigation aids. The use is restricted down to
MEA/MSA and intermediate approach altitude, unless the system is certified for use in the
approach. If these conditions are not met, the whole descent and approach procedure
must be performed by using conventional radio navigation.
An approximate cross check for a 3º approach is that the height distance relationship is
300 feet / NM.
Cross check for the required Vertical Speed (V/S) is Gradient x Ground Speed (i.e. 5.2 x
130 kts, the ROD should be approximately 670 ft/min).
ILS facilities are known to produce false beams outside their coverage sectors due to
radiation aberrations. Such beams may be captured without a warning flag.
In order to ensure proper localizer beam capture, the ILS mode shall not be armed until
the vicinity of the beam has been ascertained and checked by independent navigation aids
and the capture shall be monitored by the same means.
A DME distance check at glide slope intercept should be performed whenever possible. An
altitude check must be performed at the OM position or its equivalent. FMS vertical
navigation features may not be substituted for altitude capture and holding procedures.
Navigation aids should be selected for coverage and adequate cross checks. Distance
information for cross checks shall be used if a DME is co-located with a VOR which
coincides with a waypoint. DMEs co-located to ILS or approach localizers normally
indicate zero DME at touchdown. En-route facilities may be expected to provide reliable
information along the published routes they define.
Manually tuned navigation aids should be positively identified at the time of selection.
When elements of information relative to a position are contradictory, the reliability of any
relevant navigation aid(s) should be verified by additional independent means. Navigation
and approach aids shall not be used:
• Whenever positive identification is not possible; or
• Whenever reports or other information (e.g. NOTAMS) indicate that a system might
be unreliable or inadequate for en-route navigation or approach.
Area Navigation (RNAV) is a method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on any
desired flight path within the coverage of station-referenced navigation aids or within the
limits of the capability of self-contained aids, or a combination of these.
For more information about RNAV refer to JC Airlines RNAV Training Manual.
The PBN concept specifies that RNAV system performance requirements be defined in
terms of the accuracy, integrity, availability, continuity and functionality which are needed
for the proposed operations in the context of a particular airspace concept.
Navigation Specifications
The following Navigation Specification approvals have been granted to JC Airlines (refer to
AOC Operations Specifications) and are in use within Company's area of operations:
FLIGHT PHASE
NAVIGATION En-Route
En-Route APPROACH PHASE
SPECIFICATION Oceanic / TER DEP
Continental INIT INT FINAL MISSED
Remote
RNAV 10 10
RNAV 5 5 5
RNAV 2 2 2 2
RNP 1 1 1 1 1 1
RNAV 5 is an en-route navigation specification which may be used for the initial part of the
STAR outside 30 NM and above MSA.
Note(1): The area of application can only be used after the initial climb of a missed
approach phase.
RNAV 10
RNAV 10 is an oceanic or remote area specification requiring the aircraft to maintain a
track-keeping accuracy of +/- 10 NM without regular updates from ground-based
navigation aids. RNAV 10 approval can be based on IRS performance alone (with a time
limit of 6.2 h since IRS ground alignment or 5.7 h since last FM radio update).
RNAV 10 airspace supports 50 NM lateral and longitudinal distance-based separation
minima, and examples of RNAV 10 airspace exist over the Indian Ocean and in the AFI,
SAM and PAC regions.
Contingency procedures for the area in which RNAV 10 operations are to be conducted
should be checked and briefed.
RNAV 5
For operations in RNAV 5 airspace, aircraft require a track-keeping accuracy of +/-5 NM
for 95% of the flight time. RNAV 5 does not require a navigation database, it only requires
the flight management system to store four waypoints, and it does not require waypoint fly-
by functionality.
In the event of communications failure, the flight crew should continue with the flight plan
in accordance with the published communications failure procedure.
RNP 1
RNP 1 procedure can be operated in continental and terminal airspace. This procedures is
mainly used for terminal airspace (initial/intermediate/missed approach and departure), for
RNAV SID and RNAV STAR with RNP 1 capability.
navigation database with the data of the next cycle shall be uploaded. Current and
next FMS navigational database must not be switched during the flight;
• Not fly an RNAV SID or STAR unless it is retrievable by route name from the FMS
navigation database and conforms to the charted route. However, the route may
subsequently be modified through the insertion or deletion of specific waypoints in
response to ATC clearances. The manual entry or creation of new waypoints by a
manual entry, of latitude and longitude or Place-Bearing-Distance values is not
permitted. Additionally, pilots must not change any RNAV SID or STAR database
waypoint type from a fly-by to a flyover or vice versa;
• Extract, whenever possible, RNAV routes in the en-route domain from the database
in their entirety, rather than loading individual waypoints from the database into the
flight plan. However, it is permitted to select and insert individual, named
fixes/waypoints from the navigation database, provided all fixes along the published
route to be flown are inserted. Moreover, the route may subsequently be modified
through the insertion or deletion of specific waypoints in response to ATC
clearances;
• Cross-check the cleared flight plan by comparing charts or other applicable
resources with the FMS textual display and the EFIS map display, if applicable. If
required, the exclusion of specific navigation aids should be confirmed. At times,
pilots may notice a slight difference between the navigation information portrayed
on the chart and their navigation display. Differences of 3 degrees or less may
result from the equipment manufacturer’s application of magnetic variation and are
operationally acceptable;
• Verify that the correct terminal route has been loaded, prior to the arrival phase.
The active flight plan should be checked by comparing the charts with the EFIS
map display (if applicable) and the FMS textual display. This includes confirmation
of the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any
altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and
which are flyover. If required by a route, a check will need to be made to confirm
that updating will exclude a particular navigation aid. A route must not be used if
doubt exists as to the validity of the route in the navigation database;
• Note that route modifications in the terminal area may take the form of radar
headings or »DIRECT TO« clearances and the flight crew must be capable of
reacting in a timely fashion. This may include the insertion of tactical waypoints
loaded from the database. Any published altitude and speed constraints must be
observed.
It is the flight crew’s responsibility to ensure that the navigation accuracy is maintained. In
particular, the utmost care shall be taken to avoid the following common mistakes:
• Insertion errors: The pilot has the correct coordinates or waypoints of his cleared
route, but he inserts incorrect data into the system; particular care should be
exercised in case of re-clearance.
• De-coupling: The pilot allows the autopilot to become de-coupled from the
equipment which he thinks is providing steering output.
• Faulty equipment: The pilot might continue to use a navigation system which was
becoming inaccurate.
Continued operation in accordance with the current ATC clearance may be possible in
many situations. When this cannot be achieved, a revised clearance may be required to
revert to conventional navigation. In such case the flight crew shall, on each ATC
frequency change, report the situation by announcing »NEGATIVE RNAV« on initial
contact.
Incidents which affect or could affect the safety of RNAV operations must be reported by
means of an ASR – Air Safety Report. When it is identified that a particular route or
procedure contains an error, it must also be reported directly to OCC as soon as possible.
The use of the route or procedure is prohibited until the error has been corrected. This
prohibition will be annotated on the OFP. The information must be also passed to the
Flight Operations Technical Engineer for transmission to the database supplier. An ASR
must also be filed for any significant discrepancy. Examples may include, but are not
limited to:
• Navigation errors (e.g. map shifts) not associated with transitions from inertial
navigation mode to radio navigation mode;
• Incorrect data or navigation database coding error;
• Unexpected deviations in flight path not caused by pilot input;
• Significant misleading information without a failure warning;
• Total loss or multiple navigation equipment failure;
• Problems with ground navigational facilities.
In certain areas where flights are conducted over remote or non-radar environments, some
ATS authorities have authorised the use of the Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure that may
be employed at the discretion of the flight crew as standard operating practice to gain an
additional safety margin. This will mitigate the risk of conflict when non-normal events such
as aeroplane navigation errors, altitude deviation errors and turbulence-induced altitude-
keeping errors occur. SLOP is intended for both the mitigation of the increasing lateral
overlap probability and wake turbulence encounters.
The aeroplane may fly centre line or up to 2 NM right of centre line. The intent of this
procedure is to reduce risk (add safety margin) by distributing aeroplanes laterally.
Aeroplane should neither offset to the left of centre line nor offset more than 2 NM right of
centre line unless approved or instructed to do so by ATC.
While there is no ATC clearance required for this procedure, an advisory of the offset to
the relevant ATC is recommended. SLOP must be discontinued in the terminal area or at
the beginning of an approach procedure, at a hold, or during large changes of track.
RVSM airspace is defined as any airspace or route where aeroplanes are separated
vertically by 1000 ft between FL290 and FL410 inclusive, instead of the standard 2000 ft
separation. This 1000 ft vertical separation minimum is available to suitably equipped and
approved aeroplanes, thereby making available six additional usable flight levels.
The objective of the specific requirements and procedures applicable to RVSM airspace is
to increase traffic capacity, while ensuring that the same level of safety provided by
conventional vertical separation is maintained. Consequently, stringent requirements on
aeroplane equipment and training of crews, ATC controllers and associated personnel are
applied.
JC Airlines aircraft are approved for operation in RVSM airspace and these approvals can
be found in Operation Specifications.
RVSM Procedures
RVSM operations shall be in accordance with OM Part B procedures. The TCAS mode
selector should be left in the TA/RA position. Rate of climb/descent must always be
carefully monitored. When approaching a cleared FL, vertical speed must be less than
1500 ft per minute.
North Atlantic (NAT) MNPS airspace has been designated between FL285 and FL420,
between 27°N and the North Pole, bounded in the east by eastern boundaries of CTA
Santa Maria Oceanic, Shanwick Oceanic and Reykjavik; in the west by the eastern
boundaries of CTA Reykjavik, Gander Oceanic and New York Oceanic.
Canadian MNPS covers Arctic Control Area, Northern Control Area and portion of
Southern Control Area, between FL 330 and FL 410.
The altimeter setting procedures provide adequate vertical separation between aeroplanes
and, in conjunction with correct navigation procedures, ensure adequate terrain clearance
during all phases of flight. Before leaving the ramp the pressure scales of all altimeters
shall be set to the actual QNH of the aerodrome. For altimeter tolerances refer to OM Part
B. For IFR Flight Level tables (including metric system) refer to OM Part C.
When changing an altimeter setting, each pilot will call out the new setting and check
altitudes. Altimeter setting callouts are explained in OM Part B and FCOM.
Pressure altimeters are calibrated to indicate true altitude under International Standard
Atmosphere (ISA) conditions. Any deviation from ISA will therefore result in an erroneous
reading on the altimeter. The altimeter error may be significant under conditions of
extremely cold temperature and appropriate corrections should be applied. Refer to OM
Part B for specific procedures.
For take-off all shall altimeters shall be set on QNH. When passing the transition altitude,
all altimeters shall be set to STANDARD (1013.25 hPa) and baro-settings and altitude
readings shall be crosschecked. In case cleared flight level is very close to transition
altitude and QNH is much lower than 1013 hPa, altimeters may be set to STANDARD
before crossing transition altitude. This is to prevent initial flight level bust while still on
QNH. Where this procedure is applied, it must be anticipated and briefed prior to
departure. Pilot self-checking and cross-monitoring in all matters relating to vertical
clearances is therefore essential. Again this is particularly important when QNH is low and
the difference between it and the standard pressure setting (translated into vertical
distance) is potentially even more safety critical.
Cruise
If cruising at or below transition altitude, primary and stand by altimeters shall be set to
QNH and baro-settings and altitude readings shall be crosschecked. If cruising above the
transition altitude, primary and stand by altimeter shall be set to STANDARD (1013.25
hPa).
When cleared to an altitude with no flight level constraints, in order to facilitate effective
monitoring during the approach and landing phase, all altimeters shall be set to local QNH.
For approach and landing all altimeters shall be set to local QNH.
As indicated below, each setting will result in an altimeter indication which provides a
measure of the vertical distance with regard to the ICAO Standard Atmosphere (ISA)
above the particular reference datum shown.
Note: QNH shall be the sole reference for take-off, approach and landing.
• During cockpit preparation the pressure scales of all altimeters shall be set to the
actual QNH of the aerodrome - they must read to be within the type specific
tolerances as defined in OM Part B;
• The altimeter indications thus obtained shall be observed and checked against the
elevation of the aerodrome;
• When the altimeter does not indicate the reference elevation or height exactly, but
is within the tolerance specified in the OM Part B, no adjustment of this indication
shall be made at any stage of the flight. Furthermore, any error that is within
tolerance noted during pre-flight check on the ground shall be ignored by the flight
crew during entire flight;
• After each setting of altimeters the readings on the flight deck shall be compared.
This shall include the standby and metric (if installed) altimeters;
• If an altimeter indication is not within the specified tolerance follow the procedure
outlined in the OM Part B.
In certain States dimensions used are metric. Charts for these aerodromes indicate all
vertical distances as altitudes in feet (QNH), with conversion to heights in feet (QFE)
and/or metres (QFE).
ATC instructions and flight crew reports concerning vertical navigation below transition
height/level are expressed in »metres QFE« (height).
For departure, for en-route flying at or below transition altitude/level and for intermediate
and final approach, both altimeters shall be set to QNH and the QNH/QFE conversions
used to establish and report vertical position.
A third altimeter (which may be metric) should be set to QFE for monitoring.
Automatic systems for reporting altimeter setting and other operational data have been
developed which can record and transmit data directly to the pilot. The use of these
automatic systems enhance the accuracy and timeliness of reported data and also save
considerable resources since manned observation and reporting facilities would not be
required.
All JC Airlines aircraft have an automatic altitude alerting system. Refer to OM Part B and
FCOM for details.
The purpose of the altitude alerting system is to alert the flight crew by the automatic
activation of a visual and/or an aural signal when the aeroplane is about to reach or is
leaving the preselected altitude/flight level. The system and its operation shall ensure an
accurate altitude adherence during all phases of the flight:
• During climb, the altitude alerting system shall be set to the altitude/flight level that
the aeroplane is cleared to during climb. When climb constraints are part of a
departure clearance, constraint altitude(s) may be set in the altitude alerting system
(selected altitude window) even though such constraints are also entered in the
FMS (as applicable) – refer to OM Part B;
• During cruise, the altitude alerting system shall be set to the assigned cruising level;
• During descent, the altitude alerting system shall be set to the altitude/flight level
the aeroplane is cleared to descent. When descent constraints are part of a arrival
clearance, constraint altitude(s) may be set in the altitude alerting system (selected
altitude window) even though such constraints are also entered in the FMS (as
applicable) – refer to OM Part B;
• During a visual approach the altitude alerting system shall be set initially to the
minimum terrain clearance altitude and later on to traffic pattern altitude. Latest
when passed 1.000 ft AAL, the altitude alerting system shall be set to the applicable
missed approach altitude;
• When it is necessary to change the selected altitude, the change must be cross
checked by the other pilot;
• In case of an instrument approach the missed approach altitude shall be set in the
altitude alerting system once established on final approach.
Within the concept of standardization and crew resource management, setting the correct
altitude reminder (alerting system) is an action that should be achieved in the proper
sequence and by the appropriate pilot depending upon the phase of flight and who is
manipulating the controls at that specific time.
The use of the altitude alerting system does not in any way release the flight crew from the
responsibility of ensuring that the aeroplane levels off or will be levelled off at the correct
altitude or flight level.
If there is anything other than total agreement by both pilots during the verification
process, contact ATC immediately to resolve the conflict. To avoid confirmation bias when
seeking cleared altitude/level verification from ATC use open phrase (e.g. »CONFIRM
CLEARED ALTITUDE«, or »SAY AGAIN CLEARED FLIGHT LEVEL«).
The Ground Warning Proximity System (GPWS) is designed to alert pilots that the
aeroplane position in relation to the terrain is abnormal and, if not corrected, could result in
a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). An Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS) has an additional
feature of comparing the computed present position of the aircraft with a Terrain Database.
All JC Airlines aircraft shall be fitted with an EGPWS or its derivative. The following
constitute policy on the EGPWS:
• A CFIT escape manoeuvre shall be initiated in IMC or at night, or if cause of
warning cannot be identified immediately;
• When a warning occurs during daylight VMC conditions, if positive visual verification
is made that no hazard exists, the warning may be considered cautionary;
• The EGPWS must be ON from take-off until landing;
• The EGPWS may not be deactivated (by pulling the circuit breaker or use of the
relevant switch) except when specified by approved MEL/OM Part B procedures;
• Any EGPWS activation must be reported via ASR system whether genuine or
spurious;
• Where such activation indicates a technical malfunction of the system an
appropriate entry should be made in the Aircraft Technical Log.
EGPWS terrain mode should be routinely displayed to PF during climb/descent over areas
with high terrain. If because of the weather radar display is required then PF/PM shall
discuss about displaying radar and terrain mode, as applicable.
• Traffic Advisory (TA), which indicate the approximate position relative to the subject
aeroplane, either in azimuth only, or azimuth and altitude, of nearby transponding
aircraft which may become a threat;
• Resolution Advisory (RA), which recommend manoeuvres or manoeuvre
restrictions in the vertical plane to resolve conflicts with other aircraft transponding
SSR Mode C altitude.
An RA is intended to advise flight crew on the manoeuvre they should carry out in order to
achieve or maintain adequate separation from an established threat. It must be borne in
mind that another aeroplane visually identified may not necessarily be the intruder or the
only intruder causing the RA. Therefore PF shall immediately react to an RA observing
following guidelines:
• Disengage the autopilot and manually apply positive and smooth control inputs in
the direction and with the magnitude required by the RA;
• Manoeuvre shall never be made in a direction opposite to the one indicated by the
RA;
• Manoeuvre’s magnitude shall not be greater than those demanded by an RA.
Whenever ATC issues a clearance with which the pilot is unable to comply because of the
presence of an RA, the pilot monitoring (PM) should inform the controller using phrase
»UNABLE, TCAS RA« (pronounced: »UNABLE, TEE-CAS-ARAY«). The controller should
acknowledge such a report or issue an alternative clearance.
In all other cases, ATC shall only be notified whenever a manoeuvre induced by an RA
has led the pilot to deviate from the assigned clearance or instruction. The following
phrase shall be used: e.g. »JC AIRLINES 558, TCAS RA« (pronounced: »JC AIRLINES
558, TEE-CAS-ARAY«).
After the ACAS has annunciated »CLEAR OF CONFLICT« and if, concurrently, no other
traffic conflict exists, the PF shall return the aeroplane to the assigned level and clearance
and shall report:
• e.g. »JC AIRLINES 558, CLEAR OF CONFLICT, RETURNING TO (assigned
clearance)«, or
• e.g. »JC AIRLINES 558, CLEAR OF CONFLICT, (assigned clearance)
RESUMED«.
The controller should acknowledge such a report and he may issue a revised clearance.
Once an aeroplane in compliance with an RA, departs from an assigned ATC clearance,
the controller ceases to be responsible for providing separation; however circumstances
permitting, the controller should endeavour to provide traffic information to all aircraft
affected by the manoeuvre. The controller’s responsibility resumes when:
• He acknowledges the report that the aeroplane has resumed its assigned
clearance; or
• He acknowledges the report that the aeroplane is resuming its assigned clearance
and issues an alternative clearance which is acknowledged by the flight crew
member.
Whenever an aeroplane has departed from an ATC clearance in compliance with an RA,
the pilot is to report the circumstances to the Company (via Air Safety Report), which
further proceeds the report to the SSCA and if applicable, Civil Aviation Authority of the
state in which airspace the RA occurred.
At Brake Release
The Commander (Pilot-In-Command) shall ensure that following fuel quantities are on
board at brake release (i.e. start of take-off roll):
• Trip fuel;
• Contingency fuel;
• Destination alternate fuel and/or additional fuel;
• Final reserve fuel.
Accordingly during taxi only the taxi fuel and extra fuel may be burned at Commander's
discretion.
Anytime In-flight
Crew shall constantly monitor fuel used and ensure that fuel remaining on board is not less
than the fuel required to proceed to an aerodrome where a safe landing can be made with
the planned final reserve fuel remaining upon landing. The records required by these
instructions should be retained for at least three months.
When an aircraft has been dispatched under the provision of planning on an alternative
destination with re-dispatch in flight, a decision must be made at or before decision point
whether to land at the alternate destination or re-dispatch to the final destination. The
manual must contain instructions that the aircraft may only be re-dispatched if the fuel on
board is sufficient to reach the final destination with contingency fuel, destination alternate
fuel, destination alternate contingency fuel and final reserve fuel, or fuel sufficient to reach
the final destination and contingency fuel with minimum fuel reserves, if all conditions of
minimum fuel reserves criteria are met.
In the event of a diversion, the fuel on-board shall be sufficient for the aircraft to arrive at
the alternate with at least final reserve fuel upon landing.
When any abnormal fuel procedure is used in flight, the Commander (Pilot-In-Command)
must be informed and at least two crew members must monitor the operation.
The flight crew is allowed to continue a flight to a destination when normal reserve fuel will
no longer be available. Safeguarding conditions associated with those instructions include:
• Such a decision to continue should only be made when one hour or less from the
destination and when close to an usable en-route aerodrome;
• The usable fuel remaining must be sufficient to fly to the destination aerodrome,
make an approach with at least final reserve fuel upon landing;
• The actual and forecast meteorological conditions at the destination shall permit a
visual approach to land from one hour before until one hour after ETA. Account of
any significant crosswind on the runway should also be considered;
• There are no known or probable ATC delays for the period from ETA to ETA plus
one hour;
• There are at least two independent runways available and suitable for landing.
The Commander (Pilot-In-Command) shall request delay information from ATC when
unanticipated circumstances may result in landing at the destination aerodrome with less
than the final reserve fuel plus any fuel required to proceed to an alternate aerodrome or
the fuel required to operate to an isolated aerodrome.
Whenever the flight crew foresees a shortage of fuel in-flight that might affect the safe
conduct of the remaining portion of the flight, flight plan changes should be initiated as
soon as practicable to take the necessary precautions to avoid a change of destination.
When one hour or less from the destination and when close to an usable en-route
aerodrome, if an in-flight fuel check shows that the expected fuel at the destination
aerodrome will be less than the required destination alternate fuel plus destination
alternate contingency fuel plus final reserve fuel, the Commander must decide whether to
continue to the destination or to divert to another suitable aerodrome. His decision shall be
based on the evaluation of all significant factors at the destination aerodrome, along the
diversion route and the alternate aerodrome, e.g.:
• The meteorological conditions at destination and alternate at decision time and
ETA;
• The number and state of suitable runways at destination and alternate and
approach aids available;
• The EAT issued or anticipated;
• To land with not less than final reserve fuel.
When approaching the last possible point of diversion to an available en-route aerodrome,
a fuel check must indicate that the fuel remaining overhead isolated destination will not be
less than the fuel required to hold for 2 hours. In the opposite case the Commander must
divert to a suitable en-route alternate. He may continue to the planned isolated destination
only if it has two separate available runways and the weather conditions expected on
arrival satisfy the planned approach requirements for either runway.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-192
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
The fuel situation shall be continually monitored by the flight crew. Changes in the
operational status of destination aerodrome and of alternate aerodromes and deviations
from the original flight plan must be taken into account.
However, even without any failure or fuel leak, some discrepancies which may be revealed
during fuel checks. This may be due to:
• FQI tolerance;
• FU indication tolerance;
• Water freezing in the tanks.
If it becomes apparent en-route that the fuel remaining is close to the minimum amount
required, the options available are to:
• Adjust the aircraft speed;
• Obtain a more direct routing;
• Fly at a different flight level; and/or
• Select a closer alternate aerodrome.
If it is still not possible to arrive at the destination with the appropriate minimum fuel,
landing and refuelling at suitable aerodrome shall be made.
pilot calculates that any change to the existing clearance to that aerodrome may result in
landing with less than planned final reserve fuel.
The declaration of MINIMUM FUEL informs ATC that all planned aerodrome options have
been reduced to a specific aerodrome of intended landing and any change to the existing
clearance may result in landing with less than planned final reserve fuel. This is not an
emergency situation but an indication that an emergency situation is possible should any
additional delay occur.
Note: Guidance on declaring minimum fuel is contained in the Flight Planning and Fuel
Management Manual (Doc 9976).
The planned final reserve fuel is the minimum amount of fuel required upon landing at any
aerodrome.
Note: The words »MAYDAY FUEL«, describe the nature of the distress conditions as
required in ICAO Annex 10, Volume II.
The minimum fuel temperature, published in the operational documentation, may be more
restrictive than the certified aircraft environmental envelope. It includes two different
limitations both linked to engine operation:
Fuel freezing point limitation: this limitation provides an operating margin to prohibit
operations under fuel temperature conditions that could result in the accumulation of waxy
products in the fuel. The resulting limitation varies with the freezing point of the fuel being
used. Aside from this, engines have a fuel warming (oil cooling) system at their inlet.
Because of the architecture of this system and the fact that the fuel inlet hardware varies
from one engine type to another, the specification of what fuel temperature is acceptable
at the inlet of the engine varies from one engine type to the other. Therefore, engine
manufacturers sometime require a temperature margin to fuel freezing point to guarantee
correct operation.
Note: The fuel anti-icing additives authorised by engine manufacturers decrease the
freezing temperature of the water contained in the fuel, but have no effect on the
fuel freezing temperature itself.
Therefore, the minimum fuel temperature should be fuel freezing point + engine
manufacturer margin. If the actual freezing point of the fuel being used is unknown, the
minimum fuel specification values as indicated below should be used as authorised by the
AFM/FCOM.
• JET A1 = - 47°C
Fuel heat management system limitation: this limitation reflects the engine capability to
warm-up a given water-saturated fuel flow to such a point that no accumulation of ice
crystals may clog the fuel filter. Such a limitation does not appear in the documentation for
some engine types when outside the environmental envelope. When applicable (refer to
OM Part B) the resulting limitation is a fixed temperature, below which, flight is not
permitted.
Refer to FCOM regarding the procedures dealing with low fuel temperature. In general,
whenever necessary the TAT has to be increased. This is achieved by an aeroplane
speed increase and/or an altitude decrease.
Increasing the aeroplane speed provides a marginal TAT increase (in the order of 0.5 to
1ºC for 0.01 M increase) and thus a small fuel temperature increase, at the expense of a
significant increase in fuel consumption.
Decreasing the altitude generally provides a SAT increase (about 2ºC per 1.000 ft).
Nevertheless, whenever the tropopause is substantially low, decreasing the altitude may
not provide the corresponding expected SAT and, thus, TAT increase.
Reserved.
Special observations of the following conditions encountered or observed during climb out
and approach shall be reported by the flight crew to the ATC:
• Moderate or severe turbulence; or
• Moderate or severe icing; or
• Severe mountain waves; or
• Thunderstorms, without hail, that are obscured, embedded, widespread or in squall
lines; or
• Thunderstorms, with hail, that are obscured, embedded, widespread or in squall
lines; or
• Heavy dust storms or heavy sandstorms; or
• Volcanic ash cloud; or
• Pre-eruption volcanic activity or a volcanic eruption.
Note: Pre-eruption volcanic activity in this context means unusual and/or increasing
volcanic activity which could presage a volcanic eruption.
8.3.8.2 Thunderstorms
General
Weather Information
The Meteorological Service generally does not issue SIGMET messages in relation to
isolated thunderstorm activity and the absence of SIGMET warnings does not therefore
necessarily indicate the absence of thunderstorms.
Thunderstorm Hazards
Thunderstorms incorporate every weather hazard to aviation into one vicious package.
The most important hazards are:
• Icing: Supercooled water freezes on impact with an aeroplane. Clear icing can
occur at any altitude above the freezing level; but at high levels, icing from smaller
droplets may be rime or mixed rime and clear. The abundance supercooled water
droplets makes clear icing very rapid between 0ºC and -15ºC.
• Low Ceiling and Visibility: Generally, visibility is near zero within a thunderstorm
cloud. The hazards and restrictions created by low ceiling and visibility are
increased when associated with the other thunderstorm hazards.
• Lightning: A lightning strike can puncture the skin of an aeroplane. Lightning has
been suspected of igniting fuel vapours causing explosion; however, serious
accidents due to lightning strikes are extremely rare. Nearby lightning can blind the
pilot rendering him momentarily unable to navigate either by instrument or by visual
reference. Lightning can also induce permanent errors in the magnetic compass
and lightning discharges, even distant ones, can disrupt radio communications on
low and medium frequencies. Lightning intensity and frequency have no simple
relationship to other storm parameters. But, as a rule, severe storms have a high
frequency of lightning.
Each lightning strike must be recorded in Aircraft Technical Log.
• Engine Water Ingestion: Jet engines have a limit on the amount of water they can
ingest. Updrafts are present in many thunderstorms, particularly those in the
development stages. If the updraft velocity in the thunderstorms approaches or
exceeds the terminal velocity of the falling raindrops, very high concentrations of
water may occur. It is possible that these concentrations can be excess of the
quantity of water engines are designed to ingest. Therefore, severe thunderstorms
may contain areas of high water concentration which could result in flame-out
and/or structural failure of one or more engines.
Avoiding Thunderstorms
Never regard a thunderstorm harmless. Avoiding thunderstorms is the best policy. General
rules are:
• Don’t land or take-off in the face of an approaching thunderstorm. Turbulence wind
reversal or windshear could cause loss of control.
• Don’t attempt to fly under a thunderstorm even if you can see through to the other
side. Turbulence and wind shear under the storm could be disastrous.
• Don’t fly without airborne radar into a cloud mass containing scattered embedded
thunderstorms. Scattered thunderstorms not embedded usually can be visually
circumnavigated.
• Don’t trust the visual appearance to be a reliable indicator of the turbulence inside a
thunderstorm.
• Do avoid by at least 20 NM any thunderstorm identified as severe or giving an
intense radar echo. This is especially true under the anvil of large cumulonimbus.
• Do circumnavigate the entire area if the area has 6/10 thunderstorm coverage.
• Do remember that vivid and frequent lightning indicates the probability of a severe
thunderstorm.
• Do regard as extremely hazardous any thunderstorm with tops 35.000 ft or higher
whether the top is visually sighted or determined by radar.
150 ft of the ground. Microbursts commonly last one to five minutes and may emanate
from high-based cumulus clouds accompanied by little or no precipitation, or may be
associated with large cumulonimbus build-ups and be accompanied by heavy rainfall.
Because of their relatively small diameter, airport anemometers and low level windshear
alert systems may not sense this phenomenon in time to provide an adequate warning of
nearby microburst activity.
Lateral Avoidance: At altitudes above the freezing level, supercooled rain and hail may
indicate as only weak radar echoes, which can mask extreme thunderstorm intensity.
Radar echoes associated with thunderstorms should be avoided by the following minimum
distances:
If flight closer than the minimum recommended distances is unavoidable, observe the
following precaution:
• When it is necessary to fly parallel to a line of cells, the safest path is on the upwind
side (the side away from the direction of storm travel). Although severe turbulence
and hail can be encountered in any direction outside a thunderstorm, strong drafts
and hail are more often encountered outside the body of the cell on the downwind
side.
• Avoid flight under the anvil. The greatest possibility of encountering hail is
downwind of the cell, where hail falls from the anvil or is tossed out from the side of
the storm. Hail has been encountered as much as 20 NM downwind from large
thunderstorms.
• Avoid Cirrus and Cirrostratus layers downwind from the storm tops. Such layer may
be formed by cumulonimbus tops and may contain hail, even though the radar
scope shows little or no return echoes.
• If ATC requirements make flight into unsafe conditions imminent, the Commander
should request a change of routing and if necessary use his emergency authority to
avoid the severe weather conditions.
• Any flight in the vicinity of thunderstorms carries the risk of a sudden onset of
moderate or severe turbulence.
Thunderstorm Penetration
Operational Procedures
• Height for penetration must be selected bearing in mind the importance of insuring
adequate terrain clearance. Due to turbulence, wind shear, local pressure variations
the maintenance of a safe flight path can be difficult;
• The recommended speed for flight in turbulence must be observed (refer to OM
Part B);
• The autopilot should remain engaged. The autopilot is likely to produce lower
structural loads and smaller oscillations than would result from manual flight. The
auto-thrust should be disconnected to avoid unnecessary and frequent thrust
variations;
• Check the operation of all anti-icing equipment and operate all these systems in
accordance with OM Part B instructions. Icing can be very rapid at any altitude;
• Turn the cockpit lighting fully ON to minimise the blinding effect of lightning;
• Continue monitoring the weather radar in order to pick out the safest path. Tilt the
antenna up and down occasionally to detect thunderstorm activity at altitudes other
than that being flown.
Icing conditions occur when low temperatures are accompanied by precipitation. Icing of
the aircraft is one of the most dangerous flight hazards. Ice formation on the ground and its
effects are explained in OM Part A; Chapter 8.2.4. Pilots must be aware that flight in icing
conditions involves additional hazards. In particular, they must understand the peculiarities
of in-flight icing conditions and its effect on aeroplane performance and handling as well as
the use and limitations of aeroplane de-ice and anti-ice equipment.
Types of Ice
The usual cloud sized small droplets tend to follow the aerodynamic flow around the wing.
They are swept away, but larger, heavier droplets tend to impinge aft of the leading edge.
The larger (and hence heavier) the droplet (drizzle or rain-sized), the further aft it will
impinge. Furthermore, large droplets are relatively warm and as a result tend to run back
and spread out in liquid state before freezing. This effect is known as flowback, and its
effect depends directly upon size, temperature and velocity of water droplets and wing
surface temperature. Impingement and flowback result in ice collecting not only on the
leading edge, but also on the upper and lower surfaces of a wing, where there may be no
ice protection.
Rime ice is associated with stratiform clouds, and forms when droplets are small and the
temperature relatively cold (-15°C or colder). Not all of the droplets follow the airflow and
some impact upon the wing and tailplane leading edges with little or no flowback, freezing
quickly into rime ice. Therefore, leading edge de/anti-icing equipment is relatively effective
against this type of ice.
Clear Ice is associated with cumuliform clouds and forms when the temperature is
relatively warm (-10°C or warmer). Droplet sizes are relatively large (drizzle or rain sized),
and they tend to impinge further aft and flow back before freezing to form sheet ice on the
upper and lower surfaces of the wing. These areas may not be protected by de/anti-icing
equipment. Any deposit greater than light can significantly degrade performance, causing
problems in roll and pitch control with, in the extreme case, uncontrollable pitch up and
stall. Clear ice can form on aerofoil surfaces with few visual cues to the pilot. The absence
of the usual indications, such as ice formation on the windshield posts and/or wipers, does
not mean that clear ice is not forming.
The terms freezing drizzle or freezing rain in a terminal forecast/report indicate a strong
probability of conditions for clear ice.
Mixed Ice is a combination of clear and rime ice with all the hazards of both. It forms when
droplets vary in size (e.g. drizzle in stratiform cloud) and the temperature is in the range -
10°C to -15°C. The proportional make-up varies with the weather system.
Traces of Ice: Ice becomes perceptible, but is of no consequence and does not affect the
performance of the aeroplane. It should be reported by pilots for meteorological purposes.
Light Icing: The rate of accumulation may create a problem if extended flight in this
condition occurs. It can be safely handled by the aeroplanes de/anti-icing equipment. No
restriction to operations provided the systems are used.
Moderate Icing: The rate of accumulation is such that even short encounters become
potentially hazardous. The aeroplane's de/anti-icing equipment is designed to safely
handle it. However, it should be a signal to the pilot to alter his flight path so as to avoid
further exposure.
Severe Icing: Icing condition in which the rate of accumulation is such that the de/anti-
icing equipment fails to reduce or control the ice accumulation. Flight path shall be
immediately changed to establish more favourable conditions or land as soon as possible.
Severe icing is often associated with super-cooled large droplets (i.e. freezing drizzle or
rain). Flight in these conditions is not covered by icing certification rules. Droplets covered
by icing certification envelopes are so small that they are usually below the threshold of
detectability.
Important: Refer to the OM Part B for specific information regarding handling techniques
if inadvertently encountering severe icing conditions.
The most effective means of identifying severe icing conditions are cues that can be seen,
felt or heard. This includes visual inspection of aeroplane surfaces, e.g. wings or
windscreens.
The formation of ice on the aeroplane structure could create a situation from which the
pilot might have difficulty recovering and, in some instances, may not be able to recover at
all. For this reason, the following paragraphs describe two particular types of control
upsets likely to be encountered during flight in severe icing conditions.
Roll upset is an uncommanded and uncontrolled roll phenomenon which may occur as a
consequence of, or prior to, a wing stall due to anomalous forces that cause the ailerons to
deflect or because the ailerons have lost effectiveness. Deflection of ailerons or loss of
aileron effectiveness may be caused by ice accumulation in a sensitive area of the wing aft
of the de-icing boots. It occurs under unusual circumstances associated with super-cooled
large droplets and, rarely, normal cloud droplets in a very narrow temperature range near
freezing. Roll upset can result from severe icing conditions even without the usual
symptoms of ice accumulation or a perceived aerodynamic stall. Pilots can minimize the
chance of a roll upset by being sensitive to cues that identify severe icing conditions and
by promptly exiting the severe icing conditions before control or handling characteristics of
the aeroplane are degraded to a hazardous level.
Tailplane stall is another significant hazard of airframe icing. Sharp edged surfaces are
more susceptible to collecting ice than large blunt ones. For this reason, the tailplane may
begin accumulating ice before the wings and can accumulate faster. There have been
reports of ice on the tailplane without any visible ice on the wing. This can occur if the
tailplane has not been or cannot be de-iced. A tailplane stall occurs when, as with the
wing, the critical angle of attack is exceeded. Since the horizontal stabilizer counters the
natural nose down tendency caused by the centre of lift of the main wing, the aeroplane
will react by pitching nose down, sometimes uncontrollably, when the tailplane is stalled.
Application of flaps can aggravate or initiate the stall. Use caution when applying flaps
during approach if there is the possibility of icing on the tailplane. Perhaps the most
important characteristic of a tailplane stall is the relatively high airspeed at the onset and, if
it occurs, the suddenness and magnitude of the nose down pitch. A stall is more likely to
occur when the flaps are approaching the fully extended position, after nose down pitch
and airspeed changes following flap extension, or during flight through wind gusts. Once a
tailplane stall is encountered, the stall condition tends to worsen with increased airspeed
and possibly may worsen with increased power settings at the same flap setting. Airspeed,
at any flap setting, in excess of the aeroplane manufacturer's recommendations for the
flight and environmental conditions, accompanied by uncleared ice contamination on the
tailplane, may result in a tailplane stall and uncommanded pitch down from which a
recovery may not be possible. A tailplane stall may occur at speeds less than the flaps
extension speed.
8.3.8.4 Turbulence
Turbulence is defined as a disturbed, irregular flow of air with embedded irregular whirls or
eddies and waves. An aircraft in turbulent flow is subjected to irregular and random
motions while, more or less, maintaining the intended flight path.
En-route turbulence accounts for a substantial number of passenger and/or cabin crew
injuries and can occur at any time and at any altitude. Turbulence can be expected, or it
can be sudden and unexpected. Intensity can vary and is relative to location of the
occupants in the aeroplane (generally the rear of the aeroplane will experience greater
turbulence intensity then the front).
The Commander should include a weather turbulence briefing with the standard pre-
departure briefing, and the cabin crew should pay particular attention to turbulence
forecasts. The weather briefing should contain the following:
• Discussion of the critical exposure periods (which could include take-off, cruise or
known areas of turbulence and descent);
• Expected en-route weather;
• Forecast turbulence location (in terms of flying time and degree of reported
turbulence);
• Communication of possible service modifications prior to expected turbulence
encounters;
• Establishment of the “all clear” signal, usually done by turning the Seat Belts sign to
OFF.
During the welcome PA, the CIC shall advise passengers to keep their seat belts fastened
during the entire flight whilst seated.
While in flight, the Commander should communicate with the CIC if turbulence is expected
or encountered. He will call the CIC to the cockpit or turn the Seat Belts sign to ON. The
CIC should communicate this information to the other cabin crew members. Cabin crew
should then prepare the cabin according to the level of the turbulence anticipated.
Communication must flow two ways. If a reasonable amount of time has elapsed with no
turbulence and the Seat Belts sign remains ON, CIC should initiate contact with the
Commander via interphone in order to determine if it is safe to resume duties.
The following items shall be accomplished by the CIC when he is informed by the flight
crew that turbulence is expected:
• Ask how much time is available prior to encountering, anticipated intensity and the
duration of the turbulence;
• Ensure that all cabin crew members are given the same information;
• Coordinate with the flight crew regarding appropriate announcements advising the
passengers of the situation, including fastening their seat belts;
When the turbulence has ended and the Seat Belts sign has been switched OFF, the
cabin crew shall check passengers, cabin and flight deck to ensure there are no adverse
effects arising from the turbulence encounter.
If conditions dictate (moderate or greater intensity turbulence) and Seat Belts sign has not
been switched ON, cabin crew shall immediately take the nearest seats or jump seats and
fasten seat belts and shoulder harnesses. CIC or any other cabin crew member should
make public address instructing passengers to return to their seats and fasten seat belts.
When possible, the Commander shall be informed via interphone of cabin status (secured
or unsecured).
Turbulence has been divided into four categories based upon the severity of the
encounter:
When encountering turbulence, pilots shall report such conditions to ATC as soon as
practicable. The turbulence PIREP should state at least:
• Aeroplane position;
• Aeroplane altitude or flight level;
• Turbulence intensity.
8.3.8.5 Windshear
Windshear is a rapid variation in wind velocity and/or direction along the flight path of the
aeroplane. Pilots must remain alert to the possibility of wind shear, and be prepared to
make relatively harsh control inputs and power changes to offset its effects. Immediately
after take-off and on the final approach the pilot’s course of action is critical, since they will
normally be at the recommended speed for the configuration, and close to the ground.
When encountering windshear conditions, pilots shall report such conditions to ATC as
soon as practicable via PIREP, stating the loss or gain of speed and the altitude at which it
was encountered, along with the type of aircraft.
Conditions that indicate the possibility of windshear and their associated probability are
represented on the following table.
Probability of
Observation
Windshear
Forecast of convective weather. LOW
Presence of convective weather near intended flight path with
localized strong winds (tower reports or observed blowing dust, rings
of dust, tornado-like features, etc.).
MEDIUM
PIREP of airspeed loss or gain15 knots or less.
LLWAS alert or wind velocity change observation less than 20 knots.
Probability of
Observation
Windshear
Onboard windshear detection system alert reported or observed.
Presence of convective weather near intended flight path with
localized strong winds (tower reports or observed blowing dust, rings
of dust, tornado-like features, etc.).
Presence of convective weather near intended flight path with rain
shower, lightening and/or Virga.
Presence of convective weather near intended flight path with HIGH
moderate or greater turbulence (reported or radar indications).
Presence of convective weather near intended flight path with
temperature / dew point spread between 15 and 30 °C.
PIREP of airspeed loss or gain15 knots or greater.
LLWAS alert or wind velocity change observation less than 20 knots.
These guidelines apply to operations in the airport vicinity i.e. within 3 miles of the point of
take-off or landing, along the intended flight path and below 1.000 ft AGL. The clues
should be considered cumulative. If more than one is observed the probability weighting
should be increased. The hazard increases with proximity to convective weather. Weather
assessment should be made continuously.
Windshear on Take-off
If there are reports of severe windshear, take-off should be delayed. If after take-off the
presence of shear is indicated by rapidly fluctuating airspeed and/or rate of climb/descent,
or on receipt of a windshear warning apply maximum thrust and aim to achieve maximum
lift and maximum distance from the ground without changing aeroplane configuration until
safety is assured. Advise ATC as soon as possible.
Windshear on Approach
If there are reports of severe windshear, consider holding or diverting. If conditions are
such that windshear might be encountered the Commander should brief that a go-around
may be required. If windshear is experienced on final approach a go-around shall be
carried out if the approach becomes unstable. For detailed operating procedures refer to
OM Part B.
8.3.8.6 Jetstream
Near the tropopause there can be narrow bands of wind with extremely high speeds (up to
300 kts) called Jetstream. The extent in length is up to several thousand miles, the width
can be several miles. The main direction is southwest to north. In mid-latitudes there is a
common area for clear air turbulence (CAT) around the jet stream, above the jet core and
to the polar side.
Taking a cross section of a jet stream looking downwind, the turbulence region would be to
the left of the core in the Northern Hemisphere and to the right in the Southern
Hemisphere. To avoid or leave the area of CAT the following procedures should be
applied:
• Reduce speed, to reduce acceleration due to wind shears;
• When flying parallel with the jet stream changing altitude up to 1.000 ft;
• When flying perpendicular to the jet stream, changing altitude by 1.000 ft from the
warm side to the cold side downwards, from the cold side to the warm side
upwards;
• If the temperature is changing in the CAT area the flight should be continued on
course, the CAT area is likely to be crossed in a short time;
• If the temperature remains constant the course should be altered in order to leave
the CAT area.
Refer to OM Part C.
Flying through an ash cloud should be avoided by all means because of extreme hazard
for the engines and the aeroplane. Volcanic ash may extend for several hundred miles,
and eruptions may send ash plumes up to 40.000 ft.
Do not rely on weather radar to detect ash clouds or volcanic dust as they cannot be
detected by the weather radar.
If the aeroplane enters an ash cloud the flight crew can expect:
• Smoke, dust or acrid odours similar to electric sparks in the cockpit;
• At night heavy static discharges around the windshield;
• A decrease in engine rpm, a decrease in fuel flow, and an increase in EGT;
• Engine surge or overheat;
• Engine flame-out;
• Unreliable airspeed indication;
• Pressurisation and electrical systems may be affected;
• At night, St.Elmo’s fire or other static discharges accompanied by a bright orange
glow in the engine inlets.
Following encounter with an ash cloud a landing at the next suitable airport is
recommended. If visibility through the windshield is impaired a runway with autoland
capability should be considered.
Flight crew shall file an ASR (MOR) and VAR when volcanic eruption is observed or when
volcanic ash cloud is observed or encountered. If flight crew see a volcanic eruption and
have not been previously notified of it, they may have been the first person to observe it. In
this case, immediately contact ATC and alert them to the existence of the eruption. If
possible, use the Volcanic Activity Reporting form (VAR) depicted in OM Part A, Chapter
11.8.8. Items 1 through 8 of the VAR should be transmitted immediately. The information
requested in items 9 through 16 should be passed after landing. If a VAR form is not
immediately available, relay enough information to identify the position and nature of the
volcanic activity. Do not become unnecessarily alarmed if there is merely steam or very
low-level eruptions of ash.
Heavy precipitation in flight can be in the form of rain, snow or hail. It is usually
encountered in the vicinity of storm clouds and/or frontal edges. Extremely heavy
precipitation has been known to cause jet engines to flame out, therefore under these
conditions the engine ignition should be switched on. In combination with low temperature
severe airframe and engine icing can occur therefore the aeroplane anti-icing system
should be activated and monitored. The weather radar will be showing strong returns and
should be used to select the safest routing through the storm activity.
There is likely to be associated turbulence with the heavy precipitation and so prompt
action to secure the flight must be taken. Loss of orientation should be guarded against
during the change over from instruments to visual flying during the approach, especially in
snow showers and blowing snow. In falling snow and blowing snow, landing lights should
be used with caution as the reflected light may actually reduce the effective visibility and
even cause false impression of drift during flare and roll-out. On the ground, contaminated
runways may influence the performance, crosswind limitations and give a risk of
aquaplaning. The respective procedures in OM Part B must be followed.
8.3.8.9 Sandstorms
Avoid flying in active sandstorms whenever possible. When on ground, aeroplane should
ideally be kept under cover if dust storms are forecast or in progress. Alternatively, all
engine blanks and cockpit covers should be fitted, as well as the blanks for the various
system and instrument intakes and probes. They should be carefully removed before flight
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-212
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
to ensure that accumulation of dust is not deposited in the orifices which the covers are
designed to protect.
Mountain waves and downslope windshear are caused by a significant airflow crossing a
mountain range together with special atmospheric conditions. The strong vertical and
horizontal wind shears, rotor turbulences, represent a danger at low heights as well as the
strong downslope wind at the lee side of the mountains.
Frequently, a second rotor will form up to 100 NM from the lee side of the mountain,
producing original wave action. Flight crews should be aware of the potential hazard at
airports within the flow regime of the wave. Depending on moisture content of the air,
lenticular (lens-shaped) clouds may be present.
When approaching a mountain range from upwind side, there will usually be a smooth
updraft. Therefore, it is not quite as dangerous an area as the lee of the range. Expected
downdrafts from the leeward side can exceed the climb capability of the aircraft. Flight
crews should always be prepared to cope with a downdraft and turbulence. When
overflying mountainous terrain in strong winds apply additional terrain clearance margin.
On some airports, relief or obstacles may cause special wind conditions with severe
turbulence and windshear on approach or during take-off. Special procedures or
recommendations are indicated on aerodrome charts when appropriate. They must be
taken into account by the flight crews for the choice of the landing or take-off runway.
The effect of mountain waves reduces with increased height. At normal cruising
altitudes/levels, mountain waves are usually free from clear-air turbulence, unless
associated with jetstreams, thunderstorms or in rare cases of vertically-propagating wave
or wave-breaking.
Near the ground in a mountain wave area, however, severe turbulence and windshear
may be encountered. This region is known as a lee-wave rotor, and is caused by flow
separation behind the mountain range. Take-off or landing is not advisable in a strong lee-
wave rotor, and should not be attempted. If severe turbulence is encountered at low level
in the lee of a mountain range, the quickest way out is up. If unable to climb, the next best
is directly away from the range.
General
As described below, this may particularly affect the very lower layer of the atmosphere
near the earth’s surface. There are many parameters, which influence air temperature and
may lead to a temperature inversion. Close to the ground, air temperature variations
mainly result from the effects of:
• Seasonal variations;
• Diurnal/nocturnal temperature variations;
• Weather conditions (effect of clouds and wind);
• Humidity of the air,
• Geographical environment such as:
- Mountainous environment;
- Water surface (sea);
- Nature of the ground (arid, humid);
- Latitude;
- Local specificity.
As a general rule, valid for everywhere, low wind conditions and clear skies at night will
lead to rapid cooling of the earth and a morning temperature inversion at ground level.
In the absence of wind or if the wind is very low, the air which is in contact with a cold
earth surface will cool down by heating transfer from the warm air to the cold ground
surface. This transfer of heat occurs by conduction only and consequently leads to a
temperature inversion which is limited in altitude. This process needs stable weather
conditions to develop.
Schematically, during the day, the air is very little heated by solar radiation and the earth is
much more. But the lower layer of the atmosphere is also heated by contact with the
ground, which is more reactive to solar radiation than the air, and by conduction between
earth and atmosphere.
At night, in the absence of disturbing influences, ground surface cools down due to the
absence of solar radiation and will cool the air near the ground surface. In quiet conditions,
air cooling is confined to the lowest levels. Typically, this effect is the biggest at the early
hours of the day and sunshine subsequently destroys the inversion during the morning.
Similarly, wind will mix the air and destroy the inversion.
Magnitude: This kind of inversion usually affects the very lowest levels of the atmosphere.
The surface inversion may exceed 500 ft but should not exceed 1.000 to 2.000 ft. The
magnitude of the temperature inversion cannot be precisely quantified. However, a
temperature inversion of about +10°C is considered as quite an important one. Usually,
within a temperature inversion, temperature regularly increases with altitude until it
reaches a point where the conduction has no longer any effect.
Exposed Areas: This kind of inversion may be encountered world-wide. However, some
areas are more exposed to this phenomenon such as arid and desert regions. It may be
also encountered in temperate climate particularly during winter season (presence of fog).
Tropical regions are less sensitive due to less stable weather conditions. In some northern
and continental areas during winter in anticyclonic conditions, the low duration of sunshine
during the day could prevent the inversion from destruction. Thus, the temperature of the
ground may considerably reduce and amplify the inversion phenomenon. In a lower extent,
this may also occur in temperate climate during winter, if associated with cold anticyclonic
conditions.
Wind change: The air mass in the inversion layer is so stable that winds below and above
tend to diverge rapidly. Therefore, the wind change, in force and direction, at the upper
inversion surface may be quite high. This may add to the difficulty of flying through the
inversion surface. In some conditions, the wind change may be so high as to generate a
small layer of very marked turbulence.
The morning temperature inversion process is considered as the most frequent and the
most sensitive. However, as also mentioned above, other meteorological conditions of a
less frequent occurrence and magnitude may lead to temperature inversions. For instance,
the displacement of a cold air mass over a cold ground surface may lead to turbulence
resulting in a transfer of heat to the lower levels of this mass, thus, also creating a
temperature inversion in the lower levels of the atmosphere below this air mass. Usually,
this kind of inversion has lower magnitude than the previous case described above. In any
case, pilot experience, weather reports or pilot reports will be the best way in identifying
such weather conditions.
A temperature inversion will result in a reduction of the thrust only when performing a
maximum take-off thrust during hot days, i.e. the actual ambient temperature is above
TREF (Flat Rating Temperature).
In the event of temperature inversion, the climb performance will be affected in the cases
where the thrust is affected. However, to affect the aeroplane performance, a temperature
inversion must be combined with other factors. During a normal take-off with all engines
operative, the inversion will have no effect since the actual aeroplane performance is
already far beyond the minimum required performance. Then, the actual aeroplane
performance could be affected only in the event of an engine failure at take-off. However,
conservatism in the aeroplane certified performance is introduced by the FAR/JAR Part 25
rules, to take account for inaccuracy of the data that are used for performance
calculations. Although not specifically mentioned, temperature inversions can be
considered as part of this inaccuracy.
Therefore, a temperature inversion could become a concern during the take-off only in the
following worst case with all of these conditions met together:
• The engine failure occurs at V1;
• Take-off is performed at maximum take-off thrust;
• OAT is close to or above TREF;
• The take-off weight is limited by obstacles;
• The temperature inversion is such that it results in the regulatory net flight path
margin cancellation and leads to fly below the regulatory net flight path.
In all other cases, even if the performance is affected (inversion above TREF), the only
detrimental effect will be the climb performance to be lower than the nominal one.
The stopping performance of an aeroplane is for the most part dependent on the available
friction between the aircraft tires and the runway surface, and the landing and take-off
speeds.
To compensate for the reduced stopping and directional control capability for adverse
runway conditions (such as wet or slippery conditions) performance corrections are
applied in the form of a:
• Runway length increment;
• Reduction in allowable take-off or landing weight;
• Reduction of allowable cross-wind component.
At low speed the braking friction varies with speed, at higher speed braking action is
primarily function of runway surface and runway condition.
The friction level of a concrete runway is not as good as black top asphalt runway. Asphalt
needs grooving to be skid resistant, especially when wet. Grooving is an artificial way of
restoring texture to asphalt. It gives the gaps that the water can dissipate into as the tyre
rolls over the asphalt. A grooved runway is restored to being equivalent in surface texture
to a surface that is a little bit rough.
However, even grooving may not cope with standing water due to:
• Ruts and birdbaths in the runway (common in worn-out runways);
• Heavy rainstorms;
• All the grooves and texture being filled up with rubber deposits.
If standing water (puddles or sheets of water glistening) are observed on the runway, the
crew must exercise caution regardless of whether the runway has been grooved or not.
The friction coefficient (FC) is defined as the ratio of the maximum available tire friction
force and the vertical load acting on the tire. This coefficient is named “Mu”. Various
systems are used to measure the runway friction coefficient / conditions:
1) Skiddometer High pressure tire (SKH);
2) Skiddometer Low pressure tire (SKL);
3) Surface Friction Tester (SFT);
4) Mu-meter (MUM);
5) Diagonal braked vehicle (DBV);
Experience has shown that the presence of contaminants may under certain conditions
adversely affect the accuracy of the friction values obtained by any of the above friction
measuring devices. The following are conditions under which friction measurements may
not relate to actual aeroplane braking performance:
• When the water on a pavement surface exceeds 1 mm;
• When water is present on top of an ice layer on the pavement surface, and its depth
exceeds 1 mm);
• When there is presence of slush on the pavement exceeding 3 mm;
• When there is slush or wet snow on ice or compacted snow exceeding 3 mm;
• When the depth of dry snow on the pavement surface exceeds 25 mm.
As long as friction measurements are taken under conditions that do not violate the above
criteria, the results are accurate and credible and truly reflect the surface friction
characteristics. However, the results of the friction measuring equipment do not generally
correlate with each other for all surface conditions and no correlation has been established
between these results and the stopping performance of an aeroplane.
The only perfect way of measuring the friction coefficient for a specific aeroplane is by
using that specific aeroplane braking system on the surface concerned.
When friction measurement are not available but can be only estimated, the flight crew will
be informed only of the estimated braking action (BA) reported as »DRY«, »GOOD«,
»MEDIUM« (or »FAIR«), »POOR«, »UNRELIABLE/NIL« or a combination of these terms.
The following ICAO ATC runway friction report codes relate to the surface conditions i.e.
‘good’ on a wet runway relates to wet stopping performance which is already degraded
with respect to dry runway operations.
• DRY: Maximum energy stops possible with little deterioration in certified (dry)
stopping distance.
• GOOD: More braking is available than will be used in an average airline type
deceleration.
If a maximum energy stop were attempted (wet), some distance in excess of
certified stopping distance would be expected. If the surface is affected by snow or
ice and the braking action is reported as ‘good’, pilots should not expect to find
conditions as good as on clean dry runway (where the available friction may well be
greater than that needed in any case). The value ‘good’ is a comparative value and
is intended to mean that aeroplanes should not experience directional control or
braking difficulties, especially when landing.
• MEDIUM: Sufficient braking and cornering force is available for a well-flown
approach and landing using light braking. However, excess speed or long
touchdown would result in an extremely low safety factor depending on runway
length and crosswind component. Careful planning and good judgment are
required.
• POOR: Very careful planning, judgment, and execution are absolutely essential.
Crosswind becomes a priority consideration. While a safe and successful approach,
landing, and stop can be accomplished if all factors are favourable, there is little
room for error. Care must be exercised in every aspect of the operation and a very
careful evaluation of all conditions is necessary.
• UNRELIABLE: Will be reported when surface conditions do not permit a meaningful
braking action value to be determined (i.e., standing water, slush, wet snow with
potential hydroplaning).
Pilots should treat reported braking action reports with caution and interpret them
conservatively.
For example, the pilots of two identical aeroplanes landing in the same conditions, on the
same runway could give different braking action reports. These differing reports could be
the result of differences between the specific aeroplane, aeroplane weight, pilot technique,
pilot experience in similar conditions, pilot total experience, and pilot expectations.
Practically the following correlation may be used as a guideline:
Meteorological Observations
On snow- or ice-covered runways that are not treated, the friction coefficient varies from as
low as 0.05 to 0.30. In these conditions, it is very difficult to state exactly how and why the
runway conditions vary. Here, the braking action is very much dependent upon the
temperature, especially near the freezing point. When the temperature is below freezing,
the braking action could be fairly good. It will so remain if the temperature decreases but if
the temperature rises to the freezing point or above, the braking action will decrease
rapidly. Sometimes very low friction coefficient values occur when humid air is drifting over
an icy runway even though the temperature may be well below the freezing point.
Some of the various atmospheric conditions that influence braking action are given below:
• Friction Coefficient between 0.10 and 0.30 (Poor - Medium/Poor)
The following conditions typically produce these friction coefficients:
- Slush or rain on snow- or ice-covered runway;
- Runway covered with wet snow or standing water;
- Change from frost to temperature above freezing point;
- The type of ice which is formed after long periods of cold;
- A thin layer of ice formed:
- By frozen ground having been exposed to humidity or rain at 0°C or
above;
- When due to radiation, e.g. when the sky clears, the runway surface
temperature drops below freezing point and below the dew point (this
ice formation can take place very suddenly and occur while the
reported air temperature may still be quite a few degrees above the
freezing point).
• Friction Coefficient between 0.25 and 0.35 (Medium/Poor-Medium)
The following conditions typically produce these friction coefficients:
- Snow conditions at temperature just below freezing point;
- Snow-covered runways at temperatures below freezing point, exposed to
sun;
- Slush-covered runway.
• Friction Coefficient between 0.35 and 0.45 (Medium/Good-Good)
The following conditions typically produce these friction coefficients:
- Snow-covered runways which have not been exposed to temperatures
higher than about –2 ºC to –4 ºC;
- Damp or wet runway without risk of hydroplaning (less than 3 mm water
depth).
Take-off and landing performances on wet or contaminated runways are given in OM Part
B. The information presented to the flight crew in line operations is usually mixture of
contaminant type, contaminant depth, friction measurements and braking action reports.
The Commander shall consider all available information, including runway surface
condition reports, braking action reports, and friction measurements. Given a friction or
braking action report, the Commander shall apply sound judgement in considering its
applicability in determining aeroplane braking performance. He shall consider the following
factors:
• The age of the report;
• Meteorological conditions present since the report was issued;
• Type of aeroplane or device used to obtain the report;
• Whether the runway surface was treated since the report;
• The methods used for that treatment.
Important: Take-off or landing shall be avoided from icy runways, and from runways for
which the reported FC is less than 0.25 and/or BA is reported as »POOR«.
For other contaminants deposit limits as specified in OM Part B are relevant
and shall be respected. When different values of contaminant depth, runway
friction or braking action are reported for different portions of the same
runway, the most adverse values shall be used in all performance
computations.
The cleared/treated runway width should normally not be less than 30 m (100 ft). If,
however, the width of the treated runway (sanded, sprayed, etc.) is less than 30 m, the
operation on such runway is under Commander's discretion. The criteria for the FC/BA
must be met for the treated runway width. If the treated runway width is less than 40 m, the
Commander should carefully evaluate the maximum acceptable crosswind.
• General Consideration
The use of thrust reversers is mandatory for take-off and landing on contaminated
runways.
The two most important variables confronting the pilot when runway coefficient of
friction is low and/or conditions for hydroplaning exist, are the length of runway and
crosswind magnitude. The total friction force of the tires is available for two
functions – braking and cornering. If there is a crosswind, some friction force is
necessary to keep the aircraft on the centreline (cornering).
Tyre cornering capability is reduced during braking or when wheels are not fully
spun up. Locked wheels eliminate cornering. Therefore in crosswind conditions, a
longer distance will be required to stop the aircraft.
• Taxiing
Aeroplane may be taxied at the Commander discretion on ramps and taxiways not
cleared of snow and slush. More power than normal may be required to commence
and continue taxi so care should be taken to avoid jet blast damage to buildings,
equipment and other aircraft. Be aware of the possibility of ridges or ruts of frozen
snow that might cause difficulties. The boundaries/edges of manoeuvring areas and
taxiway should be clearly discernible. If in doubt, request ‘Follow me’ car guidance.
When executing sharp turns while taxiing or parking at the ramp, remember that
braking and steering capabilities are greatly reduced with icy airport conditions;
reduce taxi speed accordingly. Slat/flap selection should be delayed until
immediately before line up to minimise contamination.
• Take-off
Severe retardation may occur in slush or wet snow. In most cases, this lack of
acceleration will be evident early on the take-off run. Maximum permissible
thrust/power must be used from the start. Large quantities of snow or slush, usually
containing sand or other anti-skid substances may be thrown into the engines, static
ports and onto the airframe. Pod and engine clearance must be watched when the
runway is cleared and snow is banked at the sides of runways or taxiway.
• Landing
Pilots should be aware that where rain, hail, sleet or snow showers are encountered
on the approach or have been reported as having recently crossed the airfield,
there is a high probability of the runway being contaminated. The runway state
should be checked with ATC before commencing or continuing the approach. Very
often a short delay is sufficient to allow the runway to drain or the contaminant to
melt.
Use of reverse thrust on landing on dry snow in very low temperatures will blow the
dry snow forward especially at low speed. The increase in temperature may melt
this snow and form clear ice on re-freezing on static ports.
The shortest stopping distances on wet runways occur when the brakes are fully
applied as soon as possible after main wheel spin up with maximum and immediate
use of reverse thrust.
Landing on contaminated runways without antiskid should be avoided. It is strongly
recommended to use the autobrake (if available) provided that the contaminant is
evenly distributed. The factors and considerations involved in landing on a slippery
surface are quite complex and depending on the circumstances, the pilot may have
to make critical decisions almost instinctively.
The following list of items summarises the key points to be borne in mind (several may
have to be acted upon simultaneously):
• Limit crosswind components to values specified in OM Part B;
• Establish and maintain a stabilised approach;
• Consider the many variables involved before landing on a slippery runway:
Refer to OM Part C.
Tropical storms are basically the same worldwide. As the intensity of the storm increase,
they go under various names in different geographical regions. The term Typhoon applies
in the Western Pacific ocean; the term Hurricane applies in the West Indies, Atlantic Gulf
of Mexico and Southern USA; Cyclone in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the
Arabian Sea and Anticyclone in Southern Hemisphere.
By international agreement tropical cyclones occurring in the western Pacific and the
China Seas are classified according to the maximum sustained wind speeds within their
circulations, as shown in the table below.
Typhoon Categories
Typhoon intensities are measured by the wind speed of the storm according to the Saffir-
Simpson Scale.
Category 1
(Minor hurricane/typhoon, 74-95 mph/64-82 knots/119-153 km/h) - No real damage to
building structures. Damage primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery, and trees.
Also some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.
Category 2
(99-110 mph/83-95 knots/154-177 km/h) - Some roofing material, door, and window
damage to buildings. Considerable damage to vegetation, mobile homes and piers.
Coastal and low-lying escape routes flood 2-4 hours before arrival of centre. Small craft in
unprotected anchorages break moorings.
Category 3
(Major hurricane/typhoon, 111-130 mph/99-113 knots/178-209 km/h) – Some structural
damage to small residences and utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall
failures. Mobile homes are destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys smaller structures
with larger structures damaged by floating debris. Terrain continuously lower than 5 feet
ASL (at sea level) may be flooded inland 8 miles or more.
Category 4
(Severe hurricane/typhoon, 131-155 mph/114-135 knots/210-249 km/h) – More extensive
curtainwall failures with some complete roof structure failure on small residences. Major
erosion of beach. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the shore. Terrain
continuously lower than 10 feet ASL (at sea level) may be flooded requiring massive
evacuation of residential areas inland as far as 6 miles.
Category 5
(Severe hurricane/typhoon, 155+ mph/136+ knots/250+ km/h) - Complete roof failure on
many residences and industrial buildings. Some complete building failures with small utility
buildings blown over or away. Major damage to lower floors of all structures located less
than 15 feet ASL (at sea level) and within 500 yards of the shoreline. Massive evacuation
of residential areas on low ground within 5 to 10 miles of the shoreline may be required.
The decision for the flight to be delayed or to proceed to the destination, affected by the
tropical storm shall be made by Operations Control Centre. Assessments for operations
into these areas are reported to the Flight Operations Manager or his designate.
Operation into and out of the affected aerodromes is not recommended when the average
winds are above 42 knots.
The Commander of the aircraft that has been diverted to an alternate aerodrome must
keep a constant communication with OCC via any available means possible regarding the
typhoon conditions.
If an aircraft is grounded at the affected station, the Station Manager and the aircraft
Commander will make joint consultation and agreement on an appropriate line of action to
safeguard the aircraft.
The cancellation of a typhoon warning is issued by the appropriate state aviation agency.
Wake turbulence is generated by a pressure exchange between the lower and upper
surface of the wing. This pressure exchange causes counter rotating vortices trailing from
the outer wing tips. The larger the aeroplane the larger those vortices will be. The wake of
a large aeroplane may generate large control inputs on an aeroplane flying in the area
behind it. Those control inputs may exceed the roll control capability of the following
aeroplane. The pilot must be aware of the location of the vortex flow generated by a
preceding aeroplane and adjust his flight path accordingly. Tests with large/heavy
aeroplanes have shown that the vortex flow field, in a plane cutting through the wake at
any point downstream, covers an area about twice the wing span in width and one wing
span in depth. The vortices from the two tips remain spaced and will drift with the wind.
The vortices will sink with a rate of descent of around 500 fpm. There is a tendency that
the vortices will level off about 1.000 ft below the flight path of the vortex-generating
aeroplane.
Vortex strength diminishes with time and distance behind the aeroplane. Vortex generation
will begin on rotation when the nose wheel lifts off the ground and ends, when the nose
wheel touches down on landing. In conditions with very weak or calm winds, the remaining
vortices from a landing aeroplane may persist up to 5 minutes or even longer. All this has
prompted national Civil Aviation Authorities and ICAO to establish minimum separation
criteria.
Wake turbulence separation minima given below define a minimum separation time behind
Heavy aeroplane to cope with wake turbulence:
• On Approach: 2 minutes;
• On Line-up: 2 minutes (3 minutes if at intersection take-off).
Wake turbulence separation minima given below define a minimum separation time behind
Super aeroplane to cope with wake turbulence:
• On Approach: 3 minutes;
• On Line-up: 3 minutes (4 minutes if at intersection take-off*).
Two parallel runways have no influence of each other’s if they are separated by more than
760 m (2500 ft) and if the flight path of the second aeroplane does not cross the flight path
of the preceding aeroplane by less than 300 m (1000 ft).
Wake turbulence separation minima given below define a minimum separation distance on
approach behind Heavy or Medium aeroplane to cope with wake turbulence:
• Behind Super: 7 NM;
• Behind Heavy: 5 NM;
• Behind Medium: 3 NM.
8.3.9.2 In Cruise
Wake turbulence may be encountered in cruise, where aeroplane flying in the same
direction and are vertically separated by 1.000 ft only (e.g. North Atlantic OTS). In this
case, if considered necessary, the pilot may offset from the cleared track by up to a
maximum of 2 NM in order to alleviate the effects of wake turbulence. ATC should be
advised of this contingency action. The aeroplane should be returned to cleared track as
soon as the situation allows.
All flight crew members required to be on flight deck duty shall be at their stations when
anticipating/copying a pre-flight or in-flight ATC clearance.
During all phases of flight, all flight crew members required to be on flight deck duty shall
remain at their stations unless their absence is necessary for the performance of duties in
connection with the operation, or for physiological needs.
If a pilot is required to leave the cockpit, the other pilot must remain at the controls of the
aeroplane, using a headset and shoulder harnesses. No seat changes shall be made
below 10.000 ft AAL.
Caution: When only one pilot is in the flight deck there should be no unnecessary calls in
order to keep distraction to a minimum.
The procedure for all aircraft fitted with surveillance camera(s) is:
• When a member of the flight crew needs to leave the flight deck the cabin crew
must be notified;
• A cabin crew member must position herself outside the flight deck door facing the
passengers;
• The flight crew member shall check on the CCTV screen that the cabin crew
member is in position before opening the door and leaving the flight deck;
• Once the flight deck door is closed it is not necessary for the cabin crew member to
guard the flight deck door until such time that it needs to be opened again to allow
the pilot to return.
Note: It is not necessary for a cabin crew member to be present in the flight deck during
this time.
The procedure for all aircraft without (operational) surveillance camera(s) is:
• When a member of the flight crew needs to leave the flight deck the cabin crew
must be notified;
• Two cabin crew members must position themselves at the front of the cabin;
• Entry to the flight deck shall be obtained via the interphone;
• One cabin crew member shall stand outside the flight deck door facing the
passengers;
• The other cabin crew member shall enter the flight deck and remain there until the
flight crew member is ready to return;
• Re-entry into the flight deck by the flight crew member shall be obtained via the
interphone;
• The cabin crew member in the flight deck shall check their presence outside by
using the spy-hole in the door;
• Once the flight crew member is inside the cabin crew member can leave the flight
deck. The second cabin crew member must remain guarding the flight deck door
continuously during this time.
All non-essential activities should be avoided during phases of flight where workload is
high. At any other time, if these activities are being performed, the Commander should
ensure that only one flight crewmember is so occupied at any one time and that careful
attention is being paid to normal operational duties by other crew member(s).
Each cabin crew member shall be in their assigned seats, during take-off and landing, and
whenever it is deemed necessary by the Commander in the interest of safety (PA callout:
»CABIN CREW, AT STATIONS«). Any additional cabin staff that cannot be
accommodated in the regular cabin crew seats, will normally occupy passenger seats, or
at Commander's discretion, a spare seat in the cockpit.
During taxiing, cabin crew should be seated with their seat harness fastened. Walking or
standing in the cabin is allowed only:
• For issues directly related to safety in the cabin;
• For the announcements and demonstrations to the passengers;
• For other valid operational reasons, with the approval of the Commander.
After take-off, cabin crew may unfasten their seat harness after the seat belt signs have
been switched OFF. However, approval may be given by the Commander via Interphone
to unfasten seat harness at any time.
Flight Crew
During all phases of flight each flight crew member required to be on flight deck duty shall
remain alert. If a lack of alertness is encountered, appropriate countermeasures shall be
used. If unexpected fatigue is experienced a controlled rest procedure, organized by the
Commander, can be used if workload permits.
Important: Controlled rest taken in this way may never be considered to be part of a rest
period for purposes of calculating flight time limitations nor used to justify any
duty period.
Controlled rest should be used in conjunction with other onboard fatigue management
countermeasures such as physical exercise, bright cockpit illumination at appropriate
times, balanced eating and drinking, and intellectual activity.
Requirements:
• Controlled rest procedures must not be used by a two member flight crew when
cabin crew are not carried;
• Controlled rest procedures may only be used when workload is low during cruise
phase of the flight, between completion of the top of climb scan and 30 minutes
before top of descent;
• Controlled rest procedures shall not be used:
- Over flight plan segments that require the use of escape routes, or
- Over flight plan segments that transit multiple ATC environments, while
manual fuel transfer or fuel balancing is taking place.
• During periods of controlled rest procedures, the non-resting crew member must
wear his seatbelt including shoulder harness, and headset.
The Commander is responsible for planning and the use of controlled rest. He must take
into account considerations of airmanship, weather, workload, aeroplane serviceability and
fatigue levels.
Pre-Rest Period:
Rest Procedures:
• Each controlled rest period shall be limited to 45 minutes with another 10 minutes
allowed for operational orientation before resuming flight deck duties (unless
required due to an abnormal or emergency situation). The maximum rest time has
been chosen to limit deep sleep with consequent long recovery time (sleep inertia);
• Controlled rest must be taken by only one flight crew member at a time;
• The flight crew member who is resting must continue to occupy his normal control
seat. The harness should be used and the seat positioned to the aft position to
minimise unintentional interference with the controls. Personal equipment which
may facilitate the rest, such as eye shades, ear plugs and neck supports is
permitted;
• The non-resting flight crew member must remain in his normal control seat;
• The Commander must brief the CIC regarding the intended implementation of
controlled rest procedures, the anticipated duration of the period and any other
considerations. When one pilot is resting, the non-resting pilot must make frequent
contact (at least once every 20 minutes) with the cabin crew over the interphone to
confirm his alertness. In the event of failure of contact from the cockpit to cabin, the
CIC shall contact the cockpit immediately using all available means;
• If necessary, the flight crew member may take more than one rest period if time
permits on longer sectors, subject to restrictions above;
• The non-resting flight crew member shall wake up the resting flight crew member
when required or at the predetermined time. Calling the person's name in a normal
tone is usually sufficient;
• The non-resting flight crew member shall wake up the resting flight crew member
when required or at the predetermined time. Calling the person's name in a normal
tone is usually sufficient.
Cabin Crew
On long flights there is a significant performance benefit to crew members from short
periods of controlled rest. Cabin crew may avail controlled rest whenever the service is
over and in between services, if it is a multi-service sector.
• The CIC may disrupt or cease crew rest at any time should in-flight circumstances
dictate.
Cabin crew may utilize any of the following areas for the purpose of crew rest:
• Blocked and screened passenger seats (if applicable);
• The last row of economy class seats, if they are not occupied by passengers;
• Assigned cabin crew jump seats.
Safety Notes:
• Cabin shall be patrolled at least every 30 min;
• Toilettes shall be checked at least every 15 min;
• CIC will nominate cabin crew member to take over when he/she is having seat rest,
Commander shall be informed.
Deadheading crews should be seated at or near the emergency exits, preferably in the first
rows. If possible, no other passengers should be seated in the same row.
Any technical deficiencies of seat belts (passenger or crew) must be entered in the Aircraft
Technical Log.
8.3.11.1 Crew
Each flight crew member on the flight deck shall keep his safety lap belt fastened while at
his station. Flight crew members shall keep their safety lap belts and shoulder harnesses
fastened during:
• Taxi;
• Take-off and climb to 10.000 ft (FL100);
• Descent from 10.000 ft (FL100) to landing;
• Turbulent conditions; and
• Whenever deemed necessary by the Commander in the interest of safety.
If one pilot vacates his seat whilst airborne for any reason, then the pilot in control must
wear his full harness and have his seat in the normal flying position. During the climb and
descent, both pilots should have their seats in the normal flying position.
Cabin crew members shall be at their assigned crew stations, properly secured by the
safety belts and harnesses fastened during:
• Taxi (except for safety-related duties);
• Take-off;
• Landing; and
• Whenever deemed necessary by the Commander in the interest of safety
(turbulence, etc.).
The need for this will be indicated by the Seat Belts sign ON.
8.3.11.2 Passengers
The Commander shall ensure that each person on board is briefed before take-off on how
to fasten and unfasten his safety belt/harness. The cabin crew must also inform all
passengers that the use of the seat belts is recommended during the entire flight.
Before take-off and landing, and whenever he considers it necessary in the interests of
safety, the Commander shall ensure that each passenger on board occupies a seat with
his safety belt/harness properly secured. The need for this will be indicated by the Seat
Belts sign ON and a subsequent PA announcement. Announcement is usually done by
CIC but may also be done by the Commander whenever he deemed necessary.
Seat belts must be un-fastened and the Seat Belts sign switched OFF during:
• Transit;
• Refuelling with passengers on board.
If, after landing, the aeroplane must stop during taxiing and before reaching the parking
position, the Commander should consider informing the passengers via PA (if possible in
the specific situation) to remain seated with fastened seat belts until the aeroplane has
reached the final parking position.
The flight deck door must be closed and locked when the aeroplane’s doors are closed for
departure and shall remain closed until the engines are shut down on arrival, except when
necessary to allow routine access or permit access and way out by authorized persons.
The flight deck door may be opened, solely at the discretion of the aircraft Commander,
when required for the purposes of essential entry and egress from the flight deck.
Before opening the door the CCTV or door viewer must be checked. A pilot will
acknowledge and unlock the door. One cabin crew member is required to stand at the
front of the cabin facing the passengers and monitoring the cabin at all times. Once entry
has been gained the door must be closed and locked.
The flight crew must not leave the flight deck while the aircraft engines are in operation
except for health (including physiological needs) and safety reasons.
It is not allowed that only a single flight crew member is present in the cockpit during any
phase of the flight. If the flight crew member needs to leave the cockpit during the flight,
than other crew member (flight crew or cabin crew), or any other person permitted by JC
Airlines as per OM Part A, must be delegated to stay in the cockpit during his absence, to
ensure that at least two crew members are present in the cockpit all the time.
Admission to the flight deck is normally at the sole discretion of the Commander, subjected
to current policy issued by SSCA.
No person other than operating crew member shall have admission to or be carried on the
flight deck, unless such person is:
• A representative of SSCA, responsible for certification, licensing or inspection, if this
is required for the performance of his official duties; or
• An employee of other national Civil Aviation Authorities, if this is required for the
performance of his official duties; or
• An employee of foreign Civil Aviation Authorities/Organisations performing specific
duties and/or on a familiarisation flight, as approved by Flight Operations Manager;
or
• A person required to be on the flight deck for technical, operational, training or
official flight deck familiarisation reasons formally authorised in accordance with the
Company's Operations Manual; or
• An employee of JC Airlines (i.e. holder of Company ID).
A person shall only be carried on the flight deck provided that a seat with safety belt/safety
harnesses is available and that requirements concerning supplemental oxygen are met.
• About the relevant safety and security procedures, including operation of safety
belt/harnesses and to keep the safety belt/safety harnesses fastened at all times.
The final decision regarding the admission to the flight deck of persons of the above
categories rests with the Commander who should request credentials or identification of
such persons before granting such admission. In the interest of safety, admission to the
flight deck shall not cause distraction and/or interfere with the flight operation.
CAA personnel entitled to enter and remain on the flight deck in order to be able to
perform their duties shall only be denied access by the Commander if he deems this
necessary in the interest of safety. Commander shall explain the circumstances of such
denial in the ASR.
For introduction purposes it is permitted to have a cabin crew member in the cockpit during
take-off and/or landing, provided this cabin crew member is a member of the working crew
and does not have an emergency duty (e.g. ferry flights). This procedure shall be applied
in a restrictive manner and never for commercial reasons (i.e. selling the cabin crew jump
seat).
Before flight the Commander shall brief the CIC as to the current flight deck door
emergency access code. The code shall not be written down on any paperwork by the CIC
to guard against the code falling into the wrong hands.
For the flight crew procedures when leaving the flight deck refer to OM Part A, Chapter
8.3.10.1.
Before making request to open the flight deck door, cabin crew member shall:
• Close the forward galley curtain and dim galley lights to prevent a direct view from
the cabin to the area in front of the flight deck door;
• Verify that the adjacent lavatory (if applicable) and galley area are not passenger
occupied; and
• Keep the flight deck door opened for only the minimum time required to quickly
enter the cockpit.
The cabin crew must use the interphone system or keypad should an entry to the cockpit
is required.
The flight crew must positively identify the fact that the area around the flight deck door is
clear and that the person requesting entry is authorised to enter the cockpit. Once this is
confirmed the flight crew will unlock the door.
Prior to leaving the flight deck, the crew member must inspect the area around the cockpit
door through the video surveillance system or viewing lens or by communicating with the
cabin crew through the interphone system.
Special code phrase arranged before commencing duty (e.g. »CAPTAIN, I REALLY MUST
COME IN THE COCKPIT«) shall be used if cabin crew wants to communicate security
related problem to the Commander. Should such phrase be communicated to the cockpit
via the interphone, then the flight deck door shall not be opened.
In aeroplanes not fitted with the (operational) video surveillance system, the cabin crew
must use the interphone system should an entry to the cockpit be required. The request for
entry must be preceded by a code word. The code word for each flying duty period will be
decided by the Commander and upon boarding the aeroplane he will communicate it to the
First Officer and to the CIC, who in turn will brief one more cabin crew member in this
regard. The CIC must be briefed that the code word will not be used on the interphone
unless the area around the galley and entrance to the cockpit is clear. Should the code
word not be used then the cockpit door will not be opened. Refer also to OM Part A,
Chapter 8.3.10.1.
For the allocation of crew seats (flight deck and cabin crew jump seats) refer to CCM.
JC Airlines does not permit a cabin crew seat to be occupied by a person other than a
cabin crew member except with the approval of the SSCA.
A person other than a cabin crew member may occupy a cabin crew seat only in the event
of a landing when:
• The number of cabin crew manning emergency exits falls below the minimum cabin
crew complement during the flight due to unexpected incapacitation of a cabin crew
member; or
• During a declared emergency where the person is an able-bodied person displaced
from a passenger seat to a cabin crew seat in order to enhance evacuation
management. This person must be briefed on the necessary safety procedures,
including activation of the exit door, etc., before being permitted to occupy a cabin
crew seat and to assist in evacuation management.
All jump seat occupants are to be briefed on safety procedures which include safety
harness usage, oxygen mask operation, emergency exits, sterile cockpit procedure and
any items deemed necessary by the Commander.
Alcohol shall not be served to persons occupying crew seats (jump seats).
Important: In no case does the “Use of crew seats” policy constitutes the right to
transport persons (other than appointed crew members) without a valid ticket.
Refer to OM Part B.
8.3.14.1 General
Incapacitation of a crew member is defined as any condition which affects the health of a
crew member during the performance of duties which renders him incapable of performing
the assigned duties. Incapacitation is a real air safety hazard which occurs more frequently
than many of the other emergencies which are the subject of routine training.
Incapacitation can occur in many forms varying from obvious sudden death to subtle,
partial loss of function. It occurs in all age groups and during all phases of flight and may
not be preceded by any warning.
Obvious incapacitation means total functional failure and loss of capabilities. It will
generally be easily detectable and of prolonged occurrence.
Subtle incapacitation is the most frequent type and is considered a more significant
operational hazard, because it is difficult to detect and the effects can range from partial
loss of function to complete unconsciousness. Since a flight crew member may not be
aware of or capable of rationally evaluating their situation, this type of incapacitation is the
more dangerous one.
Flight crew members should have a very high index of suspicion of a subtle incapacitation.
The keys to an early recognition are:
• Disciplined use of standard operating procedures (SOP);
• Routine monitoring and cross-checking of flight instruments, particularly during
critical phases of flight, i.e. take-off and initial climb-out, approach and landing;
• Correct application of CRM principles, especially the Two-Challenge Rule.
• Irregular breathing;
• Pale fixed facial expression;
• Jerky motions that are either delayed or too rapid.
Refer to OM Part B.
1) Assume control and command of the aeroplane by performing following actions (in
order of priority):
• Take over control with a callout »I HAVE CONTROL«;
• Keep (return) the aeroplane to a safe flight path;
• Engage the autopilot as soon as practicable;
• Check the position of essential controls and switches;
• Concentrate on flying the aeroplane especially during critical phases of flight;
• Inform ATC and declare emergency (i.e. MAYDAY call);
• Land as soon as possible.
Important: In the situation where the Commander is incapacitated, the first officer (co-
pilot) is authorised to conduct the approach to the full minima applicable (as
defined in OM Part C) for the approach being flown.
After landing first officer (co-pilot) is authorized to taxi the aeroplane to the parking
position. Active runway shall be vacated, but whenever in doubt about the position and/or
taxi route, the aeroplane shall be stopped and ground assistance requested.
Every flight crew member should inform the remaining flight crew of any indisposition
including extreme fatigue he is suffering from. This warning will help to reduce the
operational risk associated with a possible incapacitation incident.
Should the CIC become incapacitated during flight, the Commander is to be informed
immediately. Subject to the Commander’s agreement, the pre-designated senior cabin
crew member will become CIC for the rest of the flight.
The minimum crew for each aeroplane type is stated in OM Part A, Chapter 4. If one or
more cabin crew members on board should become incapacitated during flight and the
number of remaining flight crew is less than the minimum number required to operate the
type, the following actions are necessary:
• Nomination of Able-bodied Person(s) (ABP) to occupy vacant cabin crew seats.
They must be instructed regarding:
- Handling of the crew seats and seat belts;
- Unlocking and opening the doors;
- Positioning of the oxygen masks;
- Positioning of the life vests (if required);
- Communication means.
• The passengers must be informed about:
- The situation;
- Necessary cabin safety requirements (refer to OM Part A, Chapter 8.3.15);
- Passenger briefing procedures prior to landing (refer to OM Part A, Chapter
8.3.16).
The primary function of the cabin crew is to ensure the safety and security of the cabin and
all passengers on the aeroplane from the time they board to the time they disembark. This
function must be coordinated with the flight crew during all phases of flight, and especially
when there is an abnormal or emergency situation.
There is an obvious potential for a major incident to occur when such items as conductive
liquids in open containers, cutlery, etc. are mishandled on aircraft flight deck.
The crews shall follow the company procedures for handling drinks and other items in and
around the flight deck, as appropriate. Liquids shall not be passed over the pedestal. Cups
filled with liquids must be placed in the designated cup holders at all times. Cups should
be filled maximum up to one half, to prevent any spillage. Bottles should not be disposed
on the flight deck floor at any time, neither by flight nor cabin crew. Bottles brought to the
flight deck must be closed and given in hand to the pilots or placed in the lateral stowage
compartments. Every drink must be served from the window side, so as to avoid any risk
of accidental spillage on to electrical equipment.
The cabin crew-flight crew communications over the interphone shall be formal, verbal and
structured. This is to preclude the chances of any misunderstanding on account of
interphone distortion, language, etc. Informal conversations between the cabin and cockpit
crew shall be in person. All formal operational communications between the cockpit and
the cabin crew should be in the English language. This shall strictly be observed when not
all crew members speak the same native language.
Information, instructions and inquiries from the flight crew to the cabin crew are transmitted
via:
• Face to face communication;
• Interphone;
• Public Address System (PA System).
Cabin crew members shall be careful not to interrupt the flight crew during periods of high
or critical workload, such as:
• Preparation for take-off or landing;
• R/T communication;
• Checklist usage.
During “no-contact” period, there shall be no communications attempts from cabin crew to
flight crew. The only authorised exception to this communication rule is in the case grave
emergency, i.e. cabin fire.
The Sterile Period is the period from pushback or engine start until the seatbelt sign is
switched OFF, and from top of descent (Seat Belts sign ON) until engine shutdown (Seat
Belts sign OFF).
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During Sterile Period, there shall be no calls or visits to the cockpit/flight deck except the
notification of the »CABIN SECURED«, or notification of a safety concern as explained
below.
Normal calls from the cockpit to the cabin crew, and vice-versa, shall initially be made via
the interphone, and the normal call buttons used to alert the called party.
Urgent calls from the cockpit to the cabin crew shall be initially made via Interphone and
the alert is given by activating the emergency EMER button. This gives a distinct ‘Hi-Lo’
chime signal. In more urgent cases for important information and instructions, alert is given
by via the PA system by announcing »CABIN CREW TO THE COCKPIT«, and also
activating the EMER button. Normally, it shall be the CIC who shall take the Emergency
call. In case the CIC is resting or in the toilet, the next available cabin crew member should
take the emergency call. If, at the time of an emergency call, the other cabin crew
members are able to access the interphone system, then they must also listen to the
emergency information.
In case of an emergency, the Commander shall brief the CIC at least on the following
(NITS items):
• Nature of the emergency;
• Intentions (crash landing, ditching, diversion, continue etc);
• Time remaining to landing;
• Special instructions.
In the special instructions the Commander is to clearly instruct the CIC whether to prepare
the cabin for normal or emergency landing.
After NITS briefing the Commander should challenge CIC to repeat basic NITS items to
ensure proper reception of information.
The NITS format may also be useful when communicating about an abnormal/emergency
situation with ATC.
Note: Other formats may also be used to conduct emergency briefing (e.g mnemonic
TEST: Type of Emergency (T), Evacuation Procedure or alternative means of
disembarkation (E), Special Instructions (S), Time to land (T)).
Cabin crew shall advise the flight crew immediately of any flight safety concern. Some
examples of flight safety concerns are:
• Abnormal or emergency situations;
• Emergency evacuation;
• Emergency exit or door unsafe condition;
• Engine fire (e.g., tail pipe or nacelle torching flame);
• Evidence of damage, or accumulation of ice/snow, on the aeroplane exterior
surfaces, especially the upper wing surfaces;
• Extreme cabin temperature changes (e.g., suspected bleed air duct leakage);
• Fire, burning smell or smoke in the cabin;
• Cabin crew member incapacitation;
• Fuel smell or fluid leakage;
• Medical situations;
• Preparation for and an encounter with turbulence;
• Suspicious, unclaimed bag or package;
• Uncertainty about condition (i.e., suspected incapacitation);
• Unusual noise or vibration (e.g. evidence of tail-strike on take-off, tyre burst);
• Cart stowage difficulty;
• Etc.
A (cabin) crew briefing shall be conducted by the Commander prior to each flight, or series
of flights, if to be operated on the same day by the same flight crew. Briefing is done
usually in the briefing room but can be done in other adequate space at the departure
aerodrome or in hotel, or if no other option, on the aeroplane, after checking all the
relevant data and after the cabin crew briefing with the cabin crew-in-charge is finished.
The Commander should brief the cabin crew on the following (as a minimum):
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• Introduce himself and the first officer (co-pilot), and other flight crew members, as
applicable, to the cabin crew;
• Confirm that the crew is legal to fly to the best of their knowledge;
• Confirm that all crew members’ names are correctly written in the Journey Log and
they are present;
• Any significant technical issue, especially any defect related to the cabin and/or
safety equipment;
• Expected flight time, delay (if any), significant weather including turbulence and
thunderstorms;
• Expected cruising altitude and routing (if relevant);
• Expected number of passengers and information on any special passenger/cargo
handling, if known;
• Crew coordination requirements (general and emergency);
• Any training taking place in the cockpit, if applicable;
• Any other relevant information or special instructions as deemed necessary,
including any pertinent information ensuring cabin crew members remain
knowledgeable of the laws, regulations, rules, guidelines and other information that
is relevant in the performance of duties.
Whenever a tour of duty for the whole crew begins at home base (duty after crew rest) the
Commander or the CIC should perform appropriate spot check thus ensuring that the
cabin crew is proficient in and familiar with the relevant emergency items and procedures.
The CIC shall ensure that the following information is given to the Commander:
• Any training taking place in the cabin;
• Any special passenger requirements.
If a cabin crew member changes during a schedule, then the new cabin crew member is to
introduce himself to the Commander, and acquaint with all crew briefings by the
Commander or the CIC.
The Commander or CIC will conclude the cabin briefing by allotting, to each individual
cabin crew member, the tasks that crew member is to perform on board and the
emergency station he is to occupy.
Note: The importance of the adherence to the doors’ slides arming/disarming procedure
should be highlighted during crew briefing.
All cabin crew members shall be seated with their seat belts fastened during critical
phases of flight.
The Commander and the CIC are directly and jointly responsible for ensuring compliance
with above requirements. To ensure compliance, the following procedures shall be used
for all flights:
• The Seat Belts sign should remain ON after take-off until the aeroplane has passed
at least 10.000 ft / FL100 in climb. Thereafter, it may be selected OFF subject to
flight conditions;
• If the Seat Belts sign is to remain ON for the duration of the flight it shall be cycled
OFF then ON during climb when passing 10.000 ft / FL100 or whenever it is safe for
cabin crew to leave their seats, whichever is later;
• The flight crew shall select the Seat Belts sign ON at top of descent. On short flights
this action may be delayed (flight conditions permitting) until reaching 15.000 ft /
FL150 or 20 minutes until landing, whichever comes first;
• If the Seat Belts sign is already selected ON at top of descent as a precaution, then
it shall be cycled OFF then ON once at top of descent;
• At 15.000 ft / FL150, the Seat Belts sign shall be re-cycled (OFF then ON). The
cabin crew shall complete securing the cabin as soon as possible. Upon confirming
that the cabin is secure, the CIC shall immediately pass the »CABIN SECURED«
report to the cockpit.
• Whenever the Seat Belts sign is selected ON, the flight crew should refrain from
leaving the flight deck.
Important: Cycling the Seat Belts sign shall be accomplished in a way to produce two
chimes.
Pre-departure Procedures
JC Airlines has established check-in and boarding gate procedures, and training for
applicable ground (traffic) staff and handling agents. Emphasis is placed on the need for
these personnel to identify and resolve potential difficulties in seat allocation, excess cabin
baggage, the carriage of dangerous goods, drunken or unruly passengers, including
boarding refusal, before passenger embarkation begins. This is of particular importance at
overseas departure points. Similar instructions and training is also provided to the cabin
crew to deal with cabin safety related problems which may have been missed at check-in
(refer to OM Part D).
On taking over their aircraft at the beginning of a day’s flight or series of flights, the cabin
crew shall:
• Check the type specific cabin emergency equipment (refer to OM Part B and CCM).
Equipment found at a wrong place shall be re-stowed at the appropriate location.
On completion of that check the CIC will advise the Commander of any
discrepancies so that these may be rectified or deferred;
• Check that the cabin (inclusive of lavatories and galleys) has been cleaned and
tidied up appropriately;
• Ensure that no unstowed catering, galley or other equipment inconveniences
boarding passengers nor impedes the orderly flow of boarding.
Prior to Taxiing
Cabin crew shall:
• Check if the seating of the passengers (seat allocation) complies with the provisions
of OM Part A, Chapter 8.2.2; if not, they must arrange for their reseating;
• Ensure that all passengers are seated with their safety belts properly secured, that
no food, beverage or tableware is located at any passenger seat and that food and
beverage trays as well as passengers backrests are in the upright position;
• Ensure that all passenger and crew baggage, catering equipment and other cabin
load is properly secured and stowed where it cannot impede evacuation or cause
injury by falling or other movement. Overhead bins shall be closed;
• Ensure, by an announcement and by visual checks that no passenger uses a
portable electronic device that can adversely affect the performance of the
aeroplane’s system and equipment;
• Strictly enforce the NO SMOKING instructions;
• Ensure that all exits and escape paths are unobstructed. If it is necessary to pass
through a doorway or curtain to reach any required emergency exit from any
passenger seat, the door or curtain shall be secured in the stowed position.
After passenger boarding and closing of all doors and after the appropriate announcement
by the CIC for arming the doors, each cabin crew member shall ensure:
• That each assisting means for emergency evacuation, that deploys automatically, is
armed at the door(s) and emergency exit(s) for which he has been designated
responsible;
• That all relevant emergency equipment remains easily accessible for immediate
use.
Prior to taxiing, the cabin crew shall occupy their assigned stations and fasten their safety
belts and harnesses except to perform safety related duties. Furthermore, any activity
which could distract any flight crew member from his duties is not authorised.
Prior to Take-Off
Prior to take-off, the cabin crew shall:
• Occupy their assigned stations and fasten their safety belts and, if installed, their
harnesses, and
• Ensure (at night) that the cabin lights are dimmed in order to improve the night
vision of cabin crew and passengers.
The cabin crew shall ensure that the passenger’s egress and evacuation routes are free of
obstructions during take-off.
The CIC, having received the appropriate cabin report from each cabin crew member shall
report »CABIN SECURED« to the Commander confirming:
• Passengers seated with seat belts fastened, backrests upright and tables/trays in
stowed position;
• Equipment and baggage properly secured, galleys and lavatories checked, locked,
secured, stowage spaces and bins closed;
• All exits and escape paths unobstructed and curtains secured in the stowed position
(if applicable);
• All doors in “flight/armed” condition;
• Cabin lights dimmed (night);
• Passenger briefing according to OM Part A, Chapter 8.3.16 completed.
After sufficient taxi time which allows cabin crew to prepare cabin for take-off, CM2 calls
CIC via CALLS/FWD pushbutton. Communication between cockpit and cabin crew is set
up via Cabin Interphone System. As soon as cabin is prepared for take-off CIC reports:
»CABIN SECURED« (the report might be delayed until cabin is ready). Reception of report
is confirmed by CM2.
CAB reception knob on ACP1 should be set to reception (knob out) in order to allow
Commander to receive CIC’s report.
Just before line-up, the CM2 shall make a PA announcement: »CABIN CREW BE
SEATED FOR TAKE-OFF«, in order to alert the cabin crew.
In Flight
After take-off all cabin crew members shall remain seated with seat belt/harnesses
fastened until the Seat Belts signs have been switched OFF or cycled OFF then ON.
For fire avoidance and/or detection cabin crew shall conduct regular checks and observe
the following provisions. Cabin crew shall:
• Enforce strict observation of the JC Airlines NO SMOKING rules;
• Restrict spreading of papers by passengers on the cabin floor;
• Check lavatories for signs of smoke, and open flaps of waste boxes (to check
automatic fire extinguishers);
• Check the temperature of the hot water and the proper working of electric toilet
appliances.
These checks shall be made at intervals of 15 minutes when infrequent use of lavatories
may prevent detection by passengers.
Prior to Landing
After the Seat Belts sign is switched ON at top of descent, cabin crew shall conclude
passenger services and prepare the cabin for landing as soon as possible.
The CIC, having received the appropriate cabin report from each cabin crew member shall
report »CABIN SECURED« to the Commander confirming:
• Passengers seated with seat belts fastened, backrests upright and tables/trays in
stowed position;
• Equipment and baggage properly secured, galleys and lavatories checked, locked,
secured, stowage spaces and bins closed;
• All exits and escape paths unobstructed, curtains secured in the stowed position;
• Cabin lights dimmed (night);
• Passenger briefing according OM Part A, Chapter 8.3.16 completed.
CIC may give a »CABIN SECURED« report to the Commander personally in the cockpit or
via interphone.
Commander shall acknowledge reception of »CABIN SECURED« report and inform CIC
about actual OAT at destination aerodrome.
The cabin crew shall ensure that the passenger’s egress and evacuation routes are free of
obstructions during landing.
After Landing
After the aeroplane has touched down, cabin crew shall ensure that the passengers
remain seated with their seat belts fastened until the final parking position has been
reached and the engines have been switched off. Immediately after reaching parking
position each cabin crew member shall ensure that the automatically deploying means for
emergency evacuation, at the door(s)/emergency exit(s) he has been designated
responsible for, are disarmed as prescribed in CCM.
Smoking is strictly prohibited for passengers and crew whenever on board JC Airlines
aircraft. The operating CIC is expected to use tactful initiative in sorting out any problems
with smoking passengers ensuring that the safety of the aeroplane and passengers is not
jeopardised at any time. The Commander shall be informed at all times.
JC Airlines does not permit the use of a PED on board its aircraft except as provided in the
following text.
JC Airlines shall ensure that when any PED is used on board an aircraft that:
• The use of the PED will not interfere with the performance of the aircraft’s
navigation and communications systems;
• There are established procedures for ensuring that the use of the PED complies the
company regulations;
• Crew members are assigned responsibilities and trained for ensuring the safe use
of the PED.
Cabin crew shall inform the passengers of the permissible times, conditions and limitations
for the use of PED.
Notwithstanding any use of PED permitted by the operator, the Commander has the right
to terminate the use of any PED.
JC Airlines shall obtain an approval from the SSCA if it provides or intends to provide a
PED as part of its in-flight entertainment or other services on board the aircraft.
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Refer to CCM.
Trolleys and containers must be stowed away and secured in the galleys unless they are
used for the service. During the flight, trolleys not used for the service are not allowed to
stand in the cabin or in front of the cockpit door. All items/equipment on board (trolleys,
containers, hand luggage etc.) must be safely stowed and secured in order to minimize
danger of injury to passengers/crew or damage to the aeroplane in case of any turbulence
or change in aeroplane attitude. It is a requirement that all trolleys are fitted with a
serviceable braking device.
The following procedure must be followed in case of tripped Circuit Breakers (CB):
• The Commander must always be informed when a circuit breaker ‘pops’ in the
cabin/galley (this includes any system);
• The cabin crew shall not reset the circuit breaker until advised to do so by the
Commander;
• A circuit breaker shall not be reset and then kept in closed position with external
aids.
Important: A Circuit Breaker (CB) shall never be reset more than once.
The CIC shall report the existence of any malfunctioning equipment to the Commander,
before and after each flight.
Legal Provisions prescribe that passengers shall be briefed on all safety relevant matters:
• Verbally and by demonstration (or by an audiovisual presentation); and
• By means of safety briefing card; and
• By means of pictograms or signs.
• Megaphone
For use by crew members during an emergency evacuation the installation of one
or more (refer to CCM) megaphone(s) as a backup means for verbal briefing is
prescribed on passenger carrying aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger
seating configuration of more than 60.
Where one megaphone is required, it should be easily accessible from a cabin crew
member's assigned seat. Where two or more megaphones are required they should
be suitably distributed in the passenger cabin and be readily accessible to crew
members assigned to direct an emergency evacuation.
Each passenger shall be provided, as soon as seated, with a safety briefing card which
provides, by means of a pictorial presentation, information and detailed instructions on the
use of emergency equipments and exits intended to be used by passengers.
Pictorial placards (pictograms) and picture type instructions shall indicate the location and
the use of emergency installations. Visual means for passenger briefing include the
‘Fasten Seat Belts’ and the ‘No Smoking’ signs, the installation of which is prescribed on
all aeroplanes where the Commander cannot see all the passenger seats from his own
seat.
Prior to Embarkation
Prior to Take-off
When the aeroplane's doors have been closed and armed, a designated cabin crew
member shall brief the passengers on the following provisions / regulations / procedures:
• Observation of the ‘No Smoking’ signs and prohibition of smoking during flight;
• Backrests of the seats to be in the upright position and tray tables stowed;
• Location of the emergency exits;
• Location and use of floor proximity escape path markings;
• Stowage of hand baggage;
• To switch off any portable electronic devices that can adversely affect the
performance of the aeroplane's systems and equipment;
• Location and contents of the safety briefing card.
It shall be recommended that passengers, even if the Seat Belts sign has been switched
OFF, keep their seat belts fastened.
Prior to Landing
The designated cabin crew member shall verbally brief the passengers:
• On the imminence of approach and landing;
• On the requirement to observe the Seat Belts sign (i.e., to refasten safety belts);
• To stow the tray tables, to adjust the backrests of the seats to the upright position;
• To re-stow hand baggage in its appropriate location;
• On restrictions on the use of portable electronic devices.
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After Landing
After landing the passengers shall be reminded, either verbally or by means of the
illuminated signs, about:
• Observing the smoking ban;
• Keeping safety belts fastened until the aeroplane has come to a full stop and the
engines have been shut down, and in addition, they shall be informed of all other
provisions relevant to their safety during disembarkation.
Apart from the legal requirements for safety related passenger briefings, following rules
and recommendations set up as Company policy also apply:
As long as the doors are still open, it is the duty of the ground staff to inform the
Commander about delays exceeding 10 minutes. The Commander in turn will provide
appropriate information for the passengers, either personally (via PA), via the CIC, or the
ground staff (e.g. if knowledge of local language is required). In case of delayed boarding,
information should be sought from the ground staff as to announcements already made to
the passengers (e.g. reason for delay). As soon as the doors are closed, it is the full
responsibility of the Commander or the designated crew member(s) to inform passengers
about all substantial irregularities, such as departure or approach delay, technical troubles,
go-around, etc.
Passengers are a captive audience and, as experience has shown, announcements via
the PA find a mixed acceptance. Therefore, the Commander shall select length, content
and number of announcements so as to make them as pleasing as possible to those who
like them and as unirritating as possible to those who dislike them. It is preferable to make
rather brief announcements, but to inform the passengers repeatedly. In order to avoid
monotony, announcements shall be varied as much as possible.
Expressions which might scare the passengers, such as bad weather, severe turbulence,
etc., should be avoided when forecasting weather conditions.
A delay should not be mentioned repeatedly. After one announcement and one apology,
further information should refer to Remaining Flight Time or Estimated Time of Arrival only.
The CIC shall automatically include an apology in the welcome speech if a flight is delayed
by more than 10 minutes. Cockpit announcements shall normally be made in English and
if possible, in the language used by the majority of passengers.
As soon as all passengers are boarded, Commander should perform short welcome
announcement. If cockpit workload does not permit that, welcome announcement may be
delayed until next possible opportunity.
During cruise the Commander (or PF) should inform the passengers about flight plan,
weather enroute and other information deemed necessary. Subsequent announcements
should state additional enroute information, e.g. flight progress, points of special interest,
reaching coastlines on ocean flights, etc.
Final announcement should be made when the destination actual weather report has been
received and the traffic situation at the landing place can be better judged as to possible
arrival delays, etc.
Information and explanation about the following special circumstances should be included
at least:
• Anticipated turbulence;
• Deviations from the intended plan of operations which are of interest to the
passengers.
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During extended ground stays in case of irregularities, personal contact between crew and
passengers may advantageously assist in handling the situation. When a diversion
becomes necessary, passengers shall be informed as soon as possible and be advised
that all further information will be provided by the ground personnel after landing.
Death on Board
In case a passenger dies during flight, the Commander should (if cockpit workload
permits) notify handling agency at the next point of landing of the following particulars
regarding deceased passenger:
• Full name;
• Nationality;
• Date of birth;
• Home address;
• Station of embarkation;
• Final Destination;
• Whether accompanied by relatives or friends.
After landing, the Commander shall establish a report in duplicate containing as much as
known of the following items regarding deceased passenger:
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• Full name;
• Gender;
• Nationality;
• Date of birth, age;
• Home address;
• Station of embarkation;
• Flight number;
• Route leg;
• Number of flight hours after first embarkation;
• Destination;
• Time of death;
• Altitude at time of death;
• Cabin altitude at the time of death;
• Cause of death (if known);
• Circumstantial details of death according cabin crew report;
• Information whether passenger was ill or not.
The original of this report is to be handed over to the competent local police authorities,
the copy via Flight (Return) Envelope to the Company.
JC Airlines does not operate aeroplane capable of flying at 49.000 ft (15.000 m), and as
such, cosmic or solar radiation detection procedures do not apply.
The general allocation of flight crew duties throughout the flight will be in accordance with
aircraft FCOMs.
The designations CM1 and CM2 refer to the crew members’ physical location. CM1 is the
left-seated pilot, CM2 the right-seated pilot. PF refers to the pilot flying and the associated
actions that are performed by the pilot flying the aeroplane regardless if it is CM1 or CM2.
PM (or PNF) refers to the pilot monitoring (not flying) and the associated actions that are
performed by the pilot not flying the aeroplane regardless if it is CM1 or CM2.
Flight crew duties are organized in accordance with an area of responsibility concept.
Each (flight) crew member is assigned a flight deck area where the crew member initiates
the actions for required procedures. Pre and post flight duties are apportioned between the
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CM1 and the CM2, while the phase of flight duties are apportioned between the PF and
the PM. A normal scan flow is encouraged; however, certain items may be handled in the
most logical sequence for existing conditions. Actions outside the crew member area of
responsibility are initiated at the Commander’s direction.
The main duties of Pilot Flying (PF) are the control of the aircraft and its navigation. This
applies to both normal and abnormal/emergency operations. He shall monitor the aircraft’s
attitude and be ready to immediately take control manually. In addition, PF also
communicates with ATC during abnormal/emergency situation until PM completes
required abnormal/emergency procedures or checklists.
PF task sharing:
• Control of aeroplane;
• Observance of SOP;
• Compliance with flight safety releases;
• Altitude and speed restrictions;
• Airspace observation;
• Preparation of aeroplane for the individual segments of the flight procedure;
• Correct use of checklists.
Whenever other activities or special events prevent the PF from focusing his full attention
to piloting, he shall hand over to the Pilot Monitoring/Pilot Non-Flying (PM/PNF) with the
call out »YOU HAVE CONTROL«, who confirms the takeover with the reply »I HAVE
CONTROL«.
The Pilot Monitoring (PM) shall perform all non-flying pilot duties, in addition to assisting
the PF whenever possible in monitoring the flight instruments and with the lookout. He
shall always monitor the PF for signs of incapacitation, especially during the critical stages
of flight such as take-off and approach or landing, and be prepared to take control at all
times.
PM task sharing:
• Monitoring flight progress;
• Assistance and supervision of PF;
• Airspace observation;
• Monitoring aeroplane systems;
• Operating aeroplane systems in agreement with PF;
• R/T communication and correct use of checklists;
• Keeping the necessary flight records;
• Setting, identifying and checking navigational aids according to the instructions of
PF.
Task assignment to PF and PM shall be observed in a very strict manner. PF, for instance,
shall not unnecessarily intervene in handling of R/T communication, nor shall PM set
navigational aids without consulting PF.
Whenever the Commander, with due consideration of all relevant circumstances, decides
that in any portion of the flight it is a safer course of action to take over control of the
aeroplane they shall do so, even if the First Officer originally had been assigned as PF.
Checklists are an integral part of Company aircraft type specific SOPs. In development of
procedures and checklists for the use by crew members following principles are used:
• Human factors as guidance in design of all the operational documentation through
uniform and consistent system of labels, symbols and terminology;
• Original manufacturer’s documents, including but not limited to checklists as starting
point for development of applicable JC Airlines’ documents;
• Operations Manual and other operational documentation should be user friendly
and therefore easy to identify or navigate through them according to operational
requirements.
Checklists utilization is the most important factor for an efficient flight deck management.
Reliable normal operations and repeatable success in dealing with abnormal and
emergency situations are clearly attributable to the checklist system. The system does,
however, depend absolutely on the command being given for the checklist, the correct
checklist, and ensuring its completion. It is important that all pilots are conversant with their
contents and usage.
Reading of checklists require the use of clear diction and must be audible. Challenge and
response checklists should reflect the tone of challenge, and responses should be equally
positive. Response should reflect positive unambiguous feedback. This is made more
effective by reading where specified, the standard terminology.
Since original manufacturer’s documents are approved by the SSCA they are considered
as the most suitable for direct use or development of other similar documents.
For normal and abnormal & emergency procedures JC Airlines relies on original
documents and therefore all the revision of original documents will be implemented
immediately upon issuing. In case that operational reasons demand alteration of original
documents, especially checklists, any proposed change will be discussed among the
experts, experience of other operator on the same type will be checked and finally, risk
assessment will be done before the changes take effect. Flight Operations Manager in
close cooperation with Chief Pilot(s) will take care that above mentioned principles are
obeyed at all times.
Flight crew must use normal, abnormal, supplementary procedures and appropriate
checklists prior to, during and after all phases of flight operations and in abnormal and
emergency situations to ensure compliance with procedures contained in the Operations
Manual and provisions of the aeroplane certificate of airworthiness.
All required checklists are provided in the respective type OM Part B and QRH.
Normal checklists are based on verification that routine action and procedures have been
accomplished using a challenge and response philosophy. Where the checklist is
challenge and response, the responder will verify and answer each item. Any item omitted
or incomplete will be accomplished at the time of the challenge before continuing with the
checklist. It should be the reader’s responsibility to visually check that the action taken
agrees with the response. If a response is incorrect that item shall be corrected and the
proper response given.
Automatic flight system is designed to enhance flight safety and efficiency. Pilots shall use
proper level of automation at all times.
The auto flight system shall be operated in such a way that optimum benefit is achieved
from its capabilities. Examples for optimum benefits are:
• Reduction of workload,
• Precision of navigation,
• Availability of protection modes,
• Passenger comfort,
• Economic flight.
The pilot must not allow automation to detract from the overall management of the flight. It
is the company policy that the highest level of automation appropriate to the task be used.
Nevertheless, at the Commander’s judgement and taking into account crew fatigue and
weather and operational conditions, it is possible to deviate from the above stated rule in
order for the pilot to maintain an acceptable capability of manual flight and familiarity with
not common types of approach.
Detailed procedures on the use of automated flight and navigation systems are contained
in next sub-sections and in applicable SOPs (OM Part B and FCOM, as applicable).
During approach, when the autopilot/autothrust are engaged below final intercept altitude,
the PF should rest his hands lightly on the controls in such a manner that the autopilot or
autothrust can be immediately disconnected in the event of malfunction. During flight
above final intercept altitude, the primary duty of the PF during autopilot engagement is to
monitor autopilot/autothrust performance. If it becomes necessary for the PF to divert his
attention to other matters such as an approach briefing or FMC programming, control
should first be transferred to the PM.
The PF should refrain from resting his hands on the thrust levers during climb.
An autopilot should be engaged for normal flight conditions above 10.000 ft.
An autopilot must be engaged for all CAT II/III approaches and autoland is mandatory if
autopilot function is normal for the autoland manoeuvre.
The autopilot and autothrust, if functioning normally, should be engaged for approaches in
IMC anytime the reported ceiling and visibility is less than:
• 300 ft above DH/MDH; or
• 1000 meters above minimum visibility/RVR.
In those cases, the autopilot, if functioning normally, should remain engaged until required
visual references are established, at which time the autopilot may be disconnected.
To improve situational awareness and flight management, pilots should engage the
autopilot as soon as practicable if aircraft systems malfunction or when weather in the
vicinity of the departure/arrival airport might require deviation from planned.
Pilots should not necessarily disconnect the autopilot immediately when visual conditions
are established on an ILS approach.
During approach in turbulent or very gusty wind conditions, pilots should closely monitor
autopilot and autothrust operations. Autothrust often does not respond quickly to rapid
changes in airspeed. Pilots should carefully consider the need for manual thrust control
and appropriate speed additives anytime such conditions are encountered.
If a go-around is inadvertently activated in IMC with the autopilot engaged below 1000 ft
AAL, a missed approach is mandatory. In VMC, if the go-around mode is inadvertently
activated below 1000 ft AAL, pilots may immediately disconnect the autopilot and
autothrust and complete a manual landing; or execute go-around.
In all cases, if stable approach criteria cannot be maintained during the approach, a
missed approach shall be executed.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) fall into two categories, the first of which identifies
a core of mandatory actions or procedures, which must always be performed because the
failure to do so has a direct adverse impact on the safety of operation. These SOPs
include formal items such as standard callouts, altimeter setting and checking procedures,
emergency drills, and non-exceedance of limitations. The formal SOP’s are also
categorized by the imperatives of ‘shall” and “must” and include those procedures which
require a singular means of compliance (e.g. engine failure at take-off). The second
category of standard operating procedures has the purpose of standardizing procedures to
make it possible to crew any two pilots together on a non-regular basis without lowering
safety standards.
OM Part A contains standard operating procedures which are applicable to all Company
aeroplane types. OM Part-B provides the type related instructions and guidelines needed
for the safe operation of the aeroplane. It contains the procedures necessary for flight
crews to perform all normal and abnormal/emergency procedures. In the process of
harmonizing type-related procedures into common standard operating procedures, the
following applies:
• Normal Procedures: OM Part B describes the operating procedures for all phases of
flight, and includes the normal checklist. These procedures may not exactly reflect
the procedures described in the manufacturer’s Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or
Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM). It is the responsibility of each operator to
thoroughly review all manufacturer’s procedural changes and revisions, and
implement any changes, as deemed necessary.
• Abnormal / Emergency Procedures: The in-flight simulation of emergencies
requiring the application of part or all of abnormal or emergency procedures and
simulation of Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)by artificial means during
commercial air transportation flights is not allowed. All abnormal and emergency
procedures are described in OM Part-B, and the manufacturer’s FCOM and Quick
Reference Handbook (QRH) .In some cases, OM PART B provides supplemental
information and guidance material to be used. The manufacturers QRH is the
primary reference to be used during all abnormal and emergency situations. The
contents of OM Part- B shall be used to compliment the information given in the
manufacturer’s QRH.
Experience has shown that adherence to SOP helps to enhance the crew’s situation
awareness and allows a higher performance level to be attained. One of the objectives of
SOP is to have standards to be agreed upon prior to the flight and then adhered to so that
maximum crew performance can be achieved. It is important to always ensure that
checklist and SOP are fully complied with. SOP are also a quick and convenient method of
problem solving where (if the correct procedure is followed) any disagreement is speedily
resolved.
SOP also reflect overall Company policy with regard to flight operations and must be
followed by all crew members. In general there is no room for Commanders to impose
their own operating procedures; however there may be an occasion where it is necessary
to do so. In such event, the Commander must make his intention clear to the other crew
members with the callout »NONSTANDARD«, together with the reasons for deviation from
SOP.
Crew briefings and applicable checklists are an integral part of JC Airlines’ SOPs.
All JC Airlines flight operations are based on the optimum use of Crew Resource
Management (CRM). The principle of continuous mutual briefing and assistance shall be
applied at all times. In normal cockpit work the Commander shall establish open
communication between crew members in the cockpit and in the cabin as well as with
ground personnel and Air Traffic Services.
In addition to OM Part B, all pilots have access to the electronic and paper version of
manufacturer’s AFM/FCOM, QRH and FCTM (Flight Crew Training Manual) through Flight
Operations Department. These manuals contain all the necessary information (i.e. aircraft
systems, supplementary procedures) in order to assist flight crew in performing their
duties.
PF on the Ground
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On the ground, in JC Airlines normal operations, PF duties are always performed by the
CM1.
The objective of flight crew briefing is to ensure that both pilots are aware of and agree
with a proposed plan of action. Formal briefings are required before each take-off and prior
to each descent and landing. The PF should be aware of the need to let the PM know how
he intends to conduct the operation. These briefing activities produce an environment in
which the non-handling pilot can carry out his prime function of monitoring the flight more
effectively.
In addition, the cockpit briefing by the Commander should draw the attention of the
members of his crew to the desired manner in which they are to perform their functions
during their duty time. This briefing is intended to cover such subjects not directly related
to particular phases of the intended operation, and the following examples are given as an
illustration:
• Delegation of tasks, teamwork in the cockpit and with cabin crew;
• Arrangements relating to the handling of technical malfunctions;
• The need for crew members to monitor each other, and for the mutual exchange of
information, also between flight and cabin crew;
• Recall and review important and/or recently revised procedures;
• Arrangements to cater for the event of an aborted take–off or missed approach;
• Definition of the tasks for those sectors of the flight to be flown by the first officer
(co-pilot).
Briefings shall be performed when the flight crew workload permits, and all the relevant
data has been gathered. Briefings should be relevant, concise and chronological. When a
main parameter is referred to (V speeds, Altitude, NAV setup...) by the PF, both flight crew
members must crosscheck that the parameter has been set or programmed correctly.
Prior to any departure or approach, the Pilot Flying (PF) shall give concise briefings to the
other flight crew member(s) in response to the relative checklist items, covering all aspects
mentioned in the corresponding Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) including:
• The technical status of the aircraft unless reviewed in conjunction with another
checklist or procedure;
• Normal (standard and non-standard) departure and approach considerations;
• Flight deck jump seat occupant briefing.
For specific normal and non-normal briefing items refer to applicable OM Part B – Normal
Procedures and associated FCOM/FCTM, but as a JC Airlines standard the following
should be included in the briefing:
• Technical and fuel status;
• Weather;
• NOTAMs;
• Taxi out/in routes;
• Take-off/landing configuration (including packs, anti-ice systems, use of reversers
and autobrakes);
• LVO procedures, if applicable;
• Departure/arrival/approach charts and procedures, including navigation setup;
• Minimum safe altitudes (MSA, MEA, MORA, as applicable) and terrain;
• Use of automation (autopilot, autothrust);
• Engine-out procedure/go-around procedure and alternates;
• Confirmation of sufficient landing distance on the runway of intended use
considering prevailing meteorological, operational and technical conditions.
The crew briefing should be completed before starting the engines/starting push back or
before penetration of the terminal area, preferably before starting the descent, respectively
as applicable in the phase of flight.
All flight crew members should pay attention to the possible changing circumstances
during taxi and flight. The crew briefing should be amended accordingly.
Any deviation from the ‘standard crew briefing’ or any delegation of authority shall be
clearly stated in the briefing. Final responsibility for proper and complete crew briefing
remains with the Commander (Pilot-In-Command).
Pilots shall use headsets when obtaining ATC departure clearance / engine-start
clearance, from the start of push-back or engine-start whichever comes first until 15.000 ft
(FL150) top of climb and from 15.000 ft (FL150) top of descent until the Seat Belts signs
are switched OFF on the ground.
Flight crew shall also use headsets during flight if only one pilot is present in the cockpit,
during high cockpit workload phases and when different radio frequencies are used
simultaneously. The requirement to use headsets at all other times will be at the discretion
of the Commander (Pilot- In-Command).
Taxi Briefing
The take-off and descent briefings should contain a complete review of the expected taxi
routes with special attention to the HOT SPOTS. Pay special attention to temporary
situations such as work in progress, other unusual activity and recent changes in airport
layout. During this part of the briefing, refer to the airport charts and visualise all available
information. An added benefit can be if other crew members are familiar with the airport
and have some recent taxi experience at the aerodrome.
Flight crew should ensure to follow the clearance or instruction that was actually received,
and not the one expected to receive. Be aware that the expectations established during
the pre-taxi or pre-landing planning can be significantly altered with a different and
unexpected clearance.
Airport Familiarisation
Departing from or coming into an airport should be prepared well in advance. A thorough
planning for taxi operation is essential. This preparation should be done at the gate or prior
to starting descent. Prepare the necessary charts for taxi and have them available for use
during taxi. Take some time to study the airport layout. Use the ATIS information and your
previous experience to determine the possible taxi routes. Remember to review the latest
NOTAM for both the departure and arrival airport for information concerning construction
or taxiway/runway closures. Visualise this information on the charts. Standard taxi routes
are used more often at busy airports. Review the routes you can expect. Pay special
attention to the location of HOT SPOTS. These are unique or complex intersections and
runway crossings where runway incursions have taken place in the past, or areas of the
runway or associated taxi ways which are not visible from the control tower. Know what
runways you will encounter between where you are and where you are going. Plan timing
and execution of checklists, so that no distractions occur when approaching and/or
crossing runways - all eyes should be outside during this phase.
Conduct detailed briefing for all flight crew members, especially during night and low
visibility operations.
Taxi Clearance
The receipt of any clearance in the taxi phase itself requires the complete attention of all
flight crew on the flight deck. If necessary, CM2 should write down taxi-instructions,
especially at complex or unfamiliar airports and cross-check the instructions against the
airport chart. Clear up any uncertainties about your clearance or your position on the
surface before the start of taxi.
• Only one pilot can control the aeroplane during taxi. However, as in flight, the pilot
not in control of the aeroplane (CM2) has the important task of monitoring the taxi
and assisting CM1;
• Cancel check list activity when crossing and entering runways. Maintain full
concentration of all flight crew members on the runway traffic situation;
• Never cross red stop bars when lining up or crossing a runway, unless in
exceptional cases where the stop-bars, lights or controls are reported to be
unserviceable, or some other plausible explanation is received, and a clear,
unambiguous and positive clearance has been given to cross the red stop bars;
• When entering any runway, check for traffic (left and right) using all available
surveillance means (visual contact, TCAS, radar);
• When cleared to line up and/or when crossing any runway, position the aeroplane in
a right angle with the runway where possible, in order to better observe the other
traffic, both arriving and departing;
• Do not rush. The higher your ground speed, the less time you have to react,
manoeuvre the plane and avoid an obstacle. High speed also results in greater
distance and time required to bring the plane to a complete stop;
• When you receive a clearance to taxi to a point beyond a runway, this clearance
does not automatically include the authorisation to cross that runway. Each taxi
clearance beyond a runway shall contain an explicit clearance to cross the runway
or an instruction to hold short of that runway;
• Strictly adopt the sterile cockpit concept whilst taxiing. During movement of the
aeroplane the flight crew must be able to focus on their duties without being
distracted by non-flight related matters;
• Use aeroplane lights in accordance with SOP to help controllers and other pilots to
see you;
• Ensure all flight crew are on the appropriate frequency until all runways have been
vacated after landing;
• After the landing, vacate the runway as soon as possible, but not by turning onto
another runway, unless specifically instructed to do so;
• When the aeroplane has vacated the active runway, be prepared to stop to resolve
any questions about the ATC clearance or about the aeroplane position;
• Anytime you feel uncertain about the location of the aeroplane position on the
movement area, stop the aeroplane, advise ATC, and ask for clarification – “take
the question out of the flight deck”;
• Never stop on a runway unless specifically instructed to do so.
It is of vital importance that both pilots are fully aware of their location on the terminal or
ramp and to prevent any risk of being in the wrong position, or on the wrong runway.
Navigation Lights
Strobe Lights
They shall be used for all airborne phases of a flight, irrespective of daytime, unless
becoming annoying (e.g. due to meteorological conditions). Strobe lights shall be switched
ON when entering (or crossing) the runway and switched OFF when vacating the runway.
Taxi Lights
Taxi lights shall be used for all taxi manoeuvres when aeroplane is moving. Taxi lights
shall be switched OFF when aeroplane is not moving. During parking switch taxi lights
OFF before aeroplane is aligned with the marshaller.
Landing Lights
Landing and runway turn-off lights shall be used for take-off and initial climb as well as for
approach and landing in order to make the aeroplane more conspicuous to other
aeroplane and to ATC, and to reduce the risk of bird collision. For take-off, the landing and
runway turn-off lights shall be switched on when starting the take-off roll in order to signal
that take-off is imminent to other aeroplane involved in ground operations. During climb,
landing lights should not be switched OFF before passing 10.000 ft (FL 100). During
descent the landing lights should be switched ON when passing 10.000 ft (FL 100).
Listening Watch
Flight crew shall maintain a radio listening watch (or SELCAL watch), as applicable to the
area of operation.
More details about radio listening watch may be found in OM Part A, Chapter 12.
Phraseology
All communication with Air Traffic Control (ATC) shall be conducted using standard ICAO
English phraseology as defined in OM Part C.
The flight crew shall use » JC AIRLINES« and then the flight number as a company call
sign. If and when there is difficulty in understanding the call sign by the ATC, call sign JC
(»JULIET-CHARLIE«) then the flight number should be used.
ATC Clearances
Flights requiring an ATC clearance shall not commence take-off without such clearance.
All ATC clearances, altimeter settings (including transition levels), runway in use, level
instructions, heading instructions and speed instructions must be read back including the
full call-sign.
Both the PF and PM (PNF) should monitor and confirm all issued ATC clearances, unless
operational constraints (i.e. passenger addresses, one pilot leaves the cockpit, etc.)
prohibit. Special vigilance shall be exercised in areas of high terrain and when the
clearance includes heading, flight level, frequency, route/waypoint changes and
instructions for holding short of a runway. Particular attention should be paid when aircraft
with similar call-signs are present so as to avoid any confusion when accepting and
reading back ATC clearances.
Standard phraseology must be used. Wording must be clear, precise and unmistakable.
All ATC clearances shall be understood and agreed upon by both flight crew members and
accepted if crew is able to comply with ATC instructions.
If flight crew is not completely satisfied with ATC instructions they shall request another
clearance after declaring »UNABLE TO COMPLY«. On ground during taxi, ATC clearance
shall be requested in an area with minimum workload.
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Initial ATS flight plan clearance and any subsequent ATS flight plan re-clearance (i.e.
airway clearances) shall be recorded on OFP. Recording of any other ATC instruction is
on PM discretion taking into account current workload and operational priorities.
All communication should be conducted in English language when on duty, on the flight
deck during line operations, between the flight crew and cabin crew during line operations
and during flight crew training and evaluation activities. Refer also to OM Part B.
In an emergency, the initial message should comply with the standard ICAO phraseology
to alert the controller to the level of urgency and trigger an appropriate response.
Depending on the criticality and nature of the prevailing condition, urgency »PANPAN -
PANPAN - PANPAN« call or distress »MAYDAY - MAYDAY - MAYDAY« call shall be
used. Then, to explain the situation, simple and short messages should be used
highlighting the operational implications of the prevailing condition.
In case of abnormal conditions priority for landing may be requested from ATC to avoid
any holding due to traffic. If ATC does not comply with the request the Commander shall
decide, depending on the situation, whether an emergency declaration is required.
Urgent and Distress messages consist of as many as possible of the following elements
spoken distinctly and, if possible in the following order:
1) Code word (3x);
2) Name of the station addressed (time and circumstances permitting);
3) The identification of the aircraft;
4) The nature of the distress condition;
5) Intention of the crew;
6) Present position, level (i.e. flight level, altitude) and heading.
Distress messages have priority over all other transmissions, and urgency messages have
priority over all transmissions except distress messages. A distress or urgency call should
normally be made on the frequency in use at the time. The frequency 121.500 MHz, which
has been designated as the international aeronautical emergency frequency, may also be
used.
When an aircraft is no longer in distress, it shall transmit a message cancelling the distress
condition.
The take-off should be commenced at the beginning of the runway. Intersection take-offs
are permitted, provided due consideration is given to take-off performance limitations and
local noise abatement requirements. In the interest of expediting traffic, the Commander
may decide to perform rolling take-off.
PM shall minimize tasks not directly related to the operation of the aeroplane during climb
and descent. Full completion of OFP entries and other ancillary tasks should be delayed
until after top-of-climb. During climb and descent, the PM shall closely monitor ATC
frequency and compliance with ATC clearances, ensure clearance from terrain and traffic,
and monitor the safe and correct operation of the aeroplane, the engines and all applicable
systems.
Minor heading changes (up to 10 degrees bank) are not considered to be a turn.
During normal operations no turns shall be commenced after take-off below 400 feet AGL
unless specifically required by the SID, obstacles or noise abatement procedures. In the
event of no published procedures, the following minimum heights shall be applied:
• No turns below 400 feet AGL in daylight VMC conditions.
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No turns shall be commenced below 400 feet AGL also during approach or go-around
unless specifically required by the STAR/Approach, obstacles or noise abatement
procedures.
In case of Engine failure, EOSID (if applicable) may require a turn below the above values.
In such a case, EOSID shall be followed.
The maximum bank angle for normal operations shall not exceed 30°. Before conducting
procedures at certain aerodromes, which might require higher bank angles, the approval
from the SSCA shall be obtained.
For normal operations an aircraft speed shall not exceed 250 KIAS below 10.000 ft
(FL100) AGL. Exceptionally, at the request of ATC, a higher speed may be maintained
below 10.000 ft (FL100) under Commander’s approval until reaching 5000 ft AAL. Below
5000 ft AAL speed must be reduced to 250 KIAS, or less.
Ii is recommended that the rate of climb / descent should not exceed 1500 ft/min within the
last 2000 ft before reaching the assigned level, in order to reduce the risk of TCAS
Resolution Advisories (RAs). Special country rules and regulations have to be respected.
Nevertheless, rates of climb or descent given by ATC for the purpose of maintaining
separation of aircraft shall be strictly complied with.
• Irrespective of the type of clearance received from ATC, it is still the responsibility of
the Commander to avoid collision with other aeroplane. Thus, during VMC, a look-
out for conflicting traffic is an absolute necessity;
• Traffic information given by ATC is of great value and it must always be requested.
It must, however, always be kept in mind that ATC information includes known
traffic only and may therefore be incomplete;
• If unidentified traffic is reported which cannot be seen in due time and a collision
risk is suspected, request immediate avoiding measures.
Progress check shall be performed at least once every 30 minutes after block-off time by
the PM and shall be recorded on OFP. On short flights at least one progress check at top
of climb shall be performed and recorded. After top of descent progress checks are no
longer required unless significant ATC delay action (holding) is encountered. Each
progress check should be communicated to the PF using standard progress report.
It is the policy that in order to mitigate potential risks related to the acceptance and
maintenance of assigned altitude, both verbal and automated altitude callouts are utilized
on JC Airlines’ aircraft. Furthermore, all altitude/height instructions of the ATC must be
acknowledged. If any member of the flight crew is in doubt as to the authorized
altitude/height, the PM (PNF) shall immediately call ATC and ask for confirmation of the
instruction. In order to maximize the altitude awareness the flight crews shall:
• Avail themselves of automated altitude callout, but also make regular verbal altitude
announcements, and crosscheck that the assigned altitude is above the minimum
safe altitude;
• Utilize »1000 TO GO« standard callout when approaching the assigned altitude, to
avoid as far as possible any altitude deviation;
• Pay particular attention to communications with ATC to avoid any possible call sign
confusion. After each ATC message both crew members shall agree that it was for
their flight. If there’s doubt about the clearance received, the PM (PNF) shall
immediately contact ATC and clarify/confirm the issued altitude clearance – refer to
Chapter 8.3.4.2. Both crew members shall crosscheck their altimeters and its
setting;
• Report the cleared flight level on first contact with ATC, unless specifically
requested not to do so by ATC.
8.3.20.17 Descent
Efficiency and economy in flight operations very much depend on a well planned and
conducted descent. The descent shall be performed as efficiently and smoothly as
possible taking into account flight safety, local conditions, ATS procedures, and
meteorological factors (turbulence, icing). In order to obtain descent clearance in time,
adequate advance notice should be given to ATC.
During normal operations, the rate of descent should not exceed the following values:
Every approach shall be planned and conducted in accordance with the procedures
prescribed in OM Part B and observing the limitations in respect of rate of descent and
bank angle. This phase of flight specifically requires most accurate flying technique and
highest attention of all flight crew members. Planning for an approach shall be done well in
advance in order that pilots are well prepared for the expected approach procedures and
that the approach chart is only required for quick references. It is, however, compulsory for
PF to have the approach chart readily available for display during every approach.
In preparation for each landing, the Commander shall make an assessment of all relevant
factors that increase risk; including wind, slope, runway surface condition, braking action,
and aeroplane failures, in regard to the required runway length. The Commander must
consider that runway surface conditions can degrade or improve significantly in very short
periods of time dependent on precipitation, temperature, usage, and runway treatment,
and could be significantly different than indicated by the last report. If conditions change
between the time that this assessment is made and the time of landing, the Commander
shall consider whether it would be safer to continue the landing or reassess the landing
distance.
An instrument approach may be commenced regardless of the reported RVR/VIS but the
approach shall not be continued beyond the outer marker, or equivalent position, if the
reported RVR/VIS is less than the applicable landing minima. Where no outer marker or
equivalent position exists, the Commander shall make the decision to continue or abandon
the approach before descending below 1.000 ft AAL on the final approach segment. If,
after passing the outer marker or equivalent position depicted on the Instrument Approach
Chart, the reported RVR/VIS falls below the applicable minimum, the approach may be
continued to DA(H) or MDA. A pilot may continue the approach below DA(H) or MDA and
the landing may be completed provided that the required visual reference is established at
the DA(H) or MDA and is maintained.
Where the State Approach Ban is more restrictive, the published State Approach Ban
applies (refer to OM Part C).
Note: The equivalent position can be established by means of a DME, NDB or VOR or
any other fix that independently establishes the position of the aeroplane, if
published on the instrument approach chart. If none of the above is available then
it is 1.000 ft AAL.
The altitudes prescribed in instrument approach procedures shall be strictly adhered to.
Descent to the next lower altitude prescribed in a procedure shall only be made after
passing the relevant fix and provided the aeroplane is following the track specified in the
procedure.
Descent below relevant minimum sector altitude (MSA) is not allowed unless aeroplane is:
• Being radar vectored (respect minimum radar vectoring altitudes); or
• Established on STAR (respect minimum enroute altitudes); or
• Established for approach (consider altitudes published for relevant approach); or
• Crew has gained and is able to maintain sufficient visual references regarding
terrain clearance.
Pilots shall consider performing missed approach if aeroplane is not yet stabilised at, or
becomes unstabilised below target height.
Special approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring deviation from the above
elements of stabilised approach criteria require a specific briefing prior to commencement
of the approach.
During transition from instrument approach to visual flight the pilot flying (PF) shall pay
particular attention to retain the proper approach path by maintaining the stabilized
attitude. Good co-operation between PF and PM is necessary during change-over from
instrument flight to flying with visual reference to the ground. When, during the progress of
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the final approach, visual reference is expected to be obtained, the PM shall divide his
attention between monitoring the flight instruments and lookout. When the approach lights,
runway lights, or runway markings are clearly in sight and the altitude of the aeroplane with
reference to the ground can be determined, PM shall indicate to the PF where to look for
visual reference (i.e. »RUNWAY 10 O’CLOCK«). PF should never allow the aeroplane’s
nose to drop and should not permit the rate of descent to increase during the last part of
the final approach and shortly before flare.
Flight crews shall be aware of factors and conditions that cause visual illusions and their
effects, including:
• Perception of height/depth, distances and angles;
• Assessment of the aircraft’s horizontal position and glide path.
Where no instrument approach procedure is available for the runway of intended landing,
crews may proceed to establish flight in conditions suitable for a visual approach via a
transition cleared by ATC. Crew may accept radar vectors to establish on final approach
as a method of transitioning to the visual approach. If a full traffic pattern is flown, the
downwind altitude shall be at or above 1500 ft AAL.
The visual glide path angle should normally be in the order of 2.5º to 3.0º depending on
terrain clearance requirements. Once the aeroplane is established and descending on the
final approach to the runway of intended landing, 360° turns and other manoeuvres for
descent profile adjustment should not be performed.
On runways equipped with PAPI (VASIS, T-VASIS) or the visual glide slope shall be
adhered to as closely as possible. Due to glide slope tolerances, however, PAPI (VASIS,
T-VASIS) indications shall not be used below 200 ft AAL. The use of non-standard visual
glide slope indicator systems is not permitted.
8.3.20.28 Touchdown
To accomplish a safe landing the height of the aeroplane over the landing threshold should
be approximately 50 ft. This height may vary according to information provided on the
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approach chart (TCH). Final approach shall be adjusted so as to achieve touchdown in the
Touch Down Zone (TDZ) area, paying due regard to obstructions in the final approach
area, runway length, runway conditions etc. If the touchdown cannot be accomplished
within the TDZ a missed approach shall be initiated. For the purposes of this section, the
TDZ is defined as the area extending from the landing threshold to 900 m from the landing
threshold, or the first one third of the landing runway (whichever is less). The desired
touchdown point lies at a distance between 300 m to 600 m from the landing threshold.
Corresponding runway markings, position of VASIS/PAPI bars and/or lighted touchdown
wing bars are of great assistance in determining the correct aiming point.
Spool up of engines, aeroplane speed and pitch attitude must be considered carefully. It is
of utmost importance to aim for the aeroplane to be tracking the runway heading prior to
touchdown. Consequently every effort must be made to land on and along the runway
centreline. This will provide the best margin to recover from lateral control difficulties
occurring after touchdown.
After landing pilots shall always initially select maximum reverse thrust (if at least one
reverse is operative - refer to FCOM). If runway condition, runway length, noise abatement
restrictions, weather, outside air temperature, expected brake temperature and turn-
around time permit, reverse thrust may be immediately reduced to idle.
The amount of reverse thrust to be used shall be included in the approach briefing.
8.3.20.30 Parking
After having arrived at the ramp, parking brake shall not be released unless:
• All engines have been shut down;
• It is confirmed that chocks are in position, by verbal communication or other visual
means;
• The apron is not wet, slippery, or on a slope.
Upon releasing the brakes, the Commander shall ensure the aeroplane does not move.
Parking brake should be selected ON when refuelling.
When the aeroplane is parked and no crew member is listening out on interphone by
means of a headset, the cockpit speakers and interphone should be ON in order to enable
ground personnel to attract crew’s attention in case of urgent messages. At stations where
a handling frequency is available it may be useful to maintain a listening watch on ground,
provided other cockpit duties are not hampered.
If an approach is discontinued for any reason after passing FAP/FAF, the standard go-
around procedure shall be applied as specified in OM Part B.
A climb to the published missed approach altitude may be made at any time during the
approach. Adequate protection from obstacles is assured if the missed approach
procedure is initiated not lower than the DH/DA/MDA and not later than at the missed
approach point (MAPt) where one is specified.
Non-precision approach: In the event a missed approach is initiated prior to arriving at the
MAPt the pilot should, while climbing, proceed to the MAPt and then follow the missed
approach procedure in order to remain within the protected airspace.
Precision approach: In the event that missed approach is initiated prior to reaching DA/DH,
the aeroplane shall proceed to the threshold of the runway of intended landing, before
following the missed approach procedure.
Circle-to-land: If the decision to carry out a missed approach is taken when the aeroplane
is positioned on the approach axis (track) defined by radio navigation aids, the published
missed approach procedure shall be followed. If visual reference is lost while circling to
land, it is expected that the pilot will make an initial climbing turn toward the landing
runway and overhead the aerodrome where he will establish the aeroplane in a climb on
the missed approach track. Any other missed approach tracking following circle-to-land
manoeuvre shall be prearranged with ATC.
Visual Approach: Different tracking options are possible during missed approach following
visual approach, depending on the aeroplane position at the time the missed approach is
initiated, therefore missed approach track shall always be clarified with ATC as early as
possible during visual approach.
If a missed approach has been executed for meteorological reasons another approach
shall only be commenced if the Commander has reasons to believe that a second
approach will lead to a successful landing.
No more than two approaches shall be made unless there is a significant improvement in
the weather conditions, giving a very high probability of a successful landing.
Abnormal procedures contain actions which are necessary to cope with an impending or
effective failure of any aeroplane system or component, or which are necessary to protect
the aeroplane and its occupants from serious harm. These actions are presented in
QRH/FCOM, which are provided in booklet form in each cockpit.
When the necessity arises to apply an abnormal procedure it is the obligation of the
Commander to identify the applicable procedure and to designate who acts as PF. For this
decision he must take into consideration the complexity of cockpit duties, the necessity to
supervise actions, the capacity and proficiency of crew members, and the workload arising
from flight progress. It may be appropriated to change PF designation during progress of
flight.
Primary actions designed to contain the failure shall only be accomplished after flight path
control is achieved and can be maintained and never below 400 ft AGL.
Flight crew are required to cross-check by dual response before actuation of critical
controls, including:
• Thrust lever reduction of failed engine;
• Master switch;
• Fire pushbutton;
• Any guarded pushbutton/switch;
• Any other irreversible action.
Abnormal operation is non-routine. Therefore all actions shall be announced loudly before
being performed. Announcement is either made by memory (memory actions) or by
reading from the procedure presentation (ECAM display or booklet). Execution of a
challenged action is confirmed by the appropriate response. This challenge/response
principle assures that all crew members are aware of progress and status. Each crew
member must be familiar with the contents of abnormal procedures in order to execute
their duties in proper sequence and to act efficiently.
It is Company policy that pilots must at all times maintain awareness of a suitable
aerodrome where a safe landing may be made in the event of an emergency. In-flight
cruise briefings and weather monitoring must be conducted as to maintain a high level of
situational awareness in this regard.
In standard crew composition Commander (CM1) has the final authority to reject or
continue take-off roll. For that purpose he shall keep his hands on thrust levers until
reaching V1. First Officer (CM2) has the authority to reject take-off roll only if he
encounters unambiguous sings of Commander's incapacitation.
In crew composition where CM1 duties are performed by Captain under training, he should
have the responsibility for the decision to reject a take-off. Once decision to reject take-off
has been announced it shall be executed by CM1, since the left seat position is laid out for
the optimum handling of the aeroplane.
If the TRI, occupying the right seat, takes over control during a rejection of take-off, he
shall call out »I HAVE CONTROL«.
Refer to OM Part B.
The following general guidelines should be observed in the case of engine failure on take-
off after V1:
• No crew actions should be performed below 400 ft AGL with the exception of:
- Silencing the aural warnings;
- Raising the landing gear.
• Lateral navigation should follow published engine-out SID (EOSID). If terrain
clearance is not in doubt and the aircraft climb performance is adequate, the pilot
may (at Commander’s discretion) :
- Follow the departure route – SID; or
- Accept radar vectoring by ATC; or
- Remain in the vicinity of the airport under VMC conditions – visual traffic
pattern.
Note: If an engine failure occurs during take-off, it is recommended to maintain
lateral flight path on extended runway centreline (standard) unless a special
published engine-out procedure is available. Whenever aircraft deviates from
received departure clearance, ATC must be informed as soon as possible.
• 3rd segment height (PAA) should be determined by the flight crew in advance and
inserted into the MCDU, taking into consideration following operational variables:
- Obstacle clearance with lower limit generally not below 800 ft AAL;
- TOGA thrust time limit (as upper limit);
- Terrain profile;
- Return-to-land scenario.
• Emergency shall be declared (»MAYDAY«).
• Attempted lateral navigation shall be communicated to ATC.
It is Company policy that pilots must at all times maintain awareness of a suitable
aerodrome where a safe landing may be made in the event of an emergency. In-flight
cruise briefings and weather monitoring must be conducted as to maintain a high level of
situational awareness in this regard.
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Safety of the passengers and the aircraft shall be the priority and the selection of the
nearest suitable aerodrome must take into account:
• Technical condition of the aircraft affecting performance and handling;
• Actual gross weight;
• Remaining fuel on board;
• Terrain clearance requirements;
• Enroute and terminal weather (wind, temperature, icing, thunderstorms, etc.);
• Route and aerodrome facilities.
If two or more possible aerodromes exist, the nearest aerodrome in terms of flight time
should normally be selected unless weather or NOTAM criticality becomes more limiting.
In the following cases, all attempts must be made to land the aircraft at the nearest
suitable aerodrome:
• Any fire on board an aircraft, if firefighting is not effective; or
• Any engine or APU fire; or
• Failure of an engine on a two-engine aircraft; or
• Total loss of electrical power; or
• Persistent smoke of unknown origin; or
• Dual hydraulic failure; or
• Structural damage; or
• In-flight medical emergency; or
• Positive bomb threat.
In the event of a depressurization the flight should divert to the enroute alternate, if
necessary, with adequate terrain clearance maintained at all times.
Refer to OM Part B.
Normally, the maximum certified landing weight shall not be exceeded. Overweight
landings, however, may be performed in all abnormal or emergency situations where
according to Commander’s discretion this course of action provides the same or a higher
degree of safety than using time to burn excessive fuel.
Situations such as serious illness of crew or passengers which would require immediate
medical attention also justify overweight landings. In such case, deviations from prescribed
procedures to the extent required are permissible in the interest of safety.
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All Weather Operations (AWO) means operating aircraft in Low Visibility Conditions (LVC).
The term Low Visibility Operations (LVO) may be used in Company’s documents instead
of AWO and includes:
• Low Visibility Taxi,
• Low Visibility Take-Off (LVTO),
• Precision Approach ILS Category II (Cat 2 / Cat II),
• Precision Approach ILS Category III (Cat 3 / Cat III).
In LVC non-precision approaches are not authorised. Use of Autopilot (AP) for LVO
approach is mandatory to the lowest authorised height. In case of complete autopilot
failure, the lowest authorised operating minima are RVR 550 m and DH 200 ft.
CM1 and CM2 shall be qualified and current for LVTO and applicable LVO approach.
Allocation of PF/PNF between CM1 and CM2 (CM1 is always PF) shall be strictly adhered
to.
In an event of aeroplane and/or ground system malfunction occurring in LVC below 1000 ft
AGL which requires corrective action and/or procedure modification a go-around must be
executed.
Where decision height (DH) and runway visual range (RVR) fall into different categories of
operation, the instrument approach and landing operation would be conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the most demanding category (e.g. an operation with
a DH in the range of CAT II but with an RVR in the range of CAT I would be considered a
CAT II operation).
• A suitable system for recording approach and/or automatic landing success and
failure is established and maintained to monitor the overall safety of the operation,
• The operations are approved by the SSCA,
• The flight crew consists of at least two pilots,
• Decision height is determined by means of a radio altimeter,
• Only RVR values are used for low visibility operations.
When weather condition on departure aerodrome is below the landing minima, a take-off
alternate should be nominated equal to or better than CAT I minima and noted on OFP.
This take-off alternate should be within one hour of flight with one-engine inoperative (330
NM). Terrain and weather en-route to take-off alternate must permit single-engine
operation.
When the reported meteorological visibility is below that required for take-off and RVR is
not reported, a take-off may only be commenced if the commander can determine that the
RVR/visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.
When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take-off may only be
commenced if the commander can determine that the RVR/visibility along the take-off
runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.
CM1 is PF.
For LVTO, aeroplane configuration and performance calculations resulting in lowest safe
take-off speeds should be considered even on expense of increased required take-off
thrust.
LVTO in less than 150m RVR (CAT C aircraft) shall not be conducted unless approved by
the SSCA.
(ICAO): A Category II operation (CAT II) is a precision instrument approach and landing
using ILS with:
• RVR of not less than 300 m, and
• Decision Height below 200 ft and not lower than 100 ft.
This reference must also include a lateral element of the ground pattern, i.e. an approach
lighting crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the TDZ lighting.
The lowest minima to be used for Category II operations (aircraft category C) are:
DH (feet) RVR
100 - 120 300 m
121 - 140 400 m
141 - 199 450 m
RVR for Category II approach versus DH
A Category III operation (CAT III) is a precision instrument approach and landing using
ILS, further divided into:
On a CAT 3 runway it may be assumed that operations with NO Decision Height can be
supported, unless specifically restricted, as published in the AIP or NOTAM.
Must contain a segment at least one centre line light and once attained must be
maintained.
8.4.5 Definitions
Low Visibility Operations (LVO): Means operating aircraft (taxi, take-off or landing) in
Low Visibility Conditions (LVC). LVO operations include Low Visibility Taxi, Take-Off and
CAT II/III approaches in LVC.
Low Visibility Procedures (LVP): Procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of
ensuring safe operations during ILS CAT II and ILS CAT III approaches and low visibility
take-offs.
Low Visibility Conditions (LVC): LVC for take-off and landing are defined below:
Low Visibility Take-off (LVTO): A take-off where runway visual range (RVR) is less than
400 m.
Decision Height (DH): Decision height is a wheel height above runway elevation by which
a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and
aeroplane position and approach path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue
approach and landing in safety. In this definition, runway elevation means elevation of the
highest point in touchdown zone. DH recognition must be, by means of height, measured
by radio altimeter.
Decision Height Concept: Decision Height is specified point in space at which a pilot
must make an operational decision. A pilot must decide if visual references, adequate to
safely continue approach, have been established. If visual references have not been
established, a go-around must be executed. If required visual references have been
established, approach can be continued. Nevertheless, a Commander may always decide
to execute a go-around if sudden degradations in visual references or sudden flight path
deviation occur. When necessary, published DH takes into account terrain profile before
runway threshold.
Decision Altitude (DA): A specified altitude in approach at which missed approach must
be initiated if required visual reference to continue has not been established. Decision
Altitude (DA) is referenced to Mean Sea Level (MSL).
Alert Height (ICAO): Alert Height is height above runway, based on characteristics of
aeroplane and its fail-operational automatic landing system, above which CAT 3 approach
would be discontinued and missed approach initiated if a failure occurred in one of
redundant parts of automatic landing system, or in relevant ground equipment. In other AH
definitions it is generally stated that if a failure occurred below Alert Height, it would be
ignored and approach continued.
Alert Height Concept - Alert Height (AH) is height defined for ILS CAT 3 operations with
fail-operational landing system. Above AH, a go-around must be initiated if failure affects
fail-operational landing system. Below AH, approach may be continued except if specific
Fail-Passive Flight Control System: A flight control system is Fail-Passive if, in an event
of a failure, there is no significant out-of-trim condition or deviation of flight path or attitude
but landing is not completed automatically. For Fail-Passive Automatic Flight Control
System a pilot assumes control of aeroplane after a failure.
Runway Visual Range (RVR): A range over which a Commander of aircraft on centreline
of runway can see runway surface markings or lights delineating runway or identifying its
centreline.
Minimum Approach Break-Off Height (MABH): Is the lowest height above the ground,
measured by radio altimeter, such that if a missed approach is initiated without external
references:
• In normal operation, the aircraft does not touch the ground during the procedure.
• With an engine failure during a missed approach, it can be demonstrated that taking
this failure probability, an accident is extremely improbable.
CAT II/III operations require rapidly updated and reliable reports of visibility conditions,
which a pilot may expect to encounter in touchdown zone and along runway.
RVR Zone Requirements: Relevant parts of runway, used for Rollout, in this context, are
those where decelerating aeroplane is still faster than approximately 60 knots.
For CAT II/III Approach TDZ RVR is controlling. TDZ RVR may be temporarily replaced
with MID RVR if approved by the state of the aerodrome. RVR may be reported by human
observation. If MID RVR is reported and relevant, it shall indicate not less than 75 m (125
m if manual rollout). If END RVR is reported and relevant, it shall indicate not less than 75
m.
On contaminated runways only automatic landing with manual rollout is allowed. Automatic
landing with automatic rollout is not allowed on contaminated runways.
RVR is not the Slant Visual Range (SVR). SVR is the range over which a pilot of an
aircraft in the final stages of approach or landing can see the markings or the lights as
described in RVR definition.
The minimum RVR for particular precision approach CAT II is governed by the DH,
aeroplane approach category and the approach lighting and runway lighting/marking
available. Unless stated otherwise, aeronautical approach charts show adequate minimum
RVR information to the flight crew.
The minimum RVR for particular precision approach CAT III is governed by the DH,
aeroplane approach category and the approach lighting and runway lighting/marking
available, when applicable. Beside general RVR requirements for CAT III operation, the
flight crew shall always check current CAT III minima valid for specific state authorities.
In addition to normal flight preparation, the following planning and preparation must be
performed when LVO are predicted.
Check weather condition on departure aerodrome. If it is below the landing minima, a take-
off alternate should be nominated equal to or better than CAT I minima.
Review NOTAMS to make sure that the destination airport meets visual or non-visual CAT
II/III requirements:
• Runway and approach lighting,
• Radio navaid availability,
• RVR equipment availability, etc.
Check aircraft status and Aircraft Technical Log for defects that affect aircraft Category
II/III status.
Crew Qualification: Crew qualification and currency must be reviewed - Commander and
first officer (co-pilot) must both be qualified and current).
Weather information: check that the weather forecast at destination is within airline and
crew operating minima. If the forecast is below CAT I minima, verify that alternate weather
forecasts are appropriate to the available approach means and at least equal or better
than CAT I minima.
Check whether approach can be conducted within the aircrafts performance limitations.
The higher of Company, Crew Qualification, State or Aircraft certified minima shall be
applied.
Fuel planning: additional extra fuel should be considered for possible approach delays.
• Before taxiing for take-off in low visibility conditions, both pilots should be familiar
with CAT II/III holding points for take-off runway, any taxiway routing that may be
used and possible Hot Spots (Areas of possible error/conflict with other traffic).
• Close attention should be paid to taxi speed (max 10 kts) and taxi routes. Both
pilots should give their undivided attention to taxi phase (“both heads up”).
• Any checklist, clearance or action (i.e. Flight Controls check) should only be done
while aeroplane is not moving.
• If uncertain about position, stop the aeroplane immediately and ask for ATC
assistance or Follow Me.
• Remember that ground equipment, aeroplane wingtips and tails may not be as
readily seen as taxiway lights, therefore taxi with utmost caution.
• Surface markings shall be strictly followed. Lighted stop bars must not be crossed.
CAT II/III holding points must not be crossed until cleared to enter the runway.
• On entering runway and lining up for take-off, double check runway heading
reference and make sure that aeroplane is on runway centreline. This could be
verified by markings on runway centreline and/or ILS localiser (if runway is ILS
equipped).
Aircraft Status
Check the aircraft system STATUS page that the required landing capability is available.
Although it is not required to check equipment that is not monitored by the system, if any of
this equipment is seen inoperative (flag), the landing capability may be reduced.
Weather
Check weather conditions at destination and at alternates. Required RVR values must be
available for CAT II/III approach. The selected alternate must have weather conditions
equal to or better than CAT I.
Approach Ban
If the reported RVRs are below the applicable minima prior to reaching the OM or
equivalent DME distance, then the approach is to be discontinued. If the reported RVRs
become lower than the applicable minima after passing the OM or equivalent DME
distance, the approach may be continued.
ATC Clearance
Unless LVP are reported active by ATIS or ATC, clearance to carry out CAT II/III approach
must be requested from ATC, who will check the status of the ILS and lighting and protect
the sensitive areas from incursion by aircraft or vehicles. Such an approach may not be
undertaken until the clearance has been received. Before the outer marker or 1000ft (as
applicable), the required RVR values should be transmitted by the controller.
Seat Position
Seat position and consequent eye position is very important during low visibility approach
and landing. A too low seat adjustment may greatly reduce visual segment. When an eye
reference position is lower than intended, already short visual segment is further reduced
by cut-off angle of glareshield or nose. Seat shall be correctly adjusted as defined in OM
Part B.
After obtaining the initial authorization, approved LVO must be continuously monitored to
detect any undesirable trends before they become hazardous. The Company has
established a procedure to monitor the performance of the automatic landing system to
touchdown performance of each aeroplane.
To collect the data, the Company should provide the flight crews with adequate
documents. Each CAT II/III approach, real or simulated, is to be recorded on a form
provided by the Company’s Engineering & Maintenance Department, which should be
readily available on the aircraft, including the following information as a minimum: Date,
type of aircraft, name of Commander, aerodrome and runway of landing, reported ceiling
and visibility, whether approach was auto-coupled or flown manually, if auto-coupled,
indicate, when applicable, if flight director agreed with autopilot and the height at which
coupler was disengaged, if auto landing was successful, whether approach was successful
or unsuccessful (if the approach was unsuccessful, specify the unsatisfactory element of
the CAT II/III system - e.g. airborne equipment, ground installation, crew performance,
traffic condition), the difference, if any, between computed airspeed and actual airspeed at
the DH, an assessment of the overall quality of the CAT II/III system as good, acceptable,
poor or unacceptable.
The Company must analyse results and, if necessary, take the adequate actions
(modification of SOPs and/or maintenance procedures).
It should be stressed that decision height (DH) is the lower limit of the decision zone during
which, in limiting conditions, CM1 will be assessing visual references. CM1 should come to
this zone prepared for a go-around but with no pre-established judgement. CM1 should
make a decision according to quality of approach and way visual references develop as
DH is approached. In CAT II operations and CAT III operations with DH, conditions
required at DH to continue approach are: adequate visual references to continue approach
and land, and acceptable flight path. If both these conditions are not satisfied, it is
mandatory to initiate a missed approach.
If decision to continue has been made and visual references subsequently become
insufficient, or flight path deviates unacceptably, a go-around must be initiated (a go-
around initiated at low altitude, whether auto or manual, may result in ground contact). If
visual references are lost after touchdown, a go-around should not be attempted. A rollout
should be continued with AP in ROLLOUT mode down to taxi speed.
Alert height (AH) is a height defined for Category III operations with a fail-operational
landing system.
Above AH, a go-around must be initiated if a failure affects the fail-operational landing
system. The list of these failures is contained in the AFM/FCOM.
Below AH, the approach will be continued (except if AUTOLAND warning is triggered).
The AH is evaluated during aircraft certification; it is set at 100 feet for A320 aircraft. This
is the value at which the flight crew makes a decision to land during CAT IIIB approach
with NO decision height.
If decision to continue has been made and AUTOLAND warning is triggered, a go-around
must be initiated (a go-around initiated at low altitude, whether auto or manual, may result
in ground contact).
In general, there are three possible responses to failure of any system, instrument or
element during an approach:
• CONTINUE approach to planned minima, or
• REVERT to higher minima and proceed to a new minima, or
• GO-AROUND and reassess the capability.
A nature of failure and point of its occurrence will determine which response is appropriate.
As a general rule, if a failure occurs above 1000 ft AGL, an approach may be continued
reverting to a higher DH, providing appropriate conditions are met. Below 1000 ft AGL and
down to DH an occurrence of any failure implies a go-around and reassessment of system
capability. Another approach may then be undertaken to appropriate minima for given
aeroplane status. It has been decided that below 1000 ft AGL, not enough time is available
for crew to perform necessary switching, to check system configuration and limitations and
brief for minima.
LVO (LVTO, CAT II and CAT III) require special procedures for ATC and all services on
aerodrome (maintenance, security, etc.). They are often referred to under a generic name
of Low Visibility Procedures (LVP). LVP are put into force at aerodromes authorised for
Category II / III operations latest when the RVR falls below 550m and/or the cloud base
falls below 200ft. Each aerodrome authority develops its own procedures with the ICAO All
Weather Document (or ECAC No 17) as possible aid. Flight crews shall refer to OM Part C
for specific aerodrome related LVP instructions and/or information.
To maintain CAT II / III qualification current, each flight crew member is required to have
completed two CAT II and/or CAT III approaches and landings, as appropriate, in the
aircraft in a six month period. This requirement may be satisfied by conducting practice
CAT II/III approaches and/or auto lands in good weather conditions.
The Company shall maintain records in respect of all flight crew members authorized to
conduct low visibility operations. These records shall indicate:
• Initial and continued eligibility of the flight crew member to conduct Low Visibility
Operations (LVTO and CAT II/III operations);
• Minima authorized and category of operation;
• Flight crew recency.
Each flight crew member is required to be in possession of the low visibility crew
authorization and record when exercising the low visibility operations.
8.5 EDTO
EDTO (Extended Diversion Time Operations) apply to all revenue flights conducted in a
twin engine aircraft over a route that contains a point further than 1 hour flying time from
an adequate aerodrome, at the approved one-engine inoperative cruise speed.
JC Airlines is not approved for EDTO operations; hence all its aircraft must remain within 1
hour flying time at the approved one-engine inoperative cruise speed from an adequate
aerodrome.
"Adequate" defines an aerodrome usability which has been determined, with particular
regard to one-engine-inoperative approaches and landings, by the Flight Operations
Manager, or a designated deputy, in accordance with the provisions of OM part A, Chapter
8.1.2; an ATC facility should be available and at least one letdown aid (ground radar would
so qualify) for an instrument approach.
The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is approved by the SSCA and permits the operation
with specific inoperative items of equipment for a period of time or a number of flights until
repairs can be accomplished. It is important that repairs are accomplished at the earliest
opportunity but in any case within the timeframe specified in the MEL for the particular
equipment.
The basis for establishing and approving the MEL is the MMEL - the manufacturer’s
Master Minimum Equipment List. This document is approved by the airworthiness
authority.
Other than the MMEL the MEL also considers operational regulations and increased safety
standards applicable to commercial operations. The MEL for the type concerned is
contained in the respective OM Part B and provides for release of the aircraft for flight(s)
with inoperative equipment. Whenever a flight - or series of flights - is released for dispatch
with inoperative item(s), entries must be made in the Aircraft Technical Log, containing a
detailed description of the inoperative item(s) using the appropriate system and sequence
number found in the MEL, special advice to the crew and information regarding corrective
action(s) taken. The MEL is not intended to provide for continued operation of the
aeroplane for an indefinite period with inoperative items.
The basic purpose of the MEL is to permit the operation of an aeroplane within the
framework of a controlled and sound maintenance and repair programme.
The decision of the Commander of the flight to have allowable inoperative items corrected
prior to flight will take precedence over the provision contained in the MEL. The
Commander may request requirements above the minimum listed whenever, in his
judgement, such added equipment is essential to the safety of a particular flight under the
special conditions prevailing at the time.
The MEL is applicable up until the time an aeroplane moves under its own power for the
purpose of preparing for take-off. However the Commander should take into account any
limitations of the MEL that may affect the flight, if a defect occurs between commencing
taxi and performing the take-off.
Equipment obviously basic to the aeroplane’s airworthiness (such as wings, rudders, etc)
is not listed in the MEL and must of course be operative for all flights. On the other hand,
equipment obviously not required for a safe operation of the aeroplane - such as ashtrays,
passenger convenience items, etc. - are not listed and may be unserviceable.
For all further details check the MEL for the type concerned and OM Part B.
An aircraft may be operated with secondary airframe and engine part deficiencies if so
allowed in the approved CDL. Other than in the MEL, CDL items very often do not have a
time limit or a limit on the number of landings. However the CDL will specify "changes" to
the approved AFM-procedures or its performance.
All missing/deficient parts carrying performance penalties are cumulative unless specified
penalties for certain combinations of missing parts are imposed.
Accumulated weight penalties - if there are any - must be considered and subtracted from
the allowed weight for take-off, climb en-route or landing. When first making use of the
CDL for a specific item, the appropriate item shall be described and entered in the Aircraft
Technical Log and the Deferred Maintenance Items (DMI) list. For any subsequent flight(s)
this particular item will be carried on in the Deferred Maintenance Item list until this part is
replaced or repaired.
All further details may be found in the CDL for the respective type presented and in the
OM Part B.
All non-revenue flights must normally be performed in accordance with the Company
regulations for route flights. On some non-revenue flights it may be possible that
passengers are carried. For exceptions, refer to subchapters Demonstration Flights and
Delivery Flights of this chapter.
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to the line training under supervision.
8.7.1.1 Purpose
Training flights are under the jurisdiction of the Training Manager with the purpose of:
• Commander/First Officer qualification/requalification;
• Training the abilities of pilots under normal and abnormal conditions;
• Inflight Proficiency Check.
8.7.1.2 Responsibility
The final decision to carry out the actual training flight and the responsibility for adherence
to general and detailed Company instructions remains with the designated Commander.
Requirements
The Commander of a training flight must be qualified and licensed as type rating instructor
(TRI) on the aeroplane concerned.
The Commander/TRI shall only perform functions (Pilot-in-Command, First Officer) for
which he is qualified and licensed on the aircraft type concerned. The Trainee must be
released for flight training by the Training Manager.
The company weather minima (ceiling and visibility) specified for the respective type of
aeroplane, approach and aerodrome remain applicable.
Test flights form part of the maintenance programme to be completed before the aircraft is
declared airworthy and released for line service.
According to the SSCA requirements, test flights are compulsory after change or major
repair of essential parts of the following systems:
• Flight control system, unless it can be assumed from factory instructions or
Company experience that normal condition is resumed;
• Landing gear retraction system when it cannot be determined on the ground that
the gear can be properly retracted and extended.
When at a station abroad doubt exists about the necessity of a test flight, Flight Operation
Manager should be contacted, who will consult the Maintenance Manager on course of
further action.
Note: No test flight shall be made when it is, through lack of proper equipment, not
possible to check on the ground the correct functioning of a system or part thereof
that is essential to the safety of execution of the flight.
8.7.2.2 Responsibility
When flown by JC Airlines crews, test flights are under the authority of Maintenance
Manager or his delegate. Test flights shall be performed according to programmes issued
by the responsible technical department in agreement with the Flight Operations Manager.
The responsible engineer shall give the flight crew a briefing on:
• The reason for the test flight;
• The test programme;
• How the preceding work may influence the airworthiness of the aeroplane.
The final decision to carry out the actual flight and the responsibility for adherence to
general and detailed Company instructions remains with the designated Commander. He
shall ensure that:
• No unauthorised persons are on board;
• All persons and items on board are secured;
• All persons on board are briefed about emergency procedures;
• Weight and balance documentation was properly calculated and the ballast (if
necessary) was loaded and secured;
• ATC flight plan (if applicable) is filed;
• ATC is informed of the intended flight programme prior to take-off; and
• The general flight programme is adapted to the actual flight conditions, if this
becomes necessary.
Requirements
Test flights shall be performed by the minimum flight crew according to OM Part B. If it is
required by the kind of test flight there might be, in addition to the minimum crew,
engineers, mechanics or inspectors on board who were directly involved in the preceding
work/inspection of the aeroplane. They must be recorded in the flight log as additional
crew members.
Only experienced pilots should be assigned for test flights. As a company policy the
following qualification requirements for conducting test flights has been defined for
Commander - he shall be a licensed and qualified TRI for the type concerned and released
for this type of operation by Flight Operations Manager. First officer (co-pilot) may not be
someone with less than 2000 hours of flight experience on respective type.
In-flight testing procedures shall not start before Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)
can be maintained.
For the first test flight after a major overhaul, the ceiling/visibility at take-off must be at
least 500ft/1500m.
Delivery flights are flights where - after a purchasing or lease agreement - an aeroplane is
flown from the manufacturer’s, seller’s or lessor’s facility to the airline or vice versa.
Ferry flights are flights to position aircraft for maintenance. They may be conducted with
minimum flight crew and reduced airworthiness as permitted by Operations Manual and
the SSCA.
In any case, all flights with passengers aboard require full and normal cockpit and cabin
crew complement. All flights shall follow the standard procedures described in the
Operations Manual.
Positioning flights may be performed with the minimum flight crew. In this case, the
Commander will nominate one flight crew member to be responsible for cabin safety
checks.
Crew members of the Company may be transported on the way to or from flight duty
(Deadheading Crews). The Commander may exercise discretion regarding the need for
the demonstration of safety belts, oxygen masks, life vests and emergency evacuation
procedures, if all personnel on board are familiar with their use.
Positioning flights must follow the standard operating procedures described in the
Operations Manual.
Other passengers on positioning flights are subject to Flight Operations Manager approval.
In that case, depending on the number of passengers, at least one qualified cabin crew
member must be carried on board.
The demonstration proving flights are designed to determine prior to the issuance of the
AOC that the AOC applicant is capable of operating and maintaining each aircraft type
which he proposes to use in accordance with the SSCA requirements. The demonstration
proving flights may also be required of a fully certified airline which is adding a new
airplane type to its fleet or is seeking a special authorization. Successful demonstration
proving flights may be considered the final proof that an operator is ready to commence
revenue operations with a specific type of aircraft. During these inspections, the SSCA
delegated personnel will observe and evaluate the in-flight operations within the total
operational environment of the air transportation system. In the course of these flights,
paying passengers will not be carried. However, it is desirable for the applicant to have on
board company officials who can make decisions and commitments on behalf of the
applicant concerning actions to correct deficiencies.
General objectives for pre-certification demonstration proving flights shall include the
determination of the adequacy of:
• In-flight procedures laid down in the Operations Manual and compliance with those
procedures;
• The facilities and equipment provided to the flight crew to conduct the flight safely
and in accordance with regulations;
• The support provided by operational control to the flight crew;
• The general provision made for ground handling of the aircraft and assisting the
flight crew to carry out their duties at all aerodromes utilized by the applicant along
the routes;
• En-route facilities.
Demonstration proving flights are operated exactly as though the applicant is conducting
revenue operations. However, during the course of the flights the SSCA delegated
personnel may introduce simulated situations which will require appropriate responses by
crew members and ground personnel.
Provided that flights are conducted in accordance with the applicable commercial air
transport regulations and air operator procedures, the following types of flights can be
credited towards demonstration proving flight requirements:
• Representative en-route flights. Before an applicant may conduct these flights, the
test team must be satisfied that the document review phase has been completed.
• Positioning flights. Positioning flights approved by the SSCA may be credited
towards demonstration flight requirements.
• Training flights. With the approval of the SSCA, training flights may be credited
towards demonstration test requirements, provided that the SSCA inspector
observes each flight.
Well before the demonstration proving flight (during pre-application phase of the
certification process) the SSCA should brief the Company regarding the necessity for
demonstration flights.
At least ten days prior to the demonstration proving flights, in accordance with the aircraft
demonstration plan, the Company shall submit a detailed schedule of the proposed flights
including dates, times and aerodromes to be used, along with a list of names of all crew
members who will be used on each flight. The Company shall also provide a list of names
and titles of non-crew member personnel who will be aboard the aircraft during the flights.
Preliminary flight plan information containing predicted fuel, baggage, and passenger
loads for each segment along with predicted gross take-off and landing weights shall also
be provided.
Since the primary purpose of the demonstration proving flights is to ensure basic
compliance with safe operating procedures during routine operations, the introduction of
simulated abnormal and emergency conditions shall be kept to the minimum required to
evaluate the Company's capability to respond to such conditions. The following are typical
scenarios which may be used in evaluating the operator’s capabilities:
• Diversion to alternate aerodromes for reasons such as weather or maintenance –
this tests the Company’s communications, maintenance, ground handling and other
operational capabilities;
• MEL or CDL situations – this tests crew members’ understanding of specific
operational limitations and the company’s operations and maintenance procedures;
• Performance problems – this requires the flight crew and flight dispatch personnel
to demonstrate competency and knowledge of such items as aircraft performance,
aerodrome analysis charts and alternative Company procedures;
• Dangerous goods – the introduction of simulated dangerous goods should test the
Company’s ability to properly document and handle such items or if not authorized
to carry dangerous goods, to take appropriate action;
• Simulated aircraft emergencies such as an equipment failure – this tests the flight
crew’s knowledge and competency in handling emergency situations. It also tests
the Company’s communications, maintenance and other capabilities;
• Simulated cabin emergencies – this tests the ability of the cabin crew to deal with
cabin abnormalities in accordance with established Company procedures and to
coordinate with the flight crew.
First Aid Oxygen: additional oxygen provided for the use of passengers, who do not
satisfactorily recover following subjection to excessive cabin altitudes, during which they
had been provided with supplemental oxygen.
Note: First aid oxygen is only required for pressurised aeroplanes operating above
25.000 ft where cabin crew members are required.
Crew Protective Breathing Equipment (PBE): an equipment to protect the eyes, nose
and mouth of each flight crew member while on flight deck duty and for each cabin crew
member. The PBE shall allow the crew members to continue to perform their duties even
under smoke or toxic air conditions in the cabin or on the flight deck. The portable PBE
equipment must allow active fire fighting.
The quantity of oxygen required as first aid must be enough to provide 2% of passengers
and no less than 2 passengers with undiluted oxygen at a flow rate of at least 3 litres per
minute Standard Temperature Pressure Dry (STPD) for the part of the flight above 8.000 ft
following a depressurisation. This quantity of oxygen must be added to the required
oxygen quantity for the case of emergency descent.
The first-aid oxygen equipment shall be capable of generating a mass flow to each user of
a least 4 litres per minute, STPD. Means may be provided to decrease the flow to not less
than 2 litres per minute, STPD, at any altitude.
Full provisions as mentioned above are available in each JC Airlines aircraft and full
description of the system and equipment is provided in the FCOM and in the CCM.
The amount of supplemental oxygen required shall be determined on the basis of cabin
pressure altitude, flight duration and the assumption that a cabin pressurisation failure will
occur at the altitude or point of flight that is most critical from the standpoint of oxygen
need, and that, after the failure, the aeroplane will descend in accordance with emergency
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 8 P: 8-308
OPERATING PROCEDURES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
procedures specified in the Airplane Flight Manual (or OM Part B) to a safe altitude for the
route to be flown that will allow continued safe flight and landing.
Following a cabin pressurisation failure, the cabin pressure altitude shall be considered the
same as the aeroplane altitude, unless it is shown that no probable failure of the cabin or
pressurisation system will result in a cabin pressure altitude equal to the flight altitude.
Under these circumstances, the maximum cabin pressure altitude established for the type
certification of the aeroplane shall be used as a basis for determination of oxygen supply.
Requirements
1) Flight crew members
• Each member of the flight crew on flight deck duty shall be supplied with
supplemental oxygen as specified in table below. If all occupants of flight deck
seats are supplied from the flight crew source of oxygen supply then they shall
be considered as flight crew members on flight deck duty for the purpose of
oxygen supply.
• Flight deck seat occupants, not supplied by the flight crew source, are
considered to be passengers for the purpose of oxygen supply.
• Flight crew members, not covered by the sub-paragraph above, are for the
purpose of oxygen supply, to be considered as:
- Cabin crew members if they are on call or are definitely going to have
flight deck duty before completing the flight;
- Passengers if they are not on call and will not be on flight deck duty
during the remainder of the flight.
• Oxygen masks shall be located so as to be within the immediate reach of flight
crew members whilst at their assigned duty stations.
• Oxygen masks for use by flight crew members in pressurised aeroplanes
operating above 25.000 ft shall be a quick donning type of mask.
Note: Only applicable, when the individual certificate of airworthiness was first issued on
or after 9 November, 1998.
Note: When flying over high terrain where a descent to 13.000 ft may not be possible
(e.g. MEA/MORA above 13.000 ft), oxygen shall be provided to all passengers
and cabin attendants for the entire flight above 13.000 ft.
Note 1: The supply provided must take account of the cabin pressure altitude descent
profile for the routes concerned.
Note 2: The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a
constant rate of descent from the aeroplanes maximum certificated operating
altitude to 10.000 ft in 10 minutes and followed by 20 minutes at 10.000 ft.
Note 3: The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a
constant rate of descent from the aeroplane's maximum certificated operating
altitude to 10.000 ft in 10 minutes and followed by 110 minutes at 10.000 ft.
Oxygen provided by PBEs available may be included.
Note 4: The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a
constant rate of descent from the aeroplane's maximum certificated operating
altitude to 15.000 ft in 10 minutes.
Note 5: For the purpose of this table "passengers" means passengers actually carried
and includes infants (children under the age of 2).
Note: For the purpose of this table "passengers" means passengers actually carried and
includes infants (children under the age of 2).
Equipment (PBE): The PBE (required for all pressurised aeroplanes and all unpressurised
aeroplanes with MTOW above 5,7 tons or a maximum seating capacity of more than 19)
shall provide oxygen for a period of at least 15 minutes for each such PBE mask.
When computing the total oxygen required for the non-portable equipment, then the supply
for the supplemental oxygen system as required under Chapters 8.8.2 and 8.8.3 may be
considered. The portable PBE shall have a self-contained supply for 15 minutes.
On aeroplanes requiring a flight crew of more than one but no cabin crew member, a
portable PBE must be carried to protect the eyes, nose and mouth of one flight crew
member and to provide breathing gas for a period of not less than 15 minutes.
On aeroplanes requiring cabin crew members, each required cabin crew member shall be
provided with an installed PBE adjacent to his crew member duty station.
Detailed descriptions of the oxygen system, PBE, first aid and therapeutic equipment are
contained in the OM Part B / CCM.
Should cabin depressurisation occur when the aircraft is above 14.000 ft commence an
emergency descent according OM Part B procedures to a target altitude of 10.000 ft or
less, unless limited by terrain.
When limited by terrain, descend initially to MORA and descend to 10.000 ft as soon as
terrain allows.
In case of decompression or abnormal operation above 10.000 ft flight crew shall always
wear and use oxygen masks.
JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines) is not approved to carry dangerous goods
hence those goods shall not be accepted for transport by air on JC Airlines flights.
However, the provisions in Dangerous Goods regulations allow a limited number of items
to be carried by passengers and crew (refer to OM Part A; subsection 9.1.4). As a result,
JC Airlines flight crew and ground staff will be given training to ensure only the approved
items can be carried.
Dangerous goods are articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health,
safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in
ICAO/IATA Regulations or which are classified according to these Regulations.
The transport of dangerous goods must be performed according to the IATA Dangerous
Goods Regulations (IATA/DGR) and/or the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284-AN/905).
The ICAO Technical Instructions do not apply to dangerous goods required to be on board
an aircraft for operating reasons.
All personnel responsible for accepting and handling any cargo or packaged materials
shall receive adequate training on the recognition of items classified as dangerous goods
(adequate is defined in an operational sense to mean the demonstrated ability of required
personnel to identify such items).
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 9 P: 9-2
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
JC Airlines shall not accept any package that contains dangerous goods. If damaged
packages are found to contain, or are suspected of containing the dangerous goods, this
shall be reported in compliance with ICA Technical Instructions.
All aircraft spare parts and/or company material (COMAT), classified as dangerous goods,
cannot be carried on board the Company’s aircraft and must be offered to a different mode
of transportation (e.g., ground) or to an operator that is authorized to transport dangerous
goods.
Any JC Airlines employee, agent or contract employee of the air operator who prepares
and/or offers COMAT classified as dangerous goods for shipment via any mode shall be
fully trained as a dangerous goods shipper.
Dangerous goods are divided into nine hazard classes relating to the type of hazard.
Some hazard classes are further subdivided into hazard divisions due to the wide scope of
the class.
For transportation they must be marked and labelled in accordance with respective
provisions of the ICAO/IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.
In addition, 3-letter IATA Cargo IMP Codes are used to identify dangerous goods in
documentation, such as NOTOC, Cargo Manifest, e.g. RCL= Restricted Cryogenic Liquid.
Dangerous goods must not be carried by passengers or crew except in accordance with
the provisions listed below. Nevertheless crew should be vigilant that dangerous goods
may be carried into the cabin by passengers who are unaware of, or deliberately ignore,
the requirements of the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.
The requirement of the operator’s approval means that any item within this category must
be declared by the passenger at the check-in desk prior to departure.
It is permitted to carry the following articles and substances which would otherwise be
classified as dangerous goods:
• Aircraft equipment required to be aboard the aircraft in accordance with pertinent
airworthiness requirements and operating regulations;
• Consumer goods such as aerosols, alcoholic beverages, perfumes etc. for use or
sale by the operator during the flight and catering or cabin service supplies
including dry ice for use in food and beverage service.
Advice and instructions are provided to JC Airlines’ crew on the carriage of aerosols. In
particular, the potential fire hazard posed, and how this may be obviated by careful
stowage is emphasised – refer to dangerous goods training in OM Part D. Unless it is
unavoidable, aerosols should not be used for dispensing air fresheners, insecticides or
other similar agents.
Replacements for above aircraft equipment and consumer goods must be transported in
accordance with dangerous goods regulations by the operator holding an approval of the
SSCA.
The following dangerous goods may also be carried with the approval of the operator only
when they are placed on an aircraft:
• To provide medical aid to a patient during flight;
• To provide veterinary aid or humane killer for an animal.
Above articles and substances must be properly stowed and secured during take-off and
landing and under control of trained personnel during the time when they are in use on
the aircraft.
Cargo declared under a general description may contain dangerous goods that are not
apparent. Such substances and articles may also be found in baggage. With the aim of
preventing undeclared dangerous goods from being loaded on an aircraft and passengers
from taking on board those dangerous goods which they are not permitted to have in their
baggage, cargo and passenger acceptance staff should seek confirmation from shippers
and passengers about the content of any item of cargo or baggage where there are
suspicions that it may contain dangerous goods. Staff should be aware of general
descriptions that are often used for items in cargo or in passengers' baggage which may
contain dangerous goods and shall check for other indications that dangerous goods may
be present (e.g. labels, markings). The following is the list of possible hidden dangerous
goods: aircraft spare parts/aircraft equipment, camping equipment, comat, cylinders,
dental apparatus, diving equipment, electrical equipment, film crew or media equipment,
household goods, instruments, machinery parts, tool boxes, torches. Training is key to
raising awareness and to detect undeclared dangerous goods.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 9 P: 9-4
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
When dangerous goods are transported on a flight which takes place wholly or partly
outside the Territory of a State, the transport document, labelling and marking must be in
the English language in addition to any other language requirements.
Articles and substances or other goods that are identified in the Technical Instructions as
being forbidden for transport under any circumstances must not be transported. Those
articles and substances or other goods which are forbidden for transport in normal
circumstances may be transported when they are exempted by the States concerned
under the provisions of the Technical Instructions, or the Technical Instructions indicate
they may be transported under an approval issued by the State of Origin.
An Acceptance Check List for the transport of dangerous goods for use by the company
staff and the handling agents will be provided by the Company.
The checklist shall allow a complete check of all relevant details. The results of the
acceptance check shall be recorded on the checklist manually, mechanically or by
computer.
All packages, overpacks and freight containers must be inspected for evidence of leakage
or damage immediately prior to loading on an aeroplane or into a unit load device
according to the Technical Instructions.
Leaking or damaged packages, overpacks or freight containers must not be loaded onto
an aeroplane.
An aeroplane which has been contaminated by radioactive materials must be taken out of
service immediately. It should not be returned into service until the radiation level at any
accessible surface and the non-fixed contamination are not more than the values specified
in the Technical Instructions.
For Class 1 – Explosives only, the Compatibility Group is specified by a letter behind the
division number, e.g. 1.4S. The Compatibility Group defines restrictions for combined
loading with other explosive material.
The following table shows which classes of dangerous goods must be segregated from
each other.
’x’ shows that these two hazard classes must not be loaded next to each other or in a
position that would allow interaction between them in the event of leakage.
’-’ at the intersection of a row and a column indicates that packages containing these
classes/divisions of dangerous goods do not require segregation. The segregation
requirements apply based on all hazard labels applied on the package, irrespective of
whether the hazard is the primary or subsidiary risk.
Hazard 1 excl.
1.4S 2 3 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 8
Label 1.4S
1 excl.
Note 1 Note 2 x x x x x x x
1.4S
1.4S Note 2 - - - - - - - -
2 x - - - - - - - -
3 x - - - - - x - -
4.2 x - - - - - x - -
4.3 x - - - - - - - x
5.1 x - - x x - - - -
5.2 x - - - - - - - -
8 x - - - - x - - -
Note 1: For segregation rules for Class 1, excluding 1.4S, refer to ICAO/IATA Regulations.
Such explosives are not permitted for transport on passenger aircraft.
Division 4.1 and Classes 6, 7 and 9 are not included in table above as they do not require
segregation from other classes of dangerous goods.
Articles and substances meeting the dangerous goods classification criteria are assigned
with a ‘UN Number’ under the United Nations classification system. This consists of a four-
digit number preceded by the capital letters ‘UN’. Packages of dangerous goods must be
marked with the UN Number(s) applicable to their contents. Packages containing
dangerous goods can also be identified by labels indicating the hazard of the goods by
their class or division or by the presence of certain handling labels/markings.
When dangerous goods markings or labels are seen on items not declared as dangerous
goods it is often an indication that they do contain such goods.
Undeclared dangerous goods must not be loaded on an aircraft and reporting procedures
must be followed.
Hazard Classes
Fli!lmmable Nonofli!lmmable
"Toxic
gas Non-toxic gas ges
Class 3 (RFL..)
Flammable
liquid
t
i4
Flammable
T
Spo·nteneously Dangerous
solid combustible when wet
~
Oxidizing Organic
substances Peroxides
Division 6.21RISI
1 Civisiot1 6.2 (RDS)
Division 6.1 (Rii'BI
~
/"' CJ
'\io!' " )
.__.
/¥
' -=-/
""·
~~-
,,
lnre<;tious suhstane& Biological substance
ToxJc substanoe
(Category AI (Cate{lo.ry B)
Category 1 • Whlt·e
Category II - Y·ellow (RRY) Category Ill - Yelllow IIRRY)
(RRW)
~ ~
....•
'.
~
~rn t '
"<.'"
Radioactive Radioactive
Radioac~ive
Class 8 (RCM}
c orra-si,ve
Miscellaneous
Class 1 Explosives
Explosive articles and substances are assigned to one of six divisions and to one of
thirteen compatibility groups.
Compatibility groups: A / B / C / D / E / F / G / H / J / K / L / N / S
Only the explosives listed in table below are permitted for transportation on civil aircraft.
Passenger and Cargo Aircraft (PAX OK) Cargo Aircraft Only (CAO)
1.4S RXS 1.3C RCX
1.3G RGX
1.4B RXB
1.4C RXC
1.4D RXD
1.4E RXE
1.4G RXG
Division 1.1:
Substances and articles which have a mass explosion hazard (which affects almost the
entire load virtually instantaneously).
Division 1.2:
Substances and articles which have a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.3:
Articles and substances having a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or minor
projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard. This division comprises
articles and substances that:
• Give rise to considerable radiant heat, or
• Burn one after another, producing minor blast and/or projection effects.
Division 1.4:
Articles and substances having no significant hazard (only a small hazard) on the event of
ignition or initiation during transport. The effects are largely confined to the package and
no projection of fragments of appreciable size or range is to be expected. An external fire
must not cause practically instantaneous explosion of virtually the entire contents of the
package.
Examples: igniters, fireworks, fuses, ammunition.
Division 1.5:
Very intensive articles which have a mass explosion hazard but with little probability of
imitation or, under normal conditions of transport, of transition from burning to detonation.
Division 1.6:
Extremely intensive articles which demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental
imitation or propagation and have a mass explosion hazard.
Class 2 Gases
This class comprises compressed gases, liquified gases, gases in solution, refrigerated
liquified gases, mixtures of gases, mixtures of one or more gases with one or more
vapours of substances of other classes, articles charged with a gas, tellurium hexafluoride,
aerosols.
Flash point: Lowest temperature at which enough flammable vapour is given off a liquid to
be ignited in air when exposed to a source of ignition.
Division 4.3 Substances Which, in Contact With Water, Emit Flammable Gases (RFW):
Substances, which, by interaction with water, are liable to become spontaneously
flammable or to give off flammable gases in dangerous quantities.
Examples: potassium, sodium, lithium.
Radioactive Material (RRW/RRY): Substances which emit certain types of radiation. They
are harmful to health and other material (e.g., data storage media) and cannot be detected
by any of the human senses.
The Transport Index (T.I.) indicates the radiation level of the package at 1-meter-distance:
1 T.I. = 0.01 mSv/h.
Loading on aircraft depends on transport index, package/loading height and position in a/c
(for more details see applicable loading charts).
Corrosive Material (RCM): Substances which, in the event of leakage, can cause severe
damage by chemical action when in contact with living tissue or other material (e.g.,
aluminium).
Miscellaneous Dangerous Substances and Articles (RMD): Substances, which could not
be classified under the eight other classes but which present a danger during transport.
Examples: cars, motorcycles, asbestos, electric wheelchair, life-saving devices.
Live animals are to be transported on a higher level than dry ice. The dry ice should
be loaded prior to the animals. This is also applicable for the loading of refrigerating
units together with live animals in the same compartment.
Exception: These restrictions are not valid for live animals packed airtight (e.g.,
tropical fish).
• Magnetized Material (MAG)
Any material which, when packed for air transport,
has a magnetic field strength of 0.159 A/m (0002
gauss) or more at a distance of 2.1 m (7 ft) from any
point on the surface of the assembled package.
Magnets do not affect humans directly, but can
influence the compass or other material (e.g.
undeveloped films).
Handling Labels
Packages of dangerous goods may also bear labels providing handling information.
These are:
Cryogenic Liquid
Package Orientation
Lithium Battery
IATA Codes
The following codes, describing different dangerous goods classes, are extensively used
within the airline industry:
Consumer Labelling
Many everyday household items bear consumer warning labels which may or may not
indicate they are classified as dangerous goods in air transport. If consumer labelling
causes suspicion that an item may be dangerous, check that the item is permitted for
carriage by passengers – if not, the item must be refused carriage.
Products bearing the following GHS labels ARE classified as dangerous goods:
Note: A product bearing the GHS corrosive label (depicted far right above) is NOT
classified as dangerous goods if the word ‘Danger’ and hazard statement ‘causes
serious eye damage’ is included on the label.
Products bearing the following GHS labels are NOT classified as dangerous goods:
If an in-flight emergency occurs and the situation permits, the Commander must inform the
appropriate Air Traffic Services Unit of any potentially dangerous item on board the
aircraft, the quantity and the location.
Accidents are events occurring during operation of an airplane in connections with which a
person is killed or seriously injured.
Incidents (or "malfunctions”) in connection with dangerous goods are light physical injuries,
minor damage and fire, damage to packagings, leakage of their contents, exposure to
radiation or other deficiencies which indicate that the packing is no longer fit for fulfilling its
purpose or assumed transportation risk which, among other things, is attributable to a
faulty declaration of contents.
Any incident involving suspected dangerous goods should be notified immediately to the
Commander who should be kept informed of all actions taken and their effect. It is
essential that the cabin crew and flight crew coordinate their actions and that each be kept
fully informed of the other's actions and intentions.
Apart from the exceptions listed in Chapter 9.1.1.2, dangerous goods are not permitted in
the passenger cabin.
Nevertheless, dangerous goods may be carried into the cabin by passengers who are
unaware of, or deliberately ignore the requirements of the lATA Dangerous Goods
Regulations. It is also possible that an item to which a passenger is legitimately entitled
(e.g. an item for medical purposes) may cause an incident.
Opening of bags and cases during flight may show dangerous goods directly but normally
nothing will be noticed until an actual problem with the dangerous goods item arises.
Possible problems may be recognized by:
• Bad smell or odour;
• Wet spots on clothes, seat cushion or carpet;
• Abnormal noise (e.g. escaping gas);
• Ultimately fire or smoke.
The cabin crew should identify the item and its owner. Ask him/her to identify the potential
hazards. The passenger may be able to give some guidance on the hazard (s) involved
and how these could be dealt with. If the passenger is able to identify the hazard, he may
be able to give the cabin crew either the Emergency Response Code or the item UN
number. If given the UN number, this information shall be passed to the Commander.
This section contains general information and guidelines on the factors that may need to
be considered when dealing with any dangerous goods incident.
During Flight:
• Follow the appropriate aircraft emergency procedures for fire or smoke removal:
Refer to QRH / FCOM procedures.
decision to land at the nearest suitable aerodrome should be made early rather than
late, when an incident may have developed to a very critical point, severely
restricting operational flexibility.
• For dangerous goods incidents in the passenger cabin, coordinate flight crew/cabin
crew actions:
Incidents in the passenger cabin should be dealt with by the cabin crew using the
appropriate checklist and procedures. It is essential that the cabin crew and the
flight crew coordinate their actions and that each be kept fully informed of the
other's actions and intensions.
• Use guidance from aircraft emergency response drills chart to help deal with
incident:
The drill code assigned to an item of dangerous goods consists of a number from 1
to 10 plus a single letter. Referring to the chart of emergency response drills, each
drill number corresponds to a line of information concerning the risk posed by that
substance and guidance on the preferable action that should be taken. The drill
letter is shown separately on the drill chart; it indicates other possible hazards of the
substance. In some cases the guidance given by the drill number may be further
refined by the information given by the drill letter.
• If the situation permits, notify ATC of the dangerous goods being carried:
If an inflight emergency occurs and the situation permits, the Commander should
inform the appropriate air traffic services unit of the dangerous goods on board the
aircraft. Wherever possible this information should include the proper shipping
name and/or UN number, the class/division and for Class 1 the compatibility group,
any identified subsidiary risk(s), the quantity and the location on board the aircraft.
When it is not considered possible to include all the information, those parts thought
most relevant in the circumstances should be given.
After Landing:
• Disembark passengers and crew before opening any cargo compartment doors:
Even if it has not been necessary to complete an emergency evacuation after
landing, passengers and crew should disembark before any attempt is made to
open the cargo compartment doors and before any further action is taken to deal
with a dangerous goods incident. The cargo compartment doors should be opened
with the emergency services in attendance.
A Dangerous Goods Incident Report shall be made by the Commander and shall be
reported to Flight Operations Manager as soon as possible.
9.1.3.2 Cabin Crew Checklist for Dangerous Goods Incidents in the Passenger
Cabin
The general rules to be observed following a dangerous goods incident in-flight in the
passenger cabin are:
• Notify the Commander;
• Identify the item;
• In case of fire, use standard procedures but check use of water;
• Determine emergency response drill code and use emergency drills chart to help
deal with the incident;
• In case of spillage or leakage:
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 9 P: 9-23
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
~
Risk to Risk to Spill or Leak Fire Fighting Additional
Inherent Risk Aeropllane Oocupant s Procedure IProcedure Consideration
'
AJI agents
Explosive may Use 100% according to Possible abrupt
Fire and or As indicated by
1 ·cause structural oxygen, oo availability; use loss of
explosion the drill letters
failure smoking standard fire pressurization
procedure
Use 100%
oxygen, establish AJI agents
Smoke, fumes and maintain
Flammable Fire aJild I or maximum according to Possible abrupt
3 and heat. and availability: no loss of
liquid ~or so'lid explosion as indicated by ventilation; no
water on "W" pressunza!Jon
the drillletter(s) smoking; dnll letter.
mimmum
electrics
Possible .abrupt
Spontaneously Use 100% All agents loss of
Smoke, fumes
oomblJstible or oxyg,en. establish acoording to pressurization:
4 pyrophoric Fire a111d I or and heat, and and maintain availability; no minimum electrics
explosion as indicated by
when exposed maximum water on ·w·· if -F· or "H" drill
to air the drillletter(s) ventilation drill letter. letter
Oxidiz.er, may
Fire Md I or Use 100% AJI agents
ignite other exJPiosion, Eye, nose and oxygen, establish according to Possible abrupt
malerials, may 'throat irritation:
5 explode in heat possible skin damage on and maintain availability; no loss of
corrosion maximum water on ·w·· pressurization:
of fire damage contact ventilation drill letter.
Use 100%
Possible .abrupt
Toxic. may be oxyg,en. establish AJI agents
lossot
fatal if inhaled, Contammation Acute toxicity, and maintain according to
ing.asted, or with toxic liquid effect may be maximum availability; no pressurization:
6
minimum electrics
absorbed by or solid dela~•ed ventilation: do water on "W" if ·F• or ''H" drill
skin. not touch \VIthout drtll lener. letter
gloves
Contamination Exposure to
Radiation from 'Nilh spilled radiation, and Do not. move All agents Call for a qualified
7 brof<eolu nshiel d
radioactive personnel
packages; avoid according to person to meet the
ed packages contact availability aircraft
material contamination
Accidents and incidents arising from the carriage of dangerous goods must be reported to
the SSCA within 24 hours (this also includes discovery of undeclared and misdeclared
dangerous goods) to the appropriate authority of the State in which the accident or incident
occurred and to the State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA). If necessary, a subsequent
report must be made as soon as possible whenever additional information has been
established.
The Commander shall report to the Company without delay all accidents and incidents
which occur in connection with dangerous goods in respect of cargo, mail, baggage or
passengers. The report shall contain all data as far as they are known at the time the
report is made.
• Reference number of the air way bill, pouch, baggage tag, ticket;
• Shipping name and UN number;
• Class or division and any subsidiary risk;
• Type of packaging, packaging specification marking;
• Quantity of involved dangerous goods;
• Name and address of the shipper, passenger;
• Suspected cause of the incident or accident;
• Action taken;
• Other relevant details.
The report must contain the name, title, address and contact number of the person who
made the report.
Copies of the relevant documents and photographs taken should be attached to the report.
An Operator of an aeroplane in which dangerous goods are to be carried must provide the
Commander as soon as practicable, prior to departure, with written information (NOTOC)
which specifies at least the following:
• Airway Bill number;
• Proper shipping name and UN number or ID number as listed in these Regulations;
• Class or Division, and subsidiary risks for which labels are required, by numerals
and in the case of Class I, the compatibility group;
• Packing Group when applicable;
• Number of packages, the net quantity of each package and their exact loading
location.
• For radioactive materials the number of packages, their category, their Transport
Index (if applicable), and their exact loading location;
• Whether the package must be carried on cargo aircraft only;
• Aerodrome at which the package(s) is to be unloaded.
The written information to the Commander must be readily available to him during flight.
The information to the Commander must also include confirmation (the name and
signature of the leading supervisor) that there is no evidence that any damaged or leaking
packages have been loaded on the aircraft. Further detailed information is given to be able
to perform an administration spot check. This is advisable because all information is
inserted manually without any automatic check system.
There is no evidence that any damaged or leaking packages containing dangerous goods have been loaded on the aircraft.
OTHER SPECIAL LOAD
IMP Loaded
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS
JC Airlines has established and maintains the following staff training programmes
approved by the SSCA, and as required by the Technical Instructions.
Personnel, who are engaged in general cargo and baggage handling, shall receive initial
and recurrent dangerous goods training (every 24 months) to carry out their duties in
respect to dangerous goods. As a minimum this training must cover the areas identified in
column 1 of the table below and be to a depth sufficient to ensure that an awareness is
gained of the hazards associated with dangerous goods, how to identify them and what
requirements apply to the carriage of such goods by passengers.
The following personnel:
• Crew members,
• Passenger handling staff, and
• Security staff employed by the operator who deal with the screening of
passengers and their baggage,
shall receive training which, as a minimum, must cover the areas identified in column 2 of
the table below and be to a depth sufficient to ensure that awareness is gained of the
hazards associated with dangerous goods, how to identify them and what requirements
apply to the carriage of such goods by passengers.
Areas of Training 1 2
General Philosophy x x
Limitations on Dangerous Goods in Air Transport x
Package Labelling and Marking x x
Dangerous Goods in Passengers Baggage x x
Emergency Procedures x x
All personnel mentioned above shall receive recurrent training (including a test to verify
understanding of their responsibilities) at intervals of no longer than 24 months or 12
months for cabin crew.
9.1.7 Responsibilities
Dangerous goods must not be carried without an approval by the SSCA except those
items listed in Chapter 9.1.1.2 and Table of Provisions for Dangerous Goods Carried by
Passengers or Crew. Basic requirement for transportation of dangerous goods is the
permanent approval by the SSCA which will be reflected on the Air Operator’s Certificate.
JC Airlines shall ensure that all its aircraft carry a copy of the "ICAO 9481 N/928"
Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods to assist
the crew to deal with any dangerous incident occurring on board the aircraft during flight.
JC Airlines is required to provide a "dangerous goods emergency response kit" for use
aboard an aircraft and training the crew members regarding its use. A typically dangerous
goods emergency response kit should contain large, good quality polyethylene bags, bag
ties and long rubber gloves.
The carriage of munitions of war in Cambodia registered aircraft, wherever they may be, is
prohibited by the Cambodia Civil Aviation Regulation. Munitions of war are defined as
weapons, ammunition, articles materials or devices as are intended, adapted or designed
for use in warfare or against the person.
An application for an exemption from the Cambodia Civil Aviation Regulation to enable
munitions of war to be carried should be made to the SSCA. This should be made in
writing or by fax at least 7 working days before the relevant date of shipment an
application stating the munitions of war involved, and the following information:
• The reason why it is essential for the munitions of war to be carried by air;
• A proposal (including any safety control measures specified by the applicant) on
achieving a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the instructions specified in
the Technical Instructions;
• The proposed proper shipping name, classification and UN number of the munitions
of war with full supporting technical data;
• The proposed packaging;
• The quantity to be carried;
• Any special handling required and any special emergency response information;
• Names and addresses of the consignor and consignee; and
• The airports of departure and destination and the proposed dates of shipment and
routing.
Munitions of war, if carriage is approved, shall be stowed in the aircraft in a place which is
inaccessible to passengers during flight and firearms must be unloaded.
Exceptions may be granted by all States concerned before the commencement of the flight
that such weapons of war or munitions of war may be carried in circumstances that differ
in part or in total from the procedures mentioned in this subsection above.
Passengers and crew members are not permitted to carry firearms in the cabin or on the
flight deck.
When applicable, police officers on escort duty shall hand over their unloaded weapons to
supervisor handling agent to be stored in baggage hold for the duration of flight. The
ammunition shall be stored in the baggage hold as well. After arrival the weapons shall be
returned to the police officers at the aeroplane before the passengers disembark.
The Operator has to take all reasonable measures to ensure that he will be informed about
any intended transportation of any sporting weapons or ammunition by one of its
aeroplanes.
Should there be any doubt on whether the firearm is a sporting weapon or munitions of
war, guidance should be sought from the Security Manager and/or Flight Operations
Manager. Should it be declared as munitions of war, it shall be denied transportation.
Any passenger wishing to carry a sporting weapon or ammunition in their hold baggage on
a JC Airlines flight may do this, provided he presents documents accrediting the approval
of the movement of the firearms from the States or origin, transit (if applicable) and
destination.
When accepting the carriage of sporting weapons, the Company shall ensure that they
are:
• Stowed in the aircraft in a place which is inaccessible to passengers during flight
unless the SSCA has determined that compliance is impracticable and has
accepted that other procedures might apply;
• Unloaded, in the case of firearms or other weapons that can contain ammunition.
Note: A loaded weapon means a weapon which has inserted in it a live round of
ammunition, cartridge, detonation or powder in the chamber or in a clip, magazine
or cylinder.
The weapon (firearm) shall be wrapped and packed separately in a hard-sided, special
lockable container and the ammunitions must be securely packed in a sealed and strong
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 9 P: 9-35
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
wooden, metal or fibreboard box or other packaging specially designed to carry small
amounts of ammunition. This secure packaging must be contained inside a hard-side
suitcase or in the hard-sided case containing the firearm.
The transport of cartridges for sporting weapons is only allowed if they are for the personal
use of the accompanying person, they are securely boxed, in quantities not exceeding 5
kg gross mass per passenger and are not combined into more than one package. The
ammunition must not contain any explosive or incendiary projectiles. The baggage
containing the firearm(s) and ammunition must be locked before being accepted for
carriage.
The baggage containing the weapons and/or ammunition must be held separately from
other pieces of hold baggage in a secure area or under the escort of JC Airlines’ ground
personnel or other authorized ground handling agent staff until loaded onto the aircraft.
The baggage containing the weapon (firearm) shall be loaded in such a way as to facilitate
its location within the aircraft.
Before the flight the Commander must be notified by the operator/ground personnel of
details of weapons or ammunition intended to be carried on board, including its location.
All transit stations must ensure the baggage containing weapons and/or ammunition is
kept under strict control or in a secure area from the time of offloading. The station must
notify the appropriate State agency of the arrival of the baggage in accordance with local
regulations and shall comply with their regulations regarding handling and securing of
firearms and ammunition.
At the destination airport, JC Airlines Station Manager or authorized ground handling agent
Station Manager is responsible for ensuring that the Police and Customs are notified of the
expected arrival of the items. The baggage containing the weapon should only be returned
to the passenger in the customs area of the destination airport or at any area designated
for this by the appropriate state Authority and following the legal requirements of the state.
Intentionally Blank
10 SECURITY
10.1 SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE
10.1.1 General
This chapter is in compliance with JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines) security
program and will follow as strictly as possible the following regulations:
• ICAO Annex 17- Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of
Unlawful Interference;
• ICAO Doc 8973 of 2007;
• ICAO Doc 9811 (Security Provisions of Annex 6); and
• National Aviation Security Program and National Aviation Security Program training
program.
JC Airlines crew members shall be aware that in some States different security regulations
may apply.
It is the responsibility of all appropriate operations and other personnel to be familiar, and
comply, with the relevant requirements of the National Aviation Security Program of the
Kingdom of Cambodia, as well as with the security program of JC Airlines.
Safeguard of human life is always the primary objective. In emergency situations arising
from acts of unlawful interference, on taking his decisions, the Commander must always
keep in mind that the main aim remains the safety of passengers and crew members.
Effective prevention measures on the ground are essential to avoid interference in flight.
Prevention systems involving the use of armed personnel aboard its flights are not
currently part of JC Airlines policies.
Crew members have a major role in keeping the aircraft secured from acts of aggression,
hijacking and bomb threats. It is important that all staff develop a security conscious
approach with respect to the company’s aircraft and other assets.
All flight and cabin crew members should be vigilant in ensuring that unauthorized persons
are denied access to aircraft and areas where there is the potential for sabotage or
damage.
To assure that all security objectives have been achieved crew should:
• Perform a pre-flight security check;
• Perform a security search when required;
• Ensure all persons boarding the aircraft have the authority to do so;
• Report any suspicious person or item;
• Ensure the protection of the aircraft.
When entering or leaving a country, the crew is required to comply with that country's
security, customs, health and currency regulations. Strict compliance with these
regulations is a necessity as violation does not only reflect on the person of the offender
but also is damaging to the reputation of the company. Self-evidently, the same goes for
any other offence committed during a trip.
Company has appointed Safety & Security Manager who heads the Safety and Security
Department.
Safety and Security Department of JC Airlines shall maintain and conduct approved
training programs which enable crew members to take appropriate action to prevent acts
of unlawful interference such as sabotage or unlawful seizure of airplanes and to minimise
the consequences of such events should they occur. The training programme shall be
compatible with the National Aviation Security programme. Individual crew members shall
have knowledge and competence of all relevant elements of the training programme.
Safety & Security Manager is available to provide the Company in general and in particular
with advice on the correct implementation of security measures. Safety & Security
Department and Safety & Security Manager should ensure that the security of the
Company operations is achieved through sound corporate policy, timely advice and
effective performance by members of the airline and its handling agents. Safety & Security
Manager will assist in liaison and consulting with local authorities regarding any security
problems which may arise for the Company. He is responsible for overseeing all Company
security training.
Safety & Security Manager is also available for crews to indicate the current level of threat
against the airline and at all times to give advice on all other security regulations, practices
and procedures of safe-guards against acts of unlawful interference. Furthermore Safety &
Security Manager can undertake security inspections of Company stations and can, upon
request from appropriate authorities, take part in a security survey of airports concerning
the effectiveness of the measures being implemented.
• Safety & Security Manager is responsible for compiling the Company Security
Manual (SM) and its distribution.
• Flight Operations Manager is responsible for implementation of the measures set
out in the SM and OM Part A; Chapter 10 regarding his area of responsibility.
• Ground Operations Manager is responsible for implementation of the measures set
out in the SM regarding his area of responsibility.
• Handling agents have their own responsibility for the implementation of security
measures and procedures which are to be carried out prior to the commencement
of, and during regular operations of the airline. They must ensure that no
deterioration of aeroplane security procedures occurs.
• The Commander is responsible for the safety of the aeroplane and its occupants
during the flight.
Note: ‘During the flight’ is not an accurately describable concept. As far as the
Commander's responsibility goes, the doors closed/open definition is
generally the most serviceable. The period of flight duty (from reporting on)
is considered as the time the Commander has authority over the crew. If
there is a hijacking or another threat, the concept of flight is no longer
sufficient. The responsibility of the Commander terminates actually only
when passengers and crew are safe and their own master again and the
aeroplane is disembarked. It depends on the circumstances whether and to
what extend the responsibility can or will be taken over by others when the
aeroplane is on the ground.
• Local authorities are responsible for airport security.
Ramp Areas
Stringent control of access to the aircraft must be carried out. Only authorized persons are
allowed in vicinity of the aircraft or ground equipment. All Company personnel in ramp
areas or in the airport restricted zone must wear an Identification Card (ID card). If there is
any doubt about the identity or authority of a person attempting to board the aircraft, then
the law enforcement agencies and the Airport Manager must be informed immediately.
Flight Operations Inspectors of SSCA (or other foreign CAA), customs, immigration and
aviation security inspectors may board aircraft at any time in Cambodia or overseas to
carry out their official duties. All such personnel carry an identity document issued by their
controlling authority must be produced prior to being given access.
When local security authorized personnel come onboard to conduct a preflight security
audit, the Commander shall be notified and a CIC shall be assigned to accompany the
inspector during the inspection.
Overall responsibility rests with the aircraft Commander, and actual activity is shared
between the cabin crew and the ground handling agents. It is important that all individuals
are made aware of their responsibilities and are diligent in carrying them out.
No person is allowed to access the aircraft without displaying proper identification (airport
ID card or other authority card) confirmed by the crew. This includes caterers, cleaning
staff, police officers, security personnel, CAA staff and security inspectors. The card photo
should be crosschecked with the person carrying the card.
All persons other than passengers, should be escorted for the entire duration that they
remain onboard the aircraft. No person aside from the crew must remain unattended at
any time.
The Commander must report any suspicious circumstances to relevant authority and must
file an Occurrence Report. If there are any doubts about the integrity of the aircraft or the
baggage, the Commander should consider whether another security search is necessary.
In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight deck/cockpit door, this door shall be
capable of being locked, and means or procedures acceptable to the SSCA shall be
provided or established by which the cabin crew can notify the flight crew in the event of
suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin.
In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight deck door in accordance with
requirements above:
• This door shall be closed prior to engine start for take-off and will be locked when
required by security procedure or the Commander, until engine shut down after
landing, except when deemed necessary for authorised persons to access or
egress in compliance with National Aviation Security Programme;
• Means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot’s station the area outside
the flight deck/cockpit to the extent necessary to identify persons requesting entry to
the flight deck/cockpit and to detect suspicious behaviour or potential threat.
Section 8.13.2 of this manual describes general procedures and safety precautions
regarding admission to flight deck.
Aircraft security check/search is a thorough inspection of the interior and the exterior of the
aircraft for the purpose of discovering prohibited articles. The checking and searching of
the aircraft shall be conducted as required by international and national aviation security
programs. Security searches shall also be carried out when an aircraft is suspected of
being the target of an act of unlawful interference.
The difference between the security check and security search is only in the degree and
thoroughness of check/search and this will be dictated by each particular situation. An
aircraft security check should include examination of all accessible areas of aircraft, as
listed in the Aircraft Security Check form. An aircraft security search should include all
measures included in aircraft security check and in addition, should include the
examination of all lifejacket pouches and the following accessible areas of the exterior of
the aircraft: aircraft service panels and service compartments.
Note: It is important to differentiate between Aircraft Security Check form and Aeroplane
Search Checklist, which should be used as a guidance on the search for an
explosive or any other suspicious device on board the aeroplane
The aircraft is also subject to security check when a passenger volunteers to offload
himself. However, the security check may be limited only to the area in which the
passenger had access to including the nearest lavatory and galley for any suspicious item.
Pre-flight security checks shall be completed prior to every flight. The aircraft must be
checked thoroughly after the completion of catering and cleaning and before the
passenger boarding. The security check ensures that no unauthorized person or any
prohibited articles are left on-board. The security check of the cabin should be carried out
by the cabin crew. The result of check must be reported to the Commander before
departure.
Post-flight security check of the aircraft interior ensures that the areas, where passengers
have had access during the flight (i.e. cabin, lavatories, galleys), are clear and that nothing
is left on board that may cause hazard to the aircraft. This check should be performed after
the passengers disembark the aircraft to ensure that no items have been left on-board by
the disembarked passengers.
At transit where passengers disembark the aircraft, the remaining passengers onboard
should be asked to identify their personal belongings so that any items left on-board by the
disembarked passengers can be readily identified.
The aim of the flight deck security check is to ensure that the aircraft has not been
interfered with in a manner which would jeopardise its safety. Checking of flight deck is
directly concerned with safe operation of the aircraft. Only flight crew or designated
personnel are competent to check this area.
The security checks and searches are conducted through visual inspection and by hand.
Inspection mirror may be used for crew convenience, in order to thoroughly search the
specific areas they cannot physically reach nor have easy access to.
State requirements and variations shall be observed about when the security checks or
security searches are to be conducted.
During an aircraft interior security check the following areas shall be checked:
Cabin: all overheads bins, lavatories, galleys, rubbish bins, storage bins, seat backs, seat
pockets, areas between and under the seats, crew compartments and other accessible
compartments in the aeroplane cabin. Life jacket pouches shall be examined for signs of
tampering and life jacket stowage areas inspected. This should be done on a random
basis Checking of the cabin is the responsibility of the cabin crew and shall be conducted
on an aeroplane in service during turn-around or during transit stop after service providers
have left the aeroplane. Completion of the inspections shall be reported by the CIC and
Aircraft Security Check form shall be signed and handed over to flight crew to be signed by
the Commander. By signing the Commander certifies that all parties involved have
reported completion of their part of the aeroplane security search.
An aircraft interior security search should include checking all areas defined above and in
addition, should include the examination of all life jacket pouches and life jacket stowage
areas.
Flight Deck: Searching of the flight deck is the responsibility of the flight crew or
maintenance staff, as applicable.
To ensure aircraft is airworthy, the Commander (or other designated flight crew member or
an authorized engineer) shall check the exterior of the aircraft.
During an aircraft exterior security check the following areas shall be checked:
Wheel well areas (areas visible without applying maintenance procedures to open doors),
cargo holds and adjacent areas, engine areas, stores contained within the cargo
compartment if accessible from outside without using any additional equipment
(compartments sealed need not to be checked, if the security seal is intact).
An aircraft exterior security search should include checking all areas defined above an in
addition, should include examination of all service panels and compartments. These areas
are accessible without the use of tools, keys, stairs or other aids.
Service panels and compartments to be checked during aircraft security exterior search:
Exterior security check/search of the aircraft exterior is the responsibility of flight crew or
authorized engineer, as applicable. Exterior security check may be combined with the
aircraft pre-flight inspection by the Commander or his delegate. Before the aircraft
undertakes the first flight of the day, and if circumstances dictate on turnarounds, the
Commander (or other designated flight crew member or an authorized engineer) when
inspecting the aircraft exterior, should be mindful of security considerations.
By signing the Aircraft Security Check form the Commander certifies that all parties
involved have reported completion of their part of the aeroplane security check/search.
Aircraft Security Check form needs to be filled-in and signed every time a security check or
search is conducted. The form must be filled and signed once the actual check is
completed, otherwise it is considered as false declaration to the Authorities.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 10 P: 10-9
SECURITY Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
There are two copies of each form. One copy of the form is kept at the departure station
for at least 24 hours, and one copy remains with the flight documentation, to be returned to
the OCC at the end of the flight.
Aircraft Security Checklist forms are available on board the aircraft and it falls under the
responsibility of the CIC to ensure that an adequate amount is always stocked.
Stocks of security seals should be stored on the flight deck. Seals shall be used to seal all
access doors, cargo holds and certain access hatches, according to aircraft type. If the
aircraft seal has been breached, a full check by crew or search by trained security staff
must be undertaken.
Crew are to wear their Company Identity Cards (ID cards) clearly visible on the outside of
their clothing when on duty at an airport (except when travelling on duty as a passenger).
Operating crew should remove and securely stow their cards once they board the aircraft.
Cabin crew should not wear their identity cards when serving in the cabin due to risk of
loss, theft or personal injury.
It is the individual’s responsibility to ensure his card remains valid and that he is familiar
with its conditions of issue and use. All reasonable care is to be taken to prevent loss or
theft of ID cards, particularly when off duty, due to the security implications of misuse. This
is even more serious if other identifying documents such as passports and licences are
lost or stolen at the same time. Loss or theft of an ID card should immediately be reported
to the Flight Dispatch (Operations Control Centre) or if away from base, to the Commander
and/or Station Manager.
Filming for professional reasons should only permitted with written permission of the
Safety & Security Manager. Aviation security processes for public transmission are strictly
prohibited.
Passengers filming for their own personal reason must also be reminded that filming of
any part of the security processes is not allowed by the Company. Security processes
include:
• Check in process and check in areas;
• Baggage reconciliation process;
Anyone acting strangely or refusing to turn a camera off should be reported to the police
and the Company at the earliest opportunity.
Crew members must pack their own baggage for a flight and ensure it is locked and
secure at all times while the baggage is under their possession.
Crew must not leave their baggage unattended at any point in time unless the baggage is
stored in a secure place (e.g. hotel baggage storage area, etc).
Crew shall ensure that there is no interference to their baggage during transport from the
hotel to the airport.
Crew must observe the local requirements practised by the airport for check-in of crew
baggage.
Each airport is required to establish an airport security program. This program must be
designed to meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – Annex 17, standard
4.1.1. The purpose of this security program is the prevention of unauthorized persons from
gaining access to aeroplane and the safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference.
Security must be considered in relation to the need to facilitate operations and should
conform to the principle that the scale of security measures is adequate to meet the
threats. This security program is the responsibility of the airport authorities.
Crew members shall not leave their baggage unattended at all times. Unattended baggage
is a violation of airport regulations and is subject to removal by airport police.
Crew members, ground staff, other supernumeraries and their hand baggage are
screened to the same level of screening as normal passengers. Airport authorities may put
measures in place to facilitate the screening points of crew or establish designated queues
for priority screening of crew members. Crew members shall comply with the local airport
screening requirements and procedures.
JC Airlines and contracted handling agents, cleaners and caterers shall ensure that all
personnel working under their authority in the restricted area of an airport, display airport
identification (ID) cards issued by the relevant issuing authority and/ or ID cards issued by
the Company. They shall also ensure that upon termination or suspension of employment,
the employee’s ID card is returned to the issuing authority and/or Company. Lost cards
must be notified to the issuing authority immediately.
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It is the responsibility of the handling agent to ensure that access to luggage tags,
boarding passes and ticket stocks, including those produced electronically, are limited to
authorised personnel and that they are strictly controlled to prevent unauthorised use.
Checked (hold) baggage (baggage loaded in cargo hold) are tagged appropriately so as to
allow their reconciliation with the travelling passengers. Hold baggage that is not tagged
are not forwarded to be loaded on board the aircraft.
If a piece of baggage does not correspond to a passenger of the specific flight, it is not
allowed to be transported unless handled as “rush” baggage. Rush (unaccompanied)
baggage are appropriately tagged and screened at the maximum screening level.
Should a checked-in passenger with hold baggage decides not to board the flight, his hold
baggage is located and removed from the aircraft. Baggage identification for removal in
this case, or any case where the number of baggage loaded is above the number recorded
in the loadsheet, is done by scanning the baggage tags.
In the remote case when the baggage cannot be located, as a last resort, a hold baggage
identification by the passengers can be applied.
The following three International Conventions on the suppression of violence against civil
aviation have been ratified by the Kingdom of Cambodia:
• Tokyo Convention: Convention on offences and certain other acts committed
onboard the aeroplane;
• Hague Convention: Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of
aeroplane;
• Montreal Convention: Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the
safety of civil aviation.
Since the Tokyo Convention contains provisions with regard to the powers of the aircraft
Commander and since the other two Conventions are not directly related to the authority
and duties of the aircraft crew, the next paragraphs only deal with the relevant provision of
the Tokyo Convention.
Unless the safety of flight is involved or certain specified State interests are involved, it
does not apply to offences of a political, racial or religious nature. The Convention applies
to offences committed onboard:
• Aeroplane in-flight; or
• Aeroplane on the surface of the high seas; or
• Aeroplane in any other area outside the territory of any State.
10.2.2.2 Jurisdiction
The State of Registration exercises jurisdiction over offences and acts committed onboard.
Crew members and passengers may also take reasonable preventative measures without
the authorization of the Commander if circumstances so require.
The flight deck door must stay locked during any passenger disturbance of any level, until
the situation is under control.
Procedures on ground
Cabin Crew:
• Attempt to resolve the situation verbally;
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible in order to enable disembarkation of
unruly passenger if situation cannot be resolved.
Flight crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew, ground personnel, or ATC as
required;
• Decide on requirement for disembarkation of passenger and the passenger's
baggage;
• Request for assistance from the authorities if needed.
Procedures in-flight
Cabin Crew:
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible;
• Attempt to resolve the situation verbally.
Flight Crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew.
Type of behaviour:
• Any form of physical abuse (grabbing, pushing, slapping, kicking another passenger
or crew member).
• Deliberate damage to company property (breaking of seats, panels etc.).
This type of behaviour should be approached with great care as it may easily escalate to a
Level 3 Incident. Flight crew should consider diverting and landing at the nearest airport
and request help from local authorities.
Procedures on ground
Cabin Crew:
• Attempt to resolve the situation verbally.
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible in order to enable disembarkation of
unruly passenger if situation cannot be resolved.
Flight crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew, ground personnel or ATC as required;
• Disembark passenger and the passenger's baggage;
• Request for assistance from the authorities.
Procedures in-flight
Cabin Crew:
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible;
• Attempt to resolve the situation verbally;
• Ask able-bodied passengers (ABP) for help, if needed.
Flight Crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew;
• Inform ATC or as required if cabin crew cannot regain control of the situation;
• Divert to nearest aerodrome if necessary.
Indicator of this type of incident is use of a weapon of any form and clearly (verbally or
nonverbally) expressed intention of the assailant to cause life-threatening bodily harm to a
passenger or crew member. Display or actual use of a weapon to cause harm, or even the
threat of a concealed weapon is life-threatening behaviour.
Procedures on ground
Cabin Crew:
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible;
• Do not attempt to open the flight deck (cockpit) door;
• Defend yourself and ask able-bodied passengers (ABP) or other passengers for
help;
• Attempt to regain control of the situation in the cabin and restore order.
Flight crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew, ground personnel, or ATC as
required;
• Lock the flight deck (cockpit) door. Do not open the door;
• Request for assistance from the authorities;
• Disable (park or block) the aeroplane in a manner that makes it unusable for the
assailant.
Procedures in-flight
Cabin crew:
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible;
• Stop service and block forward galley entrance with trolleys;
• Do not attempt to open the flight deck (cockpit) door;
• Defend yourself and ask able-bodied passengers (ABP) or other passengers for
help, use trolleys to separate you from the assailant;
• Attempt to regain control of the situation in the cabin and restore order.
Flight crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew, ATC or as required;
• Keep the flight deck (cockpit) door locked. Do not open the door;
• Provide the authorities with any information on the assailant;
• Declare emergency;
• Land at nearest airport.
Any attempt to break into the flight deck or gain unauthorised access to the flight deck in
order to gain control of the aeroplane and use it as weapon of mass destruction.
Procedures on ground
Cabin crew:
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible;
• Do not attempt to open the flight deck (cockpit) door;
• Defend yourself and ask able-bodied passengers (ABP) or other passengers for
help;
• Use any means available to eliminate the threat;
• Call for help using any means available;
• If possible, attempt to evacuate passengers from the aeroplane.
Flight crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew, ground personnel, or ATC as
required;
• Lock flight deck (cockpit) door. Do not open the door;
• Request for assistance from the authorities;
• Disable (park or block) the aeroplane in a manner that makes it unusable for the
assailant.
Procedures in-flight
Cabin crew:
• Inform the Commander as soon as possible;
• Do not attempt to open the flight deck (cockpit) door;
• Defend yourself and ask able-bodied passengers (ABP) or other passengers for
help;
• Use any means available to eliminate the threat.
Flight crew:
• Establish communication with the cabin crew and inform ATC or as required and
request for assistance from the authorities;
• Keep the flight deck (cockpit) door locked. Do not open the door;
• Declare emergency;
• Divert to nearest airport;
• Maintain control of aeroplane;
• Use all available means to defend the flight deck.
Restraint shall not be continued beyond the next point of landing unless:
• This point is in a non-contracting State and the authorities refuse disembarkation;
• Delivery to competent authorities is not possible because the point of landing is in a
non contracting State;
• The aeroplane makes a forced landing;
• The person agrees to onward travel under restraint.
The Commander shall advise the authorities as soon as possible and if possible before
landing that a person has been restrained and of the reasons for such a restraint.
The Commander may if necessary disembark any person of whom he has reasonable
grounds to believe that he has committed or is about to commit an offence onboard the
aeroplane. The disembarkation shall be reported to the State authorities at the point of
disembarkation, as well as the reason for the disembarkation.
When and for whatever reason, a passenger requires to disembark or decides not to travel
after checking in, the following procedure shall be strictly adhered to:
• Offload before boarding - if a checked (hold) baggage was handed over, the
baggage is traced and either is not loaded if it has not yet reached the aircraft, or is
offloaded from the aircraft;
• Offload after boarding - if any checked (hold) baggage is registered under
passenger’s name, the baggage is traced and offloaded. All his personal belongings
are identified and removed from the cabin. A positive identification of all cabin
baggage must be performed. This must include any carry-ons that may have been
transferred to the baggage hold. Any unidentified items are to be removed from the
aircraft. A security check of the area he was sitting (the row of the seat he occupied,
two rows in front and two rows behind it) and the parts of the cabin he had access
to (such as lavatories and galleys), shall be performed.
The Commander may deliver to the competent authorities at the point of landing any
person of whom he has grounds to believe that he has committed onboard an act which, in
his opinion, is a serious criminal offence according to the law of the State of registration.
This shall be reported to the authorities as soon as possible and if possible before landing
as well as the reason for the delivery.
The Commander shall provide the authorities with all relevant evidence and information.
10.2.2.8 Non-liability
Neither the Commander, nor any crew member any passenger, the carrier or charterer
can, under the Tokyo Convention, can be held liable in any proceeding on account of such
a treatment of an offender as is authorized under the Convention.
10.3 HIJACKING
10.3.1 General Policy
It is accepted that the crew may be unable to prevent the forcible seizure of an aeroplane.
A hijack attempt may occur anywhere at any time. Each set of circumstances will be
different. Any attempt to resist or overpower hijackers on the aeroplane must be
recognized as potentially excessively dangerous.
If there is a hijack situation, the flight crew will attempt to land as soon as possible at the
nearest aerodrome. Should a hostage be taken in the cabin in an attempt to gain access to
the flight deck, the flight deck door must on no account be opened. This may lead to very
stressful situation, depending on what is happening in the cabin.
It is a basic principle that the flight crew should stay with the aeroplane in order to retain as
much control over the situation as possible and to relay messages and information.
However there may be special circumstances when the escape of the flight crew would
improve the likelihood of a successful outcome and the saving of lives. Such a decision
rests with the Commander.
The Commander’s normal authority and responsibility for the safety and welfare of his
passengers, crew and aeroplane continues even in the event of unlawful interference. His
actions should take account of the demands of the hijacker only when they do not
jeopardise the safety of passengers and crew.
In-flight:
• Maintain control of the flight deck under all circumstances;
• Do not open flight deck door;
• Select transponder code 7500 (hijack) - if situation gets desperate, select
transponder code 7700;
• Keep seat belt signs ON;
• Divert and land as soon as possible at nearest suitable aerodrome so that the
situation can be resolved on the ground;
• Avoid violent aeroplane manoeuvres;
• Do not leave assigned flight deck seats.
On ground:
• Do not take-off;
• Attempt to return to apron without informing passengers as this may aggravate the
hijacker;
• After landing, the After Landing Checklist should be completed in its entirety;
• Block the aeroplane in any matter that prevents succeeding take-off;
• The Commander should keep the Authorities advised of requirements and attempt
to obtain the release of passengers and crew.
The Commander must expect the police or other Authorities to take control. It then
becomes his duty to comply with their instructions to the best of his ability consistent with
the safety of his passengers and crew. The Authorities will probably want to prevent the
aircraft taking off again. They will also be receiving technical advice and assistance from
many sources, including the Company, whereas the Commander should recognize that his
assessment of the situation is limited by the confines of the aircraft and the duress to
which he is subject. Therefore, no independent action should be taken unless absolutely
necessary.
If cabin crew are by any means able to communicate with the outside world, they should
try to pass as much information as possible, keeping to the facts and not giving guesses or
personal analyses.
When the aeroplane you were flying on has been involved in a hijacking case:
• Do not respond to questions of news reporters;
• Do not tell ‘interesting’ stories to friends and whoever else is willing to listen;
• If you really have to tell something at home, keep it simple and to the point.
Bomb threat is information, official, personal or anonymous, that an explosive device has
been or is said to be placed aboard the aeroplane.
The objective is to ensure that the response is controlled and appropriate to the risk as
assessed. Over reaction will cause unnecessary disruption to operations and, in the event
of a hoax, encourages copy-cat warnings.
Bomb warnings are most often made by telephone but are occasionally received in writing.
They are almost always anonymous. Although they are usually intended to cause a
nuisance, warnings do occasionally precede acts of terror. Each warning must therefore
be taken seriously and assessed methodically to determine its significance and the risk it
presents so that an appropriate response may be made.
After receiving the warning/threat, the Flight Dispatcher on duty must immediately:
• Inform the Safety and Security Department/Manager. It is important that all details
of the threat are reported for evaluation and accurate assessment of any further
action;
• Inform the police and airport authority.
If the threat does not specify another carrier, the service manager's/handling agent's first
action must be to ensure that no JC Airlines aeroplane departs from that aerodrome. He
must contact Air Traffic Control (ATC) and have the Commander of the aeroplane
informed. If the aeroplane is on the runway in preparation for take-off, the Commander
should be informed and he should ask permission of the airport authority to park the
aeroplane on a remote stand or return to the ramp.
In all cases the Commander of the aeroplane should be given the exact details of the
threat received to enable him to take all necessary precautions to ensure the safety of the
aeroplane and its occupants. The service manager/handling agent will also contact JC
Airlines Flight Dispatch (Operations Control Centre - OCC).
c) Passengers
Passengers must disembark and be requested to take their cabin baggage with them.
An evacuation of the aeroplane will be initiated by the Commander only if deemed
necessary.
the police if request for such assistance is received. Outside Kingdom of Cambodia
relevant local regulations apply.
If a bomb alarm would occur before take-off, or a bomb would be actually found, the
following actions should be taken:
• Inform the airport authorities and the station manager/handling agent;
• Request a suitable parking position and sufficient stairs for rapid disembarkation of
passengers and crew;
• If not available, consider the use of emergency evacuation equipment;
• Have all baggage, cargo and mail off-loaded (not by crew);
• Leave it to the proper authorities to search for and remove the bomb. The
Aeroplane Search Procedure checklist shall be handed to the authorities for use as
guidance;
• The search should be conducted to the satisfaction of the Commander;
• Crew members are not allowed to enter the aeroplane until the search for or
removal of the bomb is completed;
• Baggage should be identified by passengers before reloading;
• Consider leaving suspect cargo behind.
Questions may arise during the bomb search which can only be answered by flight and
cabin crew. Therefore, a crew member should remain available to answer these questions
until the search is completed. The carrying out of the search must be noted down in the
Aircraft Technical Log of the aeroplane.
Warning: If there is not enough time for the bomb search procedure to be completed with
regard to the predicted moment of the explosion, bomb search shall be abandoned.
Unless required by state authority, the decision to return, divert or continue the flight rests
with the Commander.
The Commander has to decide after evaluating the warning and remaining flight time,
whether an in-flight bomb search should be carried out and weather passengers should be
informed.
When information is received that a bomb could have been placed onboard the aeroplane,
a landing has to be made at the nearest suitable airport. In those cases where this is not
readily possible, the aeroplane should be searched during flight using the Aeroplane
Warning: In case a suspect object is found it is emphasized that it must not be touched
until an assessment is made. If a suspect object is assessed as a bomb follow aeroplane
type specific 'Bomb on Board' procedures (refer to OM Part B/QRH). If these are not
available follow the guidelines below.
It should be realized that the following is based on good judgement and available
information.
However, there is no ‘safe’ method for handling an explosive device. All information given
must therefore be considered to be advisory only.
• Inform appropriate ground station all available information on type of bomb and
attendant circumstances;
• Inform ATC; ask clearance for diversion and/or descent if necessary;
• Do not immediately inform passengers, unless necessary under the circumstances,
and if you have to, do it in a controlled voice, adding details on what actions are
planned, and order passengers to keep seated and fasten their seat belt. If possible
have passengers reseated away from the location of the bomb;
• Adjust altitude to equalize pressure inside and outside the aeroplane in order to
minimize possible explosion damage, maintain the existing cabin pressure as long
as possible;
• Slow down speed, extend landing gear, establish initial approach configuration;
• If the bomb can be moved and it has to be carried through the cabin, instruct
passengers to keep their heads down below the upper end of the seat backs;
• Place the bomb in the Least Risk Bomb Location (LRBL);
• Cover bomb by at least 25 cm of wetted blankets and pillows and pile up as many
soft articles (seat cushions, soft hand luggage, curtains, etc.) around it as practical.
Prevent water from entering the bomb by first applying a water resistant cover e.g. a
sheet of plastic;
• Disconnect electrical power to the bomb area;
• Prepare passengers for emergency landing.
Before landing:
Request a suitable parking position and sufficient stairs for rapid disembarkation; if not
available, consider the use of emergency evacuation equipment.
After disembarkation:
• Have all baggage and cargo off-loaded;
• Leave it to the proper authorities to search for and remove the bomb;
• The Aeroplane Search Procedure checklist shall be handed to the authorities for
use as guidance;
• The search should be conducted to the satisfaction of the Commander;
• Crew members are not allowed to enter the aeroplane until the search for or
removal of the bomb is completed;
• Baggage should be identified by passengers before reloading;
• Consider to leave suspect cargo behind.
Items within an aircraft search checklist provide guidance on the search for an explosive or
any other suspicious device on board the aeroplane. An Aircraft Security Checklist shall be
carried on board the aircraft (Documents Folder) and shall also be available at any
Company station. The checklist shall be supported by guidance on the appropriate course
of action to be taken should a bomb or suspicious object be found and by information on
the least-risk bomb location specific to the aeroplane. If necessary, the checklist shall be
handed over to the government officials concerned.
Security searches shall also be carried out when an aircraft is suspected of being the
target of an act of unlawful interference. The difference between the security checks and
security searches is only in the degree and thoroughness of the search or check and these
will be dictated by each particular situation.
The designated isolated aircraft parking position will likely prove to be the best location on
the airport at which an aircraft subjected to a specific threat can be searched. Airport
contingency plans recognize that it may not always be possible and identify alternative
positions. Routine security searches or security checks may be carried out while the
aircraft is in the normal gate or apron parking position.
Security searches and security checks should be carried out in good lighting conditions
which may require the use of auxiliary power units or the attachment of ground power lines
to the aircraft. It will be necessary to impose and maintain control access to the aircraft
before starting the search / check which should be carried out with the minimum number of
persons on board.
Searchers should be briefed not to touch suspicious objects but to notify the search
coordinator, mark the location with a prominent object (without touching the suspect item)
and withdraw from the immediate area to await further instructions. When a suspect object
is discovered the possibility of secondary devices should not be discounted.
Hand held communications are useful for coordination of the search and are often the only
way of ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation.
However, once a suspect device has been located those using hand held communications
should immediately move away and ensure that they and anyone else in the area move
outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used within 25m of a
suspect device.
All entrance doors, hatches, inlet and exhaust ducts, service and access doors etc must
be opened to allow the necessary access to all areas to be inspected. However, a check
must be made to ensure that all doors and covers which were opened for inspection
purposes are closed on conclusion of the search.
It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive
devices as they can be disguised in many ways. Search teams should be briefed to look
for unidentified objects or anything:
• That should not be there;
• That cannot be accounted for; and
• That is out of place.
Items to be checked during aircraft search are listed in details below. Refer also to Aircraft
Security Check/Security Search in paragraph 10.1.4.3.
Flight Deck
Cabin
Fuselage
Areas below the following doors, panels, and access plates and openings have to be
inspected:
Avionics Compartment
Cargo Holds
Bulk Compartment
1. Nose and main landing gear wheel wells including doors and cavities
2. Wing rear spar in area of main gear
3. Hydraulic ground service panel
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4. Nose and main landing gear with wheels, wheel hubs, brakes, struts and
attachment parts
Wing LH and RH
Warning:
If a suspect device is found in the cabin, do not cut or disconnect any wires and do not
open or attempt to gain entry to internal components of a closed or concealed suspect
device. Any attempt may result in an explosion.
Alternate locations must not be used without consulting with an aviation explosives
security specialist. Never take a suspect device to the flight deck.
The least risk bomb location for the aircraft structure and systems is center of the RH
aft cabin door.
10.4.5 In Conclusion
When the aeroplane you were flying on has been involved in a bomb alert case:
• Do not respond to questions of news reporters;
• Do not tell ‘interesting’ stories to friends and whoever else is willing to listen;
• If you really have to tell something at home, keep it simple and to the point.
The overall purpose of accident and occurrence notification, handling and reporting is to:
• Provide, as expeditiously as possible and by the quickest means available, a
maximum of help/medical aid to all persons involved regardless of whether they
have already fallen victims to an accident or whether they are immediately
threatened and, of secondary importance, to keep damages to property to a
minimum;
• Prevent, where possible, the reoccurrence of a similar accident or incident.
The first purpose requires extremely fast and smooth cooperation between involved
authorities (e.g. ATS, Search and Rescue (SAR) Services) and JC Airlines (e.g. by
providing to rescue coordination centres lists containing detailed information on the
emergency and survival equipment carried onboard, or by providing other essential
information relating to the individual flight - relevant technical/maintenance details,
information on possible dangerous goods onboard, OFP details, fuel endurance, number
of passengers and crew). Needless to say, these requirements can only be met by
notification of all parties involved, by the quickest means available. The second purpose
requires all evidence to be secured, originals and copies of documents (e.g. weight and
balance documents, Aircraft Technical Log, Operational Flight Plan, take-off data,
passenger list, cargo papers, manuals) to be seized and safeguarded, flight recorder and
cockpit voice recorder records to be preserved, a report by the Commander to be
submitted, a hearing to be held by the Company, and an accident investigation by the
state of occurrence. In connection with this second purpose, defined reporting procedures
have to be met by the Company. The authorities involved are required, after sifting and
weighing all evidence, to publish a report where necessary, and to specify
recommendations or prescribe action(s) in order to prevent a reoccurrence of a similar
incident/accident. Accidents and serious incidents are subject to investigation under the
authority of the State of occurrence, in line with the requirements and recommendations of
ICAO Annex 13.
JC Airlines and its Pilots-In-Command are required to report any accidents, incidents or
occurrences which endangers, or unless corrected, would have endangered the flight crew
and passengers and aircraft (such as unlawful interference, etc.). The written report is to
be submitted by the quickest means available, within 24 hours to the SSCA.
11.2 DEFINITIONS
11.2.1 Accident
Accident is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time
as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
• A person suffers a fatal or serious injury;
• The aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which adversely affects its
strength, performance or flight characteristics requiring a major repair or
replacement;
• The aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
It does not include engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its
cowling or accessories, damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennae, tyres, brakes,
fairings, small dents or punctured holes in the aircraft skin.
Fatal injury: An injury resulting in death within 30 days of the date of the accident is
classified as a fatal injury by ICAO.
Serious injury: Serious injury is an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and
which:
• Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days
from the date the injury was received; or
• Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose);
or
• Involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon
damage; or
• Involves injury to any internal organ; or
• Involves second or third degree burns, or
• Any burns affecting more than 5% of the body surface; or
• Involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation.
Missing aircraft: An aircraft is considered missing when the official search has been
terminated and the wreckage has not been located.
The list is not exhaustive and only serves as guidance with respect to the definition of
serious incident:
• A near collision requiring an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid a collision or an unsafe
situation or when an avoidance action would have been appropriate (AIRPROX);
• Controlled flight into terrain only marginally avoided;
• Take-offs or aborted take-offs from a closed or engaged runway, from a taxiway,
excluding authorised operations by helicopters, or from an unassigned runway;
• Landings or attempted landings on a closed or engaged runway, on a taxiway,
excluding authorised operations by helicopters, or from an unassigned runway;
• Gross failures to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb;
• Fires and smoke in the passenger compartment, in cargo compartments or engine
fires, even though such fires were extinguished by the use of extinguishing agents;
• Events requiring the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew;
• Aeroplane structural failure or engine disintegration, including uncontained turbine
engine failures, not classified as an accident;
• Multiple malfunctions of one or more aeroplane systems seriously affecting the
operation of the aeroplane;
• Flight crew incapacitation in flight;
• Fuel quantity requiring the declaration of an emergency by the pilot;
• Runway incursions classified with severity A according to the Manual on the
Prevention of Runway Incursions (ICAO Doc 9870) which contains information on
the severity classifications;
• Take-off or landing incidents - incidents such as undershooting, overrunning or
running off the side of runways;
• System failures, weather phenomena, operation outside the approved flight
envelope or other occurrences which could have caused difficulties controlling the
aeroplane, failure of more than one system in a redundancy system mandatory for
flight guidance and navigation.
11.2.3 Incident
11.2.4 Occurrence
Occurrence is any safety related event which endangers or which, if not corrected or
addressed, could endanger an aircraft, each occupant or any other person and includes in
particular an accident or serious incident process conducted for the purpose of accident
prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of
conclusions, including the determination of causes, and when appropriate, the making of
safety recommendations.
Declaration of any of the three phases defined below will be made by ATS only. ICAO
(refer to Annex 11) has defined the following three emergency phases for use by Air Traffic
Services and Search and Rescue Services:
• Uncertainty Phase;
• Alert Phase;
• Distress Phase.
In order to meet the aims of providing immediate assistance to victims and threatened
persons and to minimize damages, it is of the highest importance that, whoever is the first
to know of an accident having occurred is suspected or has been reported (ATS or other
Authority, Commander, station manager / supervisor / flight dispatcher, any employee of
JC Airlines, responsible agent of the contracted handling organization) shall notify the JC
Airlines Flight Dispatch/Operations Control Centre (OCC) by the quickest means available.
Regardless of action already taken by the authorities, JC Airlines shall endeavour to inform
local authorities (e.g. police departments), and medical services (hospitals, ambulances,
doctors).
JC Airlines has established procedures to ensure that the nearest appropriate Authority is
notified by the quickest available means of any accident, involving the aeroplane, resulting
in serious injury (as defined in ICAO Annex 13) or death of any person or substantial
damage to the aeroplane or property.
JC Airlines will, at home base, be at first (during the first hour) represented by the
Operations Control Centre (flight dispatcher on duty), thereafter by the Flight Operations
Management. In case of an accident having occurred outside home base, the Company
shall be represented by the station manager or handling agent manager of station nearest
during the first hour, thereafter by the Flight Operations Management.
The Commander shall submit a report to the Authority of any accident onboard, resulting in
serious injury to, or death of, any person onboard while he was responsible for the flight.
1) Immediately after an accident on land, or a ditching, and following the evacuation of the
passengers to either a sheltered location upwind of the aircraft, or into the life raft, the
Commander should ensure that the following items are carried out:
• Subject to safety and the prevailing situation the aircraft should be left in a safe
condition with fuel off and aircraft batteries disconnected and equipment such as
first aid kits, survival packs and fire extinguishers removed;
• A headcount should be made to account for all persons on board at the time of
the accident. In the event of a person or persons being unaccounted for, action
should be taken to recover them or locate their whereabouts;
The aircraft Commander (Pilot-In-Command) shall report in a timely manner the following:
• To the nearest Authority and to the Company, by the quickest available means, any
accident or serious incident resulting in injury, death or substantial aircraft damage
or property;
• Any occurrence or event that has or could have jeopardized the safety of the
operation, the airplane and/or any of its occupants;
• The Commander shall notify the appropriate local authority without delay in the
event of any emergency situation that necessitated action in violation of local
regulations and/or procedures and submit, if required by the state of occurrence, a
report to the appropriate local authority and also to the SSCA;
• Any situation or event that has or may have put the company, the operation, himself
and/or the crew in a non-compliant posture with laws or regulations that might be
applicable to the operation of Company’s aeroplanes.;
• Any significant complaints of passengers, service supplier, airport management and
Civil Aviation Authority involved in the airplane operation for which the Commander
is in charge for the particular flight(s) in question.
Note: In the event that the Commander is incapable of providing notification, this task shall
be undertaken by any other member of the crew if they are able to do so, note being taken
of the succession of command specified in OM Part A, Chapter4.
Upon FDM finding of significant risk-bearing incident not reported, the crew will be offered
to retrospectively file an occurrence report and will be reminded to file reports in a pro-
active manner. Repetitive failure to report incident will be brought to the attention of his
Chief Pilot and Flight Operations Manager.
behalf via the Operations Control Centre. The Commander is responsible to notify the
Company by any appropriate means and he should follow this notification with a safety
report using the ASR system as soon as is reasonably possible.
The investigation of an accident / incident serves to uncover the chain of events, its
causes and consequently should prevent re-occurrence. For that purpose, the Company
shall secure all documents and papers at headquarters, maintenance base and aerodrome
of last departure which may be of relevance.
Flight Recorders comprise two systems: a flight data recorder and a cockpit voice
recorder.
To preserve flight recorder records, flight recorders must be de-activated upon completion
of flight time following an accident or incident. The flight recorder must not be re-activated
before their disposition as determined in accordance with ICAO Annex 13.
Following an accident or serious incident, the Commander should stop the CVR by pulling
the associated circuit breaker after landing; this will prevent the recording being
overwritten. The FDR will stop recording automatically after the second engine is
shutdown and requires no flight crew action. The original recorded data pertaining to the
accident shall be retained by the Company in a safe custody for a period of 60 days or
longer if requested by the SSCA (Authority).
The need for removal of the flight recorder records from the aircraft will be determined by
the investigating Authority in the State conducting the investigation with due regard to the
seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the
operation.
The Commander must ensure, to the extent possible, in the event the aeroplane becomes
involved in an accident or incident, the preservation of all related flight recorder records,
and if necessary the associated flight recorders, and their retention in safe custody
pending their disposition as determined in accordance with ICAO Annex 13.
Flight data recordings will be made available to the SSCA and investigating Authority (as
applicable) on request.
Important: JC Airlines will not initiate disciplinary proceedings against an employee who
discloses an incident or occurrence involving flight safety. This policy shall not apply to
information provided to the Company by a source other than the employee or in the case
of negligent behaviour and/or deliberate violations.
11.4.6 Just Culture Concept vs. Negligent Behaviour and Deliberate Violations
In spite of Company’s firm determination regarding just culture concept there might be
situations where behaviour of the crew member cannot be tolerated.
In such cases crew member will not be protected against Company’s discipline actions
even if occurrence report (ASR, etc.) has been filed by him.
The Company’s Confidential Reporting Scheme follows the normal ASR procedure except
details to identify the reporter need not be provided (anonymously). This is open to any
staff member to report any potentially unsafe act or procedure.
The less information available the more difficult resolution will be and personnel is
encouraged to include maximum detail or contact a trusted manager. Confidential safety
reports will be received by the Safety Department and may be handed for evaluation to
either the Safety Manager or a manager from any of the Company’s departments (Flight
Operations Department, Engineering/Maintenance Department, Ground Operations
Department or Training Department).
All personnel should be cognisant that confidential/anonymous reports used for personal
gain could damage the company safety programme and is deemed unacceptable.
In addition to raising an ASR, the flight crew will have to notify the concerned air traffic
service unit as soon as possible if any of the following events occurs:
• A near collision with any other flying object;
• Faulty air traffic procedures or non-compliance with applicable procedures by air
traffic services or by the flight crew;
• Failure of air traffic services facilities;
• Whenever an aircraft in flight has manoeuvred in response to a TCAS Resolution
Advisory (RA);
• Unforecast or severe weather, icing, windshear, severe turbulence;
• Volcanic ash observed or encountered;
• Bird strike;
• Birds or large animals in the vicinity of the airport or runway;
• Any incident involving Dangerous Goods on board;
• Irregularity in a ground or navigational facility, inadequacy of navigational facilities
or undesirable navigational aid, facilities and infrastructure performance, braking
action;
• Unable to accept or maintain RVSM and reason (e.g. turbulence, mountain wave,
wake turbulence, etc.), loss of navigational capability;
• Security breaches, air piracy, unlawful interference or other hostile acts that
threaten the safety of the aircraft or its passengers;
• Unmanned free balloons posing a threat to the aircraft, downed aircraft observation
or ELT broadcast.
An initial notification shall be made as soon as possible by R/T to the concerned air traffic
service unit (or by telephone upon landing, if not possible in the air) in the following format:
• TCAS RA:
Example: “JC AIRLINES 558, TCAS RA”
Other hazards:
• Type of HAZARD or BIRD STRIKE,
• Position,
• Time,
• Level,
• Heading,
• Weather conditions.
The initial notification to the concerned air traffic service unit shall be subsequently
confirmed on a Company ASR form (and/or other applicable form; e.g. Volcanic Activity
Report (VAR) Form). The ASR form is not to be used for the initial notification.
Accidents and serious incidents will always be investigated within the Company regardless
of external investigations. Decision to introduce investigation of all other
events/occurrences will be judged based on risk assessment matrix presented in OM Part
A, Chapter 11.5.1.
The objective of an investigation is to discover the facts and, if possible, establish the
cause of an incident. It is not the function of investigators to decide whether any person
has been negligent or to allocate blame. The presence or absence of negligence has to be
decided by others after the investigators have finished their work and all the facts are
known. Disciplinary proceedings are outside the realm of flight safety and beyond the
scope of this manual.
Any person in the Company may forward initiative to Safety Manager to start the
investigation of an event/occurrence. In such cases initiatives will be evaluated on
appropriate safety management levels before final decision to start the investigation is
taken. Investigation shall always start immediately if requested by Accountable Manager,
Flight Operations Manager or Safety Manager.
Note: Some countries require forwarding the urine and blood samples of crew for
examination following an accident/incident.
The aircraft accident investigation will always be conducted by the authority of an ICAO
state. Guidance material will be the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation, Doc
6920. It may be expected that the Company representative will also be invited to be an
observer to the official investigation.
For the general knowledge of operations management personnel, the following text is
extract from ICAO Annex 13; Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation:
The State of Occurrence shall take all reasonable measures to protect the evidence and to
maintain safe custody of the aircraft and its contents for such a period as may be necessary
for the purposes of an investigation.
The State of Occurrence shall forward notification of accident / serious incident with a
minimum of delay to: the State of Registry, the State of the Operator, the State of Design, the
State of Manufacture, and ICAO.
Upon receipt of the notification, the State of Registry, the State of the Operator, the State of
Design and the State of Manufacture shall, as soon as possible, provide the State of
Occurrence with all relevant information available. They shall also inform the State of
Occurrence of the name of their accredited representative, whether he will participate in the
investigation and on the date of his arrival. Each State entitled to appoint an accredited
representative shall also be entitled to appoint one or more advisers to assist this
representative in the investigation. The State of Registry or the State of the Operator shall
appoint one or more advisers nominated by the operator to assist its representative.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 11 P: 11-13
HANDLING OF ACCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
The State of Occurrence shall institute an investigation into the circumstances of the accident,
and shall be responsible for the conduct of the investigation. It may delegate the whole or any
part of the conduct of such investigation to the State of Registry or the State of the Operator.
Whenever the location of the accident / serious incident cannot definitely be established as
being in the territory of any State, the State of Registry shall institute and conduct any
necessary investigation, however, it may delegate the whole or part of the investigation to
another State by mutual agreement and consent. States nearest the scene of an accident in
international waters shall provide such assistance as they are able and shall, likewise, respond
to requests by the State of Registry.
The accident investigation authority shall have independence in the conduct of the
investigation and have unrestricted authority over its conduct.
Safety occurrences are by definition events in which there was a deviation from the
desired system state, resulting in loss or damage to equipment or personnel, or increased
potential for such outcomes. Every occurrence thus provides an opportunity to study how
the deviation occurred, and to identify ways of preventing it from happening again.
A key objective of the “Just Culture” concept is to provide fair treatment for people who
have committed “normal” human errors (“honest” slips, lapses, mistakes), and apply
sanctions only where actions were intentional violations or in some sense reckless or
negligent. This philosophy was designed to counter the very strong natural inclination to
blame individuals for errors that contributed to an accident or an incident.
The way in which accidents or incidents are investigated and reported can create an
impression of blame, or searching for those responsible, even when the stated objective
includes not apportioning blame. An investigation that does not seek contextual conditions
that influenced human involvement, or deeper systemic factors, will inevitably highlight
human error as “the cause”. The implemented occurrence analysis methodology supports
the tenets of Just Culture in two ways:
• It clearly broadens the focus of an investigation from the “active failures” of
operational personnel to the latent conditions originating from deeper within the
organization that set the context for the event;
• When referring to the involvement of human operators, it adopts language which as
far as possible avoids an imputation of blame. Even terms such as “unsafe acts”
might be deemed to imply that there was something knowingly unsafe about the
person’s action or inaction, when clearly this is not the case in the majority of
events.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 11 P: 11-14
HANDLING OF ACCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
It should also be noted that a truly systemic approach is not simply a means of transferring
responsibility for a safety occurrence from front-line employees to senior managers. A
consistent philosophy must be applied, where the investigation process seeks to correct
deficiencies wherever they may be found, without attempting to apportion blame. The
responsibility for identifying unacceptable or irresponsible behaviour (e.g., wilful rule
breaking, negligence) lies outside the bounds of the safety investigation process.
All reported events/occurrences within the Company Safety Management System should
be assessed regarding risk hazard as shown in the assessment matrix. For detailed
description refer to JC Airlines’ Safety Management System (SMS) Manual.
5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
Probability <
3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
Severity>
Probability classification:
5 - Frequent (likely to occur many times - has occurred frequently);
4 - Occasional (likely to occur sometimes - has occurred infrequently);
3 - Remote (unlikely to occur, but possible - has occurred rarely);
2 - Improbable (very unlikely to occur - not known to have occurred);
1 - Extremely improbable (almost inconceivable that the event will occur).
Severity classification:
A - Catastrophic (equipment destroyed, multiple deaths);
B - Hazardous (serious injury, a large reduction in safety margins, major equipment
damage);
C - Major (a significant reduction in safety margins, serious incident, injury to persons);
D - Minor (nuisance, operating limitations, use of emergency procedures, minor incident);
E - Negligible (few or no consequences relevant to safety).
Investigation is:
• Required for events/occurrences marked 5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B and 3A;
• Optional for events/occurrences marked 5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B
and 2C;
• Not required for events/occurrences marked 3E, 2D, 2E, 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D and 1E.
If an in-flight emergency occurs and the situation permits, the Commander shall inform the
appropriate ATS units of any dangerous goods on board.
Commander and/or Company must, on request, provide Authority any information required
to minimise the hazards created by any dangerous goods carried.
The information to be provided should include the proper shipping name, UN number (if
assigned), class, subsidiary risk(s) for which labels are required, the compatibility group for
Class 1 and the quantity and location on board the aeroplane.
This section with its subsections gives guidance on events for which an Air Safety Report
(ASR) or Occurrence Report, as applicable, must be filed. The list is not exhaustive but in
general terms, any event which compromised safety, or which was avoided but had the
potential to compromise safety, should be reported on the JC Airlines’ Air Safety Report
(ASR) or Occurrence Report form.
The Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) scheme is fundamental to its purpose that
the substance of reports should be disseminated in the interests of flight safety. All JC
Airlines flight safety-related incidents will be submitted on the Air Safety Report (ASR) or
Occurrence Report form, which must be completed in full.
Without prejudice to the proper discharge of its responsibilities, the Safety Department will
not disclose the name of the person submitting a report. Should any flight safety follow-up
action be necessary, the Safety Department will take all reasonable steps to avoid
disclosing the identity of the reporter or of individuals involved in the occurrence. The
information provided will be entered into the flight safety database so that the status of any
occurrence can be monitored. The Safety Manager will decide whether or not to submit the
report to the SSCA, depending on the SSCA mandatory reporting criteria.
The objective of Air Safety Report (ASR) and Occurrence Report is to enable the JC
Airlines to identify the cause of the event to ensure that suitable corrective action is taken,
and not to apportion blame to individuals involved.
Whenever the Flight Envelope contains an ASR or Occurrence Report, the Commander
must tick YES under the MOR/CAPT REPORT ATTACHED on the Journey Log.
Note: If an ASR or Occurrence Report is upgraded and submitted to the Authority the
reporter must be advised accordingly.
The following definitions in the context of Air Safety Report are being used:
Airprox – Airprox (Aircraft Proximity) means any situation in which, in the opinion of the
pilot or ATC personnel, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and
speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved was or may have been
compromised, and a risk of collision existed. JC Airlines pilots must report such incidents
on the frequency in use and submit an ASR.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 11 P: 11-18
HANDLING OF ACCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
Air Traffic Incident – Air Traffic Incident means any incident in which aircraft appear to
have less separation than the pilot expected, although there was no risk of collision.
Wake Turbulence – Wake Turbulence means any significant air disturbance caused by a
preceding aircraft.
Heavy Landing – A heavy landing is a landing in which the impact is so severe that the
Commander considers an engineering check of structural integrity on the aircraft is
necessary before the next departure.
• AVOIDANCE MANOEUVRES:
- Risk of collision with another aeroplane, terrain or other object or an unsafe
situation when avoidance action would have been appropriate;
- An avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with another
aeroplane, terrain or other object;
- An avoidance manoeuvre to avoid other unsafe situations.
• TAKE-OFF or LANDING INCIDENTS, including precautionary or forced landings.
Incidents, such as under-shooting, overrunning or running off the side of runways
(including take-offs, rejected take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a closed,
occupied or incorrect runway).
• REJECTED TAKE-OFF after take-off power is established.
• Runway or taxiway EXCURSION: if any part of the aircraft leaves the paved surface
during taxiing, take-off or landing.
• Significant HANDLING difficulties that affect the safety of the aircraft.
• RUNWAY INCURSIONS.
• Critically LOW FUEL quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of
usable fuel.
• LOSS OF CONTROL (including partial or temporary) regardless of cause.
• GO-AROUND producing a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation.
• EXCEEDANCE OF THE LIMITING PARAMETERS for the AIRCRAFT
CONFIGURATION or UNINTENTIONAL SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION from airspeed,
intended track or altitude (more than 300 ft) regardless of cause.
• DESCENT BELOW decision height/altitude or minimum descent height/altitude
without the required visual reference.
• LOSS OF POSITION AWARENESS relative to actual position or to other aeroplane.
• BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION between flight crew (CRM) or between flight
crew and other parties (cabin crew, ATC, engineering).
• HEAVY (HARD) LANDING - a landing deemed to require a ‘heavy landing check’.
• EXCEEDANCE of FUEL IMBALANCE LIMITS.
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 11 P: 11-19
HANDLING OF ACCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
11.7.1.2 Emergencies
• FIRE, EXPLOSION, SMOKE or toxic or noxious FUMES, even though fires were
extinguished.
• The use of any NON-STANDARD PROCEDURE by the flight or cabin crew to deal
with an emergency when:
- The procedure exists but is not used;
- The procedure does not exist;
- The procedure exists but is incomplete or inappropriate;
- The procedure is incorrect;
- The incorrect procedure is used.
• INADEQUACY OF any PROCEDURES designed to be used in an emergency,
including when being used for maintenance, training or test purposes.
• An event leading to an EMERGENCY EVACUATION.
• DEPRESSURIZATION.
• The use of any EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT or prescribed EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES in order to deal with a situation.
• An event leading to the declaration of an EMERGENCY (‘MAYDAY’ or ‘PANPAN’).
• FAILURE OF any EMERGENCY SYSTEM or EQUIPMENT, including all exit doors
and lighting, to perform satisfactorily, including when being used for maintenance,
training or test purposes.
• Events requiring any use of EMERGENCY OXYGEN by any crew member.
11.7.1.3 Medical
• INCAPACITATION of any member of the crew, including that which occurs prior to
departure, if it is considered that it could have resulted in incapacitation after take-
off.
• When crew members or passengers become SERIOUSLY ILL or are INJURED.
• Occurrences, which have or could have led to SIGNIFICANT INJURY to
passengers or crew but which are not considered reportable as an accident.
11.7.1.4 Meteorology
11.7.1.5 Security
• Leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which resulted in a FIRE
HAZARD or possible hazardous contamination of aeroplane structure, systems or
equipment, or risk to occupants.
• Malfunction or defect of any indication system when this results in the possibility of
MISLEADING INDICATIONS to the crew.
• SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALL of the ACTUAL PERFORMANCES compared to the
approved performance which resulted in a hazardous situation (taking into account
the accuracy of the performance - calculation method) including braking action, fuel
consumption etc.
• ASYMMETRY OF FLIGHT CONTROLS; e.g. flaps, slats, spoilers etc.
• Near collision incidents (encompassing specific situations where one aeroplane and
another aeroplane/ground/vehicle/person or object are perceived to be too close to
each other):
- Separation minima infringement;
- Inadequate separation;
- Near-controlled flight into terrain (near CFIT);
- Runway incursion where avoiding action was necessary.
• Potential for collision or near collision (encompassing specific situations having the
potential to be an accident or a near collision, if another aeroplane is in the vicinity):
- Runway incursion where no avoiding action is necessary;
- Runway excursion;
- Aeroplane deviation from ATC clearance;
- Aeroplane deviation from applicable air traffic management (ATM) regulation.
• ATM-specific occurrences (encompassing those situations where the ability to
provide safe ATM services is affected, including situations where, by chance, the
safe operation of aeroplane has not been jeopardized). This shall include the
following occurrences:
- Inability to provide air traffic services;
The following list gives examples of reportable ATM occurrences resulting from the
application of the general criteria listed in paragraph above:
• Provision of significantly incorrect, inadequate or misleading information from any
ground sources, e.g. air traffic control (ATC), automatic terminal information service
(ATIS), meteorological services, navigation databases, maps, charts, manuals, etc.;
• Provision of less than prescribed terrain clearance;
• Provision of incorrect pressure reference data (i.e. altimeter setting);
• Incorrect transmission, receipt or interpretation of significant messages when this
results in a hazardous situation;
• Unauthorized penetration of airspace;
• Failure of ANS ground or satellite facilities;
• Major ATC/ATM failure or significant deterioration of aerodrome infrastructure;
• Aerodrome movement areas obstructed by aeroplane, vehicles, animals or foreign
objects, resulting in a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation;
• Errors or inadequacies in marking of obstructions or hazards on aerodrome
movement areas resulting in a hazardous situation;
• Failure, significant malfunction or unavailability of aerodrome lighting.
• Failure, malfunction or defect of ground equipment used for the testing or checking
of aeroplane systems and equipment when the required routine inspection and test
procedures did not clearly identify the problem, where this results in a hazardous
situation.
• Non-compliance or significant errors in compliance with required servicing
procedures.
• Loading of contaminated or incorrect type of fuel or other essential fluids (including
oxygen and potable water).
11.8 FORMS
11.8.1 General
r SR NUMBER
0
3 . DETAILS OF FLIGHT
DATE (DD/MM/YY} TIME (UTC) FLIGHT NO. ROUTE: SQUAWK
fl:l/(; l'·n / l:'·c;;: AC: FH/FC
A/C TYPE REGISTRATION PAX/CREW ATL REF. NO. l AIC WEIGHT RVSM
NIA 0
4. FLIGHT PHASE
PAh tNG 0 'rowiNG 0 PUSH BA CK 0 TAXI-OUT 0 TAKE-
OFF 0 I NITI AL
CLIMB 0 CLIM B 0
CRUISE 0 DESCENT 0 HOLDING 0 APPROACH 0 LANDING 0 TAXI-IN 0
L._,, ... :.l..~.,lt{e]l
A LTITUDE/FL I SPEED/MACH I GEOGRAPHICAL POSmON ( IF RELEVANT )
ll~.:.Y.L....'l•J~IOII{C'ltJ :f':,f(tJ.:
A/P
N/A 0 IA/TH R
N/A 0
IG EAR
N/A 0
! SLATS/FLAPS CONF
N/A 0
ISPOJLERS
N/A 0
W4.e!.t t.:I•Jif {tl.:l--'1Uliiaiii.. (C10J·l~~~ ..~lto • ' !.ll.'
··iiiHI¢d@;QeljlliiJ@3gl
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ISIG!MlUIIE, ....
W~!' YOU P.WMf OF OTHFR A/C 8fFOIItf
INCIDENT? I
If you ,conslde .. this
A ir Safety Report
~vant requiring 11 Mand2l!tol'y
Page 2
Occul'l'~n,co Report, plcb!ie tick hel'e.
•
Rev 00/10 Jan 2017
Data of parents
Full name offather: Passport/ID No:
Home address:
t.Location of incident:
o Aisle o Seat o Door
0 ~~ 0 ~~~~
n Other (Please state) ....•..............•..•..•.........•........•.....•.•..............•...•.•..
3. Meassures taken:
o Preflight off-load o Warning given to passenger o Restraint applied
o Pollee called o Unscheduled landing o Arrest made by the pollee
o cancellation of onward flight
Witness 1
IName: Isignature
Witness 2
IName: Isignature
Time Personal account to include evidence of intoxicants, word spoken, Crew member
gestures, threats, physical or verbal abuse and danger t o others (Print name)
Commander's signature:
Pollee Officer-In-Charge:
Name: Address:
Flight Disturbance lnc1dent Report Rev. 00 I 10 Jan 2017
Type of injury
Was medical treatment offered? YES NO
If yes, did the passenger or YES NO
crew member* accept it?
If the crew member is injured, Air Safety Report (ASR) shall be filled. If the illness resulted from crew
incapacitation, ASR shall be filled.
Please attach medical report signed by the Airport Medical Department, w hen applicable.
One copy: Ground staff/ground handling agent.
Injury/Illness Report Rev. 00 I 10 Jan 2017
14. UNIID no. (when known): 15. CJassiCIIVislon (when known): r6 Subsidiary risk(s):
17. Packing group 16. Category (class 7 only)' 19. Type of packaging·
23. RefersiiC9 no. of Air Waybill· 24 Reference no of courier pouch, baggago tag, CN ()Sssenger ticket·
21>. Other relevant Information {Including suspected Ci.lUSe, any action taken):
21. Name and title or person making report: 28. Telephone no.:
Notes:
1. Any type of dangerous goods occurrence must be reported, irrespective of whether the dangerous goods are
contained in cargo, mail or baggage.
2. A dangerous goods accident is an occurrence associated with and related to tile transport of dangerous goods
which results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property damage. For thb purpose, a senous injury
is an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and which: (a) requires hospitalisation for more than
48 hours, commencing from the time the injury was received ; (b) results in fracture of any bones (except small
fr<~ctu rP.s of fingf'rs, toP.s o r nosf' ); (c) involvf's l<icf'ratia ns w hich cauSf' Sf'Vf'rf' h<IP.morrhagf', nf'rVf', musclf' or
tendon damage; (d) involves injury to any internal organ; (e) involves second or third degree burns, or any burns
ilffP.cting more than 5'1!, af the body surfilcP.; or (f) involvP.s verified exposurE' to infP.ctious substancP.s ar injurious
radiation. A dangerous goods accident may also be an aircraft accident, in which case the normal procedure f or
dangf'rous goods accidf'nts must be followf'd.
3. A dan gP.rous goads incident is an accurrP.nce, oth f'r t han a dangP.rous goads <~ccident, associatP.d with and
related to the transport of d;mgeraus goods, not necessarily occurring on board an aircraft, which results in
injury to a pP.rson, prapP.rt y damage, fi rP., brP.a~ilgf', spill<~ gP., lf'ilkage of fluid or radiation or othP.r f'vidP.ncf' t hilt
the intesrity of the packaeine h~s not been rn8intained. Any occurrence rel~tin e to the tr8nsport of daneerous
goods which seriously jeopardises the aircraft or its occupants is a Iso deemed to constitute a dangerous goods
incident.
II. This form mily also be used to report any oocasion when undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods are
discovered in car~::o or when ba~::eaee contains daneerous eoods which passensers are not permitted to take on
board the aircr~ft.
5. An initial report shall be dispatched within 24 hours of the occurrence, unless exceptional circ umstances
prevent t his. The init ial re port may be made by any means but a w ritten report should be se nt as soo n as
possible, even if all the information is not available.
6. Completed report shall be sent to the State Secretar iat of Civil Aviation (SSCA).
7. Copies of all relevant documents sho uld be included with th e report.
8. Providing it is safe to do so, all dangerous goods, packagings, documents, etc. relating to t he occurrence shall
be retained unt il after the init ial repo rt has been made.
9. Local requirement s and procedures may differ frorn State to State; it is recommended that the local competent
authority be contacted in o rder to clarify the exact procedures to be follow ed itl th e event of a dangerous good s
incident o r accident.
R~·,•. DO / 10 Jun 2017 DC:Jngc · uJ~ Guo4.1~ Cu:urrerl(..:c Rc:Jur l For rn P: 2!2
PILOT-I l'f.COMMAND:
Items 1-8 are to be repor1Bd lnrunedlately to the ATS unit ll18rl you ar& In contact. with.
9) DENSITY OF ASH O..OUD D (a) Wlspf 0 (b) Moderate dense 10 (c) Vary dense
10) COLOUR OFA$1-t CLOUD D (a) White 0 (b) Light Gre~ 1L1 (c) Darkgllly
D (d) Black 0 (e) other
11) ERUPTION C (a) Continuous C (b} lntermitten1 1[::1 (e) Not visible
12) POSITION OF ACTIVITY [J (a) Summil IJ (b) Side 1t:1 (e) Si ngfle
D (d) MUltiple 0 (a) Nol observed
13} OTHER OBSERVED D (a) Lightning 0 (b) Glow 1[::1 (e) Large rocks
FEATURES OF ERUPTION [J (d) Astl fall out C (e) Mu5hroom daw 1t:1 (f) All
14) EFFECT ON AIRCRAFT D (a) Communica1ion 0 (b) Nav 5y5tems 1t:1 (c) Engines
[J (d) Pitot &ttdie 0 (e)WindSCI'etll"l ICI (I) Wlndow$
I S) OTHER EFFECTS D (a) Turbulence 0 (b) S1 Elmo's Fire 1L1 (e} Other FUI'r'les
GDR
Ground lncidenVAccidenVDamage Report
JC AIRLINES
Mark type of occurrence: Incident liil Accident llii} Damage llii} Other &iii
lc~
Total on Board
IETD
IPax:
Describe the event, including details of inJury, damage, etc. (if necessary enclose additional report and/or photos):
Apron Conditions
Weather Surface Lightening
Official MET report attached lvesO INoO Rain 0 Dry 0 Good 0
Visi bility: meters Snow 0 Wet 0 Poor 0
Wind/Gust knots Slush 0 Snow 0 Day 0
Temperature: ·c Hail 0 Slush 0 Night 0
Fog 0 Ice 0 Twilight 0
Number of casualties
Fatalities Non Fatal
Employees:
Passengers:
Others:
Flight Number Departure Airport Operation Type UTC Date State I Area of Occurrence
Passenger D
Ferry D
A ircraft Registration Destination Airport UTCTime Location of occurrence
Training D
Other D
I
Headline
Nar rative
Continued o n Yes D
I reverse side No 0
Attachments (Sketches,
Yes D No 0
Reports, Photographs, other)
Intentionally Blank
The Rules of the Air for international air transport are principally contained in ICAO
documentation, specifically: Annex 2, Flight Procedures (Doc 8168), and Air Traffic
Services PANS-RAC (Doc 4444), State Regulations which give effect to these
international standards, and the State Regulations themselves.
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) shall be used and shall be expressed in hours and
minutes of the 24-hour day beginning at midnight. A time check shall be obtained prior to
operating a controlled flight and at such other times during the flight as may be necessary.
Note: Such time check is normally obtained from an air traffic services unit unless other
arrangements have been made by the operator or by the appropriate ATS authority.
Aerodrome control towers shall, prior to an aircraft taxiing for take/off, provide the pilot with
the correct time, unless arrangements have been made for the pilot to obtain it from other
sources. Air traffic services units shall, in addition, provide aircraft with the correct time on
request. Time checks shall be given to the nearest half minute.
The Company shall ensure that all flight crew members are familiar with the laws,
regulations and procedures pertinent to the performance of their duties, prescribed for the
areas to be traversed, the aerodromes to be used and the air navigation facilities relating
thereto. The Company shall ensure that other crew members are familiar with such of
these laws, regulations and procedures as are pertinent to the performance of their
respective duties in the operation of the aeroplane. The Company shall ensure that all
employees when abroad know that they must comply with the laws, regulations and
procedures of those States in which operations are conducted.
The operation of an aircraft either in flight or on the movement area of an aerodrome shall
be in compliance with the general rules and, in addition when in flight, either with the:
• Visual and/or instrument flight rules;
• Territorial application of the rules of the air;
• Communication procedures including communication failure procedures;
• Information and instructions relating to the interception of the civil aircraft;
• The circumstances in which a radio listening watch is to be maintained;
• Signals;
• Time system used in operation;
• ATC clearances, adherence to flight plan and position reports;
• Visual signals used to warn an unauthorized aircraft flying in or about to enter a
restricted, prohibited or danger area;
• Procedures for pilots observing an accident or receiving a distress transmission;
• The ground/air visual codes for use by survivors, description and use of signal aids;
• Distress and urgency signals.
The Commander of an aircraft shall be responsible for the operation of the aircraft in
accordance with the rules of the air. The Commander shall, in an emergency situation that
requires immediate decision and action, take any action he considers necessary under the
circumstances. In such cases he may deviate from the rules of the air, operational
procedures and methods in the interest of safety.
Before beginning a flight, the Commander of an aircraft shall become familiar with all
available information appropriate to the intended operation. Pre-flight action for flights
away from the vicinity of an aerodrome and for all IFR flights shall include a careful study
of available current weather reports and forecasts, taking into consideration fuel
requirements and an alternative course of action if the flight cannot be completed as
planned.
The Commander shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while in
command.
No person shall pilot an aircraft, or act as a crew member of an aircraft, while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or any narcotic or drug, by reason of which that person's
capacity to act is impaired (refer to OM Part A, Chapter 6).
Essential information pertinent to the intended flight concerning search and rescue must
be is accessible to the Commander.
The Company, and by implication therefore the Commander, shall ensure that Air Traffic
Services are used for all flights whenever available.
The Rules of the Air shall apply to aircraft bearing the nationality and registration marks of
a Contracting State, wherever they may be, to the extent that they do not conflict with the
rules published by the State having jurisdiction over the territory overflown.
Note: The Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization resolved, in adopting
Annex 2 in April 1948 and Amendment 1 to the said Annex in November 1951 that the
Annex constitutes rules relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aeroplane within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Convention. Over the high seas, therefore, these rules apply
without exception. If, and so long as, a Contracting State has not notified the International
Civil Aviation Organization to the contrary, it shall be deemed, as regards aeroplane of its
registration, to have agreed as follows: For purposes of flight over those parts of the high
seas where a Contracting State has accepted, pursuant to a regional air navigation
agreement, the responsibility of providing air traffic services, the “appropriate ATS
authority” referred to in this Annex is the relevant authority designed by the State
responsible for providing those services. The phrase “regional air navigation agreement”
refers to an agreement approved by the Council of ICAO normally on the advice of a
Regional Air Navigation Meeting.
Except when necessary for take-off or landing, or except by permission from the
appropriate authority, aircraft shall not be flown over the congested areas of cities, towns
or settlements or over an open-air assembly of persons, unless at such a height as will
permit, in the event of an emergency arising, a landing to be made without undue hazard
to persons or property on the surface (refer to OM Part A; Chapter 8 for minimum flight
altitudes).
Aircraft shall not be flown in a prohibited area or in a restricted area, the particulars of
which have been duly published, except in accordance with the conditions of the
restrictions or by permission of the state over whose territory the areas are established.
It is important that vigilance for the purpose of detecting potential collisions be not relaxed
on board an aircraft in flight, regardless of the type of flight or the class of airspace in
which the aircraft is operating and while operation on the movement area of an aerodrome.
An aircraft shall not be operated in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision
hazard. Also aircraft shall not be flown in formation except by pre-arrangement.
The aircraft that has the right-of-way shall maintain its heading and speed, but nothing in
these rules shall relieve the Commander of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking
such action as will best avert collision.
When two aircraft are approaching head-on or approximately so and there is danger of
collision, each shall alter its heading to the right.
When two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the aircraft that has the
other on its right shall give way, except as follows:
• Power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to airships, gliders and
balloons;
• Power-driven aircraft shall give way to aircraft which are seen to be towing other
aircraft or objects.
Overtaking aircraft is an aircraft that approaching another from the rear on a line forming
an angle of less than 70 degrees with the plane of symmetry of the latter, i.e. is in such a
position with reference to the other aircraft that at night it should be unable to see either of
the aircraft's left or right navigation lights.
An aircraft that is being overtaken has the right-of-way and the overtaking aircraft, whether
climbing, descending or in horizontal flight, shall keep out of the way of the other aircraft by
altering its heading to the right, and no subsequent change in the relative positions of the
two aircraft shall absolve the overtaking aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely past
and clear.
An aircraft in flight, or operating on the ground, shall give way to aircraft landing or in the
final stages of an approach to land.
When two or more heavier-than-air aircraft are approaching an aerodrome for the purpose
of landing, aircraft at the higher level shall give way to aircraft at the lower level, but the
latter shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is in the final
stages of an approach to land, or to overtake that aircraft. Nevertheless, power-driven
heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to gliders.
An aircraft that is aware that another is compelled to land shall give way to that aircraft.
An aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome shall give way to aircraft
taking-off or about to take-off.
In case of danger of collision between two aircraft taxiing on the movement area of an
aerodrome the following shall apply:
• When two aircraft are approaching head on, or approximately so, each shall stop or
where practicable alter its course to the right so as to keep well clear;
• When two aircraft are on a converging course, the one which has the other on its
right shall give way;
• An aircraft which is being overtaken by another aircraft shall have the right-of-way
and the overtaking aircraft shall keep well clear of the other aircraft.
An aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area shall stop and hold at all taxi-holding positions
unless otherwise authorized by the aerodrome control tower.
An aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area shall stop and hold at all lighted stop bars and
may proceed further when the lights are switched off.
From sunset to sunrise or during any other period which may be prescribed by the
appropriate authority all aircraft in flight shall display:
• Anti-collision lights intended to attract attention to the aircraft; and
• Navigation lights intended to indicate the relative path of the aircraft to an observer
and other lights shall not be displayed if they are likely to be mistaken of these
lights.
From sunset to sunrise or during any other period prescribed by the appropriate authority:
• All aircraft moving on the movement area of an aerodrome shall display navigation
lights intended to indicate the relative path of the aircraft to an observer and other
lights shall not be displayed if they are likely to be mistaken for these lights;
• Unless stationary and otherwise adequately illuminated, all aircraft on the
movement area of an aerodrome shall display lights intended to indicate the
extremities of their structure:
• All aircraft operating on the movement area of an aerodrome shall display lights
intended to attract attention to the aircraft; and
• All aircraft on the movement area of an aerodrome whose engines are running shall
display lights which indicate that fact.
Regardless of the daytime, all aircraft on the movement area shall operate the anti-
collision light prior starting the engines until the engines are switched off.
An aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference shall endeavour to notify the
appropriate ATS unit of this fact, any significant circumstances associated therewith and
any deviation from the current flight plan necessitated by the circumstances, in order to
enable the ATS unit to give priority to the aircraft and to minimize conflict with other
aircraft.
The following procedures are intended as guidance for use by aircraft when unlawful
interference occurs and the aircraft is unable to notify an ATS unit of this fact.
When an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference must depart from its assigned
track or its assigned cruising level without being able to make radiotelephony contact with
ATS, the Commander should, whenever possible:
• Attempt to broadcast warnings on the VHF channel in use or the VHF emergency
frequency, and other appropriate channels, unless considerations aboard the
aircraft dictate otherwise. Other equipment such as on-board transponders and data
links should also be used when it is advantageous to do so and circumstances
permit, and
• Proceed in accordance with applicable special procedures for in-flight
contingencies, where such procedures have been established and promulgated;
• If no applicable regional procedures have been established, proceed at a level
which differs from the cruising levels normally used for IFR flight by:
12.3.4 Interception
To achieve the uniformity in regulations which is necessary for the safety of navigation of
civil aircraft ICAO contracting states shall establish the following principles when
developing regulations and administrative directives:
• Interception of civil aircraft will be undertaken only as a last resort;
• If undertaken, an interception will be limited to determine the identity of the aircraft,
unless it is necessary to return the aircraft to its planned track, direct it beyond the
boundaries of national airspaces, guide it away from a prohibited, restricted or
danger area or instruct it to land at a designated airport;
• Practice interception of civil aircraft will not be undertaken;
• Navigational guidance and related information will be given to an intercepted aircraft
by radiotelephony, whenever radio contact can be established;
• In a case where an intercepted civil aircraft is required to land in the territory
overflown, the airport designated for the landing is to be suitable for the safe landing
of the aircraft-type concerned.
Note: Contracting states have recognized that every state must refrain from resorting to
the use of weapons against civil aircraft in-flight.
The intercepted aircraft will be approached from the stern. In general 2 interceptor aircraft
will be deployed to execute the identification. Flight leader and wingman will coordinate
their individual position with a ground control unit. A safe vertical and horizontal separation
between interceptor and intercepted aircraft will be maintained at all times.
The intercepted aircraft should expect to visually acquire the lead interceptor and possibly
the wingman provided that VMC conditions are at present. The flight leader may initiate a
gentle closure toward the intercepted aircraft, stopping at a distance not closer than
absolutely necessary to obtain the information needed.
During IMC and at darkness identification of unknown aircraft will be by type only.
After completion of identification, the flight leader will turn away from the intercepted
aircraft. The wingman will remain well clear and accomplish a rejoin with the leader.
Intercepting Manoeuvres
If any instructions received by radio from any sources conflict with those given by the
intercepting aircraft by visual signals or radio, the intercepted aircraft shall request
immediate clarification while continuing to comply with the visual/radio instructions given
by the intercepting aircraft.
12.3.4.5 Communication
Phrases Meaning
CALL SIGN What is your call sign
FOLLOW Follow me
DESCEND Descend for landing
YOU LAND Land at this aerodrome
PROCEED You may proceed
Phrases Meaning
CALL SIGN My call sign is ...
WILCO Understood, will comply
CAN NOT Unable to comply
REPEAT Repeat your instruction
AM LOST Position unknown
MAYDAY I am in distress
HIJACK I have been hijacked
LAND place, name I request to land at
DESCEND I require descent
Note: Circumstances may not always permit, nor make desirable, the use of
the phrase HIJACK.
None of the provisions in this section shall prevent the use, by the aircraft in distress, of
any means at its disposal to attract attention, make known its position and obtain help.
The following signals used either together or separately, mean that grave and imminent
danger threatens, and immediate assistance is requested:
• »MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY« by radio telephony or data-link;
• A signal made by radiotelegraphy or by any other signalling method consisting of
the group SOS (…---…) in the Morse code;
• Rockets or shells throwing red lights, fired one at a time at short intervals;
• A parachute flare showing a red light;
• SSR Mode A Code 7700.
The following signals, used either together or separately, mean that an aircraft wishes to
give notice of difficulties which compel it to land without requiring immediate assistance:
• The repeated switching on and off of the landing lights;
• The repeated switching on and off of the navigation lights in such manner as to be
distinct from flashing navigation lights.
The following signals used either together or separately, mean that the aircraft has a very
urgent message to transmit concerning the safety of a ship, aircraft or other vehicle, or of
some person on board or within sight:
• »PAN PAN PAN« by radio telephony, or data-link.
Projectiles discharged at intervals of 10 seconds, each showing bursting red and green
lights or stars will indicate to an aircraft it is flying in or about to enter a restricted,
prohibited or danger area and that it has to take necessary action. These signals can be
emitted either from ground or from an aircraft. In many states this signal is replaced by
black or white shells by day and white stars by night.
The flight crew shall maintain continuous radio listening watch on the frequencies
appropriate for the area of operation and as required by the applicable authorities.
Distress communications will normally be conducted on the air to ground frequency in use.
The pilot may use any other available HF or VHF frequency including 121.500 MHz, if
considered necessary or desirable.
Under any distress condition the distress signal shall be used at the commencement of the
first distress message. In case of an urgency condition (concerning the safety, but no
immediate assistance required), the urgency signal should be used instead.
The urgency communications have priority over all other communications, except distress,
and all stations shall take care not to interfere with the transmission of urgency traffic.
The station addressed has to acknowledge the message and take immediate action.
Distress and urgency communication has priority over all other communication and all
stations on the same frequency shall take care not to interfere with the transmissions of
the distress or urgency traffic.
If circumstances require, the station handling this traffic may stop transmission to other
traffic, or will give a separate frequency to the distress / urgency traffic.
The distress / urgency communication and silence conditions shall be terminated as soon
as situation allows.
The station in distress, or the station in control of distress traffic, shall be permitted to
impose silence, either on all stations of the mobile service in the area or on any station
which interferes with the distress traffic. It shall address these instructions »TO ALL
TRAFFIC«, or to one station only, according to circumstances. In either case, it shall use
»STOP TRANSMITTING« and the radio distress signal »MAYDAY«.
Circumstances phraseologies:
• Distress signal: »MAYDAY - MAYDAY - MAYDAY«;
• Urgency signal: »PANPAN - PANPAN - PANPAN«;
• Stop transmitting: »TO ALL TRAFFIC STOP TRANSMITTING«;
• Termination of distress and silence: »DISTRESS TRAFFIC ENDED«.
The distress communications have absolute priority over all other communications, and a
station aware of them shall not transmit on the frequency concerned, unless:
• The distress is cancelled or the distress traffic is terminated;
• All distress traffic has been transferred to other frequencies;
• The station controlling communications gives permission;
• It has itself to render assistance.
Continuous guard should be kept on the emergency frequency 121.500 MHz in the
following situations:
• When directed by ATS to participate in search and rescue operation;
• To monitor movements of other aircraft in the vicinity during search and rescue
operation;
• For air-to-air relay during poor HF communication conditions unless another
frequency is specified for this purpose in the appropriate State rules and
regulations;
• When more than one VHF system is available one system should always be set to
121.500 MHz when not needed for other communications.
For In Flight Broadcast Procedures and frequencies refer to the Jeppesen Airway Manual -
General.
12.4 SIGNALS
12.4.1 Marshalling Signals
Wing-walker / guide
Raise right hand above head level with wand pointing up; move left-
hand wand pointing down toward body.
Note: This signal provides an indication by a person positioned at the
aircraft wing tip, to the pilot/ marshaller / push-back operator, that the
aircraft movement on/off a parking position would be unobstructed.
Identify gate
Raise fully extended arms straight above head with wands pointing
up.
Straight ahead
Bend extended arms at elbows and move wands up and down from
chest height to head.
Normal stop
Fully extend arms and wands at a 90 degree angle to sides and
slowly move to above head until wands cross.
Emergency stop
Abruptly extend arms and wands to top of head, crossing wands.
Set brakes
Raise hand just above shoulder height with open palm. Ensuring eye
contact with flight crew, close hand into a fist. Do not move until
receipt of "thumbs up" acknowledgement from flight crew.
Release brakes
Raise hand just above shoulder height with hand closed in a fist.
Ensuring eye contact with flight crew, open palm. Do not move until
receipt of "thumbs up" acknowledgement from flight crew.
Chocks inserted
With arms and wands fully extended above head, move wands inward
in a jabbing motion until wands touch. Ensure acknowledgement is
received from flight crew.
Chocks removed
With arms and wands fully extended above head, move wands
outward in a jabbing motion. Do not remove chocks until authorized
by flight crew.
Start engine(s)
Raise right arm to head level with wand pointing up and start a
circular motion with hand; at the same time, with left arm raised above
head level, point to engine to be started.
Cut engines
Extend arm with wand forward of body at shoulder level; move hand
and wand to top of left shoulder and draw wand to top of right
shoulder in a slicing motion across throat.
Slow down
Move extended arms downwards in a patting gesture, moving wands
up and down from waist to knees.
Move back
With arms in front of body at waist height, rotate arms in a forward
motion.
Affirmative/all clear
Raise right arm to head level with wand pointing up or display hand
with "thumbs up"; left arm remains at side by knee.
Note: This signal is also used as a technical/servicing communication
signal.
Fire
Move right hand wand in a fanning motion from shoulder to knee,
while at the same time pointing with left hand wand to area of fire.
Hold position/stand by
Fully extend arms and wands downwards at a 45 degree angle to
sides. Hold position until aircraft is clear for next manoeuvre.
Dispatch aircraft
Perform a standard salute with right hand and/or wand to dispatch the
aircraft. Maintain eye contact with flight crew until aircraft has begun
to taxi.
Rescue is largely dependent on the effort and ingenuity in surviving until the rescuers have
arrived. However, one must be spotted by the rescuers first. It is therefore mandatory that
one eases the task of spotting the place where one stays.
There are many ways of attracting the attention of the search parties. Try to put as many
into operation as possible. Some of the methods of signalling are described below. If local
circumstances make other signals more effective, do not hesitate to use them. All available
signalling devices shall be put to readiness immediately after landing.
Radio: Try to get a fix and transmit position using the aircraft radio equipment if possible.
However, do not waste the battery on long transmissions. Use the radio survival beacon
(ELT) - applicable FCOM and CCM include its description and location for each aircraft.
For better radar detection erect a corner reflector if available.
Smoke: Fire and smoke make good signals. Have fires ready to light when search aircraft
are heard or sighted. Keep some fires going all the time. Use smoke by day and bright
flame by night. Engine oil, rags soaked in oil, pieces of rubber or insulation material
produce black smoke, green leaves or a little water produce white smoke.
Flares: When flares are available, keep them ready for use. Keep flares dry.
Mirrors: Mirrors and bright pieces of metal make good signals that can be seen for many
kilometres.
Sea markers: At sea use the sea marker only by day and only when aircraft are being
heard or sighted.
Ground/air signals have been internationally agreed upon and may serve as a means of
contact between the ground and rescue planes when no radio contact is available. As far
as possible the following procedure shall be adhered to:
• Form symbols by any available means. Some of the methods usually available are:
using strips of fabric, pieces of wood, stones or any such material and further
marking the surface by tramping or staining with oil, etc.;
• Make symbols not smaller than 2.5 meters;
• Take care to lay out symbols exactly as depicted to avoid confusion with other
symbols;
V X N Y ↑
Require Require medical No or Yes or Proceeding in
assistance assistance negative affirmative this direction
LLL LL XX NN
Operation Have found Have found Are not able to Have divided into Information Nothing
completed all personnel only some continue; groups; each received that found; will
personnel returning to base proceeding in aircraft is in continue
direction this direction to search
indicated
When it is necessary for a search & rescue aircraft to convey information to survivors or to
ground search parties, and two-way radio communication is not available, it shall, if
practicable, convey the information by dropping a message or by dropping communication
equipment that would enable direct contact to be established.
When a ground signal has been displayed and is understood, the search & rescue aircraft
shall acknowledge the signal by the means described above, or if that is not possible, by
rocking the wings of the aircraft during daylight or by flashing on and off twice the landing
lights or navigation lights during darkness.
When a ground signal has been displayed and is not understood, the survivors or ground
search party shall be so informed by a direct message except that, if that course is not
practicable, failure to rock the wings will indicate that the message is not understood.
An Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance shall be obtained prior to operating a controlled
flight or a portion of a flight as a controlled flight.
Provisions governing clearances are contained in the PANS-RAC (ICAO Doc 4444). A
clearance may vary in content from a detailed description of the route and level to be flown
to a brief standard instrument departure (SID) according to local procedure. Controllers
should pass a clearance slowly and clearly since the pilot needs to write it down.
Whenever possible route clearance should be passed to an aircraft before start-up and the
aircraft’s full call sign will always be used.
The stringency of the read back requirement is directly related to a possible seriousness of
a misunderstanding in the transmission and receipt of ATC clearance and instructions.
ATC route clearances shall always be read back unless otherwise authorized by the
appropriate ATC in which case they shall be acknowledged in a positive manner. Read
backs shall always include the aircraft call sign coming at the end of message.
An aircraft shall adhere to the current flight plan or the applicable portion of a current flight
plan submitted for a controlled flight unless a request for a change has been made and
clearance obtained from the appropriate air traffic control unit, or unless an emergency
situation arises which necessitates immediate action by the aircraft, in which event as
soon as circumstances permit, after such emergency authority is exercised, the
appropriate air traffic services unit shall be notified of the action taken and that this action
has been taken under emergency authority.
Unless otherwise authorised or directed by the appropriate air traffic control unit, controlled
flights shall, in so far as practicable:
• When on an established ATS route, operate along the defined centreline of that
route;
• When on any other route, operate directly between the navigation facilities and/or
points defining that route.
Subject to the overriding requirement above, an aircraft operating along an ATS route
segment defined by reference to radio aids ranges shall change over for its primary
navigation guidance from the facility behind the aircraft to that ahead of it at, or as close as
operationally feasible to, the change-over point, where established.
12.5.2 Deviations
Deviations from the requirements in previous section shall be notified to the appropriate air
traffic services unit. In the event that a controlled flight inadvertently deviates from its
current flight plan the following action shall be taken:
a) Deviation from Track
If the aircraft is off track, action shall be taken forthwith to adjust the heading of the
aircraft to regain track as soon as practicable.
Caution: When the flight crew requests a deviation from the clearance or track (i.e.
due thunderstorm activity) and the request is denied, the Commander is always
allowed to deviate if he considers that the safety of the flight is compromised by this
denial. MORA restrictions shall be always taken in consideration. ATC shall be
notified that the flight is deviating and an Air Safety Report filed.
b) Variation in True Airspeed
If the average true airspeed at cruising level between reporting points varies or is
expected to vary by plus or minus 5 per cent of the true airspeed, from that given in
the flight plan, the appropriate air traffic services unit shall be so informed.
c) Change in Time Estimate
If the time estimate for next applicable reporting point, flight information region
boundary or destination aerodrome, whichever comes first, is found to be in error in
excess of 3 minutes from that notified to air traffic services, or such other period of
time as is prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority or on the basis of air
navigation regional agreements, a revised estimated time shall be notified as soon
as possible to the appropriate air traffic services unit.
Requests for flight plan changes shall include information as indicated hereunder:
• Change of cruising level: aircraft identification, requested new cruising level and
cruising speed at this level, revised time estimates (when applicable) at subsequent
flight information region boundaries;
• Change of route (destination unchanged): aircraft identification, flight rules,
description of new route of flight including related flight plan data beginning with the
position from which requested change of route is to commence, revised time
estimate and any other pertinent information;
• Change of route (destination changed): aircraft identification, flight rules, description
of revised route of flight to revised destination aerodrome including related flight
plan data, beginning with the position from which requested change of route is to
commence revised time estimates; alternate aerodrome(s); any other pertinent
information.
Unless exempted by the appropriate ATS authority or by the appropriate air traffic services
unit under conditions specified by that authority, a controlled flight shall report to the
appropriate air traffic services unit, as soon as possible, the time and level of passing each
designated compulsory reporting point, together with any other required information.
Position reports shall similarly be made in relation to additional points when requested by
appropriate air traffic services unit. In the absence of designated reporting points shall be
made at intervals prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority or specified by the
appropriate air traffic services unit.
12.6 COMMUNICATIONS
12.6.1 Communication Failures
The Commander must ensure that a continuous listening watch is maintained on the
appropriate radio communication frequencies at all times whenever the flight crew is
manning the aircraft for the purpose of commencing and/or conducting a flight and when
taxiing.
An aircraft operated as a controlled flight shall maintain continuous listening watch on the
appropriate radio frequency of, and establish two-way communication as necessary with,
the appropriate air traffic control unit, except as may be prescribed by the appropriate ATS
authority in respect of aircraft forming part of aerodrome traffic at a controlled aerodrome.
A VFR flight operation within or into areas, or along routes, designated by the appropriate
ATS authority (e.g. “controlled VFR flights”) shall maintain continuous listening watch on
the appropriate radio frequency of, and report its position as necessary to the air traffic
services unit providing flight information service.
An IFR flight operating outside controlled airspace but within or into areas, or along routes,
designated by the appropriate ATS authority, shall maintain a listening watch on the
appropriate radio frequency and establish two-way communication, as necessary, with the
air traffic services unit providing flight information service. An IFR flight operating outside
controlled airspace is required by the appropriate ATS authority to:
• Submit a flight plan;
• Maintain a listening watch on the appropriate radio frequency and establish two-way
communication, as necessary, with the air traffic services unit providing flight
information service;
• Report position as specified for controlled flights.
Note: Aircraft electing to use the air traffic advisory service whilst operating IFR within
specified advisory airspace are expected to comply with the provisions of these
rules except that the flight plan and changes thereto are not subjected to clearances
and that two-way communication will be maintained with the unit providing the air
traffic advisory service.
Flight crew is required to maintain continuous radio listening watch appropriate for the area
of operation and as required by the applicable authorities. Beside to keep continuous radio
listening watch on the working frequency with ATS/ATC units, the flight crew is required to
maintain continuous listening watch and continuously monitor the International Emergency
VHF frequency of 121.500 MHz:
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A JC CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CHAPTER 12 P: 12-26
RULES OF THE AIR Rev. 00, 10 JAN 2017
If required by the applicable authorities, the appropriate common frequency shall be used
for in-flight communication in designated airspace, without ATC coverage. The voluntary
broadcast communication frequency (or frequencies) shall be used for intercommunication
between aircraft in the same area. For the proper procedures and frequencies, refer to
Jeppesen documentation (Voluntary Broadcast Procedures).
ATC accepts SELCAL watch as a substitute for listening watch. In case of SELCAL failure,
the station has to be advised and continuous listening watch becomes mandatory for ATC
purposes.
13 LEASING
13.1 INTRODUCTION
From time to time, JC Cambodia International Airlines (JC Airlines) may require temporary
or long term aircraft leasing. This chapter is dedicated to the policy and procedures
involved in leasing aircraft to or from JC Airlines.
The State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA) will approve the lease arrangement only
when satisfied that all the necessary changes arising from the lease arrangement are
identified and the parties involved in the lease arrangement can demonstrate sufficient
knowledge and adequate resources to fulfill their roles and responsibilities with regard to
the continuing airworthiness and operational control of the aircraft for the duration of the
lease.
An operator operating a leased aircraft shall carry on board the following documents:
• A certified true copy of the lease agreement;
• A certified true copy of the AOC and a copy of its corresponding operational
specifications for the duration of the lease;
• The operating crew’s flight crew licenses issued or validated by the State of
Registry, if there is a transfer of those functions and duties to the SSCA.
13.2 TERMINOLOGY
For all aircraft leases other than wet lease-out, prior approval from the State Secretariat of
Civil Aviation (SSCA) shall be obtained. SSCA approval is the responsibility of the Quality
Assurance Director, who is also responsible for all leasing-related communication to
SSCA.
If JC Airlines intends to lease-in an aircraft, it shall provide in advance the SSCA with the
following information:
• Aircraft type, registration markings and serial number;
• Name and address of the registered owner;
• Copy of the valid certificate of airworthiness;
• Copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial
arrangements;
• Duration of the lease; and
• In case of wet lease-in a copy of the AOC of the third country operator and the
areas of operation.
An operator operating a leased aircraft shall carry on board the following documents:
• A certified true copy of the lease agreement;
• A certified true copy of the AOC and a copy of its corresponding operational
specifications for the duration of the lease;
• The operating crew’s flight crew licenses issued or validated by the State of
Registry, if there is a transfer of those functions and duties to the SSCA.
A dry lease-in must be approved by the State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA) and any
conditions being part of this approval must be included in the lease agreement.
The Quality Assurance Director shall ensure that, with regard to the aircraft that are dry
leased-in, any differences from the requirements are notified to and are acceptable to the
SSCA.
For the period of the lease JC Airlines has the responsibility for the flight operation
(including operational control) and maintenance.
A wet lease-in must be approved by the State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA).
The Quality Assurance Director shall ensure that, with regard to the aircraft that are wet
leased-in:
• The safety standards of the lessor with respect to maintenance and operation
satisfy SSCA requirements;
• The lessor is an operator holding the AOC issued by a State which is a signatory to
the Chicago Convention;
• The aircraft has a standard Certificate of Airworthiness issued in accordance with
ICAO Annex 8;
• Any requirement made applicable by the SSCA is complied with;
• The Quality Assurance Director shall organize an audit in order to answer the
different points.
JC Airlines may dry lease-out an aircraft for the purpose of commercial air transportation to
any operator of a State which is signatory to the Chicago Convention provided that the
following conditions are met:
• The State Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SSCA) has exempted the lessor from the
relevant provisions of SSCA and, after the foreign regulatory authority has accepted
responsibility in writing for surveillance of the maintenance and operation of the
aeroplane(s), has removed the aeroplane from its AOC;
• The aircraft is maintained according to an approved maintenance programme.
The lessor (other operator) has the responsibility for the flight operation (including
operational control) and maintenance during the period of lease. The lease agreement
shall provide for immediate notification by the lessor to JC Airlines of any technical incident
in which the aircraft is involved during the period of lease.
JC Airlines, providing an aircraft and complete crew to another entity, and retaining all the
functions and responsibilities prescribed by the SSCA (and in accordance with Regulation
No 1008/2008), shall remain the operator of the aircraft and keep exercising operational
control.
A damp lease is generally understood to be a wet lease of an aircraft where the aircraft is
operated under the AOC of the lessor, with the flight crew and possibly part of the cabin
crew being provided by the lessor. Part or all of the cabin crew is provided by the lessee.
In such case, the State of the Operator should ensure that both the flight and cabin crew
are trained to use common communications and emergency procedures and that the cabin
crew receives appropriate training. This is in view that practical safety problems develop in
damp lease operations when the lessor provides only the flight crew while the lessee
provides the cabin crew. In such cases, the cabin crew members, employed by the lessee,
will not be familiar with the aircraft, associated emergency equipment and the emergency
procedures used by the flight crew.
In these circumstances the lessee’s cabin crew members will need to receive additional
training, under the approved training programme of the lessor, with respect to their
emergency duties on the particular aircraft. In addition, they may have no knowledge of the
requirements of the State of the Lessor with respect to flight and duty time limitations and
the provision of rest periods, and to the performance of their duties and responsibilities
aboard the wet leased aircraft. These aspects need also to be taken into account.
Some wet leasing operations, charters or sub-charters are organized for short terms at
very short notice, where, for example, an operator wishes to replace an unserviceable
aircraft on a particular service and is forced to contract with another operator for that
service to be operated.
In order to facilitate operations and such leases, information on the need for this type of
arrangement and the possible lessors should be provided to the State secretariat of civil
Aviation (SSCA) such that appropriate arrangements could be put in place to enable the
SSCA approval for an actual short-term wet lease or charter to be given very quickly.
In the case of a short-term wet lease, charter or sub-charter, the lessor will retain all
responsibilities and operational control.