History of India VII-Assignment

Aishwarya Mukhopadhyay
__________________________________________________________________________________
Did the re-imposition of jaziya mark a turning point in the history of Mughal rule in India?

The re-imposition of jizyah becomes a significant issue to discuss, for to many historians it represents
a break from the syncretic traditions which made up the ideology of the Mughal dynasty.
Jizyah or poll tax had been abolished by Akbar in 1564, but Aurangzeb re-imposed it in 1679, the 22 nd
year of his rule, on the ground that it was wajib (compulsory) according to the sharia. The question of
jizyah becomes pertinent while discussing Aurangzeb’s life due to two particular reasons: the first that
the contemporary sources justify it on the basis of religion, which adds to the perception of Aurangzeb
being a bigot, and secondly very often, the historical roots of present-day communal difference is
traced back to 1579 and the re-imposition of jizyah, according to A Truschke.

Initially, historians like J Sarkar characterised Aurangzeb as a bigot, one who reversed the liberal
policies of Akbar, namely the policies of suhl-i-kul and wadat-ul-wajud. It was a plan to institute dar-
ul-Islam instead of dar-ul-harb. Other authors like Z Faruki attribute economic reasons and not
Aurangzeb’s personal prejudice for this move. According to Faruki, Aurangzeb was forced to
reinstate jizyah since he had abolished too many taxes in the beginning of his career, leading to a
revenue deficit. I H Qureshi argued that it was a measure to discipline the Hindus. S R Sharma argued
that it was a ploy of Aurangzeb to introduce mass Islamization, since the poor Hindu peasants would
now convert to Islam to avoid paying jizyah. A Aziz argued how Aurangzeb had to reinstate the
jizyah since he had done away with the other taxes. In recent writing there has been an attempt to
relocate the reasons and analyse new diverse source material to understand the meaning behind this
re-imposition and answer the larger question of the character of the Mughal state during Aurangzeb.
S Chandra argues that the decision to impose jizyah was both ideological and political. Aurangzeb had
come to power as an “orthodox Muslim King”. It rallied the clergy to his side, according to Chandra,
by “providing them jobs as amins or collectors of jizyah, with the unintended opportunity of extorting
illegal sums in the process.”1 Politically, Chandra argues it would rally the positive opinion of
Muslims in his conflicts with the Rajputs and Marathas.
The question which arises thus is, if Aurangzeb was indeed prejudiced, then why would he wait for 22
years after his accession to impose jizyah? When jizyah was implemented in 1679, the tax exempted
the dhimmi nadar (the indignant), women, children, the handicapped and government employees. The
tax was burdensome for the poor and in the rural areas it was collected as land revenue and earmarked
for charitable purposes. Chandra cites that it was administered by the qazis and provided an
opportunity to amass some money. Merchants especially found it particularly harassing, and there
were mass-protests against the same, even nobles protested about the act.
Chandra examines contemporary sources on the basis of which he draws his conclusions. Muhammad
Saqi Mustaid Khan wrote, “'As all the aims of the religious Emperor were directed to the spreading of
the law of Islam and the overthrow of the practice of the infidels, he issued…in obedience to the
Quranic injunction”, the re-imposition of jizyah. Ishwaradas emphasized on the role of the ulama and
the Muslim theologians in the move. However, contemporary European residents like Thomas Roll
have argued how the move was to replenish the treasury as well as force mass conversion among the
poor. Manucci added another point: how Aurangzeb’s attitudes had changed after the death of Rajah
Jaswant Singh, who was among the last valiant and powerful Hindu protectors of the Mughals. 2 Abul

1
Chandra, Satish, Historiography Religion and State in Medieval India (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1996), Pp 157
2
Chandra, Satish, Jizyah and the State in India during the 17th Century, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), Pp 323-4
Fazl in Ain-i-Akbari had written how jizyah was instated by a ruler only in times of financial crisis
and one reason for removing it was the abundance in Akbar’s time.
In the 13th regnal year, it was seen that the there was a significant gap between the jama and the hasil.
Aurangzeb during the beginning of his reign had forbidden a large number of customary cesses, all of
which added up to a deficit of 25 lakhs in khalisa land alone. S Chandra doubts that the official
figures of jizyah comprising of 15% of the hasil is even true, for only around 4% was collected in
reality.3 In fact, in times of crop failure, there was exemption from the jizyah. The assessment differed
in towns and villages, and the proceeds went to a separate treasury, the Khaznadah-i-jizyah, but this
money was only to be used in times of crisis and to use for charitable purposes.
According to I Habib in the last years of Aurangzeb’s reign there was a crisis in the assignment
system of the jagirdari policy. Due to the influx of a large number of nobles, there was an increase in
the number of mansabdars that the existing jagirs could no longer suffice for their pay. Persons would
wait for years to get their jagir assignment and when it was transferred, there was no guarantee as to
when they would be assigned another. There was also a sufficient gap in the jama and the hasil, cites
Habib. According to figures he cites, the jama during a particular year of Aurangzeb’s reign was
1,24,54,64,650 dams, whereas the hasil was only 2,34,51,956 dams.4
S Chandra also advocates for this theory of economic crisis, and according to hm, the draining war on
the Marathas and the Deccan further added to the plight. The influx of new Maratha and Deccani
nobility also meant the increased demand for land, and hence it continued to add up to the crisis. J F
Richards argues how the Mughals were unable to assimilate the newly gained fertile tracts in the
Deccan.
To understand the reign of Aurangzeb in context of the re-imposition of jizyah is essential, for one
can trace the continuities and changes during his reign. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss
the war of succession, his religious policies, his general beliefs and his relations with his nobles and
other states.
Aurangzeb was born a Muslim, and practiced his inherited religion throughout his life. Based on
actions though, he appears to be more pious than his predecessors. In his later years he sewed prayer
caps and copied the Quran by hand, both pious pursuits. But Aurangzeb’s approach to religion was
hardly puritanical. On the contrary, he consulted with prominent Hindu religious figures throughout
his life, as had earlier Mughal kings. For example, in the 1680s Aurangzeb conducted a religious
discussion with the Bairagi Hindu Shiv Mangaldas Maharaj and showered the saint with gifts. The
king had strong links with Islamic Sufi communities, another time-honoured Mughal tradition, as
evidenced by his burial at a Chishti shrine in Maharashtra.5
Aurangzeb’s accession to the throne was not smooth, in fact, he had to deal with a frustrating situation
with his father, Shah Jahan, who was continuously harsh towards Aurangzeb, and extremely
favourable towards Dara Shukoh, Aurangzeb’s brother. Though Aurangzeb himself was inclined to
mysticism and the writings of Rumi, he was a Sunni orthodox by faith, Dara Shukoh believed in the
fundamental genesis of Hinduism and Islam and he sought to uncover “monotheism’s greatest secret”
in the Quran. Thus, to most scholars, these two figures presented two ends of the spectrum: Dara, the
tolerant and courageous and wise, while Aurangzeb, the aggressive, discriminatory orthodox bigot.
Thus, the War of Succession between Aurangzeb and Dara has often been presented in religious
terminology.

3
Chandra, Satish, Jizyah and the State in India during the 17th Century, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), Pp 326
4
Habib, Irfan, Agrarian System of Mughal India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1963), Pp 315
5
Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb, The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King (California: Stanford University
Press, 2017), Library Genesis E-Book, Pp 46
To J Sarkar, Dara was the liberal, while Aurangzeb the orthodox, while M Shibli argued how Dara
was a traitor Muslim and wanted to extend the benefits of the Hindus who were persecuting the
Muslims. R P Tripathi focusses on how religion was the effective slogan used by Aurangzeb against
Dara. But A Ali refutes these claims based on recent evidence. He cites a nishan or princely order by
Aurangzeb to Rana Raj Singh of Merwar which showed cordial relations between the two, and spoke
of the principle of tolerance. Aurangzeb also underplayed the aspect of religion until his victory at
Samurgarj. Also, a letter to Jahanara shows how Aurangzeb was distressed by the “mischief-making”
of Dara. In fact, R Kinra also points out how many nobles in court felt Dara’s acts of translating the
Upanishads were nothing more than a show of soft power and tool to create positive impressions. 6 Ali
also cites a letter wherein Prince Akbar wrote how Dara was actually the one who was prejudiced
towards the Rajputs. Athar Ali gives a statistical analysis of the composition of nobility on either side,
and the nobles were not aligned according to faith or race.7 Dara had 87 nobles supporting him, while
Aurangzeb had 124 nobles, holding the rank 1000 and above. Thus, one cannot hypothesise that the
Hindus supported Dara and Muslims, Aurangzeb.
However, Aurangzeb’s troubles with accession did not end there: Shah Jahan was imprisoned in Agra
fort and the sharif of Mecca refused to grant him legitimacy. On top of that, Sarmad the ideologue
who had influenced Dara was executed on Aurangzeb’s orders. His death has often been seen as the
clamping down of syncretic traditions by Aurangzeb, keeping in line as portraying Aurangzeb as a
bigot. However, there has been substantial work: Truschke commented how Sarmad represented a
man who had prophesized against Aurangzeb, so his death was justified in that manner. On the other
hand, N Prigarina presented a complex argument how Sarmad was already sure about his timely
demise and this was nothing more than a glorified suicide.8
In the first decade of his rule, Aurangzeb introduced a series of moral and religious regulations known
as the Zawabit-i-Alamgiri. In 1659 Aurangzeb forbade the kalima being inscribed on coins since coins
could be trampled underfoot or be defiled while passing from hand to hand.
In 1659-60, he discontinued the festival of Nauroz on the grounds that it was a Zoroastrian practice
favoured by the Safavid rulers of Iran. We should not however accept this explanation on face value.
The celebration of Nauroz involved a great deal of expenditure and was probably ended for economic
reasons in view of the prevailing crisis and then justified on religious grounds. According to S Blake,
Nauroz was abolished primarily to abolish the solar calendar.9 Truschke argues that it was not
celebrated “at a grand scale” as before, and the reason for cancelling it was that many of these
festivals were actually dangerous involving fights.10
In 1660 Muhtasibs were appointed in all the provinces to ensure that people lived their lives in
accordance with the sharia and so they saw to it that wine and intoxicants such as bhang were not
consumed in public places. Through this Aurangzeb emphasized that the state was also responsible for
the moral welfare of the citizens. Writers like Sarkar view this again as a part of his attempts at
establishing Islam in Hindustan. However, it is clear that these measures could not have been strictly
implemented on a large-scale and did not consequently influence the non-Muslims a great deal. In
fact, for many we can see an economic imperative behind them.

6
Dalmia, Vasudha and Faruqi, Munis D, Religious Interactions in Mughal India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2014), Pp 33
7
Ali, Athar, Mughal India, Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society, and Culture (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) Pp 250
Dara had 23 Iranis, 16 Turanis, 1 Afghans, 23 other Muslims, 22 Rajputs and 2 Marathas. Aurangzeb had 27 Iranis, 20
Turanis, 23 other Muslims, 9 Rajputs, 10 Marathas, 2 other Hindus. The difference was marginal.
8
Prigarina, Natalia, Sarmad, Life and Death of a Sufi, doi: https://iphras.ru/uplfile/smirnov/ishraq/3/24_prig.pdf, Pp 327
9
Bhargava, Meena (ed). Exploring Medieval India, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, Culture, Gender, Regional Patterns
(Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2010), Pp 181
10
Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb, The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King (California: Stanford University
Press, 2017), Library Genesis E-Book, Pp 51
In a second series of regulations passed in his eleventh regnal year, Aurangzeb took a number of
similar measures. The foremost among these was his ban on singing and dancing in the court.
Patronage of such cultural activities has also been perceived as a case in example where Aurangzeb’s
policies are seen in opposition to Akbar’s. Under Akbar, music and dance developed a great deal and
numerous musicians, singers and dancers were patronized at his court where the syncretic Indo-
Muslim style of music is believed to have developed. We however cannot generalize the demise of the
arts under Aurangzeb. Instrumental music and naubat (the royal heralding ensemble) were continued
and singing also continued to be patronized by the ladies in the haram, and by individual nobles.
Interestingly the largest number of Persian works on classical Indian music were also written during
Aurangzeb's reign. Aurangzeb himself was proficient in playing the rudra veena. When we look at
this measure we should once again consider the economic factor as patronage of the arts was a costly
proposition for the Mughal court.
Aurangzeb also discontinued the practice of jharoka darshana or showing himself to the public from
the balcony, since he considered it a superstitious practice against Islam. We can trace the reason for
this not to his orthodoxy but his experience during his father’s time of the kind of rumours that could
be fuelled due to this practice. Similarly, he forbade the ceremony of weighing the emperor against
gold and silver and other articles on his birthdays, known as tuladan. The economic imperative behind
this act is obvious. In 1675, he also forbade astrologers to prepare almanacs. In 1679, the practice of
the Emperor putting a tika on the forehead of a new raja was stopped. Even the official department of
history writing was discontinued as a measure to cut down costs. Clearly, financial and political issues
led to most of these measures and even though they were justified on religious grounds, it needs to be
remembered that none of them were discriminatory in nature. In this respect, Aurangzeb did not
deviate from the policies of his predecessors.
A A Moin while discussing the character of the Mughal sovereignty, discusses Aurangzeb’s reign in
particular, deliberating over the abandoned jharokha darshan, end of Nauroz and all festivals, end of
patronisation of musical instruments and artists. According to Moin, Aurangzeb’s reign signalled a
new compendium of Islamic jurisprudence, which is explained in detail in Fatwa-i-Alamgiri.
(Truschke) It must however be noted that Aurangzeb’s sons continued with most festivities, and
Aurangzeb appears to be the most deviant person. In fact, even during his time, he was seen as the
force that sullied the honour of the House of Timur, manifest in how the Safavid ruler saw Aurangzeb
as a hereditary slave.11
If one looks at historical sources critically, the issue of mass conversion can be reinterpreted. Most
Hindus had not converted to Islam, during the 400 years that they had paid jizyah, before Akbar
abolished it in 1564. There is also no proof of any largescale conversion programmes which
Aurangzeb had undertaken during his rule. The reason for these allegations are due to the language
used by the munshis in the texts. Richard Eaton in his book, ‘The Rise of Islam and the Bengal
Frontier’ argued how the Muslims in Bengal had actually adopted the folk culture of the area and
were included in many of the contemporary literary pieces, like Rāy-Maṅgala, a poem composed in
1686, celebrated both the Bengali tiger god Daksin Ray (“King of the South”) and a Muslim pioneer
named Badi‘Ghazi Khan. If there was anything, Eaton argues, it was actually a period of syncretism,
like how the daughter of the Prophet, Fatima, was identified with the goddess, Jagata-Janani.12
Eaton also points out how the idea of state endorsed conversion itself has become a matter of
misinterpretation, that is, there has been a lot of literal translation of Persian sources, without a
contextual reading. He cites Y Friedmann who argued how these texts usually used ambiguous
11
Moin, Afzar A, The Millennial Sovereign, Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2012), Pp 251
12
Eaton, Richard, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?
docId=ft067n99v9&chunk.id=ch010&toc.depth=1&toc.id=ch010&brand=ucpress
phrases as “they submitted to Islam” (“iṭā‘at-i Islām numūdand”), or “they came under submission to
Islam” (“dar iṭā‘at-i Islām āmadand”), in which “Islam” might mean either the religion, the Muslim
state, or the “army of Islam”. In reality however, it meant that due to military defeat, the people
submitted to the Mughal army, and not Islam.13 Mass Islamization never occurred under a regime in
the subcontinent cites Eaton, the Mughals, as a matter of policy showed no interest in proselytizing on
behalf of the Islamic faith. Ruling over a vast empire built upon a bottom-heavy agrarian base,
Mughal officials were primarily interested in enhancing agricultural productivity by extracting as
much of the surplus wealth of the land, and using that wealth to create loyal clients at every level of
administration. Although there were always conservative ulama who insisted on the emperors’ “duty”
to convert the Hindu “infidels” to Islam, such a policy was not in fact implemented in Bengal, even
during the reign of the conservative emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707).14
The Naqshbandi silsila was brought into India by Muhammad al-Baqi bi-Illah, and the Naqsbandhis
had a decisive impact on the shaping of Indian Islam. Very often it has been attributed that the
Naqsbandhis had a profound influence on Aurangzeb, but it is important to re-examine the sources
and interpretations. According to Y Friedmann, there was the existence of a large number of letters,
sent by Shiekh Sirhindi’s descendants, namely Sirhindi’s two sons Khwaja Muhammad Said and
Khwaja Muhammad Masum and his son, Muhammad Sayf al-Din. Muhammad Sayf al-Din was sent
to court to serve as the spiritual guide to Aurangzeb. K A Nizami had opined how the letters from
Aurangzeb to Masum were deeply influenced by Naqsbandhi silsila, but Friedmann argues that these
were actually penned before Aurangzeb came to power. Masum wrote in one particular letter how
jihad was discussed in context of the Qandahar campaign15. Friedmann argues that this is but prima
facie evidence and it needs to be remembered that in 1679, Aurangzeb instructed the shaykh-al
Islam16, to proscribe the letters of Sheikh Sirhindi and later a decree was passed which banned the
Maktubat. The only reason, Friedmann opines Sirhindi’s sons could continue at court was because
they did not continue with the views of Sirhindi. There is also no evidence of Aurangzeb discussing
religious policies with the silsila, but primarily they were discussions on mystical thought.
K B Brown argues that the banning of music, and other art forms is a rather polemical exaggeration.
Aurangzeb’s gradual renunciation of music was less of an imperial policy and more of a troubled
private matter, having to do with his own personal piety and self-control. Aurangzeb’s self-denial was
a way for the emperor to guard himself against his weakness for elite courtesans, one which he had
struggled from since his days as a prince. R O’ Hanlon argues how the elite male adab in Mughal
India required men to hide their emotions and that elite manliness meat a careful disciplining of the
body, much like Sufi spirituality.
There are two primary contemporary sources which give us details: Manucci’s Storia do Mogor and
Khafi Khan’s Mintakhab al-Lubab. Manucci’s account acta as a potent indicator of the repressive
nature of Aurangzeb’s reign, but Brown argues that it was the personal antagonism towards
Aurangzeb that led to this skewed dramatic account. Khafi Khan on the other hand, attaches no
religious significance to the issue, and his account in fact refutes Manucci’s: there is no evidence of
invasion of private houses, or summary arrests or destruction of nstruments. Neither does Khafi Khan
refer to any general orders for the prohibition of music and dance.
Brown reminds us of the number of dhruapds composed in Aurangzeb’s honour, of how the
maximum number of musical treatises in Persian were written during his reign, of how he gave an
13
Eaton, Richard, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?
docId=ft067n99v9&chunk.id=ch05&toc.depth=1&toc.id=ch05&brand=ucpress
14
Ibid.
15
Friedmann, Yohann, The Naqsbhandis and Awrangzeb, doi:
https://www.academia.edu/16252285/The_Naqshbandis_and_Awrangzeb, Pp 213
16
Chief Judge of the Mughal Empire
allowance of rupees 7000 to his principal musician Kushal Khan Kalwant, and how he himself was
trained in classical music and the rudra veena. The ban existed only in the courts: music and dance
continued in the houses of nobles, weddings, private parties. Other Europeans also give similar
accounts. Khafi Khan clarified that restrictions only applied to qawwals and kalwants in the service
of the imperial court, however, musicians also accompanied Aurangzeb on his Deccan-Maratha
campaigns. S A A Rizvi cites how both the Naqshbandi and Chishti silsila continued with the practice
of sama.
According to Richard Eaton, the political and religious were one in the process of Indo-Muslim state
building. Hence the destruction of temples after a victory was in reality an act of obliterating the
symbols of authority of the previous regime. The act of destroying temples was not just done by the
Muslims, but by Hindu kings as well, like Pallava king Narasimhavarman I looted the image of
Ganesa from the Chalukyan capital of Vatapi.17
At the outset of his reign, Aurangzeb reiterated the position of the sharia regarding temples etc. that
"long standing temple should not be demolished but no new temples allowed to be built." Further, old
places of worship could be repaired. In January 1670, he commanded that the Keshav Rai temple of
Mathura be destroyed. In 1674, he confiscated all the lands held by Hindus as religious grants in
Gujrat. The destruction of Hindu temples came to become one of the chief duties of the muhtasibs. In
June 1680, the temples of Amber, the capital of the state of Jaipur were broken down. The new temple
of Somnath was also demolished. JN Sarkar has suggested that in the conflict with the Rajputs,
temples were destroyed in Mewar including the temple of Someshwar.
However, according to Eaton and Truschke, one must see it in the correct context: temples in Deccan
were destroyed because they had been built by the rebel, Jujhar Singh Bundela, or the Mathura
Keshava Das temple was destroyed because the Mathura brahmins had helped Shivaji escape from
Agra. Eaton argues that the evidence of Aurangzeb giving personal orders to destroy temples is
almost fragmentary and no more than a dozen temples were desecrated at this time.
Truschke goes on to argue how Aurangzeb was “The Protector of Temples”18 and that he believed in
the fact that god made “men of various dispositions and different religions (mazahib) (and they)
should live in the vale of peace and pass their days in prosperity, and no one should meddle in the
affairs of another”19 In Aurangzeb’s eyes Islamic teachings and the Mughal tradition enjoined him to
protect Hindu temples, pilgrimage destinations, and holy men. Both Chandra and Truschke cite
different farmans which show the number of land grants given to temples, or to saints. For example,
Truschke cites that the ninth year of his reign Aurangzeb dispensed a farman to the Umanand Temple
at Gauhati in Assam confirming an earlier land grant and the associated right to collect revenue. 20
Chandra cites numerous examples how Aurangzeb land grants to maths and farmans to protect
religious men in Marwar from getting harassed.21
The Rathore-Sisodia rebellion is often seen as a conflict between the Hindus and Muslims, spurred off
by the catalyst, the re-imposition of jaziya. According to J Sarkar, the re-imposition and the efforts to
“annex” Mewar and Marwar was nothing more than a design to spread Islam and establish an Islamic
state. Chandra critiques Sarkar, arguing that his understanding of Aurangzeb, as an uncompromising
bigot, has inhibited the nuanced study of his policies and has led to gross inaccurate generalisations.

17
Eaton, Richard, Temple Desecration and Indo-Muslim States, Journal of Islamic Studies 11:3 (2000) pp. 283-319. doi:
https://academic.oup.com/jis/article/11/3/283/660642, Pp 225
18
Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb, The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King (California: Stanford University
Press, 2017), Library Genesis E-Book, Pp 52
19
Ibid. Pp 53
20
Ibid. Pp 54
21
Chandra, Satish, Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs and the Deccan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1993), Pp
190-193
According to Sarkar, the war with the Rajputs was ideological in nature, where he wanted to plan
forcible conversions of Hindus and his aim was to deny Marwar of efficient leadership and for
punishing Jaswant Singh who was an important supporter of Dara. S R Sharma points out how there
was a lack of matrimonial alliances and hence supports Sarkar.
Satish Chandra however, argues that it was the purely a political move. The break in Rajput relations
came only the later part of Aurangzeb’s reign. It is true that Aurangzeb no longer conducted the tika
ceremony but that was due to the acute financial crisis looming as well. Even during the re-imposition
of jizyah, Aurangzeb had extremely cordial relations with Mewar’s Raj Singh, whose son Jai Singh
had even stayed at the Mughal court, with jizyah being promulgated, there is no evidence of any
reaction in the Rajput states and G N Sharma writes that had there been an issue, local historians
would have commented. Also, if Aurangzeb did want to punish Jaswant Singh, then why would he do
so after his death, rather, Aurangzeb had given him important designations after pardoning him: like
his being the subedar of Gujarat. There was also increasing lawlessness, and Jaswant Singh, Chandra
cites, was unable to pay back a loan of 40 lakh rupees. Under these circumstances, especially that
Jaswant Singh had died heirless, it was precedent that to convert his territory to khalisa land.
The Sisodias also had their own reasons to join the Rathores. Rana Raj Singh was moved to help his
sister, Rani Hadi, Aurangzeb had also not kept his word of giving concessions, and some land had
been made independent like Banswara, Durgapur and Devaliya. There was also a decree passed to
stop Chittor fort from being repaired, essentially to stop armament. In such a situation, with close
proximity of the Rathore state, the Sisodias also joined the rebellion.
According to R Hallissey it was the confrontation between the parochial traditional political system
and an expansionist empire. Hallissey also discusses jizyah in this context and refutes the idea that the
Rajput uprising was a national uprising because it overlooks the cordial relations shared by many
Rajputs with the Mughals like house of Bikaner. Hallissey also argues about a letter, a formal protest
for repealing jizyah, which many believe was written by Shivaji to Aurangzeb, and Hallissey writes
that there is no evidence to support that it was written by Shivaji. He cites writers like B N Goswamy
and J S Grewal who have worked on how Aurangzeb guaranteed rights of Hindus in Punjab.22 Thus,
the campaign against the Rajputs was simply to expand Mughal control and not Islamicize.
The Deccan and Maratha campaigns which Aurangzeb personally oversaw was hardly a clash of
religious sentiments. Though early on, Aurangzeb had requested the Adil Shahi dynasty to protect
their citizens as Muslims, it was of little use and Aurangzeb abandoned this tactic. Aurangzeb in fact
repealed jizyah in the Deccan owing to the severe famine. The equation with the Marathas was a bit
more complex. The Marathas during the time of Shivaji were seen as “mountain rats” by the Rajputs.
In fact, there was a resentment within the Rajputs towards Aurangzeb for the Marathas were seen to
be of no real pedigree. With regard to Shivaji in particular, the Mughals had faced humiliating defeats,
the worst at Surat where trading interests had been seriously compromised. Even after the death of
Shivaji, his son Sambhaji continued to wage war by guerrilla tactics against the Mughals, and his
execution was not out of the routine. “Neither Mughal nor Maratha writers shied away from
religiously tinged rhetoric in narrating this clash, especially in later accounts. But, on the ground, a
thirst for political power drove both the Maratha opposition to Aurangzeb’s rule and the Mughal
response.”23
So was Guru Tegh Bahadur’s death, who was seen as a rebel: in fact, his death never even figured into
the Persian sources and we are still unsure if he was executed in Lahore or Deccan. In Aurangzeb’s
eyes, Tegh Bahadur militarily opposed Mughal state interests and so was a legitimate target for a
22
Hallissey, Robert C, The Rajput Rebellion Against Aurangzeb, A Study of the Mughal Empire in the Seventeenth Century
(Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1977), Pp 88
23
Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb, The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King (California: Stanford University
Press, 2017), Library Genesis E-Book, Pp 45
death sentence. His religious stature did nothing to mitigate the overarching commitment of
Aurangzeb’s administration to meting out punishment, including capital punishment, to enemies of
the state. It probably did not help matters that Tegh Bahadur’s nephew and the seventh Sikh guru, Har
Rai, was rumoured to have supported Dara Shukoh during the war of succession. Around the same
time, the Mughals targeted other religious groups that took up arms against the state, such as the
Satnamis.24
Athar Ali critiques the views of S R Sharma who advocated that the Hindu nobility faced serious
problems during Aurangzeb’s reign. According to Ali, Aurangzeb was quite accommodating to the
Hindu mansabdars, and Ali goes on to show, how during different parts of his reign, Aurangzeb
underwent different phases. The top 15 mansabdars from 1658-78 had Raja Jai Singh as the top
holder, and his own uncle, Shaista Khan was third, while Raja Jaswant Singh also figured in the top 5
holders of mansabs. Thus, Aurangzeb’s number of employed Rajputs actually exceeded that of Akbar
by almost six times. In fact, Iranis outnumbered Turanis (his own racial group) in the ratio of 4:1. 25
Truschke comments how there was a trend of translation of Sanskrit texts to Persian, and “It did not
strike anybody in the 17th century as odd that both Hindus and Muslims read and retold the
Ramayana repeatedly in Persian, resulting in more versions of the Ramayana in Persian than in
possibly any other vernacular language in premodernity.”26 Aurangzeb, to Truschke presents one with
a “deceptive image of new religious orthodoxy”. Many have argued that Aurangzeb stopped the
patronage among many things, of Sanskrit. However, Truschke argues that Sanskrit increasingly was
becoming supplanted by Hindi, and the Mughals did not distinguish between the two. Aurangzeb’s
ascension resulted in a direct schism in royal support of Sanskrit intellectuals, for Aurangzeb sought
to distinguish the language of his empire, from the language associated with his rival, Dara. But court
patronage of Sanskrit did not stop, in fact, it continued outside court with prominent members like
Shayastha Khan patronising Sanskrit.27
Truschke goes on to argue that it becomes significant to analyse the sources before making claims
about orthodoxy. The sources are largely written in a certain context, and some widely used sources
like Khafi Khan’s Muntakhab al-Lubab and Saqi Mustaid Khan’s Maasir-i Alamgir, were written
after the death of Aurangzeb and relied heavily on memory and hearsay28. In this particular style of
history-writing, it was not felt important to get the facts right, hence, fact and fiction do converge.
This is also true in most works of European travellers like Bernier, Manucci, wherein events are
dramatized and often competition with other travellers lead to exaggerated claims. Thus, with such a
diverse array of texts available, it is but obvious that there will be disagreements among historians.
In light of this, the debate seems unending: questions of Aurangzeb’s orthodoxy do keep on coming
up, the significance of jizyah seems more important than ever before, given the current socio-political
climate. Aurangzeb was a Sunni orthodox, and as theorised K B Brown, Aurangzeb represented a
time when the empire was at its largest, but it was becoming increasingly decentralised. Blake
theorised the nature of the Mughal state to be a patrimonial bureaucratic state, where the Emperor was
the chief overarching figure, the state was centralised, ideas of the emperor would precipitate down.
But scholars like Brown, Truschke, Ali, Chandra through their works as illustrated refute this idea: the
bonds were loosening, orders were seldom followed. Thus, Aurangzeb’s policy of jizyah did not mark

24
Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb, The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King (California: Stanford University
Press, 2017), Library Genesis E-Book, Pp 40
25
Ali, Athar, Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), Pp 140-1
26
A Truschke, Indo Persian Translations, Pp 7, http://audreytruschke.com/truschke_indo_persian_trans.pdf
27
Truschke, Audrey, Culture of Encounters, Sanskrit at the Mughal Court (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), Pp
234-238
28
Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb, The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King (California: Stanford University
Press, 2017), Library Genesis E-Book, Pp 70
the turning point: it was repealed after his death, and the other bans, destruction of temples need to be
studied in the context of a looming financial crisis and political moves for articulation of power.
_________________________________________________________________________________
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