‘Bi fish Covert

=i.

Spe O Oe Srey
 It was a desperate time for England.
Faced with the growing prospect of war
with Germany in 1939, the British
government mounted a massive secret
political campaign in the United States to
weaken the isolationists, bring America
into World War II, and then influence U.S.
war policy in England’s favor. Desperate
Deception reveals Britain’s widespread use
of front groups, agents, and collaborators
and shows how its agents manipulated
polling data and influenced election
campaigns. This eye-opening book details
a vast program that not only helped
change the course of the war but also the
face of American politics. It is the latest
addition to Brassey’s Intelligence and
National Security Library, a volume series
editor Roy Godson calls “a milestone book
~ on covert action and intelligence.”

The Author
Thomas E. Mahl teaches college
history in Ohio. He holds a doctorate in
diplomatic history from Kent State
University.
JAN
27 WSS

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https://archive.org/details/desperatedecepti0000mahl
DESPERATE DECEPTION
British Covert Operations
in the United States, 1939-44

‘Thomas FE. Mahl

BRASSEY’S
Washington ¢ London
 940.5486 M278d

Mahl, Thomas E., 1943-

Desperate deception
British covert
c1998.

Copyright © 1998 by Brassey’s, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic,
electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise—without permission in writing from the publisher.

Brassey’s Editorial Offices: Brassey’s Order Department:

22883 Quicksilver Drive P.O. Box 960
Dulles, Virginia 20166 Herndon, Virginia 20172

Brassey’s books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases for sales
promotions, premiums, fund-raising, or educational use.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mahl, Thomas E., 1943-
Desperate deception : British covert operations in the United
States, 1939-44 / Thomas E. Mahl. — Ist ed.
5) Sem:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-57488-080-2
1. World War, 1939-1945—Secret service—Great Britain. 2. World
War, 1939-1945—Secret service—United States. I. Title.
D810.S7M254 1998
940.54’8641—dc2 1 97-19550
GIP

Designed by Page Graphics, Inc.

LOOT Sie 7236. 5 4 Be st

Printed in the United States ofAmerica

3 1223 04795 6454

SE Pi ie i Imoany .
To Ben and Mary Ternes Mahl,
my grandparents
if
 Contents

Foren ond Dyk Oy GrOcsOit awe Mena geescrckua ny ge missin ot

PESTACE ea ARON oe Rok ert RTE Y ry oa kG gee 6 MoM Mea te

IntroductionmAr Calculated Risk: 3 .4cawa

ib es ery esos
Organization, Methods, and Offspring .............
PCS ROR Ekin hays ae oe a eae Oe asta a ae A Pe
“Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” .. .
ihe Voteeohthe People wey isis sts mae ate
G.112—Lt. Commander Griffith ..............0.06.
Deemoy ine Congeressnant tLishim aa snrnaiity ata
ic levAut nur ere ls, ey hs hap oP as ae Oa

NH
BW
MN
SONA

DO LOS See raiet, G ne (erase Sor A edna Aah te ag tart canes ioe a

Laer Cee ee ah ee. Pa Een ok od Oe De kha

—
 ee

Foreword

Brassey’s Intelligence and National Security Library is intended to

provide citizens, students, scholars, and national security experts with a
select set of books that make a unique or significant contribution to
understanding the world of intelligence.
The intelligence literature contains much discussion but few stud-
ies of covert action—the secret influencing of events in other coun-
tries without revealing one’s involvement. Much of the focus has
been on sensational paramilitary activities, and most of this has been
about failures. There has been little detailed study of other aspects of
covert action.
Desperate Deception helps fill the gap. It is a very readable account of
British covert action in the United States in the years just before and
during World War II. Faced with the growing prospect of war with
Germany, the British government mounted in 1939 a massive secret
political campaign in the United States (including the use of front
groups, agents, collaborators, manipulation of polling data, involve-
ment in election campaigns, etc.) to weaken the isolationists, bring the
United States into the war, and influence U.S. war policy in England’s
favor. This campaign helped change not only the course of World War
II but also the face of American politics in succeeding decades.
While bits and pieces of the story have been told before and some of
the details of the British campaign are lost to history, this is probably
the best-researched and best-documented account we are likely to see
on this crucial period of Western history. It is also a well-written story

vil
vili *** DESPERATE DECEPTION

that combines both journalistic and academic skills. Desperate Deception

is a milestone book on covert action and intelligence.
Roy Godson
General Editor
Brassey’ Intelligence and National Security Library
 Preface

“What you’re looking for, what I’ve looked for, is the file with the
whole story in it. That file doesn’t exist,” retired CIA historian Thomas
F. ‘Troy told me when I began my research on this book. “The material
you want has been scattered to the winds—a sentence here, a para-
graph there. You'll have to hunt them out just as I’ve had to.” This wild
scattering is only one of the problems that confront scholars who at-
tempt to explore the covert operations of intelligence agencies as they
indistinctly reveal themselves in the public events of diplomatic and
domestic history.
As Yale historian Robin Winks has written, “There is, in fact, very
little careful, solid research on the...intelligence community...even
though intelligence history is an essential component of our times.”
Intelligence is truly “the missing dimension,” not only of diplomatic
history, but of the domestic history dealt with in this book. A conse-
quence of this void has been elementary errors that appear in academic
histories. One better-informed study notes: “The distinguished editor
of amajor volume of military diaries published in 1972 failed to realize
that the references to ‘C’ and ‘C’s information’ referred to the head of
the Secret Intelligence Service.”!
British historian Ronald Lewin pointed out in his essay “A Signal-
Intelligence War” that strict official secrecy has caused “most of the
significant volumes in the United Kingdom series of Official Histories
of the Second World War [to be] fundamentally misleading, inad-
equate and out-of-date.” Lewin points to the ruses used to camouflage
the Normandy invasion which tied down the German 15th Army.

1X
x *®¢¢ DespERATE DECEPTION

These deceptions led to the deceptions in the official histories about

the invasion. He asserts that most of the official histories and war stud-
ies published before the mid-1970s should be rewritten.’
What Lewin and others have written about the secrecy surrounding
code-breaking and signals intelligence is even more relevant to this
book’s topic: the covert action and dirty tricks used to move the United
States toward war and destroy isolationism as a respectable intellectual
position.
Several research problems confront the intelligence research
scholar. First, many of the particulars were never put on paper. Among
his many tasks, lawyer Ernest Cuneo (code name CRUSADER) was
liaison between British Security Coordination and several departments
of the U.S. government. Here he is writing to Dick Ellis, who had been
second-in-command for British intelligence operations in the Western
Hemisphere during World War II: “I saw Berle at State, Eddie Tamm,
]. Edgar and more often the Attorney General; on various other mat-
ters Dave Niles at the White House and Ed Foley at the Treasury, but
so far as I know [there] wasn’t 4 sentence recorded. I reported to Bill
Donovan and George Borden [Bowden], and never in writing.”
Even those within the intelligence agencies have sometimes lacked a
clear understanding of how events proceeded; it sometimes appears
that the insider’s only advantage over the outsider has been the insider’s
knowledge that he did not know. In a recently declassified 1968 book
review of Ladislas Farago’s The Broken Seal: The Story of “Operation
Magic” and the Pearl Harbor Disaster, CIA reviewer Edwin C. Fishel
wrote ot Pearl Harbor: “It is becoming increasingly clear that if we
want a straight story...—and that is surely a reasonable want—tt is go-
ing to have to be produced by professionals. This is true not only be-
cause of the unlikelihood of getting an adequate ‘outside’ study but also
because a really complete study involves information still classified.
Much of it does not even exist on paper.”+
Much of that information which is on paper and stored in a rational,
readily retrievable way remains classified. In Great Britain the Official
Secrets Act was first passed in 1911 under fear of Irish and German
subversion; it was tightened as recently as the 1980s and acts as a pow-
ertul inhibition against research. The British government has an arbi-
trary right to withhold any document it wishes, the “thirty-year rule”
for release notwithstanding. Harford Montgomery Hyde worked for
 Preface *** xi

British intelligence in New York and later wrote about its personnel
and operations. After his death in 1989 the British government closed
many of his papers at Churchill College, Cambridge, until 2041. For-
tunately several scholars, Canadian historian David Stafford and
Timothy Naftali of Harvard being two, had scrutinized these papers
before the veil fell.
In the United States the Freedom of Information Act would appear
on the surface to be a solution to the problem of hidden documents,
but in reality it is of limited usefulness. Firstly, there is what author
James Bamford has called “quite likely the most secret agreement ever
entered into by the English-speaking world,” the 1947 UKUSA agree-
ment between the United States and Britain prohibiting the United
States from releasing any document that the British will not allow re-
leased.’ In effect the Official Secrets Act operates in the United States
for some of the embarrassing information covered by this book.
Secondly, since a researcher must know exactly what he is looking
for, he is often asked the impossible: to supply the very information for
which he is looking. Thirdly, using the Freedom of Information Act is
very time-consuming. Begging too large a workload, government
agencies seldom release material in timely enough fashion for a re-
searcher to keep on a reasonable writing schedule. Fourthly, even after
half a century the authorities often plead that the release of the re-
quested information threatens national security.
Probably even more damaging than these research problems is the
fact that until recently, the study of the intelligence history of World
War II has lacked respectability. The conventional charge is that it
smacks too much of conspiracy—a word with a very unprofessional ring
among American historians. How does the historian avoid the charge
that he is indulging in conspiracy history when he explores the activi-
ties of athousand people, occupying two floors of Rockefeller Center,
in their efforts to involve the United States in a major war? What
should we properly call the rigging ofa public opinion poll, the plant-
ing of a lover, or a fraudulent letter by an intelligence agency in order
to gain information or influence policy?
Graduate students are warned against the “furtive fallacy.” In fact,
the only book similar to this one that was written by a respected his-
torian—Charles Beard—and published by a respected publisher was
criticized by the reviewers for this very reason and became an object
xii *@*®*) ~~Desperare DECEPTION

lesson used to train young historians. Beard’s President Roosevelt and

the Coming of the Wor 19-41 was cited for being “deeply flawed by the
furtive fallacy in its thesis that Franklin Roosevelt and his cronies se-
cretly manipulated American policy by a series of subtle and sordid
tricks to bring their nation into war.... The errors and distortions in
[Beard’s] interpretation are rather the result of his erroneous
assumptions...in the way he believed history happened.Ӣ
Chere is, in fact, far more information available than one might ex-
pect, though it is often difficult to find because historians have only
recently begun to build the base of recognizable names, theories, and
verifiable facts that smooths the path for new research. Although the
archives of the intelligence agencies may be officially closed, or their
files “lost,” much information is available to those who will persevere.
Also, although intelligence agencies have strict procedures that
theoretically prevent information trom reaching outsiders, bureaucra-
cies are populated by human beings. Human beings make mistakes.
Clerks mistile documents; weeders lack pertect knowledge, get sick, let
their attention wander. One department weeds what another does not.
Agents acquire the telltale baggage of life—spouses, children, inquisi-
tive relatives, lovers, ex-spouses. Ex-agents collect details on those with
whom they worked as a hobby; they die, and their children give the
musty papers away. Diaries are kept and memos made and misplaced.
Professional busybodies collect vast troves of information. All of these
tangential sources have supplied information for this book.
Last, but perhaps paramount, governments leak, sometimes in-
advertently, many times intentionally. A substantial relevant leak took
place more than three decades ago. Strangely, these stunning revela-
tions went unexplored by “outside” journalists and historians.
How and why Harford Montgomery Hyde's The Quiet Canadian
(published as Roe 3603 in the United States) came to be published is
not fully clear and remains a subject of controversy. What is indisput-
able is that the book, particularly the British edition, was much too
candid and that many in the intelligence community breathed a sigh of
relief when no one followed up. Although the book sold well, no well-
circulated American academic journal mentioned it, nor did any re-
spectable journalist or historian pursue its fertile leads.
Unknown to the innocent in the press and academia, there was a
tumultuous uproar behind the scenes. Intelligence professionals in
 Preface °** xiii

both America and Britain were “astounded.” A classified CIA review

said, “he publication of this study is shocking....Exactly what British
intelligence was doing in the United States...was closely held in Wash-
ington, and very little had hitherto been printed about it....One may
suppose that Mr. Hyde’s account...is relatively accurate, but the wis-
dom of placing it on the public record is extremely questionable.””
After reading this, A. M. “Bill” Ross-Smith, a World War II British
agent in the United States, wrote me: “I am most interested in CIA
review on QC....Last paragraph classes QC as relatively accurate—I
agree with him; it should not have been published....” Earlier Ross-
Smith wrote that he was “astounded that he [Hyde] revealed Bellmonte
Letter and L.A.T.L. operations at all.”* Hyde’s discussion of the “Bell-
monte” and “L.A.TI.” operations revealed the success British intelli-
gence had with phony documents it created. Along with a number of
other relevant items these two operations are explained in the Glossary
of Individuals and Organizations at the back of this book.
Other major sources of information on the organization and opera-
tion of British intelligence during this period are the papers of the head
of the OSS, William J. Donovan, at the U.S. Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Ernest Cuneo Papers
at Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
I would like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Lawrence S. Kaplan
for his patiénce and timely advice. Dr. Frank L. Byrne, Dr. John
Jameson, Dr. James Best, and Dr. Allan C. Dooley also read the manu-
script and made useful comments and suggestions. I profited greatly
from conversations with Dr. NicholasJ.Cull and from reading his doc-
toral dissertation, which he graciously supplied me. Dr. Timothy
Naftali shared with me his insights into the operations of British intel-
ligence and several pages of valuable notes. Dr. Francis MacDonnell
was similarly generous with a prepublication copy of an article. Mary S.
Lovell was more than generous with her insights and notes used for the
book Cast No Shadow. The late A. M. “Bill” Ross-Smith saved me much
wasted effort and gave me valuable insights into the operations ofBrit-
ish Security Coordination. Thomas F. Troy gave me valuable help in
starting my research, as did Walter Trohan and Edmond Taylor.
Dan and Steve Farrow and Richard Henson were helpful in allowing
me to see documents from the Francis Henson Papers held by the fam-
ily. Peter Griffith answered my questions and gave me valuable leads
xiv @@* Desperare DECEPTION

on the activities of his father, Sandy Griffith. Peter’s sister Brenda

MecCooey generously shared not only her memories but a number of
photographs trom the family album.”
There were a multitude of librarians and archivists without whose
help this book could not have been written. Foremost among them was
Nanci A. Young, who presides over the Fight for Freedom Papers at
Princeton.’ Mary K. Knill at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library was
very helpful with my requests for files from the Drew Pearson Papers,
as were Ronald M. Bulatoff and Carol A. Leadenham at the Hoover
Institution. Others who deserve mention: Rebecca Campbell Cape, at
the Lilly Library, Indiana University; Theresa Salazar at the University
of Arizona; Matthew Gilmore of the Washington, D.C., Public Li-
brary; Harold L. Miller of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
Thomas Featherstone of the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State
University; George F. Henderson of the Queen’s University Archives,
Kingston, Canada; John Taylor of the National Archives; Nancy R.
Bartlett of the Bently Historical Library, University of Michigan;
Carolyn A. Davis of the George Arents Research Library at Syracuse
University; Barbara R. Daily of the Baker Library, Harvard University;
Bernard R. Crystal of the Butler Library, Columbia University;
William R. Massa, Jr, and Judith Ann Schitf of Yale University Li-
brary; Nancy E. Metger of the Penrose Library, University of Denver;
Cora KF. Pederson of the Herbert Hoover Library; Raymond Teichman
and Nancy Snedeker of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Dr. Rich-
ard J. Sommers at the U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle Bar-
racks; and the statt of the reference department of the Elyria Public
Library.
No list of acknowledgments would be complete without mention of
my neighbors John and Sylvia McKenna, who valiantly read early
dratts of this book. Their suggestions and the wonderful editing job by
led Johnson account tor whatever clarity is to be found in my prose.

“Louise G. Parry shared her memories of Fight for Freedom and the activities
of her husband, Albert Parry. United States Congressman Sherrod Brown and his
staff helped me gain access to the Dies Committee files.
FDunean Stuart, CMG, the SOF adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth,
patiently helped me trace cover symbols and operations from the SOE files.
 INTRODUCTION

A Calculated Risk

I went up to father’s [Winston’s] bedroom....

“Sit down, dear boy....I think I see my way through.” He re-
sumed his shaving. I was astonished, and said: “Do you mean
that we can avoid defeat?”—which seemed credible—“or
beat the bastards?”—-which seemed incredible.

He...swung around, and said:—“Of course I mean we can

beat them.”
Me: “Well, Pm all for it, but I don’t see how you can do it.”
By this time he had dried and sponged his face and turning
round to me said with great intensity:—‘“I shall drag the
United States in.”
—Randolph Churchill!

This is the story of the covert operations mounted by British intel-

ligence to involve the United States in World War II and destroy iso-
lationism. These operations profoundly changed America forever,
helping it become the global power we see today—a power whose
foreign policy leaders were freed to make, after the war, a multitude
of global commitments unhampered by any significant isolationist
opposition.
2 eee JP
ESPERATE DECEPTION

Little information on these operations has hitherto found its way

into standard history texts. As recently asthe fall 1995 issue of Diplo-
matic History, prominent historian Justice Doenecke could write that “a
full-scale study of secret British operations in the United States is
much needed....”? Without a fuller understanding of British intelli-
gence operations in the United States, there is little chance of under-
standing the political behavior of the world’s greatest power during
those crucial years when it emerged to dominate the globe.
That these operations are little known or publicly debated is a
mark of their success. Though covert operations often produce spec-
tacular public results, one of their essential qualities is that the origins
of events remain secret—that the historical credit or blame falls on
the innocent, on citizens acting independently, or even better, on
mere chance. The very fact that a covert operation is known to have
been run by an intelligence agency marks it as a significant failure.
Covert operations thus present conundrums for a republic that are
not easily solved.
How can decisions be made about the efficiency of tactics about
which even those thought well educated and informed are ignorant? In
small part, this history of Britain’s effort to drag the United States into
World War II is a contribution to the discussion over the usefulness of
covert operations—an exchange presently unbalanced by the prepon-
derance of examples of operations blown and bungled.
‘To understand British intelligence operations in the United States
during the war it is necessary to review briefly the situation in which
Britain, with her worldwide commitments and inadequate resources,
found herself as World War II approached. Britain and France had
been able to win World War I only by the intervention of the United
States. ‘Iwo decades later their prospects appeared grim. Germany on
the eve of World War I had a population of 80 million with a
workforce of 41 million; Great Britain had a population of 46 million
with less than half Germany’s workforce. Germany’s total income at
market prices had been £7,260 million in 1938, the last full year of
peace, while Britain’s had been £5,242 million. More ominously, the
Germans had spent five times what Britain had spent on armaments—
£1,710 million versus £358 million. While rearmament and public
works had given Germany full employment by late 1936, Britain still
had 1.3 million unemployed when war came in September 1939.3
 A Calculated Risk #** 3

Britain simply did not have the money for the three-year war her
strategic planners envisioned. This had gradually become more and
more apparent since 1936, when the British Admiralty had proposed a
building program to meet the potential dangers from Germany, Italy,
and Japan. The cabinet flatly responded that this lay “beyond the
bounds of financial possibility.”*
The need for dollars, a hard currency, was the problem; earning
them was difficult. Hancock and Gowing have written that in 1939
“and for some years past a net deficit on the international balance of
payments had announced that the nation, even in advance of the war,
was already beginning the process of overseas disinvestment.”°
Not only were the British failing to generate net trade dollars, they
could not borrow dollars from the United States. The Johnson Act of
1934 stopped American citizens from lending dollars to any govern-
ment in default on its debts to the United States. So the prospects for
financial help from the United States appeared just as grim as the pros-
pects for war.
The attitude of the American population was even more worrisome.
Most Americans seemed determined to stay out of any European con-
flict. They had, in large measure, been profoundly disillusioned by
both the consequences of World War I and the devious way they had
come to participate in it. The public’s disillusionment had started very
quickly with John Maynard Keynes’s erratically brilliant attack on the
Versailles Peace Treaty, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919).
Over the next twenty years it had been followed by a whole series of
books, many from respected authors and publishers, exposing how deft
British propaganda and clever British agents such as Sir William
Wiseman had maneuvered the United States into the Great War.
Adding to this in the mid-1930s came the startling revelations of the
Senate’s Nye Committee linking banks and munitions makers to
American entry into the World War. From these disclosures sprang a
raft of neutrality laws. The Neutrality Act of 1935 stopped the ship-
ment of arms to all belligerents whenever the president officially de-
clared a state of war. The Neutrality Act of February 1936, though in
many ways similar to the 1935 law, forbade loans and credits to the
warring parties. In May 1937, Congress made permanent the principal
provisions of the above acts and, in addition, forbade travel by Ameri-
cans on belligerent ships.
4 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Supporting the resolve to stay out of any European conflict were a

number of active groups, some motivated: by pacifism, others by na-
tionalistic isolationism. Most Americans, however, were not pacifists—
they simply wanted to stay out of another European conflict.
As the British once again faced the looming threat of war, in the
summer and fall of 1939, there was very little likelihood of defeating
Germany without the help of the United States. It is the contention of
this book that with the use of its intelligence agents and influential
members of the American policy elite who made up various “front
groups,” the British expected to be able to involve the United States in
the war. This was a calculated risk, to be sure—but entirely rational.
There had been encouraging signs of cooperation from President
Franklin Roosevelt. One was his “Quarantine Speech,” of October 5,
1937, in Chicago, denouncing aggressor nations and calling for collec-
tive action to maintain order. John Buchan, Lord Tweedsmutr, the gov-
ernor-general of Canada, who was intimately associated with the
British intelligence services and covert propaganda, wrote that FDR’s
speech “was the culmination of a long conspiracy between us. (This
must be kept secret!)”®
But FDR’s pronouncement at Chicago, whether “trial balloon” or
prod for others to take action, was met by strong public protest.
Roosevelt had characteristically backpedaled under the criticism. Less
public indications of FDR’s pro-British sentiments include the military
talks to which he agreed in a December 16, 1937, meeting with the
British ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay.
In the summer of 1939 large crowds enthusiastically welcomed the
new British king, George VI, to the United States for a four-day visit to
New York and Washington. On June 11, a Sunday, the president enter-
tained King George and Queen Elizabeth at a grand public relations
picnic at Hyde Park, the Roosevelt home on the Hudson River, north
of New York City. There for all the American public to see in a profu-
sion of newspaper photographs was flesh-and-blood royalty: not
pompous aristocrats, but friendly, informal people who ate the pres-
ident’s hot dogs and drank his beer—just like regular folks.
Besides cultivating goodwill with the great American masses, the
visit gave the opportunity for two important conversations between
George VI and President Roosevelt exploring the help Britain might
expect from the United States in the looming war. Both talks contained
 A Calculated Risk *°° §

hints of the Destroyer Deal consummated more than a year later. Ac-
cording to historian Benjamin Rhodes, the first of these dialogues was
on the morning of June 11 at Hyde Park in the presence of Canadian
Prime Minister Mackenzie King.
Roosevelt suggested that the United States could help patrol the At-
lantic if the British would make Halifax, Nova Scotia, available to the
U.S. Navy. Mackenzie King wrote in his diary that the mood of the
conversation “was to the effect that every possible assistance short of
actual participation in war could be given.””
The next afternoon, in a private conversation the president told the
king the United States had an interest in acquiring access to British
bases in ‘Trinidad and Bermuda. The president indicated that given
these bases the United States could patrol the Atlantic for a thousand
miles out to sea. Throughout these conversations the president’s atti-
tude was warlike. He said that U-boats seen would be sunk and that if
the Nazis bombed London, the United States “would come in.”®
Roosevelt’s heart was in the right place, but evidence soon accumu-
lated that these bellicose words had only modest practical significance;
the president was not even able to push changes in the neutrality law
out of the obstinate and unpredictable Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain wrote to the Canadian
governor-general that the U.S. Congress was “incorrigible.” He con-
tinued, “Their behavior over the Neutrality Legislation is enough to
make one weep...these pig-headed and self-righteous nobodies.””
The president favored the British, but FDR was by nature both cau-
tious in the face of public opinion and a procrastinator. As a result, he
would have to be prodded and cajoled into action.
There were other potential British allies on the American scene.
These were the people sociologist C. Wright Mills later identified in
his book The Power Elite (1956). The United States, wrote Mills, was
controlled not by the mass of its citizens as described by democratic
theory, but by a wealthy Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite from Ivy
League schools. In a flurry of caustic reviews, critics, often Cold War
liberals, heatedly denied that there was such an elite.!9 That debate
now seems over, as Douglas Little noted in a recent review article in
Diplomatic History: “Far from rejecting the idea of a power elite...[{the
books under review] celebrate its short lived ‘Periclean Age’ during
the quarter century after 1945.”!! In slight contradiction to Douglas
6 *ee J)ESPERATE DECEPTION

Little, this book will show that this elite existed and was in a position
of pivotal influence at least as early as\1939 and probably much
earlier.
The British had not displayed any similar doubts about the existence
of an American “power elite,” certainly not during World War I. There
is substantial testimony that the views of Lord Robert Cecil, expressed
to his cabinet colleagues in 1917, remained the view of the British rul-
ing class for much of the next three decades. Cecil wrote that “though
the American people are very largely foreign, both in origin and in
modes of thought, their rulers are almost exclusively Anglo-Saxons,
and share our political ideals.”!*
Most of the members of this establishment were middle- or upper-
class Protestants of Northern European, often English, descent. They
were college-educated professional men often from Ivy League col-
leges or prestigious private schools at a time when fewer than two in
every hundred Americans held a college degree even from the most
lowly normal school.!
These people were concentrated in the Northeast, though there
were enough of them scattered across the country that with a con-
certed effort, their voices could be projected to seem to be the will of
the country. Politically, they came from either party, the Democrats
among them tending to liberalism of the Woodrow Wilson, League of
Nations variety, the Republicans to various degrees of conservatism.
Many in this “power elite” were practitioners of the law, particularly
international law. There was also a considerable number of academics,
and a number of bankers and clerics. These people were oriented to-
ward Europe and a stable international order; they were largely pros-
perous and respected. If there were to be any changes, they wished
them to be predictable and orderly and largely controlled by people
they respected and felt comfortable with—the British—or by them-
selves. The policy makers of this establishment were generally white
males, though there were occasionally women, included either because
they were in positions of power or for appearances—Mrs. Ogden Reid
and Irita Van Doren were in the former category, Mrs. Wendell
Willkie and Mrs. Calvin Coolidge in the latter.
This Anglo-Saxon East Coast establishment not only shared
England's political ideals but literally loved England and English cul-
ture. A surprisingly large number had gone to school in or lived in
 A Calculated Risk °°* 7

England. A number divided their time between homes in Great Britain

and the United States. Despite their pro-British bias, these Anglo-
philes were able to represent themselves as loyal, independent, dis-
interested Americans at the same time that German-Americans or
Italian-Americans were easily belittled as biased “foreigners.” This im-
age of objectivity was a gross distortion of the facts; for example, the
Anglophiles in the British intelligence front group Fight for Freedom
were willing tools of British intelligence.
Ernest Cuneo was attorney to two columnists who worked closely
with British intelligence—Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson. He was
also liaison between British intelligence, the White House, the FBI,
the Treasury, and OSS. In January 1988, in a five-page single-spaced
letter to H. Montgomery Hyde, Cuneo wrote: “...as far as the British
tricking the U.S. into war, FDR was at war with Hitler long before
Chamberlain was forced to declare it. I was eyewitness and indeed,
wrote Winchell’s stuff on it (volunteer). Of course the British were try-
ing to push the U.S. into war. If that be so, we were indeed a pushover.
It reminds me of that Chaucerian line, “He fell upon her and would
have raped her—but for her ready acquiescence!”!*
I have organized my discussion of this book’s complex subject as
follows.
Chapter 1 describes British Security Coordination (BSC), the Brit-
ish intelligence organization run by Sir William Stephenson—“In-
trepid”—and identifies several key personnel. This chapter also
describes how and why “Intrepid” had President Roosevelt create the
Coordinator of Information—later the OSS—despite the strong ob-
jections of the FBI and military intelligence.
Chapter 2 examines the origins and operations of several British in-
telligence front groups, among them Fight for Freedom, Friends of
Democracy, France Forever, and the American Irish Defense Associa-
tion. This chapter also describes how these fronts worked with the
White House to build support for the president’s dynamic interven-
tionist policies.
Chapter 3 discusses a number of influential Americans who aided
British intelligence efforts. Among those mentioned in the British
documents, and in this chapter, are prominent newspaper columnists
of the day Walter Lippmann, Drew Pearson, and Walter Winchell;
presidential speechwriter Robert Sherwood; and the heads of the New
8 eee JP)ESPERATE DECEPTION

York Post, PM, the New York Herald Tribune, the Baltimore Sun, and the
New York Times.
Chapter 4 covers the influence of British intelligence on World War
II public opinion polls. This influence ranged from BSC’s penetration
of Gallup to the rigged polls done by BSC intelligence agent Sanford
Griffith that were used to influence Congress.
Chapter 5 documents the activities of British intelligence agent
Sanford Griffith as he created front organizations, rigged public opin-
ion polls, organized election opposition to the isolationist Republican
congressman Hamilton Fish, and worked on the British intelligence
effort to convict German propagandist George Sylvester Viereck in
federal court.
Chapter 6 examines the extensive efforts of British intelligence and
President Roosevelt to rid the Congress of Hamilton Fish.
Chapter 7 chronicles the switch from isolationism to international-
ism by Senator Arthur Vandenberg and relates that change to three
female British lobbyists who insinuated themselves with him, including
British intelligence’s most famous female agent, “Cynthia.”
Chapter 8 reexamines an old idea in the light of new evidence. It
details how the Republicans, in the most bizarre convention of the
twentieth century, forsook their isolationist front-runners— Iaft,
Dewey, and Vandenberg—in order to nominate a longtime Democrat,
Wendell Willkie. It documents the work of British intelligence agents
(subagents) in getting Willkie the nomination; Willkie’s trip to En-
gland at the request of BSC head William Stephenson; Willkie’s work
for the British intelligence front Fight for Freedom; his closeness to
President Franklin Roosevelt; and his part in ridding the Congress of
Hamilton Fish.
Through these efforts, British intelligence, as an instrument of Brit-
ish foreign policy, finally prevailed. The prewar isolationists were
driven from their places of power and their philosophy lost respectabil-
ity. Hitlerism was destroyed.
 CHAPTER 1

Organization, Methods,
and Offspring

British Security Coordination (BSC) was a wide-ranging, full-service,

offensive intelligence agency that for its own purposes begot two
American agencies in its own image and likeness. One of these agen-
cies, the Coordinator of Information, is the direct lineal predecessor of
the OSS and thus today’s CIA. The other agency, the “Rockefeller Of-
fice,” as it became known, had a briefer but no less useful existence.!
The man in charge of British intelligence in the United States in
1940 was a prosperous forty-four-year-old Canadian-born business-
man, William S. Stephenson, better known today by his New York
cable address, INTREPID. He had been a flier in World War I. And
though he had been shot down and taken prisoner, he had daringly
escaped. One of the things he escaped with was a clever can opener he
had come upon as a prisoner. This can opener was unpatented in the
Allied countries, and by obtaining a patent and manufacturing it
Stephenson made his first fortune.’
By the 1930s, Stephenson was a millionaire with major interests in a
number of businesses that gave him reason to travel widely in Europe
and discreetly gather intelligence on military preparations. For our
story, Stephenson’s most important holding was Pressed Steel, a major
producer of steel auto bodies for such assemblers as Morris, Humber,
Hillman, and Austin.
It was through the steel business that he became aware that large
amounts of German steel were being diverted to the armaments indus-
try in violation of the Versailles Peace ‘Treaty. ‘This information was
10 °¢¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

passed along to the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6), and from it to

the little-known Industrial Intelligence Center under Winston
Churchill’s friend Major Desmond Morton. The IIC eventually be-
came part of the Ministry of Economic Warfare during World War II.
This was not the coup it might appear. The intelligence gathered by
Stephenson and others was erroneous, and it led to policies that might
have proved disastrous had not the United States come into the war.
They reported prior to the war that the German economy was being
fully mobilized for war, and in September 1939 that the German
economy was strained to its limits—producing at a rate that was unsus-
tainable. This analysis was totally wrong. The Germans had a great
deal of excess capacity. The height of German production proved to be
in 1944 during the intense Allied bombing campaign.
These beliefs about the German economy encouraged the British to
feel that with the money and productive capacity of the United States
behind them a war with Germany was winnable even if the United
States was not a combatant.?
The interwar cover for the Secret Intelligence Service, SIS or MI-6,
had been Passport Control offices throughout the world. William
Stephenson was appointed to this position in New York in the spring of
1940. His predecessor had been Commander Sir James Francis Paget,
RN,* a competent man but without Stephenson’s business or political
connections, or his ruthless audacity. (According to author Anthony
Cave-Brown, Stephenson had once volunteered to shoot Hitler with a
high-powered rifle.)°
Subsequently, Stephenson had been chosen by “C,” Stewart Menzies,
the head of MI-6, to go to the United States as his personal representa-
tive to “establish relations on the highest possible level between the
British SIS and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.” The mandate
given to Stephenson was to “assure sufficient aid for Britain, to counter
the enemy’s subversive plans throughout the Western Hemisphere
...and eventually to bring the United States into the War.”6
Stephenson first arrived in the United States on April 2, 1940, os-
tensibly on an official mission for the Ministry of Supply. It was on
this trip, even before Churchill’s May 10, 1940, ascension to prime
minister, that the meeting took place which set the early close work-
ing relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
British intelligence.’
 Organization, Methods, and Offspring °** 11

This meeting between Stephenson and J. Edgar Hoover had been

smoothed by a mutual friend, the boxer Gene Tunney:® “I had known
Sir William for several years. He wanted to make...contact with J.
Edgar Hoover...{but] he did not want to make an official approach
through well-placed English or American friends; he wanted to do so
quietly and with no fanfare.”?
After a short time in the United States, Stephenson took over the
thirty-eighth floor of the International Building in Rockefeller Center,
which the Rockefellers, anxious to help, let for a penny rent. This was a
convenient address. Several British agencies promoting intervention
were also housed here. The British Press Service was located on the
forty-fourth floor. The British intelligence front group Fight for Free-
dom located its operations on the twenty-second floor in the same
building, also rent-free.!° te
By January 1941, Stephenson no longer worked under the tradi-
tional SIS cover name Passport Control but under the new umbrella
name British Security Coordination, which covered all the varied se-
cret organizations Intrepid represented in the United States.!!
First and foremost, Intrepid represented Britain’s Secret Intelligence
Service (called SIS or MI-6, or Broadway after its address), which was
responsible for intelligence outside Britain and the Commonwealth—
responsibilities much like those of today’s CIA. The London head of
SIS had the designation “C,” or CSS, Chief of the Secret Service. This
is the “M” of Ian Fleming novels. The first head of the SIS after its
reformation in 1909 had been Captain Sir Mansfield Cumming. He
died in 1923 and was succeeded by Admiral Hugh “Quex” Sinclair.
Stewart Graham Menzies (pronounced Minn-giss), Sinclair’s right-
hand man, became acting “C” on Sinclair’s death in early November
1939 and then in late November “C.” SIS was nominally under the
Foreign Office (FO). Menzies’s day-to-day contact with that office was
through the permanent head of the FO, Sir Alexander Cadogan.!”
Stephenson also represented Britain’s internal Security Service,
MI-5S, which is responsible to the home secretary and cares for the in-
ternal security of Britain and its empire—responsibilities very similar
to those of the FBI. One of MI-5’s great assets was its central registry of
names that classified the loyalty of thousands who had come to the
attention of the service. On June 10, 1940, Vernon Kell, who had
headed this organization since 1909, was dismissed. In November, Sir
12 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

David Petre took over as the director general. He was the former head
of the Delhi Intelligence Bureau of India and thus a man with long
experience at fighting subversives.!?
MI-6 and MI-5 are well known; volumes have been written on
them. But Stephenson also represented lesser-known organizations—
some of them little known even today. One of these was the Political
Intelligence Department (PID). This was ostensibly a section of the
Foreign Office. Here we see the shifting kaleidoscope of intertwined,
interacting departments and covers that so bedevil the researcher.
The PID, housed at Woburn Abbey, the site of a major black propa-
ganda factory, was a real, nonsecret office between 1939 and 1943.
The problem arises because from August 1941 until 1943 the name
PID was also the cover for the secret Political Warfare Executive
(PWE), and when in 1943 the publicly known PID was disbanded,
the Political Warfare Executive continued to use the name Political
Intelligence Department.
These cover-name practices confused not onty later historians but
even the smartest of those who lived in this twilight world. One of
these, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, has confessed both his own confu-
sion and his own somewhat idiosyncratic choice of employer labels:
“Bruce [Lockhart] was to become the Director-General of what was,
for some extraordinary reason which I never mastered, sometimes
called P.W.E and sometimes P.I.D. (Political Intelligence Department)
and was also to be appointed a Deputy Under-Secretary in the Foreign
Office....[Later] I joined what I still prefer to call the Political Intelli-
gence Department of the Foreign Office.”!4
Another of Stephenson’s charges was Special Operations Executive
(SOE), itself an amalgamation of secret departments prepared in an-
ticipation of World War II. On April 1, 1938, shortly after the Ger-
mans took over Austria, SIS had begot “Section D” for “sabotage and
subversion.” This dirty-tricks department, certainly a great April
Fools’ creation, grew rapidly under the command of the dynamic and
creative Major Lawrence Grand. By July 1940 it had 140 officers, a
larger corps than SIS itself.
Though they were spared the details, recruits to Section D were left
little doubt about the potential scope of their jobs. One recruit,
Bickham Sweet Escott, has left us a record of his interview: “For secu-
rity reasons, I can’t tell you what sort of job it would be. All I can say is
 Organization, Methods, and Offspring *** 13

that if you join us, you mustn’t be afraid of forgery, and you mustn’t be
afraid of murder.”!>
A surprising number of the recruits of Section D later achieved fame,
even notoriety, in the field of intelligence. Kim Philby and Guy Burgess,
later discovered to be Soviet agents, worked for Section D. Sir William
Stephenson and his biographer, Montgomery Hyde, were there too.
In July 1940, Churchill consolidated Section D with MI R, a War
Office guerrilla warfare research group, and Sir Campbell Stewart’s
covert propaganda unit, called Department EH after its location,
Electra House. Churchill gave the new organization, Special Opera-
tions Executive (SOE), the mandate to “set Europe ablaze.” SOE had
three sections: SO.1 for propaganda, SO.2 for dirty tricks, and SO.3
for planning. A year later, SO.1 was separated from SOE, renamed the
Political Warfare Executive, and put under the control of Rex Leeper
and Robert Bruce Lockhart.
In the British system, countries had code names. As 48 LAND was the
MI-6 code name for the United States, the Special Operations Execu-
tive code name for the United States was GROSVENOR. This may well be
the origin of the prefix to SOE agent numbers in the United States—
they had a “G” prefix and a three- or four-digit suffix. Thus journalist
Walter Lucas, who worked for black-propaganda specialist Sidney
“Bill” Morrell of SO.1 and planted articles in such publications as the
Christian Science Monitor, was G.124. There was at least one exception
to this system: While William “Wild Bill” Donovan’s MI-6 code num-
ber was standard enough, 48917, his SOE symbol seems to have been
“Q,” “referring to both him and his office.”!®
Stephenson’s importance and position can be seen in the instructions
given to agent Valentine Williams, G.131, an experienced playwright
and radio broadcaster, who was sent to the United States in July 1941
by SOE operational head (CD) Frank Nelson. Williams had been in
Section D of MI-6 since 1939 while claiming to be a member of the
Foreign Office. “One reason I am concerned,” wrote Nelson in a mar-
ginal note, “to get someone out to USA is to regularize our association
with 48000. He is ‘C’’s man and is ‘running’ our show out there with-
out remuneration etc. There is much that is unsatisfactory in this, viz,
that we cannot just say to him—we are sending this man or that man...
He would be hard to replace—if he says ‘Find your own man and run
your own show.’ ”!7
14. e®e2e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Stephenson also represented the British Office of Naval Intelli-

gence (ONI), whose chief was Admiral Sir John Godfrey. Godfrey’s
personal assistant was the stockbroker Ian Fleming of later James
Bond fame. Fleming, it seems, was occasionally lent to Stephenson for
special projects.
Of all the organizations under Stephenson’s BSC umbrella the Se-
curity Executive remains one of the least known. Beyond the sketchy
fact that Duff Cooper was for a time in charge of it in England and
that it supposedly had worldwide security responsibilities in British
possessions, the Security Executive is one of the black holes of intelli-
gence history.
Lastly, Intrepid was the New York representative of the undercover
section, the Special Branch, of Scotland Yard. Special Branch had been
founded in the late nineteenth century to counter Irish terrorists, but
by 1940 it worked with MI-5 against all potential subverstves—Com-
munist, Irish, Fascist, or Indian.
As representative of these organizations in the Western Hemi-
sphere, William Stephenson conducted covert diplomacy; provided
raw positive intelligence to London; ran intelligence operations, in-
cluding recruitment of agents and surveillance; conducted a whole
range of special operations, from political warfare against isolationists
to perhaps even murder; mounted covert propaganda operations; ran a
hemisphere port security operation; built and operated Camp X, a
clandestine training establishment in Canada; built and operated a
clandestine international communications network; conducted a hemi-
spheric ship-observer scheme; and played a major role in Britain’s air
and sea control of the movement of people, mail, and commodities be-
tween the Americas and Europe.!®
An example of the capabilities of the BSC operation was in the
forgeries that it was able to effect. The skilled labor to produce this
high-quality work was by the latter part of 1941 housed in a BSC
forgery factory in downtown ‘Toronto, Canada. It was called Station
M, perhaps after its chief, Eric Maschwitz (cover symbol G.106). In
more normal times Maschwitz worked as employee of the BBC; he
wrote the lyrics of such popular songs as “The Nightingale Sang in
Berkeley Square” and “These Foolish Things.” Station M, which
opened in the summer of 1941, was under cover of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation.
 Organization, Methods, and Offspring °** 15

Evidence needed to frame Britain’s enemies or move the United

States closer to war could be and was indeed manufactured. This was a
truly frontal assault on the rules of evidence. In addition to “an indus-
trial chemist, and two ruffians who could reproduce faultlessly the im-
print of any typewriter on earth,” Maschwitz later wrote, “I controlled
a chemical laboratory in one place, a photographic studio in an-
other!”
In The Quiet Canadian, based on a secret after-action report on BSC
activities (the “BSC Account”), Montgomery Hyde spends twelve
pages chronicling the spurious documents spewed out by Station M
and the devastating effects of these genuine-looking pieces of paper.
A newly released document stamped MosT SECRET wonderfully illus-
trates Eric Maschwitz’s willingness to do whatever necessary to move
the United States toward war. One problem facing British intelligence
in the United States was a shortage of good photographs of German
atrocities. On November 26, 1941, in a memorandum titled “Atrocity
Photographs,” Maschwitz proposed a solution: “If asked to do so, my
Section could quite easily provide a regular supply of atrocity pictures,
manufactured by us in Canada.” Most problems seemed small and
quite solvable: “the buying and hiring of costumes, the manufacture of
small pieces of scenery and of dummies...a first-class make-up man...
all of which could be carried out under some sort of cover.
“ ,..For the sake of accuracy,” Maschwitz continued, “we should be
provided...with as complete a library as possible of photographs of
German personnel, equipment, vehicles...also actual specimens of
German...equipment....”
Only one problem loomed in G.106’s fertile brain, and it had noth-
ing to do with the propriety of duping the American public. If the
project was to be done they had better get busy. “The most obvious
setting for atrocity pictures at the moment is Russia, so that we should
get to work while there is still snow in Canada.”?°
Clearly the major purpose of BSC was to conduct aggressive offen-
sive operations against those it saw as the enemies of Britain. These
included not only Hitler’s agents in the United States, but those who
simply wished to remain uninvolved in the European war.
The ruthless activism of British Security Coordination was one of
Britain’s few advantages in the war against Hitler. Ernest Cuneo
summed up the BSC offensive in a memo:
16 e°°¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

“Given the time, the situation, and the mood, it is not surprising
however, that BSC also went beyond the legal, the ethical, and the
proper. Throughout the neutral Americas, and especially in the U.S., it
ran espionage agents, tampered with the mails, tapped telephone,
smuggled propaganda into the country, disrupted public gatherings,
covertly subsidized newspapers, radios, and organizations, perpetrated
forgeries—even palming one off on the President of the United States—
violated the aliens registration act, shanghaied sailors numerous times,
and possibly murdered one or more persons in this country.”?!
No one should be surprised that the British used their intelligence
system to help involve the United States in World War II. The British
use of intelligence operatives on Americans has been, after all, sort of a
tradition, dating back at least as far as the American Revolution.
British intelligence had certainly infiltrated Benjamin Franklin’s
American embassy in France. Franklin’s chief assistant, Dr. Edward
Bancroft, was a British intelligence agent who passed all the informa-
tion he could gather on to England.*?
In the period 1778-83 the problem was how to get out of a war with
the Americans, but in 1916-17 it was how to get the United States into
a war. Intrepid’s World War I counterpart had been Sir William
Wiseman (1885-1962). His family background, sense of taste, good
manners, and discretion highly recommended him to Edward M.
House, President Woodrow Wilson’s closest adviser. “Colonel” House
liked to associate with the famous and titled, and Wiseman could trace
his lineage back to the time of Henry VHI and his baronetage to 1628.
As Wilson had favored the British in World War I, Franklin Roosevelt
was quite willing to work with British intelligence in World War II. One
of the unnoticed consequences of Roosevelt’s cooperation was that Brit-
ish intelligence promoted the creation of two American intelligence
organizations. Most well known of these organizations was the Coordi-
nator of Information, which became the Office of Strategic Services.
The other intelligence organization was so well camouflaged that it
was not until 1976 that the first hint appeared that the “Rockefeller
Office,” or more properly the Office of the Coordinator of Commer-
cial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, later the
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, had been an intelligence op-
eration. The book AMan Called Intrepid by William Stevenson (no re-
lation to Intrepid) was, for all its flaws, the first to reveal that the
 Organization, Methods, and Offspring *** 17

Rockefeller Office was an intelligence operation—one that brought

the soothing balm of Rockefeller dollars to Intrepid’s ambitious but
money-short Latin American operations.”3
Although Franklin Roosevelt created the Rockefeller Office by ex-
ecutive order on August 16, 1940, the ostensibly initial move had been
made by Nelson Rockefeller on June 14, 1940, when he submitted a
memo to FDR’s close adviser Harry Hopkins. FDR accepted the plan
on the condition that the youthful Republican Rockefeller accept a
more mature Democrat, Will Clayton, as one of his assistants.’+
The German threat in Europe brought together a complex coinci-
dence of ambitions and interests in Latin America—those of the
Rockefellers with the family’s Creole Oil Company, those of the ad-
ministration with the Monroe Doctrine and the more recent Good
Neighbor Policy, and those of the British with their need to stop Ger-
man economic and political advances.
Paul Kramer, another of Nelson Rockefeller’s assistants, writes that
“the goals of the two partners were different. The one, Britain, sought
to use BSC New York as a device for destroying Nazis and pro-Ger-
mans wherever they might be (and also to bring the US in the war on
the side of Great Britain); the other, the U.S., sought to use BSC’s as-
sets—an intelligence network and mail intercept system and experi-
ence in fighting Nazis by means of operational intelligence—to further
its own policy of western hemisphere unity and defense.””°
The operations set in motion were part of one of the most important
but least studied aspects of covert operations in a modern industrial
world: economic warfare. By the end of August 1940 the Rockefeller
Office was working on a “voluntary program” by which American busi-
nesses would eliminate all their Latin American representatives who
were Germans or German agents.
Information from BSC went to its New York FBI liaison, Percy
Foxworth, who also had offices in Rockefeller Center. The informa-
tion was transmitted to the Rockefeller Office located in the old State,
War, and Navy Building, Washington, D.C. The documents, labeled
“personal and confidential,” started, “We understand from a confi-
dential source believed to be reliable,” or “Information has been
received from a reliable confidential source.”’° At the Rockefeller Of-
fice this material would be put together in a system implemented by
John S. Dickey, later president of Rockefeller’s alma mater, Dartmouth
18 e¢ee [DESPERATE DECEPTION

College. Rockefeller and his assistants, Dickey, Will Clayton, Joseph

C. Rovensky of the Chase Bank, Berent Friele of A&P, and Percy L.
Douglas of the Otis Elevator Company, with others, put the British
blacklist into effect. Thus the Rockefeller Office supplied the man-
power, the connections, and the money to reinforce the hard-nosed
British blockade and blacklist activities.
Seventeen hundred companies were contacted as part of this pro-
gram. United States exporters eliminated more than a thousand “unde-
sirable” agency accounts in Latin America during the first six months
of 1941. These activities also had a salutary effect on the ruling classes
of Latin America, writes Kramer: “Persons close to the rulers were
plunged into financial oblivion as a result and this had the effect, in a
broader sense, of persuading those in power to turn to the U.S. for aid
and protection and relief.”?’
Kramer is sure that this program had Roosevelt’s blessing, since
FDR orderedJ.Edgar Hoover personally to comply with Rockefeller’s
request that an FBI agent be sent to talk to selected businessmen about
cooperating with the blacklisting. On July 19, 1941, almost five months
before Pearl Harbor, FDR gave the British blacklist the power of
American law when the Federal Register included a long list of the
proscribed businessmen. British Security Coordination’s information
thereafter flowed to the State Department’s new division of World
Trade Intelligence, headed by John S. Dickey. Dickey continued on the
Rockefeller payroll, however.*8
The Rockefeller Office and British intelligence cooperated in two
other areas. They worked together in subverting Boston’s outwardly
independent 50,000-watt shortwave station WRUL by “secret subsi-
dies through intermediaries.”*? Also, both manipulated the Latin
American press by buying advertising space. This complemented the
existing BSC program of manipulating the Latin American press by
controlling its access to newsprint.”
The influence of British Security Coordination in America to in-
volve the United States in World War II and to prepare the United
States to participate in war is impressive, even startling. In the Cuneo
Papers at the Franklin Roosevelt Library is an article written by Cuneo
that, while its main purpose was to defend Cuneo’s friend Dick Ellis
from charges of being a Soviet mole, captures a telling fact known to
few people: British intelligence created William Donovan’s COI/OSS.
 Organization, Methods, and Offspring °° 19

“If the charge against Ellis is true,” wrote Cuneo, “...it would mean
that the OSS, and to some extent its successor, the CIA, in effect was a
branch of the Soviet KGB.”3!
Cuneo is not the only insider to say bluntly that credit must fall to
William Stephenson’s organization for the “conception and establish-
ment of the COI.” Stephenson cabled this to London in mid-June
1941: “Donovan accuses me of having ‘intrigued and driven’ him into
appointment. You can imagine how relieved I am after three months of
battle and jockeying for position in Washington that our man is in a
position of such importance to our efforts.”33
Not only were the British the primary force in the conception and
creation of the COI, which later became the OSS and whose pieces
were finally reconstructed into the CIA, but a British officer, Dick
Ellis, then ran the organization. This was done in deepest secrecy, be-
cause as Winston Churchill’s personal intelligence assistant, Major
Desmond Morton, wrote, “It is of course essential that this fact not be
known in view of the furious uproar it would cause if known to the
Isolationists.”>+
The isolationists never caught on, but Assistant Secretary of State
Adolf Berle did, though he was misled by Ellis’s cover name, as he
passed this explosive information on to Sumner Welles: “For your con-
fidential information, the really active head of the intelligence section
in Donovan’s group is Mr. Elliott, who is assistant to Mr. Stevenson
[sic]. In other words, Stevenson’s assistant in The British intelligence is
running Donovan’s intelligence service.”*>
The British were not deterred from mounting major operations by
the fear of discovery and exposure. Those operations deemed impor-
tant were given sufficient time and planning so that all of the mem-
bers of the intelligence orchestra played their parts. Some of the
protective coloration came from the British penchant for involving
the right social and political strata. ‘To push for Donovan’s organiza-
tion, Intrepid had enlisted people close to President Roosevelt—Gil-
bert Winant, ambassador to Great Britain; presidential speechwriter
Robert Sherwood; and Vincent Astor, FDR’s kinsman and intelligence
operative—to push for Donovan’s appointment.*°
For support back in Great Britain, Stephenson enlisted the help of
two men in Churchill’s immediate entourage, “C”’s good friend
General H. L. Ismay and Sir Desmond Morton.
20 °¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

Years later when dictating a history of the founding of the Coordina-

tor of Information, William Stephenson related how Donovan began
sending the White House (he called it by its code name, “the Summit”)
papers stressing the need for the United States to establish undercover
services equivalent to the various British services—Secret Intelligence
Service, Political Warfare Executive, Ministry of Economic Warfare,
and external Counterespionage. “Of course my staff,” said Sir William,
“produced the material for these papers and they were usually sent up
in practically the original form.”3”
On May 9, 1941, the wealthy, well-connected Vincent Astor, FDR’s
friend and New York area coordinator of intelligence, sent the presi-
dent a clipping from the New York Herald Tribune that was probably a
plant to build the consensus of voices calling for the plan British intel-
ligence wanted. The Herald Tribune, as we will see later, was BSC’s fa-
vorite outlet for planted articles. Moreover, the putative author,
George Fielding Eliot, was a devoted British sympathizer, one of the
most influential people in the BSC front Fight for Freedom, and a fa-
vorite vehicle for planted articles.
Citing the threat from fifth columnists and enemy agents, Eliot
pointed with alarm at the lack of a coordinator for FBI, ONI, and
G-2 intelligence. The United States needed, wrote Eliot, “a special
intelligence service to act as co-ordinator, responsible directly to the
President, acting with his own authority, and provided with personnel
to conduct investigations of its own when necessary.”3® And there
were other members of the intelligence orchestra. One was William
Donovan’s friend Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Another was
BSC collaborator Robert Sherwood. Sherwood certainly had the op-
portunity to plead Intrepid’s case. Sherwood spent twelve days as an
overnight guest at the White House between April 23, 1941, and May
27, 1941.
Sherwood was positioning himself to be head of what was to become
the Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator of Information.
On June 16, 1941, Sherwood sent to Donovan a list of people he
thought he could trust, “for the work we discussed...yesterday evening
at your home.” The letter also contains a clear reference to another of
those helping Stephenson: “Yesterday evening at your house was a
wonderfully interesting one. I saw the Ambassador again today, He’s a
honey” (letter from Sherwood to Donovan, 16 June 1941, Exhibits
 Organization, Methods, and Offspring °°? 21

Illustrating the History of OSS, vol. 3; quoted in Troy, “Coordinator of

Information,” 103).
Sherwood’s favorite journalists, it should not be surprising, were also
favorites of B3C—Edmond Taylor, Douglas Miller, E. A. Mowrer,
H. R. Knickerbocker, and Raymond Gram Swing.’ Fortunately, one
of these, Edmond Taylor, has been quite forthright about his activities
with American and British intelligence during this period. In his mem-
oir, Awakening from History, Vaylor wrote: “The propaganda wing,
called the Foreign Information Service, was to be headed by Robert E.
Sherwood, the noted playwright and one of President Roosevelt’s most
talented speech writers. I knew Sherwood slightly, from some of the
overlapping interventionist committees with which we were both con-
nected, and admired him greatly.”4?
Tom Troy, in his study done for the Central Intelligence Agency’s
Studies in Intelligence series, credits Ambassador Winant as the man
who “brought things to a head.” He had no fewer than five scheduled
meetings with FDR between June 3 and June 15, 1941.4!
So Intrepid had the American organization he wished to have, with
the man of his choice at the helm and with his own man, Dick Ellis,
actually running things. “It was conceived by Stephenson,” wrote
Intrepid’s longtime friend and confidant Ernest Cuneo, “as an Ameri-
can solution to British problems in the Western Hemisphere.” Given
its parentage and the presence of Dick Ellis, it should come as no sur-
prise that Donovan’s office was created in the image and likeness of
British Security Coordination. Writes Cuneo: “...before Pearl Harbor,
Donovan was building a strategic service, a propaganda unit, a special
operations service, an economics division, a morale unit, an SIS, and a
Commando unit. COI [Coordinator of Information] was by design
multi-faceted, multifunctional. Like BSC it was an integrated struc-
ture, and a response to BSC’s need.”*”
Not only the wide-ranging organization but the aggressive, offen-
sive spirit, the spirit of BSC at war, became embedded in the COI and
moved to OSS when the name was changed in mid-1942. BSC passed
on an attitude as much as it passed on specific technical skills. It passed
on a way of looking at problems and an openness to possible solu-
tions—no matter their legality or morality.’
This sometimes shocked others. After reading an OSS psychological
warfare manual, the head of army intelligence, the usually tough
22 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

General George Strong, “denounced” it as “devoid of every moral con-

sideration.” He could, with equal vehemence, have been speaking of
any number of BSC documents, including large stretches of Mont-
gomery Hyde’s The Quiet Canadian.
At the end of the war, President Roosevelt had an army colonel cata-
loging the “illegalities and improprieties attributable to OSS, and a
Congressional investigation was threatened,” according to Ernest
Cuneo.* It is this wartime modus operandi that the CIA was to take
into the Cold War.
 CHAPTER 2

‘The Fronts

One thing is evident. Members of the American elite, including Presi-

dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, were not tricked into the war; they were
not victims. ‘They were as eager as the British to fight Hitler.!
The Americans were eager to dance but did not know the steps; the
British knew the steps but needed a rich partner. ‘These elite interven-
tionists invariably worked with and for and through a number of orga-
nizations that were fronts for British intelligence.
One of the startling documents that has come to light is a July 1941
report from Special Operations Executive officer Sidney “Bill” Morrell
(G.101). In this memorandum, Morrell emphasizes the secret British
financial support provided to the interventionist organizations. He
stresses that these fronts had been “formed and acquired” by SO.1, the
secret propaganda arm of SOE. He listed them:
(i) The Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League. Used for the vehe-
ment exposure of enemy agents and isolationists. Prints a
wide variety of pamphlets, copies of which have been sent to
you. Has recently begun to attack Lindbergh and the many
other conscious or unconscious native Fascists....
(ii) The League
forHuman Rights. A subsidiary organization of
the American Federation of Labour which in its turn controls
4,000,000 trade unionists....

(iii) Friends ofDemocracy. An example of the work of this orga-

nization is attached. It is a complete attack upon Henry Ford
for his anti-Nazi [sic] leanings.

oe)
24 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

(iv) Fight for Freedom Committee. Both this and (iii) above are
militant interventionist organizations whose aim is to pro-
vide Roosevelt with evidence that the U.S. public is eager for
action.
(v) American Labour Committee to Aid British Labour. Another
branch organization of the American Federation of Labour.
It is organized along the lines that British labour is in the
front line defending American labour. The latest activity of
this organization has been to inaugurate a week during which
all American trade unionists are asked to donate towards a
fund in aid of British labour...
(vi) Committee for Inter-American Co-operation. Used this for
sponsoring SO.1 work in Central and South America. It is
now being used intensively for penetration in all Latin Amer-
ican countries, both as cover for agents and for sponsoring
pamphlets.
(vii) America Last. A purely provocative experiment started in
San Francisco in an attempt to sting America into a fighting
moold (sic).
The secret “BSC Account” reiterates that Fight for Freedom was a
BSC front and adds that BSC had close ties with the Italian-American
Mazzini Society, headed by the academic and journalist Max Ascoli.
Also claimed was a close working relationship with Salloum Mokarzel,
editor of A/ Shoda, the Arabic daily paper of New York City, and presi-
dent of the Lebanese League for Progress.’
British intelligence agents had created and were running several
other front groups by the fall of 1941. One of these was France For-
ever, which ran the United States part of the British effort to finance
and promote an obscure French officer, Charles de Gaulle, as the true
voice of the real France.
Another organization merits mention because its leadership inter-
locked with so many of the front groups above, and it was serviced by
British agents who also served so many of the other BSC fronts. This
was the CDAAA—the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Allies—better known as the White Committee after its nominal chair-
man, Kansas newspaperman William Allen White.
 The Fronts @°e 25

ByJuly 1941, when SOE’s Bill Morrell wrote his report, the British
propaganda themes that had powered the CDAAA—“Give us the tools
and we will finish the job,” and its concomitant “We don’t need your
men”—had run their course. Taken off propaganda support, the White
Committee withered, to be superseded by the more militant Fight for
Freedom, which better spoke more aggressive themes.
These fronts had interlocking directorates, which worked closely to-
gether doing the things the British needed done but did not wish to be
seen doing: disseminating propaganda, promoting an American peace-
time military draft, pushing through the Destroyer Deal, destroying or
turning around the isolationists, making sure that the Republican Party
nominated an interventionist in 1940.
In his memorandum describing his stewardship of SO.1, Morrell
contended that these fronts were all unaware “of British influence,
since this is maintained through a permanent official in each organiza-
tion, who in turn, is in touch with a cut-out, and never with us direct.”
Earlier, at the beginning of his report, Bill Morrell laid out his duties:
“The activities of SO.1 in New York are three-fold: (1) Subversive pro-
paganda in the United States for the exposure and destruction of
enemy propaganda...; countering isolationist and appeasement propa-
ganda.... (2)...directing ostensibly American propaganda towards the
three Axis powers and enemy-occupied territories. (3) Subversive pro-
paganda in South American countries as in (1) above.”*
Morrell’s memorandum with its simple declaration that the front
groups he listed had been formed or acquired by British intelligence is,
of course, a wonderful start for the historian. The “BSC Account” also
names Fight for Freedom as a front. But since the British intelligence
files are still closed and American intelligence—FBI, army intelligence,
navy intelligence, and the CIA—will release little, the task of tracking
the particulars of front group operations would, at first, seem formi-
dable; fortunately, however, the Fight for Freedom Papers at Princeton
contain a wealth of correspondence, which allows the researcher to es-
tablish a paper trail for many events.
This most prominent of the BSC fronts went through several name
changes during its eighteen months of existence, but is best known as _,
Fight for Freedom. Initially it was known as the Miller Group because ;
it first met (on Dunkirk weekend, June 2, 1940) at the Fairfax, Virginia,
home of Francis Pickens Miller. Miller was the organization director of
26 °*®*® DESPERATE DECEPTION

the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. The nine people

present were Miller and his wife, Helen; the man who had called the
meeting, Baltimore attorney Richard F. Cleveland;° Stacy May of New
York; Winfield Riefler of Princeton; Mr. and Mrs. Whitney Shepard-
son of New York; Edward P. Warner of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
and M. L. Wilson of the Department of Agriculture.
“The sense of doom was so strong,” wrote Miller later, “that we began
our consultations by considering what the United States should do in
view of the appalling catastrophe that had just befallen the French and
British armies on the continent.” The group thought “there was a des-
perate need for someone to speak for America. Why should not we?”®
The result was that at Miller’s urging, British intelligence “collabo-
rator” Whitney Shepardson took a pen and sat down at a desk and
wrote a statement titled “A Summons to Speak Out.” The key para-
graph reads: “The United States should immediately give official rec-
ognition to the fact and to the logic of the situation—by declaring that
a state of war exists between this country and Germany.” Because of the
prominence of the people who affixed their names to this, the story was
given large play in the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune
and other major news outlets.’
The Miller Group progressed during the summer of 1940 into the
Century Group—named for the exclusive Century Club in New York
City where it met. By the spring of 1941 this had evolved into what
appeared to be a national organization, Fight for Freedom, but in real-
ity the core of activist members remained the same East Coast elite and
the headquarters remained in New York City.
Mark Lincoln Chadwin in his major study of these “Warhawks,” as
he calls them, has identified the activist members who dominated the
Miller Group/Century Group/Fight for Freedom. The most promi-
nent members will be examined more closely in the next chapter, but
here is a simple list:
¢ Francis Pickens Miller, executive director of Century Group
e FH. Peter Cusick, Fight for Freedom office manager, executive
secretary, day-to-day policy maker; later described as a “shadowy
figure”
e Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, faculty member, Union Theological
Seminary, member of the policy committee of the White Com-
mittee (CDAAA)
 The Fronts @** 27

Lewis W. Douglas, head of Mutual Life Insurance Company,

member of the executive committee of the CDAAA
Ulric Bell, Washington correspondent of the Lowisville Courier-
Journal; replaced Miller in October 1940, became executive chair-
man of Fight for Freedom in April 1941; according to Chadwin
Bell was “leading actor” in Fight for Freedom
Ward Cheney, head of Cheney Brothers silk fabric maker, quiet
financial angel for Century Group
Herbert Agar, editor of Louisville Courier-Journal, signer of «at
Summons to Speak Out,” prominent speaker and policy maker for
Fight for Freedom
Geoffrey Parsons, chief editorial writer of New York Herald Tri-
bune; wrote the foreign affairs part of Wendell Willkie’s accep-
tance speech
John Balderston, journalist screenwriter; in late summer 1940
directed the British-founded front William Allen White News
Service
Joseph Alsop, journalist, relative of Franklin Roosevelt
Elmer Davis, CBS newsman, only Midwest native active in Fight
for Freedom
Will Clayton, founder of world’s largest cotton-trading firm, vice
president of Export Import Bank, assistant to Nelson Rockefeller
at Rockefeller Office, which worked with BSC blacklisting
operations
Whitney H. Shepardson, in 1940 coauthor of Council on Foreign
Relations series The United States in World Affairs
James P. Warburg, banker, writer
George Watts Hill of Durham, North Carolina, active in banking,
cotton manufacturer, signer of “A Summons to Speak Out”
Dean G. Acheson, international lawyer, with offices in New York
and Washington
Allen W. Dulles, lawyer, intelligence operative
By the last quarter of 1941, Fight for Freedom closely resembled the
central propaganda agency Bill Morrell had envisioned: “The most ef-
fective of all propaganda towards the US would be through a unified
organization which could be used to attack the isolationists, such as
America First, on the one hand, and to create a Nation-wide campaign
for an American declaration of war upon the other. 8
28 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Though it does not name Fight for Freedom specifically as a British

intelligence front group, The Hawks of World War II: The Interventionist
Movement in the U.S. Prior toPearl Harbor by Mark Lincoln Chadwin
supplies a wealth of information showing its interaction with both Brit-
ish intelligence and the Roosevelt administration. Indeed one of the
“Warhawks” who worked closely with British intelligence, Lewis
Douglas, was considerably disturbed by Chadwin’s research.
In a 1968 letter to British intelligence operative Sir John Wheeler-
Bennett, Douglas wrote: “...Mr. Chadwin called me on the phone....
He indicated that he had some written evidence that you and Mr.
Morgan [British propagandist] had been in touch with one of the
groups [Century Group/Fight for Freedom]. I told him...I thought as
a matter of discretion he should delete references to you and Aubrey
Morgan....”?
What, if anything, Chadwin cut because of Douglas’s objection is
not known. He wrote: “...Bell [chairman of executive committee] and
Cusick [executive secretary] continued and expanded their relationship
with Aubrey Morgan and John Wheeler-Bennett of the British Infor-
mation Service, talking with them by telephone once or twice a week.
On several occasions during the following year, Bell and Cusick were
even asked to be present at the BIS office in Rockefeller Center while
the British agents received confidential telephone messages from offi-
cials in London about which they wanted the Warhawks immediately
informed.”!°
Douglas need not have worried. American historians barely noticed
that British propagandists who worked with and for British intelligence
were suggesting activities for Fight for Freedom. Douglas was much
more discreet; his relevant correspondence is missing. As for Professor
John Wheeler-Bennett, he appears repeatedly as a coworker when
British intelligence decisions are being made. He admits in his autobi-
ography to having been “one of the earliest workers for the secret pro-
paganda unit, Department EH which was amalgamated into Special
Operations Executive.”!!
In 1942, after the secret Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was
separated from Special Operations Executive (SOE), Wheeler-
Bennett became head of the New York office. The purpose of this
office was to maintain liaison with the American Office of War Infor-
mation. “The reason for this appointment,” writes Wheeler-Bennett,
 The Fronts *e* 29

“was that I alone, of the staff of the Mission had any knowledge at all
of the United States....Moreover, the leaders of the O.W.I. in New
York were all personal friends of mine, especially James Warburg and
George Backer, who had been firm friends of Britain in the ‘Fight for
Freedom’ movement.”!?
Although he had technically been employed by the British Informa-
tion Service—whose head, Sir Gerald Campbell, worked “hand in
glove” with Bill Stephenson—in Rockefeller Center in 1941, Wheeler-
Bennett has this to say about British Security Coordination: “...S.O.E.
had established an office in New York under the direction of Bill (later
Sir William) Stephenson....I had known many of them from pre-war
days...[and] I had maintained a fairly close contact with them.”!3
There was also a close connection between Professor Wheeler-
Bennett and President Franklin Roosevelt. From the fall of 1938 to the
spring of 1940 the professor taught a class in international law at the
University of Virginia. The students included later novelist Louis
Auchincloss; ‘Tony Bliss, later of the Metropolitan Opera; Marshall
Field, son of the rich interventionist of the same name; Larry Houston,
later deputy director of the CIA; and the most immediately important
of them all, Franklin Roosevelt, Jr.
One result of the FDR Jr. connection was that Wheeler-Bennett
spent a weekend as a White House guest in early 1939. This included
a Sunday morning spent discussing international affairs with the
president.!#
These ties were, of course, unknown to the public. Also unknown to
the public was the close rapport between Fight for Freedom and the
White House—a relationship so close that FFF’s New York office spoke a
by telephone with FDR’s assistants Steve Early and “Pa” Watson “at
least once or twice a day.”!> This covert White House-FFF connection
allowed the White House to coordinate and build a bogus independent
demand for interventionist policies that FDR could then follow.
In a March 6, 1941, memo from Peter Cusick to Ulric Bell and Wil-
liam Agar concerning a mass meeting to be held on March 30 at Madi-
son Square Garden, Cusick wrote: “[David] Niles [of the White House
staff] will take care of getting all the people that will be needed for the
general effect of the presentation.
“Niles is coming to New York this afternoon and wants to talk to Mr.
Bell and Mr. Agar and would like to arrange...to go over the details of
 30 °¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

the financial end of this as it is necessary to put $800 up for the Madi-
son Square Garden binder.”!®
So the White House helped to create the demand for actions the
president or his advisers wished to take. Just as SOE agent Bill Morrell
had suggested in his memo, FFF was always trying to give the public
the impression that important people or a large segment of the public
supported the president’s interventionist policies.
Not all the cooperation between the White House and FFF was co-
vert. During 1941, Roosevelt met with FFF’s Lewis Douglas, Wayne
Johnson, and Marshall Field; there were several picture-taking sessions
igo President and Mrs. Roosevelt in 1941. In 1941, Wendell Willkie,
Secretary of the Navy Knox, Vice President Wallace, and even Mrs.
Roosevelt spoke at Fight for Freedom rallies.!7
On May 7, 1941, presidential assistant Lowell Mellett wrote asking
for help in placing an article attacking Lindbergh’s analysis of the Ger-
man air force. A week later the president requested that Fight for Free-
dom advise Director of Civilian Defense Fiorello La Guardia “in
regard to the whole subject of effective publicity to offset the propa-
ganda of the Wheelers, Nyes, Lindberghs, etc.” The result was that
FFF’s Peter Cusick went to Washington during May and June 1941 to
work with La Guardia.!§
Since the leaders of Fight for Freedom had always demanded a dec-
laration of war against Germany, they were always willing to prepare
the public by advocating extreme positions toward which the president
could work, in his cautious, even devious way. Once when Warhawks
wondered whether they would offend FDR with their charges against
the administration/ Ulric Bell went to the White House and read the
questionable text to the president. “If you’re going to give me hell,” he
said, “why not use some really strong language? You know, ‘pusillani-
mous’ isn’t such a bad word.”!9 —/
Fight for Freedom’s location in Rockefeller Center, the home of nu-
merous British organizations and British Security Coordination, was
convenient and efficient. The Rockefellers provided the rent-free
space for BSC and FFF. Moreover, Laurance D. Rockefeller also made
an arrangement for FFF’s expenses at the Rockefeller Center Club.?°
Laurance Rockefeller, Republican congressman Lucius Littauer, and
Mrs. David K. Bruce (wife of the later London OSS chief and ambassa-
dor to Britain) were among those who gave $10,000 or more to Fight
 The Fronts eee 3]

for Freedom. Most of the other significant donors to FFF seem to have
had the deep pockets necessary for such generosity: movie men Darryl
Zanuck and Jack and Harry Warner; Mrs. Harry Payne Whitney; Mr.
and Mrs. Marshall Field; Mr. and Mrs. Frank T. Altschul. One donor
listed by Chadwin as particularly generous, Dr. Max Ascoli, a dean at
the New School for Social Research, was also working for British intel-
ligence through his Italian-American Mazzini Society.?!
Labor and labor unions, many with close Communist connections,
presented the British and the White House with some of their greatest
concerns during the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, 1939-41. Fight
for Freedom claimed great success in bringing unions into the inter-
ventionist cause. This triumph, though, may have been caused as much
by the German invasion of the Soviet Union as by the efforts of Fight
for Freedom. Ernest Cuneo writes: “...I was...FDR’s personal liaison
with the United Automobile Workers, United Aircraft Workers and
the United Farm Machinery workers.... There was damn little to do
after Hitler attacked Russia. Before that, there was tough going. The
Communist-led unions were doing as much damage with strikes as a
couple of U-Boats in the Atlantic.”
David Niles of the White House staff (Ernest Cuneo’s intelligence
contact at the White House) and Isador Lubin, the commissioner of
labor statistics, successfully promoted Abe Rosenfield to organize
Fight for Freedom’s labor division. That Cuneo was “in the loop” with
Fight for Freedom and David Niles is evident from a telegram from
Fight for Freedom’s Peter Cusick to David Niles at the Carlton Hotel
in Washington, D.C.: “Hope that you can talk to Ernest Cuneo today
in Washington. He is at the Anchorage [Cuneo’s apartment] for the
Day is Anxious to talk to you.””?
Fight for Freedom made a major effort to reach unions by publish-
ing advertising in local papers and by its weekly Labor News Service.
This “news service” consisted of five legal-size pages of short items for
shop stewards and union newspaper editors.
Typically the articles told of yet another union leader or union that
had decided to back President Roosevelt’s foreign policy or, in the
words of the man behind the front, SOE’s Bill Morrell, “provide evi-
dence that the U.S. public is eager for action”: “NINETy-NINE A.F.L.
AND CIO LEADERS URGE FULL Measures TO Dereat Axis MEN-
ACE....We say to you, Mr. President, Go forward. Go forward boldly,
32 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

uncompromisingly. We know you love liberty as we do. We will sup-

port you completely till tyranny is erased and liberty wholly victori-
ous”; “CLEVELAND FEDERATION Supports F.D.R., AMALGAMATED
Approves RoosEVELT ATTITUDE ON DEFENSE STRIKES.”?4
The central theme of these notices and news items was that Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Britain were good for workers—*PROVIDE BRITISH
FOR Post-War SociAL SECURITY PENSIONS: First Lapy REFUSES TO
STRIKE-BREAK WITH WHITE House Launpry” and that the Nazis were
bad for workers, particularly unionized workers—“Nazis ARREST
UNION LEADERS IN NorWEGIAN Rounp-UpP.” Also typically present was
an article attacking pacifists or isolationists: “WHEELER HAILED IN AXIS
Papers; MONTANA SUPPORT DWINDLES.”2°
Fight for Freedom made at least one humorous faux pas for an in-
telligence front group. Labor News Service sometimes carried a per-
sonality profile or puff piece on a union man who was a close ally of
Fight for Freedom. The December 6, 1941, issue ends with this:
“Note to Editors: Through an unfortunate typographical error the
story appearing in last week’s labor news service on Emile Rieve,
president of the Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., said, ‘He
was an international spy.’ The sentence should have read, ‘He was no
international spy.”*°
It was on the labor issue that Fight for Freedom intertwined with
another of Bill Morrell’s fronts, the American Labor Committee to Aid
British Labor (ALCABL).
This front was tied to the American Federation of Labor. The hon-
orary chairman was William Green, president of the AFL, but the real
driving force was chairman Matthew Woll, the third vice president of
the AFL. Woll was in turn also president of yet another of Morrell’s
fronts, the League for Human Rights.’7
Woll is most likely the “permanent official” with whom British intel-
ligence had contact. The ALCABL was organized in early March 1941,
as Woll wrote Franklin Roosevelt, “to mobilize sympathies and re-
sources of organized labor in this country to help relieve sufferings of
British Labor fighting heroically against dictators.” It was formed dur-
ing the visit of Britain’s Sir Walter Citrine to the United States in re-
sponse to the CIO’s Communist-influenced opposition to aid for
Britain.*® The tactic of British intelligence was to find people with use-
ful views, then fund them, counsel them, guide them, and promote
 The Fronts °** 33

them. These people, given the proper guidance and proper coordina-
tion, were then used to attack Britain’s enemies, namely the American
isolationists, and move the United States toward war.
Though the committee was only formed in March 1941, Woll and
Green had been hostile to Hitler since at least 1933. At that time they
had reported on Hitler’s crushing of the German labor movement, and
they had quickly followed by pushing through a resolution boycotting
German goods and services.”’ At that time, before the Germans’ June
22, 1941, attack on the Soviet Union, Woll had shown another endear-
ing attribute: he was strongly anti-Soviet.
The CIO, on the other hand, had a number of influential Commu-
nists, usually referred to as the “left wing,” and its local unions were,
until June 1941, a real problem. In May 1941, Abe Rosenfield of Fight
for Freedom’s labor division contacted another BSC front, the League
for Human Rights: “We are preparing a statement exposing the ‘Na-
tional Labor Committee Against War’ as a Communist front for
Tuesday’s papers. Won’t you please secure names of A.F. of L. and
C.I.O. leaders in New York City who would lend their names to such
and phone them to me immediately.”*?
Woll contacted the White House at least two more times, first ask-
ing for a presidential endorsement of his organization and then for the
president’s press statement on “Aid British Labor Week.” In return he
received a letter of encouragement and one letter of support, which he
was “at liberty to release” to the press.*!
On the occasion of American troops occupying Iceland on July 7,
1941, Woll was quoted in Fight for Freedom’s Labor News Service under
the headline “CIO, A.F. or L. LEADERS APPROVE OCCUPATION OF ICE-
LAND”: “In making this move as a measure of vital national defense and
not as an act of aggression, the President deserves the wholehearted
support of the entire nation.”*?
Another of BSC’s fronts, Friends
of Democracy, was, if anything,
even tougher and more aggressive than FFF. Friends of Democracy,
whose national director was a Unitarian minister, the Rev. Leon M.
Birkhead, had been formed in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1937. On its of
stationery it still listed Kansas City as headquarters and persisted in this
practice until at least 1951. By 1940, however, it operated from its
“Eastern Regional Office” at 103 Park Avenue, New York City. Ac-
cording to Fight for Freedom and OSS executive Francis P. Miller, Dr.
34 eee PESPERATE DECEPTION

Birkhead “is a grand person who has organized the best private agency
in this country for collection of information regarding Nazi activi-
ties.”33 Friends of Democracy specialized in sensational, hard-hitting
attacks on isolationists and America First. Historian Wayne Cole rates
these attacks as “especially prominent and effective.”**
As an example of the good works he was directing, SOE black-pro-
paganda specialist Bill Morrell included in his memorandum to SOE
headquarters a sample of Friends of Democracy’s work—a “complete
attack upon Henry Ford.”%>
It is certainly that: in a large ten-by-fourteen-inch format with swas-
tikas running across the top, the cover announces, “HENRY Forp Must
Cuoosr.” Inside, Ford is labeled an anti-Semite and tied to Hitler and
the Nazis. It was also a grab bag of any accusation that might damage
Ford’s reputation. There was a section titled “TR. Scores Ford in Last
War for Anti-American Propaganda.” Another Friends of Democracy
project was a similarly tabloid-sized pamphlet, THE AMERICA FirsT
COMMITTEE: THE Nazi TRANSMISSION BELT, which labels the commit-
tee as a mouthpiece for the Nazis.*°
As should be expected, these British intelligence fronts worked in
concert. Fight for Freedom and the White Committee, for example,
distributed Friends of Democracy’s pamphlets. Mystery writer Rex
Stout, who worked for British intelligence, was an officer of Friends
of Democracy and was also a sponsor of Fight for Freedom. Both
Birkhead and Stout spoke at Fight for Freedom meetings.’
The Rev. Mr. Birkhead wrote to FFF’s Ulric Bell in early February
L941: “...we are going to take on about fifteen key anti-democratic
leaders and organizations....We hope to do with these organizations
and individuals something of the same sort of things we did with
Coughlin and McWilliams, and to some extent, with Verne Marshall.”?®
Bell wrote back that “if we have anything good enough to destroy the
people we are talking about it would be good enough for the White
House to spring.” He continued that “it will be a simple matter for us to
get the material into the proper hands.”3?
When Lindbergh spoke at Madison Square Garden on April 24,
1941, the rally was picketed by Friends of Democracy, which handed
out a pamphlet titled What One Medal Can Do, referring to the medal
that Goering had given Lindbergh on his 1938 trip to Germany.
Birkhead announced that this meeting would be “the largest gathering
 The Fronts *®° 35

of pro-Nazi and pro-Fascists...since the American Bund rallies....”

Fight for Freedom sponsored British intelligence collaborator Rex
Stout and James Warburg in a radio reply to Lindy, and shortly there-
after Birkhead charged that Lindbergh had already “been selected by
Hitler as the ‘Fuehrer’ of America.”*°
Although Lindbergh’s stand against intervention had by 1939-40
alienated his friends, his attorney, and his in-laws in the establishment,
the reaction of the general public is harder to gauge. The crucial event
was his Des Moines, Iowa, speech of September 11, 1941, in which he
mentioned Jews as one group interested in getting the United States
into war. The public reaction, as opposed to the media and intellectual
reaction, at first blush seems to have been mild.
When Lindbergh spoke in the very center of the establishment in
New York’s Madison Square Garden on May 23, 1941, he drew twenty
thousand people inside and perhaps another fourteen thousand out-
side. On October 30, 1941, he spoke again at Madison Square Garden
before nearly twenty thousand, but this may be misleading. As part of
its persistent political warfare and dirty tricks against Lindbergh, BSC
claims to have printed a duplicate set of tickets, hoping to create fights
and turmoil over seating. BSC claims this had the effect of inflating the
attendance when the original crowd proved small and the ushers more
alert thén anticipated.*!
Another BSC front, France Forever, was the American phase of the
British effort to finance and promote Charles de Gaulle as the true
voice of France. Eventually Churchill was to get heartily sick of the
pompous and prickly general, but in 1940-41 he was of major use to
British propaganda.
British intelligence controlled France Forever largely through BSC
agent Sandy Griffith and Market Analysts Inc. In a “Dear Ernie” letter
of August 3, 1940, Griffith wrote to Ernest Cuneo: “I have been asked
to head up a committee of Americans who are in sympathy with the
best of old French ideals and want no traffic with the Vichy France.
This committee will include prominent Harvard and Columbia people
and will be militant. Have you any candidates?”
In the sophisticated public relations form that typified these front
groups, France Forever held its charter signing ceremony at Indepen-
dence Hall in Philadelphia. The president of France Forever, oilman
EugeneJ.Houdry, took the occasion to praise de Gaulle and reiterate
36 °@e8 DESPERATE DECEPTION

the British theme that de Gaulle was fighting for the liberation of
France in accordance with France’s pledged word.
Another organizer of France Forever, Dr. Albert Simard announced
the organization’s creed. It incorporated two basic themes of British
propaganda: “We are convinced that France and all enslaved European
democracies can be freed only by a British victory and that a German
victory over Britain will be the signal for an attack on all the Americas.”4
De Gaulle’s London headquarters announced on October 6, 1940,
that committees had been formed in nine countries—Brazil, Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Canada, Egypt, South Africa, and the
British colony of Mauritius—‘“to act in close cooperation with the
Free French forces.” A following New York Times article of October 7,
1941, concludes that the headquarters of de Gaulle’s followers “is at 8
West 40th Street, New York City under the name ‘France Forever.’ ”
By March 9, 1941, the office had been moved to 30 Rockefeller
Plaza, convenient to British Security Coordination and Fight for
Freedom.*
In the Ernest Cuneo Papers is a “Notice of a Press Conference” sent
to Cuneo by Francis A. Henson, Sandy Griffith’s assistant at Market
Analysts Inc. The press conference in Washington’s Mayflower Hotel
on December 6, 1940, presented “Mr. Jacques de Sieyes, personal rep-
resentative of General De Gaulle and a founder and member of the
Board of France Forever.” Also introduced was Dr. Fred G. Hoffherr,
the head of the French department at Barnard College of Columbia
University. Hoffherr was chairman of France Forever’s public relations
department. Jean Delattre-Seguy, a Washington representative of
France Forever with offices in the Shoreham Building, was also
present. On the top of the release, in ink, Henson had written: “Ernie
—Stop by If you can—conveniently FAH.”*
British intelligence exerted covert influence on France Forever in
other ways. Always sensitive to the American fear of being bamboozled
by clever British propaganda, British Ambassador Lord Lothian had
promoted the formation of the Inter-Allied Information Committee
(IAIC). This allowed British propaganda to emerge from Czech or
Polish or French lips.*”
The IAIC first met on September 24, 1940, with Robert Valeur,
once of the New York office of the French Information Bureau, repre-
senting France Forever. Valeur served IAIC in the influential position
 The Fronts °*¢ 37

of director of publications. IAIC’s information center was housed—

where else—in Rockefeller Center.
The New York Times gave good coverage of France Forever’s activi-
ties—rallies, public meetings, and interviews. As always with British
intelligence fronts, the list of outside speakers was impressive and
instructive. At a packed December 20, 1940, rally at Carnegie Hall,
British intelligence collaborators Robert Sherwood and Clark Eichel-
berger, executive director of the CDAAA, urged “no appeasement with
the appeasers.”
Sherwood blamed the war on isolationists and called for the forma-
tion now of a union of all the democracies. The president of France
Forever, Eugene Houdry, reverberated the propaganda theme the
British used in the run-up to Lend-Lease. ‘The claim was that Britain
did not need American troops; American supplies were all the British
needed to defeat Germany. The claim was false, but deflected isola-
tionist criticism. ‘There was never any hope that the British could in-
vade the continent of Europe without American manpower.*®
There were also the voices of the administration. On May 27, 1941,
Assistant U.S. Attorney General Francis M. Shea told a dinner audi-
ence assembled to hear President Roosevelt’s radio speech that the
United States should fully support the Free French and not “the faith-
less men of Vichy.” Wrote the New York Times of the occasion: “Miss
[Dorothy] ‘Thompson led the applause during President Roosevelt’s
speech....At the moment he proclaimed the national emergency she
excitedly embraced Edgar Ansel Mowrer....When the President fin-
ished she told a friend, ‘I am sick with happiness.’ ”4”
Edgar Ansel Mowrer, a correspondent for the strongly intervention-
ist Chicago Daily News who also spoke at this dinner, has been named as
a British intelligence agent. Dorothy ‘Thompson has also been simi-
larly named; see Chapter 3.
At France Forever’s Bastille Day event, held at the Manhattan Cen-
ter, New York City, the administration was represented by that master
of personal attack Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes. ‘Iwo thousand
people witnessed the speech and many more heard it on radio station
WMCA. This station broadcast many interventionist speakers spon-
sored by British intelligence front groups.°?
The New York Times said Ickes’s speech was “one of the most bitter
attacks ever made on Mr. Lindbergh by any member of the administra-
38 eee P)ESPERATE DECEPTION

tion.” Ickes called Lindbergh “the knight of the German Eagle” and a
“mouthpiece of the Nazi Party line in the United States.”>! Another
British intelligence agent spoke at the 1941 Armistice ceremony of
France Forever at the Manhattan Center. He was Colonel Rex Benson,
whom the New York Times identified as the military attaché of the Brit-
ish embassy. Benson was, in fact, a British intelligence agent and an old
friend of “C”—Sir Stewart Menzies, the chief of the Secret Intelli-
gence Service (MI-6).°?
After centuries of conflict with Britain, the Irish could not bring
themselves to fight on Britain’s side and so declared themselves neutral
in World War II. This was much to the consternation of the British,
who coveted bases in Ireland to better protect convoys from North
America. The British plotted all their tried-and-true stratagems to
bring the Emerald Isle to heel. John Colville, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill’s private secretary, wrote in his diary entry of December 3,
1940: “At dinner he [Churchill] conspired with Cranborne, Rob
Hudson, Kingsley Wood and Oliver Lyttelton about means of bring-
ing pressure to bear on Ireland. Refusal to buy her food, to lend her our
shipping or to pay her our present subsidies seem calculated to bring
De Valera to his knees in a very short time.”*?
In January 1941, Wendell Willkie, who had gone to England at the
request of the head of BSC, William Stephenson, made a quick side
trip to Ireland to attempt to get the bases. Willkie warned that Ireland’s
relationship with the United States would be threatened if Britain were
not given the bases. This also failed.°+
At almost the same time, January 23, 1941, Christopher Emmet,
Chancellor James Byrne of New York University, and Professor Wil-
liam Agar (brother of Fight for Freedom activist Herbert Agar) sent
out a form letter to American interventionists of Irish descent. The
results of this ploy were published in March. Byrne headed the list of
129 Irish-Americans who urged Ireland to grant the bases to Great
Britain. The Irish were unmoved.*> If 129 petitioners were of no avail,
perhaps a full-blown front group was needed.
SOE documents on the Irish American Defense Association sched-
uled for release in 1998 give the only extensive inside view of the
planning and resources BSC devoted to even its smallest and least suc-
cessful front. In half of a dozen reports to London, the details of the
IADAs plans and ploys are given in detail reminiscent of a major
 The Fronts °*#¢ 39

corporate effort to market a new product. The “Index,” really a table of

contents, to the report of October 18, 1941, lists 123 pages of person-
nel, activities, and reports: “National Activities Planned, Irish Amer-
ican Opinion Polls (Work in Progress), “The Case for Irish and
American Unity’—First draft of 24-page pamphlet...”
The BSC cover letter to Report number SO/458 of October 18,
1941, says, “Attached is the first report on our activities in connection
with the... FORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR AMERI-
CAN-IRISH DEFENSE.... The Report has been compiled by G.112 [Sandy
Griffith] and his collaborators....We are subsidizing the MOVEMENT at
the rate of $1,500.00 per month...” [about $15,000 per month at 1997
prices].
Sandy Griffith writes in this report: “I have reserved effective con-
trol of the organization....the proposed activities have been discussed
informally with people in the Administration, with Secretaries Knox
and Welles and with Colonel Donovan....We have close friendly rela-
tions with the Committee to Defend America and with Fight for
Freedom....Efie bases for America are an immediate tangible objec-
tive....[as are] anti-Nazi, anti-Coughlin, and other patriotic resolu-
HOnss”
In another “Dear Ernie” letter of October 2, 1941, on the stationery
of Market Analysts Inc., Francis Henson, Sandy Griffith’s assistant,
wrote: “I enclose some material on an Irish American Unity campaign
for which we are working. Some of your State Department friends may
be interested. There is to be a 24 page pamphlet out soon with an in-
troduction by Frank Murphy.”°’
The material he enclosed is a “Petition of the Committee for Ameri-
can Irish Defense” with the same street address—8 West 40th Street,
New York City—as Market Analysts Inc. and the CDAAA (White
Committee). It was not long, however, before the petitions had a new
address and a new addressee; it was William Agar, Suite 301, 1270 Sixth
Avenue, RKO Building, New York City. Yet another BSC front took up
residence close to British intelligence in Rockefeller Center. The press
release stated: “Prof. William Agar of Columbia University, dis-
tinguished author and scientist and a leader of the Fight for Freedom.”
The executive committee lists James Byrne as honorary chairman,
Rossa F. Downing as national chairman, ‘I:James Tumulty as secretary,
and Christopher Emmet as treasurer.”
40 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

James Byrne was the father-in-law of John F. C. “Ivar” Bryce. Ivar

Bryce was a Special Operations Executive agent working for BSC. One
of James Byrne’s other daughters, Helen, once the wife of Foreign
Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong, had been, since March 1938,
the wife of columnist Walter Lippmann, who the “BSC Account” says
was “among those who rendered service of particular value.”*? Chris-
topher Emmet, the treasurer, worked on many British intelligence
projects with British intelligence agent Sanford Griffith and after the
war on MI-6 and CIA projects. He was the cousin of Robert Emmet
Sherwood.
Christopher Emmet in a fund-raising letter of November 1941
clearly stated the purpose of the organization. The AIDA sought to
counter the likes of “America First, Father Coughlin and others still
defying the majority verdict” of “an openly and legally recognized
Shooting War in the Atlantic.”
The AIDA’ slogan was, “You can count on the Irish, Mr. President.”
Emmet also said: “Our first rally was held on Armistice Day at Father
Duffy’s statue in New York...attended by 6,000 people.”® All the
bandwagon tactics usually so effective—the testimonials by scholars
and prominent citizens, the rallies, the petitions, the radio broad-
casts—fell flat. The bitter truth was that the president could not count
on the Irish.
In the end, the Irish would have none of it; no amount of slick propa-
ganda could convince them that Britain was the last hope of civiliza-
tion. Mark Chadwin says of the Fight for Freedom interlock with this
Irish campaign: “...in one of the few instances in the fall when it seized
the initiative and sought to influence diplomatic events concurrently
with administrative action, the Century Group failed completely.”°!
For the BSC fronts that specialized in hard-hitting, even malicious,
attacks it was an ignominious end. The AIDA was reduced to whining
about “vicious attacks by the Coughlinite Irish Organizations and
Press.” The masters of distortion were left complaining that the Irish
had “distorted” AIDA pronouncements.”
Lastly, we come to the Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies (CDAAA), better known in its day as the William Allen
White Committee. This was in fact the second William Allen White
Committee. ‘The first White Committee had been the popular name
for another interventionist front, the Committee for Concerted Peace
 The Fronts #¢* 4]

Efforts, and its official name had been just as cleverly and misleadingly
contrived: Nonpartisan Committee for Peace Through Revision of
the Neutrality Law. These were all interventionist organizations.
“The Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts was in effect a front for
the League of Nations Association,’ writes historian Jane Harriet
?

Schwar.®
The first William Allen White Committee (WAW I) had lasted only
a few weeks in the late summer and fall of 1939. It was of major impor-
tance, however, since it marked a “definite shift toward conservatism in
the leadership of the interventionist movement.” Left-wing radicals
had been replaced by pro-British conservatives.“
As was true of the other interventionist committees, such as Fight
for Freedom, with which it interlocked, half the 550 members of the
White Committee lived in the Northeast. One hundred forty-three of
these lived or worked in New York City. Fewer than a hundred mem-
bers lived west of the Mississippi.© ‘The dozen men who made the
CDAAA run were white male Protestants of largely British descent and
old families who had gone to the better Eastern colleges.
One of the White Committee connections to the British was through
its William Allen White News Service, launched by the British puppet
Inter-Allied Information Committee, also located in Rockefeller Cen-
ter with numerous other interventionist groups and BSC.°7
The head of the William Allen White News Service was John
Balderston. He had been a war correspondent in the Great War. His
highly emotional articles had been favorable to the British, and he had
continued in this vein in 1917, when he became director of information
in Great Britain for George Creel’s Committee on Public Information.
He then spent from 1923 to 1931 in London as correspondent for
Herbert Bayard Swope’s New York World. His days with the British in
London seem to go with him to Hollywood, where he spent the 1930s
as a screenwriter on such films as Lives of aBengal Lancer (British army
heroics on the Northwest Frontier of India) and The Prisoner ofZenda
(Englishman defeats plot against the king of Ruritania).®
Like many in the Century Group/Fight for Freedom, he greatly en-
joyed his contact with British Ambassador Lothian. Balderston quickly
informed Lothian of the Century Group’s finances and his own hopes
for ties with Clarence Streit’s Union Now Movement, which sought to
form a union of the United States and Great Britain. He wrote or told
42 eee [PESPERATE DECEPTION

Lothian of the Century Group’s efforts to discuss its program with Sec-
retary of State Hull and Secretary of War Stimson and the effort to
obtain the cooperation of Republican presidential nominee Wendell
Willkie.%
In 1940 the British Ministry of Information had been confident
enough of its ability to influence the White Committee that it felt the
need for a direct telephone link. The British ambassador at Washing-
ton, Lord Lothian, ever wishing to use intermediaries and covert links,
was horrified: “It would be most disastrous to the William Allen White
Committee were it ever to be established that it was communicating
and collaborating with any branch of His Majesty’s Government.””°
Most prominent was the energetic leader of WAW I, Clark Eichel-
berger, the national director of the League of Nations. Quiet support
also came from an interventionist group organized around the promi-
nent New York attorney Frederic R. Coudert. Coudert had been a vo-
ciferous interventionist before United States entry into World War Iand
had been legal adviser to the British embassy during that war. Between
the wars, Coudert’s law firm represented the French government. In this
capacity he not only gave advice to the French embassy but made himself
useful by writing pro-French articles for American newspapers.’! The
Coudert group invited White to a luncheon on October 20, 1939.
The group had two goals. The first was to repeal the neutrality laws,
which were impeding the flow of greatly needed goods to Britain and
France. Second, after this effort to get the neutrality laws changed had
succeeded, the friends of Britain and France faced up to an even more
dangerous problem. They had to make sure that both political parties
nominated candidates who supported aid to the Allies. There was great
fear that in the heat of the election either party, but particularly the
Republicans, might cater to antiwar sentiment. All those present at the
April 1940 meeting agreed to try to prevent this.’* How this second
concern was turned into action is the subject of Chapter 8.
Some of those present at this October meeting were official mem-
bers of the Nonpartisan Committee (WAW I). These would include
William Allen White himself, Clark Eichelberger, Frederick Coudert,
and Thomas K. Finletter, a member of Coudert’s law firm. Others in
the Coudert Group who attended this luncheon were Wendell Willkie,
the president of the J. P. Morgan-controlled utility Commonwealth
and Southern Corporation; Thomas J. Watson, president of IBM and
 The Fronts °e* 43

the International Chamber of Commerce and a major factor at radio

station WRUL, which British intelligence controlled; Henry L.
Stimson, a staunch interventionist active in various pro-intervention
organizations; and Frank L. Polk, international lawyer and member of
the firm of Polk, Davis, Wardwell—he was acting secretary of state
while Wilson and Lansing were at the Versailles Peace Conference.
Allen Dulles, a veteran intelligence operative and member of the For-
eign Service, may also have been present. The record is conflicting.”
By July 1940, charges that the committee was dominated by Wall
Street seem to have brought on the formation of an official policy
committee, in which the Wall Street connection would be less obvious,
to replace the informal relationship with the Coudert Group. To be
sure, Frederic Coudert and Thomas W. Lamont, senior partner at J. P.
Morgan, continued behind the scenes. However, “committee leaders,”
writes historian Jane Schwar, “thinking of the possibility of a congres-
sional investigation, prudently did not record Lamont’s presence in the
minutes.”74
Though two interventionist committees were named for him, Will-
iam Allen White, “the Sage of Emporia, Kansas,” himself need be ex-
amined only briefly, because he turns out to have been anything but a
real insider. ‘The ignominious end of White as leader of the William
Allen White Committee came when he gave an interview, to Roy
Howard of the Scripps Howard chain of newspapers, denying that his
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was intervention-
ist. In a widely published response, White replied: “The only reason in
God’s world I am in this organization is to keep the country out of
war.” White went on to say that if he were to make a motto for the
committee it would be “The Yanks are not coming.””>
Clark Eichelberger and several members of the strongly interven-
tionist policy committee of CDAAA were meeting on December 23,
1940, at the home of one of the most deeply interventionist members
Lewis Douglas. “We were stunned...” reports Eichelberger. If the
”

committee was “stunned,” William Allen White was “very much sur-
prised and hurt at the reaction of members of the committee....”
White resigned, but his name was so useful that he remained as honor-
ary chairman.’¢
White gave the impression of having a confused mind, and this
was true, but many people would have a confused mind given his
44 eee [PESPERATE DECEPTION

circumstances. In his daily life in Kansas the people he met were dis-
tanced from the action in Europe, both physically and emotionally.
They did not identify with Britain, and they questioned the efforts of
White and his Eastern establishment friends to get the United States
to abet Britain. The Eastern-based captains of finance and law and
intellectual life whose respect White desired were, on the other
hand, emotionally committed to a British victory.
CDAAA even moved into the foreign broadcasting business by
sponsoring daily shortwave broadcasts in French over the 50,000-watt
Station WRUL. Ostensibly these broadcasts were summaries of Amer-
ican press opinion; in reality they were British black propaganda.
WRUL was founded to spread “international goodwill,” but Mont-
gomery Hyde wrote in The Quiet Canadian: “By the middle of 1941,
Station WRUL was virtually, though quite unconsciously, a subsidiary
of the Stephenson organization, sending out British propaganda in
twenty-two different languages and dialects....” The official “BSC Ac-
count” says: “Through cut-outs, BSC began to supply it (WRUL] with
everything it needed to run a first-class international programme wor-
thy of its transmitting power....BSC subsidized it financially. It re-
cruited foreign news editors, translators and announcers to serve on its
staff. It furnished it with material for news bulletins, with specially pre-
pared scripts for talks and commentaries.” The man who financed the
French broadcasts for the CDAAA was its treasurer, Frederick Chad-
wick McKee.’’
Documents that have recently become available confirm Hyde’s ac-
count and specify how WRUL was controlled by BSC. In his report to
London of July 1941 Sydney Morrell wrote: “...WRUL has been the
station on which British organizations have concentrated their efforts.
This station was privately endowed by the Rockefeller Foundation....A
few months ago a new subsidy was paid by S.O.1 to ‘France Forever’
for separate French broadcasts from WRUL...and another subsidy
was paid to the Mazzini Society for Italian broadcasts.”
Later in his report Morrell detailed the mechanics of the WRUL
operation. “...G.112 [Sandy Griffith]...has set up an office to deal with
radio programs....all commentators work receiving their instructions
and writing their broadcasts....[these are] approved by the State De-
partment Censor, recorded, sent to WRUL in Boston and then broad-
cast under the sponsorship of the Fight for Freedom Committee.”
 The Fronts °#®* 45

The daily WRUL Broadcast Schedule from the SOE archives shows
the responsibility for running the broadcasts divided between G.112,
Sandy Griffith, and G.111, Alexander J. Halpern, once (1917) secre-
tary to the Kerensky government in Russia, now working at BSC, and
soon to become the head of its Political and Minorities Section with a
new cover symbol, G.400. A note at the bottom of the schedule says,
“Where no particular control is indicated we have indirect control.”’8
So the CDAAA was one of many interventionist groups used by BSC
to project its interventionist message. It is little wonder then that Fight
for Freedom’s Francis Miller could later say: “Right-wing ‘revisionists’
may have grounds to accuse the Warhawks of a ‘conspiracy’ to involve
the United States in a War.” The post-World War II revisionists—
those who contributed to editor Harry Elmer Barnes’s book Perpetual
War for Perpetual Peace are an example—spotted the gaps and glitches
in the standard histories, but their own works, heavy on logic and
analysis, unavoidably light on documents, were also vulnerable.
 a a 16 ccm
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 CHAPTER 3
@Se@

“Those Who Rendered

Service of Particular Value”

In early 1969 the United States Supreme Court ruled that wiretap re-
cordings must be revealed in open court, even in cases of national secu-
rity. Ernest Cuneo, once the liaison between British intelligence, the
White House, the FBI, and OSS, wrote a caustic denunciation of this
ruling and sent it to J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI. ”Friendly and neutral
powers,” wrote Cuneo, “are quaint and laughable terms unrecognized
in the world of international intelligence. Every major nation taps ev-
ery other major nation, none more than its Allies.”
The purpose of these taps, he explained, is “to trace down the for-
eign country’s apparatus in this country. Who is talking to whom is as
important as what is said. ‘Io whom each speaks afterward is even more
important, because it leads up to the chiefs in command. The process
of unveiling this is called ‘going up the ladder.’ ”!
This chapter reverses the process by going down the ladder to locate
British agents, informers, and collaborators; explore how they helped
to implement British policy; and examine how they helped move the
United States toward World War II and then toward a peace that was
in Britain’s interest.
“British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activi-
ties in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-45” very explicitly depicts a
number of people as helpmates of British intelligence. The attack on
the American isolationists and defeatists by BSC was a thorough, clas-
sical case of covert political warfare. Of the Americans who aided BSC,
the “BSC Account” says: “The press and radio men with whom BSC

47
48 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

maintained contact were comparable with subagents and the interme-

diaries with agents. They were thus regarded.”
The World War II intelligence community was appalled by the pub-
lication of Montgomery Hyde’s The Quiet Canadian because they
feared that some historian or journalist would use the methodology of
intelligence to track the revealed agents to other and darker opera-
tions. Ernest Cuneo wrote to Intrepid’s assistant, Dick Ellis: “No great
harm came of it, but Montgomery Hyde broke confidences which I was
assured were inviolate. They involved newspaper friends of mine who
accepted my personal assurances and, indeed, a President for whom I
bore deepest affection.”
Who were the newspaper people who were particularly useful to
British intelligence? The “BSC Account” gives a partial list: George
Backer, publisher of the New York Post; Ralph Ingersoll, editor of PM;
Helen Ogden Reid, who controlled the New York Herald Tribune; Paul
Patterson, publisher of the Baltimore Sun; A. H. Sulzberger, president
of the New York Times; and Walter Lippmann.*
The “BSC Account” also lists the Overseas News Agency (ONA),
which was a branch of the Jewish Telegraph Agency. In return for co-
operation, BSC began subsidizing ONA in April 1941.5 Jacob Landau
had founded the Jewish Telegraph Agency during World War I. The
headquarters, first in London, was soon moved to New York; branches
were established in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and Jerusalem. The money
to run this news agency came only in part from newspapers; the re-
mainder came from wealthy contributors, the major one being the
banker Felix Warburg.
The ONA evolved from the Jewish Telegraph Agency in the spring of
1940 as an agency to provide news and feature articles on the persecu-
tion of minorities. The guiding hand behind this transformation was the
militant interventionist Herbert Bayard Swope, who eventually became
vice chairman of the New York Fight for Freedom Committee. At a
meeting at Swope’s home the board of directors was set up; George
Backer of the New York Post and Harold Guinzberg of Viking Press, both
leaders of Fight for Freedom, were among the board members. Swope
became “Correspondent and Chairman of the Board,” as his business
cards identified him. ONA did well during the war, providing copy in
twenty-eight languages for the Office of War Information. Addition-
ally, it served United States papers with five million circulation.®
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °** 49

In the VENONA Project the United States intercepted and then

decrypted hundreds of messages between Moscow and its intelligence
apparatus in the U.S. Recently released VENONA messages show that
Landau was working for the British, but alas the VENONA messages
reveal this because Soviet secret intelligence, the NKVD, had so thor-
oughly penetrated BSC and its offspring OSS.
On September 8, 1943, one of the Soviet agents within British Secu-
rity Coordination, UCN 9 (probably Cedric Belfrage), reported of the
Overseas News Agency: “On instructions of the British, LANDAU left
for the ‘COUNTRYSIDE’ [Mexico] to meet “TYuLEN’ [Soviet am-
bassador to Mexico Konstantin Umanskij].” Landau was in Mexico City
for two months and had several meetings with the Soviet ambassador.’
To this list we should add—as the “BSC Account” does—the names
of two columnists to whom Cuneo had undoubtedly given his solemn
word that their ties to British intelligence would remain secret, Walter
Winchell and Drew Pearson. Cuneo (code name Crusader) writes on
Pearson and Winchell: “...I controlled the world’s largest newspaper
and radio circulation, centering on Walter Winchell and his near 1,000
papers and the only near approach was Drew Pearson’s Washington
Merry-Go-Round. Drew had been my instructor at Columbia, and for
the next half century we were the closest of friends....From 1933 on,
we were intent on bringing down Hitler/Mussolini and along with
Franco had been waging all-out journalistic and legal war on them.”®
Other BSC ties to the world of media were columnist Dorothy
Thompson, journalist Edmond ‘Taylor, movie mogul Alexander Korda,
presidential speechwriter Robert Emmet Sherwood, and mystery
writer Rex Stout.
Rex Stout was not only an officer in the BSC front Friends of De-
mocracy and a major spokesman for another BSC front, Fight for
Freedom, he also admits to working directly for BSC agent Donald
MacLaren. In the fall of 1941, MacLaren recruited Stout, George
Merten (from BSC’s George Office economic warfare operations), and
syndicated New York Post economic columnist Sylvia Porter to write a
propaganda booklet titled Sequel to the Apocalypse: The Uncensored Story:
How Your Dimes and Quarters Helped Pay for Hitler’s War.?
As in the case of front groups, there were often several British intel-
ligence agents, subagents, and collaborators working the same organi-
zation. There is another tendency that should be noted about these
50 #*@ DESPERATE DECEPTION

competent and trustworthy agents and collaborators who worked

closely with British intelligence in the 1939-41 period. They fre-
quently reappeared in Donovan’s Coordinator of Information intelli-
gence service or his Foreign Information Service propaganda arm run
by British intelligence collaborator Robert Sherwood. There is noth-
ing very unusual here; this was merely the very human tendency to hire
familiar people who had previously served and performed well. The
first list of people Sherwood sent Donovan, “for the work we dis-
cussed,” included Edmond ‘Taylor, Douglas Miller, E. A. Mowrer,
H. R. Knickerbocker, and Raymond Gram Swing.!°
The journalist Edmond Taylor has written me of his cooperation
with British intelligence and described the subtlety of the British
technique: “What they did more often, especially before Pearl Har-
bor and in the early months of the war, was to connive, usually as
non-committally as possible, with Americans like myself who were
willing to go out of regular (or even legal) channels to try to bend
U.S. policy towards objectives that the British, as well as the Ameri-
cans in question, considered desirable.”!!
In fact, the New York office of Donovan’s organization, run by
Allen Dulles, was Room 3663, 630 Fifth Avenue. The address of Brit-
ish Security Coordination was Room 3603, 630 Fifth Avenue. BSC
agent Sandy Griffith’s man at Fight for Freedom in Chicago joined
OSS, as did SOE man and Walter Lippmann brother-in-law Ivar
Bryce. Donald Downes was another. In one case—that of George
Merten, a German economist who had turned over to BSC evidence
that the Schering drug company was Nazi-owned and who had then
worked completely for BSC, gathering economic intelligence and
planting articles in the press— an entire operation, the “George Of-
fice,” was unloaded onto OSS.!?
The British vigorously maneuvered their agents into positions in
Donovan’s organization and probably other departments as well. Re-
member that Intrepid’s assistant at BSC, Dick Ellis, was the person
really running William Donovan’s COI office.
To be sure, there were degrees in the anglophilia of Donovan’s per-
sonnel. Here is Ernest Cuneo, a powerfully built former NFL football
player, on an agreement he had worked out on the fate of Italy: “I went
to the O.S.S. Office in New York. De Witte Poole, the assistant to
Allen Dulles, hailed me. ‘Oh Mr. Cuneo,’ he said, “That Italian Treaty
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °** 51

is off! Cancel it!’ I said, ‘Mr. Poole, the President has approved it.
There were some minor things which have to be ironed out, but it’s
been finally approved by the President.’ He said, ‘It doesn’t matter. Sir
Ronald Campbell just called. He doesn’t want it so it’s off!’ I simply
lifted him from his seat and slapped his face back and forth and threw
iinrbackmehis chair2) 920 © a te nen
Among Donovan’s papers is a four-page memo. Handwritten across
the top is “Provided WJD-by Bill Stephenson (Pre C.O.1.).” It is titled
“British Recruitment and Handling of Agents.” Though it warns that
“definitions of the term ‘agent’ vary considerably” and that its “discus-
sion is in terms of normal, not wartime, intelligence operations,” this
memo still serves as a guide to the world of recruiting intelligence
agents. It also helps to explain the origins and rationale of the CIA
recruiting practices that have come under such close scrutiny in recent
years. “Such persons are initially recommended to the service either by
friends already in the service or by particular alumni of the service des-
ignated for this purpose....Both MI6 and MI5 have such former offic-
ers appointed for this purpose, particularly those who are connected
with British universities....By far the largest number of British agents
are not “agents” properly speaking, but voluntary informers....”!*
The following sketches look more closely at the collaborators,
agents, and voluntary informers who, as the “BSC Account” states,
“rendered service of particular value” to British intelligence.
George Backer (1903-74). Backer was publisher of the New York Post.
During the 1930s he worked for the election of FDR. For his work
helping Jews escape from Nazism during the 1930s he was made a
Chevalier of the Legion of Honor. From 1932 to 1942 he was married
to Dorothy Schiff, granddaughter of the legendary German Jewish
philanthropist Jacob H. Schiff. In 1939, Dorothy and George acquired
the New York Post.
Backer helped British intelligence in the numerous ways open to a
wealthy publisher. He was a generous donor to Fight for Freedom.!>
As previously mentioned, Backer was a founding board member of the
Overseas News Agency, which worked with BSC. Before the United
States entered the war he provided journalist cover for Virginia Hall
(field name Marie of Lyons), one of SOE’s greatest agents in France.!°
British intelligence agent and propagandist John Wheeler-Bennett
counted Backer and James Warburg among Britain’s friends in Fight
52 ee DESPERATE DECEPTION

for Freedom. He also worked closely with them in the American Office
of War Information.!”
Arthur Hayes Sulzberger (1892-1968). When Harrison Salisbury
published his history of his employer, the New York Times, in 1980 he
did not have the benefit of David Ignatius’s article at the rival Post.
Though he readily admits that the New York Times was used by British
intelligence, Salisbury is at pains to convince the reader of the owner's
dedication to objectivity. Salisbury writes: “...World War II was to
bring to Arthur Hays Sulzberger another concern....Not long after the
outbreak of the war Sulzberger learned that a number of these corre-
spondents had connections with MI-6 the British intelligence agency.”
Salisbury wrote that this revelation made Sulzberger “very angry,” but
apparently not angry enough to stop it or to fire the culprits. According
to one old Times staff man, Hanson Baldwin, “leaks to British intelli-
gence through The Times continued after U.S. entry into the war.”!§
One of those to whom Sulzberger expressed his anger about MI-6
use of his staff was Scotty Reston. Reston may well have been one of
these BSC people himself. When Frank Thistlewaite of Britain’s Joint
American Secretariat was asked to pass on one of numerous items that
the British planted in the American press, he responded that he would
ask Robin Cruickshank if “it would be a suitable topic to feed to one of
his tame journalists.” Cruickshank liked the idea. Historian Susan Ann
Brewer identifies the tame journalists as James Reston of the New York
Times, Geoffrey Parsons of the New York Herald Tribune, and Frederick
Kuh of the Chicago Sun.!°
Salisbury recorded that Sulzberger had refused the 1942 proposal of
Colonel Donovan that the Times be at the disposal of the OSS. The
presently unanswerable question is whether Donovan was approaching
Sulzberger cold or if he thought the head of the Times would cooperate
with the OSS because he had cooperated with British intelligence.
There were also other indications that Sulzberger’s cooperation with
British intelligence in the 1939-42 period and later with the CIA was
not always as enthusiastic as the wholehearted cooperation shown by
the New York Herald Tribune.
An August 1941 Fight for Freedom internal memo complains:
“Here is another example of the same thing. The Tribune gives us a
break and the Times doesn’t.”*9 Sulzberger’s apparent ambivalence
might have remained without explanation but for one of the reports
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °** 53

found in SOE agent Valentine Williams’s personal file in the SOE ar-
chives. Williams had been sent out from London under Ministry of
Economic Warfare (MEW) cover to advise Intrepid on propaganda
matters, promote General de Gaulle, and pick up his old contacts. On
September 15, 1941, Williams wrote to his boss Dr. Hugh Dalton:
“T had an hour with Arthur Sulzberger, proprietor of the New York
Times, last week. He told me that for the first time in his life he regret-
ted being a Jew because, with the tide of antisemitism rising, he was
unable to champion the anti-Hitler policy of the administration as vig-
orously and as universally as he would like as his sponsorship would be
attributed to Jewish influence by isolationists and thus lose something
of its force.”?!
Walter Winchell (1897-1972). In a letter to Sir William Stephenson
of January 4, 1988, complaining about the inaccuracies of the book A
Man Called Intrepid, Ernest Cuneo wrote of Winchell: “My relation-
ship with BSC was one of the many source-relationships I maintained
as part of my de facto editorship of Winchell’s policies....We ‘moved’
about 1,200 words a day, six days a week and had also to prepare a
Sunday broadcast. For years I did this as a service to FDR. Thereaf-
ter, I was paid more than a million and W.W. left me his papers. Un-
fortunately, there is an overtone that Winchell was a British agent.
He was not. He was, in fact, fighting Hitler long before anyone else
in the U.S. or Britain. He was a free man, under the control of no
one (including himself).”?2
As Cuneo admits, he was the one actually writing the column and
radio show and maintaining contact with BSC.’} It is also clear from
his papers that he was working with British intelligence agents, such as
Sandy Griffith, in 1940 and was certainly working for Britain’s interest
at the outbreak of the war. “I had worked,” wrote Cuneo, “on the hold-
ing up of the Bremen for 24 hours at the beginning of the war, broad-
casting her hour of departure en clair so the British Navy could kill her
as she cleared Sandy Hook. They couldn’t spare the destroyer.”**
Helen Reid (1882-1970). Born Helen Rogers in Appleton, Wiscon-
sin, she graduated in 1903 from Barnard and went to work as social
secretary for Mrs. Whitelaw Reid. From 1905 to 1911, when Whitelaw
Reid was ambassador to Great Britain, she divided her time between
England and the United States. She married Whitelaw’s son, Ogden
Mills Reid, in 1911.75 Mrs. Reid had effective control of the paper not
54 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

only because she was a strong-willed and talented woman but because
her husband, Ogden Mills Reid, had a drinking problem.
According to intelligence historian Anthony Cave-Brown, Whitelaw
Reid was a family friend of MI-6 head Stewart Menzies and attended
Menzies family functions.2° No newspaper in the United States was
more useful to British intelligence during World War II than the Her-
ald Tribune. A descripton of BSC’s work with the Herald Tribune fills a
dozen pages of the secret “BSC Account.”
Dorothy Thompson (1894-1961). During the period under study,
Dorothy Thompson exhibited an amazing ability to reflect the British
propaganda line of the day. This is one of the few useful conclusions to
be gained from reading the hundreds of pages in her FBI file. (A num-
ber of paragraphs and several pages were withheld from the 1940s with
the “b-1” “national security exemption.”)*’ Thompson’s diary, kept for
only a dozen entries in early 1942, also illustrates her close ties to the
intelligence community.

January 3—Emmy Rado [a refugee working for Donovan’s

Coordinator of Information] came in the afternoon about
Paul.
January 4—Called J. Wheeler-Bennett [as we have seen, a
major figure in British Information Service, British intelli-
gence, and Political Warfare]. In the evening I worked on a
memo for D. [Bill Donovan, head of CO]].

January 5—Went to lunch with Agars, Goldsmiths and

George Field....Agreed to organize the “opening” party
Jan. 17th. Wrote end of memo to B.D. [Bill Donovan] in af-
ternoon.?®

Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). Walter Lippmann was a syndicated

Herald Tribune columnist closely tied to British intelligence. Not only
does the “BSC Account” list Lippmann “among those who rendered
service of particular value,” but he was not only taking advice, he was
giving it.??
In late winter or early spring 1940, Lippmann even told the British
to initiate Secret Intelligence Service operations against American
isolationists. His exact thoughts are unknown. His specific ideas were
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” ee* 55

“too delicate” for the British Foreign Office to put to paper, but the
idea is quite clear. Lippmann was a heavyweight. His suggestions on
how to handle the American public reached as high as the British
War Cabinet.3?
Lippmann’s papers also contain remarkable examples of intelligence
history as the “missing dimension” in conventional histories. Intelli-
gence history has been so ignored that even first-class historians do not
recognize the names of intelligence personnel. In his 1985 book of
Lippmann’s papers, Public Philosopher, editor John Morton Blum iden-
tifies the author of a letter to Lippmann thusly: “Ivar Bryce, a personal
friend of Lippmann’s had written to express his distress about the
Darlan deal.” That Bryce was a friend was true, but hardly adequate.
Ivar Bryce was Walter Lippmann’s brother-in-law and he was in fact a
Special Operations Executive agent working for Intrepid.*!
Though Bryce’s name is not well known, one of the works he has
claimed has a more public persona; in fact, President Roosevelt himself
spoke of it in late October 1941.
Just when the administration was making its final push to have Con-
gress repeal the Neutrality Acts, there emerged a most useful and in-
triguing document. Said FDR: “I have in my possession a secret map, (
made in Germany by Hitler’s Government, by planners of the new
world order. It is a map of South America and part of Central America
as Hitler proposes to organize it.”3?
Those who heard the president’s Navy Day speech were amazed,
and none more so than Hitler and his underlings. They were so
stunned by it that on December 11, 1941, they cited it as an example
of the sort of provocative act that brought on Germany’s declaration
of war.?3 Reporters were somewhat suspicious about the bogus map,
but to little avail.
Lippmann’s brother-in-law, Ivar Bryce, worked in the Latin Ameri-
can affairs section of BSC, which was run by Dickie Coit (known in
the office as “Coitis Interruptus”). Because there was little evidence
of a German plot to take over Latin America, Ivar found it difficult to
excite Americans about the threat. In his 1975 memoir, You Only Live
Once: Memories ofIan Fleming, Bryce wrote: “Sketching out trial maps
of the possible changes, on my blotter, I came up with one showing
the probable reallocation of territories that would appeal to Berlin. It
was very convincing: The more I studied it the more sense it made....
56 °2¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Were a genuine German map of this kind to be discovered...and

publicized among...the ‘America Firsters,’ what a commotion would
be caused.”34
Intrepid approved the idea. The skilled team at Station M, the
phony document factory in Toronto run by SOE’s Eric Maschwitz,
took only forty-eight hours to produce “a map, slightly travel-stained
with use, but on which the Reich’s chief map makers...would be pre-
pared to swear was made by them.” In Roosevelt’s hands the “docu-
ment” had its desired effect, and Congress dismantled the last of the
neutrality legislation.*>
John F: C. “Ivar” Bryce (1906-1985). Bryce worked for both SOE and
OSS. As an SOE agent he had the number G.140; as an OSS man he
was 991. Among other jobs for SOE, Bryce describes himself as an
agent recruiter: “and to find...[recruits] in Latin America was...my
special responsibility.”*°
Bryce wrote to Lippmann in March 1942: “If you felt at all inclined
to write anything about the danger to S. America, I could give you any
number of facts which have never been published, but which my
friends here would like to see judiciously made public, at this point.”>/
Earlier in the same letter he wrote: “I am sending you a copy of my
friend Artuco’s book, which I think will interest you....Some of it
sounds rather alarming & exaggerated but it is much more accurate
than most books on South America.”3®
This book, by Hugo Artuco Fernandez, is certainly one of the many
planted books written at the behest of British intelligence and propa-
ganda agencies. British propaganda targeted everyone—from the edu-
cated classes with their thirst to be informed and in the know to the
superstitious lower classes. The lower classes were fed comic books and
bogus horoscopes. Ham Fischer, who did the Joe Palooka cartoons,
was persuaded to change from a negative to a positive portrayal of the
British. This came about when the British embassy became fearful that
his cartoons were damaging their image; a British officer was sent to
meet Fischer. It worked. In an interview with propaganda historian
Nick Cull, Leonard Miall of the British Political Warfare Executive
recalled that Fischer was fed pro-British material through the senior
OWI officer Lew Cowan.3?
The “BSC Account” reports BSC’s success at planting the fraudu-
lent anti-Hitler predictions of a tame Hungarian astrologer named
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °°® 57

Louis de Wohl. BSC even built him up with bogus confirmations of

his predictions with planted stories in the legitimate press. “It is
unlikely,” says the “BSC Account” somewhat condescendingly, “that
any propagandist would seriously attempt to influence politically the
people of England, say, or France through the medium of astrological
predictions. Yet in the United States this was done with effective if
limited results.”4°
The educated classes were targeted for this onslaught. They were
subjected to an outpouring of books, many for the head and some for
the heart. Concocting propaganda books and foisting them onto an
unsuspecting public had been a very successful ploy in World War I,
with many prominent authors producing the books and Wellington
House secretly publishing them under the imprint of recognized
publishers. In 1939 the British government again requested the help
of its literati. H. G. Wells refused, but the majority of the first sev-
enty authors approached accepted. Thus in World War II, major
publishers—Penguin, Macmillan, Harcourt, and Doubleday—and big
name authors—E. M. Forster, Somerset Maugham, historian Alan
Nevins, Harold Callender of the New York Times—helped the British
give an “ideological construction” to a war that many Americans were
viewing as the same old European land-grab politics.*!
A book could be used not only to promote a propaganda theme but
also to establish an agent. For example, soon after its creation on the
perfectly fitting April Fools’ Day, 1938, Section D of MI-6 began ex-
ploring ways of cutting off Germany’s supply of Swedish iron ore. In
May 1938, Section D sent one Alfred Rickman (agent number D/1)
to Sweden posing as a journalist. Not only did Rickman know noth-
ing of the local languages or of Sweden, he did not know he was em-
ployed by British intelligence. After several months, Mr. Rickman
was told to write a book on Swedish iron ore. ‘The book, published by
Faber & Faber in August 1939, gave Rickman the credentials as an
expert on Swedish iron ore and a cover. He was then told that he was
working for British intelligence and set up as an importer of machin-
ery, just in time for World War II.
There was definitely a feeling in the Anglo-American intelligence
community that this ploy of planting articles and books was worth the
effort. Not only had it been very successful in World War I but those
Americans who learned their craft from the British certainly preserved
58 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

the tradition. The CIA carried on as a patron of literature into the

1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.¥
Though there was little real danger of the Nazis taking over Latin
America, here is Book Review Digest’s summary of the book Bryce sent
Lippmann: “A native Uruguayan, who is a member of the faculty ofthe
University of Montevideo, describes the Nazi infiltration and diaboli-
cal workings throughout South America, especially in his own country
and Colombia. The author has made many radio addresses attempting
to call attention to the Nazi organization in South America....”4
Robert Emmet Sherwood (1896-1955). Sherwood exemplifies the way
in which many who helped British intelligence were connected to each
other and to England by blood, marriage, and residence.
On his mother’s side he was a descendant of the Anglo-Irish Protes-
tant hero Thomas Addis Emmet. His mother, Rosina Emmet Sher-
wood, was a prominent artist, as were nearly a dozen other female
relatives. In 1934 his aunt Ellen Emmet painted the official portrait of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By blood and marriage the Emmets
tied together two of America’s great banking families: the Morgans of
J. P. Morgan and the Aldriches of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller.*
Despite the talented family, Robert was a slow starter academically
and received only a certificate of attendance from Milton Academy,
near Boston, in 1914. This was not then thought an impediment to
further academic work, and he attended his father’s school, Harvard,
1914-17. Rejected by the U.S. Army because he was too tall, he joined
the Canadian Black Watch. According to one of his biographers, John
Mason Brown, Sherwood “loved England, the England he had first
known as a boy in its full majesty of Empire, and then in the desperate
testing of the war years.” Sherwood also had relatives, the writer Henry
James being one, who lived in England. From the late 1920s Sherwood
resided in England for increasing periods of time. For the twenty-three
years after 1932 he lived half or more of the year at his large house,
Great Eatron, at Whitley Surrey, England.*¢
By the fall of 1940, Sherwood was helping to write President Roose-
velt’s speeches, and he habitually showed the important foreign policy
speeches to Intrepid before FDR delivered them. When Intrepid was
pushing Donovan as Coordinator of Information, he says, he “enlisted
the help of several avenues of influence at the White House. Winant
and Sherwood were the most persistent and effective, I think.” Thus
 “Those Who Rendered Service ofParticular Value” *** 59

Sherwood was what intelligence officers call an “agent of influence,” a

spokesman at the very center of the policy-making process.”
‘Two major purposes of British propaganda were to excite American
fears that Hitler would take over the Americas and to discredit isola-
tionists—to paint them as “fifth columnists” and traitors. On June 10,
1940, there appeared in the New York Times and other major papers
full-page advertisements boldly headlined “Stop Hrrier Now.” ‘The
CDAAA, the William Allen White Committee, was the listed sponsor,
but Sherwood and his first cousin Christopher Emmet (who worked on
British intelligence projects with agent Sandy Griffith) were respon-
sible. Sherwood had written the copy and raised the $25,000 for space.
Hitler’s agents, wrote Sherwood, were already infiltrating the Western
Hemisphere. “Will the Nazis considerately wait until we are ready to
fight them?...Anyone who argues that they will wait is either an imbe-
cile or a traitor.” Among those who gave large sums for this advertise-
ment were Sherwood himself ($5,000); Dorothy and George Backer,
owners of the New York Post (helpers of BSC); Ward Cheney, a silk
manufacturer, also a heavy contributor to Fight for Freedom; Henry
Luce; and publisher Harold Guinzburg, who was highly influential in
Fight for Freedom and in intelligence circles.4*
Paul Patterson (1878-1952). Patterson was publisher of the Baltimore
Sun. In the case of the Sun we havea competent ifirascible witness to give
weight to the claim of the “BSC Account”—prominent journalist H. L.
Mencken was on the Sun’s board of directors and had written for the
paper until early 1941, when he stopped because of what he said was the
paper’s wildly pro-British bias. Intrepid certainly would have been grati-
fied at the testimony to BSC’s effect on the Sum had he read Mencken’s
diaries, which are now open. “From the first to the last,” wrote Mencken
in an October 1945 summing-up, “they [the Sun papers] were official
organs and nothing more, and taking one day with another they were
official organs of England rather than of the United States.”4”
How did the British get Patterson to render the “service of particular
value” mentioned in the “BSC Account”? Mencken also wondered
about this, so in March 1944 when Patterson “dropped in” for their
“long delayed palaver,” Mencken let him have it: “I told Patterson that,
in my judgment, the English had found him an easy mark, and made a
monkey out of him. He...did not attempt to dispute the main fact. In
the course of his talk I gathered...that he is entertained while in London
60 @¢¢*e DESPERATE DECEPTION

by an Englishwoman who is the head of one of the women’s auxiliary

organizations—perhaps characteristically, he did not know its name.
He also let fall the proud fact that she is a countess.”°?
The identity of the “countess,” the “head of one of the women’s
auxiliary organizations,” the name of which Patterson professed not
to know, was most likely a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, HRH
the Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, commandant in chief of
FANY, the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry. FANY was the ladies’ auxil-
iary of the black-propaganda and dirty-tricks organization Special
Operations Executive.°! Alice was married to the Earl of Athlone,
Queen Mary’s brother.
John Buchan, Lord Tweedsmuir, the governor-general of Canada,
was a well-practiced behind-the-scenes operator well connected to
British intelligence and propaganda. When he fell in the bath and died
in February 1940, there was a need to place a similar person close to the
United States. That person was the Earl of Athlone,’ one of the most
powerful patrons of “C,” Stewart Graham Menzies, the head of
MI-6.°3 Princess Alice of FANY and SOE can be seen, not with a cloak
and dagger, but at her fur-coated, smiling best in an October 1940 Time
magazine photograph showing her and Franklin Roosevelt leaving St.
James Church in Hyde Park. Time wrote: “After...lunch [Saturday],
the President drove the Princess round the estate (the Earl had a
cold)....that night the President talked international affairs with the
big, bluff, grey Earl; again the next morning after church.”*+
This is the sort of person of whom Paul Patterson seemed so proud.
The connection illustrates how difficult it has been, in this world of
cutouts and go-betweens, for historians to identify meetings between
FDR and British intelligence. Time, after all, did not tell its readers that
the president spent the afternoon with a woman from Special Opera-
tions Executive.
Ulric Bell (1891-1960). Ulric Bell ran the day-to-day operations of
Fight for Freedom. Chadwin listed him as the “prime policy-maker as
well as the individual responsible for co-ordinating the efforts of the
leaders of FFF and keeping in close touch with the administration.” In
World War I he had been an infantry captain; he was personally close
to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, having been Hull’s press secretary at
the Montevideo Conference in 1933-34. Normally he was Washing-
ton correspondent for Barry Bingham’s Louisville Courier-Fournal.>>
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °** 61

In the early fall of 1940, Bell replaced Francis Pickens Miller at the
Century Group; Miller had returned to the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions. Bell became executive director of Fight for Freedom when that
name was formally adopted in April 1941. Bell’s part in the effort to
use the movies for interventionist propaganda and then the effort to
protect them when Congress started to investigate must have im-
pressed one of the Fight for Freedom contacts, Spyros P. Skouras of
Twentieth Century—Fox. After the war, Bell became Skouras’s execu-
tive assistant.°°
Barry Bingham (1906-88). Bingham was the son of FDR’s first
ambassador to England, the outspokenly pro-British Judge Robert
Bingham. Barry inherited the paper on his father’s death in 1937. He
employed both Ulric Bell and Herbert Agar at the Louisville Courier-
Journal and continued to pay both of their salaries while they helped
run Fight for Freedom.°’
Barry Bingham was deeply involved with intelligence and attacks on
the isolationists. From the spring of 1941 he was ostensibly in the navy,
but attached to Fiorello La Guardia’s Office of Civilian Defense.
Bingham became attached to this office about the time his subordinate
Ulric Bell was asked by FDR to help organize the office “in regard to
the whole subject of offensive publicity to offset the propaganda of the
Wheeler’s, Nye’s, Lindbergh’, etc.”°®
From the over one hundred surviving pieces of correspondence in
Barry Bingham’s file in the Fight for Freedom Papers it is evident that
after Bell went back to Fight for Freedom, Bingham organized these
anti-isolationist speakers for Fight for Freedom. Here are two typical
examples of cables to Bingham at the Office of Civilian Defense from
George Havell of the FFF speakers’ bureau. The first is dated Septem-
ber22,, 1941:

UNABLE TO CONTACT WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT HERE. PLEASE

PUT ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON HIM FOR PITTSBURGH DINNER
OCTOBER 13TH. UNDERSTAND HE DID A SWELL JOB ON AMERICAN
FORUM LAST NIGHT AGAINST FISH.

The second is from September 26, 1941:

ANY PROGRESS ON PATTERSON OR FORESTAL FOR CLEVELAND EARLY

IN OCTOBER. WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOT DARIEN CONNECTICUT
62 °¢e¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

OCTOBER 17TH, SENATOR PEPPER FOR DAYTON, OHIO EARLY

OCTOBER. WILL APPRECIATE WORD FROM YOU.

There is also an interesting letter from his brother Robert, who was
visiting New York from his home in England: “I shall try to arrange for
Scudder to see Raymond Gram Swing sometime this week, as I saw
him myself on Friday. I will tell Herbert’s [Herbert Agar’s] brother
what happened as it is the same matter he has been working on. I think
it is unwise to write letters about this.”°?
There are also strong indications that Barry Bingham was not only
paying the salaries of two of the British intelligence front’s executives
and recruiting speakers for it but was working directly with intelli-
gence, particularly British intelligence.
In a letter of September 12, 1941, from Ulric Bell’s secretary: “...I
am enclosing a letter received today from Bishop Henry E. Hobson
regarding his nephew George C. Mackenzie’s desire to be of service in
Intelligence work.”°? Another sign of Barry Bingham’s direct work
with British intelligence is also from the Fight for Freedom Papers.
Donald MacLaren was a British intelligence agent working for BSC.
In the fall of 1941, MacLaren was arranging for Rex Stout, George
Merten, and Sylvia Porter to write a BSC propaganda booklet, Sequel to
the Apocalypse, as part of the attack on Standard Oil of New Jersey. In
the middle of November, MacLaren was apparently staying in Louis-
ville, Kentucky, with his brother-in-law Robert F. Crone. From the
telegrams and messages it is clear that Barry Bingham was trying very
hard to make contact with MacLaren either at the Crone residence or
at the Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C.°!
FE. H. Peter Cusick (1910-82). Cusick was a native of California, an
advertising executive, a close adviser to Wendell Willkie, and execu-
tive secretary of Fight for Freedom.®* During World War IT he was
decorated with the Croix de Guerre by General Jean LeClerc of the
Free French. At the time of his death he was a member of the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations and a private consultant on government and
foreign affairs.
While they have not been named as British intelligence agents and
were not permanent officials of a front group, the next four men
worked so closely with British intelligence and propaganda and were so
prominent in Fight for Freedom that they should be mentioned.
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” *** 63

Marshall Field (1893-1956). Field was born in Chicago but grew up

and was educated in England at Eton and Cambridge. As the United
States entered World War I he enlisted in the Illinois Cavalry as a
private; he rose to captain. Field’s Aunt Ethel married Arthur Tree
and had a son by him, Arthur Ronald Tree; Marshall and his cousin
Ronald were raised together. Ronald ‘Tree, the classic example of the
Anglo-American gentry, became a member of the British Parliament
and performed various propaganda functions in the United States.°
Working closely with the Roosevelt administration and Fight for
Freedom, Marshall Field started the Chicago Sun in October 1941 to
counter Colonel Robert McCormick’s isolationist Chicago Tribune.
According to Field’s editor, Turner Catledge, “It was early in 1941
that Field resolved to start a newspaper....Roosevelt was trying to
move the nation toward support of England...and Colonel Mc-
Cormick was fighting him tooth and nail.... The Tribune’s influence
on the American heartland was great, and to Field and others who
thought the United States must fight Nazism, McCormick’s daily ti-
rades were agonizing. All this contributed to the haste with which the
Sun was started.”°4
Marshall Field’s biographer Stephen Becker is more specific about
the origins of the final effort that gave Field the resolve to fight isola-
tionists and help Franklin Roosevelt in Chicago. Becker says that
Field’s determination to start the Sun came from his “attendance at a
meeting of the Fight for Freedom Committee at the Town Hall Club
in New York on the evening of April 30, 1941.”
The man who plotted the Fight for Freedom attacks on the Chicago
Tribune was BSC agent Sandy Griffith’s man at the Chicago FFF head-
quarters, Albert Parry. It was the scholarly Parry (later Chairman of
Russian Studies Department at Colgate and Slavic Studies Department
at Case Western Reserve) who devised the slogans: “Millions for de-
fense, but not two cents for the Tribune” and “What Chicago needs is
a morning paper.” The campaign against the 7ribune must have been
important enough to leave Parry in place despite BSC’s need for the
Russian-born Parry’s language and editing skills in subverting Boston
shortwave radio station WRUL—one of Sandy Griffith’s projects. A
cable from Chicago Fight for Freedom to FFF headquarters in New
York says: “WIRE FROM PARRY’S BOSS SANFORD GRIFFITH... .SAYS...NEED YOU
BEGINNING COMING WEEK FOR IMPORTANT SHORTWAVE EDITORSHIP...
64 °2ee DESPERATE DECEPTION

PLEASE TELEPHONE GRIFFITH AND ASK POSTPONEMENT OF PARRY’S COMING

TO NEW YORK....”66
One of the White House’s contributions was to use the FBI to call on
small-town editors and urge them to support Field’s bid for a coveted
Associated Press franchise. In the circular world inhabited by those at-
tempting to help the British in their hour of need, Field also turns up as
a major financial backer of Ralph Ingersoll’s newspaper, PM (Dorothy
Thompson was another one of the original financial backers). PM
never attracted enough circulation to make money, but it was a won-
derful propaganda vehicle despite its small circulation. In September,
Field bought out the other backers for twenty cents on the dollar.
Ingersoll and his paper were also among those listed in the “BSC Ac-
count” as “among those who rendered service of particular value.”®
Guinzburg, Harold (1899-1961). Guinzburg was a Jewish native of
New York City. He received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard in
1921 and then attended Columbia Law School, but dropped out after
two years. In 1925 he became cofounder (with George S. Oppen-
heimer) and president of Viking Press. According to Chadwin,
Guinzberg was consulted on “day-to-day policy by Bell and Peter
Cusick at Fight for Freedom headquarters.” Viking Press published a
number of books by interventionist writers of the late 1930s and early
1940s.°8
In Guinzburg’s FBI file is a letter fromJ.Edgar Hoover of March 12,
1942, saying Guinzburg “is presently employed by the Office of Coor-
dinator of Information, New York.”©? After the United States entered
the war, he went to work for Elmer Davis at the Office of War Infor-
mation. At first he worked with the overseas branch; in 1943 he was put
in charge of the Domestic Bureau of Publications; then in 1944 he was
sent to London to direct the publications to be sent into liberated ar-
eas. Curiously, his entries in Who’s Who and Current Biography make no
mention of Fight for Freedom.
Writing forty-five years after the events, Jerome Weidman, author
of I Can Get It for You Wholesale, may have garbled the sequence of
events, but the basic information rings true. Weidman writes that he
accompanied the drama critic Leonard Lyons, a favorite of William
Stephenson, to plays on Friday nights because Mrs. Lyons, a deeply
religious woman, would not scone her husband the night before
Jewish holidays.7° me spvbprH REGS AT SUNDOLON
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °** 65

In the lobby, during the first intermission, at the opening of Robert

Sherwood’s play There Shall Be No Night, Weidman encountered
Harold Guinzburg. Said Guinzburg: “Instead of going back for the sec-
ond act, I wonder if I could persuade you to take a walk with me?...
Willie Maugham suggested we have a talk....No matter what you de-
cide about what I tell you,” Harold Guinzburg said, “I must before I say
a word have your promise that you must not repeat any of it.”7!
Weidman says that Guinzburg was recruiting him for Robert Sher-
wood’s section of Donovan’s Coordinator of Information office. But
the time is wrong. The COI did not organize until the summer of
1941, and Sherwood’s There Shall Be No Night had two openings—
April 29, 1940, and September 9, 1940.72
Henry Luce (1898-1967). Henry Luce was born in Tengchow,
Shantung Province, China, to missionary parents and educated at
Hotchkiss, Yale, and Oxford. His mother was Elizabeth Middleton
Root, a relative of the more famous Root family; Oren Root was the
promoter of the Willkie Clubs.73 He was a second lieutenant in field
artillery in World War I. As publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune
magazines, Luce was the only client for the Roper public opinion
polls until Roper went with William Donovan as his deputy director.
Luce was very generous with his leaves of absence. In 1940 one of his
vice presidents of Time, C. D. Jackson, took a leave to organize an anti-
isolationist propaganda group called the Council for Democracy. After
the war, Jackson, as editor of Fortune, brought together the prominent
Americans who allowed their names to be used by the CIA front Na-
tional Committee for a Free Europe.
Luce had been one of the founders of the Century Group/Fight for
Freedom. It is correct that he did depart, but so did a number of oth-
ers—among them Whitney Shepardson and Allen Dulles. Two of
these, Shepardson and Dulles, heavily involved with intelligence. The
newsreel offshoot of Luce’s Time/Life, The March of Time, was under
the direction of Louis de Rochmont, who produced the pro-British
anti-Nazi film Inside Nazi Germany—1938. When Luce opened an of-
fice in London, Britain’s heroic struggle became a major theme of The
March of Time. Luce’s London operation was in fact intricately tied to
British propaganda.’*
Luce also was not averse to requesting advice from British intelli-
gence. One of Intrepid’s people was the philosopher Alfred Ayer,
66 °*%® DESPERATE DECEPTION

G.426, an officer in the Political and Minorities Section of SOE within

BSC. In his memoirs, Part ofMy Life, Ayer wrote of Luce’s close adviser
Raimund von Hofmannsthal: “When I met him he was working for the
Time-Life organization, which had offices in one of the other build-
ings in Rockefeller Center....he was...concerned with its editorial
policy. He used to consult me on questions of world politics....””°
Luce had made himself so congenial to British intelligence that
when, in June 1941, Ian Fleming, working for BSC’s naval intelligence
section, wrote a proposal for Donovan’s Coordinator of Information
office, he proposed Luce to run the foreign propaganda section. Be-
cause Fleming was under urgent time constraints to finish this pro-
posal, Luce must have been the first name that came to mind: the
obvious man.’ When the choice of Luce did not work out, Robert
Emmet Sherwood, a man we can now see was a staunch collaborator of
British intelligence, took this post.
The warm feelings did not last. The British soon found themselves
in conflict with Henry Luce. His global internationalist vision of the
“American Century” and his ability to publicize that vision were very
useful when the British were trying to involve the United States in in-
ternational events. But they became a threat to the British vision of the
postwar world after Pearl Harbor. By early 1943, Henry Luce was on
the list of “enemies” who endangered the British Empire.’’
Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen (b. 1897). Henry Van Dusen was born in
Philadelphia. He graduated from Princeton, Edinburgh, and Union
Theological Seminary. His years as a student at Edinburgh and his par-
ticipation in international religious meetings had given him a large
number of friends in both Britain and the United States.’8
Dr. Van Dusen was a member of the policy committee of the
CDAAA (White Committee). Particularly on the sensitive issue of
food for starving Europe, proxy propagandists such as Van Dusen and
Bishop Henry Hobson were extremely useful. They protected the in-
tegrity of the British blockade, piously explaining why the Europeans
needed to be starved for their own good, while allowing the British to
stay undercover. Dr. Van Dusen even helped British propagandists by
arranging for Sunday radio talks by leading British churchmen.
Van Dusen was also helpful in promoting Britain’s black propaganda.
For the British Ministry of Information he compiled a mailing list of
prominent American churchmen, who then received, apparently from
 “Those Who Rendered Service of Particular Value” °** 67

a publisher unconnected to the British, a British propaganda publica-

tion named the Christian Newsletter. The Ministry of Information was
grateful for “an extremely valuable piece of propaganda...very much
welcomed by the people to whom it is sent.”7?
Alexander Korda (1893-1956). Alexander Korda (The Lion Has
Wings, That Hamilton Woman) was a bona fide British intelligence
agent, and several other prominent movie producers were working
with the British.2° Ernest Cuneo included Korda in “the Club,” the
intelligence people who gravitated to Bill Stephenson’s suite at
Claridge’s in London.*!
In Secret Intelligence Agent—according to Bill Ross-Smith, once of
BSC, a more candid book than The Quiet Canadian and more reliable
than A Man Called Intrepid—H. Montgomery Hyde wrote that Alex
and Vincent Korda were “secret service agents.” On a trip to see Korda
in 1941, Hyde says he gathered “that at Churchill’s suggestion en-
dorsed by Stephenson, Korda...had taken an office ostensibly as a mo-
tion-picture headquarters but which really served as a clearinghouse
for British intelligence.” The eastern branch office of Korda’s intelli-
gence cover-filmmaking enterprise was, once again, in Rockefeller
Center, New York City.®* This gave him ready access to BSC head
William Stephenson. Elinore Little Nascarella, then a Stephenson sec-
retary, remembers Korda as regularly “in and out” of Intrepid’s office.®?
Alexander Korda had been working for British intelligence since the
1930s. After Munich, Admiral Sinclair, the head of MI-6, fearing that
his organization had been penetrated in the field, created a parallel or-
ganization called the Z Network under “Uncle Claude” Dansey, the
ruthless former Passport Control officer in Rome. The Kordas worked
for Dansey. Alexander Korda recruited agents, and his London Films
organization was used by Dansey as cover for Z agents in Europe. After
the war started, and after many hours of consultation with Churchill
and British intelligence, Alex was sent to the United States “to make
major films that would subtly represent the British point of view...in a
way that would seem patriotic but not propagandistic.”**
When the Films Division of the British Ministry of Information sent
the prominent film executive A. W. Jarratt to Hollywood, it was
Alexander Korda as the leader of the pro-British filmmakers who
hosted a magnificent dinner in November 1940 so that his friends could
hear of Britain’s needs. Present were Harry Cohn from Columbia, Sam
68 °° DESPERATE DECEPTION

Goldwyn from MGM, Arthur Kelly from United Artists, Sidney Kent
of Twentieth Century-Fox, Hal Roach, the brothers Warner, Darry] F-
Zanuck, and representatives from Paramount, RKO, and Universal.
Louis B. Mayer seems to have spoken for the moguls when he said that
the British could “count on the producers of Hollywood doing every-
thing possible to help the great cause for which the British empire was
fighting.” The promises were not only made but were followed by
prompt action.
Alex Korda’s efforts were appreciated by Churchill and rewarded,
even if the reward baffled outsiders. Korda was knighted in the King’s
Birthday Honours List in 1942. Many questioned how it was that a
divorced Hungarian Jew who had escaped the dangers of the European
war, to live safely in the United States had become the first person in
the movie industry to be knighted by the British king. After the war,
Alex Korda hired British intelligence agent and later Stephenson biog-
rapher Montgomery Hyde as his legal adviser.°5
There were other movie men who also helped the British. Fight for
Freedom’s Walter Wanger was one. Wanger was born in San Fran-
cisco, in 1894, to Jewish parents, but by World War I he was an Epis-
copalian. His higher education had been at Dartmouth, Heidelberg,
and Oxford. Wanger was versatile; he had been an attaché at Versailles
and a motion picture director with Paramount Studios. He saw the
movies as a powerful instrument for educating the public.8° He was
trusted enough that British operative John Wheeler-Bennett was sent
to Hollywood by Lord Lothian to discuss making pro-British films
with him.*’ Wanger produced two blatantly anti-Nazi films in the
summer of 1940. In collaboration with the English director Alfred
Hitchcock he made Foreign Correspondent, which Hitler’s Dr. Goebbels
pronounced “a masterpiece of propaganda.”*8

So BSC had available, willing, and powerful agents, subagents, and col-
laborators at the very nerve centers of American politics, news, and
entertainment.
 CHAPTER 4
eso

The Voice of the People

The World War II public opinion polls are widely used by historians.
They are so convenient and the numbers so crisp and credible. Occa-
sionally, it is true, some historian will point out that poll questions were
“loaded,” or that “the right questions were not asked.” Despite these
flaws, historians continue to employ them, often feeling, as one wrote
recently, that “flawed polls are preferable to none.”! Few seem to won-
der about the depth or the source of the defects.
The first thing to know when reading the public opinion polls com-
monly cited from 1939 to 1942 is that none of them was produced by
disinterested seekers of truth. The most prominently published polls
were all under the influence of British intelligence, its friends, employ-
ees, and agents. At the very best, when questions of the war or interna-
tional relations are considered, the major polls should be thought of as
what modern critics call “advocacy polls.”
Advocacy polls are polls that are used as a means to reach some pre-
determined end. Their purpose, says polling expert Irving Crespi, “is
to influence policy makers by claiming that the public wants a course of
action espoused by the sponsoring group to be adopted.” Unfortu-
nately, Crespi goes on to say that advocacy polls are suspect because
their “intent is always apparent.”?
The intent of these polls was not apparent. They purported to be
the scientifically, objectively gathered voice of the people. Unknown
to the public, the polls of Gallup, Hadley Cantril, Market Analysts
Inc., and Roper were all done under the influence of dedicated

69
70 °e¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

interventionists and British intelligence agents. Moreover, they often

were unable to bear close scrutiny or comparison with other polls,
even at the time.
The secret “BSC Account” makes three pertinent points about the
Gallup polls, which were withheld from Montgomery Hyde’s Quiet
Canadian/Room 3603: British intelligence had “penetrated” the Gallup
organization; the Roosevelt administration also had a man named
Hadley Cantril at Gallup; and Gallup was dissuaded from publishing
some polls considered harmful to the British.’
There is considerable testimony corroborating the first two state-
ments. BSC had David Ogilvy, more recently a very successful adver-
tising man, at Gallup. The White House did have Hadley Cantril at
Gallup. There is little reason, given the available evidence, to doubt
the “BSC Account” on the third point. The polls were another instru-
ment playing the correct notes from the right score in the British or-
chestrated attempt to move the United States toward war.
By the late 1930s the public opinion polls had become a highly vis-
ible barometer of public opinion. In Richard Steele’s words, they “be-
came a political weapon that could be used to inform the views of the
doubtful, weaken the commitment of opponents, and strengthen the
conviction of supporters.”*
British intelligence agent Sanford Griffith (G.112), who worked
under SOE officer Bill Morrell at BSC, clearly recognized the possi-
bility of exploiting the polls. In November 1940, after a failed effort
to get rid of isolationist Hamilton Fish, he put his ideas to paper un-
der the title “Recommendations by Sanford Griffith for Hamilton
Fish Campaign and Continuation.” Among the four pages of rec-
ommendations are these thoughts on polling: “Opinion polls are a
source of information, a propaganda weapon....Favorable results of
the poll are accepted by the newspapers as news and are effective pro-
paganda.”>
Polls were thus an integral part of BSC’s tenacious, and ultimately
successful, campaign to damage Fish politically and finally to eliminate
him. In February 1941, Elmo Roper released a poll undermining Con-
gressman Fish’s opposition to Lend-Lease. The poll of Fish’s constitu-
ents said that 70 percent of them favored the passage of Lend-Lease.
This blatant attempt to hamstring Fish in the congressional debates
was at least modestly successful, according to his biographer.
 The Voice of the People °°* 71

The poll had ostensibly been done for one of Fish’s constituents,
James H. Causey, president of the Foundation for the Advancement of
Social Sciences, tied to the University of Denver.® Fish, irate at these
tactics, called for a congressional investigation.
The man in the White House, Franklin Roosevelt, was more subtle
than Fish, but he was also subjected to heavy doses of interventionist
opinion, of which the polls were a significant part. In FDR the British
and their interventionist allies were confronted with a president who
was, in his own devious way, extremely sensitive to public opinion and
would not move without it.’
The group of devout Anglophiles who had gathered at the Vir-
ginia home of Francis and Helen Miller on Dunkirk weekend,
June 2, 1940, were anything but cautious in their pronouncements.
They had quickly published “Summons to Speak Out,” demanding
an immediate declaration of war on Germany.® These elitists who
were to form the core of Fight for Freedom knew what they
wanted and were impatient with the president’s concern for public
opinion.
The British and their allies sought to eliminate obstacles to presi-
dential and congressional actions that would prepare and speed the
United States toward war. The president, though by nature a procras-
tinator, was just as anxious to aid the British as they were to gain the
aid; corroborative public opinion polls would help get needed mea-
sures through Congress or, as in the case of the Destroyer Deal in Sep-
tember of 1940, make the legislators feel they lacked a mandate to stop
actions already taken. Author G. F. Lewis, Jr., writing in the June 1940
Public Opinion Quarterly, found that approximately two-thirds of con-
gressmen considered polls in their foreign policy votes, even though
they denied being so influenced.”
FDR’s attempts to gauge public opinion are clearly evident almost
from the moment he took office in 1933. Routinely the president had
taken the pulse of the people by traditional means: he started off his day
by reading several major daily newspapers. ‘These impressions were
enhanced by a clipping service organized by his longtime political advi-
ser Louis McHenry Howe, which monitored 350 newspapers and
forty-three magazines.!°
During 1941, FDR received a series of reports from ‘Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s office, analyzing press opinion on
72 eee JP)ESPERATE DECEPTION

Lend-Lease, taxes, and defense bonds. Other agencies sent similar re-
ports, most of them “liberal interventionist.”!!
Steele gives numerous examples to illustrate the strong interven-
tionist bias in these Treasury Department reports to the president.
There is a replay effect at work here. Not only were the report writers
biased, but so were their sources of information. The reports were
based on material from the New York Times, the Washington Post, the
New York Herald Tribune, the New York Post, and the Baltimore Sun—the
very places BSC was most successfully planting articles.!? Once again,
sections of the orchestra were working harmoniously to produce the
interventionist music.
In May 1941, the president read: “the impact of events abroad has
produced a mass migration in American opinion.... Today’s isolation-
ist follows the precepts of yesterday’s interventionist.” In June the
president was congratulated: “decisive Administration measures ‘have
had an inspiring effect.’” In August: “...the degree to which the
American press has enlisted in the war against Nazism is graphically
illustrated by its reaction to the British invasion of Iran.” In Septem-
ber: “The newspapers want a final showdown on foreign policy.”
Steele is quite correct that the purpose of these reports was to correct
“Administration timidity.”!3
In this circuitous world of intrigue and manipulation it is often diffi-
cult to distinguish when others were attempting to correct the admin-
istration’s “timidity” and when the administration has already planted a
feigned public outcry to which it could then seem grudgingly to re-
spond—calling it “the will of the people.” In September 1941, the
William Allen White Committee “initiated” a letter and telegram cam-
paign to Hull and Roosevelt calling for the rejection of any compro-
mise with Japan that would not fully uphold American principles
respecting China. There had been no real public outcry. The impetus
for this action had come from within the administration itself.!4
The president also used visitors and correspondents to flesh out the
views he and his wife, Eleanor, gathered in their travels. One of those
who reported to him on a regular basis was John Franklin Carter
(1897-1967), a syndicated newspaper columnist and radio commenta-
tor who worked under the name Jay Franklin. “In 1941,” writes histo-
rian Richard Steele, “Carter’s services to the White House were
expanded to include various clandestine operations—the kind of secret
 The Voice of the People °°* 73

agent type activities that both he and the President loved.” Carter’s
intelligence-gathering organization included comments on public
opinion, “particularly within the New York business community.”!>
Another regular reporter of anecdotal opinion was Morris Ernst.
Ernst was a well-known and well-connected trial lawyer and civil liber-
tarian. He apparently reveled in knowing the powerful, because he was
also an informant forJ.Edgar Hoover. Ernst gathered the sort of gos-
sipy information FDR so loved from the guests at his famous parties.
The guests, however, hardly represented a cross section of national
opinion. They might well be called the friends of British intelligence:
“the publisher of the New York Herald Tribune (Helen Reid) and the
New York Times (Arthur Hays Sulzberger); Henry Luce of Time-Life-
Fortune; correspondents and columnists Dorothy Thompson, Ray-
mond Gram Swing, William L. Shirer....”!° Their opinions were
invariably little more than reiterations of the basic interventionist Brit-
ish themes—send destroyers, send money, send supplies, help convoy,
declare war.
The standing of the “scientific polling organizations” in the eyes of
FDR and his minions varied. The White House thought Gallup was a
backer of Willkie and was “suspected of coloring his reports.” This
may well have been correct, though Gallup himself may not have been
the one actually coloring the reports, since he appears to have rarely
written them.!’
The “BSC Account” is correct that President Roosevelt had his own
interventionist plugged into the Gallup apparatus. That man was
Hadley Cantril (1907-69), a social psychologist. With the benefit of
Rockefeller money, Cantril ran the Office of Public Opinion Research
at Princeton. Cantril had graduated from Dartmouth College and had
done graduate work at the University of Berlin before receiving his
doctorate from Harvard in 1931; in 1939 he was a major force in the
establishment of the Princeton Listening Center to study German ra-
dio propaganda.!8
In the uproar within the intelligence community over the publication
of Hyde’s Quiet Canadian, former BSC officer David Ogilvy, an early
wartime assistant to Gallup, wrote a letter for Hyde: “I beg you to re-
move all references to Hadley Cantril and Dr. Gallup....Dr. Gallup was,
and still is, a great friend of England. What you have written would cause
him anguish—and damage. One does not want to damage one’s
74 eee [DESPERATE DECEPTION

friends....In subsequent years Hadley Cantril has done a vast amount of

secret polling for the United States Government. What you have writ-
ten would compromise him—and S.L.S. [Secret Intelligence Service—
MI-6] does not make a practice of compromising its friends.”!?
Cantril operated from the assumption that the president needed “an
approving body of public opinion to sustain him in each measure of
assistance to Britain and the U.S.S.R.”?° Cantril told David Niles of
the White House (also the BSC contact at the White House) how it
was done.
While analyzing Gallup results in 1943, Cantril came up with the
startling observation that FDR’s prospects for the presidency were in-
versely related to the prospects of peace. If peace was at hand in 1944,
FDR would have serious trouble getting reelected. Niles asked if the
results could be suppressed. Telling Gallup what not to publish had
never been his style, Cantril told Niles, “but I have tried to influence
poll results by suggesting issues and questions the vote on which I was
fairly sure would be on the right side.” All of this was strictly confiden-
tial and beyond the grasp of prying congressmen and Cantril’s business
and academic associates.?!
British intelligence claims to have been less shy, and there is no rea-
son to doubt the “BSC Account” claim that BSC persuaded Gallup (or
more likely someone in his organization) to drop the results of ques-
tions that reflected poorly on the British cause.’
Scattered through the literature are numerous footnotes and schol-
arly asides suggesting that there was something wrong with the 1939-44
polls. ‘Typical is this comment by scholar Jane Harriet Schwar on the
Destroyer Deal the British were so desperate for: “Of those expressing
an opinion, 61% supported the sale of destroyers. It should be noted,
however, that the questions asked were heavily loaded in favor of the
destroyer transfer.”*> Despite these suggestions there has been little
systematic, coherent analysis of them. This seems strange given the
many ways polls can be influenced once you have someone on the inside.
In Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics Michael Wheeler points out the
problem: “Proving that a given poll is rigged is difficult because there
are so many subtle ways to fake data...[as easy as faking results but less
detectable]....a clever pollster can just as easily favor one candidate or
the other by making less conspicuous adjustments, such as allocating
the undecided voters as suits his needs, throwing out certain interviews
 The Voice of the People *** 75

on the grounds that they were with non-voters, or manipulating the

sequence and context within which the questions are asked....Polls can
even be rigged without the pollster knowing it. If a candidate could get
hold of a list of sampling points...[consequently]. Most major polling
organizations keep their sampling lists under lock and key....”24
The minimum requirement, of course, is that those determined to
rig a poll have someone on the inside. This need was clearly fulfilled at
Roper and Gallup, the National Opinion Research Center, and Market
Analysts Inc.
British intelligence had “penetrated” the Gallup organization; there
can be no doubt of this. British intelligence officer David Ogilvy later
wrote about his days at Gallup: “I could not have had a better boss than
Dr. Gallup. His confidence in me was such that I do not recall his ever
reading any of the reports I wrote in his name. Once he had worked out
the methodology of the research, he lost interest and moved on to
something new.” David Ogilvy’s revered older brother Francis had
been one of the earliest recruits to Lawrence Grand’s Section D of
MI-6, the black-propaganda and dirty-tricks organization.”°
Although Ogilvy’s autobiography is brief, he drops several august
names and emphasizes the intimacy of this Anglophile intelligence
world: “J. C. Masterman and R. B. McCalum tried...to teach me his-
tory....My other letter of introduction was from my cousin Rebecca
West to Alexander Woollcott.” One of the first people Woollcott in-
troduced Ogilvy to at his island in Vermont was Robert Sherwood.
Ogilvy continues: “I find it difficult to describe my early days in New
York without gushing about American hospitality. At the top of my list
I put Charles C. Burlingham....Then there were ‘Tom Finletter, who
later became Secretary of the Air Force, [and] Tom Lamont, who had
been a partner in J. P. Morgan since 1911—I ate my first Thanksgiving
dinner under his roof.” This was the Thanksgiving of 1938, just after
Munich—a period when the British intelligence services were seriously
gearing for war.?°
In a letter he wrote suggesting changes in H. Montgomery Hyde’s
The Quiet Canadian, Ogilvy said that he had started to report to
Laurence Grand of MI-6’s Section D in 1939. In his autobiography he
reveals his dual role: “I had been moonlighting as advisor to the British
government on American Public Opinion, but it was time I played a
more active part.” Bill Ross-Smith, one of Intrepid’s assistants at BSC,
76 °¢® DESPERATE DECEPTION

wrote to Hyde on the publication of The Quiet Canadian: “PUBLIC

OPINION POLLS—David Ogilvy acted as my sub agent on this for
six to twelve months before I brought him in to B.S.C. proper.” The
work for Ogilvy turned out to be economic warfare from an office in
the British embassy in Washington.’7
There were other polls, to be sure, but almost all of them were con-
trolled by British intelligence and its helpmates. For example, Elmo
Burns Roper, Jr. (1900-71), had only one client, Henry Luce of Time,
Life, and Fortune. In a 1968 speech to the American Statistical Associa-
tion, Roper might well have been talking about Luce when he com-
plained about those who employed pollsters but then released only
those results that favored their point of view. Henry Luce was notori-
ous for interfering with his writers and arbitrarily slanting the news.?®
Roper had attended the University of Minnesota and the University
of Edinburgh, Scotland. He had gravitated into market research, even-
tually forming Roper Research. In 1935, Henry Luce hired him to
conduct polls for Fortune. His work for the interventionist Luce must
have marked him as reliable, because he became “a charter member of
Donovan’s ‘brain trust’ ” and deputy director of OSS. As discussed in
Chapter 1, Donovan’s organization was a creation of British intelli-
gence really run by an MI-6 officer, Dickie Ellis.?°
The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Denver
was incorporated on October 27, 1941. Denver seems far from the
Eastern foreign policy elite and the English, Gallup, and Hadley
Cantril. But it only seems that way. The money for this enterprise had
come from that prominent Fight for Freedom interventionist Marshall
Field II. Field, as we remember, was very close to his first cousin
Ronald ‘Tree, the director of British propaganda. Field also financed
the stridently interventionist PM newspaper.
Field had also founded the Chicago Sun, whose purpose was to “end
the un-American monopoly” of Colonel McCormick’s Chicago Tribune.
Describing a trip to the United States early in the war, Tree wrote:
“I...went down to Long Island to spend the week-end with my cousin,
Marshall Field, the proprietor of PM....Educated from boyhood in
England, he wanted to do anything he could to help the British
cause.>?
If the money for the National Opinion Research Center came from
Marshall Field, its founder was an Englishman named Harry Hubert
 The Voice of the People °** 77

Field (no relation to Marshall Field). Harry Field (1897-1946), a native

of Harrogate, England, had served in World War I and had worked
with the Young & Rubicam advertising agency; in 1936 he helped
George Gallup set up operations in England.*!
The official history of the founding of NORC says that Harry
Field was following “Elmo Roper’s suggestion—that a government
managed survey organization be established.” Hadley Cantril was one
of NORC%s earliest advisers and directors.??
Whatever its original purpose, NORC quickly became the contrac-
tor for the U.S. government’s Office of Facts and Figures and then the
propaganda-producing Office of War Information, testing the atti-
tudes of the common people toward the war. Much was kept hidden
from the Congress and the public, particularly studies for the State
Department.*?
In 1940 and 1941, BSC rigged a series of polls, usually with the help
of its friends in the Miller Group/Century Group/Fight for Freedom
Committee. These polls were done by Market Analysts Inc. at national
conventions to project the notion that the members of prominent or-
ganizations were pro-British, avidly in favor of intervention, and in-
tensely antagonistic toward America First.
William Stephenson’s A Man Called Intrepid refers to one of these
BSC poll-rigging projects. This was an FFF poll of the membership at
the CIO national convention which opened November 17, 1941, at the
Moose ‘Temple in Detroit. In what appears to be a direct quote from
the “BSC Account,” Stevenson says: “Great care was taken beforehand
to make certain the poll results would turn out as desired. The ques-
tions were...to steer the delegates’ opinion toward the support of Brit-
ain and the war....Public Opinion [was] manipulated through what
seemed an objective poll.”**
BSC got just what it wanted—widely distributed front-page news
that the delegates were uniformly anti-Hitler, anti-Japanese, and anti-
Charles Lindbergh and that “Ninety-four percent of the delegates...
thought defeating Hitler was more important than for the United
States to stay out of war.”> The “BSC Account” also states: “The cam-
paign was particularly appreciated by some representatives of the
Roosevelt administration who attended the convention as observers.”
The persistent association of the White House and BSC and its front
groups is again clearly evident here. Fight for Freedom’s labor division
78 ¢e8 [DESPERATE DECEPTION

had been organized at the behest of Commissioner of Labor Statistics

Isador Lubin and David K. “Devious Dave” Niles of the White House
staff.3° Documents in the Fight for Freedom Papers substantially cor-
roborate the assertions of A Man Called Intrepid. There is an FFF tele-
gram to the Statler Hotel in Detroit: “Please reserve Suite of two
Bedrooms on the Lower Floor for Fight for Freedom, Inc. Week be-
ginning Sunday night November sixteenth.”*” There is also mention
of British intelligence agent Sandy Griffith (G.112):

Ulric [Bell]:—

Abe has probably kept you informed about the plans Sandy
Griffith and he are working out re the CIO convention. They
look very good.
I think we have an excellent opportunity to break some sto-
ries from Detroit.
Would you approve sending Merle [Miller] out for one
week? Things are much more likely to go right if he is on the
spot than if we do it by remote control.
Bob [Spivak]?®

Fight for Freedom had taken over these polls earlier, but the exact
date is not clear from their documents. It is clear that Market Analysts
Inc. also did similar polling for the Committee to Defend America by
Aiding the Allies. This should not be surprising, given CDAAA% close
connections to British intelligence and propaganda agencies.
After World War II, Francis Henson, assistant to British intelli-
gence agent Sandy Griffith, put this in his résumé: “Director of
Washington Bureau of Market Analysts, Inc. New York City. The
chief client was the Committee to Defend America to Aid the Allies
[sic] (the William Allen White Committee); my job was to use the re-
sults of our polls, taken among their constituents, to convince on-the-
fence Congressman and senators that they should favor more aid to
Britain. (1940-42)”3°
Not every organization was so easy as the CIO. The National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers banned the interviewing of members between
sessions and “also threatened to warn members individually against an-
swering questions by poll takers.”
 The Voice of the People ee 79

FFF’s Dr. Frank Kingdon’s telegram requesting NAM to lift its ban
on polls is quoted to illustrate the breadth of FFF’s polling operation:
“Our questionnaire is similar to those used by ourselves at national
conventions of American Legion, National Labor Union conventions and
asked individually of all members of Congress.” Kingdon’s suggestion
that Sandy Griffith was using his polls to influence Congress is born
out not only by Henson’s résumé but by research done on the De-
stroyer Deal by British historian David Reynolds. He cites a “provi-
sional poll [of the Senate] by Market Analysts, Inc., forwarded by
[White House insider Ben] Cohen and seen by [Secretary of the Inte-
rior Harold] Ickes on 8 Aug.” Cohen was, of course, working very close
with the British on the Destroyer Deal. He and John Foster of the
British embassy concocted the legal opinion that, when published in
the New York Times, served to give a fraudulent legal gloss to the De-
stroyer Deal.7”
Sandy Griffith did other, more public work on this project. In his
book on the Destroyer Deal, Fifty Ships That Saved the World, British
MP Philip Goodhart, records that at the 1940 Republican convention
in Philadelphia—“according to a public opinion research firm called
Market Analysis [sic]”—“some sixty per cent of the delegates favored
extensive aid to Britain.”*! Again this is a familiar scenario: a poll at a
convention, by a man who was a British intelligence agent, producing
results saying clearly that the delegates wished to send “extensive aid to
Britain.”
Though the technique used at the conventions may have been to
load the questions, there are other methods for affecting poll results
without directly fabricating them. Leonard Doob in Public Opinion and
Propaganda notes how he himself “has repeatedly demonstrated how
the interviewer, the order of the questions on the ballot, the suggested
replies, and the wording of the question may affect the results....”4
Cornell political scientist Benjamin Guinsberg has written that
“polls do more than simply measure and record the natural or sponta-
neous manifestations of popular belief. The data reported by opinion
polls are actually the product of an interplay between opinion and the
survey instrument.”
In his 1944 book Gauging Public Opinion, Hadley Cantril, the inter-
ventionist who was working with Fight for Freedom and the White
House, gives an example of how answers to one of the most often
80 e¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

quoted Gallup polling questions of the pre-Pearl Harbor period was

biased by the interviewers. ‘The question was:

Which of these two things do you think is more important

for the United States to try to do—
‘To keep out of war ourselves, or
‘To help England win, even at the risk of getting into war?

It was apparentas early as October 1940 thatif the interviewer favored

helping England, then 60 percent of the respondents favored helping
England. Ifthe interviewer favored keeping out, only 44 percent favored
helping England. In a democracy this is a crucial difference.*
Cantril also refers to a March 1941 study showing that the social
class of the interviewer affected the degree of isolationism that respon-
dents would admit; most interviewers were middle-class. In a test
group, working-class interviewers were trained to ask the same ques-
tions. The result: "On war questions the working-class interviewers
reported more isolationist sentiment than did the middle-class inter-
viewers.” From other parts of this study Cantril concluded that “it
seems likely that the findings of the working-class group are more rep-
resentative of the true state of opinion....”*
The results of this question concerning the desire of Americans to
help England even if it meant the United States becoming involved in
the war were used to keep the i solationists off balance.
Cantril’s analysis on how poll results could be severely skewed even
by the social class of the interviewer was unknown to the isolationists,
but they did suspect there was something wrong with the polls. Robert
M. Hutchins, the isolationist president of the University of Chicago,
chaired a committee that looked at the problem and sponsored a care-
fully done opinion poll by Samuel E. Gill, a professional pollster from
New York. ‘This poll showed only 20.3 percent answering “Yes” to the
question “Do you believe that the United States should enter the war
as an active belligerent at this time?” The “Yes” percentage rose only to
34.4 percent when a possible British defeat was proposed. At the time
these poll results were released, July 14, 1941, the various well-publi-
cized polls into which BSC and the interventionists had their fingers
showed 60 to 90 percent of Americans willing to fight if Britain was
 The Voice of the People *** 81

threatened with defeat. Even if this poll is simply considered an advo-

cacy poll from the other side, it shows the wide variability of results
obtainable from “scientific” polling techniques. This episode should
also make the historian extremely wary of the opinion polls of the time.
But the Hutchins poll did not disturb the public. The Hutchins
group found it almost impossible to get its results published. BSC and
its interventionist allies had a lock on the major media outlets. Only
Time magazine carried a very small, very disdainful mention of the poll;
no other national paper or journal even mentioned it.*°
Another possible ploy, visible only on those rare occasions when the
questions are published verbatim, or to the professional investigator
with access to the raw data, is the problem that can be caused by the
order of the questions.
Rowena Wyant of the Office of Radio Research, Columbia Univer-
sity, wrote an interesting article for the fall 1941 issue of Public Opinion
Quarterly. Buried deep in her article, titled “Voting via the Senate
Mailbag,” is a three-pronged attack on the Gallup poll. The problem
was the exact order of the questions. She wrote: “...the Gallup poll
appears to be unduly weighted in favor of the [draft] bill. These pos-
sible sources of bias are...: 1. The question itself, ‘Do you favor in-
creasing the size of our army and navy by drafting men between the
ages of 21 and 31 to serve in the armed forces for one year?’ has the
rather obvious defect of not being confined to the issue it is supposedly
testing....2. The conscription question was asked immediately after
two questions which may be accused of steering the respondents’
thoughts in a bellicose direction....” Wyant also found evidence that
some of the subjects were afraid to tell the truth.*”
The draft (selective service) merits a closer examination. Sir William
Stephenson’s mandate when he arrived in the United States in June
1940 was to bring the United States into the war. One of the predica-
ments faced very early by the British was that even if the United States
could be dragged into the war, its army was far too small to be useful.
If the British were to go back onto the continent of Europe, the
number of troops they could muster was simply inadequate. Despite
the vigorous denials, there was no possibility for the British to invade
Europe without American troops. The polls played their part in this
campaign. The polls of the summer of 1940, which seemed to show
overwhelming public support for the draft, were in fact running
82 eee [DESPERATE DECEPTION

counter to a number of other indicators. Public devotion to the draft

was doubtless much thinner than it appeared.
In the published literature there are many references to the involve-
ment of British intelligence in the effort to get President Roosevelt to
give or trade Britain fifty destroyers. There is little mention of similar
efforts to pass an American draft law. William Donovan's trip to En-
gland in July 1940 was promoted by William Stephenson of BSC. In
England, Donovan was subjected to a hoax as the British impressed
him with a great facade suggesting they were well prepared to resist
the Germans.
The startling thing for the researcher reading Donovan’s posttrip
correspondence with his hosts is the great effort the British intelli-
gence and propaganda chiefs must have made to impress upon him the
need for an American draft law. Judging by its frequent mention in the
correspondence, the draft must have been the primary topic of discus-
sion. Someone has torn from its bindings Donovan’s letter to Sir
Stewart Graham Menzies, the head of MI-6. Fortunately the Log of
Documents summary survives. It says: “Letter WJD to Col. S.G.
Menzies DSO re WJD plans, his efforts to get conscription passed by
House and Senate and his efforts to alert the country as to situation in
Europe 8/27/40.”48
Donovan’s correspondence with Admiral John Godfrey, the head of
the British Office of Naval Intelligence, to Sir Cyril Newall and to
Marshall Field’s cousin Ronald Tree of British Information Services
carry on similarly. Io Admiral Godfrey he wrote: “We have been hav-
ing difficulties with conscription. In my absence I found that resistance
had developed in several quarters. However, we have been keeping up
the fight and I really believe that we will probably have the bill passed
and in effect within the next month. It will not be as complete as I
would have liked it, but it will mean that we are going to have men
available.”??
On August 17, 1940, “our man,” as British intelligence called
Donovan, made a nationwide radio address promoting the draft. He
was sponsored by the Century Group.
Another example of the considerable effort British intelligence put
into promoting the American draft law can be seen in the work of intel-
ligence agent Sandy Griffith and his polling company, Market Analysts
Inc. In a letter of August 3, 1940, Griffith wrote to Ernest Cuneo:
 The Voice of the People °** 83

“Enclosed are copies of a release I just made of some preliminary returns.

This gain in sentiment for conscription I think is very important.” The
press release, titled “Big Majority of People Favor Conscription,” an-
nounced: “Three-fourths (75.6%) of the American people are in favor
of ‘some form of universal selective service now.’ ” Sandy also notes the
“unbroken rise in public opinion in support of conscription.”>9
The ostensible prime mover for the draft was another major figure
in Fight for Freedom, Grenville Clark (1882-1967), Harvard College
1903, Harvard Law School 1906, onetime law clerk with Franklin
Roosevelt. His Wall Street law firm, Root Clark, Buckner and Bal-
lantine, was one of the most prestigious in the country, but Clark was
unknown to the general public despite his role as a major figure in the
Plattsburg Movement of officer training from World War I.
In May 1940 he started the campaign for a draft law. With the help
of that irrepressible Anglophile Supreme Court Associate Justice Felix
Frankfurter, Clark was able to have the isolationist, antidraft Secretary
of War Henry Woodring replaced by the interventionist, pro-draft
Henry Stimson. Clark’s National Emergency Committee pledged it-
self to raise $285,000 (more than $3 million in 1997 dollars) in six
months for publicity. One luncheon at the Bankers Club on June 7,
1940, netted $30,000.°!
The public opinion polls whose questions Rowena Wyant found so
biased produced spectacularly prodraft results. Of those people Gallup
asked whether they would favor one year compulsory military service
at age twenty, the yes response in December 1938 was 37 percent; in
December 1939, 39 percent; on June 1, 1940, 50 percent; and by the
end of June, 63 percent. This had climbed to over 70 percent by late
August 1940. Certainly an astounding figure.*?
Of those men Gallup questioned who would actually be facing the
draft shortly if it passed, those between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
one, an unbelievable 81 percent were willing. Congressional mail, on
the other hand, was running “overwhelmingly against conscription.”*
In tracking this problem for London, the British Library of Informa-
tion wrote in its August 14, 1940, “Washington Letter”: “Congress-
men are frightened by their mail which is overwhelmingly against the
bill and they don’t trust the straw polls which indicate the country ap-
proves. They feel that even if not faked they don’t take into consider-
ation the fact that a man sufficiently interested in a public question to
84 eee J[)ESPERATE DECEPTION

write about it, is a man prepared to turn out and vote, while a man who
has to be hunted up and asked his opinion by a canvasser is likely to stay
home.”**
Even if they were not fully believable—and they were not—the polls
controlled by British intelligence and its interventionist allies served to
confuse the issue of public support for the peacetime draft. Without
these cooked polls the congressional mail would certainly have killed
conscription.
Secretary of War Stimson attributed the imbalance of letters to
“Mushroom peace societies” that were better organized and financed
than the champions of conscription.*> Stimson’s statement is a com-
plete falsehood. All those who opposed the bill spent less than $5,000
for their campaign. The high-powered prodraft campaign had been
run by Pearley Boone, a former New York Times journalist who had
more recently done the publicity for the New York World’s Fair. With
his able staff of writers and photographers he easily outmatched history
professor Howard L. Beale from the University of North Carolina.°°
There are others besides Rowena Wyant who analyzed the polls and
the issues involved with intervention. A study by Dartmouth psycholo-
gist Ross Stagner examined the Gallup polls from April 1937 until Feb-
ruary 1941. Stagner chose fifty-nine questions for study because they
focused directly on the “problem of intervention against Germany.”
About one-third had related to the repeal of the Neutrality Act in the
fallior1e39>/
Stagner analyzed the polls for four types of wording that tend to bias
the results. For thirteen of the questions he judged the language to be as
impartial as possible within the bounds of plain English. In forty-six of
the fifty-nine, however, he found flaws. Since some questions combined
these flaws, there were fifty-five “cases of dubious practices.” Seven of
these he judged to bias the answer toward the noninterventionist camp
while forty-eight tended to elicit an interventionist reply.°®
His example of the effect of injecting prestige-bearing names, such
as President Roosevelt’s, into the questions is revealing. The week of
May 29, 1940, the Gallup’s organization for the Princeton Public
Opinion Research Project asked: “The United States Army and Navy
have about 5,000 airplanes. Would you approve of selling all, some, or
none of these planes to England and France at this time?” Forty-nine
percent of the respondents were recorded as answering “none.” But
 The Voice of the People *** 85

only 20 percent disapproved of this action a few days later when Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s name was injected thus: “President Roosevelt has
taken action making it possible for England and France to buy air-
planes that were being used by our Army and Navy. Do you approve or
disapprove of this action?” The great change was due to the “prestige
value of Roosevelt’s name,” plus the fact that the deal was already done
and could not be changed.
An important fact here is that the questions used in the Market
Analysts Inc. BSC-rigged polls were very similar to those being asked
by Gallup and to a lesser extent by Roper. The Roper polls usually gave
a larger choice of answers. Iwo purported examples of FFF questions
were included in the article reporting the refusal of the National
Association of Manufacturers to allow its members to be polled by
Fight for Freedom: “Which do you consider more important: that
Hitler be defeated or that the United States stay out of war?” and “Do
you think that we should try to block further Japanese expansion even
at the risk of war?”>?
There is an important issue to note regarding the simple direct ques-
tion of whether the respondent wished the United States to declare war
on Germany and fight against her. The percent in favor never rose
above 21 before Pearl Harbor was attacked. It was on tangential, diffi-
cult-to-check, often loaded and contrived questions that covered step-
ping-stone issues that the American public was said to favor policies
that would obviously lead to war.
The way that most authors today quote the polls of 1939-42 gives
the numbers an aura of hard scientific truth that is little merited. In a
recent book review attacking John Charmley’s revisionist book
Churchill: The End of Glory, Louis D. Rubin, Jr., writes: “But public
opinion was overwhelmingly on the side of Britain; an opinion poll
taken in July 1940 indicated that seven out of ten Americans believed
a Nazi victory would place the United States in danger, and so were
in favor of assistance to the embattled British.”
As with many other ploys worked by British intelligence and its
friends, there were people at the time who suspected that there was
something wrong with many of the polls being ballyhooed by interven-
tionists. The anti-interventionist problem was how to prove the decep-
tions, discover who was involved and how the rigging was done, and
then get their views published.
86 ¢*2e@ DESPERATE DECEPTION

The North American Newspaper Alliance sent out a story from

Washington on February 8, 1941, saying that Senators McKellar of
Tennessee and Holman of Oregon and Representative Walter M.
Pierce of Oregon “have resolutions pending, which they say they intend
to press cooperatively for an investigation of the Gallup, Fortune Maga-
zine and other polls which have been reporting public opinion on the
lease-lend bill and other features of the defense program.” Whether or
not at the prompting of the White House, the administration’s spokes-
man and House Majority Leader John McCormack “said he could not
see why there should be an investigation of polls....”°!
Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota did no better challenging the
major polls. On May 6, 1941, he introduced Senate Resolution 111,
“Investigation of Polls of Public Opinion.” This resolution was re-
ferred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce. It disappeared.°
So the polls of World War II should be seen for what they were: at
worst they were flatly rigged, at best they were tweaked and massaged
and cooked—advocacy polls without the advocate being visible.
 G@rArT
ER 5
Ges

eal
Lt. Commander Griffith

Sandy Griffith was a British intelligence agent. The archives of Special

Operations Executive list him as Lt. Commander Griffith and indicate
that he also had an SIS connection.! His work and that of his company,
Market Analysts Inc., and his closest associates, Francis Henson and
Christopher Emmet, allows us to focus on some of those events in
which British intelligence actively attempted to alter American public
policy. These include the legal/political problems of Hamilton Fish,
which drove him from Congress; a series of carefully wrought public
opinion polls favoring the peacetime draft, the Destroyer Deal, and
America’s desire to help Britain; the creation of a number of British
intelligence front groups; the BSC attack on Esso; the writing of pro-
paganda radio programs used on shortwave Boston radio station
WRUL,; and finally the trial and conviction, and retrial and conviction,
of George Sylvester Viereck, among other accused seditionists.
Sometime before World War I, Griffith attended Heidelberg Uni-
versity. With the outbreak of the Great War, Griffith joined first the
Belgian army for six weeks and then the French army before joining
the U.S. Army.
The American Legion Magazine of February 1939 carried an article,
“They Told All,” describing the great success American army intelli-
gence (G-2) had interrogating German prisoners in the World War.
Much of the article is on Sandy Griffith. One photograph shows a seri-
ous, dark-mustached Griffith staring into the camera. The caption
reads: “Captain, later Major, Sanford Griffith under whose direction

87
88 ¢*e DESPERATE DECEPTION

most of the 48,000 Germans captured by the A.E.F. were subjected to

questioning. 2 Zz

At the end of the Great War Sandy Griffith found himself a member
of the Armistice Commission at Spa. From 1920 to 1923 he worked in
Germany and Rome as a European correspondent for that great friend
of British intelligence the New York Herald Tribune. From 1923 to 1927
he was based in London representing the Wall Street Journal and other
Dow Jones publications; his two sons, Sandy and Peter, were born
there in 1925 and 1927. From 1927 to 1930 he represented the stock-
broker Dillon, Read & Co. in Paris, where his daughter, Brenda, was
born in 1929.
During the early 1930s he worked as a broker for Stokes Hoyt &
Co. and Otis & Co. In 1924 he had married Katherine Beach
Bennett; he was divorced in 1934. Her death in that year left him with
the three children.’
After a 1938 stint as director of consumer research projects for a
company called Miller Franklin, Griffith became, in 1939, president of
Market Analysts Inc. In 1939 and 1940, this company worked from a
summer office at the New York World’s Fair. There Griffith functioned
as a consultant to companies wishing to brighten up their booths at the
fair—Borden, Addressograph Multigraph, IBM.* By 1940 his polls for
the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies—the White
Committee—were becoming a major focus of his efforts.
Bill Ross-Smith, assistant to Intrepid at British Security Coordina-
tion, remembers Griffith: “Sandy was a cheerful confident American
utterly devoted to awakening American Opinion. He lived near Lloyd’s
Neck Long Island, where I once visited him for Sunday lunch.”°
There was another connection between BSC and Sandy Griffith,
the particulars of which are not clear. According to Sandy’s son Peter,
“Dick Ellis came out to the house a number of times in 1940. His son
Olic Ellis, whose mother was Russian as I recall, spent several weeks
with us at that time. He was fourteen or-fifteen, the same age as my
older brother, Sandy. I believe Ellis was divorced from Olic’s mother
at the time.” Ellis was, of course, the number two man at BSC and
the man who actually ran “Wild Bill” Donovan’s COI/OSS from its
start in 1941.°
According to his second wife, Sandy Griffith joined British intelli-
gence in “the late 1930s—’38 or 739.” Most likely this was the black-
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith °** 89

propaganda and dirty-tricks group, Section D of MI-6, which under-

went tremendous expansion during this period. BSC officer Bill Ross-
Smith also remembers: “When [Bill Morrell] first arrived at BSC he
worked in my section for a while & did excellent, he soon moved on to
dealing with press, radio, black propaganda & anti British pro-German
organizations. For instance he coordinated Sandy Griffith’s work.”’
Sidney “Bill” Morrell (SOE code number G.101), who “coordinated
Sandy Griffith’s work,” had been European correspondent for Lord
Beaverbrook’s Daily Express, had married Beaverbrook’s secretary, and,
according to a later employee, had been recruited into British intelli-
gence by “the Beaver himself.”
Morrell had been the only reporter who had been present at all of
Hitler’s great triumphs of the 1930s. The resulting book, titled I Saw
the Crucifixion, charges that British Prime Minister Neville Chamber-
lain was wrong at Munich. William Shirer mentions Bill Morrell sev-
eral times in Berlin Diary: “Prague, September 12 [1938]....I listened to
the broadcast of the [Hitler] speech in the apartment of Bill and Mary
Morrell overlooking Wilson station. The smoke-filled room was full of
correspondents—Kerr, Cox, Maurice Hindus, and so on.”®
In much the same way that Stephenson had lent Dick Ellis to help
organize Donovan’s Coordinator of Information office, Intrepid also
lent Bill Morrell to Robert Sherwood for Sherwood’s Foreign Infor-
mation Service. With Morrell at Sherwood’s office we should not be
surprised to find Market Analysts Inc. also working with Sherwood’s
people. Judging by the closing lines of a report to Ernest Cuneo from
Sandy Griffith’s assistant, Francis Henson, Market Analysts must have
been in close touch with Sherwood: “The primary purpose of this let-
ter is to urge you to call and go out to lunch with Mrs. Mildred ‘Pat’
Allen, who is now secretary to Robert Sherwood, assistant to Donovan
...she is dying to meet you—after I tooted your horn for you.”
Sandy Griffith’s helpers on these projects were Christopher ‘Temple
Emmet and Francis Henson. Christopher Emmet is a classic example
of those who ran the British intelligence fronts before and during
World War II and who, having proved themselves faithful and compe-
tent, went on to help run the CIA/MI-6 fronts of the Cold War. The
Eastern establishment ties of family and school are also well exempli-
fied in Christopher Emmet. Emmet was born in 1900 in Port Chester,
New York, into a prominent Protestant Irish patriot family—one of
90 °¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

whose members, Robert Emmet, had been hanged by the British in

1803. In 1968 Life magazine did an article titled “America’s ‘Grandes
Dames.’ ” Christopher Emmet’s mother merited a full-page photo-
graph captioned, “Alida Chanler Emmet, 94, of Stony Brook, Long
Island, is a grandniece of Mrs. William B. Astor and one of only two or
three ladies now living who made their debuts at her great-aunt’s 1892
ball, the ball of the original Four Hundred.”!° His father, sisters, and
kin were prominent artists.
The catalog of a recent art exhibit gives a taste of the Emmets’
prominence. “New York society stampeded the opening tea for the
Arden Gallery’s 1936 fall exhibition, ‘Paintings, Drawings and Sculp-
tures by Five Generations of the Emmet Family.’ ” The ties of blood
and marriage to both the banking Aldrich and Morgan families are evi-
dent in the names of some of the exhibitors. There was not only Rosina
Emmet Sherwood, the mother of Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright
Robert Sherwood, but also Elizabeth Winthrop Emmet Morgan, Jane
Grenville Lapsley, and Mrs. Nicholas Biddle, Jr.!!
One in-law, Margaret Chanler Aldrich, had won a Congressional
Medal for her work as a nurse during the Spanish-American War.!?
This connection, of course, tied Christopher to the Aldrich/Rocke-
feller clan. Emmet’s first cousin was playwright, FDR speechwriter,
and British agent of influence Robert Emmet Sherwood, with whom
he worked so closely.
Emmet attended Harvard (1919-20) before going on to “several
universities in Germany” during a six-year study and writing odyssey.
He returned to the United States in 1933. By 1938 he was secretary to
the Volunteer Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany. In
1940 he became chairman of the Committee to Aid Britain by Recipro-
cal Trade and helped Sandy Griffith and Francis Henson found France
Forever. He became vice president of the latter, which was a British
intelligence front group whose purpose was to promote Charles de
Gaulle as the true voice of France.!3
In 1941 he was treasurer and major force in the British intelligence
front group Committee for American Irish Defense. It had the same
street address, 8 West 40th Street, as Sandy Griffith’s Market Analysts
Inc. The ground floor of this building was occupied by the New York
chapter of the CDAAA, of which Emmet was a member of the execu-
tive committee; in July and August 1941, Emmet played a major role in
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith eee 91

the amalgamation of the New York chapter with Fight for Freedom.
According to his obituary, Emmet worked during World War II for a
“Freedom lobby to defeat ‘isolationist’ congressmen who had opposed
American involvement in the European War.”!4
Later during the Cold War when the British and American intelli-
gence assets were used to prevent the Russians from dominating the
continent of Europe, Emmet manned a slew of front groups in the
CIA/M1-6 political warfare against the Soviet Union. These included
chairman, Committee Against Mass Expulsions; treasurer, Commit-
tee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich; organizer, Committee for a
Just Peace with Italy; member board of directors, Common Cause
(this is not today’s Common Cause, but according to author Christo-
pher Simpson was the prototype for the CIA-sponsored National
Committee for a Free Europe); executive vice president, American
Council on Germany; member of executive committee, American
Friends of Vietnam; and chairman, American Friends of the Captive
Nations.!°
Another who helped Sandy Griffith was his assistant, Francis Adams
Henson (1906-63). Fortunately, Henson was a prolific correspondent.
He was sent by his family to Lynchburg College in Virginia because
they considered it to have “a good safe Christian atmosphere.” By
graduation in 1927, he had done very well and had even edited the
school paper. His family’s hopes had not. “I had...become militantly
pro-labor and in general a socialist,” he later wrote. From 1927 to
1932, Henson worked for the YMCA in New York and Connecticut
and moved farther left. From early 1933 until 1936, Henson writes, “I
was a fellow traveler of the CP [Communist Party] under various dis-
guises and serving in many capacities.”!¢
From 1932 Henson was in turn “executive secretary of the National
Religion and Labor Foundation, founded by Jerome Davis of Yale”; an
organizer of “the American League Against War and Fascism and...its
first co-secretary with Donald Henderson”; “Secretary of the Interna-
tional Student Service in the United States,” and “secretary of the
Emergency Committee to Aid Refugees from Germany.”
In 1935, Henson became treasurer of the Committee on Fair Play in
Sports, which opposed American participation in the German Olym-
pics. When this group lost its fight he represented the committee in
Germany. There he “sought to convince American and other newspaper
92 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

men that the Nazis were using the Olympics as a facade to hide ugly Nazi
realities.”
After a short stint as campaign manager for the Committee to Aid
Spanish Democracy, Henson became, in 1937, administrative assistant
to the president of the United Auto Workers Union, which was within
the CIO. By this time, he says, he believed that the Communists were a
menace to labor. He says that John L. Lewis saw to it that he was fired
for this belief. Henson then went to Washington in 1939 to become a
freelance writer for the New Deal—mainly writing for Commissioner
of Education J. W. Studebaker.
In 1940 he went to work for Sandy Griffith at Market Analysts Inc.
“My job,” wrote Henson after the war in his résumé, “was to use the
results of our polls, taken among their constituents, to convince on-
the-fence Congressmen and Senators that they should favor more aid
to Britain.”!”
One of the first published references to Market Analysts Inc. is in
British MP Philip Goodhart’s book on the Destroyer Deal, Fifty Ships
That Saved the World.!® Goodhart cites Market Analysts to the effect
that “some sixty per cent of the delegates [to the 1940 Republican con-
vention in Philadelphia] favored extensive aid to Britain.” In the two-
page copy of the results of this poll sent to Ernie Cuneo appear the
topics important to the British:

I. If Germany wins a decisive victory over France and Britain,

do you think that we will be endangered in the U.S.? Yes 60%
No 37.6%
IV. If you think we are endangered, do you favor our helping
the allies with everything (check as many as necessary) a/
short of war.... 65.4%

Please note that the 65.4 percent who wished to give the Allies ev-
erything necessary short of war is actually 65 percent of the 60 percent
in Question I who believed the United States would be endangered by
a German victory. In short, only 39 percent of the delegates questioned
actually wished to give the Allies (a loaded word to be sure) “everything
short of war.”!? Questions I, III, IX, and X played on one of the major
themes of British propaganda—namely, that once the Allies were
beaten, Hitler would very quickly attack the Western Hemisphere:
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith e** 93

II. Do you think that our armed strength will be sufficient for
us to defend the U.S.?

II. If Germany wins do you think we can defend the Monroe

Doctrine in the Americas?

IX. If Germany were to set up a puppet government in the

Americas, would it be a threat to American Security?

X. If yes, would you favor U.S. military intervention there?

This was repeated at the July 1940 Democratic convention. “Dear

Ernie: Enclosed are the final results of our opinion poll. We got good
play throughout in the Chicago Daily News, the New York Times, and a
couple of the agencies....Sandy.”?°
The Chicago Daily News was passionately interventionist with several
reporters who worked closely with British intelligence and the British
Information Service. The result of this poll sponsored by the White
Committee was to soften the impact of the rather isolationist platform
the Democrats had adopted. “A wide disparity,” says the press release,
“exists between the Democratic Platform and the opinions of the indi-
vidual delegates, as revealed in a very complete poll.” According to this
poll, 85 percent of the delegates thought that a British defeat would
endanger the United States, and of these 59.7 percent thought Hitler
would give us “no time at all” to arm after he had defeated Great Brit-
ain. Sixty-five percent thought that Germany already threatened the
United States.
Griffith and Henson also provided investigative services at the con-
ventions. Later that same day, July 22, 1940 another informative letter
was sent to Cuneo: “Enclosed are some rough notes on the activities of
the pacifist organizations at the two conventions....Sandy.” In nine
typewritten pages these notes identified how the isolationists had suc-
ceeded in getting their way on the platform committee at the Demo-
cratic convention, identified the principal pacifist organizations, and
gave the results of interviews with them.
For example: “National Council for Prevention of War. Frederick J.
Libby, the Executive Secretary of the Organization,...is a Quaker with
an abnormal amount of religious fanaticism and an anti-English hate
which goes back to the time he was snubbed as a student at Oxford.
94 eee J)ESPERATE DECEPTION

He...has...persecution mania which leads him to see spies and myste-

rious influences everywhere—in this case English ones.”?!
Paranoid Libby may have been, but he was not wrong—they were
after him. It is one of the tricks of fate that he shared his suspicions of
lurking English agents with a genuine British intelligence agent.
Griffith went on to interview Dr. Dorothy Detzer, national executive
secretary of the Women’s International League for Peace and Free-
dom, and somehow acquired from her a copy of the memorandum on
lobbying, titled “Peace Pressure Primer,” which was also sent to
Cuneo. This investigative work was carried out under cover of a com-
pany called Information, Inc. “Confidential Research for the Facts You
Seek,” says the letterhead, giving Francis Henson’s Washington, D.C.,
address at the National Press Building.’?
Also on August 9, 1940, Griffith continued his efforts to have Cuneo
use his influence to have Market Analysts Inc. become the pollster for
the Democratic National Committee; Cuneo had served the commit-
tee as attorney: “Dear Ernie: Enclosed is a brief outline of the kind of
nation-wide job we can do on opinion polls. You can get me at my
number at the Fair. I am anxious to see you on this and on the general
situation.—Sandy.” The eight-point outline claimed that Market Ana-
lysts Inc. had in both 1939 and 1940 made “all of the attendance analy-
sis for the New York World’s Fair,” that it did work for the “foreign
government exhibitors” and conducted a variety of “local and national
political surveys.” Sandy further claimed “225 interviewers in all parts
of the country” and said that a “rush job...can be done in 48 hours” and
that he could “insure full privacy.”
Henson, as Sandy Griffith’s Washington representative, continued,
during the fall of 1940, to supply Cuneo with information on the front
group France Forever, which he and Sandy and Christopher Emmet
had created to generate support for Charles de Gaulle. “I want to con-
tinue to run errands for you etc.,” wrote Henson in a letter of October
1, 1940. They also continued to supply Cuneo with intelligence.?4
In Cuneo’s Henson files is a report on an interview with William R.
Castle on November 19, 1940. Castle was a retired diplomat with close
ties to former President Herbert Hoover.’> Castle was of interest to
British intelligence because he was a member of the national commit-
tee of America First, the leading isolationist group in the United
States. The interviewer was Francis Henson. Once again the target
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith eee 95

suspected that the interviewer was a spy, but he was not suspicious
enough: “Castle was very cordial,” wrote Henson, “and talked with me
for about one hour and a half. When I left and gave him my card and
the Washington office address of M[{arket] A[nalysts Inc.] he said, ‘So
you are not a spy of the White Committee.’ I answered, smiling, ‘If I
am I am a very open spy, don’t you think?’ He smiled.”*6
One other British project Henson worked on should be mentioned
before returning to Market Analysts Inc.’s polling endeavors. British
propaganda both overt and covert was very diligent, from the late
1930s, in trying to get the United States to accept its responsibilities as
a world power, a world power guided by the more mature, surer hand
of the British, but still a country with global political commitments.
One aspect of this project was to subject American schoolchildren
and their teachers to good healthy doses of internationalist propa-
ganda. The thought was that this could be done cheaply via radio. His-
torian Susan Ann Brewer tells of the unforeseen problems: “W. M.
Newton, the B.B.C. representative in Chicago, was stunned to discover
that there was no federal or hardly even a state authority for education.
The decentralization of the American System made it difficult for the
British to pursue this method.”?7
By 1943, “Teachers (especially history)” made the British “enemies
list.” American anticolonialism was blamed on American teachers.
Graham Spry, a Canadian journalist and onetime executive of Standard
Oil of California, told the Law Committee: “What was taught was the
doctrine of American nationalism.” The British propagandist pro-
posed improving the American curriculum and textbooks.’® It is not
surprising that working as closely with British intelligence on covert
propaganda as Francis Henson did, he helped fill this British need:
“Dear Ernie—...Chet Williams wants you to have Winchell plug the
Ist of his new books. How about something like this: “Che U.S. Com-
missioner of Education, J. W. Studebaker and his No. 1 man on the
Public Forums, have struck a new blow to the solar plexus of the
dictators.... These books, for 6,250,000 high school youth, tell how we
came by American freedom...it leads a procession of scores of books
being brought out this fall by Row, Peterson & Co under the trade-
mark ‘Unitext’...the kids are going...to know why this country is
worth fighting for...and my guess is that the adults will find them use-
ful as first class brickbats to throw at Fifth Columnists.’ I think the
96 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

books are fairly good because I helped ghost write them. This, of
course, should not be mentioned. Ever—Francis Henson.”??
One of Griffith’s most effective polls was done at the American Le-
gion convention, September 15, 1941. This poll received two days of
big play on the front page of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox’s Chi-
cago Daily News. Question: “In view of the dangers from continued
widespread Nazi and Fascist agitation in the United States, do you fa-
vor our breaking off of diplomatic relations with Germany-Italy, Yes
67.8%.” Slightly more than 55 percent thought that Hitler would
attack the United States if he defeated Britain and Russia. The poll
results were used to promote a Legion resolution removing all geo-
graphical limitations on the movement of American armed forces.
(Draft proponents had been forced to accept limitations which would
have kept U.S. troops from Europe in order to get the Conscription
Law passed in 1940.)
The Chicago Daily News story by Clem Lane said when this resolu-
tion was proposed: “In this recommendation the Legion leaders are
simply following the wishes of the rank and file, and are not leading
them into war, as the isolationists charge. This is borne out by a sam-
pling poll, the results of which were made public today, in which it is
indicated that 40 per cent of the Legionaries want the United States to
enter the war now.”
In a Sunday, September 21, 1941, article in the New York Times.
Washington reporter Arthur Krock gauged the impact of the American
Legion resolution, promoted by Griffith’s poll, on Congress: “Definite
signs are beginning to appear that what may be called the anti-war in-
volvement group in Congress had lost its solidarity...defections have
begun to show....the reasons are not hard to find...the resolutions
adopted by the American Legion...are another factor in the shift.”
As Krock wrote, this British intelligence poll was a stunning reversal,
for the Legion “has long argued against another war adventure abroad.”
Not everyone was convinced by this poll. The Chicago Tribune took its
own poll of the Legion delegates and found 70 percent against sending
troops to Europe.*? But this hardly mattered in the developing culture
of belligerence that Arthur Krock detected in Congress. Sandy Griffith
and his BSC polls helped to create the illusion of public support on which
Franklin Roosevelt could base his moves toward war. He was only fol-
lowing the will of the people.
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith eee 97

The principle was enunciated by Christopher Emmet in a letter to

Griffith when Sandy was in Milwaukee preparing for the American
Legion convention: “...this sort of effort where we are going after
people who are on the fence requires the most careful possible prepara-
tion before publicity in order to get as much of a ‘band wagon’ psychol-
ogy as possible.”3!
This devious tactic of running spurious polls at the conventions of
various high-visibility organizations worked quite well at numerous
conventions including that of the CIO. By purporting to represent the
interventionist sentiments of the CIO rank and file at the convention,
this poll circumvented one of the great leaders of the CIO, John L.
Lewis, who was completely antiwar. Robert Spivak got out the good
word to his press contacts. David Stern of the Philadelphia Record, Vic-
tor Riesel of the New York Post, Harold Levine of PM, Bruce Bliven of
The New Republic, Freda Kirchway of The Nation, and Bruce Bliven, Jr.,
of the New York Post were sent a cover letter for the poll that said in part:
“T think you will find interesting the fact that despite the official atti-
tude of the C.I.O. on the captive mines situation, delegates are very
determined to defeat Hitler and to protect the United States.”>?
As far as the objectivity of the poll, Spivak gave assurances on that
subject also: “The Poll was conducted for us by Market Analyst, Inc. a
private polling organization without any viewpoint that it is trying to
foster.” One may wonder if he smiled when he typed “without any
viewpoint.”
Some of these polls were organized by the militant New York Fight
for Freedom/Committee to Defend America and its activist chairman,
Frank Kingdon; we will see more of Kingdon in the next chapter on the
effort to remove isolationist Hamilton Fish from Congress. Kingdon
ran into problems with the National Association of Manufacturers.
The usual trick of polling the rank-and-file members and then report-
ing interventionist poll results to undercut the mandate of the organi-
zation’s isolationist leadership did not work because the leadership
refused Kingdon’s request to “permit the polling of its members on
questions of vital national policy.”*?
Griffith and Henson worked on other British intelligence projects
after Pearl Harbor. British Security Coordination waged not only po-
litical warfare against Britain’s enemies (this included those wishing to
be neutral), but also economic warfare against German companies and
98 °° DESPERATE DECEPTION

American companies that had ties to them. Since America was techni-
cally neutral before Pearl Harbor, these business relationships between
German and American companies were often legal.
BSC nevertheless attacked them in several ways. One of the targets,
Schering, the giant drug company, is typical. BSC collected the evi-
dence from spies it had planted within the company and then “both the
Department ofJustice and the press were supplied with full particulars.
...the press campaign was taken up throughout the country by more
than a thousand papers [Winchell’s circulation] as well as by many
magazines....”
As a result, Schering was convicted of conspiracy, its board of direc-
tors was purged, and it was fined for antitrust violations. Much of the
evidence for this was manufactured by BSC, planted in Schering’s Eu-
ropean mail, and then conveniently confiscated by censorship examin-
ers in Bermuda and sent back to the United States for use as evidence
by United States authorities.*+
Not all aspects of this political/economic warfare against American
companies with ties to German companies went well. Sandy Griffith
and Francis Henson had the misfortune to run one campaign against a
company that was too big a fish for even BSC to boat easily. That com-
pany was Standard Oil of New Jersey, now called Exxon.
The campaign against Standard Oil of New Jersey was really only
one phase of the campaign against what was, in 1940, probably the
world’s largest corporation, Interessen Gemeinschaft Farbenindustrie
Aktiengellschaft, better known as I.G. Farben. The campaign against
I.G. Farben was in turn one of the projects being run by Intrepid’s
assistant John Pepper through the “George Office,” directed by
George Muhle Merten.*> The attack on Schering was one of the
projects run by “George.”
Merten left Schering in March of 1941 and became an economic
consultant with offices in—where else—Rockefeller Center. In Sep-
tember 1941, Merten’s offices became a British Security Coordination
front called the Western Continents Trading Corporation.*°
Part of this project against Jersey Standard was run by British intelli-
gence agent Donald MacLaren, who assisted Merton and was later
transferred to William Donovan’s COI/OSS, where he was put under
Francis Pickens Miller, whom we previously met as a major figure in
Fight for Freedom.*’ In the fall of 1941, MacLaren put together a team
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith eee 99

to write a booklet to attack I.G. Farben and American companies that

did business with the chemical giant.
Several of the talented people who toiled on this BSC project were
public personages in their own right. One was Rex Stout, the mystery
writer and interventionist who had worked long and diligently with the
BSC front Friends of Democracy. Stout “pledged full cooperation.”
Screenwriter, FFF activist, and head of the William Allen White News
Service John L. Balderston was another. Sylvia Porter, the popular
writer on money matters, then working for one of BSC’s friends,
George Backer at the New York Post, was one more.
Most of the work was done by British agent Donald MacLaren and
Sylvia Porter. Rex Stout wrote the foreword and thus became the only
recognizable name associated publicly with the project. The putative
author, one John Boylan, did not exist. Titled Sequel to the Apocalypse:
The Uncensored Story: How Your Dimes and Quarters Helped Pay for
Hitler’s War, it went on sale in March 1942. According to Stout’s biog-
raphy, done with his “full cooperation,” the booklet’s “distribution in
the United States was facilitated by the energetic efforts of Nelson A.
Rockefeller...[the] Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.”3°
Beginning in the 1920s, Standard Oil of New Jersey had entered into
a series of global agreements with I.G. Farben. These covered the ex-
change of patfents and research and a strategic agreement that Stan-
dard summarized: “...the I.G. are going to stay out of the oil business
and we are going to stay out of the chemical business....”3° The ex-
change of information BSC was trying to stop had continued after the
war began in Europe. The major subject of contention was the Ger-
man and American process for making synthetic rubber.
In 1941, encouraged and provided information by BSC, ‘Thurman
Arnold, the crusading antitrust chief of the Justice Department,
brought antitrust suits against Standard Oil. These were accompanied
and driven by a typically ferocious media campaign of planted material
and by a contentious minority stockholders’ group. Francis Henson
wrote to Ernest Cuneo: “Here is something hot for Walter [Cuneo
wrote Walter Winchell’s column and radio show]...on the Jersey Com-
pany....We have been working on this project for a long time, as you
know, first for some individuals in the Fight for Freedom Committee
and now in cooperation with William Floyd, H who is chairman of the
Minority Stockholders Committee of the Standard Oil company of
100 °*®®* DESPERATE DECEPTION

New Jersey....l am asking Mr. Floyd to enclose with this letter an out-
line of what he hopes Winchell will say.”*°
In his letter to Cuneo, Floyd suggested his material go in Winchell’s
“column in the Mirror or his Sunday broadcast.” One of Floyd’s sug-
gestions for a lead was “A stockholder’s group wants to make Standard
oil come all-out for the War.”#! This was just one more item in the
British intelligence campaign against I.G. Farben and Standard Oil,
but outsiders, even very astute outsiders, failed to see the wire-pullers.
I. F Stone, columnist for The Nation, attended the Standard Oil of
New Jersey 1943 stockholders’ meeting in the Flemington, New Jer-
sey, Grange Hall. Stone reported: “A committee of five minority stock-
holders with 744 shares among them managed miraculously to roll up
228,759 share votes for a resolution which would have pledged the
management not to resume its cartel with I.G. Farben after the war.”
One should not be too hard on Mr. Stone; he was dealing with pro-
fessional intelligence agents. Only with our present knowledge does it
appear that he should have been more suspicious of the “miraculous”
performance of the five minority stockholders. Sandy Griffith, the
one-time European correspondent for the Wall Street fournal and Wall
Street stock market operator, was perfect for this operation.*
Things did not end very well for either side in this confrontation.
Walter Teagle, who as president of Standard Oil of New Jersey made
several of the deals with Farben, and his successor, Texan Bill Farish
(Teagle became chairman of the board), were both broken by the accu-
sations of treason. Farish soon died of a heart attack. Teagle “lost all his
customary confidence, became nervous and fumbling,” according to
author Anthony Sampson.**
Jersey Standard was not without defenses. According to one BSC
document, one-time Standard Oil attorney and later head of the CIA
Allen Dulles, then part of Donovan’s Coordinator of Information, in-
tervened on behalf of Standard Oil and I.G. Farben. The document
explains that in March 1942, Dulles and*someone else in COI “ex-
pressed their desire to have our propaganda action in the U.S.A., as far
as I.G. Farben is concerned, discontinued. Their explanation of this
was that this might involve large American companies like Standard
Oil of New Jersey, etc., thereby perhaps impairing the war effort.”*5
In later years, Sandy Griffith also told his wife, Valerie, that Pinker-
tons hired by Standard Oil circulated the story that he was a Communist.
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith ee* 101

This made life quite difficult for him; there is some confirmation in this
story because of similar problems that plagued others involved in this
operation. Francis Henson’s letters to Cuneo after the war are filled with
requests for testimonials to refute charges that he was a security risk.*
In 1975, Drew Pearson’s successor on the “Washington Merry-Go-
Round” column revealed that newly opened State Department files
listed Rex Stout as a “tool of Communist Agents” because of his part in
writing Sequel to the Apocalypse.¥’
As bad as things turned out for some of the exposed participants, they
could have been much worse. In the summer of 1943, Francis Henson,
by then in the army and stationed at Camp Lee, Virginia, wrote a two-
page single-spaced letter to Sandy Griffith in greatest secrecy.
While in a bar in Washington he had happened upon a drunk and
talkative “J.B. Matthews, brain trust of the Dies Committee”—the
Special House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Ac-
tivities. Matthews told Henson that he had been shipped around and
unable to get ahead in the army “because of the dirty work you and
Griffith did.” Griffith, said Matthews, “acted as a British and French
agent....” He further claimed, wrote Henson, that “all of the telegrams
to and from various people have been surrendered to the Dies Com-
mittee, under subpoena, by WU [Western Union] and PT [Postal
Telegraph-Cable].”
Matthews seems to have had a good idea who had been involved. He
listed John Hunter, the English actor who helped run Fight for Free-
dom; (Henry) Hoke, who worked with BSC to stop isolationist propa-
ganda from being mailed postage-free; and “Agar”—both Herbert and
William worked for BSC fronts. He also mentioned Eugene Houdry of
France Forever.
Although the chief counsel of the Dies Committee knew a great
deal, particularly about how the Justice Department had worked with
BSC to attack Standard Oil, he admitted that getting the information
out to the public faced two obstacles, wrote Henson: “M.[atthews] says
that this would have come out before—especially re game of the Justice
Department and Thurman Arnold, if the Senators were not so scared
of being labeled pro-Esso.” Matthews also admitted to Henson that he
could not “get to first base with the present administration.” Henson
closed, noting to Sandy that their problems were “Certainly as much
excitement as a Graham Greene novel....”**
102 °*° DESPERATE DECEPTION

Little of this evidence gathered by the Dies Committee ever dis-

turbed the public. The administration, as pointed out by Matthews,
had a firm grip on the Democratic Congress. For more than half a
century the clerk of the House of Representatives repelled all attempts
to look at these files.
Neal Gabler in his book Winchell recounts his failed four-year
quest for the Dies Committee files on Walter Winchell, who worked
so closely with BSC. Gabler writes: “Donald Anderson, the House
clerk, has refused on the ground that it would not serve the national
interest. An archivist, however, has told me that the file is roughly
two inches thick.”*?
With the mid-90s change in party control of the House and addi-
tional pressure from Congressman Sharrod Brown, the Dies Commit-
tee files were finally opened in mid-1996. The drunkenJ.B. Matthews
had spoken correctly. The investigators had everything: Market Ana-
lyst Inc.’s checking account records, duplicate ledger cards from MA‘’s
bank account, nearly thirty pages of long-distance telephone records,
and hundreds of copies of telegrams.
Three things are clear in going through this trove. The committee
had stumbled on Sandy Griffith by accident. They did not know quite
what to make of his extensive operations. Without the administration’s
iron grip on the House leadership, all these operations could have eas-
ily blown up in hearings with sworn testimony.
Committee investigator Robert E. Stripling wrote to Congressman
Dies: “In checking on one Francis Henson, member of the Board of
Directors of the Union for Democratic Action...we found that...[he]
was the Washington representative of a corporation known as ‘Market
Analysts,’ which is headed by one Sanford (Sandy) Griffith....Com-
mittee agents subpoenaed the telegrams for ‘Market Analyst’ and
Sanford Griffith...and they reveal an amazing conspiracy...which has
been carried on...by Sanford Griffith...certain high officials of the
Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice...to smear and dis-
credit the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.”>°
To a large extent the BSC cut-outs held. The investigators traced the
money for Sandy’s operations against Standard Oil to the great flows of
funds from Eugene Houdry’s Catalytic Development Corporation.
They seem not to have made the immediate connection that Houdry
was a major player in France Forever. The investigators also noticed
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith e** 103

Sandy’s creation of the Irish American Defense Association. But again,

the go-betweens held at least temporarily. In a memo to Dies a staffer
wrote: “...Sanford Griffith set up an organization known as ‘American-
Irish Defense Association.’...it is my opinion that Griffith undertook
this project at the request of...certain Jewish leaders in an effort to
solidify Irish in this country behind the war effort. It is my understand-
ing that this enterprise flopped for the reason that it was discovered
that there were more Jews in it than Irishmen.”>!
Part of the genius of British intelligence in the United States during
World War II was its ability, with the help of its American friends in the
White House and media, to evade the legal and political consequences
of its disruptive actions while making sure that every possible penalty
was heaped upon its enemies.
The case of German propagandist George Sylvester Viereck illus-
trates how BSC was able to help the Justice Department obliterate
competing voices. Propaganda thrives best if there are no competing
expressions of opinion to disturb the audience.
George Sylvester Viereck had registered as a representative of the
German newspaper Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten and the German
Library of Information. Given that the German propaganda effort was
a only a small fraction of the British propaganda machine (for instance,
after 1938 interventionists had the radio commentary and radio drama
and the movies to themselves), Viereck did strike some painful blows.
In December 1940, Senator Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota formed a
Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee under encouragement from
Viereck. At this delicate time, when Britain was nearly bankrupt and
about to push for what became Lend-Lease, His Majesty’s Govern-
ment did not need anyone harping on the embarrassing fact that Brit-
ain had not paid her World War I debts. ‘This committee proposed that
European debtor nations cede their islands in the Western Hemi-
sphere as payment, thus the eventual name change to “Islands for War
Debts Committee.”*”
Viereck also took over a small publisher named Flanders Hall and
over the course of eighteen months published twenty titles. The most
popular title unfavorably pointed out contradictions in statements
made by British Ambassador Lothian under the title Lord Lothian
Against Lord Lothian. Although Viereck wrote this, the putative author
was Senator Ernest Lundeen. Viereck also wrote a foreword to this
104 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

work under the name James Burr Hamilton. In the summer of 1941
that close friend of British intelligence Drew Pearson wrote an article
exposing Viereck, Lothian Against Lothian, and Flanders Hall. This was
followed by the impaneling of a grand jury, in September 1941, to ex-
amine the prevalence of Nazi agents in this country. Viereck was ques-
tioned by this grand jury and indicted. One of the charges was that
Viereck had used fictitious names to conceal from the American public
the true names of the authors. The British were never charged with this
offense, though they were doing the same thing, many times more pro-
lifically and successfully.
At 8:00 a.m. on October 8, 1941, seven agents of the Justice De-
partment called on Viereck’s residence, arrested him, and without a
search warrant searched his home and office and took away his can-
celed checks and numerous papers and books. Bail was set at $15,000,
about $150,000 in 1996 dollars. The prosecuting attorney, William P.
Maloney, told the press that George Viereck was “the head and brains
of an insidious propaganda machine, engaged in sabotaging the Pres-
ident’s efforts to arouse the American people to their danger.”
Viereck’s biographer says that the truly damaging evidence against
the defendant was supplied by the British censor in Bermuda, specifi-
cally by one Nadya Gardner.*? BSC agent and author Montgomery
Hyde, who had worked as part of this censorship unit, writes in his
memoir, Secret Intelligence Agent: “I proposed that she should go to
Washington as soon as possible to testify.... Her sensational evidence
changed the whole atmosphere.”*+
Prosecutor Maloney helped his own cause and made Viereck appear
intensely devious by quoting out of context from Viereck’s books. The
judge upheld the prosecutor’s objections to the defense witnesses and
disallowed other key parts of the defense as irrelevant. On March 5,
1942, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The judge imposed maxi-
mum sentences on the three counts. On September 21, 1942, the court
of appeals denied a retrial. But on appeal to the Supreme Court the
conviction was overturned 5—2 with Justices Black and Douglas dis-
senting Jackson and Rutledge not participating).°°
In his majority opinion the conservative Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone judiciously stated: “...men are not subjected to criminal punish-
ment because their conduct offends our patriotic emotions....” But
then Stone became specific. He said the district court judge had erred
 G.112 Lt. Commander Griffith °** 105

in his charge to the jury. If that were not bad enough for the prosecu-
tion, Stone’s “haymaker landed.” Speaking of prosecutor Maloney,
Stone wrote: “He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones.”*°
In his history of the United States Supreme Court, Nine Young Men,
Wesley McCune writes that “the freeing of Viereck was a bitter blow to
lawyers for the administration....”°” This was probably even more dis-
concerting for British intelligence, but both BSC and the Roosevelt
Justice Department were equal to the task. Viereck was retried and
convicted in July 1943. Once again British intelligence supplied prize
witnesses—Nadya Gardner who had appeared before, and now also
BSC’s Sandy Griffith. Viereck’s biographer describes Viereck’s reaction
to Sandy Griffith’s damaging testimony: Viereck in an unusual letter to
the judge “reiterated his charge that the testimony of Sanford Griffith
was untrue. Griffith had claimed he overheard Viereck at a meeting of
the Overseas Press Club, saying that the German government was pre-
pared to ‘spend plenty of money’ to get accurate analysis of American
public opinion polls and that he could obtain and had obtained money
from the German embassy.”°®
Montgomery Hyde says that for his efforts in helping to get this
conviction “I was personally thanked by [Attorney General] Francis
Biddle.” The prosecutor also sent a letter thanking Hyde for his efforts
and saying, “Miss Gardner deserves great credit both for the quality of
her work and her shrewdness as a witness.”>?
That one or both British intelligence agents may have committed
perjury is not surprising. Intelligence agencies are instruments of a
government’ foreign policy. The loyalty of British agents was not to
the integrity of the American legal process, but to the needs of British
foreign policy.
British intelligence influence comes into play here in other in-
cremental and technical ways. In July 1942, while Viereck had been
appealing his first conviction under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him and twenty-
seven others for sedition and conspiracy under the Smith Act. Prosecu-
tor Maloney’s first indictment was so dubious that a second was drawn
up in January 1943 widening the charges and adding five defendants.
And even this indictment was supplanted by a third, which added five
106 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

German-American Bund members, thirty-five organizations, and

forty-two publications.
Attention should be paid to a small item on page 11 of the August 16,
1944, New York Times: “Ben Lindas, Government-appointed and un-
paid attorney for George Sylvester Viereck, a defendant in the mass
sedition trial, today asked Justice Edward C. Eicher to consider his
contention that publication of a book called ‘Blackmail,’ by Henry
Hoke, was prejudicing his client’s case. ‘Hundreds of thousands of cop-
ies of this book are being sold in the country,’ he said, describing it as
giving alleged evidence against the defendants which the prosecution
has not yet introduced.”
With delays and a mistrial—the judge died—the trial went on until
June 1947. As will be shown more completely in the next chapter on
the travails of Congressman Hamilton Fish, Mr. Hoke, who ran the
Reporter of Direct Mail Advertising, was one of those working with In-
trepid to destroy isolationism and chill the climate for those who op-
posed America’s global mission as defined by the British and their
American sympathizers. Viereck was unable to reconcile with his wife,
who had sold most of their assets and given the money to charity; his
reputation was destroyed.
The drunken J. B. Matthews of the Dies Committee was certainly
correct when he told Henson: “Griffith is as guilty as Viereck....” He
was also correct when he told Henson that Henry Hoke was working
with Griffith.°!
After the war the emerging Cold Warrior Christopher Emmet
wrote Sandy Griffith: “We got in some good blows against one form of
totalitarian aggression and if we can’t do likewise against the other
form of the same danger, perhaps that was too much to expect.”®
Sandy Griffith went into the resort hotel business with a place called
Holiday Lodge at Northport, Long Island. He remained active in the
nether world of the intelligence business.
 CHAPTER 6
See

Destroying
Congressman Fish

In the fall of 1940, BSC agent Sandy Griffith and his trusted coworkers
Christopher Emmet and Francis Henson were in Poughkeepsie, New
York, running the Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish.
In a letter to interventionist attorney Charles C. Burlingham, thanking
him for his financial assistance, Emmet pronounced the essence of the
entire British intelligence campaign against the isolationists: “If...we
can defeat Fish, who has been considered invincible for twenty years,
we will put the fear of God into every isolationist senator and congress-
man in the country.”!
This was the road to the bipartisan internationalist United States
foreign policy that shaped the world after World War II. The joint
British intelligence—Roosevelt administration effort to rid the Con-
gress of Hamilton Fish, an influential isolationist from Franklin
Roosevelt’s home district, was not unique. Given that the “BSC Ac-
count” says William Stephenson declared “a covert war” on the isola-
tionists, it is not surprising that other isolationist congressmen had
similar problems.?
For example, isolationist senators Wheeler of Montana and Nye of
South Dakota met defeat in campaigns that bear a striking resem-
blance to the problems that defeated Fish—great flows of outside
money and assistance for their opponents; surprise charges of wrong-
doing just before election time; virulent attacks untraceable to any-
one; the distribution of books in their districts charging them with
disloyalty.

107
108 ¢** DESPERATE DECEPTION

In his farewell address to the United States Senate on December 19,

1944, Senator Nye remarked ruefully on the tactics that had defeated
him: “Propaganda sponsored by irresponsible forces outside the state,
plus propaganda the source and responsibility for which could not be
traced to anyone, had many honest North Dakotans convinced that if I
was not actually on Hitler’s payroll, I should have been.”*
The elimination of Congressman Hamilton Fish is closely examined
here because it exhibits a wide range of the classic political warfare
tactics British intelligence used to defeat the isolationists. These at-
tacks on the isolationists not only preceded Pearl Harbor but contin-
ued afterward, because the British needed the United States to accept
its responsibilities as a world power. The war was rapidly exhausting
Britain’s resources. Only if the United States could be wed to the Brit-
ish cause could Britain look forward to prosperity and success in an
unstable and dangerous postwar world. Scholar Susan Ann Brewer ar-
gues persuasively that the historical foundation of this wedding, the
“special relationship” between the United States and Britain, was, in its
origins, largely a myth created by British propaganda to help fulfill
Britain’s needs for a strong partner.’
The dissenting voices of the isolationists were delegitimized, and, as
individuals, they either turned around, as did Senator Arthur Van-
denberg of Michigan, or they were largely driven from office. J. G.
Donnelly of the Foreign Office summed up the success of British intel-
ligence and propaganda in August 1945: “The Americans, without nec-
essarily knowing it, are bound to continue to see the world in large
measure through the British window.”® This was possible because Fish
and those like him who proposed that Americans view the world
through other than “the British window” had been driven from office
and respectability.
Hamilton Fish was born on December 7, 1888, in Garrison, New
York. He outlived almost all his adversaries, dying on January 18, 1991,
at 102 years old. His father, another Hamilton Fish, had been in Con-
gress, and his grandfather, yet another Hamilton Fish, had been Presi-
dent Grant’s secretary of state. His son, yet a fourth Hamilton Fish and
also a congressman, but more liberal, died in July 1996.
The Hamilton Fish of our interest was first elected, as a Republi-
can, to Congress in 1920 from a New York district that included
Dutchess, Orange, and Putnam counties; thus he was President
 Destroying Congressman Fish ¢e* 109

Franklin Roosevelt’s congressman. By the late 1930s, Hamilton Fish

was causing problems for the administration and the president. He
had become the ranking Republican on the House Rules Committee
and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.’
Ona trip to Europe in the summer of 1939, the very eve of World War
I, Fish met with officials of several governments. For these meetings
President Roosevelt wanted to prosecute Fish under the Logan Act, for
meddling in foreign affairs, and if that proved impossible to have some
congressman attack him. The prosecution did prove impossible, but
Congressman Clifton Woodrum of Virginia certainly warmed FDR’s
heart with a wonderfully uninhibited ad hominem attack on Fish.°
By 1940, Fish was being lumped together with two other isolation-
ists, Congressmen Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts and Bruce
Barton of Connecticut, in the president’s cadenced refrain “Martin,
Barton, and Fish.” Though British intelligence and the administration
may have been after him earlier, the concrete evidence of their con-
certed efforts to relieve Fish of his seat begins in the fall of 1940.
‘The Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish operated in
October and November 1940. It had an extremely small base, and
little of that was from Fish’s district. Only ninety-five contributors
gave the $4,616.95 (about $50,000 in 1997 dollars) collected for the
campaign. The largest contribution, of $1,000 or $500, depending on
the set of accounts, came from Sidney Spivak. Frank Kingdon, the
head of the militant New York chapter of the White Committee, gave
$250, and Frederick McKee of Fight for Freedom gave $500. McKee,
remember, was also the conduit for British intelligence funding for its
control of Station WRUL. Francis Henson gave $200, a rather hefty
amount in 1940.°
Offices for this campaign were at 100 Broadway, Newburgh, New
York, and 8 West 40th Street, New York City; the latter address housed
the League of Nations Association, the William Allen White Commit-
tee, and Sandy Griffith’s Market Analysts Inc. The chairman of the
Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish was the Rev. Leon
C. Birkhead, who was also the head of the British intelligence front
group Friends of Democracy. Christopher T. Emmet was secretary and
treasurer.!°
Sandy Griffith’s assistant Francis Henson wrote Ernest Cuneo a let-
ter on October 18, 1940, from the Campbell Hotel in Poughkeepsie,
110 ¢**® DESPERATE DECEPTION

New York: “I enclose some very interesting material issued in connec-

tion with the ‘Stop Fish’ campaign. Sandy and I are in Poughkeepsie
working on the matter and will probably be here until election day.”
There is a piece of the literature the Nonpartisan Committee put out
for the campaign in Drew Pearson’s papers. The cover of the four-page
pamphlet has photographs of Hitler, German Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop, and Fritz Kuhn of the German-American Bund.
One picture showing Kuhn and Fish together looks very incriminat-
ing. It is labeled “Hamilton Fish inspecting documents with Fritz
Kuhn (jailed ex-Bund leader), who was Fish’s invited guest at State
Constitutional Convention. The caption of the map (on the table) in-
dicates that it shows locations of Nazi Units and Camps.” The head-
lines say “VOTERS OF DUTCHESS, ORANGE AND PUTNAM COUNTIES Is
HAMILTON FisH Pro-Nazi?” The rest of the material is a wild array of
charges and out-of-context quotations.!!
Fish later explained that the photograph of Kuhn and himself had
been taken in 1938 when Kuhn appeared uninvited before Fish’s com-
mittee of the New York State Convention in Albany, which was inves-
tigating the advisability of a proposed ban on the drilling and arming of
paramilitary groups. Fish said that the photograph was taken while he
was talking with Kuhn.!”
Henson continued in his October 18, 1940, letter to Cuneo: “I
suggest you call this campaign to the attention of friends in Washing-
ton. I also hope that you will suggest to Walter [Winchell] that he put
something into his column about the matter and give us a plug over
the radio on Saturday night.”!> Cuneo also may have been the con-
nection to Drew Pearson in 1940, though by 1942 it is clear that
Sandy Griffith was sending material directly to Pearson. The number
of those strongly enough opposed to Fish to contribute money was
small—only eighty-four people gave $10 or more, and none of these
had an address in Fish’s district. Seventy-four of those who contrib-
uted $10 or more gave New York City addresses.!4
The opening salvo at Fish came from the New York Times, one of
the newspapers that greatly assisted BSC. In early October 1940, the
Times took an editorial stand supporting the movement to defeat Fish
and in the process put forth a striking metaphor. If Willkie was
elected, said the Times, Fish “would be an albatross around Willkie’s
necko#>
 Destroying Congressman Fish eee (11

Fish also had local problems when the usually Republican Middle-
town Times Herald urged a vote for his opponent, and the Poughkeepsie
Trade and Labor Council charged that Fish’s policies “can only be in-
terpreted as direct aid to the dictator nations.”!®
The real “October Surprise,” however, came on October 21, 1940,
with a “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column by Drew Pearson and
Robert S. Allen. These columnists suggested the Nazis were subsidiz-
ing Fish through inflated rents they were supposedly paying him for
property. The charge was false but could not help but erode voter con-
fidence in Fish.
Had all this effort by Sandy Griffith and his helpers Emmet and
Henson had any effect? Fish, after all, survived this 1940 onslaught, but
by only nine thousand votes, less than half his margin of victory in 1938
and his smallest margin in many years.!’ This was a very small margin
for an incumbent Republican in a Republican district.
Sandy Griffith wrote to Ernest Cuneo after the election: “Francis
probably reported to you on the Hamilton Fish fight. Our size-up of
the situation was correct—that $2,000 or $3,000 additional a week or
two ahead would have been sufficient to put it over. The local Demo-
cratic machine in the district was of practically no help.”!8
Agent Griffith also wrote a four-page memo titled “Recommenda-
tions by Sanford Griffith for Hamilton Fish Campaign and Continua-
tion,” dated “November 1940 (upon conclusion of campaign),” which
examined the congressman’s weaknesses and spelled out the best meth-
ods to attack him in the future.!? Griffith wrote: “Only those items are
included as could relate to campaigns against other congressmen.”
To read Griffith’s “recommendations” is to review the “political dif-
ficulties” not only of Fish but of numerous isolationists who in their
temerity ran afoul of the political warfare tactics of British intelligence.
It is little wonder that historians have had difficulty seeing the hid-
den strings or the puppeteers behind the curtains. A number of times in
Section III of his memo, Griffith emphasizes that attacks must appear
to be spontaneous, with the organizers staying offstage:

I. General Strategy Against Fish

(a) Make attacks from all sides, particularly from own district.
Keep as far as possible an indirect approach and avoid any
suggestion of central planning.
112 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Emphasize spontaneity.
Keep in background any protests emanating from New
York City, and protests from Jewish and foreign groups.”°
In Section IV, Griffith puts forth the basic British intelligence tactics
for black propaganda—propaganda that seems to be emanating from
independent sources. Also he recommends creating media tie-ins for
attacks on Fish, even if there are no real events that lend themselves to
the task:

IV. Dissemination
(a) Make selections from material to supply specific needs of
individual editors, radio commentators and columnists.
Use personal approach through best existing contacts to a
large number of newspaper people rather than using broad-
side routine releases or giving news exclusively with a single
paper.
Tie-in attacks with current events. Study, and where nec-
essary create, incidents which give sufficient news pegs on
which to hang a story....?!

Sandy Griffith had a number of specific recommendations based

upon the above principles. All of them involved staying out of sight and
letting others make the publicly visible maneuvers. His recommenda-
tion that Fish should be given the impression that he was a lame duck
who did not represent his constituents had almost immediate conse-
quences in the Lend-Lease debates of early 1941.
On February 17, 1941, Henry Luce minion and Fortune pollster
Elmo Roper released a public opinion poll of Fish’s constituents done
at the request of James H. Causey.”* According to Roper, only 20 per-
cent of the voters in Fish’s district agreed with their congressman’s for-
eign policy views. Even more significantly and conveniently, 78.6
percent of those polled favored the Lend-Lease bill, while Fish himself
had stated that his mail was heavily against Lend-Lease.
Fish’s biographer Richard Hanks writes of this poll that: “it probably
forced Fish in subsequent debates into a more moderate position on
foreign policy issues than he might otherwise have been inclined to
follow.”?> The validity of these polls should be judged against the fact
 Destroying Congressman Fish 9e* 113

Sandy
Griffith
sailing
in the
1930s.
Photo
courtesy of
Brenda
McCovey.

Sandy Griffith with his children after the death of his wife. The New York
license plate is from 1935. The Griffith children (left to right) are Peter,
Brenda, and Sandy. Photo courtesy of Brenda McCovey.
 Francis A. Henson was agent Sandy
Griffith’s principal assistant at Market
Analysts Inc. from 1940 to 1942.
Photo courtesy of Stephen R. Farrow.

Christopher T. Emmet worked with Sandy

Griffith to run fronts such as France Forever
and the Irish-American Defense Association
and to remove isolationist Congressman
Hamilton Fish from power.
Photo courtesy of Sara Fagin.

Dr. Albert Parry was British Intelli-

gence agent Sandy Griffith’ man at
the Committee to Defend America
Fight for Freedom office in Chi-
cago. In a classic intelligence
odyssey, Parry went on to the OSS
and then to the CIA fronts of the
1950s and 1960s. A Russian expert
and prolific writer, he taught at
Northwestern, Colgate, and Case
Western Reserve universities.
Photo courtesy of Thomas Parry.
 Destroying Congressman Fish e** 115

John Hunter, shown here as a

captain in Patton’s Third Army,
was American born but spent
most of his life in England. An
experienced scriptwriter, he
worked in Sandy Griffith’s
stable of scriptwriters for
Boston radio station WRUL.
Hunter also worked on the
opinion poll-rigging side ofthe
operation. He appears to have
been an MI-6 man assigned to
Griffith.
Photo courtesy of Brenda McCooey.

Richard Julius Maurice Frederick Carl

Wetzler Coit (G.100)—a name to be
reckoned with and certainly not to be
taken in vain, despite his cherubic looks. A
banker by profession, Dick Coit (or
“Coitus Interruptus” behind his back)
was chief of staff toWilliam Stephenson
at BSC. SOE Archives.
116 ?¢¢°e DESPERATE DECEPTION

President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard Vincent Astor’s yacht S.S. Nourmabal

on March 27, 1935. FDR, with his characteristic cigarette holder, is in the
center, looking down. Vincent Astor and his friends in the Room, later code-
named The Club, acted as an intelligence-gathering agency for FDR. During
World War II, Astor was also FDR’s area coordinator for New York intelli-
gence.

Vincent Astor, the Duke of Kent, Lady Clifford, FDR, and the Duchess of
Kent aboard Astor’s yacht Nourmahal on March 27, 1935.
 Destroying Congressman Fish °°° 117

Matthew Woll is second from left. To his left is William Green, president of
the AFL. Woll was the driving force for BSC’s anti-Nazi labor fronts. After
the war both Woll and Green were major figures in the Cold War anti-Com-
munist crusade. Beside Green is Alexander Kerensky, who held power in Rus-
sia briefly in 1917 before the Bolsheviks pushed him out. George Meany
Memorial Archives.

Picketers from the BSC

front Fight for Freedom
outside an America First
rally in September 1941.
Driving isolationists such as
Congressman Hamilton
Fish from public life was a
major BSC objective.
Princeton University
Libraries.
118 ¢**® DESPERATE DECEPTION

David K. Niles was the White House contact for

British Security Coordination and the BSC front
Fight for Freedom.

Robert Emmet Sherwood worked closely with

BSC head William Stephenson, even showing him
President Roosevelt’s speeches before they were
delivered. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Walter Winchell’s column and radio show gave

him the largest following of any American news
commentator. Winchell had been working against
the Nazis since the 1930s. Winchell and his ghost
writer Ernest Cuneo worked closely with BSC.

» \
Wendell Willkie, an active Democrat and a man
who had never held public office, was suddenly
and unexpectedly nominated by the Republicans
in 1940, thus depriving the voters of any real
choice on international policy in the November
1940 elections.
 Destroying Congressman Fish #e* 119

Celebrated political
columnist Walter
Lippmann, shown
here with his wife
Helen Byrne
Armstrong Lippmann,
was one of the
prominent journalists
who helped BSC.
Mrs. Lippmann’s
father was a highly
visible member of the
BSC front, the
American-Irish
Defense Association.
Her sister was married
to BSC agent Ivar
Bryce. Yale University
Library.

On November 30, 1946, Sir William Stephenson received the

Medal of Merit, America’s highest civilian award, from his World
War II collaborator William Donovan, the wartime head of the
OSS. Looking on are Donovan’s OSS assistant Col. G. Edward
Buxton and Lady Stephenson. This photo and the accompanying
article in the New York Times give away a great deal to the careful
reader or those in the know. AP/Wide World Photo.
120 °**e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Ernest Cuneo was the

liaison between BSC,
the White House, the
FBI, the Treasury, and
the OSS. He is shown
here with BSC staff
member Margaret
Watson, who became
his wife. Photo courtesy
ofJonathan Cuneo.

John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (left), and banker Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan

raise a glass at the Associated Canadian Organization of New York dinner,
June 18, 1941. Lamont was a major force in the BSC front, the Committee to
Defend America by Aiding the Allies and in the creation of Wendell Willkie.
The Rockefellers were major contributors to Willkie and to BSC and Fight
for Freedom. Baker Library, Harvard Business School.
 Destroying Congressman Fish °*¢ 121

that despite U.S. entry into World War II and a ferocious campaign
against him, Fish survived the election of 1942, and it was only on the
third try in 1944, abetted by a redistricting, that the administration and
British intelligence were able, narrowly, to rid the Congress of him.
V. Specific Activities Recommended
(a) Local:
Keep alive the several volunteer anti-Fish committees in
his district.
...let the local committees pass resolutions and communi-
cate them to the local press. Let them register in a variety of
ways that Fish does not represent opinion in his district and
that he went back to Congress a lame duck. Let local Legion
Posts keep alive his obstructionists record on conscription.

Griffith’s thoughts on action to be taken in Washington propose

“ganging up on Fish” with the administration. He was a pollster, and
public opinion strategies seem to have rarely been out of his mind.
Since Ernest Cuneo was always kept abreast of Henson and Griffith’s
activities, this coordination was relatively easy. Franklin Roosevelt ab-
solutely delighted in the thought of “Cooking Ham Fish’s Goose”:

(b) In Washington
Whenever Fish pushes into the news provide the Press
with data showing Fish up as out of step with his constituents.
Pin on the pro-Nazi and obstructionist labels. Cooperate
with the Administration and hostile colleagues to assure their
ganging up on Fish whenever he obstructs.

But more than one can play this polling game, even if not as effec-
tively. While the interventionists could hide behind the names of “sci-
entific” polling organizations and get their polls wide dissemination,
the isolationists were more restricted. But Fish as a method of self-
defense did make an effort by promoting his own advocacy poll. On
June 18, 1941, Fish mailed 107,000 franked letters to his constituents.
Accompanying the letter, which warned of the dangers of war, was a
stamped return postcard; it allowed the voter two options: “I am op-
posed to the United States entering the war,” or “I am in favor of the
United States entering the war.” Soon the results began to flow back to
122 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Fish, and even he professed to be amazed by the 9-1 vote for staying
out of the war: “I want the people to know the facts and not be fooled.
I was fooled myself. I thought there was a much greater desire in my
district to get us into war. I would not have been surprised if the poll
had shown as high as one-third of my district for war, yet when the
votes are counted, it discloses 9-1 among the plain people.”?*
The bureau of publicity of the Democratic National Committee re-
sponded quickly, if circuitously, by sending a “suggestion” to various
Democratic newspapers calling Fish’s poll a “naive enterprise” and say-
ing that if the poll had been differently worded the response would
have been “overwhelmingly to the contrary.”?* This may well have
been true. As mentioned in Chapter 4, interventionist pollster Hadley
Cantril emphasized the importance of the wording when he wrote
David Niles at the White House of his efforts to suggest questions to
Gallup that would get the desired interventionist answers.
Sandy Griffith had a number of other suggestions. They all relied on
the ability to manipulate the press and to give the impression the
movement against isolationists like Fish was nationwide:
(c) Smoke him out in advance:
1) By having the newspapers send around reporters to in-
terview him.
2) By having patriotic committees send around delega-
tions accompanied by reporters to report on the interview.
3) Where possible link Fish in with the most disreputable
leaders in the movements he sponsors.
4) On his specific obstructionist stands get people from
several parts of the country to write him protest letters....7°
There were other harsh suggestions made by agent Griffith, and
most of them happened to Fish over the next four years as his political
career lurched from one disaster to another. Some of Sandy’s strategies
were based on legal harassment: “Where: Fish makes libelous state-
ments about others, give the injured party able counsel and try to get
litigation started as a peg on which to hang further publicity.”
Others were more overtly political: “Engineer...debates” while of-
fering “able speakers to rebut him.” “Opinion Polls are a source of
information, a propaganda weapon...” and “are accepted by the news-
papers as news and are effective propaganda.” Griffith also suggested
 Destroying Congressman Fish #9° 123

a “Combat Fund” of at least $5,000 ready “at all times for anti-Fish
activity.”*/
In August 1941 there was more trouble for Fish in his 26th Con-
gressional District. More than five hundred citizens of the town of
Warwick signed a letter charging that Fish’s activities were aiding
Hitler. The upshot was the scheduling of a debate. And there was no
respite for the beleaguered congressman. Within days after the first
challenge, another group, in Amenia, New York, asked Fish to debate
Lewis Mumford; the Mumford debate took place on August 30, in
the local high school. The New York City press was well represented.
Mumford had been one of the original members of Sandy Griffith’s
Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish. Mumford was also
one of the sponsors of Fight for Freedom.’® The New York Times re-
ported that among the throng of spectators were Mrs. Franklin Roose-
velt and Mrs. Henry Morgenthau; Herbert Agar and Christopher
Emmet had traveled from Connecticut. Agar, we have seen earlier, was
one of the leading lights of Fight for Freedom.?? Emmet was secretary
and treasurer of Sandy Griffith’s committee against Fish.
Mumford promoted the standard Fight for Freedom position that
Hitler threatened everything America stood for, that the United States
should immediately declare war on Hitler, and that Fish’s isolation
aided the Nazis. Fish talked about the costs of war in terms of money
and lives and about how those wishing to get the United States into the
war were dominated by Communists, refugees, international bankers,
and interventionist newspapers.??
Fish barely had time to recover from the tumultuous gathering at
Amenia when on September 19, 1941, he debated Harvard professor of
government William Yandell Elliot at Warwick, New York. Professor
Elliot went right to the heart of the matter, saying Fish was a “dupe of
Nazism.” He drew cheers for his sly play on Fish’s fellow isolationist
Senator Burton Wheeler, saying that Fish was not a fifth columnist,
just a fifth-Wheeler.
The New York Times reported that the crowd was mostly interven-
tionist. Although there was not a “good radio tie in” as Sandy Griffith
had suggested, Fish was persuaded to do the debate with Elliot over
again two nights later for a national radio audience. It should be made
clear here that Hamilton Fish was not an admirer of Adolf Hitler, was
not an anti-Semite, and was not pro-Axis. He was vociferously opposed
124 ese [DESPERATE DECEPTION

to all dictatorships and had consistently spoken out against anti-

Semitism.
Congressman Fish had little rest. By the summer of 1941, British
Security Coordination had organized a well-executed campaign against
the free use of the mails—the franking privilege—by isolationist con-
gressmen.*? Interestingly, Sandy Griffith had mentioned the possibility
of attacking Fish on the franking issue in his November 1940 “Recom-
mendations” but thought it would be difficult because an attack on Fish
would “threaten prerogatives of all members.”
British intelligence officer Montgomery Hyde’s The Quiet Canadian,
which contains about 85 percent of the secret “BSC Account,” gives
this background on the franking privilege controversy: “Early in 1941,
a friend of Stephenson [Intrepid], who was in the advertising business,
drew his attention to the fact that certain isolationist congressmen
were using the ‘frank’ for distributing free through the mails not only
their own isolationist speeches but others that had been specially writ-
ten by Nazi propagandists.”3?
The original “BSC Account” amends this slightly to say that Ste-
phenson had a friend in the direct mail business. This “friend of
Stephenson” was undoubtedly Henry Hoke (1894-1970), the publisher
of the Reporter ofDirect Mail Advertising. The Dies Committee had also
spotted Hoke’s work for British intelligence, its drunken and talkative
chief investigator,J.B. Matthews, told Francis Henson in 1943.34
This franking controversy was not Hoke’s first attempt to stem the
flow of German mail propaganda. A year before he had appealed to
the Post Office to issue a fraud order to prevent the German Library
of Information from mailing, to 100,000 readers, its eight-page “Facts
in Review,” edited ably, perhaps too ably for his own good, by pro-
pagandist George Sylvester Viereck. Hoke had on that occasion also
demanded that the bulletins distributed by the German Railroads In-
formation Bureau be censored to prevent the country from being
flooded by German propaganda.*°
Hoke’s June 1940 call for censorship had come at a time when the
British were desperate to stem the flow of German propaganda and
improperly interpreted news. Given proper news management and
spin, even military disasters like Dunkirk could be portrayed as vic-
tories of a sort. But these wordy edifices constructed by British pro-
paganda were not very sturdy, and the last thing they needed was
 Destroying Congressman Fish @e* 125

comparison with objective fact, to say nothing of contrary propaganda.

At the time of Dunkirk the German news was actually much more
straightforward and factual than the British. Stopping the flow of un-
timely news and film from Europe was a major British challenge in
June 1940.
Henry Hoke authored two books of interest here: Blackmail (issued
in 1944) promised “the inside story of the conspiracy to disrupt
America”; It’s a Secret (1945) laid bare subversive organizations and
their activities. This is the book that German propagandist George
Sylvester Viereck’s attorney said was prejudicing the jury against his
client. These books were written under the auspices of an obscure
group that had Hoke as executive chairman, the Graphic Arts Victory
Committee.*°
In the franking controversy the charges against Fish were just part
of British Security Coordination’s campaign to attack prominent iso-
lationist members of Congress. The campaign kicked off in May
1941 with an open letter from Henry Hoke accusing Senator Burton
Wheeler of misusing the franking privilege.*”
By July 25, 1941, this campaign merited two columns above the fold
on the front page of the New York Times: “Stimson Accuses Wheeler of
Actions Near Treason, Citing Anti-War Cards Franked to Soldiers by
Senator....” Hoke’s charges against Wheeler are mentioned in a story
tagged on to the Stimson charges. Fish became embroiled in the con-
troversy over misuse of the franking privilege on August 26, 1941. This
charge dogged him for the rest of his congressional career.
The first accusation came in the form ofa press release from Fight for
Freedom accusing Congressman Fish of allowing William C. Pelly, an
anti-Semite and leader of the fascist Silver-shirts, to use his frank. Fish’s
franked envelope addressed to “FIGHT FOR JEWDOM COMMITTEE” (which
still resides in the FFF Papers at Princeton) contained advertising for
such anti-Semitic works as the “Protocols of the Learned Elders of
Zion” and a magazine named Liberation. FFF also wrote in its press
release that when reached by telephone, Fish said: “But it doesn’t bother
me any.... There’s been too much Jewism going around anyway....”°8
Fish responded immediately in a press release of his own. His ver-
sion of the telephone interview differed notably from the Fight for
Freedom version; he wrote: “No American in public life has made
more speeches against religious and racial persecution in Germany,
126 °¢°*° DESPERATE DECEPTION

Romania and at home than I have. I was the author of the Zionist Reso-
lution for a Homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine that passed
Congress in 1923. I challenge anyone to show one single utterance of
mine that was anti-Semitic during the twenty-one years that I have
been in Congress.”>?
The clarity of Fish’s very positive record on Jewish issues and issues
of discrimination is undoubtedly the reason that only PM printed Fight
for Freedom’s accusations.*° Though he was able to deal with this ac-
cusation rather easily, it was not the end of his troubles.
The episode had begun when isolationist Prescott Dennett, the
chairman of the Islands for War Debts committee, became alarmed
that the contents of his office were about to be subpoenaed. Twenty
mailbags were then transferred by truck from Dennett’s office to Fish’s.
But Fish’s office refused to accept the bags. After some confusion, eight
of these bags were left outside Fish’s storage room and the remainder
were sent to the office of America First.
This “was observed,” writes Montgomery Hyde in The Quiet Cana-
dian, “by one of Stephenson’s agents who had been keeping watch.”
This suggests that Intrepid had someone in Fish’s office, or that there
was a telephone tap. The Washington Post and PM conspicuously car-
ried the story, and with much fanfare; the PM headline read “HAM FISH
SNATCHES EVIDENCE WANTED IN U.S. NAZI HUNT.”
This became a continuing story in both papers. The Washington Post
reporter, Dillard Stokes, opened the mailbags, though he had no per-
mission to do so. Both the Washington Post and PM were able to obtain
inside information on the supposedly secret grand jury proceedings for
their stories.*!
It finally came out that Fish’s clerk George Hill was the guilty party,
and he was convicted and sentenced to two to six years for lying under
oath about the franked mail, his relations to German propagandist
George Sylvester Viereck, and $12,000 he had received. Prosecutor
William Power Maloney, who worked with British intelligence on this
prosecution, also got in some good political blows in early 1942, when
he finally got Hamilton Fish on the witness stand in the trial of George
Sylvester Viereck.
Fish admitted he knew Viereck, though he had not seen him in a year
and a half, but denied that any Nazi propaganda had gone out of his
office with his “consent and approval.” Prosecutor Maloney asked if
 Destroying Congressman Fish °*® 127

Fish had read a Viereck book on German propaganda. “Isn’t it a co-

incidence,” asked Mr. Maloney, “that the views on Nazi propaganda
expressed in that book are similar to those you have held as a Congress-
man?” Mr. Fish, leaning forward in the witness chair, retorted hotly:
“The man who made that statement lies.” “Are you referring to Mr.
Viereck?” inquired the prosecutor. “I am referring to you,” Mr. Fish
shot back.”
Wrangling with a Justice Department prosecutor was not a good
way for Fish to start an election year, but British intelligence’s Sandy
Griffith and the Justice Department also had an interesting “October
Surprise” ready for him. The administration and British intelligence
and its fronts gathered to finish Fish.
They were all back in 1942 working under the name Independent
Committee of the Twenty-sixth District, certainly a wonderful name
for an organization run by an intelligence agency. The chairman was
James Causey, who had put forth the early 1941 public opinion poll
that had thrown Fish off balance during the Lend-Lease debate.
As might be expected with such a carefully organized campaign,
there was also an “August Surprise” five days before the August pri-
mary. On this occasion, Dillard Stokes, who had written the Washing-
ton Post articles in BSC’s campaign against misuse of the franking
privilege, charged Fish with income tax evasion. Fish, wrote Stokes,
had never declared $25,000 he had received from Rafael Trujillo, the
Dominican Republic dictator. Caught off guard, as was surely in-
tended, Fish said he had lost $12,500 of the money, along with some of
his own, in an oil investment. He had returned the rest.
He said that he had consulted the Internal Revenue Service concern-
ing this transaction and had been told he need not declare nor pay taxes
on this money. What Fish said may have been true, but the exposure of
his dealing with a man such as ‘Trujillo left many wondering about his
judgment.”
Despite the best efforts of the Independent Committee of the
Twenty-sixth District and all those who harassed and vilified Fish, the
candidacy of the major contender, Republican Augustus W. Bennett,
was a dismal failure. In the August 11, 1942, Republican primary, Fish
overwhelmed Bennett by two and a half to one. Fish had a plurality of
two to one over the combined votes of the other three contenders for
the nomination.
128 °¢®e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Publicly undaunted, the anti-Fish forces announced that they had

just begun to fight. Very quickly they met to map out strategy and unite
behind the Democratic candidate, Hoyt. The Independent Committee
of the Twenty-sixth District, run by agent Sandy Griffith and Intrepid’s
“friend in advertising” Henry Hoke, disbanded in mid-August 1942.
But Griffith and Hoke were not quitting. They moved on to produce
similar tough attacks in the autumn under the banner of the Hoyt for
Congress Committee of Putnam Valley Democratic Club, Inc.
Fish confronted numerous attempts at character assassination in Sep-
tember and October, all of them the managed events in which British
intelligence specialized and which Sandy Griffith had recommended. In
an open letter to Republican voters, Bennett, whom Fish had just
trounced in the Republican primary, announced that he was endorsing
the Democrat Hoyt. The national magazines Collier’s and The Nation
carried articles suggesting that the country would be better off without
Congressman Fish.* Fish also found himself opposed by the CIO and,
for the first time in his career, the AFL locals in his district.
Though these problems all fit into Griffith’s overall list of recom-
mendations, their exact origins are not clear. In the case of the “Octo-
ber Surprises,” there is unequivocal documentation linking British
intelligence agents and the political bombs bursting over the Fish cam-
paign; Drew Pearson kept all the pertinent correspondence, which
now resides in his papers at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas.
Here are the highlights of a letter from Intrepid’s friend Henry
Hoke to Drew Pearson. Attached to the letter are samples of the litera-
ture the committee was releasing, tying Fish to the Nazis. The major
purpose of the letter, however, was to prepare Pearson to deliver the
“October Surprise” the British agents hoped would be fatal to Fish.*¢
Hoke points out that Franklin Roosevelt’s Justice Department was
the secret source that had supplied the British agents with the ammuni-
tion with which to prompt Drew Pearson: “...so far as Iknow now, we
are not supposed to reveal the source of our information, but the fol-
lowing five checks were issued by Henson Sturm to Hamilton Fish,
and the Department of Justice has the checks....You can check with
Sanford Griffith on Henson’s record as a wholesaler of Nazi propa-
ganda....Sanford Griffith claims that Sturm was one of the chief pay-
off men for the Nazi government....Sanford Griffith has reams of
reports on both Sturm and Henson, but those reports aren’t available
 Destroying Congressman Fish *2* 129

today....1 am told that Fish could not possibly sue for Libel....I am
sending you, Drew, tear sheets of the second ad we ran on Fish in the
Putnam Valley Courier....1 am sending you also a photostat of the map-
chart that will appear in the third ad....”47
The tear sheets Henry Hoke enclosed with his letter include a bla-
tant full-page picture-and-captions layout featuring short biographies
of seemingly every Nazi or Nazi sympathizer who could remotely be
tied to Hamilton Fish: “Prescott Dennett has been indicted...had
nearly daily contact with George Hill in Hamilton Fish’s office...; Wil-
liam Griffin recently been indicted...; Caviar Auhagen is now in jail...;
Charles Hudson was recently indicted for sedition...; Fritz Kuhn
leader of the Bund....” Twenty of these vignettes certainly give the im-
pression that Fish associated with few people who were not Nazis or
under indictment or in jail.
The second “ad” shows an outline map of the United States with
Nazi propaganda going to Viereck and from Viereck to Fish’s office
from which the map shows the propaganda being distributed to various
people, most of whom were under indictment, already convicted, or, in
the case of Father Coughlin’s Social Justice, banned.
Drew Pearson, who is listed in the “BSC Account” as one of BSC’s
friends in the press, made the charges in his October 26, 1942, “Wash-
ington Merry-Go-Round” column that Congressman Fish had re-
ceived $3,100 from German propagandists in the Romanoff Caviar
Company. Fish was incensed by this “despicable eleventh hour attack”
and did what Sandy Griffith had hoped for in his “Recommendations”
back in November 1940—he laid himself open to the lawsuit that
Griffith had always hoped to entangle him in.
Henry Hoke rushed the good news to Drew Pearson in a note and
a letter, both dated October 29, 1942: “Dear Drew, Just a note. Sandy
Griffith just told me that he thinks you have a darn good case for a
libel suit against Fish. It would be a wonderful case of man bites
dog.”48 In his longer letter, Hoke was more specific: “I am rushing to
you by air mail, something you should see if you haven’t seen it
already....notice that Mr. Fish says of you:—‘Drew Pearson, in my
opinion, is the most contemptible, dishonest, and dishonorable smear
propagandist in America and by inference the most colossal liar in the
nation.’ When I got word yesterday of the Fish statement about you,
I went over to Sandy Griffith’s office and he let me see all of the de-
130 **e DESPERATE DECEPTION

tailed report on Sturm, Mack, Fish and Von Gienanth....Since Fish

was claiming that Sturm was a good American citizen, I figured we
would have to get some sort of quick action to have Sturm put on the
pan. So, I called Bill Maloney and gave him a summary of all the re-
ports. Bill then decided to issue his subpoenas (there wasn’t any
chance to get an indictment before the election). Confidentially,
Sandy Griffith is making up a full report of the Mack angle for Bill
Maloney. He is sending the report tonight.... The thing is loaded
with dynamite and I think it is a much better story than the Westrick
affair of some time back.”*?
Hoke’s mention of “the Westrick affair” also marks him out as an
insider, because the Westrick affair was from start to finish a British
intelligence operation. Dr. Gerhard Westrick was thought by BSC to
be a high-grade German agent, though he was registered with the U.S.
State Department as the commercial counselor at the German embassy
in Washington. Westrick had disturbingly good contacts in American
business circles, particularly at ITT and Texaco Oil Company. These
facts were written into news stories and placed in BSC’s favorite news-
paper, the New York Herald Tribune, with headlines such as “HITLER
AGENT ENSCONCED IN WESTCHESTER.”
Westrick was “deluged with abusive letters and telephone calls.” The
angry crowd that gathered outside his home led his landlord to ask
Westrick to leave. BSC-instigated action also led to Westrick’s losing
his driver’s license and finally his recall to Germany. One upshot of this
operation by Intrepid’s people was that the Herald Tribune was nomi-
nated for the Pulitzer Prize for these planted articles.°°
As for Congressman Hamilton Fish, the voters, of course, were in-
nocent of the coordination between British intelligence agent Sandy
Griffith and Special Assistant to the Attorney General William Power
Maloney and columnist Drew Pearson. What the public saw was the
headlines of October 29, 1942: “U.S. Jury CaL_s 2 N.Y. EXECUTIVES
TO EXPLAIN CHECKS FOR Rep. FIsH” or “Two SUBPOENAED IN FISH
Inqutry.”>!
There was more to come for the harried Fish on the Monday before
the election. That morning the five-column headline in the Beacon
News of Beacon, New York, in Fish’s district, announced: “WRITER
SEEKS $250,000 LiseL DAMAGE FROM Han Fisu; ‘Liar’ REMARK Is Basis
or Lawsur.”°?
 Destroying Congressman Fish °** 131

This was a bold and imaginative effort by British intelligence and the
White House as they pursued their mutual goal of relieving Ham Fish
of his congressional seat. Immediate results, however, were rather dis-
appointing. Ham Fish defeated his Democrat-American Labor Party
opponent, Ferdinand A. Hoyt, by 4,000 votes out of a total of approxi-
mately 100,000.
In Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During
World War II, historian Robert Divine calls this 1942 election a “jolting
setback” for Roosevelt and the internationalists. “The election,” he
writes, “created widespread gloom. English observers feared that the
United States would once again repudiate its responsibilities as a world
leadermea’
The Hoyt for Congress Committee, however, did not seem publicly
discouraged and continued to try to damage Fish as much as possible
by emphasizing the large number who voted against Fish and by con-
tinuing to tie him to the Nazis: “The 44,691 citizens in the Twenty-
sixth District saw the defeat of Hamilton Fish as a matter of national
importance. They properly construed the broadcast from Berlin in
August, praising the renomination of Fish, and the broadcast from ‘To-
kyo Sunday night, 1 November, urging his re-election, as signs which
lent weight to their opinion.”*4
In a letter dated November 7, 1942, G. F. Hansen-Sturm, assistant
treasurer of the Romanoff Caviar Company, wrote to Drew Pearson
denying most of the “facts” in the article, starting with the misspell-
ing of the family name and pointing out that the payments allegedly
made to Fish were made before the United States entered the war
and had actually gone to the National Committee to Keep America
Out of Foreign Wars, which included fifty congressman, one of
whom was Fish as chairman. This letter must have prompted Pearson
to call Sandy Griffith, because at the bottom of the letter, in what
appears to be Pearson’s hand, is Sandy Griffith’s address and phone
number.*?
Drew Pearson wrote two pertinent letters on November 12, 1942,
one to Henry Hoke, the other to Sandy Griffith. To Sandy Griffith he
wrote: “...also, Iwould appreciate a little advice as to whether I should
go ahead with this Ham Fish suit or not. Personally I am inclined
against it. Ihave enough to do writing the column, and the less I see of
the courts the better.”*°
132 *®e® DESPERATE DECEPTION

To Henry Hoke, Pearson wrote about the failed campaign against

Fish: “Thanks for your good letter. I sure am sorry we didn’t put things
across, but we did the best we could. Anyway it was a good race.”
Pearson wrote further that he would be willing to take the libel case
against Fish to trial if there was anything to gain. Sandy Griffith wrote
back to Pearson on November 19. He had “discussed your problem
with a couple of wise lawyers,” who feared that in a trial Fish’s attorneys
might be able to prevent Pearson from making “Fish’s Nazi affilia-
tions” the major issue. “But dragging the case out indefinitely might
have some value...it would offset any capital Fish might make of your
dropping the case.”*”
Pearson wrote back agreeing with Sandy and his wise lawyer friends.
Fish was to be left with the suit hanging over his head as a distraction.*®
In The Hawks of World War I, author Mark Lincoln Chadwin identi-
fies members of the executive committee of Fight for Freedom who
were the most popular speakers: Herbert Agar, Alexander Woollcott,
Rex Stout, and Wendell Willkie. Of these we have a good record of
Wendell Willkie, the nominal leader of the Republican Party, and his
work with President Franklin D. Roosevelt to dispose of Republican
Congressman Fish.
A February 21, 1942, note from President Roosevelt inviting Willkie
to lunch says: “By the way, it seems to me that the problem of Fish is
just as much a problem as it was when we talked it over many months
ago. I have various recommendations for candidates.”°?
Roosevelt suggested Warren Lawes as Fish opponent. Roosevelt to
Willkie April 15: “I did enjoy that little party the other night a lot. We
did not get very far on the Ham Fish Matter.” Willkie reported back on
April 27, and then on June 2 he reported the death of Dan Gleason,
who had been helping against Fish—‘“since which time the whole mat-
ter has been in some confusion.”
That the anti-Fish effort consumed considerable effort and time is
also recorded by FDR’s assistant William Hassett: “July 11, [1942,] Sat-
urday: Told me Wendell Willkie was coming up from New York to see
him—state and congressional politics. The Boss and Wendell Willkie
have this in common: they both hate Ham Fish and Tom Dewey.”®!
The British had high hopes that Willkie could help them eliminate
American isolationism. Historian Christopher Thorne is certainly cor-
rect on British hopes for the Hoosier: “... Wendell Willkie, on whom
 Destroying Congressman Fish 2° 133

considerable thought and care was already being focused by Whitehall

...and who, it was hoped, could help prevent his party [the Republi-
cans] from adopting an isolationist attitude after the war.”
The Foreign Office and the British ambassador in Washington were
in turn working closely with Intrepid and BSC. In his foreword to the
secret “BSC Account,” the “Bible,” Sir William Stephenson writes:
“,..one feels impelled to make specific mention of the close coopera-
tion afforded BSC by H.M. Embassy in Washington—without which
much that was achieved could not have been. Lord Lothian’s intimate
concern in the early days proved invaluable; and so, too, did the unfail-
ing support subsequently given by Lord Halifax.”°?
According to the notes of Willkie’s extremely friendly biographer
Ellsworth Barnard of the Lord Halifax file in Willkie’s papers:
“Shows W.[illkie] was working very closely with the British embassy
early in 1941 getting confidential information for use in his speeches
about aid.”°*
This cooperation extended into 1942, and it specifically concerned
Willkie’s efforts to get rid of the isolationists, Fish in particular. Isaiah
Berlin was the political commentator in the British embassy in Wash-
ington. ‘Io wit:

March 20, 1942—Willkie, whom I saw a few days ago, is do-

ing all he can to prevent the inevitable reaction against the
Administration in forthcoming congressional elections from
accruing to benefit of isolationists groups who are active un-
derground.
4 June 1942—Willkie told a member of my staff recently that
he thought the extreme isolationists would be gradually
eliminated from the Republican Party in the course of the
primaries....Fish would probably not be nominated though
there might be a hard fight for this.... Willkie expects the Re-
publicans to lose fifteen to twenty in the House when the
election takes place.®

So here again was the three-cornered relationship that made so

many of these operations a success and moved the United States irre-
vocably into the international arena—British Security Coordination,
the Anglophile elite, and the White House.
134 eee J)ESPERATE DECEPTION

Fish was finally defeated in 1944, but then he was faced by an addi-
tional burden, which when coupled to his other problems proved to be
more than he could overcome. This problem was created in 1942. It
was then that the New York state legislature chopped Fish’s district—
Orange, Dutchess, and Putnam counties—into three pieces. Putnam
and Dutchess counties were linked to other counties already having
representatives. Since he lived at Garrison in Putnam County, Fish
would have been stuck in a race against an incumbent. To avoid this,
Fish announced, in early 1942, that he would be moving his residence
to Newburgh in Orange County, the 29th Congressional District,
which would not have an incumbent. Although this change of resi-
dence avoided the race against an incumbent, it placed him at a disad-
vantage and opened him to ridicule by his opponents.
Other problems continued to dog the congressman. There was an
old familiar one over Fish’s misuse of the congressional frank. ‘This
variant of the problem apparently had its origin in 1942 when a booklet
was published—by the Seventeenth District American Legion Ameri-
canism Committee of California—making the standard charges of mis-
use of the franking privilege.
Since Fish, a well-decorated officer (Silver Star, French Croix de
Guerre) of World War I, had been active in American Legion affairs,
this was a serious blow. But far worse was a resolution passed at the
1943 annual Legion convention in Omaha, Nebraska, charging that
Fish had allowed the misuse of his frank for subversive and un-Ameri-
can activities. This sorely distracted Fish, who felt obliged to make a
lengthy defense of himself at Indianapolis, Indiana.
Only in May 1944 did the Legion announce the report of a special
committee that exonerated Fish completely. But this was late in the
game, and though false, the charges had taken their toll in time and
travel and added to the incremental damage that all the charges had
recorded.
As in the past, Fish had several visible and vigorous antagonists in
this election. Probably the most visible was New York governor and
presidential aspirant Dewey. He was under great pressure from the in-
ternationalist Willkie wing of the Republican Party to endorse a post-
war international organization and to attack Fish. As late as July 26,
1944, he refused four times in one day to comment on Fish’s reelection.
Eventually Dewey came out against Fish.
 Destroying Congressman Fish @°* 135

The other antagonists were Helen Hayes, one of the leaders of the
theater, radio, and arts division of Fight for Freedom,*’ playwright
Maxwell Anderson, and Rex Stout, who had participated in other BSC
fronts and had worked directly for BSC on the anti-I.G. Farben book
Sequel to the Apocalypse. Anderson dredged up all the old charges and
ran them in advertisements in several papers and even published a
poem, “Mr. Fish Crosses the River,” in The New Yorker, ridiculing
Fish’s change of residence.®
The breaking up of his district and the incessant charges—usually
false or wildly misleading—all took their toll. In the election Fish was
defeated by five thousand votes. Historian Richard Hanks in summing
up this defeat has written: “Fish lost the election because of his own
errors of judgement and because of the swirl of controversy that de-
scended around him—whether the charges had substance or not. He
was a part of another era in American history and his removal from the
Congress, while hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of international-
ism, was a notification that the electorate was moving into a new age
with new expectations.”°
I would argue that it would have been difficult for any one person to
have the judgment and political acumen necessary to long survive the
incessant, constantly shifting, all-pervasive political warfare directed
against Fish by British intelligence with the connivance of the White
House. At that, it took three major efforts by his foes finally to defeat
him. Christopher Emmet’s words before the election of 1940 bear re-
peating, for they are the very essence of what the defeat of Fish meant:
“Tf...we can defeat Fish, who has been considered invincible for twenty
years, we will put the fear of God into every isolationist senator and
congressman in the country.”’?

Given the collective forces aligned against him and their ruthless tac-
tics, the duration of Fish’s survival is a tribute to his tenacity and energy
and perhaps even to his inflexibility. We will now examine a senator
who, by demonstrating greater flexibility, enjoyed more survivability.
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 CHAPTER 7
eee

Uncle Arthur

There is no question that the British planted Kay Sum-

mersby, the British WAC, on Eisenhower, and there was the
neat way in which the British foisted Mitzi Sims, wife of the
Canadian counselor, on Sen. Arthur Vandenberg and later,
the attractive British widow, Mrs. Paterson [sic].
—Drew Pearson!

British intelligence operations on Senator Arthur Vandenberg were

based on a very simple human assumption—those who are sleeping
with a senator are most likely to have his ear. In recent years the Ameri-
can public has been treated to a catalog of hairdressers, movie stars,
models, and would-be models whose liaisons with statesmen and
would-be statesmen have enlivened the pages of the national press.
There is a major difference, however, between the amorous revelations
of the recent past and those of this account of the World War II era.
With the possible exception of Judith Campbell Exner, John F.
Kennedy’s paramour, who acted as a courier between Kennedy and the
Mafia, none of these recently revealed lovers was the emissary of a great
power. They were, by most accounts, independent and unaffiliated
United States citizens, not special pleaders for a foreign power. Their
endeavors posed little threat to the political direction of the state.
The bedmates discussed in this chapter are something quite dif-
ferent: they were the covert intelligence agents and lobbyists of a for-
eign power. Although other high officials and even office workers were

Ne¥
138 °8®® DESPERATE DECEPTION

targeted for similar attention by British intelligence, this chapter ex-

plores the efforts made to track and influence Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan.
Senator Vandenberg’s disposition toward the British was extremely
important to them during the period 1939-49, and had he won the
Republican presidential nomination in 1940, it would have been even
more important. Certainly his attitude toward Great Britain would
not be allowed to dangle on mere chance or personal whim, particu-
larly when there were such fine opportunities to give chance and
whim a nudge.
To some extent these women operated as moles, ferreting out infor-
mation from Senator Vandenberg and his colleagues, but far more im-
portant, they were “agents of influence.” Ernest Cuneo, code name
Crusader, the liaison between British intelligence, the White House,
OSS, the Treasury, and the Justice Department, was quite correct when
he wrote: “An Agent of Influence is rated far above even the mightiest
of Moles.”?
Historians have long noted that Vandenberg, a prominent isolation-
ist in the late 1930s, had a surprising change of heart in the mid-1940s.
Thereafter he helped champion the legislation that involved the
United States in the affairs of the world and prevented it from retreat-
ing into itself after World War II. In a 1962 article in The New Yorker,
Richard H. Rovere wrote: “It was Vandenberg’s conversion from isola-
tionism...that made him a large figure in the postwar world. Without
his help, it is at least conceivable that Roosevelt and Truman would
have suffered the fate of Woodrow Wilson.”?
Before recent times the private adventures of prominent politicians
were not seen as fit subjects for the legitimate press. New York Times
political reporter R. W. Apple, Jr., told of the old journalistic ethic in
a 1987 article: “In early 1963, for example, a fledgling reporter for
this newspaper was assigned to patrol the lobby of the Carlyle Hotel
while President Kennedy was visiting New York City. The reporter’s
job was to observe the coming and going of politicians, but what he
saw was the coming and going of a prominent actress, so that was
what he reported to his editor. ‘No story there,’ said the editor, and
the matter was dropped.”+
Both Arthur Krock of the New York Times and syndicated columnist
Drew Pearson knew of Senator Vandenberg’s fondness for women.
 Uncle Arthur #e¢ 139

Playing on the name of one of those women, wags in Washington ap-

parently called Vandenberg “the Senator from Mitzi-Sims” or “the
Senator from Mitzi-gan.” Neither Krock nor Pearson mentioned this
in public print for two decades. Both writers do say they questioned
Vandenberg.
Vandenberg died on April 18, 1951. Two days later, Drew Pearson
wrote a diary entry on the senator. Part of it reads: “I recall vividly two
conversations with Vandenberg: one was when he returned from De-
troit in the spring of 48, and I told him half-jokingly that some of his
friends in Michigan had quoted him as saying that he would not run for
President because if he did ‘Drew Pearson would bring out the facts
regarding the “Senator from Mitzi-Sims.” ’ I told Vandenberg: ‘Sena-
tor, I would not write that story....’”°
Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg was born into a solidly middle-class
family in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on March 22, 1884. Unfortunately
his father lost everything in the panic of 1893; young Arthur was forced
to work: “I had no youth. I went to work when I was nine, and I never
got a chance to enjoy myself until I came to the Senate.Ӣ
He attended the University of Michigan briefly, 1900-1901, to study
law. Soon out of money, he returned to Grand Rapids, to his girlfriend
and to employment in the newspaper business. By 1906 he was manag-
ing editor of the Grand Rapids Herald at the then munificent salary of
$2,500 a year. As editor he fell into the mold of progressive Republi-
canism, advocating “moderate and practical reforms” on the domestic
front. World War I and Wilson brought out his patriotism, but by the
time of the vote on the League of Nations he was a reservationist.
By 1928 the man who had dropped out of college for lack of money
was a millionaire. His diligence had made him board chairman of Fed-
erated Publications, which published not only the Grand Rapids Herald
but the Battle Creek Enquirer and News and the Lansing State Journal.
Now he could afford the political career he had long wished to pursue.
Vandenberg became senator from Michigan on the March 1928 res-
ignation and death of the incumbent, Woodbridge N. Ferris. After
some arm-twisting, Governor Fred W. Green finally kept his political
promise to appoint Vandenberg to the remainder of Ferris’s term.’
The new senator soon acquired the reputation that historians have
passed down. Fred Rodell styled Vandenberg as “more like a strutting,
orating, Claghornesque caricature than any Northerner in history.”
140 e¢*®*® DESPERATE DECEPTION

The comment that he was “the only Senator who can strut sitting
down” was to be repeated over and over for the rest of his career. The
Chicago Tribune’s well-connected reporter Walter Trohan writes: “I
knew Vandenberg quite well. I was paid, in part, to know him. I confess
I was not fond of him.... Politicians as a class are vain but he was vain
beyond most of the tribe. His chief conversation was on his last speech
or the one he had in preparation.... I remember seeing him when he
had moved into William Borah’s office after the latter’s death [January
19, 1940] and gloated in calling it to my attention as though he had
inherited Borah’s role of spokesman on foreign policy, at least for the
GOP.
This was a typical male view of Arthur Vandenberg; however, given
the testimony of one of the British women involved with the senator,
this must still be considered a one-dimensional perspective of
Vandenberg.
Lady Cotter—Mrs. John F. Paterson during the time of our inter-
est—remembers Arthur Vandenberg as “delightful—interesting and
amusing...kind and generous...no bad attributes...[from him she re-
ceived] tremendous friendship and understanding.”? Other qualities
not mentioned by those put off by the senator’s vanity were his willing-
ness to work and his great drive to succeed.
Although he became a friend and in many ways a protégé of isola-
tionist William Borah, Vandenberg was a supporter of President
Hoover’s emphasis on restrained American involvement in world af-
fairs. But the Depression closed in on the Hoover administration, and
the focus of his successor, Franklin Roosevelt, was on domestic policy.
One piece of domestic legislation fostered by Vandenberg is espe-
cially interesting because it illustrates not only his intelligence and
diligence but the deftness of FDR and his smooth publicity machine.
In 1933, Vandenberg managed to push through federal insurance on
bank deposits over the strong objection of Franklin Roosevelt. In-
deed, Vandenberg has been called the father of the FDIC. Once the
legislation proved itself popular and successful, the White House
took pains to deny that Vandenberg had anything to do with the law.
Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, FDR’s speechwriter, listed the FDIC as
one of FDR’s great accomplishments. Raymond Moley noted that
FDR, “despite his last-ditch opposition, in later years claimed credit
for the Legislation.”!°
 Uncle Arthur #e¢ 14]

In 1934, Vandenberg was one of the few Republicans who was re-
turned to the Senate. In fact, for the first two years of the New Deal,
Vandenberg’s conciliatory performance marked him as a “New Deal
Republican.” Perhaps this was the key to his survival. The “Second
New Deal,” starting in mid-1935, was quite another case, however, and
Vandenberg fought that vigorously on the basis of constitutionalism.
Arthur Vandenberg’s reputation as an isolationist undoubtedly had
its origins in his sponsorship, with Gerald Nye of North Dakota, of
Senate Resolution 206, to investigate the munitions industry. His work
on the Nye investigation convinced him that the United States’ entry
into World War I had been a mistake.
A trip to Europe in the summer of 1935 further strengthened these
feelings, and by 1936 Vandenberg supported the isolationist position
advocated by Senators Nye and4 Bennett Clark of Missouri.!! 1936
was not a good year for the Republican Party; Franklin Roosevelt had a
523-8 electoral college victory over Alfred Landon, and only seventeen
Republicans remained in the Senate after the election.
Vandenberg was disturbed by these political disasters, but for him
personally there had been positive developments. He had often been
mentioned as a possible presidential candidate in 1936 and could easily
have had the party’s nomination for vice president. After the party’s
defeat, Vandenberg was considered the leader of the Republicans in the
Senate. According to Vandenberg biographer David ‘Tompkins, “dur-
ing 1937 most opinion polls rated him as the Republican voters’ first
choice for the nomination.” Lord Beaverbrook, the Canadian pub-
lisher friend of both Churchill and BSC head William Stephenson,
pronounced Vandenberg the “next president.”!? Vandenberg publicly
denied any presidential aspirations. But his high rankings persisted.
Ominous events in Europe were also afoot. In March 1936, Britain
increased its defense budget in response to international tensions. Ger-
many, citing danger from the recent Franco-Soviet alliance, reoccupied
the Rhineland. In October 1936 the Rome-Berlin Axis was formed.
This was the unstable background of world tensions and Arthur
Vandenberg’s personal prospects that underlay the developing rela-
tionship with the socially adept Simses—Mitzi and Harold. Mitzi Sims
is probably the woman to whom New York Times correspondent Arthur
Krock was referring when years later he wrote: “Vandenberg’s roman-
tic impulses led to gossip at Washington hen-parties, where the hens
142 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

have teeth and the teeth are sharp, that Vandenberg had been ‘con-
verted’ from isolationism by the pretty wife of a West European diplo-
mat, a lady of whom, as the saying goes, he saw a lot.”!?
One of Mitzi’s nieces told me in a 1987 telephone interview: “Aunt
Mitzi was a jet-setter before there were jets. She and Harold ran
around with the Duke of Windsor and that crowd....Mitzi had lots of
beaus—why, Arthur Vandenberg was one of her beaus—you aren’t go-
ing to print that, are you?” Few entries in Mrs. Vandenberg’s diary
mention the Simses until a dinner in April 1937; then in May 1937 the
Vandenbergs drove the Simses back from a party to the Wardman Park
Hotel, a residential hotel where both couples lived. Invited up to the
Simses’ apartment, the Vandenbergs stayed until 5:00 a.m. and had, ac-
cording to Mrs. Vandenberg’s diary, “Some Eve.”
It is clear from Mrs. Vandenberg’s diary entries of 1937 that she and
Senator Vandenberg knew the Simses casually, but the entries are for-
mal and their full names—Mitzi Sims, Harold Sims—are usually writ-
ten out.!* They are clearly not the “Mitzi” and “Harold” that were
soon to dominate the Vandenbergs’ social life until Harold’s unex-
pected death in May 1940 and Mitzi’s departure on February 11, 1941,
just days before British intelligence’s most adept and famous agent,
Betty Pack, “Cynthia,” appeared.
Harold Haig Sims was born in 1880 into what the Montreal Star
said years later was “an old established” Montreal family. His father
had been a prominent manufacturer in that city. He was educated at
Bishops College School, Lennoxville, and then McGill University.
He worked in banking in London before returning to Montreal,
where he worked in the insurance business. In 1917 he became “asso-
ciated with the British Government.” He went to Washington with
the British War Mission and afterward was appointed an attaché at
the British embassy.
As a wealthy man, Harold Sims worked “in a commercial and diplo-
matic capacity,” without compensation. As was fitting for a man of
wealth and social position, Harold belonged to the St. James Club,
Royal Montreal Golf Club, Montreal Racket Club, Montreal Hut, and
Zeta Psi Fraternity.!>
His obituary in the Washington Post supports the statements of
Harold’s nieces in a series of telephone interviews in 1987. Harold was
a “friend of the Duke of Windsor....He was to have played host to the
 Uncle Arthur #** 143

Duke and Duchess of Windsor during their proposed trip to the

United States in 1937.”!6 The vagueness of all references to Harold’s
employment by the British government is striking but explicable. One
of his nieces told me that he “ran the code room at the embassy.” They
told me that both their father, Ross Sims of Montreal, and “Uncle
Harold” knew Sir William Stephenson and that their father had hired
girls for him in Canada.!”
Harold Sims had, in 1926, married Emelia Mauritsen Hemmerde,
the widow of Captain Eric Hemmerde, a British officer killed in
France during the Great War.!* A newspaper clipping found in Mrs.
Vandenberg’s diary, from January 1937, has both a picture of Mitzi and
Harold and a description of her social skills. The striking thing about
this description is that it fits all three of these women, not just Mitzi.
“Among the guests at the recent reception at the Norwegian Lega-
tion was Mrs. Harold Sims (center), who is always the center of an
animated group at any event she attends. An exceptionally good con-
versationalist, she is one of the few social notables in Washington who
never need to rely on the weather as a topic of repartee.”
Arthur Vandenberg had indeed come a long way from the poor boy
who went to work at nine years old and the impoverished student
forced to drop out of college. For the next decade the women he asso-
ciated with—Mitzi Sims, Cynthia, Eveline Paterson—came from a far
more glamorous world than Grand Rapids. Because of their wide trav-
els they also represented a more cosmopolitan world than Washington,
D.C. They were all very handsome, and noted by even the hard-bitten
for their charm.!?
By 1940 the Vandenbergs and Simses were close friends.’ But
Harold was under great strain from overwork, and on May 6, 1940, he
had a stroke and died. According to the statement issued by the first
secretary of the British Embassy, F. R. Hoyer Miller, Harold “had
come here early and left late every day since the war began.” The Wash-
ington Times-Herald called Harold Sims “Great Britain’s first casualty
of the war to occur in this country.”?!
The Washington Post in its obituary succinctly states facts that have
been completely weeded from the senator’s own papers: “He and Mrs.
Sims were close friends of Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, a Repub-
lican Presidential candidate, who was notified of his death and took
charge of funeral arrangements.”*-9977
144 eee PESPERATE DECEPTION

Mitzi and Harold Sims were unquestionably well placed to keep an

eye on an important man; a December 1939 poll found a majority of
481 daily newspaper editors predicted Vandenberg would be chosen as
the presidential candidate of the GOP. The exact date when Arthur
Vandenberg became one of Mitzi’s “beaus” is not known, but most
probably it was between 1937 and 1939.
According to middle-class mores it would seem remarkable to be
close friends with the husband of one’s mistress, but the Simses’ milieu
was worldly. The recent Life of the Party: The Biography ofPamela Digby
Churchill Hayward Harriman well illustrates the temper of the time
within the British upper class. Author Christopher Ogden describes
the love affair between Winston Churchill’s daughter-in-law, Pamela
Churchill, and President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease expediter in En-
gland, Averell Harriman. According to Ogden, Winston Churchill’s
intimate friend the wealthy Canadian Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook,
“was delighted. Averell had been in Britain only a matter of days and
already he was compromised.” She could pass to Winston and Max
what the Americans were thinking and planning. She could pass on to
the Americans through Averell whatever spin Britain wanted delivered.
American Ambassador Gilbert Winant was also similarly compro-
mised. Although married, he was sleeping with Winston Churchill’s
daughter Sarah. This affair drove him to distraction and perhaps even
to his death by suicide when she broke it off after the war.?3
The “close” friendship of the Vandenbergs and the Simses permitted
the Simses to explore the thinking of a major figure on the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee during the beginning of an extremely dan-
gerous period for the British.
Most historians consider Vandenberg’s official break from isola-
tionism to be his prominent speech in the Senate on January 10,
1945. Mrs. Vandenberg in her diary dates the break much earlier,
from a radio speech he delivered on June 9, 1940. She states that the
speech made Arthur the chief subject of discussion in Washington the
next day.** Why historians have generally overlooked this speech is
difficult to explain.
Walter Trohan, the reporter for the isolationist Chicago Tribune,
tells of Vandenberg’s relationship with Mitzi Sims and the senator’s
conversion: “One evening I attended a small dinner party in the din-
ing room of his [Senator Vandenberg’s] Wardman Park apartment.
 Uncle Arthur ee¢ 145

Sen. Burton K. Wheeler (D. Mont.) and Gerald P. Nye (R. N.D.)
were there along with me at a strategy huddle on keeping out of
World War II. Vandenberg was known among wits in the Senate and
in the press gallery as the Senator from Mitzi-gan. Mrs. Hazel Van-
denberg, the Senator’s second wife, had left him and returned to their
Grand Rapids home because he moved Mitzi into an adjoining apart-
ment. Mitzi acted as hostess for the dinner. When it ended and we
were settled down to business, she rose and we all rose. She walked
over to him and patted him on the cheek, exclaiming: ‘Good night
you great big statesman!”?°
Though there is strong testimony that Mitzi Sims was involved
with Arthur Vandenberg at the time he became an internationalist,
there is no definite proof that she or her husband caused this meta-
morphosis. But it is hard to believe that the Simses, as best social
companions of the Vandenbergs, could have been without influence.
, Someone thought the Simses important enough to remove all refer-
ences to them from Arthur Vandenberg’s papers. The separate and
previously unused diaries of Mrs. Vandenberg have the only mentions
of Harold and Mitzi. It should be further remembered that the Sims
family claimed close ties with William Stephenson.
The Simses had the most important thing a lobbyist needs—access.
There is another indication that British intelligence thought Mitzi had
influence over Vandenberg. This came with her sudden and unex-
pected return to the Vandenbergs during the great behind-the-scenes
push for Lend-Lease in early 1941. When, after a week, she left the
Vandenbergs again she was quickly followed by one of Britain’s most
famous woman spies.
In 1940: Myth and Reality, Clive Ponting has written an interesting
and useful book whose main thesis is that since 1940, Britain cultivated
the myth of the “special relationship with the United States” to paper
over the embarrassing fact that it was a “client state” of the United
States. He is surely wrong, however, on one small statement concern-
ing Lend-Lease: “Britain then had to wait helpless on the sidelines
while Congress spent the next two months in hearings. ‘Lend-Lease’
finally became Law on 11 March.”?°
This feigned helplessness has long prevented historians from care-
fully analyzing precisely how the desperate British helped their own
cause. The consequences of leaving Britain’s very survival in the hands
146 ¢** DESPERATE DECEPTION

of an ignorant, capricious rabble of windbags, blown hither and thither

by every gust of public opinion, was simply too much for the British to
bear. Since the British had great influence with the press and few pa-
pers published news of sexual peccadilloes by public figures, the mini-
mal chances of being exposed were trivial when weighed against the
prospects of success.
One of the few public suggestions of these delicate operations has
come recently from prominent British author Mary Lovell in her book
Cast No Shadow, the biography of the famous British spy Betty Thorpe
Pack—“Cynthia.” Writes Lovell: “Betty’s second mission for British
Security Coordination was to try to convert the opinions of Senators
Connally and Vandenberg into, if not support, a less heated opposition
to the bill [Lend-Lease] which literally meant the difference between
survival and defeat for the British. Other agents of both sexes were
given similar missions with other politicians.... With Vandenberg Betty
was successful; with Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations (which was holding hearings on the bill),
she was not.”?/
Connally seems to have seen through Cynthia’s game rather quickly.
Almost as soon as she had finagled an introduction at a party, Connally
told her: “You’re wasting your time, my dear—come over here and sit
on my knee instead.”?®
Of the three women involved with Senator Vandenberg, Amy Eliza-
beth ‘Thorpe Pack Brousse, known almost universally to those even
mildly interested in the history of British intelligence by her nom d’es-
pionage, Cynthia, is the agent we know the most about. Her death on
December 1, 1963, brought not the standard cramped death notice
Time magazine usually gives the famous but two-thirds of a page and
included her debutante portrait.??
The secret “BSC Account” says of her: “It would be difficult to over-
emphasize the importance of her work.... Her security was irreproach-
able and her loyalty to her employers complete. She was not greedy for
money but greedy only to serve a cause in which she believed. In fact
she was paid a small salary which represented little more than her living
expenses, although the value of her work to Britain could be assessed, if
at all, in millions.”3°
Her most recent biographer, Mary S. Lovell, summarizes Cynthia’s
modus operandi: “She singled out top men and seduced them.”3!
 Uncle Arthur ee 147

Elizabeth Thorpe was born on November 22, 1910, in Minneapo-

lis. Her father, George C. Thorpe (1875-1936) was a military man
and author of several volumes on both military and legal subjects. Af-
ter retiring from the Marines in 1922 with the rank of colonel, he
practiced law in Washington until his death. Her socially ambitious
mother, Cora Wells Thorpe, graduated cum laude from the Univer-
sity of Michigan and did graduate work at the Sorbonne in Paris, the
University of Munich, and Columbia.”
Arthur Vandenberg and his future second wife, Hazel Whitaker, met
at the University of Michigan during the 1900-1901 school year, Van-
denberg’s only year of college. Although he had Elizabeth Watson, his
high school sweetheart, whom he was to marry in 1906, back in Grand
Rapids, Arthur generally squired Hazel to social events at Michigan.
Elizabeth Watson Vandenberg died of a brain tumor in May 1917,
leaving him with two daughters and a son. He waited only a year to
marry Hazel. Hazel and Cora Thorpe, Cynthia’s mother, also attended
the University of Michigan in the 1901-1902 and 1902-1903 school
years. They were both enrolled in the College of Literature, Science,
and the Arts. They also lived within a couple of blocks of each other.*?
This may have been where they met. The tone of Hazel’s diary entries
indicates that they knew each other well.
On April 29, 1930, Betty Thorpe married Arthur J. Pack at the
Church of the Epiphany in Washington, D.C. In the small world of
British diplomacy it should not be surprising to find “H. H. Sims,
attaché of the British Embassy” as a member of the wedding party.>#
Betty was pregnant at the time of the wedding. The boy, born Octo-
ber 2, 1930, was raised in England by others, because Arthur feared the
effects knowledge of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy would have on his
diplomatic career.
The Packs were posted to Latin America in the early 1930s and in
1935 to Spain. Here Betty’s lovers even included the priest who was
helping her spiritual growth in her newly adopted Catholicism: “...it
was more than the flame of religion that was kept alive in my breast.
The priest was a good looking young man...and [there] followed a se-
ries of secret meetings once or twice a week at the apartment....as he
was poor and the cost of rooms high I was always happy to help him out
with the bill.” Betty became involved in the Spanish Civil War and with
British intelligence as well as with various lovers.*°
148 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

The next assignment for the Packs was Poland. Betty arrived there in
September 1937. In early 1938, Arthur being absent, sick in England,
Betty took as lover a diplomat, Edward Kulikowski, who held a good
position in the Polish Foreign Office. He casually mentioned to her
that Hitler’s next target was Czechoslovakia. “What is more,” he told
her, “Poland intends to take a bite of the cherry!” This startling bit of
information she passed on to the Passport Control officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel Jack Shelley. Passport Control, was, of course, the worldwide
cover for SIS. By March 1938, Betty was actively working for the Se-
cret Intelligence Service (MI-6).*°
Betty’s next conquest was Count Michael Lubienski, a handsome man
with the courtly manners and charm for which the Polish aristocracy
was well known. He also happened to be chefde cabinet to Colonel Joseph
Beck, the Polish foreign minister. There is strong evidence she obtained
news from Michael Lubienski of the progress the Polish were making
against the German Enigma cypher machine. Until the 1970s this was
one ofthe most closely guarded secrets of the war. Betty’s role is still not
entirely clear.’ This affair with Lubienski led, in September 1938, to
Beck’s asking the British to get her out of Poland, which they did.
By May 1939 the Packs had been sent to Chile, where Betty whiled
away her time socializing, playing polo, and writing political reports on
the Nazi sympathies of prominent Chileans. This was followed in Sep-
tember 1939 by a series of anti-Nazi propaganda articles on the Euro-
pean situation. These were written under the pen name Elizabeth
Thomas, and the English versions appeared in the English-language
South Pacific Mail.
In early 1940 the German ambassador learned the true identity of
“Elizabeth Thomas” and threatened to make a formal complaint to
the Chilean government that Betty was abusing her diplomatic privi-
leges. So her writing stopped. The result was that by January 1941
she was back in Washington without her husband. Betty had this time
been contacted by British Security Coordination’s John Pepper, “a
cagey operator” according to one of his fellow BSC officers, Bill
Ross-Smith. Her contacts at BSC were either Pepper or a woman
named Marion de Chastellaine. It was at this time that she was given
the code name Cynthia.*®
In Washington, Betty rented a house at 3327 O Street. Betty’s
mother, Cora Thorpe, who lived at 2139 Wyoming Avenue, was well
 Uncle Arthur ee 149

established in Washington society and was of great use to Betty. We

have a description of this apartment and Betty from an FBI agent who
interviewed her there on December 24, 1942: “It was noted during this
interview that Mrs. Pack was extremely well dressed and well groomed
and that she appeared to have been well educated. It was also noted that
her mother’s apartment was expensively furnished in good taste.”3?
Betty arrived to help with the Lend-Lease bill, passage of which was
desperately needed by the British. She was not the only one who ar-
rived unexpectedly during the Lend-Lease debates. Mitzi Sims had
given up the Wardman Park apartment shortly after Harold’s death
and moved back to Montreal.
On Monday, February 3, 1941, Hazel Vandenberg’s diary records
the sudden, timely, but unexpected arrival of Mitzi. She stayed with the
Vandenbergs until Tuesday, February 11, when she suddenly flew back
to Montreal, never to be seen by the Vandenbergs again.
As a houseguest and one-time flame of Arthur Vandenberg’s, Mitzi
was during this crucial period in a good position to lobby the senator
on Lend-Lease. Mrs. Vandenberg’s entry of February 6, 1941, records
that both she and Mitzi attended the Foreign Relations Committee
hearings on Lend-Lease that day.
Mitzi certainly had time alone with Arthur: “Sat. Feb. 8, 41. Went
to see “The Male Animal’ with Cora Thorpe,” wrote Mrs. Vanden-
berg. “From there I went to the Tydings where I met Dad and Mitzi.”
The forces of isolationism were not to have a free time with the sena-
tor after Mitzi returned to Montreal. On February 27, 1941, Hazel
Vandenberg opened her apartment door in the Wardman Park Hotel
and found new company. She wrote in her diary: “Cora T[horpe] came
with daughter, Betty Pack, back again from Chile for why I do not
know.”40 Mrs. Vandenberg may have gotten suspicious of Betty some-
time after this, because the next diary entry that mentions her reads:
“Friday March 21, 1941—Lunched with the Countess Cassini at
Pierre’s. Mrs. Chandler, Cafritz, the Baroness von Pagenhardt, Ruth
Hurley, Cora Letts, Polly Guggenheim, Betty Pack and Mrs. Fred
Mitchell Gould, queer collection and one wondered why. I know why
I went!”
The next Friday, Mrs. Vandenberg had been invited to tea at Betty
Pack’s for the Count and Countess Bouillant, but she was sick and did
not go.
150 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

The record of Senator Vandenberg and Cynthia trails off here, but
her career as a first-class agent was to go on to the further seductions,
embassy break-ins, and code thefts that have entertained readers of
four books: The Quiet Canadian, Cynthia, A Man Called Intrepid, and
Cast No Shadow.
At the end of the war the British were in a difficult position. Not only
was Britain destitute, the Lend-Lease debt was enormous. British Se-
curity Coordination’s David Ogilvy, then working on economic mat-
ters out of the British embassy in Washington, wrote that the British
government had three choices: default, pay up, or talk the Americans
into canceling the debt. To default would be politically calamitous, to
pay up was impossible. The third option, being the only one possible,
was the one taken.*!
Debt of $4 billion was canceled; $6 billion worth of property in Brit-
ain was sold to the king for $532 million; Britain would have to pay
$118 million for orders already in transit.
Most of the debt was simply wiped away, making this a good start,
but since Britain had lost one-fourth of her wealth during the war, this
still left the United Kingdom destitute. Poll results indicated that the
American public would be of little help. In June 1946 only 10 percent
of Americans gave their unqualified approval of a loan to Britain, while
40 percent disapproved.”
Marquis Childs reported in the Washington Post that the hearing on
the loan began “in an atmosphere of defeatism and pessimism” and
added that “very real doubt exists whether Congress will approve the
loan proposals.” The Times of London quoted Sir Stafford Cripps,
president of the Board of Trade, as saying that “it looks as if Congress
may possibly turn it down.”
In the classic work Sterling Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective,
author Richard N. Gardner gives his evaluation of Vandenberg’s im-
portance in this dark financial hour for Great Britain: “Perhaps the
most powerful appeal of all was made by Senator Vandenberg. In April,
before departing for the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers,
Vandenberg announced on the floor of the Senate that he had finally
decided to support the loan. He warned his colleagues: ‘If we do not
lead some other great and powerful nation will capitalize our failure
and we shall pay the price of our default.’ This was the turning point in
the Senate Debate. *
 Uncle Arthur eee 151

This speech was not a reflection of the mail from home; that was
running so strongly against his speech as to make it the most unpopular
foreign policy speech Vandenberg had ever given.+
Walter Trohan has supplied a fine clue that the checkable parts
prove out, but the difficulty of obtaining Office of Naval Intelligence
files has prevented full confirmation: “The Office of Naval Intelli-
gence kept a file on the activities of Sims and Paterson....In the 1948
convention at Philadelphia Vandenberg had hopes of being nom-
inated....I played a small role in the Vandenberg stab at the nomina-
tion. Joseph Pew, head of the Sun Oil Company and a heavy party
contributor, had been given the ONI file on the activities of Mitzi
and Paterson. Pew was determined to take the floor and speak on the
file and its disclosures. Friends of Pew asked me to persuade him not
to do so because they knew I was against such mudslinging....I told
Pew that Vandenberg had no chance of winning the nomination and
that he would only smear himself by his proposed action, which I was
certain would do so. At any length Pew did not do so.”*
The Englishwoman involved with Senator Vandenberg during the
period 1945-48 was at her recent death Eveline Mary Mardon Pater-
son Cotter. She was born in Naini Tal, India, on October 2, 1908. She
died Lady Cotter on February 13, 1991, as the wife of Delaval James
Alfred Cotter.” Her father had been a civil servant in India who retired
to Devonshire, England, where she lived with him until she was mar-
ried about 1929.
Until July 1940, she and her two children, Jeremy, ten, and Vir-
ginia, four, had divided their time between a townhouse in DeVere
Gardens, Kensington, London, and a country home in Somerset.
They escaped to Canada that summer on one of the last convoyed
refugee vessels, the Monarch of Bermuda. Her husband, John, a major,
had been stationed for the previous three years at Kuala Lumpur in
the Malay States.
Once in North America, Eveline stayed with various relatives while
speaking on behalf of Great Britain. An undated newspaper clipping
from her scrapbook ends: “Mrs. Paterson has been speaking through-
out the Middle west, during the past months for the benefit of relief
work in Britain.”
Newspaper clippings from her scrapbook give a good picture of what
she was telling interviewers and audiences on her travels. In the winter
152 ¢ee DESPERATE DECEPTION

and spring of 1941 she was working out of the home of her cousin Mrs.
Theodore Baer in Peoria, Illinois.
In February 1941, the Peoria newspapers ran photographs and ar-
ticles based on interviews with Eveline. She had clearly been well
briefed and on Lend-Lease spoke the British propaganda line with
exactitude. “We can win if you help us with money and munitions—
we don’t need your men.... The English have plenty of soldiers, and if
you Americans only help us by furnishing materials we are sure to
win.” Although not quoting her words, the reporter wrote after lis-
tening to her that the British “are certain that the conquered peoples
who now are nearing famine because of the German leader will rise
up against him at the first opportunity, and make a British victory
possible.”*®
None of these statements was correct, but having a beautiful, charm-
ing, and well-spoken person saying them with conviction helped the
British cause with the reputedly isolationist people of the Midwest.
The articles and headlines—“Englishwoman Is Absorbing Speaker
Here”—may to some extent have been the courtesy extended to a for-
eign visitor, but they are consistent in their praise of Eveline, her
charm, and her ability to deliver her message.
To another Peoria reporter Eveline said: “I am quite confident that
we will beat them in the end....Churchill and Bevin...are like Dyna-
mite....”*? Three days after publishing the interview, the Peoria Journal
and Transcript ran a short notice for “any club or...organization which
might like to get a closer understanding of some of the ordeals the
courageous British are now enduring.”
Those interested were given a phone number to contact “Mrs.
Paterson...a charming and cultured woman.” Eveline’s effort appar-
ently reaped results in Peoria. On April 20, 1941, the Peoria fournal-
Transcript ran a photograph of the striking Mrs. Paterson, who was
distinctly taller than the Rev. Edison Shepard, who was blessing the
Bundles for Britain.
According to a poster and clippings in her scrapbook, Mrs. Pater-
son had been in Warren, New Hampshire, in November 1940: “Mrs.
Eveline Paterson of London and Somerset England, and Ontario
Canada, who is an authorized worker for the British War Relief heads
the committee in charge” of a benefit dance. By July 1941, Eveline
was in Cape Cod and was speaking before such groups as the Garden
 Uncle Arthur eee 153

Club of Hyannis. She must have returned to Peoria, because her

daughter remembers starting school there before moving to Wash-
ington.°?
The real question, however, is: was there a relationship between this
lovely, well-briefed spokeswoman for the British cause and Senator
Arthur Vandenberg? On this issue there is considerable testimony in
the affirmative. One of my queries to Mrs. Paterson drew a letter from
her daughter suggesting I contact her brother: “He may remember
‘Uncle Arthur’ (as we knew him) better than I as he is a few years
older....I know there was some scandal, but M. was always adamant
they were ‘just friends,’ and he was sympathetic listener to her pleas for
the USA to join the war.”?! |
When newsman Harry Costello called Drew Pearson on June 5,
1948, to tell him that Vandenberg met “Miss Paterson [sic] at Union
Station in Washington and they go into the station restaurant,” and
that he had seen them together “recently” in New York, the timing is
perfect for the Vandenberg Resolution, which cleared the way for an
Atlantic alliance (NATO). It passed the Senate on June 11, 1948.°2
In Mrs. Paterson’s scrapbook are several Vandenberg items. Particu-
larly interesting is a note on Wardman Park Hotel stationery. It bears the
date “Oct. 1942” and has a photograph of the senator from U.S. News.
Eveline appears to have known Vandenberg reasonably well by then:
Sorry to miss you.
Also sorry about Saturday night when I was previously en-
gaged.
If you are around about six we might have a drink.
R.
Another piece in Mrs. Paterson’s scrapbook is a cover and article
from Time of April 30, 1945. Arthur Vandenberg is pictured on the
cover, along with an article on Vandenberg as an internationalist. From
1944 to 1946 there are numerous clippings indicating that Eveline
Paterson was moving in diplomatic circles. She “was a great party per-
son,” writes her daughter, “and I remember a lot of the people men-
tioned” in the clippings.*?
In 1942, Eveline was involved in “improving the translation of war
plans from Norwegian English to English.” That year she also spent
time in Canada, ostensibly auditioning for a radio show.**
154 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

After reading Mary S. Lovell’s Cast No Shadow on Cynthia, Mrs.

Paterson’s daughter wrote of Cynthia’s associates that “the only one
that rang a bell...was Donald Downes [BSC/OSS man who ran
Cynthia] who we knew quite well.”*?
Mrs. Paterson does remember discussing politics with Senator
Vandenberg: “Particularly U.S. entry into the war and support for
G[reat] B[ritain].” Is it any wonder, then, that Drew Pearson, Walter
Trohan, and the FBI thought that this lovely spokeswoman for the
British was a British intelligence agent?
After the war, Francis Henson, Sandy Griffith’s assistant, wrote a
weekly private intelligence report from Washington to Ernest Cuneo
in New York. A note of June 17, 1948, attached to a newspaper clipping
reads: “This is the Mrs. Paterson about whom there is so much talk....”
The clipping describes “Mrs. John Paterson...the charming...comely,
statuesque blonde.” The comment for insiders is the writer’s feigned
sorrow that Eveline cannot attend the Republican convention. The
reference apparently is to the possibility that Vandenberg would be
nominated as the Republican candidate.*°
Before the FBI realized what this author was looking for, it re-
sponded to my Freedom of Information Act request with a copy of the
clipping Henson sent Cuneo on Mrs. Paterson.
The clipping bore the notation “105—0122—4 ENCLOSURE.”
According to Ann Mari Buitrago in Are You Now or Have You Ever Been
in the FBI Files, the prefix code 105 designates “Foreign Counterintel-
ligence Matters...[Frequently used as a ‘subversive matter’ file, similar
to ‘100;’ for investigations purporting to determine whether a person
or group is subject to foreign influence, control or financing—author’s
comment].”>”
The last digit, the dash 4, signifies that this clipping on Eveline
Paterson is the fourth item in her file. Since then, however, the FBI has
denied it has a file on Mrs. Paterson. Only after several years did the
FBI accept my amended FOIA request for her file without telling me
no file exists. Since most of the impact of Mrs. Paterson’s lobbying of
Senator Vandenberg appears to have taken place outside the time pe-
riod that concerns this book, a closer investigation of her influence,
though merited, will have to wait.
 CHAPTER 8
&3@

“We Want Willkie”

When they [British intelligence] work up such an incident

they apparently use the New York Tribune as a means of publi-
cation, much the same as they used to use the Providence Four-
nal in the World War.

—Assistant Secretary of State

Adolf Berle to Sumner Welles,
September 18, 1941!
Indeed, no newspaper people may ever have exercised more
decisive influence upon the nomination of a major party can-
didate than Tribune staff members did [in the presidential
campaign of 1940]...
—Richard Kluger, The Paper:
The Life and Death of the
New York Herald Tribune?

In June 1940, the Republicans in convention in Philadelphia nomi-

nated Willkie. He was a man who had never held political office—a
man who had been a bona fide registered Democrat as late as Septem-
ber 1939 and whose switch to the Republican Party is difficult, perhaps
impossible, to document. His nomination exempted his Democratic
opponent, President Franklin Roosevelt,’ from the normal pressures
of an election campaign.

iY)
156 °*e DESPERATE DECEPTION

This chapter does not propose a new idea; it simply explores an old
idea in the light of new evidence. The stunning nature of Willkie’s
nomination has resulted in the recurrent theme that the nomination
was the result of divine intervention. H. L. Mencken, certainly a hard-
bitten journalist, and one not usually given to supernatural explana-
tions, wrote, after watching the nomination: “I am thoroughly
convinced that the nomination of Willkie was Managed by the Holy
Ghost in Person.” The serious literature on the convention abounds
with awed titles—“Was the Nomination of Wendell Willkie a Political
Miracle?”; “The Philadelphia Miracle”; “Miracle in Philadelphia.”*
Soon after the “miracle in Philadelphia,” Earl Browder and Nelson
Sparks, from opposite ends of the political spectrum, proposed a
more worldly explanation. They said that the nomination of Wendell
Willkie had been concocted by British Ambassador Lord Lothian,° in
connivance with Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas W. Lamont of J. P.
Morgan, and columnist Walter Lippmann. Though these accusations
have gone largely unnoticed by historians, two of the principles were
well aware of them. Thomas W. Lamont was probably the prime
mover behind the scenes in the Willkie nomination; he sent Presi-
dent Roosevelt a clipping of a speech by Earl Browder recorded in
the Communist Daily Worker of September 9, 1940. This is only one
of nearly forty contacts—letters, meetings, and phone calls—between
FDR and Lamont during the period 1938-40.
Lamont has marked this passage for the president’s attention:
“’..Robert Taft...was defeated in the Philadelphia Convention, and
the pro-war, big business, renegade Democrat, Wendell Willkie, was
nominated by a conspiratorial junta, organized by Thomas W.
Lamont of the firm of J. P. Morgan, working in direct agreement
with Roosevelt and engineered by Walter Lippmann. Willkie was
chosen for the Republican Party by Roosevelt and Lamont, after an
agreement had been reached as to fundamental policy to which all
would adhere, the same policy revealed in the President’s sensational
coup [The Destroyers-for-Bases Deal] of September 3rd.”°
Roosevelt wrote back to Lamont on September 13, 1940, in obvi-
ous good humor: “What is that old saying about politics and strange
bedfellows? All I can say, Tom, is that if you can stand it I can.”
Similar charges were made in Spark’s 1943 book One Man—Wendell
Willkie.’
 “We Want Willkie” ¢e* 157

This theme was also later echoed by Harry Elmer Barnes in Was
Roosevelt Pushed into War by Popular Demand in 1941?®
The two quotations that begin this chapter also suggest that
Willkie’s nomination should be looked at more carefully. Adolf Berle is
quite correct that the New York Herald Tribune was a tool of British
intelligence. Countless operations involved the Herald Tribune in one
way or another. The historian of the Herald Tribune, Richard Kluger, is
also correct in his assessment of the Tribune’s influence on Willkie’s
nomination. Now if the Herald Tribune was a creature of British intelli-
gence and Willkie’s nomination was a creation of the Herald Tribune, it
follows that Willkie may well have been a creation of British intelli-
gence, especially since Britain was in such dire need of a Republican
interventionist candidate. There are now a number of facts available
that support the accusations of Browder and Sparks.
First, the people who created the Willkie candidacy were working
closely with Franklin Roosevelt. Second, those who created the Willkie
candidacy were working closely with British intelligence and its fronts.
Third, Willkie was working closely with British intelligence and its
fronts, especially Fight for Freedom, on whose executive board he sat.
Fourth, Willkie’s close work with his ostensible opponent, Franklin
Roosevelt, particularly their joint effort to eliminate members of
Willkie’s newly adopted Republican Party from office, is a collabora-
tion rare, perhaps even unique, in American political history. Last, the
secrecy and compartmentalization of the scheme to promote Willkie
are a fundamental attribute of intelligence tradecraft; none of the indi-
vidual toilers working for Willkie’s nomination ever knew enough to be
able to see the big picture of the operation.
Wendell Lewis Willkie was born Lewis Wendell Willkie (he disliked
the original order) on February 18, 1892, in Elwood, Indiana. His
mother, Henrietta, had been the first woman admitted to the Indiana
bar, and she and Wendell’s father, Herman, were law partners. “Wen,”
as family members called him, was the fourth of six children reared in
an intensely intellectual, comfortable, and financially secure home. In
the 1940 campaign, Willkie claimed to have grown up “the hard, not
the soft way,” but this assertion has little basis in fact.’
After graduating from Elwood High School in 1910, Willkie fol-
lowed his older brothers, Robert and Fred, and sister, Julia, to Indiana
University at Bloomington. He graduated in 1913. He worked two
158 °e® DESPERATE DECEPTION

years, then returned to study law at Indiana, graduating at the top of his
class and winning the award for the best thesis. He joined the army in
World War I, but did not get shipped overseas until September 1918,
when the war was nearly over.!°
After the war, Willkie secured a position heading the legal depart-
ment at Firestone Tire and Rubber in Akron, Ohio. He quit Firestone
and in 1921 he joined the law firm of Mather and Nesbitt and quickly
rose to prominence in the Akron bar; here Willkie’s political career as a
Democrat also blossomed. As a leader in the Akron Democratic Club,
he was elected as a delegate to the 1924 national convention in New
York City, where he was a floor leader for Newton D. Baker.!!
Willkie’s successful legal work for Northern Ohio Power and Light
gained him the offer of a $36,000 salary to be a partner in the New York
law firm representing the Morgan-dominated Commonwealth and
Southern utility holding company. Willkie moved to New York in Oc-
tober of 1929. He became president of Commonwealth and Southern
on January 24, 1933. The move did not hamper Willkie’s involvement
in Democratic politics. At the 1932 Democratic convention in Chicago
he was a floor manager for Newton D. Baker.
Willkie had one weakness that might have been damaging to his
presidential aspirations today, though in the 1930s and 1940s it caused
him no public embarrassment: he was a deeply committed and practic-
ing womanizer.
The relationship of most interest here was with Irita Van Doren, the
editor of the book review section of the New York Herald Tribune and
the ex-wife of Carl Van Doren. This was a good match intellectually.
Willkie was a habitual reader and book lover. He wrote reviews for her
book review section. She introduced him to her literary salon that in-
cluded some of the most famous writers of the time—Carl Sandburg,
Rebecca West, James Thurber, Sinclair Lewis, and Dorothy Thomp-
son, to name a few. She taught him to pronounce the hundreds of
words he had seen but never heard.
Irita was a close confidante of a woman who British intelligence said
was “among those who rendered service of particular value...Helen
Ogden Reid who controls The New York Herald Tribune.”!?Willkie met
Irita in 1938 when Helen Reid, the real power at the Herald Tribune,
had him speak at the paper’s annual “forum.” Despite his marriage to
Edith Willkie, Wendell was by 1939 spending weekends at the farm-
 “We Want Willkie” eee 159

house Irita and Carl Van Doren had bought in West Cornwall, Con-
necticut. He also accompanied her, “frequently,” to dinners at the
Reids’.!3
Richard Kluger, the historian of the Tribune, wrote: “That summer
[1939], they spent a week together at Dorothy Thompson’s Vermont
farm. Irita encouraged him to think more about his future in political
terms and challenged him to work out his views on major issues so that
he might express them more forcefully and confidently in his writings
and speeches.”!4
Not only did Dorothy Thompson, as we have seen, work closely
with major figures in British intelligence, but documents also strongly
suggest that one of her houseguests at the time of Willkie’s visit was
also a British intelligence agent. One recently released document
from the Soviet archives is a message from Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin,
the head of the foreign intelligence directorate of the NKVD in Mos-
cow: “Wolff’s [Milton Wolf, last commander of the Abraham Lincoln
Battalion in the Spanish Civil War] introduction to Colonel DON-
OVAN was organized by the wife of a former correspondent in Spain,
VINCENT SHEEAN;...SHEEAN himself is anti-Soviet, and his
wife, according to our information, is an agent of British intelli-
gencen
The long week of conversations between Willkie, the Sheeans, and
Dorothy Thompson was not without its effects. Thompson emerged
from this week as a great Willkie supporter, telling Helen Reid: “If the
convention doesn’t nominate him, I am going out into the streets and
do it myself.”!¢
One of Willkie’s outstanding talents was his ability to appear wide-
eyed and naive, a fresh innocent doing battle with reactionary forces.
He used this image to gull reporters, who then passed their reports on
to an equally innocent public. The often confused Kansas editor Wil-
liam Allen White thought Willkie was forthright and courageous.
Drew Pearson has a reputation for being more hardheaded and search-
ing, but you would never know this from his interview notes: “For
sheer force of personality and character, I believe Willkie makes the
greatest impact of any man I’ve ever talked to. He rings true in the very
essence of his word.”!”
The inability of seasoned reporters to penetrate this charade is a
tribute to Willkie’s charisma and his apparent trustworthiness. ‘Those
 160 ¢** DESPERATE DECEPTION

behind Willkie carefully hid the well-financed organization backing

him and let Willkie play the role of the energetic, innocent outsider.
Taft had 102 rooms at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel, Vandenberg had
forty-eight at the Adelphia, and Dewey had seventy-eight at the Hotel
Walton; Willkie made a show of having only two at the Benjamin
Franklin.
“Willkie’s advisors,” wrote biographer Donald Bruce Johnson, “did
everything possible to suppress independent activities by his friends
which might have altered the carefully cultivated impression among
the delegates that he was ‘just plain folks, just like you.’ ”!S
The event that allowed the Willkie forces to take control of the me-
chanics of the convention was most likely a stroke of pure luck, though
given the stakes, mayhem is not beyond the realm of the possible. In-
variably it is in every major intelligence service’s bag of tricks. When
Bickham Sweet-Escott was recruited into Lawrence Grand’s Section D
of SIS, the man interviewing him said: “For security reasons I can’t tell
you what sort of job it would be. All I can say is that if you join us, you
mustn’t be afraid of forgery, and you mustn't be afraid of murder.”!°
Ralph E. Williams, age seventy, a “Taftite,” headed the committee
on arrangements of the Republican convention in Philadelphia, which
was meeting at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel. Shortly after 5:30 P.M.,
May 16, “Mr. Williams, leaning on a chair, started to speak. Inmedi-
ately the chair slipped trom his grasp, and he fell to the floor.”?°
This allowed Sam Pryor of Connecticut, a Willkie insider, to take over
the convention and the allocation of essential credentials. Pryor reduced
the ticket allotments to delegations committed to other candidates. Del-
gations committed to Willkie got their full allotment. Finally, as Pryor
’ told it years later, he printed a duplicate set of tickets and opened up the
galleries to Willkie supporters, who responded with the “We Want
Willkie” chant so embossed on the memories of participants.?!
Pryor ordered one other small job for which there is sworn testi-
mony. Former President Herbert Hoover. wanted to stay aloof from
the war in Europe. He had worked on his isolationist speech for weeks,
and those who read it thought it the best speech of his career. When he
marched to the podium a great roar erupted from the fifteen thousand
as they stood and cheered, in expectation, for seven minutes.
Sam Pryor, or someone advising him, had foreseen this embar-
rassing situation. An enthusiastic response from the delegates to an
 “We Want Willkie” °*¢ 161

isolationist speech would have set entirely the wrong tone. There
was no great response; in fact, the delegates could not even hear the
speech. Pryor had had a faulty microphone installed for the ex- -_

president’s speech, and years later Hoover obtained a deposition to

this effect.??
Sam Pryor’s subterfuge certainly earned him the gratitude and trust
of those in power, and further covert assignments.?} Subsequently, he
built the secret airports in Latin America used by the British to ferry
American planes from Brazil to Africa. In later years this proven man
was liaison between Pan American Airways and the CIA. “One advan-
tage for Pryor of being an executive of an international airline,” write
Marylin Bender and Selig Altschul in their history of Pan Am, “was the
scope it permitted him in enacting his adolescent fantasies of being a
cloak-and-dagger operative.”*4
Strangely, Hoover also had difficulty making himself heard at his
convention press conference at the Bellevue Hotel, because a drum
corp happened to march into the lobby as he was speaking. These an-
noying incidents have the feel of the British intelligence political war-
fare game the secret “BSC Account” called “Vik.”°
Willkie, the “dark horse,” did get the nomination in June 1940.
“Thank God,” wrote one “key” member of FDR’s cabinet of Willkie’s
nomination. “Now we can go on helping Great Britain during the next
four months.”?°
At the Hoover Library is an interesting oral history interview with
James P. Selvage, a participant in the convention. In part Mr. Selvage
says: “I think it was the worst rigged convention I ever saw....I recall
another funny part of it was that the...press was saying—‘If you don’t
nominate Willkie—he is the people’s choice.’...[[] went home...and
the next day people up in my area in New Jersey were saying, ‘Who’s
this guy Willkie you nominated?’...People never heard of Willkie.”*’
David Lilienthal, the first head of the TVA, had a similar experience
when he and his son took a late August 1940 cab ride to Yankee Sta-
dium; the outspoken cab driver queried: “Sa-aay, who in the hell is this
guy Willkie? Who in the /e// is he anyway?”?®
Perhaps the experience of Selvage and Lilienthal was just a quirk.
After all, there was a rising public clamor for Willkie. The Gallup
poll, for example, shows an impressive and steady gain in popularity
for him:??
162 °*e DESPERATE DECEPTION

3/40 i S07 5/17 eh SBI GOAZan 20

Willkie ~~ 3% 57 LOYoy y Live. 4206
Dewey 33% Olle. O27 ~)070) 5270 aio
Taft 17% 12% 14% 16% 13% 8%
Vandenberg 19% 14% 13% 12% 12% 8%
Hoover 3% 2 2% 2% 2% 8%
What a perfect wave of rising support for the well-managed Willkie
quest for the nomination. Support for all the others was reportedly
sagging even more than is apparent here.
The perfect stroke came with precise timing, on Thursday morning
of the Republican convention. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner re-
ported in their column the results of a leaked Gallup poll. Forty-four
percent of Republican voters favored Willkie, while only 29 percent
chose Dewey and 13 percent wanted Taft. That night, amid the cries of
“We Want Willkie” from the Sam Pryor—packed galleries, the conven-
tion stampeded for Willkie.*°
Once the nomination was in hand, the money stopped flowing; the
aura of amateurish disorganization so skillfully promoted by the well-
financed campaign for the nomination gave way to full-blown chaos.
The Willkie Special traveled almost nineteen thousand miles and em-
blazoned on its participants memories of wild disorder. Russell Daven-
port’s speechwriter wife remembers the train as “a traveling equivalent
of Andersonville.”>!
Pierce Butler, a senior aide, distilled the Willkie Special experience
when he explained to a local Republican bigwig who demanded to
know who was running things: “Have you ever been in a whorehouse
on Saturday night, when the Madam was away and the girls were run-
ning it to suit themselves?—That’s how this campaign train is run.”32
This chaotic state of affairs reflected the real Wendell Willkie. In
his memoirs, published in 1963, New York Times staffer Turner
Catledge recorded his personal experiences with Willkie: “Willkie
was a most disorganized person. If you visited his hotel room you’d
likely see his clothes scattered everywhere—shirt under the bed,
socks on the chandelier....In the fall of 1941, when I was about to go
to work for Marshall Field’s Chicago Sun, I hada personal experience
with Willkie’s lack of organization. He drew up my contractual agree-
ment with the Swn.... The contract he wrote was three pages long and
 “We Want Willkie” #** 163

I couldn’t understand it. I took it to another lawyer and he didn’t un-

derstand it either.”?3
Who were the people who created Wendell Willkie? What was their
relationship to British intelligence and FDR?
The late 1930s had been hard on President Franklin Roosevelt.
Conservatives had defeated him in his attempt to pack the Supreme
Court. His attempts to purge his opponents from Congress in 1938
had also been an ignominious failure. Unemployment rates, if not
startling by the standards of his first two years in office, the 25 per-
cent of 1933 or the 24 percent of 1934, were still shockingly high—
19 percent in 1938, 17.2 percent in 1939, 14.6 percent in the election
year of 1940.34
The precarious international situation posed an opportunity for
FDR to win over the very conservatives who had beaten him on the
Court packing issue and exposed the failures of the New Deal. “Who,
after all,” asks historian Robert E. Herzstein, “needed Roosevelt in
1940, if he intended to honor the Neutrality Act in the fashion recom-
mended by Herbert Hoover?”*>
FDR’s recent political enemies came to his rescue; they backed his
vulnerable interventionist policies and supplied a cooperative candi-
date to oppose him in the presidential election. In the Court fight in
1937, the New York Herald Tribune had quickly and sharply attacked
Roosevelt on the Court issue. The New York Times attacked the Court
scheme more slowly but even more methodically.*°
Grenville Clark, a vital force in Fight for Freedom, had, with
Charles C. Burlingham, led a committee of lawyers that spearheaded
the fight to block FDR’s Court-packing plan and was now actively
working with the president and in his administration. Clark was a for-
midable opponent, but just as formidable a proponent. We have also
seen Burlingham as the host and friend of BSC’s David Ogilvy, as a
donor to the BSC attack on Congressman Fish, and as a signer of the
letter to the New York Times endorsing the legality of the illegal De-
stroyer Deal.*’
Two prominent commentators who had also launched virulent at-
tacks on Roosevelt’s Court plan were Walter Lippmann and Dorothy
Thompson. Both, as we-have seen, worked closely with British intelli-
gence; both helped create the Willkie boom, even advising the candi-
date; both suddenly defected after Willkie had the nomination in
164 °¢*¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

hand: Dorothy to Franklin Roosevelt; Lippmann to an enigmatic

neutrality.*®
Without Franklin Roosevelt, or someone similarly interventionist
as the president, the British could not possibly win the war. The firm
commitment to fight the Germans whatever the odds was not made
nearly so early as British propaganda would have had Americans be-
lieve. Only in July, after Willkie was nominated and an intervention-
ist president assured, did the British commit themselves, after two
cabinet meetings on the topic, to fighting on in the expectation that
the United States would rescue them.*? The other possible Republi-
can nominees— Taft, Dewey, and Vandenberg—were essentially isola-
tionists. Of these, Taft was the most isolationist of all and the most
intelligent and difficult to handle—“a limited little man with ignoble
values and a tough acute mind,” as one British intelligence officer
wrote years later.”
Lippmann himself wrote: “Second only to the Battle of Britain, the
sudden rise and nomination of Wendell Willkie was the decisive event,
perhaps providential, which made it possible to rally the free world when
it was almost conquered. Under any other leadership but his, the Repub-
lican party would in 1940 have turned its back on Great Britain....”*!
The first peacetime draft law in American history, Burke-
Wadsworth, and the Destroyer Deal would not have received
Roosevelt’s endorsement had a genuine opposition candidate stood
ready to make it a political issue in the 1940 election. Without the
Burke-Wadsworth conscription law the United States would not have
had the standing army that Britain would need to venture back onto
the continent of Europe.
As Senator Hiram Johnson wrote his son, Willkie “had raised hell
with us here by adopting the Roosevelt foreign policy, and being for
conscription, etc. He really broke the back of the opposition to the
conscription law.” The major experts on the draft, scholars Garry
Clifford and Samuel Spencer, catch the strangeness of this episode and
the lack of domestic support for the draft: “...even more curious is the
fact that during the early stages, both the army and the White House
were at best apathetic to its passage....In its worst light, it [the passage
of the draft law] might suggest that a powerful minority interest can
control the democratic process for its own ends...even though the
original sponsors envisaged the draft as being necessary for raising an
 “We Want Willkie” °° 165

army to participate in the European war, Congress as a whole did not

consciously enact the legislation for such bellicose purpose.”#
“We knew,” wrote Francis Pickens Miller, years later, “that Roose-
velt would not act [on the Destroyer Deal] until he had been reliably
assured that Willkie would not attack him for giving away part of our
fleet.” It is clear from the testimony of the British intelligence officials
that British intelligence was deeply involved in the Destroyer Deal.
Colin Gubbins, the head of Special Operations Executive, cites Ste-
phenson’s work on the Destroyer Deal as the best example of important
material left out of Hyde’s The Quiet Canadian. Though Sir William
Stephenson himself wrote in the 1980s that his role in the Destroyer
Deal was only secondary, no insider denies he was involved.#
Montgomery Hyde says: “Later in the summer came the destroyer-
for-bases deal in which I also played a part, along with General
Donovan on the American side.”*4 Several of the American partici-
pants in the dramatic effort to get Willkie’s assent to the plan seem to
have been greatly impressed by the drama, but they need not have
worked so hard; it was a fait accompli.
In a confidential message to the British ambassador, Lord Lothian,
Willkie wrote he was “in favor of doing everything possible to see that
Great Britain did not get beaten in the war...[but because] of the over-
whelming desire of the United States not to get involved in the
war...[it would be] necessary to convince the American people about
every particular step.” He went on to say that he would not oppose the
Destroyer Deal, but he was “most insistent that this statement of his
views should not in any circumstances be allowed to leak....”*? The
Destroyer Deal was very vulnerable, not its least problem being that it
was without doubt illegal.*¢
Though there is much commentary on this available, Ernest Cuneo
had been helping his friend and roommate George Bowden, later a top,
if unacknowledged, official of OSS, run the Destroyer Deal. Here is
/Cuneo: “...the Attorney General Bob Jackson had called me one
/ morning in 1940 and asked me to come over. I found him both sad and
disturbed. He said he was off to a Cabinet meeting where he had to
give the President very disappointing news: the transfer of the 50 de-
stroyers to Britain was unconstitutional. I told him not to feel too
badly: that by one o’clock that day he would either reverse himself or
he’d be asked for his resignation.”47 /
166 °*e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Francis Pickens Miller, a fervent interventionist and a prime mover

in Century Group/Fight for Freedom, says this: “If the Republicans
had launched an all out attack on the president for doing this [giving
away part of the fleet], their candidate would have attracted hundreds
of thousands of America First isolationist voters who otherwise might
not go to the polls. The political stakes were high and the temptation
great. But there were two weighty factors in our favor. Our chairman,
Lewis Douglas was one of Willkie’s most ardent supporters and trusted
advisors. Further, Willkie himself was a great patriot.”
The extremely shaky legal justification for the Destroyer Deal was a
letter to the editor published in the New York Times, August 11, 1940,
filled with disinformation and specious legal reasoning. The point at
which letters to the editor, even editors of the New York Times, took on
the force of law has never been explained. The letter had been con-
cocted by Ben Cohen of the White House staff and John Foster, the
counsel for the British embassy, and promoted by political insider and
associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter. Dean
Acheson, a major power in Fight for Freedom, and Frankfurter’s one-
time student and most ardent protégé, then persuaded prestigious at-
torneys Charles C. Burlingham (who had been one of the prime
movers against FDR’s Court-packing scheme), Thomas D. Thatcher,
and George Rublee to add their names to his, giving the letter in au-
thoritative endorsements what it lacked in logic.*?
The questionable legality of this appears to have unsettled even the
usually steady FDR. David Lilienthal, the head of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, wrote on September 2, 1940: “...aboard the Presidents spe-
cial train, en route to Knoxville: Mr. Baruch was in my stateroom when
I returned....He said the President was deeply absorbed in something,
for instead of inquiring about political prospects...he was brooding.
... Ithink it is something pretty serious...for he said twice on the jour-
ney something to the effect that he might get impeached for what he
was about to do.’ ”>?
British intelligence consistently used prominent Americans to pro-
nounce its messages and disarm its critics. The Destroyer Deal was no
exception. Hyde writes of this in The Quiet Canadian, the slightly
shortened version of the “BSC Account”: “General Pershing had been
persuaded through the good offices of an intermediary, a wealthy
American businessman...who was a friend of both Stephenson and the
 “We Want Willkie” °#* 167

General, to come out with a strong speech early in August supporting

the destroyer deal.”>!
Pershing’s eloquent speech was written for him by Walter Lipp-
mann, who was working with British intelligence and had pressed so
hard for Willkie. The Pershing speech “was the turning point in our
efforts to create a public opinion favorable to the president’s taking
action.” So three more speakers were scheduled, two of whom were
working with British intelligence, William Donovan and Robert
Sherwood.°?
“Senator Taft,” said Herbert Agar, a key figure in Fight for Freedom,
“was the rock on which we feared that our policy [of aid to Great Brit-
ain] would founder.”°} The other prospective Republican contenders
were not internationalists either. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg had
shown interest, undoubtedly under the tutelage of his neighbor at the
Wardman Park Hotel, British diplomat Harold Haig Sims, with whom
he lunched several times a week, or of Harold’s wife, Mitzi, with whom
Vandenberg was sleeping.
The central figure behind the Willkie boom was Thomas W.
Lamont, the senior partner in J. P. Morgan. Lamont was a vital factor
behind the scenes in most of the interventionist organizations. The
French aristocrat-become-newspaperman Raoul de Roussy de Sales
later worked with Sandy Griffith’s BSC front France Forever. His di-
ary entry of May 26, 1940, captures the feelings of Thomas Lamont
and his friends: “Dinner last night at Jones Beach as the guest of
Robert Moses....About twenty people were there, including the Tom
Lamonts, the Finletters, Mrs. Pratt, Herbert Swope. The only point
worth noting is that the sole concern of all these people was how to get the
United States into the war”(emphasis added).*+
Willkie was a media creation: those given credit for making his na-
tional image were the Luce publications—Fortune, Time, and Life—
and the Cowles publications—Look, the Des Moines Register and
Tribune, and the Minneapolis Star Journal. Luce and his wife Clare
Boothe Luce were very helpful to British intelligence. The Cowles
were apparently brought into this because they were cousins of
Lamont, Lamont’s aunt being the paternal grandmother of Gardner
“Mike” and John Cowles.°°
Though Mike Cowles was pivotal in the creation of Willkie, Presi-
dent Roosevelt apparently held no grudge; in fact, he was probably
168 °¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

grateful, because he soon made Cowles domestic director of the Office

of War Information. When FDR sent Willkie as his personal represen-
tative on a round-the-world flight, he sent along Mike Cowles and Jo-
seph Barnes. Barnes, while at the New York Herald Tribune, had also
been instrumental in promoting Willkie, but at the time of the trip he
was an Office of War Information foreign propaganda supervisor.°°
But Thomas Lamont was not Willkie’s only link to the Morgan in-
terests that so benefited his campaign. Willkie was on the board of di-
rectors of the Morgan-dominated First National Bank of New York
(1940; 1943-44). His close friends included not only Lamont but Perry
Hall, a vice president of Morgan Stanley & Co., and Charlton Mac-
Veagh, the brother of Ambassador to Spain Lincoln MacVeagh, who
had worked at J. P. Morgan. His father had been a longtime partner in
the Morgan law firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardner & Reed; his
brother continued to work for that firm.
Oren Root, grandnephew of Elihu Root and also a relative of Henry
Luce, creator of the Willkie Clubs, worked for Davis, Polk until he
began working full-time on the Willkie campaign. Before Root took a
leave of absence, Lamont had been considerate enough to intervene
with one of the Davis, Polk partners who had wished to have Oren
cease efforts on behalf of Willkie or be fired. “It was some ten minutes
later,” writes Root, “that the partner came bursting into my room with
‘Well, Oren, my boy, how is the great politician feeling today? You are
doing a wonderful job. Keep it up.’ ”*”
Journalist Warren Moscow has described the compartmentalization
(a characteristic of intelligence operations) of the advertising people
operating behind the scenes for Willkie in early 1940: “Before the
nomination was secured, more than twenty of them [advertising
people] had been recruited for the Willkie operation, each given a spe-
cific task, but with no knowledge that he was part of a larger force
embarked on a general campaign.” Even Oren Root confesses that “the
part I saw was only a fraction of the whole.”*®
An Information Please quiz show appearance and a multitude of oth-
ers were, in Warren Moscow’s words, “all planted by the public rela-
tions machinery at some of the meetings where the Willkie gospel,
rather than Willkie, was put on exhibition.”»?
There was also a Democrats for Willkie organization led by future
ambassador to Great Britain Lewis Douglas and the covert British
 “We Want Willkie” °°* 169

informant John W. Hanes. Hanes had been in charge of the Treasury

Department’s efforts to stall German ships in American harbors so
that the British could be ready for them when they tried to depart for
Germany.
Hanes had then gone to work for Hearst and, as he secretly informed
the British, was the one who persuaded Hearst to attack Lindbergh
after his Des Moines speech in September 1941.69 Among other ac-
complishments, Douglas had helped form Century Group/Fight for
Freedom.®! Douglas was also one of the interventionists who ran the
William Allen White Committee. Though he was the titular head of
Democrats for Willkie, Douglas took little interest in the campaign;
this fed the suspicion that he was “still having swb-rosa contact with the
opposing camp.”
There were others, besides Dorothy Thompson and Walter Lipp-
mann, who promoted Willkie for the Republican nomination, but
once the voters had been deprived of a real choice, went back to sup-
porting FDR. Willkie and FDR sat down before Willkie’s trip to En-
gland. “At intervals,” James Roosevelt has recorded, “great bursts of
laughter could be heard coming through the closed doors.” FDR told
Willkie, “You'll like Averell....He contributed to our campaign, you
know...[FDR professed to be embarrassed by what he had just said.]
Oh, that’s all right, Willkie grinned. Harriman did contribute to our
campaign. Harriman gave me money for my pre-convention cam-
paign before I got the nomination, but then he contributed to your
election campaign.”°?
The highlights of the preconvention campaign not already discussed
are these. In January 1940, Charlton MacVeagh and Russell Davenport
had secretly set up operations with a paid professional staff in the quiet
Murray Hill Hotel, MacVeagh on one floor, Davenport on another, a
mailroom and staff on still another. Warren Moscow was most wary of
Root’s claims of innocence when he noted the result of Root’s little
advertisement: “The day the ad appeared, the boiler factory in Murray
Hill went to work. By midnight, two thousand telegrams had gone out
to the mailing clubs [run by the Edison Electric Institute] suggesting a
rapid response to the Root appeal. Root was snowed under.”°+
William Donovan, whom British intelligence called “our man,” was
also at Philadelphia. And when Allen Dulles chanced on him in his
hotel lobby, Donovan had a wide grin on his face. He pointed out to
170 °¢2®* DESPERATE DECEPTION

Dulles that the nomination of Willkie simplified the situation and that
there was now no doubt the United States would get into the war. He
also told Dulles that certain preparations would have to be made “and
that’s where you come in.”®©
“The most popular member of the Willkie entourage,” wrote Drew
Pearson, “is [Russell] Davenport whose ability to think rapidly and co-
herently has made a deep imprint on newsmen. He seems to be the
only advisor who has Willkie’s ear; most of the others seeming to be
figureheads....” Davenport was an editor for Henry Luce’s Fortune
magazine and an early behind-the-scenes strategist for Willkie. In col-
laboration with Irita Van Doren and Willkie, Davenport turned the
April 1940 issue of Fortune into a promotion piece for Willkie. Accord-
ing to Oren Root, “The Fortune article and the Information Please ap-
pearance were part of the plan, together with a number of other
appearances by Willkie on public platforms and in print. The basic
essential of the strategy was that it be low key. Above all, there was
never, never to be any mention of the true objective, the Republican
nomination.”©
Once the publicity machine began its preconvention grind, there
was another problem. The narrow, artificial base of Willkie’s support,
concentrated as it was around New York, was too obvious. Root con-
sulted with Davenport, who suggested Oscaloosa, Iowa, as the site tar-
get of a Root trip. With trepidation, Root traveled west—”I was fearful
that my registration at the local hotel might attract undue attention,
thus spoiling the spontaneity of the result which I hoped would ensue.”
But everything went well. “Two days later, on May 4, there developed
from Oscaloosa, lowa—entirely spontaneously—a new one man cam-
paign for Wendell Willkie for President.”°’
After Willkie had the nomination and was trying to rest in Colorado
Springs, he was beset by a string of visitors. One was a “Mr. Franklin,”
a.k.a. Nelson Rockefeller. In this convoluted world Rockefeller osten-
sibly came “to ask permission from the Republican presidential stan-
dard-bearer, Wendell Willkie, who was on the campaign trail in a
candidacy Nelson’s Uncle Winthrop [Aldrich] had helped create and
whose effort the Rockefeller family was heavily backing.”®
The permission Nelson Rockefeller was requesting was to join the
Roosevelt administration as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.
Uncle Winthrop had long been a member of what Rutgers historian
 “We Want Willkie” eee 171

Jeffery M. Dorwart called “the Roosevelt-Astor Espionage Ring.”

Known for most of its existence as “the Room” and code named “the
Club” during World War I, this group was working with and for
British intelligence and Franklin Roosevelt in February, March, and
April 1940.°
Information from British intelligence was passed through Astor to
FDR. Through Winthrop Aldrich, Astor also became informed of a
wonderful opportunity to plant agents on a Chase National mission to
Japan.’? While funding the creation of Willkie and passing inside bank
information on to FDR, Winthrop Aldrich also “headed the British
War Relief Society in America and funded a secret pilot training pro-
gram for British fliers in the United States.”7!
The complex origins of Willkie’s 1941 trip to England further illus-
trate why historians have had such difficulty tracking events in this
maze of cutouts and intermediaries. “What could be better than send-
ing Mr. Wendell Willkie, your opponent in the recent bitter elec-
tions?” Stephenson suggested to FDR. The fact that Intrepid was the
initiator of this trip is reiterated by Montgomery Hyde in Secret Intelli-
gence Agent: “Shortly afterwards he [Willkie] passed through Bermuda
on a visit to England, which he made at President Roosevelt’s special
request prompted by Stephenson.””
President Roosevelt liked the idea of the trip. In the next step, Justice
Felix Frankfurter and publisher, Fight for Freedom activist, and British
intelligence helper Harold Guinzburg cornered Willkie’s mistress,
Irita Van Doren, at a New Year’s party. Van Doren talked to Willkie,
who accepted the idea.”
Again the effort by British intelligence to gain credibility for its
American spokesmen—Dorothy Thompson, Edgar Ansel Mowrer,
William Donovan, and now Wendell Willkie—by having them visit
wartime Britain met with considerable success.
Fight for Freedom used Willkie as one of its most effective speakers
at its rallies. Willkie’s file in the Fight for Freedom Papers is 270 pages
of correspondence, telegrams, and speeches, much of it congratula-
tory—“Congratulations on your swell speech at San Francisco rally.
Best parts were your war-mongering.— Ulric Bell.”
There is also a group of interesting negative letters—some of them
very caustic. The occasion of these unflattering letters was a letter, pre-
pared by Fight for Freedom, sent by Willkie to prominent American
172 *** Desperate DECEPTION

businessmen to promote the book You Can’t Do Business with Hitler by

Douglas Miller, the one-time U.S. commercial attaché in Berlin.
For those American businessmen who were not profoundly horrified
by Hitler, a reading of Miller’s book would put the proper fear in them.
“Mr. Miller,” wrote one reviewer,” devotes much of his space to the
foreboding future which awaits Europe and the world in case of
Hitler's victory....[|Miller makes] an ardent plea for intervention of the
United States in the present struggle: “The sooner we declare war the
better.’ ”’+ The book became an immense success, thanks to heavy pro-
motion by the friends and fronts of British intelligence.
In March 1941, Willkie went to Canada, where he delivered a fiery
speech to open the national war drive fund. By spring, Willkie “was
considered the leading interventionist spokesman in America.” As a
member of the executive committee of Fight for Freedom, Willkie
emerged as one of FFF’s most popular speakers.’°
Lindbergh’s speech at Des Moines, Iowa, in early September 1941
permitted British intelligence the opportunity it sorely needed to dis-
credit the most effective anti-interventionist speaker fighting against
them. Lindbergh’s charge that the British, the administration, and the
Jews were trying to involve the United States in the war opened him
to the charge of Fight for Freedom’s Peter Cusick that he was a
“barefaced” anti-Semite. Bishop Hobson of FFF prompted Willkie
into action with a telegram saying that “the ugly spectacle of Nazi
anti-Semitism [is] being made the plank in the platform of the Amer-
ica First Committee.””°
Willkie responded on cue by calling Lindbergh’s speech “the most
un-American talk made in my time by any person of national reputa-
tion.” Since Bill Morrell of British Security Coordination directed the
work of Fight for Freedom, the Rev. Leon M. Birkhead’s Friends of
Democracy, and the Nonsectarian Anti-Nazi League in their efforts to
discredit the anti-interventionists, the concerted attacks mentioned by
historians were no coincidence. John W. Hanes, one of the leaders of
Democrats for Willkie, confidentially reported to the British on how
he pressured Hearst into attacking Lindbergh.
Chapter 3 suggests that the movie industry was dominated by in-
terventionists and British intelligence agents such as the Korda
brothers. Vhe isolationist Senator Burton K. Wheeler told a radio
audience that the movie companies “have been operating as war
 “We Want Willkie” 2 173

propaganda machines almost as if they were being directed from a

central bureau....” Soon the Senate passed a resolution by Senator
Wheeler creating a subcommittee to investigate the movies. This
could have been trouble. The subcommittee was packed with isola-
tionists—D. Worth Clark, Bone, Tobey, and Wayland Brooks.
From papers in the Fight for Freedom collection at Princeton, Mark
L. Chadwin concluded that Ulric Bell “outlined the tactics” to go
“fighting on the offensive....””” It appears that Chadwin had spotted
only one of the links in the chain. Wheeler would surely have been in a
dither had he known that the man coaching the movie makers, and
their visible counsel, Willkie, was Sidney Bernstein, a man proud to be
both a Jew and a British agent. (There were also worries about the
Jewish influence in the movies.) In Willkie’s Fight for Freedom file are
several examples of telegrams and speeches written by FFF for others.
Here is part of a telegram, with a tough speech enclosed, to Senator
Carter Glass from Ulric Bell of FFF:
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
September 15, 1941
Mr.J.W. Rixey Smith

Senator Carter Glass’ Office...

Willkie is very much in need of some help from your quarter.

He says it will be of infinite assistance if at this juncture...the
Senator will let go with a strong blast. It may be just enough
to push over the whole business and stop the inquisition....I
know that you will want something as a guide and I am offer-
inguty?

This heavy counterattack orchestrated by British agents threw the

subcommittee into confusion; the hearings sputtered and finally died.
Fight for Freedom claimed this proved the innocence of its movie al-
lies. Today there is strong testimony that the Korda brothers were full-
fledged British intelligence agents and that several of the other
producers were working closely with the British.
Willkie’s relationship with FDR was ofspecial interest. At the March
1941 dinner of the White House Correspondents Association, a mock
newsreel was shown titled Al/ We Know Is What They Let Us Write in the
174 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Papers or It Ain’t Necessarily So. One scene, showing Roosevelt and

Willkie in bed together, was titled ”Bundling for Britain.””?
Willkie and Franklin Roosevelt worked together in a way that no
other “political opponents” ever have. There were, of course, the attacks
Willkie made, concurrently with British intelligence, on Congressman
Hamilton Fish. These were done in conjunction with President Roose-
velt; they are discussed in Chapter 6, but there was more.
New York Times reporter Warren Moscow records: “Intimates of
Willkie recall that there were a number of calls from the White
House to Willkie in New York, after which Willkie would board a
late afternoon or early evening plane for Washington. He would be
met at the airport by an unmarked White House car, which left him
off at the back entrance to the President’s mansion. After the talk
with the President, he would be taken back to the airport and be at
his desk the next morning, with the same measure of secrecy used.
There is no record of these trips, but the best information is that they
began before Roosevelt sent his lend-lease program to Congress on
10 January 1941.”8°
Drew Pearson was to write later: “Perhaps never in American history
has there been such a unique and friendly situation between two men
who once engaged in a bitter cut-throat race for the White House as
between Franklin Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie.”*! The depth and
authenticity of this “bitterness” is much in doubt, considering their
subsequent amicable relationship. Willkie later confessed of the things
he had said about FDR during the 1940 presidential election that it
“was campaign oratory.”®?
Willkie’s record of accommodation and support after the November
1940 election is further evidence that he should be viewed as more of a
stalking horse than a dark horse. Clearly he had none of the earmarks
of the leader of the opposing political party. Defying almost the entire
Republican Party leadership, Willkie became an outspoken advocate
for Lend-Lease, which the British were extremely anxious to obtain.
Willkie became an open ally of Franklin Roosevelt, a launcher of trial
balloons, helping to prepare the ground for the more cautious FDR.
If British intelligence collaborator and Roosevelt speechwriter Rob-
ert Sherwood is correct, FDR was very grateful for the help. Wrote
Sherwood: “Once I heard Hopkins make some slurring remark about
Willkie and Roosevelt slapped him with as sharp a reproof as I ever
 “We Want Willkie” °** 175

heard him utter. He said, ‘Don’t ever say anything like that around here
again. Don’t even think it. You of all people ought to know that we
might not have had Lend Lease or Selective Service or a lot of other
things if it hadn’t been for Wendell Willkie. He was a godsend to this
country when we needed him most.’ ”83
During his trip to England, January 22 to February 9, 1941,
Willkie enjoyed the same sort of red carpet treatment other American
celebrities had received. And Willkie’s assessments of the situation
were just as erroneous. Willkie returned hastily to the United States
on the Dixie Clipper with the avowed purpose of pronouncing the
British propaganda message: “What the British desire from us is not
men, but materials and equipment.”** (This is the same message
Senator Vandenberg’s friend Mrs. Paterson was giving her audiences.)
It was patently false; there was not the faintest chance the British
could have invaded the continent without American soldiers or that the
goods could be transferred to England without American sailors being
in danger.
Willkie’s pro-administration, pro-British activity destroyed his fol-
lowing among Republicans in a way that no high-road, idealistic
rhetoric could conceal. By midspring of 1941, Republican National
Chairman John D. Hamilton wrote to a fellow Republican: “Out of
the 190-odd Republican members of the House and the Senate,
Willkie couldn’t dig up ten friends if his life depended on it.” In a
March 28, 1944, letter to John Hanes, Oren Root said: “It is regret-
table, but I think a conservative assumption that only a minority of all
our contributors, and not much more than a majority of the Commit-
tee, are today still friendly to Willkie.”®°
All his work on behalf of the British and Franklin Roosevelt’s admin-
istration had simply exhausted Willkie’s credibility and fueled the sus-
picion—never far from the surface—that he had been a plant. If by the
autumn of 1941 Willkie’s credibility was diminished among rank-and-
file Republicans, after the publication of Nelson Sparks’s book naming
the British Ambassador Lord Lothian, Thomas Lamont of Morgan,
and the Reids as his political creators, it was small indeed.
Isaiah Berlin of the British embassy in Washington warned London:
“A member of my staff, who has been talking to Mrs. Ogden Reid,
obtained the impression that while proposing to continue her present
investment in Willkie...she was well aware of the possibility of having
176 °¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

to switch to someone else in time, and would endeavor to do so as

gracefully as possible, after some formal casus belli, which no one could
have much difficulty picking with Willkie.”®¢
Isaiah Berlin’s dispatches are filled with notes on personal contacts
between the British Embassy and Willkie.®’ As late as December 13,
1943, Berlin was reporting to London: “Henry Luce...shows no dispo-
sition as yet to start selling his shares in Willkie, nor do the Morgan
interests.”
If Willkie was too severely damaged to be viable as a Republican,
perhaps he could undergo yet another political transmogrification.
There were emissaries from FDR—Harold Ickes, Judge Rosenman—
asking if he would take the vice presidential nomination. Felix Frank-
furter and Drew Pearson were also pushing hard for Willkie.®* In
Pearson’s files is a 1966 letter to Matthew Rosenhaus, J. B. Williams
Co., 711 Fifth Avenue, New York:

Dear Matty:...My recollection is that you were the one who

inspired me to approach Wilkie [sic] regarding the idea of
running for Vice President on the Democratic ticket in 1944.
As you will recall, Willkie was willing, but my efforts with
FDR and with those around him failed. It was a fairly impor-
tant chapter, for the most part unwritten, of that political
Vear,
Not only did this fail, but so did Willkie. He had a heart attack in
August. This brought on a stay in the hospital, where he seemed to be
getting better, but he caught a streptococcic throat infection and died
on October 7. In referring to the death of the author of One World,
British intelligence agent Montgomery Hyde wrote of Willkie, the ha-
bitual reader, that “by an ironic twist of fate he died from a virus con-
tracted from another book which he had been reading.””
 CHAPTER 9
See

The Success
of Deception

By the late 1930s, then, it had become apparent to the British that they
did not have the resources to fight a war with Germany. Only if the
United States could be dragged into the war on Britain’s side would
there be a chance to prevent German hegemony in Europe. But the
Americans were perceived as being unreliable and unpredictable. They
were, in the words of the shrewd permanent undersecretary of state for
foreign affairs, Sir Robert Vansittart, an “untrustworthy Race...who
will always let us down.”!
Moreover, there was ample evidence to indicate that the people of
the United States were determined not to become involved in another
European war; the Congress had manifestly expressed this popular de-
sire to stay out of any conflict by passing neutrality laws. As late as the
summer of 1939 the Congress—“pigheaded and self-righteous nobod-
ies” in Neville Chamberlain’s words’ had steadfastly refused to over-
turn this legislation.
Because of the gravity of this situation, the British now had a desper-
ate need to exert as much influence as possible to cause the American
government to abandon its isolationist policies and enter the war on
Britain’s side. Given the unpredictability of Congress, it should be little
wonder that the British made a major effort to influence its members
and destroy the careers of those who proved resistant. It is, thus, not
surprising that the British diplomat Harold Sims and his wife, Mitzi,
made an effort to ingratiate themselves with Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg, a powerful member of the Foreign Relations Committee and

v7
178 °¢**® DESPERATE DECEPTION

potential presidential candidate in 1940; or that Mitzi suddenly reap-

peared during the debate on Lend-Lease; or that when Mitzi again left,
one of British intelligence’s most skilled operatives, “Cynthia,” unex-
pectedly appeared at the senator’s apartment.
The resources available to the British government were very lim-
ited when compared with those needed to fulfill her worldwide com-
mitments, but among Britain’s assets were its secret intelligence and
propaganda agencies. These experienced tremendous growth during
1938-40. Section D is reported to have grown larger than its parent,
MI-6.
British intelligence was already established in the United States be-
fore the April 1940 arrival of William Stephenson, now almost univer-
sally known as Intrepid. But operations were consolidated and greatly
expanded under Stephenson; from 1940 to 1945 he represented a shift-
ing kaleidoscope of British intelligence and propaganda agencies, most
of them housed in Rockefeller Center under the name British Security
Coordination (BSC). British agencies, overt and covert, worked so
closely together that it is often difficult to tell precisely where black
operations shade into gray and then into white. British intelligence
formed one part, the most secret part, of a three-sided relationship—
the Roosevelt White House and the Eastern foreign policy elite form-
ing the other sides. President Roosevelt allowed British intelligence
broad latitude in its American operations before and during World
War II; this served his own purposes quite well and at the same time
also served the purposes of the Anglophile foreign policy elite.
When World War II was over, those who participated in the BSC
campaign to involve the United States in World War II and destroy
isolationism felt that they had succeeded, that they had guided history
in the desired direction, however slow and halting the process. Writing
of British Security Coordination’s efforts to portray the isolationists as
Nazis or Nazi dupes, the “BSC Account” says: “All this [black propa-
ganda] and much more was handed out by devious means to the great
impartial newspapers of the country.... Personalities were discredited,
their unsavory pasts were dug up, their utterances were printed and
reprinted....Little by little, a sense of guilt crept through the cities and
out across the states. The campaign took hold.” The very word “isola-
tionist” became a scandalous epithet, to be hurled at one’s enemies.
The destruction of the isolationist opposition paved the way for the
 The Success of Deception ***® 179

post-World War IT bipartisan foreign policy that diplomatic historians

have so marveled at.
Attempting to answer the question of which operations considered
in this book would have been accomplished without British intel-
ligence’s expert guidance is, of course, an exercise in counterfactual his-
tory and the unknowable. This is not to say that such speculation is
unnatural or that its basic assumptions are categorically without merit.
Such speculation is inevitable, because secret intelligence agencies by
their very nature try to keep their operations secret, to have others
front for them, to stay in the background. Time after time, in his plans
to unseat Congressman Hamilton Fish, SOE agent Sandy Griffith ad-
monished his people to “remain in the background.” “Events,” he
wrote, should appear to be “spontaneous.” To fix the historical credit
or blame on others, or on mere chance, is the raison d’étre of covert
operations.*
Not only did British intelligence attempt to stay in the background,
its agents had circuitous contacts at so many different levels that the
lineage of specific events is often difficult to trace. The manipulation of
the public opinion polls is an example. Agent Sandy Griffith and his
Market Analysts Inc. did spurious polls that were published by BSC
fronts such as Fight for Freedom and the Committee to Defend
America by Aiding the Allies. MI-6’s David Ogilvy was a top man at
Gallup, and David Niles, the British intelligence contact at the White
House, was also the contact for informant Hadley Cantril of the Office
of Public Opinion Research at Princeton. Cantril, who worked with
Gallup, was also cooperating with Fight for Freedom/Century Group.
The dualistic case of Walter Lippmann is even more obscure be-
cause he was both giving and receiving advice from the British. What is
clear about both the Gallup organization and Walter Lippmann is that
British intelligence and its fronts were “in the loop” with them.
The counterfactual argument is legitimately based on the valid
premise that the White House and the Eastern policy elite, the “War-
hawks,” earnestly wished for the United States to intervene in the war
and assume its global responsibilities. The willingness, however, was
not the deed. What British intelligence brought to the equation was
sharp focus, good organization, technical expertise, and a courageous
determination to do whatever was necessary—however illegal or un-
seemly. BSC’s sharp focus and tight organization were desperately
180 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

needed. Most scholars who have looked closely at the Franklin Roose-
velt White House have remarked on its disorganization and confusion.
After World War I, William Langer and S. Everett Gleason wrote an
authoritative volume on American involvement in the war using this
well-known confusion to deny that anyone in particular was to blame
for the way events unfolded.
British intelligence could hardly have worked so effectively alone,
however. It was, after all, a foreign intelligence service operating within
the United States, but outside and often in direct contradiction to
American law. Ernest Cuneo observed in a memo for his files: “So ob-
jectionable was BSC activity, and so politically dangerous was it for the
American bureaucracy, that it excited strong hostility within both the
Justice and State departments.”°
For BSC to function so freely and effectively, FDR or someone simi-
larly cooperative was needed to occupy the White House. There is
now considerable evidence available affirming the charges by Earl
Browder and Nelson Sparks that Wendell Willkie was a creation of
Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan, Franklin Roosevelt, and British Am-
bassador Lord Lothian. Several of the principals felt that the Destroyer
Deal would never have materialized without the crucial cooperation of
Willkie. After the election, Willkie became spokesman for Fight for
Freedom. In this capacity he performed numerous chores BSC needed
done. For one he defended American moviemakers at congressional
hearings when they stood accused of cooperating with the British in
producing pro-interventionist propaganda movies.
Because there is little doubt that the American moviemakers had
made numerous pro-Allied films before Pearl Harbor, matters could
have become awkward. One propaganda historian has written of the
senators’ attacks on the Warner Brothers Studio: “Fortunately for
Warners the Senators only saw the films and not the studio’s [very in-
criminating] correspondence.”© Fortunate also was the timing of the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Film producer and MI-6 agent Alexander
Korda was scheduled to testify before Congress on December 12, 1941.
Sir Robert Vansittart, once the permanent undersecretary of state
for foreign affairs, the liaison between MI-6 and the Foreign Office,
had in 1938 moved to the nebulous position of chief diplomatic adviser
to the foreign secretary; from that position he worked diligently at
planning for intelligence and propaganda work. In an October 1939
 The Success of Deception °°? 181

minute to a Foreign Office document, Vansittart wrote: “There are

plenty of people in Hollywood who would be delighted to make films
which work our way if they were provided with material. Many of the
leading actors would give their services for nothing....So far, I repeat
we have made no real use whatever of the most potent means of propa-
ganda.”’ Vansittart here captures the essence of the situation. There
were those in America who were willing to help the British, but they
needed guidance and support.
Did the Louis Mumfords and their interventionist friends wish to
rid their congressional district of isolationist Hamilton Fish? Yes,
they certainly did. Mrs. Mumford wrote to a friend about how the
work of British intelligence agent Sanford Griffith gave the campaign
“direction”: “Alone, I am quite sure the amateurs could not have
swung it....”°
Was Assistant Attorney General William P. Maloney willing to chill
the atmosphere of isolationism by prosecuting George Sylvester
Viereck for improperly registering as a German propagandist? He
definitely was willing, but where would he have been without British
intelligence? It was British intelligence that supplied the key witnesses
and the material evidence in the initial trial.
After that conviction was overturned, British intelligence once again
lent a helping hand to prejudice the case against the defendant, supply
the key witnesses, and perhaps even promote perjury by witness Sandy
Griffith. Griffith may have had to commit perjury in this trial, but the
Justice Department was able to get another conviction. British intelli-
gence was such an integral part of these proceedings and the gov-
ernment’s charges were so fragile that it is very hard to believe that it
would have been pursued so relentlessly or successfully without BSC’s
preparation, its agents, and their testimony.
Was interventionist political columnist Drew Pearson willing to at-
tack Congressman Fish? Yes, of course, but it was British intelligence
agent Sanford Griffith who furnished Pearson with the material.
When Fish responded by calling Pearson a liar, the somewhat reluctant
Pearson was persuaded to sue Fish. What should he then do? asked
Pearson. Griffith told him to let the suit drag on, hanging over Fish’s
head, and that was done. It is difficult to see how this strategic attack on
Congressman Fish by Drew Pearson would have taken place without
the sustained support of British intelligence.
182 ¢e® DESPERATE DECEPTION

Was President Roosevelt inhibited about telling fabricated tales to

create the impression that Latin America was gravely threatened by the
Nazis, thus intensifying America’s fear and prodding the United States
closer to war? No, numerous witnesses tell us FDR had nothing
against a good fib, but the White House’s ability to manufacture the
documentary evidence to back him was limited. For the final coup to
remove the last of the neutrality laws, British intelligence supplied the
fib and the forged map of how Hitler was planning to divide up Latin
America. Likewise, there was no internal impetus existing within the
United States for the creation of Donovan’s Coordinator of Informa-
tion/Office of Strategic Services. Neither the FBI, nor navy intelli-
gence, nor army intelligence was demanding the creation of a separate
agency.’ There is no evidence to contradict this conclusion—not in
Cuneo’s papers, certainly not in Tom Troy’s study done twenty years
ago at the CIA.
Further testimony to the success of British intelligence operations
can be seen in the actions of Americans who, having learned the intel-
ligence trade from the British, later flattered their teachers by copying
their successful methods. The aggressive offensive spirit of British in-
telligence at war became the model for generations of American intel-
ligence officers and government officials in the Cold War.
British Security Coordination, an activist, full-service intelligence
agency, pushed into existence the Coordinator of Information, which
became OSS; pushed “our man,” as they called William Donovan, to
its top; supplied MI-6 officer Dickie Ellis to run its daily operations
and train its personnel; and supplied numerous other BSC agents and
collaborators to run COI/OSS operations.!? With the coming of the
Cold War many of the key personnel trained in the front group opera-
tions—dirty tricks, black propaganda, and incessant political warfare—
of British Special Operations at war moved into the CIA. Is it any
wonder that the OSS developed in the image and likeness of British
intelligence at war or that the CIA developed along similar lines?
Was Special Operations Executive officer Bill Morrell planting
twenty items a day in the media? The CIA planted eighty.!! Did BSC
organize opposition for political candidates? The CIA did the same:
the Italian election of 1948 is a known example. Did BSC introduce
women and agents of influence to politicians? “The CIA maintains an
extensive stable of ‘agents of influence’ around the world...from valets
 The Success of Deception °** 183

and mistresses to personal secretaries....”!2 Did BSC make Station

WRUL an unwitting mouthpiece for British propaganda? The CIA
ran Radio Free Europe. From Allen Dulles’ operations in Guatemala
and Iran to William Casey and his convoluted methods in Iran-Contra,
the continuation of BSC/OSS tactics is evident.
The fronts run by British Security Coordination—Friends of De-
mocracy, Fight for Freedom, etc.—had several distinct advantages over
open attempts by the British government to affect American opinion
and influence congressional action. These fronts allowed the tenden-
tious messages of the British to come from ostensibly disinterested
American mouths.
One example is the starvation of Europeans caused by the British
blockade. In August 1940, former president Herbert Hoover, ignoring
the possibility of Nazi diversion, presented a plan to feed the hungry
civilians of Europe and thereby break the British blockade, one of
Britannia’s most potent weapons. Once again the anxious British were
able to remain in the background; they did not have to explain why it
was necessary to starve the civilians of the defeated countries; a man of
God was available to give the British words the respectability. Episco-
pal Bishop Henry W. Hobson led Fight for Freedom in its vigorous
and successful defense of the blockade. It was a necessity, explained the
bishop, to starve the Europeans for their own good.!* With good rea-
son the British felt this argument would have been given short shift by
most Americans had it been known to be an obviously self-serving pro-
nouncement of the British government.
Perhaps one of the most remarkable achievements of the tough po-
litical warfare waged by BSC was the elimination of the prewar isola-
tionists from the postwar foreign policy debates. The British feared
that if the isolationist voices were not silenced, the United States might
once again recoil into itself after the war. Note the relentless BSC cam-
paign against Congressman Hamilton Fish, described in Chapter 6. A
cursory examination of biographies of the isolationists Gerald Nye and
Burton Wheeler strongly suggests they were the targets of similar
campaigns. The bipartisan foreign policy of which many diplomatic
historians have written was created by this elimination of strong and
respected isolationist senators and congressmen.
After the war these BSC operations to involve the United States in
the war and destroy isolationism were generally ignored by main-
184 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

stream historians. There developed an establishment consensus that

the revisionist controversy that had surrounded World War I had been
a mistake and, as OSS head William Donovan explained to counterin-
telligence officer James Angleton, “after World War II there must be
‘no rewriting of history,’ as there had been after World War I.”!#
Those who had made this World War II history filled the vacuum by
promulgating and financing, by writing and publishing, their very own
version of it. In announcing a grant of $139,000 (later added to by the
Sloan Foundation) to William Langer for a study of the origins of
World War II, the 1946 annual report of the Rockefeller Foundation
read: “The Committee on Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations
is concerned that the debunking journalistic campaign following
World War I should not be repeated and believes that the American
public deserves a clear and competent statement of our basic aims and
activities during the Second World War.”!> William Langer says in his
autobiography, In and Out ofthe Ivory Tower, that this tendentious state-
ment by the Rockefeller Foundation was “badly worded.”!® Perhaps,
but it nonetheless catches the self-serving sense of the Rockefeller
Foundation mandate.
In his history of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Wise Men of
Foreign Affairs, Robert D. Schulzinger summarizes the messages from
the council’s executive director Walter Mallory: “[Mallory] railed
against revisionist histories of the First World War which had under-
mined the public approval of an active foreign policy. [Langer’s] book
should counter the ‘bad teaching in most schools and universities fol-
lowing the First World War which left the country so ill-prepared for
either preventing World War IJ or participating in it.’ ”!7
The authors of the Rockefeller-financed study The Challenge to Isola-
tion: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy were two
of William Donovan’s OSS men, William L. Langer and S. Everett
Gleason. British Security Coordination, Intrepid, black propaganda—
none of these is to be found in the Langer and Gleason study, and there
is a manifestly less purposeful FDR.!®
Historian Warren F. Kimball writes this of the Langer and Gleason
work: “In fact, there are many who have denied that he [FDR] had any
strategy at all. That is the thrust of arguments by early so-called ‘court’
historians like William Langer and S. Everett Gleason who, writing in
the decade after World War II and with ‘Isolationism’ as the villain,
 The Success of Deception *** 185

sought to defend Roosevelt’ actions by picturing him as one who only

reacted to events, one whose foreign policy was akin to flying by the
seat of the pants. After all, they imply, if Hitler and the Japanese were
clearly aggressors, then why debate the issue of whether or not the
President lied? The United States had done the right thing—there was
no need to dig any deeper. Whether or not those deceptions were part
of a clear foreign policy was never answered.”!°
The absence of a powerful and intellectually respectable revisionism
after World War II also left unnoticed that Langer and Gleason were
from the British intelligence-created OSS and that the Rockefellers,
whose foundation financed the book, had been the rent-free provider
of space in Rockefeller Center for BSC and such BSC frontsas Fight
for Freedom. The activities of Nelson Rockefeller as Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs (the Rockefeller Office) might have also been
revealed earlier by searching revisionist historians.”°
Moreover, some key members of the Council on Foreign Relations
also had good reason to promote an official history that would preclude
any careful examination of the British efforts to involve the United
States in the war. Several of its officers, directors, and prominent com-
mittee members—Francis P. Miller, Lewis W. Douglas, Whitney H.
Shepardson, Stacy May, Edward Warner, and Winfield W. Riefler—
had been leading members of the BSC front Century Group/Fight for
Freedom.?!
Miller, Douglas, and Shepardson had unquestionably been witting
about some operations of BSC. It was Lewis Douglas who had tried to
get doctoral candidate Mark Lincoln Chadwin to remove evidence of
British influence on Fight for Freedom from the manuscript that be-
came the book The Hawks of World War II. Whitney Shepardson was
wartime head of Special Intelligence for William Donovan at OSS and
worked closely with British intelligence.
Francis Miller had worked for OSS and was undeniably knowledge-
able about many BSC operations. He was a close friend of BSC’s
Donald MacLaren, who helped run BSC’s “George Office.” ‘Iwo de-
cades after World War II, Miller’s views were recorded by Mark
Chadwin: “Right-wing ‘revisionists’ may have grounds to accuse the
Warhawks of a ‘conspiracy’ to involve the United States in war but
certainly not of a ‘liberal conspiracy.’...
The original members of the
Group were predominately conservative not liberal...”
186 °¢¢¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Besides the deliberate attempt to promote an evasive semiofficial

history, two other factors worked against a revisionist evaluation of the
way the United States had become involved in the war. First, the de-
struction of Nazism was so universally acclaimed as a positive good that
the revisionists simply found themselves on the wrong side of the po-
litical consensus. The consensus, which British black propaganda
helped develop, that the Axis was not only evil but had threatened the
Western Hemisphere was a major factor in the British intelligence
campaign to involve the United States in the war.
Second, whereas the wide-ranging revisionism after World War I
had been a wide-open debate in a time of peace, revisionism after
World War II was inhibited by the emerging Cold War. The review by
Samuel Flagg Bemis, the eminent Yale diplomatic historian, of George
Morgenstern’s Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War in the March
1947 edition of Modern History is the classic illustration of the way in
which the Cold War constrained responsible historians. While agree-
ing with Morgenstern that much of the blame for Pearl Harbor rested
in Washington and “that the majority of the congressional commit-
tee...[investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster] was biased and trying to
protect its party leaders,” Bemis nonetheless wrote that “this revision-
ist attempt...in this year 1947 is serious, unfortunate,...deplorable.
Unfriendly critics will pick sentences...to hurt Morgenstern’s own
country, our still free Republic.”*3 The Soviet menace and World War
Il seemed to loom just over the horizon as Bemis summed up the revi-
sionist threat: “After winning the second World War will the new revi-
sion help to lose the second peace as the first revision helped to lose the
first peace?”24
The peace was kept, but so were many secrets. This work has at-
tempted to uncover and piece together the known facts. We will never
know the full story, of course: most of its principals have carried their
secrets to the grave. Our knowledge of the British operations will al-
ways remain incomplete.
One thing is clear, however. Britain’s World War II influence-
shaping campaign in the United States was one of the most important
and successful covert operations of history. As such, it deserves careful
examination at a time when intelligence organizations are under fire
for conducting covert operations at all. Rarely informed of anything
but the failures of covert operations, their opponents seem off on a
 The Success of Deception °*°® 187

cloud—a morally defensible cloud, perhaps, but still a cloud. In a time

of great national crises and dwindling resources, covert operations
were the tool that ultimately was responsible for saving England. As
history knows now, England’s saving was the world’s.
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 Glossary of
Individuals and
Organizations

Agar, Herbert Sebastian (1897-1980). London correspondent and

later editor for the Louisville Courier-Journal; speaker and policy-
maker for Fight for Freedom; special assistant to U.S. ambassador in
London, Gil Winant; stayed in England after the war.
Agar, William (1894-1972). Educator; older brother of Herbert Agar;
Princeton Ph.D.; full-time employee of Fight for Freedom; also ran
the Rockefeller Center office of another BSC front, the American
Irish Defense Association.

Aglion, Also Aghion, Raoul. Said to have been legal attaché in the
French legation at Cairo before the fall of France in June 1940; then
moved to the United States, where he worked for SOE Political and
Minorities Section of British Security Coordination with the cover
symbol G.411; wrote pro-British articles for The Nation; general sec-
retary of the Free French delegation to the United States; wrote
book Fighting French telling of de Gaulle’s greatness and great sup-
port among the French people.
AIPO. American Institute of Public Opinion; polling organization run
by George Gallup and penetrated by BSC.
Aitken, Max (Lord Beaverbrook) (1879-1964). Newspaper owner;
close friend and adviser to Prime Minister Winston Churchill; close
friend of fellow Canadian and BSC intelligence chief Sir William
Stephenson.

189
190 *** DESPERATE DECEPTION

America First. Anti-interventionist organization which sought to

keep the United States out of the war. BSC declared and fought a
covert political war on America First.
American Irish Defense Association (also Irish-American Defense
Association). BSC front organized by agent Sandy Griffith in an un-
successful attempt to persuade Irish-Americans to endorse aid for
Britain.
American Labor Committee to Aid British Labor (ALCABL).
Branch of the American Federation of Labor; used as a front by BSC.
American Youth Congress. Youth organization under strong Com-
munist influence and thus strongly against United States involve-
ment in European affairs during the period of the Hitler Stalin Pact
(August 1939 to June 1941).
Ascoli, Max (1898-1978). Head of the Italian-American Mazzini Soci-
ety. BSC claimed a close working relationship with Ascoli and IAMS.
Astor, Vincent (1891-1959). Ran a private intelligence service, called
“the Room” or “the Club,” for his friend and kinsman President
Franklin Roosevelt.
Ayer, Alfred Jules (1910-89). Philosopher; SOE agent posted to BSC
from October 1941 to March 1943 with cover symbol G.426, thus
part of Political and Minorities Section; worked on intelligence on
Latin America, with particular reference to Argentina and Chile,
political, and S.O. planning.
Backer, George (1903-74). Author; publisher of the New York Post;
also served as propaganda policy director for the U.S. Office of War
Information. The “BSC Account” mentions him as having “ren-
dered service of particular value.”
Balderston, John (1889-1954). London correspondent of the New
York World, 1923-31; Hollywood screenwriter; headed the William
Allen White News Service, an offspring of the British puppet Inter-
Allied Information Committee; major figure in Fight for Freedom.
Bell, Ulric (1891-1960). Washington correspondent of Louisville Cou-
rier-fournal, 1921-41; chairman of executive committee of Fight for
Freedom; deputy to BSC collaborator Robert Sherwood at overseas
branch of Office of War Information.
 Glossary of Individuals and Organizations °** 191

Belmonte Letter. Fake letter created by BSC and leaked to Bolivian

government; implicated Bolivia’s military attaché to Germany in a
plot to overthrow Bolivian government. Consequence: arrests in Bo-
livia, German minister to Bolivia thrown out, reinforced British pro-
paganda theme that Hitler threatened Latin America.
Berle, Adolf (1895-1971). Lawyer; State Department official; Pan
Americanist; wished to stay out of European war and thus was early
seen as an enemy by BSC; held unwelcome idea that only American
intelligence services should operate in the United States.
Birkhead, the Rev. Leon M. (1885-1954). Unitarian minister who
ran the Friends of Democracy; specialized in tough attacks on isola-
tionists. ;
BIS. British Information Service; British Ministry of Information’s ad-
ministrative offices in Rockefeller Center, New York City; worked
with BSC, also housed in Rockefeller Center.
Bruce, David K. E. (1898-1977). Headed the Secret Intelligence (SI)
branch of COI/OSS until 1943; later headed Marshall Plan in
France and served as U.S. ambassador to Britain.
Bryce, John F. C. “Ivar.” SOE agent; code number G.140; brother-
in-law of columnist Walter Lippmann; took credit for idea of phony
map showing how Nazis planned to divide Latin America. The map
was used by FDR in his Navy Day speech of 1941 to call for an end to
all neutrality laws.
BSC. British Security Coordination; umbrella agency in charge of all
British covert operations in the Western Hemisphere. Run by Sir
William Stephenson (Intrepid) 1940-46.
“BSC Account.” “British Security Coordination (BSC). An Account
of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-45” called the
“Bible” by insiders; a selective after-action report on the work of
BSC in the Western Hemisphere. About 85 percent of this very se-
cret account is contained in Montgomery Hyde’s The Quiet Cana-
dian.
CDAAA. Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (White
Committee, after its nominal leader, Kansas journalist William Allen
White). Its directors interlocked with those of Fight for Freedom.
Several BSC agents worked for CDAAA.
192 °° [DESPERATE DECEPTION

Century Group. See Fight for Freedom.

CIAA. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (first called the Office of

Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations). The Coordi-
nator 1940-44 was Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller; this U.S. govern-
ment organization used BSC-supplied information to carry out the
British agenda in Latin America.

COI. Coordinator of Information; American counterpart of BSC.

Planned by and created at the behest of British intelligence by FDR’s
presidential order of July 1941; run by BSC officer Dick Ellis.

Coit, Richard Julius Maurice Carl Wetzler (b. 1887). Born sur-
name: Wetzlar; banker; chief of staff to William Stephenson; cover
symbol G.100; brought into BSC in summer 1940 because of knowl-
edge of Brazil and German banking; sent by BSC to Brazil in late
1940, 1941, and early 1942.

Committee for Inter-American Cooperation. BSC front; used for

black-propaganda work and cover for agents in Latin America.

Committee on Public Information. American propaganda agency

during World War I. Headed by George Creel, this organization
generated strong public feelings against all things German.

Coudert Group. Interventionist organization called together in Oc-

tober 1939 at the Down ‘Town Association in New York by promi-
nent lawyer Frederick R. Coudert to support lifting the embargo on
supplies to Britain and France; at April 1940 CG meeting all present
pledged to see that the Republicans and Democrats did not cater to
the public’s antiwar feelings.
Council for Democracy. Interventionist organization tied to Fight
for Freedom; produced lofty moral statements and scholarly studies;
useful, but not militant enough and had little grass-roots support.
Council on Foreign Relations. Formed in 1921 by an assortment of
Anglophile Americans, many of them veterans of the Versailles
Peace Conference; based in New York City; from 1922 published
influential journal Foreign Affairs; voice of the American foreign
policy establishment.
 Glossary of Individuals and Organizations °®* 193

Cowles, Gardner Jr. “Mike” (1903-85). Publisher of the Des Moines

Register and Look magazine; U.S. director of OWI, 1942-43; cousin
of Morgan banker Thomas W. Lamont; promoter of Wendell
Willkie; accompanied Willkie on 1942 round-the-world trip.

Cuneo, Ernest (1905-88). Code name Crusader; lawyer, journalist,

author, intelligence officer; Roosevelt administration insider; attor-
ney for columnists Drew Pearson and Walter Winchell and wrote
much of Winchell’s material; liaison between BSC, the White
House, OSS, the State Department, the Treasury, and the Justice
Department.

Cynthia. Code name for Amy Elizabeth Thorpe Pack Brousse (1910-
63), wife of British diplomat Arthur Pack; MI-6 agent who worked in
Spain, Poland, Chile, and the United States. Her classic tactic: “She
singled out important men and seduced them.” Isolationist Arthur
Vandenberg was one of her targets.

Deakin, Major Frederick William Dampier “Bill” (b. 1913). Liter-

ary secretary to Winston Churchill from 1936 to December 1939;
posted to BSC August 1941 to June 1942; worked in SOE’s Political
and Minorities Section (South American affairs) at BSC with cover
symbol G.401; returned to UK and in May 1943 led first British
military mission to Tito.

Department E.H. Stands for Electra House; this was a black propa-
ganda agency run by Sir Campbell Stuart that came under the British
Foreign Office; one of three agencies (the others being Section D of
MI-6 and MI R of the War Office) brought together in July 1940 to
form Special Operations Executive (SOE).

De Wohl, Louis (1903-61). Hungarian-born astrologer employed by

British intelligence. His bogus anti-Hitler predictions were planted
in American newspapers.

Dies Committee. U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee

on Un-American Activities, 1938-44; this committee’s investigators
stumbled on BSC agent Sandy Griffith (G.112); obtained copies of
Griffith’s phone calls, telegrams, and bank records; Clerk of the
House of Representatives kept these records closed until 1996.
194 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Donovan, William Joseph “Wild Bill” (1883-1959). Congressional

Medal of Honor in World War I. BSC called him “our man” and
pushed him into position as head of COI/OSS, which had been cre-
ated at request of BSC and according to British plans.
Douglas, Lewis (1894-1974). President of Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 1940-47; ran meetings of Century Group/Fight for Freedom;
leader of CDAAA; leading figure in nomination of Wendell Willkie
and British-instigated Destroyer Deal; U.S. ambassador to England,
1947 to 1950.
Ellis, Colonel Charles Howard “Dick” (1895-1975). Professional
member of MI-6; assistant to Sir William Stephenson (“Intrepid”);
actually ran Donovan’s COI office and produced the blueprint for
the American OSS; also suspected of working for German and Soviet
intelligence services.
Emmet, Christopher Temple, Jr. (1900-74). Journalist; cousin of
BSC collaborator Robert Emmet Sherwood; worked closely with
BSC agent Sandy Griffith; vice president of BSC front France
Forever.
Field, Marshall III (1893-1956). Publisher; born in Chicago, reared
and educated in England; close to his cousin British MOI propagan-
dist Ronald Tree; member of executive committee of Fight for Free-
dom; funded interventionist papers PM and Chicago Sun.
Fight for Freedom (FFF). BSC front; militant interventionist group
which called for an American declaration of war on Germany; started
as Miller Group/Century Group in late spring 1940; used by BSC
for vigorous attacks on isolationists.
Fish, Hamilton (1888-1991). Vocal anti-interventionist Republican
congressman from President Franklin Roosevelt’s home district in
New York. The successful BSC campaign to destroy his reputation
and remove him from office was run by BSC agent Sandy Griffith.
FO. British Foreign Office; nominally in control of SIS; contact be-
tween SIS and the FO was through the permanent undersecretary of
state, who from 1938 to 1946 was Sir Alexander Cadogan.
France Forever. BSC front organized by BSC agent Sandy Griffith;
supported British declaration that obscure French tank general
Charles de Gaulle was the true voice of France.
 Glossary of Individuals and Organizations *** 195

Friends of Democracy. BSC front ostensibly run by Unitarian minis-

ter Leon M. Birkhead; specialized in vitriolic, name-calling attacks
labeling isolationists as Nazis.
George Office. Cover name for organization that managed part of
BSC’s economic warfare campaign; named for its director, George
Merten, a German economist. The George operation was given to
OSS to protect it from the FBI.
Griffith, Sanford (1893-1974). Journalist, stockbroker, BSC intelli-
gence agent with SOE cover symbol G.112; ran BSC fronts such as
France Forever, American Irish Defense Association; ran campaign
to drive Hamilton Fish from Congress; rigged polls suggesting that
various groups favored aiding Britain; oversaw writing of scripts for
shortwave radio station WRUL.
Guinzburg, Harold (1899-1961). President of Viking Press; involved
in intelligence; made daily decisions at Fight for Freedom; official of
OWI.
Halpern, Alexander J. (ca. 1879-1956). Russian lawyer; in 1917 he
had been secretary to the cabinet in the Kerensky government in
Russia; at BSC, symbolized first as G.111; under this symbol he was
responsible for controlling Arabic, Senegalese, French, Persian, Ital-
ian, and Turkish broadcasts by the supposedly independent Boston
shortwave station WRUL,; later G.400 and thus the leader of SOE’s
Political and Minorities Section at BSC.
Henson, Francis (1906-63). Journalist; assistant to British intelli-
gence agent Sandy Griffith at polling firm Market Analysts Inc.;
worked on BSC political warfare and poll-rigging projects with
Griffith.
Hoke, Henry (1894-1970). Editor and publisher of the Reporter ofDi-
rect Mail Advertising, Intrepid’s “friend in advertising” who helped
stop free mailing of Nazi and isolationist propaganda under the con-
gressional frank.
Hyde, H. Montgomery (1907-89). BSC agent who edited the “BSC
Account” for publication as The Quiet Canadian or, in the United
States, Room 3603. Despite successful sales, few in journalism or
academia realized this book’s importance. Hyde also wrote two other
books on BSC operations, Cynthia and Secret Intelligence Agent.
196 ¢*e DESPERATE DECEPTION

IAIC. Inter-Allied Information Committee. Covertly formed in 1940;

funded by British to see that the lesser Allies spoke the British propa-
ganda line; later became UNIO, the United Nations Information
Organization.
Ingersoll, Ralph (1900-85). Editor of interventionist newspaper PM
(which was owned by Marshall Field I). The “BSC Account” lists
Ingersoll as among “those who rendered service of particular value.”
InrrEPID. New York cable address of BSC head Sir William Stephen-
son (48000), which became synonymous with him on the publication
of the 1976 book A Man Called Intrepid by William Stevenson (no
relation).
Korda, Alexander (1893-1956). Filmmaker; British intelligence agent.
Made wartime U.S. films sympathetic to Britain; allowed BSC to use
his offices; was frequent visitor to Intrepid in Rockefeller Center.
Korda, Vincent (1896-1979). British intelligence agent; brother of
Alexander Korda; Oscar award-winning art director of The Thief of
Baghdad.
Lamont, Thomas William (1870-1948). Director and chairman of
board of J. P Morgan banking firm; behind-the-scenes power in in-
terventionist movement. Was in close contact with President
Roosevelt; was instrumental in Republican nomination of Wendell
Willkie for president in 1940.
Langley, Noel (b. 1911). Worked in Hollywood 1936-42 as screen-
writer; engaged by BSC to work in the Political and Minorities Sec-
tion by September 1942 with the symbol G.433.
L.A. TI. Operation. Fraudulent letter produced by BSC containing
negative comments about the president of Brazil and purporting to
have been written by the head of the Italian airline L.A.T.I. L.A. TI.
was fined and its officials were jailed; it lost its landing rights and no
longer broke the British blockade of Europe.
League for Human Rights. BSC front attached to the American Fed-
eration of Labor.
Levy, Benn W. (1900-73). Playwright; SOE cover symbol at BSC was
G.145.
 Glossary of Individuals and Organizations °°* 197

Lippmann, Walter (1889-1974). Newspaper columnist; brother-in-

law of SOE agent Ivar Bryce; major influence in nomination of
Willkie for president. The “BSC Account” lists him as “among those
who rendered service of particular value.”
Lothian, Lord (1882-1940). British ambassador to U.S.; worked very
closely with BSC head, Sir William Stephenson.
Maschwitz, Eric (1901-69). Officer of Special Operations Executive
(SOE); cover symbol G.106; ran Station M, the producer of bogus
documents BSC used to attack its enemies and further interven-
tionism.
Menzies, Brigadier General (later Sir) Stewart Graham (1899-
1974). Head of MI-6, 1939-52; called “C.”
MEW. British Ministry of Economic Warfare. Cover for Special Op-
erations Executive (SOE).
MI-5. The British domestic security service. Had responsibilities simi-
lar to those of the American FBI.
MI-6. World War II designation of the British overseas SIS. Had re-
sponsibilities similar to those of today’s American CIA.
Miller, Francis Pickens (1895-1978). Rhodes scholar; founding
member of Fight for Freedom; OSS officer.
Miller Group. See Fight for Freedom.
Mokarzel, Salloum (1881-1952). Editor of A/ Shoda, the Arabic daily
newspaper of New York City; president of the Lebanese League of
Progress. BSC claims to have worked closely with him.
Morrell, Sidney “Bill” (1912-85). Journalist; advertising man; SOE
black propagandist with cover symbol G.101. Worked for BSC; co-
ordinated the work of agent Sandy Griffith.
Mowrer, Edgar Ansel (1892-1977). Journalist; correspondent for
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox’s Chicago News, deputy director to
Robert Sherwood at OWI. Accompanied Donovan on his 1940 trip
to London and coauthored nationally distributed series of exagger-
ated articles on the threat of the Nazi fifth column.
New York Herald Tribune. Favorite outlet for stories BSC wished to
see published in mainstream American press.
198 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Niles, David (1882-1952). White House official and the usual contact
for BSC and BSC fronts such as Fight for Freedom.
NKVD. People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs; Soviet security ser-
vice. Predecessor to the KGB (Committee for State Security); thor-
oughly penetrated BSC and OSS.
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League. BSC front. According to BSC
documents this front was “used for vehement exposure of enemy
agents and isolationists.”
Nye Committee (1934-36). Special Senate Committee on Investiga-
tion of the Munitions Industry led by Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-
N.D.); sensational revelations of this committee provided
background for the passage of a series of American neutrality laws.
Office of Civilian Defense. Agency of the U.S. Government that
promoted interventionist propaganda before Pearl Harbor.
Ogilvy, David (1911-—). British intelligence officer; worked simulta-
neously for George Gallup’s American Institute of Public Opinion
and for BSC; later a prominent advertising man. His brother Francis
had been one of the earliest recruits to Section D of MI-6.
ONI. Office of Naval Intelligence, either British or American.
OSS. Office of Strategic Services. On June 12, 1942, COI was sepa-
rated into two parts, OSS and OWI. OSS was placed under the U.S.
military and its operations excluded from the Western Hemisphere.
Overseas News Agency (ONA). Branch of the Jewish Telegraph
Agency. British intelligence subsidized ONA in return for coopera-
tion.
OWI. Office of War Information. Created in June 1942 with Robert
Emmet Sherwood as head; responsible for overseas U.S. propaganda
other than black.
Parry, Alfred (1901-92). Born in Russia as Abraham Paretsky; BSC
agent Sandy Griffith’s man in the Chicago Committee to Defend
America/Fight for Freedom office; later worked for the OSS and still
later for the CIA.
Passport Control. Between the world wars this was the worldwide
cover for Britain’s SIS.
 Glossary of Individuals and Organizations °** 199

Patterson, Paul Chenery (1878-1952). Publisher of Baltimore Sun,

listed in the “BSC Account” as one of “those who rendered service of
particular value.”
Pearson, Drew (Andrew Russell) (1897-1969). Wrote “Washington
Merry-Go-Round” newspaper column, 1931-65. His column and
radio broadcast were vehicles for British black propaganda and char-
acter assassination. His former student and attorney Ernest Cuneo
was White House liaison with BSC.
PID. Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. At first a
genuine department of the FO which was used as cover for covert
propaganda. The covert operations continued under this name even
after the real department was abolished. .
PWE. Political Warfare Executive; the British Foreign Office psycho-
logical warfare and black propaganda unit. Until July 1940 much of
this unit had been part of MI-6, Section D; then, until the summer of
1941, it was SO.1 of SOE.
The Quiet Canadian. Unknown to historians or journalists of the
time, this stunning book leaked roughly 85 percent of the very secret
after-action report “BSA Account.” Passages deemed too sensitive
were changed or removed from the American version, Room 3603.
Reid, Helen Rogers (1882-1970). Wife of Ogden Mills Reid, owner
of the New York Herald Tribune. Mrs. Reid really ran the paper; the
“BSC Account” lists her as “among those who rendered service of
particular value.” Was a major force in promoting Willkie for the
Republican nomination in 1940.
Rockefeller Office. See CIAA.
The Room; the Club. President Roosevelt’s personal intelligence ser-
vice of upper-class anglophile New Yorkers, led by FDR’s friend and
kinsman Vincent Astor. Astor was a conduit for information from
British intelligence to FDR.
Room 3603. See The Quiet Canadian.
Ross-Smith, A. M. “Bill” (d. 1993). British intelligence officer who
worked for BSC; code number 48907. Conceived and ran the “ships
watch scheme,” which developed agents on neutral ships to watch for
anti-British activity.
200 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Section D. Special sabotage and black-propaganda section of MI-6.

Created on April Fools’ day 1938, it grew very rapidly and by 1940
was larger than the rest of MI-6. Became part of SOE July 1940.

Security Executive. Worldwide responsibilities for supervision of

British internal security during World War II, little is known of the
details of the Security Executive; once headed by Duff Cooper.

Shepardson, Whitney Hart (1890-1966). Rhodes scholar; assistant

to President Wilson’s confidant Colonel House at Paris peace talks,
1919; wrote June 1940 demand that U.S. declare war on Germany
for group that became Fight for Freedom; friend and failed biogra-
pher of Bill Stephenson and Bill Donovan; first OSS Secret Intelli-
gence (SI) chief in London; special assistant to Ambassador Winant
in London in 1942.

Sherwood, Robert Emmet (1896-1955). Pulitzer Prize-winning

playwright and author; member of Canadian Black Watch in World
War I; FDR speechwriter. Allowed British intelligence to review
FDR speeches; promoted British intelligence agenda with FDR.
Lived half of each year in England.

SIS. Secret Intelligence Service; also known by its World War II desig-
nation MI-6, or Broadway after its address, near the St. James Park
underground station.

SO.1. Covert propaganda department of Section D of MI-6. It was

moved to the new Special Operations Executive (SOE) on the cre-
ation of that unit in July 1940; moved to the Political Warfare Execu-
tive (PWE) in summer 1941.

SO.2. Sabotage department of MI-6 Section D. It became part of the

new Special Operations Executive (SOE) in July 1940.

SOE. Special Operations Executive; also known as Baker Street after

the location of its offices near the fictional address of Sherlock
Holmes. Formed by Churchill, July 19, 1940, as amalgamation of
Section D of MI-6; MIR, the War Office’s guerrilla warfare research
group; and Department EH, Sir Campbell Stewart’s secret propa-
ganda unit.
 Glossary of Individuals and Organizations °** 201

Station M. Phony-document factory located in Toronto, run by Eric

Maschwitz, G.106 of SOE. Ink, paper, and typewriter specialists
worked together to produce authentic-looking documents to back
BSC’s various covert action programs.
Stephenson, Sir William Samuel (1896-1989). Canadian-born in-
dustrialist better known today as Intrepid, from the cable address of
his office; head of BSC, which ran British intelligence operations in
the Western Hemisphere. Knighted in 1945; code number 48000.
Stout, Rex (1886-1975). Mystery writer; worked for BSC on such
projects as the attack on Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Swope, Herbert Bayard (1882-1958). Active in Fight for Freedom;
guiding hand behind Overseas News Agency, which was subsidized
by and worked closely with BSC.
Tunney, Gene (1897-1978). One time world heavyweight champion
boxer; close friend of Sir William Stephenson. Introduced
Stephenson to J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI; ostensibly funded
anti-Communist youth group the National Foundation for Ameri-
can Youth, headquartered in Rockefeller Center.
Union Now Movement. Plan put forth by one-time New York Times
League of Nations correspondent Clarence K. Streit (1896-1986);
proposed that the United States amalgamate with Britain in two
books: Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-Democracy Federal Union
(1940) and Union Now with Britain (1941).
Viereck, George Sylvester (1884-1962). Registered German propa-
gandist. BSC worked very closely with the Justice Department to
supply the evidence to convict Viereck of improperly registering.
BSC persevered when the first conviction was overturned by the
U.S. Supreme Court; got conviction on the second try.
Wellington House. Headquarters of British World War I propaganda
operations aimed at winning American sympathy for the British
cause.
Wheeler-Bennett, John (1902-75). Covert British propagandist;
worked closely with Intrepid.
White Committee. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies (CDAAA); known by name of its nominal chairman, Kan-
sas journalist William Allen White. Used by BSC.
202 °° DESPERATE DECEPTION

Williams, Valentine (1883-1946). Arrived in United States in July

1941 as representative of SO.1 with BSC head William Stephenson
to advise and guide him on all matters of propaganda; to lecture,
broadcast, and write as much as possible; and to further the cause of
General de Gaulle in America; his SOE cover symbol was G.131.
Williams, Wythe (1881-1956). Journalist; faded reporter from World
War I; used surprising appointment as editor of Greenwich (Con-
necticut) Tie to make national reputation for scoops on Hitler’s ac-
tions; became prominent radio news analyst in 1940-41 for Mutual
Broadcast System; BSC black propagandist Bill Morrell was feeding
him these inside scoops; wrote, with BSC agent Sandy Griffith’s man
Albert Parry, propaganda book Riddle of the Reich.
Willkie, Wendell (1892-1944). Lifelong Democrat and intervention-
ist; never elected to public office. In 1940, in the most bizarre con-
vention of the century, the Republicans nominated Willkie for
president; this enabled FDR to consummate the Destroyer Deal and
to continue to press forward with his interventionist policies. Willkie
worked with FDR to eliminate isolationist Republicans such as Fish
from office and was an activist in Fight for Freedom.
Winant, John Gilbert (1889-1947). Republican governor of New
Hampshire; director of the International Labor Office in Geneva,
1938-39; ambassador to Great Britain, 1941-46. Worked closely
with Sir William Stephenson in creation of Donovan’s COI.
Winchell, Walter (1897-1972). Strongly anti-Nazi newspaper and ra-
dio columnist. Worked closely with BSC; his column was largely
written by Ernest Cuneo, the White House liaison with BSC.
Wiseman, Sir William (1885-1962). SIS officer in charge of U.S. op-
erations during World War I; close confidant of Colonel House, ad-
viser to President Woodrow Wilson; interwar partner in investment
banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb; active in BSC work in early days of
World War II.
WRUL. Boston shortwave radio station whose foreign-language
broadcasts were covertly written and subsidized by BSC.
 eee

Notes

Abbreviations
AHVP Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg Papers. Bentley Historical Library, Univer-
sity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
CDAAAP Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (William Allen White
Committee) Papers. Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Prince-
ton, NJ.
CIAFI CIA documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
CLEP Christopher T. Emmet Papers. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution
and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
DH Diplomatic History (journal).
DPP Drew Pearson Papers. Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, Austin,
Tex:
EBP Ellsworth Barnard Papers. Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indi-
ana University, Bloomington, Ind.
ECP Ernest Cuneo Papers. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
EPCP Lady Cotter (Eveline Mary Paterson) Papers. Privately held by her daugh-
ter Virginia Owen, London, England
FBIF Federal Bureau of Investigation Files obtained through Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests.
FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
FDRP Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
N.Y.
FFFP Fight for Freedom Papers. Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University,
Princeton, N.J.
FHP Francis Henson Papers. Held by Henson/Farrow family in Maryland.
FO Foreign Office Records. Public Records Office (Kew), London, England.
GCP Grenville Clark Papers. Dartmouth College Library, Hanover, N.H.
Habel? Herbert Hoover Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West
Branch, Iowa.
HHVP Hazel Harper Vandenberg Papers. Bentley Historical Library, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

203
204 °¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

HMHP ~ H. Montgomery Hyde Papers. Churchill College Library, Cambridge,

England.
IANS Intelligence and National Security (journal published in London by Frank
Cass).
JBP John Buchan (Lord Tweedsmuir) Papers. Douglas Library, Queen’s Uni-
versity, Kingston, Ont., Canada.
jJCH Journal of Contemporary History.
KRP Kermit Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
LDP Lewis W. Douglas Papers. Special Collections, University of Arizona Li-
brary, Tucson, Ariz.
MLP Mary S. Lovell Papers. Privately held. Stroat, Nr Chepstow Gwent, En-
gland.
MMP Marie Meloney Papers. Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Li-
brary, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
Studies in Intelligence (the CIA scholarly in-house journal; many of the ar-
ticles are classified).
TWLP ~~ Thomas W. Lamont Papers. Historical Collections, Soldier’s Field Baker
Library, Harvard University, Boston, Mass.
WJDP WilliamJ.Donovan Papers. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.
WLP Walter Lippmann Papers. Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.
WTP Walter Trohan Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West
Branch, Iowa.
WWP Wendell Willkie Papers. Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Ind.

PREFACE
Ike Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961 (New York:
William Morrow, 1987), 476; Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The
Missing Dimension: Government and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century
(Urbana, IIl.: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 1.
. Ronald Lewin, “A Signal-Intelligence War,” in The Second World War: Essays in
Military and Political History, ed. Walter Laqueur (London: Sage Publications,
1982), 185-86. This shortcoming in the official histories has been lessened by the
publication of the official series British Intelligence in the Second World War, written
under the direction of F. H. Hinsley.
. ECP, Box 51, Unidentified file.
. Fishel, review of Fargo, The Broken Seal, in SII 59, no. 1 (Winter 1968), 81.
. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 309.
. David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), 76.
. L.B. Kirkpatrick, review of Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, in SII 7, no. 3 (Summer
1963): 122-25.
. Bill Ross-Smith to author, 14 June and 16 April 1993.
 Notes @e¢ 205

INTRODUCTION
ly Randolph Churchill recollections in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 6,
Finest Hour 1939-41, 358.
. Justice D. Doenecke, “Historiography: U.S. Policy and the European War, 1939-
1941,” DH 19 (Fall 1995): 690.
. W.K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy (London: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1949), 101-2, 71, 69.
4. Ibid., 65.
al. Ibid., 107.
6. JBP, Reel 6, John Buchan to Stair A. Gillon, 11 October 1937. The letter contin-
ued: “T think there is just a chance of America now coming back into the fold and
working along with the European democracies....I feel the most useful work I can
do is in connection with the U.S.A. I have Cordell Hull coming up to stay with me
in a fortnight for some serious talks.” Buchan reported his talks to the prime min-
ister and received a letter dated 19 November 1937 in reply: “I was delighted to
receive your letter of the 25th October and to have your very interesting account of
your conversations with Roosevelt and Cordell Hull. You will doubtless have no-
ticed that in recent speeches I have gone out of my way to encourage those sections
of American opinion that seem to have welcomed the President’s Chicago speech.”
Chamberlain to Buchan, JBP, Reel 6, Box 9.
. King, Diary, 10 and 11 June 1939, pp. 675-784, MG26, J13 Public Archives of
Canada, quoted in Benjamin D. Rhodes, “The British Royal Visit of 1939 and the
Psychological Approach to the United States,” DP 2 (Spring 1978): 210.
. Rhodes, “British Royal Visit,” 211.
. JBP, Box II Correspondence, a) General May 1939-Feb. 1940, Reel 7, Chamber-
lain to Buchan, 7 July 1939.
10. G. William Domhoff, “The Power Elite and Its Critics,” in C. Wright Mills and the
Power Elite, ed. G. William Domhoff and Hoit B. Ballard (Boston: Beacon Press,
1968), 251-78.
me Douglas Little, “Crackpot Realists and Other Heroes: The Rise and Fall of the
Postwar American Diplomatic Elite,” DH 13 (Winter 1989): 99-111.
Oe Lord Robert Cecil, memo, 18 September 1917, CAB 24/26, GT 2074, quoted in
David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” International Affairs 65
(Winter 1988/89), 95.
132 U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Times to 1970, 380.
14; ECP, Box 51, Unidentified File, “Dear Montgomery” letter, 29 January 1988, 2.

CHAPTER 1: ORGANIZATION, METHODS, AND OFFSPRING

i Created by President Roosevelt’s executive order on August 16, 1940, this organi-
zation was called the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Rela-
tions Between the American Republics. Later this was changed to the Coordinator
of Inter American Affairs. It became known as the Rockefeller Office because ofits
head, thirty-two-year-old Nelson Rockefeller.
ry, Thomas F. Troy, “The Coordinator of Information and British Intelligence,” S//
18, no. 1-S (Spring 1974): 15.
3. Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990), 60.
206 ?@¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

. Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 48.

. Anthony Cave-Brown, “C”: The Secret Life ofSir Stewart Menzies, Spymaster to Win-
ston Churchill (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 195.
. Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 17; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Cana-
dian (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), 28. This quote is illustrative of the sub-
stantial differences between the British version of Hyde’s book, titled The Quiet
Canadian, and the American version, titled Room 3603 (New York: Farrar, Straus,
1962). What appears to be the quotation in question reads differently on page 28 of
Room 3603: “...to counter the enemy’s subversive plans throughout the Western
Hemisphere, and to promote sympathy for the British cause in the United States.
This included counter-espionage, political warfare and special operations.” This is
one of many changes suggested by David Ogilvy in a nine-page letter (1 Janurary
1963) of potential changes he sent to Sir William Stephenson to be passed on to
Montgomery Hyde. Sir William, by this time very nervous about the project,
wrote across the top of the letter “David’s points indicate why I have been against
an American edition. WS, Jan. 17/63.” The letter is in the Hyde Papers, Churchill
College, Cambridge. For commentary on this see TimothyJ. Naftali, “Intrepid’s
Last Deception: Documenting the Career of Sir William Stephenson,” IANS 8,
no. 3 July 1993): 81 and nn. 62, 63.
. Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 18-19.
. During the period of the German-Russian nonaggression pact, August 23, 1939, to
June 22, 1941, the American Youth Congress (AYC) was strongly under the influ-
ence of Communists and was strongly against intervention in the European war.
The opposition to this youthful peace lobby was organized and led by the National
Foundation for American Youth and its leader Murray Plavner. Gene Tunney ap-
parently financed this organization, with offices in, once again, Rockefeller Center.
Joseph Jaffe, Jr., “Isolationism and Neutrality in Academe, 1938-1941” (Ph.D.
diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1979), 289.
Letters from Gene Tunney to Thomas F. Troy, 6 and 18 August and 18 September
1969, cited in Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 22-23.
10. Hyde, Room 3603, 31-32. Laurance Rockefeller contributed more than $10,000
(about $100,000 in 1996 dollars) to Fight for Freedom and also made an “arrange-
ment” for the rent and for the expenses of the committee at the Rockefeller Center
Club. Mark Lincoln Chadwin, The Hawks of World War II: The Interventionist Move-
ment in the U.S. Prior to Pearl Harbor (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1968), 177.
. The new name BSC was apparently suggested by J. Edgar Hoover. Hyde, Room
SOD S72
. Occasionally a reference to Menzies is found in Cadogan’s printed diaries: “Thurs-
day, 7 December 1944....‘C’ at 4:30 for gossip. He off to Belgium and he not so
pessimistic as P.M. regarding present situation on western front.” The Diaries ofSir
Alexander Cadogan O.M., 1938-1945, edited by David Dilks (New York: G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1972), 685.
13), Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelli-
gence Community (New York: Viking, 1986), 467.
ers John Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationship (London: Macmillan, 1975), 153-54.
 Notes @** 207

15: Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), 21-24. Quoted in
Andrew, Secret Service, 472.
NG. For the SOE code-name system I am thankful to the SOE Adviser, Gervase
Cowell. Letters to author dated 9 March, 5 April, and 25 October 1995.
We Valentine Williams Personal File (SOE Archives), Duncan Stuart, CMG, The
SOE Adviser, to author November 25, 1996.
18. This is from a list in ECP, Box 107, CIA file.
19). Maschwitz, No Chip on My Shoulder, 144-45, quoted in Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 135.
20. Public Records Office (PRO) HS 1/333. Professor Nick Cull supplied me with this
document, and Gervase Cowell, the SOE Adviser, identified G.106 as Maschwitz.
Zile ECP, Box 107, CIA file, eighteen unnumbered pages.
De Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence (New
York: Paragon House, 1989), 42.
23% Paul Kramer, “Nelson Rockefeller and British Security Coordination,” 7CH 16
(January 1981): 76. ;
24: Ibid., 77.
VAD Ibid., 78.
26. Ibid., 79.
vane Ibid., 83.
28. Ibid. For a contrary view on the effectiveness of these operations, see the admit-
tedly cantankerous Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues (New Rochelle,
N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971), 263.
29: Kramer, “Rockefeller and British Security,” 83-84.
30. Ibid., 84.
31. ECP, Box 107, Intrepid file. Cuneo reasons in this article that Ellis could not have
been a Soviet mole because he and Intrepid “were as close as a picture to its frame.”
Cuneo goes on to say that Stephenson told him the Soviet Union would explode its
first atom bomb “on or about Sept. 27, 1949.” (It went off four weeks early.)
“When Sir William gave me this staggering information on Feb. 18, 1948—a year
and a half in advance of the event—I asked him how good the source was. He
answered, “Iriple A, Triple 1.’ I asked the question which never should be asked:
Exactly how do you know?
“We have a little window,’ Sir William said. Moles were then called ‘little win-
dows.’
“Except to transmit this to U.S. authorities, I have never before disclosed this. I
do so now as some evidence in defense of the honor of Col. Ellis.
“What Sir William knew, Dickie Ellis knew. Hence, If Dickie Ellis had been a
KGB mole, he would have reported the British mole in the Kremlin to his true
masters. He had not.”
a8 Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 109.
33 . Ibid., 108.
34. Memorandum from Desmond Morton to Colonel E. I. Jacob, 18 September 1941,
Churchill Papers, Box 145, Folder 463, Item 2, quoted in Troy, “Coordinator of
Information,” 109.
5D) FDRL, Berle, Box 213, Berle to Wells, September 18, 1941. Diary Vol. VU, 2,
122-23.
208 ¢¢e DESPERATE DECEPTION

36. Sir William S. Stephenson, “Early Days of OSS (COD),” 7-8. OSS Records, ca
1960. Typescript, quoted in Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 100.
Die Ibid.
38. Ibid., 101.
39. Ibid., 103.
40. Edmond Taylor, Awakening from History (Boston: Gambit, 1969), 308.
cle Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 104.
42: ECP, Box 107, CIA file.
AS The CIA is not unique. This legacy, particularly of Special Operations Executive,
has been very evident in France. For the French experience, see Douglas Porch,
“French Intelligence Culture,” LANS 10 July 1995): 486-511. For a suggestion
that the example of Eric Maschwitz’s fakery at “Station M” may have influenced
more recent Canadian covert operations, see Nick Cull, “Did the Mounties and
the NFB fake Nazi atrocity pictures?” Globe and Mail June 3, 1995 FOCUS (Bir-
mingham, England), Section D.
at ECP, Box 107, CIA file.
45) Ibid.

CHAPTER 2: THE FRONTS

ile ECP, Box 51, Unidentified file, “Dear Montgomery” letter, 29 January 1988, 2.
Dis PRO OF 898/103 Political Warfare Executive, Morrell, “SO.1,” 10 July 1941.
Ds David Ignatius, “Britain’s War in America: How Churchill’s Agents Secretly
Manipulated the U.S. before Pearl Harbor,” Washington Post, 17 September 1989,
C-2.
4. Morrell, “SO.1,” 10 July 1941.
Richard F. Cleveland was the son of former president Grover Cleveland.
. Francis Pickens Miller, Man from the Valley: Memories of a 20th Century Virginian,
NN

(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 89-90.

Whitney Shepardson (1890-1960) also worked very closely with British intelli-
gence. BSC officer Bill Ross-Smith wrote that like Robert Sherwood, [Whitney]
Shepardson was not BSC but only a “collaborator.” Bill Ross-Smith to author, 16
April 1993. Shepardson joined OSS and was sent to London as Secret Intelligence
Service chief. The London positions of OSS were reserved for the most unre-
served of Anglophiles. See also Chapter 3.
. Morrell, “SO.1,” 10 July 1941.
LDP, Box 82, Folder 20.
. Chadwin, Hawks, 139.
. Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationship, 151.
. Tbid., 154.
. Cull, “British Campaign,” 448; Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationship, 155.
. Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationship, 58.
. Chadwin, Hawks, 201.
. FFFP, Cusick to Bell and Agar, 6 March 1941, Cusick file.
. Chadwin, Hawks, 204.
. Ibid., 201-2.
. Ibid., 205.
 Notes °** 209

20. Ibid., 177.

PAN Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
aja ECP, Box 51, Unidentified file, “Dear Montgomery” letter, 29 January 1988, 2.
23% FFFP, David Niles file.
Be FFFP, Labor News Service 1, 13 June 1941.
25 . Ibid., 25 July 1941.
26. Ibid., 6 December 1941, 8.
Pail FDRL, President’s Personal File (PPF) 7426, Woll to FDR, 23 April 1941.
23. Ibid., 23 April 1941 and 7 March 1941.
29. Timothy R. Dzierba, “Organized Labor and the Coming of World War II, 1937-
1941” (Ph.D diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1983), 32-33.
30. FFFP, Abe Rosenfield to Mr. Bluestone, 24 May 1941.
oi See FDRL, PPF 7426, letters of 12 July 1941 and 5 May 1941.
32. FFFP, Labor News Service 1, 11 July 1941, 2.
33; FFFP, Birkhead file, Francis P. Miller to G. Bernard Noble, 23 October 1940.
34. Wayne S. Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle against American Intervention in
World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 139.
35: The original says: “It is a complete attack upon Henry Ford for his anti-Nazi [sic]
leanings.” This report by Morrell was apparently written off the top of his head
under great deadline pressure, and never proofread. This is only one of numerous
minor slips.
36. FFFP.
37s Cole, Lindbergh, 140. For Stout’s work for British intelligence, see John McAleer,
Rex Stout: A Biography (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 295-96. For Stout as an of-
ficer of Friends of Democracy, see Cole, Lindbergh, 139-40. For Stout as a sponsor
of Fight for Freedom, see Chadwin, Hawks, 168.
38. FFFP, L. M. Birkhead to Ulric Bell, dated 4 February 1940 [should be 1941]. The
1940 date on the letter is certainly an error, as the letter is about events of 1941.
The Fight for Freedom Committee did not exist in February 1940, and the letter is
addressed to the RKO Building in Rockefeller Center. FFF did not occupy that
space in February 1940.
. Tbid.
. Cole, Lindbergh, 147-48.
. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 73-74.
. Francois Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle (New York: Atheneum, 1982), 76-103.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson files.
. New York Times, 29 September 1940, 12.
. Ibid., 9March 1941, 22.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson files.
. Cull, Nicholas John, “The British Campaign Against American ‘Neutrality’ Pub-
licity and Propaganda” (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 1991), 552.
. New York Times, 21 December 1940, 4.
. Ibid., 28 May 1941, 9.
. FFFP, WMCA file.
. New York Times, 15 July 1941, 13. For other material on this episode, see Cole,
Lindbergh, 129-35.
210 ¢¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

. New York Times, 12 November 1941, 3. For Rex Benson’s relationship to Menzies
and SIS, see Cave-Brown, “C,” passim.
. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955 (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1985), 306.
. H. Montgomery Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the
Creation of the OSS (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 91; Harold Nicolson, The
War Years, 1939-1945, ed. Nigel Nicolson (New York: Atheneum, 1967); Volume II
of the Diaries & Letters, 142-43; and Steve Neal, Dark Horse: A Biography of Wendell
Willkie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1989), 199-200.
532 Obituary of James Byrne, New York Times, 5 November 1942.
56. Duncan Stuart, CMG, The SOE Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice, to author December 20, 1996.
Dis ECP, Box 25, Henson files. In CTEP, Box 13, American Irish Defense Association
file, there is a “Draft of Irish Declaration” dated 25 August 1941.
58. Another mentioned was Father Vincent Donovan, National Director of Catholic
Thought Association. Father Donovan was the brother of William Donovan,
whom Intrepid maneuvered into becoming the head of COI/OSS.
59: Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
60. ECP, Box 13, American Irish Defense Association file.
6l. Chadwin, Hawks, 148.
62. CTEP, Box 13, American Irish Defense Association file, paper titled “Material for
Mr. Berney Hershey’s Broadcast over WMCA on Committee for American Irish
Defense.”
63. Jane Harriet Schwar, “Interventionist Propaganda and Pressure Groups in the
United States, 1937-1941” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1973), 116.
64. Ibid., 152.
65. Ibid., 194.
66. Ibid., 209.
67. Cull, “British Campaign,” 380.
68. Leslie Halliwell, Halliwell’s Film Guide (New York: Harper and Row, 1989) com-
ments on Lives of a Bengal Lancer, 608; comments on Prisoner of Zenda, 829.
69. Cull, “British Campaign,” 250.
70. Tbid., 365.
dike William R. Keylor, “How They Advertised France,” DH 17 (Summer 1993), 364.
Uzn Schwar, “Interventionist Propaganda,” 170-71.
(By bia 153%
74. Ibid., 202, 208.
ED: Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, 145, 146.
76. Ibid., 146, 147.
Tie Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 157-60; Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2; Schwar, “Interven-
tionist Propaganda, 216 n. 75.
78. PRO FO 898/103 Sydney Morrell, SO.1 Organisation, 10 July 1941; also Morrell
of 19 June 1941 (SOE Archives), Duncan Stuart, CMG, The SOE Adviser at FCO,
to author, November 25, 1997.
 Notes *°® 211

CHAPTER 3: THOSE WHO RENDERED SERVICE OF PARTICULAR

VALUE
. FBIF, Ernest Cuneo file, 94-4-4411-63 (item 63), letter of 14 March 1969. The
crux of Cuneo’s argument is that since every major power knows it is being tapped,
the Supreme Court ruling “raises a most delicate problem...the few untapped for-
eign ambassadors will deeply resent the dire insult that what they have to say isn’t
even worth bugging.”
Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
ECP, Box 51, Unidentified file, “Dear Dick” letter.
Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
Ibid.
E. J. Kahn, Jr., The World of Swope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), 433-37.
. National Security Agency, VENONA Messages, No. 389-390.
. ECP, Box 107, Crusader to Intrepid file.
. McAleer, Rex Stout, 295-97.
. Troy, COIBI, 103.
SPRPNAMAYWN
RPS
— . Taylor to author, 29 June 1991.
. Tom Troy, “George,” in Hayden Peake and Samuel Halpern, eds., In the Name of
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: NIBC Press, 1995), 479-498.
—
—_Ww
i) . ECP, Box 51, Unidentified file, Cuneo to Montgomery [Hyde], 29 January 1988,
3
4. WJDP, Box 120 B, Folder 78, Sir William Stephenson. The paper goes on to say:
“On a long-range basis the British method is to take a person who is young and
newly engaged upon a career useful to British intelligence and so to pay him and
otherwise assist him as increasingly to develop his usefulness over an extended pe-
riod of years.” This is the very method the Soviets used to insinuate Philby, Bur-
gess, Maclean, Blunt, and John Cairncross into British intelligence.
LS. FFFP, Bell to Backer, 30 September 1941, thanking Backer for $2,000 donation.
16. Gleeson, They Feared No Evil, 54.
Ty. Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationship, 154.
18. Harrison Evans Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor (New York: Times Books, 1980),
453-54.
19 Susan Ann Brewer, “Creating the ‘Special Relationship’: British Propaganda in the
United States During the Second World” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1991),
384.
20. FFFP, Robert Spivak file.
Mile Williams to Dalton, September 15, 1941, Valentine Williams Personal File (SOE
Archives, FCO), Duncan Stuart, CMG, The SOE Adviser to author, November
25, 1996.
Uiphe ECP, Box 51, Unidentified file.
23, Although no wartime thank-you notes from British Intelligence have been found,
here are two fromJ.Edgar Hoover in a later period testifying to Cuneo’s influence
on the column: “...I have not had the opportunity until now to drop you this confi-
dential note of appreciation for what I know was a very constructive influence in
connection with one broadcast and one column by our friend. In fact, I could see
your fine hand particularly in the column” J. E. Hoover to Cuneo, 15 February
212 °¢¢8® DESPERATE DECEPTION

1950). “I wanted to drop you this personal note to tell you how effective Walter
was last night and that I could see your fine hand in the background. Thanks a
million” (J. E. Hoover to Cuneo, January 29, 1951). Both these letters are in FBIF,
Ernest Cuneo file, 94-4-4411.
24 ECP, Box 107. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau’ assistant John W. Hanes (of
the knitwear family) was in charge of the Treasury Department’ part in this 1939
attempt to make German ships easy targets for the British. Hanes soon quit the
Treasury over some vague complaint and went to work on the Willkie campaign.
He later helped the British campaign against Lindbergh by getting William
Randolph Hearst to attack the flier. For Hanes’s part in holding the German ships,
see Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second
World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 556.
Vay Obituary of Helen Reid, New York Times, 28 July 1970, 1.
26. Cave-Brown, “C,” 35, 46. Except for Joseph Kennedy, the ambassadorship to En-
gland seems to have been a special preserve for those and their families who
worked closely with British intelligence. Barry Bingham, owner of the Louzsville
Courier-fournal, the son of FDR’s first ambassador to England, was closely in-
volved with British intelligence. He paid the salaries of Herbert Agar and Ulric
Bell while they devoted their time to running Fight for Freedom. During the war
he was an intelligence officer in England, and after the war he worked on the
Marshall Plan intelligence cover in France with such as E. Howard Hunt. He also
allowed the CIA to use his newspaper as a cover. Gilbert Winant, who took the
post of ambassador in February 1941, helped Intrepid promote an American intel-
ligence service with Donovan at the helm (Troy, “Coordinator of Information,”
103-4). Lewis Douglas, as we will see, was closely embroiled in the work of British
intelligence, not only with such agents as Rex Benson and John Wheeler-Bennett
and fronts such as Fight for Freedom and the William Allen White Committee but
in fulfilling such needs as the Destroyer Deal and the nomination of Wendell
Willkie. Later ambassador David Bruce was acceptable enough to be named head
of Donovan’s organization in London. Bruce had been a member of Vincent
Astor’s “Room” intelligence group. The strong Anglophile Winthrop Aldrich of
Chase Bank also served as ambassador to Great Britain.
27. Dorothy Thompson’s FBI file numbers: 62—74478, 65-16748 sub A, 65-16748, 9-
7646, 9-8306, 9-7990, 9-9588.
28. Quoted in Marion K. Sanders, Dorothy Thompson: A Legend in Her Time (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 289-91.
29: Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-1, C-2.
30. PRO FO 371/2422B, A/2299/26/45, Reith to Halifax, 27 March 1940; PRO FO
371/26186, A5348/118/45, Halifax to FO, No«127, 2 July 1941, and Minute by
North Whitehead, 11 July 1941; in Cull, “British Campaign,” 471.
31. Walter Lippmann, Public Philosopher: Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann, edited by
John Morton Blum (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1985), 433; WLP, Box 59,
Folder 314.
. Roosevelt, Public Papers of Franklin Roosevelt, ed. Rosenman 10:438-44.
. Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP) Series D, Vol. 13, Ribbentrop to
Thomsen, 10 December 1941; Cull, “British Campaign,” 540.
 Notes #¢* 213

34: Ivar Bryce, You Only Live Once: Memories ofIan Fleming (Frederick, Md.: University
Publications of America, 1984), 62-63.
35. Ibid., 63; Cull, “British Campaign,” 529-40. Also see John F. Bratzel and Leslie
Rout, “FDR and the ‘Secret Map,’ ” Wilson Quarterly, 1 January 1985, 167-73. A
better journal article than Rout and Bratzel is Francis MacDonnell, “The Search
for a Second Zimmerman Telegram: FDR, BSC, and the Latin American Front,”
IANS 4, no. 4: 496-99.
36. For Bryce’s OSS number, see his picture OSS identification card among the illus-
trations in You Only Live Once. His SOE number was G-140. You Only Live Once, 63,
50. Ivar divorced Mrs. Lippmann’s sister and in 1950 married Josephine Hartford,
granddaughter of the founder of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, and
thus became the stepfather-in-law of Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. After
the war he went to work for Ernest Cuneo at the North American Newspapers
Alliance (NANA). Cuneo, Ian Fleming, and Bryce became good friends after the
war. Bryce died in 1985. See obituary of Josephine Hartford Bryce, New York
Times, June 10, 1992, D20.
37 WLP, Box 59, Folder 314, Bryce to Lippman, 23 March [1942].
38. Ibid.
39. Cull, “British Campaign,” 552.
40. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2; Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 189-91.
ly, Ellic Howe, The Black Game (London: Queen Anne Press, 1982), 213-15; Peter
Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1987), Cull, “British Campaign,” 129-31; David Lloyd Jones, “Marketing
the Allies to America,” Midwest Quarterly 29 (Spring 1988): 378.
az. Charles Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia (Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press, 1986), 28.
43. Stuart H. Loory, “The CIA’s Use of the Press: A ‘Mighty Wurlitzer,’ ” Columbia
Journalism Review 13, no. 3 (September/October 1974): 9-18, mentions CIA “con-
tracts with some 30 journalists,” “efforts to plant false or misleading stories,” “cash
9 66

payments...for information,” “access to information in the home offices,” “secret

ownership of 40 percent of...the Rome Daily American.”
. Book Review Digest 1942, 251.
45. Martha J. Hoppin, The Emmets: A Family of Women Painters (Pittsfield, Mass.,
1982), 7; Tara L. Tappert, The Emmets: A Generation of Gifted Women (New York:
Borghi, c. 1993).
46. John Mason Brown, The Worlds of Robert E. Sherwood (New York, 1962), 258, 259.
47. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.I am grateful to Dr. Tim Naftali, who had an oppor-
tunity to read and take notes on the secret “BSC Account” for confirming that this
claim is found in the “BSC Account,” on page 15; Stephenson, Early Days..., 7-8,
in Troy, “Coordinator of Information,” 100.
48. Schwar, “Interventionist Propaganda,” 185, 184.
49, H.L. Mencken, The Diary of H. L. Mencken, edited by Charles A. Fecher (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 388.
50. Ibid., 309.
st: For the story of the Countess of Athlone and FANY, see Irene Ward, RA.N.Y.
Invicta (London: Hutchinson, n.d.). The FANYs performed a myriad of tasks for
214 e228 DESPERATE DECEPTION

SOE. They were largely upper-class and highly cultured. Some performed duties
as drivers for visiting VIPs; others were infiltrated into Europe to help “set Europe
ablaze”; others were hostesses, radio operators, and code workers.
a2: Athlone (1874-1957) had been Prince Alexander of Teck until World War I, when
like the rest of the royal family he discarded his German-sounding name.
33: Cave-Brown, “C,” 52-54, 110.
sae Time, 28 October 1940, 11, 12. For Athlone’s appointment, see Time, 15 April
1940, 36-37; for correspondence, FDRL, President’s Personal File (6957).
558 Chadwin, Hawks, 170.
56. In February 1942, Francis Pickens Miller was recruited, by Robert Sherwood, to
Donovan’s Coordinator of Information as chairman of the board of the Foreign
Information Service. There he worked with Edmond Taylor. Miller, Man from the
Valley, 105-14; obituary of Ulric Bell, New York Times, 18 January 1960, 27.
Se For the judge’s pro-Britishness, see the book by his granddaughter Sallie Bingham,
Passion and Prejudice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 204-5.
58. Chadwin, Hawks, 201.
Ds FFFP, letter from Robert Bingham, 28 October 1940.
60. FFFP, Bingham file.
61. For MacLaren as BSC agent who became a member of Donovan’s COI/OSS, see
Miller, Man from the Valley, 109.
62. Chadwin, Hawks, 114.
63. Stephen Becker, Marshall Field III: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1964), 63; Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990), 311-16.
64. Turner Catledge, My Life and the Times (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 126.
65. Becker, Marshall Field LI, 279.
66. FFFP, Courteney Barber file, telephone interviews with Louise Parry, March 12,
1997, and April 8, 1997.
67. Walter Trohan, Political Animals: Memoirs of a Sentimental Cynic (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), 169; Becker, Marshall Field III, 202-7, 216; Ignatius,
“Britain’s War,” C-2.
68. Chadwin, Hawks, 64.
69. FBIF, Harold Guinzburg file, 77-19605.
70. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 199, says: “Stephenson himself was attracted by two
[American writers]...Walter Lippmann...and Leonard Lyons [who wrote] ‘In the
Lyons Den.’ ”
7M Maugham was a veteran of the Secret Intelligence Service. In 1917 he had been
hired by Sir William Wiseman, head of SIS in the United States, and sent to Rus-
sia. His Ashenden stories reflected his SIS experience.
After being chased out of Europe by the Germans in 1940, Maugham was sent to
the United States by the BIS to do propaganda. It was during this period that he
became a luncheon companion of Jerome Weidman. “The Ministry of Informa-
tion,” writes Weidman, “promptly assigned him to the Untied States....Nelson
Doubleday, Maugham’s American publisher, arranged to build a modest house for
him on the Doubleday family plantation....while work went forward...Maugham
spent his time working on a novel called The Hour Before the Dawn, which the
 Notes @*@ 215

British Ministry of Information had asked him to write.” Jerome Weidman, Pray-
ing for Rain (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 208, 222-224.
72. Dates are from James M. Salem, A Guide to Critical Reviews: Part I, American
Drama, 1909-1982, 3rd ed., 487.
13: Oren Root, Persons and Persuasions (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 53.
Wass Cull, “British Campaign,” 52.
Ts Raimund von Hofmannsthal (d. 1974), son of librettist Hugo von Hofmannsthal,
was connected to the world of intelligence and propaganda in other ways. He mar-
ried Vincent Astor’s sister Alice and had two daughters by her. At the New Year
1939, Raimund divorced Alice Astor and married Elizabeth Paget, the niece of
Diana Cooper, the wife of Churchill’s friend Duff Cooper. Duff ran Britain’s pro-
paganda arm, the Ministry of Information, from May 11, 1940. He was succeeded
in that job by Brendon Bracken in 1941. By late 1941 or early 1942 he started a
period of what his granddaughter calls “secret work”; he was head of the Security
Executive. Duff knew and liked Raimund, but to judge by Duff's letters, Raim@nd
did have his drawbacks. Duff wrote in a letter on September 12, 1938: “What is
amusing is that his advances in courtship are identical with Raimund’s...but my
new lover has it all over Raimund every time, for one reason his hand is not like a
hippopotamus’s tongue.” Duff and Diana Cooper, A Durable Fire, 292; A.J. Ayer,
Part of My Life (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 259.
76. Cull, “British Campaign,” 436.
i. The enemies were “Professional Isolationist Anglophobes”—Hearst, McCormick,
and Patterson newspapers, Senators Burton Wheeler and Gerald Nye, and Repre-
sentative Hamilton Fish; “Professional Liberals and Left Wing”—The Nation, The
New Republic, the pro-Indian nationalist journalist Louis Fischer, the New School
for Social Research, and Communists; “New Internationalist-Imperialists”—
presidential candidate Wendell Willkie and Henry and Clare Booth Luce. “Break-
down of Anti-British Groups and Individuals in U.S.A.,” 17 April 1943, Graham
Spray Papers, MG30, D297, Vol. 46-13, Public Archives of Canada, in Brewer,
“Creating the ‘Special Relationship,’ ” 253-54.
78. Chadwin, Hawks, 48.
79. PRO FO 371/26187, A/6013/118/45, Campbell to Martin, 28 July 1941, in Cull,
“British Campaign,” 502-3.
80. Anthony Read and David Fischer, Colonel Z: The Secret Life of a Master ofSpies (New
York: Viking, 1985), 176-80.
81. ECP, Box 107, “Clips from Claridges” file, 4 [my pagination].
82. Michael Korda, Charmed Lives, 146.
83. Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, 163, 162; Korda, Charmed Lives, 146; telephone in-
terview with Elinore Little Nascarella, 15 January 1996.
84. Claude Edward Marjoribanks Dansey was born in 1876 in London to a father in
the First Life Guards. In “C,” 127, Cave Brown writes: “...Dansey became (as
Menzies was to discover) a man who could commit murder easily...in short a man
capable of anything, and therefore exactly the sort who could rise to great heights
in the secret service....” Read and Fischer, Colonel Z, 176-87; Korda, Charmed
Lives, 138-39.
85. Korda, Charmed Lives, 155; Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, 245. Korda family tradi-
tion says that Churchill wrote a propaganda speech for Korda’s famous movie That
216 °¢°e DESPERATE DECEPTION

Hamilton Woman, about the hero of Trafalgar, Lord Nelson. In a footnote, Michael
Korda says of the speech: “It reads in part: ‘Napoleon can never be master of the
world until he has smashed us up—and believe me, gentleman, he means to be
master of the world. You cannot make peace with dictators, you have to destroy
them...’ The entire tone of the speech is faintly Churchillian, and it is difficult to
believe that Alex would have included a scene quite as unsuitable as this if he had
not felt obliged to do so because of its authorship.” Charmed Lives, 154.
86. Chadwin, Hawks, 64-65.
87. Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Nostalgia, 85.
88. FFFP, F. H. Peter Cusick file, telegrams of 8May 1941. One of them, addressed to
Kenneth Thomson in Hollywood, says: “Spyros Skouras will call you tomorrow
about a luncheon we are arranging with Walter Wanger and others in Hollywood
Tuesday.... There are five of us coming from here [New York] to discuss our needs
and plans for the immediate future.” Chadwin, Hawks, 64-65; Hitchins, Blood,
Class, and Nostalgia, 85; Halliwell, Halliwell’s Film Guide, 1989, 367.

CHAPTER 4: THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

iF James G. Schneider, Should America Go to War? The Debate over Foreign Policy in
Chicago, 1939-1941 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press,
1989), xvii.
Irving Crespi, Public Opinion Polls and Democracy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1989), 40-42.
. Letter to the author from Dr. Timothy Naftali of the University of Hawaii at
Manoa, 18 October 1993. Dr. Naftali was allowed to read the secret history and
take extensive notes, a number of which he has generously shared with me. The
information on Cantril and the penetration of Gallup are found on pages 170-72
of the “BSC Account” which in other respects is much like pages 192-94 of Hyde,
Quiet Canadian. The material on dissuading Gallup from publishing some poll re-
sults harmful to the British is from page 176 of the “BSC Account,” which is essen-
tially “identical” to page 198 of Quiet Canadian.
. Richard W. Steele, “The Pulse of the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gaug-
ing of American Public Opinion,” 7CH 9, no. 4 (October 1974): 195.
. CTEP, Box 46, “Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish.”
. America First Committee papers, Box 9, “Hamilton Fish file,” Hoover Institution,
Stanford, in Richard Kay Hanks, “Hamilton Fish and American Isolationism,
1929-1944” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Riverside, 1971), 286-87.
. Fora few of the many references to Franklin Roosevelt’s sensitivity to public opin-
ion and his determination not to get too far ahead of the public, see Robert
Herzstein, Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War (New York: Paragon House, 1989),
236, 237, 239, 291; Steele, “Pulse of the People,” 195-216.
. Although the Warhawks may have been the tools of British intelligence, they were
already by June 1940 conversant in manipulating the president with a coordinated
blitz of planted stories and letters. In May 1940, Whitney Shepardson, Francis
Miller, and Henry Wriston of Brown had wished to secure the position of minister
to Canada forJ.Pierrepont Moffat. According to Chadwin: “This trio had quietly
contacted a few of their friends whose judgement they knew President Roosevelt
valued, among them editorial writers for the New York Times and the New York
 Notes #** 217

Herald Tribune.” Their campaign was rewarded with success. Chadwin, Hawks, 33-
34:
Roger Stagner, “An Analysis of American Institute of Public Opinion Polls Relat-
ing to Intervention in the European War,” Congressional Record, 9 May 1941, 3840.
. Steele, “Pulse of the People,” 197.
. Ibid., 198.
. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
. Steele, “Pulse of the People,” 199.
. Warren I. Cohen, The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont,
George E. Sokolsky and American—East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1978), 238.
15. Steele, “Pulse of the People,” 200. FBIF, John Franklin Carter file, 62-47509, says
that Carter graduated from Yale in 1919 and worked for the State Department at
various foreign embassies until 1932. During the New Deal he had been an assis-
tant to Rexford Guy Tugwell. The FBI believed him to be hostile. The FBI, resent-
ing rivals, was very irritated; this irritation was shared by Vincent Astor, “Area
Controller” and New York contact with British intelligence.
. Steele, “Pulse of the People,” 201; Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2. Swing and Shirer
are also frequently mentioned in British propaganda reports as friends of the Brit-
ish.
Li, FDRL, President’s Secretary’s File (PSF) “Rowe,” James Rowe to FDR, 3 October
1940. “(Concerning rumor that the Gallup poll was rigged] I have of course grave
doubts about the accuracy of the story. However, Gallup is known to be very strong
for Willkie.” Steele, “Pulse of the People,” 208 n. 24.
18. One must remember the Rockefeller/Aldrich connection. The Rockefellers picked
up the rent for BSC’s office space in Rockefeller Center and did the same for Fight
for Freedom (they also subsidized some of FFF’s expenses). Nelson Aldrich
Rockefeller also created the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs office to aid
British intelligence in Latin America. Numerous other British intelligence fronts
and propaganda organizations called Rockefeller Center home; New York Times, 30
May 1969, 27. This unit became the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service when
it was absorbed by the Federal Communications Commission in 1941. More re-
cently it has been operated by the CIA as the Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice. G. J. A. O”Toole, The Encyclopedia ofAmerican Intelligence and Espionage, from
the Revolutionary War to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1988), 196.
Lo; MLP Ogilvy to Stephenson, 13 November 1962.
20. Michael Leigh, Mobilizing Consent (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), 74.
ae Cantril to Niles, 23 March 1943, “Cantril Notebooks,” vol. 2, in Leigh, Mobilizing
Consent, 82, 15.
ee Naftali to author, 18 October 1993.
23. Schwar, “Interventionist Propaganda,” 299.
24; Michael Wheeler, Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics (New York: Liveright, 1976), 115—
16.
Foye David Ogilvy, Blood, Brains and Beer: The Autobiography ofDavid Ogilvy (New York:
Atheneum, 1978), 82; Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, 17-23.
26. Charles Burlingham, Dean Acheson, and Thomas Thatcher signed the letter to
the New York Times that had been concocted by Ben Cohen and counsel to the
218 °¢¢ DESPERATE DECEPTION

British embassy John Foster. This specious piece of legal reasoning was the justifi-
cation for the Destroyer Deal. Acheson had his Yale classmate Charles Merz, edi-
tor of the Times editorial page, run the letter. Ogilvy, Blood, Brains and Beer, 70-72.
2Fs MLP Ogilvy to Stephenson, 13 November 1962; Ogilvy, Blood, Brains and Beer, 86,
Bill Ross-Smith to Montgomery Hyde, November 1962. Ogilvy suggested that
reference to himself in The Quiet Canadian should read: “W.[illiam] S. S.[tephen-
son] made Ogilvy his representative at the Washington embassy, where he worked
in liaison with Noel Hall and OSS, largely in the field of economic warfare. At one
period Ogilvy was giving OSS (Col. Francis Pickens Miller) an average of fifty
secret reports a day.” Ogilvy to Stephenson, 13 November 1962. Ogilvy’s OSS
contact was the same Francis Pickens Miller who had directed the Century Group.
He was one of the original Warhawks, who had published the letter in June 1940
demanding the United States declare war on Germany immediately. In a letter of
January 1, 1963, from Barbados, Ogilvy sent nine pages of changes he thought
necessary to make The Quiet Canadian more accurate and less offensive to Ameri-
cans. Ogilvy’s economic warfare work was one cause of the strained relations be-
tween BSC and the FBI. Hyde had written: “For some months Hoover was
convinced that Stephenson was deliberately withholding information from his
agents and passing it on to Donovan instead. This was not true.” Quiet Canadian,
166. Ogilvy counters: “Yes it was true. B.S.C. agents in Latin America passed their
economic stuff to OSS (via myself); also their political stuff—I think.”
28. Crespi, Public Opinion Polls and Democracy, 15; New York Times, 1 May 1971, 36.
HS): O” Toole, Encyclopedia ofAmerican Intelligence and Espionage, 395; obituary of Elmer
Burns Roper, Jr., New York Times, 1 May 1971, 36.
30. Chadwin, Hawks, 212; Ronald Tree, When the Moon Was High: Memoirs of War and
Peace, 1897-1942 (London: Macmillan, 1975), 94.
Syl Obituary of Harry Hubert Field, New York Times, 5 September 1946, 4. Field was
killed in an airplane crash in Paris as he returned from attempting to establish
public opinion polls “for all of Europe.”
Bye Hackett, America by Number: NORC Report 1991 (Chicago: National Opinion Re-
search Center, 1992), 1, 2, 8, 10, 79.
SBE, Whid. 7333.
34: William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York: Ballantine,
1976), 324-325.
oo: FFFP, Labor News Service, 21 November 1941.
36. FFFP, “Notes ‘Taken by Mr William Agar at Executive Committee Meeting of the
Fight for Freedom Committee,” 8 May 1941.
37 FFFP, Box 103, telegram from Abe Rosenfield, “Fight For Freedom, Inc.,” to the
Statler Hotel, Detroit, 10 November 1941.
38. FFFP, Robert Spivak file. Merle Miller (1919-86) later made a wide reputation for
his biographies: Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman and Lyndon:
An Oral Biography. He was quite open about his homosexuality, writing On Being
Different: What It Means to Be a Homosexual. He was much less forthcoming about
his extensive work for Fight for Freedom. During the time he was a major force in
FFF’s press operations he listed himself in his Who’s Who biography as “Washing-
ton corr. Phila. Record 1940-41; editor Yank Mag. 1941-45.” Who’s Who, 43rd ed.,
1984-85, vol. 2 For his Fight for Freedom work, see his thick file in FFFP.
 Notes °*e 219

39. FHP.
40. FFFP, Labor News Service, 1 (6 December 1941), 3; David Reynolds, The Creation of
the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (Chapel
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 330 n. 18. Reynolds cites
Ickes Papers 371/5 as his authority.
. Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships That Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo-
American Alliance (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 113.
. Leonard Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt, 1948), 140.
. Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 60.
. Hadley Cantril, Gauging Public Opinion (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1944), 108-10.
. Ibid., 114.
. Justice D. Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement
of 1940-41 as Revealed in the Papers ofthe America First Committee (Stanford, Calif.:
Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 29-30, 66; Harry S. Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), 218-19.
. Rowena Wyant, “Voting Via the Senate Mailbag,” Public Opinion Quarterly 5 (Fall
1941), 373-74.
. WJDP, Box 81 B.
. WJDP, Volume 34, WilliamJ.Donovan Personal, Box 81B.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson file.
. “There are no limits to...my willingness to be of help,” Frankfurter had told Brit-
ish Ambassador Lord Lothian. J. Garry Clifford and Samuel Spencer, The First
Peacetime Draft (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 63. Gerald T.
Dunne, Grenville Clark: Public Citizen (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1982),
127. Also, J. Garry Clifford, “Grenville Clark and the Origins of Selective Ser-
vice,” Review of Politics 35 (January 1973), 23-24.
a2. Clifford, “Grenville Clark,” 32.
53 Clifford, First Peacetime Draft, 139; Clifford, “Grenville Clark,” 33, 53.
a4. “Washington Letter,” 14 August 1940, British Library of Information no. 362, FO
371/2421/131, RBFO, in Clifford, First Peacetime Draft, 284 n. 113.
555 Stimson Diary, 22 August 1940, quoted in Clifford, “Grenville Clark,” 33.
56. Professor Beale lost the battle against the draft bill, but he did get in a telling blow
against the bandwagon effect Pearley Boone was building in conjunction with
Harvard professors in the Harvard Defense Group. In the late summer the
Harvard Defense Group issued a press release claiming that there was “practically
unanimous support” for conscription at the University of North Carolina. Since he
did not believe the UNC faculty could reach unanimous agreement on anything,
Beale called the Harvard professors on this, and they beat an indelicate retreat with
an apology. Clifford, First Peacetime Draft, 144.
Suhe Ross Stagner, “An Analysis of American Institute of Public Opinion Polls Relating
to Intervention in the European War,” Congressional Record, 9 May 1941, 3840-42.
Although Stagner was commissioned to make this study by the America First
Committee, it remains an excellent, careful analysis of the polls for this period.
58. Ibid., 3841.
a9) FFFP, Labor News Service 1, no. 28 (6 December 1941): 3.
220 °¢*8® DESPERATE DECEPTION

60. Louis D. Rubin, Jr., “Did Churchill Ruin ‘The Great Work of Time’? Thought on
the New British Revisionism,” Virginia Quarterly Review 70 (Winter 1994): 75.
61. FFFP, Box 169, clipping, “Congress Inquiry Sought for Polls.” According to
Ernest Cuneo, after the president intervened to make Alben Barkley the Senate
leader he “was in an immensely strong position in his continuing fight with the
Hill, because he had both majority leaders and they could prevent plays from form-
ing against him.” Interview with Ernest Cuneo, 23 April 1970, at Mr. Cuneo’s
office, Washington, D.C., LBJ Library Oral History Collection, Austin, ‘Tex.
62. Congressional Record, 6 May 1941, 3606.

CHAPTER 5: G.112 LE. COMMANDER GRIFFITH

. Duncan Stuart, CMG, The SOE Adviser at the FCO, to author, March 11, 1997.
Thomas M. Johnson, “They Told All,” American Legion Magazine 26 (February
1939):16:
Sandy Griffith’s Who’s Who entries of 1938-39 and 1958-59.
Telephone interview with Peter Griffith, 1 December 1993.
Letter to author, from A. M. “Bill” Ross-Smith, 6 April 1992.
Telephone interview with Peter Griffith, 7 July 1993. For Ellis as recruiter for
British intelligence, see Winks, Cloak and Gown, 166-67.
Letter to author from A. M. “Bill” Ross-Smith, 27 March 1992. Ross-Smith’s
agent number was 48907.
Shirer, Berlin Diary, 126. For other references to Bill Morrell and his pregnant
wife, see pp. 127 and 130. Ina letter to me, 24 November 1992, William L. Shirer
wrote: “Yes, I knew Bill Morrell, an old colleague of mine in Europe, who worked
for British Intelligence during the war. He was intelligent; a good writer. As I re-
member, he worked mostly in America.”
David Stafford, Camp X (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1986), 209; ECP,
Box 25, Henson files, Henson to Cuneo, 2 October 1941.
. Mary Elizabeth Allison, “America’s ‘Grandes Dames’ ” Life 64 January 26, 1968):
14-45.
. Tappert, The Emmets: A Generation of Gifted Women, 4-5.
. Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr., Old Money: The Mythology of America’s Upper Class (New
York: Vintage, 1988), 63.
. Obituary of Christopher T. Emmet, New York Times, 14 February 1974; CTEP,
Box 33, France Forever file.
. CTEP, Box 13, American Irish Defense Association; FFFP, Bell File, Emmet to
Ulric Bell, 31 July 1941, and Emmet to Bell, 25 November 1941; Emmet obituary.
. Christopher Simpson, Blowback (New York: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988), 222-
H3y.
. Much of the biographical information is from the Francis Henson Papers, held by
the Henson/Farrow family in Maryland. The Hensons were aviation pioneers;
Henson Airlines is now part of U.S. Air. In a letter of 9 July 1944 from “Camp Hq.
Camp Lee Va.” addressed “Dear Hingham,” Henson summarized his political phi-
losophy and the events of his life that had brought him to his ideas.
. FHP, résumé (of which there are several versions). Other versions of this résumé
can be found in ECP, Henson files.
 Notes eee 221

18. Goodhart, Fifty Ships, 113.

LY: ECP, Box 25, Henson files, “Opinion Poll at the Republican National Conven-
tion,” 19-25 June 1940, Market Analysts Inc., New York World’s Fair, Flushing,
INGYs
a): ECP, Box 25, Henson files, Griffith to Cuneo, 22 July 1940.
vas . ECP, Box 25, Henson files.
DDD, Ibid., letter of 9 August 1940.
Zs; Ibid., Griffith to Cuneo, 9 August 1940.
24. Ibid., Griffith to Cuneo, 1 October and 3 August 1940.
2a Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted, 11, 15, 23, 36, 37, 45, 47, 48, 50, 57, 64n,
72n, 95, 99, 103, 152, 159, 180, 227, 453-54, 465-66.
26. ECP, Box 25, Henson files, “Report on Interview with William R. Castle—19
November 1940.”
Dies Brewer, “Creating the ‘Special Relationships,’ ” 237.
28: “Breakdown of Anti-British Groups and Individuals in U.S.A.,” ce 1943, Spry
papers, Vol. 46-18, Public Archives of Canada; Law Commies , January 1944, FO
381/38522, PRO; MacDugal Report, March 12, 1943, CO875/18/12, PRO; in
Brewer, “Creating the ‘Special Relationship,’ ” 313-14.
JS), ECP, Box 25, Henson files, memo, Henson to Cuneo, undated. Probably from
1942 or 1943, because this series of textbooks was reviewed in Social Education 7
(1943), 183.
30. FFFP, Market Analysts Inc. File contains all of this newspaper commentary.
aul, CTEP, Box 76, Sanford Griffith file, Emmet to Griffith (at 5146 Plankinton Ar-
cade, Milwaukee, Wisconsin), 12 September 1941.
32). FFFP, Box 66, Spivak to David Stern et al., 21 November 1941.
33. FFFP, Labor News Service 1 (6 December 1941), 3.
34. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 124.
30a Troy, “ ‘George’: OSS’s FBI Secret,” 480, 483.
36. Tbid., 483.
SWE Miller, Man from the Valley, 109.
38. McAleer, Rex Stout, 295-96, McAleer’s notes for this episode include correspon-
dence with George M. Merton of 15 September 1972 and with Sylvia Porter of 3
October 1972. Porter (born Feldman) professionally used the name of her first
husband, whom she divorced in 1931. She married G. Summer Collins in 1943.
Her biography in Contemporary Authors 81-84:451 lists a volume titled The Nazi
Chemical Trust in the United States, published by the National Policy Committee,
1942.
. Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New York: Viking Press, 1975), 79.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson files, Henson to Cuneo, undated. Probably July 1942, be-
cause William Floyd II wrote a follow-up letter dated 24 July 1942.
. Ibid., Floyd to Cuneo, 24 July 1942.
. I. F Stone, “Esso Family Reunion,” Nation, 12 July 1943, 826-27.
. Lbid.; Who’s Who in America 1940-41, 1106.
. Sampson, Seven Sisters, 80.
. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2; Troy, “ “George’: OSS’s FBI Secret,” 485.
222 eee JD)ESPERATE DECEPTION

46. ECP, Box 25, Henson files.

ile Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 30 November 1975, in McAleer, Rex Stout, 558-59
ink, Yi.
48. FHP, Henson to Griffith, 3 August 1943, from Camp Special Service Office, Camp
Hq., Camp Lee, Va.
a Neal Gabler, Winchell: Gossip, Power, and the Culture of Celebrity (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1994), 613.
50. Robert E. Stripling to The Honorable Martin Dies, November 12, 1942, Box 76,
Market Analysts: Sanford Griffith, Frederick McKee, Francis Henson, Records
Group 233, House of Representatives, Records of the Select Committee on Un-
American Activities, 1938-44 (The Dies Committee), National Archives and
Records Administration (hereafter, Dies Committee, NARA).
bale Memo to Mr. Dies, attached to Sanford Griffith’s bank account, Box 76, Record
Group 233, Dies Committee, NARA.
Dee Niel M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck: German American Propagandist (Urbana,
Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 198-200.
Doe Ibid., 224, 227; Washington Post, 11 October 1941, 1.
Sak Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, 198.
py Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck, 231-33.
56. Quoted in Wesley McCune, The Nine Young Men (New York: Greenwood Publish-
ers, 1947), 154-55.
bye Tbid., 154.
58 . Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck, 242-43.
59: Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, 200.
60. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck, 250-51.
61 . FHP, Henson to Griffith, 3 August 1943.
62. CTEP, Box 76, Griffith file, Emmet to Griffith, 19 January 1946.

CHAPTER 6: DESTROYING CONGRESSMAN FISH

it. CTEP, Box 65, Burlingham file, Emmet to Burlingham, 4 November 1940.
Dr Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
Bs Wheeler, Yankee from the West, 404, 408-9. The book attacking Wheeler was The
Plot Against America; Senator Wheeler and the Forces Behind Him, by David George
Kin, real name Plotkin. The book attacking Senator Nye was Under Cover by John
Roy Carlson, real name Avedis Derounian (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943).
Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962), 216.
Brewer, “Creating the ‘Special Relationship,’ ” 436.
J. G. Donnelly, August 1945, FO371/44557 AN2560/22/45, PRO.
Obituary of Hamilton Fish, New York Times, 20 January 1991, 26.
Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 189, 191.
ee
eo
SA CTEP, Box 46, Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish file, List of Do-
nors.

. CTEP, Box 46, NPCDHIF file. Other members of the committee: Mr. and Mrs.
Lewis Mumford, Amenia, New York; Mr. and Mrs. Lee Woodward Ziegler,
Newburgh, New York; Mr. John Wing, Millbrook, New York; Mr. Guy S. Bailley,
 Notes #e* 223

Amenia, New York; George Field, New York City; Mr. Arthur Goldsmith, New
York City.
i: DPP, Container 150, 3 of 3, Hamilton Fish, #1.
12 . Hamilton Fish, Memoirs ofan American Patriot (Washington, D.C.: Regnery/Gate-
way, 1991), 145-46.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson files, Henson to Cuneo (The Moorings, 1909 Que St. N.W.,
Washington, D.C.), 18 October 1940.
. CTEP, Box 46, NPCDHF file, “Receipts.”
. New York Times, 4 October 1940, 22.
. New York Times, 19, 11, 30, and 16 October 1940, in Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 260.
. New York Times, 9 November 1938, 3.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson files, Griffith to Cuneo, 13 November 1940.
. CTEP, Box 46, NPCDHF file, “Recommendations by Sanford Griffith for
Hamilton Fish Campaign and Continuation.”
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. FFFP, Box 9, James Causey file. Causey spoke of himself as a constituent of
Hamilton Fish, but his address on the poll is Room 803, 63 Wall Street, New York
City.
. Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 286-88.
. Congressional Record, 26 June 1941, 5552.
. Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 298-300.
. CTEP, Box 46, NPCDHF file, “Recommendations,” 2-3.
. Ibid., 34.
. CTEP, Box 46. For Mumford on the NPCDHE see Financial Report of Receipts
and Expenditures of Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish. For
Mumford as sponsor of Fight for Freedom, see Chadwin, Hawks, 168.
. Chadwin, Hawks, 53.
. Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 302-3.
bide le
. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 87.
. Naftali to author, 18 October 1993; obituaries of Henry Hoke in New York Times,
23 November 1970, 40, and Howard County Times (Columbia, Md.], 26 November
1970; FHP, Henson to Griffith, 3 August 1943.
. New York Times, 13 June 1940, 5.
. ECP, Box 25, Henson files. For the closeness of Henson and Hoke see letter from
Hoke, 11 January 1946.
. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 88.
. FFFP, Hamilton Fish file, press release marked “For A.M. Release.”
. FFFP, Hamilton Fish file.
. Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 328.
. Ibid., 329-36.
. DPP, Box F 33, 1 of 3, Viereck Trial Clippings.
. Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 370-72.
224 eee JPESPERATE DECEPTION

44. New York Times, October 15, 1942, 19.

45, Davenport, “Hot Seats,” Collier’s, 5 September 1942, 18-19; Jordy and Chasen,
“Keep Them Out!” Nation, 24 October 1942, 415-17.
46. DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish #1, Scheiber to Pearson, 7, 19, 20 October and
20, 23 November 1942.
AY: DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Hoke to Pearson, 29 October 1942.
48. DPP, F 150, 3 of 3, Fish #2, Hoke to Pearson, 29 October 1942.
aD. Ibid.
50. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 70-71, Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2, reports the same inci-
dent is found in the “BSC Account,” in nearly identical language. Ignatius adds the
name ‘Torkild Reiber of Texaco as one of Westrick’s chief contacts in the oil busi-
ness. Hyde in Quiet Canadian calls him “the president of a certain oil company.”
Sle DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish, #2; New York Mirror, 29 October 1942, and
New York World Telegram, 29 October 1942.
a2: DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish, Beacon News (Beacon, N.Y.), 2 November 1942.
ps Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During
World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 73.
SA: New York Times, 5 November 1942, 30.
5: DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish, Hansen-Sturm to Pearson, 7 November 1942,
and Pearson reply, 24 November 1942.
56. DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish, #1, Pearson to Griffith, 12 November 1942.
NE DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish, #1, Pearson to Hoke, 12 November 1942;
Griffith to Pearson, 19 November 1942.
58. DPP, Container F 150, 3 of 3, Fish, #1, Pearson to Griffith, 23 November 1942.
59: EBP, “Relations with Roosevelt,” 7.
60. EBP, quotes from “Correspondence,” 34.
61. Hassett, Off the Record with RD.R. 1942-1945 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1958), 87.
62. E.g., material in Prime Ministers Office Files (PREM) 4, 26/6 and 27/1; FO 371,
files 30715, 31723, 34162, in Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United
States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1978), 221.
63. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
64. EBP, “Correspondence,” 18.
65. Sir Isaiah Berlin, Washington Despatches, 1941-1945: Weekly Political Reports from the
British Embassy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), entries for 1 August
1942, 21 November 1942, 3 July 1943, 25 July 1942, 8 August 1942, 27 December
1942, 24 January 1943, 13 February 1943, 22 October 1943, 22 November 1943, 6
December 1943, 11 December 1943.
66. Washington Evening Star, 3 May 1944, A-4.
67. Chadwin, Hawks, 228.
68. For Anderson’s poem see New Yorker, 28 May 1944, 28. See also New York Times, 27
July 1944, 7; 29 July 1944, 15; 30 July 1944, 1; 31 July 1944, 8; 26 August 1944, 13.
For Stout, see New York Times, 3 November 1944, 14, in Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,”
397.
 Notes @e¢ 225

69. Hanks, “Hamilton Fish,” 405.

70. CTEP, Box 65, Burlingham file, Emmet to Burlingham, 4 November 1940.

CHAPTER 7: UNCLE AUTHOR

ie Anderson, “Britain’s Fetching Lobbyists,” Washington Post-Times Herald, 14 Sep-
tember 1969, B-7.
ECP, Box 108, Michael Straight file.
Rovere, “New Man in the Pantheon,” New Yorker, 24 March 1962, 150-66.
Rovere, like many, dates Vandenberg’s conversion from his famous Senate speech
of 10 January 1945. I place his conversion much earlier, as early as mid-1940.
4. R. W. Apple, Jr., New York Times, 6 May 1987.
Drew Pearson, Drew Pearson Diaries,1949-1959, edited Tyler Abel (New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974), 158.
. C. David Tompkins, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Re-
publican, 1884-1945 (Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1970), 2.
. Ibid., 6,7, 15-25, 28, 42-43.
. Walter Trohan to author, 6 July 1987.
. Virginia Owen to author, 9 December 1989. Lady Cotter was too infirm to write
me; Virginia Owen, her daughter, wrote down her answers to a series of questions.
. Tompkins, Vandenberg, 94-95.
. Ibid., 126-227.
. Ibid., 167.
. Arthur Krock, The Consent of the Governed and Other Deceits (Boston: Little, Brown,
1971), 163-64.
. HHVP, Diary entry of 6May 1937.
. Montreal Daily Star, 7 May 1940, 18; Washington Star, 7 May 1940, A-2; Washington
Post, 7 May 1940, 11; Washington Times Herald, 7 May 1940.
. Washington Post, 7 May 1940, 11.
. Telephone interviews with Mrs. Bogart and Mrs. Carsley, May and June 1987.
. Washington Star, 7 May 1940, p. A-2.
. Pearson, Diaries, entry of 20 April 1951, 157-59.
. HHVD, entries for the first four months of 1940. In particular see entries of 18
April, 5 May, and 6 May 1940.
. Obituary of Harold Sims, Washington Times-Herald, 7 May 1940.
. Washington Post, 7 May 1940, 11.
. Chris Ogden, The Life ofthe Party: The Biography ofPamela Dighy Churchill Hayward
Harriman (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 122-124, 120.
. HHVD, June 9, 1940.
. Trohan to author, 6 July 1987.
. Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990), 212.
. Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The Life of Betty Pack, the American Spy Who
Changed the Course of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 146.
. hid.
. Time, 20 December 1963.
. “BSC Account,” 153, in Lovell, Cast No Shadow, page preceding contents, titled
“Betty. ”
226 °2° DESPERATE DECEPTION

31; Lovell, Cast No Shadow, xiii.

32. Obituary of George Thorpe, New York Times, 29 July 1936, 19. Cora Wells Thorpe
died at age seventy-three, 9 August 1954. Washington Post, 10 August 1954, 22.
32. Karen L. Jana, reference librarian at the Bentley Historical Library at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, kindly answered my questions on the University of Michigan
connection between Hazel Vandenberg and Cora Thorpe.
34. New York Times, 30 April 1930, 17. Other members of the party were matron of
honor the bride’s cousin Mrs. Christian L. Christensen, daughter of Federal Trade
Commissioner C. H. March; Miss Gertrude Lamont, daughter of the secretary of
commerce; best man was Captain J. T. Godfrey, assistant military attaché of the
British embassy; Ronald Ian Campbell, counselor at the British embassy; British
Ambassador and Lady Lindsey also attended.
ope Lovell, Cast No Shadow, 37, 57.
36. Ibid., 85-87.
ave Ibid., 88-97.
38. Ibid., 142.
3) FBIF Special Agent in Charge S. K. McKee to Director FBI (GED: MG 65-3575),
22 January 1943, RE: MRS. ARTHUR PACK, with aliases ESPIONAGE (F).
40. HHVD. “Cora T,” Cora Thorpe, was sometimes called “Lil Thorpe” in Mrs.
Vandenberg’s diaries.
anil. David Ogilvy, Notes on American Public Opinion in Relation to U.K., 25 Septem-
ber 1945, Canceling/44608 AN3037/109/45, PRO, in Brewer, “Creating the ‘Spe-
cial Relationship,’ ” 412.
ao Leonard S. Cottrell and Sylvia Eberhart, American Opinion on World Affairs in the
Atomic Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948), 130, in Richard N.
Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The Origins and Prospects of
Our International Economic Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980),
236.
. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, 237.
. Ibid., 250.
. Vandenberg, Private Papers, 231.
. Trohan to author, 6 July 1987.
. Virginia Owen (Mrs. Paterson’s daughter) to author, 3 January 1993. Also her
death certificate from North Dorset, entry Number 53.
. Peoria fournal-Transcript, 11 February 1941.
. Peoria Star, February 11, 1941. The story is illustrated with a photograph of
Eveline, her daughter, Virginia, and her cousin Mrs. Theodore Baer, with whom
she was staying in Peoria. My thanks to Virginia Owen for sending this and other
items from her mother’s scrapbook.
. The scrapbook of Eveline Paterson; also Virginia Owen to author, 25 March 1992.
. Owen to author, 11 January 1992.
. DPP, Container F 32, 3 of 3, Vandenberg File, Memo to DP from
JD ofJune 5,
1948.
. Owen to author, 25 March 1992.
. Ibid.
. Owen to author, 3 January 1993.
 Notes °** 227

56. ECP, Henson files.

We Mari Ann Buitrago, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been in the FBI Files? (New York:
Grove Press, 1981), Appendix C.

CHAPTER 8: WE WANT WILLKIE

Ile FDRL, Berle, Box 213, also FDRL Berle Diary Vol. VII, 2 122-123.
Ne Richard Kluger, The Paper: The Life and Death of the New York Herald Tribune (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 322.
. ECP, Box 107, “For the Record: Crusader to Intrepid,” File, 86. The generally
reliable Ernest Cuneo repeats several times in his papers that the movement for a
third term started in July 1938: “...the historians and the record to the contrary,
ED.R. gave the green light to a Third Term. I wrote the first ‘Draft FD.R.’ speech,
delivered by Governor Frank Murphy at ‘Traverse City on 25 July 1938. I had
Walter Winchell pick it up and he trumpeted it to 40 million people daily for the
next two years, plus driving it into 8 out of 9 American adults every Sunday night.”
. H. L. Mencken to New York Daily News reporter Doris Fleeson, 3 July 1940,
quoted in The New Mencken Letters, edited by Carl Bode (New York: Dial Press,
1977), 463. Other examples: Hugh Ross, “Was the Nomination of Wendell
Willkie a Political Miracle?” Indiana Magazine of History 58 (June 1962): 79-100.
Ross lists Chapter 9, “Miracle in Philadelphia,” of Joseph Barnes, Willkie (New
York, 1952). Eugene H. Rosenbloom, A History ofPresidential Elections (New York:
Macmillan, 1957), has a chapter on the nomination, 460-65, subtitled “The Phila-
delphia Miracle.”
. The British ambassador from mid-1939 until his unexpected death in December
1940, Lord Lothian worked very closely with British intelligence. Hyde writes of
“Lothian, who had always been en rapport with Stephenson” (Secret Intelligence
Agent, 22). In September 1939, Sir William Wiseman, the World War I head of
British intelligence in the United States, visited Assistant Secretary of State Adolf
Berle. Wiseman was, in 1939, an aide to the new Ambassador Lothian. Startled,
Berle wrote a memorandum: “Well, I thought, under the cover of some courteous
remarks, this approaches the fantastic. For Lothian, in an earlier incarnation, was
Sir Phillip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary. As young men, he and Wiseman were
the brain trusters; Wiseman arranged many of the meetings between Colonel
House, Lloyd George’s private emissaries and the British Ambassador... The his-
tory of our past English ‘interpretations’ was a history of half truths, broken faith,
intrigue behind the back of the State Department, and even the President, and
everything that goes with it.” FDRL, Berle Diary, 13 September 1939, 2-3.
Presidents Personal File (PPF), FDRL, File 70. The address from which this was
taken was delivered at Olympic Auditorium in Los Angeles by the strange expedi-
ent of a phonograph record. According to the speech, Browder was unable to at-
tend in person because the Roosevelt administration had gone to federal court and
obtained an order preventing him from leaving New York.
FDRL, PPF 70, Lamont, Thomas W. 1938-40, Roosevelt to Lamont, 13 Septem-
ber 1940; C. Nelson Sparks, One Man—Wendell Willkie (New York: Raynor, 1943).
Neal, Dark Horse, 3.
Tbid., 16.
Ibid., 19.
228 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Lt. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.

12 The organizer of these three-day “forums” was Marie (Missy) Meloney, for some
years the editor of the New York Herald Tribune Sunday Magazine. Kluger, Paper,
286. Her only child, William Brown Meloney, had been a member of William
Donovan’ law firm. One intelligence author writes: “...Meloney and her son en-
joyed a close relationship with the President and his wife, particularly Eleanor
Roosevelt. Since Meloney’s country home lay near the Roosevelt’s in Hyde Park,
she met them frequently.” Brian R. Sullivan, “ ‘A Highly Commendable Action’:
William J. Donovan’s Intelligence Mission and Roosevelt,” INS 6 (April 1991):
339, 343. From the fragmentary correspondence in the Marie M. Meloney Papers
at Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library it appears that
Donovan and Mrs. Meloney had a very close relationship. Kluger, Paper, 327.
13: Kluger, Paper, 327.
i Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Firsov, The Secret World ofAmerican
Communism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 262, 265.
5 Sanders, Dorothy Thompson, 254.
16. Walter Johnson, William Allen White’s America (New York: Henry Holt, 1947),
530; DPP, Container No. F 33, Willkie, Wendell L. File.
ive Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana, Ill.: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1960), 74-75.
18. In Howe, Black Game, 32.
19. My request for Mr. Williams’s autopsy report was returned from the Thomas
Jefferson University Hospital in Philadelphia with a form letter. The block
checked said: “Patient records dated prior to 1975 are no longer available.” Letter
from Ms. Belinda Benson, Correspondence Secretary Medical Records Depart-
ment, 4 April 1990. If it still exists, this autopsy report deserves a thorough review
by a forensic specialist knowledgeable in the intelligence techniques of the time.
203 D. B. Johnson, Republican Party, 92.
Al . HHP, Post Presidential Subject files, Gahagan/HH Campaign Deposition by Dor-
othy Emerson, 3 July 1947, Gahagan/HH 1940.
. HHP. See also the letter by Herbert Hoover’s son Allan and the oral history by
James P. Selvage in “Campaign 1940, Post Pres. Subjects.” Pryor’s work at the
convention caused a rift between himself and Herbert Hoover that Pryor was
never able to heal.
3. Marylin Bender and Selig Altschul, The Chosen Instrument: Juan Trippe, Pan Am:
The Rise and Fall ofan American Entrepreneur (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982),
480.
. Neal, Dark Horse, 102; Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
. Goodhart, Fifty Ships, 108.
. HHP, Oral History, James P. Selvage, 25, 26.
. David E. Lilienthal, Volume I (New York: Harper & Row), 205-6.
. Public Opinion Quarterly 4 (September 1940), 537.
. Stevenson, Intrepid, 507, mentions the involvement of the Alsop brothers in BSC
operations. The brothers were relatives of FDR. Neal, Dark Horse, 186.
. Davenport, Too Strong for Fantasy, 277.
. Neal, Dark Horse, 148.
 Notes °** 229

a2, Catledge, My Life and the Times, 120.

33. Richard J. Jensen, “The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depres-
sion,” Journal ofInterdisciplinary History 19 (Spring 1989): 557.
34. Herzstein, Roosevelt and Hitler, 406.
39 Alfred Haines Cope and Fred Krinsky, “Introduction” in Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the Supreme Court (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1969), vi, 27-30.
36. Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, 23.
37. Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little, Brown,
1980), 387-89; Lerner, “The Supreme Court and American Capitalism,” in Cope
and Krinsky, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, 58-59; Neal, Dark Horse,
158; D. B. Johnson, Republican Party, 142.
38. Ponting, 1940, 75.
ae Malcolm Muggeridge, Like It Was: The Diaries of Malcolm Muggeridge (New York:
William Morrow, 1982), 218.
40. Quoted in Neal, Dark Horse, viii.
ai. Hiram Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., 30 August 1940, Johnson Papers,
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California, in Cole, Roosevelt
and the Isolationists, 1932-45 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 395; J. Garry
Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 1986), 5.
. Miller, Man from the Valley, 102; Naftali, “Intrepid’s Last Deception,” 82, 96, n. 69.
. Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, xvii.
. Lothian to Halifax, 29 August 1940, FO 800/324, Halifax Papers, Public Records
Office London, in Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 395.
. Robert Shogan, Hard Bargain: How FDR Twisted Churchill’s Arm, Evaded the Law,
and Changed the Role of the American Presidency (New York: Scribner, 1995), 259-60.
46. ECP, Box 111, Crusader to Intrepid file.
a Miller, Man from the Valley, 102. Douglas was an ardent Anglophile and later
United States ambassador to Great Britain whose father (the father had renounced
his United States citizenship and become a British citizen) had financially sup-
ported him his whole life under the apparent understanding that Lewis would help
the British whenever he had the opportunity.
48. A group of journalists purchased full-page advertisements in papers across the na-
tion to promote the Destroyer Deal. Donald B. Johnson writes of those who placed
the advertisements: “The group included Barry Bingham, publisher of the Louzs-
ville Courier-Journal, Herbert Agar, the editor of the paper; Walter Lippmann; Jo-
seph Alsop; Robert S. Allen; Frank Kent of the Baltimore Sun; Geoffrey Parsons,
chief editorial writer of the New York Herald Tribune; Russell Davenport, and a
number of others.” D. B. Johnson, Republican Party, 126n.
49, Lilienthal, Volume I, the TVA Years 1939-1945, 209.
50. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 41, gives the intermediary the name Albert Younglove
Gowen. Francis Pickens Miller, one of the founders of Fight for Freedom, was
involved with this event. In his autobiography, Man from the Valley, 98-101, he
gives the intermediary’s name as George A. C. Christiancy. Why Hyde disguised
the name is not clear. He also did this with one of Cynthia’s targets, Captain
Charles Brousse, whom he called Captain Bestrand. Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 109.
230 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Miller says George Christiancy’s name was passed to him from Walter Mallory of
the Council on Foreign Relations, at the suggestion of Frank Altschul.
oe Miller, Man from the Valley, 100-101.
52. Goodhart, Fifty Ships, 106.
DEE Raoul de Sales, The Making of Yesterday: The Diaries ofRaoul de Roussy de Sales (New
York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947), 124.
54: Corliss Lamont, The Thomas Lamont Family in America (1962).
Jae Obituary of Gardner Cowles, Des Moines Register, 9 July 1985, 1A; D. B. Johnson,
Republican Party, 215n.
56. Philip Burch, Jr., Elites in American History (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980),
366. Oren Root says: “Through his mother he [Henry Luce] and I were distantly
related....” Root also writes that he was an occasional dinner and house guest of the
Luces and that is where he was on December 7, 1941, when Pearl Harbor was
attacked. Root, Persons and Persuasions, 53, 31.
one Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1968), 54; Root, Persons and Persuasions, 37.
58. Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 54.
59. Watt, How War Came, 556.
60. For Lewis Douglas’s connection with Fight for Freedom, see Chadwin, Hawks, 43,
50-51, 75, 78-80, 89, 96, 105, 110.
61. Jaffe, “Isolationism and Neutrality,” 139-40.
62. Quoted in Neal, Dark Horse, 191.
63. Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 56, 61.
64. Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and
Their Family Network (New York: Dial, 1978), 107-8, 504n, cites a note in the
Dulles papers. Several things in Mosley’s account, however, seem out of sequence.
In particular, Mosley seems to put Donovan’s trip to England before the conven-
tion.

65. DPP, Container G 247 Willkie, #1; Neal, Dark Horse, 67; Root, Persons and Persua-
sions, 27.
66. Root, Persons and Persuasions, 34-35.
67. Neal, Dark Horse, 130; Peter Collier and David Horwitz, The Rockefellers: An
American Dynasty (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 214.
68. Winthrop W. Aldrich (1885-1974) was the son of Nelson Aldrich, senator from
Rhode Island from 1881 to 1911 and one of the founders of the Federal Reserve
System. Aldrich was a 1907 graduate of Harvard College and a 1910 graduate of
the Harvard Law School. Winthrop’s sister Abby G. Aldrich had married John D.
Rockefeller, Jr., thus making him uncle to the five Rockefeller brothers, John
D. III, Nelson, Laurance, David, and Winthrop. Aldrich was associated with
Rockefeller interests from the 1920s. Aldrich took over the chairmanship of the
Chase National Bank in early 1933 and held that position until January 1953, when
President Eisenhower appointed him ambassador to Great Britain. Like Lewis
Douglas, David Bruce, and Gil Winant, Aldrich was a known quantity to the Brit-
ish long before he arrived at the Court of St. James’s.
69. Jeffrey M. Dorwart, “The Roosevelt-Astor Espionage Ring,” New York History 62
July 1981): 315.
 Notes °°? 231

79. Dorwart writes: “Everyone of the old ROOM members held deep family, educa-
tional and emotional bonds to England and to English society and institutions.”
Dorwart, “Roosevelt-Astor,” 315-16.
7A, Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid, 169; “BSC Account,” 16; Hyde, Secret Intelligence
Agent, 91.
72 . Neal, Dark Horse, 188. Chadwin, Hawks, 133, gives a less complete and more
garbled version of the same event involving officials of Fight for Freedom.
73% Michael T. Florinsky, review of Douglas Miller, You Can’t Do Business with Hitler, in
Political Science Quarterly 56 (December 1941): 639.
TA Neal, Dark Horse, 211; Chadwin, Hawks, 179.
15% FFFP, Hobson to Willkie, telegram, 23 September 1941.
76. Chawin, Hawks, 216-18.
This FFFP, Willkie File.
78. Christian Science Monitor, 17 March 1941, in Sargent, Getting U.S. into War, 503.
79: Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 204-5.
80. DDP, G-247, 1 of 2.
81. Congressional Record, 12 November 1941, 8801.
82. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York:
Harper, 1948), 635.
83. Neal, Dark Horse, 202.
84. Ibid., 189; EBP, Summaries of Willkie Correspondence, 36.
85. Berlin, Washington Despatches, 291.
86. Ibid., entries for 1 August 1942, 21 November 1942, 3 July 1943, 25 July 1942, 8
August 1942, 27 December 1942, 24 January 1943; 13 February 1943, 22 October
1943, 22 November 1943, 6 December 1943, 11 December 1943, 13 December
1943.
87. Neal, Dark Horse, 313, 317; Hyde, Quiet Canadian, 204-8. Pearson’s inside contacts
in the administration have been excised from page 205 of Room 3603, the U.S.
edition of Quiet Canadian. According to Quiet Canadian they were Ickes,
Morgenthau, and Biddle. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
88. DPP, Container F 33, 2 of 3.
89. Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, 91.

CHAPTER 9: THE SUCCESS OF DECEPTION

} David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between
Britian and America in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1988),
102-3.
. JBP, Neville Chamberlain to Buchan (Lord Tweedsmuir), dated July 1939.
. Ignatius, “Britain’s War,” C-2.
Ww .
ft For comment on this, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Gov-
ernmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, A//eged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Cong., Ist sess.,
LO SRO Ome
» EGP, Box 107, CIActle.
6. Cull, “British Campaign,” 126.
232 eee [DESPERATE DECEPTION

PRO FO 371/22839, A/7053/7052/45, minute by Vansittart, 21 October 1939, in

Cull, “British Campaign,” 115. Vansittart was quite familiar with the film business.
CTEP, Box 46, Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton Fish file, Sophie
Mumford to Betty Maclean, 7 November 1940.
In a memo for his files, Cuneo wrote: “To sum it up, outside the COI/OSS there
was no significant person, organization, or group that wanted a new agency or an
independent coordinator. There were no discernable attitudes or forces working in
that direction....No, there never was the possibility...without the impetus...from
outside.” ECP, Box 107, CIA file.
10. Robert Sherwood, Bill Morrell, Donald Downes, Edmond ‘Taylor, Donald Mac-
Laren, George Merton, Elizabeth Thorpe Pack (Cynthia), George Bowden, and
Ivar Bryce are examples. This area merits closer study.
ie Loch K. Johnson, America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 25.
We Ibid. Loch K. Johnson was associated with the CIA. This book may be a planned
leak.
13 . Chadwin, Hawks, 138-41.
14. Anthony Cave-Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books,
1982), 651.
15. Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1946, 188-89, 33.
16. William Leonard Langer, In and Out of the Ivory Tower (New York: Neale Watson
Academic Publications, 1977), 210.
We Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men ofForeign Affairs:The History of the Council on
Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 130.
18. See William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World
Crises of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy, 2 vols. (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1952), 716, n.18, listing Donovan’s letters to England of August 27,
1940. These letters were addressed to: Brenden Bracken, Colonel S. G. Menzies,
Admiral Godfrey, Sir Cyril Newal and Sir Ronald Tree. None are identified or
elaborated on, and none of these can be located in the index. The most important
individuals mentioned are Colonel S. G. Menzies—“C,” the head of the Secret
Intelligence Service (MI-6)—and Admiral Godfrey, the head of the Office of Naval
Intelligence, whose facile aide Ian Fleming worked for Stephenson for a time.
Ronald Tree, of British Information Services (propaganda), who was Marshall
Field’s first cousin, had been in charge of Donovan in England.
. Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 13-14.
. Kramer, “Nelson Rockefeller and British Security Coordination,” 7CH 16 (Janu-
ary 1981): 76.
. Laurence H. Shoup and William Mintner, Imperial Brain Trust (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1977), 123.
. Chadwin, Hawks, 71.
. Samuel Flagg Bemis, “First Gun of a Revisionist Historiography for the Second
World War,” Modern History 19 (March 1947): 56-59.
odlbid.,59.
 &ee

Bibliography

PRINTED MEMOIRS, DIARIES, AND DOCUMENTS

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 Index

Acheson, Dean G., 166 Barnes, Harry Elmer, 157

with Fight for Freedom, 27 Barnes, Joseph, 168
Agar, Herbert S., 29, 54, 123, 189 Beale, Prof. Howard L., 84
editor, Louisville Courier-Journal, 27 Beaverbrook, Lord (Max Aitkin), 189
major figure in Fight for Freedom, 27 Belfrage, Cedric, 49
popular speaker, 132 Bell, Ulric, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 171, 190
Agar, William, 38, 39, 54, 189 ran FFF operations, 60, 61
Agents, 48, 51 close to Hull, 60
Agents ofinfluence, 59, 138 Barry Bingham, 60
Agents, recruitment, 51 Belmonte Letter, 191
Aglion, Raoul, 189 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 186
Aldrich, Winthrop, 170, 171 Benson, Rex, 38
Alice, Princess, 60 Berle, Adolf A., 19,
Alsop, Joseph, 27, 162 Berlin, Isaiah, 133, 175, 176
Al Shoda, 24 Bernstein, Sidney, 172
America First Committee, 34, 56, 190 Bingham, Barry, 60, 61
America Last, 24, employed Bell and Agar, 61
American Federation of Scientific Astrolo- Fight for Freedom, 61
gers, 57 anti-isolationist speakers, 62
American Irish Defense Association—see and intelligence, 62
Irish-American Defense Association Robert Bingham, 62
American Labor Committee to Aid British and Donald MacLaren, 62
Labor, 24, 32, 190 Birkhead, Reverend Leon M., 33, 109, 172,
American Legion, 134 191
BSC poll, 96 BIS-see British Information Service
Chicago Tribune poll, 96 Black listing, 17, 18
American Youth Congress, 190 Blockade, 66
Anderson, Maxwell, 135 Blum, John Morton, 55
Anglophiles-see also Eastern foreign policy Books, planted, 57
elite, 7, 50, 71, 83, 133, 167, 178 British debt, 150
Antisemitism, 53, 125, 126, 172 British Foreign Office-see also Foreign Office
Ascoli, Max, 24, 31, 190 (FO)
Astor, Vincent, 19, 20, 171, 190 British Information Services (BIS), 191
photos of, 116 worked closely with BSC, 29
Astrologers-see American Federation of British Security Coordination-see BSC
Scientific Astrologers Browder, Earl, 156, 157, 180
Athlone, Earl, 60 Bruce, David K. E., 191
Atrocity Photographs, 15 Bruce, Mrs. David K.E., 30
Awakening from History (Taylor), 21, Bryce, John EC. “Ivor”, 40, 50, 56, 191
Ayer, Alfred Jules, 65, 190 South American map, 55, 56
Backer, George, 29, 48, 51, 59, 190 Lippmann in-law, 55
Baker, Newton D., 158 Latin American specialist, 56
Balderston, John L., 27, 41, 99, 190 BSC Account, 14, 24, 47, 124, 161
Baltimore Sun, 8, 59 BSC (British Security Coordination), 7, 9,
Bancroft, Dr. Edward, 16 ly 133) 17.3) L79P 180, 182. 191
Barnard, Ellsworth, 133 and polls, 77
248 DESPERATE DECEPTION

attacks isolationists, 47 Comics, 56

fronts, 183, 185 Committee for Inter-American Co-
Buchan, John (Lord Tweedsmuir), 4, 60 operation, 24, 192
Bundling for Britain, 174 Committee on Fair Play in Sports, 91
Burgess, Guy, 13 Committee on Public Information (Creel
Burlingham, Charles C., 75, 163, 166 Committee), 192
Butler, Pierce, 162 Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Byrne, Chancellor James, 38, 39, 40 Allies (CDAAA)-see White Committee
Byrne, Helen (Mrs Walter Lippmann), 40 Commonwealth and Southern, 158
photo of, 119 Communists, 31, 49
“C,” (Stewart Graham Menzies), 11 Congress) UiSi/8;.02 0b
Cadogan, Alexander, 11 Congress of Industrial Organizations-see
Callender, Harold, 57 CIO
Campbell, Sir Gerald, 29 Coolidge, Mrs Calvin, 6
Campbell, Sir Ronald, 51 Cooper, Alfred Duff, 14
Camp X, 14, Coordinator of Information-see COI
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs-see
14 Rockefeller Office
Cantril, Hadley, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 179 Coudert Group, 42, 43, 192
Carter, John Franklin, 72 Council on Foreign Relations, 184, 193
Castle, William R., 94, 95 Coughlin, Father Charles, 34, 39, 40
Cast No Shadow (Lovell), 146, 150 Council for Democracy, 192
Catledge, Turner, 162, 163 Court packing, 163
CD (code name)-see Nelson, Sir Frank Cowan, Lew, 56
CDAAA (Committee to Defend America by Cowles, Gardner, Jr. “Mike”, 167, 168
Aiding the Allies)-see White Committee Cowles, John, 167, 192
Cecil, Lord Robert, 6 Crespi, Irving, 69
Censorship, British, 104, 105 Cuneo Ernest, 47, 154
Century Group-see a/so Fight for Freedom FDR against Hitler, 7
Chadwin, Mark Lincoln, 26, 185, 40 on BSC tactics, 15, 16, 180
Chamberlain, Neville, 177 on Dick Ellis and COI, 18, 19
Challange to Isolationism, The (Langer & on COI, 21
Gleason), 184 on Communists in unions, 31
Cheney, Ward, 27, 59 on Hyde, 48
Chicago Daily News, 93, 96 on Pearson, 49
Chicago Sun, 63, 64, 162 and Winchell, 48, 53, 99, 110
Chicago Tribune, 63, 76, 96 wrote Winchell column, 53
Christian Newsletter, 67 held up liner Bremen, 53
Churchill, Randolph, 1 service to FDR, 53
Churchill, Winston S., 1, 10, 38 and Sandy Griffith, 111
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 19, 91 photo of, 120, 193
BSC heritage, 21, 22, 182 Cusick, F-H. Peter, 26, 28, 29, 62
patron ofliterature, 58 executive secretary FFF, 62
CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations), adviser to Willkie, 62
77, 78, 97, 92 CYNTHIA (Amy Elizabeth Thorpe Pack
Clark, Grenville, 83, 163 Brousse), 193
Clayton, Will, 17, 18, 27 and Arthur Vandenberg, 8, 149
Clergy, 66, 67 Lend Lease, 146, 149. 178
Cleveland, Richard F, 26 death, 146
Clifford, Garry, 164 did important work, 146
Cohen, Benjamin V., 166 tactics, 146
COI (Coordinator of Information), 192 life and career, 147, 148, 150
Intrepid’s part in creation, 7, 16, 18, 19, 20 with BSC, 148
and Dick Ellis, 19, 21 Cynthia (Hyde), 150
offensive spirit from BSC, 21, 182 Dalton, Dr. Hugh (later Lord), 53
Coit, Richard R.J.M.W., 55, 192 Dansey, Claude, 67
photo of, 115 Davenport, Marcia, 162
Cole, Wayne, 34 Davenport, Russell, 162, 169, 170
Colville, John, 38 Davis, Elmer, 27
 Index #** 249

Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner and Reed, and Donovan’s organization, 18, 19, 21,
168 50, 182
Deakin, Major Frederick W.D. “Bill”, 193 and Sandy Griffith, 88
De Gaulle, General Charles, 24 Emmet, Christopher T.,Jr., 38, 40, 89, 194
Democratic National Committee, 122 treasurer of AIDA, 39
Democrats for Willkie, 168, 169 cousin of Robert E. Sherwood, 40
Department FH, 13, 28, 193 kinship connections, 90
De Wohl, Louis, 193 Harvard and Germany, 90
Dennett, Prescott, 126 Nazi boycott, 90
De Rochmont, Louis, 65, 66 VP of France Forever, 90, 107
De Sales, Raoul de Roussy, 167 and Sandy Griffith, 90
Destroyers for bases deal, 71, 92, 156, 163, executive committee CDAAA, 90
164, 180 Cold War fronts, 91
unconstitutional, 165 American Legion poll, 97
letter to New York Times, 166 anti-Fish campaign, 107
Pershing speech, 167 put fear in isolationists, 107, 135
and Lippmann, 167 secy. treas. defeat Fish effort, 109, 123
Fight for Freedom photo of, 114
Detzer, Dorothy, 94 Enemies list, British, 66, 95 i
Dewey, Thomas E., 8, 132, 134, 160, 164 ENIGMA (Cipher machine), 148
Dickey, John S., 17, 18 Ernst, Morris, 73
Dies Committee, 101, 102, 124, 193 ESSO (Standard Oil of New Jersey), 98,
Divine, Robert, 131 99, 100
Doenecke, Justice, 2, Exner, Judith Campbell, 137
Donovan, Colonel WilliamJ. (“Wild Bill”), FANY (First Aid Nursing Yeomanry), 60
50, 169, 171, 194 Farish, Bill, 100
code symbols for, 13 Farban, I.G., 98, 99
Irish campaign, 39 FBI, 47, 64, 149, 154
and Donovan, 54 Federal Bureau of Investigation- see FBI
letters to British Intelligence officials, 82 Fernandez, Hugo Artuco, 56
and draft, 82 FFF-see Fight For Freedom
photo of, 119 Field, Harry H., 76, 77
Destroyer Deal, 165, 167 Field, Marshall III, 30, 31, 63, 76, 194
anti-revisionist, 184 reared in England, 63
Dorwart, Jeffery M., 171 Ronald Tree, 63, 76
Doubleday, 57 Chicago Sun, 63, 76
Douglas, Lewis W., 194 and Fignt for Freedom, 63
on executive committee CDAAA, 27 PM, 64, 76
on Chadwin’s Fight for Freedom research, financed Nat. Op. Res. Cent., 76
28 Fifth Column, 20,
and Fight for Freedom, 30, 169 Fifty Ships That Saved the World (Goodhart),
Democrats for Willkie, 168, 169 79, 92
Council on Foreign Relations, 185 Fight for Freedom, 7, 26, 39, 166, 179,
Douglas, Percy L., 18 185, 192, 194
Downes, Donald, 50 photo of pickets, 117
Downing, Rossa F., 39 as BSC front, 24, 183
Draft, military, 82, 83, 84, 164, 175 close to White House, 29, 30, 77, 78
Dulles, Allen W., 27, 50, 100, 169, 170 and Willkie, 30, 132, 157, 171, 172, 173,
Dunkirk, 124, 125 180
Eastern foreign policy elite, 26, 76, 178 labor division, 31, 33, 77
Economic Consequences ofthe Peace (Keynes), 3 Labor News Service, 31, 32, 33
Eichelberger, Clark, 37 and Irish campaign, 40
Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 137 interlocks with White Committee, 41,
Election of 1942, 131 91
Eliot, George Fielding, 20 and newspapers, 52
Elite, Eastern policy 5, 6, 23, Barry Bingham, 61
Elhiot, William Yandell, 123 Ulric Bell, 61
Ellis, Colonel Charles H. “Dick”, 194 Peter Cusick, 62
possible mole, 18, 19 Marshall Field, 63
250 66 DESPERATE DECEPTION

demanded immediate declaration of war, headed by Rev. Leon M. Birkhead, 33

7 Gallup Poll, 69, 74, 76, 189
impatient with public opinion, 71 penetrated by BSC, 70, 75
CIO poll, 77, 78 White House had Cantril, 70, 73
and Sandy Griffith, 78 polls withheld, 70
polls, 77, 78, 79 David Ogilvy, 70, 73, 74, 75
and frank, 125 as backer of Willkie, 73
and Fish, 117, 125, 135 and Harry Field, 77
attacks Lindbergh, 172 and Willkie, 161, 162
defends movie makers, 172 Gardner, Nadya, 104, 105
defends blockade, 183 George Office, 50, 195
Finletter, Tom, 75 George VI, King of England, 4
Fish, Representative Hamilton, 8, 107-135, German Library of Information, 124
179, 181, 183, 194 German Railroads Information Bureau, 124
and FDR, 109, 132 Germany, 177
position, 109 resources, 2
1940 election, 109, 111 Glass, Senator Carter, 173
charges against, 110, 126, 127, 129, 134 Gleason, S. Everett, 180, 184, 185
New York Times, 110 Godfrey, Admiral John, 82
Drew Pearson, 111, 131 Goldsmith, Arthur, 54
and Sandy Griffith, 111, 112, 121, 122, Grand, Colonel Laurence, 12
129, 131, 181 Great Britain,
plan against, 111, 112, 121, 122 resources, 2, 3
andi poliss 705, ld 2 2a 22, Greene, Graham, 101
photo of FFF pickets, 117 Green, William, 32, 33
debates, 123 photo of, 117
anti-Hitler, 123, 124 Griffith, Sanford, 8, 87-106, 195
not anti-Semite, 123, 124, 126 and France Forever, 35, 36
and frank, 124, 125 and Irish-American Defense Association,
1942 election, 127, 128, 131 39
August surprise, 127 and radio station WRUL, 44, 45
October surprise, 128, 129 and FFF, 78
and Justice Dept.,126, 127, 128, 130 work for SOE and SIS, 87, 89
and Willkie, 132, 133, 174 and Francis Henson 87, 89
1944 election, 134, 135 and Christopher Emmet, 87, 89
redistricting, 134 education, 87
and American Legion, 134 WWI, 87, 88
Flanders Hall, 103 European correspondent, 88
Flemming, Commander Ian, 14, 15 stockbroker, 88
FO (British Foreign Office), 11, 194 connections to BSC, 70, 88, 89
Ford, Henry, 23 investigating isolationists, 93, 94
Foreign Information Service (FIS), 20, 50 and Ernest Cuneo, 35, 82, 83, 94
Foreign Policy, U.S., 179 and Eugene,J.Houdry. 35
Foreign Relations Committee (Senate), 5, polls as propaganda, 70
178 American Legion poll, 96
Forster, E.M., 57 and ESSO, 99, 100, 101
48 LAND, 13 Dies committee, 102
Foster, John, 166 and G.S. Viereck, 103, 104, 105, 106
Foundation for the Advancement of Social and Hamilton Fish, 87, 107, 110, 111, 112,
Sciences, 71 1225 127 2S 1S eli79
France Forever, 7, 24, 35, 36, 194 photos of, 113
Frankfurter, Justice Felix, 83, 166, 176 and Drew Pearson, 131
Franking privilege, 124 GROSVENOR, 13
Franklin, Benjamin, 16 Guinzburg, Harold, 48, 59, 171, 195
Franklin, Jay-see Carter, John Franklin Viking Press, 64
Friele, Berent, 18 Fight for Freedom, 64
Friends of Democracy, 195 COL, 64
BoGitronteiy2o. lie OWI, 64
hardhitting attacks, 33, 34, 35 intelligence recruiter, 64, 65
 Index ee* pees

Halifax, Lord, 133 Ickes, Harold, 37, 38, 176

Hall, Perry, 168 LG. Farben-see Farben, I.G.
Halpern, Alexander J., 45, 195 Industrial Intelligence Center (ICC), 10
Hamilton, John D.M., 175 Ingersoll, Ralph, 48, 64, 196
Hanes, John W., 169, 172, 175 Inter-Allied Information Committee (IAIC),
Hancock and Gowing, 3 36, 37
Harcourt, 57 Internationalists, U.S., 131
Harriman, W. Averell, 169 INTREPID-see Stephenson, William
Hassett, William, 132 Ireland, 38
Hawks of World War I, The, (Chadwin), 28, Irish-American Defense Association, 7, 90,
132, 185 190
Hayes, Helen, 135 problems, 40, 103
Hensen-Sturm, Gunther, 131, 128 visible leadership, 38, 39, 40
Henson, Francis, 89, 93, 154, 195 SOE project, 38
Irish campaign, 39 and agent Sandy Griffith, 39
used polls on Congress, 78, 92 Murphy pamphlet, 39
and Sandy Griffith, 87, 89 and James Byrne, 40
socialist, 91 and Christopher Emmet, 40
fellow traveler of CP, 91 Ismay, General Hastings, 19,
anti-Nazi groups, 91 Isolationists, 8, 54, 107, 164, 173, 178, 183,
becomes anti-CP, 92 184
UAW/CIO days, 92 Italy, 3, 50, 51
CIO, 92 Jackson, Robert, 165
and Market Analysts, 92, 93, 94 Japan, 3
investigates peace lobby, 93, 94, 95 Jewish Telegraph Agency, 48
and Ernest Cuneo, 89, 93, 94, 99, 101 Johnson Act, 3
textbook writer, 95 Johnson, Hiram, 164
and ESSO campaign, 99 Johnson, Wayne, 30
Dies Committee, 101 Justice Department, 101, 181
anti-Fish campaign, 107, 109, 110 Kell, Sir Vernon, 11
photo of, 114 Kennedy, John F,, 137
Herzstein, Robert E. 163 Keynes, John Maynard, 3
Hill, George, 126 Kimball, Warren F., 184
Hill, George Watts, 27 Kingdon, Frank, 79, 97, 109
Hitler, Adolf, 55, 92, 182 Kintner, Robert, 162
Hitler-Stalin Pact, period of, 31 Kluger, Richard, 155, 159
Hobson, Bishop Henry W., 183 Knickerbocker, H.R., 21, 50
Hoke, Henry, 106, 130, 132, 195 Knox, Frank, 20, 30, 39
on franking, 124 Korda, Alexander, 49, 173, 180, 196
Intrepid’s friend, 124 as SIS agent, 67
books, 125 office used as cover by BSC, 67
and Sandy Griffith, 128, 129 friend of Intrepid, 67
campaigns against Fish, 128, 129 Z Network, 67
and Drew Pearson, 129, 130 131, 132 Hollywood, 67, 68
and Justice Dept., 130 knighted, 68
and Westrick affair, 130 hired Hyde, 68
Hollywood, 67, 68, 180, 181 Korda, Vincent, 67, 173, 196
Hoover, John Edgar, 47, 73 Kramer, Paul, 17, 18
Hoover, Herbert, 160, 161, 183 Krock, Arthur, 96, 138, 141, 142
Hopkins, Harry, 174, 175 Kuh, Frederick, 52
Houdry, Eugene,J.,35, 37, 102 Labor News Service-see Fight for Freedom
House, Colonel Edward, 16 La Guardia, Fiorello, 30
Houston, Larry, 29 Lamont, Thomas W., 75, 175, 196
Hunter, John photo of, 120
photo of, 115 and Willkie, 156, 167, 180
Hutchins, Robert M., 80, 81 Landau, Jacob, 48, 49
Hyde, Harford Montgomery, 7, 13, 165, 195 Langer, William L., 180, 184, 185
IAIC (Inter-Allied Information Center and Langley, Noel, 196
Committee), 36, 37, 196 LATI Operation, 196
252 eee DESPERATE DECEPTION

Latin America, 17, 58, 182 Menzies, Stewart Graham “C,” 11, 197
League for Human Rights, ‘The, 23, 32, 196 family friend of Reids, 54
League of Nations Associations, 109 and Donovan, 82
Lebanese League for Progress, 24 Merten, George, 49, 50, 62
Lend-Lease Act, 145, 146, 149, 152, 178 MEW (British Ministry of Economic
Levy, Benn, 196 Warfare), 197
Lewis, Sinclair, 158 MI-5, 11, 14, 50, 197
Libby, Frederick
J., 93 MI-6-see SIS
Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics, (Wheeler), 74 Miller, Douglas, 21, 50
Life of the Party (Ogden), 144 Miller, Francis Pickens, 26, 197
Lilienthal, David, 161, 166 on revisionists, 45, 185
Lindbergh, Colonel Charles A., 34, 35, 172 FFF, 61
Lindsay, Sir Ronald, 4 Council on Foreign Relations, 61
Lippmann, Walter, 7, 48, 167, 179, 197 on destroyer deal, 165
service to BSC, 54 Miller, Merle, 78
suggestions to British, 55 MIR (Military Intelligence Research), 13,
photo of, 119 Mokarzel, Salloum, 24, 197
and Willkie, 156, 163, 164, 169 Morgan, Aubrey Neil, 28
against Court packing, 163 Morgan, (J.P.) & Co., 158, 168
pushed Destroyer deal, 167 Morgenthau, Henry, Jr.,
Littauer, Lucius, 30 Morrell, Sydney, “Bill”, 13, 27, 182, 197
Little, Douglas, 5 report on fronts, 23, 24
Lockhart, Sir Robert Bruce, 12 example of work, 34
London Films, 67 report on WRUL, 44
Lothian, Lord (Philip Kerr), 103, 156, 175, at BSC, 89
196 and Sandy Griffith, 44, 89
Louisville-Courier-Journal, 27, 60 and Lord Beaverbrook, 89
Lovell, Mary S., 146 William Shirer, 89
Lubin, Isador, 31 and Robert Sherwood, 89
Lucas, Walter, 13, Morton, Major Desmond, 10, 19,
Luce, Henry R., 59, 73, 76, 167, 170 Movies (U.S.) 172, 180
Root family, 65 Mowrer, Edgar Ansel, 21, 37, 50, 171, 197
one of founders Century Group, 65 Mumford, Lewis, 123
close to British, 65, 66 Murder, 13, 16, 160
becomes British enemy, 66 Murray Hill Hotel, 169
and Willkie, 176 Murphy, Frank, 39
Lundeen, Senator Ernest, 103 Nation, The, 100
Lyons, Leonard, 64, 65 National Association of Manufacturers, 78,
MacLaren, Donald, 49, 62, 99 97
McKee, Frederick, C. 44, 109 National Council for Prevention of War, 93
Macmillan, 57 National Opinion Research Center (NORC),
MacVeagh, Charlton, 168, 169 Mes EH
MacVeagh, Lincoln, 168 Nelson, Sir Frank, 13
Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee, Neutrality Acts, 3
103 Nevins, Alan, 57
Maloney, William P., 104, 127, 130, 181 New York Herald Tribune, 52, 197
Man Called Intrepid, A (Stevenson), 16, 53, Reids named as helpers for BSC, 8, 53, 54
78, 150 BSC used Herald Tribune, 20, 54, 155, 157
March of Time, 65 nominated for Pulitzer, 130
Marshall, Verne, 34 role in Willkie nomination, 155, 157
Market Analysts Inc., 92, 179, 97 Irita Van Doren, 158, 159
and FFF, 77 Court packing, 163
polls at conventions, 77, 78 New York Post, 8, 51
Maschwitz, Eric, 14, 15, 56, 197 New York Times, 37, 57, 138
Matthews, J.B., 101 aided BSC, 8
Maugham, Somerset, 57 Sulzberger and BSC, 52, 53
Mazzini Society, 24 attacked Fish, 110
May, Stacy, 26 Court packing, 163
Mencken, H.L., 59, 156 Niles, David K., 74, 179, 198
 Index ee 253

and Fight for Freedom, 29, 30, 31 Philby, H.A.R. (“Kim”), 13

and polls, 74, 122 PID (Political Intelligence Department of
White House intelligence contact, 31 Foreign Office, also a cover for covert
photo of, 118 propaganda), 12, 199
NKVD, 198 PM, 48, 64, 76, 126
Nonpartisan Committee for Peace Through Polls,
8,69, 179
Revision of the Neutrality Law, 41 advocacy, 69
Nonpartisan Committee to Defeat Hamilton in BSC Account, 70
Fish, 109 against Fish, 70, 112
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League, 23, 172, propaganda weapon, 70, 71
198 Destroyer deal, 71, 74
NORC-see National Opinion Research Congress, 71, 74, 79, 83, 96, 112
Center and Hadley Cantril, 73, 79, 80
Nye Committee, 198 Office of Public Opinion Research, 73
Nye, Senator Gerald P., 3, 107, 108, 183 Gallup, 73, 75
Office of Civilian Defense, 198 the right questions, 74
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American faking data, 74, 75
Affairs-see Rockefeller Office David Ogilvy, 75, 76
Office of War Information-see OWI Elmo Roper, 76
Ogilvy, David, 70, 73, 75, 150, 179, 198 selective release of results, 76
One Man—Wendell Willkie (Sparks), 156 National Opinion Research Center, 76
ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence, British), FFF involvement, 77
14, CIO poll,
77,78
OSS (Office of Strategic Services), 47, 198, Sandy Griffith, 78, 82, 83
16 Market Analysts, Inc., 79, 85
Overseas News Agency, 48, 49, 51, 198 influences on results, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85
OWI (Office of War Information), 28, 48, for White Committee, 78
198 at conventions, 79, 92, 93, 96, 97
Pack, Betty-see CYNTHIA isolationist polls, 80, 81, 96
Pack, Arthur, 147 draft, 81, 82, 83
Paget, Captain Sir James Francis, 10 threatened investigation, 86
Parry, Albert, 63, 64, 198 effects of Legion poll, 96
photo, 114 band wagon, 97
Parsons, Geoffrey, 27, 52 and mail, 112
Part of My Life (Ayer), 66 and Willkie, 161, 162
Passport Control, 10, 148, 198 Poole, De Witte, 50, 51
Paterson, Eveline (Mrs John FE), 151, 152, Porter, Sylvia, 49, 99
153 Power Elite (Mills), 5
Patterson, Paul C., 48, 59, 199 Propaganda, British themes, 73
and BSC, 59 give us the tools, 25
Mencken confrontation, 59 we don’t need your men, 25, 152
and countess, 60 GB and FDR good for workers, 32
Pearson, Drew, 199 Hitler will attack Americas, 36, 59, 92
aided BSC, 7, 49 promoting de Gaulle, 35
and Cuneo, 49 only British victory can save democracy, 36
and George Viereck, 104 Erie bases for America, 39
anti-Fish campaign, 110, 181 isolationists are fifth-columnists, 59
October surprise for Fish, 111, 128 America should declare war, 172
Fish lawsuit, 130, 131 propaganda, 112, 124, 172
and Henry Hoke, 129-132 Pryor, Samuel F., 160, 161, 162
and Sandy Griffith, 131, 132 Public Opinion and Propaganda (Doob), 79,
and Vandenberg, 138, 139, 153 80
and Wendell Willkie, 159, 176 PWE (Political Warfare Executive), 12, 28,
Penguin, 57 199
Pepper, John, 148 QC/Room 3603(Hyde), 199
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Barnes), 45 based on “BSC Account,” 15
Pershing, General John J., 166, 167 on phoney documents, 15
Petre, Sir David, 11 on WRUL, 44
Pew, Joseph Newton, 151 publication shocking, 48
254 @es DESPERATE DECEPTION

material withheld, 70, 165 Rosenfield, Abe, 31

on Fish, 126 Rosenhaus, Matthew, 176
Quiet Canadian—see QC/Room 3603 Rosenman, Judge Samuel, 176
Radio Free Europe, 183 Ross-Smith, A.M. “Bill”, 75, 88, 89, 199
Reid, Helen Rogers, 199 Rovensky, Joseph C., 18
and power elite, 6, 73 Rovere, Richard H., 138
useful to BSC, 48 Schering Company, 98
control of Herald Tribune, 53 Schwar, Jane Harriet, 41, 74
Reids close to Menzies family, 54 Scientific Astrologers-see American
and Irita Van Doren, 158 Federation of Scientific Astrologers
and Dorothy Thompson, 159 Scotland Yard, 14
and Willkie, 175, 176 Second Chance (Divine), 131
Reid, Ogden, 53, 54, 175 Secret Intelligence Agent (Hyde), 67, 104
Republican Convention (1940), 160, 161, 162 Secret Intelligence Service-see SIS and MI-6
Reston, James, 52 Section D (of MI-6), 200
Revisionists, 184, 186 origins, 12
Reynolds, David, 79 Major Lawrence Grand, 12
Rhodes, Benjamin, 5 recruiting, 12, 13
Rickman, Alfred, 57 famous members, 13
Riefler, Winfield, 26, 185 as part of SOE, 13
Rockefeller Center cover symbols, 13
as home for BSC and fronts, 11, 30, 36, 37, and Intrepid, 13
178 and Swedish Iron ore, 57
Rockefeller, Laurance, 30 Ogilvy reported to Grand, 75
Rockefeller, Nelson, 170, 185 on murder, 160
Rockefeller Office, 27, 185, 192, 199 grew larger than MI-6, 178
first revealed, 16 Security Executive, 14, 200
creation, 17 Selective Service, bill-see Draft
and BSC, 17 Selvage, James P., 161
economic warfare, 17, 18 Sequel to the Apocalypse, 49, 62, 99
personel, 18 Shea, Francis M., 37
WRUL, 18 Sheean, Vincent, 159
controlling S.A. press, 18 Shepardson, Whitney H., 26, 27, 185, 200
and Willkie, 170 Sherwood, Robert E., 75, 200
Rockefeller, John D., Jr. as helper of British intelligence, 7
photo of, 120 pushes for creation of COI, 19, 20
Rockefeller Foundation, 184, 185 speaks at France Forever rally, 37
ROOM/CLUB, THE, 171, 199 Foreign Information Service, 49
photo of 116 photo of, 118
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 184 opening of There Shall Be No Night, 65
Quarantine Speech, 4 on FDR and Willkie, 174
conversations with George VI, 5 love of England, 58
work against Fish, 8 relatives, 58
cooperation with British, 16 shows FDR speeches to Intrepid, 58
blacklisting, 18 and COI, 58
and John Wheeler-Bennett, 29 agent ofinfluence, 59
and Fight for Freedom, 30 placed anti-Hitler advertisements, 59
Navy Day speech, 55, 181 destroyer deal, 167
and Princes Alice, 60 Shirer, William L., 73
attention to polls, 71, 72 Sims, Harold, 141, 177
and Willkie, 132, 133, 156, 157, 173 Sims, Mitzi, 145, 149, 177
and Thomas W. Lamont, 156 and Krock reference, 141, 142
unemployment problem, 163 Vandenberg as beau, 142
conservative foes, 163 and Vandenberg’s, 142, 144, 145
destroyer deal, 166, 156 Harold dies, 143
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 29 SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), 11, 50, 52,
Roosevelt, Mrs Franklin D. (Eleanor), 30, 72 197, 200
Root, Oren, 168, 170, 175 Skouras, Spyros P., 61
Roper, Elmo B., 69, 70, 76, 77 SOMMI3 255200
 Index #8 255

SO 2, 13, 200 and Willkie boom, 159, 163, 164, 169

SOB 13 defects to FDR, 163, 164
SOE (Special Operations Executive), 12, 13, returned to FDR, 169
60, 200 Thorpe, Cora Wells, 147, 148, 149, 149
South America-see Latin America ‘Thurber, James, 158
Sparks, Nelson, 156, 157, 180 Times, The (London)
Special Operations Executive-see SOE Tree, Ronald, 76, 82
Spencer, Samuel, 164 Trohan, Walter, 140, 144
Spivack, Robert, 78, 97 ‘Troy, Thomas F., 182
Spivak, Sidney, 109 Tumulty, T. James, 39
Standard Oil Company of NewJersey-see also Tunney, Gene, 11, 201
ESSO; 98; 99; 100 ‘Tweedsmuir, Lord-see Buchan, John
Station M, 14, 15, 56, 201 Unemployment rates, 163
Steele, Richard, Union Now (Streit), 41, 201
polls as political weapon, 70 Valeur, Robert, 36, 37
interventionist bias of reports, 72 Vandenberg, Arthur H., 8, 137-154
newspapers, 72 conversion, 138, 144
Stephenson, William, Sir, 7, 8, 196, 201 importance, 138
in WWI, 9 media and privacy, 138, 139
as businessman, 9 early life, 139
intelligence work in 1930's, 10 becomes senator, 139
sent to USA, 10 personality, 139
to bring USA into war, 10, 81 achievements, 138, 140
position, 13 as isolationist, 141, 144
on founding of COI, 20 as presidential hopeful, 141, 144, 160, 164
and Sir Gerald Campbell, 29 the Simses, 141, 142, 143, 177
recruitment of agents, 51 Harold Sims funeral, 143
photo of, 119 Cynthia, 146, 177
prompts Willkie trip, 171 Lend Lease, 149, 177
intelligence responsibilities, 178 loan to Britian, 150
Stephenson, Mrs (Mary French Simmons) ONI, 151
photo of, 119 Eveline Paterson, 151, 153, 154
Stimson, Henry L., 84 Vandenberg, Hazel (Mrs. Arthur), 145, 149
Stone, Chief Justice Harlan F, 104, 105 Van Doren, Irita, 6, 158, 159, 170, 171
Stone, I.F., 100 Van Dusen, Henry P., 26
Strong, General George, 22 school in Scotland, 66
Stout, Rex, 201 policy committee CDAAA, 66
and BSC operations, 49 defended blockade, 66
Sequel to the Apocalypse, 99, 101 helped British propaganda, 66, 67
accused as Communist, 101 Vansittart, Sir Robert, 180
popular FFF speaker, 132 Americans untrustworthy. 177
fights Fish, 135 VENONA, 49
Strategic Services, Office of-see OSS Viereck, George Sylvester, 8, 201
Streit, Clarence, 41 Make Europe Pay War Debts, 103
Sulzberger, Arthur Hays, 48, 52, 53, 73 Lothian book, 103
Summons to Speak Out, A, 26 Flanders Hall, 104
Sweet-Escott, Bickham, 12, 160 prosecution of, 104
Swing, Raymond Gram, 21, 50, 73 conviction overturned, 104, 105
Swope, Herbert Bayard, 48, 201 retriend and convicted, 105
Taft, Robert A., 8, 156, 160, 164 Hoke attacks Viereck, 106, 124, 125
‘Taylor, Edmond, 21, 49, 50 and George Hill, 126
‘Teagle, Walter, 100 prosecution helped by BSC, 104, 105, 106,
Thompson, Dorothy, 171 181
and FDR proclaimation ofnatl. emerg. 37 Vik, Game of, 161
and BSC, 49 Wallace, Henry, 30
diary entries, 54 Wanger, Walter, 68
backer of PM, 64 FFE, 68
and Irita Van Doren, 158 moviemaker, 68
against Court packing, 163 anti-Nazi films, 68
256 °¢¢® DESPERATE DECEPTION

Warburg, Felix, 48 Nelson Sparks, 156, 175, 180

Warburg, James P., 27, 29 Walter Lippmann, 156, 163, 164, 169
Warner Brothers, 31 and Lord Lothian, 156, 165, 180
Warner, Edward P., 26 Irita Van Doren, 158, 159, 170, 171
Washington Post, 126, 127 intellectual bent, 158
Was Roosevelt Pushed into War (Barnes), 157 Helen Reid, 158, 174
Watson, General Edwin M. (“Pa”) Dorothy Thompson, 159, 163, 164, 169
Weidman, Jerome, 64 as innocent, 159, 160
Welles, Sumner, 39 as unknown, 161
Wellington House, 57, 201 polls, 161, 162
West, Rebecca, 75, 158 Willkie Special, 162
Westrick, Dr. Gerhard Alois, 130 disorganized, 162, 163
Wheeler-Bennett, John, 12, 28, 29, 54, 68, destroyer deal, 164, 165, 166, 180
201 draft, 164, 175
Wheeler, Burton K., 107, 125, 172, 183 and Thomas W. Lamont, 167, 180
Wheeler, Michael, 74 media creation, 167, 170
White, William Allen, 24, 43, 159 other Morgan connections, 168
White Committee (CDAAA) 109, 179, 191, Democrats for Willkie, 168, 169, 172
201 Russell Davenport, 169, 170
and BSC agents and fronts, 24, 39 boiler factory, 169
and Clark Eichelberger, 37 Oren Root, 170
names and background, 40, 41 ‘Trip to England, 171, 175
close to British, 42 leading interventionist spokesman, 172
creates demand for White House, 72 defends moviemakers, 172, 173
and Market Analysts, 78 advocates Lend Lease, 174
White House, 182 outspoken advocate of Lend Lease, 174
Cuneo and BSC, 7, 47 Democratic V.P. talk, 176
and Fight for Freedom, 29, 30 death, 176
and BSC and elite, 133, 178 Wilson, M.L., 26
and David Niles, 179 Wilson, Woodrow, 16
confusion, 180 Winant, John Gilbert, 19, 21, 202
Whitney, Mrs. Harry Payne, 31 Winchell, Walter, 7, 53, 110, 202
William Allen White News Service, 41 and BSC, 49
Williams, Ralph E., 160 and Cuneo, 49, 53
Williams, Valentine, 13, 53, 202 photo of, 118
Williams, Wythe, 202 Winchell (Gabler), 102
Willkie, Wendell L., 8, 155-176, 180, 202 Wiseman, Sir William, 3, 16, 202
and Fight for Freedom, 30, 132, 157, 171, Wisemen ofForeign Affairs (Schulzinger), 184
172, 173, 180 Woburn Abbey, 12
requests bases in Ireland, 38 Wohl. Louis de, 57
photo of 118 Woll, Matthew, 32, 33
and HDRe 132 sss ool oOn lo loe photo of, 117
174 Woollcott, Alexander, 75, 132
against Fish, 132, 133, 174 WMCA, 37
fights isolationists, 133, 157, 172 WRUL, 18, 44, 109, 202
and Lord Halifax, 133 Wyant, Rowena, 83
early years, 157 You Can’t Do Business with Hitler(Miller),
and Herald Tribune, 155, 157, 158 172
as Democrat, 155, 158 You Only Live Once (Bryce), 55
nomination as miracle, 156 Zanuck, Darryl, 31
Earl Browder, 156, 180 “Z”” Network, 67
 About
the Author

‘Tom Mahl teaches college history in Ohio. He holds a doctorate in

diplomatic history from Kent State University.

237
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 donde INTELLIGENCE
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The First Book to Document the |
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“A milestone book on covert action andintelligence.”
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days of WWII.... A carefully researched, engrossing addition to WWII
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“Tom Mahl has written the book that a generation of document weeders
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during World War II. Faked documents, seduced Senators, planted press
stories, and rigged opinion polls—Mah1 tells it ali and gives us the names
and the dates as weil. The history of the Anglo-American alliance and
America’s entry into the war will never be quite the same again.”
—Nicholas J. Cull
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American “Neutrality” in World War Two
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