Bulacan State University

College of Criminal Justice Education

ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
CASE DIGESTS

isa

DE LEON, SHAINA P.
BSLM 3B
CASE DIGEST NO. 1

Antonio A. Mecano v. Commission on Audit (COA), G.R. No. 10398211

December 1992

FACTS:
During March and April of 1990, Antonio Mecano, Director II of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), was hospitalized and
incurred medical and hospitalization expenditures. He was asking
repayment for his expenditures from the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), Alfredo Lim, on the grounds that he is entitled to
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC)
(Allowances in case of accident, death, or sickness incurred in
performance of duty) to be claimed against the Commission on Audit
(COA).
The petitioner's claim was returned to Director Alfredo Lim by
Undersecretary of Justice Bello III, after the Chairman of the Commission
on Audit (COA) said that the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) relied
on had been repealed (removal or reversal of legislation) by the
Administrative Code of 1987. Mecano then re-submitted his claim to
Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
along with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. "The issuing of the Administrative
Code did not act to repeal or annul in its whole the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter,"
wrote then-Secretary of Justice Drilon in 1991.
The Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, Eufemio Domingo,
denied petitioner's argument that Section 699 of the RAC was repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987, primarily because the "identical
section was neither re-stated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code
of 1987." The petitioner's claim was returned to Director Alfredo Lim by
Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro with the recommendation that the
petitioner "elevate the case to the Supreme Court if he so wishes," which
led to this certiorari petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1987 Administrative Code repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC)?
CASE DIGEST NO. 1

Antonio A. Mecano v. Commission on Audit (COA), G.R. No. 10398211

December 1992

HELD:
NO. "All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or sections
thereof, conflicting with this Code are forthwith repealed or changed
appropriately," according to Section 27 of the Administrative Code of
1987.
"This is just an inferred repeal because it makes no particular
reference to the act or acts that it wants to repeal or abrogate." The
Court explained that there are two types of implied repeal: (1) where
provisions in two acts on the same subject matter are in irreconcilable
conflict, the later act constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one to
the extent of the conflict; and (2) if the later act covers the entire subject
of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law.
To summarize, it is a well-established norm of statutory
construction that implication repeals of legislation are not supported.
The legislature is believed to know about existing laws on the issue and
not to have adopted inconsistent or conflicting statutes, therefore the
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy.
CASE DIGEST NO. 2

Primitivo Leveriza, Fe Leveriza, Parunago & Antonio C. Vasco v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, Mobil Oil Philippines & Civil
Aeronautics Administration, G.R. No. L-66614, 25 January 1988

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) entered into a lease contract (Contract A) on
April 2, 1965 with Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of land for 25 years.
On May 21, 1965, another lease contract (Contract B and in effect a
sublease) was entered into by and between Rosario C. Leveriza and
plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the same parcel of land
for 25 years. On June 1, 1968, a new lease contract (Contract C) was
entered into, by and between CAA and MOPI over the same parcel of
land, for 25 years, without the approval of the secretary of the Public
Works and Communications (PWC).
Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts between CAA,
Leveriza and MOPI, the CAA seeks the rescission or cancellation of
Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which
Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the
CAA and maintains that Contr act C with the CAA is the only valid and
subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present
litigation is concerned. On the other hand, Leverizas' claim that Contract
A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and
still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between MOPI and CAA
which should be declared void. The lower court and Intermediate
Appellate Court ruled in favor of CAA, hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrator of Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) can execute, without approval of the Department
of Public Works and Communications Secretary, a valid contract of
lease over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines?
CASE DIGEST NO. 2

Primitivo Leveriza, Fe Leveriza, Parunago & Antonio C. Vasco v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, Mobil Oil Philippines & Civil Aeronautics
Administration, G.R. No. L-66614, 25 January 1988

HELD:
YES, the Supreme Court upheld CAA’s authority to enter and
cancel a contract of lease over a property owned by the RP without the
approval of the secretary of the PWC. Under 567 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), such contract of lease must be executed: (1)
by the President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated
by him or (3) by an officer expressly vested by law.
It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the
authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the
third category. As provided in Section 32 of Republic Act 776, the
Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and
existence, administers properties belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and it is on these properties that the Administrator must
exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and
execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private
corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any
personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be
proper or necessary.
The basic principle of statutory construction mandates that
general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute
prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
specially should prevail.
CASE DIGEST NO. 3

Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank

Employees and Atty. Ester S. Garcia in her capacity as Voluntary
Arbitrator, G.R. No. 120319, 6 October 1995

FACTS:
An arbitration case arose from a submission agreement between
the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) to determine whether the
company violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on promotion signed in April 1994.
The parties agreed to submit their respective position papers at a
conference, culminating in the following events: (1) Atty. In her role as a
volunteer arbitrator, Ester S. Garcia received the position paper of the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE); (2) Luzon
Development Bank (LDB) failed to submit despite being reminded; and
(3) Luzon Development Bank (LDB) did not file any position paper.
Accordingly, Atty. The Luzon Development Bank (LDB) has been
found in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the
Memorandum of Agreement, according to Ester S. Garcia (MOA). As a
result, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to overturn the
volunteer arbitrator's judgment and prevent her from enforcing it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the
Court of Appeals and not to the Supreme Court?

HELD:
YES. Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provided
that "Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders." According to the Court's decision, the jurisdiction granted by law
on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is relatively
restricted when compared to the labor arbitrator's original jurisdiction
and the National Labor Relations Commission's appellate jurisdiction
(NLRC).
As a result, while there is an express form of appeal from a
labor arbitrator's judgment, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent on an appeal
from a volunteer arbitrator's conclusion.
CASE DIGEST NO. 4

Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals and Maria Cristina

Fertilizer Corporation, G.R. No. 102976, 25 October 1995

FACTS:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was established by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 of 1973 for a five-year term with the
stated objectives of "strengthening the iron and steel industry of the
Philippines and expanding the domestic and export markets for the
industry's products." When the term of the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA)
expired in 1978, it was extended for another ten years by Executive
Order No. 555 in 1979. The National Steel Corporation (NSC), a wholly
owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation—a
government-owned corporation—began an expansion program that
included the development of an integrated steel plant in Iligan City,
among other things. Proclamation 2239 was issued, removing a
significant piece of public property in Iligan City with a total size of
30.25 hectares from sale or settlement and reserving it for the use and
immediate occupation of National Steel Corporation (NSC).
However, a non-operational chemical fertilizer factory and
accompanying infrastructure held by Martia Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation occupied sections of the public property pursuant to
Proclamation 2239. (MCFC). Letter of Instruction 1277 was issued
directing the National Steel Corporation (NSC) to “negotiate with the
owners of Martia Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), for and on
behalf of the government, for the compensation of Martia Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC)'s present occupancy rights on the subject
land." It was also directed that if the National Steel Corporation (NSC)
and Martia Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) failed to reach an
agreement within 60 days of the date of Letter of Instruction 1277, the
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) would be required to exercise its eminent
domain powers under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 and to initiate
expropriation proceedings in respect of Martia Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC) relinquished occupancy (NSC).
CASE DIGEST NO. 4

Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals and Maria Cristina

Fertilizer Corporation, G.R. No. 102976, 25 October 1995

After failed negotiations, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan

City issued a writ of possession in favor of Iron and Steel Authority
(ISA), placing National Steel Corporation (NSC) in possession and
control of the land occupied by Martia Cristina Fertilizer Corporation's
fertilizer plant installation. Martia Cristina Fertilizer Corporation
(MCFC) filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that no valid judgment could
be rendered against the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), which had
ceased to be a juridical person and had become ineffective as a result of
the delegate's dissolution, and could not be continued in the name of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be
substituted for Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) in view of the expiration of
its term?

HELD:
YES. Only natural or juridical individuals or entities allowed by
law may be parties in a civil action, according to Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. The administrative body is expressly authorized to initiate
expropriation procedures by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 of 1973.
It's also worth noting that the enabling Act explicitly allowed it to enter
into specific types of contracts "for and on behalf of the Government."
Therefore, the Court's decision said that the Iron and Steel Authority
(ISA) was given legal authority generally associated with legal
personality.
CASE DIGEST NO. 5
Cesar G. Viola, Chairman, Brgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila v. Hon.
Rafael M. Alunan III, Secretary Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Alex L. David, President/Secretary General,
National Liga ng mga Barangay, Leonardo L. Angat, President, City of
Manila, Liga ng mga Barangay, G.R. No. 115844, 15 August 1997

FACTS:
Brgy. Cesar G. Viola, as barangay chairman 167, Zone 15, District
II, Manila—filed a petition for prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Article 3, Sec.1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules
and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers, which provide for the election of first, second, and third vice
presidents as well as auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay
and its chapters. He argued that the positions in question go beyond
those specified in Section 493 of Republic Act No. 7610, or the Local
Government Code, which states that elective positions at the municipal,
city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels
are limited to president, vice president, and five members of the board
of directors.
As a result, Section 1-2 of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers'
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga
ng mga Barangay Officers expands the number of positions authorized
in Section 493 of the Local Government Code, in violation of the
principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add to or
subtract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional questions, Section 1-2 of the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga
ng mga Barangay Officers, are created with the authority of law?

HELD:
YES. The preceding section specifies, rather than simply enables,
the board of directors to "establish such such roles as it may determine
essential for the operation of the chapter." The formation of these roles
was created in the Liga ng mga barangay's Constitution and By-laws,
which were accepted by the First Barangay National Assembly.
The Court's decision determined that the installation of extra posts
is properly permitted under Section 493 of Republic Act No. 7610, also
known as the Local Government Code.
CASE DIGEST NO. 6
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, 7 December
2010.

FACTS:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No.
1 in 2010, creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) as a special
body to examine reported incidents of bribery and corruption
committed under the previous government. It is merely an ad hoc body
established under the President's Office, with the primary task of
"investigating reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices, and
accessories during the previous administration, and then submitting its
findings and recommendations to the President, Congress, and the
Ombudsman."
It has been described as an "independent collegial body" which
is essentially an entity within the Office of the President subject to its
control. The Philippine Truth Commission shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. However, it was clarified that it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. Its scope is only
limited to gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. Additionally, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law thereby not having any capacity to
impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
This is a special civil action for prohibition filed by Louis
Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, accusing the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 of violating Congress' legislative power
under Article 6, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution by usurping the
legislature's constitutional authority to create a public office and
appropriate funds for it.

ISSUE:
Whether or noy Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause thereby making it
unconstitutional?
CASE DIGEST NO. 6
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, 7 December
2010.

HELD:
YES. Executive Order No. 1 does not apply equally to all members
of the same class as intent to search for truth behind the reported cases
of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during
the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo but
also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of
controversies and anomalies" were reported to have been committed
against the Filipino people. Hence, the Court ruled that Executive Order
No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 is
unconstitutional because it violates and seems to violate the equal
protection guarantee of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court emphasized how the equal protection provision applies
to all official state activities, not simply legislative ones. Its prohibitions
apply to all branches of government, including the political and
executive branches, and to any action performed by a state that denies
equal protection under the law, regardless of the agency or disguise
used.
CASE DIGEST NO. 7
Isabelo T. Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals and the People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 106296, 5 July 1996

FACTS:
Isabelo Crisostomo was the President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC) in 1974, however during his tenure, two administrative
complaints were filed against him: (1) with the Office of the President,
and (2) with the Office of the Solicitor General for inquiry. Isabelo
Crisostomo was prevented from taking office in 1976 by Republic Act No.
3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
modified. As a result, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was named officer-in-
charge. He served as its Acting President in 1977. In 1978, Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1341 was issued converting the Philippine College of
Commerce into a Polytechnic University (PUP) and Dr. Pablo T. Mateo,
Jr. continued as the head of the new university. In 1979, he was appointed
Acting President. In 1980, he was then its President for a term of (6)
years.
In 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
acquitting Isabelo Crisostomo of the charges against him. Isabelo
Crisostomo, in his reinstatement, argued that he is entitled to receive the
salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.
In 1992, he filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of
the judgment, specifically the part ordering his reinstatement to the
position of president of the Polytechnic University (PUP) and the
payment of his salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension. The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was
issued. However, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime
Gellor as acting president of the Polytechnic University (PUP). Judge
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores issued an order for the reinstatement of the
petitioner to the position of Polytechnic University (PUP) president. The
sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as
President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he
wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first.
The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, challenging the trial court's orders and writs of execution. A
temporary restraining order was also requested. The Court of Appeals
granted a temporary restraining order, ordering petitioner to halt and
desist from functioning as president of the PUP in accordance with the
trial court's restoration orders.
CASE DIGEST NO. 7
Isabelo T. Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals and the People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 106296, 5 July 1996

According to Isabelo Crisostomo, Presidential Decree (PD) No.

1341 did not abolish the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), and if it
had, the law would have stated that it was being abolished. He claims that
the Polytechnic University (PUP) is just a continuation of the existence of
the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), and that if it was intended to
be a new institution, the law would have said it was being "created." As a
result, he claims that he could be reinstated to his former position as
president.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) was
abolished by the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) by
virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1341?

HELD:
NO. The lawmaking authority declares that the objective is to
abolish a department, office, or organization and replace it with
another. What happened was that the educational institution's academic
status changed, not its corporate life. As a result, it has changed its name,
expanded its curricular offerings, and changed its structure and
organization. Per the Court's decision, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1341
did not abolish, but rather transformed the previous Philippine College
of Commerce (PCC) into what is today the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP).
Due to the promulgation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1437 of
1978, which fixes the term of office of presidents of state universities and
colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another six (6) years, and
authorizes the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of
incumbents who were not reappointed, reinstatement is no longer
possible and only retirement benefits or payment of separation pay are
available.
 CASE DIGEST NO. 8
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe
B. Barin, Deputy Commissioners Carlos R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver B.
Butalid, and Mary Anne B. Colayco of the Energy Regulatory Commission,
G.R. No. 150974, 29 June 2007

FACTS:
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, often known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), was passed. Kapisanan ng mga
Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board (KERB) argued that there was no
valid abolition of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), but; The Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) is abolished and the Energy Regulatory
Commission is established under Section 38 of the aforementioned statute
(ERC). Using Section 2(b) of Republic Act No. 6656 (AN ACT TO
PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION) as evidence,
"No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid

cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,

pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or

rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions

in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by

the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following

circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made

as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or

reappointment by an aggrieved party: (b) Where an office is abolished and

another performing substantially the same functions is created”

In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,

Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board (KERB) seeks to
declare Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), which abolished
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and created the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), as unconstitutional and to prohibit the selection and
appointment of employees by its Board of Commissioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 38 of the Republic Act No. 9136 otherwise known
as Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was a valid
abolition of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)?
CASE DIGEST NO. 8
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe
B. Barin, Deputy Commissioners Carlos R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver B.
Butalid, and Mary Anne B. Colayco of the Energy Regulatory Commission,
G.R. No. 150974, 29 June 2007

HELD:
YES. A valid order of abolition must not only originate from a
recognized entity, but it must also be made in good faith, according to
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9136, generally known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001. When an abolition is done
in good faith, It is not made for political or personal purposes, or when it
does not jeopardize civil service members' constitutional right to tenure.
An office may be abolished for economic reasons, to eliminate
redundancy of functions, or because of a clear and explicit constitutional
obligation for such termination of employment.
Therefore, the petition was dismissed by the Court due to the
extension of the Energy Regulatory Commission's (ERC) duties and
concerns, and the Energy Regulatory Board was validly abolished
(ERB).
CASE DIGEST NO. 9
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) represented
by its President, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R.
No. 155336, 25 November2004

FACTS:
The General Appropriations Act, or Republic Act No. 8522, was
passed in 1998 and included specific provisions that applied to all
constitutional positions with budgetary autonomy. The United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) issued Resolution No. A98-047
implementing a strategy for upgrading and reclassifying some jobs in
the commission. Following that, it adopted Resolution No. A98-0555
authorizes the upgrading or increase of wage grades for specific
Commission posts. The same resolution permitted the augmentation of a
proportionate amount earned from Personnel Services savings to assist
the implementation of such a plan. Nevertheless, Resolution No. A98-062
"collapsed" the body's empty jobs in order to offer greater cash for the
personnel change. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted
the staffing adjustment and upgrading scheme for approval to the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), but Secretary Benjamin
Diokno refused it.
Due to the Department of Budget and Management's (DBM)
disagreement of the plantilla categorization, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) of the National Capital Region Office recommended
to its Central Office that the relevant appointments be refused. The
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) asked the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Central Office to uphold the
recommendation of its regional office, claiming that the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) is the only agency with the legal
authority to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as the creation of new positions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is one of the
constitutional bodies that has fiscal autonomy thereby can lawfully
implement an upgrading and reclassification of personnel positions
without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
CASE DIGEST NO. 9
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) represented
by its President, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R.
No. 155336, 25 November2004

HELD:
NO. Only the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions (Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on
Audit), and the Office of the Ombudsman have fiscal autonomy under
Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution. The Court further stated that, while the
founding of the Body on Human Rights (CHR) is legally mandated under
Section 17 of Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution, it is not a constitutional
commission in the literal sense.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Central Office's proclamation that the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is a constitutional commission with
economic autonomy, according to the Court's decision. The defendant
cannot use Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution's provisions on constitutional
commissions to its advantage; it must be able to establish a constitutional
and/or statutory foundation specific to it to justify its claim of budgetary
autonomy.