Ocampo vs. CA (G.R. No. 79060 December 8, 1989)

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Republic of the Philippines No. 772 (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 21, 1985; pp.

6-7, TSN,
SUPREME COURT July 22, 1985).
Manila
The accused was again told to stop the construction
SECOND DIVISION of his house. The accused ignored the U.P. Police
Squatter's Team, and insisted that he bought the
land from Mr. Pael (p. 9, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 10,
G.R. No. 79060 December 8, 1989
TSN, June 21, 1985).

ANICETO C. OCAMPO, petitioner,


The team reported the matter to their Chief, Captain
vs.
Madrigal, and executed an affidavit (Exh. "A") which
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
they submitted to the U.P. Legal Department (p. 9,
(University of the Philippines), respondents.
TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 10, tsn, June 21, 1985).

Pedro F. Martinez for petitioner.


A picture of the house constructed by the accused
was also taken" (Exhibit "B"). (pp. 2-3, Comment; pp.
PARAS, J.: 22-23, Rollo).

This is a petition for review on certiorari to reverse or set aside the After the preliminary investigation had been conducted, an information
judgment of public respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1987 which dated March 25, 1985, was filed against Aniceto Ocampo charging him
affirmed the trial court's decision finding petitioner guilty of violation of with violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, docketed as Criminal Case
Presidential Decree No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) and sentencing him to No. Q-38997.
suffer imprisonment for one (1) year, with the accessories provided by
law and to remove the house constructed on the land in question within
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant (now petitioner) pleaded "not
thirty (30) days from the finality of judgment, otherwise, private
guilty".
respondent University of the Philippines was authorized to demolish or
dismantle the house at the expense of the petitioner.
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the presentation
of his evidence and instead filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to
The facts are not disputed.
evidence) on the ground that the prosecution did not present Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove ownership of the land in question
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 15, and that it failed to prove that the land on which the petitioner
1984, the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force constructed his house belongs to the University of the Philippines.
received a telephone call; the caller reported that
somebody was constructing a house at the U.P.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, arriving at
Arboretum.
the following conclusion:

Villanueva, Ladip and Ernesto were directed to


The prosecution did not present in evidence
investigate (pp. 4-5, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 4, TSN,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove that
July 22, 1985).
the land in question, indeed, belongs to the
University of the Philippines. The absence of this
Villanueva and Ladip are members of the U.P. Police piece of evidence, in the considered view of this
Force connected or assigned with the U.P. Squatter's Court, did not cripple the fact that the accused,
Relocation Team. The U.P. Arboretum is located at Aniceto Ocampo, is not the owner of said property.
the back of the U.P. Petron, beside the U.P. Hydraulic And since there is no showing that the accused
Research Center (p. 5, TSN, June 21, 1985). They occupied the lot in question and constructed his
proceeded to said place and there they saw some residential house thereat with the knowledge
people constructing a house. They asked the and/or consent of the owner thereof, the accused is
carpenters who owned the house and were told that a squatter within the contemplation of Presidential
the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is the owner. Aniceto Decree No. 772. "Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
Ocampo who was present at the time, was asked 772 reads:
whether he had a building permit. The accused
admitted that he had no building permit, although he
Any person, who with the use of force, intimidation
claimed that he bought the parcel of land on which
or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
his house was being constructed from a certain
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying
Roberto Pael (p. 5, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 6, TSN, June
or possessing the property of the latter against his
21, 1985).
will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment
The accused was informed that the land belongs to ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not
the University of the Philippines and that he should less than one thousand nor more than five thousand
stop the construction of his aforesaid house. The pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary
accused complied (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 6, imprisonment in case of insolvency.
TSN, July 22, 1985).
(p. 5, Comment; p. 25, Rollo)
However, on August 24, 1984, the accused resumed
the construction of his aforesaid house. The
On October 7, 1985, the trial court found Aniceto Ocampo guilty beyond
aforenamed prosecution witnesses reminded the
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
accused that he was violating Presidential Decree
Accused then appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court prove ownership by the University of the Philippines of the land in
erred in: (a) applying Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rule of Criminal question is not material in proving the guilt of the petitioner beyond
Procedure; (b) convicting appellant on the basis of evidence which does reasonable doubt. The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this case.
not measure to the degree of proof as required by law; and (c) not Withal, the property has been widely and publicly known to be part of the
applying the principle of presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. U.P. grounds. The crucial issue is the act of squatting of the petitioner and
his non-ownership of the property, both of which have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court,
finding said appealed decision to be in accordance with law and
supported by evidence as well. As regard the second issue presented, the answer is in the affirmative.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides:
Hence, accused-appellant filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
Section 15. Demurrer to Evidence. — after the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may
In this petition, two issues are presented involving purely questions of
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
law:
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on
1. Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
present evidence of ownership is not a fatal defect in
finding the accused-petitioner guilty beyond
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the
reasonable doubt of the crime of squatting; and
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When
the accused files such motion to dismiss without
2. Is the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused- express leave of court, he waives the right to present
petitioner a bar for him to present evidence? evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis
supplied).
For failure of the petitioner to file his reply within the period which
expired on December 20, 1987, this Court, in a resolution dated February
3, 1988, resolved to dispense with the aforesaid reply and considered the The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
case submitted for deliberation. Procedure took effect only on October 1, 1988, but the same was given
retroactive effect in the case of Bonalos vs. People, in its resolution dated,
September 19, 1988. Well-settled is the rule that "statutes regulating the
Petitioner alleges that the very essence of the case is the proof of
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending
ownership of the land involved herein. We do not agree.
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent" (People vs. Sumilang, 77
The law involved in this case is Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, Phil. 784; Alday vs. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522). The amendment would
otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, which embraces three (3) therefore apply in this case.
elements, namely: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) that he
succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force,
In the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that accused-
intimidation, or threat or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance
petitioner's demurrer to evidence was filed with prior leave of court, the
of the owner; and (c) such occupation of the property is without the
retroactive effect of the amendment aforestated would therefore work
consent or against the will of the owner. In the case at bar, all three (3)
against herein petitioner.
elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt.

By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused-


The evidence presented by the prosecution manifested that Aniceto
petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense
Ocampo was not the owner of the land on which he constructed his house
and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
and that he did so against the owner's will or without its consent.
for the prosecution. This is exactly what petitioner did, and he cannot
Prosecuution witnesses testified that as early as May, 1983, petitioner
now claim denial of his right to adduce his own evidence. As the Solicitor
was told that the area is U.P. property; that he began constructing his
General aptly opined, "petitioner gambled on securing an acquittal, a
house without a permit from the owner; that petitioner had no building
gamble which he lost." (pp. 31-32, Rollo)
permit and that he had been informed that he was violating the Anti-
Squatting Law. Besides, it was also confirmed that petitioner had never
shown title to the land he claims to have purchased from one Roberto More than that, petitioner raises as issue whether his motion to dismiss
Pael. Yet, he failed to present any deed of sale or any title in his name. bars him from presenting his evidence, but nowhere in his petition does
This alleged sale is a defense which the petitioner could have successfully he endeavor to argue in his favor. Such a question should have been
utilized to his advantage but failed to substantiate it with evidence at the raised by the petitioner in the court a quo and on appeal yet he failed to
trial. When petitioner moved for dismissal of the case, he forfeited his do the same.
chance to prove his claim. It must be noted also that this Roberto Pael was
shown by testimonial evidence to be not the owner of the land and that
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the public
said land is the subject of a criminal case against Pael for squatting.
respondent is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Neither did the petitioner exhibit any building or sanitary permit to the
SO ORDERED.
U.P. Security Force or in court, such being attached only to his motion for
reconsideration. Worthy of note is the fact that such permits are both
dated June 26, 1985, which is more than ten (10) months after the illegal Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
construction took place and three (3) months after the case had been filed
against petitioner. (p. 29, Rello)
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.

We concur with the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial court's decision
which maintained that the failure of the prosecution to present title to

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