Research Reactors:

Safe Management and Effective Utilization

Summary of an International Conference

16–20 November 2015, Vienna, Austria

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA
ISBN 978–92–0–105117–2
17-22851

ISSN 0074–1884
 RESEARCH REACTORS:
SAFE MANAGEMENT
AND EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION
 The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

AFGHANISTAN GEORGIA OMAN

ALBANIA GERMANY PAKISTAN
ALGERIA GHANA PALAU
ANGOLA GREECE PANAMA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA GUATEMALA PAPUA NEW GUINEA
ARGENTINA GUYANA PARAGUAY
ARMENIA HAITI PERU
AUSTRALIA HOLY SEE PHILIPPINES
AUSTRIA HONDURAS POLAND
AZERBAIJAN HUNGARY PORTUGAL
BAHAMAS ICELAND QATAR
BAHRAIN INDIA REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
BANGLADESH INDONESIA ROMANIA
BARBADOS IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BELARUS IRAQ RWANDA
BELGIUM IRELAND SAN MARINO
BELIZE ISRAEL SAUDI ARABIA
BENIN ITALY SENEGAL
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL JAMAICA SERBIA
STATE OF JAPAN SEYCHELLES
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JORDAN SIERRA LEONE
BOTSWANA KAZAKHSTAN SINGAPORE
BRAZIL KENYA SLOVAKIA
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
BULGARIA KUWAIT SOUTH AFRICA
BURKINA FASO KYRGYZSTAN SPAIN
BURUNDI LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC SRI LANKA
CAMBODIA REPUBLIC SUDAN
CAMEROON LATVIA SWAZILAND
CANADA LEBANON SWEDEN
CENTRAL AFRICAN LESOTHO SWITZERLAND
REPUBLIC LIBERIA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
CHAD LIBYA TAJIKISTAN
CHILE LIECHTENSTEIN THAILAND
CHINA LITHUANIA THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
CONGO MADAGASCAR TOGO
COSTA RICA MALAWI TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CÔTE D’IVOIRE MALAYSIA TUNISIA
CROATIA MALI TURKEY
CUBA MALTA TURKMENISTAN
CYPRUS MARSHALL ISLANDS UGANDA
CZECH REPUBLIC MAURITANIA UKRAINE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MAURITIUS UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
OF THE CONGO MEXICO UNITED KINGDOM OF
DENMARK MONACO GREAT BRITAIN AND
DJIBOUTI MONGOLIA NORTHERN IRELAND
DOMINICA MONTENEGRO UNITED REPUBLIC
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MOROCCO OF TANZANIA
ECUADOR MOZAMBIQUE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
EGYPT MYANMAR URUGUAY
EL SALVADOR NAMIBIA UZBEKISTAN
ERITREA NEPAL VANUATU
ESTONIA NETHERLANDS VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
ETHIOPIA NEW ZEALAND REPUBLIC OF
FIJI NICARAGUA VIET NAM
FINLAND NIGER YEMEN
FRANCE NIGERIA ZAMBIA
GABON NORWAY ZIMBABWE

The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957.
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
 PROCEEDINGS SERIES

RESEARCH REACTORS:
SAFE MANAGEMENT
AND EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION
SUMMARY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ORGANIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AND HELD IN VIENNA, 16–20 NOVEMBER 2015

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2017
 COPYRIGHT NOTICE

All IAEA scientific and technical publications are protected by the terms of
the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised
in 1972 (Paris). The copyright has since been extended by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (Geneva) to include electronic and virtual intellectual
property. Permission to use whole or parts of texts contained in IAEA publications
in printed or electronic form must be obtained and is usually subject to royalty
agreements. Proposals for non-commercial reproductions and translations are
welcomed and considered on a case-by-case basis. Enquiries should be addressed
to the IAEA Publishing Section at:

Marketing and Sales Unit, Publishing Section

International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna International Centre
PO Box 100
1400 Vienna, Austria
fax: +43 1 2600 29302
tel.: +43 1 2600 22417
email: [email protected]
http://www.iaea.org/books

© IAEA, 2017

Printed by the IAEA in Austria

July 2017
STI/PUB/1793

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Names: International Atomic Energy Agency.

Title: Research reactors: safe management and effective utilization : summary of an
international conference organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna,
16-20 November 2015 / International Atomic Energy Agency.
Description: Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2017. | Series: Proceedings
series (International Atomic Energy Agency), ISSN 0074–1884 | Includes bibliographical
references.
Identifiers: IAEAL 17-01098 | ISBN 978–92–0–105117–2 (paperback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Nuclear reactors — Safety measures — Congresses. | Nuclear reactors. —
Congresses | International cooperation.
Classification: UDC 621.039.57 | STI/PUB/1793.
 FOREWORD

For more than 60 years, research reactors have been centres of innovation and productivity for
nuclear science and technology programmes around the world. The multidisciplinary
scientific and technological applications that research reactors support have spawned
advances in industry, medicine, food and agriculture. According to 2016 figures in the IAEA
Research Reactor Database, 747 research reactors had been built in 67 countries and of those,
243 reactors were in operation in 55 countries.

The International Conference on Research Reactors: Safe Management and Effective

Utilization was organized by the IAEA and held in Vienna on 16–20 November 2015. The
fifth and largest of its kind, it is regarded as the major networking event for the research
reactor community worldwide. Research reactor organizations need to address challenges
such as: the management of ageing of facilities and staff; the more effective and efficient
utilization of the facilities to justify operation and maintenance costs; the need to enhance
regulatory effectiveness and to address the relevant lessons learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident; the security of fuel supply and the management of spent fuel; the
need for increased vigilance to prevent malicious acts; and the strain of shrinking resources,
both financial and human, while fulfilling an expanding role in support of nuclear science and
technology development. New research reactor projects also challenge Member States in
developing their national infrastructure and human resources to ensure successful
implementation. The conference provided a forum at which reactor operators, managers,
users, regulators, designers and suppliers could all share experience and lessons learned, as
well as address common issues, challenges and strategies.

The IAEA, through its programmatic activities, is committed to providing support to Member
States in addressing these challenges through knowledge sharing of good practices for all
aspects of the research reactor life cycle, guidance based on safety standards and technical
publications, and promotion of scientific research and technological development using
research reactors by highlighting the unique products and services these facilities can offer.

This publication provides a summary of the conference, the major findings and conclusions of
the sessions, and the opening and closing addresses. The accompanying CD-ROM includes
the individual technical papers and presentations.

The IAEA wishes to express its appreciation to the members of the Technical Programme
Committee, chairpersons of technical sessions, the authors of the submitted papers and to all
those who gave presentations for their contributions to the technical success of the
conference. The IAEA is especially grateful to L.W. Deitrich as the principal Rapporteur of
this conference, and to T. Desai, D. Jinchuk and A. Zhukova for the preparation of the
proceedings. The IAEA officers responsible for this publication were A. Borio di Tigliole of
the Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology, D. Ridikas of the Division of
Physical and Chemical Sciences, and A.M. Shokr of the Division of Nuclear Installation
Safety.
 EDITORIAL NOTE

The contents of this publication have not been edited by the editorial staff of the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility
of the named authors or participants. In addition, the views are not necessarily those of the governments of the nominating Member
States or of the nominating organizations.

Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information contained in this publication, neither the IAEA nor its
Member States assume any responsibility for consequences which may arise from its use.

The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal
status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.

The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to
infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.

The authors are responsible for having obtained the necessary permission for the IAEA to reproduce, translate or use material from
sources already protected by copyrights. Material prepared by authors who are in contractual relation with governments is copyrighted
by the IAEA, as publisher, only to the extent permitted by the appropriate national regulations.

Any accompanying material has been prepared from the original material as submitted by the authors.

The IAEA has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party Internet web sites referred to in this
book and does not guarantee that any content on any such web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
 Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................... 1
Background ................................................................................................................................... 1
Objectives ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Opening Session ............................................................................................................................ 1
Overall Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................. 2
Session A: Utilization and Application ....................................................................................... 2
Session B: Common Management Considerations ...................................................................... 3
Session C: Safety of Research Reactors...................................................................................... 3
Session D: Operations and Maintenance..................................................................................... 4
Session E: Spent Fuel Management and Decommissioning ........................................................ 4
Session F: New Research Reactor Projects ................................................................................. 4
Session G: Security of Research Reactors .................................................................................. 5
Closing Session ............................................................................................................................. 5
WELCOME ADDRESS & OPENING REMARKS............................................................................. 7
SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL SESSIONS AND PRESENTATIONS ............................................. 10
SESSION A: UTILIZATION AND APPLICATIONS ................................................................. 10
SESSION A: POSTER PAPERS ............................................................................................. 14
SESSION B: COMMON MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS .............................................. 17
SESSION B: POSTER PAPERS .............................................................................................. 19
SESSION C: SAFETY OF RESEARCH REACTORS................................................................. 19
SESSION C: POSTER PAPERS .............................................................................................. 25
SESSION D: OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE................................................................. 26
SESSION D: POSTER PAPERS ............................................................................................. 30
SESSION E: SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND DECOMMISSIONING .............................. 33
SESSION E: POSTER PAPERS .............................................................................................. 34
SESSION F: NEW RESEARCH REACTOR PROJECTS............................................................ 34
SESSION F: POSTER PAPERS .............................................................................................. 37
SESSION G: SECURITY OF RESEARCH REACTORS ............................................................ 37
SESSION G: POSTER PAPERS ............................................................................................. 39
SUMMARY OF PANEL SESSION .................................................................................................... 42
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 42
STATEMENTS OF THE EXPERT PANELLISTS ...................................................................... 42
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................. 44
CLOSING SPEECH............................................................................................................................ 46
SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE SIDE EVENTS .................................................................... 48
 Side Event 1: IAEA Support to Education and Training Based on Research Reactors ................... 48
Side Event 2: IAEA Assistance to New Research Reactor Projects............................................... 48
Side Event 3: IAEA Assistance to Addressing Research Reactor–based Radioisotope Production
Issues .......................................................................................................................................... 49
ANNEX ................................................................................................................................................ 51
CONTENTS OF THE ATTACHED CD–ROM ........................................................................... 51
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
The International Conference on Research Reactors: Safe Management and Effective
Utilization was held at the IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria, 16–20 November, 2015. The
Conference was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This
Conference was the fifth in a series of quadrennial International Conferences on Research
Reactors; previous Conferences were held in: Lisbon, Portugal (1999); Santiago, Chile
(2003); Sydney, Australia (2007); and Rabat, Morocco (2011).

Three hundred thirteen (313) delegates and observers from 56 Member States and 3
international organisations participated in the Conference. A total of 74 papers were
presented orally and 74 papers were presented in poster sessions. Seven topical areas were
covered in the Conference, namely: A) Utilization and Applications of Research Reactors; B)
Common Management Considerations; C) Safety of Research Reactors; D) Research Reactor
Operations and Maintenance; E) Research Reactor Spent Fuel Management and
Decommissioning; F) New Research Reactor Projects; and G) Security of Research Reactors.
In addition, three side events were organized: 1) IAEA Support to Education and Training
Based on Research Reactors; 2) IAEA Assistance to New Research Reactor Projects; and 3)
IAEA Assistance in Addressing Research Reactor–based Radioisotope Production Issues.
The Conference was closed with a panel session at which the Conference Conclusions and
Recommendations were presented and summary remarks made by the panellists. After the
Conference, a technical tour to the Atominstitut of the Vienna University of Technology,
hosting a research reactor facility, was offered to interested participants.

Objectives
The purpose of this Conference was to foster the exchange of information on operating and
planned research reactors and to provide a forum at which reactor operators, managers, users,
regulators, designers and suppliers could share experience and lessons learned, as well as
address common issues, challenges, and strategies.

Opening Session
The Conference was opened by Mr. M. Chudakov, Deputy Director General and Head of the
Department of Nuclear Energy, joined on the podium by the Deputy Directors General Heads
of the Departments of Nuclear Sciences and Applications Mr Aldo Malavasi, Nuclear Safety
and Security Mr Juan Carlos Lentijo and Technical Cooperation Mr Dazhu Yang. Mr
Chudakov emphasized the cross–cutting nature of the Conference and of the Agency’s
activities on research reactors (the speech of Mr Chudakov is available in a separate Section
of this Summary Report).

There are 246 research reactors currently in operation in 55 countries, and close to 30 new
research reactor projects in various stages of implementation. Mr Chudakov mentioned some
challenges that the research reactor community is facing and the IAEA activities to support
Member States in addressing these challenges. In particular, increased interest in new
research reactor projects, and the need to ensure appropriate infrastructure; maintaining a
high level of safety, including safety re–assessment in the light of the Fukushima–Daiichi

1
nuclear power plant accident, and implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of
Research Reactors and Safety Standards; maintaining research reactor operational
performance and developing maintenance and ageing management programmes; improving
utilization, since a large number of research reactors around the world are not utilized to their
full potential; and the research reactor fuel cycle, including security of fuel supply, core
conversion from HEU to LEU, and viable spent fuel and waste management options. The
Agency also supports Member States with research reactors in security and physical
protection, incident and emergency preparedness and capacity building. With the large
number of ageing reactors and those no longer in operations, decommissioning is also an
important area.

Mr Chudakov expressed his appreciation to the Conference organizers and the participants,
and wished everyone a successful Conference.

Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 1

Session A: Utilization and Application
1. The Conference notes that there are many research reactors that are effectively used for
a variety of purposes, but also that there are many that have a low utilization factor and
are not utilized to their full potential. Proper strategic planning is essential to
sustainable utilization of a research reactor. Member States are urged to make use of the
IAEA services available to support strategic planning and implementation.
2. Increased use of networking and participation in regional coalitions has been shown to
be effective in improving transfer of knowledge and experience from one installation to
another. An example is the Eastern European Research Reactor Initiative (EERRI).
Bilateral agreements between institutions can also be effective. The Conference notes
that IAEA offers assistance in creating and maintaining such coalitions, and Member
States are urged to take advantage of this assistance.
3. Several well–developed facilities for neutron science and testing can make their
capacity available to scientists from other countries, in some cases at no cost. The
Conference recommended that the IAEA expand the Research Reactor Data Base
(RRDB) to include a list of facilities offering confirmed access for various types of
research reactor utilization, such as neutron imaging and other neutron beam
techniques, material testing and neutron activation analysis (NAA).
4. The Conference recognizes the important role of the IAEA in coordinating and
providing support to Member States in the production and supply of radioisotopes. This
support can continue expanding on regional and international cooperation and joint
actions to facilitate reliable availability of the widely used radioisotopes produced in
research reactors. Furthermore, the Conference recommends that the IAEA provide
enlarged assistance covering the entire radioisotope production and supply chain, from
preparation and irradiation of the targets, through processing, waste management,
quality control and assurance, and regulatory issues.
5. The Conference recognises that validity of NAA results is very important, especially if
the materials being characterized are related to environmental problems, health–related
studies, industrial products or forensic cases. The Conference recommends that the

1
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the named authors, participants and session’s
chairmen and do not necessarily represent the views of the IAEA, its Member States or of the nominating
organizations.

2
 IAEA continue its efforts in supporting NAA laboratories in Member States to assess
and further improve their performance and the analytical quality of their analyses.
Session B: Common Management Considerations
1. The Conference notes the importance of integrated management of all activities in the
research reactor organization, and encourages all research reactor operating
organizations to make use of the Agency’s documentation and services to ensure that
safety and security and their interface are properly integrated into their management
system.
2. There is increasing recognition in the Member States of the need for effective
coordination of the interface between safety and security in all research reactor
activities throughout the life cycle of the facility. The Conference notes that it is
essential that measures in security do not unduly impact measures in safety and vice
versa, and requests the Agency to continue its efforts in providing support to Member
States in this area.
3. Several challenges for TRIGA reactors were noted, including continued supply of new
fuel in the long term, back–end options for spent fuel and high–level technical support
from that original reactor manufacturer. The Conference encourages TRIGA operators
to strengthen regional and global cooperation to address these issues, enhance effective
utilization and improve relations with stakeholders. The Conference also recommends
that the IAEA uses its good offices to foster this cooperation.
4. The Conference notes the effective coordination of the IAEA’s cross–cutting activities
for research reactors, and encourages the Agency to continue to work toward
integration, harmonization and synchronization of these activities to maximize the
benefits to the Member States.
Session C: Safety of Research Reactors
1. The Conference appreciates the significant progress that has been achieved in IAEA
activities on safety of research reactors, including supporting application of the Code of
Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, development of Safety Standards,
supporting their application and conducting safety reviews. The Conference encourages
the Agency to continue with these activities for the benefit of Member States. The
Conference recommends that Member States take advantage of safety review services,
especially the Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) service. In
addition, the Conference recommends that the Agency continue to support
establishment of an adequate regulatory and safety infrastructure in Member States
planning to acquire their first research reactor.
2. Many research reactor organizations have performed safety re–assessments in light of
the lessons learned from the Fukushima–Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, with the
objective of improving their ability to withstand extreme external events. The
Conference encourages Member States that have not yet performed safety
reassessments to do so.
3. The Conference recommends that the IAEA continues its efforts to disseminate the
relevant lessons learned from the Fukushima–Daiichi accident and to support Member
States to address them through implementation of technical meetings, workshops, peer
reviews and advisory missions. It also recommends that the lessons learned be
considered in the design of new research reactors.
4. Member States are continuing to address ageing of research reactors through
implementation of a systematic ageing management programme based on the IAEA
Safety Standards, including refurbishment and modernization activities. The
Conference recognizes the IAEA Research Reactor Ageing Management Database

3
 (RR–AMDB) as an important information resource for Member States and encourages
Member States to contribute information to the database to strengthen it for all. The
Conference recommends that the Agency continue to support ageing management of
research reactors.
5. Several Member States have initiated a process of periodic safety review (PSR) for
research reactors, although there is no current Agency guidance. The Conference
recommends that the Agency develops such guidance and support Member States in
establishment of a PSR process on the basis of experience from similar processes for
nuclear power plants.
Session D: Operations and Maintenance
1. The Conference appreciates the Agency’s activities in support of research reactor
operations and maintenance (O&M), including ageing management and establishment
of an integrated management system. The Conference recommends that Member States
avail themselves of the opportunity to request an IAEA Operations and Maintenance
Assessment of Research Reactors (OMARR) review service.
2. The Conference appreciates the progress that has been made in conversion of research
reactor cores from HEU to LEU fuel, and the accompanying fuel development work.
Continued work on development of fuels suitable for high–performance research
reactors is needed. The support of the Agency with coordination and expertise is
appreciated, and the Conference recommends that it continues.
Session E: Spent Fuel Management and Decommissioning
1. The Conference recognizes that decommissioning planning is necessary and that it
should start as soon as possible, even in the design stage of a new research reactor. The
Conference recommends that the Agency continues to assist Member States in
developing decommissioning plans and providing the platform for related information
exchange through a technical cooperation programme. The Conference also
recommends that that Member States having a research reactor in extended shutdown
decide whether to restart or decommission without unnecessary delay.

Session F: New Research Reactor Projects

1. The Conference recognizes that the IAEA–developed Milestone Approach and
supporting technical documents and Safety Standards provide valuable guidance to
Member States planning and implementing new research reactor projects. Such
documents are well known and used by Member States. The Conference recommends
that IAEA guidance on the preparation of a feasibility study for a new or first research
reactor project be finalized as soon as possible. The Conference also recognizes the
value of the newly established Integrated Research Reactor Infrastructure Assessment
(IRRIA) review service and urges the IAEA to implement this service as soon as
possible.
2. The Conference recognizes that building a new research reactor is a national decision
and that the Agency is ready to assist Member States in all stages of such projects.
Newcomers to research reactor Member States are also encouraged by the Conference
to consider accessing existing well–utilized research reactor facilities to build their
national nuclear capacity. The Conference also recognizes that the recently IAEA–
developed International Centres based on Research Reactors (ICERR) scheme can be a
valuable tool to share competences among experienced and newcomer Member States
for nuclear capacity building as well as research and development projects.

4
Session G: Security of Research Reactors
1. The Conference notes that nuclear security for research reactors now has a well–defined
structure within the Agency. However, the Conference observed that there are areas
which need to be further structured and explained from the implementation perspective.
The Conference recommends that IAEA guidance be developed on: vital area
identification; definition of unacceptable radiological consequences; the interfaces
between nuclear safety and nuclear security design; evaluation analysis and contingency
versus emergency response; cyber security threats and protective measures for research
reactors; and determining trustworthiness of research reactor employees and visitors.

Closing Session
The Conference was closed by Mr J. C. Lentijo, Deputy Director General and Head of the
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. On behalf of the IAEA Director General, he
thanked everyone for their participation in the Conference. He noted that the large attendance
and number of papers reflect a strong interest in exchange of information and experience, and
a healthy desire in the research reactor community to learn from one another and to continue
improving (the speech of Mr Lentijo is available in a separate Section of this Summary
Report).

The Conference has covered a comprehensive list of topics, ranging from new reactor
projects and common management considerations, through utilization, applications, operation
and maintenance of the existing reactors, to spent fuel management and decommissioning,
plus the overarching considerations of safety and security. This wide variety of topics
demonstrated the broad interests and concerns of the world–wide research reactor
community. The Conference programme included 5 keynote presentations from the IAEA
staff, which summarized the Agency’s work in the various technical topic areas, along with
the documents and services available to the Member States. Mr Lentijo invited Member
States to take advantage of these services.

Mr Lentijo noted the increased interest in new research reactors, especially in countries that
want a first research reactor as an important tool for development of the human resources and
infrastructure necessary for a future nuclear power programme. He encouraged these
countries to make use of the Agency’s resources to ensure that new reactors and adequate
infrastructure make use of international best practices and guidance, including the IAEA
Safety Standards, to ensure a high level of safety and security, along with effective
utilization.

There has been progress in many important areas: safety and security; use of research reactors
in education and training; scientific and industrial applications; maintenance practices and
core fuel conversion to LEU. However, issues and challenges remain. Some of these include:
lack of new fuel for TRIGA reactors and continued challenges in development of LEU fuel
for high–performance research reactors; completion of safety re–assessments in light of the
Fukushima–Daiichi nuclear power plant accident and implementation of needed
improvements; ageing of many research reactors, with the potential impact on safety and
reliability and supply of important medical isotopes; and lack of planning for
decommissioning in many cases. As always, the IAEA Secretariat stands ready to assist the
Member States in working to address these issues and challenges.

5
Mr Lentijo noted that preparation of the Conference has been a “one–house” undertaking. He
recognized the three Scientific Secretaries Mr Andrea Borio di Tigliole, Mr Danas Ridikas,
and Mr Amgad Shokr, and Ms Martina Neuhold of Conference Services, who were
instrumental in organizing the Conference. He also thanked the members of the Technical
Programme Committee and all of the speakers, poster presenters and participants.

6
WELCOME ADDRESS & OPENING REMARKS2

M. Chudakov
Deputy Director General
Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy

Dear distinguished participants, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

Good morning!

I am Mikhail Chudakov, Deputy Director General and Head of the Nuclear Energy
Department. On behalf of the Director General of the IAEA, Mr Yukiya Amano, it is my
pleasure to welcome you to this International Conference on the safe management and
effective utilization of research reactors.

The IAEA organizes this conference every four years as the largest gathering of the
international research reactor community. This year we have more than 300 delegates from
56 Member States. It is a forum for reactor users, operators, managers, regulators, suppliers
and other stakeholders to share experience, exchange information and discuss common
issues, challenges and strategies.

We are pleased to host this year’s conference in Vienna. Four IAEA Departments
have come together to organize it. And to recognize the cross–cutting nature of research
reactors activities and to demonstrate the importance for the Agency’s to support such
activities with a “one–house approach”, I am particularly pleased to share the podium this
morning with the Deputy Directors General and Heads of the Departments of from Nuclear
Science and Applications, Nuclear Safety and Security, and Technical Cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For more than 60 years, research reactors have been centres of innovation and
productivity for nuclear science and technology programmes in 67 countries around the
world. Research reactors provide a multidisciplinary environment to catalyse scientific,
industrial, medical and agricultural development. They are facilities for nuclear education and
training of young scientists and technicians, and they can contribute to the development of
nuclear power programmes.

According to the IAEA Research Reactor Database, there are 246 research reactors
currently in operation in 55 countries, and close to 30 new research reactor projects are at
different stages of implementation. Many of the operating reactors are several decades old
and face ageing management issues. These reactors must be operated and maintained with
due regard to safety and security.
Some reactors face challenges with sustainable supply of fresh fuel. Others are
looking to improve utilization, which is linked to justifying adequate resources for operation,
maintenance and refurbishment. As some of the fuel return programmes are expected to wind
down in the near term, the community will need to find solutions for spent fuel and waste
management. And taking into account the large number of reactors, about 140, no longer in

2
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the IAEA’s Deputy Director General and do not
necessarily represent the views of the IAEA or its Member States.

7
operation, as well as ageing reactors coming to the end of their lifecycles, decommissioning
is an important area of sharing experience and best practice. You will have an opportunity to
discuss these and other issues over the course of the conference.

I would like to focus on a few of the emerging challenges to highlight some IAEA
activities in recent years.

First, we have seen increased interest in new research reactor projects, particularly
where it would be the first nuclear installation in the country. This means development of an
adequate safety and security regulatory infrastructure, as well as a system for accounting for
the country’s first nuclear material. Building capacity for safety, security and safeguards and
getting the interfaces right will be the key. It is clear that a new research reactor project is a
significant national undertaking that requires careful preparation, planning, implementation
and investment of time, money, and human resources. We have developed the IAEA
Research Reactor Milestones approach to provide guidance to our Member States for
assessment and development of their national nuclear infrastructure including for human
resources development. We have recently launched the Integrated Research Reactor
Infrastructure Assessment (IRRIA) mission as a peer review service. The first mission is
scheduled to take place in Mongolia early next year.

The next emerging challenge is the safety re–assessment of research reactor facilities
in light of the accident at the Fukushima–Daiichi nuclear power plant. Many of the lessons
learned from the accident are relevant to research reactors and there is a need to assess the
robustness of the reactor systems and components in case of extreme external events, tacking
ageing effects into consideration; and reviewing the capabilities of emergency response to
events at reactors with potential off–site radiological consequences.

We continue to focus on the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors and
of the IAEA safety standards through training, networks, and the Integrated Safety
Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR). We are also supporting Member States to
address safety and operational implications of ageing facilities. Approximately 55% of the
research reactors currently in operation are more than 40 years old and 75% are more than 30
years old. We recently established the Operation and Maintenance Assessment for Research
Reactors (OMARR) peer review service to assist Member States to address operational
performance and reliability of such facilities.

The third challenge is improving utilization. A large number of research reactors

around the world are not utilized to their full potential. The IAEA has recently developed
some new programmes to support member states in this area. We recently launched a new
initiative called the International Centre based on Research Reactor (ICERR), which aims to
facilitate cooperation between Member States for the development of specific competences.
During the 59th General Conference, the French CEA, through its research centres at Saclay
and Cadarache, was designated as the first ICERR and we expect more to come. Similarly,
we are pleased with the success of the Internet Reactor Laboratory (IRL) project, which was
initiated as a pilot project a few years ago and is now under implementation in Latin
America, Europe and Africa. We continue to support other networks and coalitions as well to
not only increase utilization of existing facilities, but also to build capacity in countries
without research reactors through regional and international sharing of experience.

8
 Finally, I would like to highlight the work being done around the research reactor fuel
cycle. We support global efforts to minimize the civilian use of HEU, while maintaining
scientific research capabilities and the operating performance of research reactor facilities.
We are assisting in the conversion of research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, in the removal
of HEU fuel and in the development of LEU target designs for radioisotopes production. We
continue to support the development and qualification of new research reactor high density
LEU fuels, which would enable the majority of high flux reactors to convert from HEU to
LEU. The IAEA supports development of viable spent fuel management options, in particular
for Member States where the research reactor is the only nuclear facility in the country and
where the amount of nuclear waste will be relatively small.

These are only a few of the areas in which the Agency is supporting Member States
with research reactors. Our cross–cutting programmes span the work of the Agency, from
incident and emergency reporting, to nuclear safety and nuclear security and physical
protection programmes, to fostering international cooperation and capacity building. Many of
these activities are supported under national, regional and interregional technical cooperation
projects.

At this conference, more than 150 scientific and technical papers will be presented in
oral and poster sessions under 7 different technical track areas. You will have an excellent
opportunity to voice your opinion on the issues that matter most to you. There will be several
IAEA staff contributing as well, and I trust that we will hear important conclusions and
recommendations resulting from your discussions.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to the organizers who have

worked so hard to prepare this event and to you, the participants, who will contribute greatly
to its success.

I wish you a successful Conference and a pleasant stay in Vienna.

Thank you.….

9
SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL SESSIONS AND PRESENTATIONS3

SESSION A: UTILIZATION AND APPLICATIONS

Thirty five (35) papers were presented in Session A (1 keynote, 3 invited and 12
contributed oral and 19 poster presentations). The papers described the present utilization of
both new research reactors and those that have been in operation for many years and are still
very well utilized, along with opportunities and challenges for utilization in the future.

Papers, Part 1

In the keynote address for Session A, Mr Danas Ridikas (IAEA) presented an

overview of the research reactor situation worldwide and the IAEA support programmes to
the research reactor user community. He emphasized that proper strategic planning is
essential to sustainable utilization of a research reactor. Strategic considerations include:
understanding the needs of stakeholders and building their support; improving the quality and
quantity of services; sustainable knowledge management; and understanding the socio–
economic and research impact of the reactor. Several IAEA services and publications are
available to assist strategic planning. Another topic was networking and regional coalitions of
research reactors. The IAEA offers assistance in creating and maintaining such coalitions.

Mr Ridikas noted that the four most common areas of research reactor utilization are:
education and training; neutron activation analysis (NAA); isotope production; and neutron
radiography. Education and training initiatives include the Internet Reactor Laboratory (IRL),
the Eastern European Research Reactor Initiative (EERRI), train–the–trainer workshops, and
various schools and workshops, some with hands–on training. Support to NAA has focused
on automation and proficiency tests for NAA laboratories. Support to isotope production
focuses on production of 99 Mo by neutron capture and promotion of reactor production using
LEU targets. A coordinated research programme and training workshops support neutron
imaging. Overall, there are now 19 national and 4 regional TC projects having a research
reactor utilization and application component; some will end this year, but 14 new projects
will start in 2016.

The next three papers emphasized use of research reactors in education and training.

In his paper, Mr F. Foulon (France) discussed the impact of education and training
based on research reactors on building knowledge, competencies and skills in nuclear
programmes. He concluded that development or sustainability of nuclear programmes needs
the availability of human resources with adequate knowledge, competencies and skills.
Achieving an adequate level of qualification needs a complex combination of knowledge,
know–how, skills and experience in a working environment. The study that was conducted
emphasized the important impact of education and training on research reactors in the global
3
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the named authors, participants and session’s
chairmen and do not necessarily represent the views of the IAEA, its Member States or of the nominating
organizations.

10
learning process. Both research reactors and simulators make specific contributions to
development of the knowledge, competencies and skills that cannot be gained only on one of
these tools. Research reactors provide hands–on training on a real reactor that cannot be
gained on a simulator, while a simulator allows training in situations not possible on a real
reactor, such as accident simulations. The practical experience gained through education and
training on a research reactor helps to ensure an adequate safety culture for all the personnel
involved in the design, operation and control of a nuclear reactor.

Mr S. Malkawi (Jordan) compared use of the Internet Reactor Laboratory (IRL)

with a subcritical assembly in nuclear engineering education. The Jordan University of
Science and Technology (JUST) partnered with North Carolina State University (USA) on an
Internet Reactor Laboratory from 2010 to 2013. Jordan is building its own new research
reactor at JAEC. He concluded that every research reactor facility, regardless of its power,
can be utilized for education and training. The IRL approach benefits from an already
existing research reactor facility in another location by utilizing it as a remote reactor
laboratory. However, an on campus reactor facility is needed to provide education, training,
experimental research and hands–on experience for students and trainees. Nuclear Reactor
Laboratory course objectives and learning outcomes are attainable by both approaches. He
emphasized that for Nuclear Engineering Education, the need is to have an access to a
research reactor facility.

Mr L. Sklenka (Czech Republic) discussed using research reactors for sharing

experience from Europe with partners from Asia and Africa. Research reactors offer
education and training opportunities in two principal areas: first, the reactor itself as a
complex nuclear installation, in which the typical reactor experiments can be performed, and
hands–on experience in operational matters can be gained; second, the reactor is a source of
radiation for experience in the various applications, such as NAA and neutron imaging.
Starting from the experience of the EERRI, the Agency developed and used a questionnaire
aimed at obtaining a general overview of education and training needs and capabilities in
Asia and Africa. It was followed by development of regional courses based on utilization of
the research reactors. Sharing of experience and practice in the frame of regional course
development has proven to be effective and will be further developed by the IAEA.

Papers, Part 2

This session included 3 contributions on utilization of research reactors and one

presentation dealing with the assessment of the needs for experimental data:

In an invited paper, Mr N Kardjilov (Germany) addressed neutron imaging in

science and technology. He reported that over the last 10 years, significant developmental
work has been performed to expand the radiographic and tomographic capabilities of the
neutron imaging facility at Helmholz–Zentrum Berlin. He gave an overview of the
improvements in flux and performance of cold neutron imaging on the CONRAD–2
beamline. New techniques have been implemented, including imaging with polarized
neutrons, Bragg–edge mapping, high–resolution neutron imaging and grating interferometry.

11
He gave examples of diffraction contrast (use of Bragg edges to distinguish martensite and
austenite in steels) and dark field phase contrast (use of magnetically scattered polarized
neutrons to image magnetic flux retained inside a piece of superconducting lead). These
methods have been provided to the user community as tools to help addressing scientific
problems over a broad range of topics such as superconductivity, materials research, life
sciences, cultural heritage, palaeontology and some others.

Mr P. Mikula (Czech Republic) reported on the use of thermal neutron beams at the
medium–power LVR–15 reactor in Rez for competitive neutron scattering. He gave an
overview of LVR–15, its refurbishments, and described the inability to put in cold sources
and guides due to space constraints, and showed the variety of thermal neutron scattering and
nuclear techniques available at Rez. Thermal neutron depth profiling, while sensitive to few
light elements, is the instrument most in demand. He concluded that a wide variety of
competitive experiments of basic, interdisciplinary and applied research can be carried out at
the medium power research reactors. Low and medium power neutron sources offer excellent
opportunity for education and training of young scientists.

Mr A. Izhutov (Russian Federation) reported on modern methods for testing

materials and fuel in the research reactors of the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR)
centre. He gave an overview of the test and research reactors available in the RIAR’s fleet
and described the technical capabilities of the various in–core materials testing rigs and
facilities at each reactor (dpa/year, temperature etc.). RIAR’s research reactors SМ–3,
MIR.М1, BOR–60, RBT–6 and RBT–10/2 are used in a wide range of applied research in
nuclear power engineering and radioisotope production. These reactors are operated at a high
capacity factor (~65–75%) with a high experimental load. There are plans to use the reactors
and extend their operating lifetime until 2020 and further. Recently, some updated and new
techniques have been implemented at the reactor facilities to test materials and fuels for both
fast reactors with different coolants in addition to water–cooled reactors with a moderated
neutron spectrum. Research reactors are used to implement Russia’s programmes and to
perform tests under contracts with foreign customers. Reactor facilities are accessible for
research programmes in all aspects of innovation in nuclear power engineering and
radioisotope production.

In the final paper of this session, Ms T. Ivanova (OECD/NEA) presented an

overview of the NEA activities related to experimental needs. She gave a description of the
evolution of the databases and associated handbooks developed and maintained by the NEA
for the OECD Member States. The NEA has been collecting experimental data and evaluated
benchmarks in several different technical areas. Research reactors have been an important
source of the experimental data, including operational data. With the new trends in nuclear
science and engineering, high–priority experimental needs include: certificated data and
benchmark models for validation of multi–physics and multi–scale simulations; data on
fundamental properties and behaviour for advanced core materials and components (Gen II,
Gen III and Gen III+); differential and integral data to support minor–actinide management
technology; plant measurement and observation. Regular review of experimental needs and
capabilities is needed, requiring a cross–disciplinary approach. A long–term activity has been

12
launched at the NEA/Nuclear Science Section to support and coordinate this process in
different areas.

Papers, Part 3

To open this session, Mr C. Grant (Jamaica) presented the lessons learned in

strategic planning for enhanced utilization of low power research reactors, specifically the
SLOWPOKE reactor at the International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Science of
the University of the West Indies. After 31 years of operation the research reactor still
remains the flagship analytical tool of the institution. Neutron activation analysis is the
principal utilization of the reactor, applied to studies of geochemistry, agriculture and health.
Its convenient location on the university campus has allowed the Centre to make use of inter–
institutional (University/Government Ministries) and international collaborations to ensure
that the research activities are relevant to all stakeholders; in particular, the transfer of
knowledge between academia and government with a major objective being the development
of the human and economic resources of the country. Strategic planning is essential to
sustainable utilization of a reactor facility; it ensures that all essential components (not just
technical) are adequately addressed.

Mr P. Bode (Netherlands) discussed improving performance of neutron activation

analysis laboratories by inter–laboratory comparison rounds followed by feedback
workshops. Confidence in the validity of NAA results is essential and proficiency testing is
one way to improve confidence. Workshops emphasize performance of quality control and
assurance, calibration and validation of results. The inter–laboratory comparisons and
feedback workshops have to be done periodically to train new people and ensure that quality
is maintained. E–learning study modules are available. Mr Bode emphasized that knowledge
and communication are keys to success. Feedback workshops for interpretation of inter–
comparison results are a very effective way to sustainable improvement of measurement
results.

Ms L. Hamidatou (Algeria) presented an overview of NAA methods applied at the

Es–Salam research reactor. She discussed development of the k0–NAA technique, the cyclic
delayed neutron counting technique for detecting low concentrations of uranium, and various
applications of NAA in medical seeds and plants, human health, nutrition, archaeology and
mining.

Mr L. Snoj (Slovenia) discussed advances in utilisation of the 250 kW TRIGA Mark

II reactor at the Josef Stefan Institute. This reactor has a varied utilization, including standard
activities such as NAA, radiography, development of bio–dosimeters, production of trace
elements, education and training, as well as advanced applications in nuclear safeguards,
radiation hardness studies and experimental reactor physics benchmarks. Mr Snoj concluded
that small reactors are also very flexible, and well suited for non–routine applications.

Papers, Part 4

13
 Mr B. Ponsard (Belgium) gave a very comprehensive presentation on the status of
radioisotope production in research reactors, in particular on the production of 99Mo and role
of the international AIPES organization on the planning of the irradiation of targets
worldwide. He also showed that the decision to refurbish the BR–2 reactor in Belgium is a
very important, in that it contributes to the stability of the world’s supply of 99Mo for the next
decade. The refurbishment may allow a 35% increase in production of 99Mo.

Mr Kochnov (Russian Federation) presented the past experience and prospective

future development at the Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry, Obninsk, for increasing
production of radioisotopes for medical applications, particularly production of 99Mo and
99
Mo–99mTc generators under good manufacturing practices (GMP) and standards. Some
promising radiopharmaceuticals for cancer treatment were also discussed.

Mr B. Luong (Vietnam) presented the plans for upgrading the use of the Dalat
Nuclear Research Reactor (DNRR). The major objectives are continued safe and reliable
operation until at least 2025 and improved utilization to meet the needs of society. They plan
to implement an effective ageing management programme, perform a periodic safety review
for license renewal, improve quality management and update the safety documents. Also,
they plan to improve radioisotope production, analytical techniques based on NAA, expand
research on filtered neutron beams and strengthen education and training programmes.

In the final presentation of Session A, Mr M. Salam (Bangladesh) presented the

importance of the Bangladesh TRIGA Research Reactor (BTRR) in the education and
training of nuclear specialists and the work done in support of the implementation of a
nuclear power programme in the country. A strategic plan has been developed to the
enhancement of utilization of the BTRR.
SESSION A: POSTER PAPERS

This session included 22 contributed poster papers, of which 19 were presented and 3
were absent. Four posters were addressing general and new utilization, 3 were on education
and training, 2 on isotope production, 2 on NAA, 2 on neutron beam facilities, 1 on material
damage testing, and 5 on new reactor instruments.

Several innovative neutron flux monitoring systems were presented. The importance
of neutron spectrum characterization for radiation damage studies was emphasized. Nuclear
forensics was identified as a potential new area for NAA laboratories at research reactors.
There is increasing interest at existing reactors for the analytical opportunities of external
neutron beams, e.g. for prompt gamma activation analysis or neutron imaging.

General and New Utilization

Ms R. Baranyai (Hungary) presented a poster on the multiple utilization of the

Budapest Research Reactor. It provided a research and development base for the energy
sector in Hungary. Areas of utilization include material irradiations, isotope production,
neutron beam experiments, and education for the university, both at graduate and under–
graduate levels. The Budapest Research Reactor is a founding member of the Eastern

14
European Research Reactor Initiative and hosts participants in the Central European School
of Neutron Scattering.

Ms L. Superlina (Indonesia) presented a poster discussing utilization of the RAS–

GAS reactor. Isotope production dominates the reactor utilization and scheduling. However,
enhancement of utilization through cooperation with universities or regionally through
overseas arrangements is being explored.

Mr S. Landsberger (USA) discussed utilization of a research reactor and some of its

associated facilities in nuclear forensics, in particular in the areas of radiochemistry, chemical
instrumentation and nuclear instrumentation.

Mr F. Kungurov (Uzbekistan) and co–authors discussed the utilization of the

WWR–SM reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics related to reactor fuel and nuclear
materials.

Education and Training

Mr J. Rataj (Czech Republic) and co–authors presented a poster on enhancement of

the VR–1 research reactor at the Czech Technical University in Prague for practical
education using a portable neutron generator. The neutron generator allows study of the
reactor’s response to neutron pulses for determining its reactivity and kinetic parameters.

Mr F. Foulon (France) and co–authors presented an overview of experience with the

Internet Reactor Laboratory (IRL) project of the IAEA and utilization of the ISIS research
reactor in reactor laboratories. Through the IRL, reactor laboratory sessions are broadcasted
to other European institutions for training of students who do not have access to a reactor for
education purposes.

Mr K. Gyamfi (Ghana) and co–authors discussed the role of the Ghana Research
Reactor – 1 in development of nuclear science and technology in Ghana and in the region.
The reactor is used as a teaching and training laboratory for students in the Graduate School
of Nuclear and Allied Sciences, the IAEA’s regional centre for professional and higher
education in nuclear science and technology, as well as in development of uses of nuclear
techniques in industry, health and agriculture.

Isotope Production

Mr Y. Ellethy (Egypt) presented a poster on the strategic plan for isotope production
in the ETRR–2 complex, which consists of the ETRR–2 research reactor, the fuel
manufacturing pilot plant and the radioisotope production plant.

Mr B. El Bakkari (Morocco) and co–authors presented a poster on a feasibility study

and safety analysis of production of 131I, using two in–core irradiation positions in the
Moroccan TRIGA research reactor.

Neutron Activation Analysis

15
 Mr T. Tegas Sutondo (Indonesia) and co–authors presented a poster on studies of
using a beam port at the KARTINI research reactor for prompt gamma activation analysis,
including analysis of the neutron energy spectrum, gamma dose at the experimental area, and
possible designs of collimators, filters and shielding for various beam port options.

Mr I. Silachyov (Kazakhstan) discussed use of an internal mono–standard method

as an alternative to using certified reference materials in mineral resource investigations for
rare–earth element content using instrumental neutron activation analysis.

Neutron Beam Facilities

Mr C. El Younoussi (Morocco) and co–authors presented a poster on design studies

of a new thermal neutron beam facility at the Moroccan TRIGA Mk II research reactor. The
work concentrated on obtaining a well–thermalized neutron beam with minimum gamma
content.

Mr A. Zakaria (Bangladesh) and co–authors presented a poster on characterization

of spinel oxides using X ray and neutron powder diffraction techniques performed at room
temperature.

Material Damage Testing

Mr A Salvini (Italy) presented a poster on utilization of the TRIGA reactor at the

University of Pavia for experiments on radiation damage in materials, including a complete
characterization of the neutron spectrum in the reactor.

New Reactor Instruments

Mr E. Griesmayer (Austria) and co–authors presented a poster on a neutron flux

detector using a new diamond detector technology, which allows measurements in a high
irradiation environment. Testing at the Vienna TRIGA Mk II reactor showed that the detector
can be effectively used for neutron diagnostics in a research reactor.

Mr L. Sklenka (Czech Republic) and co–authors discussed development of a test

facility called MONTE–1, intended to provide a means to test detection systems and sensors
in a mixed field of radiation from fission radionuclides such as would be encountered after a
reactor accident.

Mr L. Snoj (Slovenia) and co–authors presented a poster which discussed the

experimental and computational biases and uncertainties in fission rate profile measurements
made at the TRIGA Mk II reactor at the Josef Stefan Institute using absolutely calibrated
miniature fission chambers.

Ms L. Nassan (Syria) presented a poster which discussed use of metal films

deposited on Teflon as neutron threshold detectors in a miniature neutron source reactor.

16
 Ms K. Kaiser (USA) and co–authors presented a poster which discussed a new
neutron monitoring system for the Annular Core Research Reactor. The new system is
intended to extend the low–flux capability of the reactor for irradiation of components.

SESSION B: COMMON MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Ten papers were presented in Session B, including 2 invited talks by experts from
Member States, a keynote talk from the IAEA, 5 contributed papers and 2 posters.

Papers, Part 1

The first invited paper delivered by Mr G. Storr (Australia) highlighted the nexus
between safety, security and safeguards in research reactors with the common overall
objective to protect people and environment. The talk focused on definitions, culture,
practices and experience gained in the management of simultaneously addressing safety and
security challenges at the OPAL reactor. Mr Storr noted that the goal of safety is to avoid,
protect against and mitigate design basis accidents, while the goal of security is to do the
same for the design basis threat, that is, intent. Regulators need to be sure that regulations are
coordinated. OPAL has done a periodic safety review and a security review, as well as a
safety reassessment. Integrated reviews are now a license requirement in Australia.

The second invited talk was delivered by Mr K. Du Bruyn (South Africa). He

described in detail the well–structured elements of the Integrated Management System (IMS),
Configuration and Document Control as applicable to RR, based on the practices instituted at
SAFARI–1 reactor in South Africa. The IMS is a framework establishing all the necessary
processes to address and achieve the overall goals of the RR facility. This includes inter alia
safety culture, quality and environmental aspects. Key elements of configuration management
and document control (disciplined processes) were outlined. He concluded that there are
multiple benefits in having an IMS with Configuration Management (CM) and
documentation control integrated into this system. Configuration management and document
control within an integrated management system are essential requirements for the safe
operation, utilisation and modification as well as up–to–date information of any research
reactor.

Mr H. Böck (Austria) reviewed the history of the TRIGA research reactors. Sixty–
six TRIGA reactors were built in 23 countries; 35 are still operating, about half of which are
well utilized. He outlined the many areas in which TRIGA reactors have been used. Several
challenges facing the TRIGA operators were highlighted, specifically: continued supply of
TRIGA fuel; back–end options; high–level technical support from the original manufacturer;
strengthening of regional ties to address challenges; enhancing utilization; and improving
relationship with national and international stakeholders. All that is being reflected in the new
Agency publication “History, Development and Future of TRIGA® Research Reactors”, TRS
No 482.

17
 Mr A. Mahjoub (Arab Atomic Energy Agency) outlined the challenges faced by
the RRs and critical facilities in the Arab countries. The AAEA operates under the auspices
of the League of Arab States; fifteen Arab nations are members. Its programme is focused on
human resource development. The use of nuclear technology in Arab countries has increased
significantly in different social and economic aspects of life (e.g., medicine, industry,
agriculture and research, etc.). Many Arab countries have or are planning to have research
reactors. There are currently nine operating research reactors, two under construction and five
being planned or considered. There is a working group on safety management of research
reactors within the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators.

Papers, Part 2

The keynote talk by Mr A. Shokr (IAEA) brought out the Agency efforts in
providing holistic support on research reactor matters through implementation of cross–
cutting activities across different Agency departments and divisions. Most of the issues and
challenges on research reactors include components of safety, technology and utilization and
require implementation of the relevant activities in a coordinated manner. Effective
coordination of the activities resulted in improved services to Member States by avoiding
duplication, synchronizing activities, ensuring consistency, and harmonizing approaches. The
activities were mainly related to infrastructure development and capacity building, ageing
management, refurbishment and modernization, Technical Cooperation programmes,
coordinated research projects, HEU minimization, safety of utilization programmes and the
interface between safety and security. Efforts will continue to enhance the coordination of the
IAEA activities on research reactors to further enhance the services to the Member States.

Mr Y. Ellethy (Egypt) described the application of graded approach to quality

assurance during construction of the ETRR–2 facility and to maintenance, periodic testing
and inspection during operation. A quantitative system for grading was applied based on
many factors, such as, safety, availability, reliability, complexity, design state, costs of failure
and experience with the component. Weighting factors are applied and point values are
assigned based on judgment and anecdotal criteria. The numerical results are used to
determine the quality level or the maintenance programme for a component or system.

Ms K. Niedzwiedz (Germany) presented their experience in applying a graded

approach in the periodic safety review (PSR) according to their National Atomic Energy Act.
There are 7 RRs in operation in Germany, including two large pool reactors (FRM II in
Munich and BER II in Berlin), one TRIGA reactor (Mainz) and three low–power training
reactors. Reactors are classified on the basis of thermal power, hazard potential (inventory of
131
I and 137Cs) and presence of safety–relevant cooling systems. The focus of the presentation
was evaluation of risk potential of individual reactors and development of a graded approach
to periodic safety reviews.

Ms J. Leach (USA) presented how safety programmes can be extended to leverage

and improve and support security programmes, in place of building similar capabilities within
security organizations. Three programmes can result in a holistic approach to safety and

18
security: the Integrated Management System; formality of operations and maintenance
activities; and training exercise programmes. However, there are some aspects of security that
do not have direct parallels with safety. There are distinct differences between safety and
security.

SESSION B: POSTER PAPERS

Two posters were presented on safeguards and security challenges for research
reactors.

Mr C. Pickett (USA) presented a poster focused on the safeguards and security

challenges with research reactors and new approaches needed to improve awareness of
experiments being conducted, target materials being used and methods to conceal such
activities.

Mr T. Bonner (USA) presented a poster focused on integrated management of

programmes for protection against sabotage and theft.

SESSION C: SAFETY OF RESEARCH REACTORS

Twenty–eight papers were presented in Session C, including 1 keynote, 3 invited and
13 contributed oral presentations and 11 poster presentations. In the following summary, the
oral papers are grouped by subject matter rather than sequentially.

Papers, Part 1:

The first part of Session C included: a review of the IAEA sub–programme on safety
enhancement of research reactors, 5 papers on actions taken by Member States for improving
the robustness and defence–in–depth of their facilities following safety reassessment in light
of the Fukushima–Daiichi accident, and a paper on establishing specific regulations based on
IAEA Safety Report No. 80.

In his keynote address for Session C, Mr A. Shokr (IAEA) discussed the activities of
the Agency’s sub–programme on safety enhancement of research reactors. Feedback from the
various activities indicates that attention is still needed in several areas: regulatory
effectiveness; ageing management; ability to perform safety assessment; operational radiation
protection; emergency planning; decommissioning plans; and the safety–security interface.
There is also a need to establish infrastructure in countries planning their first research
reactor. Mr Shokr reviewed the Agency’s activities in support of application of the Code of
Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. He noted improved application by Member
States of the Code of Conduct. However, there is a need for further improvements in some
areas, including regulatory supervision, human factors, emergency preparedness, and
decommissioning. The set of IAEA safety standards for research reactors is now complete,
but continued work is needed to ensure their effective application. The quality of the IAEA
peer review services to research reactors continues to be enhanced and increased requests
from Member States for these services is observed. Other activities include monitoring of
research reactors under Project and Supply Agreements with the IAEA; capacity building;

19
and support to technical cooperation projects and a survey of Member States’ safety re–
assessments in light of the Fukushima–Daiichi nuclear power plant accident and
implementation of safety improvements.

For the future, Mr Shokr anticipated work in: maintaining and expanding worldwide
application of the Code of Conduct and the IAEA safety standards; maintaining adequate
safety levels of ageing research reactors; improving regulatory effectiveness, including
infrastructure for first research reactor projects; dissemination of the relevant lessons learned
from the Fukushima–Daiichi NPP accident; improving management the interface between
safety and security; and improving exchange of operating experience and networking.

Mr H. Abou Yehia (France) presented an invited paper in which he highlighted

safety enhancements of research reactors based on safety re–assessments following the
Fukushima–Daiichi accident. While most of the effort on safety re–assessments and ‘stress
tests’ was focused on nuclear power plants, many countries expanded the scope of stress tests
to include research reactors and applied the same methodology as for NPPs. In this process,
priorities were given to research reactors according to their risks and following a graded
approach (in some cases the re–assessments were performed only for research reactors having
power levels above a certain threshold value). The emphasis of the safety re–assessments
carried out was to evaluate the following: robustness of the facilities and their ability to
withstand effects of extreme hazards more than those considered for the design basis;
defence–in–depth; and performance of fundamental safety functions and continuity of facility
monitoring. One adequate approach applied by many operators was to first assess the current
status of the facilities and verify their conformity with the design basis and license
conditions, and then expand the scope of the assessment to Design Extension Conditions,
which included consequences of external events (earthquake, flooding, etc.) combined with a
total loss of electrical power supply, and verification of existing margins to severe accidents
(reactor core damage, containment damage and off–site releases). The safety enhancements
resulting from performed safety reassessments included: improvements in regulatory
supervision and emergency planning; corrective measures for improving defence–in–depth,
operational safety, accident management and measures to prevent or mitigate unacceptable
consequences from fundamental safety function failures. For some research reactors, safety
demonstrations were improved to include: consideration of Design Extension Conditions in
the safety analyses; implementation of additional engineered safety features for ensuring
performance of fundamental safety functions; and updating of safety documents to take into
account site specific hazards. Mr Abou Yehia concluded by remarking that safety re–
assessments performed for research reactors in light of the Fukushima–Daiichi NPP accident
resulted in an effective strengthening of the Defence–in–Depth and improvements of the
capabilities of facilities to withstand beyond design events for many of them. Mechanisms
should be established for ensuring regular updates at the international level on
implementation status of safety re–assessments and resulting safety enhancements for
research reactors. The specific surveys launched by the IAEA and the safety review missions
conducted in many countries could be an adequate means for collecting and reviewing
information on this subject. Peer review of different safety matters related to research reactors

20
should be continued and facilitated by the IAEA, through technical meetings and workshops
aimed at sharing good safety practices. Safety enhancements implemented following post–
Fukushima safety re–assessments should not in any case reduce the attention to prevention of
accidents.

Mr C. Karhadkar (India) presented the safety re–assessment and upgrade proposed

for the Dhruva reactor. He noted that the safety of the reactor was demonstrated up to the
design basis flood level, but that a ‘cliff–edge’ effect due to loss of electrical equipment is
possible for a beyond design basis flood based on an upper–bound value for a postulated
cyclonic storm. It was decided to construct a new seismically–qualified building and provide
two 625 kVA air–cooled diesel–generator sets in this building at higher elevation with
adequate diesel fuel storage facility. For the interim period a 200 kW portable diesel–
generator set has been identified and ear marked for this purpose. To ensure cooling, a new
pump house, with two pumps and independent make up line, was built and made external
flood proof, up to BDBFL. An additional hook–up point to provide a high–pressure water
source for directly driving the turbines and providing secondary cooling, external to the
reactor building has been made. Modifications were proposed to provide direct hook–up
points in loop#1 turbine inlet and outlet lines and primary heat exchanger for driving one
turbine and providing secondary cooling, using any water source (like fire hydrant water). An
additional down comer from OHST was proposed for improving redundancy. Considering
various improvements made/ proposed in the system configuration, it was felt that it would
be possible to cope with an overwhelming beyond–design–basis natural event as described
above in a preventive regime.

Mr E. Grolleau (France) reported on French post–Fukushima complementary safety

assessments (CSAs) and safety improvements. In France, the Institute of Radiation Protection
and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) was responsible for the review. Although the CSA identified the
systems, structures and components (SSCs) of facilities whose loss or failure may lead to
significant radiological or toxic consequences, they determined that given the uncertainties
about the levels of extreme hazards, and given the simplified approaches implemented for
assessing the facilities, the IRSN recommended that a more robust and systematic approach
be adopted to accurately identify the improvements to ensure the resistance of nuclear
facilities against extreme hazards. From this the concept of “hardened safety core” (HSC)
was developed with the purpose of ensuring that nuclear facilities could withstand beyond–
design–basis accidents. The hardened safety core must ensure ultimate protection of nuclear
facilities according to the following objectives: prevent a severe accident or limit its
progression; limit large–scale releases in the event of an accident which is not possible to
control; and enable the licensee to perform its emergency management duties. The HSC may
be composed of existing SSCs (that might need to be strengthened) and new SSCs (that shall
be designed and sized to withstand extreme hazards). Effective implementation of the HSC
on facilities implies the characterisation of extreme natural hazards (intensity, duration,
magnitude, frequencies, etc.) and the use of robust methods to design new SSCs or to verify
existing SSCs belonging to the HSC. This information shall be determined with the aim that

21
the HSC will be able to ensure, with a high degree of confidence, its functions in case of
extreme events.

The example given was for the High Flux Reactor (HFR) operated by the Laue–
Langevin Institute (ILL), with a maximum thermal power of 58.3 MW. The Laue–Langevin
Institute used the defence–in–depth principle in the development of the HSC. The three main
components were: prevention of severe accidents (core water supply systems); mitigation of
severe accidents (containment isolation devices); and emergency management (emergency
control room). The modifications made have significantly improved the robustness of the
installation in the event of extreme natural hazards.

Mr Y. Barnea (Israel) addressed implementation of regulatory guidelines for safety

re–assessment based on IAEA Safety Report No. 80. Based on regulatory decree, the
approach adopted by the operators of the Soreq Nuclear Research Centre (SNRC) IRR
research reactor was implementation of the IAEA Safety Report No.80. This took the form of
developing an action plan which included the following analyses: re–evaluation of the
seismic database on the IRR–1/SNRC site; dynamic analyses of systems of the primary
cooling system, aluminium windows; and selected “critical” SSCs. In addition, a new PIE,
the ‘flapper’ valve intended to facilitate natural convection core cooling after shutdown stuck
closed, was analysed. Upgrading of SSCs included: installation of a high quality
accelerometer, connected to the SCRAM system; enhanced remote monitoring capacity from
the SNRC Command Room; modification of water supply systems; power system upgrades;
and complementary procedures, training and education. Planned future activities include:
dynamic analysis of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water piping; modification
of the cooling tower pipes configuration as an additional emergency water source; and
accident analyses of consecutive external events (i.e., earthquake & fire, fire & SBO). The
action plan was submitted to the regulator and approved and the first installation of two
ground accelerometers took 8 months and was considered as proof that the 3– year overall
project was feasible based on the time taken for the first activity initiated and completed.

Mr S. Malaka (South Africa) reported on safety re–assessment and modifications to

the SAFARI–1 reactor. A directive was given by the regulator that a safety re–assessment be
completed to evaluate the response of the SAFARI–1 reactor to extreme external events. A
defence–in–depth approach was adopted. The safety re–assessments made resulted in several
modifications: improvement of the fresh fuel storage facility; installation of emergency water
systems; provision of portable electrical power systems; implementation of an emergency
control room; installation of core flooding nozzles in the event of a LOCA; installation of
seismic trips; installation of a second shutdown system; and improvement of containment. A
number of the above mentioned modifications were underway, however, larger
modifications, such as building reinforcements would best be dealt with under the ageing
management programme.

Papers, Part 2
The second part of Session C included: 4 papers on maintenance, thermal–hydraulic
and safety analysis, and extended shutdown. Note that the presentation by Mr. T. Sato (Japan)

22
on the status of the JRR–3 reactor after the great East Japan earthquake was cancelled due to
his inability to join the Conference and the following paper was substituted.

Mr F. Gajdos (Hungary) discussed maintenance and ageing management at the

Budapest Research Reactor. He reviewed the normal periodic, preventive and corrective
maintenance and inspection practices, as well as the more extensive summer maintenance
work. Following this, he reviewed the various maintenance–related events and the associated
corrective actions.

Mr Y. Boulaich (Morocco) reported on thermal–hydraulic and safety analysis for

their TRIGA Mark II research reactor. Thermal–hydraulic parameters for the Moroccan 2
MW TRIGA reactor were discussed. Steady–state and transient analysis was performed using
the PARET and MCNP Codes, and the modelling was validated by comparison between
calculated and measured fuel temperatures. Reactivity insertion and LOCA events were
analysed using the model. It was concluded that the reactor remained within the safety
margins for the postulated abnormal events.

Mr K. Krezhov (Bulgaria) presented a detailed account on the history of the

management of the IRT–Sofia Research Reactor which was unfuelled and now been in
extended shutdown for 26 years. The numerous obstacles that exist were catalogued, it was
concluded that the required budget for re–commissioning the facility had not been granted
due to the uncertainty of nuclear power as part of the Bulgarian energy mix. Present funding
is only sufficient to maintain physical protection, nuclear safety and radiological monitoring.

Mr H. Kim (Rep. of Korea) presented an analysis of the thermal–hydraulic

behaviour of a reflector system, considering both performance–related and safety–related
studies. The events investigated originate in the heavy water reflector system. They are
analysed with a best estimate code, RELAP5/MOD3.3, using conservative assumptions and
conservative initial conditions. It is concluded that performance and safety can be assured.

Papers, Part 3
The third part of Session C included 3 papers on periodic safety review of research
reactors.
The invited talk of Mr A. Sapozhnikov (Russian Federation) covered the
methodology and experience in application of the PSR for enhancement of safety of nuclear
research facilities in the Russian Federation. He emphasized that PSR provides a consistent,
reliable means for identifying and taking timely preventive measures for deficiencies in
safety and is an effective tool for improving safety through implementation of international
good practices by both operating organization and regulatory body.

The presentation of Mr A. Shepitchak (Ukraine) highlighted the safety reassessment

performed for WWR–M reactor in Ukraine. The license for continuation of the reactor
operation was granted by the regulatory body based on this assessment that included analysis
for design extension condition and completion of specific safety improvements identified.
The safety reassessment also included updating of safety documentation.

23
 The presentation of Mr J. Sterba (Austria) described the new Austrian legislation
that requires a yearly review by the Competent Authority, and a periodic safety assessment
every ten years for nuclear facilities. The first PSA for their TRIGA–type RR was initiated in
2011 and submitted in 2014; it has been accepted. Replacement of the instrumentation and
control system was required; this is already nearly done. A number of pre–emptive
replacements of SSCs have been done. They will enter into a three–week period of non–
nuclear testing, followed by a 3–month nuclear trial run. The results will be submitted to the
Competent Authority as the basis for regular operation with a yearly assessment.

Papers, Part 4
The final part of Session C included 4 papers on regulation of research reactors.
Ms J. Adamcyzk (Poland) presented the Polish regulatory body’s follow–up of
implementation of recommendations resulting from the 2013 INSARR mission to MARIA
research reactor. She summarized the INSARR team’s observations, the regulatory body’s
actions, and the results. The results of this follow–up and the benefits of the implemented
IAEA INSARR mission in improving the safety of the Maria reactor were highlighted.

Mr A. Adams, Jr. (USA) discussed the application of a graded approach in

regulation of research and test reactors by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He
emphasized that, as risk increases the strictness of regulation also increases. This approach
was detailed in IAEA Safety Guide SSG–22. Grading was applied in the licensing process,
technical requirements, security, inspection and financial considerations. It was based on the
power rating and whether the reactor is used for research and development or for commercial
purposes. He discussed the details of grading in each of the categories. Graded approach
started with the Atomic Energy Act and has been used from the earliest days of reactor
regulation in all aspects of NRC regulation.

Ms F. Nasser (Pakistan) discussed the role of Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory

Authority in ensuring safety of their research reactors. Regulatory activities include:
development and maintenance of the regulatory framework; licensing; regulatory oversight;
operator licensing; and coordination with the licensee. A graded approach was applied
throughout. Regulatory infrastructure was developed and in place for ensuring safety of
research reactors in Pakistan. Regulatory processes were defined. Strong regulatory oversight
was one of the significant factors in safe operation of research reactors for almost five
decades.

Mr M. Abubakar (Nigeria) discussed safety of the Nigerian NIRR–1, a miniature

neutron source reactor (MNSR) supplied by China and the role of the Nigerian Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (NNRA). He presented the functions of the NNRA and problems faced
in some detail. Current challenges include: modification of the reactivity control system of
the reactor; core conversion from HEU to LEU; adequate infrastructural arrangements for
decommissioning; and adequate professional training for regulatory officers on research
reactors review and assessment of SAR and other submissions.

24
SESSION C: POSTER PAPERS
Six of the posters presented on safety of research reactors dealt with criticality and
neutronic calculations, 2 with thermal–hydraulic calculations and 3 with safety analysis.

Criticality and Neutronic Calculations

Mr S. Sikorin (Belarus) presented a benchmark on criticality experiments using

Uranium–Zirconium fuel assemblies composed each of 7 fuel rods (uranium enriched at
21%). Experimental and calculation results were presented for the studied fuel
configurations.

Ms R. Abou–Alo (Egypt) presented criticality safety analysis for wet spent fuel
storage of WWR–C research reactor in normal conditions and in case of LOCA. The results
of calculations made using a Monte Carlo (MCNP–5) code confirmed the sub–criticality of
the studied fuel configurations.

Ms L. Suparlina (Indonesia) presented core calculations of the IAEA 10–MW MTR

research reactor benchmark using SERPENT and DYN3D codes for both HEU (93%) and
LEU (20%) uranium silicide fuel having different fuel loadings.

Mr M. Margolis (Israel) presented detailed core calculations of the IAEA 10–MW

MTR light–water pool–type reactor benchmark using the Serpent/DYN3D code system. Both
HEU and LEU cores were considered in BOL and EOL configurations.

Mr D. Sumkhuu (Mongolia) presented results of dynamic modelling of the IBR–2M

pulsed reactor aimed at establishing safe and reliable operation.

Mr R. Khan (Pakistan) presented a calculation of reactor safety parameters using

MCNP–5 (control rods worth, excess reactivity, shutdown margin, flux density distribution
and power peaking factor) with measurements for the 10–MW PARR–1 research reactor.

Thermal–hydraulic Calculations

Mr B. Lee (Republic of Korea) presented calculations related to the two phase

vertical stratification in decay tank of a 15–MW pool–type research reactor. In case of a pipe
break accident in an inverted U–shape cooling pipe, ambient air can be inhaled into the pipe
and accumulated in the decay tank before it reaches the reactor core. The results showed that
the fuel damage by air ingression in the core was not expected until the decay tank becomes
almost empty.

Mr J. Park (Republic of Korea) presented a simulation of the flow inversion in a

uniformly heated thin rectangular channel array (using ANSYS–CFX code). The results for
coolant, plate temperature and flow rate through the flap valve were in agreement with those
obtained using RELAP5 Code.

Safety Analysis

25
 Mr Y. Pesnya (Russian Federation) presented accident analyses made in the frame
of the conversion of the IR–8 research reactor to LEU fuel. The accidents studied include
unplanned insertion of positive reactivity during reloading, full instantaneous primary coolant
pipe rupture (LOCA) and spontaneous withdrawal of the automatic regulation rod with
subsequent loss of flow and failure of safety rods.

Mr P. Kohut (USA) presented the results of a radiological hazard study for the
University of Massachusetts–Lowell 1–MW research reactor by postulating a fuel plate
failure resulting in a release of accumulated fission products. The objective of the study was
to provide a comprehensive review of a methodological approach for consequence analysis,
which was consistent with recommendations of NUREG–1537.

Mr P. Domitr (Poland) presented the results of a dynamic analysis for a TRIGA

reactor, which showed that the present technical specification limits on fuel temperature for
pulsing were adequate to ensure safe operation of TRIGA reactors.

SESSION D: OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

The session on operations and maintenance included 34 papers: 1 keynote, 2 invited

and 12 contributed oral presentations, and 19 poster presentations. It was clear that O&M has
many faces – system upgrades, equipment design, material condition assessment and ageing
management, safety reviews, new facility designs – but all desire the same end result, service
to the customers and increased utilization of the reactors. The presentations covered a range
of topics including IAEA activities and examples from facilities of their programmes for
improving maintenance and operations activities, ranging from new techniques for
management of research reactors to practical techniques for evaluating components under
high radiation conditions. One of the major aims of the various maintenance programmes was
improvement of facility reliability and operations. In addition, one half of Session D was
largely dedicated to reactor fuel issues, concentrating on the development of LEU fuels and
the conversion of research reactors to LEU cores.

Papers, Part 1

In her keynote address, Ms F. Marshall (IAEA) presented the IAEA activities in

operations and maintenance of RRs. The activities are broad, covering many areas to support
Member States, with the following initiatives of particular note:

• The Operations and Maintenance Assessment of Research Reactors (OMARR)

service provides for peer review of the O&M practices at a facility; it is an important
approach to improve O&M practices and reliability. There have been 2 OMARR
missions to date and another is planned in 2016;
• Organizing of technical meetings, conferences, workshops and Coordinated Research
Programmes (establishment of material properties data base, monitoring, etc.);

26
 • Set–up competences for in–service inspection (IAEA provides support of experts and
training in using non–destructive equipment.);
• Publication of various TECDOCs, Safety Standards, safety reports and guidance
documents;
• Development of a research reactor ageing data base (description of main issues,
corrective actions, etc.).

The IAEA Research Reactor Section recommended that Member States make use of the
opportunity to request an OMARR mission.

In an invited paper, Mr D. Elliot (Australia) presented the work that has been done
at OPAL RR in developing the Asset Management programme. This is an integrated
approach to maintenance where one of the main objectives is to improve the reliability of the
reactor, its safety and support commercial activities. The asset management programme is
based on the ISO 55000 standard and uses the Plan–Do–Check–Act concept. Key
components of the programme include application of reliability–centred maintenance (e.g.,
vibration analysis of rotating equipment), which leads to higher reliability and reduction in
unplanned shutdowns. It was noted that no unplanned shutdowns have stemmed from
equipment which has thus far been included in the Asset Management programme. It was
noted that planning and a planning system are vital for success. The result was an RR that is
safer, more reliable, and with a more controlled budget. OPAL RR achieved 302 Full Power
Days (FPDs) of operation last financial year.

Mr M. Shaat (Egypt) presented the ageing management programme and

modifications performed on the two Egyptian research reactors ETRR–1 and ETRR–2 with
the aim of ensuring long–term safety and reliability of these reactors. He defined two kinds of
ageing effects, physical ageing and obsolescence. He mentioned the replacement of the I&C
systems in control room for ETRR–1 and the maintenance programme implemented at
ETRR–2. Safe operation of the reactor was ensured using an ageing–management
maintenance concept, an ISI programme and routine maintenance as detailed in the IAEA
Standards and guideline documents.

Mr A. Pichlmaier (Germany) presented work done at the FRM–II to extend the

lifetime of core components that will be affected by irradiation effects using fracture
mechanics. These components, the central channel, beam tubes, and instrumentation tubes are
made of aluminium (EN AW–5754). Initially, using extremely conservative boundaries, the
schedule of core components replacement was developed. FRM–II proposed to modify this
approach by using fracture mechanics to determine the need to replace these specific selected
core components. An extension of 10 years has been granted by the regulatory authority for
the beam tubes and instrumentation tubes; the extension for the central channel was still
under discussion. The worldwide data base on fracture of aluminium was limited; FRM–II
requested data to be shared by other Member States to improve the data base.

Papers, Part 2

27
 In his invited paper, Mr E. Koonen (Belgium) gave an overview of the status of
development of high density fuel for HEU to LEU conversion. Uranium–silicide dispersion
fuel was used in many reactors, but cannot have high–enough uranium density for high–
performance reactors. European development work centres on uranium–molybdenum
dispersion fuel. Various coatings of the fuel particles have shown improved swelling
resistance, but the fuel still exhibited unacceptably high swelling at high burnup, so it was not
yet suitable for conversion of high–performance research reactors. Work in the U.S. focused
on monolithic U–Mo fuel and developing an industrial production process. The European
HERACLES collaboration has been formed to do irradiation testing with strong support from
the US efforts.

Mr J. Stevens (USA) gave an overview of what has been achieved since 2011 on
conversion of reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. In total, 92 facilities no longer use HEU after
conversion to LEU or (25) have been shut down prior to conversion. Some like the
SLOWPOKE in Jamaica have been unexpectedly difficult to convert, in this case due to
special challenges in the supply chain. Basically all facilities that are “easy" to convert have
been converted by now. Both the high flux reactors in Europe and the US require LEU fuel
with a high uranium density which was not yet available. Significant activities in the field of
fuel development were ongoing (see E. Koonen's paper) and clearly needed.

Mr P. Chakrov (Kazakhstan) reported on the conversion of the WWR–K reactor in

Almaty. While the fuel has already been successfully tested, numerous other activities were
still ongoing in the facility. The period of core conversion was also used to significantly
overhaul and improve the reactor as a whole. The I&C systems were being replaced, new
control rods and drives were being installed, an uninterruptable power supply was being
installed for the emergency cooling system, radiation monitoring systems were being
refurbished and new and more efficient cooling towers have been installed. Finally the
reactor tank and primary cooling loop have been inspected. Start–up after completion of the
programme was foreseen later in 2015.

Mr K. Kamajaya (Indonesia) gave a talk on the Bandung TRIGA reactor in

Indonesia. Because of the current uncertainties in availability of TRIGA fuel and the ability
of Indonesia to manufacture its own plate–type fuel a conversion from standard TRIGA fuel
to plate–type fuel is being investigated. The neutronics calculations have already been
successfully completed. Next, detailed calculations on the thermal–hydraulics were required
as well as a redesign of the primary cooling loop for the operation with fuel plates at 2 MW
power. All these activities would help to obtain a new license for the Bandung reactor. If
everything went as planned, a restart of the reactor with the new plate–type fuel was foreseen
for 2019.

Mr Y. Mahlers (Ukraine) reported on the conversion of the WWR–M research

reactor in Kiev. Initially, HEU fuel was replaced with LEU fuel during normal scheduled
reloading. However, since this is slow process, efforts have now been put in place to achieve
conversion faster. Hence open positions in the core were filled with either aluminium–
dummy–elements or beryllium–elements. Some of the Be–elements have more than 40 years

28
of (partially) unknown history, so a conservative approach was used to compensate for the
unknown 3He poisoning. Given the constraints of the reactor design, this resulted in an
asymmetric core. With more experience gained, some the Be–elements were shuffled;
improvements for better neutron flux, especially at the beam tubes with position unfavourable
with respect to the asymmetric core, could be achieved. It was clear that conversion and fuel
development were ongoing activities. To achieve the goal of conversion of all reactors from
HEU to LEU a lot of significant work remained to be done. The support of the Agency with
coordination and expertise was appreciated.

Papers, Part 3

Mr J. Sandoval (Colombia) discussed thermal power calibration and neutron flux

measurements in the nuclear research reactor IAN–R1. The reactor had a TRIGA converted–
core, operated at a maximum power of 30 kW with LEU fuel. The I&C system was upgraded
in 2012 in collaboration with ININ of Mexico. The thermal power calibration was performed
using the calorimetric method adopted in the TRIGA IAN–R1 Reactor, what enabled
accurate determination of thermal neutron flux levels. Accuracy of the calibration allowed
good performance by the Laboratory of Neutron Activation Analysis (CGS) during the first
round of proficiency testing in the Wageningen Evaluating Programmes for Analytical
Laboratories (WEPAL) in 2015, supported by the IAEA.

Mr K. Konoplev (Russian Federation) reported on an upgraded core for the PIK

reactor, which has been under construction since 1976. It is a very large, powerful reactor,
with 10 horizontal channels for beam extraction, as many as 50 irradiation positions, hot, cold
and ultra–cold neutron sources, neutron guides and a cryogenic loop at liquid helium
temperatures. The changes in the PIK reactor core would solve the main problem of
increasing the operational cycle from two weeks to four, and will improve the reactor's
research capabilities. Neutron physics computations with improved fuel assemblies showed
that the neutron flux in the experimental channels will remain at the high level of 1‒5x1015
cm–2·s–1.

Mr M. Reichenberger (USA) reported on development and testing of micro–pocket

fission detectors. The goal was to develop a small size detector that would not perturb the
flux in a test capsule. It was designed to work in 1x1014 cm–2·s–1 thermal neutron flux
environment and withstand a high fluence allowing use for more than 1 year at most research
reactors. The current design showed good correlation between power and detector response
and good power tracking results in transient tests. They now used natural uranium, but hoped
to go to HEU to improve sensitivity. The goal was to have 5 years life in a neutron flux of
1x1014 cm–2·s–1.

Mr H. Obeng (Ghana) reported on ageing management at the Ghana Research

Reactor–1, a Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) used primarily for neutron
activation analysis and education and training. The adding management programme focused
on physical ageing and obsolescence, and included procedures for operation, maintenance,
periodic testing and inspection, radiation protection and administration, along with detection,

29
monitoring and trending of ageing. The maintenance programme included both proactive
(routine and preventive) and corrective components. A screening system was used to
prioritize based on the importance to safety and difficulty of repair or replacement.
Refurbishment and upgrading was part of the programme; recent examples included the
control rod drive mechanism, deionized water plant and the microcomputer system.
Preparations were now underway for core conversion to LEU fuel. A staff training and
succession plan was in place, including a graduate school, to manage ageing of the reactor
staff.

Mr N. Arkangelskiy (Russian Federation) discussed the Rosatom activity in

research reactors. Rosatom has under its jurisdiction 35 steady–state and 57 pulse research
reactors, 7 of which have power rating greater than 10 MW, located in 4 institutes. The
reactors and associated post–irradiation examination facilities are used for irradiation testing
of materials, production of radioisotopes, fundamental research and education and training.
Stress tests following the Fukushima–Daiichi NPP accident led to safety improvements, most
importantly, installation of seismically–qualified diesel generators and additional pumps for
emergency cooling. Ageing was a problem, as only one of the high–power reactors was less
than 35 years old. They have countered this problem by modernization and building a new
reactor, the Multipurpose Fast Research Reactor (MBIR). A proposal for construction of
Centres of Nuclear Research including a multipurpose research reactor as the main
experimental facility of the Centre has been developed.

Mr B. Munkhbat (Mongolia) described a dedicated facility for mass–production of

doped silicon. A new doping facility with a large irradiation capacity for NTD–Si may need
to be constructed to ensure an adequate supply of doped silicon to meet expected demand on
the order of 1000 tons/year in the next decades. Purpose of study was to design small and
simple nuclear reactors for doping of large–diameter NTD–Si ingots using PWR fuel
elements. The reactors would be intended for industry (only for Si doping); not for research,
so they needed to make a profit and provide a stable and reliable supply of doped Si.
Requirements include low construction and operating cost, the ability to dope large–diameter
ingots with uniform irradiation to achieve a high production rate and a stable and reliable fuel
supply, such as could be achieved by using fuel supplied by several vendors. Mr Munkhbat
reported studies of two possible designs comparing full–length and shortened PWR fuel
elements. He concluded that both could produce more than 100 tons/year.

SESSION D: POSTER PAPERS

Nineteen posters were displayed in the Operations and Maintenance category, 7
covering a broad range of topics including: instrumentation and control, 3 ageing
management, 4 fuels; and 5 general operations and maintenance.

Instrumentation and Control

Mr M. Villa (Austria) and co–authors discussed the new fourth–generation I&C

system installed at the TRIGA Mk II reactor in Vienna. The digital system was produced by
the Skoda and DataPartner companies of the Czech Republic. It was capable of monitoring

30
and controlling processes and the status of components and system, and maintaining
predefined project and safety limits.

Mr J. Sandoval (Colombia) presented the details of the I&C upgrade at the TRIGA
IAN–R1 reactor at the Colombian Geological Survey in Bogota. The system, supplied by
ININ (Mexico), was partially digital and used direct wiring for the protection system instead
of software. The changes have improved safety and flux stability, resulting in improved
precision in irradiation of samples and better neutron activation analysis results.

Mr M. Kropik (Czech Republic) and co–authors described testing of a new reactor

protection system intended for the LVR–15 reactor, first using simulated signals to validate
the response of the new system, and then using the VR–1 training reactor. The successful
tests supported licensing of the new system.

Mr J. Matousek (Czech Republic) and co–authors described the refurbishment of

the I&C system for the LVR–15 reactor, focusing on the qualification, licensing and testing
of the new system, and the first operational experience.

Mr L. Rodriguez (France) and co–authors described the computerized and non–

computerized solutions for the safety I&C systems for new research reactors and
modernization of existing reactors offered by AREVA.

Mr E. Tomarchio (Italy) presented a poster on maintenance operations on the

nuclear instrumentation of the 50 years old AGN–201 reactor “COSTANZA” at the
University of Palermo. A failed ionization chamber was removed from the reactor and
repaired, and protective devices applied to prevent future corrosion due to parasitic electrical
currents.

Mr N. Abubakar (Nigeria) and co–authors presented the design of a manual control

unit for a pneumatic sample transfer (‘rabbit’) system at the NIRR–1. This system was
intended to substitute for an automatic system that was out–of–service pending repair and
could serve as a redundant back–up system in the longer term.

Ageing Management

Mr M. Izzerrouken (Algeria) and co–authors presented results of gamma radiation

tests of polyethylene (PE) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) cable insulation components. The
results indicated that the PE insulation presented a successful behaviour under gamma dose
similar to that in a reactor tank, but the PVC became far less durable.

Mr H Boeck (Austria) and Mr D. Winfield (Canada) presented a historical

summary of reactor tank corrosion events, the root causes and consequences, along with
recommendations for designers and operating organizations.

Ms T. Schmidt (Germany) described the preventive maintenance programme for the

SUR–100 teaching reactor at the University of Stuttgart. Ageing management was essential

31
for continued operation of the facility, since it was no longer supported by the manufacturer
(Siemens).

Fuels

Mr T. Makmal (Israel) and co–authors presented a simple non–destructive method

for evaluation of the burnup of an MTR fuel element using gamma spectroscopy. The method
was simple and could be used for samples having a very irregular irradiation history, typical
of many research reactors that operated intermittently.

On behalf of Mr R. Irkimbekov (Kazakhstan) and co–authors, Mr P. Chakrov

discussed methods for determining the energy released in a test fuel assembly during a
transient experiment in the Impulse Graphite Reactor (IGR). The method included a three–
dimensional space–time kinetics code that simulated the effects of control rod position and
core heating on the thermal neutron flux. The calculation could be validated by temperature
measurements in the test sample so long as the sample is not destroyed in the experiment.

Mr H.–J. Kim (Republic of Korea) and co–authors presented the status of

qualification tests and licensing of plate–type fuel for the new Ki–Jang Research Reactor in
Korea. The new fuel is U–7%Mo/Al–5%Si dispersion with a U density of 8 g/cm3 in most of
the plates, and 6.5 g/cm3 in the outer plates.

Mr R. Abdel Aziz (Sudan) presented results of calculations of neutronic parameters

and fuel consumption rates for three different densities of U3Si2–Al fuel in an MTR aimed at
providing data that could be used to optimize the fuel density for optimised consumption rate.

General Operations and Maintenance

Ms M. Varvayanni (Greece) presented a poster on the issues raised regarding restart

of the Greece Research Reactor–1 after a period of extended shutdown. A programme of
refurbishment of the primary cooling system to meet IAEA safety standards has not been
completed due to lack of funds; however the reactor infrastructure has been maintained. A
proposal has been formulated and submitted for refurbishment and restart of the GRR–1.

Mr K. Dinesh (India) discussed 30 years of operating experience of the Fast Breeder

Test Reactor. This sodium–cooled, mixed–carbide fuelled reactor has undergone extensive
ageing management, life extension and safety enhancement work, including modifications to
protect against flooding, tsunami and seismic events in a post–Fukushima retrofitting
programme. This work, along with various maintenance issues was discussed.

Mr M. Palomba (Italy) presented a poster on activities at the TRIGA RC–1 reactor

at the Casaccia Research Centre of ENEA. The work focused on improved techniques for
determining fuel burn–up, modernization of area radiation monitoring instrumentation and
flow meters. A new irradiation facility in the reactor shield tank was described.

Ms N. Ramli (Malaysia) presented a poster on refurbishment and upgrading projects

carried out to improve the safety and long–term availability of the PUSPATI TRIGA reactor.

32
 Mr R Schickler (USA) discussed reflector replacement at the Oregon State
University TRIGA reactor. The original reflector had filled with water, leading to reduced
neutron fluxes in exterior beam ports and reduced core excess reactivity. A new, water–tight
reflector was installed, and other preventive maintenance work was carried out to improve
operation of the reactor.

SESSION E: SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND DECOMMISSIONING

Seven papers were presented in this session, including 1 invited and 3 oral
presentations, plus 3 poster presentations. Oral presentations of Session E covered spent fuel
management, transition from operation to decommissioning, implementation of
decommissioning, and safety assessment related to the different types of research reactors
and fuels.

Mr C. Karhadkar (India) presented an invited paper on behalf of Mr. R.C. Sharma,

in which the transition from shutdown and decommissioning of the research reactor CIRUS
was discussed. CIRUS was the first large reactor in India for production of radioisotopes,
testing of materials, fundamental research and human resource development. It was
permanently closed at the end of 2010, after a two year transition period. During the
transition, experiments in the reactor were completed, some experimental facilities moved to
other reactors, fuel utilization was optimized and redeployment of personnel planned.
Planning also included preparation of procedures, technical specifications and obtaining
regulatory approval for shutdown. After shutdown, the core was unloaded, although some
SSCs continued in operation. Heavy water was removed, the in–core pressurized loop was
removed and staffing reduced. Access controls were maintained as before. A
decommissioning organization has been set up. A radiological characterization has been
performed, and estimates of radioactive waste volumes and activity prepared. Deferred
dismantling has been selected as the decommissioning option, with a deferral period of 15–20
years to allow decay of 60Co. The site being within the BARC campus will not be released to
the public domain, but may be used for another laboratory or facility in future.

Ms S. Kanamori (France) discussed the safety assessment of the OSIRIS reactor and
the decision for final shutdown at the end of 2015. The main outcomes of a review of safety
of OSIRIS included that the reactor building is not designed to withstand an airplane crash or
external explosion; the approach used in safety demonstration should be updated; and that
improving the gas tightness of the containment would significantly reduce noble gas and
iodine release in a ‘Borax–type’ accident. The French regulatory authority (ASN) decided
that OSIRIS should be shut down in 2015. However, CEA requested an extension to 2019 to
avoid a gap in medical radioisotope production until availability of the Jules Horowitz reactor
in 2019. The government informed the CEA at the end of July 2015 that the decision of a
final shutdown of OSIRIS in 2015 was maintained.

Mr G. Nabkhtiani (Georgia) discussed decommissioning of the Georgian research

reactor. Decommissioning was accomplished under several TC projects. The selected strategy
was core entombment in place. All fuel, fresh and spent, was removed and sent out of
Georgia. The core region in the reactor tank was entombed by underwater concreting. Also,

33
decommissioning involved dismantling the primary and secondary cooling systems,
dismantling the connection to the cryogenic station and dismantling the cryogenic station
itself. Waste management was a challenge due to large volumes and possibility of liquid
wastes. A project to install a small neutron source reactor into the existing reactor tank is still
under consideration.

Mr L. Ramanathan (Brazil) reported on development of coatings for safe long–term

wet storage of Al–clad spent fuels. This work was motivated by the fact that there are over 64
000 spent research reactor fuel elements in wet storage. Over 90% of these assemblies are
clad with Al or Al–alloys, and are susceptible to pitting corrosion. Many countries have no
clear plans for reprocessing or otherwise disposing of this spent fuel. A chemical coating
appears to be the only solution to protection from pitting corrosion. Numerous trials of
various coatings were conducted over a period since 2007. It has been found that a process
involving simple immersion in several solutions to form a cerium–containing hydrotalcite
(HTC) coating on Al alloys increases significantly the pitting corrosion resistance of the
alloy. This process can be scaled–up to increase the corrosion resistance of Al–clad spent RR
fuel assemblies during long term wet storage.

SESSION E: POSTER PAPERS

Three posters provided addressed topics of decommissioning and waste management.

Mr X. Masseau (France) presented a poster addressing management of the transition

from definitive shutdown to dismantling of the Phenix sodium–cooled fast reactor, including
regulatory aspects, the periodic safety review and the authorization process for dismantling.

Mr F. Foulon (France) and co–authors presented a poster that addressed

decommissioning of the ULYSSE reactor, including the various tasks involved in the period
between shutdown and the decommissioning decree. Waste management during the
dismantling was also discussed.

Mr G. Mank (Germany) and co–authors (France and USA) described the

management and technical strategy under development for disposal of the graphite–based
fuel from the German HTR reactor, including investigation of how to ship the fuel to the US
and development of a method for digesting the fuel for reprocessing.

SESSION F: NEW RESEARCH REACTOR PROJECTS

Thirteen papers were presented in this session; including 1 keynote, 2 invited and 6
contributed oral papers, plus 4 poster presentations.

Papers, Part 1

Mr A. Borio di Tigliole (IAEA) gave the statistics of new research reactor projects
and the status of guidance document publication and review missions. The IAEA ‘milestone’
approach for research reactors was found in Nuclear Energy Series Report NP–T–5.1. Thirty

34
Member States were planning new research reactors, 13 of which were working on their first
research reactor project. Seventeen States were at Phase 1 (consideration); 6 were at Phase 2
(preparatory work); and 8 were at Phase 3 (implementation). Guidance for strategic planning
and for preparing the feasibility study for a research reactor was forthcoming. The Integrated
Research Reactor Infrastructure Assessment (IRRIA) service would also start in 2016. Mr
Borio presented also the new IAEA–developed International Centres based on Research
Reactors (ICERR) scheme to facilitate establishment of bilateral relations between Member
States for nuclear capacity building and R&D projects. The French CEA was the first
organization designated as an ICERR. Mr. Borio emphasized that even a low power RR
requires establishment of an adequate national nuclear infrastructure to ensure safe, secure
and effective construction and operation of the facility. Such infrastructure, even if to a lesser
extent, was similar to the infrastructure required for a nuclear power programme. Under–
estimating the national commitments related to development of such infrastructure might
seriously compromise the success of the research reactor project. The IAEA did not
encourage or discourage the construction of new RRs but offered assistance to Member
States, upon their request and with a holistic approach, to take an informed decision on the
feasibility of such projects. Once the decision to proceed was taken by a Member State, the
IAEA also offered assistance, through several different means (often through technical
cooperation projects) for safe and secure construction, operation as well as effective
utilization of such facilities.

In an invited paper, Mr H. Blaumann (Argentina) gave a detailed description of the

technical and safety requirements for the new RA–10 reactor of CNEA constructed by
INVAP. The safety approach emphasized defence–in–depth and maintenance of safety
functions, with consideration of design basis events outlined in Safety Requirements NS–R–4
and extreme external events. Siting studies included seismic, hydrology and aircraft crash.
SSCs are classified according to importance to safety and acceptance criteria formulated
according to the classification. In Argentina regulations require compliance with risk–based
criteria, so a PSA is essential. An extensive external event safety assessment was conducted
based on the information provided by the site evaluation; this evaluation led to raising the site
1 meter to accommodate possible flooding. Mr. Blaumann also discussed technical
requirements and design objectives for the reactor.

Mr J. Perrotta (Brazil) talked about the status and future plans for the RMB project
of Brazil. The RMB reactor would be the centrepiece of a new research centre located at
Ipero, 110 km from Sao Paulo. The design was based on the OPAL reactor in Australia. Its
principal purpose would be isotope production combined with neutron beams research. Mr
Perrotta reported that the conceptual and basic designs were finished and the environmental
permitting and licensing activities for a construction permit were being conducted. However,
the budget for the project was not all available. More support from the government and the
local people were needed.

35
 Mr A. Tuzov (Russian Federation) explained the background, characteristics,
international cooperation scheme and status of the MBIR project which was being conducted
by Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR) in Dimitrovgrad. The MBIR was a 150
MW (t) sodium–cooled fast reactor intended to be the centrepiece of an international research
centre. It was scheduled for commissioning in 2020. Mr Tuzov reviewed the design of the
reactor, the heat transport system and experimental facilities. He reported that the foundation
plate pouring was completed in September 2015, a sign of smooth start of the construction
phase.

Papers, Part 2

Mr I–C. Lim (Republic of Korea) presented an invited paper on a Feasibility Study

for a New Research Reactor Project, where he addressed the scope of the feasibility study,
the general content of the feasibility study report and presented an example of the feasibility
study for the KJRR. He emphasized that newcomers should pay close attention to
infrastructure issues in a feasibility study. Mr Lim also reported the status of KJRR project,
including qualification of new high–density U–Mo LEU fuel. The KJRR was now 43%
implemented. Irradiation of a lead test assembly started one week ago in the Advanced Test
Reactor (ATR) in the USA; the target burnup was 65% average and 85% peak. The basic
utilization of the KJRR would be radioisotope production and silicon doping, but some
elements in the design were included to have additional capability later but not taken into
consideration in the feasibility study.

Mr I. Rotaru (Romania) discussed the role of a research reactor in the development

of the national infrastructure for nuclear science and technology. In addition to their
applications in research, isotope production, imaging and neutron activation analysis,
research reactors can have a large contribution in education and training in all areas of
nuclear technology. In countries having nuclear power, as programmes matured the role of
research reactors in job–specific training decreased; full–scope simulators were now the main
tool for nuclear power plant operator training. For embarking countries, a research reactor
could help to build confidence in nuclear technology, build capacity and public acceptance.
Having a research reactor was good, but not mandatory; its value to the nuclear power
programme might diminish once the power plant is in operation.

Mr M. Gurisha (Tanzania) discussed development of supporting infrastructure for a

new research reactor project in Tanzania. Developing a research reactor was a primary
instrument to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and National Vision 2025. For
Tanzania the main issues were: legislative and regulatory framework, radiation protection,
human resources development, stakeholder involvement, site survey and selection,
radioactive waste management, which were being shaped with the IAEA assistance through
TC project. There was a need for research reactor in Tanzania because the facility would have
an impact in every aspect of social and community development. It would contribute to a
country’s scientific and educational resources, raise living standards through improved health
care, industrial and agricultural productivity, and pave the way to the utilization of nuclear
energy. It would be an extraordinary tool with capabilities that include training of scientists

36
and engineers, research and technology, testing of materials, radioisotope production (for
industrial and medical applications), and other commercial applications.

Mr J. Lu (People’s Republic of China) addressed the design of miniature neutron

source reactor (MNSR) with LEU core, which was an improved version for medical and
scientific application with an enhanced epithermal beam for boron neutron capture therapy
(BNCT). An overview of the design features of the new MNSR with LEU core was
presented. The fuel was more closely packed, leading to better safety and a harder neutron
spectrum. Fuel was UO2 at 13% enrichment. Actual power for the new facility was 30 kW
but it was expected to increase to 45 kW.

Mr N. Waeckel and Mr G. Bignan (France) jointly presented a paper on the key

role of materials testing reactors in support to nuclear industry. They gave an example of the
Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR) and the ICERR scheme. In–pile testing was required to ensure
that fuel elements withstand normal operation and the transients to which they may be
exposed. Design and safety margins were challenged by new fuel management schemes, new
design standards and specific safety issues to be accounted for in safety analysis. Improved
modelling, calculation tools and testing, safety design methods and an improved fuel product
could generate additional margin to accommodate the challenges. The JHR was expected to
provide a facility for in–pile simulation of normal and accident conditions and satisfy these
needs of the industry. Mr Bignan reported on the status of the JHR and preparing the JHR
international community, including the annual seminar, three working groups, the secondee
programme and the recent ICERR designation by the IAEA. The ICERR centred on the JHR
would serve as an international resource for better utilization and sharing of research reactor
facilities, in particular to the countries without such capabilities.

SESSION F: POSTER PAPERS

Ms J. Lupiano (Argentina) presented a summary of the thermal/hydraulic design of
the COQUI reactor, which was a set of two twin 10 MW reactors for radioisotope production
now in the preliminary design stage (Phase 2).

Mr T. Sembiring (Indonesia) presented the status of research reactors operated by

BATAN in Indonesia and a conceptual design of new multipurpose reactor in Phase 1.

Mr B. Munkhbat (Mongolia) showed a conceptual study of a research reactor for

radioisotope production to meet the local needs of Mongolia.

Mr H. Chae (Republic of Korea) presented the design characteristic of KJRR and its
implementation status, which was in Phase 3.

SESSION G: SECURITY OF RESEARCH REACTORS

Twenty–one papers were presented in this session including 1 invited, 4 contributed
oral papers and 16 poster presentations.

37
 In an invited paper, Mr D. Ek (USA) discussed how the changes in the global threat
environment raised concerns about nuclear security. In response, international community
steadily improved the concepts and approaches to nuclear security, leading to establishing
risk–informed security levels for research reactors stemming from a performance–based
approach. He outlined the relationship between safety and security events and the resulting
security development, and described the resulting risk–based nuclear approach to security
management. The effectiveness of three fundamental security system capacities – detection,
delay and response – can be achieved by the individual robustness of each of these three
fundamental capacities against the adversary; the efficiency of integration of these three
capacities for all adversary scenarios; and the effectiveness of the systematic approach to
security management, which includes quality controls. He discussed the introduction of
design basis threats, a more structured approach to sabotage analysis, methods to effectively
address insider adversaries, a quantified and performance–based system vulnerability
assessment approach and a security risk management approach to inform decision makers.
This improvement is a result of collaboration by international community and has resulted in
a mature, systematic, and structured approach to nuclear security management. Mr Ek
emphasized three points: not all adverse consequences are unacceptable and that all
unacceptable consequences require security resources; all unacceptable consequences are not
equal and a graded approach is necessary; and the likelihood of unacceptable consequences
cannot be reduced to zero and some risk is acceptable. Attempts by an adversary cannot be
controlled, but their success can be controlled. Nuclear security has common objectives with
nuclear safeguards – to protect the material.
Mr E. Ryan (Australia) described a new Agency technical guidance document for
research reactors and associated facilities (RRAFs), Nuclear Security Management for
RRAFs, which builds on the recommendations of INFCIRC–225, Rev. 5 and Security of
Radioactive Sources. Nuclear security was a key part of the Integrated Management System
(IMS) of the facility. The facility IMS incorporated the overall facility organization
management components in a single framework or structure. The Nuclear Security
Management System (NSMS) was practices for executing and monitoring the Nuclear
Security Programme. NSMS components were operations, processes and security forces. The
NSMS interfaced with processes in the Facility IMS – importantly safety.

Mr J. Lolich (Argentina) addressed safety considerations when implementing

security at RRAFs. Nuclear security and nuclear safety shared the same ultimate goal: to
protect individuals, the public, and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing
radiations. The activities that addressed nuclear safety and security had different focus and
sometimes actions that were taken in one area can have implications for the other one.
Nuclear safety and nuclear security were similar, but they were not identical. Safety and
security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security
measures did not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security. A
safety/security interface was needed. Appropriate application of design concepts and criteria
for nuclear safety and good operational safety practices would enhance the protection against
sabotage. Specific attributes in some areas related to nuclear safety and nuclear security
might lead to conflicts in the implementation of the relevant activities. This conflict should be

38
managed by proper coordination of the methods and approaches, and operating practices
through the RRAFs lifetime. Access and operations by emergency teams must be facilitated
for safety reasons, but access to certain areas must be permanently controlled.

Ms R. Leitch (USA) presented an overview of international policies and tools for

protecting against radiological sabotage in nuclear and radiological facilities. The paper
highlighted the role and responsibilities of competent authority and site operator regarding
vital area identification process protecting sabotage and cooperation among the entities for
mitigation measures. She introduced several PC–based user tools for sabotage analysis and
radiological assessment.

Mr G. Heo (Republic of Korea) introduced a method for cyber security risk

evaluation using event trees (ETs) and a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) for cyber security
of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in research reactors. The paper proposed
using event trees to deduce the critical I&C assets in various hazard scenarios and a Bayesian
Belief Network to quantify models based on qualitative values. Mr. Heo noted USNRC
Regulatory Guide 5.71.

SESSION G: POSTER PAPERS

Mr E. Ryan (Australia) presented a poster on developing a security plan. The poster

described essential information and relevant guidance to be included in preparation.
Additionally, it explained that the level of detail and depth of content should be
commensurate with the category of facilities and material to be protected.

Ms E. Susilowati (Indonesia) presented a poster on the nuclear security management

system to be implemented at the GA SIWABESSY RR. The poster described how adequate
security management by way of an early and continued safety/security interface allows an
efficient security programme.

Mr D. Ek and co–authors (USA) presented a poster on the adversary threat

environment and its impact on nuclear security. This poster described the inadequate process
of using open–source data in developing a threat assessment (TA) which in–turn is used to
determine a facility’s physical protection regime. The poster also alluded to the opinion that
the typical physical security regime is static and may not be adequate for today’s dynamic
threat environment.

Mr D. Ek and co–authors (USA) presented a poster that describes the various

benefits of table top exercises in identifying gaps in security systems, incorrect assumptions
made by operators and first responders about each other’s actions and differences in
understanding between responder agencies, and help identify ways to mitigate vulnerabilities.

Mr D. Ek and co–authors (USA, Australia, and IAEA) presented a poster on a

coordinated research project (CRP) on strengthening research reactor security. The poster
described the benefits and process (topics) for Member States conducting a Coordinated
Research Project (CRP).

39
 Mr D. Ek and co–author (USA) presented a poster discussing the similarities and
differences between safety analysis and sabotage analysis. The poster described how safety
and sabotage analysis both benefit a facility and explained the potential differences between
the two. It also described the difference in maturity between the two analyses.

Ms M. Williams (USA) presented a poster on a practical assessment of a facility

nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) system for nuclear security. The poster
described the benefits and criteria related to the IAEA guidance for NMAC security.

Mr T. N. Bonner (USA) presented a poster on a table–top methodology for

addressing the insider threat. The poster described the benefits and process of performing
table– top exercises in evaluation of measures against an insider threat.

Mr T. Edmunds (USA) presented a poster on insider threat analysis and mitigation in

research reactors. The poster described the dangers associated with insider threats and a
process for performing various analyses to develop an effective insider threat mitigation
programme.

Ms M. Williams (USA) presented a poster on steps to be taken to protect against the

insider threat. The poster described the benefits of an insider threat mitigation programme to
protect the NMAC and the availability of IAEA guidance in assisting in establishing effective
insider threat mitigation programmes for facilities.

Mr R. Anderson (USA) presented a poster on the need for cyber–informed

engineering expertise for research reactors. The poster described the potential vulnerabilities
of digital equipment and the need for cyber security in facilities.

Mr D. Stanford (USA) presented a poster on radiological sabotage training based on

the IAEA recommendations in INFCIRC 225, Rev. 5. The poster described the benefits of the
PNNL–developed radiological training course for facility managers and operators tasked with
implementing the IAEA recommendations.

Ms R. Leitch and co–authors (USA) presented a poster on ‘worst–case unacceptable

radiological consequence (URC) evaluation, using QLRAM. The poster describes the
benefits, capabilities and limitations of using QLRAM software to perform ‘worst–case’
dispersion analysis which allows users to determine credible threats from a sabotage event.

Mr R. Hoffman (USA) presented a poster that described the differences in the cyber
security environment between commercial power reactors and research reactors and the
potential cyber security risks to research reactor facilities as a result of these differences.

Mr S. Datres (USA) presented a poster on commercial off–the–shelf technology that

could be used as a force multiplier at research reactors. The poster described commercially
available, cost–efficient technology that would allow facility security and responders to use
cellular phones for communications in providing an effective response to a malicious act.

40
 Mr G. White (USA) presented a poster discussing simple institutional and user best
practices that can be applied to computer– and network–based systems for industrial control,
physical protection, and material control and accounting in order to improve cybersecurity.

41
SUMMARY OF PANEL SESSION4
The final panel session of the Conference was chaired by Mr P. Adelfang (Argentina),
and included the Conference Rapporteur Mr L. W. Deitrich (USA) and expert panellists: Mr
H. Abou Yehia (France); Mr A. Bychkov (Russian Federation); Ms T. Ivanova
(OECD/NEA); Mr N. Ramamoorthy (India); and Mr G. Storr (Australia).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr Deitrich presented the draft of the Conference Conclusions and
Recommendations to the assembled participants. Participants were invited to submit
comments and additions through the Conference ‘app’ for consideration for inclusion in the
final meeting report. The final Conclusions and Recommendations are found above.

STATEMENTS OF THE EXPERT PANELLISTS

Mr Abou Yehia highlighted three positive and important aspects of progress in
safety. The first aspect was the increased application of the provisions of the Code of
Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, such as the performance of periodic safety
reviews (PSR) and the implementation of effective ageing management programmes. The
second positive aspect was the safety improvements resulting from the safety re–assessments
performed in light of the Fukushima–Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, in
particular in the capabilities of the facilities to withstand beyond design events and in safety
management, including regulatory oversight and emergency preparedness and response. The
third positive aspect was the improved awareness of national authorities and organizations
concerning the challenges associated with the establishment of a first research reactor. These
challenges were related to the necessity of capacity building and establishment of sound
safety and regulatory infrastructures in compliance with the Code of Conduct and supporting
IAEA Safety Standards.

Mr Bychkov addressed three important aspects of the Conference. First, it was a

pleasure to see the presentations on new research reactor (RR) projects. The Jules Horowitz
Reactor, MBIR and others would bring new opportunities for future R&D and innovative
nuclear technologies. It was very important that these instruments are created as international
projects from the beginning. The key role of the Agency was to facilitate access of scientists
and engineers from many countries to these prospective instruments through regional
coalitions and ICERRs. Second, stable and safe operation and utilization of the current
research reactor fleet was a key instrument for capacity building for many countries.
Establishing new research centres based on research reactors was a valuable step for
development of national nuclear programmes and safety culture education. Nuclear industries
and national scientific communities needed a lot of trained specialists in different fields. The

4
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the named authors, participants and session’s
chairmen and do not necessarily represent the views of the IAEA, its Member States or of the nominating
organizations.

42
role of the Agency here was also crucial. Newcomer Member States could choose a
traditional research reactor, a simple neutron source or an innovative accelerator–driven
system. Whatever the choice, the national programmes with research reactors provided a
good school for engineers, designers, regulators, radiation protection specialists, scientists
and others. Third, new IAEA instruments in combination with existing ones and other
support systems could provide a unique service for Member States: to prepare a strategic and
qualified decision before establishing new nuclear centre or laboratory. As a former head of
the big research centre (RIAR–Dimitrovgrad) who managed during the crisis period, Mr
Bychkov highlighted that all decisions related to research reactors should be made after
comprehensive analysis. The world economy was not stable and financial support of national
R&D programmes could be stopped or reduced unexpectedly. There was a statement about
Uzbekistan reactor that the Government decided to stop it. All new projects, new upgrading
and conversion programmes should be initiated only after detail consideration. It was noticed
that the IAEA proposed now a number of institutional instruments for Member States in order
to prepare for an informed decision.

Ms Ivanova highlighted the role of research reactors as an important source of the

experimental data contributing to the extensive knowledge preservation programme and joint
projects coordinated by the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency. With the new trends in nuclear
science and engineering, the need for integral experiments at large scale remained a high
priority including certificated experimental data and benchmarks for validation in reactor
physics, nuclear data, multi–physics and multi–scale simulations, experimental tests of
fundamental properties and performance for advanced core materials and components, and
fuel behaviour, as well as differential and integral data for support of minor actinide
management technology. Although the operational flexibility of most research reactors and
on–going modernization of the current fleet reported on the conference allowed addressing
the major needs identified for the nuclear industry, it has been recognized that specific
actions were required through international collaboration in order to pool resources, identify
qualified facilities and measurement techniques.

Mr Storr addressed safety and security issues in research reactors. He expressed his
support to the good management and leadership, because good management and leadership
will invariably lead to great outcomes in a business. For the research reactor community that
translated to reliable operations and great utilization of our reactors. The maturation of the
approach in nuclear security where it became an activity that was systematic and integrated
into operations has been discussed in this Conference. This integration means that the
interface between safety and security requires awareness, then understanding, followed by
practice in making sure that safety and security issues received the attention and treatment
they deserved. Practical examples and experiences that could be shared using the graded
approach in safety and security and how the interface between safety and security issues was
managed would lead to benefits for operators and regulators of research reactors. Looking to
the future, it was clear that for new facilities which were being designed and built and
existing facilities which were operating and undergoing upgrades cyber–security would be a
key factor in operations and utilization. Finally, good leadership leverages human capital and

43
resources – and in safety and security the culture of RR staff was paramount in helping to
protect RR facilities from accidents and threats.

Mr Ramamoorthy noted that the successful conduct and outcome of the 2015
International Conference was the culmination of the efforts of the (international) Technical
Programme Committee (TPC) and of the IAEA Secretariat. As the Chair of the TPC, he
conveyed his appreciation for the successful conduct of the event and thanked the Co–
Members of TPC, many of whom were in attendance at the Conference, for their fine
contributions. The topical Session on ‘Common Management Considerations (CMC)’ has
been instituted for the first time in this Conference series by the TPC to highlight the need
and importance of integrated management of all aspects and activities of research reactor
organizations. Establishing and implementing an Integrated Management System (IMS)
would be the key in this context. An IMS aids achieving an effective interface and smooth
overlap between inter–connected and inter–related management functions, as for example,
O&M of the research reactor vis–à–vis ageing management vis–à–vis utilization; and safety
and security of the facility. All stakeholders in research reactor organizations derived benefits
from the IAEA’s support and services – most of which were directed towards addressing
CMC and delivered through cross–cutting activities planned and implemented by the IAEA
Secretariat, along with expertise of Member State academia and industry called upon as
required for specific domain competencies. It was imperative to continue to nurture and
further strengthen such cross–cutting activities and services. Repeated reference made to the
IAEA documents and publications in almost all the presentations at this Conference was yet
another endorsement of the high utility and value of these IAEA products to the entire
research reactor community and associated stakeholders, be they operators, academia,
regulators, Government, etc. The research reactor community looked forward to the
continued delivery of IAEA publications and their periodic revisions and update as needs
aroused.

DISCUSSION
One participant suggested that guidance for PSR for research reactors be emphasized
because the only Agency guidance available was for nuclear power plants.

It was also suggested that the research reactor community paid more attention to spent
fuel disposition, because the fuel take–back programmes would end and the issue would
return with urgency.

Another participant reported that a license condition for his facility requires a
combined periodic safety and security review. This would require early preparation, since this
was a new undertaking and it was not clear how to address it. It was also noted that effective
coordination among the reviewers was important, especially if they were from different
government agencies.

With respect to application of the graded approach, another participant suggested that
the Agency needed to go farther into interpretation and application of the concept than was

44
currently available. The principle was known but application in practice was difficult. A
comprehensive document would be useful. The Conference also noted that a Technical
Meeting on the graded approach was being organized for May 2016.

One participant noted that the research reactor user community was not well–
represented at the Conference and suggested that an effort be made to increase involvement
of this community in future Conferences.

Finally, the Chair noted with pleasure the outstanding level of cross–cutting
coordination in the research reactor programmes and the culture of cooperation that has
developed in the Agency.

45
CLOSING SPEECH5

J. C. Lentijo
Deputy Director General
Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of the IAEA Director General, I thank you for your participation in this, the
fifth quadrennial International Conference on Research Reactors: Safe Management and
Effective Utilization. I am especially pleased that more than 300 participants from 56
Member States are here. A total of 74 papers have been presented orally, along with 74 poster
presentations. The large attendance and number of papers reflects a strong interest in
exchange of information and experience, and a healthy desire to learn from one another and
to continue improving.

The Conference has covered a comprehensive list of topics, ranging from new reactor
projects and common management considerations, through utilization, applications, operation
and maintenance of the existing reactors, to spent fuel management and decommissioning,
plus the overarching considerations of safety and security. This wide variety of topics
demonstrates the broad interests and concerns of the world–wide research reactor community.
The Conference programme included 5 keynote presentations from the IAEA staff, which
summarized the Agency’s work in the various topic areas, along with the documents and
services available to the Member States. I invite you to take advantage of these services.

The Secretariat is pleased at the renewed interest in new research reactors, especially
in countries that want a first research reactor as an important tool for development of the
human resources and infrastructure necessary for a future nuclear power programme. I
encourage these countries to make use of the Agency’s resources to ensure that new reactors
and adequate infrastructure make use of international best practices and guidance, including
the IAEA Safety Standards, to ensure a high level of safety and security, along with effective
and utilization.

During this week, we have heard of progress in many important areas: safety and
security, use of research reactors in education and training, scientific and industrial
applications, maintenance practices and core fuel conversion to LEU. However, issues and
challenges remain. Some of these include: lack of new fuel for TRIGA reactors and
continued challenges in development of LEU fuel for high–performance research reactors;
completion of safety reassessments in light of the Fukushima–Daiichi NPP accident and
implementation of needed improvements; ageing of many research reactors, with the
potential impact on safety and reliability and supply of important medical isotopes; and lack
of planning for decommissioning in many cases. As always, the Secretariat stands ready to
assist the Member States in working to address these issues and challenges.

5
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the IAEA’s Deputy Director General and do not
necessarily represent the views of the IAEA or its Member States.

46
 Preparation of this Conference has been a “one–house” undertaking. In particular, I
want to recognize the three Scientific Secretaries Mr Andrea Borio di Tigliole, Mr Danas
Ridikas and Mr Amgad Shokr, and Ms Martina Neuhold of Conference Services were
instrumental in organizing the Conference. Special thanks go to the members of the Technical
Programme Committee and to all the speakers and poster presenters for your effort. Without
you, we could not have had this successful Conference.

Once again, I thank you for your participation in this Conference, and I wish you a
safe and pleasant journey home or wherever your travels may take you.

47
SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE SIDE EVENTS6

Side Event 1: IAEA Support to Education and Training Based on Research

Reactors
Side event 1 provided an overview of the IAEA’s education and training activities on
safety, operations, maintenance and utilization of research reactors with emphasis on
activities that directly involved the use of research reactor facilities. About 40 conference
participants representing operating organizations, regulatory bodies and State governments
attended the event. Mr R. Altamimi (Jordan) related experience with the Eastern European
Research Reactors Initiative (EERRI), which used research reactors in Austria, Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia for theoretical and hands–on training of students from
around the world. Mr F. Foulon (France) presented the capabilities and opportunities
available with the Internet Reactor Laboratory (IRL) centred on the CEA–ISIS research
reactor in France, which internationally broadcasts reactor physics experiments online. Mr W.
Kennedy (IAEA) reported on regional workshops on regulatory supervision, which includes
simulated inspections of research reactors in the host countries. Mr A. D’Arcy (IAEA)
introduced new IAEA training packages covering safety of operations and operational
radiation protection to be published in 2016.

The participants’ feedback indicated that IAEA should continue to develop and
promote education and training activities based on research reactors, with the greatest interest
being in expanding access to existing activities such as EERRI and IRL (or creating similar
activities in other regions), providing activities that were relevant to regulatory bodies and
reactor designers and increasing activities of a cross–cutting nature, such as computer codes
and models for research reactor analysis.

Side Event 2: IAEA Assistance to New Research Reactor Projects

Side event 2 on IAEA assistance to new research reactor (RR) projects was well
attended with some 30 participants joining the event. The main objective was to highlight the
assistance that the IAEA offers to Member States embarking on new RR projects, to share
lessons learned from the new RR projects and to obtain feedback on the IAEA services
offered to its Member States. The presentation by Ms A. Zhukova (IAEA) covered the
IAEA’s milestones approach; a companion presentation by Mr D. Sears (IAEA) covered
specific safety considerations in different phases of a new RR project. The invited speakers
included Mr G. Bignan (France), Mr K. Abu Saleem (Jordan) and Mr M. Gurisha (Tanzania),
who reported on their new RR projects, which covered a broad range of power levels and
different phases/stages. The invited speakers shared their experience and highlighted the main
challenges of the new RR projects their country. The lessons learned and feedback
highlighted the importance of strong stakeholder support, suitable site selection, a robust

6
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the named authors, participants and session’s
chairmen and do not necessarily represent the views of the IAEA, its Member States or of the nominating
organizations.

48
feasibility study, and adherence to the IAEA Safety Standards during all phases of the
project.

It was highlighted that an RR project is a major undertaking that requires careful

preparation, planning, implementation and investment in time, money, and human resources.
New RR projects need to be justified based on the national and/or regional needs for RR
services, a robust utilization programme, availability of a suitable site, and full awareness of
and national commitment to establish the necessary safety and technical infrastructure. The
Member State were suggested to develop a comprehensive understanding of the obligations
and commitments involved, and ensure that there was a long term national strategy and
resources available to discharge these obligations. Establishment of the safety infrastructure
would need to start early in the process and be achieved progressively during different phases
of the project. Safety infrastructure was best achieved through the effective application of the
IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors and the supporting Safety
Standards.

In concluding remarks, Mr A. Borio di Tigliole highlighted that the IAEA offered

assistance to Member States, upon their request and with a holistic approach, to take an
informed decision on the feasibility of such projects. The participants’ feedback indicated
that IAEA needed to continue to assist Member States in establishing the infrastructure using
a phased approach that was matched to the needs of the project, and to support the
achievement of associated milestones for each phase of the project.

Side Event 3: IAEA Assistance to Addressing Research Reactor–based

Radioisotope Production Issues
Side event 3 was attended by some 35 participants. The IAEA presentation by Mr J.
Osso Junior covered the resources, mechanisms and initiatives available to support Member
States in radioisotope production and supply. Mr N. Ramamoorthy (India) emphasized the
different approaches to get the assistance, evaluating the real needs of the country and the
possible routes of production, including alternative pathways. Mr V. de Villiers of the World
Council on Isotopes (WCI) expressed the need for an approach to promotion of radioisotope
utilization, focusing on radioisotopes employed also in other applications, not only medical.

During the discussions, the important role of the IAEA in advising and providing
support to Member States in the production and supply of radioisotopes for several
applications was highlighted. It was emphasized that the support needed to reach the regions
and not only the specific individual countries and expand cooperation and joint actions to
address the demand–supply chain, including continued cooperation with the OECD/NEA.
Furthermore, the side event participants recommended that IAEA needed to provide enlarged
assistance covering all the radioisotope production–supply chain, from the preparation and
irradiation of the targets, going through the processing, waste management, quality control
and assurance and regulatory issues, both radiological– and health–related.

49
ANNEX
CONTENTS OF THE ATTACHED CD–ROM

The attached CD–ROM contains the technical programme of this Conference as well
as all papers and posters presented. The reader needs to click on GO button or Index of the
CD–ROM to view its contents and navigate through the available documents.

============

51
@ No. 25

ORDERING LOCALLY
In the following countries, IAEA priced publications may be purchased from the sources listed below or
from major local booksellers.
Orders for unpriced publications should be made directly to the IAEA. The contact details are given at
the end of this list.

CANADA
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd
22-1010 Polytek Street, Ottawa, ON K1J 9J1, CANADA
Telephone: +1 613 745 2665  Fax: +1 643 745 7660
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.renoufbooks.com

Bernan / Rowman & Littlefield

15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214, USA
Tel: +1 800 462 6420 • Fax: +1 800 338 4550
Email: [email protected] Web site: www.rowman.com/bernan

CZECH REPUBLIC
Suweco CZ, s.r.o.
Sestupná 153/11, 162 00 Prague 6, CZECH REPUBLIC
Telephone: +420 242 459 205  Fax: +420 284 821 646
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.suweco.cz

FRANCE
Form-Edit
5 rue Janssen, PO Box 25, 75921 Paris CEDEX, FRANCE
Telephone: +33 1 42 01 49 49  Fax: +33 1 42 01 90 90
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.form-edit.com

GERMANY
Goethe Buchhandlung Teubig GmbH
Schweitzer Fachinformationen
Willstätterstrasse 15, 40549 Düsseldorf, GERMANY
Telephone: +49 (0) 211 49 874 015  Fax: +49 (0) 211 49 874 28
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.goethebuch.de

INDIA
Allied Publishers
1st Floor, Dubash House, 15, J.N. Heredi Marg, Ballard Estate, Mumbai 400001, INDIA
Telephone: +91 22 4212 6930/31/69  Fax: +91 22 2261 7928
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.alliedpublishers.com

Bookwell
3/79 Nirankari, Delhi 110009, INDIA
Telephone: +91 11 2760 1283/4536
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.bookwellindia.com
ITALY
Libreria Scientifica “AEIOU”
Via Vincenzo Maria Coronelli 6, 20146 Milan, ITALY
Telephone: +39 02 48 95 45 52  Fax: +39 02 48 95 45 48
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.libreriaaeiou.eu

JAPAN
Maruzen-Yushodo Co., Ltd
10-10 Yotsuyasakamachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160-0002, JAPAN
Telephone: +81 3 4335 9312  Fax: +81 3 4335 9364
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.maruzen.co.jp

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Scientific and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety
107140, Moscow, Malaya Krasnoselskaya st. 2/8, bld. 5, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Telephone: +7 499 264 00 03  Fax: +7 499 264 28 59
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.secnrs.ru

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bernan / Rowman & Littlefield
15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214, USA
Tel: +1 800 462 6420 • Fax: +1 800 338 4550
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.rowman.com/bernan

Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd

812 Proctor Avenue, Ogdensburg, NY 13669-2205, USA
Telephone: +1 888 551 7470  Fax: +1 888 551 7471
Email: [email protected]  Web site: www.renoufbooks.com

Orders for both priced and unpriced publications may be addressed directly to:
Marketing and Sales Unit
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna International Centre, PO Box 100, 1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: +43 1 2600 22529 or 22530 • Fax: +43 1 2600 29302 or +43 1 26007 22529
Email: [email protected] • Web site: www.iaea.org/books
17-22851
 Research Reactors:
Safe Management and Effective Utilization

Summary of an International Conference

16–20 November 2015, Vienna, Austria

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA
ISBN 978–92–0–105117–2
17-22851

ISSN 0074–1884