IAEA Radiological Crime Scene Management

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.
22–G
Implementing Guide
Radiological Crime Scene

Management
Jointly sponsored by
IAEA, ICPO-INTERPOL, UNICRI
@
IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES
Nuclear security issues relating to the prevention and detection of, and response
to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving, or directed at, nuclear material,
other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities are addressed in the
IAEA Nuclear Security Series. These publications are consistent with, and complement,
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the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
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guidance set out in the Implementing Guides. They focus on details of how to implement
the necessary measures.
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RADIOLOGICAL CRIME
SCENE MANAGEMENT
IMPLEMENTING GUIDE
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTAN GHANA OMAN

ALBANIA GREECE PAKISTAN
ALGERIA GUATEMALA PALAU
ANGOLA HAITI PANAMA
ARGENTINA HOLY SEE PAPUA NEW GUINEA
ARMENIA HONDURAS PARAGUAY
AUSTRALIA HUNGARY PERU
AUSTRIA ICELAND PHILIPPINES
AZERBAIJAN INDIA POLAND
BAHAMAS INDONESIA PORTUGAL
BAHRAIN IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF QATAR
BANGLADESH IRAQ REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
BELARUS IRELAND ROMANIA
BELGIUM ISRAEL RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BELIZE ITALY RWANDA
BENIN JAMAICA SAN MARINO
BOLIVIA JAPAN SAUDI ARABIA
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JORDAN SENEGAL
BOTSWANA KAZAKHSTAN SERBIA
BRAZIL KENYA SEYCHELLES
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
BULGARIA KUWAIT SINGAPORE
BURKINA FASO KYRGYZSTAN SLOVAKIA
BURUNDI LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC SLOVENIA
CAMBODIA REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA
CAMEROON LATVIA SPAIN
CANADA LEBANON SRI LANKA
CENTRAL AFRICAN LESOTHO SUDAN
REPUBLIC LIBERIA SWAZILAND
CHAD LIBYA SWEDEN
CHILE LIECHTENSTEIN SWITZERLAND
CHINA LITHUANIA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG TAJIKISTAN
CONGO MADAGASCAR THAILAND
COSTA RICA MALAWI THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
CÔTE D’IVOIRE MALAYSIA REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
CROATIA MALI TOGO
CUBA MALTA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CYPRUS MARSHALL ISLANDS TUNISIA
CZECH REPUBLIC MAURITANIA, ISLAMIC TURKEY
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
OF THE CONGO MAURITIUS UKRAINE
DENMARK MEXICO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
DOMINICA MONACO UNITED KINGDOM OF
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MONGOLIA GREAT BRITAIN AND
ECUADOR MONTENEGRO NORTHERN IRELAND
EGYPT MOROCCO UNITED REPUBLIC
EL SALVADOR MOZAMBIQUE OF TANZANIA
ERITREA MYANMAR UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ESTONIA NAMIBIA URUGUAY
ETHIOPIA NEPAL UZBEKISTAN
FIJI NETHERLANDS VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
FINLAND NEW ZEALAND REPUBLIC OF
FRANCE NICARAGUA VIET NAM
GABON NIGER YEMEN
GEORGIA NIGERIA ZAMBIA
GERMANY NORWAY ZIMBABWE
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IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES No. 22–G
RADIOLOGICAL CRIME
SCENE MANAGEMENT
IMPLEMENTING GUIDE
JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION–INTERPOL,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND
JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2014
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STI/PUB/1672
IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Radiological crime scene management : implementing guide. — Vienna :
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2014.
p. ; 24 cm. — (IAEA nuclear security series, ISSN 1816–9317 ; no. 22)
STI/PUB/1672
ISBN 978–92–0–108714–0
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Radioactive substances — Detection. 2. Radioactive substances — Security
measures. 3. Crime scenes. 4. Forensic sciences. I. International Atomic Energy
Agency. II. Series.
IAEAL14–00939
FOREWORD
by Yukiya Amano
Director General
The IAEA’s principal objective under its Statute is “to accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the
world.” Our work involves both preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and
ensuring that nuclear technology is made available for peaceful purposes in areas
such as health and agriculture. It is essential that all nuclear and other radioactive
materials, and the facilities at which they are held, are managed in a safe manner
and properly protected against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts.
Nuclear security is the responsibility of each individual State, but
international cooperation is vital to support States in establishing and maintaining
effective nuclear security regimes. The central role of the IAEA in facilitating
such cooperation and providing assistance to States is well recognized. The
IAEA’s role reflects its broad membership, its mandate, its unique expertise and
its long experience of providing technical assistance and specialist, practical
guidance to States.
Since 2006, the IAEA has issued Nuclear Security Series publications
to help States to establish effective national nuclear security regimes. These
publications complement international legal instruments on nuclear security,
such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its
Amendment, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540, and the
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
Guidance is developed with the active involvement of experts from IAEA
Member States, which ensures that it reflects a consensus on good practices in
nuclear security. The IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, established
in March 2012 and made up of Member States’ representatives, reviews and
approves draft publications in the Nuclear Security Series as they are developed.
The IAEA will continue to work with its Member States to ensure that the
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology are made available to improve the health,
well-being and prosperity of people worldwide.
EDITORIAL NOTE
Guidance issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series is not binding on States, but
States may use the guidance to assist them in meeting their obligations under international
legal instruments and in discharging their responsibility for nuclear security within the State.
Guidance expressed as ‘should’ statements is intended to present international good practices
and to indicate an international consensus that it is necessary for States to take the measures
recommended or equivalent alternative measures.
Security related terms are to be understood as defined in the publication in which they
appear, or in the higher level guidance that the publication supports. Otherwise, words are used
with their commonly understood meanings.
An appendix is considered to form an integral part of the publication. Material in an
appendix has the same status as the body text. Annexes are used to provide practical examples
or additional information or explanation. Annexes are not integral parts of the main text.
Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information contained
in this publication, neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for
consequences which may arise from its use.
The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any
judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of
their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.
The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as
registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed
as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background (1.1–1.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Objective (1.5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scope (1.6–1.8). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Structure (1.9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO A NUCLEAR

SECURITY EVENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
General (2.1–2.6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Notification and response system activation (2.7–2.12). . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Radiological crime scene management (2.13–2.16). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Forensic examination (2.17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Investigative activities (2.18–2.25). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Public information (2.26–2.27). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. FRAMEWORK FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE

MANAGEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
General (3.1–3.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Roles and responsibilities of the integrated command structure
(3.4–3.12). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Roles and responsibilities of on-scene/operational personnel
(3.13–3.35). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Specialized personnel (3.36–3.39). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
General (4.1–4.2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Scene control (4.3–4.7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Common hazards risk assessment (4.8–4.14). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Risk reduction procedures (4.15–4.24). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Forensic evidence management (4.25–4.54). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Release of scene (4.55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
After-action review (4.56–4.59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. PREPAREDNESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
General (5.1–5.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Basis for preparedness (5.4–5.7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Plans and procedures (5.8–5.12). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Equipment (5.13–5.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Information resources and management (5.21–5.24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Training (5.25–5.26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Drills and exercises (5.27). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Sustainability (5.28–5.30). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE . . . . . . . . 51
General (6.1–6.4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Areas of cooperation and assistance (6.5–6.11). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Development of arrangements for assistance (6.12–6.13). . . . . . . . . . . 55
APPENDIX I: SAMPLE FORMS USED FOR RADIOLOGICAL

CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
APPENDIX II: HAZARDS COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED

AT CRIME SCENES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
ANNEX I: TYPES OF EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR USE

AT A RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
ANNEX II: INTERPOL CBRNE TERRORISM PREVENTION

PROGRAMME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
DEFINITIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
1. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
1.1. A site associated with a nuclear security event may contain trace evidence
of activities believed, or alleged, to have included a criminal or intentional
unauthorized act involving nuclear or other radioactive material. Such a site is,
in the context of this publication, called a radiological crime scene. It is essential
to ensure that all actions at the radiological crime scene are carried out in a way
that maintains the integrity of the criminal investigation and that all relevant
criminal investigative procedures are applied through effective radiological
crime scene management.
1.2. Radiological crime scene management is the process used to ensure safe,
secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other
radioactive material are known, or suspected, to be present. These operations are
similar to those used to manage a conventional crime scene (i.e. a crime scene
without the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material). However, the
conduct of operations at a radiological crime scene differs from the conduct of
operations at most other crime scenes with respect to the need to control:
(a) Time spent in the hazard control areas;

(b) Distance between the evidence contaminated with radionuclides and the
individual collecting the evidence;
(c) Radiation shielding between the evidence and the individual collecting
the evidence;
(d) Radionuclide contamination;
(e) Individual radiation exposure.
The degree to which each of these factors will apply depends on the radioactive
material present, as detailed in Section 4.
1.3. Management of a crime scene includes the process of ensuring the orderly,
accurate and effective collection and preservation of evidence so that it may
be used in the context of legal proceedings. It is assumed in this guidance
on radiological crime scene management that intentional unauthorized acts
involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control have
been criminalized [1–3]. In the absence of laws criminalizing such acts, the
unauthorized acts involving these materials might not themselves constitute
crimes requiring investigation, although other crimes may have occurred.
1
1.4. There are interfaces between nuclear security, radiation safety and nuclear or
radiological emergency response that need to be considered for the management
of a radiological crime scene. In particular, law enforcement operations, radiation
protection procedures and emergency response activities should be applied
simultaneously and in a coordinated manner at a radiological crime scene.
OBJECTIVE
1.5. The objective of this publication is to provide law enforcement officials,

national policy makers, decision makers, local authorities and technical support
personnel with guidance on the framework and the main functional elements for
radiological crime scene management so that they may be adopted or adapted
to meet the needs of the various jurisdictions and competent authorities within
each State.
SCOPE
1.6. This publication focuses on the framework and functional elements for
managing a radiological crime scene that are distinct from any other crime scene.
It assumes that States have a capability for managing conventional crime scenes.
States needing guidance on conventional crime scene operations are encouraged
to take advantage of published resources, such as in Refs [4–7].
1.7. The scope of this Implementing Guide is limited to radiological crime scene
management. It addresses the actions needed at a radiological crime scene in order
to collect and preserve evidence, but does not cover other aspects of a criminal
investigation. This publication provides guidance on the interface of criminal
investigation with the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material, and
the use of nuclear forensic examination in support of investigations, but does not
address any of these topics in detail. This publication does not address the legal
framework that supports the management of a radiological crime scene, nor does
it address the nuclear security detection architecture [8] or the nuclear forensic
characterization of nuclear and other radioactive material [9]. It also does not
address detailed aspects of radiation protection and emergency response in
radiological crime scene management. These aspects are covered in other IAEA
publications [10–24].
1.8. This publication does not provide specific guidance on procedures for
dealing with casualties at a radiological crime scene or for the collection and
2
disposition of human remains. General guidance on best practices for collecting
human remains is provided by the International Committee of the Red
Cross [25]. States needing guidance on disposition of evidence contaminated
with radionuclides or radioactive material from a radiological crime scene are
encouraged to consult other relevant IAEA publications [9, 17, 18].
STRUCTURE
1.9. Following this introduction, Section 2 presents an overview of the process

for investigating a nuclear security event. Section 3 addresses the framework for
radiological crime scene management, describing roles and responsibilities of an
integrated command and control structure and on-scene operational personnel.
Section 4 describes the conduct of operations at a radiological crime scene.
Section 5 presents the general responsibilities associated with preparedness
needed to manage a radiological crime scene. Section 6 discusses international
cooperation and assistance. Appendix I provides samples of the types of forms
that might be used in radiological crime scene management and Appendix II
outlines examples of hazards that might be encountered at crime scenes. Annex I
discusses types of detection, protective and other equipment that might be used
at a radiological crime scene, and Annex II provides some details of International
Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL programmes relevant to the subject
of this publication.
2. OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO

A NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT
GENERAL
2.1. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear

security event. Evidence collection at radiological crime scenes may share a wide
range of characteristics with that of conventional crime scenes, such as evidence
search patterns, geographical scene modelling and evidence recording (see
Section 3), whether or not explosives are involved.
2.2. A radiological crime scene may contain nuclear or other radioactive

material that is either intact or dispersed. Scenarios in which nuclear or other
radioactive material may be intact include, for example:
3
(a) Radioactive material or a radiological dispersal device (RDD) involving
explosives or any other dispersal mechanism that has not functioned;
(b) A radiation exposure device (RED) that is shielded or has been inactivated;
(c) Nuclear material or an improvised nuclear device (IND) that has
not functioned;
(d) Nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control that is being
illicitly trafficked;
(e) Acts of sabotage of nuclear and other radioactive material, associated
facilities or associated activities that have not dispersed the material.
2.3. Scenarios in which the nuclear or other radioactive material may be

dispersed include, for example:
(a) Dispersion of radioactive material by an RDD using explosives or any other

dispersal mechanism;
(b) An unshielded and activated RED;
(c) Explosion of an IND;
(d) Radionuclide contamination of a food chain, a water supply network,
cosmetic or pharmaceutical products or other consumables;
(e) Acts of sabotage causing dispersion of nuclear or other radioactive material.
2.4. The effective management of these scenarios requires a national response

system for managing a nuclear security event to be in place.1 A national response
system for managing a nuclear security event is an essential part of a State’s
nuclear security infrastructure. Managing the radiological crime scene is also an
integral part of law enforcement investigations needed to support any future legal
proceedings in relation to the nuclear security event.
2.5. Response systems are integrated sets of response measures, which are
intended to assess an instrument alarm or an information alert and to respond to a
nuclear security event [3]. A national framework for managing nuclear security
events should take into account and be coordinated with the national arrangements
for preparedness and response for natural and technological disasters, including
nuclear or radiological emergencies [13]. The response system of a State should
ideally be documented in a national response plan for managing nuclear security
1
In this context, ‘response’ refers to those security related actions that might be needed
to respond to the nuclear security event itself (e.g. recovering material, disabling a device,
collecting and analysing evidence or pursuing perpetrators), as distinct from consequence
management response actions (e.g. lifesaving, evacuation, decontamination, embargo of areas,
population monitoring and registration).
4
events [3]. The response to nuclear security events comprises two phases:
assessment and management (see Fig. 1). The first phase is a continuation of the
initial assessment of an instrument alarm or an information alert if that initial
assessment is inconclusive. The second phase of the response is the management
of the nuclear security event through the execution of the national plan. This
execution comprises:
(a) Notification of the nuclear security event;

(b) Activation of the response system;
(c) Radiological crime scene management;
(d) Forensic examination.
2.6. Figure 1 illustrates a generic flow of actions to be implemented in response

to a nuclear security event.
NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE SYSTEM ACTIVATION
2.7. Upon detection of nuclear or other radioactive material through an

instrument alarm or an information alert, the relevant competent authority should
initiate procedures with the objective of interrupting the potential criminal or
intentional unauthorized act that has nuclear security implications [3]. In parallel,
Reporting Declaration & notification
Crime scene
management
Detection Assessment Confirmation Activation &
forensic
examination
Assessment phase Management phase
Response phases
FIG. 1. Two phases of response to a nuclear security event.

5
.7. Upon detection of nuclear or other radioactive material through an instrument alarm or an
nformation alert, the relevant competent authority should initiate procedures with the objective of
Reporting Declaration & notification
a law enforcement investigation into the act(s) should also commence. Figure 2
illustrates a generic scheme of actions for investigation of a nuclear security
event, from the time of detection of an instrument alarm or information alert until
Crime scene
the forensic examination, which may lead to the institution of legal proceedings.
management
Detection Assessment Confirmation Activation &
2.8. An instrument alarm or an information alert should lead to an initial forensic
examination
assessment, the results of which may determine whether or not a nuclear security
event has occurred. If the initial assessment is inconclusive, then a detailed
assessment should be carried out to arrive at a definite conclusion. The outcome
of the assessment process could be the determination that a nuclear security event
has occurred, or the instrumentAssessment
alarm may phase
be determined to have been innocent phase
Management
or false, or the information alert may be determined to be false.
Response phases
2.9. The outcome of the initial assessment should be reported to the competent
authority designated for this purpose in the national plan for managing nuclear
security events, for example a national operations and analysis centre [8]. Upon
a conclusive assessment, the designated competent authority should initiate the
management phase of the response by declaring the occurrence of the nuclear
2.7. Upon security
detection of nuclear
event, notifyingorrelevant
other radioactive material
authorities and through
activating an instrument
appropriate plans andalarm or an
procedures.
nformation alert, This activation
the relevant competentincludes using
authority a graded
should approach
initiate [3] inwith
procedures whichthetheobjective of
appropriate level of response is activated.
nterrupting the potential criminal or intentional unauthorized act that has nuclear security
2.10.
mplications [3]. InIfparallel,
a nuclear security
a law event isinvestigation
enforcement declared, scene
into control
the act(s)procedures (seecommence.
should also
paras 4.3–4.7) should immediately be established by first responders and, as
Figure 2 illustrates a generic
applicable, scheme
by other of actions
competent for investigation
authorities. As in anyof a nuclear
natural security
disaster, event,
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otherofevent,
ime of detection traces are left
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transient and fragile
the forensic nature
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of those traces, their reliability and the preservation of their physical integrity
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institution of legal
to a very largeproceedings.
extent on initial actions at the scene [4].
LEGAL
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS
Crime scene Forensic

Detection Assessment Confirmation Activation
management examination
PUBLIC INFORMATION
FIG. 2. Generic scheme of actions for responding to a nuclear security event involving
FIG. 2. Generic scheme of actions for responding to a nuclear security event involving radiological crime scene
radiological crime scene management, from detection to possible legal proceedings.
management, from detection to possible legal proceedings.
2.8. 6
An instrument alarm or an information alert should lead to an initial assessment, the results of
which may determine whether or not a nuclear security event has occurred. If the initial assessment is
nconclusive, then a detailed assessment should be carried out to arrive at a definite conclusion. The
2.11. Upon notification, the relevant competent authorities (such as local or
national response organizations) should promptly initiate pre-planned and
coordinated actions appropriate to the nuclear security event in accordance with
the national plan for managing nuclear security events.
2.12. In summary, upon a conclusive assessment that a nuclear security event has
occurred, the following immediate actions should be undertaken:
(a) Establishment (by the first responders) of perimeter control procedures in

parallel to other immediate actions at the scene;
(b) Reporting (by the first responders) of the possible occurrence of a nuclear
security event to the relevant competent authority;
(c) Declaration of a nuclear security event by the designated
competent authority;
(d) Activation of the response system by notification of relevant
competent authorities;
(e) Initiation of pre-planned and coordinated actions at the radiological crime
scene and other places in connection with the nuclear security event.
RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT
2.13. The primary goals of a crime scene investigation are to establish what
has happened (crime scene reconstruction), to collect and examine evidence
in a timely manner in order to develop investigative leads to prevent potential
additional crimes, and to identify and prosecute those involved or suspected. This
is done by carefully documenting the conditions at a crime scene and recognizing
all relevant physical evidence. The ability to recognize and properly collect
physical evidence is crucial to both solving crimes and prosecuting perpetrators.
2.14. At its most basic level, a radiological crime scene is a location where either
a criminal act involving nuclear or other radioactive material has taken place
or is suspected to have taken place, or it is a location where traces or evidence
related to such an act have been found. The act, the subject of the radiological
crime scene, may be an unauthorized possession of nuclear or other radioactive
material. However, the scene may be made more complex by other factors such
as the detonation of explosives with the intention of deliberately dispersing
nuclear or other radioactive material in a populated area.
7
2.15. A nuclear security event should be managed in such a way that:
(a) All subsequent actions at the scene are conducted so as to ensure the
integrity of the criminal investigations.
(b) All relevant criminal investigative procedures are applied.
(c) The safety and security of all personnel involved and the general public
takes precedence over the integrity of evidence and preservation of its later
admissibility in a courtroom setting.
Special attention should be paid to the importance of securing the crime scene in
order to prevent any destruction or cross-contamination2 of physical evidence as
well as for protection of responding personnel and other individuals. In addition,
the radiological crime scene should be managed in a way that takes into account
the possible presence of multiple hazards (see Appendix II).
2.16. Figure 3 illustrates a set of pre-planned and coordinated actions to be

conducted from the identification and notification of a nuclear security event, to
the submission of evidence and subsequent release of the scene.
FORENSIC EXAMINATION
2.17. Nuclear forensics is one element of the broader investigation into a nuclear
security event. It is an iterative process that aims to answer questions regarding
the nature, history and origin of nuclear and other radioactive material involved
in a nuclear security event. Nuclear forensic examinations, when combined
with other aspects of the investigation, may provide information that links the
material to people, places or events. Detailed information on nuclear forensic
examinations in support of investigations can be found in another publication (see
Ref. [9]). It is imperative that all responders are aware of the need for forensic
examinations, just as they would be aware of this need at any other crime scene.
2
In this publication, the term ‘cross-contamination’ is used to refer to the direct or
indirect transfer of extraneous material to a forensic sample or crime scene, which may reduce
the evidentiary value of the sample or of other evidence at the scene. The terms ‘contamination
with radionuclides’ and ‘radionuclide contamination’ are used to refer to radionuclides on
surfaces or within solids, liquids or gases (including the human body), where their presence
is unintended or undesirable. These terms can also refer to the process that brought about the
presence of radionuclides in such places, which may be of concern for radiological safety (and
may also affect the evidentiary value of the material that has been contaminated).
8
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
Conduct common hazards risk assessment

Nuclear Establish
security event scene Identification of nuclear or other radioactive
notified control material
Ascertain dispersion mode/pathways

Release scene
Apply danger reduction procedures from law
Initiate
Activate enforcement
common Establish hazard control areas control
response hazards
system assessment Develop: event action plan; scene safety plan;
evidence collection plan
Collect, package & manage evidence

On-scene
response Apply chain of custody procedures
measures
Transport & submit evidence for examination
Conduct after action review
PUBLIC INFORMATION
FIG. 3. Radiological crime scene conduct of operations.
FIG. 3. Radiological crime scene conduct of operations.

For this reason, care should be taken to preserve the crime scene and protect the
integrity of evidence.
FORENSIC EXAMINATION
2.17. Nuclear forensics is one

INVESTIGATIVE element of the broader investigation into a nuclear security event. It
ACTIVITIES
is an iterative process that aims to answer questions regarding the nature, history and origin of nuclear
2.18. An investigation into a nuclear security event extends beyond the
and other radioactive
radiologicalmaterial involved
crime scene in Investigative
itself. a nuclear security event.
activities Nuclear
of the typesforensic examinations,
described
when combined belowwith
should be conducted
other aspects ofclose to, but outside,may
the investigation, the radiological crime scene
provide information that links the
as near to the time of the nuclear security event as possible. Such activities are
material to people, places
normally or events. Detailed
the responsibility information agencies
of law enforcement on nuclearandforensic examinations in support
their personnel.
of investigations can be found in another publication (see Ref. [9]). It is imperative that all responders
Routine investigative activities
are aware of the need for forensic examinations, just as they would be aware of this need at any other
crime scene.2.19. Routine
For this investigative
reason, care should activities
be taken toinclude collecting
preserve the crimeitems
sceneof
andpotential
protect the integrity
evidentiary value or other items that might yield information useful to the
of evidence. investigation, noting that the perpetrators may have used residences, vehicles
and possibly assembly sites in preparing for the act. Examples include recording
INVESTIGATIVE
devices thatACTIVITIES
might help identify individuals or vehicles entering or exiting the
scene and that might help in reconstructing the path taken by the nuclear or other
radioactive material. Examples of potential sources of digital evidence include:
2.18. An investigation into a nuclear security event extends beyond the radiological crime scene
desktop, laptop and tablet computers (as well as data storage devices associated
itself. Investigative activities of the types described below should be conducted close to, but outside,
the radiological crime scene as near to the time of the nuclear security event as possible.
9 Such
activities are normally the responsibility of law enforcement agencies and their personnel.
Routine investigative activities

with these computers), cell phones, global positioning system (GPS) devices,
security and surveillance cameras, traffic cameras, portable media players and
digital cameras.
2.20. Appropriate personnel should also take statements and pursue other
investigative activities aimed at obtaining evidence, in accordance with national
procedures for criminal investigations, from individuals in the vicinity of the
radiological crime scene who may have witnessed events leading up to, during or
immediately following the nuclear security event.
Investigative activities requiring assistance from nuclear or radiation

specialists
2.21. Most investigative activities are essentially the same as those for other
crime scenes and are not unique to the investigation of a nuclear security event. A
unique factor may, however, be the need for specialist knowledge of the chemical,
physical and isotopic properties of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Such
expertise might be beyond that possessed by many law enforcement agencies, but
could be obtained from national resources such as nuclear regulatory bodies, other
government agencies, universities, industries and laboratories involving nuclear
or other radioactive material, or through international cooperation and assistance
(see Section 6). The expertise might help investigators to formulate questions
for prospective witnesses, and understand the relevance of the responses that
are received.
2.22. Specialists in nuclear forensics or radiation protection might brief

investigators on the value of ascertaining whether witnesses noticed:
(a) A radiation warning trefoil placard or similar hazard warning displayed on

any items;
(b) Instruments, such as Geiger–Müller radiation detectors, or dosimeters
associated with a person or persons;
(c) Protective gloves, boots, suits or respirators in use or being acquired for
potential use;
(d) Specialized containers, such as those used for transport or storage of
radioactive material;
(e) Unusual occurrences of illness or injury suggestive of radiation exposure,
such as skin reddening, blisters or vomiting;
(f) Any material emitting heat or radioluminescence in the absence of external
heat or a light source.
10
2.23. Specialists might also assist law enforcement personnel and other
investigators by assembling images, such as those of typical or representative
radiation symbols, detectors, protective equipment and transport and storage
containers, so that these images might be shown to prospective witnesses. Such
images can be collected in advance of any nuclear security event and incorporated
into the national plan.
Investigative activities for determining national and international security

implications
2.24. In order to analyse the nuclear security implications of a nuclear security

event, it is essential that relevant data be collected and provided in a timely
fashion to the responsible competent authorities. The data could include:
(a) Description of the radiological crime scene and the causes, impacts and
possible longer term consequences of the nuclear security event;
(b) Information on the suspected perpetrators;
(c) Data on the identification of the nuclear or other radioactive
material involved.
2.25. Based upon the above data, investigative activities should be performed to
determine the nuclear security implications for the State and other States, and
the application of relevant procedures for notification of interested international
intergovernmental organizations.
PUBLIC INFORMATION
2.26. A nuclear security event is likely to be of keen interest to national

governments and local authorities. If news of an event is disseminated by the
media, there will also be heightened public interest [26]. Effective, timely and
clear communication within the government and with news media outlets and
the public is essential and should be performed as part of the management of a
radiological crime scene [3].
2.27. Prior to the occurrence of a nuclear security event, effective

communication should be established among the various ministries and relevant
competent authorities of the national governments and local authorities, as
well as for news media outlets and the general public. Spokesperson(s) for
communication with news media outlets and the general public need(s) to be
11
designated. A communications team should be in place, with well defined roles
and responsibilities.
3. FRAMEWORK FOR RADIOLOGICAL

CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT
GENERAL
3.1. The management of a radiological crime scene needs an integrated

command structure (also referred to as an integrated command, control,
coordination and communication system) with clear responsibilities for decision
making at different levels. While such a command structure would be largely
similar to that for conventional crime scene management, it should provide for
additional considerations to ensure that:
(a) The safety of the public and of all persons associated with the crime scene
is ensured in a manner that reduces the risks associated with radiation
hazards to the extent reasonably achievable [13, 23, 24].
(b) The collection of evidence in the presence of nuclear or other radioactive
material is done safely and securely in a manner that, whenever possible,
avoids compromising the investigative value of the evidence.
(c) Seized nuclear or other radioactive material is placed under regulatory
control or is otherwise managed to guard against any further unauthorized
activities in relation to that material.
(d) Wherever possible, actions in the crime scene are oriented in a way that
prioritizes the removal of the radioactive material.
3.2. The integrated command structure needs to be understood by all involved

personnel and periodically exercised.
3.3. Managing radiological crime scenes is complex, involves multiple

competent authorities and may extend across local and national jurisdictions.
There may also be an international component resulting from a State’s
obligations under relevant international legal instruments. Depending on the size
and magnitude of the nuclear security event, there may be multiple crime scenes
linked to the event. Therefore, an integrated command structure needs to include
national, local and on-scene levels of command.
12
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE
3.4. The adoption of an integrated command structure is essential for achieving

effective radiological crime scene management. The structure is likely to be most
effective if implemented in a flexible manner, while maintaining its efficiency
and its multidirectional flow of information.
3.5. The structure will typically have three levels associated with radiological
crime scene management:
(a) National/strategic command level;

(b) Local/tactical command level;
(c) On-scene/operational command level.
This design allows for the flow of information from one level to the next through
a designated primary point of contact at each level. This design also allows for
horizontal communication within each level.
3.6. Effective management of a crime scene involving radioactive material

demands coordination at the strategic, tactical and operational levels ensuring
that all parties understand their roles and responsibilities and are kept advised of
developments. Figure 4 shows a diagram of the functional relationships of these
levels as they relate to a radiological crime scene.
National/strategic command level
3.7. The national response plan for managing nuclear security events (referred to
below as ‘the national response plan’) should establish three levels of command.
The first level is the national/strategic command level. The following roles and
responsibilities should be assigned to this level of command:
(a) Ensuring the strategic and political management of the nuclear security
event in accordance with the national response plan.
(b) Establishing the strategy that will assist and provide direction to the
local/tactical command level, including national/strategic priorities for
radiological crime scene management.
(c) Establishing a mechanism to manage requests for, coordination of and
assessment of additional information pertaining to the nuclear security
event received from other departments and agencies.
13
COMMAND STRUCTURE
STRATEGIC AREA National

Public info flow (instructions)
command
Strategic planning
Interagency International
coordination cooperation
coordination
Legal advice
Release Information
Reachback expert management
capabilities
TACTICAL AREA SECURED

AREA
Control and
command post Access
Law Bomb squad control
enforcement
Exit
Meeting point control
Local
commander
Forensic
Medical care
Heliport
Radiation protection Emergency
Exit
services Access
control control
OPERATIONAL SECURED
ON-SCENE/OPERATIONAL LEVEL
AREA AREA
Scene
modeller
Public info flow (source)
Safety Hazardous materials

Ancillary specialist operations specialist
equipment Radiological Evidence recovery
assessor personnel
Photographer
Exit Access
control control
Decontamination
station
Contamination
control
HAZARD CONTROL AREA
FIG. 4. The integrated command structure for radiological crime scene management.
(d) FIG.
Establishing a briefing
4. The integrated process
command to for
structure ensure that senior
radiological crime government officials
scene management.
are regularly informed on the progress and magnitude of the nuclear security
National/strategicevent and its effect
command level on the affected population and local infrastructure. These
regular communications might be conducted on a pre-determined, periodic
3.7. basisresponse
The national accordingplan
to afor
schedule established
managing nuclearin security
the national response
events plan. to below as ‘the
(referred
national response plan’) should establish three levels of command. The first level is the
14
national/strategic command level. The following roles and responsibilities should be assigned to this
level of command:
(a) Ensuring the strategic and political management of the nuclear security event in
(e) Providing expert legal advice to the local/tactical and on-scene/operational
levels to ensure compliance with applicable legal requirements concerning
crime scene operations and the collection of evidence.
(f) Determining the need for and the coordination of international cooperation
and assistance.
(g) Managing public information and provision of guidance to the local/tactical
command level.
(h) Securing personnel and financial resources as well as logistical support.
3.8. The national/strategic command level may include senior personnel from
competent authorities and support organizations that have a vested interest in any
particular nuclear security event.
Local/tactical command level
3.9. The next level in the national response plan for managing a nuclear security
event should be the local/tactical command level. The following roles and
(a) Implementing the relevant measures of the national response plan selected
by the national/strategic command level;
(b) Establishing tactical directions for on-scene/operational command level,
such as local/tactical priorities for radiological crime scene management;
(c) Establishing the mechanism for ensuring that the national/strategic
command level is regularly informed on the progress and magnitude of
the nuclear security event and its effect on the affected population and
local infrastructure;
(d) Establishing a decision making structure to ensure that directions received
from the national/strategic command level with respect to managing public
information are followed;
(e) Allocating resources for crime scene and ancillary operations;
(f) Requesting additional support for operations, as needed.
3.10. The local/tactical command level includes personnel from the competent
authorities and support organizations that have been designated roles and
responsibilities in relation to the nuclear security event.
15
On-scene/operational command level
3.11. The third level in the national response plan for managing nuclear security
events is the on-scene/operational command level. The following roles and
(a) Providing on-scene/operational direction to the personnel responding to the

nuclear security event in a manner that is compliant with recognized health
and safety practices;
(b) Ensuring that the local/tactical command level is regularly informed on the
progress and magnitude of the nuclear security event and its effect on the
affected population and local infrastructure;
(c) Executing directions received from the local/tactical command level with
regard to radiological crime scene management;
(d) Ensuring that information relevant to the developing criminal investigation
is reported in a timely manner to the relevant law enforcement agencies.
3.12. The on-scene/operational command level includes personnel from the

competent authorities and support organizations that have been designated roles
and responsibilities in relation to the nuclear security event.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ON-SCENE/

OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL
3.13. The roles and responsibilities of personnel operating at or near a

radiological crime scene are similar to those of personnel operating at or near any
other crime scene. The inherently hazardous nature of a crime scene involving
radioactive material is likely to necessitate additional knowledge, equipment and
conditions for certain personnel. All on-scene/operational personnel fulfilling
their roles and responsibilities at a crime scene involving radioactive material
should be protected in accordance with the requirements of IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation
Sources: International Basic Safety Standards [15]. However, if a nuclear or
radiological emergency is declared, the responding personnel should be regarded
as emergency workers and protected in accordance with Refs [14, 23]. Additional
specialized personnel would be needed to address the hazards associated with the
nuclear or other radioactive material.
3.14. Essential functions for radiological crime scene management related to

on-scene/operational personnel are described on the following pages.
16
3.15. Particular functions of on-scene/operational personnel are often fulfilled
by one person, such as the on-scene/operational commander or the hazardous
materials operations specialist, but a group or team of specialists might assume a
particular role and responsibility. The number of people needed to fulfil particular
roles and responsibilities will be dictated by scene specific factors, such as the
expected duration of operations, the physical area to be searched for evidence
and the complexity of the tasks to be performed. Sample forms for use by these
personnel are presented in Appendix I.
On-scene/operational commander
3.16. The most senior official with decision making authority at the scene
automatically assumes the role of the on-scene/operational commander until
confirmed or replaced as such by the local/tactical commander.
3.17. The roles and responsibilities of the on-scene/operational commander for

a radiological crime scene are essentially the same as those for any other crime
scene. He or she is designated as the lead official for all on-scene activities and,
as such, is empowered to make decisions that ensure the safety and security of
the general public as well as crime scene personnel. The roles and responsibilities
typically associated with the on-scene/operational commander include:
(a) Assuming overall responsibility for the coordination of response at

the scene;
(b) Ensuring the safety and security of personnel and the public, including
designating an individual or a team of qualified personnel to address the
threat posed by unexploded ordnance and by individuals at or near the scene
(these human based threats might arise from individuals having malicious
intent or from victims of the criminal event who, as a consequence, may be
acting irrationally);
(c) Ensuring the overall security at the scene;
(d) Determining the search pattern to be used within the crime scene;
(e) Ensuring that access to the scene is controlled, including designating an
individual to log everyone entering or exiting the scene;
(f) Establishing and supervising the operational control area, recognizing that
the operational control area needs to be sufficiently large for management
of the crime scene (and the hazard control area(s) within it);
(g) Coordinating activities with other competent authorities having a role with
regard to the scene;
(h) Providing a continuous flow of information to the local/tactical commander;
17
(i) Notifying the local/tactical commander of needs for resources
and personnel;
(j) Ensuring a cooperative spirit is maintained;
(k) Ensuring effective and efficient exchange of information among all
responding personnel;
(l) Continually re-evaluating the efficiency of on-scene operations throughout
the operation;
(m) Ensuring that appropriate measures are taken to ensure that chain of
custody of all evidence is maintained and documented in compliance with
all relevant legal obligations;
(n) Releasing the scene to an identified competent authority in accordance with
national and local practices after a final survey and inventory of evidence
is completed.
3.18. The on-scene/operational commander should establish and maintain an

administrative worksheet to maintain awareness of on-scene activities. Such
a document is described in Appendix I, and sample generic administrative
worksheets are given in Figs 5, 6 and 7.
3.19. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of the on-scene/operational

commander that apply specifically to a radiological crime scene should include:
(a) Ensuring that any nuclear or other radioactive material at the scene is
placed under proper control by a relevant competent authority.
(b) Recognizing the need for examination of items collected at the scene. These
items include both nuclear or other radioactive material and any items of
possible value to the investigation.
(c) Notifying relevant organizations and laboratories of the pending delivery
of items of evidence collected from the scene and of the possible or known
presence of radionuclides associated with these items.
(d) Ensuring that special attention is paid to the safety of personnel and the
public on the scene considering the actual or suspected presence of
radioactive material.
Hazardous materials operations specialist
3.20. The roles and responsibilities of a hazardous materials operations specialist

are similar to those at any other crime scene where hazardous materials are
known, or suspected, to be present. However, the exact nature of the duties of the
hazardous materials operations specialist will differ according to the nature of the
18
hazardous material. The roles and responsibilities typically associated with the
hazardous materials operations specialist include:
(a) Identifying hazardous materials and monitoring the scene for the presence
of hazardous situations and conditions;
(b) Coordinating with the safety specialist (see paras 3.22 and 3.23) on
developing and implementing mitigation techniques for dealing with these
same hazardous situations and conditions, and planning and supervising the
initial entry into the crime scene (see paras 4.16–4.23);
(c) Coordinating with the on-scene/operational commander to ensure that all
personnel on the scene are informed of the presence of these hazardous
situations and conditions and of appropriate ways of managing them.
3.21. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of the hazardous materials

operations specialist that apply specifically to a radiological crime scene
should include:
(a) Establishing and supervising hazard control areas;

(b) Ensuring the conduct of radiation monitoring at the scene;
(c) Establishing safety objectives for personnel conducting operations in
areas where nuclear or other radioactive material is present or suspected,
and ensuring that all personnel have the understanding and capability
to fulfil their roles to meet these objectives and that they have the
appropriate equipment;
(d) Ensuring that all operations in the hazard control areas and the operational
control area are coordinated with the on-scene/operational commander to
ensure that goals are being met.
Safety specialist
3.22. The roles and responsibilities of the safety specialist for a radiological
crime scene are essentially the same as those for any other crime scene. The
presence of nuclear or other radioactive material will influence some of the tasks
performed by the safety specialist, but the safety specialist remains the primary
advisor to the on-scene/operational commander on matters of safety of all
on-scene personnel. The roles and responsibilities typically associated with the
safety specialist include:
(a) Coordinating with the hazardous materials operations specialist to identify

hazardous conditions and situations to plan and supervise the initial entry
19
into the crime scene (see paras 4.16–4.23) and to develop a plan for
mitigating these conditions and situations;
(b) Ensuring the availability of medical care for injuries, illnesses and stress on
the part of on-scene personnel, including the availability and administration
of drugs and other medications needed to deal with these injuries, illnesses
and stress;
(c) Implementing a plan for monitoring the general physical health of
on-scene personnel;
(d) Coordinating with local and national medical care centres to arrange
specialized treatment of injuries for on-scene personnel, including arranging
for the transport of personnel in need of such care.
3.23. The additional roles and responsibilities for the safety specialist that apply
specifically to a radiological crime scene should include:
(a) Advising the hazardous materials operations specialist of all aspects of

health and safety, including work–rest cycles for teams working in hazard
control areas and the selection of appropriate personal protective equipment
(PPE);
(b) Ensuring the protection of all personnel operating in hazard control areas
from exposure to all physical, chemical and environmental hazards;
(c) Coordinating with the radiological assessor (see para. 3.24) to provide
insight and advice regarding the application of the time–distance–shielding
paradigm related to the radiation safety of those personnel operating at or
near an environment where radiation is detected above background levels
(as measured off-scene);
(d) Identifying and monitoring personnel operating within hazard control
areas, including documenting and confirming both ‘stay times’ (e.g. the
time using an air supply or in an area of higher radiation exposure) and
‘work times’ (time within a hazard control area performing work);
(e) Ensuring that appropriate decontamination (the term decontamination
is used in this publication to refer to the removal of radionuclide
contamination) facilities are operational for on-scene decontamination of
personnel, equipment, evidence and other items as necessary.
Radiological assessor
3.24. The known, or suspected, presence of nuclear or other radioactive material

at a crime scene necessitates the addition of a radiological assessor to the roster
of crime scene personnel. The roles and responsibilities of the radiological
assessor apply uniquely to a crime scene involving radioactive material. The
20
radiological assessor should be suitably qualified and experienced to advise the
on-scene/operational commander on all aspects of radiation protection. The roles
and responsibilities of the radiological assessor should include:
(a) Advising the hazardous materials operations specialist and the safety
specialist on the development of hazard risk assessment and the selection
of PPE, taking into consideration scene specific factors (such as geography,
presence of debris and weather) and that these factors could change
over time.
(b) Briefing on-scene personnel on the radiological situation and necessary
protection measures.
(c) Measuring air-borne and surface radionuclide contamination and
monitoring for the presence of nuclear and other radioactive material.
(d) Identification of any radioactive material present.
(e) Measuring external dose rates.
(f) Arranging for effective radionuclide contamination control.
(g) Assisting the hazardous materials operation specialist and the safety
specialist in the establishment of hazard control areas based on potential
radiation exposure.
(h) Calculating the permissible or recommended times (stay times) for
personnel who are operating in any hazard control area.
(i) Conducting and interpreting radiation surveys in close coordination with
evidence recovery personnel in order to protect the integrity of forensic
evidence at the scene. A form used for this purpose is described in Appendix
I, and a generic radiation survey map is given in Fig. 8. Radiation detection
instruments and other tools that might be used in conducting the radiation
survey are presented in Annex I.
(j) Assisting the hazardous materials operations specialist and evidence
recovery personnel with surveying evidence as it is brought out of a hazard
control area.
(k) Coordinating with the safety specialist (see paras 3.22 and 3.23) to provide
insight and advice regarding the application of the time–distance–shielding
paradigm related to the radiation safety of those personnel operating at or
near an environment where radiation is detected above background levels
(as measured off-scene).
(l) Ensuring that personal external radiation monitoring logs and records are
maintained for all team members (a form used for this purpose is described
in Appendix I, and a generic personal external radiation monitoring log
sheet is given in Fig. 9).
21
(m) Identifying appropriate procedures for decontamination of personnel,
equipment and evidence removed from the scene and conducting
supporting measurements.
(n) Ensuring, in coordination with the safety specialist, the appropriate use of
decontamination facilities, whenever needed.
(o) Assisting in planning the collection, packaging, labelling, storage and
transport of items of evidence.
(p) Advising on the on-scene radionuclide contamination control measures and
decontamination of personnel, if needed.
(q) Ensuring that any waste items (e.g. used PPE contaminated with
radionuclides) produced at the scene are recorded and managed in
accordance with national guidelines.
Scene modeller
3.25. The roles and responsibilities of the scene modeller at a radiological crime
scene are essentially the same as those at any other crime scene. The roles and
responsibilities typically associated with the scene modeller include:
(a) Preparing a diagram of the crime scene, establishing a scale for the diagram
and geographically orienting the sketch with respect to north. A form used
for this purpose is described in Appendix I, and a generic scene diagram
form is given in Fig. 10.
(b) Marking on the diagram the locations of major items of evidence.
(c) Coordinating the naming convention used for each item of evidence with
evidence recovery personnel and the evidence recorder/custodian to ensure
consistency in the naming of such items.
(d) Annotating the diagram to indicate such things as adjacent buildings,
rooms, furniture, etc., as needed.
(e) Designating and labelling areas to be searched and advising the on-scene/
operational commander and evidence recovery personnel of appropriate
naming conventions for designated areas.
(f) Obtaining appropriate assistance for taking measurements and listing each
method of measurement selected on the diagram.
(g) Ensuring that necessary information, such as a scale (or a disclaimer
indicating the diagram is not drawn to scale), is recorded on each sketch
prepared of the crime scene.
(h) Preparing all documents related to the scene in a manner suitable for use in
any subsequent legal proceedings.
22
3.26. Fulfilling these roles and responsibilities at a radiological crime scene
is likely to be more challenging than would be the case for conventional
crime scenes. This is in part owing to the need for the scene modeller to wear
appropriate PPE while working within the hazard control areas.
Evidence recovery personnel
3.27. The roles and responsibilities of evidence recovery personnel for a

radiological crime scene are essentially the same as those for any other crime
scene. The roles and responsibilities typically associated with evidence recovery
personnel include:
(a) Planning for the identification, collection, packaging, storage and

transport of items of evidence, with advice from the hazardous materials
operations specialist.
(b) Ensuring that items of evidence deemed to be significant are photographed
in place, with and without scale, before they are collected, thereby assisting
with reconstruction of the crime scene.
(c) Keeping the on-scene/operational commander informed whenever items of
evidence deemed to be significant are found.
(d) Initialling and dating evidence (typically on the bag or other container
used for collecting evidence), noting where the item was found (typically
by reference to the sketch of the crime scene), and then releasing it to the
evidence recorder/custodian. This action is the first entry into a chain of
custody log for the particular item of evidence that has been collected.
A form used for this purpose is described in Appendix I, and a generic
chain of custody form is given in Fig. 11).
(e) Coordinating the naming conventions used for items of evidence with the
evidence recorder/custodian and the scene modeller to ensure consistency
in naming such items.
(f) Ensuring that all appropriate safety measures, as detailed in the site safety
plan, are adhered to, especially with respect to proper use of PPE.
3.28. Fulfilling these roles and responsibilities at a radiological crime scene is

likely to be more challenging than would be the case for conventional crime
scenes. This is in part owing to the fact that evidence recovery personnel need to
wear appropriate PPE while working within hazard control areas.
3.29. In addition to these roles and responsibilities, evidence recovery personnel

take on two additional duties at a radiological crime scene:
23
(a) Coordinating with the radiological assessor and the hazardous materials
operations specialist to ensure that each item of evidence is surveyed to
determine whether it is contaminated with radionuclides or whether
radiation is detected above background levels (as measured off-scene). The
resulting information can be used to ensure that all personnel potentially
coming into proximity with the evidence or with the packaging associated
with the evidence are alerted to any radiation hazard.
(b) Ensuring that each item of evidence is secured in a manner that will enable
it to pass through the control measures on exiting the hazard control area,
and the radionuclide contamination control station, with the minimum
likelihood of its potential evidentiary value being lost. This may, for
example, necessitate evidence contaminated with radionuclides being
placed into a double bag or wrapped in appropriate material prior to being
processed through the contamination control station.
3.30. Evidence recovery personnel are typically organized into teams, with each
team having a team leader. The evidence recovery team leader is responsible
for preparing the evidence collection plan (see paras 4.29–4.36). Additional
information on forensic evidence management is given in paras 4.25–4.54.
Photographer
3.31. The roles and responsibilities of the photographer for a radiological crime
scene are essentially the same as those for any other crime scene. However,
fulfilling these roles and responsibilities at a radiological crime scene is likely to
be more challenging than would be the case for conventional crime scenes. This
is in part owing to the fact that the photographer may need to wear appropriate
PPE while within hazard control areas.
3.32. The roles and responsibilities typically associated with the photographer
should include recording images (using still photography, video recording, or a
combination of both) of:
(a) The entire scene prior to the collection of any evidence. This step is vital
to faithful reconstruction of the crime scene. Such reconstruction will most
likely be needed as part of the investigation.
(b) Victims (including body parts, in the event there has been an explosion or
other event that has resulted in dismembering of victims), the public and
any vehicles on-scene or near to the scene.
(c) Major evidence items prior to their recovery or to their being moved for
any reason.
24
(d) Fingerprints, other impressions (such as shoe prints or tyre tread marks),
and blueprints, maps or any other documents visible at the scene.
3.33. The photographer will also typically seek to obtain any photographic
images available of the scene that were taken prior to the event that is being
investigated. Finally, the photographer is responsible for preparing a log detailing
each photographic image and sketching where that image was taken (a form used
for this purpose is described in Appendix I, and a generic photographic log sheet
is given in Fig. 12). As far as possible, this sketch should be coordinated with that
prepared by the scene modeller.
Evidence recorder/custodian
3.34. The roles and responsibilities of the evidence recorder/custodian for a

radiological crime scene are essentially the same as those for any other crime
scene. The roles and responsibilities typically associated with the evidence
recorder/custodian should include:
(a) Preparing the evidence recovery log (the evidence recovery log used with a
conventional crime scene is augmented by the inclusion of radiation survey
results for each item of evidence). A form used for this purpose is described
in Appendix I, and a generic evidence recovery log is given in Figs 13
and 14.
(b) Coordinating the preservation and packaging of evidence.
(c) Coordinating with the scene modeller and evidence recovery personnel
regarding the naming conventions used to describe each item of evidence.
(d) Receiving and recording all evidence.
(e) Maintaining custody and control of all evidence.
(f) Maintaining chain of custody in relation to all evidence.
(g) Coordinating transmittal of all evidence to the case investigator or to a
qualified laboratory, in accordance with relevant guidelines [9].
3.35. An additional duty of the evidence recorder/custodian at a radiological

crime scene should be to ensure that warnings regarding any radiation hazard
associated with the evidence are properly affixed and displayed. This step ensures
that all personnel transporting, receiving or otherwise handling the evidence are
made aware of the presence of radiation and any radiation hazards associated
with transporting, receiving or otherwise handling the evidence.
25
SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL
3.36. The composition of teams needed for managing a crime scene involving
radioactive material is dependent on the nature, magnitude, location and
complexity of the scene. These resources should be managed and organized at
the national/strategic, local/tactical and on-scene/operational levels.
3.37. At the national/strategic command level, these resources should comprise

senior officials from ministries, agencies and relevant authorities. At the local/
tactical command level these resources should comprise officials from the
judicial, law enforcement and other emergency services, public health, military
and scientific and technical support agencies. The resources at the on-scene/
operational command level should be similar to those for the local/tactical
command level.
3.38. These resources, organized into command levels, will take into account the
following functions, which are relevant to radiological crime scenes:
(a) Conduct of site surveys and assessment of radiation hazards;

(b) Establishment, maintenance and control of hazard control areas;
(c) Protection of personnel against radiation hazards;
(d) Radiation risk reduction;
(e) Identification, collection, packaging, storage and transport of items
of evidence containing nuclear or other radioactive material to the
forensic laboratories;
(f) Monitoring and decontamination of personnel, equipment and areas,
as needed;
(g) Decontamination of evidence contaminated with radionuclides in a manner
that avoids compromising its value to the associated criminal investigation;
(h) Containment and treatment of waste liquids, such as decontaminating
solutions, in a manner that minimizes any release to the environment;
(i) Clean-up of the site, including the containment and treatment of any
waste materials;
(j) Proper disposal of contaminated waste items in accordance with
national guidelines.
3.39. Effective management and organization of these resources should ensure

their availability at the needed location in a timely manner.
26
4. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
GENERAL
4.1. The conduct of operations at a radiological crime scene has several elements
in common with the conduct of operations at any other crime scene. The need
to protect response personnel and the public is critical and will, therefore, take
priority over collecting evidence, interviewing witnesses, taking photographic
images and preparing written records of the scene. However, the conduct of
operations at a radiological crime scene differs from the conduct of operations at
other crime scenes with respect to:
(a) Time spent in hazard control areas: Personnel at a radiological crime scene
may need to limit the time spent within designated areas where nuclear or
other radioactive material is known, or suspected, to be present. Limiting
time within such areas is necessary to protect the health and safety of
all on-scene personnel, regardless of their on-scene role. However, an
exception exists for scenes where toxic chemicals or biological pathogens
are known, or suspected, to be present. For those types of scenes, there may
be a need to limit the time spent on-scene to minimize the possibility of
accidental exposure to the chemicals or pathogens.
(b) Distance between the evidence and the individual collecting that evidence:
To the extent reasonably possible, personnel conducting operations at a
radiological crime scene should maintain a distance from any evidence
contaminated with radionuclides and/or from the nuclear or other
radioactive material itself. This is necessary in order to limit personnel
exposure to radiation.
(c) Radiation shielding between the evidence and the individual collecting that
evidence: Personnel at a radiological crime scene may need to be shielded
from radiation associated with nuclear or other radioactive material or
radionuclide contamination. Such shielding may impair the relevant
personnel’s view of items to be sketched, photographed, collected or
inventoried. At some radiological crime scenes, such shielding may need to
be within PPE worn by relevant personnel, and may restrict their mobility,
reduce their manual dexterity and inhibit their ability to communicate.
Nonetheless, radiation protection requirements need to be met by all
personnel at all times at a crime scene involving radioactive material.
27
(d) Radionuclide contamination control (surface activity concentration)3:
Measures to minimize the dispersal (or further dispersal) of radioactive
material should be implemented. These may include, but are not limited
to, the erection of barriers, damping down of particulates, access control
and decontamination lines. Continuous checking of the efficacy of these
measures is important and should include:
(i) Monitoring of air-borne radionuclides;
(ii) Monitoring of personnel and equipment entering and exiting the scene
and hazard control areas within the scene;
(iii) Monitoring the crime scene for changes in location of radiation hazards;
(iv) Monitoring of evidence and other items removed from the scene.
(e) Personnel entering a radiological crime scene should be aware of the
potential for, and trained in measures to avoid as far as possible:
(i) Intake of radionuclides;
(ii) Radionuclide contamination of PPE surfaces;
(iii) Contamination of evidence with radionuclides;
(iv) Further dispersal of radionuclides.
(f) Personnel, equipment, evidence and other items leaving the scene of a
hazard control area should be monitored in a radionuclide contamination
control station and, if needed, decontaminated in a decontamination station.
(g) Individual radiation exposure control: It is necessary to reduce, to the
extent reasonably achievable, the risk to personnel who may be exposed
to radiation or any associated chemical toxicity [15]. This may involve
trade-offs, for example, between the number of personnel involved and the
dose each may receive.
4.2. The degree to which each of these factors will apply depends on the
radioactive material present, as determined by the common hazards risk
assessment (see paras 4.8–4.14). Operations at the radiological crime scene
should be adapted to the level of the hazard(s). Generalized guidance for
conducting operations at any scene where nuclear or other radioactive material
might be present is given in Ref. [13].
3
A similar requirement for decontamination might exist for other crime scenes, such as
a scene where blood-borne pathogens might be present, but the extent to which decontamination
is applied and the manner in which it is managed differ for a radiological crime scene.
28
SCENE CONTROL
4.3. Scene control involves all those activities undertaken to manage access
into, within and out of a radiological crime scene. The overarching goals in
controlling such a scene should be:
(a) To reduce any radiation hazard and other hazards posed by a nuclear
security event to the general public and to those personnel who need to gain
access to the scene for legitimate purposes, such as evidence collection and
scene security;
(b) To establish and maintain effective control over the nuclear or other
radioactive material associated with the radiological crime scene;
(c) To preserve items of potential evidentiary value, both those that contain
nuclear or other radioactive material and those not containing such material
(which may be contaminated with dispersed radionuclides).
4.4. The primary activities undertaken for scene control are perimeter security,
traffic control and access control. In most regards, these activities are essentially
the same as those activities undertaken for other crime scenes. The important
distinction, however, is that the known, or suspected, presence of nuclear or other
radioactive material demands special attention to ensure the protection of the
public and of response personnel as well as the need to secure the nuclear or
other radioactive material.
Perimeter security
4.5. An initial step in scene control is to secure the perimeter of the crime scene.
Perimeter security is often under the jurisdiction of law enforcement personnel,
who are authorized to stop pedestrians and vehicles from entering or exiting the
scene and who can take appropriate action against those individuals or groups
who fail to obey a lawful order to stop. Perimeter security personnel need to be
integrated into the command structure, previously described.
Traffic control
4.6. Control of traffic entering, exiting and moving around a radiological crime
scene can be accomplished either in concert with establishing perimeter security
or immediately following establishment of perimeter security. As with perimeter
security, traffic control is often under the jurisdiction of law enforcement
personnel. In addition to control of surface traffic, at some scenes traffic control
29
might need to be extended to include control of air, maritime or subsurface traffic,
through the national/strategic command level or the local/tactical command level.
Scene access control
4.7. The procedures for scene access control include ensuring that anyone
entering the scene needs to pass a designated official who will determine
whether the individual can be granted access. This determination is often made
by direct consultation with the on-scene/operational commander or designated
representative or is based on a written list of personnel who are authorized to
have access to the scene (either by name or by position). Once it is determined
that scene access can be granted, the designated official will record the date and
time of entry, the name of the individual for whom access was granted, and the
purpose associated with access (e.g. evidence collection, preparing a sketch of
the scene or delivery of supplies). Similarly, the date and time are recorded when
the individual leaves the scene. In this way, an accurate log is maintained that
documents who had scene access, for what purpose and for how long. A form
used for this purpose is described in Appendix I, and a portion of a generic crime
scene entry log is given in Fig. 15.
COMMON HAZARDS RISK ASSESSMENT
4.8. The initial phase of operations at a radiological crime scene should include
an assessment of the risks associated with hazards that might be encountered at
the scene. This assessment encompasses commonly encountered hazards that
might pose a risk to the health and safety of the public or personnel conducting
operations at the scene (e.g. debris, exposed utilities or severe weather). This
assessment is known as a common hazards risk assessment and is essentially
the same as the assessment that would be performed for other crime scenes.
However, the conduct of common hazards risk assessment at a radiological crime
scene differs from an assessment at other crime scenes in that:
(a) Owing to the known, or suspected, presence of nuclear or other radioactive

material, material identification should be performed as part of the common
hazards risk assessment.
(b) The hazards need to be assessed not only for the risks they might pose to
routine operations at the scene, but also for the risks they might pose:
(i) To personnel wearing equipment to protect themselves from radiation
while at the scene;
30
(ii) Of causing uncontrolled dispersal of nuclear or other
radioactive material;
(iii) To ancillary equipment used to support operations at a radiological
crime scene.
4.9. Additionally, attention needs to be paid to the possibility of unexploded

ordnance, secondary devices and access denial devices (booby traps) as well as
any explosives associated with the nuclear or other radioactive material (e.g. as
in the case of an RDD). The tasks of locating and rendering safe any such items
are routinely performed for crime scenes by an individual or a team of specialists
designated for this task by the on-scene commander, as noted in paras 3.36–3.39.
Examples of common hazards are described in Appendix II.
4.10. The common hazards risk assessment should be used when preparing
operational plans. These plans should take into account the nature of these
hazards as well as the actions to be taken to mitigate them. Two such plans are
described below, namely the event action plan and the scene safety plan.
Event action plan
4.11. The event action plan concisely defines the actions to be taken during
the operational period. The on-scene/operational commander is responsible for
preparing the event action plan, which should specify:
(a) The overall objective of on-scene operations;

(b) Goals associated with meeting this objective;
(c) Strategies and tactics to be used to meet each goal;
(d) Task assignments;
(e) Relevant safety and medical guidance.
Scene safety plan
4.12. The scene safety plan describes the scene specific hazards as well as the risk
reduction measures to be used. The safety specialist is responsible for preparing
the scene safety plan. The scene safety plan typically specifies:
31
(a) Key safety issues for all personnel at the scene4;
(b) Scene safety goals;
(c) The safety command structure.
4.13. Scene safety goals specific to a radiological crime scene include:
(a) Minimizing the number of personnel operating in any area where nuclear or
other radioactive material is present;
(b) Avoiding physical contact with items contaminated with radionuclides or,
where such avoidance is impossible owing to the work being performed,
limiting such contact through the use of appropriate tools;
(c) Avoiding or otherwise limiting passage through areas where nuclear or
other radioactive material is present;
(d) Avoiding radionuclide contamination of persons and equipment (e.g. not
placing equipment on surfaces contaminated with radionuclides);
(e) Using the ALARA5 principle and the concepts of minimizing time,
maximizing distance and employing shielding to reduce exposure
to radiation.
4.14. Additional aspects of scene safety include:
(a) Ensuring that all personnel operating at the scene are briefed on the scene
safety plan and policies;
(b) Establishing an escape route and emergency evacuation signals;
(c) Briefing personnel on all of their tasks and responsibilities prior to entry
into the hazard control areas;
(d) Maintaining radio communications among the entry team, backup team and
the safety specialist;
(e) Prohibiting drinking, eating, smoking and elimination of body wastes until
after personnel have left the scene through the radionuclide contamination
control station and, if needed, through the decontamination station.
4
All personnel entering the hazard control areas and backup personnel who might enter
the hazard control areas need to be formed into teams having a minimum of two members. This
condition ensures that a ‘buddy’ system can be implemented, in which each person entering the
hazard control area is paired with one other person (a buddy). Each individual is directed to
look after the safety of the other person, including observing the person’s PPE for rips, tears or
other openings and watching the actions of the other person (especially the posture, walk and
speech) for signs of fatigue or heat stress.
5
ALARA stands for ‘as low as reasonably achievable’, economic and social factors
being taken into account, and is the guiding principle for the optimization of radiation protection.
32
RISK REDUCTION PROCEDURES
General
4.15. Most hazards at a radiological crime scene will be essentially the same as
those found at other crime scenes. Therefore, the risk reduction procedures will
be essentially the same. An additional risk reduction procedure at a radiological
crime scene is the implementation of radiation protection measures. These
measures include monitoring and documenting the individual radiation doses
received by crime scene personnel. Results of this monitoring will be used
in accordance with the requirements in Refs [13, 14], including comparing
individual doses to relevant dose limits. Activities conducted at a radiological
crime scene need to adhere to the relevant requirements specified in Ref. [15].
Control areas
4.16. The establishment of an operational control area and a hazard control

area will assist with the application of command and control within those areas,
and access control to those areas. The perimeters of the operational and hazard
control areas need to be established and marked to facilitate perimeter security
and scene access control.
4.17. The establishment of a hazard control area will delineate the area in which
there is intact radioactive material or contamination with radionuclides from the
rest of the operational control area. The extent and configuration of the hazard
control area will depend upon the specific situation at the scene, such as radiation
level, precipitation and wind speed and direction, and may need to be altered if
the situation changes.
4.18. Before a hazard control area can be established within a radiological crime
scene, there must be an initial entry, conducted in a controlled manner, into the
areas where nuclear or other radioactive material is, or is suspected to be, present.
When establishing a hazard control area, guidance on radiation safety perimeters
provided in Ref. [27] should be considered. This initial entry is conducted
by personnel whose actions are coordinated with the hazardous materials
operations specialist (paras 3.20–3.21), safety specialist (paras 3.22 and 3.23)
and radiological assessor (para. 3.24), and such personnel need to wear suitable
personal dosimeters and PPE (see Annex I). The tasks to be carried out during the
initial entry should include:
33
(a) Measuring oxygen and contaminant levels in the air to help determine
whether supplemental oxygen or respiratory protection is needed;
(b) Detecting the presence of air-borne and surface contamination to help
determine suitable protective measures;
(c) Measuring levels of gases and vapours in relation to their explosive range in
air to help determine whether additional safety measures will be necessary;
(d) Measuring external dose rates in the operational and hazard control areas to
help determine permissible stay times for team personnel as well as to have
an understanding of the locations with high radiation levels6;
(e) Identifying the radioactive material to help to evaluate the risks associated
with the material for first responders, law enforcement personnel and
the public;
(f) Obtaining spectral data to help identify radionuclide(s) and to increase
confidence in the material identification process (detection instruments
useful for this purpose are listed in Annex I).
4.19. At the time the initial entry is conducted, knowledge of the actual radiation
hazards and of any other hazards within the scene will be incomplete. Therefore,
this initial entry should be made cautiously, and the actions of the personnel
conducting the entry should be monitored closely.
4.20. The results of the initial entry are used by the hazardous materials operations
specialist, the safety specialist and the radiological assessor to determine:
(a) The geographical limits to the hazard control area;

(b) The types of PPE, including personal respiratory equipment, to be worn
during subsequent entries;
(c) Permitted stay times and action levels for personnel entering the hazard
control area;
(d) The presence of common hazards and mitigation techniques appropriate for
these hazards (a discussion of common hazards is given in Appendix II);
(e) The need for specialized equipment to assist in evidence collection
(e.g. to remove debris to enable access to evidence).
4.21. Further entries into hazard control areas should be made only by personnel
wearing the PPE, including personal respiratory equipment, determined to be
6
Areas having high radiation levels are to be avoided to the maximum extent practical.
If avoidance is impossible or impractical, then specific procedures will need to be implemented
to minimize time spent in such areas, to consider distance from the nuclear or other radioactive
material or to incorporate the use of shielding.
34
appropriate to the situation and for the use of which personnel have been trained
and deemed competent.
4.22. Any individual making routine entry into a hazard control area should
receive a pre-entry safety briefing and vital signs assessment. This assessment
should include taking the individual’s temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate
and blood pressure. The safety specialist, radiological assessor and hazardous
materials operations specialist will collaborate on the preparation of the briefing.
All relevant personnel will acknowledge in writing having received the briefing.
Backup teams need to be ready and available to assist. The radionuclide
contamination control station and the decontamination station will be established
prior to any entry and personnel will be informed of its location prior to entry.
Upon exit from any hazard control area and any decontamination station, a
post-entry vital signs assessment should be performed on each team member.
4.23. The entry team provides a briefing to the on-scene/operational commander

or delegate regarding the operations that they performed and the conditions that
they witnessed or measured.
Material identification
4.24. The main radionuclides in intact radioactive material or in radionuclide

contamination can usually be identified quickly and this information will help
in evaluating the risks associated with the material for first responders, law
enforcement personnel and the public [3]. This information may also help
to determine whether laws covering the unauthorized use or possession of
radioactive material may have been broken, thereby forming the basis for a
continued investigation. In some cases, material identification may lead to a
determination that no further investigation is warranted. Examples of commonly
used techniques and methods for identification are described in Annex I.
FORENSIC EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT
General
4.25. Collection of items of potential evidentiary value at a radiological crime

scene should take place following the completion of the common hazards risk
assessment and the implementation of risk reduction procedures. Forensic
evidence management at a radiological crime scene is essentially the same as it is
at other crime scenes. However, it differs in two important respects:
35
(a) The known, or suspected, presence of nuclear or other radioactive
material means that all evidence should be checked for contamination
with radionuclides.
(b) Nuclear or other radioactive material present at the scene should be
collected to contribute both to evidence gathering and to risk reduction.
4.26. Two types of items of potential evidentiary value might also represent
radiological hazards:
(a) Intact nuclear or other radioactive material itself;

(b) Other items warranting further examination using traditional or nuclear
forensic science disciplines, which are contaminated with radionuclides
(traditional forensic science disciplines include analysis of fingerprints,
DNA, explosives, fibres, paints, tool marks and digitally recorded data).
A more comprehensive discussion of these and other forensic science disciplines

can be found in Ref. [9].
4.27. Such items will need special consideration in both collection and
subsequent handling. All items seized as potential evidence from the radiological
crime scene or from any other scene of interest to the investigation should:
(a) Be recorded in an evidence recovery log;

(b) Carry a unique identifier;
(c) Be placed under chain of custody at the time of collection;
(d) Remain under chain of custody until it is no longer needed and is, at that
point, disposed of according to law as applicable.
4.28. An essential element in the effective management of forensic evidence is

the need to identify the forensic laboratory or laboratories to which evidence
should be submitted for examination. These laboratories should be designated in
advance, as described in Ref. [9].
Evidence collection plan
4.29. The evidence collection plan details the priorities for collecting items of
evidence or other samples, specifying:
(a) What is to be collected;

(b) How it is to be collected;
(c) By whom it is to be collected;
36
(d) What packaging is necessary for the collected evidence;
(e) Where and how the collected evidence is to be transported.
4.30. This plan should be based upon, among other things, the images of the
scene taken by the photographer, or otherwise made available to the team, as well
as any reconnaissance that has been conducted.
4.31. The evidence recovery team leader prepares the evidence collection plan,
assisted by personnel with knowledge of the scene or of the goals of evidence
collection at the scene. For a radiological crime scene, the radiological assessor
provides assistance in preparing the evidence collection plan. In particular, the
radiological assessor assists with those elements of the evidence collection
plan related to the nature of the nuclear or other radioactive material known, or
suspected, to be present at the scene.
4.32. Before starting evidence collection, the evidence recovery team leader
should also consult with specialists from the laboratory to which the evidence
will be transported. This consultation should aid the development of the evidence
collection plan by providing information regarding markings, labels, packaging
or similar attributes associated with nuclear or other radioactive material that
might otherwise be unfamiliar to the evidence recovery team leader, but might
be useful in identifying promising items at the scene for collection. Examples
of such potentially useful information include the use of the trefoil symbol to
designate radioactive material and the use of high-density packaging materials to
shield radioactive material, such as lead-lined storage containers.
4.33. This consultation with laboratory specialists during the development of

the evidence recovery plan may serve additional purposes. For instance, the
consultation will alert laboratory personnel to expect evidence requiring analysis,
allowing them to make the necessary preparations so that the evidence might
be processed and analysed as rapidly as possible. The consultation should also
allow the laboratory specialists to provide guidance on any laboratory specific
requirements for labelling, packaging or shipment of evidence, such as periods
when the laboratory might be unavailable to receive shipments.
4.34. Information obtained during the first entry into the hazard control area will
assist in the development of an evidence collection plan. This information also
assists in the identification of any special engineering techniques that will be
needed to facilitate the collection of evidence, such as the removal of debris or
the conduct of operations in confined spaces. Such necessary actions should be
part of the evidence collection plan. Any special requirements for packaging or
37
transport of evidence (e.g. transport of large items) will also be included. The plan
should identify any special techniques needed, such as underwater operations or
the handling of human remains.
4.35. The evidence collection plan and the briefings given to evidence collection
team members should emphasize items of evidence expected to be of special
interest for purposes of the investigation, if any. Examples include written
or printed materials that might be used to identify persons, places or things
that could be linked to the events associated with the discovery of nuclear or
other radioactive material out of regulatory control or that could indicate
plans regarding the future disposition of such material. Such material should
be a priority for investigative purposes because it could allow perpetrators to
be identified or steps to be taken to prevent further losses of nuclear or other
radioactive material.
4.36. Collecting items of evidence at a radiological crime scene may involve using
specialized equipment that is unfamiliar to evidence recovery team personnel.
Even if they are familiar with the equipment, it may be more difficult to use
while wearing PPE. Support from technical experts may, therefore, be needed.
Procedures for collection of nuclear or other radioactive material and

evidence contaminated with radionuclides
4.37. The number of personnel needed in an evidence recovery team will depend
upon the specific situation. However, there are defined roles that need to be filled
in such a team. It is important that all personnel within the team know their own
roles and responsibilities and those of the other team members before they enter
any hazard control area. This would normally be ensured through a team briefing,
carried out when the evidence collection plan is in place (paras 4.29–4.36), but
preferably before personnel are dressed in PPE.
4.38. All personnel entering a hazard control area should wear two pairs of
gloves in order that the outer pair can be disposed of and replaced when needed,
without leaving the hand exposed.
4.39. The evidence recovery team leader should take responsibility for the
effective reconnaissance of the scene, concentrating on planning for the collection
of items of evidence. The team leader should, in line with the evidence collection
plan and with the aid of any images, maps, plans or drawings that have been
produced, determine the sequence of evidence collection and discuss with the
38
team the best equipment and packaging to use for the collection of evidence or
other samples within the time available.
4.40. Specific team roles and responsibilities are assigned to the primary evidence
collector and to the assistant evidence collector. They both follow techniques to
avoid inadvertent transfer of radionuclides during the evidence collection process.
(a) The primary evidence collector is responsible for gathering evidence and
placing it into a bag or other receptacle.
(b) The assistant evidence collector is assigned the role of opening and holding
a bag or other receptacle known to be free of radionuclide contamination.
This person works closely in support of the primary evidence collector.
4.41. On entering the hazard control area, the assistant evidence collector prepares
a clean workspace on which to place items of evidence by placing a clean cloth
or similar covering over an appropriate area. This provides a working surface
area that is free of radionuclides and other possible contaminants. The container
holding the empty evidence collection bags is placed onto the covered workspace.
4.42. A waste container is placed within the workspace. This container is used for
the disposal of gloves, discarded packaging materials and other wastes associated
with the evidence collection process. A record should be maintained of the
contents of this container to assist with their disposal, which should be conducted
in accordance with national regulations or international guidelines [17].
4.43. Once the workspace is prepared, the assistant evidence collector should
prepare the bag into which the primary evidence collector will place each item of
evidence. The primary evidence collector should then place the item of evidence
directly into the bag, avoiding touching the exterior of the bag and possibly
transferring radionuclide contamination to this exterior surface.
4.44. The assistant evidence collector then seals the packaging, taking care to avoid
cross-contamination, and labels it, ensuring that the same description is written on
the bag as is recorded by the scene modeller and photographer. This first bag is then
placed into another clean bag or other receptacle in the covered workspace.
4.45. A swipe sample of the outer bag is taken and measured with a portable
contamination monitor. If the surface activity concentration (radionuclide
contamination) is above background levels, the item is placed into yet another
clean bag (i.e. a third bag) or other receptacle. Personnel need to avoid cleaning or
decontaminating the outer bag because such actions might compromise the evidence.
39
4.46. A dose rate survey of the bagged item then needs to be conducted in a low
background area. The survey results should be noted on the radioactive material
label (see Appendix I and Fig. 16).
4.47. Once an item of evidence has been collected, the evidence collectors
should change their outer pair of gloves, disposing of the gloves as contaminated
waste and using a fresh pair of gloves to continue with evidence collection,
before collecting the next item of evidence. This step minimizes the possibility
of cross-contamination. The PPE of the evidence collectors should be checked
regularly for integrity, fit and contamination with radionuclides.
4.48. The clean packaged evidence is then placed in a suitable container, which will
be placed on the covered workspace (or another cloth or covering if space permits)
to prevent the packaging from being externally contaminated. The assistant
evidence collector should carry the packaged evidence through the radionuclide
contamination control station and, if needed, through the decontamination station.
Initial forensic examination at the scene
4.49. If the criminal investigation calls for an immediate initial evaluation by

forensic examiners of evidence contaminated with radionuclides (e.g. mobile
telephones, paper notebooks or items with latent fingerprints), then this initial
examination could be carried out in a mobile glove box or in a designated hazard
control area at or near the radiological crime scene. These initial examinations
should be conducted under the supervision of the evidence recorder/custodian,
the safety specialist and the radiological assessor. After the initial examinations
are completed, the evidence should be re-packaged for transport and submitted to
the designated laboratory, as described in Ref. [9].
Evidence packaging, transport and submission
4.50. All evidence from a radiological crime scene should be collected, packaged
and submitted in accordance with the evidence collection plan. The practice of
using a collector and assistant will be applied during packaging of the evidence.
This applies to all three types of evidence:
(a) The nuclear or other radioactive material itself;

(b) Other items of potential evidentiary value contaminated with radionuclides;
(c) Uncontaminated items of potential evidentiary value.
40
4.51. All packaged items of nuclear or other radioactive material will be marked
to identify them as a radiological hazard. Solid evidence (e.g. a closed container
or a sealed source) may need to be imaged using X ray radiography to understand
the nature of the evidence and to confirm the absence of hidden explosives or
other dangers within the container. The label will also indicate all data that are
known concerning the material and associated hazard (e.g. dose rate, isotopes
present, activity and types of radiation). A form used for this purpose is described
in Appendix I, and a generic radioactive material label is given in Fig. 16. Items
should be transported in accordance with national transport guidelines [10] or
recognized exceptions.
4.52. Evidence contaminated with radionuclides and emitting radiation at or

above recommended safety levels [15] should be packaged, labelled, stored and
transported in accordance with relevant national regulations and international
standards, such as those given in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1,
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material [10], including the use
of special arrangements for transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.
Evidence contaminated with radionuclides, but determined not to be of concern
for safety, should be packaged, labelled, stored, transported and examined in the
same manner as that used for other evidence.
Interim storage site for evidence
4.53. At some radiological crime scenes, it will be necessary to safely and

securely store evidence at an interim location, known as the interim storage site
for evidence, prior to its further transport to the designated laboratory. This may be
necessary to ensure national regulations and laboratory procedures are followed,
or simply to facilitate arrangements with the receiving laboratory, particularly in
cases where international assistance is needed. This interim storage site needs to
have security measures in place to prevent tampering with evidence, while also
having the appropriate radiation safety, chemical or safeguards permits necessary
to store the quantity of nuclear or other radioactive material present. The interim
storage site for evidence should operate in accordance with the applicable rules
of evidence, including maintaining the chain of custody for handling of evidence.
4.54. If material identification was not performed at the scene, it should be

performed at the interim storage site for evidence before transport to the
designated laboratories. Even if material identification was performed at the
scene, it may be useful to confirm the identification, for example by using more
sensitive instrumentation. This confirmation can provide further information, and
can be used to evaluate the efficacy of the on-scene identification. All material
41
identification measurements need to be recorded in writing and be communicated
to the designated laboratories.
RELEASE OF SCENE
4.55. Once collection of evidence has been completed, the scene may be released
from law enforcement control. However, any decision to release the scene for
unrestricted use should take account of radiological criteria as required by the
relevant competent authority. The mechanism for release of any radiological
crime scene to relevant competent authorities should be addressed in the national
response plan consistent with relevant laws and regulations.
AFTER-ACTION REVIEW
4.56. After operations have concluded at a radiological crime scene, it may be

useful to conduct an after-action review. The intent of this review is to determine
those actions that met or exceeded expectations and those that failed to meet some
or all expectations. The after-action review represents an important opportunity
to learn from experience and feed that learning back into the planning process.
The results of the after-action review should be communicated to all personnel
having responsibilities for radiological crime scene operations as well as to other
agencies that are supported by or that support these operations. The results should
be incorporated into plans and procedures as applicable.
4.57. The after-action review should be conducted by, or be at the direction of,
the on-scene/operational commander and should include input from all personnel
who participated in radiological crime scene operations. After-action review
is often an iterative process, with input to the review being provided while
radiological crime scene operations are under way. Additional input should be
provided by operational personnel outside the radiological crime scene, such
as the designated laboratories that received the evidence and law enforcement
personnel and prosecutors who used information from the radiological crime
scene to support investigation and prosecution.
4.58. Those actions at the radiological crime scene that met or exceeded
expectations merit further consideration to identify the measures that contributed
to their success. For example, additional consideration might identify the extent
to which success might be attributed to some combination of proper planning,
effective training and frequent exercising of the operations at a radiological crime
42
scene. Alternatively, additional consideration might identify the availability of
international assistance as a key element of successful radiological crime scene
operation. Such information might prove useful to reinforce those measures that
contributed to success as part of preparations for operations at future radiological
crime scenes, and can be used to augment applicable sections of the national plan
for managing nuclear security events.
4.59. Those actions at the radiological crime scene that fell short of expectations
merit further consideration to identify the cause(s) of the shortcomings. The
review should identify measures to improve operations at any future radiological
crime scene. Such measures may include enhanced training, development of new
tools, acquisition of additional or improved equipment and clarification of roles
and responsibilities.
5. PREPAREDNESS
GENERAL
5.1. Preparedness for radiological crime scene operations is essential to building

confidence that the mobilization of resources can be managed, controlled and
coordinated effectively in a multidisciplinary environment. The practical goal of
preparedness is to ensure that arrangements are in place for a timely, managed,
controlled, coordinated and effective mobilization of resources at the national/
strategic command level, the local/tactical command level and the on-scene/
operational command level.
5.2. Each competent authority involved with managing radiological crime

scenes should establish and maintain a preparedness programme commensurate
with its roles and responsibilities, including implementing national requirements
for trustworthiness of personnel [3]. Such programmes are necessary to ensure
that competent authorities have identified the necessary resources and have made
preparations and arrangements to deal with any kind of radiological crime scene.
This planning and preparation may result in a competent authority selecting and
acquiring appropriate PPE and tools for use at radiological crime scenes. These
preparations should define the actions that need to be taken before, during and
after a radiological crime scene operation by all competent authorities involved
in managing the radiological crime scene.
43
5.3. Competent authorities should also ensure that appropriate training is
provided for all personnel involved in the management of and operations at a
radiological crime scene. The necessary capabilities for all levels of command
should be exercised periodically.
BASIS FOR PREPAREDNESS
5.4. Consideration should be given to treating the management of operations

at a radiological crime scene as an extension of managing operations at a
conventional crime scene. Additional considerations specific to managing crime
scenes involving nuclear and other radioactive material should be included, with
regard to the national/strategic, local/tactical and on-scene/operational levels.
Once the capability for managing a radiological crime scene is established, it
should be exercised at time intervals in accordance with the national plan.
5.5. Competent authorities should ensure the preparedness of the specialized

resources for radiological crime scene operations and ensure that appropriate
procedures are in place for such situations. Consideration should be given to
the possible need to manage, simultaneously or nearly simultaneously, multiple
radiological crime scenes or a combination of crimes involving nuclear or other
radioactive material and other high priority criminal acts.
5.6. All necessary arrangements should be in place to ensure the availability

of personnel needed for radiological crime scene management, including those
personnel who are remote from the scene itself but who support scene operations.
The various competent authorities with roles and responsibilities for response
should ensure that they have appropriate arrangements in place for selecting and
equipping personnel. These arrangements should include provisions for periodic
refresher training on an appropriate schedule.
5.7. Attention should be given to the training of appropriate personnel in:
(a) Procedures to be followed at a radiological crime scene;

(b) Conduct of site surveys for and identification of radiation hazards;
(c) Establishment, maintenance and control of hazard control areas;
(d) Protection of personnel against radiation hazards;
(e) Radiological risk reduction;
(f) Radionuclide contamination control;
(g) Decontamination of personnel and equipment;
44
(h) Decontamination of evidence in a manner that avoids compromising its
value to the associated criminal investigation;
(i) Containment and treatment of liquids, such as decontaminating solutions,
in a manner that minimizes pollution;
(j) Proper disposal of contaminated waste items in accordance with national
guidelines and international standards;
(k) Use of radiation detection instruments and PPE;
(l) Forensic evidence management;
(m) Command, control, coordination and communication;
(n) Safety of personnel;
(o) Procedures for communicating to and maintaining effective relations with
the various levels of local authorities and national government, the news
media and the general public.
PLANS AND PROCEDURES
National response plan for managing nuclear security events
5.8. In order to facilitate the management of a radiological crime scene, a

comprehensive national response plan to manage nuclear security events is
needed. This plan should have clear interface with, among other things, the
national and local level plans for response to conventional and/or nuclear or
radiological emergencies [3, 19]. The national plan should serve as:
(a) A basis for establishing compatible operational tools needed for prompt and
effective radiological crime scene management;
(b) A guide for the competent authorities who need to ensure that all necessary
tasks are given the appropriate resources and support.
5.9. The national response plan, which outlines the various response measures
and standard operating procedures, is typically developed and implemented
coherently by the competent authorities involved, and ideally coordinated by the
national coordinating body or mechanism [3, 19].
Inter-agency arrangements
5.10. Arrangements should be made on an inter-agency basis for an integrated

command structure to facilitate the management of a radiological crime scene.
These arrangements should cover, as a minimum, functions, responsibilities
and authorities, allocation of resources, coordination of activities, priorities and
45
interoperability, logistic support and facilities, plans and procedures and training,
drills and exercises. Arrangements should also be in place for notifying other
States and relevant international intergovernmental organizations in accordance
with international agreements or national policy.
Procedures for radiological crime scene operations
5.11. Each relevant competent authority should develop procedures in

accordance with their roles as specified in the national response plan. Procedures
for managing a radiological crime scene should be updated as necessary. Such
procedures should contain provisions for:
(a) Integrated command, control, coordination and communication.

(b) Interoperability.
(c) Scene safety.
(d) Physical and operational security of the scene, examples of operational
security include:
(i) Refraining from discussing the nature of the operation outside of the
scene in public;
(ii) Using encrypted means of communication for both voice and data;
(iii) Disposing of all written materials associated with the crime scene in a
secure manner;
(iv) Shrouding sensitive operations.
(e) Reduction of radiological and other risks posed by a nuclear security event
to the general public and to those personnel who need to gain access to the
radiological crime scene for legitimate purposes.
(f) Establishment and maintenance of effective control over the nuclear or
other radioactive material.
(g) Identification and rendering safe of explosives, explosive devices and
booby traps.
(h) Preservation of items of potential evidentiary value, those that contain
nuclear or other radioactive material, those contaminated with radionuclides
and those with no radionuclides.
(i) Decontamination of personnel, radiation detection instruments and
evidence, among other things.
(j) Incorporation of mechanisms for requesting assistance, both domestically
and internationally, when necessary.
(k) Arrangements for informing the local and national levels of government,
news media and the general public, as appropriate, in a coordinated,
accurate, clear and consistent manner.
46
(l) Maintenance of capabilities for radiological crime scene
operations, including:
(i) Periodic testing of these capabilities;
(ii) Replacement of lost personnel;
(iii) Refresher training of all personnel and resupply of equipment and
instrumentation that have reached the end of their service life or are
otherwise no longer suitable for use.
(m) Periodic exercising of all procedures, personnel and equipment.
5.12. Relevant personnel from a competent authority should be trained in the

procedures for managing a radiological crime scene and be subjected to periodic
drills and exercises.
EQUIPMENT
General
5.13. Planning for the acquisition of equipment for use at a radiological crime
scene should be guided by technical specifications that reflect the concepts of
operations at such scenes. These specifications should adhere to national or
international standards. In determining the technical specifications, account
should be taken of the nature of the scenes and types of radiation that are expected
to be encountered, as well as functional requirements such as:
(a) Ability to withstand exposure to environmental factors, such as a suitable

range of temperatures, humidity and adverse weather conditions;
(b) Ease of installation, use, decontamination and removal under expected
conditions of deployment;
(c) Ease of training personnel in use, calibration and maintenance;
(d) Ability to be sustained (e.g. ease of maintenance, availability of
consumables and spare parts).
5.14. Periodic drills and exercises should imitate a real situation as closely
as possible and should be conducted with all items of equipment intended
for radiological crime scene operations to ensure both that items perform
according to specifications and that personnel are familiar with their use.
Technical specifications should be reviewed and modified periodically to reflect
technological developments and to incorporate lessons learned during drills and
exercises. The specifications should also be updated to reflect experience gained
47
during actual radiological crime scene operations, as identified in the after-action
review (see paras 4.56–4.59).
Radiation detection instruments
5.15. Preparation for radiological crime scene operations should include the
selection of radiation detection instruments. Representative types of radiation
detection instruments suitable for use at a radiological crime scene are presented
in Annex I. Prior to their first use, instruments should be calibrated according to
national regulations/procedures and be acceptance tested to confirm performance
to the technical specifications. A maintenance plan for the instrument should
be established at the time of acceptance and should be based on national or
international standards and the advice of the manufacturer. In addition, calibration,
performance testing and preventive maintenance should be carried out periodically
by qualified experts based on international or national standards and the advice of
the manufacturer of the instrument. Results of calibrations, performance testing and
preventive maintenance should be recorded, and these records should be retained.
Personal protective equipment
selection of PPE. Items of PPE should include:
(a) Respiratory protective equipment (RPE);

(b) Gloves;
(c) Footwear;
(d) Undergarments, such as vests worn to reduce heat load;
(e) Overgarments.
5.17. One goal in selecting PPE is to minimize the hindrance caused by the PPE
while providing adequate protection against exposure to radiation and the range
of possible on-scene hazards (e.g. toxic vapours and blood-borne pathogens).
Factors to be considered in achieving this goal include:
(a) Ability to afford protection for the anticipated duration of operations;

(b) Compatibility with various body types (such as different heights, weights
and physiques);
(c) Ability to withstand damage during operations;
(d) Ability to withstand loss of normal human sensitivities to speech, sight
and touch;
(e) Ease of putting on and removing each item.
48
5.18. Representative types of PPE suitable for use at a radiological crime scene
are presented in Annex I.
Ancillary equipment
selection of ancillary equipment. Examples of ancillary equipment include:
(a) Communications equipment;

(b) Decontamination equipment;
(c) Evidence collection, packaging and transport containers;
(d) Manipulators for remotely moving objects, such as evidence;
(e) Specialized equipment for examining objects, such as portable X ray units.
5.20. Representative types of ancillary equipment suitable for use at a radiological

crime scene are presented in Annex I.
INFORMATION RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT
5.21. Resources to manage the flow of information to and from competent

authorities should be identified within the national response plan for managing
a nuclear security event. Methods for management of these resources should be
implemented and exercised in accordance with this plan.
Points of contact
5.22. Predefined points of contact should be established at each competent

authority that needs to receive notifications of a nuclear security event and/or
has responsibilities in managing such an event. These points of contact should be
available at all times.
Routine communications
5.23. Effective communication in planning, execution and follow-up is essential

to effective radiological crime scene management. In preparation for such
operations, participants from all levels (strategic, tactical and operational)
may be asked for input based on their different fields of expertise. In this way,
engagement of participants could broaden the support base for radiological crime
scene management.
49
5.24. It is essential that routine communications between all competent
authorities are robust and efficient. These routine communications should
be established on the basis of radio systems or telephone/Internet networks,
recognizing that in a nuclear security event or other emergency, some methods
of routine communications may become compromised or unavailable owing to
heavy demand or damage associated with the event.
TRAINING
5.25. Relevant competent authorities should assist each other with planning and
training activities designed to improve preparedness. Each relevant competent
authority is encouraged to coordinate its training programmes through a
coordinating body to avoid duplication, and make its training available to others.
An example of a coordinating body is a committee with representatives of all
relevant competent authorities.
5.26. An effective training mechanism is a critical component in developing the

skills and knowledge of radiological crime scene personnel. However, given the
diverse nature of the conditions, demands and activities at a radiological crime
scene, formulating a rigorous training approach may be challenging, and should
take into account the following:
(a) National needs assessment, such as a need for training facilities;

(b) Awareness efforts;
(c) Roles and personnel;
(d) Continual evaluation of training programmes.
DRILLS AND EXERCISES
5.27. A programme of drills and exercises should be designed to continually

improve the effectiveness of cooperation between relevant competent authorities
as well as the competencies and capabilities of personnel involved in radiological
crime scene operations. Programme officials should use the results of such drills
and exercises to identify strengths and address deficiencies in instrumentation,
operations and training [19].
50
SUSTAINABILITY
5.28. Comprehensive planning and commitment of sufficient financial, material

and human resources are needed to ensure the long term effectiveness of national
capabilities for managing a radiological crime scene [28]. Attention needs to
be given to day-to-day operations, maintenance, quality control and continuous
system improvements and to the flexibility to adapt to an evolving threat.
5.29. Sustainability of human resources should take into account movements

of personnel and attrition within different competent authorities as well as the
necessity for continual training of all personnel. Planning efforts should ensure
that there will be sufficient qualified personnel to operate and maintain equipment
and assess instrument alarms and information alerts. States should consider, in
this regard, the possibility of needing to manage multiple radiological crime
scenes or the combination of a radiological crime scene with other high priority
national events. In considering such possibilities, States may seek arrangements
for bilateral, regional or multilateral mutual assistance if their own radiological
crime scene management capabilities were to be overwhelmed.
5.30. The goals of promoting sustainable resources for radiological crime

scene management and, more specifically, sustainable programmes and
practices, include:
(a) Encouraging long term effectiveness by effectively managing costs and

fostering sharing of resources and information where appropriate;
(b) Sustaining operations by accounting for the life cycle cost of the
equipment and by ensuring the continuous availability of trained and
motivated personnel.
6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
GENERAL
6.1. Radiological crime scenes have the potential to involve transboundary

issues. For example, material associated with the nuclear fuel cycle may
have been mined and milled in one State, then transported across borders for
manufacture into nuclear fuel, and finally moved across other borders for use in a
reactor. Similarly, radioactive sources may have been produced in one State and
51
then transported across one or more borders to another State for use or resale.
All such transboundary movements may have been carried out in full accordance
with national and international laws governing such transfer and use of such
materials. However, there is a possibility of nuclear or other radioactive material
falling out of regulatory control at any step associated with these transboundary
movements. Dispersed radionuclides from a radiological crime scene may also
cross-borders.
6.2. International cooperation and assistance may, therefore, be essential to

the effective management of any radiological crime scene from which nuclear
or other radioactive material out of regulatory control is collected, packaged
and transported. Furthermore, cooperation and assistance might be initiated in
advance of any nuclear security event, such as through joint participation in
training and exercises in preparation for any specific challenges in managing a
crime scene involving radioactive material.
6.3. States may also have obligations relating to cooperation and assistance as
a result of being party to bilateral agreements or international legal instruments.
For example, States party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material are obliged to render assistance to another State Party, if requested, on
matters where nuclear material is lost or stolen [2]; such an event could involve a
known, or suspected, radiological crime scene.
6.4. Because of the universal need to strengthen the means of responding to

nuclear security events, sharing lessons learned from actual events or from
exercises with international counterparts is desirable. Such sharing allows
counterparts to consider whether their own procedures need to be revised.
AREAS OF COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
6.5. Assistance on matters related to managing a radiological crime scene may

be facilitated by the international community or may be requested directly on
a bilateral or multilateral basis [12, 13, 21]. Assistance during response to a
nuclear security event may be requested for activities at the scene of the known,
or suspected, crime (on-scene) or other locations (off-scene).
6.6. In order to expedite the provision of bilateral or multilateral assistance,

arrangements should be made in advance for promptly and directly notifying
any State in which urgent protective actions might need to be taken. States are
responsible for arriving at such arrangements [12, 13, 16].
52
6.7. Joint training and exercises will also be beneficial to optimizing
international cooperation and rendering assistance during an actual incident. Such
training and exercises will help to identify additional areas in which cooperation
and assistance might be desirable, and will help to develop enhanced means by
which cooperation and assistance are provided.
6.8. A State managing a radiological crime scene may need to request

additional resources or expertise from another State. Consequently, cooperation
and assistance may be needed to ensure that the actions taken on the scene
protect public health and safety while also preserving items of potential value
as evidence during any investigation. The precise nature of the cooperation and
assistance will depend on various factors associated with the requesting State and
the radiological crime scene. Possible areas in which cooperation and assistance
might be requested include:
(a) Identifying and subsequently obtaining and operating equipment for

radiological crime scene operations. This equipment might include,
for example:
(i) PPE for on-scene operators;
(ii) Vehicles or specialized equipment needed to gain access to, and to
move within, the site, or to control entry to an exit from the scene;
(iii) Radiation detection instruments.
(b) Rendering safe an IND or an RDD.
(c) Providing experts to assist with on-scene operations, such as:
(i) Command, control and communication;
(ii) Material identification;
(iii) Evidence collection;
(iv) Mitigating non-radioactive hazards at or near the scene, such as
flammable liquids, compressed gases and explosives;
(v) Medical assistance to individuals exposed to radiation or with other
injuries associated with the scene;
(vi) Decontamination of personnel and equipment;
(vii) Remediation of the scene to allow reoccupation.
(d) Identifying and applying procedures for collecting, packaging and
transporting evidence in a way that is appropriate to the environment
associated with the radiological crime scene, the surrounding community,
and the situation within the affected State.
(e) Assisting with bringing seized nuclear or other radioactive material under
regulatory control [13].
53
6.9. In addition to requesting and receiving cooperation and assistance with
on-scene activities, a State might take similar steps for related activities away
from the radiological crime scene.
6.10. In many respects, off-scene cooperation and assistance is similar to that

on-scene, with the important distinction that off-scene activities are not in the
area directly associated with the recovery of the nuclear or other radioactive
material. Therefore, the risk to the health and safety of any individual, team or
group rendering such assistance may be more easily manageable. Possible areas
in which off-scene cooperation and assistance might be requested include:
(a) Assessment of likely or potential consequences of a nuclear security event;

(b) Development of specifications for, identifying potential sources of, and
aiding in the delivery of equipment to be used in managing the radiological
crime scene;
(c) Provision of experts and equipment to assist with off-scene screening and
treatment of individuals exposed to radiation or with other injuries related
to the incident;
(d) Provision of experts to assist with locating, identifying and gathering of
off-scene items of potential evidentiary value;
(e) Provision of knowledgeable personnel who can give direction, advice
and support with regard to the taking of statements from witnesses or
the follow-up of investigative leads related to events associated with the
radiological crime scene;
(f) Identification of interim or permanent storage sites for evidence contaminated
with radionuclides and for nuclear or other radioactive material;
(g) Identification and coordination of potential locations for analysis to support
any nuclear forensic investigation needed to assist in attribution of the
nuclear or other radioactive material;
(h) Development of strategies for communicating to the public, other States
and relevant international organizations [12, 16].
6.11. One example of off-scene cooperation and assistance that might be afforded
to States is that offered by INTERPOL. Operation Fail Safe takes advantage of
INTERPOL’s Notice System to generate the issuance of a Green Notice regarding
individuals involved in the smuggling of nuclear or other radioactive material.
Project Geiger involves the development and sharing of analytical products on
illicit trafficking and other events (see Annex II).
54
DEVELOPMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE
6.12. In developing or in responding to a request for assistance, it is important to

establish a firm understanding of the basis of the request for assistance. Issues to
consider include:
(a) Whether payment is to be offered or is expected for the assistance and, if

so, the amount, method and timing of that payment;
(b) Whether testimony will be required from donor State personnel and, if
so, under what conditions and laws that testimony is to be provided and
whether the expertise of such personnel would be recognized in the national
legal system of the requesting State;
(c) How security of sensitive information associated with the donor(s) and the
recipient State will be managed;
(d) The exact roles and responsibilities of any individual, team or group
providing assistance, and the arrangements for command and control of
that individual, team or group;
(e) Provisions for medical assistance provided by the donor(s) to individuals
from another State present on-scene or otherwise in the State (including
expectations regarding payment for such medical assistance);
(f) Arrangements for logistical support (such as lodging, meals and transport)
and for personal security (if needed) for any individual, team or group from
the donor(s) rendering assistance;
(g) Whether visas might be required and, if so, what assistance might be
provided by the requesting State toward obtaining these visas;
(h) Whether and how any individual, team or group from the donor(s) might
be indemnified against any unintentional acts that are deemed harmful by
an individual, private group or governmental entity in the State receiving
the assistance;
(i) The expectations of the receiving State and the donor(s) with regard
to sharing of any information regarding the assistance being provided,
including the information that assistance is being provided, and clarification
of who (if anyone) is authorized to speak publicly on behalf of the assisting
State(s).
6.13. One means of formalizing such arrangements is to develop a bilateral or

multilateral assistance agreement, memorandum of understanding or similar
instrument in advance of any nuclear security event where such assistance might
be required or desired. Some of the issues listed above may have been agreed
upon in more general mutual assistance agreements and, consequently, could be
included by reference. The existence of an approved agreement might expedite
55
any response to a request for assistance by ensuring that all parties already
understand expectations and limitations that apply to the individual, team or
group providing assistance to the requesting State.
56
Appendix I
SAMPLE FORMS USED FOR RADIOLOGICAL

CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT
I.1. This Appendix provides samples of some of the forms that might be used
for radiological crime scene management. Each form is described in terms of
its intended use, the essential elements of information to be recorded on the
form and the crime scene personnel routinely associated with its preparation. All
forms, once used, become part of the record of the crime scene and, therefore,
should be retained in accordance with national arrangements. The forms given in
Figs 5–16 are generic in nature. States might alter or otherwise adapt each form
as needed to suit their national requirements or preferences.
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSHEET
I.2. The administrative worksheet is used to record general information

regarding the crime scene, the duties of all personnel involved in processing
the scene, and all pertinent times and critical events that occurred during the
processing of the scene. It typically consists of three parts:
(a) A cover page;

(b) A notes and observations section;
(c) A record of actions.
I.3. A sample administrative worksheet A cover page is given in Fig. 5. Essential

elements of information to be recorded on this cover page include:
(a) Unique identifier associated with the investigation, such as its name
or number;
(b) Geographical location of the scene;
(c) Conditions at the scene on arrival;
(d) Weather at the scene;
(e) Lighting conditions at the scene;
(f) Notes and observations regarding the scene itself, such as preliminary
survey results and special conditions or situations (if any).
I.4. Those personnel who are named on the cover page should place their
initials next to their name. This step both ensures that they acknowledge their
assignments and assists in identifying initials placed on evidence packaging. The
57
and special conditions or situations (if any).
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSHEET A
PAGE ____ OF_____

DATE____________
CRIME SCENE
NOTES/OBSERVATIONS
OPERATIONS DATA
Case identifier
Location of the scene
Preparer/assistant
Time and date of arrival
Person(s) present at the
scene at time of arrival
Control of scene obtained
from/time/date
Condition of the scene
(secured/unsecured)
Lighting conditions
Weather conditions
FIG. 5. Generic administrative worksheet — cover page.
cover page should also indicate whether local authorities secured the scene prior
FIG. 6. Generic administrative worksheet — cover page.
to the arrival of the on-scene commander and the persons handing over the scene.
I.5. A sample notes and observations administrative worksheet B is given in

Fig. 6. These notes and observations record any occurrence or result of a meeting
or briefing held at the scene or any information collected at the scene. Examples
of such notes and observations for a radiological crime scene include entries
to indicate when and by whom briefings were given on the event action plan
(para. 4.11) and the scene safety plan (paras 4.12–4.14). The time and date when
processing of the scene was completed is recorded in this section, including
indication of who deemed the processing to be complete and to whom the scene
was released.
I.6. A sample administrative worksheet C is given in Fig. 7. The administrative

worksheet is a useful tool for documenting the sequence of relevant actions taken
at the scene and who was involved in taking these actions. Examples of events to
be recorded include:
(a) Arrival at the scene;

(b) Conduct of the initial walk-through;
(c) Initiation of the radiation survey;
58
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSHEET B
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
CRIME SCENE
NOTES/OBSERVATIONS
OPERATIONS DATA
Scene consists of
Personnel involved in search
and their respective duties
Preliminary survey/evidence
evaluation
Special situations or
conditions
Crime scene conference
Final survey
Name:
Title:
Crime scene operations
completed and release of Date:
scene authorized
Signature:
Name:
Title:
Crime scene released to Date:
Signature:
FIG. 6. Generic administrative worksheet — notes and observations.
(d) Briefing of the evidence recovery team;

(e) Conclusion of operations.
FIG. 7. Generic administrative worksheet — notes and observations.
Entries should also be made to indicate any arrival of news media representatives
and the action taken in dealing with these representatives.
RADIATION SURVEY MAP
I.7. The radiation survey map provides a record of the radiation levels at the
radiological crime scene. It records the results of a radiation survey of the scene.
It is prepared by or at the direction of the radiological assessor (para. 3.24), with
59
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSHEET C
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
TIME ACTIONS TAKEN AND PERSONNEL INVOLVED
FIG. 7. Generic administrative worksheet — record of actions.
FIG. 8. Generic administrative worksheet — record of actions.

advice from evidence recovery personnel regarding the particular areas to be
monitored. Essential elements of information given on this map are the:
(a) Location of the survey;

CHAIN OF CUSTODY
(b) Date of the survey;
(c) Name of the person preparing the survey;
.8. Chain of custody for evidence
(d) Radiation begins
detector used at
forthe crime
each scene.
survey Each item of evidence has its own chain
result;
(e)hence,
of custody and, Result, in form.
its own terms Essential
of dose elements
rate for of
radiation field given
information or count
on thisrate forare:
form
surface activity.
(a) Description of the item;
In addition, the map records the position of swipe samples. The map also notes
theFrom
(b) background
whom dose rate.where
or from A sample radiation
it was survey map is shown in Fig. 8.
obtained;
(c) Name and signature of the person who obtained the item;
PERSONAL EXTERNAL RADIATION MONITORING LOG
(d) Date on which it was obtained;
I.8. The personal external radiation monitoring log records the external
(e)radiation
Uniquedose
identifier associated
received by each with
persontheincase, event or incident,
the radiological such as
crime scene. Theits name or
radiological assessor is responsible for ensuring that this log is maintained, with
number.
assistance from the evidence recovery team leader and/or scene safety officer.
Each transfer Essential elements
of the item of information
is recorded, giving thegiven on this
location, dateform are, for name
of transfer, each individual
and signature of the
operating in the hazard control area:
person releasing the item and name and signature of the person receiving the item. This form remains
with the item as
60 documentation of its provenance. A sample chain of custody form is given in Fig. 9.
RADIATION SURVEY MAP
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
Case identifier: Location: Name and signature:
Instrument type: Instrument calibration date:
Number Dose rate/count rate Number Dose rate/count rate
Survey map drawing:
FIG. 8. Generic radiation survey map.
(a) Unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its
name or number;
(b) Date; FIG. 10. Generic radiation survey map.
(c) Name of the recording and monitored individuals;
SCENE DIAGRAM (d) Model and serial number of the personal radiation monitoring device
carried by this individual;
(e) Time of reading and the time spent in hazard control area;
.10. The scene diagram or sketch provides a pictorial record of the radiological crime scene as found
(f) Estimated external radiation dose.
prior to collecting evidence. It is typically tied to the photographic log and the evidence recovery log.
A sample personal external radiation monitoring log is given in Fig. 9.
t is prepared by the scene modeller (paras 3.25 and 3.26). Essential elements of information given on
his diagram are:
61
(a) Date;
(b) Unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its name or
number;
PERSONAL EXTERNAL RADIATION MONITORING LOG
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
Case identifier: Prepared by: (name, signature)

Name and personal ID no.: (monitored person)
1) Using direct reading personal dosimeter

Dosimeter type: Model: Serial no.:
Reading
Date of reading Time of reading Location at time of reading
(mSv)
2) Using gamma dose rate meter

Dosimeter type: Model: Serial No.:
Dose rate Time spent
Location Estimated external dose
(mSv) (min)
3) Using thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) or film badge

TLD or film badge no.: (NOT to be read in the field)
Received Signature Date/time Signature Reading

(mSv)
NOTE: Film badge or TLDs should be assessed as soon as possible after the exposure and recorded above. To
ensure a quick response, the dosimetry service should be informed if the dosimeter was worn during a crime scene
operation.
FIG. 9. Generic personal external radiation monitoring log.
SCENE DIAGRAM
I.9. The scene diagram, or sketch, provides a pictorial record of the radiological
Fig. 16. Generic personal external radiation monitoring log.
crime scene as found prior to collecting evidence. It is typically tied to the
photographic log and the evidence recovery log. It is prepared by the scene
modeller (paras 3.25 and 3.26). Essential elements of information given on this
diagram are:
(a) Date;
(b) Unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its
name or number;
62
(c) Name of the scene modeller and of any other personnel assisting in
preparing the diagram;
(d) Reference data, such as scale, compass orientation, fixed objects (such as
geographical features or structures);
(e) Location of any items of evidence that are recovered.
A sample scene diagram/sketch form is given in Fig. 10.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
I.10. Chain of custody for evidence begins at the crime scene. Each item
of evidence has its own chain of custody and, hence, its own form. Essential
elements of information given on this form are:
(a) Description of the item;

(b) From whom or from where it was obtained;
(c) Name and signature of the person who obtained the item;
(d) Date on which it was obtained;
(e) Unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its
name or number.
Each transfer of the item is recorded, giving the location, date of transfer, name
and signature of the person releasing the item and name and signature of the
person receiving the item. This form remains with the item as documentation of
its provenance. A sample chain of custody form is given in Fig. 11.
PHOTOGRAPHIC LOG
I.11. The photographic log provides a record of images taken at the radiological
crime scene. It is typically linked to the scene diagram and the evidence recovery
log. It is prepared by the photographer (paras 3.31–3.33). Essential elements of
information given on this log are:
(a) Date;
name or number;
(c) Name of the photographer and of any other person assisting with
photographing the scene;
63
SCENE DIAGRAM/SKETCH FORM
64
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
General information Reference
Date: Scale or disclaimer:

Case identifier: Evidence:
Location: Fixed objects:
Preparer/assistants: Compass orientation:
Key legend:
FIG. 10. Generic scene diagram/sketch form.
FIG. 11. Generic scene diagram/sketch form.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY FORM
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
Description of item:
Obtained from: (title, name, location and phone number)
Printed name of investigator: Signature of investigator: Date obtained:
Case identifier:
Temporary deposition of item(s): (where stored)
Released by: (printed name and signature) Released to: (printed name and signature) Date:
Temporary deposition of item(s): (where stored)
Released by: (printed name and signature) Released to: (printed name and signature) Date:
FIG. 11. Generic chain of custody form.
(d) Unique identifier/photo number and description for each photograph or

other image that is taken.
FIG. 9. Generic chain of custody form.
A sample photographic log is given in Fig. 12.
EVIDENCE RECOVERY LOG
I.12. The evidence recovery log cover sheet provides a record of both the
personnel collecting evidence at a radiological crime scene and the items of
evidence collected. It is prepared by the evidence recorder/custodian (paras 3.34
and 3.35). It is typically prepared in two parts: a cover sheet and a listing of the
items of evidence. Essential elements of information on the evidence recovery
log cover sheet are:
(a) Date;
name or number;
65
that is taken. A sample photographic log is given in Fig. 12.
PHOTOGRAPHIC LOG
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
General information
Date:
Case identifier:
Photographer/assistant:
Remarks:
Photo number Description of photographic subject/area
FIG. 12. Generic photographic log.
FIG. 12. Generic photographic log.

(c) Location;
(d) Identifying information, signature and initials of all personnel involved in
collecting items of evidence.
A sample evidence recovery log cover sheet is given in Fig. 13.
I.13. Essential elements of information on the evidence recovery log are:
(a) Date;
name or number;
0 (c) Location;
(d) Name of the personnel preparing the log;
(e) Information on each item of evidence recovered.
This information includes the unique identifier assigned to each item, a

description of the item, the location where it was collected, identity of the
personnel who collected it, the unique identifier for any photographs taken of the
evidence and the method used to package the item. A sample evidence recovery
log is given in Fig. 14.
66
.13. Essential elements of information on the evidence recovery log are:
EVIDENCE RECOVERY LOG – COVER SHEET
(a) Date; PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
(b) Unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its name or
number; General information Complete if applicable
Date: Site number:
(c)Case
Location;
identifier: Team number:
Location: Grid number:
(d)Remarks:
Name of the personnel preparing the Remarks:
log;
(e) Information on each item of Search

evidence recovered.
team personnel
Print full name Signature Agency Office/division Phone Print initials
This information includes the unique identifier assigned to each item, a description of the item, the
ocation where it was collected, identity of the personnel who collected it, the unique identifier for any
photographs taken of the evidence and the method used to package the item. A sample evidence
ecovery log is given in Fig. 14.
FIG. 13. Generic cover sheet (this sheet accompanies the evidence recovery log).
EVIDENCE RECOVERY LOG
PAGE ____ OF_____

FIG. 13. Generic cover sheet (this sheet accompanies the evidence recovery log).
DATE____________
General information Personnel (include initials)

Case identifier:
1
Location:
Preparer/assistants:
Item Description Where Recovered by Photo Marking Packaging Comments

number found method
FIG. 14. Generic Evidence Recovery Log. This sheet is accompanied by a cover sheet
detailing the evidence recovery personnel.
FIG. 14. Generic Evidence Recovery Log. This sheet is accompanied by a cover sheet detailing the evidence 67
recovery
personnel.
CRIME SCENE ENTRY LOG
I.14. The crime scene entry log is used to record each person entering or exiting
the scene. Essential elements of information include:
(a) Name of the agency having responsibility for managing the scene or for
maintaining the entry log;
name or number;
(c) Geographical location of the scene;
(d) Name of each person entering or exiting the scene;
(e) Date and time of each entry;
(f) Date and time of each exit;
(g) Reason for each person entering the scene.
Local practices might dictate inclusion of additional information, such as the title
and agency of each person entering or exiting the scene, or might require the
signature of each person to be recorded in the entry log. A sample entry log is
given in Fig. 15.
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL LABEL
I.15. The radioactive material (RAM) label is affixed to each item of evidence
collected at a radiological crime scene when that item is determined to have
a level of activity or give rise to radiation in excess of thresholds specified in
national or local standards. Essential elements of information given on this
label are:
(a) Evidence item number (an identifier that is unique to that item);
(b) Description of the item;
(c) Location where it was collected;
(d) Unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its
name or number;
(e) Date collected;
(f) Personnel who collected the item;
(g) Radiation survey data describing the nature of the radiation associated with
the item.
A generic RAM label is shown in Fig. 16.
68
CRIME SCENE ENTRY LOG
ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE SCENE MUST SIGN THIS SHEET
PAGE ____ OF_____
DATE____________
AGENCY:
LOCATION: CASE IDENTIFIER:
NOTE: Officers assigned to maintain scene security must also log in and out on this sheet
DATE / TIME DATE / TIME REASON

NUMBER NAME, TITLE AGENCY FOR
IN OUT ENTERING
FIG. 15. Generic crime scene entry log.
FIG. 5. Generic crime scene entry log.
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSHEET
.3. The administrative worksheet is used to record general information regarding the crime scene, the
duties of all personnel involved in processing the scene, and all pertinent times and critical events that
occurred during the processing of the scene. It typically consists of three parts:
(a) A cover page;
(b) A notes and observations section;
(c) A record of actions.
.4. A sample cover page for an administrative worksheet A is given in Fig. 6. Essential elements of
nformation to be recorded on this cover page include:
(a) Unique identifier associated with the investigation, such as its name or number;
(b) Geographical location of the scene;
(c) Conditions at the scene on arrival; 69
(d) Weather at the scene;
(e) Lighting conditions at the scene;

CAUTION RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Item number: _________________________________________________________

Description: __________________________________________________________
Location: _____________________________________________________________
Case identifier: ________________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________________________
Collector 1: ___________________________________________________________
Collector 2: ___________________________________________________________
SURVEY INFORMATION
Dose rate (30 cm): _____________________________________________________

Dose rate (contact): ____________________________________________________
Swipe test (dis/min): ____________________________________________________
Suspect material: ______________________________________________________
Surveyor: ____________________________________________________________
Org/unit: _____________________________________________________________
Survey date: __________________________________________________________
Survey time: __________________________________________________________
FIG. 16. Generic radioactive material label.
70
Appendix II
HAZARDS COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED AT CRIME SCENES
II.1. This Appendix briefly describes examples of hazards that might be

encountered at any crime scene and, therefore, are to be considered when
preparing the common hazards risk assessment (paras 4.8–4.14) and when
developing scene specific risk reduction measures (paras 4.15–4.24). The
hazardous materials operations specialist (paras 3.20 and 3.21) and the safety
specialist (paras 3.22 and 3.23) collaborate in conducting the common hazards
risk assessment and in developing risk reduction measures. The assessment and
the plan for risk reduction become part of the record of the crime scene.
II.2. Examples of such hazards are as follows:
(a) Chemical or fuel storage tanks, such as those used for chlorine, fuel oil,
liquefied natural gas, petrol, propane and other commercial chemicals.
The presence of such storage tanks might be of particular importance if
the scene has been disrupted by an explosion connected with the nuclear
security event or with causes independent of the event.
(b) Confined spaces, such as an empty swimming pool, the interior of a storage
tank or a grain silo, a tunnel or an underground vault such as those used for
utilities. Such spaces are inherently unsafe and present hazards, such as the
possibility of a low oxygen atmosphere and the presence of harmful gases.
(c) Debris, such as concrete, broken or intact glass, construction materials and
timber that might be on the ground or suspended above the site. The presence
of such debris might call for special planning to ensure that on-scene
personnel can manoeuvre safely, including avoiding compromising their
PPE. Debris might also interfere with the operation of remotely controlled
robotic devices used to aid in processing the scene.
(d) Explosives, including those that might be at the scene for legitimate
purposes (e.g. blasting caps, dynamite or explosives for military use), as
well as any explosives that might be associated with the nuclear or other
radioactive material, as might be the case for an RDD.
(e) High voltage lines or exposed utilities, such as downed overhead electrical
lines. Their presence might require coordination with personnel qualified to
disconnect electrical supplies.
(f) Natural gas lines, petroleum pipelines or water and sewer lines. As with
electrical utilities, the presence of such lines might require coordination with
national or local authorities to have the flow through such lines stopped.
71
(g) Adverse weather, such as heavy rain, thunderstorms, high winds or snow.
Such weather conditions might limit visibility for on-scene personnel,
obscure the presence of items of potential evidentiary value or cause the
uncontrolled dispersal of radionuclides within and beyond the scene. They
might also pose a risk to the health and safety of on-scene personnel, for
example by contributing to overheating or by creating slippery surfaces for
pedestrian or vehicular traffic.
(h) Weapons and ammunition, especially if these items might fall into the
hands of individuals whose interests are opposed to the orderly processing
of the scene.
(i) Animals, such as livestock, feral animals, birds and pets. The presence of
animals needs to be assessed relative to their potential to harm personnel
physically, to be carriers of diseases that could be spread to or by on-site
personnel, or to disperse radionuclides. The known, or suspected, presence
of such animals may necessitate the inclusion of traps as part of the on-scene
operations or the presence of an animal control technician, veterinarian or
other expert in animal control.
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Resolution A/59/766, United Nations, New York (2005).
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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL
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Publishers, Sudbury, MA (2011).
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Nuclear Security Series No. 2, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
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Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1, IAEA,
Vienna (2009).
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Radioactive Material, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (2008).
[12] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Convention on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency, Legal Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (1987).
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LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN
AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR
THE CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological
Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear
or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, IAEA,
Vienna (2011).
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Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
[16] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operations Manual for Incident and
Emergency Communication, EPR-IEComm 2012, IAEA, Vienna (2012).
[17] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management of
Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5, IAEA, Vienna (2009).
[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Disposal of Radioactive Waste,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-5, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
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Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency,
EPR-METHOD 2003, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Preparation, Conduct and
Evaluation of Exercises to Test Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency,
EPR-Exercise 2005, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
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Network, EPR-RANET 2010, IAEA, Vienna (2010).
73
[22] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency, EPR-Medical 2005, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Manual for First Responders
to a Radiological Emergency, EPR-First Responders 2006, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[24] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic Procedures for Assessment
and Response During a Radiological Emergency, IAEA-TECDOC-1162, IAEA,
Vienna (2000).
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in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Public Communications 2012, IAEA,
Vienna (2012).
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OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD
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Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, IAEA,
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74
Annex I
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR USE

AT A RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE
I–1. This Annex discusses representative types of radiation detection instruments,

personal protective equipment and ancillary equipment suitable for use at a
radiological crime scene. Selected examples of specific types of instruments and
equipment are presented. However, these examples are for illustrative purposes
only. The range of types and manufacturers of such instruments and equipment
is extensive and subject to change. More comprehensive listings of instruments
and equipment are available from Internet sources and publications such as
Ref. [I–1]. States should select instruments and equipment that best suit their
national arrangements and resources.
RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS
I–2. Once the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material has been
confirmed at the scene of a nuclear security event, a more comprehensive effort
is needed both to assess the radiation safety hazards and to identify the nuclear
or other radioactive material. Table I–1 describes radiation detection instruments
suitable for use in assessing radiation safety hazards. Table I–2 describes
instruments suitable for use in on-scene material identification.
I–3. Figure I–1 illustrates examples of instruments suitable for use in performing
on-scene assessment of radiation hazards.
I–4. Figure I–2 illustrates examples of instruments suitable for use in performing
on-scene material identification. Additional information on radiation detection
instruments is provided in Ref. [I–2].
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
I–5. As noted in paras 5.16–5.18, preparation for radiological crime scene

operations includes the selection of personal protective equipment (PPE). Items
of PPE include:
(a) Respiratory protective equipment (RPE);

(b) Gloves (two layers of gloves is optimal);
75
TABLE I–1. EXAMPLES OF RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS
SUITABLE FOR USE IN ASSESSING RADIATION SAFETY HAZARDS
Instrument Function
Gamma and neutron dose rate meters Source monitor
(may require a telescopic arm for high dose Area monitor
rate measurements) Map radiation fields
Determine types of radiation emitted
Passive dosimeters Personal dosimetry
(e.g. thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs),
film badges, electronic personal dosimeters
with alarm)
Alpha/beta contamination monitors Monitor personnel, equipment and scene
Identify contaminated areas
Identify source locations
Continuous air monitor Monitor air-borne radionuclides
(or air sampler with filters that can be
measured with a survey meter/spectrometer)
Note: The radiation safety assessment should be determined by the radiological assessor. It is the
basis for specification of personal protective equipment, dosimetry, radionuclide contamination
controls and decontamination. The assessment also determines any off-scene risks needing
mitigation or monitoring. In situations where air-borne radionuclides are present, additional
internal dosimetry measurements or bioassay monitoring should be considered. The radiation
safety assessment may be part of the common hazards assessment used to quantify all hazards
present at the scene.
TABLE I–2. EXAMPLES OF RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

SUITABLE FOR USE IN ON-SCENE MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION
Instrument Function
Low/medium resolution gamma ray spectrometer Identify gamma emitting
radionuclides
High resolution gamma ray spectrometer with Identify gamma emitting radionu-
high purity germanium detector and specialized clides
expert level software for radionuclide identification Perform quantitative analysis of radio-
including uranium/plutonium isotopic analysis codes nuclides (estimate activity, etc.)
(e.g. Multi-Group Analysis Software, Multi-Group Characterize uranium and plutonium
Analysis for Uranium and Fixed-Energy, Response through analysis of isotopic composi-
Function Analysis with Multiple Efficiency) tions and through quantitative analysis
Note: Identification of nuclear and other radioactive material at the scene requires expertise in the
use of portable non-destructive analysis instrumentation. The information obtained during the
radiation safety assessment is also relevant to material identification. In some cases, it may
be necessary to obtain assistance from experts, such as personnel at laboratories routinely
using similar instruments, to help interpret data. In addition to the identification of nuclear
and other radioactive material, non-destructive analysis should be used to estimate the amount
of material present. This estimation is necessary to determine specifications for both physical
protection and transport. Results should be communicated to the nuclear forensic laboratory
that will receive the material.
76
FIG. I–1. Various models and types of handheld instruments available for assessing a scene
for radiation hazards.
FIG. I–2. Various models and types of instruments available to identify radioactive materials
at a scene.
77
(c) Footwear (can include overboots or shoe covers);
(d) Undergarments, such as vests worn to reduce heat load;
(e) Protective suits or other outer clothing (e.g. lead aprons).
I–6. All personnel entering the operational control area should wear suitable
dosimeters in order to provide a record of the accumulated dose. Personnel
should be equipped with self-reading (e.g. electronic) dosimeters with a range up
to at least 250 mSv, as specified in Ref. [I–3].
I–7. PPE can be described in terms of the different levels of protection. A typical
protection range is from Level A (greatest level of protection) to Level D
(least level of protection). The level of protection for the PPE to be worn at
the scene is decided upon by the on-scene/operational commander with advice
from the hazardous materials operations specialist, the safety specialist and the
radiological assessor. The PPE chosen could serve as equipment with different
levels of protection (e.g. a Level B RPE coupled with a Level C suit), depending
on the hazards present and the tasks to be undertaken at the scene.
I–8. Regardless of the level of PPE that it is worn, its use imposes limits on
operational capabilities. These limits include:
(a) Restricted mobility and dexterity;

(b) Reduced vision (in terms of both field of vision and visual clarity);
(c) Degraded ability to communicate;
(d) Degraded ability for prolonged operations, especially in view of the thermal
(heat) stress attendant to wearing protective suits.
I–9. Additional factors to consider include:
(a) Potential difficulties in obtaining a proper fit with certain designs of

respiratory protection devices for individuals having facial hair;
(b) Weight of the PPE;
(c) Limited supply of breathable air associated with a self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA);
(d) Completion of regular medical checks for personnel prior to the use of
RPE, depending on national health and safety regulations;
(e) Limited shelf life of certain items of PPE, which makes procurement and
quality assurance a priority;
(f) Possibility that wearing PPE may cause psychological stress in those
wearing it due to the induced sensation of claustrophobia.
78
Level A
I–10. Level A affords the highest level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous
membrane protection. The Level A PPE ensemble includes:
(a) A fully encapsulating, vapourtight suit, with integral chemical resistant

hand and foot protection;
(b) Positive pressure (pressure demand) SCBA; positive pressure supplied
air respirator with escape SCBA; or a closed-circuit breathing apparatus
(CCBA) (any one of which is typically worn inside the suit);
(c) Chemical resistant gloves, inner and outer (depending on the suit
glove construction);
(d) Chemical resistant boots with steel toe and shank (worn either inside or
outside the suit, depending on the suit boot construction).
I–11. An example of a closed-circuit breathing apparatus is given in Fig. I–3.
I–12. Optional items worn with Level A include:
(a) Undergarments, cotton;

(b) Radiation shielding, such as lead-lined aprons and garments;
(c) Coveralls (worn under suit);
FIG. I–3. A CCBA is one option for respiratory protection when on-scene conditions require
the highest level of respiratory protection.
79
(d) Safety helmet (worn under suit);
(e) Special overgarments for protection from fire or other high thermal
load hazards;
(f) Special undergarments to assist in either reducing heat load or providing
warmth, as dictated by local environmental circumstances.
An example of individuals wearing Level A PPE ensembles is given in Fig. I–4.
Level B
I–13. Level B affords the highest level of respiratory protection but a reduced
level of dermal, eye and mucous membrane protection. The Level B PPE
ensemble includes:
(a) Chemical (splash) resistant clothing (not vapourtight) (such as overalls and
long sleeved jacket, coveralls, hooded two-piece chemical splash suit);
(b) Positive pressure (pressure demand) SCBA or positive pressure supplied air
respirator with escape SCBA;
(c) Chemical resistant inner and outer gloves;
(d) Chemical resistant boots with steel toe and shank and worn outside the suit.
I–14. Optional items worn with Level B include:
(a) Coveralls (worn under the suit);

(b) Chemical resistant boot covers;
FIG. I–4. Level A PPE ensembles, as shown on these individuals during a training exercise,
afford the highest level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous membrane protection.
80
(c) Radiation shielding, such as lead-lined aprons and garments;
(d) Safety helmet;
(e) Special overgarments for protection from fire or other high thermal
load hazards;
(f) Special undergarments to help to either reduce heat load or provide warmth.
I–15. An example of individuals wearing Level B PPE ensembles is given in

Fig. I–5.
Level C
I–16. Level C affords a reduced level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous
membrane protection. The Level C PPE ensemble includes:
(a) Chemical resistant clothing (such as a one-piece coverall, hooded two-piece

chemical protective (splash) suit, chemical resistant hood and apron,
disposable chemical resistant coveralls);
(b) Full-face, or half-mask, air purifying respirator;
(c) Chemical resistant inner and outer gloves;
(d) Chemical resistant boots with steel toe and shank and worn outside the suit.
FIG. I–5. Personnel wearing Level B PPE ensembles, with SCBA, undergoing equipment
check prior to entering a hazard control area.
81
I–17. Examples of half-mask air purifying respirators are shown in Fig. I–6.
I–18. Optional items worn with Level C include:
(a) Face shield;

(b) Coveralls (worn inside chemical protective clothing);
(c) Safety helmet;
(d) Chemical resistant boot covers;
(e) Radiation shielding, such as lead-lined aprons and garments;
(f) Specialty undergarments to help to either reduce heat load or
provide warmth;
(g) Specialty overgarments for protection from fire or other high thermal
load hazards;
(h) Escape mask (i.e. a full-face or half-mask designed to provide interim
respiratory protection so that personnel might safely exit an environment
where toxic chemical vapour is encountered).
I–19. An example of individuals wearing Level C PPE ensembles is given in

Fig. I–7.
Level D
I–20. Level D affords the lowest level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous
membrane protection. The Level D PPE ensemble includes the normal work
FIG. I–6. Half-mask air purifying respirators, such as those depicted here, include both
the face piece (upper portion of the figure) and the filter. Various options are available for
the filter, and selecting the proper configuration of face piece and filter is dictated by local
conditions plus national standards.
82
uniform, coveralls or overalls plus safety glasses, safety helmet, and safety shoes
(with steel toes and shanks). Other items, such as gloves, special garments for
protection from fire or other high thermal load hazards, and radiation shielding
aprons and garments, may be required in accordance with the specific situation.
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
I–21. As noted in paras 5.19 and 5.20, preparation for radiological crime scene
operations includes the selection of ancillary equipment. Examples of ancillary
equipment include:
(a) Communications equipment;

(b) Decontamination equipment;
(c) Equipment for evacuating casualties;
FIG. I–7. Individuals wearing Level C PPE ensembles, including a powered air purifying
respirator and safety helmet, are shown prior to entering a hazard control area.
83
(d) Evidence collection, packaging and transport containers;
(e) Manipulators and remotely operated vehicles for grasping or moving
objects, such as evidence.
Communications equipment
I–22. While effective and timely communication is essential for all crime scene
operations, special conditions exist for communication at a radiological crime
scene. For example, the need to monitor and report levels of radioactivity
encountered in the hazard control areas means personnel operating within these
areas should routinely communicate such levels to the radiological assessor, scene
safety officer or other on-scene personnel. Similarly, the radiological assessor,
scene safety officer and other on-scene personnel may need to communicate with
personnel in the hazard control areas to ensure they exit the areas before reaching
their turn-back dose rate or cumulative radiation dose limit. Finally, on-scene
personnel may need to communicate with outside parties, such as subject matter
experts at nuclear forensic laboratories, regarding unfamiliar items or unusual
radioactive material that is encountered.
I–23. Personnel conducting operations while wearing PPE in a radiological

crime scene face several challenges regarding communication. For example,
RPE presents a challenge owing to the degradation of voice communications.
Additionally, PPE may include protective clothing that covers the ears. Any
communications equipment should be:
(a) Compatible with the PPE ensemble such that it does not degrade the
protection provided by the PPE.
(b) Designed for ease of operations for personnel wearing PPE.
(c) Intrinsically safe, meaning that the communications equipment will not
prevent alarm recognition, will not spark, and will have a limited output
of energy. These non-sparking and limited energy features are needed to
avoid the accidental ignition of flammable gases or dust or the accidental
activation of an explosive device.
Decontamination equipment
I–24. Decontamination is the process of using chemical and/or physical means

to remove or otherwise contain radionuclides, thus limiting their unintentional
spread beyond the radiological crime scene. In some cases, the careful removal
of PPE from personnel and the correct packaging of evidence, together with
contamination controls for open radioactive material, will be sufficient to
84
effectively limit the spread of radionuclides from the scene. In other cases, the
removal of radionuclide contamination from animals, areas, equipment, evidence
and personnel may be necessary to effectively manage radiological crime scene
operations. Various tools and procedures have been developed for this purpose.
Many of these tools reflect a low technology approach to removal or containment
of radioactive material. Such low technology tools include:
(a) Handheld survey meters (alpha, beta, gamma) for contamination controls
before, during and after decontamination (see Table I–1);
(b) Handheld sprayers (such as those used for house plants) filled with water or
glycerol solution or hairspray to fix small areas of surface contamination on
PPE prior to removal;
(c) Tape, scissors and extra protective suits for covering up small contaminated
areas on protective suits prior to removal;
(d) Backpack and handheld, pump operated pressure sprayers (such as those
used for applying liquids in gardens and to lawns) for washing down
large areas;
(e) Brooms, brushes (including nail brushes) and mops;
(f) Buckets;
(g) Inflatable wading pools;
(h) Plastic or rubber sheeting (for ground cover);
(i) Water storage bags, tanks and similar containers, including those that are
portable or collapsible;
(j) Watering hoses;
(k) Large waste disposal sacks;
(l) Clothing for personnel to change into after decontamination measures
are complete.
I–25. Slightly higher technology tools include portable showers, shelters, tents
and portable decontamination kits, among other things. These units can be used
as a decontamination station for personnel and equipment, or for decontamination
of selected items of evidence or equipment.
I–26. It is important that personnel at the decontamination station are familiar

with all applicable operational procedures and with all deployed PPE, and know
in which order, and how, the PPE should be removed. RPE should generally
be left on as long as possible to prevent inhalation of air-borne radionuclides
(particles). The PPE should be removed with the outer surface turned inwards to
prevent the spread of radioactive material. In the case of skin contamination with
radionuclides, with or without injuries to the person involved, the radiological
assessor should be consulted for advice on the correct decontamination measures.
85
Equipment for evacuating casualties
I–27. Operations at a radiological crime scene may include evacuation of

casualties. These casualties might be victims or perpetrators of the nuclear
security event associated with the crime scene. They might also be personnel
operating in the operational control areas or the hazard control areas. Casualties
who are mobile (i.e. who can move with minimal assistance) might be able to
pass through the decontamination station alone. Casualties who are unconscious,
who have limited mobility, or who have open wounds may need special
procedures and equipment for decontamination. In all cases, life saving measures
take precedence over decontamination measures. Guidance on providing medical
care to victims of a nuclear security event is given in Ref. [I–4].
Evidence collection, packaging and transport containers
I–28. Evidence collection, packaging and transport may be subject to national and
international regulations, such as those given in Refs [I–5, I–6]. These regulations
establish standards of safety for radiation, criticality and thermal hazards to
persons, property and the environment associated with transport of radioactive
material. Various items of equipment have been developed to ensure compliance
with these regulations in particular and with best practices for containers used in
evidence collection, packaging and transport in general.
I–29. Figure I–8 depicts various smaller evidence transport containers.
FIG. I–8. Various sizes and configurations of evidence transport containers have been
developed, as shown here by these examples which are suitable for smaller items of radioactive
material. Note that the container on the left bears a radioactive material (RAM) label, such as
the one described in Appendix I.
86
Manipulators and remotely operated vehicles
I–30. Manipulators and remotely operated vehicles afford a means of limiting the
time spent by personnel in the hazard control area and maximizing the distance
between individuals and radiation hazards. Manipulators can be low technology
tools, such as short or long handled manipulating tools used to grip or to move
objects, such as debris, that might be an obstacle to the collection of evidence.
These manipulators can also be used to grasp the evidence itself. Fig. I–9 depicts
a pair of such manipulators; in this case, the manipulators are also referred to as
tweezers or tongs.
I–31. By contrast, remotely operated vehicles are typically higher technology

equipment, such as robotic platforms that have been developed for the explosive
ordnance disposal community. Remotely operated vehicles can effectively
replace human involvement in radiological crime scene operations to, for
example, safely conduct the initial entry to a scene, perform radiation surveys
and provide surveillance.
Note: Tweezers and tongs, as depicted in this figure, can be used to grasp evidence or to move
objects that present obstacles to collecting evidence. The tweezers on the left of the figure are
capable of locking in position once the item of interest has been grasped. The tongs on the right
of the figure have extended handles to add distance between the individual and the item of
interest to be collected or moved.
FIG. I–9. Manipulators.
87
REFERENCES TO ANNEX I
[I–1] JANE’S, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence 2011–2012, 24th edn, Jane’s
Information Group, Alexandria, VA (2011).
[I–2] EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL POLICE ORGANISATION, WORLD CUSTOMS
ORGANIZATION, Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive
Material, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 6, IAEA, Vienna (2007).
[I–3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Method for Developing
Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Method
2003, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[I–4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency, EPR-Medical 2005, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
[I–5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6, IAEA,
Vienna (2012).
[I–6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. SSG-26, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
88
Annex II
INTERPOL CBRNE TERRORISM PREVENTION PROGRAMME
II–1. International Criminal Police Organization–INTERPOL is the world’s

largest international police organization, with 190 member countries. Created
in 1923 and headquartered in Lyon, France, it facilitates cross-border police
cooperation and provides assistance to all organizations, authorities and services
whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime.
II–2. INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global police communications system connects law

enforcement officials in all of its member countries, providing them with the
means to share crucial information on criminals and criminal activities, 24 hours
a day, seven days a week. Using INTERPOL’s I-24/7 system, National Central
Bureaus can search and cross-check data in a matter of seconds, with direct access
to databases of information on, among other things, suspected terrorists, wanted
persons, fingerprints, DNA profiles, lost or stolen travel documents, stolen motor
vehicles and stolen works of art. These multiple resources give law enforcement
officials instant access to potentially important information, thereby facilitating
criminal investigations.
II–3. INTERPOL is able to provide support services to law enforcement

operations, which include analysis, information exchange, incident response and
coordination of national authorities for the full spectrum of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) threats and investigations.
II–4. The INTERPOL CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Programme is engaged in a

wide range of activities to combat cross-border smuggling of CBRNE weapons
and materials by non-State actors, including criminals and terrorists. INTERPOL
is engaged in capacity building and training of member country authorities, the
development of guidance documents and manuals and active investigations.
Operation Fail Safe
II–5. INTERPOL is uniquely positioned to engage in the global effort to

counter nuclear smuggling through use of its internationally recognized notice
system (INTERPOL notices are international requests for cooperation or alerts
allowing police in member countries to share critical crime related information).
INTERPOL’s Operation Fail Safe addresses non-State actors and is being
implemented to generate the issuance of INTERPOL Green Notices (e.g. a Green
Notice is issued to provide warnings and criminal intelligence about persons
89
who have committed criminal offences and are likely to repeat these crimes in
other countries) regarding individuals involved in the smuggling of radioactive
or nuclear material. Upon query by law enforcement officials at border crossings
or other locations, an alert will be generated based upon the Green Notice.
II–6. The INTERPOL Command and Coordination Centre, staffed continuously,

will be notified of the country location and identity of the individual subject of
the query and will subsequently notify the INTERPOL CBRNE Programme.
This alert and notification process creates a new capability to detect transnational
movement of individuals known to be engaged in this activity and facilitates
contemporaneous operational coordination by the INTERPOL CBRNE
Programme with, and at the discretion of, law enforcement in the affected States,
consistent with their laws and policies.
II–7. If a State has established a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team, which

combines specific expertise across relevant disciplines, the coordination to
address a situation effectively will be maximized.
II–8. The communication conducted through Operation Fail Safe expands

the network of States engaged in the international effort to counter nuclear
smuggling and supports the transition from national policy to positive operational
engagement, with the goal of prevention.
Project Geiger
II–9. Intelligence is essential in order for INTERPOL and police services

worldwide to tailor their operations to specific threats and to drive prevention
programmes. Project Geiger focuses on collating and analysing information
on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving radioactive/
nuclear material. The Project Geiger database combines the IAEA’s Incident and
Trafficking Database with additional open source reports and law enforcement
data collected through INTERPOL’s secure channels.
II–10. The analytical products that are published through Project Geiger are
highly valuable to both the international law enforcement community and to
other international organizations working to prevent radiological and nuclear
crimes. These products include Project Geiger monthly reports that assess current
nuclear and other radioactive material trafficking threats, and other reports
that address more specific issues, usually at the request of States or partner
international organizations.
90
DEFINITIONS
The definitions given below may not necessarily conform to definitions adopted
elsewhere for international use. Examples have been added to some definitions
in order to assist the reader in understanding the definition. When examples
are given, they are not intended to be exhaustive, or to limit the definition in
any manner.
chain of custody. The procedures and documents that account for the integrity
of physical evidence by tracking its handling and storage from its point of
collection to its final disposition. Other terms for this process are ‘chain of
evidence’, ‘chain of physical custody’ and ‘chain of possession’.
competent authority. A governmental organization or institution that has been

designated by a State to carry out one or more nuclear security functions.
—— Example: Competent authorities may include regulatory bodies, law

enforcement, customs and border control, intelligence and security
agencies, health agencies, etc.
crime scene. A site containing records of activities, alleged to be a crime.
crime scene operations. The procedures that aim to control access at a crime
scene, to document the scene as it was first encountered, and to recognize,
collect, package and remove from the scene all relevant evidence.
hazard control area. A designated geographical area, representing the maximum

extent of all hazards within a radiological crime scene, into which, within
and from which access is controlled.
improvised nuclear device (IND). A device incorporating radioactive material

designed to result in the formation of a nuclear yield reaction. Such devices
may be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may be an
improvised modification to a nuclear weapon.
information alert. Time sensitive reporting that could indicate a nuclear security
event, requiring assessment, and may come from a variety of sources,
including operational information, medical surveillance, accounting and
consigner/consignee discrepancies and border monitoring.
91
initial assessment. The process of analysing systematically and evaluating an
information alert or an instrument alarm to determine whether a nuclear
security event has occurred.
initial entry. The first controlled entry made into a crime scene, conducted
for the purpose of gathering data regarding the nature and extent of
on-scene hazards.
innocent alarm. An alarm found by subsequent assessment to have been caused

by nuclear or other radioactive material under regulatory control or exempt
or excluded from regulatory control.
instrument alarm. A signal from instruments that could indicate a nuclear

security event requiring assessment. An instrument alarm may come from
devices that are portable or deployed at fixed locations and operated to
augment normal commerce protocols or law enforcement operation.
nuclear security event. An event that has potential or actual implications for
nuclear security that must be addressed.
operational control area. A designated geographical area, representing the

maximum extent of the area needed to support the management of a
radiological crime scene, into and from which access is controlled.
radiation exposure device (RED). A device with radioactive material designed

to intentionally expose members of the public to radiation.
radiological assessor. A person who, at a radiological crime scene, assists by

performing radiation surveys, performing dose assessments, assisting
with the control of radionuclide contamination, ensuring the radiation
protection of crime scene personnel, and formulating recommendations on
protective actions.
radiological crime scene. A crime scene in which a criminal act or intentional

unauthorized act involving nuclear or other radioactive material has taken
place or is suspected.
radiological dispersal device (RDD). A device to spread radioactive material

using conventional explosives or other means.
92
regulatory control. Any form of institutional control applied to nuclear material
or other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities
by any competent authority as required by the legislative and regulatory
provisions related to safety, security, or safeguards.
—— Explanation: The phrase ‘out of regulatory control’ is used to describe a

situation where nuclear or other radioactive material is present in sufficient
quantity that it should be under regulatory control, but control is absent,
either because controls have failed for some reason, or they never existed.
response measure. A measure intended to assess an alarm/alert and to respond to

a nuclear security event.
response system. An integrated set of response measures including capabilities

and resources necessary for assessing the alarms/alerts and response to a
nuclear security event.
93
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Radiological crime scene management is the process
used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient
operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other
radioactive materials are known, or suspected, to
be present. Managing a radiological crime scene is
a key part of responding to a nuclear security event.
Evidence collection at radiological crime scenes
may share a wide range of characteristics with that
at conventional crime scenes, such as evidence
search patterns, geographical scene modelling and
evidence recording, whether or not explosives are
involved. This publication focuses on the framework
and functional elements for managing a radiological
crime scene that are distinct from any other crime
scene. It assumes that States have a capability for
managing conventional crime scenes.
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA
ISBN 978–92–0–108714–0
ISSN 1816–9317

IAEA Radiological Crime Scene Management

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IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.

Radiological Crime Scene

CATEGORIES IN THE IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES

DRAFTING AND REVIEW

AFGHANISTAN GHANA OMAN

JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Marketing and Sales Unit, Publishing Section

Printed by the IAEA in Austria

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

2. OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO A NUCLEAR

3. FRAMEWORK FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE

6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE . . . . . . . . 51

APPENDIX I: SAMPLE FORMS USED FOR RADIOLOGICAL

APPENDIX II: HAZARDS COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED

ANNEX I: TYPES OF EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR USE

ANNEX II: INTERPOL CBRNE TERRORISM PREVENTION

(a) Time spent in the hazard control areas;

1.5. The objective of this publication is to provide law enforcement officials,

1.9. Following this introduction, Section 2 presents an overview of the process

2. OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO

2.1. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear

2.2. A radiological crime scene may contain nuclear or other radioactive

2.3. Scenarios in which the nuclear or other radioactive material may be

(a) Dispersion of radioactive material by an RDD using explosives or any other

2.4. The effective management of these scenarios requires a national response

(a) Notification of the nuclear security event;

2.6. Figure 1 illustrates a generic flow of actions to be implemented in response

NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE SYSTEM ACTIVATION

2.7. Upon detection of nuclear or other radioactive material through an

Reporting Declaration & notification

Assessment phase Management phase

FIG. 1. Two phases of response to a nuclear security event.

FIG. 1. Two phases of response to a nuclear security event.

NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE SYSTEM ACTIVATION

Crime scene Forensic

(a) Establishment (by the first responders) of perimeter control procedures in

RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT

2.16. Figure 3 illustrates a set of pre-planned and coordinated actions to be

RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE

Conduct common hazards risk assessment

Ascertain dispersion mode/pathways

Collect, package & manage evidence

Conduct after action review

FIG. 3. Radiological crime scene conduct of operations.

FIG. 3. Radiological crime scene conduct of operations.

2.17. Nuclear forensics is one

Routine investigative activities

Investigative activities requiring assistance from nuclear or radiation

2.22. Specialists in nuclear forensics or radiation protection might brief

(a) A radiation warning trefoil placard or similar hazard warning displayed on

Investigative activities for determining national and international security

2.24. In order to analyse the nuclear security implications of a nuclear security

2.26. A nuclear security event is likely to be of keen interest to national

2.27. Prior to the occurrence of a nuclear security event, effective

3. FRAMEWORK FOR RADIOLOGICAL

3.1. The management of a radiological crime scene needs an integrated

3.2. The integrated command structure needs to be understood by all involved

3.3. Managing radiological crime scenes is complex, involves multiple

3.4. The adoption of an integrated command structure is essential for achieving