Effect and Operation of Laws
Effect and Operation of Laws
Effect and Operation of Laws
10.1.Prospectivity of Laws
laws are classified
Accordingto their effect and operation,law applies to acts,
either prospectiveor retroactive. Prospective its effectivity.The
situations or events that will happen after to acts, situations
law looks forward. Retroactive law appliespassage or enactment.
or events that happened even before its term for retroactive is
Retroactive law looks backward. The other
retrospective.
As a general rule, laws shall have prospective effect. Article
4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides for the rule on
prospectivity of laws, to wit:
"Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
"
the contrary is provided.
The aforestated article is the articulation of the legal maxims
lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future,
the judge for the past; l and lexprospicit non respicit — the law looks
forward, not backward.2Statutes are prospective and not retroactive
in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future,
not the past.3The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive
legislation to be unjust and oppressiveon account of its liability to
unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. 4
258
CHAPTER X 259
EFFECT AND OPERATION OF LAWS
Case:
coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(senior Citizens Party-List), represented herein by its Chairperson and
First Nominee,Francisco G. Datol, Jr., PetitionervsCommission on
Elections, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013. 701 SCRA 786
Facts:
In 2007, SENIOR CITIZENS was accredited as a party-list organiza-
tion. In the May 14, 2007 elections, it got one seat in Congress. Rep. Arqui-
za, then the organization's first nominee, served as a member of the House
ofRepresentatives.
on May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENSsigned an
agreement, wherein they agreed on a term sharing.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS
ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two
seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee,
David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENScame about not
long after. According to the Datol Group's petition, the members of SENIOR
CITIZENSheld a national convention on November27, 2010 in order to
address "the unfulfilled commitmentof Rep. Arquiza to his constituents."
Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the
organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR
OF THE LAWs
260 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Issue:
Whether the COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENSsolely on account of its purported
violation of the prohibitionagainst term-sharing.
Ruling:
Article 4 of the Civil Codestates that 'taws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Reyes, "the general rule is that statutes are prospective. However,
statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation
of statutes." The Court also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National
Power Corporation that:
"It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively
less the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest un-
terms or by necessary implication because the by express
plication of a law usually divests rights that retroactive ap-
come vested. This is based on the Latin have already be-
non respicit (The law looks maxim: Lex prospicit
forward, not backward)."
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, does not provide that it shall
the Court cannot subscribe the
to
EFFECT 263
OPERATIONOF Lxws
the Group
rrght to its registration asthat SENIORCITIZENSalready earned a
a party•list organization.
Ntontesclaros t'. Commission
is not a property right. As on Elections teaches
the Constitution that "a public office
is public trust? So one has a expressly states, a •Public office
right to an expectancyvested right to any public office,much less
Article I-X-Cof the of holding a public office."Under Section
Constitution. the COMELECis
function to ۥregister,after entrusted with the
sufficient publication, political parties,
or coalitions which, in organiza-
their platform or program of addition to other requirements, must present
COMELECis duty-bound to review
government." In fulfillingthis function, the
ganizations, or coalitions already the grant of registration to parties, ore
continuousadherence to the registered in order to ensure the latter's
requirements prescribedby law and the rel-
evant rulings of this Court relative
to their qualificationsand eligibility to
participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object
to the retroactive appli-
cation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground
of the impairment
of SENIOR CITIZENS' vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELECResolutionNo. 9366 expressly
provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC
en banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invokedby the COMELECen
banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS, was not implemented.
This fact was manifested by the Arquiza
Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
en banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it
was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho's
replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No.
12-040,the COMELEC en banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. The COMELECeven
declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said
agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees
OfSENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in
implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Beforethis Court, the Arquiza
Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives,
in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC en
banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this
point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually imple-
that SENIORCITIZENS,as a
mented by the parties thereto, it appearsand
Party-list organization, had been unfairly arbitrarily penalized by the
264 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWs
10.2.Exceptions
Article 4 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence have created
exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws. These are:
1. When law expressly provides for retroactive application.
2. When the penal law is favorable to the accused who is not
a habitual criminal.
3. When the law is procedural in nature.
4. When the law is curative in nature.
5. When the law creates a new substantive right.
6. When the law is issued in the exercise of the state's police
power in order to meet an emergency.5
121bid.,at pp. 47-48; citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298,
322-323.
131bid., at p. 48.
14
Supra note 12.
15G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.
16"AnAct Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled 'An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998
National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exer-
cises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No.
7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes."
The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the
Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to
one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred
(400.00).
There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six
accredited major political parties excluding the dominant majority and minors
ity parties. who Shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the
said parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission
upon notice and hearing on the basis of the followingcircumstances:
(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that
now composed them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in
past election;
(b) number of incumbent elective officiala belonging to them uin+
(90) days before the date of election;
(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evi•
dent*d by their organized/chapters;
(d) ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal
level co the position of President; and
(e) Other analogouscircumstanceøthat may
determine their relative
organizations and strengths,"
CHAPTER X 269
EFFECT AND
OPERATION OF LAWS
Case:
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and Agemar Manning
Agency, Inc., Petitionersv. Estanislao Surio, Freddie Palguiran,
Graciano Morales, Henry Castillo, Aristotle Arreola, Alexander
Ygot, Anrique Battung, Gregorio Aldovino, Narciso Frias, Victor
Flores, Samuel Marcial, Carlito Palguiran, Duque Vinluan, Jesus
Mendegorin, Neil Flores, RomeoMangaliag,Joe Garfin and
Salestino Susa, Respondents.
G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012. 679 SCRA 21
Bersamin, J.:
Facts:
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel
owned by petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and
operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents
were still on board the vessel, they experienceddelays in the payment of
their wages and in the remittance of allotments, and were not paid for
extra work and extra overtime work. They complainedabout the vessel's
inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their
repeated requests for the improvementof their working conditions.On
Issue:
Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided
by the POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions against private
respondents.
Ruling:
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners' adamant insistence that the NLRCshould have appellate
authority over the POEA's decision in the disciplinary action because their
complaint against respondents was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although
RA No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino
workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from
the POEA the original and exclusivejurisdiction to hear and decideall
disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character
involving such workers. The obvious intent of RA No. 8042 was to have the
POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and
involving such workers. This intent was even expressly recognized in the
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on February 29, 1996, viz.:
24G.R. No. 149508, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 411, 422.
276 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage,
for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired. Converselyand by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a
new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply
with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new
law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal
from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon
authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is
proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts
by which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved. This is why it is
consistentlyheld that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is
available only if granted by law or statute.
When RA No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in
respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested
in the Secretary of Labor in accordancewith his power of supervision and
control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title Il, Book Ill of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and
Regulations specifically provides, as follows:
Case:26
Mendoza, J.:
Facts:
(SSC) and St. Scholastica's
Respondents St. Scholastica's College educational institutions
are
Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina)
Republicof the Philippines, with principal
Organizedunder the laws of the
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 192 is a remedial or
curative statute.
CHAPTER X 279
EFFECT AND OPERATION OF LAWS
Ruling:
The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192is a curative statute as
it aims to correct or cure a defect in the National Building Code,namely,
its failure to provide for adequate guidelines for the construction of fences.
Theyultimately seek to remedy an insufficiencyin the law. In aiming to
curethis insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking provisions to
the National Building Code.This is not what is contemplated by curative
statutes, which intend to correct irregularities or invalidity in the law. The
petitionersfail to point out any irregular or invalid provision.As such, the
assailedordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.
in the National
At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency
BuildingCode with respect to parking provisions in relation to the issue of
the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
ofthe said code requires an educational institution to provide one parking
slot for every ten classrooms. As found by the lower courts, the respondents
providea total of 76 parking slots for their 80 classrooms and, thus, had
morethan sufficiently complied with the law.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative statute
whichmay be applied retroactively.
27G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984, 129 SCRA 187, 197.
28Valencia v. Surtida, L-17277,May 31, 1961; citing Viuda de Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, 47 Off. Gaz. 5613.
29Ponce v. Guevarra, No. L-19629 & L-19672-92, March
31, 1964, 10 SCRA 649,
656; citing Viuda de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, supra; and Valencia v. Surtida, supra.