CHAPTER X

AND OPERATION OF LAWS

EFFECT

10.1.Prospectivity of Laws
laws are classified
Accordingto their effect and operation,law applies to acts,
either prospectiveor retroactive. Prospective its effectivity.The
situations or events that will happen after to acts, situations
law looks forward. Retroactive law appliespassage or enactment.
or events that happened even before its term for retroactive is
Retroactive law looks backward. The other
retrospective.
As a general rule, laws shall have prospective effect. Article
4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides for the rule on
prospectivity of laws, to wit:
"Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
"
the contrary is provided.
The aforestated article is the articulation of the legal maxims
lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future,
the judge for the past; l and lexprospicit non respicit — the law looks
forward, not backward.2Statutes are prospective and not retroactive
in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future,
not the past.3The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive
legislation to be unjust and oppressiveon account of its liability to
unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. 4

IPhilippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings

and Loan Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 181556, December 14, 2009, 608 SCRA 215, 221; citing
Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA
214, 294.
2Lintag v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 158609, July 27, 2007, 528
SCRA 287.
3Supra note 1.
4Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, supra at pp. 294-295.

258
 CHAPTER X 259
EFFECT AND OPERATION OF LAWS

Case:
coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(senior Citizens Party-List), represented herein by its Chairperson and
First Nominee,Francisco G. Datol, Jr., PetitionervsCommission on
Elections, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013. 701 SCRA 786

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (Senior Citizens), represented by its President and incumbent
Representative in the House of Representatives, Atty. Godofredo V.
Arquiza, Petitioner v. Commission on Elections, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013. 701 SCRA 786

Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

The case involves the two rival factions within the same party-
list organization, the Coalition of Associationsof Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS). one group is headed by Godofredo
V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization's incumbent representative in
the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to
as the Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr.,
the organization's erstwhile third nominee.This group shall be hereinafter
referred to as the Datol Group.

Facts:
In 2007, SENIOR CITIZENS was accredited as a party-list organiza-
tion. In the May 14, 2007 elections, it got one seat in Congress. Rep. Arqui-
za, then the organization's first nominee, served as a member of the House
ofRepresentatives.
on May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENSsigned an
agreement, wherein they agreed on a term sharing.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS
ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two
seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee,
David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENScame about not
long after. According to the Datol Group's petition, the members of SENIOR
CITIZENSheld a national convention on November27, 2010 in order to
address "the unfulfilled commitmentof Rep. Arquiza to his constituents."
Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the
organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR
 OF THE LAWs
260 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

CITIZENS' third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected

as the organization's Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010,in an
opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the
Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged
in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers,Claimed
leadership of the organization.
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the COMELECin
a letter dated, December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR
CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take
effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza,
was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from
the organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. The letter
was accompaniedby a petition in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS.The
petition prayed that the "confirmationand approval of the replacement of
Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios
D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol,
Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of her assumption into
the office."The petition was docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.
During the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No.
9366 was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule
4 thereof providedthat:

"Section 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as

a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning
party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed."

On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS

that were allied with Rep. Arquiza issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012,
recalling the acceptance of the resignation of congressman David L. Kho and
allowing him to continue representing the senior citizens party-list in the
house of representatives, allowinghim to continue his term and imposing
certain conditions on him to be performed with the coalition.
Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC en banc conducted a
hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS' petition in E.M. No. 12-040. on June 27,
2012, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petition E.M. No. 12-040 stating
that resignation of Kho, pursuant to the party nominees' term-sharing
agreement, cannot be recognized and be given effect so as to create a vacancy
in the list and change the order of the nominees.
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their
respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System
of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR
CITIZENS. The Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP NO.
 CHAPTER X 261
EFFECT AND OPERATION
OF LAWS

12-157(PLM), while that of the Arquiza

Group was docketed as SPP No.
12-191(PIM).
The COMELECen banc ordered
the cancellation of the registration
and accreditation of the petitioner
SENIOR CITIZENS, and consequently,
the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate
filed with the Commission
were denied. The sole ground for which the petitioner Senior Citizens
was disqualified was because of the term-sharing agreement between its
nominees,which the Commissionen banc found to be contrary to public
policy.
Accordingto the COMELEC,"the term-sharing agreement was made
in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it was promulgated
only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"),
is of no moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified and as it was in 1995 when RA No. 7941 was
enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to public policy because
it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public elective
officeto contractual bargaining and negotiation,and treats the same as
though it were nothing more than a contractual clause, an object in the
ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense will not only
open the floodgatesto unscrupulousindividuals, but more importantly it
will render inutile Section 16 of RA No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure
to be taken to fill a vacancyin the available seats for a party-list group
or organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens cannot
hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be
pierced if necessary to achieve the ends of justice or equity, such as when
it is used to defeat public convenience,justify wrong, or protect fraud. It
further cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment of ex post facto laws
under Section 22, Article Ill of the Constitution because the guarantee only
the retrospectivity of penal laws and definitely, Res. No. 9366 is not penal
in character."
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declara-
tion of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS' registration and
its disqualificationto participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol
Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.

Contentionof the Parties:

The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-
Sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution
NO.9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the
resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR
CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When
the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet
expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
 OF THE LAWs
INTERPRETATION
262 CONSTRUCTIONAND

points out that the mere execution of

Furthermore, the Datol Group nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for
the
the Irrevocable Covenant between been a ground for the cancellation of the
the 2010 elections should not have
accreditation because the nominees never
organization's registration and
actually implemented the agreement.
Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term.
In like manner, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS.
transpired between the
sharing actually arrangements made by the nominees on
It explained that whatever prior
agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
the term-sharing by the Board of Trustees and the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved
members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
that the term-sharing agree.
Still, granting for the sake of argument Group points out that SE-
ment was actually implemented, the Arquiza Section 7 of
NIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated
entered into in 2010 or two
tion No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was
years prior to the promulgationof said resolution on February 21, 2012.
Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be applied retroactively, the
Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at
it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.

Issue:
Whether the COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENSsolely on account of its purported
violation of the prohibitionagainst term-sharing.

Ruling:
Article 4 of the Civil Codestates that 'taws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Reyes, "the general rule is that statutes are prospective. However,
statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation
of statutes." The Court also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National
Power Corporation that:
"It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively
less the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest un-
terms or by necessary implication because the by express
plication of a law usually divests rights that retroactive ap-
come vested. This is based on the Latin have already be-
non respicit (The law looks maxim: Lex prospicit
forward, not backward)."
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, does not provide that it shall
the Court cannot subscribe the
to
 EFFECT 263
OPERATIONOF Lxws

the Group
rrght to its registration asthat SENIORCITIZENSalready earned a
a party•list organization.
Ntontesclaros t'. Commission
is not a property right. As on Elections teaches
the Constitution that "a public office
is public trust? So one has a expressly states, a •Public office
right to an expectancyvested right to any public office,much less
Article I-X-Cof the of holding a public office."Under Section
Constitution. the COMELECis
function to ۥregister,after entrusted with the
sufficient publication, political parties,
or coalitions which, in organiza-
their platform or program of addition to other requirements, must present
COMELECis duty-bound to review
government." In fulfillingthis function, the
ganizations, or coalitions already the grant of registration to parties, ore
continuousadherence to the registered in order to ensure the latter's
requirements prescribedby law and the rel-
evant rulings of this Court relative
to their qualificationsand eligibility to
participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object
to the retroactive appli-
cation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground
of the impairment
of SENIOR CITIZENS' vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELECResolutionNo. 9366 expressly
provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC
en banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invokedby the COMELECen
banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS, was not implemented.
This fact was manifested by the Arquiza
Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
en banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it
was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho's
replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No.
12-040,the COMELEC en banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. The COMELECeven
declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said
agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees
OfSENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in
implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Beforethis Court, the Arquiza
Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives,
in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC en
banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this
point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually imple-
that SENIORCITIZENS,as a
mented by the parties thereto, it appearsand
Party-list organization, had been unfairly arbitrarily penalized by the
 264 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWs

COMELECen banc. Verily, how can there be disobedienceon the part of

SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out
their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
regulation to speak 01 Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITI_
ZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no
gal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack
of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a findingof
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the COMELEC en banc.
Having established that the COMELECen banc erred in ordering
the disqualificationof SENIOR CITIZENSand the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed
as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently concludedMay
13, 2013 elections.
The Commission on Elections en banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of
the winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with
the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes
it garnered during the said elections.

10.2.Exceptions
Article 4 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence have created
exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws. These are:
1. When law expressly provides for retroactive application.
2. When the penal law is favorable to the accused who is not
a habitual criminal.
3. When the law is procedural in nature.
4. When the law is curative in nature.
5. When the law creates a new substantive right.
6. When the law is issued in the exercise of the state's police
power in order to meet an emergency.5

6See footnote 28 of Philippine

National Bank v. Tejano, G.R. No. 173615,
October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 147, 158; citing Valencia v. Surtida, G.R. No.
May 31, 1961. See also Ponce v. Guevarra, G.R. L-17277,
Nos. L-19629 and L-19672-92, Mar ch
31, 1964, '10 SCRA 649, 656; Viuda de Ongsiako
v. Gamboa, 47 Off. Gaz., 5613.
 ANT)
LAWS
10.3.When Law Expressly
Provides for Retroactivo Application
Basic is the rule Chat
no 8Cat,ute,decree, ordinance, rule, or
regulation shall be given retrospective
Hence, there should effect unleggexplicitly gtat-
be a legal bagi8Chata law should apply
retroactively.7
In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec.
No. 957 did not expressly provide the Court held that while PD
for its retroactive application,
nonetheless,it can be plainly inferred from
be grvenretroactive effect so as to extend its intent that it wag to
its coverageeven to those
contractsexecuted prior to its effectivityin 1976.
However, in a subsequent case of People's Industrial and
CommercialCorp. v. Court of Appeals,9the Court clarified that PD
No.957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactivelyin view of the
absenceof any express provision on its retroactive application.Thus:
"x x x Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.Thus, it is necessarythat an expressprovision
for its retroactive applicationmust be made in the law.
There being no such provisionin both PD Nos. 957 and
1344,these decrees cannot be appliedto a situation that
occurred years before their promulgation x x x 10

10.3.1. Examples of Statutes that Clearly Provide for

Retroactive Application:
Section 68 of RA No. 9344, otherwise known as "Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,"reads:
"Section. 68. Children Who Have Been Con-
victed and are Serving Sentence. —Personswhohave
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eigh•
teen (18) years at the time the commissionof the offense
for which they were convictedand are serving sentence,

Ilorneowner8 Association, C.R. NO. 149417,

"Duenag v. Santos Subdivision Philippine8 v, Sandiganbayan,
June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA76, 89; citing Republic o/ the
G.R. No, 119292, 31 July 1998, 293 SCRA 440, 459.
Tlbid., at p. 89.
1996, 252 SCRA 106.
8G.R. No. 109404, January 22,
1997, 281 SCRA 206,
9G.R. No. 112733, October 24,
101bid., at p. 215.
 OF THE LAws
266 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

shall likewise benefit from the retroactive applica-

tion of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
sentences
dispositionsprovidedunder this Act and their
shall be adjusted accordingly.They shall be immediately
released if they are so qualifiedunder this Act or other
applicable law." (Emphasis supplied)
RA No. 6138 — Act to Amend Certain Sections of Republic Act
Numbered Five Thousand Five Hundred Twenty- Seven, known as
the Philippine Medical TechnologyAct of 1969 — was also expressly
given a retroactive application. Section 2 thereof reads:
"Section 2. This Act shall take effect retroactively as
of June 21, 1969."

10.3.2. No Retroactive Application Despite the Same is

Provided
Although the legislature expresslygives a law a retroactive
effect, but such law will not be applied retroactively when it is
an ex post facto law, and it impairs obligationof contracts. These
limitations to the powerof the legislature to enact a law are clearly
provided by the Constitution.

10.3.2.1. Ex Post Facto Law

Section 22, Article Ill (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution states:
"Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted."

An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which

makes an action done before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.ll The

nsalvador v. Mapa, G.R. No. 135080,

November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 34, 4 7;
citing Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA
534, 565.
 CHAPTER X
EFFECT AND 267
OPERATION OF LAWS
Court added two more
to regulate civil rights to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes
penalty or deprivation and remedies only but in effect imposesa
(f) that which deprives of a right which when done was lawful; or
a
protectionto which he person accused of a crime of some lawful
of a former conviction has becomeentitled, such as the protection
or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.lZ
The constitutional
generally prohibits the doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
retrospectivityof penal laws.13Penal laws
are those acts of the legislature
establish penalties for their which prohibit certain acts and
violations;or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment.14
10.3.2.2. Non-Impairment of
Obligation of Contracts
Section 10, Article Ill (Bill of Rights)
of the 1987 Philippine
Constitutionstates:
"Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts shall be passed."
The scope and extent of the aforestated constitutional provi-
sion is discussed in the case of Barangay Associationfor National
Advancement and Transparency (Banat) Party-List v. Commission
on Elections (COMELEC),15wherein the petitioner assails the con-
stitutionality of Section 34 of RA No. 936916which fixes the per diem

121bid.,at pp. 47-48; citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298,
322-323.
131bid., at p. 48.
14
Supra note 12.
15G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.
16"AnAct Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled 'An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998
National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exer-
cises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No.
7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes."

Section 34. Section 26 of RA No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section. 26. Official Watchers. — Every registered political party or
coalition of political parties, and every candidate shall each be entitled to one
watcher in every polling place and canvassing center: Provided That, candi-
dates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sanggu-
niang Bayan belongingto the same slate or ticket shall collectivelybe entitled
to only one watcher.
 OF LAWS

of of dnminnnt mnjorityand dominant minority

dny, Petitioner that the provision
the ft•oodomof Ihe patties to contract and their right to fix terms
conditionsof (he contract they gee fair, just, and equitablo
adds thAt this ig purely private contract using private
funds y cannot be regulated by law. The Officeof the Solicitor
General (OSG)argues that Petitioner erroneouslyinvoked the
impairment clause because this clause only applies to previously
perfected contracts, in this case, there is no perfectedcontact and,
therefore, no obligation will be impaired.
Justice Antonio Carpio, in resolving that Section 34 of RA No.
9369 does not violate the non-impairment clause, states:
"First, the non-impairmentclause is limited in ap•
plication to laws that derogate from prior acts or con-
tracts by enlarging, abridgingor in any manner change
ing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between
the parties, imposesnew conditions,dispenses with those
agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement
of the rights of the parties.
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing
contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or
demandable obligation will be impaired. RA [No.] 9369

The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the
Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to
one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred
(400.00).
There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six
accredited major political parties excluding the dominant majority and minors
ity parties. who Shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the
said parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission
upon notice and hearing on the basis of the followingcircumstances:
(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that
now composed them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in
past election;
(b) number of incumbent elective officiala belonging to them uin+
(90) days before the date of election;
(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evi•
dent*d by their organized/chapters;
(d) ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal
level co the position of President; and
(e) Other analogouscircumstanceøthat may
determine their relative
organizations and strengths,"
 CHAPTER X 269
EFFECT AND
OPERATION OF LAWS

was enacted more than

2007 elections. Hence, three months prior to the 14 May
when
minority parties hired their the dominant majority and
the 14 May 2007 elections,respectivepoll watchersfor
they were deemed to have
incorporated in their contracts
[No.] 9369.
all the provisionsof RA

Second,it is settled that policepower

the non-impairmentclause. The is superior to
of non-impairment of contracts constitutionalguaranty
is
of the police power of the State, inlimited by the exercise
the interest of public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the com-
munity.

Therefore, assuming there were existingcontracts,

section 34 would still be constitutionalbecause the law
was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
state to promote the general welfare of the people. [The
Court] agree[sl with the COMELECthat the role of poll
watchers is invested with public interest. In fact, even
petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard
the votes of their respective candidates or political
parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly
counted. Ultimately, poll watchersaid in fair and honest
elections. Poll watchers help ensure that the electionsare
transparent, credible,fair, and accurate. The regulation of
the per diem of the pollwatchers ofthe dominantmajority
and minority parties promotesthe general welfare of the
community and is a valid exercise of police power."

10.4.When the Penal Law is Favorable to the Accused Who is Not

a Habitual Criminal
10.4.1. FavorabiliaSuntAmpliandaAdiosaRestrigenda
This exceptionis based on the well-entrenchedprinciple in
criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda.
Penal laws which are favorableto the accusedare givenretroactive
effect.This principle is embodiedin Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code,which reads:
"Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. —
Penal laws shall have a retroactiveeffectinsofar as they
not a habitual
favor the persons guilty of a felony,who is
 INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
CONSTRUCTION AND
270

term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62

criminal,as this time of the publication of
of this Code,although at the
been pronounced and the
such laws, a final sentence has
convictis serving the same."
case of People v. the Supreme Court modified
Adviento,17
In the from death to reclusion
the penalty imposedon accused-appellants the Court explained
perpetua. Quoting the case of People v. Tinsay,18
that:
"On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (RA No.
9346),entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition ofDeath
Penalty in the Philippines, took effect. Pertinent provi-
sions thereof provide as follows:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of
death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-
Seven (RANo. 8177),otherwise known as the Act
DesignatingDeath by Lethal Injection is hereby re-
pealed. RepublicAct No. Seven Thousand Six Hun-
dred Fifty-Nine (RA No. 7659) otherwise known as
the Death PenaltyLaw and all other laws, execu-
tive orders and decreesinsofar as they impose the
death penalty are hereby repealed or amended ac-
cordingly.
Section2. In lieu of the death penalty, the fol-
lowing shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when
the law violatedmakes use of the nomenclature
the penaltiesof the RevisedPenal Code;or of

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of

punished with reclusionperpetua, offenses
will be reduced to reclusion or whose sentences
perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible
No. 4103, otherwise known for parole under Act
Sentence Law, as amended.
as the Indeterminate

17G.R. No. 175781,

J8G.R. No. March 20, 2012, 668
167383, September SCRA 486.
23, 2008, 566 SCRA
170.
 271
EFFECT AND OPERATION
or LAWS

It has also been held in Peoplev. Quiachon

that RA No, 9346
has retroactive effect, to wit:
The aforequoted provision of RA [No.] 9346 is
applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in cri minal
law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal
laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive
effect. This principle is embodiedunder Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall
have a retroactive effectinsofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws, a
final sentence has been pronouncedand the convict is
serving the same.
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because
Section 3 of RA No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted
of offenses pushed with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusionperpetua by reason
of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
Hence, in accordance with the foregoing,ap-
pellant should only be sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole."19(Emphasis
supplied)

10.42. Non-Applicability of the Rule

The rule that criminal laws have retroactive effect when
—
favorable to the accused has no application
1. when the accused is a habitual criminal; 20and
2. where the later law is expressly made inapplicable
of actions. 21
to pending actions or existing causes

19668 SCRA 486, 501-502.

2The term "habitual criminal" is understoodto be the same as 'habitual
last paragraph of Article 62 of the Revised Penal
delinquent"as defined under the be habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten
Code."A person shall be deemed to
or last conviction of the crimes robo, horto, estafa,
years from the date of his release of any of said crimes a third time or oftener,"
or falsificacion, he is found guilty November 8, 1902, 1 Phil. 468, 470-471.
21Tavera v. Valdez, G.R. No. 922,
272 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS

10.5.When the Law is Procedural in Nature

A law is procedural when it "refers to the adjective law which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be
able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the
legal conceptionof a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes they may be given retroactive
effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights
in rules of procedure. "22
The rationale underpinningthe exceptionis that no person
can claim any vested right in any particular remedy or modeof
procedure for the enforcement of a right. 23

Case:
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and Agemar Manning
Agency, Inc., Petitionersv. Estanislao Surio, Freddie Palguiran,
Graciano Morales, Henry Castillo, Aristotle Arreola, Alexander
Ygot, Anrique Battung, Gregorio Aldovino, Narciso Frias, Victor
Flores, Samuel Marcial, Carlito Palguiran, Duque Vinluan, Jesus
Mendegorin, Neil Flores, RomeoMangaliag,Joe Garfin and
Salestino Susa, Respondents.
G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012. 679 SCRA 21

Bersamin, J.:
Facts:
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel
owned by petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and
operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents
were still on board the vessel, they experienceddelays in the payment of
their wages and in the remittance of allotments, and were not paid for
extra work and extra overtime work. They complainedabout the vessel's
inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their
repeated requests for the improvementof their working conditions.On

22Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. v. Surio,

G.R. No. 154213,August
23, 2012, 679 SCRA 21, 30; quoting De Los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat, G.R. NO,
149508, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 411, 422. See also Suico Industrial Corp. v.
Lagura•Yap, G.R. No. 177711, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 145.
23Curatav. Philippine Ports Authority, supra at p. 295; citing Zulueta v. Asia
Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 100.
 CHAPTER X 273
EFFECT AND OPERATION
OF LAWS

December19, 1993, when MT Seadance

Swedento discharge oil, representativesdocked at the port of Brofiorden,
Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and
of the International Transport
found the wages of the respondents
to be below the prevailing rates. The
ensuing negotiations between the ITF
and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents'
the payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials
wages resulted in
and the immediate
repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.
subsequently, on December23, 1993,the petitioners filed against the
newly-repatriatedrespondentsa complaint for disciplinary action based
onbreach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in
the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Officeof the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA,
RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect
on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of RA No. 8042 vested original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-employee
relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters.
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA
under the POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary
action. Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book Vll of the 1991 POEA Rules,
petitioners filed a partial appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still
maintaining that respondents should be administratively sanctioned for
their conduct while they were on board MT Seadance.
On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners' appeal for lack
ofjurisdiction, to wit:

"The Commission has no jurisdiction to review cases

decided by the POEA Administrator involving disciplinary
actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money
claims involving employer-employeerelationship (Section 10,
RA [No.] 8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from
decisions arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in
the Commission."
reconsideration,but the NLRC
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for
denied their motion.
action for certiorari and
Petitioners then commenceda special civil referred it to the Court
mandamus before the Supreme Court but the latter
of Appeals (CA).
dismissed the petition for certiorari
On December 21, 2001, the CA and deletion of overseas contract
and mandamus, holding that the inclusion
list were within the exclusive
Workersfrom the POEA blacklist/watch
 THE LAWs
274 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF

jurisdiction of the to Cheexclusionof the NLRC, and that the NLRc

had no appellate jurisdiction to review the matter.
Ilence, the petition.

Contention of the Parties:

Petitioners contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to
rule that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only because
RA No. 8042 had not provided for its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the
Secretary of Labor who had exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving
administrative matters decidedby the POEA.

Issue:
Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided
by the POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions against private
respondents.
Ruling:
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners' adamant insistence that the NLRCshould have appellate
authority over the POEA's decision in the disciplinary action because their
complaint against respondents was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although
RA No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino
workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from
the POEA the original and exclusivejurisdiction to hear and decideall
disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character
involving such workers. The obvious intent of RA No. 8042 was to have the
POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and
involving such workers. This intent was even expressly recognized in the
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on February 29, 1996, viz.:

"Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. — The POEA

shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and de-
cide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in character, in-
volving or arising out of violations or rules and regulations re-
lating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employ-
ment agencies or entities; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases,
which are administrative in character, involving employers,
principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers.
 C} IAI VI'ER X 275
EFFECT AND OPERATION OF LAWS

Section 29. Venue ----The cases mentioned in Section

28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with the P()EA Adjudication
Office or the DOLE/POEAregional officeof the place where
the complainant applied or was recruited, at the option of the
complainant. The office with which the complaint was first filed
shall take cognizance of the case.
Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, as men-
tioned in the preceding Section, shall be filed with the POEA
Adjudication Office."

It is clear to the Court, therefore, that the NLRChad no appellate

jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases
involvingoverseas contract workers.
Petitioners' position that RA No. 8042 should not be applied retro-
actively to the review of the POEA's decision dismissing their complaint
against respondents has no support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule,
all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly
provided,or unless the law is procedural or curative in nature, there is no
serious question about the retroactive applicabilityof RA No. 8042 to the
appeal of the POEA's decision on petitioners' disciplinary action against re-
spondents. In a way, RA No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing
or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los
Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat, 24when it —

[Rlefers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and

forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to adminis-
ter justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal concep-
tion of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroac-
tive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights
in rules of procedure.

RA No. 8042 applies to petitioners' complaint by virtue of the case

passage,
beingthen still pending or undetermined at the time of the law'snot validly
there being no vested rights in rules of procedure. They could
insist that the reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule should
originally filed
apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was
its implementing rules
in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, RA No. 8042 and took their appeal.
and regulations were already in effect when petitioners the judgment
A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers
to appeal, but not
rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right

24G.R. No. 149508, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 411, 422.
276 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS

the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage,
for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired. Converselyand by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a
new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply
with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new
law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal
from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon
authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is
proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts
by which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved. This is why it is
consistentlyheld that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is
available only if granted by law or statute.
When RA No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in
respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested
in the Secretary of Labor in accordancewith his power of supervision and
control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title Il, Book Ill of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:

"Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship.

—-Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other
laws definingthe special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall
include authority to act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commissionof acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate of-
ficials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans
and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided
in the specificlaw governing the relationship of particular agen-
cies, the word 'control' shall encompass supervision and control
as defined in this paragraph. x x x."

Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and
Regulations specifically provides, as follows:

"Section 1. Jurisdiction. — The Secretary shall have the

exclusiveand original jurisdiction to act on appeals or petition
for review of disciplinary action cases decided by the Adminis-
tration."
In conclusion,the Court held that petitioners should have appealed
the adverse decision of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor
instead
NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct on its conclusions, of to the
no error in upholding the NLRC. committed
 CHAPTER X 277
EFFECT AND OPERATION
OF LAWS

The Court AFFIRMED the

decisionpromulgated on December
21,2001by the Court of Appeals;and ORDERED the petitioners to
pay the costs of suit.

10.6. When the Law is Curative in Nature.

In Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission, curative
lawor statute is defined and explainedin this wise:
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a
prior law or to validate legal proceedingswhich would
otherwise be void for want of conformitywith certain
legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are
intended to enable persons to carry into effectthat which
they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected
legal consequenceby reason of some statutory disability
or irregularity in their own action.They make valid that
which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid.
Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws
have been compliedwith. Curative statutes, therefore, by
their very essence, are

Case:26

Hon. Ma. Lourdes C. Fernando, in her capacity as City Mayor of

Marikina City, Josephine C. Evangelista, in her capacity as Chief,
Permit Division, Officeof the City Engineer, and Alfonso Espiritu,
Petitioners v. St.
in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina City,
Scholastica's College and St. Scholastica's Academy-
Marikina, Inc., Respondents.
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013. 693 SCRA 141

Mendoza, J.:
Facts:
(SSC) and St. Scholastica's
Respondents St. Scholastica's College educational institutions
are
Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina)
Republicof the Philippines, with principal
Organizedunder the laws of the

29, 2000, 341 SCRA 533, 538.

25G.R.No. 141959, September under 'Ordinance' for the other issues that
26Seethe same case in Chapter Ill
were resolved by the Court.
 UC'I'ION AND OF Till! LAWS

ofiiees business nCLeon Cluinto Street„ Mnlat,e, Manila, and

at West Ovive, MnvilcinnI Mnril(inn City, regpect,ivcly.
Respondent, SSC is the owner oc four (d) porcelg of Innd menauring a
tot al 0th square metet'fi, in Mnrilcina Ileightg and covered
by Transfer Certifientx)tl'itle (TCT) No. 915.37.Located within the property
ave SSA-Mnrikina,the residence of CheSisters of the Benedictine Order,
Cheformation house of the novices. and the retirement house for the elderly
nuns. The property is enclosed by n tall concrete perimet,er fence built some
thirty (3())years ago. Abutting che fence along the West Drive are buildings,
facilities, and other improvements.
The petitioners are the officialsof the City Government of Marikina.
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City
enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences
and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998,Ordinance
Nos. 217 and 200 were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to
the respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their
Marikina property to make it 80%see-through, and, at the same time, to
move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles. On
April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply
with the directive. In response,the petitioners, through then City Mayor
Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with
an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restrain-
ing order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC).
The RTC found, among others, untenable the petitioners' argument
that Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or curative statute intended to
correct the defects of buildings and structures, which were brought about
by the absence or insufficiencyof laws. It ruled that the assailed ordinance
was neither remedial nor curative in nature, considering that at the time
the respondents' perimeter wall was built, the same was valid and legal,
and the ordinance did not refer to any previous legislation that it sought
to
correct.
The CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision. In affirming the RTC ruling that the ordinance was not a
curative statute, the CA found that the petitioner failed to point out any
irregularity or invalidity in the provisions of the National Building Code
that required correctionor cure. It noted that any correctionin the
should be Code
properly undertaken by the Congress and not by the City Council
of Marikina through an ordinance.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 192 is a remedial or
curative statute.
 CHAPTER X 279
EFFECT AND OPERATION OF LAWS

Ruling:
The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192is a curative statute as
it aims to correct or cure a defect in the National Building Code,namely,
its failure to provide for adequate guidelines for the construction of fences.
Theyultimately seek to remedy an insufficiencyin the law. In aiming to
curethis insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking provisions to
the National Building Code.This is not what is contemplated by curative
statutes, which intend to correct irregularities or invalidity in the law. The
petitionersfail to point out any irregular or invalid provision.As such, the
assailedordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.
in the National
At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency
BuildingCode with respect to parking provisions in relation to the issue of
the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
ofthe said code requires an educational institution to provide one parking
slot for every ten classrooms. As found by the lower courts, the respondents
providea total of 76 parking slots for their 80 classrooms and, thus, had
morethan sufficiently complied with the law.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative statute
whichmay be applied retroactively.

10.7.When the Law Creates a New Substantive Right.

Article 2253 of the transitory provision of the new Civil Code
servesas an example of this exception to the rule on prospectivity of
laws, viz.:
"Article 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other
previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said
laws, from acts done or events which took place under
their regime, even though this Codemay regulate them
in a different manner, or may not recognizethem. But if
a right should be declared for the first time in this
Code,it shall be effective at once, even though the
act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair
Many vested or acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1)
(Emphasis supplied)

The retroactive effect providedby the aforestated article is

explained in the case of Maxey v. Court of Appeals in this way:
"x x x But the secondsentence gives a retroactive
effect to newly created rights provided they do not
280 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS

prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, The

retroactive character of the new right is the result of the
exercise of the sovereign power of legislation, when the
lawmakingbodyis persuaded that the new right is called
for by considerations of justice and public policy. But such
new right must not encroachupon a vested right. (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 167)."27

10.8.When the Law is Issued in the Exercise of the State's Police

Power in Order to Meetan Emergency.
It is ready settled that laws enacted in the exercise of the police
power, may constitutionallyeffect tenancy relations created before
the enactment or effectivitythereof.28Furthermore, it is well settled
that the applicationof our agrarian laws to contracts made prior
to the enactment thereof constitutes a valid exerciseof the police
power the State. 29

27G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984, 129 SCRA 187, 197.
28Valencia v. Surtida, L-17277,May 31, 1961; citing Viuda de Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, 47 Off. Gaz. 5613.
29Ponce v. Guevarra, No. L-19629 & L-19672-92, March
31, 1964, 10 SCRA 649,
656; citing Viuda de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, supra; and Valencia v. Surtida, supra.