Fankhauser CLIMATECHANGE 2012
Fankhauser CLIMATECHANGE 2012
Fankhauser CLIMATECHANGE 2012
CLIMATE CHANGE
Author(s): Samuel Fankhauser
Copenhagen Consensus Center (2012)
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Samuel Fankhauser
Grantham Research Institute and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
London School of Economics1
21 March 2012
Introduction
This paper offers a broader perspective on climate change to complement the four
challenge papers on the topic. The challenge papers cover most of the policy options that
are available to combat climate change, that is:
The only generic option that is missing is the pursuit of energy efficiency. It is a surprising
omission given that energy efficiency improvements are one of the cheapest ways to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps it was assumed that a carbon price would take
care of these opportunities. A price on carbon is certainly important, but the empirical
evidence has identified wider market imperfections and behavioural barriers that have to be
tackled separately (Martin et al. 2011; de Canio 1998; de Canio and Watkins 1998; Sanstad
and Howarth 1994).
The challenge papers give a fair assessment of the pros and cons of the four options
considered. I will offer a few technical comments in passing, but my main concern is not
the technical merit of the papers. Instead I make two more fundamental observations.
My first observation is that the four papers understate the case for tackling climate
change. This is mostly due to the way in which the Copenhagen Consensus experiment is
1 Contact information: London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.
Email: [email protected]. The Grantham Research Institute is supported financially by the Grantham
Foundation for the Protection of the Environment and through CCCEP by the UK Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC) and Munich Re.
My second observation is that the four papers could be grounded better in the emerging
empirical evidence. Most of the conclusions are derived from high-level simulation
models. Although these models represent the state of the art in climate change economics,
they are too stylized to base policy decisions exclusively on their outputs. Where ever
possible additional empirical evidence should be mustered to reinforce their conclusions.
Such evidence is beginning to emerge from the practical experience with climate policy in
countries like the UK. Although still sketchy it can help to inform the Copenhagen
Consensus. I will summarise this experience the final section of this paper.
It is worth recapitulating the overall case for climate change intervention before reviewing
the relative merit of different climate policies. None of the challenge papers explicitly does
this, although the papers by Tol (2012) and Bosello et al. (2012) implicitly look at the
question.
Both Tol and Bosello et al base their arguments on a cost-benefit rationale. That is, the
aggregate (worldwide) costs of climate action are compared with the aggregate
(worldwide) benefits, which take the form of avoided climate change damages. This is an
intuitive way for economists to think about the problem, although most economists
(including Tol and Bosello et al) would agree that climate change is too complex to lend
itself to simple cost-benefit analysis. Complicating factors include tough questions about
inter- and intra-generational equity and the fact that climate change poses an existential
threat to some unique natural and social systems.
However, the main complication is risk. Stern (2006) and Weitzman (2011) argue
convincingly that climate change is primarily an issue of risk management. Unabated
climate change would expose the world to climate regimes not experienced for millions of
years. No climate model can offer assurances that these fundamental changes will not turn
out to be calamitous. In fact most models suggest that they might be.
Tol (2012) gives a sense of the broad range of damage cost (or social cost) estimates. He
notes that the probability distribution is skewed, with the possibility of a fat tail at the
catastrophic end, and acknowledges that even his wide range may not cover the full set of
possible outcomes. Unfortunately, his subsequent analysis is based on a much narrower
range of numbers, and this needs to be borne in mind when interpreting his results. The
main case, in particular, is based on a marginal damage value that is in no way
representative of the underlying probability distribution.
People in industrialised countries spend the equivalent of about 5 per cent of GDP
on life insurance. In emerging markets the corresponding sum is close to 2 per cent
of GDP (Swiss Re 2011).
Most nations spend at least around 1per cent of GDP on military defence, and often
a lot more. This is true even for countries with explicitly defensive armies and no
immediate threats from neighbours, such as Austria, Canada, Germany and
Switzerland.1
There is a clear parallel with climate risks, although it is not perfect. In both examples
significant sums of money are spent to reduce a threat that is relatively remote but
devastating if it does occur. How do these sums compare to the expected cost of climate
change insurance?
The order of magnitude is similar. Energy-economy models suggest that limiting the
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases to around 450ppm might cost between one
and three per cent of GDP over the next 40 years, although achieving this would require
near-perfect policy coordination (Edenhofer et al 2010; Clarke et al. 2009). That is, GDP in
2050 would be 1-3 per cent lower than would otherwise be the case. In return, the
probability of a risky climate change outcome – say of warming in excess of 4oC – would
be reduced to perhaps one per cent (Committee on Climate Change 2008).
While not based on careful integrated modelling, the above line of argument suggests that
limiting atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to around 450 ppm is a rational
precaution and the ensuing cost are a reasonable insurance premium to pay. It still leaves
open the question about the appropriate mix of policies, that is, the choice between pricing
carbon, promoting technology, adapting and climate engineering. I turn to this next.
1 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
As more and more countries begin to address climate change it becomes possible to
complement the top-down simulation results in the challenge papers with empirical
insights from actual climate change policy. Townshend et al (2011) count no fewer than
155 climate change or climate change-related laws in a survey of fifteen G20 economies.
Many of these laws have been in place for several years now.
The analysis and evaluation of existing climate policies is only just beginning, but it can
add important empirical credibility to the climate change story. Models like DICE (used in
Bickel and Lane 2012), FUND (Tol 2012) and WITCH (Bosello et al. 2012) are excellent
tools to describe high-level trends, but they are much too stylized to offer firm evidence on
how policies work on the ground. They do not have the same level of detail and richness as
the models used to inform decisions in Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, for
example.
A good place from which to distil policy lessons is the UK, although there is also evidence
from many other places. The climate change debate in Britain is fairly advanced, with a
strong legal basis for climate action, ambitious targets and sophisticated institutional
arrangements (Fankhauser 2012). Through a combination of dedicated policies and
serendipity the UK has succeeded in reducing its carbon emissions by about 25 per cent
between 1990 and 2010, and by about 12 per cent since 2007. Britain’s policy mix features
carbon pricing, technology support and adaptation (although not climate engineering). The
main planks of low-carbon policy are:
A price on carbon, primarily through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS),
which covers about half of Britain’s carbon emissions. This is flanked by a climate
change levy on firms outside the EU ETS and soon by a carbon price “underpin” to
prop up the ETS price.
Support for low-carbon technologies, through a mix of supply push (e.g.
demonstration projects, a new Green Investment Bank) and demand pull measures
(a renewable energy obligation and feed-in tariffs for small-scale renewables and
renewable heat).
Measures to address barriers to energy efficiency, an area that is not covered by the
challenge papers but which receives much policy attention. There is a bewildering
range of mostly regulatory measures (such as obligations on energy suppliers) to
facilitate the uptake of energy efficiency.
Evidence on the effectiveness of these policies comes in the form of empirical policy
evaluations, independent monitoring reports and the detailed modelling of policy choices.
An econometric analysis by Martin et al. (2009) finds that Britain’s climate change levy –
a carbon-cum-energy tax – has reduced the energy intensity particularly of larger and more
The EU ETS has helped to curtail European carbon emissions, although the amount of
abatement has been modest (Ellerman et al. 2010; Ellerman and Bucher 2008). There is a
yet no evidence that the scheme has triggered low-carbon innovation (Calel and
Dechezleprêtre 2012), although innovation effects associated with pricing policies are
documented elsewhere in the literature (Popp 2002). This suggests that additional,
technology-oriented policies will be needed, as suggested by Galiana and Green (2012).
The fact that the UK is reducing emissions faster than some of its economic competitors is
having a surprisingly small impact on British industry. The sectors for which loss of
competitiveness is an issue are those where high trade exposure goes together with high
carbon compliance costs (such as aluminium or steel). They account for less than one per
cent of UK GDP and UK jobs, although this result will obviously be different in countries
with a stronger industrial base (Carbon Trust 2008). In fact, many firms have benefitted
from the EU ETS: they are allocated free emissions permits, the opportunity cost of which
they are able to pass on to consumers. It is a distributional feature the European
Commission is now trying to address.
The Committee on Climate Change (2011) finds that low-carbon policies have added 12.5
per cent, in nominal terms, to the typical household energy bill since 2004. Over the same
period, fuel price shifts have added 63 per cent to the typical bill. The general level of
inflation was 16 per cent (reflecting, among other factors, the hike in energy prices). The
Committee anticipates that the effect of tighter policies between now and 2020 will be
roughly offset by the effect of energy efficiency measures. The overall resource cost of
Britain’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50 per cent by 2027 is
estimated to be less than one per cent of GDP (Committee on Climate Change 2010). The
estimate is based on fairly detailed sector-by-sector modelling, although it is a bottom-up
estimate and does not include indirect general equilibrium effects.
Despite their small economic impact there has been opposition to Britain’s carbon policies
from vested interests. Such lobbying is normal, of course, and there are also business
interests that have seized the low-carbon opportunities and are pushing for tighter targets
(as well as better policies). There is some apprehension in the Treasury about pursuing
low-carbon polices at a time of austerity and low growth, but there are also compelling
arguments that low-carbon investment is no worse, and arguably better, at kick-starting a
flagging economy than other forms of support (Zenghelis 2011; Bowen and Stern 2011).
The UK policy framework recognises the need for both adaptation and mitigation.
Although the UK is fairly well adapted to the current climate, a closer look (ASC 2011)
identified a number of low-cost options that have attractive benefit-cost ratios even before
taking climate change into account (see also Swiss Re 2009). Their short-term benefits in
terms of current climate resilience, water efficiency or other concerns are up to five times
A rational adaptation policy would focus on such win-win options. They also feature
prominently in low-income countries, where there are strong overlaps between adaptation
and development (Fankhauser and Burton 2011).
There are no policy frameworks, in the UK or elsewhere, that include climate engineering.
However, Bickel and Lane (2012) are right that research into geo-engineering is an
important insurance policy to complement the other climate measures. Given the early
stage of this research, it seems sensible to cast the net more widely than Bickel and Lane
suggest, and explore air capture as well as solar radiation management. Climate
engineering raises important ethical and regulatory issues, as well as questions of technical
feasibility and environmental side effects. For example, which organisation should provide
the global public good “climate stabilisation”? How would that organisation be regulated?
How would the optimal level of climate stabilisation be determined? How would potential
liabilities be apportioned if something goes wrong? How would unilateral action by rogue
states be prevented? These questions are crucial and need to be part of the research effort
into climate engineering. Demonstrating technical feasibility and environmental
acceptability alone is not enough.
Conclusions
This perspective paper complements the challenge papers on climate change by offering a
broader viewpoint on the merits of climate change policy. It makes two key points.
This risk-based argumentation is different from the straight benefit-cost calculus applied
elsewhere in the Copenhagen Consensus. However, it is arguably more appropriate given
the levels of risk and uncertainty involved.
Second, a rational response to climate change should combine all the four options put
forward in the challenge papers. The main thrust should be to reduce emissions through a
combination of carbon pricing (either a tax or trading scheme), the promotion of low-
carbon technologies and measures to unlock energy efficiency improvements. We are
starting to see evidence from countries like the UK that ambitious decarbonisation policies
are technologically and economically feasible. As in other areas of public policy, the
challenge is competent implementation.
Some climate change is now unavoidable and measures to adapt to these residual risks are
important. Adaptation can be timed, given the gradual onset of climate change, but there
are measures that ought to be considered now. They include decisions with long-term
consequences, such as infrastructure investments and spatial planning, and decisions with
early side-benefits, for example in terms of economic development, resource efficiency
and poverty alleviation. It is worth spending money on ensuring climate change is properly
factored into these decisions.
Climate engineering solutions play a role as a last resort option to guard against adverse
surprises. They are worth spending some research money on, including on work to
understand their environmental side-effects and the regulatory, governance and
institutional implications of this option.
ASC (2011). Adapting to Climate Change in the UK. Measuring Progress, UK Adaptation
Sub-Committee, London.
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European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Cambridge: CUP.
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Business: Evidence from Microdata, Working Paper 6, Grantham Research Institute,
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