Amurao Vs People

12/27/23, 8:02 PM E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 249168. April 26, 2021
]
AILEEN CYNTHIA M. AMURAO,
PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN
SIXTH DIVISION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J., J.:
The Verified Petition[1] for Certiorari, Prohibition,

and Mandamus (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction) filed by petitioner Aileen Cynthia M.
Amurao seeks the nullification and setting aside of
the Resolution[2] dated September 5, 2019 issued by
the respondent Sandiganbayan Sixth Division,
ordering the suspension pendente lite of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1385.
The case stemmed from an Affidavit executed by

Doris Suelo, Sheryl Lynn Lebante, and Engilbert
Alvarez, the private complainants in Criminal Case
No. SB-17-CRM-1385, wherein they alleged that
petitioner and her co-accused, as tourism officers of
the City Government of Puerto Princesa, Palawan,
solicited money and other gifts from private
individuals and entities for the purpose of tourism
activities. The money and gifts solicited then went to
the personal and individual accounts of the petitioner
and her co-accused.[3]
In an Information[4] dated March 5, 2015, petitioner

and several others were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 7(d) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6713,[5] otherwise known as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. The Information
states:
file:///D:/Study/Bar Exam Reviewer/Mario Lopez SC cases/SC Library Web pages/Amurao vs People.mhtml 1/11
That on or about the period between

February 2014 and April 2014 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused public officers, Aileen Cynthia
M. Amurao, being the City Tourism
Officer and Head of the City Tourism
Department, Joyce C. Enriquez, Tourism
Operations Assistant, Michie H. Meneses,
Tourism Operations Officer I, and
Michael Angelo M. Meneses and Lucero
Aquino, Jr., contractual Tourism
Operations Assistant, all of the City
Tourism Department, City Government of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, while in
the performance of their functions, taking
advantage of their positions, committing
the offense in relation to their office, and
conspiring and confederating with each
other, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or
anything of monetary value from tourism-
oriented and private entities or individuals
by sending them solicitation letters for
sponsorship of the City Government of
Puerto Princesa's tourism activities and
related projects, supervised by the
accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
During the pendency of the proceedings, the

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[7] dated July 23,
2019 pursuant to Section 4, Rule VIII of the 2018
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. The
Order directed petitioner to show cause why she
should not be suspended pendente lite in accordance
with Section 13 of R.A. 3019.[8]
In her Compliance and Manifestation,[9] petitioner

claimed that she should not be suspended because
Section 13 of R.A. 3019 only applies to those
charged with violation under the same law and the
provisions under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) on
bribery, and not to violations of R.A. 6713 of which

she was charged.
On September 5, 2019, the Sandiganbayan issued the

assailed Resolution,[10] the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,

accused AILEEN CYNTHIA MAGGAY
AMURAO is ordered SUSPENDED
pendente lite, for a period of ninety (90)
days, as Head of the Office of the City
Tourism of Puerto Princesa City, or any
other public position she may now or
hereafter be holding.
Accused Aileen Cynthia Maggay Amurao

is ordered to CEASE AND DESIST from
further performing and/or exercising the
functions, duties, and privileges of her
position upon the implementation of this
Order of Preventive Suspension. The
suspension of the accused shall be
automatically lifted upon the expiration of
the 90-day period from the
implementation of this resolution.[11]
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the offense charged

against petitioner is covered by the rule on preventive
suspension under Section 13 of R.A. 3019. It noted
that the imposition of preventive suspension is
applicable not only to those charged with violation of
R.A. 3019 and Title 7, Book II of the RPC, but also
to those charged with any offense involving fraud
upon the government and any offense involving
public funds or property.[12] Finding that the latter
two instances applies to petitioner's case, the
Sandiganbayan held that fraud upon the government
was committed when the money received from
solicitations was deposited in petitioner's personal
bank account and allegedly used for the latter's
personal consumption; and that such amounts of
money solicited from the private individuals and
entities are public funds as they were intended for the
tourism activities of the City Government of Puerto
Princesa.[13]
Petitioner did not move for the reconsideration of the

assailed Resolution. Instead, she filed the instant
petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan.
The contentions raised by petitioner boil down to the

lone issue of whether the Sandiganbayan, Sixth
Division committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Resolution ordering her
suspension pendente lite.
Petitioner maintains that violation of Section 7(d) of

R.A. 6713 is not among those offenses covered by
the preventive suspension rule under Section 13 of
R.A. 3019 as there is yet to be a categorical
pronouncement on such inclusion. She asserts that
the letters which became the basis of her indictment
refer to the term "sponsorship" and not solicitation.
[14] Petitioner likewise argues that she did not
commit fraud and that deceit was not proven in
relation to the offense charged against her. She claims
that evidence for the defense in Criminal Case No.
SB-17-CRM-1385 would show that the cash, gift
checks, and other form of awards went directly to the
participants and winners of contests, pageants, and
other activities. Petitioner also contends that the
money that came from tourism stakeholders was not
in the nature of public funds because it was still in the
possession of the one in charge or assigned to collect
and keep the same for distribution during an awards
night.
In its Comment,[15] the People of the Philippines,

represented by the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
argues that Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 is included
among the offenses covered by Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019. It maintains that the assailed Resolution
was issued on the basis of compliance with Section
13, R.A. 3019, as amended, reiterating that the
fraudulent act of petitioner was established through
evidence before the Sandiganbayan when money
(and gifts) was solicited from private individuals and
deposited in petitioner's (and her co-accused's)
personal accounts. The OSP likewise echoes the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the sums of money
subject of the criminal case, having been collected for

the purpose of tourism activities, are public funds.
The Ruling of the Court
We first discuss the procedural issue of petitioner's

failure to file a motion for reconsideration prior to
resorting to the present petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
In her Verified Petition, petitioner submits that she

did not file a motion for reconsideration because the
preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of
R.A. 3019 is mandatory and ministerial on the part of
the Sandiganbayan. She, likewise, posits that the
instant petition falls under the exceptions to the
necessity of filing a motion for reconsideration.[16]
It has long been settled that a motion for

reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari.[17] The objective of
this mandate is to allow the lower court, or tribunal,
the opportunity to correct any actual or perceived
error imputed to it.[18]
In Siok Ping Tan v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc.,[19]

however, the Court reiterated that the foregoing rule
admits of exceptions:
x x x The rule is, however, circumscribed

by well-defined exceptions, such as (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo had no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is

urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceedings were ex parte, or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is
one purely of law or where public interest
is involved.[20]
While the petitioner cites exceptions (c), (d), (e), and

(i) in her petition,[21] she plainly did so without
explaining how such circumstances apply to her case.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the second
exception is more relevant in this case as the question
raised by petitioner in her Verified Petition has been
duly raised before and was already passed upon by
the Sandiganbayan.
Excusing the petitioner's procedural misstep

notwithstanding, the petition fails.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there has

been an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty prescribed by law or to act in
accordance with law, such as when a judgment was
rendered not on the basis of law and evidence, but on
caprice, whim, and despotism.[22]
Here, the Court finds that no grave abuse of

discretion may be attributed to the Sandiganbayan in
the assailed Resolution, the same having been issued
on cogent legal grounds.
The suspension pendente lite ordered in the assailed

Resolution finds basis in Section 13 of R.A. 3019, to
wit:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of

benefits. — Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this
Act or under Title Seven Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a
simple or as complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of

participation, is pending in court shall be
suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgement, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer,

who may have been separated from the
service has already received such benefits
he shall be liable to restitute the same to
the government. (Emphasis and
underscoring added)
Verily, and contrary to petitioner's contention, the rule

on preventive suspension is not limited to cases
where there has been a violation of R.A. 3019 or Title
7, Book II of the RPC. The same Rule applies for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property.
The relevant question now is whether the offense

charged against petitioner is considered as fraud upon
the government or public funds or property.
In Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan,[23] this Court has

settled that the term "fraud," as used in Section 13 of
R.A. 3019, is understood in its generic sense, that is,
referring to "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit
especially when involving misrepresentation."[24]
The Information[25] filed against petitioner charged

her and her co-accused with violation of Section 7(d)
of R.A. 6713 by soliciting money and gifts from
private individuals and entities for supposed tourism
activities and projects of the City Government of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan while in the performance of
their functions and taking advantage of their positions
as tourism officers. It is clear from the foregoing that
the act of petitioner (and her co-accused) involves
fraud upon public funds as such money and gifts
solicited were collected for the purpose of funding
the tourism activities of the City Government of

Puerto Princesa, Palawan.
It is noteworthy that petitioner did not assail the

validity of such Information. In fact, in her
Manifestation and Compliance before the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner begged exception to the
suspension pendente lite that she admitted should be
imposed on her under a "valid information."[26]
In Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division),[27]

the Court underscored the mandatory nature of
preventive suspension when a public officer is
charged with a valid information involving violation
of R.A. 3019, Title 7, Book II of the RPC, or offenses
involving fraud upon government, public funds, or
property:
x x x [S]ec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019

makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public
officer against whom a valid information
charging violation of that law, Book II,
Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any
offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property is filed. The
court trying a case has neither discretion
nor duty to determine whether preventive
suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is
that unless the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit
further acts of malfeasance or do both, in
the same way that upon a finding that
there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused. The law does not
require the court to determine whether the
accused is likely to escape or evade the
jurisdiction of the court.[28] (citations
omitted)
Since the petitioner is charged with an offense that

clearly falls under Section 13 of R.A. 3019, her
suspension pendente lite is justified. The
Sandiganbayan has no other option but to order the
suspension of the petitioner when it is convinced that
the information charges her with acts of fraud
involving government funds.[29]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 5, 2019 issued by the Sandiganbayan,
Sixth Division in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-
1385 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Delos

Santos, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-9.
[2] Penned by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Karl

B. Miranda, with Associate Justices Sarah Jane T.
Fernandez and Kevin Narce B. Vivero concurring; id.
at 14-19.
[3] Id. at 17.
[4] Id. at 20-22.
[5]Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In

addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public

officials and employees shall not solicit or accept,
directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value
from any person in the course of their official duties
or in connection with any operation being regulated
by, or any transaction which may be affected by the

functions of their office.
xxx
[6] Rollo, p. 21.
[7] Id. at 10.
[8]Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act.
[9] Rollo, pp. 11-13.
[10] Id. at 14-19.
[11] Id. at 18.
[12] Id. at 15-16.
[13] Id. at 16-17.
[14] Id. at 7.
[15] Id. at 68-78.
[16] Id. at 6.
[17] Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the

Ombudsman, 811 Phil 686, 695 (2017), citing
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 695 Phil. 55, 61 (2012); Medado v. Heirs of
Consing, 681 Phil. 536, 548 (2012), citing Pineda v.
Court of Appeals, 649 Phil. 562, 571 (2010).
[18]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of

Tax Appeals, supra, 17.
[19] 653 Phil 124 (2010).
[20] Id. at 136-137.
[21] Rollo, p. 6.
[22]Galvante v. Hon. Casimiro, 575 Phil. 324, 335

(2008).
[23] 521 Phil. 43 (2006).
[24] Id. at 51.
[25] Supra note 4.
[26] Rollo, p. 46.
[27] 305 Phil. 110 (1994).
[28] Id. at 115.
[29]See Flores v. Hon. Layosa, 479 Phil. 1020, 1039

(2004).
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12/27/23, 8:02 PM E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

The Verified Petition[1] for Certiorari, Prohibition,

The case stemmed from an Affidavit executed by

In an Information[4] dated March 5, 2015, petitioner

That on or about the period between

During the pendency of the proceedings, the

In her Compliance and Manifestation,[9] petitioner

bribery, and not to violations of R.A. 6713 of which

On September 5, 2019, the Sandiganbayan issued the

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

Accused Aileen Cynthia Maggay Amurao

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the offense charged

Petitioner did not move for the reconsideration of the

The contentions raised by petitioner boil down to the

Petitioner maintains that violation of Section 7(d) of

In its Comment,[15] the People of the Philippines,

subject of the criminal case, having been collected for

The Ruling of the Court

We first discuss the procedural issue of petitioner's

In her Verified Petition, petitioner submits that she

It has long been settled that a motion for

In Siok Ping Tan v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc.,[19]

x x x The rule is, however, circumscribed

case, relief from an order of arrest is

While the petitioner cites exceptions (c), (d), (e), and

Excusing the petitioner's procedural misstep

There is grave abuse of discretion when there has

Here, the Court finds that no grave abuse of

The suspension pendente lite ordered in the assailed

Section 13. Suspension and loss of

whatever stage of execution and mode of

In the event that such convicted officer,

Verily, and contrary to petitioner's contention, the rule

The relevant question now is whether the offense

In Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan,[23] this Court has

The Information[25] filed against petitioner charged

the tourism activities of the City Government of

It is noteworthy that petitioner did not assail the

In Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division),[27]

x x x [S]ec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019

Since the petitioner is charged with an offense that

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Delos

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-9.

[2] Penned by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Karl

[3] Id. at 17.

[4] Id. at 20-22.

[5]Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public

by, or any transaction which may be affected by the

[6] Rollo, p. 21.

[7] Id. at 10.

[8]Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

[9] Rollo, pp. 11-13.

[10] Id. at 14-19.

[11] Id. at 18.

[12] Id. at 15-16.

[13] Id. at 16-17.