133900cv

Kurtzv.VerizonNewYork,Inc.
UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS
FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT
AugustTerm,2013
(Argued:April11,2014Decided:July16,2014) 1
2
DocketNo.133900cv 3
4
x 5
6
JACKKURTZ,onbehalfofhimselfand 7
allotherssimilarlysituated,JOSEPH 8
GRILLO,husband,VIVIANGRILLO,wife, 9
JEFFMICHAELS,husband,BARBARA 10
MICHAELS,wife,311130THAVELLC, 11
AGRINIOSREALTYINC.,K.A.P.REALTY 12
INC.,LINDADAVIS,PETERBLIDY, 13
VASILIOSCHRYSIKOS,3212ASTORIABLVD. 14
REALTYCORP.,MNTREALTYLLC,ANTHONY 15
CARDELLA,BRIANCARDELLA,460630TH 16
AVENUEREALTYCORP.,CATHERINEPICCIONE, 17
CROMWELLASSOC.LLC, 18
19
PlaintiffsAppellants, 20
21
v. 22
23
VERIZONNEWYORK,INC.,FKANEWYORK 24
TELEPHONECOMPANY,VERIZON 25
COMMUNICATIONSINC.,IVANG.SEIDENBERG, 26
LOWELLC.MCADAM,RANDALLS.MILCH, 27
JOHNDOES, 1
2
DefendantsAppellees.
*
3
4
x 5
6
Before: JACOBS,CALABRESIandLIVINGSTON,Circuit 7
Judges. 8
9
ThePlaintiffsAppellants,aputativeplaintiffclassofpropertyownersin 10
NewYork,appealfromajudgmentoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe 11
EasternDistrictofNewYork(Irizarry,J.),dismissingtheirtakingsanddue 12
processclaimsasunripeunderthetwoparttestinWilliamsonCnty.Regl 13
PlanningCommnv.HamiltonBankofJohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985).We 14
concludethat1)WilliamsonCountyappliestophysicaltakingsclaimsasitdoes 15
toregulatorytakings,withtherecognitionthatanallegationofaphysicaltaking 16
satisfiesthefinalityrequirement;and2)WilliamsonCountyappliesto 17
proceduraldueprocessclaimsarisingfromthesamecircumstancesasatakings 18
claim.Affirmed. 19
20
21

*
TheClerkofCourtisrespectfullydirectedtoamendtheofficialcaption
inthiscasetoconformwiththecaptionabove.
2
DAVIDM.WISE,LawOfficesofDavidM. 1
Wise,P.A.,Cranford,NJ,forPlaintiffs 2
Appellants. 3
4
PATRICKF.PHILBIN(JohnS.Moran,on 5
thebrief),Kirkland&EllisLLP, 6
Washington,DC,forDefendants 7
Appellees. 8
9
10
DENNISJACOBS,CircuitJudge: 11
12
NewYorkallowstelecommunicationscompaniestoexercisethestates 13
eminentdomainpowerstofacilitatetheconstructionandmaintenanceof 14
telecommunicationsnetworks.Propertyownersarecompensatedbythe 15
companyundertheproceduresoutlinedinstatelaw.Aputativeplaintiffclass 16
allegesthatVerizoninstalledmultiunitterminalboxesontheirpropertywithout 17
justcompensation,andcitesproceduraldueprocessviolationsinconnection 18
withtheinstallation.TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictof 19
NewYork(Irizarry,J.)dismissedthecomplaintbecausetheclaimswereunripe 20
underthetestestablishedbyWilliamsonCnty.ReglPlanningCommnv. 21
HamiltonBankofJohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985).Thatcaseheldthatatakings 22
claimundertheFifthAmendmentisnotripeforfederalreviewuntilafinal 23
decisionisreachedbylocalauthoritiesandtheownerexhaustsstateremedies. 24
3
Onappeal,theplaintiffsarguethatWilliamsonCountyappliesonlyto 1
regulatorytakingsclaimsandnottotheirphysicaltakingsclaims,andthat 2
WilliamsonCountyisinapplicabletotheirdueprocessclaims.Weconcludethat 3
WilliamsonCountydoesapplytophysicaltakings,withtherecognitionthatthe 4
finalityrequirementissatisfiedbyaphysicaltaking.Theexhaustion 5
requirement,however,remains.Astotheplaintiffsdueprocessclaims,we 6
concludethatWilliamsonCountyappliestosuchclaimsarisingfromthesame 7
circumstancesasatakingsclaim.Becausetheplaintiffshavefailedtoexhaust 8
theirstateremediesthroughaninversecondemnationproceeding,weaffirmthe 9
judgmentofthedistrictcourt. 10
11
BACKGROUND 12
Telecommunicationsnetworks,particularlyincongestedurbanareas,may 13
requireinstallationofnetworkequipmentonprivateproperty.Often,the 14
companysecurespermissionfromtheownerintheformofalicenseoreasement. 15
Ifconsentcannotbeobtained,however,NewYorklawpermitsthecompanyto 16
employthestatespowerofeminentdomain.Section27oftheTransportation 17
CorporationsLawprovidesthisauthority: 18
4
Any[telephone]corporationmayerect,constructandmaintainthe 1
necessaryfixturesforitslinesupon,overorunderanyofthepublic 2
roads,streetsandhighways...andmayerect,constructand 3
maintainitsnecessarystations,plants,equipmentorlinesupon, 4
throughoroveranyotherland,subjecttotherightoftheowners 5
thereoftofullcompensationforthesame.Ifanysuchcorporation 6
cannotagreewithsuchownerorownersuponthecompensationto 7
bepaidtherefor,suchcompensationshallbeascertainedinthe 8
mannerprovidedintheeminentdomainprocedurelaw. 9
10
N.Y.Transp.Corp.Law27. 11
TheplaintiffsallegethatVerizonexercisedthispowerofeminentdomain 12
toinstallmultiunitterminalboxesontheirproperties.Theseboxes,typically 13
attachedtoanexteriorwallortoapoleintheyard,splitthelocalhighcapacity 14
cablesintothelinesthatserveindividualphonesubscribersinnearbybuildings. 15
Thus,theseboxesservetheneighborhoodaswellasthesubscribersonthe 16
subjectproperty. 17
TheplaintiffsassertthatVerizonfailedtopayfullcompensationfor 18
placingterminalsontheirproperties.TheyfurtherassertthatVerizonviolated 19
theirproceduraldueprocessrightsby:1)concealingtheirrighttofull 20
compensation,orfailingtonotifythemofit;2)offeringthemnocompensation;3) 21
givingthefalseimpressionthattheymustconsentiftheywantedtelephone 22
23
5
serviceintheirownbuildings;and4)placingtheonusonthemtoinitiatean 1
eminentdomainproceedingifnoagreementwasreached. 2
TworelatedcasesintheNewYorkstatecourtshavebearingonthepresent 3
matter.Bothwerefiledbyplaintiffscounselhereandbothinvolvethesame 4
plaintiffs,orplaintiffssimilarlysituated.Thefirst,Corsellov.Verizon,was 5
commencedin2007onbehalfofaputativeclassrepresentedbyWilliamand 6
EvelynCorsello.TheyallegedVerizonsuseoftheirpropertywithoutconsent 7
andassertedclaimspremisedonNewYorkstatutoryandcommonlaw(notthe 8
DueProcessandTakingsClauseclaimsatissuehere).Afterdiscovery,the 9
Corsellossoughtclasscertification.TheNewYorkSupremeCourt,Kings 10
County,deniedcertificationonthegroundsthatindividualinquiriesintohow 11
Verizonacquiredpermissiontoinstalltheterminalswouldpredominateandthat 12
theCorselloswerenotadequateclassrepresentatives.SeegenerallyCorsellov. 13
VerizonN.Y.Inc.,No.39610/07,2009WL3682595(N.Y.Sup.Ct.Nov.5,2009). 14
Appealsofthatcertificationdecision(andotherdecisionsmadebythetrial 15
court)eventuallyreachedtheNewYorkCourtofAppeals,whichheld(interalia) 16
thattheplaintiffsallegedavalidinversecondemnationclaim,butaffirmedthe 17
18
6
denialofclasscertification.SeeCorsellov.VerizonN.Y.,Inc.,18N.Y.3d777,783 1
87,79192(2012). 2
WhiletheCorselloappealwaspending,plaintiffscounselcommencedtwo 3
otherputativeclassactions:thiscaseinfederalcourt;and(afterward)Grillov. 4
VerizonN.Y.,Inc.inNewYorkSupremeCourt,QueensCounty.(TheCorsellos, 5
originallynamedasclassplaintiffsintheGrilloaction,werelaterdropped.)The 6
Grillocomplaintacknowledgedthefilingofthisfederalcaseandstatedthatthe 7
plaintiffswishedtoholdtheirclaimsinabeyanceuntilthefederalcourtssubject 8
matterjurisdictionwasdetermined.SeeGrilloCompl.,J.A.at19899.The 9
proceedingsinGrillohavebeenstayedaccordingly. 10
TheplaintiffscommencedthisactioninDecember2010andfiledaSecond 11
AmendedComplaintinJuly2010.(AsinGrillo,theCorselloswereoriginally 12
namedasclassplaintiffsandlaterdropped.)Thecomplaintallegedseveral 13
causesofactionunder28U.S.C.1983forwrongfultakingofplaintiffsproperty 14
withoutjustcompensationandforviolationoftheirassociateddueprocess 15
rights.Thecomplaintalsosoughtcertificationforaclassconsistingofall 16
propertyownerswithVerizonmultipropertyterminalsotherthanthosewho 17
havesignedaneasementorreceivedcompensationgreaterthanonedollar. 18
7
Verizonmovedtodismissonthegroundsthat:1)thedistrictcourtlacked 1
jurisdictionbecausetheclaimswereunripepursuanttotheSupremeCourts 2
decisioninWilliamsonCounty;2)theplaintiffslackedstanding;3)theclaims 3
weretimebarred;4)thecomplaintfailedtostateacauseofaction;and5)the 4
declaratoryjudgmentreliefsoughtbytheplaintiffswasanimpermissible 5
attempttoobtainanadvisoryopinion.ThedistrictcourtgrantedVerizons 6
motioninSeptember2013,holdingthatWilliamsonCountybarredtheplaintiffs 7
claims.SeegenerallyCorsellov.VerizonN.Y.,Inc.,976F.Supp.2d354(S.D.N.Y. 8
2013).Theplaintiffstimelyappealed. 9
10
DISCUSSION 11
Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsdeterminationthatitlackssubject 12
matterjurisdictiononripenessgrounds.NatlOrg.forMarriage,Inc.v.Walsh, 13
714F.3d682,687(2dCir.2013);seealsoConnecticutv.Duncan,612F.3d107,112 14
(2dCir.2010)(Adistrictcourtsripenessdeterminationis...alegal 15
determinationsubjecttodenovoreview.). 16
17
18
8
I 1
Tobejusticiable,acauseofactionmustberipeitmustpresentareal, 2
substantialcontroversy,notamerehypotheticalquestion.NatlOrg.for 3
Marriage,714F.3dat687(quotationmarksomitted).Aclaimisnotripeifit 4
dependsuponcontingentfutureeventsthatmayormaynotoccurasanticipated, 5
orindeedmaynotoccuratall.Thedoctrinesmajorpurposeistopreventthe 6
courts,throughavoidanceofprematureadjudication,fromentangling 7
themselvesinabstractdisagreements.Id.(quotationmarksandinternalcitation 8
omitted). 9
Totesttheripenessofaconstitutionaltakingsclaiminfederalcourt,we 10
consultWilliamsonCounty.Inthatcase,aplaintiffownerofatractofland 11
suedaTennesseeregionalplanningcommissionallegingthatthecommissions 12
applicationofvariouszoninglawsandregulationstotheplaintiffsproperty 13
amountedtoanunconstitutionaltakingundertheFifthAmendment. 14
Doughertyv.TownofN.HempsteadBd.ofZoningAppeals,282F.3d83,88(2d 15
Cir.2002).WilliamsonCountyheldthattheclaimwasunripe:aplaintiff 16
allegingaFifthAmendmenttakingofapropertyinterestmust...showthat(1) 17
thestateregulatoryentityhasrenderedafinaldecisiononthematter,and(2) 18
9
theplaintiffhassoughtjustcompensationbymeansofanavailablestate 1
procedure.Id. 2
Astofinality,aclaimthattheapplicationofgovernmentregulations 3
effectsatakingofapropertyinterestisnotripeuntilthegovernmententity 4
chargedwithimplementingtheregulations...hasreachedafinaldecision 5
regardingtheapplicationoftheregulationstothepropertyatissue.Williamson 6
County,473U.S.at186.ThisrequirementiscompelledbytheTakingsClause 7
becausethefactorsrelevanttodeterminingwhetheratakinghasoccurredarethe 8
economicimpactofthestatesactionsanditsinterferencewithinvestment 9
backedexpectations,andthesefactorscannotbeevaluateduntilthe 10
administrativeagencyhasarrivedatafinal,definitivepositionregardinghowit 11
willapplytheregulationsatissuetotheparticularlandinquestion.Id.at191. 12
Thefinalityrequirementalsohelpstodevelopafullrecordforreview,limits 13
judicialentanglementinconstitutionaldisputes,andgivesproperrespectto 14
principlesoffederalism.SeeMurphyv.NewMilfordZoningCommn,402F.3d 15
342,348(2dCir.2005).BecausetheplaintiffinWilliamsonCountysoughtno 16
variancefromthezoningprovisionatissue,therewasnofinal,definitive 17
positiontoreview.473U.S.at18890. 18
10
TheFifthAmendmentsproscriptionofatakingwithoutjustcompensation 1
underliesWilliamsonCountysexhaustionrequirement:theFifthAmendment 2
[doesnot]requirethatjustcompensationbepaidinadvanceof,or 3
contemporaneouslywith,thetaking;allthatisrequiredisthatareasonable, 4
certainandadequateprovisionforobtainingcompensationexistatthetimeof 5
thetaking.Id.at194(quotationmarksomitted).Therefore,ifaStateprovides 6
anadequateprocedureforseekingjustcompensation,thepropertyownercannot 7
claimaviolationoftheJustCompensationClauseuntilithasusedtheprocedure 8
andbeendeniedjustcompensation.Id.at195.Inotherterms,becausethe 9
Constitutiondoesnotrequirepretakingcompensation,andisinsteadsatisfiedby 10
areasonableandadequateprovisionforobtainingcompensationafterthetaking, 11
theStatesaction...isnotcompleteuntiltheStatefailstoprovideadequate 12
compensationforthetaking.Id.Aplaintiff,however,mayachieveexhaustion 13
byshowingthatthestatesinversecondemnationprocedureisunavailableor 14
inadequate.Seeid.at196.TheWilliamsonCountyplaintiff,havingfailedtouse 15
Tennesseesinversecondemnationaction,failedtoexhaust.Id. 16
17
18
11
II 1
PlaintiffsarguethatWilliamsonCountywasacaseaboutregulatory 2
takings,andthatitdoesnotgovernclaimsinwhich,asintheirs,thetakingis 3
physical.Wedisagree.Thefinalityandexhaustionrequirementsareboth 4
derivedfromelementsthatmustbeshowninanytakingsclaim:[i]ataking[ii] 5
withoutjustcompensation.Seeid.at19091,19495.SoWilliamsonCounty 6
appliestoalltakingsclaims.SeeIslandPark,LLCv.CSXTransp.,559F.3d96, 7
109(2dCir.2009)(Beforeafederaltakingsclaimcanbeasserted,compensation 8
mustfirstbesoughtfromthestateifithasareasonable,certainandadequate 9
provisionforobtainingcompensation.(quotationmarksomitted)).Williamson 10
[County]drewnodistinctionbetweenphysicalandregulatorytakings,andthe 11
rationaleofthatcase,thatapropertyownerhasnotsufferedaviolationofthe 12
JustCompensationClauseuntiltheownerhasunsuccessfullyattemptedto 13
obtainjustcompensationthroughtheproceduresprovidedbytheState, 14
demonstratesthatanysuchdistinctionwouldbeunjustified.VillagerPond,Inc. 15
v.TownofDarien,56F.3d375,380(2dCir.1995)(internalcitationomitted) 16
(quotingWilliamsonCnty.,473U.S.at195). 17
18
12
WhileWilliamsonCountyappliestoregulatoryandphysicaltakingsalike, 1
aphysicaltakinginitselfsatisfiestheneedtoshowfinality.[A]nalleged 2
physicaltakingisbydefinitionafinaldecisionforthepurposeofsatisfying 3
Williamson[Countys]firstrequirement.Julianov.MontgomeryOtsego 4
SchoharieSolidWasteMgmt.Auth.,983F.Supp.319,323(N.D.N.Y.1997);see 5
alsoHallv.CityofSantaBarbara,833F.2d1270,1281n.28(9thCir.1986) 6
(Wheretherehasbeenaphysicalinvasion,thetakingoccursatonce,and 7
nothingthecitycandoorsayafterthatpointwillchangethatfact.). 8
Theplaintiffsfurtherarguethataphysicaltakingalsosatisfiesthetestof 9
exhaustion,andtherebyobviatesWilliamsonCountyaltogether,becauseitis 10
unconstitutionaltorequirethemtoinitiateasuitforcompensationafterataking 11
occurs.Thecasescitedbytheplaintiffsdonotsupportthisargument.For 12
example,thevenerableBloodgoodv.Mohawk&HudsonR.R.Co.,18Wend.9 13
(N.Y.1837)wasaglossonNewYorklaw,anditsholding(thatcompensation 14
mustbepaidpriortoataking)restedonastatestatute.Id.at19.Thefederal 15
principleisprescribedinWilliamsonCounty:NordoestheFifthAmendment 16
requirethatjustcompensationbepaidinadvanceof,orcontemporaneously 17
with,thetaking;allthatisrequiredisthatareasonable,certainandadequate 18
13
provisionforobtainingcompensationexistatthetimeofthetaking.473U.S.at 1
194. 2
Thecasesreliedonbyplaintiffsareinapposite.SeeKrusev.Vill.of 3
ChagrinFalls,Ohio,74F.3d694(6thCir.1996);Juliano,983F.Supp.at32324.In 4
eachcase,aphysicaltakingsclaimwasheldtoberipe.Butneithercaseis 5
incompatiblewiththeanalysisinthisopinion:thephysicaltakingsatisfiesthe 6
finalityrequirement;andtheexhaustionrequirementissatisfiedbythe 7
unavailabilityofanadequateprocedureforposttakingcompensation.See 8
Kruse,74F.3dat698700(holdingthatOhiosinversecondemnationremedyis 9
uncertain,confusing,andlacksstatutoryauthority);Juliano,983F.Supp.at323 10
(noevidenceintherecordofanadequateprovisionforobtainingcompensation 11
inthestate).Inbothcases,ripenessunderWilliamsonCountywasachieved.
1
12

1
TheSixthCircuitsopinioninKrusedoessuggestthatWilliamson
Countyexhaustionneednotbeshownwhentherehasbeenaphysicaltaking.
See74F.3dat701.Thispassageoftheopinion,however,isdictasaidtobein
furthersupportforaconclusionalreadyreached:thattheplaintiffswerenot
requiredtopursueastatelevelinversecondemnationproceeding.Id.Inany
event,suchadispensationcontradictsWilliamsonCounty,whichtiesthe
exhaustionrequirementdirectlytothewordingoftheFifthAmendment.See473
U.S.at195([I]faStateprovidesanadequateprocedureforseekingjust
compensation,thepropertyownercannotclaimaviolationoftheJust
CompensationClauseuntilithasusedtheprocedureandbeendeniedjust
compensation.).
14
SeeJuliano,983F.Supp.at323(Here,underthephysicaloccupationtheoryof 1
takingsliabilityPlaintiffshavemetbothprongsoftheripenesstest.(emphasis 2
added)). 3
Theplaintiffstakingsclaimhereisunripe.Althoughthepleadingofa 4
physicaltakingsufficientlyshowsfinality,plaintiffsflunktheexhaustion 5
requirementbytheirfailuretoseekcompensationatthestatelevel.Itiswell 6
settledthatNewYorkStatehasareasonable,certainandadequateprovisionfor 7
[email protected] 8
Brookhaven,452F.Supp.2d142,157(E.D.N.Y.2006)(quotationmarksomitted); 9
seealsoIslandPark,559F.3dat110(holdingclaimwasnotripebecauseplaintiffs 10
failedtopursueaninversecondemnationproceedingunderNewYorksEminent 11
DomainProcedureLaw).TheplaintiffshavependinganactionintheNewYork 12
courtstoseekcompensation(theGrilloaction).Untilsuchlitigationhasrunits 13
course,theplaintiffshavenoripetakingsclaimforadjudicationinthefederal 14
courts. 15
16
17
18
15
III 1
WilliamsonCountysapplicabilitytotheplaintiffsdueprocessclaimsis 2
lessclear.AfterWilliamsonCounty,courtshaveattemptedtosettlequestionsof 3
ripenessintheseveralcontextsofdueprocessclaims:substantiveorprocedural; 4
substantiveclaimsallegingregulatoryoverreachorthoseallegingarbitraryand 5
capriciousconduct;claimsarisingfromthesamenucleusoffactasatakings 6
claim,ornot;andregulatoryorphysicaltakings.Myriadpermutationscan 7
result.Theplaintiffsdueprocessclaimspresentonesuchpermutationthatis 8
notconsideredinprecedent.Thoughtheprecedentswehaveare 9
distinguishable,theyareinstructivenevertheless. 10
WestartwithWilliamsonCountyitself.Theplaintifftherepursueda 11
substantivedueprocessclaimofregulatoryoverreacharisingfromthesameset 12
offactsasthetakingsclaim:whenaregulation...goessofarthatithasthe 13
sameeffectasatakingbyeminentdomain[suchthatit]isaninvalidexerciseof 14
thepolicepower.473U.S.at197.Insteadofjustcompensation,theremedy 15
forsuchaclaimwouldbeinvalidationoftheregulationand,possibly,damages. 16
Id.Withoutdecidingwhethersuchaclaimiscognizable,theCourtruledthatit 17
wasunripebecausetheeffect[couldnot]bemeasureduntilafinaldecisionis 18
16
madeastohowtheregulationswillbeappliedto[theplaintiffs]property.Id. 1
at200.Itisthus(atleast)impliedthatfinalityisaprerequisitetothistypeofdue 2
processclaim.TheCourtdidnotreachanyissueofexhaustion. 3
SinceWilliamsonCounty,thisCourthasconsidereditsapplicabilitytodue 4
processclaimsononlyafewoccasions.Substantivedueprocessclaimshave 5
beentreateddifferentlybasedonthenatureoftheclaim.Claimsalleging 6
regulatoryoverreach,suchastheoneconsideredinWilliamsonCounty,must 7
satisfythefinalityandexhaustionrequirementstoberipe.SeeSouthview 8
Assocs.,Ltd.v.Bongartz,980F.2d84,96(2dCir.1992)(Ifthestateprovidesan 9
acceptableprocedureforobtainingcompensation,thestatesregulatoryaction 10
willgenerallynotexceeditspolicepowers.).Substantivedueprocessclaimsof 11
arbitraryandcapriciousconduct,however,requireonlyashowingoffinality 12
thereisnoexhaustionrequirement.Seeid.at97;seealsoVillagerPond,56F.3d 13
at381.
2
WehavealsosuggestedthatWilliamsonCounty(thefinality 14

2
WilliamsonCountygenerallycontrolsforsubstantivedueprocessclaims
basedonthesamenucleusoffactsasatakingsclaim,ontheprinciplethatcourts
shouldnotuseageneralizednotionofsubstantivedueprocesswhenthe
Constitutionprovidesanexplicitsourceofprotectionagainsttheconduct
alleged.SeeGrahamv.Connor,490U.S.386,395(1989)(BecausetheFourth
Amendmentprovidesanexplicittextualsourceofconstitutionalprotection
againstthissortofphysicallyintrusivegovernmentalconduct,thatAmendment,
17
requirementatleast)appliesbroadlyinthecontextoflandusechallenges.See 1
Dougherty,282F.3dat88(statingWilliamsonCountyhasbeenextendedto 2
equalprotectionanddueprocessclaimsassertedinthecontextoflanduse 3
challenges);Murphy,402F.3dat34950(observingthatWilliamsonCountyhas 4
notbeenstrictlyconfinedtoaregulatorytakingschallengeand[f]ollowing 5
theviewof...othercircuits,wehaveappliedprongone[finality]ripenessto 6
landusedisputesimplicatingmorethanjustFifthAmendmenttakingsclaims). 7
Theplaintiffsdueprocessclaimsfallwithinagapinourprecedents: 8
proceduraldueprocessclaimsarisingfromaphysicaltaking.
3
Theplaintiffs 9
arguethatthisCourthasrepeatedlynotapplied[WilliamsonCounty][r]ipeness 10
toproceduraldueprocessclaimsinvolvingdenialofappropriatenoticeand 11
hearingintakingstypecontexts.AppellantBr.at49.Thecasescitedbythe 12
plaintiffs,however,failtosupporttheirargumentthatWilliamsonCountyis 13
notthemoregeneralizednotionofsubstantivedueprocess,mustbetheguide
foranalyzingtheseclaims.).

3
TheplaintiffsalsoargueWilliamsonCountydoesnotapplytotheir
substantivedueprocessclaimofarbitraryandcapriciousconduct,citingVillager
PondandSouthviewAssociates.However,theplaintiffscomplaintand
argumentsinthedistrictcourtreferonlytoproceduraldueprocessviolations.
Thisargumentis,therefore,waived.
18
inapplicable.InFordMotorCreditCo.v.N.Y.C.PoliceDept,503F.3d186(2d 1
Cir.2007),theCourtaddresseddueprocessinacriminalforfeitureproceeding. 2
Althoughthedistrictcourtdismissedatakingclaimforlackofripeness,that 3
issuewasnotpresentedonappealand,accordingly,wasunremarkeduponin 4
ouropinion.Similarly,theothercasescitedbytheplaintiffsalloweddueprocess 5
claimswithlittleconnectiontoatakingclaimanddidso,again,withoutmention 6
ofWilliamsonCounty.SeeBrodyv.Vill.ofPortChester,434F.3d121,127(2d 7
Cir.2005)(addressingwhetherthepublicuseandjustcompensationlimitations 8
triggerproceduraldueprocessrightsforacondemnee);Kraebelv.N.Y.C.Dept 9
ofHousingPreservation&Dev.,959F.2d395(2dCir.1992)(remandingto 10
determineiftherewasapropertyinterestinapaymentfromthecityafter 11
determiningthatadelayinentitlementpaymentscannotconstituteataking). 12
WearepersuadedbythosecourtsholdingthatWilliamsonCountyapplies 13
todueprocessclaimsarisingfromthesamenucleusoffactsasatakingsclaim. 14
See,e.g.,B.Willis,C.P.A.,Inc.v.BNSFRy.Corp.,531F.3d1282,1299n.19(10th 15
Cir.2008)(Thiscourthasacknowledgedthepossibilitythat,undercertain 16
circumstances,dueprocessrightsmayarisewhicharebeyondthemore 17
particularizedclaimassertedpursuanttotheJustCompensationClause.... 18
19
Nevertheless,thiscourthasheldthat,wherethepropertyinterestinwhicha 1
plaintiffassertsarighttoproceduraldueprocessiscoextensivewiththeasserted 2
takingsclaim,WilliamsonCountysripenessprinciplestillapplies.(quotation 3
marksomitted));GreenfieldMills,Inc.v.Macklin,361F.3d934,961(7thCir. 4
2004)([O]urcaselawexplainsthattheWilliamsonCountyexhaustion 5
requirementapplieswithfullforcetodueprocessclaims(bothproceduraland 6
substantive)whenbasedonthesamefactsasatakingsclaim.);Goldfinev. 7
Kelly,80F.Supp.2d153,158(S.D.N.Y.2000)(Conner,J.)(Althoughin 8
Williamson[County]theripenesstestwasappliedtoatakingsclaimonly,the 9
sameripenesstestappliestodueprocessandequalprotectionclaims.).Sucha 10
rulefindssupportinWilliamsonCountyitself:iftheonlyprocessguaranteedto 11
onewhosepropertyistakenisapostdeprivationremedy,afederalcourtcannot 12
determinewhetherthestatesprocessisconstitutionallydeficientuntiltheowner 13
haspursuedtheavailablestateremedy.See473U.S.at194. 14
ApplyingWilliamsonCountymorebroadlytothesedueprocessclaims 15
confersotherbenefits.Itpreventsevasionoftheripenesstestbyartfulpleading 16
ofatakingsclaimasadueprocessclaim.SeeBatemanv.CityofWestBountiful, 17
89F.3d704,709(10thCir.1996)(TheTenthCircuitrepeatedlyhasheldthatthe 18
20
ripenessrequirementofWilliamson[County]appliestodueprocessandequal 1
protectionclaimsthatrestuponthesamefactsasaconcomitanttakingsclaim... 2
.AcontraryholdingwouldrendertheSupremeCourtsdecisioninWilliamson 3
[County]nugatory,asitwouldenablearesourcefullitiganttocircumventthe 4
ripenessrequirementssimplybyallegingamoregeneralizeddueprocessor 5
equalprotectionviolation.).ApplyingWilliamsonCountygenerallytothese 6
typesofdueprocessclaimsalsoprovidesaclearrulethatavoidsmessy 7
distinctionsbasedonhowadueprocessclaimispled. 8
WeconcludethattheWilliamsonCountyripenessrequirement(finality 9
andexhaustion)appliestoallproceduraldueprocessclaimsarisingfromthe 10
samecircumstancesasatakingclaim.
4
SincewehaveconcludedthatNew 11
Yorksinversecondemnationproceduresareadequateontheirface,noclaim 12
wouldariseuntiltheplaintiffs,havingavailedthemselvesofthoseprocedures, 13
showthemtobewantinginpractice.Theproceduraldueprocessclaimsinthis 14

4
TheplaintiffsalsoarguethatWilliamsonCountydoesnotapplyto
claimsfordeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief.Thecasescitedbytheplaintiffs,
however,donotsupportthisargument.Thiscaseisnotoneinwhichweneedto
decidewhetheraparticularstatestatutefaciallyviolatestheFifthAmendment.
SeeWash.LegalFound.v.LegalFound.ofWash.,236F.3d1097,1104(9thCir.
2001).Theremainingcasesrelatetocriminalforfeiturepractices,whichare
distinctfrompublicusetakings.
21
case,whicharebasedonthecircumstancessurroundingthetakingsclaim,are 1
thereforepremature.Becausetheplaintiffsdidnotexhaustavailablestate 2
remedies,theirdueprocessclaimsarenotripeforfederalreview. 3
4
CONCLUSION 5
Fortheforegoingreasons,weaffirmthejudgmentofthedistrictcourt. 6
22