EN BANC

G.R. No. 236118 -ACT TEACHERS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO

TINIO, ET AL., Petitioner v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE,
ET AL., Respondent

G.R. No. 236295 - LABAN KONSYUMER INC., ET AL., Petitioner, v.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL.,
Respondent

Promulgated:
January 24, 2023
X---------~

SEPARATE OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result. The Petitions must be dismissed for lack of an

actual case and violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution requires the presence of an

actual case or controversy for the exercise of this Court's judicial power:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION I. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

An aspect of judicial power is the competence to determine the

constitutionality or validity of a treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, ordinance or regulation. 1 However, the general rule
is that this Court will decide on the constitutionality of a statute only if "it is /
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential

CONST., art. Vlll, sec. 5.

Separate Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

to the protection of the rights of the parties concemed." 2 The crucial

requirement for justiciability is the presence of an actual case or controversy.

In Pangilinan v. Cayetano,3 this Court discussed judicial power in its

traditional and expanded scope and emphasized the essentiality of an actual
case or justiciable controversy in both cases:

Separation of powers is fundamental in our legal system. The

Constitution delineated the powers among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the government, with each having autonomy and
supremacy within its own sphere. This is moderated by a system of checks
and balances "carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official
acts" of each branch.

Among the three branches, the judiciary was designated as the

arbiter in allocating constitutional boundaries. Judicial power is defined in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution as:

A plain reading of the Constitution identifies two instances when

judicial power is exercised: (1) in settling actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; and (2) in determining
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.

In justifying judicial review in its traditional sense, Justice Jose P.

Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission underscored that when this Court
allocates constitntional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy nor annuls
the legislature's acts. It simply carries out the obligations that the
Constitution imposed upon it to determine conflicting claims and to
establish the parties' rights in an actual controversy:

The latter conception of judicial power that jurisprudence refers to

as the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" was an innovation of the 1987
Constitution:

This situation changed after 1987 when the new

Constitution "expanded" the scope of judicial power[.]

In Francisco v. The House of Representatives, we

recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was meant "to
ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb
grave abuse of discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities
of government."' Thus, the second paragraph of Article

Pr?vincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836
Phil. 205,244 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En
Banc].
 Separate Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

VIII, Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its history, into
black letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, whose nature and purpose had been provided in the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion.

Tanada v. Angara characterized this not only as a power, but as a

duty ordained by the Constitution:

It is an innovation in our political law. As explained

by fonner Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch
of govenunent or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature."

As this Court has repeatedly and finnly emphasized

in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before
it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government.

Despite its expansion, judicial review has its limits. In deciding

matters involving grave abuse of discretion, courts cannot brush aside the
requisite ofan actual case or controversy. The clause articulating expanded
certiorari jurisdiction requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act which, in essence, is the actual
case or controversy. Thus, "even now, under the regime of the textually
broadened power of judicial review articulated in Article VIII, Section I of
the 1987 Constitution, the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
not dispensed with."4 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The constitutional component of an actual case or controversy is rooted

in the doctrine of separation of powers 5 and the consequent deferential respect
accorded by the judiciary to coordinate branches of the government. The
legislative and executive branches are presumed to have enacted the law
within constitutional limitations. The rationale for the presumption of
constitutionality of the law is elucidated in People v. Vera: 6

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the

judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from
the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section I 0, of Article VIII of
the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fw1damental law. It will not shirk from its sworn
duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to

4
Id.
5
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, 850 Phil. I I 68, 1188 (20 I 9) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
6
65 Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, First Division].
Separate Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith.
This is the essence of judicial duty.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of

this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The
responsibility ofupholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but
on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is
first determined by the legislative department of the government itself" And
a statute finally comes b~fore the courts sustained by the sanction of the
executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have
taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they
have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular
law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but
cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of
the three grand departments of the government. Then, there is that peculiar
political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the
people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as
violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too
plain to require a citation of authorities. 7 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

The courts must avoid delving into the wisdom, justice, or expediency
of legislative or executive acts. In Angara v. Electoral Commission: 8

[T]his power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies

to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very !is mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to a.bide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. 9

Canonical is the rule that this Court cannot exercise its power of judicial
review without an actual case. It is not enough that the law has been passed
or is in effect. To rule on the constitutionality of provisions in the law without
an actual case amounts to a ruling on the wisdom of the policy imposed by the
legislature on the subject matter of the law. 10

Id. at 95.
63 Phil. 139 (I 936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
9
Id. at 158-159.
°
1
Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 440 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
 Separate Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

The actual case or controversy requirement is satisfied when the case

presents conflicting or opposite legal rights that may be settled in a judicial
proceeding. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: 11

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an

opposite legal claim susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interest"; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. 12
(Citation omitted)

The issues presented must be "ripe for adjudication," 13 and the

challenged act must have had a "direct, concrete and adverse effect on the
petitioner." 14 The conflicting legal rights must be real and concrete, not
merely hypothetical or anticipatory, lest this Court's decision amount to an
advisory opinion. 15

When this Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction is invoked to assail

the constitutionality of a statute, the actual case or controversy requirement is
satisfied by at least a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act. 16

[G]rave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise

of judgment as is equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, a11d must be so patent a11d so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. 17

Here, petitioners-legislators in G.R. No. 236118 anchor their

constitutional challenge on the alleged lack of quorum when the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 5636 and Senate Bill No.
1592 were ratified in the House. They aver that since the Bills were not
properly passed in Congress, President Duterte's act of signing the same into
law was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

I submit that petitioners failed to show a prima facie case of grave abuse
of discretion. There is no assertion of a legal right or a legal claim that is
susceptible to judicial resolution.

11
522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutien-ez, En Banc].
12
Id at 753.
" Kilusang Maya Uno v. Aquino JfI, 850 Phil. 1168, 1191 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
1, Id
15
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836
Phil. 205,245 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
16
Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En
Banc].
17
Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 604 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
Separate Opinion 6 G.R. Nos.236118 & 236295

The ponencia finds that House Journal No. 48 explicitly showed a

quorum at the start of the December 13, 201 7 session of the House (where the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report was ratified), 18 and that prior to
ratification no objection on the lack of a quorum was raised. 19 It further
discerns that the issue raised by the petitioners ultimately pertains to matters
affecting the internal rules of the House of Representatives, the formulation
and implementation of which is within the exclusive realm of the House and
beyond the reach of this Court. 20

Parenthetically, the ponencia holds that "both the enrolled bill and
Journal No. 48 do not mention any infirmity in the passage of the law."21
Thus, applying the doctrines on the binding force of legislative journals22 and
the enrolled bill, 23 the presumption of due passage of the law remains.

Furthermore, petitioner's allegations that the irregular passage of the

law in Congress taints the President's approval with grave abuse of discretion
is a legal conclusion that utterly fails to meet an actual case.

On the other hand, the petitioners in G.R. No. 236295, as consumers,

assail the constitutionality of the TRAIN Law additionally on the ground that
the imposition of excise taxes on diesel, coal, LPG and kerosene are
"confiscatory, baseless, discriminatory, and violative of the right of the people
to due process of law and equal protection of the laws." 24

Again, petitioners failed to present actual facts, and merely presented

generalizations on the supposed effect of the imposition of excise taxes. They
were unable to demonstrate concretely how the challenged provisions
adversely affected them as to warrant a judicial review. Mere allegations of
injury or economic hardship without factual foundation will not suffice.

In Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance, 25 the claims that Republic Act No.

7716 or the Expanded Value Added Tax Law is regressive, oppressive,
confiscatory and that it violates due process and equal protection of the laws
were held to be premature without a factual foundation. 26 On motion for
reconsideration, this Court held that broad claims of constitutional violations
without concrete, factual foundation cannot be resolved without an actual
case. This Court held that its duty to determine the presence or absence of

18
Ponencia, pp. 19-20.
19
Id. at 20.
20
Id. at 22-25.
11
Id. at 29.
11
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado. 298 Phil. 502, 511 (1993) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
23
In Tolenlinov. Secretary ofFinance, 305 Phil. 686, 752-753 (I 994) (Per J. Mendoza, En Banc], the rule
1s that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
24
Ponencia, p. 4.
25
305 Phil. 686, 752-753 (1994) (Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
26
Id. at 770.
 Separate Opinion 7 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

grave abuse of discretion on the part of a branch or instrumentality of

government can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before it.

The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims

of constitutional violations by tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale
and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record which can impart to
adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show
in the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify
its effect on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have
not even been assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by
a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no different from those
dealt with in advisory opinions.

The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent.

He alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here, does not
suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such
unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here
would condemn such a provision as void on its face, he has
not made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the
authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal
protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not
fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for
proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a
conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of
validity must prevail.

Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a

concrete case. It may be that postponement of adjudication would result in
a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case, however. Enforcement of
the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual
case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.

Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for

adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different
from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues. 27
(Citations omitted)

Without an actual case or controversy, the petitions do not provide a

justification for this Court to rule upon the constitutionality of the TRAIN
Law. To do so would be an unnecessary encroachment on the policy-making
powers of the legislative and executive bodies.

Consistently, this Court has refused to make constitutional

adjudications that do not involve actual cases.

27
Tolentino v. Secretmy of Finance (Resolution}, 319 Phil. 755, 798-799 (1995) [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc].
 '• '
Separate Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

In Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 28 this Court declined to resolve the

petition challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Family
Code for failing to present an actual case, among other grounds:

This Court's constitutional mandate does not include the duty to

answer all of life's questions. No question, no matter how interesting or
compelling, can be answered by this Court if it cannot be shown that there
is an "actual and an antagonistic assertion ofrights by one party against the
other in a controversy wherein judicial intervention is unavoidable."

This Court does not issue advisory opinions. We do not act to satisfy
academic questions or dabble in thought experiments. We do not decide
hypothetical, feigned, or abstract disputes, or those collusively arranged by
parties without real adverse interests. If this Court were to do otherwise and
jump headlong into ruling on every matter brought before us, we may close
off avenues for opportune, future litigation. We may forestall proper
adjudication for when there are actual, concrete, adversarial positions,
rather than mere conjectural posturing:

As this Court makes "final and binding construction[ s] of law[,]"

our opinions cannot be mere counsel for unreal conflicts conjured by
enterprising minds. Judicial decisions, as part of the legal system, bind
actual persons, places, and things. Rulings based on hypothetical situations
weaken the immense power of judicial review.

It is not enough that laws or regulations have been passed or are in

effect when their constitutionality is questioned. The judiciary interprets
and applies the law. "It does not formulate public policy, which is the
province of the legislative and executive branches of governrnent." Thus,
it does not - by the mere existence of a law or regulation - embark on an
exercise that may render laws or regulations inefficacious.

Lest the exercise of its power amount to a ruling on the wisdom of

the policy imposed by Congress on the subject matter of the law, the
judiciary does not arrogate unto itself the rule-making prerogative by a swift
determination that a rule ought not exist. There must be an actual case, "a
contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."29 (Citations omitted)

In Private Hospitals Association ofthe Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea 30

this Court similarly declined to take cognizance of the petition for lack of an
actual case and legal standing of the petitioner. It held:

The allegations set forth in the petlt10n failed to meet the

requirement of a prima .facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Congress relative to the provisions of R.A. No. 10932. While

28
Falcis J/1 v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
29 Id.
30
842 Phil. 747 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].
Separate Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

R.A. No. 10932 and its implementing rules are accomplished acts of a co-
equal branch of the government, the petition is unfortunately bereft of any
allegation that petitioner, nor any of its members, had thereby suffered an
actual or direct injury as a result of a discretion gravely abused. In the
absence of an actual and direct injury, any pronouncement by the Court
would be purely advisory or sheer legal opinion, in view of the mere
hypothetical scenanos, which the instant petition presents.

The challenged law also enjoys the presumption of constitutionality

which the Court, at the first instance, cannot disturb in the absence of a
prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion and, upon delving into the
merits, in the absence of a clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution. If the Court were to invalidate the questioned
law on the basis of conjectures and suppositions, then it would be unduly
treading questions of policy and wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it, but also of the executive which approved it.31 (Citations omitted)

In National Federation ofHog Farmers, Inc. v. Board ofInvestments, 32

this Court refused to adjudicate on the constitutional line demarcating Filipino
citizens' privileges from those of foreigners, absent an actual case. We
reiterated:

A conflict must be justiciable for this Court to take cognizance of it.

Otherwise, our decision will be nothing more than an advisory opinion on a
legislative or executive action, which "is inconsistent with our role as final
arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule ofLaw."33
(Citation omitted)

In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism

Council, 34 this Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9372, or the Human Security Act of 2007, for lack of actual facts. It held
that the possibility of abuse in its implementation is not enough.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the

occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to
provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the
Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.

Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and

supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate
a credible threat ofprosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being
lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas

31

32
for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Id. at 783-784.
G.R. No. 205835, June 23, 2020 [Per .J. Leonen, En Banc].
I
'' Id.
34
646 Phil. 452 (20 I 0) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
 .' .
Separate Opinion 10 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency,"

where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not

avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
' .
imagined. Such possibility is I)0t peculiar to RA 93 72 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. 35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
'

In Republic v. Roque, 36 ihis Court dismissed the declaratory relief

petitions that again challenged ti;ie provisions of the Human Security Act for
failure to "demonstrate how [respondents] are left to sustain or are in
immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the assailed provisions of RA ,9372." 37 Therein, there was no showing that
the remarks addressed by certain government officials to the general public
tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action, under RA 9372,
against the respondents.

In Pangilinan, this Court'. restrained from declaring a diplomatic act

unconstitutional without a proper justiciable controversy, emphasizing that:

We reiterate that courts may only rule on an actual case. This Court
has no jurisdiction to rule on matters that are abstract, hypothetical, or
'

merely potential. Petitioners' fear that the President may unilaterally

withdraw from other treaties has not transpired and cannot be taken
cognizance of by this Court in this case. We have the duty to determine
when we should stay our hand, and refuse to rule on cases where the issues
are speculative and theoretical', and consequently, not justiciable.

Legislative and executive powers impel the concerned branches of

government into assuming a more proactive role in our constitutional order.
Judicial power, on the other hand, limits this Court into taking a passive
stance. Such is the consequence of separation of powers. Until an actual
case is brought before us by tHe proper parties at the opportune time, where
the constitutional question is ihe very /is mota, we cannot act on an issue,
no matter how much it agonizes us. 38 (Citation omitted)

There are naITow inst~nces when this Court may review the
constitutionality of a statute despite the lack of an actual case. In Parcon-
Song v. Parcon, 39 this Court held that a constitutional issue may still be
resolved when there is a violation of the right to free expression and its

35

'.'
·'
7
!d. at481-483.
718 Phil. 294 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
!d. at 305.
I
:: Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
·' G.R. No. 199582, July 7, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
: ,,

Separate Opinion II G.R. Nos.236118 & 236295

cognates, or when it involves violations of fundamental constitutional rights

that are demonstrably egregious:

There are exceptions, namely: (a) when a facial review of the statute
is allowed, as in cases of actual or clearly imminent violation of the
sovereign rights to free expression and its cognate rights; or (b) when there
is a clear and convincing showing that a fundamental constitutional right
has been actually violated in the application of a statute, which are of
transcendental interest. The violation must be so demonstrably and urgently
egregious that it outweighs a reasonable policy of deference in such specific
instance. The facts constituting that violation must either be uncontested or
established on trial. The basis for ruling on the constitutional issue must also
be clearly alleged and traversed by the parties. Otherwise, this Court will
not take cognizance of the constitutional issue, let alone rule on it. 40

This case, however, is no exception.

II

Further, petitioners' direct recourse to this Court is improper.

There are factual issues underlying the petitioners' arguments on the

unconstitutionality of the TRAIN Law that must be fully threshed out for the
proper disposition of the case. These factual issues pertaining to the existence
of a quorum, the alleged oppressive, confiscatory, and anti-poor effects of the
excise tax provision on oil products require the presentation of evidence that
must be evaluated and weighed by the proper court.

This Court is not a tiier of facts. "[T]he initial reception and

appreciation of evidence are functions that [the] Court cannot perform. These
are functions best left to the [lower] courts." 41

In GIOS-SAA1.AR, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and

Communication, 42 this Court has emphasized, for the guidance of the bench
and the bar, that:

[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue

indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to
resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paran1ount importance of the case.
Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA,
both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions. 43

40 Id.
41
A ala v. Uy, 803 Phil. 36, 59(2017) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
42
849 Phil. 120 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
43
Id. at I 87.
 ' I 0

Separate Opinion 12 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

"Transcendental importance" of the constitutional issue raised, by

itself, does not justify direct resort to this Court. The doctrine of respect for
hierarchy of courts is not a matter of mere policy but a constitutional
imperative given the structure of our judicial system and the requirements
of due process. Since the Court generally does not receive evidence and
resolve factual questions at the first instance, parties who directly file their
petitions before it risk having their cases resolved on disputed or incomplete
facts. As such, they are deprived the opportunity to have a complete, final
and definitive resolution of their controversy. The Court explained in GIOS-
SAMAR:

Under the present Rules of Court, which governs our judicial proceedings,
warring factual allegations of parties are settled through presentation of
evidence. Evidence is the means of ascertaining, in a judicial proceeding,
the truth respecting a matter of fact. As earlier demonstrated, the Court
cannot accept evidence in the first instance. By directly filing a case before
the Court, litigants necessarily deprive themselves of the opportunity to
completely pursue or defend their causes of actions. Their right to due
process is effectively undermined by their own doing.

Objective justice also requires the ascertainment of all relevant facts

before the Court can rule on the issue brought before it. Our pronouncement
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan is enlightening:

The resolution of controversies is, as everyone

knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function
is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the
material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from
the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that
determination of the facts has been completed, by the
application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy
may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.

It is for this reason that a substantial part of the

adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with
assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the
Court; for obviously, to the extent that adjudication is
made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there
is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It
is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see
that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there [be] no
suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of
the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material
and relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail
suddenly brought to his attention during the trial. 44
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

44
/d.at!S!-182.
' . '
Separate Opinion 13 G.R. Nos. 236118 & 236295

Thus, more than the "special and important reasons" invoked to justify
direct resort to the Court, the questions raised by the parties must be purely
legal in nature before the Court may exercise judicial review.

We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or more

of the so-called "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor
considered by the Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at the
first instance, of its original jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary
writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised by the parties in
those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the direct action before us.

An examination of the cases wherein this Court used "transcendental

importance" of the constitutional issue raised to excuse violation of the
principle of hierarchy of comis would show that resolution of factual issues
was not necessary for the resolution of the constitutional issue/s ... In all
these cases, there were no disputed facts and the issues involved were
ones of law.

To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe

us with the power to tackle factual questions and play the role of a trial court.
The only circmnstance when we may take cognizance of a case in the first
instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the exercise of our
constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the President's proclamation of martial law m1der Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. The case before us does not fall under this
exception. 45 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Considering the factual questions involved in this case, we should stay

our hand in strict adherence to the doctrine of respect for hierarchy of courts.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions.

\

45
Id.at175-178.