Judgment Lubwama Fred Vs AG
Judgment Lubwama Fred Vs AG
Judgment Lubwama Fred Vs AG
FRED LUBWAMA:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
ATTORNEY GENERAL:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
The plaintiff filed this suit seeking recovery of his vehicle that was
damaged by the defendant’s force during the 1981-1986 liberation war or
its current market value, general damages, interest at the rate of 24% and
costs of this suit.
The plaintiff’s claim is that during the early 1980s the plaintiff joined the
Panther battalion which took part in the Liberation struggle that brought
the current regime into power in 1986. According to the plaintiff, he
surrendered his motor vehicle Reg. No. UVE 957 [a pick up Junior Nissan]
to the urban task force for purposes of easing transportation of war
equipment, forces and food supplies.
The defendant further stated that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against the defendant and that the defendant would raise a preliminary
objection that this suit is time barred and ought to be dismissed with costs.
At trial the plaintiff was represented by Mr. Dominic Twinamatsiko and the
defendant by Ms Nabaasa Charity. The plaintiff brought one witness
whereas the defendant had no witnesses since the claim was over 30 years.
The parties were directed to file final written submissions. The plaintiff
filed the written submissions which were considered by this court.
This honorable court framed the following issues for determination of this
matter;
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the compensation sought.
2. Whether the matter is res judicata.
3. Whether the matter is time barred.
COURT’S ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the compensation sought.
The plaintiff testified that in the early 1980s, he joined the liberation
struggle that the brought the NRM in 1986 to power and that during the
war, he surrendered his motor vehicle [a pick up] to the urban task force
for purposes of easing transportation of war equipment, forces and food
supplies to the fighting forces.
The plaintiff told this court that after the war the government came up with
a program to compensate all the veterans including the plaintiff. The war
debts committee was later formed for purposes of coordinating and
verifying all the persons who were to benefit from the said compensation.
It was the evidence of the plaintiff that later the war debts committee
recommended that he be compensated with his motor vehicle and or the
prevailing market rate at the time of compensation. The plaintiff further
testified that various correspondences were written between the Office of
the President and Ministry of Luwero Triangle in the respect to the
compensation herein on court record all in relation to the payment of the
plaintiff’s compensation for his motor vehicle but to date the same has not
been realized.
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that by adducing the exhibits on court’s
record, the plaintiff has demonstrated to this honorable court that the
government was fully aware of his compensation and actually had
undertaken to compensate him when the funds became available. However
to date he has never realized his compensation.
Counsel prayed that this honorable court find that the defendant breached
her undertaking and thus should compensate the plaintiff with his vehicle
and or the value of the same as at the time of compensation.
For the doctrine to apply, it must be shown that; a) there was a former suit
between the same parties or their privies, b) a final decision on the merits
was made in that suit, c) by a court of competent jurisdiction and, d) the
fresh suit concerns the same subject matter and parties or their privies
(see Ganatra v. Ganatra [2007] 1 EA 76 and Karia and another v. Attorney-
General and others [2005] 1 EA 83 at 93 -94).
Hon Justice Stephen Mubiru in Dubo & Anor v Minduni & Ors (CIVIL
REVISION No. 0001 OF 2017) stated that; “The matter directly and
substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter
which was directly and substantially in issue either actually or constructively in
the former suit; the former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or
between parties under whom they or any of them claim; the parties must have been
litigating under the same title in the former suit; the court which decided the
former suit must be a court that was competent to try the former suit or the suit in
which such issue is subsequently raised; and the matter directly and substantially
in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the
court in the former suit. A suit therefore will not be res judicata where it is
determined that the subject matter is different from that which was considered in
the former suit, or the judgment in the former suit was not pronounced by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or where it was not a decision given on the merits of the
case, or where the parties are different and not privy to those in the earlier suit or if
they are not litigating under the same title.”
The plaintiff in this case filed a suit Civil Suit No. 11 of 2013 in the
Commercial Court that was determined by Lady Justice Anna B Mugenyi.
The case was still against the defendant however in that case, the plaintiff
sought the court to determine whether the payment made by the defendant
was an ex gratia payment and final for his claim as well as whether he was
entitled to the payment of UGX 131,320,000.
Bearing in mind the authorities above, the subject matter in this suit is
different from that of Civil Suit No. 11 of 2013 therefore this matter does
not fall under the ambit of res judicata.
The plaintiff proceeded to file his suit in 2016 which was still within the
time provided by law to bring a suit against the defendant. Counsel prayed
that court finds that this suit is not time barred and that the same was
brought within the prescribed period of time.
We have to note that the events leading up to this claim arose in 1990 and
the plaintiff sought compensation from the War Claims Committee
thereafter until 2012 when it was concluded that the plaintiff would be
paid the following financial year when fund were available.
According to Section 3(2) of the Civil Procedure and Limitation
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 72, “No action founded on contract shall
be brought against the Government or against a local authority after expiration of
three years from the date on which the cause of action arose.”
I am inclined to agree with Hon Lady Justice Anna B Mugenyi in Civil Suit
No. 11 of 2013 where she held; “…the suit to begin with is time barred as the
events that led to the claim took place in 1990 and the plaintiff only came to court
in 2013. The plaintiff cannot distance himself from the events of 1990 because they
are the ones that led to this claim…”
”…further whereas it is true that that there were several correspondences from
various offices regarding compensation, it is not true to conclusively say they
amounted to a contract or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff. If the ambush had not occurred then there would be no
claim in the first place.
The plaintiff ought to have instituted this suit soon after his demands for
compensation were made to the war committee and not heeded to
immediately had he wanted to pursue this course of action. Instituting this
suit nearly 26 years after the events that resulted in to the claim arose
unfortunately make the suit time barred.
With the foregoing, this suit fails and is therefore dismissed with costs.
It is so ordered.
SSEKAANA MUSA
JUDGE
14th April 2020