Dokumen - Pub Geopolitics and Democracy The Western Liberal Order From Foundation To Fracture 0197535402 9780197535400

Geopolitics and Democracy
Advance Praise for Geopolitics and

Democracy
“Timely and compelling, Geopolitics and Democracy argues that since the
end of the Cold War, government leaders in the West broke the social con-
tract underpinning the liberal international order they built. By focusing
their efforts on market globalization and the pooling sovereignty at the
international level, while reducing social protections at home, Western
government leaders overstretched public support for their actions, paving
the way for growing anti-globalization sentiment. The book is a model for
how to bridge insights from international relations and domestic politics,
and does an exceptional job of marshaling a wealth of available evidence
to make nuanced arguments about the state and future of the Western-led
liberal order. I strongly encourage everyone to read it.”
—Catherine E. De Vries, Professor of Political Science,
Bocconi University
“In this tour de force, Trubowitz and Burgoon offer a new and compelling
portrait of the shifting and fraught domestic foundations of Western de-
mocracy and its postwar leadership of the liberal world order. Beautifully
written and deeply researched, Geopolitics and Democracy chronicles the
decades-in-the-making erosion of support for liberal internationalism in
Western societies—and points to ways in which liberal democracies might
once again bring their ambitions and capacities back into line.”
—G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and
International Affairs, Princeton University
“Trubowitz and Burgoon offer a highly readable and persuasive argument

about the interaction between populism and the unraveling of the liberal
international order. A notable contribution helping us understand our
politics today.”
—Kathleen R. McNamara, Professor of Government and
Foreign Service, Georgetown University
“This ambitious book synthesizes existing scholarship and also breaks
new ground, theoretically and empirically. The authors argue convinc-
ingly that the embrace of ‘globalism’ by Western political elites has been
accompanied by domestic reforms that have undermined public support
for the liberal international order. A must-read for students of comparative
welfare-state politics as well as international political economy and inter-
national relations.”
—Jonas Pontusson, Professor of Comparative Politics,
Université de Genève
“Geopolitics and Democracy is essential reading for everyone who wants

to grasp the root causes of the anti-globalist pressures in today’s liberal
democracies and the resulting crisis of the liberal international order.
Based on a rigorous analysis of a wealth of data, Trubowitz and Burgoon
challenge standard accounts of liberal internationalism’s decline and show
how trade liberalization and neoliberal governance have contributed to
the widening gap between governments and voters in the West.”
—Wolfgang Wagner, Professor of International Security,
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
“Geopolitics and Democracy is a thought-provoking book that studies the

challenges to the liberal international order from a broad perspective.
Drawing on insights from different subfields that are usually studied in
isolation, paying attention to different levels of analysis, and presenting a
vast array of empirical findings, this book provides a provocative new per-
spective on why the Western liberal world order has come under pressure
and what could be done to change this.”
—Stefanie Walter, Professor of International Relations and
Political Economy, University of Zurich
“A big, grand sweeping and important argument. Geopolitics and

Democracy makes a powerful case that Western governments got well
ahead of what their populations would support when they decided to
deepen and broaden the liberal international order after 1990.”
—William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government,
Dartmouth College
Geopolitics and
Democracy
The Western Liberal Order from Foundation
to Fracture
P E T E R T RU B OW I T Z A N D B R IA N BU R G O O N
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Trubowitz, Peter, author. | Burgoon, Brian, 1965– author.
Title: Geopolitics and democracy : the Western liberal order from
foundation to fracture / Peter Trubowitz, Brian Burgoon.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2023. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022035036 (print) | LCCN 2022035037 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197535417 (paperback) | ISBN 9780197535400 (Hardcover) |
ISBN 9780197535431 (epub) | ISBN 9780197535448 |
Subjects: LCSH: Liberalism—Western countries. | Geopolitics—Western
countries. | Political planning—Western countries. | Western
countries—Social policy. | Western countries—Economic integration. |
World politics—1989–
Classification: LCC JC574 .T736 2023 (print) | LCC JC574 (ebook) |
DDC 320.5109182/1—dc23/eng/20221107
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022035036
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022035037
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197535400.001.0001
Paperback printed by Marquis Book Printing, Canada

Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
To our families
Contents
List of Figures xi
Preface and Acknowledgments xv
1. The Solvency Gap 1

2. A Widening Gyre 27
3. Roots of Insolvency 55
4. Reaping the Whirlwind 85
5. Bridging the Gap 120
Appendices 139
Notes 183
References 207
Index 233
Figures
1.1 Power and partnership: dimensions of international statecraft 7

1.2 Foreign policy strategies by power and partnership 10
2.1 Government support for international partnership and military power
by country, 1970–1975 33
by country, 1976–1991 37
by country, 1992–2017 42
2.4 Government support for international partnership and military power by
EU, Japan, and United States, 1970–2018 44
2.5 Cross-national variation in government support for international
partnership and military power in Western democracies, 1970–2018 45
2.6 Voter support for international partnership and military power by EU,
Japan, and United States, 1950–2017 47
2.7 Government and voter support for international partnership and military
power in Western democracies, 1970–2017 49
2.8 Government and voter support for international partnership and military
power in the EU, Japan, and United States, 1970–2017 51
3.1 Government support for social protection and liberal internationalism
by Western democracy, 1970–2017 58
3.2 Effect of a Western government’s spending on social protection on its
support for liberal internationalist policies, 1970–2017 59
3.3 Effect of social protection on party support for liberal internationalism
by Western party family, 1960–2017 61
3.4 Relationship between social protection and voter support for liberal
internationalism in Western democracies, 1960–2017 63
3.5 Western government investment in social protection for labor force
adjusted by economic risk, 1960–2017 65
3.6 Average level of geopolitical threat facing Western democracies, 1950–2011 74
3.7 Geopolitical threat and Western government support for liberal
internationalism by country, 1960–2011 75
xii Figures
3.8 Effect of geopolitical threat on Western government support for liberal

internationalism, 1970–2017 76
3.9 Effect of geopolitical threat on party support for liberal internationalism by
Western party family, 1960–2015 77
3.10 Relationship between geopolitical threat and voter support for liberal
internationalism in Western democracies, 1960–2017 78
3.11 Relationship between globalization and government-voter solvency gap
over international partnership in Western democracies, 1970–2017 82
4.1 Party support for international partnership and military power in Western
democracies, 1950–1975 90
4.3 Effect of party vote share on government support for international
partnership and military power in Western democracies, 1970–2017 94
4.4 Relationship between mainstream and radical party strength and government
support for liberal internationalism in Western democracies, 1950–2017 95
4.5 Average vote share by party family in Western democracies, 1950–2017 97
4.7 Average party family support for international partnership and military
power in Western democracies, 1950–2017 102
4.8 Relationship between party support for international partnership and
military power and electoral success in Western democracies, 1960–2017 105
4.9 Relationship between social protection, foreign policy, and party vote share
in Western democracies, 1950–2017 106
4.10 Average level of globalization among Western democracies, 1970–2018 112
4.11 Relationship between domestic political fragmentation and globalization,
1970–2018 113
4.12 Average level of decision-making authority exercised by international
organizations (IOs), 1950–2019 114
4.13 Effect of domestic political fragmentation in Western democracies on
IO decision-making authority, 1960–2018 115
4.14 Level of voting similarity between Western and non-Western countries in
UN General Assembly, 1950–2020 116
4.15 Relationship between domestic political fragmentation in Western
democracies and voting similarity with non-Western countries in the
UN General Assembly, 1960–2018 117
Figures xiii
E.1 Effect of government-voter gap over international partnership on party

vote shares and party-system fragmentation in Western democracies,
1970–2018 179
E.2 Predicted radical-party vote share and party-system fragmentation due to
government-voter gap over international partnership in Western democracies,
1970–2018 179
F.1 Convergence of KOF index of globalization policies and military expenditures,
selected EU-15 countries, 1970–2017 180
F.2 Voting agreement and ideal-point similarity by EU, Japan, and United States
in UN General Assembly, 1950–2020 181
Preface and Acknowledgments
War has given Western democracies a renewed sense of unity and purpose.
In response to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Western governments
have imposed tough economic sanctions on Moscow, sent weapons and aid
to Kyiv, ratcheted up military spending, strengthened their security ties,
and thrown open their doors to millions of Ukrainian refugees. The speed,
breadth, and vigor of the West’s response have raised hopes that Putin’s brutal
war marks a turning point for a liberal international order whose rules and
norms have been badly battered and weakened by the forces of autocracy and
nationalism. Whether the liberal order gains a new lease on life will depend
on more than Western democracies’ resolve in the current international
crisis, however. The liberal order’s future will be determined by the push and
pull of domestic politics as well as by geopolitics.
Geopolitics and Democracy is about how international and domestic pol-
itics have shaped and reshaped the liberal world order from its postwar
origins through the height of the Cold War to the present era. For decades,
the liberal order’s political foundations were sturdy and strong. Geopolitics
and social democracy were self-reinforcing, the one buttressing and forti-
fying the other. Today, the liberal order’s foundations are fractured, riven by
anti-globalist and populist insurgencies and democratic backsliding. We ex-
plain how this happened and consider what might be done to restore do-
mestic support for the liberal order. In telling this story, we draw on ideas and
concepts that will be familiar to scholars of international relations, compara-
tive politics, and political economy, combining and testing them in new ways.
What emerges is an account that traces today’s disorder and discontent
back to choices and missteps that Western leaders made at the height of
liberal triumphalism after the Cold War. Chief among them was Western
governments’ failure to balance the pressures to rapidly globalize markets
and pool national sovereignty at the supranational level against the demands
for greater social protections and economic security at home. Western
democracies succeeded in expanding the liberal order, but the resulting im-
balance between foreign and domestic policy came at the cost of mounting
public disillusionment and political division at home. In short, Western
xvi Preface and Acknowledgments
governments’ efforts to globalize the liberal order exceeded what their do-
mestic politics would allow.
Closing this gap will be critical if Western leaders hope to put the liberal
order on solid domestic footing again in their nations. In one democracy after
another, the turn to globalism has weakened the political center and fueled
ideological extremism. As we show, this has proven costly internationally as
well as domestically. As Western democracies have become more internally
fragmented, the pace of globalization and international institution-building
they have long set has slowed. Meanwhile, Western party democracy, once
a source of Western attraction, has lost much of its international luster and
appeal. If Western democracies hope to reverse these international trends,
understanding how they got themselves into this political fix is an essential
first step. In writing Geopolitics and Democracy, we have tried to keep this
goal front and center.
We began this collaborative journey in 2015 as part of the Dahrendorf
Forum on Europe’s future, a joint initiative by the Hertie School in Berlin and
the London School of Economics and Political Science, funded by Stiftung
Mercator. After co-authoring a couple of articles on the erosion of domestic
support for the liberal order in the US, European, and other Western democ-
racies, we decided to deepen and expand the argument in a book. We began
working on the project in earnest shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic
struck, traveling back and forth between Amsterdam and London and
then, like so many others, meeting over Zoom. For both of us, it was a labor
of love as the book engages issues that touch core themes of our research
interests. It was also an opportunity to rekindle and deepen an old friendship
forged many years before when teaching and studying at UCSD in La Jolla,
California.
At various stages of the project, we have benefited from the comments,
suggestions, and insights of colleagues and friends at LSE and the University
of Amsterdam, as well as from seminars and conferences at Columbia
University, the Hertie School, Princeton University, Université de Genève,
the University of Konstanz, and the University of Tokyo where we have
presented parts of the argument and analysis. We are especially grateful to
Catherine Boone, Alexander Trubowitz, Wolfgang Wagner, and three anon-
ymous reviewers for extremely helpful suggestions on how to improve the
book. At Oxford University Press, we wish to thank Dave McBride for his
sound advice and encouragement. The book has also benefited from Alexcee
Bechthold’s attention to detail during the production process. We would also
Preface and Acknowledgments xvii
like to thank Stella Canessa and Beatriz Da Silva for their expert research
assistance.
We have accumulated many debts in writing this book, but none is greater
than the ones we owe to our respective families. They have been a source of
inspiration and support, especially in the face of the many challenges that
COVID-19 presented for work and family life while this book was being
researched and drafted. Peter thanks Catherine, Joshua, and Alexander for
their constant encouragement and many insights about this research and the
immense challenges facing liberal democracies today. Brian thanks Nicole,
Max, and David for their support and wisdom on the project (and on life out-
side the project). We dedicate this book to them.
1
The Solvency Gap
In a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1950,

Secretary of State Dean Acheson observed, “There is no longer any difference
between foreign questions and domestic questions. They are all part of the
same question.”1 Acheson’s view about the relationship between international
and domestic politics was not a uniquely American perspective. Many of his
Western contemporaries had reached the same judgment. After a decade of
economic depression and war, international security and domestic stability
were considered inseparable, each required to guarantee the success of the
other. In the years and decades that followed, the imperatives of geopoli-
tics and social democracy would reinforce and buttress this view in Western
democracies. Political leaders had to guarantee their citizens “freedom from
want” as well as “freedom from fear” if they hoped to sustain popular support
for international openness and cooperation within the West, and to blunt
the appeal of communism, socialism, and fascism at home. International and
domestic politics were aligned.
Today, Western democracies are struggling to keep international and do-
mestic politics in balance. Since the end of the Cold War, foreign and do-
mestic policy have become disconnected, each operating in isolation and
increasingly, at cross-purposes with the other. In the absence of a common
foe, the West’s international ambitions expanded globally. New international
markets and supranational institutions were created; visions of a new global
security architecture were promulgated. Western governments’ commit-
ment to social stability did not keep pace, however. Western investment in
social protection and welfare slowed. Economic insecurity and inequality
increased. Ideological extremism resurfaced. On issues ranging from inter-
national trade to global governance, domestic support for the liberal world
order fragmented. A large and widening gap opened up between the West’s
international ambitions and its domestic political capacity to support them.
Much of the debate over the West’s weakening commitment to the liberal
international order has focused on recent developments: Donald Trump’s
turbulent presidency, Britain’s surprising decision to leave the European
Geopolitics and Democracy. Peter Trubowitz and Brian Burgoon, Oxford University Press.
© Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197535400.003.0001
2 Geopolitics and Democracy
Union, and the spread of populist and nationalist sentiment in France,

Germany, and other Western democracies. Geopolitics and Democracy shows
that the decline in domestic support for what we call the “Western-led lib-
eral order” is not as recent as these examples suggest. Drawing on an array
of cross-national data on Western governments, parties, and voters, we show
that anti-globalist pressures have been building in Western democracies for
over three decades.2 We trace these pressures back to decisions that Western
governments made after the Cold War ended. The key decisions were to
globalize markets and pool sovereignty at the supranational level, while at
the same time relaxing the social protections and guarantees that domestic
support for international engagement had long rested upon. As we show, this
combination of policies succeeded in expanding the Western-led system, but
at the cost of mounting domestic discontent and division.
Geopolitics and Democracy is about how and why Western governments
overreached internationally, and what they can do to bring international
ends and domestic means back into balance at a time when the problems of
great power rivalry, spheres of influence, and reactionary nationalism have
returned. The book focuses on three separate, yet interrelated, political pro-
cesses: Western governments’ backing away from the foreign policies and
social bargains that defined and supported liberal internationalism through
the long East-West struggle for primacy; the steady decline in public sup-
port for international openness and institutionalized cooperation in Western
democracies since the Cold War ended; and the associated fragmentation of
the liberal order’s domestic foundations in Western party systems. Each is
part of the larger story that Geopolitics and Democracy tells about the West’s
efforts to globalize the postwar liberal order in the wake of the Soviet Union
and communism’s collapse and the resulting problems of strategic overexten-
sion that plague Western democracies today.
International relations scholars use the term “overextension” to describe
nations that make international commitments beyond their means. Often,
those means are equated with military or economic capabilities.3 However,
a country’s “political solvency” can be more critical than its material means.
This is especially true for democracies that depend on the consent of the
governed. In the pages that follow, we argue that Western democracies today
are suffering from a democratic “solvency gap”: the many foreign policy
commitments that Western governments have made to promote greater ec-
onomic integration and institutionalized cooperation since the end of the
Cold War have come to exceed what their domestic publics are willing to bear.
The Solvency Gap 3
A once virtuous cycle between party democracy and international openness,

each strengthening and reinforcing the other, has been transformed into a vi-
cious cycle. Populist and nationalist parties, marginalized and isolated during
the Cold War, have steadily gained political ground by attacking core princi-
ples of liberal international order-building. Established mainstream polit-
ical parties that were the backbone of the Western liberal order in national
parliaments and electorates—Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and
Conservative and Liberal—have been forced onto the political defensive.
In developing this argument about the fracturing of the Western liberal
order, we focus on two separate, yet interrelated, drivers: the end of the Cold
War and of bipolar superpower rivalry, and the breakdown of the postwar
compromise between free- market capitalism and social democracy as-
sociated with “embedded liberalism.”4 Briefly, we argue that the Cold War
had a disciplining effect on party politics in Western democracies, at once
strengthening mainstream parties’ commitment to embedded liberalism
while marginalizing parties espousing globalism, isolationism, or nation-
alism that voters deemed too weak, extreme, or belligerent to be entrusted
with power. With the end of the Cold War, political space in Western democ-
racies opened up, making it easier for once-marginalized parties to gain po-
litical traction by pushing anti-globalist and nationalist agendas. Western
leaders inadvertently lent those parties a helping hand by more fully inte-
grating and institutionalizing international markets while slowing the growth
of, and in some cases, actively rolling back, social protections governments
once guaranteed their citizens. As the costs to many ordinary citizens in
terms of economic security and national autonomy became clear, Western
voters grew increasingly receptive to anti-globalist parties’ platforms.
In combination, these developments go far in explaining why Western
electorates have grown increasingly dissatisfied over the past thirty
years with efforts to integrate and institutionalize international markets,
and dissatisfied with the political elites and parties advancing this for-
eign policy agenda. In general, we show that the level of domestic sup-
port for liberal internationalism in Western democracies has depended
greatly on the level and intensity of international threat those democra-
cies face and the extent to which their governments provide social pro-
tection from market forces for their own citizens. Broadly speaking, the
less “geopolitical slack,” or room for strategic error, Western democra-
cies have internationally, and the more extensive their welfare and social
safety net provisions are at home, the stronger domestic support for liberal
internationalism is likely to be in Western polities.5 Conversely, the lower

the perceived threat and the thinner the social safety net, the less citizens
will endorse expansive internationalist projects. We show that these two
drivers are critical in understanding why domestic political support for
the Western-led liberal international order was so abundant during the
Cold War. This means that popular claims today that the “West is back”
should be viewed with caution.
The future of the Western liberal order depends on the ability of leaders
in America, Germany, France, and other advanced industrialized nations to
nourish and support it. However, the more these democracies invest in ec-
onomic integration and institutionalized cooperation, the more internally
divided and polarized they risk becoming. This is the West’s strategic conun-
drum, and the reemergence of great power politics alone will not solve it.
A common threat can concentrate the West’s collective mind, as Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine reminds. Yet as Geopolitics and Democracy shows, the liberal
order did not rest on fear alone. Throughout the long Cold War, it depended
critically on the economic security and welfare that Western governments
guaranteed their citizens. In the absence of a renewed commitment to those
social purposes, Western democracies will struggle to find a collective grand
strategy that their domestic publics will support.
In making this argument it is important not to overstate the West’s coher-
ence and inclusiveness. The West is not a monolith and the liberal order was
never as benign as some analysts and commentators would have it. The lib-
eral order has excluded countries in the developing world (some also opted
not to join “the club”), and penalized some of them. In Western democra-
cies, the principle of social protection that was so central to the practice of
embedded liberalism typically excluded peoples immigrating from their
former colonies and other nations.6 Liberal order-building has also involved
the use of hard power to create “buffer zones,” protect strategic “choke points,”
and “guarantee access” to strategic materials in the Middle East and else-
where.7 Nations at the receiving end of American and Western power pro-
jection have sometimes paid a steep price for nationalizing Western assets,
attacking their neighbors, or harming their own citizens. Western democra-
cies sometimes fall short domestically of the high standards they hold others
to. During the Cold War, fears of communism and Soviet “fifth columns” led
Western leaders to trample on individual rights in the name of national secu-
rity, intervene in places like Vietnam, and suppress democracy in developing
The Solvency Gap 5
countries. This too is part of the Western-led liberal order’s long trajectory
stretching from the postwar era to the present.
We are also mindful that there is a long arc of writings about the West’s
woes. Like the greatly exaggerated reports of Mark Twain’s demise,
historians, political scientists, and commentators have been predicting the
West’s death since Oswald Spengler published The Decline of the West after
World War I.8 Geopolitics and Democracy is not another monograph about
the West’s inexorable decline. Our purpose is different. In the pages that
follow, we argue that Western democracies’ foreign policies have overrun
their political foundations, but that it is within their power to bring inter-
national ends and domestic means back into balance. To do so, a necessary
first step is to correctly diagnose how the West got itself into this fix. As we
show, today’s anti-globalist pressures in Western democracies owe more to
the breakdown of their commitment to social democracy at home than the
headlong pursuit of democracy promotion abroad, however checkered the
history of the latter. It is here, in Western efforts to build an open, institu-
tionalized order, that the gap between international ambition and domestic
politics is greatest. If Western leaders hope to rebuild domestic support for
international engagement, this is where they must concentrate their efforts,
and their governments’ resources.
In the rest of this introductory chapter, we sketch out the theoretical
framework, research design, and methods we use to track Western democ-
racies’ foreign policies, and domestic support for them, over the past
seventy-five years. We begin by developing a typology that distinguishes
between four basic foreign policy strategies: globalism, liberal internation-
alism, isolationism, and nationalism. We then provide an overview of our
argument about how Western governments’ foreign policies changed in the
1990s, and why they overran their domestic foundations. We turn next to
how we develop and test our argument empirically, and describe how our
argument differs from other explanations for the rise of anti-globalism and
the causes of Western overreach. Finally, we summarize the book’s three
empirical chapters, along with the book’s concluding chapter on possible
strategies for bringing international ends and domestic means back into bal-
ance. Our principal aim in this book is to explain the widening gap between
Western governments and their publics over foreign policy. Yet our analysis
of Western foreign policy does point to a number of “dos” and “don’ts” for
those hoping to bridge the gap and make the liberal order more solvent.
VARIETIES OF STATECRAFT
Geopolitics and Democracy combines a novel theoretical framework and em-

pirical strategy to systematically analyze the correlates of change in the for-
eign policies of Western democracies since the postwar era, as well as the
long-run causes of the widening gap between governments and their voters
on foreign policy. Our theoretical framework draws on the fields of inter-
national security, international political economy, comparative political
economy, and comparative party politics. These four fields of inquiry are
rarely combined, but there are theoretical and empirical payoffs in doing so.9
Indeed, one of our objectives in writing this book is to show how our under-
standing of the evolution of the Western system over the past seventy-five
years can be enhanced by taking into account the interaction between geo-
politics, political economy, and party politics. As we show, the political sol-
vency of the liberal world order has depended far more on party democracy,
and especially on the electoral dominance of mainstream parties, than is gen-
erally appreciated by international relations scholars. The reverse is also true.
Populism and nationalism’s steady rise in Western democracies over the past
three decades owes more to geopolitical developments than current models
of comparative party politics allow.
Power and partnership
In making these and related arguments about the Western liberal system’s evolu-
tion since World War II, we model Western statecraft along two separate foreign
policy dimensions that we call “power” and “partnership.” These are depicted in
Figure 1.1. By power, we mean military power, one of statecraft’s oldest tools and
a key indicator of a foreign policy strategy’s ambition and cost. International re-
lations scholars and defense analysts measure military power in different ways,
though most agree that the percentage of GDP a country invests in building up
and maintaining its military power is a good barometer of how much weight or
value its leaders and citizens attach to military might and defense preparedness
as part of their nation’s overall foreign policy strategy.10 Nations that are located
on the right end of the horizontal axis strongly favor investing in building up
national militaries and national defense capabilities and maintaining military
preparedness. Those located at the opposite end of the horizontal axis strongly
oppose investing a large share of gross domestic product.
The Solvency Gap 7
More international
partnership
Support for economic integration

and institutionalized cooperation
Partnership Power plus
over power partnership
More
military
power
Little partner- Power over

ship or power partnership
Support for defense spending

and military preparedness
Figure 1.1 Power and partnership: dimensions of international statecraft
Where states lie on this continuum thus tells us something about the rel-
ative weight they attach to military strength, balance of power, and power
projection in foreign policy. There is an extensive literature by international
relations scholars on how, why, and when states come to occupy different
points or positions on this power continuum. Motivations can vary from
protecting national sovereignty, to checking the expansionist ambitions of
other states in the international system, to establishing spheres of influence.
Where states land on this continuum also depends on pressures within states,
from economic interests (e.g., industrialists, merchants) seeking private gain
from militarism and war-making, to peace movements that seek to reduce
the impetus toward war through disarmament, collective security, or inter-
national federation.11
The position of each state on the power continuum also offers a rough
sense of their international and domestic spending priorities.12 This is be-
cause states’ resources are limited. As the American strategist Bernard Brodie
famously put it, “Strategy wears a dollar sign.”13 Political leaders must decide
how much military power is enough to meet their foreign policy objectives,
and whether to favor foreign policy strategies that make fewer demands on
the government’s resources and national wealth.14 Political leaders must also
consider whether and how those decisions might affect what they hope to
achieve domestically. Political economists often describe this trade-off as a

choice between guns and butter. Choices must be made on how much of the
state’s resources to invest in national defense (guns) versus how much to in-
vest in domestically oriented policies and social programs (butter). While
there is ample evidence that political leaders frame many foreign policy
choices in guns-versus-butter terms, in practice the trade-off is rarely as
harsh and unbending as modern economic texts portray it to be.15 Countries
can and often do invest in both guns and butter, relying on increased taxes or
large budget deficits to reduce the severity of the trade-off.
As many historians, sociologists, and political scientists have shown, this
compatibility between guns and butter exists especially when states face a
common enemy or threat.16 One reason for this is that leaders see domestic
spending as a means to gain popular support and legitimacy for their for-
eign policy initiatives.17 Another reason is to preempt, or at least neutralize,
adversaries’ efforts to sow internal division and factionalism.18 In the 1880s,
Otto von Bismarck introduced social insurance in Germany, partly in an ef-
fort to tame a growing internal socialist movement and to contain the spread
of revolutionary ideas from other European states.19 During the Cold War,
Western leaders saw the welfare state as a means to blunt the appeal of com-
munism at home and as a political weapon in the East-West struggle.20 The
German Social Democrat Ludwig Preller spoke for many elected officials
when he claimed that welfare state “battalions” would play a decisive role in
determining the outcome of the Cold War.21
In Western democracies, political parties play a critical intermediary
role between governments and society by framing public debate, and by
mobilizing popular support for and against specific military policies and
programs in national parliaments and legislatures.22 In the postwar era,
these party debates have focused on Western “burden-sharing” (i.e., the
percentage of GDP Western democracies spend on national defense) rela-
tive to one another, as well as more sharply defined questions concerning
the strategic necessity and risks of military doctrines (e.g., NATO’s nuclear
“first use” doctrine) and weapon systems (e.g., the UK-US “Skybolt Crisis” in
the 1960s; the “Euromissile” deployment in the 1980s). Debates over military
preparedness, and arms control and disarmament (e.g., Britain’s Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament in the late 1950s and early 1960s; the 1980s’
Nuclear Freeze movement in the United States) have also frequently figured
in party platforms and positioning over the domestic opportunity costs of
military spending, as well as its benefits for local economies and regional
The Solvency Gap 9
development. Often these distributional struggles are played out as partisan

debates over the strategic necessity of peacetime military spending (“peace
through strength,” “weakness invites aggression”) and the domestic dangers
of excessive militarism (“corruption,” “atavism,” “despotism,” “militarism”).
Partnership is international statecraft’s second dimension. By partnership,
we mean political support for international openness (e.g., trade liberaliza-
tion; capital mobility), institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral gov-
ernance. Here, too, governments face choices and trade-offs. Political leaders
and policymakers must decide how much discretion over national policies to
surrender in order to comply with standards set by international institutions,
treaties, and agreements, and how much regulatory and adjudicatory power
to transfer to international bodies like the European Union. There is also an
extensive literature on when and why states elect to voluntarily pay these
“sovereignty costs,” and when they are most likely to oppose doing so.23
Motivations for transferring national authority to the international level can
vary from gaining access to larger markets and capital, to harmonizing tax,
regulatory, and social standards, to neutralizing contentious domestic issues
by going beyond national borders.24
The vertical dimension in Figure 1.1 tells us something about states’ will-
ingness to cooperate internationally to achieve their ends and, conversely,
how much they worry about the loss of political sovereignty to interna-
tional bodies beyond their control.25 States that are located at the top end
of the vertical axis strongly favor investing in international partnership; the
advantages they see in economic integration and international cooperation
outweighs whatever concerns they may have about the loss of national au-
tonomy. Those located at the opposite end of the vertical axis can be expected
to strongly oppose transferring domestic discretionary authority to inter-
national institutions of any type. They worry more about the intrusiveness
and costs of these institutions: that is, how much they constrain national
decision-making authority, impose limits on states’ redistributive and regu-
latory capacity, and risk foreign entanglement and entrapment.
As in the case of military power, how intensively governments invest in
international partnership cannot be divorced from the domestic interests
that win or lose from greater international openness, institutionalized co-
operation, and multilateral governance. There is a large literature on the un-
even domestic effects of trade liberalization and economic integration, as
well as their repercussions for mass politics.26 There is also considerable ev-
idence that voters are sensitive to the distributional benefits and costs, real
and imagined, of international cooperation and multilateral governance.27

Here, too, political parties play a key role in framing public debates over
international trade and institutionalized cooperation and, as Britain’s de-
bate over withdrawing from the European Union reminds us, in mobilizing
voters for and against international openness and sovereignty-pooling
arrangements.28
Foreign policy strategies
We now have a way of describing variation in the types of foreign policy

strategies that countries can choose. These strategies can be broadly classi-
fied in terms of their relative reliance on power and partnership. This yields
four permutations: “partnership over power” (quadrant 1), “power plus part-
nership” (quadrant 2), “little partnership or power” (quadrant 3), and “power
over partnership” (quadrant 4). These combinations are broadly consistent
with four foreign policy strategies that are summarized in Figure 1.2. We
have labeled them globalism (quadrant 1), liberal internationalism (quad-
rant 2), isolationism (quadrant 3), and nationalism (quadrant 4). This is not
More international
partnership
Support for economic integration
and institutionalized cooperation
Globalism
Liberal inter-
nationalism
More
military
power
Nationalism
Isolationism
Support for defense spending

and military preparedness
Figure 1.2 Foreign policy strategies by power and partnership

The Solvency Gap 11
an exhaustive list of foreign policy approaches that fit into these quadrants,
and the relative weight that different governments, parties, or voters attach
to each of these dimensions—power and partnership—can also vary within
quadrants.29 We describe each of these four foreign policy approaches, be-
ginning with globalism in quadrant 1.
Globalism
Globalism favors partnership over power. Globalists consider national sov-
ereignty to be the root cause of international instability and war, and look
to economic integration and institutionalized cooperation as remedies.30
While viewing a common defense and foreign policy as indispensable for
settling disputes and guaranteeing collective external security, they see
political and economic union as essential prerequisites to overcoming the
frictions caused by self-interested sovereign states. In the 1940s, this diag-
nosis of sovereignty’s pernicious effects was shared by leading American,
British, and European public intellectuals of varying political persuasions.
They argued that international federation, of one form or another, offered
the most promising path to removing the barriers of national economies,
improving economic and social well-being, and reducing the risk of inter-
national conflict among self-interested sovereign states.31 Today’s suprana-
tional European Union, which pools sovereignty and guarantees the free
movement of goods, capital, services, and people across borders, arguably
stands as the fullest expression of this midcentury globalist vision, albeit on
a regional scale.32
Globalists give pride of place to economic integration and institutional-
ized cooperation, but they are not opposed to investing in or using military
power under all conditions.33 In general, though, globalists favor investing
relatively few resources in peacetime militaries and, importantly, see military
power as a means for collective self-defense and enforcing international laws
rather than as a tool for maintaining international order through balance of
power. This view of when, how, and to what end military power should be
used in international affairs is not wholly different from Woodrow Wilson’s
vision of a “community of power.” For Wilson and other supporters of the
League of Nations, the purpose was not only to guarantee peace through the
threat of collective action against aggressors, but also importantly, to grad-
ually transcend traditional raison d’état and balance of power politics by
transforming “how states and peoples thought about rights and obligations
and the imperatives to uphold them.”34
Liberal internationalism
If globalists favor partnership over power, liberal internationalists (quadrant
2) see both as essential and complementary.35 Liberal internationalists also
see international openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilater-
alism as means to foster a more peaceful and prosperous world. However,
they worry more about the sovereignty costs of institutionalized cooperation
than do globalists. They also think that international order and peace de-
pend on balance of power politics and the willingness to use military power
to uphold it. In a world of sovereign states, liberal internationalists do not
think the Hobbesian problem of anarchy can be solved through interna-
tional institutions and laws, but they think those challenges can be managed
and lessened if partnership is buttressed by a heavy investment in military
power. This very intuition lies at the core of the liberal international order
that Western democracies built after World War II, and in the thinking of its
chief architect, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.36
Liberal internationalism and globalism are often conflated. It is easy to
see why. Like globalism, liberal internationalism entails a commitment to
economic integration and institutionalized cooperation. Yet the liberal in-
ternationalism championed by Roosevelt and his successors in the United
States and elsewhere differs from globalism in two important ways. First,
unlike globalists, who view international federation as a substitute and
remedy for domestic interventionism, liberal internationalists see govern-
ment intervention as a means to correct for international market failures
and to respond to domestic demands for social justice. In schematic terms,
liberal internationalists are thus located lower on the vertical axis in Figure
1.2 than are globalists, even if both liberal internationalists and globalists
are more favorably disposed to international openness and multilateralism
than isolationists and nationalists (see below). Second, unlike globalists who
look to international law and institutions to restrain the dogs of war, liberal
internationalists also rely on power politics to guarantee security, even as
they try to devise institutional arrangements to manage great power rival-
ries, armament races, and destabilizing technologies. Where globalists focus
on the promise of a world free of balance of power, spheres of influence, and
militarism, liberal internationalists see wisdom in realist adages of “peace
through strength” and “weakness invites aggression.”
Isolationism
In contrast to globalism and liberal internationalism, isolationism (quadrant
3) attaches comparatively little weight to international institutions, preferring
The Solvency Gap 13
self-sufficiency to multilateral cooperation.37 In general, political leaders

and parties that favor isolationism oppose institutionalized cooperation, fo-
cusing less on potential benefits (e.g., larger markets; burden-sharing) and
more on the potential risks (e.g., unstable international markets, economic
exploitation by foreigners, foreign entanglement). Isolationists also take a
dim view of heavy investment in military power, seeing high costs in terms
of butter (or higher taxes) and unnecessary risk, be it centralized power, or
imperial ambition, or military overexpansion. In principle, proponents of
isolationism oppose or are deeply skeptical of both power and partnership.
However, in the real world, this “ideal point” is nearly impossible to achieve.
As a practical matter, they often find themselves playing defense, arguing for
“restraint” to minimize the risk of strategic overextension and, in the case of
smaller powers, for neutrality, to minimize the dangers of foreign influence
and economic harm.
A strategy of isolationism does not mean diplomatic inactivity, let alone
closure to the outside world. Nor does it necessarily preclude the move-
ment of goods, services, and people across national borders, provided it does
not involve surrendering national control and autonomy to international
institutions. In the nineteenth century, isolationist America combined tariffs
on foreign manufactures with exports of agricultural goods. Isolationism also
does not imply nativism, even if this, too, has been a strain in isolationism’s
long history. Often associated with libertarianism today, isolationism, like
globalism, has progressive as well as conservative variants, and not only in
the United States where progressives such as Senator William Borah and so-
cialist Eugene Victor Debs, among many others, championed it in the first
quarter of the twentieth century.38 As we will see, many parties on the far
left in Europe’s multiparty democracies have also populated this quadrant in
Figure 1.2. Radical-left parties were staunch opponents of Atlanticism and
early efforts at European integration in the postwar era, and also actively
campaigned for unilateral nuclear disarmament and neutrality in the East-
West conflict.39
Nationalism
Nationalists (quadrant 4) share isolationists’ strong aversion to trade liber-
alization, international institutions, and multilateral governance. At best,
they see international institutions as a temporary expedient to leverage
power advantages or export their nation’s socioeconomic model; at worst,
they consider institutionalized cooperation, especially security coopera-
tion, to be a source of moral hazard and strategic entrapment. However,
unlike isolationists who worry as much about the dangers of militarism

for civil liberties and democracy as about the risks of pooling sovereignty
in international institutions, nationalists strongly support building and
maintaining large militaries. In this respect, nationalists are similar to lib-
eral internationalists who consider military power essential for guaranteeing
national security and welfare. Where nationalists part company with liberal
internationalists on military power is over the latter’s willingness to also rely
on multilateral arrangements to check foreign threats and advance vital na-
tional security interests (e.g., access to raw materials).
Nationalists come in many guises.40 Certainly, nineteenth- century
mercantilists, and their twentieth-century neo-mercantilist heirs, belong
in this quadrant.41 They favored targeted trade restrictions and other forms
of government economic activism to make strategic domestic industries
more competitive in world markets. Geopolitical rivalry and economic
competition were considered two sides of the same coin. Today’s economic
nationalists bear a strong family resemblance. In her run for the French
presidency in 2017, French populist Marine Le Pen vowed to invest more of
France’s GDP in national defense while liberating French firms and workers
from the “tyrannies” of globalization and the European Union.42 Donald
Trump, whose foreign policy evoked comparisons to the country’s first pop-
ulist president, Andrew Jackson, arguably belongs here, too. Trump attached
comparatively little weight to multilateral cooperation, but he did not hesitate
to invest in military power or use it for narrowly defined national purposes.43
As we will see, many of today’s nationalists populate this quadrant.
OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS
We now have the pieces in place to distinguish between different foreign

policy strategies, and to measure variations across and within each approach.
In the chapters that follow, we use this conceptual framework to identify and
map out Western democracies’ foreign policy preferences along each of these
key dimensions of statecraft and how they have changed over time. In doing
so, we focus the analysis on three political actors: governments, parties, and
voters. Governments’ foreign policies make up the strategies we examine
in these pages. Parties and their leaders occupy positions of power within
governments and influence foreign policymaking by framing policy choices
and mobilizing voters on behalf of their preferred foreign policy strategies
The Solvency Gap 15
(combinations of partnership and power). Voters select political parties to

represent their collective interests and preferences in the corridors of power
at the national level. We track the foreign policy preferences of all three to
identify where and when they overlap and, just as importantly, where and
when they diverge.
Party democracy and liberal order
For roughly half a century after World War II, liberal internationalism was the
West’s lodestar. A strategy of international order-building that was at once lib-
eral and realist, postwar liberal internationalism relied on international part-
nership and military power. Forged in the shadow of the Cold War, the West’s
liberal internationalist strategy was organized around two great regional
axes, with the United States at the center. One was an Atlantic axis binding
North America and Western Europe; the other, a Pacific axis tying Japan and
other non-communist Asian nations to the United States. Together, they de-
fined the geographic core of the Western system and the dense networks of
military, economic, and diplomatic ties that made the whole greater than
the sum of its parts. Sometimes described as Pax Americana, the Western
system was dominated by the United States. However, it was not a distinc-
tively American system, or unilaterally imposed by Washington. European
and Asian democracies also saw benefits in foreign policies that offered pro-
tection from Soviet geopolitical ambitions and delivered high rates of eco-
nomic growth.
To be sure, the Western system fell short of the universal liberal world order
that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and other Western leaders envisioned as
World War II was coming to a close. Even within the West, the level of support
for liberal internationalism varied, as did the precise mix of power and part-
nership that member states favored. And economic nationalists in the emer-
ging postwar “Third World” were often penalized or undercut. Nevertheless,
the system achieved a level of international openness, economic interde-
pendence, and political integration that exceeded what postwar planners
thought possible, and that set the West apart from the rest—something the
empirical analysis in Chapter 2 lays bare. Trade, foreign investment, and
monetary cooperation grew rapidly along the system’s Atlantic and Pacific
axes. Western democracies’ commitment to the common defense deepened.
So, too, did the West’s commitment to party democracy. In sharp contrast to
the interwar years, when ideological extremism ruled in much of Europe and
Asia, the postwar era was one of domestic consensus and coalition-building
across party lines. Socialists and conservatives, Christian Democrats, and
secular liberals found common ground in liberal internationalism.
During the Cold War, the Western liberal international order benefited
from what political scientist Robert Dahl called a “surplus of consensus.”44
Mainstream parties dominated the electoral landscape and controlled the
machinery of national government. Their dominance did not guarantee do-
mestic consensus over foreign policy across the board. Public support for
partnership often sagged during economic downturns. When fears of nu-
clear Armageddon dwarfed concerns about Soviet ambition, public support
for military spending softened too. Yet for most of the Cold War, Western
governments’ foreign policies enjoyed broad and consistent domestic sup-
port. At the same time, Western governments’ commitment to liberal inter-
nationalism provided grounds for consensus within Western democracies.
Western leaders could advance liberal internationalist policies, confident
that those policies would garner the support of a broad cross section of po-
litical parties representing the majority of voters in their countries. What
was good for liberal internationalism was good for mainstream parties, and
vice versa.
This virtuous cycle between foreign policy and party democracy in
Western democracies did not last. The first cracks in liberal internationalism’s
domestic foundations appeared in the 1970s, but it was not until the Cold War
ended that the virtuous cycle between foreign policy and party democracy
broke down. In the 1990s, Western governments shifted from a strategy of
liberal internationalism that combined power with partnership to a strategy
of globalism that relied increasingly on partnership, and a particular market-
oriented variant thereof. Military spending declined. International markets
and institutionalized cooperation expanded. Trade and investment boomed.
New international bodies were formed and older ones were enlarged, many
promoting the expansion of global markets. Countries that once languished
on the edges of the liberal world order, or that the Cold War had effectively
locked out, were suddenly in play as destinations for Western investment. In
the 1990s, the Western system was globalized.
Domestic support did not keep stride, however. We show that, even be-
fore the 1990s were out, popular support for liberalized trade, institution-
alized cooperation, and multilateral governance was declining in Western
democracies. The erosion of domestic support was starkest in the European
The Solvency Gap 17
democracies, but similar patterns emerged in America, Japan, and in most

OECD countries. Across the West, a large and widening gap opened up
between governments and voters over international partnership. While
Western governments’ support for international partnership continued to
rise each year, support among Western voters for international partnership,
and the mainstream parties championing it, declined steadily. The pace of
trade liberalization and institutionalized cooperation slowed in the 2000s,
but the gap between Western governments’ global ambitions and what voters
were willing to support continued to widen. Mainstream parties paid a hefty
price for the growing disjuncture between governments’ foreign policies and
voters’ policy preferences. Anti-globalist parties on the far left and especially,
the far right, successfully exploited these gaps. Mainstream parties advo-
cating international partnership lost significant electoral ground to these
once marginal parties.
The pace and extent of these shifts in public support for partnership and
power have varied across the West, and by party families within countries.
Yet we show that this downward spiral in voter support for the liberal order
has posed challenges for Western leaders everywhere. The more Western
leaders invested in trade liberalization, institutionalized cooperation, and
multilateral governance, the more vulnerable their parties became to anti-
globalist parties and the more fragmented Western party systems became.
Ultra-left parties, such as Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos, capitalized
on growing Euroskepticism and anti-internationalist sentiment, which was
fueled by the 2008 financial crash and the ensuing eurozone crisis. On the far
right, France’s Front National (FN), Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ), and the
Danish People’s Party (DPP), among others, found that anti-globalism could
be wielded as a “wedge issue” to exploit cracks within mainstream parties’
electoral coalitions.45 They used this to peel off voters no longer convinced
that economic integration and supranational institutions were in their self-
interest, or their country’s best interest. By the time Britain voted for Brexit
and Donald Trump was elected president, the once virtuous cycle between
foreign policy and party democracy had become a vicious one.
Explaining Western insolvency
How did Western foreign policy ends become so disconnected from do-
mestic political means? What explains this widening gap between Western
governments and their publics? In the chapters that follow, we argue that
popular support for the Western-led liberal order was contingent on a
particular configuration of geopolitical pressures and domestic bargains.
Geopolitically, the Soviet challenge was a defining reality for Western leaders
and voters. For over half a century, worries about communist expansion
on the Eurasian landmass and the associated danger of nuclear war pushed
Western leaders toward liberal internationalist foreign policies. Soviet power
and the nuclear arms race made most Western voters skeptical of foreign pol-
icies that were too trusting or too belligerent. For the “median voter,” a liberal
internationalist strategy that balanced liberalism with realism was far prefer-
able to globalism, nationalism, or isolationism, especially if waging Cold War
did not require sacrificing butter for guns.
Cold War constraints gave Western leaders and voters strong incentives
to support liberal internationalism. So did the practical realities of domestic
coalition-building in what Peter Mair calls the “age of party democracy.”46
For most of the second half of the twentieth century, political parties had to
build cross-class coalitions to win power. This led Western leaders to pursue
mixed-economy growth strategies at home, combining state intervention
and free-market policies. In foreign policy, this meant striking a balance
between international openness and social protection, and between insti-
tutionalized cooperation and national sovereignty. International openness
and multilateral institutions were needed to promote and sustain growth;
national autonomy and social protection were needed to correct for interna-
tional market forces and ensure working-class voters’ support. This was the
compromise of embedded liberalism that balanced international openness
with domestic policy objectives—full employment, economic equity, unem-
ployment insurance, and social welfare, at least for labor market insiders.
For thirty remarkable years—les trente glorieuses—Western democra-
cies’ commitment to the liberal world order deepened. It was not until the
1970s and 1980s that the first cracks in liberal internationalism’s domestic
foundation appeared. This is when Western leaders, led by Ronald Reagan
and Margaret Thatcher, began “liberalizing” the Western system by shifting
the balance between international openness and social protection in favor
of markets. The West’s turn toward neoliberalism set in motion forces that
would ultimately come back to haunt mainstream parties by weakening
public support for the liberal order and opening the door to political parties
advancing anti-globalist platforms. However, it was not until the Cold War
ended, and Western governments fully embraced an agenda of international
The Solvency Gap 19
market expansion and welfare state “reform,” that a clear gap emerged be-
tween political leaders and their domestic publics.
In the 1990s, globalization became the West’s new elixir. Those who argued
that too much economic integration would trigger a political backlash were
dismissed as Cassandras. At the height of Western triumphalism over “win-
ning” the Cold War, political leaders doubled down on international partner-
ship, driving economic integration and international rule to new heights. The
new supranational European Union and World Trade Organization pooled
sovereignty far more extensively than their forerunners—the European
Community and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
With the lifting of the Iron Curtain, West European industries moved pro-
duction to low-cost East European countries and, soon, opened their doors
to workers from Eastern Europe. American and Western investment in
China accelerated. At the same time, Western leaders, including center-left
politicians like Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schröder, continued
to liberalize domestic economies and loosen social protections. In the early
2000s, Japan’s Koizumi Junichiro followed suit.
For Western leaders, globalization’s promise of greater national wealth
and security served as a substitute for Cold War imperatives—a new way to
sustain the Western system in the absence of a common threat. However,
domestic support for foreign policies to promote greater international open-
ness and multilateral cooperation had never depended on geopolitics alone.
This support also rested on social guarantees to Western workers, especially
those who formed much of the backbone of the mainstream parties. And
therein lay the problem. After a decade of market liberalization and priva-
tization at home, Western leaders had less and less domestic political room
to maneuver in foreign policy. Public opinion was shifting against the new
orthodoxy. We show that, by expanding the global liberal order through the
European Union, the WTO, and other global initiatives in the 1990s, but
doing so without also expanding social protection at home, Western leaders
set in motion the anti-global political dynamics we see today. While for-
eign policies that resulted in greater access to low-wage markets in Asia and
Eastern Europe appealed to many middle-class voters who benefited from
cheaper goods and low-cost immigrant labor, those same policies fueled
working-class discontent and anti-globalist politics.
In the chapters that follow, we document how the end of the Cold War and
the growing reliance on globalism combined to make liberal international
order-building less attractive to Western electorates. While the electoral
strategizing of parties on the far left is part of the story, we show that it is the
parties on the radical right that have been particularly adept at converting
anti-globalist policies and platforms into electoral support. Once champions
of traditional values and laissez-faire economic orthodoxy, far-right parties
adopted nationalist and nativist foreign policies while moving their do-
mestic economic policy agendas to the left. This made radical-right parties
more appealing to the swelling ranks of disaffected working-class voters. It
also put mainstream parties on the center-right on the political defensive.
Western governments’ failure to uphold the postwar social bargains they had
struck with their citizens does not fully explain the hollowing out of the lib-
eral order’s domestic foundation, but we show that it has contributed signif-
icantly to the fragmentation of Western party systems and to the political
divisions over the purposes of foreign policy that we see today.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD
Geopolitics and Democracy relies on historical, aggregate, and inferential

analysis to develop and test these descriptive and causal claims about the shift
from liberal internationalism to globalism, the international and domestic
sources of Western overreach, and the concurrent fragmentation of Western
party systems. The analysis spans twenty-four Western democracies, over
four hundred political parties, and nearly seventy years. We combine large-
N quantitative analysis of government policies, party platforms, and voter
behavior with more fine-grained historical analysis of foreign policy and
party dynamics in the West’s major players—the United States, Japan, and
the European states that would come to comprise the European Union. In
developing the quantitative and historical analysis throughout the book, we
draw on the work of scholars in the fields of international security, interna-
tional political economy, comparative political economy, and comparative
party politics that shed light on the origins and evolution of the liberal order,
the changing relationship between party democracy and foreign policy, and
the rise and spread of anti-globalist sentiment in Western democracies.
We develop and test the argument at the country, party, and voter levels
of analysis.47 We also use this multi-level approach to compare and contrast
actual government foreign policies with party and voter support for those
policies. The inferential analysis of the country, party, and voter dynamics
draws on a variety of cross-national and cross-party time series data. For the
The Solvency Gap 21
country-level analysis of governments’ foreign policies, we leverage widely

used Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicators
measuring the share of national wealth invested in military power and KOF
Swiss Institute indices measuring the degree to which our 24 OECD coun-
tries’ foreign policies promote international partnership through economic
openness, membership in international organizations, and multilateral di-
plomacy. Because these measures vary over large time spans, we are able to
compare the foreign policies of the West to those of “the rest” over time. At
the country level, we also rely on a battery of cross-national indicators that
vary over time to gauge states’ international security environment (their rel-
ative vulnerability to geopolitical rivals and international threats) and their
commitment to social protection and overall social welfare.48
At the party level, we rely principally on data from the Manifesto Project
Database (MPD), a widely used database that summarizes political parties’
policy positions through systematic content analysis of their electoral man-
ifestos (platforms) by country and election year.49 The database includes all
twenty-four OECD countries and over 455 political parties between 1950 and
2018. We use the Manifesto data to identify, summarize, and compare, cross-
sectionally and longitudinally, political parties’ foreign policy preferences
on our two foreign policy dimensions: international partnership and mili-
tary power.50 We do not assume that parties always implement their platform
pledges when they are in power. In fact, we show that party platforms and
government policies frequently diverge. We also do not assume that voters
read party manifestos. Party manifestos can, however, tell us something im-
portant about what policy positions parties think will help them win national
elections.
At the voter level, we also use the Manifesto database to indirectly measure
Western voters’ support for international partnership and military power.
Our strategy is different from relying on available direct measures of public
support for partnership and power. The problem with such a direct approach
is that public opinion survey data on foreign policy issues is very patchy
and inconsistent over time and cross-nationally, leaving too many gaps to
adequately address the issues and questions we are raising.51 The Manifesto
database provides a useful and more empirically complete way to manage
this issue. It provides a proxy for voter attitudes, with coverage and focus
matching our party and policy measures, where we can weight each party’s
manifesto score for partnership and power by the electoral vote share the
party won, based partly on their manifesto positions on these key foreign
policy positions.52 The resulting scores can be interpreted as behavioral

indicators of voters’ support for partnership and power, or what economists
call “revealed preferences.”53 They do not tell us directly what voters think,
but they capture voters’ policy preferences based on voting behavior (e.g.,
whether they favor parties for or against trade liberalization).54
Our multi-tiered approach to analyzing the liberal order has several
advantages. First, it enables us to assess the validity of our arguments de-
scriptively and inferentially at multiple levels of analysis, using different
data sources. Second, it allows us to evaluate some common arguments
about the liberal order that are pitched at different levels of analysis and,
sometimes, at multiple levels at once. For example, some international re-
lations scholars argue that there never really was a “golden age” of liberal
order-building—that there was little consensus between or within Western
democracies in favor of liberal internationalism.55 This argument does not
hold up to empirical scrutiny. We show that there was a domestic consensus
in favor of liberal internationalism in Western party systems and that it
was remarkably robust for decades. Moreover, using different measures of
support for partnership and power, we see the same pattern at the level of
Western governments. Showing that our arguments about the liberal order
hold up at different levels of analysis, using different data sources, increases
confidence in the findings.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARGUMENT
Most international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts agree that
the liberal world order has fallen on hard times.56 Yet there is considerable
disagreement about how and why liberal internationalism lost its way, and
debate over what steps Western democracies should take to rebuild inter-
national and domestic support for the liberal order. Our analysis starts from
the assumption that there is much to be gained by viewing the current anti-
globalist backlash against a larger historical canvas—that is, by tracking the
ebb and flow of domestic support for liberal international order-building
across many Western democracies, different issue areas, and over many
decades. Adopting such a comparative, historical approach reveals many
things about the liberal international order’s trajectory, but perhaps the most
essential is that the anti-globalist backlash we see across the West today has
deep roots. As we show, anti-globalist domestic pressures have been steadily
The Solvency Gap 23
building in Western democracies, large and small, old and new, for over three
decades.
Establishing when the West’s retreat from liberal internationalism began is
important for several reasons. For one thing, it helps us understand why early,
highly influential prognostications about the post–Cold War world were so
far off the mark. In the 1990s, Western commentators were proclaiming the
“end of history” and the arrival of the “unipolar moment.”57 The end of the
Cold War, they argued, represented the permanent victory of liberal democ-
racy and capitalism over the forces of illiberalism and nationalism. America’s
unparalleled power put it in a position to ensure liberal democracy’s triumph
by consolidating, protecting, and extending the liberal international order.
As we show, these arguments sorely underestimated the risks of Western
overreach because they rested on mistaken assumptions about the sources
of popular support for liberal internationalism during the Cold War. They
assumed that Western leaders’ success in winning cross-partisan support for
their foreign policy was due to voters’ commitment to liberalizing the world
order, and thus that it would continue after the Cold War. In fact, Western
leaders’ success was contingent on geopolitical imperatives and social guar-
antees that would soon disappear and weaken.
If many observers underestimated the risk that Western ambition would
outstrip its domestic supports, others have misread how ends and means
became so misaligned in the ensuing years. The most popular explanation
for Western overreach attributes it to political leaders’ overreliance on mil-
itary power and democracy promotion in the Middle East and elsewhere.58
That the West’s misguided pursuit of overly expansive liberal goals like de-
mocracy promotion in the Middle East contributed to voter disillusionment
seems clear. Yet, as we show in Geopolitics and Democracy, domestic disen-
chantment with the liberal order set in well before Western efforts to spread
democracy to the Middle East, the former republics of the Soviet Union,
and elsewhere. The evidence in this book makes clear that it was Western
governments’ unbridled pursuit of trade liberalization, institutionalized co-
operation, and multilateral governance after the Cold War, rather than their
failed military ventures (e.g., the Iraq War) or their strategic gambits (e.g., the
effort to expand democracy to Ukraine on Russia’s doorstep), that put these
governments at odds with their publics over foreign policy.
Explanations that attribute the anti-globalist backlash to globalization
itself are closer to the mark. Many cross-national and country-specific
studies indicate that anti-globalist parties have gained national vote share by
hammering Western leaders for outsourcing jobs to low-wage countries like

China, and for putting too much power in the hands of unelected bureaucrats
in supranational institutions like the European Commission and the WTO.59
Our analysis supports these findings. Yet it also indicates that anti-globalists’
arguments about the costs of economic integration and multilateral gov-
ernance succeeded in no small part because Western leaders no longer felt
compelled by geopolitical necessity to uphold the social protections that
had buoyed their foreign policies during the Cold War. Instead of taking
steps to shore up domestic support for liberal international order-building,
Western leaders’ domestic reforms made it easier for populist and nationalist
politicians to use nativism, Euroscepticism, and calls for protectionism to
play on voters’ concerns about the sovereignty costs of globalization and, as
we show, increase their parties’ share of the national vote.
Geopolitics looms large in our account of the West’s retreat from the
strategy of liberal internationalism that guided it for over half a century.
This story is not only about how the presence, and absence, of Cold War
imperatives have impacted Western solidarity—the province of international
relations scholars. It is also about how international politics have shaped and
influenced Western leaders, domestic policy choices and electoral strategies,
matters central to the study of comparative politics. In showing how the Cold
War superpower bipolar competition reinforced mainstream parties’ elec-
toral clout and commitment to social protection and, conversely, how the
end of the Cold War weakened mainstream parties’ hold on their electorates
and fueled the fragmentation of Western party systems, Geopolitics and
Democracy reminds us that the connection between geopolitics and do-
mestic politics runs deep.60
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
In the chapters that follow, we explore how and why Western democra-
cies overreached, and what their political leaders can do to set things right.
We begin in Chapter 2 by focusing on the widening gap between Western
governments and their voting publics over foreign policy. Using the two-
dimensional model described above, we show that, starting in the 1990s,
Western governments began turning away from the Cold War strategy com-
bining partnership and power (liberal internationalism) to one that relied
increasingly on partnership as opposed to power (globalism). We show that
The Solvency Gap 25
this was true of Western democracies in general, but it was also true of the
West’s preeminent power: the United States. America’s commitment to inter-
national partnership also increased, albeit less conspicuously and less fully
than did Europe’s, Japan’s, and other OECD nations. The West’s commit-
ment to globalism also deepened in the 2000s, through the war on terrorism
and the 2008 financial crisis. Western voters did not keep pace with their
governments, however. We show that, as Western governments shifted from
liberal internationalism to globalism, their foreign policies grew increasingly
out of step with what their electorates were willing to support. Anti-globalist
sentiment spread.
Chapter 3 picks up where Chapter 2 leaves off by focusing on the sources
of Western overreach and the anti-globalist backlash. We argue that Western
governments’ turn toward globalism led to a domestic backlash because it
was shorn of many of the social guarantees and protections that liberal inter-
nationalism originally entailed and that Cold War strategic exigencies rein-
forced. We show how sensitive Western domestic support for international
partnership and military power is to the level of international threat facing
Western democracies and to their governments’ commitment to economic
security for their citizens. In the absence of a “clear and present danger” to
Western interests and softening government support for social protection,
efforts to expand international markets and supernationalism were all but
guaranteed to provoke a backlash. We conclude this chapter by considering
why, in the face of these anti-globalist pressures, Western leaders did not
alter course, by trimming their internationalist sails or providing greater so-
cial compensation.
Chapter 4 considers the consequences of the anti-globalist backlash for
Western democracies and the liberal order. We show that, while mainstream
party support for liberal internationalism has not collapsed, it has weakened
in the face of declining voter support for trade liberalization and multilateral
institutions. It has also contributed to the process of political fragmentation
that has been unfolding in Western democracies for the past three decades.
In contrast to the Cold War, when liberal internationalism strengthened the
mainstream parties’ hold on national electorates, Western governments’ turn
toward globalism cost parties on the center-left and the center-right at the
polls. We show that, since the 1990s, the more mainstream parties promoted
economic integration and multilateral governance the more fragmented
Western party systems became. Parties running on anti-globalist platforms,
especially on the far right, steadily increased their share of the national vote
in Western democracies. The splintering of political authority in Western

democracies has made them less effective and credible as models of good
governance. One consequence we show is that international efforts to
deepen the liberal order through institutionalized cooperation have slowed
significantly.
In the book’s concluding chapter, we consider the implications of our
analysis for Western solvency and the liberal world order. We begin by sum-
marizing our findings about the sources of Western overreach, the causes
of anti-globalist backlash we see today, and the hollowing out of the liberal
order’s domestic foundations in the advanced industrialized nations. We
compare and contrast our analysis to other explanations of Western over-
reach, anti-globalism, and political fragmentation. In the last section, we
take up the coming debate over the liberal order’s future. We focus on three
strategies that are likely to dominate foreign policy deliberations in Western
capitals: one that urges Western democracies to retrench by scaling back in-
ternationally; another that seeks to rekindle Western solidarity and support
for liberal internationalism through confrontation with China and Russia;
and a third strategy that attacks the ends-means problem from the domestic
side through policies of economic renewal. We assess each of these strategies
in light of our analysis of Western party democracy and the liberal order.
2
A Widening Gyre
Writing two decades ago, Robert Kagan famously challenged the idea that
the countries of the West still shared a common approach to international
order-building. “On major strategic and international questions today,”
Kagan wrote about the post–Cold War world, “Americans are from Mars and
Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another
less and less. . . . When it comes to setting national priorities, determining
threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and
defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.”1 Since the
Cold War, Americans, Kagan argued, had been more apt to rely on power
and coercion to promote international order and stability. By contrast,
Europeans preferred diplomacy, negotiation, and partnership to manage in-
ternational conflict and strengthen the international order. Ever since, inter-
national relations scholars and foreign policy analysts have debated how best
to characterize these differences over foreign policy—as a clash of ideas, or
interests, or, as Kagan suggested, values.2 But they did not contest the core as-
sertion itself. The idea that Western democracies’ foreign policy differences
were more significant than their similarities became an article of faith in aca-
demic and policy circles.
In this chapter, we show that Western democracies’ approaches to for-
eign policy today are far more similar than such accounts assume. Indeed,
one reason that so many Western democracies today are experiencing anti-
globalist backlashes is that their governments made essentially the same for-
eign policy bet a quarter of a century ago. In the 1990s, Western governments
turned from the Cold War strategy of liberal internationalism that had bal-
anced international openness and social protection to a strategy of globalism
that put greater emphasis on market-driven economic integration and in-
stitutionalized cooperation. This shift in strategy proved costly for Western
governments: as we show, it set in motion political forces that have weak-
ened the liberal order’s domestic supports. In this chapter, we take the first
step in explaining how and why Western domestic support for the liberal
order has declined by tracking Western government and voter support for
international partnership and military power cross-nationally from the

postwar era to the present.
Briefly, we show that during the Cold War, the United States, Europe’s
democracies, and most of the rest of the OECD invested heavily in both power
and partnership—they coalesced around a liberal internationalist foreign
policy strategy. With few exceptions, the twenty-four Western governments
in our sample favored foreign policies that relied on military power to check
and contain the Soviet Union and on managed trade and international co-
operation to promote growth, stability, and solidarity within the West. This
commitment to liberal internationalism lasted until the end of the Cold
War when Western democracies’ foreign policy (and domestic) priorities
shifted. In the 1990s, Western governments began investing fewer resources
in power while relying more heavily on partnership. Western governments’
reliance on trade liberalization, institutionalized cooperation, and multilat-
eral governance increased while military spending as a percentage of GDP
declined in most OECD nations. This pattern continued into the 2000s, when
it began to stabilize, albeit at levels that dwarfed those achieved by Western
governments at the height of the Cold War.
Western governments’ enthusiasm for globalism was never matched by
their publics, however. We show that, in contrast to the Cold War years, when
the voting public backed Western governments’ efforts to expand trade and
institutionalize cooperation, voters’ support for integration and multilater-
alism declined steadily after the Cold War. As Western governments invested
in ever greater international openness and pooled more and more authority
in multilateral institutions, a widening gap opened up between governments
and their citizens over how heavily to rely on international partnership.
The reverse is true of military power. While Western investment in mili-
tary power as a share of GDP predictably fell during the 1990s, the voting
public’s support for military spending and preparedness did not; it increased.
Cold War worries that Western governments were fueling the arms race by
overinvesting in military power were soon replaced by concerns that na-
tional defenses were atrophying. Those concerns intensified in the ensuing
years and, as we show in Chapter 4, contributed to populist parties’ success at
the ballot box.
The chapter is organized into three main sections. In the first section, we
describe the origins, consolidation, and development of the Western-led lib-
eral order from the early postwar years through the end of the Cold War. We
show how the commitment to both international partnership and military
A Widening Gyre 29
power distinguished Western democracies and liberal internationalism from

other nations’ foreign policies. In Section Two, we show that the Western-
led system was transformed in the 1990s as Western governments moved
from a managed approach to liberal order-building to one that was increas-
ingly market-led. We show that the turn toward what we call globalism was
as true of the United States as it was of the European Union, and that to the
extent that there is a gap between America’s and Europe’s vision of interna-
tional order-building, it has narrowed, not widened, since the Cold War. In
the chapter’s final section, we show that, as Western governments came to
rely increasingly on international partnership, voter support for their foreign
policies declined. We show that this trend, which first appeared in the early
1990s and accelerated in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, is a
Western-wide phenomenon.
THE WESTERN LIBERAL ORDER
For roughly half a century after World War II, the West embraced a strategy of
liberal internationalism. After a decade of global depression and war, Western
democracies converged on a strategy that relied on international partner-
ship and military power to guarantee security and prosperity. The resulting
Western-led liberal order fell far short of the “one world” liberal internation-
alist vision that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and others were advancing as
World War II came to a close.3 Global institutions like the United Nations
(1945) and Bretton Woods (1944) championed by Roosevelt remained, but
the exigencies of the Cold War led Western leaders to adopt a system that
was less universal in ambition. Regional initiatives and programs such as
the Marshall Plan (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949),
and the European Economic Community (1957), backed up by a substan-
tial American military presence and nuclear security guarantees, assumed a
much larger role in promoting economic recovery and guaranteeing security
than postwar planners had originally envisioned.
Cold War liberal internationalism
The United States was the dominant power in the Western liberal order, but
it was not a solely American system. European and Japanese leaders saw
benefits in the emerging order and American leaders found it necessary,

for geopolitical as well as practical political reasons, to make concessions to
their European and Japanese counterparts on matters ranging from tariffs, to
monetary convertibility, to military burden-sharing.4 In Europe, US officials,
who initially opposed the idea of a European economic bloc, reversed course.
They came to see the Schuman Plan (1950) to regulate European produc-
tion in heavy industries and, then, the more ambitious European Economic
Community, as essential steps to creating a barrier to communist expansion
on the continent and a larger, more efficient market for European as well as
American goods.5 Americans’ early hopes of avoiding a costly long-term
military commitment to Europe were also set aside. Between 1950 and 1963,
the United States forward deployed some 343,000 troops in Europe on av-
erage each year, a number that did not drop significantly until after the Soviet
Union collapsed in 1991.6
Early postwar American plans in Asia were also revised to accommodate
the region’s rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. Initially, US officials
planned to break up and decentralize Japanese industry to limit Tokyo’s
freedom of action internationally.7 In a region where there was no obvious
strategic counterweight to Japan, breaking up the Zaibatsu, Japan’s indus-
trial and financial conglomerates, made geopolitical sense. However, as Mao
Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party gained ground in their decades-
long struggle for control of China against Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist
Kuomintang, and Japanese communists and socialists grew stronger domes-
tically, the tide of opinion in Washington turned. Support mounted for rein-
dustrializing Japan and turning it into a strategic bulwark against the spread
of communism in Asia. The “fall of China” to the communists in 1949 and
the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula the following year made Japan
indispensable to Washington. Tokyo became the lynchpin of the Western-
led system in Asia that included Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and
Taiwan, among others.
The emerging Western liberal order was thus organized around two re-
gional axes: an Atlantic axis linking North America and Western Europe,
and a Pacific axis tying Japan and other non-communist nations in Asia
to the United States. Similar economic, political, and military means were
used to develop and expand both axes of this international order, albeit in
different combinations and at different rates. US efforts to promote Asian
economic growth, for example, focused more on production for export. Its
approach in Europe focused as much on creating a continental market as it
A Widening Gyre 31
did on increasing European nations’ share of the world market.8 Meanwhile,

America’s NATO security ties with its European partners were more multi-
lateral and symmetric than the bilateral “hub and spokes” partnerships with
its Asian allies: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.9
The United States also enjoyed greater success in getting its European allies,
especially Britain, France, and West Germany, to contribute to collective de-
fense. Still, defense spending by US allies in both regions was considerable,
averaging roughly 3.2 percent of GDP in the 1960s.10
Of course, security considerations were not the only reason Western
democracies favored liberal internationalism. As John Ruggie and others
have argued, Western support for liberal internationalism also rested on a
crucial domestic bargain— the compromise of “embedded liberalism.”11
In the 1930s, Western democracies’ commitment to full employment, so-
cial insurance, and the welfare state expanded. At Bretton Woods, Western
policymakers looking to rebuild the postwar world economy agreed to pre-
serve those domestic commitments, and the peace between capital and labor
they bought. Policymakers struck a balance between international open-
ness and national autonomy. New rules and mechanisms were devised to
make currencies convertible and enable governments to manage exchange-
rate imbalances while facilitating growth-oriented means of adjustment.
Globalization was to be kept within manageable bounds. Unions and workers
agreed to Bretton Wood’s new international rules and mechanisms; business
agreed to preserve and expand the existing system of social protection.12
The West versus the rest
The West’s commitment to liberal internationalism deepened during

the early decades of the Cold War. Foreign aid, international trade, over-
seas investment, and monetary cooperation grew rapidly along the North
Atlantic axis. The institutional linkages tying the United States and Europe
together soon eclipsed levels achieved during the era of laissez-faire inter-
nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.13 Within
Europe itself, the European Economic Community was enlarged to include
Britain, Denmark, and Ireland (1973), making it roughly equal in popula-
tion to both the United States and the USSR and, in terms of international
trade, comparable in importance to the United States. America’s political
and military ties with its Asian partners never reached comparable levels of
institutionalization due to lingering resentment toward Japan after the war.

Nevertheless, trade and investment ties in the Pacific region also expanded,
especially after Washington concluded that boosting Japanese exports would
do more to consolidate the Cold War alliance than demanding that Tokyo
bear a greater share of the defense burden.14
The West’s economic performance during this period was impressive.
Annual GDP growth for OECD members averaged 4.3 percent between 1950
and 1975.15 For America, Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan the av-
erage was about the same, at 4 percent. Per capita income in the West also
grew by leaps and bounds, doubling for the OECD as a whole and tripling
for the big five countries. Much of this growth was due to the huge expansion
in trade spurred by postwar recovery and successive rounds of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).16 Between 1950 and 1975, OECD
countries’ imports and exports as a percentage of GDP rose from an average
of less than 49 to more than 58 percent. Nation after nation experienced dra-
matic export growth. America, Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan
alone grew 25 percent, on average, over the period. The overwhelming share
of their trade was with each other and other members of the OECD. Trade
ties were reinforced by the increasing interpenetration of foreign investment
within the West. Most of this was in the form of foreign direct investment by
multinational corporations, the bulk of them American.17
By the 1970s, the West had achieved a level of economic and political inte-
gration and coherence that set it apart from the rest. This is captured in Figure
2.1, which summarizes Western governments’ support for partnership and
power from 1970 through 1975.18 We use total national defense expenditure
(share of GDP) to measure a country’s relative defense burden.19 Countries
that shoulder a greater relative defense burden are further to the right in the
space; countries investing comparatively little in defense are further to the
left. For partnership, we rely on KOF Swiss Economic Institute indices meas-
uring government policies to promote and regulate economic and political
globalization.20 KOF’s economic globalization policy index monitors varia-
tions in tariff rates, trade regulations and taxes, capital account openness, and
foreign investment agreements—policy tools that Bretton Woods allowed
governments to use to stimulate, restrict, and otherwise manage cross-
border flows of goods, capital, and services.21 KOF’s political globalization
policy index measures country membership in international organizations
and the number and “diversity” of its international treaties and agreements.22
Together, these measures capture the extent to which a government supports
policies of economic integration and an international rules-based system.23
A Widening Gyre 33
200
KOF index of globalization policies
Globalism Liberal internationalism
FRG
NLD
BEL SWE
LUX CHE DNK
150
FRA
ITA NOR GBR
FIN
AUT ESP USA
CAN GRC
100 IRL AUS PRT Sample
JPN NZL median
KOR
50
Sample
median
Isolationism Nationalism
0
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5

Military spending (% GDP) (logged values)
West (mean) Other countries (mean)
Figure 2.1 Government support for international partnership and military

power by country, 1970–1975
As Figure 2.1 indicates, the West’s commitment to partnership and power

distinguished it from the rest of the world.24 While countries from all regions
of the world invested in military power during the Cold War, comparatively
few countries invested in foreign policies promoting international partner-
ship, and only Western governments invested in both. To be sure, there were
exceptions within the West. For constitutional and political reasons, Iceland,
Japan, and Luxembourg did not contribute their “fair share” to Western se-
curity during the Cold War. This is reflected in their location on the left side
of Figure 2.1. South Korea, which did not join the Western liberal trading
system until the early 1970s (and did not become a member of the OECD
until 1996), is also an “outlier” in Figure 2.1. It is positioned below the hor-
izontal line. However, America, Britain, France, West Germany, and most
other Western democracies line up squarely in the liberal internationalist
quadrant.25 Most other countries supported more nationalist foreign policies
(quadrant 4).26 In short, liberal internationalism was a Western strategy.
THE CRISIS OF THE 1970s
In the 1970s, the Western liberal order’s capitalist foundations were shaken.
Growth in the advanced Western democracies suddenly slowed, dropping
in the 1970s to half its postwar rate.27 Unemployment doubled, and then
tripled. Inflation surged. The price of oil fueling Western economies soared
from three to thirty dollars a barrel as a result of crises in the Middle East.
Currencies fluctuated wildly, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods re-
gime and the end of capital controls. Political consensus in Western democ-
racies over the proper mix of internationalism and nationalism buckled
under the weight of mounting, conflicting demands for fiscal solvency, social
redress, and global financial liberalization. Surveying the political landscape,
one highly influential analysis of the period concluded that Western democ-
racies were suffering from a “governability crisis.”28 Western governments,
it argued, were struggling to cope with the escalating demands for public
goods and services being placed on them. Something had to give.
Cracks in the order
For many, the deepening crisis in the West evoked disquieting comparisons
to the onset of the Great Depression and the sudden breakdown of that era’s
international order. The causes of the laissez-faire international order’s col-
lapse in the interwar years were different, of course. The interwar interna-
tional system had put too much faith in markets and business.29 The question
now was whether the reverse was true—whether Western democracies had
come to rely too heavily on the state as a provider of goods and services for the
public. Many political elites, business leaders, and academic scholars thought
so.30 They argued that Western governments’ commitment to full employ-
ment and social protection had “overloaded” Western governments and sty-
mied the full development of global markets. Labor unions, workers, and
their elected representatives strongly disagreed. They urged Western officials
to maintain distributive and redistributive policies and strengthen national
control and regulation of their economies. At the time, the implications of
all this for Western democracies’ foreign policies were not immediately clear.
One reason is that the crisis of the Western economic order coincided and
intersected with unanticipated developments in the geopolitical realm.
In the late 1960s, cracks opened up on both sides of the Cold War di-
vide. In the East, a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing led to military
encounters in 1969 along the border separating the two communist powers.
Compounding matters, Eastern Europe had grown increasingly restive
under Soviet control. In 1968, the Soviet economic and political model was
challenged in Czechoslovakia. Moscow crushed the Czechs’ experiment in
A Widening Gyre 35
liberalization (the “Prague Spring”), but the movement was a harbinger of

things to come elsewhere in the East. Meanwhile, on the Western side of the
divide, America’s war in Vietnam put enormous strain on transatlantic re-
lations. Young Europeans, like many young Americans, took to the streets
to protest the war. America’s European partners were also less willing to
follow its lead on security matters. Mistrust between Washington and Paris
led the French to pull out of NATO’s integrated military command in the
mid-1960s. A few years later, West Germany’s Willy Brandt, who had long
favored German reunification, moved to improve relations with the Soviet
Union and other Eastern bloc countries. Under Brandt’s Ostpolitik policy,
West Germany signed a nonaggression pact with Moscow in 1970. Later that
year, Brandt also agreed to Polish territorial demands dating from 1945 that
came at Germany’s expense. Two years later, West Germany offered diplo-
matic recognition to its East German neighbor.
In principle, East-West détente meant that Western governments could
invest less in guns and more in butter. The rationale for doing so was clear.
Sluggish growth had resulted in a widening gap between welfare states’ de-
clining tax revenues and soaring social expenditures.31 At the same time, a
world less polarized along East-West lines could unlock new markets and in-
vestment opportunities in China, Eastern Europe, and in much of the Global
South for Western businesses suffering from falling profits. This is the di-
rection most Western governments moved. Between 1976 and 1991, defense
spending as a share of GDP dropped 12 percent on average within the West;
this happened despite the sharp but short-lived revival of US-Soviet tensions
in the early 1980s.32 The United States continued to outpace its Western
allies, spending between 4.6 (in 1991) and 6.6 (in 1982) percent of GDP on
defense in the period 1976 to 1991 (compared to the average for the rest of
the West that ranged from 2.7 to 3.2 percent of GDP during this period). But
America’s defense burden was also now well below its average of 8.4 percent
during the 1950s and 1960s.
Less investment in military power did not mean less reliance on in-
ternational markets or international institutions. As the West’s defense
burden lessened, its commitment to economic integration and institution-
alized cooperation intensified. America and Britain were the West’s first-
movers.33 Under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the United States
and the United Kingdom took steps to reduce government intervention in
the economy, liberalize financial markets, and weaken organized labor.
Internationally, the Reagan administration was also the driving force behind
the 1986 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that would

lead to lower global tariffs and, in 1995, the creation of the World Trade
Organization. Unlike the GATT, the WTO was designed to move from
managed trade to freer trade and give international authorities more au-
tonomy to settle trade disputes.34 The idea was to make international trade
less vulnerable to domestic political pressures by setting economic rule-
making above the authority of the sovereign member states.35 Meanwhile,
Western governments tightened IMF and World Bank “structural adjust-
ment” demands for assisting developing countries while negotiating new
agreements to better protect the rights of Western investors.36 These were the
first glimmers of a post–Bretton Woods international order that would come
to prioritize the rights of property over the rights of states.37
As part of this global liberalizing movement, Western governments also
deepened their commitment to regional integration. Traditionally, regional
markets were considered anathema to trade liberalization. It was not only
geopolitical imperatives and the need for larger markets that led the West
to turn to them in Europe in the 1950s. By the 1980s, Western thinking had
undergone a sea change. As political economist Jeffrey Frieden puts it, re-
gionalism was now considered the “antechamber of broader liberalization.”38
In an era where market liberalization was rapidly becoming the leitmotif for
policymakers at both the national and global levels, Western government
saw regional integration as a stepping stone to strengthening existing re-
gional markets and creating new ones. In Europe, the European Community
was expanded to include Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986;
Austria, Finland, and Sweden followed in the 1990s. The “Single European
Act” in 1986 created a single market in goods and services and transformed
the European Commission into a powerful agent for market liberalization.
In North America, the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative gave countries in
and around the Caribbean greater access to the American market. It was
followed in 1988 by the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement that
reduced trade restrictions between the two countries. In Asia, an Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was created to promote freer trade in
the region.
In the 1980s, Western democracies began to recalibrate. The state-based
approach that had guided Western international engagement since the
postwar era lost ground to a decidedly more market-based approach.39 As
Figure 2.2 indicates, between 1976 and 1991, Western governments relied
more heavily on international partnership than they did during the earlier
A Widening Gyre 37
200
Globalism

Liberal Internationalism
FRG
NLD FRA
CHE SWE GBR
LUX BEL
FIN ITA DNK NOR
150
AUT ESP USA
CAN PRT
IRL AUS GRC
JPN NZL
100 Sample
median
KOR
50
Sample
median
0
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5


period. Most Western democracies moved northward on the vertical (part-

nership) axis. Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom all invested more heavily in part-
nership. Newly democratic Greece, Portugal, and Spain also moved toward
greater partnership. Less dramatic was the shift leftward along the horizontal
(power) axis. Overall, Western defense budgets as a share of GDP declined
during this period. However, compared to the global median, most Western
governments remained firmly in the liberal internationalist quadrant. Even
though Western democracies’ relative reliance on international partnership
increased, their comparative investment in military power held steady.
AGE OF GLOBALISM
In the 1990s, the West’s approach to liberal order-building changed. Western

governments shifted from a strategy of liberal internationalism that com-
bined power with partnership to a strategy of globalism that prioritized part-
nership over power. International relations scholars have characterized this
shift in different ways: “global neoliberalism,” “liberal internationalism 3.0,”
and “postnational liberalism” to distinguish it from Wilsonian liberal inter-
nationalism after World War I and the liberal internationalism of the Cold
War era.40 What these labels have in common is a recognition that, in the
1990s, the West’s approach to liberal international order-building began to

rely more heavily on international markets and global institutions. The man-
aged approach to globalization that held sway during the Cold War, favoring
domestic policy objectives (e.g., full employment, social insurance) over eco-
nomic integration and international institutions, was transformed into a new
type of globalization that prioritized international trade, global finance, and
supranational institutions as means to expand the liberal order and put it be-
yond the reach of domestic politics. The age of globalism had begun.
The turn to globalism
The surge in globalism that started in the 1990s is often equated with the
rapid global expansion of economic activity of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. There are similarities, to be sure. However, the globalism
of the 1990s and 2000s owed far more to Western governments’ efforts to
actively promote the cross-border flow of goods, capital, and services and to
shield that activity from vicissitudes of domestic politics by encasing them
in supranational institutions.41 During the 1990s, Washington, Paris, Berlin,
and other Western capitals launched new institutional projects to deepen
their economic ties as well as their reliance on international institutions.
In Europe, the Maastricht treaty of 1993 formally established the European
Union, including a new European Central Bank and a new common cur-
rency, the euro.42 In North America, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement
was expanded to include Mexico, resulting in the 1994 North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In Asia, APEC expanded its goals, calling
for free and open trade in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for the region’s more ad-
vanced economies and 2020 for its developing economies.
As the Western-led liberal order became more integrated internally, it also
expanded outwardly into new markets. In the 1990s, countries that were on
the periphery of the liberal order, by Western fiat or by choice, were sud-
denly in play as destinations for Western investment. Already, many coun-
tries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa had started reducing government
involvement in their domestic markets and opening up their economies to
cross-border flows of capital as well as expanded trade.43 In the 1990s, the
former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet republics of Central and Eastern
Europe followed suit. This gave them access to Western markets and capital.
However, in most cases access came at a price: a commitment to the very
A Widening Gyre 39
market-oriented adjustments that Western democracies themselves had

undertaken a decade earlier.
During the 1990s, the market-based movement of the 1980s gathered
strength in the West, and in much of the rest. As Beth Simmons and her
coauthors observe, the turn to privatization that Thatcher and Reagan had set
in motion in the 1980s had become “a major element of economic policy in
both the developed and developing world over the course of twenty years.”44
The so-called Washington Consensus that prescribed fiscal discipline, tax re-
form, privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization became the new
orthodoxy at the IMF, World Bank, and other financial institutions lending
to those countries integrated as subordinate players into, or now joining,
the Western liberal order. Yet the turn toward globalism was not only about
markets and growth. In the 1990s, a bevy of new issues—from human rights
to climate change—were thrust onto the international agenda by progressive
voices in the developed and developing worlds. The result was a rapid expan-
sion in the scope of institutionalized cooperation. Between the mid-1980s
and late 2000s, the number of international government organizations more
than doubled globally, from 3,546 in 1985 to 7,459 in 2008.45
In Central and Eastern Europe, publics that raced to join the West would
later express resentment about the hardships, corruption, and inequities
that so often accompanied market-induced liberalization.46 However, in the
1990s, gaining access to Western foreign investment, the EU’s market, and
NATO’s security umbrella were among many governments’ highest priori-
ties.47 Political elites leading the transition from the Soviet centrally planned
economies to the West’s liberal economic system viewed access to Western
capital and markets as essential to their countries’ success, and to their own
political fortunes. Western political and economic elites were no less enthu-
siastic about the advantages of gaining access to the low-cost, high-skilled
labor that the former Warsaw Pact nations and Soviet republics had to offer
their more developed economies. Over the course of the 1990s, Western
capital flowed into Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary attracted over $20
billion in foreign direct investment; Poland, some $30 billion; the Czech
Republic, $15 billion.48
Even more striking was China’s rapid transition from the periphery of the
world economy to its core. During the second half of the Cold War, Beijing
and Washington’s “tacit alliance” against Moscow had opened the door to
China’s economic liberalization and closer economic ties with the West.49
Over the next two decades, Chinese exports grew from $20 billion to over
$170 billion, while United States, Japanese, and other foreign investors
poured billions into China each year.50 However, it was not until the late
1990s that Washington led a concerted effort to institutionalize China’s inte-
gration into the world economy by normalizing trade relations with Beijing,
paving the way for China’s entry into the WTO. The idea was to encourage
China to become a “strategic partner,” as the Clinton administration put it.51
The United States, and the West more generally, would benefit from China’s
integration into the rapidly globalizing world economy. China would benefit
too, the thinking went. As its people began to reap the rewards of trade and
economic growth, onlookers believed that there would be domestic pressure
for social liberalization and bottom-up political change.52
In the 1990s, Western leaders also began reshaping and updating the
Western liberal order’s security architecture in Europe and Asia.53 In Europe,
this involved the unification of Germany and the integration of the former
Warsaw Pact states and Soviet Baltic republics into NATO, along with their
incorporation into the European Union. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic joined the sixteen-member military and political alliance in 1999.
Three years later, at NATO’s Prague Summit, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to join the security
pact. In Asia, Washington and Tokyo reaffirmed their alliance commitments.
Worries about Beijing’s ambitions in East Asia following the 1996 Taiwan
Strait missile crisis and North Korea’s ballistic missile tests over Japan led
Washington to commit to keeping 100,000 troops in East Asia. Tokyo sig-
naled greater resolve, too, by broadening the role of its Self Defense Forces
(SDF) from its traditional mission of territorial defense to regional and
global multilateral operations and peacekeeping.54
As Western democracies’ conception of security broadened, so did the
range of missions they were prepared to support.55 Democratic enlargement,
democracy promotion, humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to
Protect increasingly vied with more traditional conceptions of national in-
terest and international security such as balance of power, collective security,
and extended deterrence. Western governments worked to strengthen inter-
national laws to hold governments and their leaders more accountable for
how they treated their populations, and began funding nongovernmental or-
ganizations with the hope of building civil society within states transitioning
to democracy.56 In the wake of the international community’s failure to re-
spond to the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, Western
governments also displayed a greater willingness to use coercion and force
A Widening Gyre 41
to achieve these goals. This was perhaps clearest in the case of the Balkans in
1999, when NATO pressured Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to ac-
cept Kosovo’s de facto independence.
On security as well as economic issues, the West relied increasingly on insti-
tutionalized cooperation. The West also continued to invest in military power.
However, in the absence of a Cold War–style geopolitical rival, large outlays
for defense were harder for governments to justify and sell to publics after a
half-century of vigilance and, for many families, sacrifice.57 Talk of a “peace
dividend” was rife. In the 1990s, military expenditures as percentage of GDP
fell in every NATO nation, including the United States.58 In the wake of the
September 11 attacks and with the onset of the war in Afghanistan, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France increased the share of GDP they
invested in defense, but they were the exceptions. As Figure 2.3 makes clear, be-
tween 1992 and 2017, the center of gravity in the West shifted from liberal in-
ternationalism toward globalism. Every Western democracy moved left along
the horizontal axis (power) and, notably, upward on the vertical axis (partner-
ship).59 The West was not alone. Now the vast majority of non-Western coun-
tries also clustered above the horizontal axis, signifying increased support for
trade liberalization, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral govern-
ance. In the age of globalism, the West and the rest were converging.
Of Mars and Venus
The ensuing years were not trouble-free years for the West, of course. The
US-led war in Iraq in 2003 triggered the most significant rift in transatlantic
relations since the Vietnam War. The debate over the war exposed European
reservations about American power and the George W. Bush administration’s
willingness to flout liberal norms of sovereignty, multilateralism, and inter-
national law to overturn Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime. Many Americans
were put off by Europe’s hand-wringing and second-guessing. It fueled
suspicions that European capitals were no longer reliable allies or willing to
make the tough choices thought to be necessary to keep citizens safe in the
post-9/11 world. Speculation about the “end of the West” was widespread.60
However, as Figure 2.3 makes clear, the war did not drive the West apart.
The political storms over the Atlantic soon calmed. Western governments,
most under new leadership, moved on. Despite their differences over Iraq,
the United States and Europe remained committed to globalism.
200
Globalism AUT DEU GBR

DNKBEL NLD
LUX SWE FRA
CHE FINITA PRT USA
ESP NOR GRC
IRL CANNZL AUS
150
JPN KOR
BIH
Sample
100
median
50
Sample
median
0
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5


In the 2000s, the event that arguably posed the greatest test of Western sol-
idarity and the liberal order’s durability was the 2008 global financial crisis.
The scale and timing of the crisis, and the recession that followed, varied
from country to country, but the crisis sent shockwaves across the OECD
and beyond. Indeed, none of the 104 countries tracked by the WTO were
spared its effects.61 As the crisis cascaded across the globe, international
trade plummeted. Unemployment spiked. International banks and financial
institutions’ asset values dropped sharply. In desperation, banks turned to
their home countries’ governments to be bailed out. By April 2009, the IMF
concluded that the recession was the deepest economic downturn on record
since the Great Depression.62 After years of being told that markets free of
domestic regulations are more efficient, national taxpayers, particularly in
the United States, were now being asked to intervene to stabilize their econ-
omies, rescue the banks, and put an end to a crisis that sprang from their
governments’ increased reliance on market liberalization.
Much has been written about the effect of the 2008 economic crisis on
Western support for international openness and global governance. On the
surface, this key dimension of the liberal order appeared to be under threat
during the first year of the crisis. Western and other governments initially
responded by imposing “micro-protectionist” measures (e.g., local content
requirements, export taxes and quotas, public procurement discrimination
A Widening Gyre 43
against foreign firms), often skirting the letter of WTO rules.63 Even so, the
beggar-thy-neighbor downward spiral in international trade many feared
did not materialize. After the immediate shock, the surge in protectionism
receded and cross-border capital flows rebounded, even if they remained
below the 2007 highs for some time.64 The initial drop in industrial output
was steep, of course. Yet here, too, the rebound exceeded what many analysts
had predicted in the early stages of the financial crisis.65 Within four years of
the recession’s onset, global industrial output was 10 percent higher than be-
fore its start, partly because capital flows did not dry up.66
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, global trade, investment, and output
resumed sooner and more forcefully than they had in the wake of the Great
Depression of 1929. As a number of scholars have pointed out, one impor-
tant reason for this is that the existing international institutional architecture
proved to be more robust than one might have expected, given the severity of
the crisis.67 Existing global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank were
arguably strengthened, not weakened. As the crisis deepened, the Group of
20 (G20) was transformed into a major forum for policy deliberation and
coordination between the advanced industrialized countries of the West and
the developing economies of the Global South.68 In the area of international
trade, the WTO was able to prevent or at least limit many forms of trade
policy backsliding.69 In short, the supranational architecture that Western
democracies had invested in so heavily over the preceding decades helped
them weather 2008’s strong economic headwinds.
If globalism promoted the diffusion of the financial crisis, it also gave
Western governments strong incentives to stick with the system rather than
decouple from it.70 It also arguably brought Western governments closer to-
gether. Evidence for this can be seen in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Figure 2.4 tracks
government support in the EU-15, Japan, and the United States for partner-
ship and power from 1970 through 2018.71 We see that, over the entire time
period, there is very little distance between the EU-15 and the United States
over international partnership (vertical dimension) and that, as EU support
for international openness and cooperation increases, so does US support.
By contrast, the distance between the EU-15 and the United States on the
horizontal dimension (military power) narrows over time. Overall, though,
the EU and the United States follow the same general pattern. In the 1990s,
Western governments move away from liberal internationalism toward
globalism, and this process continues through the 2000s and into the 2010s.
While the United States never fully embraces globalism, it does follow a path
Globalism 2000 2001 2016 Liberal internationalism

2000 2004 2006
180
2018

2012 2018 2014 2010
2002 2012
1994 2008
2018 2016 1992 19981996 1994
2012 2014 1988 1986
1984 1992
160
2010 2008 1982
2004 2006 1980 1990 United States
1978
2002 200019901974 1976
140 1986
Japan 1998 1972
1996 1970 1988
1994 1992 1978 1976 1984
1986 1984 EU-15 1980
1990 1982 1982
1974
120
1980 1988 1972 1970

1978 1990
Sample
median
2016 2002 1998
1976
100
1974 2014 2004 1996 Sample

1972 2010 2006 median
1970 2008
80
0 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09

Military spending (% GDP)

power by EU, Japan, and United States, 1970–2018
that is strikingly similar to the EU’s. Indeed, if there is an outlier in Figure 2.4,
it is Japan.
Japan’s path toward globalism is clearly different from America’s and
Europe’s. Not surprisingly, Japanese investment in power is low by Western
standards. Japanese defense spending averaged 0.94 percent of GDP during
the 1990s through 2000s. This is not significantly different from Japan’s de-
fense burden during the 1970s and 1980s, when it averaged 0.90 percent of
GDP.72 Yet like the EU-15 and the United States, Japan’s investment in in-
ternational partnership increased over time, and substantially so during the
1990s and especially, 2000s. This was a very active period of Japanese di-
plomacy. In the 2000s, Japan signed free trade agreements with Singapore
(2002) and Mexico (2004). Similar trade negotiations were launched with the
Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, among other countries in the region.73
Tokyo also expanded its level of participation in multilateral peacekeeping
and non-lethal international security missions.74 In short, as Japan invested
more heavily in international partnership, its foreign policy priorities more
closely aligned with America’s and Europe’s.
The convergence of the United States, EU, and Japan in Figure 2.4 raises
questions about the West, more generally. Did Western governments’ for-
eign policy preferences also become more similar over time? The short an-
swer is, yes. Figure 2.5 tracks Western government support for partnership
and power from 1970 through 2018.75 The dark-shaded areas in the figure
A Widening Gyre 45
Partnership

5.2
5
4.8
4.6
4.4
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Power
6
4
2
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 2.5 Cross-national variation in government support for international

partnership and military power in Western democracies, 1970–2018
represent the bottom twenty-fifth and top seventy-fifth percentile of the in-
terquartile distribution. The median value for the twenty-four OECD coun-
tries in our sample is denoted by white horizontal lines in the shaded areas.
The “whiskers” in the plots represent the maximum and minimum value
among Western countries in any given year. We see Figure 2.5a that policy
differences among Western governments over trade liberalization and in-
stitutionalized cooperation have narrowed considerably over time. We see
a similar trend in the case of defense spending and military preparedness in
the bottom panel. Here, the relative defense burden shouldered by Western
governments narrows considerably between 1970 and 2000. It expands
slightly after 2001 due to the spike in US defense spending for the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, before narrowing again. In short, the post–Cold
War decades were a time of increasing policy convergence, not divergence,
among Western governments. The same could not be said about Western
governments and their publics, however.
GLOBALISM’S DISCONTENTS
In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, it is not hard to see why
some Western political analysts concluded that “the system worked.” The
worst was avoided: the West and the rest did not plunge headfirst into an-
other Great Depression. The Great Recession did not lead to rapid “de-
globalization.” Yet if Western democracies were able to avoid the worst,
the notion that the system worked overlooks, or downplays, just how un-
popular globalism had become within Western democracies by 2008. Signs
that there was trouble ahead on the domestic front were evident as early as
the late 1990s. In the wake of the 1999 Seattle protests, Peter Sutherland,
the former head of the WTO, observed that the protests reflected “a fun-
damental deficit in effective political support for the WTO.”76 The deci-
sive battles were not on the streets, but at the ballot box. It was there that
Western voters began registering in ever-increasing numbers their opposi-
tion to their governments’ deepening commitment to market liberalization
and global governance.77
End of consensus
That few Western leaders saw it coming is not surprising. For decades
after World War II, Western voters had backed liberal internationalist pol-
icies, giving policymakers substantial “decision latitude” on foreign policy
matters.78 In most Western democracies, public support for international
partnership kept pace with government efforts to expand international
markets and promote multilateral cooperation. Scholars wrote of a “permis-
sive mood” or “permissive consensus,” where citizens deferred to political
elites on matters of economic integration and international governance.79
Public support for investing in military power was more variable and vol-
uble, due largely to worries about nuclear war (see below). Yet, for the most
A Widening Gyre 47
part, public backing of military spending and preparedness tracked actual

government investment in national defense. As Western defense budgets
waxed and waned, so, generally, did public support. Even during the widely
perceived crisis in Western security in the late 1970s and early 1980s, public
support for defense spending was, as one careful study of the period puts it,
“largely in tune with the views of governmental elites.”80
As Figure 2.6 suggests, public attitudes toward the liberal order, and the
government elites who championed it, began to change in the 1990s. The
figure tracks “voter support” in the EU-15, Japan, and the United States for
international partnership and military power from 1950 through 2017. Our
voter support estimates are based on Manifesto Project data.81 We use the
Manifesto data to score the extent to which parties run on platforms favoring
economic integration and multilateral governance and military spending
and preparedness.82 We then weight those scores by the parties’ electoral
vote share to estimate the popularity of these foreign policies among a
country’s voters by year. The party-system averages of such weighted scores
provide an estimate of voters’ foreign policy positions based on their actual
voting behavior—that is, which party platforms they vote for at the polls.83
These measures do not tell us directly what voters think, but they provide
insight into voters’ foreign policy preferences, the extent to which they are
stable or change over time, and importantly, how closely they parallel their
governments’ foreign policies.

Index of voter support for partnership
1996 US '76-'91
1996
2
1992 1994 US '50-'75

2002 2002 1992 2004 2006 2008
1998 1998
Japan 2000 2006 2004 2002 2010
1.5
2012
'50-'75 1994 2012 2000
EU15 Sample
2008 '76-'91 2014 median
1992
Japan EU-15 2014
1
'76-'91 '50-'75 2016

2014
2010 2016 United States
EU-15
.5
2004
2012 1994 2000
Japan 1996 2006
1996 1998
2008 2010
0
Sample
median
–.5
–1.2 –.7 –.2 0 .3 .8 1.3 1.8 2.3

Index of voter support for power
Figure 2.6 Voter support for international partnership and military power by
EU, Japan, and United States, 1950–2017
For expositional purposes, we organize the results in Figure 2.6 by time

period: with period averages from 1950–1975 and 1976–1991 and annual
trends from 1991–2017.84 The lines demarcating the full-sample medians
on each axis provide visual benchmarks for comparing countries and iden-
tifying trends. We can see that, relative to the sample median for our twenty-
four OECD countries, voter support in the EU-15, Japan, and United States
has shifted considerably over time. During the Cold War, voter support for
liberal internationalism was clearly stronger in the United States than in the
EU-15 or Japan. American voters were more supportive of partnership and
power. However, since the Cold War there has been a clear shift in voter sen-
timent toward nationalism. American, European, and Japanese support for
international partnership has decreased, while support for military power has
increased. This pattern is particularly clear for the EU-15 and United States,
but since 2009, Japanese voters have also moved in the same general direction.
Viewed together, Figures 2.4 and 2.6 point to a growing disconnect between
governments and voters over foreign policy since the Cold War: with the US,
European, and Japanese governments favoring globalism, and American, EU,
and Japanese voters, displaying increasing support for nationalism.
To sharpen our understanding of this gap, Figure 2.7 plots Western gov-
ernment and voter support for partnership and power on each dimension,
separately. We use again the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s indices meas-
uring government policy support for economic and political globalization
and SIPRI estimates of military spending as a percent of GDP. Our measure
of voter support is based on the same Manifesto data used earlier, though
now focusing on the average over-time trends of Western voter support from
1970 through 2017. We display the trends in government policy and voter
support on separate scales to better visualize how changes in one compare
to changes in the other. The top panel measuring support for partnership es-
sentially capture movement along the vertical axis in the two-dimensional
plots above—the extent to which governments and voters favor foreign
policy strategies relying on economic integration and multilateral govern-
ance. The bottom panel measuring support for power depict movement
along the horizontal axis in the two-dimensional plots: the greater govern-
ment and voter support for defense spending and preparedness in Figure 2.7,
the more support for grand strategies that rely on military power in the two-
dimensional plots.
We see in Figure 2.7 governments and voters are largely in sync during
the Cold War. Western governments invested heavily in foreign policies of
A Widening Gyre 49
Western support for partnership
180
30
Manifesto index of voter support
Government
support
160
20 25
140
15
Voter
support
120
10
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Western support for power
20
3

Voter
support
2.5
15
2
10
Government
support
1.5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 2.7 Government and voter support for international partnership and
military power in Western democracies, 1970–2017
ever-increasing international partnership. Western voters consistently cast

their ballots for parties promising to deliver those foreign policies in office.
Indeed, Western leaders enjoyed a healthy cushion of support among voters
on matters involving economic integration and multilateral governance. This
pattern lasted until the 1990s, when public support changed dramatically.
While Western government support for economic integration and multi-
lateral cooperation continued to expand, Western voter support dropped
sharply in the 1990s and then again in the 2000s. Even as the pace of gov-
ernment support for trade liberalization and institutionalized cooperation
slowed in the 2000s, the gap between Western governments’ international
ambitions and what voters were willing to support continued to widen.

Between 1990 and 2017, Western voters’ support for political parties running
on platforms advocating greater international partnership fell by nearly half.
Much of the decline came after 2008, but the widening gap between Western
governments and their voting publics was evident well before the financial
crisis.85
The story is quite different when it comes to the West’s commitment to
military power, at least since the early 1990s. During the Cold War, Western
political leaders who invested in military power did so knowing that public
support was less predictable. While Westerners were generally anxious about
Soviet power and favored military preparedness, they also worried about the
risk of nuclear war.86 As a result, Western government investment in military
power often ran ahead of voters’ support for parties running on platforms
calling for increased defense spending and military preparedness. However,
with the collapse of the Soviet Union the trend lines reversed. Western in-
vestment in military power as a share of GDP fell steadily. By contrast, after
hitting rock bottom in the 1990s, the voting public’s appetite for military
spending returned to Cold War levels. Public support for military spending
and preparedness intensified following the September 11 attacks, and even
more sharply in the 2010s.
These aggregate measures of government and voter support for part-
nership and power smooth over considerable cross-national variation, of
course. The timing and severity of the gaps between Western governments
and voters over foreign policy also vary across the West. Yet, as we can see in
Figure 2.8, the overall pattern holds for the EU-15, the United States, and, to
a lesser extent, Japan. This is especially true of government and voter support
for international partnership. In each case, government and voter support
for economic integration and multilateral cooperation diverge sharply after
the Cold War. This occurs earlier in the EU-15 and the United States, but
by the early 2000s, the same pattern is evident in Japan. While European,
American, and Japanese government support for international partnership
levels off in the post–Cold War era, voter support for government and parties
defending these policies steadily declines.
The picture is less clear-cut when it comes to European, American, and
Japanese support for investing in military power. In each case, voter support
for military spending and preparedness declines after the Cold War before
rebounding in the EU and US cases. In US case, the resurgence of support
owed partly to lingering concerns about international security, especially
EU−15 support for partnership
200
30

Government
support
180
25
160
20
Voter
140
15
support
120
10
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
EU−15 support for power

3
Voter

support
10
2.5
2
5
1.5
Government
support
0
1
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
US support for partnership

120
180
Government
support
100
160
80
140
60
Voter
support
120
40
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 2.8 Government and voter support for international partnership and
military power in the EU, Japan, and United States, 1970–2017
US support for power
150
8

Voter
7
support
100
6
5
50
4
Government
support
3
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Japanese support for partnership
40
160
Government

support
30
140
20
120
Voter
support
100
10
80
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Japanese support for power

1
Government
10
support
.95
0
.9
Voter
support
.85
−10
.8
−20
.75
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 2.8 Continued

A Widening Gyre 53
after the September 11 attacks.87 Continuing voter support for pooling na-
tional sovereignty over defense as a means to keep guns-versus-butter trade-
offs in check was a factor for many in the EU.88 In Japan, mounting concerns
about China’s military buildup and North Korean hostility led to growing
support for amending constitutional prohibitions against militarization and
expanding the SDF’s role to include national security (as well as disaster re-
lief, humanitarian aid, and domestic security).89 Yet as we show in Chapter 4,
the resurgence of voter support for military power also reflects the growing
number and strength of anti-globalist, nationalist parties since the Cold
War. As these parties gained political strength, the gap between Western
governments and voters that took shape in the 1990s widened.
A BRIDGE TOO FAR
In the 1990s, few Western leaders spoke more eloquently about globalism’s
promise than President Bill Clinton. Speaking before the UN General
Assembly in September 1997, Clinton declared: “At the dawn of a new millen-
nium, we can envision a new era that escapes the twentieth century’s darkest
moments” and “fulfills its most brilliant possibilities.” “The forces of global
integration are a great tide inexorably wearing away the established order of
things.”90 Clinton’s optimism about globalism as a bridge to a twenty-first
century free of geopolitics and the narrow nationalisms of the past was easily
shared by many world leaders sitting in the audience that day, especially
those representing the advanced industrialized economies of the West. In the
absence of a shared security agenda after the fall of the Soviet Union, Western
elites found common purpose in a global agenda calling for the freer move-
ment of capital, goods, and services across national boundaries and greater
reliance on multilateral institutions and governance.
The West’s turn to globalism would prove a bridge too far. Clinton was
right about one thing, though: at the level of government policy, globalism
did function as a unifying force in the West. On the one hand, cooperation
between Western democracies on trade, security, and other matters con-
tinued, and as we have seen, rapidly expanded into new policy domains such
as the environment and human rights. On the other hand, Western public
support did not keep step with their leaders’ efforts to liberalize their econ-
omies, delegate more discretionary authority to supranational institutions,
and incorporate nations on the periphery of the world economy into their
countries’ manufacturing supply chains. As we will see, the fact that Western
leaders’ efforts to promote globalization usually went hand-in-hand with
commitments to reform and scale back the welfare state only compounded
matters by making it easier for anti-globalists on the left and right to appeal
to voters who worried they were being sold a bridge to nowhere.
It would take time before the gap between Western governments and
their publics would reach critical proportions, but as we have seen, anti-
globalist nationalist sentiment was spreading in the democracies even before
the decade of the 1990s was out. The moral of the story is not that domestic
politics matter now. As we show in Chapters 3 and 4, domestic politics have
shaped the political possibilities for liberal international order-building in
Western democracies since the very beginning of the postwar era. Forged
in an era of superpower rivalry, the postwar liberal order benefited from the
backing of Western leaders who saw electoral advantage in a foreign policy
strategy that combined partnership and power and that struck a delicate
balance between international openness and social protection. That voters
backed their governments’ foreign policies as long as they did was due in
no small part to the depth of Western political leaders’ commitment to bal-
ancing these conflicting demands and pressures in their national political
economies. In the 1990s, this too would change.
3
Roots of Insolvency
Susan Strange, Britain’s most influential scholar of world politics in the

late twentieth century, was one of globalization’s fiercest critics. In a 1997
essay entitled “The Erosion of the State,” Strange took exception to a cadre
of economists at the time who argued that globalization was “globaloney,”
a myth or an illusion, and thus of little real consequence to Western
democracies. Contemporary globalization, Strange argued, was not their
grandfathers’ globalization. It was not just the scope and form that differed
from earlier versions of globalization, she argued. It was that the globaliza-
tion of the 1990s was undermining the state as a social safety net and pro-
ducing “a democratic deficit, not only in Europe, but in America, Japan—the
entire globalized economy.”1 Too much authority for managing the world
economy was being pooled at the supranational level and delegated to inter-
national bureaucrats. Too little thought was being given to how democracies’
headlong pursuit of trade liberalization, cross-border investment, and mul-
tilateral governance was weakening their capacity “to protect the vulnerable
in society.” Western leaders, Strange concluded, had to restore “a measure of
social justice denied by the market” for those left behind.
Strange’s worries about the risks that unbridled globalization posed to
democratic solvency were prescient. As we showed in Chapter 2, the insol-
vency gap between Western governments’ international ambitions and what
their publics were willing to support steadily worsened over the next quarter-
century. Western leaders’ growing reliance on economic integration and
multilateral governance fueled anti-globalist sentiment and, as we have seen,
weakened the liberal order’s domestic supports in Western electorates. In this
chapter we explain why this happened. We argue that Western governments’
turn toward globalism provoked a domestic political backlash because it was
stripped of many of the social guarantees and protections that liberal inter-
nationalism originally entailed and, importantly, that Cold War geopolitical
imperatives reinforced. We show that the stronger Western governments’
commitment to social protection, and the more threatening the interna-
tional environment, the more support liberal internationalism receives from
parties and voters. This is why political support in Western democracies for
the liberal international order ran so strong during the Cold War, and why it
has weakened considerably since.
In developing our explanation for the decline of Western support for the
liberal order, we focus considerable attention on the collapse of the Soviet
Union and its implications for the liberal order. Little has been written about
how this international development impacted the internal politics of the two
dozen Western democracies who were locked in Cold War with it for nearly
half a century. This is not surprising, given the triumphalism that has per-
meated the topic in Western commentary. However, as we show, the Cold
War strengthened national cohesion in Western democracies. It also contrib-
uted to the expansion of the welfare state. This matters because the social
protections that postwar Western leaders and mainstream parties guaran-
teed workers were essential to winning their votes. Social protection drew
voters into the liberal internationalist fold. Cold War imperatives helped
keep them there.
The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section focuses on
the relationship between economic openness and social protection. We show
that domestic support for liberal internationalism in Western democracies
depends in part on the level of social protection they guarantee their citizens.
The erosion of social protections in Western democracies since the 1990s
helps explain the widening gap between Western governments and voters
over foreign policy that we described in Chapter 2.2 In the second section,
we show that geopolitical imperatives reinforced Western governments and
mainstream parties’ commitment to liberal internationalism during the
Cold War. The corollary to this argument is that, in the absence of Cold War
pressures, Western domestic support for liberal internationalism weakened.
In the third section, we consider why Western governments and leaders did
not do more to close the resulting gap with their publics over foreign policy.
Was it simply a case of hubris and triumphalism, as some have charged, or
does it owe more to changes in the political economies of the advanced in-
dustrial nations?3 We consider several explanations.
POLANYI’S REVENGE
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi famously chronicled how glob-

alization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provoked
Roots of Insolvency 57
large-scale social backlashes.4 Drawing on the economic history of England,

Polanyi’s study suggested that societies exposed to extensive market liberal-
ization invariably sought to protect themselves by turning to a wide variety
of mechanisms ranging from trade protectionism, to capital controls and
price-setting mechanisms, to minimum wage laws, workers’ compensation,
and other forms of “social protection.” Polanyi judged these measures of a
piece: all part of a society’s natural and “spontaneous” effort to shield itself
from market forces. If nations experiencing the harshest economic pain were
not careful, those efforts to save themselves could metastasize and transform
them into illiberal anti-democratic polities, as happened during the interwar
years in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Writing for a broad audience,
Polanyi’s message was clear. If countries hoped to avoid a recurrence of such
calamities, their leaders needed to strike a new bargain between interna-
tional openness and social protection.
The postwar bargain
In the postwar era, Western leaders sought to strike precisely this balance
between market and state.5 Constructing a liberal international trade and fi-
nancial order would have to allow governments a substantial degree of social
protection in the domestic realm. International openness would have to be
harmonized with national autonomy. To be sure, a robust social safety net
would not guarantee international order and stability in an anarchical world
of states. However, it could cushion the market’s most disruptive effects while
allowing industrialists, farmers, and workers to reap the rewards of potential
export markets and cheaper imports. By taking the hard edge off capitalism,
the postwar welfare state could also help strengthen support for liberal in-
ternationalism more broadly, among Western publics, and make competing
foreign policy strategies of nationalism and isolationism less attractive.
To Western leaders, liberal internationalism and the welfare state were
thus mutually supportive.6 For most voters, the ensuing postwar eco-
nomic boom was proof enough that the basic formula worked. Across the
West, expanded trade drove economic growth, making it easier for Western
governments to expand social protections and boost real wages and giving
Western voters reason to support closer economic ties within the West. This,
in turn, gave Western leaders more latitude to press forward with liberal in-
ternationalist policies.7 Leftist arguments about the evils of capitalism and
2
Support for liberal internationalism
United States
Greece
United Kingdom
1
France
Portugal
Netherlands Finland
Sweden Germany
Australia SpainDenmark Italy
Canada Norway Belgium
0
Switzerland Austria
New Zealand
Japan Luxembourg
−1
Ireland
6 10 15 20
Social security transfers (% GDP)
Figure 3.1 Government support for social protection and liberal

internationalism by Western democracy, 1970–2017
the American-led postwar order rang hollow at a time when the vast ma-
jority of Western workers were benefiting from high rates of growth and
much higher unionization rates than today. Right-wing arguments that
Western governments harbored wild-eyed “one world” schemes of global
government also fell flat politically. Such claims strained credibility in an era
when Western leaders turned a blind eye to the many ambitious plans and
designs for international federation being advanced by leading international
scientists, economists, and public intellectuals.8
For decades Western governments maintained this delicate balance be-
tween international openness and social protection.9 Western leaders viewed
investing in social protection as an investment in liberal internationalism
and international stability. Systematic analysis at the country, party, and
voter levels of analysis indicates that they were close to the mark. Starting
at the country level, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that a country’s level of social
protection is positively correlated with partnership and power, individually,
and in most cases, our proxy for liberal internationalism: partnership and
power combined (partnership +power).10 Figure 3.1 provides a descriptive
snapshot of the relationship between social protection and liberal interna-
tionalism (partnership +power) from 1970 through 2017 for our sample
of Western countries.11 The solid lines in these and similar figures indicate
the direction of the relationship between the variables: in this case, between
social transfers and liberal internationalism. The broken lines refer to the
tightness of the association, or fit, between the variables. These are set at the
95 percent confidence intervals. If we see that both the upper and lower con-
fidence intervals are positive throughout the distribution, as we do here, then
we know with 95 percent confidence that the correlation between the two
variables in the figure tends to be positive. In Figure 3.1, we see that on av-
erage the higher a country’s spending on social protection, the more its gov-
ernment tends to support liberal internationalism.12
Figure 3.2 summarizes the results of more systematic analysis of these
relationships at the country-year level. Here we consider whether spending
on social protection spurs government support for liberal internationalism.
We analyze the full country-year variation, with the baseline results focused
Spending on social protection and ...
Partnership (KOF
globalization policies)
Power (military exp.

% GDP)
Partnership+power
(std. sum of policies)
−.05 0 .05 .1 .15

Govt support for liberal internationalism
2
1
0
−1
3 8 13 18 23
Figure 3.2 Effect of a Western government’s spending on social protection on

its support for liberal internationalist policies, 1970–2017
on our twenty-four OECD countries. The top panel in the figure summarizes
the regression result, where our measure of welfare effort predicts increased
government support for liberal internationalism and its component parts,
partnership and power.13 The results for partnership and partnership +power
are statistically significant and substantively meaningful. The full country-
year variation in the West’s social security transfers predicts an 8 percent in-
crease in partnership, and a 9 percent increase in partnership +power. The
bottom panel in Figure 3.2 draws out this connection, focusing on the sub-
stantive pattern for partnership +power. We see clearly that government
spending on social protection is positively associated with increased govern-
ment support for liberal internationalism.14
The effects of spending on social protection on Western support for liberal
internationalism are also visible when we move to the party level. Figure 3.3
summarizes the results for a range of models measuring the effect of social
protection in a given country on a given political party’s support for partner-
ship, power, and partnership +power. We rely on the same party manifesto
data used in Chapter 2, though here, we focus on party-year, which is a more
fine-grained unit of analysis. The models are OLS estimates with decade
and country fixed effects, and include substantive controls for the effect of
globalization flows, level of democracy, unemployment rate, union density,
and real GDP growth, as well as individual parties’ vote share and left-to-
right ideological orientation.15 These party influences are particularly im-
portant to control for here because it is necessary to separate out and isolate
the sources of parties’ positions on partnership and power from the many
other policy stances they take in their electoral manifestos.16 The top panel
in Figure 3.3 reports results averaged across all party families. The bottom
panel summarizes the effects of social protection on support for partnership
+ power (liberal internationalism) by party family.17
The patterns we see in Figure 3.3 are consistent with our expectations. We
see that across the party family spectrum, government spending on social
protection is associated with high party support for partnership and power,
and with liberal internationalism (partnership +power) more generally. The
correlation between social protection and partnership here is consistent with
a large body of research stretching back to Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism”
reformulation of Polanyi’s argument about the need to balance international
markets and social protection. As Ruggie suggested, greater levels of social
protection and compensation in the form of unemployment insurance, so-
cial services (e.g., health care, housing assistance, child care support), and
Party support for liberal internationalism

3
Partnership+Power
2
Partnership
1
Power
0
−1
5 10 15 20 25
Relationship between social protection and...

.3
.2
.1
0
−.1
Radical Social Liberal Christian Conser− Radical

left Democrat Democrat vative right
Figure 3.3 Effect of social protection on party support for liberal

internationalism by Western party family, 1960–2017
other payments improve the chances that citizens, and their elected repre-
sentatives, will support international openness and economic integration.
This finding is consistent with previous research, including our own.18
However, the analysis here goes beyond Ruggie’s original formulation
and intuition in two important ways. First, we see that the relationship be-
tween social protection and liberal internationalism is especially consistent
for parties on the left (Social Democrats and radical-left parties), where the
confidence intervals do not cross zero. This is striking because one might ex-
pect parties of the left, whose working-class voters disproportionately benefit
from social spending, to be more skeptical of economic integration and mili-

tary spending. This suggests that the social protections Western governments
put into place in the early postwar decades were especially effective at
bringing working-class voters into the internationalist fold. Second, we see
that social protection not only leads to increased support for economic inte-
gration and multilateralism. It also boosts cross-partisan support for the in-
ternational security structures and institutions (e.g., military alliances, large
armies, military bases) that the United States and other Western democracies
put in place and financed to contain Soviet power and ambitions. Put another
way, social protection contributed to larger Western geopolitical purposes as
well as domestic ends.
This finding squares with a growing body of research on the relationship
between the Cold War and the welfare state.19 It shows that the East-West ri-
valry was an important factor stimulating the expansion of the welfare state
(and not just on the Western side of the Iron Curtain). Whatever its merits as
a social policy paradigm, Western leaders came to see social protection as a
necessary concession to working-class voters to smooth market capitalism’s
hard edges, to counter Soviet claims that communism was a “workers’ para-
dise,” and to enhance the legitimacy of capitalism in the East-West struggle
for dominance. “Western governments were compelled in some way to com-
pete with the Soviet Union ideologically and socially rather than solely in
military and political terms,” reads an entry in the Encyclopedia of the Cold
War.20 Cold War strategic imperatives not only fueled a superpower arms
race, they also stimulated an East-West welfare race. As the historian Eric
Hobsbawm observed, fear of communism and worries about capitalism’s
own stability loomed large in the minds of Western policymakers: “Whatever
Stalin did to the Russians, he was good for the common people in the West.”21
Figure 3.4 suggests that Western voters saw it that way too.22 Here the
outcome variable is voter support for partnership, power, and partnership
+ power (liberal internationalism).23 To measure voter support, we rely on
the vote-weighted party platform measures of voter sentiment that we intro-
duced in Chapter 2.24 Ideally, we would supplement these indirect voting-
based patterns with direct measures of voter sentiment, as we have done
in measuring government and party support for partnership and power.
However, as noted in Chapter 1, public opinion data on such issues is spo-
radic and uneven over time and cross-nationally, leaving too many gaps for
the country years we are studying. Fortunately, indirect voter-weighted man-
ifesto measures like ours tend to correlate significantly with direct measures
Voter support for liberal internationalism

50
Partnership+Power
40
30
Partnership
20
Power
10
0
−10
5 10 15 20 25
Figure 3.4 Relationship between social protection and voter support for liberal
internationalism in Western democracies, 1960–2017
of public opinion.25 In any event, these measures do tell us which platforms

voters actually reward with their ballot choices, whatever their stated senti-
ment. The explanatory variable, social protection, is the same measure used in
Figure 3.1.26
We see that voters are sensitive to promises of greater (lesser) social wel-
fare. Greater social protection is associated with higher support among
Western voters for partnership and, notably, for liberal internationalism
(partnership +power) as a whole. The substantive size of the effects in Figure
3.4 are considerable. For instance, a substantial 20 percent of the sample
variation in partnership +power is “explained” away by the full variation in
social transfer spending (explaining from the 52nd to the 74th percentile
in partnership +power). This result, including its rough magnitude, is con-
sistent with an extensive literature in comparative and international political
economy that indicates that governments and parties that provide social pol-
icies to mitigate the distributional effects of trade liberalization are rewarded
by voters, and conversely, that governments and parties associated with do-
mestic policies that directly or indirectly reduce social protection and welfare
compensation more generally, are punished.27 However, here we show that
Western governments’ investments in social democracy also yielded interna-
tional benefits that extended beyond trade. This also helps explain why, when
Western governments began reducing their commitments to social protec-
tion at the same time that they were increasing their reliance on multilateral
institutions as well as international markets, their publics began responding

in kind. We turn to this now.
The broken bargain
Western governments’ commitment to social insurance, social assistance,

and other features of the postwar welfare state began to soften as early as the
1980s. The pace and extent of these cutbacks varied across the West: they
arrived earlier and were more draconian in the Anglo-American economies;
they came later and with less brute force in many European and Asian econ-
omies.28 In many instances, Western governments did not fully embrace the
idea of “welfare state reform” until after the Cold War ended and their econo-
mies were under the influence of globalization. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the spread of liberalism in the former Warsaw Pact countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, the Cold War rationale for investing in social
protection lost its political potency. America, Britain, France, Germany, and
other welfare states began actively looking for ways to reduce the collective
costs of welfare while simultaneously lowering barriers to trade, capital, and
immigration flows. In the 1990s, the balance between economic integration
and social protection shifted decisively toward the market and what became
known as “hypergobalization.”29
Political economists at the time disagreed sharply about the likely im-
pact this shift in Western government policy would have on public sup-
port for international openness. Some studies revealed a sharp increase in
perceived insecurity and protectionist attitudes among Western citizens
who were most exposed to expanded international trade, investment, and
immigration as a result of globalization.30 Other studies yielded evidence
that growing exposure to international trade and investment mattered, but
painted a mixed picture of the effects of unemployment, inequality, and im-
migration on public support for globalization.31 And still other scholarly
research suggested that whether an anti-globalist backlash materialized in
Western democracies would turn not only on globalization’s effects on em-
ployment and income. Following Polanyi, Ruggie, and others, their research
indicated that it would also depend on Western governments’ willingness to
invest more resources in social policies and programs to insulate and com-
pensate those workers and sectors most vulnerable to hyperglobalization’s
disruptive effects.32
By this point, Western governments’ willingness to make those social

investments was thin and, as Figure 3.5 suggests, fell far short of what was
needed to address the economic risks and insecurities that working fami-
lies faced. Figure 3.5 tracks Western governments’ investment in social pro-
tection from 1960 through 2017. The solid line in the figure represents the
raw average of social transfers (as a percentage of GDP). The broken line
represents Western governments’ social welfare effort, adjusting for the fact
that spending automatically increases when unemployment rises.33 As the
solid line in Figure 3.5 shows, welfare spending was very high during the
postwar golden age despite the fact that most Western economies were op-
erating at full employment. Since then, social transfers have increased as a
share of GDP, in part because of structurally high levels of unemployment
in several Western countries. However, when we adjust the social transfer
measure for unemployment levels (the broken line in the figure), we see the
true effects of Western workers’ exposure to higher levels of economic risk
stemming from globalization and other market forces (e.g., automation).
Even allowing for cross-national variation (workers in some countries are at
greater risk than those in other countries), Western governments’ commit-
ment to social protection clearly did not match their growing reliance on the
market.
Of course, the social bargain that postwar leaders struck with their
citizens was not only about the market. It was also about how much
16
10
Social transfers
Social security transfers normalized
(% GDP)
14
by unemployment rate
8
12
6
10
Social transfers
normalized
2
8
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
Figure 3.5 Western government investment in social protection for labor force
adjusted by economic risk, 1960–2017
authority to delegate and pool in international institutions. As we showed

in Chapter 2, the turn toward globalism involved a dramatic increase in the
number and type of international bodies.34 A cornucopia of international
and supranational institutions arose to meet a rapidly expanding list of global
challenges—terrorism, organized crime, ethnic conflict, and environmental
decline, among others. As Jessica Mathews, a leading foreign policy thinker,
wrote in 1997, the rapid growth of these institutions was double-edged.35 On
the one hand, they were needed to help solve transnational problems that
governments were ill-equipped to address. On the other hand, more inter-
national decision-making was certain to stoke public resentment over the
loss of national control. At the time Mathews was writing, this was already a
potent issue in Europe, where perceptions of “distance” between Brussels and
ordinary citizens contributed to the backlash against the Maastricht treaty
and the European Union in Denmark and France.36
In the years ahead, talk of a “democratic deficit” would become common-
place in Europe. Too much power, globalism’s critics charged, was being put
in the hands of remote, unelected international bureaucrats making decisions
that impacted, often negatively, citizens’ lives and livelihoods. Similar
concerns were raised in the United States, where a deeply rooted skepticism
about international institutions, dating back to Woodrow Wilson’s failure to
get the League of Nations ratified, resurfaced.37 In Chapter 2, we saw that
Western voters’ reservations about international market liberalization and
multilateral governance intensified in the years ahead.38 Opposition was
starkest in Europe, but the same steep downward slope in voter support for
international openness and institutionalized cooperation was evident in the
United States, Japan, and elsewhere.
Political discontent does not arise on its own, of course. It requires
politicians and parties to mobilize it. And if there is one thing that Western
politicians on the far left and far right became remarkably adept at, it was
exploiting working-class frustration and resentment about globalism and
the erosion of social protections by fusing the two issues. Among the first
to do so were Jörg Haider who led the Austria Freedom Party (FPÖ) from
1986 to 2000 and Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder and leader of France’s
Front National (FN) from 1972 to 2011. This was no easy feat. For years, both
parties depended on the support of small businesses and farmers and stead-
fastly opposed welfare state spending. In the 1990s, in a bid to win working-
class voters, they changed tack.39 Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ
combined long-standing commitments to low taxes and trade liberalization
with “welfare populism” and Euroscepticism.40 In France, Le Pen did the

same, easing up on the party’s long-standing anti-tax and anti-government
platform in favor of platform planks in support of job security and economic
protection. Meanwhile, the FN became one of the EU’s staunchest critics,
with Le Pen now claiming that European integration was “programmed
death” for French sovereignty.41
Fusing anti-globalism with social protection was not the only reason the
FPÖ, FN, and other right-wing parties started gaining electoral market share
in the 1990s. They also leaned heavily on socio-cultural issues (e.g., immi-
gration, law and order, social conservativism) to mobilize voters. Yet voting
studies showed that these naked appeals to working-class voters worried
about job security and “the loss of national control” paid off at the polls.42
Enough so that Britain’s Nigel Farage, the leader of the far-right United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), adopted the continental populist
playbook to take things to a new level in British politics. Following a poor
showing in Britain’s 2010 general election, Farage revamped UKIP’s platform
by proposing to take funds that the UK contributed to the European Union
and use them to improve the country’s National Health Service.43 Farage’s
bold gambit upended British politics. UKIP came in first in the 2014 EU
election with 27.5 percent. More importantly, it forced Conservative Prime
Minister David Cameron to promise a referendum on British membership of
the EU. Cameron hoped to take the starch out of the so-called “revolt of the
left-behinds” that was now wreaking havoc inside his own party. Three years
later, Cameron delivered on that promise only to see Farage, along with Boris
Johnson and some other prominent Tories, win the referendum that would
set Britain on its path to leave the EU.
That same year America’s Donald Trump drove the Brexiteers’ anti-
globalist message home by showing how it could be leveraged to mount a
successful insurgency within the liberal order’s citadel itself. Lambasting the
Washington political class for “worshiping globalism over Americanism,”
Trump promised to stop the outsourcing and offshoring of US jobs and in-
dustry in his run for the presidency against political insider Hillary Clinton.
Pledging to withdraw from the twelve-nation multilateral Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) that President Barack Obama’s administration had
signed earlier that year, Trump claimed the treaty would undermine the US
economy and independence.44 Like Farage and Le Pen before him, Trump’s
broadsides against globalism were paired with a vigorous rhetorical defense
of the welfare state. Trump committed to defending popular Social Security
and Medicare programs and promised to replace the Affordable Care Act—
Obamacare—with a universal health insurance system. Trump’s “one-two”
combo was effective, especially in the traditional Democratic strongholds of
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, whose industries and workers had
been worn down by years of outsourcing and offshoring to China, Mexico,
and other destinations for low-cost production, assembly, and supply.45
In case after case, the pattern was the same. Parties on the far right
campaigned against globalism’s costs in economic insecurity and national
sovereignty. They urged governments to do more to compensate those
harmed by trade liberalization and supranationalism. This, of course, was
also true of many parties on the far left. Most rejected the right’s incendiary
anti-
immigration message, but far- left parties also campaigned against
hyperglobalization and for expanding compensation and assistance to hard-
hit workers, sectors, and communities.46 The fact that voters rewarded these
parties with an increasing share of the national vote revealed just how much
the postwar bargain had frayed in Western democracies. Yet, as we have seen,
the story of anti-globalism’s rise is not only one of popular resentment and
grievance bubbling up from below. Political entrepreneurs and parties on the
fringes of Western party systems successfully tapped and mobilized this dis-
content to increase their vote share. That parties on the far left and far right
seized on anti-globalism after the Cold War ended is no coincidence.
GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
Shortly before the Soviet Union fell, Georgi Arbatov, the éminence grise of
Moscow’s foreign policy establishment, warned an American audience: “We
are going to do a terrible thing to you. We are going to deprive you of an
enemy.” Arbatov was a seasoned observer of the Western political scene and
surely knew that Western unity was not due solely to fears of Soviet com-
munism. Still, Arbatov’s claim contained a kernel of truth. For nearly half a
century, widespread worries about Soviet communism and the risk of nu-
clear war made liberal internationalism the strategy of choice in the West’s
corridors of power and in its courts of public opinion. With the end of the
Cold War, these external pressures and influences on domestic politics eased
considerably. Security concerns no longer weighed as heavily on voters’
minds. Western political leaders and policymakers had more latitude in de-
fining their nation’s international interests. So, however, did parties on the
far left and far right. As Cold War tensions dissipated, the room for political
maneuver in Western democracies expanded.
Cold War constraints
Geopolitics cast a long shadow over the West’s politics during the Cold War.
Suspicions of Soviet intentions in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere made Western
leaders skeptical of schemes for global disarmament and neutralism that
were popular on the far left. They were considered too idealistic, too imprac-
tical, and too risky. Calls from the far right to “roll back” the Soviet pres-
ence in Eastern Europe and rely on nuclear brinksmanship to keep the peace
were also rejected as unrealistic or, worse, reckless in a bipolar world where
both sides had “the bomb.”47 Isolationism was also a non-starter. American
politicians like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who had advocated it in the
face of German and Japanese expansionism in the run up to World War II,
now kept the discredited strategy at arm’s length. The fear of being second-
guessed by political opponents for failing to do enough to contain the spread
of communism or, alternatively, being dubbed “trigger happy,” forced most
politicians into the middle lane. The Cold War thus exerted centripetal pres-
sure on the West’s politics.
In the United States, Cold War imperatives pushed Democrats and
Republicans toward the bipartisan liberal internationalist center. The two
parties often disagreed over how much of the federal purse was needed to
contain or balance against Soviet power and what steps needed to be taken
to avoid the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. For example, the
Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, and Reagan administrations boosted national
defense spending. The Eisenhower, Nixon, and early Carter administrations
looked for ways to trim the Pentagon’s budget.48 Yet every administration
from Truman’s through Reagan’s steered clear of strategies that were overly
reliant on idealism or realism. Investing in both partnership and power gave
them additional leverage against Moscow and limited their political exposure
domestically to charges of weakness or recklessness. Presidential hopefuls
who strayed too far to the left or to the right—as did George McGovern on
the left and Barry Goldwater on the right—paid dearly at the polls.
Geopolitics had a similar effect on West European politics. To be sure,
most politicians and parties on the far left and far right flatly rejected lib-
eral internationalism, arguing that it was little more than a stalking horse
for US dominance. However, the vast majority of political parties in Western

democracies, including socialist parties in Britain, France, Belgium,
Holland, Norway, Denmark, and Luxembourg, favored closer transat-
lantic military and economic ties, and military preparedness, too.49 Fearing
American hegemony, others like West Germany’s Social Democratic Party
(SPD) and Italy’s Socialist Party (PSI) initially resisted and campaigned in
favor of a “bridge-building neutralism” in East-West relations.50 But worries
about being judged weak on communism by voters ultimately led the SPD
and PSI to put their concerns about American suzerainty aside and embrace
Atlanticism. Parties on the center-right, like France’s Gaullists, that shared
the far left’s concerns about Transatlanticism also made their peace with lib-
eral internationalism. On the all-important matter of an independent French
nuclear force, they framed the case in terms of collective deterrence and de-
fense against external threats rather than purely in terms of independence
from Washington.
In Japan, worries about Soviet ambitions were tempered by fears of en-
trapment in America’s wars in Korea and Vietnam and lingering distrust of
the Japanese military.51 Yet here, too, politicians and parties ignored Cold
War exigencies at their peril. Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) elites paid a
price for their neutralist position, which “contributed to the party’s image
as unfit to govern.”52 A large portion of the Japanese public shared the JSP’s
anti-militarist sensibilities, especially when it came to maintaining firm ci-
vilian control over the military. However, that did not mean that they favored
unarmed neutrality in the East-West conflict. Opinion polls conducted by
Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s largest and oldest newspapers, showed abso-
lute majorities preferring alignment with the United States throughout the
1950s.53 By contrast, no more than 1 percent of respondents favored aligning
with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, conservative factions inside the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that favored a more independent, milita-
ristic approach to Japanese defense ran into strong headwinds within the
party.54 So long as Japanese security was formally tied to the United States,
and America and the Soviet Union were locked in the Cold War, LPD leaders
had little incentive domestically to buck Washington.55
A thaw in the East-West struggle did come, of course. In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and Richard Nixon’s policy of
US-Soviet détente produced understandings about the “two Germanies”
and nuclear weapons that eased popular concerns about security. Yet hopes
for a more comprehensive, lasting superpower rapprochement came to an
unhappy end in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A confluence of events—from
Moscow’s decision to deploy a new generation of nuclear-tipped missiles in
Europe, to the spread of Marxist governments in the Middle East and Africa,
to the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979—forced
a reckoning. Western voters grew more apprehensive about national secu-
rity.56 Western party leaders became more concerned about the credibility
of Western security commitments. At a time of heightened anxiety about the
possibility of nuclear war and fiscal belt-tightening, there was also political
resistance to military build-up. In the late 1970s and 1980s, fears of nuclear
war and guns-versus-butter trade-offs figured prominently in party debates
about how best to strengthen Western security: should this be done through
arms control treaties and confidence-building measures, or by building up
the West’s offensive nuclear and conventional military capabilities?57
It was not until the 1990s, that the strategic imperatives dominating
Western political life for over half a century truly disappeared. Without
Soviet communism and nuclear Armageddon hanging knifelike over
Western polities, Western leaders found themselves with more room to ma-
neuver in foreign affairs, but also with less clarity about which foreign policy
strategy—which combination of partnership and power—to place their bets
on. When Bill Clinton gushed, “Gosh, I miss the Cold War,” he said out loud
what many Western leaders at the time were thinking. In a world defined by
bipolar superpower rivalry, the international rules of the road were clearer
and the task of coalition-building in democracies easier. In the absence of
a Soviet-style threat, investing in military power at Cold War levels was less
necessary to guarantee security. Defense spending as a percentage of GDP
dropped from an average of 2.7 percent in the 1980s to 2 percent in the 1990s,
where it would remain for the next twenty years. Defense spending in the
United States, UK, and France did edge back up in the 2000s. Yet even in
these countries, the share of GDP spent on defense would not return to Cold
War levels.
The end of the Cold War also helps explain why the West doubled down on
multilateralism. In the 1990s, the prevailing view in Western foreign policy
circles was that the international institutions forged in the crucible of the
Cold War had worked and could be repurposed to bring other nations and
regions into the liberal world order.58 The initial impulse in America, and
Europe too, was to expand existing regional and global institutions in both
security and economic cooperation, or use them to devise new ones. In the
security realm, NATO was expanded eastward and the role of the Conference
on Security Cooperation in Europe was broadened. ln the economic area, the

GATT was transformed into the WTO, and the European Union and APEC
were used to stabilize and integrate emerging market economies in Central
and Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific region into the advanced world
economy. Again, it was Clinton who put Western foreign policy thinking
into words. In a 2006 interview, Clinton observed: “I was heavily influenced
by the success of the post-World War II and Cold War multilateral organi-
zations. . . . I saw that they worked, and at the end of the Cold War, I saw an
opportunity for the first time in history to globalize them in a way that the
East-West division had prevented.”59
In the 1990s, the West’s commitment to liberalism and multilateralism was
widely seen as its decisive edge in its victory over Soviet communism, the
case for globalizing those principles and institutions was a compelling one.
John Ikenberry has aptly referred to the process of international consolida-
tion and expansion that followed over the next decade as the “globalization
of the liberal order.”60 Western democracies drove economic integration and
institutionalized cooperation to new heights. However, the globalization of
the liberal order also created problems of governance and legitimacy at home
because it was not matched by a comparable commitment to social protec-
tion. Instead of expanding the social guarantees that were part and parcel of
Cold War liberal internationalism to Western workers, they were reined in.
Anti-globalist parties like France’s FN, Austria’s FPÖ, and later, Germany’s
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gained ground by promising not only
greater protection from global market forces and supranational institutions
but also fewer international security commitments and greater self-reliance
in national defense.61
In time, the widening appeal of anti-globalism led Western leaders
to modulate their own parties’ globalist platform planks. In Europe,
Conservative and Christian Democratic parties began soft-pedaling trade
liberalization, open immigration, and supranationalism, and in some cases
actively opposing one or more of the three.62 In the United States, Donald
Trump’s 2016 insurgent campaign used anti-globalism to discredit the
Republican establishment and, as mentioned earlier, mobilize disaffected
white working-and middle-class voters who felt left behind by globalization
and the shift to a post-industrial economy.63 In the Democratic Party, Bernie
Sanders came close to defeating the party’s establishment candidate, Hillary
Clinton, that same year by using trade policy to appeal to those same white
working-class voters, along with younger, more educated voters concerned
about the effects of globalization on income inequality, climate change, and

labor standards.
In Japan, the situation was different. In contrast to Europe and North
America, where security constraints loosened, in East Asia they gradually
tightened. For Japan, the issue was two-fold: China’s rise and North Korea’s
nuclear and missile defense programs. Heightened concerns about both
began registering in Japanese public opinion polls in the late 1990s, along
with increasing support for expanding the national defense role of the Japan
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).64 Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s efforts from 2012
to 2020 to move Japanese policy toward China away from engagement to
a more “active balancing strategy” capitalized on this shift in public senti-
ment, and reinforced it. Under Abe, Japan adopted a larger Indo-Pacific
conception of its security interests, invested in even closer security ties
with the United States, centralized Japanese security policymaking, and ex-
panded the country’s military capabilities. The fact that this more expansive
view of Japan’s security needs faced little real domestic opposition within
the LDP or the country was striking. It was an indication of just how much
the political barriers to Japan’s security role had come down since liberal
internationalism’s heyday, when the Yoshida Doctrine held sway.
Threats and politics
We have argued that fears of Soviet communism and nuclear war bolstered
Western support for liberal internationalism. They gave most governments,
most parties, and most voters reason to support investing in power as well as
partnership. To test this argument, we explored whether geopolitical threat
correlates positively with government, party, and voter support for liberal
internationalism. Our models below rely on the same outcome variables,
estimators, and specifications that we used earlier to measure the possible
effects of social protection. However, now we consider the relationship be-
tween geopolitical threat and support for partnership, power, and partnership
+ power. To measure the scope and intensity of geopolitical threat, we created
a composite index based upon seven different measures of the international
security environment for each of the twenty-four OECD countries in our
sample.65 This gives us a scale that runs from low to high for each country.66
The individual measures that make up this composite index capture different
features of a state’s “geopolitical threat environment,” including how stable its
borders and regions are, how territorial or ideological the challenge is, and
so on.67
The descriptive results for this composite threat measure are summa-
rized in Figure 3.6. It tracks the level of geopolitical threat facing the West
in general between 1950 and 2011 (top panel), and for the EU-15, Japan, and
the United States individually (bottom panel). Four key patterns stand out
in the data. First, we see that there is a secular decline in the level of threat
over time, with the average threat level for the full sample of our twenty-
four OECD countries falling below zero following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and remaining below that level down to the present era. Second, the
.5
Geopolitical threat index
0 −.5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

1
Japan
United States
0 −.5 .5
EU−15
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 3.6 Average level of geopolitical threat facing Western democracies,

1950–2011
geopolitical threat scale is sensitive to major developments and events, rising

during periods widely considered to be ones of elevated international hos-
tility and great power rivalry (e.g., the Korean War; the “second Cold War”
of the 1980s; post-9/11) and conversely, declining during periods of reduced
tension, such as the East-West détente of the 1970s and the post-Cold War
era. Third, it is evident that threat levels are generally higher for the United
States than they are for the European Union and Japan. This is not surprising
given America’s global forward presence, with roughly 750 overseas military
bases in 80 countries and territories.68 But it does remind us of just how much
more global American security commitments are than those of its many stra-
tegic allies and partners in Europe and Asia. Finally, we see that the level of
geopolitical threat facing the EU-15, Japan, and the United States, individu-
ally, drops sharply following the end of the Cold War, although notably in the
case of Japan, it begins to rise in the late 1990s.
Figure 3.6 underscores how much the West’s strategic environment has
changed since the height of the Cold War. It also prompts the question: did
support for liberal internationalism in West democracies weaken as the ge-
opolitical threat facing them waned? In Figure 3.7, which covers the 1960–
2011 time period for our twenty-four OECD countries, we take a first cut
at this question by drawing on a modest cross-section of the period aver-
ages from the available data.69 The figure shows clearly that there is a posi-
tive descriptive association between the level of geopolitical threat a country
2
Support for liberal internationalism
United States
United Kingdom
France
1
Greece
Portugal
S. Korea
Finland Australia
Denmark Netherlands
Norway Italy
Sweden
0
Belgium Canada
New Zealand
Japan
−1
Ireland
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Figure 3.7 Geopolitical threat and Western government support for liberal
internationalism by country, 1960–2011
faces on the horizontal axis and its government’s support for liberal inter-
nationalism (partnership +power) on the vertical axis. The positive corre-
lation, which is statistically significant, is in line with what our argument
predicts: that Western democracies’ commitment to liberal internationalism
was driven, in no small part, by the challenge that Soviet power and ambition
posed to their security and interests.
The descriptive results reported in Figure 3.7 are based on cross-country
averages. To test our argument in a more controlled and systematic way, we
expanded the analysis to the country-year level. The regression results are
summarized in Figures 3.8 through 3.10.70 Overall, the analysis provides
a good deal of support for our argument. As expected, we see that higher
Level of geopolitical threat and ...
Partnership (KOF
globalization policies)
Power (military exp.

% GDP)
Partnership+power
(std. sum of policies)
−.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
1.5
1
.5
0
−1.5 −1 −.5 0 .5 1 1.5

Figure 3.8 Effect of geopolitical threat on Western government support for

liberal internationalism, 1970–2017
levels of geopolitical threat are associated with increased government and

party support for liberal internationalism, though, interestingly, not with
voter support. In general, the more challenging a country’s international
circumstances, the more willing its government and political parties—from
left to right—are to invest in power and liberal internationalism (partnership
+ power). This helps explain why liberal internationalism was the strategy of
choice in the West during the Cold War. It also helps explain why, in the ab-
sence of Cold War imperatives, liberal internationalism has lost domestic
political ground to globalism, isolationism, and nationalism. To be sure, ge-
opolitical threat’s correlation with government policy and party platforms in
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 is more modest than social protection’s impact reported
3
Partnership+Power
2
Partnership
1
Power
0
−1
−1 0 1 2
Geopolitical threat and...

3
2
1
0
−1
Radical Social Liberal Christian Conser− Radical

left Democrat Democrat vative right
Figure 3.9 Effect of geopolitical threat on party support for liberal

internationalism by Western party family, 1960–2015
earlier (Figures 3.2–3.3).71 However, the overall tenor and direction of geo-
political threat’s association with Western government and party support are
similar.
By contrast, our argument about geopolitical threats gets much less
traction when it comes to voters. In Figure 3.10, we see that the level of
international security has no significant correlation with voter-weighted
party platforms (although geopolitical threat almost reaches standard
levels of statistical significance for power).72 One possible explanation for
this is that government officials and party leaders are more attuned to ge-
opolitics than are voters.73 Certainly, heads of government have strong
electoral incentives to hedge against the risk of foreign policy failure—
that is, the risk of being blamed by their partisan rivals for failing to cor-
rectly read the international security environment.74 As we have seen,
during the Cold War such concerns weighed on political leaders in the
United States, Germany, Japan, and other Western democracies. Another
possible reason is that our geopolitical threat scale does not fully capture
well-documented public anxieties during the Cold War about the risk of
catastrophic nuclear war.75 The various threat measures that make up this
scale focus on geopolitical risk (e.g., territorial expansion), as opposed to
existential risk (e.g., public fears of “nuclear winter” in the 1980s). While
the two are related, they are not the same. As we showed in Chapter 2
(Figures 2.7 and 2.8), public support for defense outlays during the Cold
War rose sharply during periods, like the late 1970s, of heightened concern
Voter support for liberal internationalism
45
Partnership+Power
35
25
15
Partnership Power
5
−5
−1.5 −1 −.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2

Figure 3.10 Relationship between geopolitical threat and voter support for
liberal internationalism in Western democracies, 1960–2017
over Soviet ambitions. Conversely, public support for military spending

dropped sharply during periods of heightened fears of nuclear war, such
as the early 1980s.
FAILURE TO ADJUST
Much has been written about globalization and its economic, political,
and social consequences. Much less has been written about why political
leaders did not do more for those that globalization was leaving behind.76
In the face of a mounting anti-globalist backlash, one might have expected
Western leaders to trim their international sails, expand social safety nets,
and redesign international institutions to make them more responsive to the
demands of national electorates. As we discuss in Chapter 4, there was some
movement by Western governments along these lines. The breakneck pace
of trade liberalization and multilateral cooperation began to slow even be-
fore the 2008 economic crisis. In some OECD countries (e.g., Ireland, Italy,
Norway), welfare generosity and other social protections also increased. Yet
Western leaders did not actively look for programmatic ways to close the
ends-means gap. Western government efforts to liberalize trade and capital
markets continued to outpace Cold War levels and, in most cases, govern-
ment support for social protection or other measures of social policy gener-
osity stalled or declined, as it did in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Sweden.
Some theories
Why didn’t Western leaders do more to close the gap over globalism? Why
didn’t they take steps to address the concerns of populists before the anger
and resentment over globalism reached crisis proportions? Some scholars
and analysts attribute the failure to political arrogance, elitism, and “group-
think.” These factors may help explain why Western leaders embraced glob-
alization and supranationalism in the 1990s, but they are less helpful in
explaining why, in the face of mounting political resistance, self-interested
elected leaders did not balance their support for globalization and multi-
lateralism with greater investments in social protection and compensation.
Fortunately, existing theories of international and comparative politics
suggest several candidate explanations for Western democracies’ failure to

adjust.
One plausible explanation is “financialization,” and the growing influence
of international financial and corporate interests over political deliberation
and deal-making in Western capitals—a shift that many scholars argue was
in full swing by the 1990s.77 There is an extensive literature on this topic, but
the crux of the argument is that, as Western leaders became more dependent
on these financial and corporate interests for holding on to power, polit-
ical parties were transformed from postwar “catch-all” or “big tent” parties
that sought to win the “median voter” by providing public goods into “cartel
parties” that focused on richer “median” voters by letting markets and cen-
tral banks set policy. In short, Western leaders became less focused on mass
electorates, and more responsive to the needs of high-flying internationalist
business interests.
A related explanation emphasizes the effects of Western leaders’ growing
reliance on international institutions. They argue that Western governments
have become more responsive to the expectations of unelected international
technocrats than to the needs of their own citizens.78 This is not simply due
to “multilateral overreach” where, in the natural course of carrying out their
duties, the policymakers and technocrats that staff these institutions have
gradually expanded their authority.79 The deeper problem is that Western
leaders intentionally “outsourced” decision-making authority to these in-
ternational bodies to shield themselves from voters over politically sensitive
redistributive issues like trade liberalization.80 Needless to say, this strategy
did not depoliticize these issues. However, that was not considered a sign of
the strategy’s flaws and shortsightedness, but rather, further evidence of pop-
ular democracy’s ineffectiveness in responding to the global forces of science,
technology, and modern capitalism. The more domestic pushback there was,
the more policy needed to be “rescued” from politics.
There is also the declining influence of labor in national political econo-
mies to consider. Many scholars have argued that the secular decline of the
manufacturing sector in Western economies, and the center-right’s efforts to
undercut labor’s bargaining power, made it easier (safer, politically) for po-
litical leaders to cater to pro-globalization interests and ignore or soft-pedal
working-class interests.81 By the 2000s, the attack on labor that began under
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, and then spread to other
advanced industrialized economies, had reached a point where unions no
longer had sufficient leverage over labor markets to act as a political check
on financial and business interests, and political leaders aligned with them.
Between 1980s and 2010, average OECD union density—a standard measure
of union political strength based on union workers as a proportion of civilian
employment—dropped by more than ten percentage points.82
Gauging the gap
To gauge the weight of these possible explanations for why Western govern-
ment policies’ have consistently outstripped voter support since the end of
the Cold War, we empirically explored several possible predictors of the gap.
To assess the impact of international financial interests and supranational
institutions on Western policymaking, we rely on the KOF Swiss Institute’s
indices for de facto globalization. These include de facto economic globali-
zation, political globalization, and KOF’s composite all globalization index.83
We measure union strength using a standard measure of union density: union
members as a proportion of civilian employment. We control for democratic
representativeness (Polity-IV democracy score and voter turnout), political
orientation (left-right platform position and right-party percentage of cabinet
posts), and economic performance (unemployment rate and GDP growth).84
The outcome variable (government-voter gap) measures the extent to which a
given Western government and its voters converge (diverge) in their support
for international partnership between 1970 and 2017.85 We focus here on in-
ternational partnership because, as we showed in Chapter 2, this is where
Western governments have consistently run ahead of voters since the end of
the Cold War.86
Figure 3.11 summarizes the key results.87 We see that our three measures
of de facto globalization, which plausibly capture the size and influence of in-
ternational business and financial interests in Western capitals and Western
leaders growing reliance on supranational institutions, tend to be positively
and significantly associated with our outcome of interest: the gap between
governments and voters over international partnership. Figure 3.11 captures
the substantive size of these associations: the outcome variable (government-
voter gap) is always on the same scale and the panels display the full-sample
variation for each KOF de facto globalization measure.88 The broadest con-
ception of globalization (all globalization; top panel) has the strongest asso-
ciation with the solvency gap. Economic globalization (middle panel) and
political globalization (bottom panel) have more modest associations, though
1.5
Govt−voter gap on partnership
0 .5 −.5 1
50 60 70 80 90
KOF index of de facto globalization (all de facto indices)
1.5
0 .5 −.5 1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
KOF index of de facto economic globalization
1.5
0 .5 −.51
50 60 70 80 90 100
KOF index of de facto political globalization
Figure 3.11 Relationship between globalization and government-voter solvency

gap over international partnership in Western democracies, 1970–2017
still substantively as well as statistically significant.89 The pattern suggests

that the de facto political and economic faces of globalization are comple-
mentary and cumulative. The full variation of each de facto globalization
measure predicts roughly 45 percent of the variation in the government-voter
gap with respect to international partnership (predicting a shift from roughly
the 25th percentile to roughly the 70th percentile).90
The full results (reported in Table B.5, Appendix B) also indicate that party
vote share average is a negative predictor of the solvency gap. This is consistent
with the idea that political systems with parties that are more dependent on
international financial and business interests, or governments that have dele-
gated a great deal of decision-authority to supranational institutions, or both,
might be less responsive to what voters want. As expected, union strength,
our measure of labor’s political and organizational strength, is negatively
associated with the solvency gap, but is not statistically significant in most
specifications. The other controls have little or no effect, though more right-
oriented party systems tend to be associated with greater insolvency. All told,
the patterns suggest that Western leaders are increasingly responsive to in-
ternationally oriented interests, and have a freer hand to do so, domestically.
It is here, in the shifting balance of international and domestic power, that
the failure of Western political leadership lies.
MIND THE GAP
In the two decades following the publication of Susan Strange’s writings

about globalization, Western public support for economic integration and
multilateral institutions faded. As we have seen, one critical reason is that
Western governments’ commitment to social protection did not keep up
with their efforts to liberalize markets and expand the authority of inter-
national institutions. Coming on the heels of the neoliberal reforms of the
1980s, Western governments’ commitment to social democracy weakened
in the 1990s as the East-West conflict came to an end. Free of Cold War ge-
opolitical rivalries and tensions, Western leaders and voters no longer felt
as compelled to uphold liberal internationalism. Western leaders saw po-
litical advantage in moving toward globalism. Western voters moved in the
opposite direction, with growing numbers seeing greater promise in the anti-
globalist agendas and foreign policies that populist and nationalist parties
were offering.
It took time for the West’s turn to globalism to produce a backlash. Looking
back, it is also clear there was also no single defining moment when the tide
of Western political support for the liberal order turned. The 2003 invasion
of Iraq, the 2008 financial crash, and the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis are often
singled out as inflection points. Certainly, each contributed to the widening
democratic solvency gap between Western governments and their publics
over international openness and cooperation. However, the downward spiral
in domestic support began well before the Iraq War, and it has continued to
widen with each passing year since then. And it did not occur on its own.
Since the 1990s, populist and nationalist politicians have actively mobilized
globalism’s discontents by speaking to Western publics’ fears and interests.
Mainstream political leaders did remarkably little materially to offset and
counteract those attacks.
The failure of Western democracies to close this ends-means gap sheds
new light on how and why the liberal international order fractured. Writing
in the early 1990s, many international relations scholars and foreign policy
analysts predicted that in the absence of geopolitical imperatives, the West
would quickly divide and splinter over security and economic issues.91
Without a common enemy to unite them, Western democracies strategic and
commercial interests would diverge. This did not happen. The liberal order
did not devolve into rival trading blocs. NATO did not collapse. Friends did
not become foes. What did happen is that Western foreign and domestic
policy diverged. This has proved enormously costly for Western democra-
cies, internationally as well as domestically. We turn to these issues now.
4
Reaping the Whirlwind
In 1949, historian and New Dealer Arthur Schlesinger Jr. published The
Vital Center, a best-selling call to arms. Writing in the shadow of the Cold
War, Schlesinger saw a vibrant liberal political center as the West’s best de-
fense against the spread of Soviet-style communism or a possible resur-
gence of the laissez-faire capitalism that could result in depression and war.
Though writing principally for an American audience, Schlesinger’s assess-
ment of the international predicament and domestic challenges facing the
United States in the late 1940s echoed public fears and anxieties in Britain,
France, Germany, and other Western democracies. With memories of war
and democracy’s failings in the interwar years still rife, Western voters
from all strata of society and every class favored political moderation and
consensus-building over ideological fervor, economic volatility, and political
extremism. For the vast majority of Western voters, mainstream parties—
Christian Democratic and Social Democratic, Conservative and Liberal—
offered the best hope for guaranteeing protection from Soviet ambitions and
market forces.
For much of the past seventy-five years, mainstream political parties were
the bedrock of the Western liberal international order. As the vital center,
they were not only a bulwark against political extremism from the political
left and political right during the Cold War. Mainstream parties were also
the building blocks upon which the West’s shared commitment to the lib-
eral international order rested. Western leaders could advance internation-
alist policies, knowing that those policies rested on sturdy foundations in
national party systems. This is no longer the case. While most mainstream
parties continue to back the liberal order, their political capacity to support
and promote it has weakened considerably. Over the past thirty years, in-
surgent parties have made inroads on both right and left in one democracy
after another. Political authority has fragmented and coalition-building has
become more difficult. Even in two-party systems like the United States and
Britain, anti-globalist movements have made it harder for leaders to govern
effectively, eroding international confidence in their commitment to the lib-

eral order.
In this chapter, we focus on the decline of the West’s vital center and con-
sider its international implications. We show three things. First, we show that,
in contrast to the Cold War, when party democracy and liberal order were
mutually reinforcing, today, the fragmentation of Western party democra-
cies is making it harder for Western leaders to mobilize domestic support for
liberal order-building. Second, we show that, while many factors have con-
tributed to party fragmentation, Western governments’ turn to globalism in
the 1990s played a pivotal role by handing insurgent parties a potent issue to
mobilize disenchanted voters. There is great irony here because one reason
Western leaders turned to globalism was to shore up their electoral bases.
Finally, we show that this process of domestic political fragmentation has not
only reduced the latitude Western leaders have in foreign policymaking. It
has also weakened core features of the liberal international order itself.
In developing these arguments, we build on the analysis in Chapter 3 by
showing that Western leaders’ political ambitions have contributed to this
downward spiral between party democracy and liberal order. In the 1990s,
in an effort to expand their parties’ support base, Western leaders on the
center-left as well as the center-right upended the delicate balance between
international openness and social protection that their postwar predecessors
had set, by slowing the growth of the welfare state while liberalizing inter-
national markets. While this “double move” succeeded in greatly expanding
the liberal order, it came at the cost of working-class support for mainstream
parties themselves. As we showed in Chapter 3, parties on the far left and,
especially, the far right responded by using anti-globalism to appeal to disaf-
fected voters. In this chapter, we show that their efforts paid off at the ballot
box. Parties campaigning against trade liberalization and multilateral gov-
ernance succeeded in expanding their share of the national vote at the ex-
pense of the vital center, and the liberal order.
THE VITAL CENTER
During the Cold War, Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats,

and Conservatives found common ground in liberal internationalism. In
contrast to the interwar years, when established Western parties fanned
the flames of nationalism and international disorder, mainstream parties
Reaping the Whirlwind 87
acted as a break on domestic jingoism, xenophobia, and revanchism and as

a guardian against foreign intimidation and subterfuge. The leaders of main-
stream parties were well placed in the highest reaches of national government
to frame public debate, influence foreign policymaking, and keep nationalist
and populist pressures in check. Even in Europe, where communist parties
were competitive, mainstream parties dominated Western electorates, cap-
turing between 75 and 85 percent of the national vote between 1950 and
1991.1 Their dominance all but guaranteed broad and consistent domestic
support for Western governments’ foreign policies aimed at checking Soviet
ambition and promoting closer economic ties within the West. At the same
time, Western governments’ commitment to the liberal order was a source of
domestic support. Western leaders could advance liberal internationalist for-
eign policies, confident that political parties representing different regions,
classes, and ideologies would support them.
Cold War consensus
That support took different forms in different countries and party systems.
In America’s two-party system, liberal internationalism was backed by
both of the country’s two major parties and by major segments of business,
labor, and agriculture.2 Democrats’ and Republicans’ shared power base in
postwar America’s internationally competitive industrial financial centers of
the urban Northeast gave them a strong incentive to work together to re-
build the world economy and defend it against potential military and po-
litical threats in Europe and Asia. Democrats from the agrarian South and
trans-Mississippi Republican West, whose commodity producers stood to
benefit from freer trade, also favored liberal internationalism. To be sure,
partisan politics did not stop at the water’s edge. Democrats and Republicans
frequently disagreed over the size of the defense budget and the amount of
foreign aid. Yet these partisan divisions were sporadic and transitory. On the
core features of liberal internationalism—the need for freer trade, the impor-
tance of security alliances, the role of international institutions—bipartisan
consensus was the norm in the United States during the Cold War.3
In Europe’s multiparty democracies, liberal internationalism garnered
support from both sides of the left-right ideological divide. Under the leader-
ship of Christian Democrats and Conservatives, who largely dominated party
politics in the 1950s, Western European countries joined NATO, rearmed
militarily, and took the first steps toward political confederation and an inte-
grated common market.4 Some center-left parties like West Germany’s Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and Italy’s Socialist Party (PSI) initially opposed the
center-right’s liberal internationalist agenda. However, by the early 1960s
they too had come around to supporting European integration and NATO
membership, even if military rearmament remained an issue for many on the
center-left.5 Conservatives in Britain and France who worried about liberal
internationalism’s sovereignty costs sought to assert some control or impose
limits, but did not reject it outright. French Conservatives sought to impose
control by making a Paris-Bonn axis the central coordinate of any move to-
ward European unity. British Conservatives approved European unity so
long as it did not require Britain to be “in Europe” or jeopardize the UK’s nas-
cent “special relationship” with the United States.6
In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) favored what might
be characterized as liberal internationalism lite.7 Guided by the skillful lead-
ership of Shigeru Yoshida, postwar Japan adopted a Western-oriented for-
eign policy that relied on US security guarantees, homeland defense, and
foreign markets. The LDP rejected substantial military rearmament in favor
of cheaper Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and relied on state-led development
of the civilian economy instead of the market. Under the so-called Yoshida
Doctrine, successive Japanese governments accepted infringements on na-
tional sovereignty, most notably in the form of continued American military
bases and forces on Japanese soil. Japan’s status as a “semi-sovereign nation”
was a price that most members of the LDP were willing to pay if it meant
greater access to US markets and technology, and did not require the party
to sacrifice its support coalition of industry and farmers—the so-called coa-
lition of “steel and rice”—on the altar of free trade.8 To bolster broader public
support for aligning with America in the East-West struggle, mainstream
conservatives committed to forgoing nuclear weapons and arms exports and
to a narrowly prescribed regional security role for Japanese military forces.
Western support for liberal internationalism did not mean unanimity, of
course. In the United States, progressive Democrats initially favored closer
cooperation with Moscow and opposed military spending and the use of
military force in distant lands.9 In the early postwar years, Republicans on
the far right—Fortress America and America-First regionalists—opposed
strengthening transatlantic ties. In Western Europe, Atlanticism also sparked
fierce resistance on the fringes of French, German, and Italian party politics,
and debate over East-West neutrality was a staple of party politics in smaller
states such as Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, that traditionally favored

foreign policies of neutrality and restraint.10 On the far left, communist
parties campaigned for disarmament. Most were also hostile to European in-
tegration.11 Parties on the far right generally shared the far left’s reservations
about Transatlanticism. However, they had few qualms about investing in
military power and were occasionally willing to accept some form of loose
European confederation to counterbalance American as well as Soviet power
and influence on the Continent.
In Japan, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) opposed liberal internationalism,
as did conservative factions within the LDP. Parties on the left favored a pro-
gressive “mixture of pacifism, isolationism, and idealism.”12 They preferred
“unarmed neutrality” to rearmament and alignment with the United States
and, in the case of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), dissolution of the
SDF and peace with the Soviet Union and China.13 Japanese communists and
socialists saw unarmed neutrality and breaking up Japan’s large industrial
financial conglomerates (Zaibatsu) as the best ways to guarantee Japanese
security and prosperity and prevent a revival of Japanese militarism and
prewar political repression.14 Japanese security, many argued, could be best
guaranteed through security treaties with Moscow and Beijing and making
the East Asia–Pacific region a denuclearized zone. Ultra-right conservatives
within the LDP shared the ultra-left’s concerns about preserving national
autonomy. However, they saw military power and repealing Article 9 of the
Constitution prohibiting military rearmament as the best way to make Japan
less dependent on the United States and less vulnerable to Soviet and Chinese
ambitions.15
In the West, the critical dividing line over foreign policy was thus between
the parties in the vital center and parties on both the far left and far right.
This can be seen plainly in Figure 4.1. The figure is based on party platform
data drawn from the Manifesto Project Data.16 Here we use it to identify,
summarize, and compare political parties’ foreign policy preferences. We use
Manifesto variables that include a pro and con position taken on issues rel-
evant to our two key foreign policy dimensions: international partnership
and military power.17 We use these measures to locate party families in each
of the twenty-four OECD nations in our sample on each foreign policy di-
mension from 1950 to 1975.18 Each dot in the space represents a party family
per country-year.19 Mainstream parties are color-coded in blue; radical-left
parties are labeled in green; radical-right parties in red. To provide refer-
ence points, we set the axes in Figure 4.1 (and subsequent two-dimensional
4
Globalism
Party support for partnership

2
Sample
median
−2 0
Sample
median
−4
−4 −2 0 2 4
Party support for power
Mainstream parties Radical Left parties Radical Right parties
Mainstream mean Radical Left mean Radical Right mean
Social Dem mean Liberal mean Christian Dem mean
Conservative mean
Figure 4.1 Party support for international partnership and military power in
Western democracies, 1950–1975
plots in this chapter) using the full sample medians on each dimension from
1950 through 2018. These median values roughly correspond to the values
demarcating the four quadrants in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1: globalism (high
partnership, low power); liberal internationalism (high partnership, high
power); isolationism (low partnership, low power); and nationalism (low
partnership, high power).20
As we see in Figure 4.1, mainstream parties were liberal internationalism’s
staunchest supporters in the postwar era; parties on the far left and far right,
dedicated opponents. Most mainstream parties ran on party platforms advo-
cating liberal internationalism and, as a result, we see that the means for
each of the mainstream party families are located in, or in the case of Social
Democrats and Conservatives, close to, quadrant 2. Mainstream parties show
comparatively little support for strategies of isolationism (quadrant 3) or na-
tionalism (quadrant 4). As one might expect, Social Democratic parties are
less supportive of defense spending, military preparedness, and the use of
force than Conservative parties. As a result, there is a fair amount of disper-
sion along the horizontal axis (military power) among mainstream parties
in the liberal internationalist quadrant. There is less dispersion or variation
among mainstream parties along the vertical (international partnership)
axis—that is, on matters having to do with international trade, European in-
tegration, and multilateral cooperation.
Most radical-left parties cluster on the left side of the space and, espe-
cially, in the lower-left quadrant (isolationism). Radical-right parties are
concentrated on the right side of the space. Most are located in the bottom-
right nationalist quadrant, though some are in the upper-right, liberal in-
ternationalist quadrant. These alignments are not surprising. Parties on the
far-left championed disarmament and generally opposed European inte-
gration.21 Radical-right parties were more divided than the far left on the
issue of European integration: for some parties on the right, some form of
European confederation was preferable to US hegemony. Some far-right
parties also supported trade liberalization. However, most ultra-right parties
ran on party platforms that strongly favored containing the Soviet Union and
investing in national military power; hence, their location on the right side
of the figure. Last, we see in Figure 4.1 that there were relatively few radical-
right parties, as most reactionary movements from the interwar years had
collapsed.
In Western democracies, the level of mainstream party support for liberal
internationalism was impressively strong. It also proved resilient, despite
repeated challenges. The most serious of these was the crisis of the 1970s,
when the postwar compromises between left and right frayed. While parties
on the center-left urged governments to double down on Keynesianism
by expanding government spending and market regulation, parties on the
center-right called for political retrenchment, privatization, and market lib-
eralization, or what came to be known as “neoliberalism.” At first, the political
fight tilted in the center-left’s favor. Center-left parties held or gained ground
in national elections in Austria (1975), Britain (1974), the Netherlands
(1972), and West Germany (1976).22 In time, however, the balance of power
shifted to the center-right. Popular dissatisfaction with the status quo and
pressure from powerful business interests propelled Conservatives to vic-
tory in Britain (1979), the United States (1980), and Germany (1983). As
Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Helmut Kohl began experimenting
with different combinations of neoliberal economic policies, competitive
pressure on other Western governments to follow suit intensified. Even
France’s François Mitterrand’s socialist government (1981–1995) found it
necessary to pivot toward greater market liberalization.
For all the churn in Western party systems during the 1970s and 1980s,
mainstream parties continued to dominate the political landscape. As Figure
4.2 indicates, they also remained firmly in the liberal internationalist camp.
4
2
Sample
median
−2 0
Sample
median
−4
−4 −2 0 2 4
Conservative mean
Mainstream parties remain liberal internationalism’s strongest supporters

between 1976 and 1991; radical-left and radical-right parties, ardent foes.
Center-left and center-right parties continue to cluster heavily in the upper-
right, liberal internationalist quadrant. Radical-left and radical-right parties
still clustered on the left and right sides of the space, respectively. Most far-
left parties continued to campaign on platforms urging disarmament and
protectionism and for the most part, opposed multilateralism as a means to
make progress on issues high on their agenda (e.g., the environment; human
rights). Radical-right parties’ foreign policy platforms also did not change
much. Some far-right parties, such as Austria’s FPÖ, continued to cluster in
the upper-right quadrant.23 Other far-right parties, like France’s FN, began to
drift toward the lower-right nationalist quadrant.24 In the 1990s, this trend
would accelerate.
Custodians of the order
During the Cold War, the mainstream parties that made up Schlesinger’s
vital center were the liberal order’s custodians. Lying between voters and
governments, they acted as critical intermediaries, shaping and aggregating
voters’ foreign policy preferences in the electoral arena and translating that
support into programmatic policy. The relative strength of center-left and
center-right parties varied within Western democracies, as did the depth

of their support for military spending and preparedness. However, the de-
gree of continuity and robustness of their foreign policies to party and party-
coalition turnover was striking. International commitments undertaken by
center-right governments were upheld by center-left governments when po-
litical power shifted hands, and vice versa. As a general rule, the larger main-
stream parties’ share of the national vote, the stronger Western governments’
commitment to liberal internationalism.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 provide empirical support for this claim.25 These
models focus on the relationship between party strength and govern-
ment policy, taking into account how factors shaping government policies
favoring international partnership might be related to government policies
involving increased military power.26 We measure partnership using the
KOF globalization policies index used in Chapter 3. Again, power refers to
defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Partnership +power is the same
composite measure for liberal internationalism we used in Chapter 3.27 We
use national vote share—a standard measure of party influence—to measure
party strength in each of the following five party categories: mainstream vote
share (the combined vote share of Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian
Democratic, and Conservative parties), radical-right vote share and radical-
left vote share (their respective share of the national vote), total radical vote
share (the combined radical party vote share) and net mainstream vote share
(the vote share for mainstream parties minus the vote share for all radical
parties combined).28
Figure 4.3 summarizes the basic direction and significance of the associ-
ations between party family vote shares and government support for part-
nership (top panel), power (middle panel), and partnership +power (bottom
panel). Each panel summarizes the results for these country-level out-
come variables. The black dots in the figures represent coefficients for the
predicted associations between party family vote share and our outcomes
of interest: partnership, power, and partnership and power combined. The
bars summarize the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimates (with
estimates meeting the threshold of statistical significance when the bars do
not cross zero). We see that each of the key patterns summarized in Figure
4.3 is in the predicted direction. The two models measuring the effect of
mainstream party vote share and net mainstream vote share with partnership,
power, and partnership +power have a significant positive correlation. By
contrast, the three models measuring the effect of radical-right vote share,
...and support for partnership
(KOF index of globalization policies)
Mainstream vote
share
Radical right vote

share
Radical left vote

share
All Radical vote
share
Net Mainstream
vote share
−.004 −.002 0 .002 .004
...and support for power

(military spending as % GDP)
Mainstream vote
share
Radical right vote

share
Radical left vote
share
All Radical vote

share
Net Mainstream
vote share
−.008 −.006 −.004 −.002 0 .002
...and support for liberal internationalism

(partnership+power)
Mainstream vote
share
Radical right vote

share
Radical left vote

share
All Radical vote
share
Net Mainstream
vote share
−.03 −.02 −.01 0 .01
Figure 4.3 Effect of party vote share on government support for international
partnership and military power in Western democracies, 1970–2017
radical-left vote share, and combined radical vote share are all strongly nega-
tively correlated with government support for each of our outcome variables.
Figure 4.4 summarizes what these patterns mean substantively. Each panel
displays the counterfactual predicted levels of government policy support for
partnership +power as a function of the full sample variation of (a) main-
stream party vote shares (top panel) and (b) all radical-left and radical-right
party vote shares (bottom panel). The vertical axis for both models is the
same.29 Again, the solid lines in the figures refer to the direction of the re-
gression line capturing the two-way association between the variables on
.75
.5
.25
0
−.25
−.5
−.75
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Mainstream party vote share
.75
.5
.25
0
−.25
−.5
−.75
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Radical left and radical right party vote share
Figure 4.4 Relationship between mainstream and radical party strength and
government support for liberal internationalism in Western democracies,
1950–2017
the horizontal and vertical axes. The broken lines refer to the consistency or
tightness of the fit between these two variables with 95 percent confidence.
As the top panel makes clear, the larger the mainstream parties’ national vote
share, the more likely Western governments are to invest in partnership and
power—that is, in liberal internationalism. In the bottom panel, we see that
the greater the radical parties’ vote share, the less likely Western governments
are to invest in liberal internationalism. Notably, the positive effect of main-
stream party strength is marginally smaller than the negative effect of rad-
ical party strength. This is captured in Figure 4.4, where we see that the full
sample variation of mainstream vote share predicts a smaller swath of vari-
ation in liberal internationalism (top panel) than does the sample variation
in radical party vote share (bottom panel). These are substantial associations.
The variation in radical party vote shares predicts between 20 and 30 percent
of the variation in government policies of partnership +power.30
The West’s double commitment to partnership and power distinguished
liberal internationalism from other foreign policy strategies on offer, and
mainstream parties from their competitors on the far left and far right.
However, as the analyses in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 make clear, it was mainstream
parties’ strength at the ballot box during the Cold War, especially relative to
the radical parties, that enabled Western leaders to put liberal internation-
alism on a stable footing as the West’s strategy of choice.31 This point is often
forgotten or glossed over in accounts of the liberal order’s formation after
World War II and its subsequent amplification and elaboration in the decades
that followed. It was a time when party politics in Western democracies was
remarkably stable or “frozen,” as Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan put it
in their classic 1967 cross-national study of party democracy.32 A hidden
source of Western strength during the Cold War, the party alignments that
Lipset and Rokkan identified would remain in place until it ended.
THE GREAT UNWINDING
In the 1990s, Western party systems began to unwind. Parties on the center-
left and center-right started losing vote share at a slow but accelerating pace
to insurgent parties on the far left and far right. Scholars of comparative pol-
itics have written extensively about the decomposition of the West’s postwar
party systems and its implications for democratic governance. Much less has
been written about how the West’s turn to globalism in the post-Cold War
era contributed to the fragmentation and disruption of Western party sys-

tems or on its implications for Western solidarity and international influ-
ence. In Chapter 3, we showed how Western democracies’ failure to maintain
adequate levels of social compensation at a time of rapid economic integra-
tion stoked anti-globalist sentiment among voters and created opportunities
for parties on the far left and far right to make political hay. In this section, we
show that insurgent parties capitalized on those opportunities by using anti-
globalism to chip away at mainstream parties’ vote share and political power.
Working-class blues
When the Cold War ended, the parties that made up the vital center con-
tinued to dwarf their rivals. Mainstream parties continued to win the lion’s
share of the national vote and, as a result, retained control of the pivotal
foreign policymaking positions in national governments. Between 1976
and 1991, mainstream parties captured nearly 80 percent of the popular
vote, on average; lower than the share they received during the postwar
era, but not significantly so. As Figure 4.5 indicates, thirty years later, the
situation looks quite different. Since the Cold War, mainstream parties’
share of the national vote has dropped by a full 15 percent of the total
vote—averaging only around 65 percent of the vote by the late 2010s.
In some countries, the drop was sharper still. For example, in the 1990
German election, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats received
85
Radical right & left vote shares

8
Mainstream party vote share
80
6
75
4
70
2
65
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Mainstream Radical Right Radical Left
Figure 4.5 Average vote share by party family in Western democracies,

1950–2017
over 70 percent of the vote. In the 2021 election, together they received
just under 50 percent.33
Mainstream parties have not only lost vote share. Over the past thirty
years, Western government majorities have become smaller and Western
electorates have become more disjointed and volatile.34 The erosion of the
mainstream parties’ dominance in Western governing majorities is evident
in the data. Since 1991 the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by main-
stream parties dropped from a Cold War average of almost 50 percent to just
30 percent during the 2010s.35 As shared governments have become more
commonplace in the West, the process of putting them together and keeping
them together has become more complex and taxing. A two-party system
like America’s is spared the trials and tribulations of coalition government,
but worsening polarization in the United States has also made it more diffi-
cult for Republicans or Democrats to build winning coalitions to enact na-
tional legislation. Twenty years ago, Congress passed 225 laws in a year. In
2020, it passed only twenty-eight laws.36
Many factors have contributed to the electoral decline of mainstream
parties, from technological change, to secularization, to generational change,
to mass immigration, to income inequality.37 However, a strong case can be
made that Western governments’ turn toward globalism after the Cold War
played a decisive role. In the heady days of Western triumphalism over cap-
italism and open economies, Western leaders on the center-left did not only
see globalization as a strategy to expand the liberal order, internationally.
They also saw it as a means to boost their parties’ political fortunes, after a
decade or longer languishing in the political wilderness while center-right
parties set the policy agenda. Bill Clinton’s New Democratic agenda, Tony
Blair’s “New Labour,” Lionel Jospin’s réalisme de gauche (left realism), and
Gerhard Schröder’s “Agenda 2010” were cut from the same neoliberal cloth,
and under the influence of globalization, driven by the same political imper-
ative to make the center-left more competitive electorally.
During the Cold War, center-left leaders relied on the support of working-
class voters to win elections. The viability of that electoral strategy depended
greatly on the manufacturing sector’s vitality in Western economies. For
decades, that was a safe bet. However, over time center-left leaders found it
increasingly difficult to win national office relying principally on blue-collar
votes.38 The secular decline of the manufacturing sector in Western econo-
mies, and the concomitant rise of the service sector, led Social Democratic
leaders in the 1990s to adopt more pro-globalization policies in hopes of
winning over service-sector voters who benefited from cheaper goods and
services increasingly provided by imports and low-wage immigrant labor.39
In effect, center-left leaders began trading a large part of their traditional
older working-class political base that was being hurt by hyperglobalization
to win over younger, educated, middle-class voters who benefited from
market liberalization and supported multilateral cooperation. By one esti-
mate, in 1980 Social Democratic parties mobilized roughly twice as many
working-class voters as middle-class voters. By 2010, the proportions were
roughly the reverse.40
In Europe, Social Democratic and socialist leaders had already begun
changing course when they agreed to the creation of a single market in the
1980s. In the 1990s, they abandoned what remained of their long-standing
commitment to independent, national roads to social democracy by
embracing economic and monetary union.41 The 1992 Maastricht treaty, for-
mally establishing the European Central Bank and a common European cur-
rency, ruled out the kind of national autonomy that center-left parties once
insisted upon to protect their working-class constituencies from market
forces. Britain’s Labour Party, at most a reluctant supporter of earlier efforts
to promote European economic integration, set aside its “ancient enmity” to-
ward market liberalization and threw in its lot with the new European Union.
As Donald Sassoon puts it in his magisterial history of the European Left,
Maastricht “decreed that inflation, and not unemployment, was the main
enemy. This was now fully accepted by the Labour Party and by all other
European socialist parties.”42
In the United States, Clinton and other New Democrats broke with
Democrats from the aging Rust Belt cities of the Northeast on globalization
as well as on welfare policy, and aligned with conservative Republicans.43
Clinton embraced trade liberalization and pushed for the NAFTA regional
trade pact (1994), the GATT agreement creating the WTO (1994), and
granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China (2000). These
agreements angered labor and other Democratic constituencies (e.g., envi-
ronmental groups, human rights NGOs), and put Clinton at odds with many
traditional Democrats in Congress.44 But free trade deals helped Clinton and
the New Democrats earn the support of fast-growing high-tech and service
sectors, as well as their voters.45 These sectors were not strongly attached
to the Republican Party, and they were a huge potential source of votes and
money. Liberal, redistributive Democratic programs could not win over
this new class of voters and investors. What could help move them into the
Democratic column were cheaper imports and the promise of greater access
to foreign markets and investment opportunities.46
In Japan, globalization also weakened old party alignments and led to new
domestic alliances. In the early 1990s, the coalition of “steel and rice” frac-
tured, sending the conservative LDP to its first electoral defeat in nearly four
decades. While the LDP soon regained power, its defeat ushered in a host
of institutional reforms that led to a more competitive, fluid party system.47
Urban and middle-class voters previously frozen out of party politics by the
dominant LDP’s fealty to farmers were now an object of political mobiliza-
tion drives. In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi, a political maverick, captured the
LDP’s presidency and Japan’s premiership, campaigning on a neoliberal plat-
form targeting these voters.48 Koizumi’s platform of “reform, with no sacred
cows” took aim at the protection of inefficient sectors like agriculture while
offering neoliberal policies like lower taxes, privatization (e.g., postal ser-
vice), and cuts in pork barrel spending to woo new voters.49 Stealing a page
out of the US and EU playbook, Koizumi sought to strengthen Japan’s eco-
nomic ties to other countries in the region through “open regionalism.”50
In the 1990s, center-left as well as center-right parties in Western democ-
racies saw political advantage in promoting globalization and its domestic
corollaries: lower corporate taxes, tighter fiscal policy, fewer government
regulations, trimmed down welfare states, and weaker trade unions. This
trend continued though the 2000s as the balance of power in America, France,
Germany, and other Western democracies shifted from the center-left to the
center-right.51 Under Germany’s Angela Merkel, France’s Nicolas Sarkozy,
and America’s George W. Bush, multilateralism and intergovernmentalism
remained the preferred mode for global economic cooperation. The same
was true of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which came to power in
2009, and the LDP’s Shinzo Abe, who returned to power in 2012.52 Both con-
tinued to pursue FTAs with other nations and backed the multilateral negoti-
ations that culminated in the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty (TPP).53
Figure 4.6 summarizes the party alignments in Western democracies over
foreign policy during these years. We see that most center-left and center-
right parties continue to cluster in quadrant two (liberal internationalism).
However, many mainstream parties also now cluster in quadrant one (glob-
alism). When compared to Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the most significant change
in the behavior of mainstream parties is their movement up the vertical axis,
indicating greater support for economic integration and institutionalized
cooperation. Center-left and center-right parties are now on average more
4

2
Sample
median
−2 0
Sample
median
−4
−4 −2 0 2 4
Conservative mean
deeply committed to partnership than they were during the Cold War (and
far more than parties on the radical left and, especially, the radical right). By
contrast, there is little sustained change in mainstream party family support
for military power. As during the Cold War, the more conservative the main-
stream party family, the more likely it is to urge increased military spending
and preparedness.
The shift in mainstream parties’ support for globalization is easier to see
in Figure 4.7. It tracks the mean position of each mainstream party family,
as well as the mean location of radical-left and radical-right parties from
1950 through 2017. In the case of mainstream parties, we see gradual move-
ment up the vertical axis. This is clearest in the case of Social Democrats,
but we see the same upward drift in the mean position of Conservatives and
Liberals (though not Christian Democrats). To be sure, the upward shift in
overall mainstream party support for market liberalization and institutional-
ized cooperation is not as dramatic as the overall movement toward market-
favoring change in Western government foreign policy that we described
in Chapter 2. This is not surprising, however. Party manifestos can tell us
something important about what parties promise voters, but they are an im-
perfect guide to what their leaders actually do once in office. As the anal-
ysis in Chapter 3 showed, one important reason for the divergence between
government policy and party platforms on trade liberalization and interna-
tional institutions is that Western leaders have become overly responsive to
2
Globalism SD Liberal Internationalism
L M ’92−’17

Mainstream (M) CD
1.5
Radical left (RL) M ’76−’91
Radical right (RR) C Sample
Social Dem (SD) M ’50−’75 median
1 Liberal (L)
Christian Dem (CD)
Conservative (C) RR ’50−’75
.5
RL ’92−’17 RR ’76−’91
Sample
median
0
RL ’76−’92
−.5
RR ’92−’17
RL ’50−’75 Isolationism Nationalism
−2 −1 0 1 2
Figure 4.7 Average party family support for international partnership and
military power in Western democracies, 1950–2017
the market-oriented views and expectations of international business and in-

ternational technocrats—far more than voters anticipate, based upon their
party’s election platforms.54
Things fall apart
The most significant post-Cold War changes to Western party platforms in

the area of foreign policy were those that radical-left and radical-right parties
put before voters.55 Throughout the Cold War, parties on the far left ran for
election on platforms with foreign policy planks favoring disarmament,
East-West neutrality, and in most cases, trade protection. As we have seen,
these parties generally gravitated toward the lower-left isolationist quad-
rant, opposing government investment in both military power and interna-
tional partnership. Radical-right parties were less of a single mind. While
they agreed that governments should spend more on national defense, they
were less united over how much international partnership was enough. Most
radical-right parties opposed free markets and international institutions.
Others viewed open markets as a means to combat socialism at home and saw
institutionalized cooperation as a means to dilute American power and influ-
ence. During the Cold War (Figures 4.1 and 4.2), some radical-right parties
thus aligned with Conservative parties in the upper-right liberal internation-
alist quadrant. Others gravitated to the bottom-right nationalist quadrant.
In the 1990s, many radical-left parties began combining traditional calls

for defense cuts and disarmament with a greater willingness to work through
international institutions. Parties that once viewed international institutions
as inherently elitist and undemocratic, now argued that international
institutions could play a valuable role in mounting effective, democratic
responses to transnational challenges such as climate change, human rights,
and social justice.56 Speaking for many on the left, Mary Kaldor argued that
global institutions could be reimagined to help “civilize globalization.”57 No
longer laboring under the weight of the Cold War, political parties on the
far left certainly had more political room to reposition themselves for such a
mission. Figure 4.7 captures this movement in the foreign policy orientation
of parties on the far left from the lower-left quadrant toward the upper-left
quadrant (globalism). As a result, a growing number of these parties can now
be found just above or just below the horizontal axis in Figure 4.6.
The far left’s willingness to campaign for institutionalized cooperation and
global governance had its limits though. First, as Figure 4.6 indicates, most
radical-left parties continued to oppose trade liberalization and supranation-
alism; the vast majority were still located in the bottom-left isolationist quad-
rant. This included newer left-wing populist parties in Spain, Greece, and
Italy which were hard-hit by the Eurozone crisis of the early 2010s. Podemos,
Syriza, and other parties on the far left all sharply contested EU-backed aus-
terity programs and rules and made the case for democratizing decision-
making in Brussels. The radical left’s increased support for partnership also
did not translate into increased support for the WTO or multilateral trade
initiatives. In Europe, parties on the far left opposed the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Program (TTIP). They argued that the negotiations were too
secretive, and that the agreement lowered EU food, auto, and environmental
standards, while threatening local jobs and wages by giving foreign compa-
nies unfair advantages.58 Similar arguments were made against the TPP in
Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific nations.59
The post–Cold War era also led radical-right parties to reposition them-
selves on foreign policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, those radical-right
parties that once favored free and open trade began reversing course in the
1990s, combining calls for tighter restrictions on trade, outsourcing, and
immigration with their traditional support for military preparedness.60
They also stepped up their attacks on supranational institutions like the
European Union and the WTO, whose rules, regulations, and decision-
making processes, they argued, infringed on national sovereignty.61 We see
in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 that parties on the far right now clustered heavily in
the bottom-right nationalist quadrant. Older radical-right parties such as
France’s FN and the Denmark’s DPP, which sometimes aligned with lib-
eral internationalist parties in the past, were now squarely in the nationalist
fold.62 So were newer far-right parties like Britain’s UKIP and Germany’s
AfD.63 Still vociferous backers of military power and strength, after the
Cold War radical-right parties also became ardent foes of international
partnership.
They also became deft practitioners of wedge politics. As discussed in
Chapter 3, radical-right parties were actively using anti-globalism as early
as the 1990s to mobilize voters no longer strongly aligned with Social
Democratic parties and to put Conservative and Christian Democratic
parties on the political defensive.64 By the 2010s, campaigning against trade
liberalization and supranational institutions had become an effective strategy
for winning over working-class voters, especially in regions that were se-
verely impacted by globalization and falling behind economically.65 In the
run-up to the Brexit referendum, UKIP’s Nigel Farage made gains with the
so-called “left behind” in Northern and Eastern England’s aging Rust Belt
cities and towns by fusing the explosive issue of immigration with opposition
to EU membership. In 2017, Marine Le Pen ran for the French presidency
merging the FN’s long-standing opposition to mass immigration with a new
“strategic plan for reindustrialization” aimed directly at regions of France’s
north and east hard-hit by globalization.66
Their efforts did not catapult them into national government, but they did
succeed in putting mainstream parties on the defensive and, importantly,
capturing a larger share of the electorate. Indeed, the more issues of trade
liberalization and supranationalism were debated, the more radical-right
parties stood to benefit. Evidence for this can be found in more detailed
quantitative analysis of whether a given party’s platform position on inter-
national partnership and military power before a national election improves
or hurts its performance (vote share) in the election. Our baseline models
in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 pool all parties, countries, and years in the Manifesto
Project data (1950–2017), and control for all party families, decades, and
country fixed effects. We also control for a given party’s other manifesto
positions on a left-versus-right ideological scale to better isolate the possible
electoral effects of its stance on partnership and power.67 We expected that,
all things being equal (e.g., in the absence of a corollary commitment to ex-
pand social protections), parties that were more supportive of international
15.6
15.41%
15.4
Party’s vote share
15.2
15
14.9%
14.8
−4.3 −2.3 −.3 1.7 3.7

Party platform support for international partnership
15.8
15.6
15.4
15.2
15
14.8
−2.8 −1.8 −.8 .2 1.2 2.2 3.2

Party platform support for military power
15.6
15.4
15.35%
15.2
15
14.9%
14.8
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6
Party platform support for liberal internationalism
Figure 4.8 Relationship between party support for international partnership

and military power and electoral success in Western democracies, 1960–2017
16
When social security trans-
15.5
fers are high (>90th%)
15

fers are low (<10th%)
14.5
−4 −2 0 2 4
Party platform support for international partnership
15.6

15.4

15.2
15
14.8

fers are low (<10%)
14.6
−4 −2 0 2 4
Party platform support for military power
16

15.5
14.5 15

fers are low (<10th%)
14
−5 0 5
Party platform support for partnership+power
Figure 4.9 Relationship between social protection, foreign policy, and party
vote share in Western democracies, 1950–2017
partnership would be punished at the ballot box, while parties more opposed
to partnership would be rewarded.
This is, in fact, what we see in Figure 4.8. While there is low correlation
between a given party’s support for military spending and preparedness
(power; middle panel) and that party’s share of the national vote (party vote
share) in the ensuing election, a party’s support for trade, international
institutions, and multilateralism (partnership; top panel) correlates signifi-
cantly and negatively with its subsequent electoral performance. In general,
parties supporting partnership lose votes. By contrast, opposing partnership
increases their vote share. This pattern applies for the entire 1950–2017 time
period, but, notably, the electoral rewards for parties opposing partnership
have increased since the end of the Cold War.68 This same pattern is evident
for liberal internationalism (partnership +power; bottom panel), but does
not hold up for party support of power.
Figure 4.9 takes things a step further by considering how sensitive the
correlations reported in Figure 4.8 are to the presence or absence of social
protection. In Chapter 2, we showed that voters are more inclined to sup-
port liberal internationalism when social protections are robust, as they were
during the Cold War in the advanced industrialized economies. Here, we
consider whether this commitment to social democracy made voters more
likely to vote for parties supporting liberal internationalism. To answer
this question, we interacted social protection with liberal internationalism
(partnership +power; bottom panel) and partnership (top panel) and power
(middle panel), separately.69 The model is based on the same specifications
as the models in Figure 4.8, though now we add these interactive terms.
Figure 4.9 compares the counterfactual results, with two schedules in each
of the three panels: a light-shaded schedule, where the level of social pro-
tection is modest (at the sample’s 10th percentile of social protection); and a
dark-shaded schedule, where social protection is strong (at the sample’s 90th
percentile).70
The results we see in Figure 4.9 are clear-cut. In countries where social
protection is robust, parties running on platforms favoring partnership and
power do not pay an electoral price. Indeed, parties calling for increased
military spending and preparedness gain vote share, provided strong social
protections are in place. By contrast, in countries where social protection is
modest, a party running on the same liberal internationalist platform can ex-
pect to experience a sharp decline in its vote share, all else equal. These results
are consistent with an extensive literature in comparative and international
political economy that shows that governments and parties that act to miti-
gate the uneven distributional effects of economic openness are rewarded by
voters, while those that do not are punished at the ballot box.71 However, the
results in Figure 4.9, show that this holds for military spending as well. This
suggests that voters are sensitive to guns-versus-butter trade-offs, and that all
things being equal, prefer both. More broadly, the analysis here indicates that
political parties investing in partnership or power will suffer at the polls un-
less liberal order-building and social protection go hand-in-hand.
It is here, at the intersection of international and domestic politics, that
Western governments, and the mainstream parties leading them, lost their
way and opened the door to populist and nationalist parties once on the
fringes of party democracy. To be sure, the factors mentioned earlier, such as
automation, mass migration, economic inequality, have also contributed to
the rise of radical-right parties and the decline of mainstream parties. A case
can be made that many of these are having effects picked up in our meas-
ures. It is also important to bear in mind that while statistically significant,
the negative correlation between partnership (and partnership +power) and
party vote share are modest, with the full sample variation in Figures 4.8 and
4.9 predicting no more than a 0.7 percent shift in vote share. All of that said,
the results reported in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 are robust to a number of model
specifications.72 The results are also consistent with country-level aggregate
analyses that show that the size of the gaps between governments and voters
over foreign policy correlate positively with radical parties’ electoral success
and negatively with mainstream party performance at the polls.73 Minimally,
what these results tell us is that liberal order-building no longer affords main-
stream parties the electoral advantages it once did, and that radical-right
parties have found a powerful weapon in anti-globalism to challenge the au-
thority of Western democracies’ vital center.
A DECLINING ASSET
For decades international relations scholars largely took Western democ-

racies’ legitimacy and capacity to govern themselves as givens. The main
focus was on how rapid international changes were impacting the liberal
order: how shifts in the balance of power, technological change, and environ-
mental degradation affected the willingness and ability of states to open their
economies and to cooperate multilaterally.74 International relations scholars
had much less to say about how changes in the distribution of political au-
thority and power within countries affect the possibilities for cooperation be-
tween them. Political polarization and democratic backsliding in the West
has exposed the limits of viewing the liberal order as though it is suspended
above domestic politics. As we have shown, party democracy has shaped the
possibilities of international cooperation between Western governments
since the inception of the postwar liberal order. In this section, we consider
how the erosion of political authority in Western democracies is impacting
the liberal order today.
Western power and influence
During the Cold War, party democracy was a force multiplier for Western
governments in international politics. The stability, legitimacy, and effective-
ness of the mainstream parties that made up the vital center was a source
of Western strength and international influence. Western leaders had little
reason to worry that party and party-coalition turnover in the two dozen
democracies that formed the core of the liberal order would lead those
governments to renege on international commitments undertaken by their
predecessors, or at least far less than they do today. This did not mean that
mainstream parties within Western democracies were always in agreement
with one another, or that elections never produced foreign policy reversals.
Social Democrats emphasized liberal internationalism’s commitment to
partnership; Conservatives, put the accent on power. But in general, alter-
nation in power between the mainstream parties did not bring radical shifts
in governments’ commitments to partnership and power. Indeed, scholars
have argued that the robustness of foreign policy commitments to demo-
cratic deliberation and party turnover within Western democracies was a
critical source of their international credibility.75 At a time of great anxiety
about Soviet ambitions and the risk of nuclear war, party democracy was a
foreign policy asset, bolstering Western collective purpose and resolve and
strengthening the liberal order’s domestic foundations.
Western democracies did not always see eye-to-eye, of course, and liberal
order-building did not move in a straight line. There were setbacks and incon-
sistencies (e.g., high tariffs on agricultural goods, France’s 1966 decision to
opt out of NATO’s integrated military command). Fears of American dom-
ination and abandonment were never very far from the surface in Europe
or Asia.76 Yet by working within multilateral institutions, Washington was

able to reassure its allies that it would wield its immense power in concert
with them rather than use it to reap unilateral advantage. The fact that both
of America’s major political parties publicly backed these commitments to
managed openness, multilateral cooperation, and the common defense
was a constant source of reassurance too. Among other things, it signaled
a high degree of consistency in US foreign policy. Former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson once referred to bipartisanship as the “oil of national govern-
ment.”77 By signaling American purposefulness and reliability, party cooper-
ation over foreign policy also lubricated the wheels of Western cooperation.
This was also true of the West’s many multiparty democracies and co-
alition governments. There, too, political stability was an international
asset. Whatever policy differences American policymakers had with their
European and Asian counterparts, they had little reason to think that the
foreign policy pendulum would swing dramatically when a center-left coa-
lition replaced a center-right coalition, or vice versa. As we have seen, liberal
internationalism enjoyed the unstinting support of the many mainstream
parties that governed in Europe and Asia during the Cold War. Broad-based
domestic support was not a substitute for Western governments’ directly sig-
naling their commitment to liberal internationalism by negotiating down
tariff barriers or agreeing collectively to increase their share of the common
defense. But it did underscore multiparty democracies’ capacity to make
good on these commitments, and that was no small thing in a world where
East and West seized every international opportunity to claim that their po-
litical model was best.
Often derided as volatile, dysfunctional, and ineffective today, Western
democracies were seen differently in the age of party democracy. Party de-
mocracy was a source of Western international attraction. West Germany
and Japan were proof that ideological extremism could be tamed, and for
the many countries that wanted “in” to the liberal order, that democracy
could deliver the goods. For political elites in the developing world, the lib-
eral order’s promise of economic growth and advancement may have been
its main attraction. But the democratic make-up of the polities driving the
liberal order forward did not go unnoticed by their citizens. Between the
early 1980s and the early 2000s, the proportion of democratic countries in
the world more than doubled.78 Of course, many of the countries that were
part of this “third wave” of democratization and liberal constitutionalism
never fully crossed the democratic threshold. Others did democratize only
to revert to autocratic rule. Yet the sharp rise in democratization reminds us

that Western democracies have not always been on the political defensive,
internationally.
The price of fragmentation
To better understand the international effects of Western democracies’ polit-

ical fragmentation, we developed a model focusing on three key features of
the liberal order. These are the degree of international openness, the amount
of multilateral regulatory and adjudicatory authority, and the extent to which
non-Western countries align themselves with Western democracies. If party
democracy contributed to the expansion of the liberal order, we would expect
party fragmentation to result in less international openness among Western
democracies, less delegation and pooling of authority by Western and other
international states to multilateral institutions, and less willingness by non-
Western states to align with Western democracies in international bodies.
To test these arguments, we rely on three quantitative measures. The first
is KOF’s (2021) de facto index of economic, political, and sociocultural glob-
alization among Western democracies.79 We treat this index as a proxy for
the degree of Western international openness. The second is Hooghe et al.’s
(2018; 2020) Measure of International Authority (MIA). We use this measure
to gauge the level of authority delegated, pooled, and vested by states in inter-
national governmental organizations with strong Western membership. Our
third measure uses Voeten et al.’s (2009) UN voting agreement (or similarity)
scores to measure how much non-Western countries vote with Western
democracies on General Assembly roll call votes.80 We measure party frag-
mentation using Rae’s (1968) popular index of legislative fractionalization of
the party system.81 We take each of these measures of the liberal order in turn,
starting with the effects of party fragmentation on international openness.
International openness
Figure 4.10 tracks the level of international openness based on KOF’s most
comprehensive measure of globalization. It measures actual economic, polit-
ical, and sociocultural globalization flows at the country level for our sample
of twenty-four OECD nations from 1970 through 2018. We see clearly that
globalization steadily increased from the early 1970s until the mid-2000s,
when it slowed and leveled off. The trend here closely parallels the steady
80
KOF index of de facto globalization
60 65 70 75
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 4.10 Average level of globalization among Western democracies,

1970–2018
increase in Western government policies promoting economic and polit-

ical globalization that we described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.7). However,
Figure 4.10 is tracking the actual flow of goods, services, and peoples across
national boundaries, participation in peacekeeping operations, and the
spread of human rights, civil liberties, and culture. That these two indicators
have moved roughly in parallel since the 1970s, when the time series begins,
is not surprising. Policy change is expected to lead to changes in trade beha-
vior, currency flows, migration patterns, and so on.
In Figure 4.11 we summarize the main result of a regression analysis esti-
mating the effects of Western party fragmentation on international open-
ness. Here, we regressed models of KOF de facto globalization on five-year
lagged moving averages of parliamentary fractionalization. The models in-
clude a range of substantive controls (level of democracy, voter, turnout, GDP
growth, union density, openness, social transfers, and unemployment rate),
and “dummy” variables for time and country.82 As is clear from the negative
slope of the line and its confidence intervals, party fragmentation does result
in less international openness. The negative correlation is significant in sub-
stantive terms too. We see that the full sample variation in party-system frag-
mentation predicts about 30 percent of the sample variation in globalization
flows (between roughly the 30th and the 60th percentile in the full sample
distribution of the KOF index of de facto globalization). As Western democ-
racies have become more fragmented and volatile, the pace of international
integration has slowed.
78
KOF index of de facto globalization
76
74
72
70
68
.42 .51 .60 .69 .78 .87

Party−system fragmentation
Figure 4.11 Relationship between domestic political fragmentation and

globalization, 1970–2018
Global governance
If globalization has slowed in the face of Western domestic fragmentation,
efforts to expand multilateral governance have stalled outright. Figure 4.12
tracks the growth of international authority from 1950 through 2019 for
twenty-five international organizations where Western democracies are ac-
tive members.83 We use the MIA database’s three scales to capture differences
in the scope, form, and level of authority states lodge in international gov-
ernmental institutions.84 These include the extent to which states delegate
authority to international institutions, jointly pool authority in international
organizations, and international bodies have the authority to resolve or settle
disputes among their member states. We see in Figure 4.12 that, after a rela-
tively brief increase in the 1990s, the amount of international authority in two
of the three indicators levels off in the 2000s, with little subsequent growth in
international intergovernmental authority over the next two decades.
In estimating the association between party- system fragmentation
and international authority, we focus on how strongly an international
institution’s authority in a given year correlates with its authority in the pre-
ceding year.85 The results of the time series analysis are summarized in the
top panel in Figure 4.13.86 They offer considerable support for our argu-
ment. The more Western party systems fragment in a given year, the less au-
thority Western governments are willing to delegate or pool in international
institutions, on average. The relationship between party-system fragmenta-
tion and international dispute settlement is also negative. However, it is not
.36
.4
IO delegation and settlement scales
Dispute
.35
settlement
IO pooled sovereignty scale

.35
.34
Pooling
.3
.33
.32
.25
Delegating
.31
.2
.29 .3
.15
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 4.12 Average level of decision-making authority exercised by

international organizations (IOs), 1950–2019
statistically significant. Finally, we see that party fragmentation also signifi-

cantly correlates with a composite measure combining the three MIA scales.
Thus, in three out of four measures of international authority, we see the ex-
pected effect or association.
The substantive meaning of the results is also summarized in Figure 4.13
(bottom panel). It focuses on the results for delegating and pooling interna-
tional authority. We can see from the negative slopes (including the upper
and lower confidence intervals) that fragmentation of Western party sys-
tems has a substantially large as well as statistically significant correlation
with governments’ willingness to delegate and pool authority in multilateral
institutions. Based on the first-differences of the variables, we see that the full
variation in party fragmentation is associated with a major portion of the
sample variation in the annual delegation and pooling of authority: for del-
egation, roughly the 15th percentile to the 80th percentile and, for pooling,
roughly the 3rd percentile to the 78th percentile. These patterns are also evi-
dent in our composite measure.87
Aligning with the West

Our final test focuses on the extent to which states align with Western
democracies in multilateral institutions. We consider how often states vote
with the West in the UN General Assembly. Of course, the UN is only one
international organization of import and much of the negotiation in the
run-up to public votes on UN resolutions takes place behind closed doors.
Nevertheless, UN General Assembly voting provides a useful way to uncover

latent voting blocs and political alignments and to test theories about the
conditions under which they form. Our interest here is in determining the
extent to which Western democracies’ governing effectiveness has burnished
or tarnished their international reputation and standing. We cannot test this
directly, but voting behavior in the UN General Assembly provides an in-
direct method for assessing the relationship between political fragmenta-
tion within Western democracies and the “Western model’s” attractiveness
internationally.
Party−system fragmentation
(annual first-difference) and ...
Delegation
Pooled
sovereignty
Dispute−
settlement
International
authority com-
posite index
−1 −.5 0
IO delegation & pooled sovereignty*
.005
Delegation
score
0
Pooled sovereignty
score
−.005
−.015 −.005 .005 .015

Western party−system fragmentation*
*Annual first−difference
Figure 4.13 Effect of domestic political fragmentation in Western democracies

on IO decision-making authority, 1960–2018
.9
−1.4
Similarity
score
Ideal−point similarity score

Voting agreement score
−1.6
.8
−1.8
.7
Agreement
score
.6
−2
−2.2
.5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 4.14 Level of voting similarity between Western and non-Western

countries in UN General Assembly, 1950–2020
Figure 4.14 tracks the level of voting similarity between Western and non-
Western states between 1950 and 2020 using two separate but related meas-
ures: “voting agreement” and “ideal-point similarity.”88 The first is simply the
share of all votes cast by our sample of twenty-four Western states that are in
agreement with non-Western states.89 The “ideal-point similarity” index is
based on a model of similarity of broader voting patterns in a given year (here
recalculated for similarity between Western and non-Western states). We see
that ideal-point similarity between Western and non-Western countries has
increased considerably since a low point in the 1970s and 1980s. The trend
is more stable over time when using the voting agreement measure, though
here, too, since the 1990s the level of voting agreement between the West
and the rest is above the historic norm dating back to the 1950s. However,
by either standard we see a marked softening in voting “likeness” between
Western and non-Western states since the 1990s. The pattern is evident by
the early 1990s in the voting agreement index, and by the mid-2000s using
the ideal-point similarity measure.90
Did political fragmentation within Western democracies contribute to
this leveling off in voting likeness between the West and the rest? In Figure
4.15, we summarize the results of a regression analysis of the relationship be-
tween party fragmentation and UN voting similarity between Western and
non-Western states.91 We expect the pattern of voting agreement and ideal-
point similarity to be negatively correlated with party fragmentation, even
.8
Voting agreement with West
Chance that any non-Western
.75
country votes with a given
Western country
.7
.65
.42 .51 .60 .69 .78 .87

Western party−system fragmentation
−1.3
Ideal−point similarity with West
−1.4
Similarity between a Western

country’s votes and all non-Western
countries’ votes
−1.5
−1.6
−1.7
−1.8
.42 .51 .60 .69 .78 .87

Western party−system fragmentation
Figure 4.15 Relationship between domestic political fragmentation in Western

democracies and voting similarity with non-Western countries in the UN
General Assembly, 1960–2018
after controlling for the influence of other factors.92 The top panel shows the
results for the basic “voting agreement” scores. We see that higher party frag-
mentation does, in fact, result in lower rates of agreement between Western
and non-Western countries. The correlation is statistically significant, and
the substantive associations are quite substantial. The full sample variation
in fragmentation “explains” roughly 35 percent of the variation in UN voting
agreement (from the roughly 25th to 60th percentiles in the sample distribu-
tion of non-Western agreement). In the bottom panel, we see the same nega-
tive pattern for ideal-point similarity, even if it is less significant, statistically
and substantively. In both cases, party system fragmentation in a given

Western country decreases voting likeness with non-Western countries.
Taken together, these patterns suggest that as Western democracies have
become more politically divided and volatile, they have lost some of their
international luster as models of good governance. Of course, other factors
(e.g., China’s growing influence in Africa, Latin America, and other world re-
gions; the West’s ill-conceived military interventions in the Middle East in the
2000s) have undoubtedly contributed to the softening in voting correspond-
ence between Western and non-Western states. We have only scratched the
surface. Additional research on this issue is needed. But this much is already
clear: the political fragmentation disrupting Western democracies today is
taking a toll on international openness, international authority, and interna-
tional affinity with the West. At a time when illiberal powers are challenging
the liberal international order from the outside, Western democracies are
suffering from what Abraham Lincoln, in another context, famously called
“the fire in the rear.”93
THE FIRE IN THE REAR
The 1990s were a high-water mark for the West’s confidence in itself. Many
commentators viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in
Eastern Europe as a victory for liberalism and open economies.94 The end of
the Cold War, they argued, represented the permanent victory of liberal de-
mocracy and capitalism over the forces of illiberalism and nationalism. Great
hopes were pinned on the new European Union’s communitarian spirit,
the promise of a more open, integrated world order that included China,
the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and other
emerging economies, and America’s capacity to consolidate, protect, and ex-
tend democracy and markets across the globe.
Today, those Western visions of the future look dated and off-target.
Western prognosticators significantly underestimated the extent to which
nations outside the Western-led system would resist efforts to globalize lib-
eral norms, laws, and institutions. They also greatly overestimated Western
democracies’ political capacity to support such a far-reaching global agenda.
In the absence of a renewed commitment to social democracy, Western
governments’ turn toward globalism after the Cold War weakened the lib-
eral order’s vital center by giving insurgent parties and movements a potent
wedge issue to peel off disillusioned voters and put mainstream parties on
the political defensive. As support for the vital center declined, and Western
democracies became more fragmented, disjointed, and volatile, the liberal
order itself has fractured.
New fault lines have emerged over how best to tame the disruptive forces
of globalization and to guarantee international security in a world rapidly
devolving into competing power centers. Western political fragmentation
and volatility have also exposed new vulnerabilities, as illiberal states have
sought to capitalize on these divisions by stoking nationalism and fomenting
unrest within the West. Once mutually reinforcing, party politics and lib-
eral order are now pulling Western democracies in opposite directions.
This brings us to the West’s current predicament. Given the intensity of the
domestic pressures now confronting Western democracies, any hope of
bringing international ends and domestic means back into balance must
start from within. The West must find ways to renew the liberal order’s do-
mestic purposes and legitimacy. We take up this issue in the next chapter.
5
Bridging the Gap
Writing in the midst of World War II, Walter Lippmann argued that the key
to successful international statecraft involves keeping ends and means in
balance. “In foreign relations,” Lippmann wrote, “a nation must maintain its
objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and
its means equal to its purposes.” When nations fail to balance international
commitments and national capabilities, Lippmann added, they “will follow
a course that leads to disaster.”1 International relations scholars and foreign
policy analysts often equate Lippmann’s means to military and economic
capabilities, but as Lippmann himself argued, a country’s political “solvency”
is often more critical to effective statecraft than its material means.
Today, Western democracies are suffering from a “Lippmann gap.”2
A large gulf has opened up between Western governments’ internationalist
ambitions and their domestic political capacity to support them. Donald
Trump’s presidency, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the
spread of anti-globalist parties and movements in Europe are the most visible
signs of this gap. Yet, as we have shown in this book, today’s anti-globalist
backlash represents an intensification of a process that has been gathering
strength in Western democracies for three decades now, unbowed by ter-
rorism, pandemic, or war. The many commentators who view Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine as a watershed moment in the reaffirmation of the Western
alliance may be proven right in time, but if so, it will be because Western
leaders capitalized on the moment by rebuilding the domestic foundations of
the liberal international order.
As we have seen, the erosion of domestic support for the liberal order in
Western democratic polities took shape in the aftermath of the Cold War,
and at the height of Western optimism about the future. In the ensuing years,
as Western leaders deepened their nations’ commitment to economic inte-
gration and institutionalized cooperation while loosening long-standing so-
cial protections, domestic support for these foreign policies weakened. Once
a wellspring of domestic consensus and coalition-building, foreign policy
became a source of political disruption and fragmentation within the West.
Bridging the Gap 121
Mainstream parties lost ground to parties on the far left and especially to the
anti-globalist right. The gap between Western governments and voters over
foreign policy continued to widen. Today, the domestic political foundations
of the Western liberal international order are a pale shadow of what they
were at the height of the Cold War. The West overreached.
The West’s failure to keep international ends and domestic means in bal-
ance is not a classic case of imperial overreach. The anti-globalism roiling the
advanced democracies is not a backlash against far-flung empires, bloated
military establishments, or endless wars on the periphery. It has more to
do with Western leaders’ overreliance on global markets and international
institutions than with war and military expansion. As we have shown, since
the end of the Cold War, Western governments failed to maintain high levels
of social protection to compensate for the disruptive effects of capitalist
growth in an era of hyperglobalization. This eroded public confidence in the
liberal order and created opportunities for new politicians and new parties
to win over disaffected and angry voters. Freed of Cold War imperatives,
nationalist parties in Western countries turned liberalized trade, European
integration, and national sovereignty into potent wedge issues against main-
stream political leaders and parties.
This has proved costly for the West, domestically as well as internationally.
Domestically, the fragmentation of Western party systems made it harder for
Western governments to marshal the political power and authority required
to deliver on issues their citizens care most about. This fuels voter dissatisfac-
tion which, in turn, leads to greater fragmentation, paralysis, and dysfunc-
tion. Internationally, domestic fragmentation has slowed the pace of liberal
order-building and eroded confidence in the West. China and Russia have
been quick to seize on the erosion of support for Western international lead-
ership to promote alternative, illiberal visions of politics and society and to
test Western resolve. Many factors contributed to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine,
but one was surely the belief that Western democracies were too internally
divided and polarized to respond collectively and programmatically.
In this concluding chapter, we discuss the implications of Western over-
reach, and the strategies now on offer to bring ends and means back into
balance. We begin by summarizing our main findings on how Western
governments’ approach to international order-building has changed over the
past seventy-five years and how this resulted in the anti-globalist backlash we
see across the West today. We compare and contrast our analysis of Western
overreach, anti-globalism, and political fragmentation to other explanations.
Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for

restoring Western solvency. We consider three paths Western democracies
are being urged to follow, and assess their advantages and disadvantages in
light of our analysis of the liberal order.
PARTNERSHIP AND POWER
All foreign policy strategies involve choices. Leaders must decide how much
to rely on partnership, and how heavily to invest in power. They must decide
how much to subordinate national autonomy to international markets and
pooled sovereignty, and how much to spend on military power (guns) versus
on domestically oriented policies and programs (butter). International rela-
tions scholars and foreign policy analysts writing about world politics and
foreign policy typically focus on one dimension or the other: on partnership,
or on power. There are obvious economies in doing so. Yet, as we have shown,
widening the field of vision to include both of these key dimensions of inter-
national statecraft in a single framework offers real payoffs. We have used
this framework to track the evolution of the liberal order from its postwar
inception to the current crisis, and to test our arguments about the origins,
timing, and extent of Western overreach across twenty-four OECD countries
and four hundred political parties.
From virtuous to vicious cycle
The Western-led liberal order has changed in far-reaching ways since its in-
ception seventy-five years ago. During the Cold War era, the United States,
Europe, and most of the rest of the OECD shared a vision of international
order-building that rested on a robust commitment to both international
partnership and military power. At once liberal and realist, the Western-
led order balanced the demands of geopolitics and social democracy, and
international openness and national autonomy. The social democrats,
liberals, Christian democrats, and conservatives that dominated Western
governments advanced liberal internationalist policies knowing that
those policies would enjoy broad public support and, in turn, pay electoral
dividends for them. For over half a century, what was good for liberal inter-
nationalism was good for party democracy, and vice versa.
The Western liberal order that took form in the postwar era was not a mon-
olith, of course. Western democracies did not move in lockstep. At any given
time, there was significant cross-national variation in levels of government
support for partnership and power along the liberal order’s Atlantic and
Pacific axes, and across party families within the liberal order’s many democ-
racies. Western leaders combined partnership and power in varying ways,
and to varying degrees, due to differences in their country’s geopolitical, do-
mestic, and historical circumstances. Yet to an extent that even the most opti-
mistic postwar planners did not anticipate, the Western liberal order became
more open, integrated, and institutionalized. America, Britain, France, West
Germany, and most other Western democracies all came to display a level of
commitment to partnership and power that sharply distinguished the West
from the rest, and that would endure through the Cold War.
What seemed to many like a virtuous cycle between foreign policy and
party democracy in Western democracies did not last. The first cracks in lib-
eral internationalism’s domestic foundations appeared in the 1980s, when
Western governments’ turn to neoliberalism in response to the crisis of
the 1970s set in motion forces that would weaken the liberal order’s party
foundations. However, it was not until the Cold War ended that the virtuous
cycle between foreign policy and party democracy broke down. In the 1990s,
Western governments shifted from a strategy of liberal internationalism that
combined power with partnership, to a strategy of globalism that relied in-
creasingly on market forces without corresponding investments in social
protections and economic security for their citizens.
Domestic support did not keep stride, however. As we have seen, that
support has eroded most starkly in the European democracies, but similar
patterns emerged in America, Japan, and in most OECD countries. Across
the West, a gap opened up between governments and voters over globalism.
Anti-globalist parties successfully exploited these gaps. Support for radical
left and radical right parties grew steadily in the 2000s, and then swelled in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. At the same time, globalism became a
source of contestation and division within mainstream parties themselves.
The Tea Party faction of the Republican party in the United States and the
Brexit faction within Britain’s Conservative party broke with the majority
over foreign policy.
By the time Donald Trump launched his campaign for the presidency
in 2015, the virtuous cycle between foreign policy and party democ-
racy in Western democracies had broken down. Parties and candidates
that actively campaigned on the anti-globalist platforms of protectionism,

Euroskepticism, and “taking back control from unelected bureaucrats” in
Brussels and foreign policy establishments were rewarded by voters. Those
that called for expanding and deepening institutional ties lost ground,
fragmenting the liberal order’s domestic foundations and reducing the po-
litical room that Western governments have to make foreign (and domestic)
policy. Early hopes that Western democracies’ response to the COVID-19
pandemic would foster greater international cooperation were frustrated.
Most Western countries responded by entrenching themselves behind their
borders and engaging in vaccine nationalism.3
Sources of Western anti-globalism
What explains the politicization of foreign policy in Western democracies?

How did foreign policies that were once widely accepted by Western voters
become political lightning rods? We have argued that our understanding
of these questions can be significantly enhanced by considering how inter-
national and domestic politics interact to shape the possibilities for foreign
policy consensus and fragmentation. As we have shown, since the inception
of the Western-led system in the early postwar era, the level of democratic
support for liberal international order-building among its member states has
been conditioned by two key drivers: the level of geopolitical threat or risk
facing Western democracies, and the extent to which Western governments
are committed to providing social protection and welfare support for their
citizens.
During the Cold War, geopolitical imperatives were a source of political
consensus within Western democracies, and between them. For Western
governments, a common strategy that relied on military rearmament, mil-
itary alliances, and economic integration offered the best hope for pro-
moting economic growth and prosperity for their citizens and limiting or
containing the political impact of Soviet power and communism in Europe
and East Asia. For Western voters, this liberal internationalist agenda was
vastly preferable to foreign policy strategies being advanced by parties on the
far left and the far right that were considered too soft on communism, or
too belligerent and thus too risky in the superpower bipolar nuclear age. For
mainstream parties, whose electoral strength in the postwar era depended
on their ability to secure broad cross-class support, a strategy that combined
partnership and power was not only considered wise statecraft, it was good
politics too. A foreign policy strategy that relied solely on one or the other
risked alienating center left or center right voters. In short, liberal interna-
tionalism was a Goldilocks solution: just the right mix of liberalism and re-
alism, integration and autonomy, and partnership and power.
Cold War imperatives gave Western governments and voters reason to
support liberal internationalism. So did the generous social protections
that were part and parcel of the postwar welfare state. The nature of these
social protections and welfare provisions varied across the OECD, but the
different types of welfare models—social democratic, Christian democratic,
and liberal—shared common values of full employment, social security, and
increasing social equality. The idea that governments were responsible for
balancing free markets and economic security was widely accepted, as was
the principle that wealth should be redistributed from those that benefited
the most from greater economic growth to those who did not. These social
bargains limited how far Western governments could open up their econ-
omies to trade and capital flows, or transfer decision-making authority to
international bodies. They also helped cushion the free market’s disruptive
effects, while allowing industry, workers, and farmers to reap the benefits of
increased exports and imports. Mainstream parties’ commitment to these
social bargains and understandings secured the votes of critical working-
class voters during the Cold War who might otherwise have backed parties
on the far left.
Consensus did not mean unanimity within or between the liberal order’s
members, and every crisis generated new predictions of imminent Western
decline. During the Cold War, the most serious test of Western democra-
cies’ commitment to liberal internationalism was the crisis that unfolded
in the 1970s. The end of the postwar boom and the rise of US-Soviet stra-
tegic parity raised new doubts at the elite and mass levels about the postwar
liberal order’s ability to continue delivering prosperity and security. A rift
opened between center left and center right parties over its causes and how
best to restore growth and enhance security. The crisis was ultimately re-
solved in the 1980s on terms favorable to the center right. Center left parties
began shifting course, moving toward the right. International markets were
liberalized, security alliances were strengthened, and social protections
were reined in. Political allegiances and alignments that had defined
Western party democracy for decades frayed, but they did not unravel. The
center held.
In the 1990s, the political opportunity structure favoring liberal interna-

tionalism over other foreign policy strategies changed. The collapse of the
Soviet Union removed one of the central justifications in Western democra-
cies for investing in power as well as partnership: the need to contain Soviet
power on the Eurasian landmass and protect the free flow of economic ac-
tivity along the liberal order’s Atlantic and Pacific axes. The end of the Cold
War also weakened a key rationale for social protection: the need to offer
working-class voters an alternative to state socialism and unrestrained cap-
italism. Even before the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the postwar balance be-
tween international openness and social protection was shifting in favor of
the former. This continued in the 1990s. In an effort to win support of the
most globalized (pro-globalization) sectors of business and capital and at-
tract younger, educated, middle-class voters who benefited from globaliza-
tion and supported multilateral cooperation, Western leaders on the center
left and center right prioritized market liberalization and institutionalized
cooperation. In the 2000s, this globalizing trend gathered momentum.
Western leaders’ efforts to globalize the liberal order after the Cold War
succeeded in expanding the web of international institutions and making
national borders more porous. But it also spurred political fragmentation
within Western democracies. Political ideologies and alignments frozen by
the bipolar Cold War conflict thawed. Foreign policy strategies sidelined and
shunned by Western leaders during the long East-West struggle gained a new
lease on political life. As popular fears of communist expansion and nuclear
Armageddon receded, Western voters were more willing to take a chance on
parties advancing foreign policy platforms that were once considered be-
yond the pale. At a time when Western governments were retrenching polit-
ically, working-class voters and members of the new precariat certainly were
not at a loss for reasons to buck mainstream parties.
In response, parties on the far left and far right began to reinvent and repo-
sition themselves. On the far left, parties combined traditional calls for trade
protection, defense cuts, and disarmament with transnational issues such as
social justice, climate change, and social regulation, relaxing their opposi-
tion to all forms of multilateral cooperation. On the far right, long-standing
commitments to laissez-faire capitalism were jettisoned in favor of anti-
globalism and social protection in hopes of broadening their appeal to the
growing ranks of disenchanted working-class voters and the structurally un-
employed. As pressure mounted on their flanks in the ensuing years, center
left and center right parties have increasingly looked for ways to incorporate
key elements of the far left and far right’s agenda. Center left parties have be-
come increasingly Green in hopes of winning over younger, educated voters.
Center right parties have become more nationalist and nativist, and in many
cases more protectionist. At the height of the Cold War, parties on the center
left and center right had more in common with each other than they did with
the parties further toward the political extremes. Today, in many cases, this
is no longer true.
DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY
For three decades, domestic opposition to globalism has been building in

Western democracies. Understanding anti-globalism’s roots is important
for several reasons. For one thing, it reminds us how different the path to
the West’s present predicament is from the one that international relations
scholars and foreign policy analysts envisioned in the Cold War’s aftermath.
Visions of the liberal order’s future ranged from liberals who believed democ-
racy and free markets had permanently triumphed over the forces of illiber-
alism and nationalism, to realists who predicted heightened economic and
strategic competition between Western democracies as the imperatives of in-
ternational anarchy reasserted themselves. If liberals overestimated democ-
racies’ immunity to illiberalism and nationalism, realists underestimated
the extent to which increasing economic integration and interdependence
would be a primary cause of nationalism’s revival. What both missed was the
extent to which the liberal order’s trajectory would be determined by politics
within the Western democracies.
The politics of overreach
This book is predicated on the argument that our understanding of the

origins, consolidation, and retreat of the liberal order can be deepened by
taking into account domestic politics. Most accounts of the liberal order’s
evolution are pitched at the international level—at the level of state-to-state
relations. States’ geopolitical circumstances do tell us a great deal about their
foreign policy choices. During the Cold War, the presence of a common threat
had a disciplining effect on politics within Western democracies. However,
Western governments’ foreign policy choices are also shaped and influenced
by similarities in their domestic makeup and political circumstances (e.g.,

class composition, social commitments). The liberal order arose in an age
of Cold War and social democracy. Twin pressures—one international, the
other domestic—reminded Western leaders of the need to balance interna-
tional integration and national autonomy, free markets and social protec-
tion, foreign and domestic policy.
With the end of the Cold War, Western leaders were under less pressure to
keep international ends and domestic means in balance. The collapse of the
Soviet empire opened up new international markets for Western capital while
reducing the strategic impetus for welfare-state growth at home. The ongoing
erosion of the manufacturing sector in Western economies, and the rapid ex-
pansion of service sectors and knowledge-based economies, led mainstream
parties to put their hand on the scale in favor of globalization and younger,
educated middle-class voters who benefited from market liberalization and
supported multilateral cooperation. The end result was the growing mismatch
between Western international ambitions and the domestic capacity to sustain
these ambitions. This is what we have described and documented in this book.
This explanation of Western overextension differs from those who attribute
it to political leaders’ overreliance on military power. Many international rela-
tions scholars and foreign policy analysts argue that America’s and, more gen-
erally, the West’s failed efforts to use war to promote democracy and other ends
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere fueled nationalism abroad and eroded
public trust at home.4 There is no doubt that the heavy cost in blood and trea-
sure of the failed wars in the Middle East eroded public confidence in Western
political elites, to say nothing of the anger and resentment they generated in
countries at the receiving end. However, as we have seen, Western publics’ dis-
enchantment with foreign policy set in well before their governments began
putting “boots on the ground” in the Middle East. Moreover, since the 1990s,
Western governments’ investment in partnership has been of greater concern
to voters, including American voters, than has investment in military power.
It has also been costly for mainstream parties at the ballot box. Radical parties
have enjoyed more success campaigning against free trade and supranation-
alism than against defense spending and military preparedness.5
Sources of fragmentation
There is a large and growing literature on the effects of globalization on

Western party democracy. Numerous cross-national and country-specific
studies by economists and political scientists indicate that globalization’s

uneven domestic economic effects have taken a heavy toll on mainstream
parties in recent decades.6 Economic and social dislocations, especially in
hard-pressed manufacturing regions, have made it easier for populist and
nationalist politicians to use trade, Euroskepticism, and immigration to ex-
ploit voters’ economic and social anxieties. Our analysis of the party and elec-
toral consequences of the West’s turn to globalism is consistent with these
findings. We have shown that Western party fragmentation has increased
since the end of the Cold War, and that increasing opposition to the liberali-
zation of international markets and the transfer of national sovereignty to in-
ternational institutions is one key reason. Anti-globalist parties have gained
national vote share by attacking mainstream parties for outsourcing jobs
to lower-wage producers like China and Eastern Europe, and for transfer-
ring too much discretionary power to supranational institutions such as the
European Commission and the WTO.
We have seen too that Western democracies’ vulnerability to the siren
calls of nationalism and isolationism depends partly on the strength of their
commitment to social protection. In general, voters’ support for mainstream
parties rises when government spending on social security and other wel-
fare entitlements increases. Decline in such spending is one reason that sup-
port for mainstream parties has fallen in most Western democracies since
the 1990s. This is when many OECD countries began reducing spending on
income maintenance. Western governments’ commitment to social protec-
tion did not keep stride with their efforts to liberalize international markets
and expand the scope of international rule through trans-and suprana-
tional institutions. Instead of taking steps to shore up domestic support for
liberal international order-building, Western leaders’ austerity programs
made it easier for populist and nationalist politicians to use protectionism,
Euroskepticism, and nativism to increase their parties’ share of the na-
tional vote.
Our analysis breaks new ground by demonstrating the critical role that
the Cold War, the Soviet collapse, and geopolitics more generally have
played in shaping the domestic politics of liberal order-building across the
West. We have shown that the disappearance of a common geopolitical
threat after the Cold War expanded the domestic political playing field for
political parties on the far left and right that had been marginalized during
the Cold War, and that refused to subordinate local grievances and claims to
wider post–Cold War international geopolitical logics. This finding is also
consistent with work by political scientists who have shown that the end
of the Cold War weakened mainstream parties’ support for social protec-
tion, and for the welfare state more generally, in Western democracies.7 For
much of the Cold War, the rivalry between the capitalist West and the Soviet
bloc encouraged both sides of the East-West divide to spend unprecedented
sums on social welfare to demonstrate the superiority of their “system” and
to gain popular support and legitimacy in the struggle. With the end of the
Cold War, an important strategic impetus for Western welfare state growth
disappeared.
The analysis also sheds new light on the fragmentation of Western party
systems. Much of the current debate among scholars specializing in com-
parative party politics is focused on whether economic or cultural causes
best explain the decline of mainstream parties and the concomitant rise of
populist and nationalist parties. This analytic distinction has its limits. The
differences between explanations that stress the consequences of globaliza-
tion, technological change, and economic inequality on those “left behind”
and “cultural backlash” theories that emphasize parochialism, nationalism,
and nativism as drivers are often overdrawn. Both explanations point to
voters’ feelings of social marginalization and their resentment against polit-
ical elites, government bureaucracies, and “foreigners.”8 Moreover, political
discontent does not find its fullest political expression on its own. The story
of anti-globalism’s rise since the end of the Cold War is not only one of pop-
ular demands for social redress. It is also about how political entrepreneurs
and parties on the fringes of Western party systems successfully tapped and
mobilized popular discontent.9
The politics of anti-globalism can be read as a textbook case of how parties
and party leaders actively try to mobilize and demobilize voters to gain and
hold on to power. As the ties between mainstream parties and working-
class voters frayed in the 1990s, parties on the far left and especially the far
right sought to capitalize on this opening by using anti-globalism to reach
out to these newly unattached voters. In the case of radical right parties, it
meant abandoning long-held laissez-faire platform positions concerning
international trade in favor of economic nationalism and protectionism.
Meanwhile, in a world where the West faced no peer challenger, voters were
more open and amenable to radical parties’ foreign policy appeals. In hind-
sight, it is clear that Western leaders seriously misjudged this electoral threat.
By doubling down on globalization while they were putting the brakes on the
growth of the welfare state and eliminating legislation favorable to unions,
political leaders fed a slow-burning fire. Western democracies have paid a
heavy price for the failure of their leaders to keep international ends and do-
mestic means in balance.
DRIFT OR MASTERY
Can Western leaders bring foreign and domestic policy back into balance?
Is it possible for Western governments to renew their commitment to the
liberal order without fueling further division within their societies? In this
concluding section, we consider three strategies for easing this tension and
bridging the gap between international ends and domestic means. Discussion
around these choices is already underway. One option is for Western democ-
racies to scale back international commitments to keep the West’s interna-
tional expectations in line with what domestic politics will currently allow.
A second approach is to use Great Power confrontation with China and
Russia to rekindle Western solidarity and revive domestic support for liberal
internationalism. A third strategy is to attack the ends-means problem from
the domestic side by investing in a strategy of economic renewal, and thereby
gird the West for the return of geopolitics.
Strategic retrenchment
The idea that Western democracies can bring international ends and do-
mestic means back into equilibrium through strategic retrenchment is an al-
luring one. The argument is especially well-rehearsed in the United States,
where an entire school of thought—the “restraint” school—calls on America
to reduce its international commitments in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.10
Made up of conservative libertarians, anti-imperialist progressives, and
balance-of-power realists, the restraint coalition claims that the mainstream
foreign policy establishment’s preoccupation with promoting “liberal he-
gemony” has led America astray. Under the guise of liberal order, Democratic
and Republican presidents alike have invested far too much blood and
treasure in parts of the world that are not vital to America’s core national
interests. This encourages wealthy allies to free ride on US military might
and engage in “reckless driving.”11 It also fuels insecurity among states who
are suspicious of US and Western motives. “Restrainers” argue that Putin’s
invasion of Ukraine was the direct result of American and European efforts
to expand NATO into Russia’s Near Abroad.12 The United States, restrainers
argue, would be better served by a strategy of “off-shore balancing,” where
American power is reserved for rare occasions when regional balances of
power fail and an onshore US military presence is needed to check an ag-
gressor and restore stability.13
A strategy dedicated to reeling in US security commitments is guaranteed
to set off alarm bells among America’s allies in Asia and Europe. Restrainers
acknowledge this, but they contend that weaning allies off the “American
pacifier” will force them to take more responsibility for their own security.
Meanwhile, restrainers argue that it will reduce the risk that Washington is in-
advertently drawn into regional disputes that have little bearing on America’s
national security, and provide cost savings that might be invested in butter or
used for debt reduction. Many American strategists disagree, arguing that a
strategy of restraint is neither safer nor cheaper, and risks throwing the baby
out with the bathwater. They argue that America’s strategic alliances and
forward presence in Europe and Asia strengthen regional stability, and are
cheaper to maintain than to rebuild once dismantled.14
Whatever its geopolitical advantages, a strategy of restraint stands little
chance of success domestically. One takeaway from our comparative analysis
of Western democracies’ foreign policies since World War II is that grand
strategies are only as stable and durable as the domestic political foundations
they rest on. “Ends-against-the-middle” ideological coalitions like the re-
straint coalition, which straddle positions on the far left and the far right, are
inherently unstable and invariably short-lived.15 Indeed, such coalitions are
rare in Western democracies, and rarer still in two-party systems. Trump’s
America First strategy, which crudely aped many of the restrainers’ core stra-
tegic arguments, failed to win broad-based support not only because of pres-
idential incompetence. It also ran up against the limits of security policies
that appeal only to ideological extremes. Bipartisan consensus may not be a
political prerequisite for programmatic foreign policy change in the United
States, but foreign policies that appeal to a broad cross section of voters are a
prerequisite for durable, programmatic shifts.16
Practical politics aside, restrainers have also misdiagnosed America’s
ailments. As we have shown, the erosion of domestic support for the liberal
order is not unique to America, or due to its overreliance on military power,
however misguided. It stems from the abandonment of managed trade, the
fraying of the social safety net, and overreliance on multilateral governance.
Like their Western counterparts, America’s leaders began betting too heavily
on the beneficial effects of trade liberalization and multilateral institutions,

and became too inattentive or indifferent to the political risks of scaling back
the welfare state. As Western governments invested in ever greater economic
integration and pooled more and more authority in multilateral institutions,
Western voters balked at the rising costs in national sovereignty and their
own economic insecurity. In short, restrainers are prescribing the wrong
medicine for the patient. American and other Western publics are not clam-
oring for fewer security commitments abroad. They are demanding greater
economic security at home.
Cold War 2.0
If America and other Western democracies cannot bridge the ends-means

divide by pulling back internationally, perhaps they can do so through Great
Power competition. This is the view of a growing number of policymakers,
political analysts, and pundits who see geopolitical rivalry with China and
Russia as a way to increase domestic buy-in and support for international
order-building.17 By harnessing the geopolitical tensions to the cause of
global activism, the argument goes, Western democracies can drive domestic
social transformation, much as they did during the postwar boom that began
in the early 1950s. Already political analysts are drawing stark parallels be-
tween a “new axis of autocracy” led by China today and the threat posed by
the former Soviet Union and its allies in the 1950s.18 The thinking is that
worries about China’s growing power might reinforce Western solidarity and
keep nationalist pressures in check domestically, just as the Soviet challenge
had during the Cold War.
Can a strategy that makes China enemy No. 1 close the solvency gap?
Would such a strategy pitting democracies against autocracies foster greater
social coherence and common purpose in the West? Yes, up to a point.
Foreign threats can boost domestic solidarity. History is full of examples of
this dynamic.19 Indeed, we have shown that the Soviet threat played a crit-
ical role during the Cold War in marginalizing liberal internationalism’s do-
mestic opponents. Yet the Cold War analogy must be handled with care.20
As we have shown, Western solidarity did not rest solely on shared concerns
about Soviet power and intentions, and the West’s trente glorieuses owed
more to the expansion of international trade than to military spending.
Western democracies also found unity and common purpose in embedded
liberalism. Social democracy was not sacrificed to fight communism during

the Cold War. In the absence of a similar commitment to domestic renewal
and inclusive growth, strategies aimed at isolating and “othering” China or
other illiberal states are unlikely to generate the broad based domestic buy-in
needed to sustain a containment-like Western strategy.
The nature of the geopolitical challenge posed by illiberal powers like
China and Russia today is also different. The Soviet Union was a hardened,
ideological adversary. The pervasive fear of communism in the West com-
pelled political elites to strike the class compromise between capital and labor
that was a hallmark of embedded liberalism.21 During the Cold War, Western
elites had to demonstrate that capitalism was every bit communism’s match,
and more, by offering workers greater economic security, equality, and op-
portunity. This critical social dimension of the Cold War rivalry for “hearts
and minds” is missing today. China can attract other countries, including
many in the West, by offering aid, technology, and infrastructure, but it has
no comprehensive, alternative vision to offer the outside world. As diplo-
matic historian Melvyn Leffler puts it, “Beijing today may disparage Western
democracy and tout socialism with Chinese characteristics, but all the world
can see that it has embraced a capitalist mentality and nationalist ethos.”22
Playing the China card to draw Western democracies together is not a
sure thing either.23 Western democracies are growing increasingly anx-
ious about China’s strategic ambitions in Eurasia and along the maritime
“string of pearls” stretching from the Chinese mainland through the Strait
of Malacca to the Horn of Africa. However, those worries are not equally
shared by Western governments. Some Western capitals worry more about
Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions than others— concerns are greater in
Washington than in Berlin, and in Tokyo than in Seoul. As a result, Western
governments differ on how best to deal with China. Most of America’s allies
favor some mix of “carrots” and “sticks” or “hedging,” hoping to maintain ac-
cess to China’s markets and labor along with the security and protection that
American power affords. For most Western democracies, dealing with China
is thus a mixed sum, not a zero-sum, game. Here, too, the Cold War analogy
breaks down.
During the Cold War, Western security and economic policy toward
Moscow were both committed to the same strategic objective: containing
Soviet power. Geopolitics and geo-economics were joined up. Since the end
of the Cold War, however, the security and economic dimensions of grand
strategy have grown increasingly disjointed. One key reason for this was the
West’s deliberate policy of promoting China’s steady growth and integration

into the world economy on the assumption that, as the rewards of trade and
economic development spread through society, Chinese leaders would find
it hard to resist pressures to liberalize socially and to cooperate with the West
on security as well as economic matters. However optimistic that strategy
may appear today, China’s outsized role in the global economy now makes
isolating it a tough sell within the West, let alone in the Global South, where
Beijing has a strong economic as well as diplomatic presence.
At a time when economic growth itself has become a planetary threat due
to environmental unsustainability, a strategy that aims to isolate China is
also dysfunctional. This is not only because China is now the world’s largest
carbon emitter whose actions will decide a large part of the climate future. It
is also because Western democracies are internally divided over the China
challenge. In the United States, where talk of a “bipartisan consensus” against
China is commonplace, there are divisions within America’s political parties
and among the wider public.24 The same is true in other Western countries
such as Germany and France, where mainstream parties find themselves
at odds over China with parties on their left and right, respectively.25 This
could change, of course. Much depends on Beijing’s behavior, including how
firmly it allies with Russia and other autocratic powers and how aggressively
it acts toward its Asian neighbors or repressively within its own borders.
Yet it also depends on whether Western parties and interests that see ad-
vantage in a strategy of domestic renewal are able to build broad-based do-
mestic coalitions to move their progressive agenda forward with agreement
on China.
Domestic renewal
Proponents of domestic renewal argue that Western democracies must re-

turn to their postwar roots—to the compromise of embedded liberalism—
if they hope to close the Lippmann gap between ends and means.26 At the
heart of the postwar compromise was a progressive grand bargain be-
tween capital and labor that ensured crucial domestic support for liberal
order-building for decades to come. However, when Western governments
turned to neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, and broke the bargain their
predecessors had struck between growth and equity, domestic support weak-
ened. Market liberalization created new, sharper divisions between winners
and losers in Western societies, and heightened the distinction between tra-
ditional blue-collar workers and the rapidly expanding pool of immigrant
labor joining the labor force. In short, rising economic insecurity and ine-
quality eroded the liberal order’s legitimacy within Western democracies.
If Western governments want to restore the liberal order’s social purposes,
renewal’s proponents argue, they must revitalize their commitment to social
democracy.
Our analysis provides empirical support for this interpretation of the pre-
dicament Western democracies now find themselves in. As we have shown,
as government support for social protection weakened, so did domestic sup-
port for liberal order. Yet our analysis has also highlighted the pivotal role that
parties have played as intermediaries in this process, from brokering the in-
itial compromise of embedded liberalism, to its subsequent breakdown over
the turn to neoliberalism and globalism in the 1980s and 1990s, to the anti-
globalist backlash roiling Western democracies today. By bringing political
parties into the analytic frame, we have underscored the extent to which the
social bargain underlying the liberal order is contingent on party democracy.
As mainstream parties’ willingness to support social protection and eco-
nomic inclusiveness wavered, so too did voters’ enthusiasm for international
openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance. Once
dismissed as a problem of little strategic significance, the widening chasm
between Western governments and their voters is now a source of Western
international weakness and vulnerability.
Geopolitics can help bridge this ends-means gap, as it did during the long
Cold War. But alone it cannot restore the liberal order’s legitimacy. If Western
leaders hope to rebuild popular support for the liberal order, they must attack
this ends-means problem “from the inside out”—that is, from the domestic
rather than the international side.27 In eras like the present, when traditional
foreign policy remedies (e.g., trade liberalization) have fallen into disfavor
and the domestic coalitions long associated with those foreign policies have
fragmented, political leaders must find new arguments about the necessity of
international openness and institutionalized cooperation and forge new do-
mestic bargains and political alliances to support them. Policy requires pol-
itics. This is the crucial takeaway from our analysis of seventy-five years of
liberal order-building by Western democracies. Today, as in earlier periods
of intense debate and conflict in Western democracies over the proper bal-
ance between foreign and domestic policy, these struggles will be shaped and
influenced by political parties competing for electoral advantage.28
What precise shape these political arguments and party alliances might
take is unclear. Much will depend on the ability of political leaders to reim-
agine the relationship between foreign and domestic policy and reconnect
policies in the international realm to recognizable benefits at home. Western
democracies cannot return to the early decades of the postwar liberal order,
but they can look for new ways to renew and update their commitment to
inclusive growth and economic security for their citizens. This will require
innovation in domestic growth regimes centering on strategic localization of
productive activities, investment in human capital, quality-of-life supports,
and environmental sustainability. Some of these processes are already un-
derway in some progressive internationalist policy initiatives within the
OECD. Yet given the depth of the anti-globalist backlash, far more is needed
if Western democracies hope to close the solvency gap. By rebuilding support
for the liberal order from the inside out, such a strategy of renewal would also
put Western democracies on a stronger footing to compete geopolitically in
a world where international power and authority are increasingly contested.
To paraphrase Lippmann, Western democracies’ international purposes
would once again be within their domestic means, and their means equal to
their purposes.
Appendices
APPENDIX A
Summary statistics for country-year and party-year analyses.
Table A.1 Country-year summary statistics for Western democracies, 1960–2017.

Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.
Government support for 1,049 5.06 0.18 4.36 5.27
partnership: KOF index of globalization
policies
Government support for 1,158 1.12 0.36 0.29 2.31
power: Military spending (% GDP)
(logged %)
Partnership + Power (standardized sum 1,005 0.28 0.84 −2.80 2.16
of policies)
Mainstream party vote share 1,225 76.21 15.49 9.56 99.62
Radical right party vote share 1,225 3.47 6.20 0 30.76
Radical left party vote share 1,225 6.07 7.10 0 44.88
All radical party vote share 1,225 9.55 9.77 0 55.48
Net mainstream vote share 1,225 66.67 22.85 −29.46 99.62
Party-system fragmentation (Rae- 1,195 0.68 0.11 0.35 0.89
legislative fragmentation)
Party platform support for partnership 1,225 1.12 0.77 −1.86 2.73
(mean)
Party platform support for power 1,225 0.25 0.66 −2.20 2.81
(mean)
Party platform support for Partnership 1,225 1.37 1.05 −2.42 4.82
+ Power (mean)
Manifesto index of voter support for 1,225 24.90 22.66 −49.41 119.41
partnership
power
partnership + power
partnership (normalized)
(continued)
140 Appendices
Table A.1 Continued
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max

Dev.
power (normalized)
Social transfers (% GDP) 1,193 12.44 3.97 3.80 22.79
Geopolitical threat index 840 −0.53 0.61 −1.47 1.05
Government-voter gap: partnership 1,049 0.61 0.56 0 2.58
Government-voter gap: power 1,158 0.36 0.50 0 2.84
KOF index of political globalization 1,049 83.71 13.47 38.51 97.72
flows (de facto)
KOF index of globalization flows (de 1,049 70.37 10.65 45.71 90.69
facto)
Voting agreement in UNGA 989 0.73 0.10 −0.26 0.88
Voting agreement of non-West in 989 0.71 0.10 0.23 0.89
UNGA
Ideal-point similarity in UNGA 989 −1.49 0.42 −3.27 −0.69
Ideal-point similarity of non-West in 989 −1.63 0.46 −3.50 −0.596
UNGA
Right government cabinet share 1,194 38.08 32.23 0 100
Democracy score 1,134 9.70 1.33 −6 10
Party vote share average 1,225 19.46 9.49 6.97 49.77
Voter turnout 1,195 78.01 13.07 39.77 95.72
Union density 1,157 40.80 19.65 7.63 93.65
Unemployment rate 1,195 5.44 3.79 0 23.13
GDP growth 1,182 3.03 1.79 −4.94 10.34
Left-to-right platform average 1,225 −5.59 10.97 −38.58 45.68
Effective number of parties 1,195 3.48 1.30 1.54 8.74
Appendices 141
Table A.2 Party-year summary statistics for Western democracies, 1950–2018.

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Party platform support for partnership 6,871 1.16 1.34 −4.29 4.06
Party platform support for power 6,871 0.18 1.21 −3.67 3.58
Party platform support for partnership + 6,871 1.34 1.89 −6.17 7.46
power
partnership
power
partnership + power
Vote share 6,879 15.44 13.86 0 57.71
Vote share (moving-average) 6,879 15.63 13.94 0 56.16
Social transfers (% GDP) 6,868 13.10 3.76 4.32 22.79
Geopolitical threat index 5,595 −0.11 0.59 −0.91 2.35
Party families (1–7) 6,879 3.55 1.90 1 7
Democracy 6,542 9.82 0.71 1 10
KOF de facto globalization 6,313 4.28 0.15 3.86 4.51
Military expenditures (logged) 6,639 0.64 0.49 −0.82 2.14
Unemployment rate 6,879 6.02 4.11 0 26.17
Left-to-right platform (adjusted) 6,871 −2.70 19.74 −74.30 78.85
Decades 6,879 5.62 1.49 3 8
Country code 6,879 33.47 17.62 11 71
APPENDIX B
Detailed statistical results for regression estimations.
Table B.1 Government support for international partnership and military power as a function of social security transfers and geopolitical threat in Western
democracies, 1970−2017 (summarized in main text, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.8).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt. support Govt. support Govt. support Govt. support Govt. support Govt. support
for partnership for power for partnership + for partnership for power for partnership +
power power
Social transfers (% GDP) 0.015*** 0.013 0.086*** 0.015*** 0.013* 0.086***

(0.003) (0.007) (0.019) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
Geopolitical threat 0.014 0.066* 0.132 −0.01 0.076* 0.127
(0.035) (0.03) (0.145) (0.038) (0.037) (0.152)
Democracy level 0.005 −0.026 −0.054 0.011 −0.028** −0.039
(0.009) (0.017) (0.043) (0.006)+ (0.009) (0.035)
Trade openness 0.001 −0.001 0 .0004 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Avg. vote share −0.003 0.005 0.006 −0.001 0.006 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.014)
Voter turnout −0.001 0.002 −0.006 −0.001 0.001 −0.009
(0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
Union density −0.004* −0.001 −0.019* −0.004** −0.001 −0.016*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.001 −0.001 0.0002 −0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015)
GDP growth 0.001 −0.016 −0.026 0.004 0.004 0.023
(0.005) (0.013) (0.03) (0.004) (0.009) (0.029)
Constant 5.059*** 1.629*** 2.054 5.041*** 1.692*** 1.843
(0.199) (0.366) (1.103) (0.2) (0.297) (1.038)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.897 0.917 0.899 0.897 0.874 0.879
Observations 698 822 698 793 793 793
(1) and (4) DV =Government policy support for international partnership (KOF index of globalization policies)
(2) and (5) DV =Government policy support for military power (military spending, % GDP)
(3) and (6) DV =Government policy support for partnership +power (standardized sum of government policy support for partnership and for power)
Models (1)–(3) are OLS coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. Models (4)–(6) are seemingly unrelated regression with OLS
coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. Decade and country fixed effects included but not shown.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Table B.2 Party platform support for international partnership and military power as a function of social security transfers in Western democracies, 1960–
2017 (summarized in main text, Figure 3.3).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party Platform Party Platform Party Platform Party platform Party platform Party Platform
partnership power partnership +power partnership power partnership + power
Social security transfers 0.043* 0.053* 0.096** 0.043 0.017 0.059
(0.019) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.048)
Radical-left (RL) −1.12*** −0.9*** −2.02*** −0.981* −2.20*** −3.18***
(0.152) (0.199) (0.256) (0.457) (0.395) (0.676)
Social Democratic (SD) 0.396 −0.121 0.275 0.025 −0.448 −0.423
(0.192) (0.163) (0.296) (0.455) (0.501) (0.66)
Liberal (L) 0.73*** 0.382* 1.112*** 0.539 0.196 0.735
(0.171) (0.143) (0.211) (0.444) (0.292) (0.512)
Christian Democratic (CD) 0.709** 0.421** 1.13*** 0.847 −0.057 0.79
(0.194) (0.138) (0.252) (0.521) (0.477) (0.765)
Conservative (C) 0.544* 0.782*** 1.326** 0.411 0.354 0.765
(0.249) (0.178) (0.38) (0.596) (0.417) (0.832)
Radical-right (RR) −1.039** 0.981*** −0.058 0.043 −0.224 −0.181
(0.273) (0.146) (0.349) (0.819) (0.524) (0.807)
Social security × RL −0.01 0.097** 0.087
(0.034) (0.029) (0.048)
Social security × SD 0.03 0.024 0.053
(0.028) (0.035) (0.045)
Social security × L 0.015 0.014 0.029
(0.034) (0.02) (0.04)
Social security × CD −0.01 0.035 0.025
(0.041) (0.031) (0.055)
Social security × C 0.01 0.032 0.043
(0.048) (0.031) (0.07)
Social security × RR −0.076 0.087* 0.011
(0.06) (0.039) (0.055)
Democracy level 0.115 0.156 0.27 0.119 0.144 0.263
(0.092) (0.092) (0.166) (0.095) (0.09) (0.167)
Trade openness 0.005 0.008** 0.013** 0.005 0.008*** 0.014**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Unemployment rate −0.016 −0.044** −0.06* −0.013 −0.043* −0.057*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022)
Avg. vote share 0.006 0.018*** 0.025** 0.006 0.018*** 0.025**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Left-right platform −0.014*** 0.01** −0.005 −0.015*** 0.01** −0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant −0.847 −2.595* −3.442* −0.892 −2.004 −2.896
(0.912) (0.979) (1.579) (1.026) (0.996) (1.692)
R-squared 0.397 0.462 0.461 0.401 0.47 0.463
Observations 6935 6935 6935 6935 6935 6935
(1) and (4) DV =Party platform support for international partnership

(2) and (5) DV =Party platform support for military power
(3) and (6) DV =Party platform support for partnership +power
Models are OLS coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. Decade and country fixed effects included but not shown.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B.3 Manifesto index of voter support for international partnership and military power as a function of social transfers and geopolitical threat in Western
democracies, 1960−2017 (summarized in main text, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.10).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voter support: Voter support: Voter support: Voter support: Voter support: power Voter support:
partnership power partnership +power partnership partnership + power
Social security transfers 0.88* 0.591 1.348*
(0.393) (0.546) (0.568)
Geopolitical threat −0.483 4.144+ 2.375
(2.768) (2.679) (4.286)
Radical-left −8.336** −7.44** −13.843*** −8.113* −8.842** −14.952**
(2.481) (2.188) (3.556) (2.958) (2.421) (4.069)
Social Democratic 8.491* −11.732*** −3.088 8.541* −12.261*** −3.493
(3.181) (2.573) (3.929) (3.622) (2.656) (4.418)
Liberal 4.413* 3.188 6.862* 4.403 3.304 6.983*
(2.027) (1.915) (2.425) (2.561) (2.275) (2.936)
Christian Democratic 7.682** 2.775 8.615** 6.35** 1.859 6.063*
(2.232) (2.029) (2.928) (2.034) (1.993) (2.841)
Conservative 3.429 14.403*** 16.718** 4.164 15.252*** 18.065**
(3.815) (3.531) (5.068) (4.045) (3.906) (5.524)
Radical-right −11.821*** 7.379*** −5.243 −10.277*** 7.228** −4.144
(2.384) (1.817) (2.609) (2.602) (2.165) (2.679)
Democracy level 3.085** 1.908 5.164* 2.329* 2.691 4.551*
(0.874) (1.534) (1.851) (0.856) (1.546) (1.79)
Past globalization flows −36.212 −68.243* −22.406 −32.383
(19.657) (24.17) (23.908) (28.128)
Past military spending −4.759 −5.854 −2.089 −2.641
(5.353) (7.08) (5.048) (8.47)
Unemployment rate −0.184 −0.589 −0.584 0.286 −0.327 −0.115
(0.352) (0.309) (0.435) (0.372) (0.315) (0.5)
Avg. vote share 1.429*** 0.821*** 2.3*** 1.436*** 0.787*** 2.271***
(0.155) (0.112) (0.185) (0.162) (0.115) (0.201)
Left-right platform −0.135** 0.083* −0.011 −0.132* 0.057 −0.026
(0.044) (0.039) (0.049) (0.052) (0.042) (0.055)
Constant 109.085 −26.642 216.267* 69.491 −29.925 88.163
(80.287) (16.19) (98.898) (98.392) (14.614) (119.57)
R-squared 0.601 0.465 0.657 0.598 0.462 0.645
Observations 6077 6935 6077 5164 5976 5164
(1) and (4) DV =Manifesto index of voter support for international partnership
(2) and (5) DV =Manifesto index of voter support for military power
(3) and (6) DV =Manifesto index of voter support for partnership + power
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B.4 Party platform support for international partnership and military power as a function of geopolitical threat in Western democracies, 1960–2015
(summarized in main text, Figure 3.9).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party platform: Party Party platform: Party platform: Party platform: Party platform:
partnership platform: power partnership +power partnership power partnership +power
Geopolitical threat 0.156 0.42** 0.576** 0.34 0.328 0.667*
(0.137) (0.115) (0.167) (0.20) (0.159) (0.26)
Radical-left −1.109*** −0.971*** −2.08*** −1.143*** −0.955*** −2.098***
(0.176) (0.212) (0.276) (0.177) (0.222) (0.299)
Social Democratic 0.365 −0.199 0.166 0.311 −0.168 0.143
(0.209) (0.173) (0.319) (0.19) (0.181) (0.308)
Liberal 0.72** 0.325 1.045*** 0.758*** 0.289 1.047***
(0.2) (0.165) (0.237) (0.166) (0.185) (0.221)
Christian Democratic 0.664** 0.349* 1.013** 0.652** 0.374* 1.026**
(0.197) (0.149) (0.268) (0.188) (0.165) (0.276)
Conservative 0.583* 0.758*** 1.341** 0.565* 0.768*** 1.333**
(0.265) (0.193) (0.412) (0.243) (0.196) (0.4)
Radical-right −0.935** 0.936*** 0.001 −1.01* 1.025*** 0.015
(0.297) (0.157) (0.381) (0.403) (0.191) (0.438)
Social security × RL −0.273 0.047 −0.226
(0.171) (0.258) (0.367)
Social security × SD −0.208 0.082 −0.125
(0.173) (0.208) (0.312)
Social security × L 0.211 −0.201 0.01
(0.215) (0.282) (0.335)
Social security × CD 0.053 0.075 0.128
(0.189) (0.217) (0.314)
Social security × C −0.664** 0.351 −0.313
(0.203) (0.23) (0.345)
Social security × RR −0.233 0.298 0.065
(0.867) (0.374) (1.036)
Democracy level 0.101 0.19* 0.291* 0.099 0.191* 0.289*
(0.064) (0.077) (0.118) (0.066) (0.077) (0.114)
Trade openness 0.007 0.01* 0.017* 0.007 0.011** 0.017*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Unemployment rate 0.011 −0.021 −0.01 0.012 −0.022 −0.01
(0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028)
Avg. vote share 0.006 0.018** 0.024* 0.006 0.018** 0.024*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Left-right platform −0.014*** 0.009* −0.006 −0.014*** 0.008* −0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant −0.357 −2.418** −2.775* −0.338 −2.43** −2.768*
(0.64) (0.816) (1.176) (0.639) (0.809) (1.113)
R-squared 0.393 0.457 0.454 0.406 0.462 0.456
Observations 5976 5976 5976 5976 5976 5976
(1) and (4) DV =Party platform support for international partnership

(2) and (5) DV =Party platform support for military power
(3) and (6) DV =Party platform support for partnership +power
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B.5 Analysis of government-voter solvency gap over international partnership in Western democracies, 1970−2017 (summarized in main text,
Figure 3.11).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt.-voter Govt.-voter Govt.-voter Govt.-voter Govt.-voter Govt.-voter
gap over gap over gap over gap over gap over gap over
partnership partnership partnership partnership partnership partnership
De facto all 0.017*** 0.026***
globalization (0.005) (0.008)
De facto economic 0.005*** 0.01**
De facto political 0.007 0.015**
Left-to-right 0.013*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.004 0.012** 0.005
Platforms (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Democracy level −0.01 −0.007 0.003 0.001 0.012 −0.008
(0.057) (0.021) (0.061) (0.02) (0.056) (0.022)
Right government 0.001 −0.002 0 −0.002 0 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Avg. party vote −0.028*** −0.006 −0.029*** −0.004 −0.03*** −0.004
share (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.016)
Voter turnout −0.004 0.015 −0.005* 0.014 −0.004 0.012
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.009)
Union density −0.001 −0.007 0 −0.009* 0 −0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployment 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.002 0.016
Rate (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
GDP growth −0.03 0.001 −0.036* −0.007 −0.02 0.002
(0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.728 −2.11* 1.555** −0.623 0.897 −1.607
(0.662) (1.16) (0.717) (0.872) (0.706) (1.056)
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Decade dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.461 0.628 0.435 0.622 0.428 0.624
Observations 934 934 934 934 934 934
(1)−(6) DV =Government-voter gap over international partnership

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
152 Appendices
Table B.6 (a–e) Government support for international partnership and military power
as a function of mainstream and radical party vote share in Western democracies,
1970−2017 (summarized in main text, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4).
Table B.6a Effect of mainstream party vote share on Western government

for international partnership and military power, 1970–2017.
(1) (2) (3)
Government Government Government
support for support for support for
partnership power partnership +power
Mainstream party vote share 0.001* 0.001* 0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Past globalization 0.004* −0.005* 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Democracy level 0.013** −0.015* −0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.021)
Avg. vote share −0.001 0.005+ 0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
Voter turnout −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Union density −0.003** −0.000 −0.012*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Unemployment rate 0.003 0.003 0.022*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.002 −0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.008) (0.023)
Constant 5.011*** 1.301*** 0.414
(0.177) (0.288) (0.907)
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.861 0.901 0.856
Observations 1043 1043 1043
(1) DV =Government policy support for international partnership (KOF index of globalization
policies)
(2) DV =Government policy support for military power (military spending, % GDP)
(3) DV =Government policy support for partnership +power (standardized sum of government
policy support for partnership and for power)
Models are seemingly unrelated regression with OLS coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors
(in parentheses) clustered by country. Decade and country fixed effects included but not shown.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Appendices 153
Table B.6b Effect of radical-right party vote share on Western government support
(1) (2) (3)
partnership power partnership +
power
Radical-right vote share −0.002** −0.004* −0.015**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Past globalization 0.004** −0.004+ 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Democracy level 0.012** −0.016* −0.004
(0.005) (0.008) (0.024)
Avg. vote share −0.000 0.007* 0.015
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
Voter turnout 0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Union density −0.003*** −0.001 −0.015*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.002 −0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.008) (0.022)
Constant 5.016*** 0.000 0.473
(0.162) ( 0) (0.881)
R-squared 0.866 0.904 0.863
policies)
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
154 Appendices
Table B.6c Effect of radical-left party vote share on Western government support
(1) (2) (3)
partnership power partnership +
power
Radical-left vote share 0.000 0.005** −0.013+
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
Past globalization 0.004* −0.005* 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Democracy level 0.014** −0.014+ 0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.021)
Avg. vote share −0.001 0.005+ 0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
Voter turnout −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Union density −0.003** −0.000 −0.012*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.003 0.020+
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.002 −0.002 0.007
(0.002) (0.008) (0.023)
Constant 5.048*** 0.000 0.000
(0.183) ( 0) ( 0)
R-squared 0.859 0.904 0.856
policies)
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Appendices 155
Table B.6d Effect of radical party vote share (radical-left plus radical-right parties)
on Western government support for international partnership and military power,
1970–2017.
(1) (2) (3)
All radical vote share −0.001* −0.004*** −0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Past globalization 0.004* −0.004+ 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Democracy level 0.013** −0.017* −0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.022)
Avg. vote share −0.001 0.006* 0.014
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
Voter turnout 0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Union density −0.003*** −0.001 −0.015**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.002 −0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.007) (0.021)
Constant 5.041*** 1.339*** 0.0001
(0.164) (0.283) (0.001)
R-squared 0.863 0.907 0.866
policies)
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
156 Appendices
Table B.6e Effect of net mainstream vote share (mainstream vote share minus all radical
vote share) on Western government support for international partnership and military
power, 1970−2017.
(1) (2) (3)
Net mainstream vote share 0.001* 0.001*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Past globalization 0.004* −0.005+ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Democracy level 0.012** −0.017* −0.005
(0.004) (0.008) (0.021)
Avg. vote share −0.001 0.006* 0.011
(0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
Voter turn out 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Union density −0.003*** −0.001 −0.014*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.002 −0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.008) (0.022)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.368
( 0) ( 0) (0.869)
R-squared 0.862 0.904 0.862
(1) DV =Government policy support for international partnership (KOF index of globalization policies)
(3) DV =Government policy support for partnership +power (standardized sum of government policy
support for partnership and for power)
Models are seemingly unrelated regression with OLS coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered by country. Decade and country fixed effects included but not shown.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Appendices 157
Table B.7 Party vote share as a function of party platform support for international
partnership and military power in Western democracies, 1960−2017 (summarized in the
main text, Figure 4.8).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vote share Vote share Vote share Vote share Vote share Vote share
Party platform support −0.06* −0.086**
for partnership (0.023) (0.029)
Party platform support −0.005 0.007
for power (0.023) (0.032)
Party platform support −0.034* −0.048*
for partnership +power (0.013) (0.02)
Cold War dummy −0.254** −0.159* −0.209**
(0.083) (0.074) (0.073)
Platform × Cold 0.058* −0.021 0.025+
War
period (0.031) (0.024) (0.018)
Radical-left −0.078 −0.017 −0.077 −0.077 −0.019 −0.079

(0.07) (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074)
Social Democratic 0.009 −0.016 −0.005 0.008 −0.02 0
(0.083) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) (0.082)
Liberal 0.041 0.001 0.036 0.039 −0.001 0.041
(0.085) (0.075) (0.08) (0.085) (0.075) (0.081)
Christian Democratic −0.016 −0.055 −0.019 −0.019 −0.059 −0.013
(0.072) (0.065) (0.069) (0.074) (0.065) (0.07)
Conservative 0.212 0.182 0.226 0.211 0.18 0.231
(0.117) (0.112) (0.116) (0.117) (0.113) (0.117)
Radical-right 0.256* 0.332*** 0.321** 0.232* 0.324*** 0.319**
(0.095) (0.086) (0.094) (0.098) (0.085) (0.096)
Left-right platform −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged vote (t−1) 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.989*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.989***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Democracy level −0.027 −0.035 −0.027 −0.023 −0.03 −0.021
(0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.05) (0.048)
(continued)
158 Appendices
Table B.7 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Past globalization −0.52 −0.39 −0.48 −0.723 −0.467 −0.652
(0.541) (0.543) (0.565) (0.515) (0.552) (0.554)
Unemployment rate −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 2.744 2.209 2.535 3.767 2.65 3.384
(2.171) (2.199) (2.277) (2.115) (2.249) (2.257)
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 5819 5819 5819 5819 5819 5819
DV all models =Party vote share

Models are OLS coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country.
Decade and country fixed effects included but not shown.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B.8 Effect of party platform support for international partnership and for military power on party vote share in Western democracies,
moderated by social security transfers and geopolitical threat, 1960−2017 (summarized in the main text, Figure 4.9).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party platform support −0.155** −0.055**
for partnership (0.052) (0.019)
Social transfers (% GDP) 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Support partnership × 0.007+
Social security transfers (0.003)
Party platform support −0.115* −0.011
for power (0.047) (0.02)
Support power × 0.008*
Social security transfers (0.003)
Party platform support −0.119*** −0.034*

for partership +power (0.033) (0.014)
Support partnership +power × 0.006**
Social transfers (% GDP) (0.002)
Geopolitical threat −0.027 0.016 0.022

(0.08) (0.071) (0.075)
Support partnership × 0.031
Geopolitical threat (0.031)
(continued)
Table B.8 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Support power × −0.019
Support partnership +power × 0.004
Radical-left −0.091 −0.029 −0.092 −0.059 −0.01 −0.066
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.065)
Social Democratic 0.006 −0.031 −0.019 0.12 0.087 0.1
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.08) (0.081) (0.08)
Liberal 0.042 0 0.035 0.02 −0.021 0.015
(0.063) (0.06) (0.062) (0.069) (0.066) (0.068)
Christian Democratic −0.012 −0.063 −0.022 −0.026 −0.061 −0.03
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Conservative 0.21* 0.185* 0.23** 0.285** 0.248** 0.287**
(0.084) (0.088) (0.087) (0.09) (0.095) (0.093)
Radical-right 0.261** 0.32*** 0.323*** 0.264* 0.341** 0.33**
(0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Left-right platform −0.003* −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(adjusted) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged vote share 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.989*** 0.987*** 0.987*** 0.988***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Democracy level −0.011 −0.023 −0.011 −0.033 −0.032 −0.024
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.04) (0.039) (0.04)
Globalization de facto −0.567 −0.377 −0.512 −0.098 −0.004 −0.05
(0.346) (0.343) (0.348) (0.38) (0.384) (0.389)
Unemployment −0.021*** −0.021** −0.023*** −0.008 −0.008 −0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 2.739 1.899 2.484 0.777 0.265 0.447
(1.42) (1.42) (1.436) (1.55) (1.586) (1.59)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 5819 5819 5819 4991 4991 4991
DV all models =Party vote share

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10
Table B.9 Effect of party-system fragmentation on de facto globalization (1970–2018) and on voting affinity with Western countries in UN General
Assembly (1960–2018) (summarized in the main text, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.15).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KOF de facto KOF de facto Agree Non-West Ideal-point Non-West ideal-
globalization all political with West agree similarity point similarity
(econ., pol., soc.) globalization with West with West with West
Party-system −11.83* −20.866+ −0.137* −0.16* −0.345 −0.431+
fragmentation (5.348) (11.878) (0.055) (0.062) (0.22) (0.24)
Social transfers (% GDP) 0.334* −0.161 −0.006* −0.007* −0.029** −0.032**
(0.119) (0.236) (0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.011)
Democracy level 0.739*** 1.363** −0.009*** −0.011*** −0.048** −0.063***
(0.111) (0.386) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016)
Union density −0.055 −0.131+ 0.0001 0.0001 −0.001 −0.002
(0.045) (0.069) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment rate 0.373** 0.362 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.006
(0.1) (0.208) (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.011)
GDP growth −0.112 −0.468 −0.004+ −0.005* −0.02* −0.024*
(0.131) (0.299) (0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.011)
Voter turnout −0.073 −0.007 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.07) (0.165) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Past trade openness 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.002** 0.002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 73.45*** 103.68*** 1.068*** 1.1*** −0.015 0.144
(9.192) (25.054) (0.095) (0.107) (0.353) (0.39)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.939 0.871 0.826 0.815 0.841 0.835
Observations 954 954 922 922 922 922
DV models given by column heading. Models are OLS coefficients and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. Decade and country fixed
effects included but not shown.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10
Table B.10 (a–c) International organization (IO) authority as a function of party-system
fragmentation in Western democracies, 1960−2018 (summarized in the main text,
Figure 4.13).
Table B.10a Time series analysis of authority measures in twenty-five IOs with strong
Western membership, 1960–2018.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Delegation ∆ Pooling ∆ Dispute- ∆ IO authority
settlement
∆ Party-system −0.137** −0.174** −0.064 −0.655**
fragmentation (0.048) (0.065) (0.12) (0.231)
Constant 0.001 0 0.002 0.005
(0.001) ( 0) (0.002) (0.005)
AR(1) 0.724** 0.323 0.611 0.736*
(0.238) (0.404) (0.653) (0.37)
MA(1) −0.472 −0.797** −0.507 −0.584
(0.27) (0.256) (0.661) (0.395)
Sigma: const. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.016***
( 0) ( 0) ( 0) (0.001)
Log likelihood 240.9 250.9 200.5 251.2
Observations 57 57 57 57
Standard errors are in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B.10b Time series analysis of authority measures in thirty-five IOs with little
Western membership, 1960−2018.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Delegation ∆ Pooling ∆ Dispute- ∆ IO authority
settlement
∆ Party-system 0.001 0.139 −0.32 0.147
fragmentation (0.125) (0.15) (0.353) (0.743)
Constant 0.002 0 0.004* 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009)
AR(1) 0.807** −0.916*** −0.813*** 0.849***
(0.25) (0.078) (0.132) (0.24)
MA(1) −0.623 1 1 −0.677
(0.355) ( 0) (104.713) (0.357)
Sigma: constant 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.011 0.029***
( 0) ( 0) (0.563) (0.002)
Log likelihood 200.9 198.9 188.5 179.2

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Appendices 165
Table B.10c Alternative specifications for IO delegation: Time series analysis

of delegation for IOs with strong Western membership that underwent change in level
of delegated authority.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Delegation ∆ Delegation ∆ Delegation ∆ Delegation
∆ Party-system −0.113+ −0.133*
fragmentation (0.058) (0.058)
∆ Effective # −0.008* −0.01*
parties (0.004) (0.005)
∆ Mainstream vote −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Constant 0.001* 0.001* 0.004 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.156) (0.001)
AR(1) 0.019 0.036 −0.004 0.019
(0.238) (0.161) (0.156) (0.147)
Sigma: const. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Log likelihood 245.4 246.02 245.4 246.2

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10
166 Appendices
APPENDIX C
List of parties in Western countries by party family.
Radical Left Parties (RL)

Country RL party name
Austria Austrian Communist Party
Denmark Left Socialist Party
Denmark Danish Communist Party
Denmark Common Course
Denmark Red-Green Unity List
Denmark Socialist People’s Party
Finland Finnish People’s Democratic Union
Finland Democratic Alternative
Finland Left Wing Alliance
France Left Front
France French Communist Party
France Left Radical Party
France Indomitable France
Germany Party of Democratic Socialism
Germany The Left. Party of Democratic Socialism
Germany The Left
Greece Coalition of the Radical Left
Greece Communist Party of Greece
Greece Progressive Left Coalition
Greece Coalition of the Radical Left
Greece Democratic Left
Greece Popular Unity
Ireland United Left Alliance
Ireland Workers’ Party
Ireland Democratic Left Party
Ireland Socialist Party
Ireland People Before Profit Alliance
Ireland Anti-Austerity Alliance
Ireland Workers and Unemployment Action
Ireland We Ourselves
Ireland/UK We Ourselves
Italy Civil Revolution
Italy Proletarian Unity Party
Italy Proletarian Democracy
Italy Communist Refoundation Party
Italy Party of Italian Communists
Italy Democrats of the Left
Italy Rose in the Fist
Italy Left Ecology Freedom
Japan Japanese Communist Party
Luxembourg Communist Party of Luxembourg
Luxembourg The Left
Appendices 167
Radical Left Parties (RL)

Country RL party name
Netherlands Communist Party of the Netherlands
Netherlands Socialist Party
Netherlands Pacifist Socialist Party
Norway Norwegian Communist Party
Norway Socialist Left Party
Portugal Popular Democratic Union
Portugal Left Bloc
Portugal Portuguese Communist Party
Portugal Unified Democratic Coalition
Spain Popular Unity
Spain We Can
Spain United Left
Sweden Left Party
Switzerland Swiss Labour Party
Social Democratic Parties (SD)
Country SD party name
Australia Australian Labor Party
Australia Australian Democrats
Australia Democratic Labor Party
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party
Belgium Socialist Party Different—Spirit
Belgium Belgian Socialist Party
Belgium Socialist Party Different
Belgium Francophone Socialist Party
Belgium Social, Progressive, International,
Democratic and Forward-Looking
Canada New Democratic Party
Denmark Social Democratic Party
Finland Social Democratic League of Workers
Finland Finnish Social Democrats
France Socialist Party
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Greece Democratic Social Movement
Greece The River
Ireland Labour Party
Ireland Social Democrats
Italy Pannella-Sgarbi List
Italy Italian Socialist Party
Italy Italian Renewal
Italy Unified Italian Socialist Party-Italy
Italy Olive Tree
Italy Italian Democratic Socialist Party
Japan Social Democratic Party
Japan Democratic Socialist Party
168 Appendices
Social Democratic Parties (SD)

Country SD party name
Japan Social Democratic Federation
Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party of Luxembourg
Netherlands Radical Political Party
Netherlands Labour Party
Netherlands DENK
New Zealand New Zealand Labour Party
New Zealand The Alliance
Norway Labour Party
Portugal Popular Democratic Movement
Portugal Socialist Party
Portugal Democratic Renewal Party
Portugal Democratic Intervention
Portugal Association of Independent Social
Democrats
Portugal Leftwing Union for the Socialist
Democracy
Spain Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
Switzerland Independents’ Alliance
United Kingdom Labour Party
United Kingdom Social Democratic Party
United Kingdom Social Democratic and Labour Party
United States Democratic Party
Liberal parties (L)
Country L party name
Australia Palmer United Party
Australia Nick Xenophon Team
Austria Liberal Forum
Austria The New Austria and Liberal Forum
Belgium Party of Liberty and Progress
Belgium Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Belgium Liberal Reformation Party
Belgium Liberal Reformation Party—
Francophone Democratic Front
Belgium Liberal Party
Belgium Reform Movement
Belgium List Dedecker
Canada Liberal Party of Canada
Denmark Liberal Alliance
Denmark Danish Social-Liberal Party
Denmark Liberals
Denmark Independents’ Party
Denmark Liberal Centre
Finland Liberal People’s Party
Finland Young Finnish Party
Appendices 169
Liberal Parties (L)

Country L party name
France Radical Party
France Republic Onwards!
France Union of Democrats and Independents
Germany Free Democratic Party
Greece Union of Centrists
Ireland Progressive Democrats
Italy Italian Republican Party
Italy Italian Liberal Party
Italy Daisy—Democracy Is Freedom
Italy Democratic Party
Italy Democratic Centre
Italy Civic Choice
Italy List Di Pietro—Italy of Values
Japan Your Party
Japan Liberal League
Japan New Party Nippon
Luxembourg Democratic Party
Netherlands Democrats ’66
Netherlands People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy
New Zealand ACT New Zealand
New Zealand United Future New Zealand
New Zealand Progressive Party
Norway New People’s Party
Norway Liberal Party
Spain Citizens
Spain Union of the Democratic Centre/
Centrist Bloc
Spain Popular Democratic Party
Spain Liberal Party
Spain Union, Progress and Democracy
Sweden Liberal People’s Party
Switzerland FDP. The Liberals
United Kingdom Liberal Party
United Kingdom Liberal Democrats
Christian Democratic Parties (CD)
Country CD party name
Austria Austrian People’s Party
Belgium Francophone Christian Social Party
Belgium Christian Democratic and Flemish
Belgium Christian Social Party
Denmark Christian People’s Party
Finland Christian Democrats in Finland
France Popular Republican Movement
France Progress and Modern Democracy
170 Appendices
Christian Democratic Parties (CD)

Country CD party name
France Centre, Democracy and Progress
France Reformers’ Movement
Germany Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Democrats
Germany Centre Party
Greece Union of the Democratic Centre
Greece New Democracy
Greece Political Spring
Ireland Family of the Irish
Italy Italian Popular Party
Italy Christian Democratic Centre
Italy White Flower
Italy Pact for Italy
Italy Democratic Alliance
Italy Union of the Center
Japan New Clean Government Party
Luxembourg Christian Social People’s Party
Netherlands Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands Anti-Revolutionary Party
Netherlands Democratic Socialists ’70
Netherlands Christian Historical Union
Netherlands Christian Union
Netherlands Reformed Political League
Netherlands Reformatory Political Federation
Norway Christian People’s Party
Portugal Social Democratic Center-Popular Party
Spain Centre Democrats
Sweden Christian Democrats
Switzerland Christian Democratic People’s Party
Switzerland Protestant People’s Party of Switzerland
Switzerland Liberal Party of Switzerland
Switzerland Christian Social Party
Conservative Parties (C)
Country C party name
Australia Liberal Party of Australia
Australia Liberal National Party of Queensland
Australia Country Liberal Party
Canada Progressive Conservative Party
Canada Reform Party of Canada
Canada Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance
Canada Conservative Party of Canada
Denmark Centre Democrats
Denmark Conservative People’s Party
Finland National Coalition
Appendices 171
Conservative Parties (C)

Country C party name
France Union for a New Majority—Gaullist
France Union for a New
Majority—Conservatives
France Union for the Defence of Traders and
Artisans
France Democratic Mouvement
France Rally for the Republic
France The Republicans
France New Centre
France Centrist Alliance
Germany German Party
Greece National Alignment
Ireland Soldiers of Destiny
Italy People of Freedom
Italy Go Italy
Italy New Italian Socialist Party
Italy House of Freedom
Italy Labour and Freedom List
Japan Japan Restoration Party
Japan Liberal Democratic Party
Japan New Liberal Club
Japan Japan Renewal Party
Japan New Frontier Party
Japan Democratic Party of Japan
Japan Liberal Party
Japan New Conservative Party
Japan People’s New Party
Japan Independent’s Party
Japan Japan Innovation Party
New Zealand New Zealand National Party
New Zealand New Zealand First Party
Norway Conservative Party
Portugal Portugal Ahead
Portugal Social Democratic Party
Spain People’s Party
Sweden Moderate Coalition Party
Switzerland Conservative Democratic Party of
Switzerland
United Kingdom Conservative Party
United Kingdom Ulster Unionist Party
United States Republican Party
Radical Right Parties (RR)
Country RR party name
Australia Katter’s Australian Party
172 Appendices
Radical Right Parties (RR)

Country RR party name
Austria Austrian Freedom Party
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium Flemish Bloc
Belgium Flemish Interest
Denmark Danish People’s Party
Finland True Finns
France National Front
Germany Alternative for Germany
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally
Greece Golden Dawn
Greece Independent Greeks
Ireland Republican Party
Italy Brothers of Italy—National Centre
Italy National Alliance
Italy Northern League
Japan Party for Future Generations
Netherlands Livable Netherlands
Netherlands Centre Party
Netherlands Centre Democrats
Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn
Netherlands Party of Freedom
Netherlands Forum for Democracy
Norway Progress Party
Portugal Popular Monarchist Party
Sweden Sweden Democrats
Switzerland Swiss Democrats
Switzerland Federal Democratic Union
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party
Switzerland Ticino League
United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party
APPENDIX D
Categorical measures of government support for liberal internationalism.
Table D.1 Government support for liberal internationalism (partnership +power, categorical) as a function of social protection and geopolitical
threat in Western democracies, 1970−2015 (see discussion of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in main text).
(1) (2) (3)
Liberal Liberal Outcome 1: Outcome 2: Outcome 3:
Internationalism Internationalism Isolationism Nationalism Globalism
relative to liberal relative to liberal relative to liberal
internationalism internationalism internationalism
Social transfers (% GDP) 0.82*** 0.985*** 0.312 −0.481** −0.721*
(0.146) (0.171) (0.399) (0.176) (0.347)
Geopolitical threat −0.324 −1.306 0.437 −2.301 −4.118
(1.173) (1.113) (1.973) (1.314) (2.106)
Democracy level 9.539** 13.424*** −1.383 −2.638*** −1.042
(3.225) (3.827) (0.992) (0.639) (1.248)
Trade openness −0.119*** −0.152*** 0.195** 0.035 0.193**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.074) (0.042) (0.073)
Avg. party vote −0.415** −0.501** −0.295 0.171 −0.303
(0.16) (0.155) (0.21) (0.112) (0.244)
Voter turnout 0.215*** 0.163* 0.019 0.15 −0.631***
(0.058) (0.066) (0.162) (0.078) (0.181)
Union density −0.172*** −0.185*** −0.075 0.061 0.229*
(0.048) (0.042) (0.097) (0.053) (0.095)
(continued)
Table D.1 Continued
(1) (2) (3)

Internationalism Internationalism Isolationism Nationalism Globalism
relative to liberal relative to liberal relative to liberal
internationalism internationalism internationalism
Unemployment rate −0.3 −0.458** −0.538 −0.368* −0.233
(0.176) (0.158) (0.297) (0.167) (0.259)
GDP growth −0.094 −0.213 0.608* 0.226 0.273
(0.189) (0.197) (0.301) (0.209) (0.251)
Constant −98.694** −136.889*** −45.253 1.865 24.155
(32.486) (38.117) (5154.218) (8.164) (1260.921)
Country dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .762 .796 .815 .815 .815
Observations 698 496 953 953 953
Models (1) and (2): DV =Government policy support for liberal internationalism (1 =KOF globalization policies>median AND military spending>median; 0 =KOF
policies and/or military spending<median)
Model (3): DV =Government policy support for liberal internationalism in categories (1 =lower-than-median KOF policies and lower-than-median military spending;
2 =lower-than-median KOF policies and higher-than-median military spending; 3 =higher-than-median KOF policies and lower-than-median military spending;
4 =higher-than-median KOF policies and higher-than-median military spending)
Model (1) is logistic regression with country and decade dummies (not shown).
Model (2) is multi-level random intercept logistic regression with country as level 2, country-year as level 1, with decade dummies (not shown).
Model (3) is multinomial logit with baseline value being outcome 4 (liberal internationalism =high government support for partnership and high government support
for power).
Table D.2 Government support for liberal internationalism (partnership +power, categorical) as a function of net mainstream vote share in Western
democracies, 1970−2017 (relevant to Figure 4.1).
(1) (2) (3)
internationalism internationalism Isolationism relative Nationalism relative Globalism relative to lib.
to lib. int’lsm. to lib. int’lsm int’lsm
Net mainstream vote 0.037*** 0.045*** −0.024*** −0.029*** −0.019***
(0.01) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Democracy level 9.454* 9.888** 0.763*** −0.177 0.946***
(4.149) (3.218) (0.159) (0.093) (0.162)
Trade openness −0.143*** −0.154*** 0.011*** −0.008* 0.02***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Avg. party vote −0.093 −0.105* 0.014 0.064*** −0.03*
(0.05) (0.049) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Voter turnout 0.2*** 0.146** −0.014 0.014 −0.02*
(0.048) (0.047) (0.008) (0.01) (0.008)
Union density −0.081* −0.082** 0.012 0.022** 0.029***
(0.032) (0.03) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Unemployment rate 0.073 0.058 0.017 0.029 −0.021
(0.091) (0.091) (0.027) (0.035) (0.028)
GDP growth −0.463*** −0.561*** 0.406*** 0.056 0.221***
(0.128) (0.134) (0.058) (0.066) (0.053)
(continued)
Table D.2 Continued
(1) (2) (3)

internationalism internationalism Isolationism relative Nationalism relative Globalism relative to lib.
to lib. int’lsm. to lib. int’lsm int’lsm
Constant −99.742* −104.023** −11.263*** −1.854 −10.222***
(40.933) (32.851) (1.722) (1.112) (1.694)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.495 0.492 0.313 0.313 0.313
Observations 659 954 1307 1307 1307
Models (1) and (2): DV =Government policy support for liberal internationalism (1 =KOF globalization policies > median AND military spending > median; 0 =KOF
policies and/or military spending < median)
Model (3): DV =Government policy support for liberal internationalism in categories (1 =lower-than-median KOF policies AND military spending; 2 =lower-than-
median KOF policies AND higher-than-median military spending; 3 =higher-than-median KOF policies AND lower-than-median military spending; 4 =higher-than-
median KOF policies AND higher-than-median military spending).
Models (1) is logistic regression with country and decade dummies (not shown).
Models (2) is multi-level random intercept logistic regression with country as level 2, country-year as level 1, with decade dummies (not shown).
Model (3) is multinomial logit with outcome 4 (liberal internationalism) as baseline.
APPENDIX E
Effect of government-voter gap on party politics.
Table E.1 Government-voter gap over international partnership and military power as a function of party vote share and party-system fragmentation
in Western democracies, 1970−2018.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Radical right Radical left vote All radical vote Mainstream vote Net mainstream Party-system
vote share share share share vote share fragmentation
Government-voter 2.378* 0.523 2.902* −2.056 −4.957 2.975*
gap: partnership (0.966) (1.042) (1.348) (2.138) (3.312) (1.282)
Government-voter: −0.859 0.035 −0.824 0.046 0.869 0.027
gap: power (1.018) (1.177) (1.723) (1.387) (2.922) (0.836)
Democracy −0.485 −0.269 −0.754 1.064 1.818* −0.716*
(0.327) (0.283) (0.442) (0.53) (0.847) (0.27)
Trade openness −0.027 0.026 −0.001 −0.071 −0.069 0.016
(0.023) (0.04) (0.05) (0.057) (0.104) (0.03)
Average party vote share 0.045 −0.216 −0.171 0.327 0.498 −0.62**
(0.142) (0.109) (0.184) (0.258) (0.389) (0.19)
Voter turnout −0.093 0.217 0.123 0.19 0.066 0.094
(0.149) (0.108) (0.186) (0.122) (0.276) (0.132)
Union density 0.013 −0.009 0.005 −0.018 −0.023 −0.066
(0.1) (0.039) (0.12) (0.158) (0.245) (0.072)
Unemployment rate 0.062 0.076 0.137 −0.475 −0.613 0.168
(0.193) (0.165) (0.25) (0.402) (0.601) (0.179)
GDP growth −0.064 −0.123 −0.187 0.419 0.606 −0.058
(continued)
Table E.1 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Radical right Radical left vote All radical vote Mainstream vote Net mainstream Party-system
vote share share share share vote share fragmentation
(0.318) (0.2) (0.408) (0.571) (0.921) (0.155)
Constant 10.971 −6.155 4.816 48.783* 43.967 84.72***
(13.428) (9.89) (14.788) (17.773) (28.113) (11.234)
R-squared 0.667 0.763 0.708 09.701 0.749 0.87
Observations 954 954 954 954 954 954

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Relationship between government−
voter gap over partnership and ...
Radical right
vote share
Radical left
vote share
All radical
vote share
Mainstream
vote share
Net mainstream
vote share
Party−system
fragmentation
−10 −5 0 5
Figure E.1 Effect of government-voter gap over international partnership on

party vote shares and party-system fragmentation in Western democracies,
1970–2018
20
Vote share of radical party families
15
All radical parties

10
Radical left parties

5
Radical right parties

0
0 .6 1.2 1.8 2.4

80
Predicted party−system fragmentation
75
70
65
0 .6 1.2 1.8 2.4

Figure E.2 Predicted radical-party vote share and party-system fragmentation

due to government-voter gap over international partnership, 1970–2018
180 Appendices
APPENDIX F
Additional figures for selected Western countries.

5.2
5
4.8
4.6
4.4
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Austria France Germany Ireland
Italy Spain UK
5
Military expenditures (% GDP)
1 2 3 4 0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Austria France Germany Ireland
Italy Spain UK
Figure F.1 Convergence of KOF index of globalization policies and military

expenditures, selected EU-15 countries, 1970–2017
1
−1.5
Ideal−point similarity score with US
Voting agreement score with US
Similarity
.8
score
−2
.6
−2.5
Agreement
score
.4
−3
−3.5
.2
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
−1.2
.9
Ideal−point similarity score with EU−15

Similarity
score
Agreement score with EU−15
−1.4
.8
−1.6
.7
Agreement −1.8
score
.6
−2
−2.2
.5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

−1
Similarity
.9
Ideal−point similarity score with Japan
score
Agreement score with Japan
−1.2
.8
−1.4
−1.6
Agreement
.7
score
−1.8
.6
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure F.2 Voting agreement and ideal-point similarity by EU, Japan, and
United States in UN General Assembly, 1950–2020
Notes
Chapter 1
1. Quoted in Sheehan, 2008, 156.

2. In the analysis that follows, the “West” refers to the following twenty-four coun-
tries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. We exclude the Central and Eastern European nations as they
joined the West only after the Cold War. However, at several points in the pages that
follow, we consider the extent to which our claims about the West also hold up for its
newest members.
3. See, for example, Sprout and Sprout, 1968; Olson, 1982; Huntington, 1987; and
Kennedy, 1987.
4. Ruggie, 1982.
5. On geopolitical slack and its implications for domestic politics, see Trubowitz, 2011.
6. On the exclusion of states from the liberal order, see Adler-Nissen and Zarakol,
2021. On the exclusion of migration from embedded liberalism, see Goodman and
Pepinsky, 2021.
7. On the relationship of military intervention to liberal internationalism, see Cox et al.,
2003; Desch, 2007; Mearsheimer, 2018; and Ikenberry, 2020a, c hapter 7.
8. Spengler, 1926.
9. Some earlier works that straddle two or three of these fields include: Gilpin, 1975;
Kurth, 1979; Tilly, 1985; Levi, 1988; Abdelal and Kirshner, 1999; Mastanduno, 1999;
Strange, 1999; Rathbun, 2004; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; North et al., 2009; and
Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016a.
10. States’ commitment to military power could also be measured by the use of military
force. Since we are principally interested in how much weight governments attach to
the international and domestic sides of the national ledger, measuring the use of force
is less useful for our purposes. However, national commitment to defense spending
is correlated with other military-related indicators, including the use of force. See
Trubowitz and Burgoon, 2020.
11. The literature on each of these motivations is substantial. On states’ security motiv-
ations, see, for example, Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; and Mearsheimer, 2001. On the role
of economic interests and pressures, see Snyder, 1991. On the impact of disarmament
and peace movements, see Ceadel, 1980; Williams, 1998; and Lynch, 1999.
12. The discussion here draws on Trubowitz, 2011, c hapter 2.
13. Brodie, 1965.
184 Notes
14. The literature here is extensive. See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;
Narizny, 2003; Trubowitz, 2011; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2012; Oatley, 2015; and
Obinger et al., 2018.
15. For a discussion of these issues, see Petersen, 2013; and Obinger et al., 2018.
16. See, for example, Cozer, 1956; Mayer, 1969; Skocpol, 1992; Giddens, 1985; and Mann,
1988. For an older but still relevant review of the literature, see Levi, 1988.
17. Obinger and Schmitt, 2011, 250.
18. This is a common strategy in peacetime as well as wartime. See, for example, Blainey,
1973; Mearsheimer, 2001; and Luttwak, 2009.
19. Petersen, 2013, 233.
20. Indeed, scholars have argued that the massive postwar expansion of the welfare state
was a byproduct of the Cold War. For a review of the relevant literature, see Obinger
and Lee, 2013; and Petersen, 2013. See also the recent histories by Westad, 2018b; and
Gerstle, 2022.
22. On the mediating role of political parties in this process, see Trubowitz, 1998 and
2011; Narizny, 2003; Rathbun, 2004; Fordham, 2007; Hoffmann, 2013; Martill, 2019;
and Wagner, 2020.
23. The term sovereignty costs is from Moravcsik, 2000. For other work on this issue,
see Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998; Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Lake,
2007; Rixen and Zangl, 2013; Hafner-Burton et al., 2015; Hooghe and Marks, 2015;
Grewal, 2018; and Börzel and Zürn, 2021.
24. Sovereignty costs also vary depending on international institutions’ architecture or
design. Some, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, involve
no delegation or transfer of authority by members to a collective body. In other cases,
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, members pool and transfer
authority to a collective body that makes binding decisions on its members. These are
supranational institutions. For a discussion of the different forms that transfers of na-
tional authority to international institutions can take, see Lake, 2007; and Hooghe
and Marks, 2015.
25. We are interested here in liberal institutionalized cooperation, but multilater-
alism can serve illiberal ends too. In the 1930s, Italian and German fascists viewed
multilateralism as a means to export their economic models. During the Cold
War, the Soviet Union relied on the multilateral Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, or COMECON, to promote economic planning and coordination
with its allies in Central and Eastern Europe. On these and other examples, see
Helleiner, 2019.
26. On the domestic effects of trade liberalization, see Katzenstein, 1985; Kurzer, 1993;
Rodrik, 1998; Trubowitz, 1998; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Swank, 2002; Scheve and
Slaughter, 2004; Finseraas, 2008; Burgoon, 2009; Hays, 2009; Mau and Burkhardt,
2009; Rehm, 2009; Walter, 2010; Autor et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; and
Milner, 2019.
27. See Dancygier and Water, 2015; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018; Copelovitch and
Pevehouse, 2019; and Konstantinidis et al., 2019.
Notes 185
28. On the role of political parties in this process, see Boix, 1998; Garrett, 1998; Piazza,
2001; Hooghe, 2003; Swank and Betz, 2003; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Benoit and
Laver, 2006; Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Hobolt, 2009; Hooghe
and Marks, 2009; Burgoon, 2012; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014; Hutter et al., 2016; Margalit,
2019; Rommel and Walter, 2018; and Zürn, 2019.
29. It is also not hard to imagine foreign policy strategies that straddle two quadrants. As
we note below, arguably Wilson’s vision of a “community of power” is an example.
30. On globalism, see Rosenboim, 2017; and Slobodian, 2018.
31. These versions of international federation differed principally in terms of the relative
weight globalists assigned to international markets versus economic planning at the
supranational level. F.A. Hayek was mostly closely identified with the former; Barbara
Wootton with the latter. Both were members of the London-based Federal Union
that championed international federation as a blueprint for the postwar order. See
Rosenboim 2017, especially 130–167.
32. On the connection between the EU and mid-twentieth century globalist thought, see
Streeck, 2017, 97–105.
33. This was true too of Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises and others in the Austrian school.
See Kjar and Anderson, 2010; and Westley et al., 2011.
34. Quoted in Ikenberry, 2020a, 132.
35. On liberal internationalism’s dual commitment to power and partnership see
Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007. See also Hoffmann, 1995; Ikenberry, 2009; and Brooks
and Wohlforth, 2016a.
36. Wilson as quoted in Ikenberry, 2009.
37. For isolationism and related strategies (e.g., autarky, self-sufficiency), see Borchart,
1990; Nordlinger, 1996; Nichols, 2011; Kupchan, 2020; and Helleiner, 2021.
38. Nichols, 2011.
39. We use the terms radical-right (radical-left), far-right (far-left), and right-wing (left-
wing) interchangeably in the text. Chapter 4 describes these party families, and the
parties within each of them, in more detail.
40. John Mearsheimer (2011) argues that realism and nationalism are “kissing cousins,”
and there are certainly similarities. Yet, as Mearsheimer himself notes, realism is a
large church with many denominations. Indeed, different strands of realism favor dif-
ferent combinations of power and partnership, putting realists in every quadrant in
Figure 1.2 except quadrant 1 (globalism). Some realists (e.g., Brooks and Wohlforth,
2016a) explicitly embrace liberal internationalism. They favor investing in partner-
ship as well as power. Other realists are more drawn to the combination of partnership
and power that we have labeled isolationism (e.g., Gholz et al., 1997; Sapolsky et al.,
2017; and Thrall and Friedman, 2018). They are not opposed to free trade or investing
in military power, but they do not favor large peacetime military establishments or
the transfer of sovereignty to “lock in” liberal trade. This variation within the realist
school is not surprising. As Robert Gilpin argued, realism, like its counterpart lib-
eralism, is elastic and malleable and better understood as an intellectual tradition
rather than a strategy. On realism’s elasticity and malleability, see Gilpin, 1987. See
also Wohlforth, 2011.
186 Notes
41. On neo- mercantilism, see Hirschmann, 1945; Waltz, 1979; Grieco, 1988; and
Drezner, 2010.
42. Henley, 2017.
43. On Trump’s foreign policy approach, see Mead, 2017; Schweller, 2018; and
Mastanduno, 2020.
44. See Dahl, 1965, 19.
45. In 2018, Front National changed its name to Rassemblement National. We use Front
National throughout when referring to the party.
46. See Mair, 2013, 1.
47. Supporting material and links to data used in this book can be found at the authors’
webpages.
48. Our measures of international threat rely on Dreyer and Thompson, 2011; Gibler
et al., 2016; Goertz et al., 2016; Hensel et al., 2008; Kim, 2018; Markowitz and Fariss,
2018; and Palmer et al., 2021. All of our measures of social protection rely on OECD
data on social transfers and expenditures (see Chapter 3 for details).
49. The strengths and limits of this particular measurement instrument have been widely
debated. See Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; and Benoit et al., 2009.
50. The coding unit in the Manifesto database is the number of sentences or sentence
fragments in party platforms that take a position (for or against) on a particular for-
eign (or domestic policy) issue. Here we focus on foreign policy issues that concern
international partnership (e.g., open markets, international cooperation) and mili-
tary power (e.g., military spending and military preparedness). These are described in
Chapter 2.
51. There are few systematic cross-national studies on public support for foreign policy,
and even fewer studies tracking public support for foreign policy spanning time-
frames as long as the one here. Most studies focus on a single nation, usually the
United States. Moreover, these cross-national studies tend to focus on specific events
or issues (e.g., the 2003 Iraq War; nuclear weapons) and thus, do not permit broad
comparisons of support for different types of foreign policy strategies (e.g., liberal
internationalism, isolationism) over time. For a recent effort to address some of these
limitations, see Gravelle et al., 2017.
52. For discussion of approaches to gauging voter support for policy issues based on
voter support for parties with systematically measured policy positions, see Kim and
Fording, 1998, 2003; and De Neve, 2011. For a discussion of the limits of this ap-
proach, see Warwick and Zakharova, 2013. Perhaps the greatest concern is that voters
do not usually vote for a party based solely on that party’s stated position on a single
issue. We address this concern in various ways, including estimating the effects of a
party’s platform position on a single issue (e.g., support for defense spending) only
after controlling for the party’s platform positions on other salient issues.
53. Voter support estimates are based on the country-year means of party platform sup-
port for international partnership and military power for any given political party,
weighted by that party’s actual electoral vote share won partly on its manifesto
positions on partnership and power. For a discussion of this and related approachs,
see Kim and Fording, 1998; De Neve, 2011; and Lindvall and Rueda, 2018. See
Notes 187
Chapter 2 for a description of the items in the Manifesto database used to create party
measures of partnership and power.
54. Previous research indicates that indirect voter-weighted manifesto measures like the
ones used here correlate significantly with direct measures of public opinion (e.g.,
Kim and Fording, 1998; McGregor, 2013; and Caughey et al., 2019). More related to
the specific focus of our study, Burgoon et al. (2019) find that manifesto positions on
the EU and trade tend to correlate with direct questions on these issues in European
Social Survey data.
55. See, for example, Acharya, 2014; Allison, 2018; Barma et al., 2007; Nye, 2019; and
Adler-Nissen and Zarakol, 2021.
56. See, for example, Mearsheimer, 2019; Cooley and Nexon, 2020; Ikenberry, 2020a; Lake
et al., 2021; Krastev and Holmes, 2020; Kornprobst and Paul, 2021; and Katzenstein
and Kirshner, 2022. Some scholars take issue with how “liberal” and “coherent” the
Western international order was, but not with the idea that Western democracies are
experiencing domestic blowback from their foreign policies. See, for example, Porter,
2020; and Barnett, 2021.
57. See Fukuyama, 1989; and Krauthammer, 1990.
58. See, for example, Posen, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2018; Porter, 2020; and Walt, 2018.
59. See, for example, Kriesi et al., 2008; Burgoon, 2009; Guiso et al., 2017; Colantone and
Stanig, 2018; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Rommel and Walter, 2018; Dippel et al., 2015;
Pástor and Veronesi, 2018; Autor et al., 2020; Rodrik, 2021; and Caselli et al., 2021.
60. As Charles Tilly’s well-known phrase in describing the rise of states in Europe,
“War made the state and the state made war,” reminds us, it is also hardly new. Tilly,
1975, 42.
Chapter 2
1. Kagan, 2003, 3–4.

2. See, for example, Lindberg, 2005; Anderson et al., 2008; Dorman and Kaufman, 2011;
and Lake, 2018.
3. On the various visions for the postwar era, see Rosenboim, 2017.
4. Lundestad, 1986; and Forsberg, 2000.
5. Young, 1996.
6. Kane, 2016.
7. McCormick, 1995.
8. McCormick, 1995, 89.
9. Known as the “San Francisco system,” the Asian regional alliance network rested on
a series of treaties between the United States and Japan (1951), Australia and New
Zealand (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953), and Thailand (1954), as
part of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (Cha, 2000). San Francisco was the
site of the conference that led to the signing of the 1951 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security. See Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002.
188 Notes
10. In the 1960s, America’s allies in Asia invested 2.7 percent of GDP in defense on av-
erage, though notably Japan spent only 0.8 percent of GDP on defense (Chai, 1997;
Sandler and George, 2016). In Europe, defense spending as a share of GDP averaged
just under 4 percent during the same period, with Britain, France, and Germany
each investing more in the common defense than the West European average
(Nikolaidou, 2008).
11. Ruggie, 1982.
12. On class and industrial sector support of liberal internationalism in the United
States, see Block, 1977; Ferguson, 1984; Frieden, 1988; and Trubowitz, 1998. For
the European states, see Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1978, 1985; and Eichengreen,
1996, 2007.
13. Deporte, 1979, 197.
14. Beckley et al., 2018.
15. Authors’ calculations using OECD Country Statistical Profiles (OECD, 2020).
16. Following the initial GATT round in 1947, there were five rounds between 1949 and
1967: the Annecy Round (1949); Torquay Round (1951); Geneva Round (1956);
Dillon Round (1960–1961); and the Kennedy Round (1964–1967). The Tokyo Round
began in 1973, but was not completed until 1979.
17. By 1973, multinational corporations had invested $200 billion dollars globally, with
three quarters of it going into the advanced industrial countries. Frieden, 2006, 293.
18. Again, we include the following twenty-four countries under the heading of the
“West”: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
19. Military spending as a share of GDP figures prominently in national election
campaigns and public debate about “burden-sharing.” We treat this as a proxy for
military preparedness and resource commitments. This measure does not provide
explicit information about actual military missions, deployments, and use of force.
But scholars and policy analysts regularly focus on this indicator to compare national
investments in military power (e.g., Sandler and George, 2016). In our inferential
analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, we also consider alternative specifications, particularly
spending per capita, yielding patterns that corroborate our baseline focus on share
of GDP.
20. KOF’s widely used and cited database includes a range of policy and flow measures
of globalization for more than 200 countries and territories over the period 1970 to
2016. Here we use only those measures representing national government policies
that enable or constrain economic and political globalization—measures that the cur-
rent version of the dataset refers to as “de jure” as opposed to “de facto” measures that
represent actual cross-border flows and actions. See Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2019.
21. Our indices exclude the dataset’s economic data on actual flows of trade, foreign di-
rect investment and migration, and also measures of sociocultural globalization.
22. The KOF treaty party diversity measure refers to the degree to which a country’s in-
vestment treaties are multilateral in nature.
Notes 189
23. Our partnership measure is a weighted index of these two KOF indices from 1970
through 2017, the most recent available year. There are many ways of aggregating,
normalizing, and weighting the various components. Our baseline simply adds these
two KOF indices, providing an intuitive composite measure of global engagement
and international cooperation and the pooling (sacrificing) of national sovereignty.
24. To provide reference points, we set the axes in Figure 2.1 using the worldwide (193
countries) sample medians for all 9,408 observations on each dimension for the full
time-period (1970–2017). These median values yield rough approximations of the
four quadrants in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1. We use logged values because log
transformation improves the visibility of the relative positions of the countries. Our
analysis is the same whether we use raw or logged values.
25. Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not transition to democracy until the mid-1970s.
26. One limitation of the KOF data is that few countries that were members of the former
Communist bloc appear in the data set before the 1990s. We are thus unable to plot
the Soviet Union and most other members of the Communist bloc in Figures 2.1 and
2.2. Two exceptions are China (CHN) and Hungary (HUN), which are both located
in the nationalist quadrant (quadrant 4) in Figure 2.1. After the Cold War, China and
Hungary, like many other countries, move northward on the vertical axis in support of
greater economic integration and institutionalized cooperation. See Figure 2.3 below.
27. Frieden, 2006, 363.
28. Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, 1975.
29. Frieden, 2006, 173–194.
30. Burnham, 1978; Scharpf, 1991; and Reid-Henry, 2019, 78–95.
31. O’Connor, 1973.
32. SIPRI, 2018. Calculations by authors.
33. In 1975, Chile imposed economic liberalization, privatization of state-owned com-
panies, and fighting inflation anticipated many of the policies. Its economic poli-
cies were a precursor to many of the steps that Reagan, Thatcher, and other Western
leaders took.
34. Gilpin, 2002, 99–103.
35. Slobodian, 2018, 257.
36. Slobodian, 2018.
37. Reid-Henry, 2019, 743.
38. Frieden, 2006, 383.
39. For accounts of this shift in Western governments’ foreign economic policies, see
Frieden, 2006; Rodrik, 2011; and Reid-Henry, 2019.
40. See, Ikenberry, 2009; Slobodian, 2018; Börzel and Zürn, 2021.
41. Reid-Henry, 2019, 312–313.
42. Britain, Denmark, and Sweden remained outside the new euro zone.
43. Irwin, 2022.
44. Simmons et al., 2008, 3.
45. Bloodgood, 2016; Börzel and Zürn, 2021.
46. Krastev and Homes, 2019.
47. Reid-Henry, 2019, 315–326.
190 Notes
48. Frieden, 2006, 431–432.

49. Mann, 1999.
50. Frieden, 2006, 425.
51. Ikenberry, 2019.
52. Johnston, 2019, 107.
53. Indeed, some international relations scholars have argued that these efforts to reshape
the Western security architecture, especially by allowing in states from Russia’s Near
Abroad fueled Moscow’s mistrust and expansion (e.g., Mearsheimer, 2019).
54. Liff, 2015, 81; Heginbotham and Samuels, 2018, 136–137.
55. Glanville, 2014.
56. Lind and Wohlforth, 2019.
57. Lindsay, 2000; Eichenberg and Stoll, 2003.
58. Sandler and George, 2016, 182.
59. The rise in globalization in this period (1997–2017) covers roughly 18 percent of the
full sample variation, while the drop in military spending during the same time span
covers 19 percent of the sample variation.
60. Marquand, 2004; Frum, 2005.
61. Tooze, 2018, 159.
62. IMF, 2009.
63. Hufbauer and Jung, 2016.
64. The actual effect of these measures on global trade also proved to be relatively modest.
See Wolfe, 2012; Drezner, 2014, 132, 135–136.
65. Di Bella and Grigoli, 2019.
66. Aggregate economic growth numbers tell a similar story. In 2009, global economic
output dropped. 0.59 percent. However, growth quickly returned. For the next two
years, average global output growth was comparable to the growth rate recorded for
the decade preceding the financial crisis. Drezner, 2014, 131.
67. Woods, 2010; Frieden, 2012; Kahler, 2013; Drezner, 2014.
68. The membership of the G20 includes nineteen major industrialized and developing
economies plus the European Union.
69. Some of the slippage was also made up by increased enthusiasm for regional and bi-
lateral FTAs. In the four years before the 2008 crash, 51 FTAs were reported to the
WTO; in the four years following the crisis, 58 FTAs were registered with the interna-
tional body. Drezner, 2014, 146.
70. Kahler, 2013, 64.
71. The EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. For visual clarity, we display even years only, except for 2001 in the
U.S. case.
72. Calculations by authors. SIPRI, 2018.
73. Historically, FTAs were considered closed-door measures. However, in the 1990s they
came to be seen as complements to WTO efforts to promote trade liberalization. See
Urata, 2009.
74. Liff, 2015, 81–82.
Notes 191
75. In Figure F.1 in Appendix F, we show that the same pattern holds when the EU-15 is
disaggregated by individual countries: Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom.
76. Quoted in Slobodian, 2018, 275.
77. Stephens, Huber, and Ray, 1999, 179.
78. Flynn and Rattinger, 1985, 384.
79. See Almond, 1960; and Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, 41–42.
80. See Domke et al., 1987, 404.
81. See Chapter 1 for a description of the Manifesto Project Database. The Manifesto
coding unit is sentences or quasi-sentences (single statements) in party platforms that
take a pro-and an anti-position on issues relevant to a given issue. This allows the
analyst to gauge the level of support for, or opposition to, a given position (e.g., for or
against more open trade) by individual parties (cf. Burgoon, 2009; Lowe et al., 2011;
Milner and Judkins, 2004).
82. Our Manifesto measure of international partnership refers to the (logged) percentage
of total sentences or quasi-sentences (single statements) expressing support for ge-
neral internationalism, free trade (low trade protectionism) and the European Union
minus the (logged) percentage of (quasi-) sentences expressing opposition to each.
This net measure includes every reference to open markets, international coopera-
tion, and global governance in the Manifesto database (per107 +per108 +per407 +
.5) and (per109 +per110 +per406 +.5). Our Manifesto measure of “military power”
refers to the (logged) percentage of total sentences or quasi-sentences in favor of mil-
itary spending, preparedness, security, and defense generally minus the (logged) per-
centage of statements expressing doubt and criticism of defense spending, military
conscription, and the use of military power to solve conflict. Following Lowe et al.
(2011), we take the natural log of each component, to ensure a more normal distribu-
tion of the measures, and add .5 to avoid zeros in the calculations.
83. To compare such voter support between countries, we weight the results for a given
policy position by the average vote share in a party system (since countries with only two
choices will have higher vote shares on average than countries with many party choices).
84. The full-sample median benchmarks are based on all countries and years for which
the Manifesto project provides data since 1950. These median values yield rough
approximations of the four quadrants in Figure 2.6, comparable to quadrants in
Figures 2.1 through 2.4. When using voting support measures, it is also possible to set
the benchmark at a score of zero on each axis. This is because the zero-line demarcates
net voter support from net voter opposition on each dimension. For example, on the
vertical axis, scores greater than zero indicate voter-support levels for platforms that
are more positive than negative about international partnership. Conversely, scores
lower than zero indicate voter support for platforms that are more negative than pos-
itive about partnership. The equivalent holds for the measures of voter-support for
military power displayed on the horizontal axis. We considered both benchmarks—
the zero-lines as well as the sample-medians—in interpreting the data. For the sake of
consistency with our measures of government and party positions elsewhere in the
analysis, we use the full-sample median here.
192 Notes
85. This finding is broadly consistent with recent public opinion research on rising anti-
globalist sentiment towards trade liberalization and institutionalized cooperation.
See Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Copelovitch, et al., 2020; and De Vries, et al., 2020.
86. Western political elites were more willing to live with the threat of nuclear war than
their publics were. On this point, see Domke et al., 1987, 405.
87. Corman et al., 2015.
88. Schilde et al., 2019, 155.
89. Madison, 2019.
90. Clinton, 1997.
Chapter 3
1. Strange, 1997, 365, 369.

2. Our baseline models throughout the chapter focus on our sample of twenty-four
OECD countries. However, the results broadly hold for wider samples that include
Central and East European countries.
3. Greider, 2018; and Walt, 2019.
4. Polanyi, 1944.
5. John Ruggie was the first to recognize this connection. See Ruggie, 1982.
6. The nature of liberal internationalism’s social supports in Western welfare states
varied considerably. They ranged from the extensive social insurance and social
investments characteristic of Europe’s Scandinavian and small Continental states
(e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands), and the conservative, status-preserving social pro-
tection model dominant in West Germany, France, and Italy, to the more market-
oriented, minimalist model in the United States and other Anglo countries, to the
more informal and firm-based social insurance model found in East Asia. These var-
iations in social provision reflected national differences in public-private ownership,
government investment, and corporate governance, as well as in the character and
strength of unions. The classic account of these models of welfare capitalism is Esping-
Andersen, 1990. For important revisions and extensions, see Korpi and Palme, 1998
and 2003; Éstevez-Abe et al., 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Iversen, 2005; Aspalter,
2006; Pontusson, 2005; Éstevez-Abe, 2008; Lim and Burgoon, 2020.
7. DeLong, 1997; Bordo et al., 2007; and Hays, 2019.
8. On these many proposals, see Rosenboim, 2017.
9. These protections also varied considerably across the West, both in terms of the
benefits provided and levels of spending. Some welfare-state systems relied on means-
tested provisions while others offered broader entitlements. Some countries offered
social transfers and insurance (e.g., income supplements), while others included so-
cial services (e.g., training or health services). Countries also differed in how broadly
they defined social protection—many, but not all, included child care, health care,
and old-age provisions. Despite these differences, Western governments shared a
commitment to manage the market risks arising from international openness.
Notes 193
10. To measure Western government support for partnership, power, and the two
combined (partnership +power), we use the same measures we introduced in
Chapter 2: KOF’s globalization policy measures to gauge support for international
partnership, and defense spending as a percentage of GDP to measure investment
in military power. Partnership +Power is the sum of the standardized measures of
partnership and power. This provides a rough approximation of liberal internation-
alism (partnership +power), though it smooths over which of the two components—
partnership or power—accounts for year-to-year or cross-country difference. We
explored other measurement approaches, such as categorizing values of partnership
and power into the four categories or quadrants introduced in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1,
including the category liberal internationalism, where partnership and power are
higher than the sample medians. These specifications, which are summarized in
Appendix D, yield results similar to the baseline results in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
11. Social protection, our explanatory variable here, is based on social security transfers
as a percentage of GDP, a widely used measure of social protection in the comparative
political economy literature. This is a particularly useful measure for our purposes.
Among the available measures of social protection, social security transfers have a
large economic impact and are thus politically salient. This measure has the added ad-
vantage of providing the most complete coverage for all of the OECD countries in our
sample from 1960 to 2017. We use country-year data from OECD, 2019. The results
reported here are also broadly supported using other measures such as social wel-
fare generosity (1970–2011) and OECD social expenditures (transfers and services)
(1980–2017).
12. The descriptive patterns are not as strong for power, and stronger for partnership, but
the positive correlation holds for both.
13. For full results, see Table B.1 in Appendix B. Controls for the country-level analyses
(where the unit of analysis is country-year) include democratic representativeness,
unemployment rate, union density, voter turnout, past trade openness, and GDP
growth. All of these control variables are lagged five-year moving averages to take
into account the time it often takes for these factors to register in government policy.
In addition to these substantive controls, the models include “dummies” (or indi-
cator variables) for each sample country and decade to control for “fixed effects” of
country-level or general conditions that do not vary over the time period.
14. This is consistent with other research that has focused more narrowly on the rela-
tionship between social safety net compensation and government support for trade
liberalization, capital mobility, and so on. See, for example, Burgoon et al., 2012;
and Ha and Tsebelis, 2010. Of course, there is also a large literature that explores
globalization’s effects on social compensation: cf. Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985;
Rodrik, 1998; and Adsera and Boix, 2002.
15. The explanatory variables capturing social protection, and geopolitical threat, as well
as the control variables, are lagged values of five-year moving averages. We use five-
year lagged moving averages to account for the time it takes political and economic
conditions to fully affect party or voter position-taking.
194 Notes
16. We calculate the party’s left-right orientation using Manifesto’s “RILE” (Right-Left)
parameter, excluding platform positions we use to generate our party platform meas-
ures of partnership and power. The “RILE” measure is a composite variable made up
of platform positions (for or against) on issues highly related to “left versus right” ide-
ological orientation, such as government regulation, social welfare, market efficiency,
and economic inequality.
17. For presentational purposes, we restrict the analysis by individual party families to
partnership +power. See Table B.2 in Appendix B for the full regression results.
18. Burgoon, 2009 and 2012; and Burgoon and Schakel, 2022.
19. See, for example, Inglot, 2008; Mishra, 1993; Obinger and Schmitt, 2011; and Obinger
and Lee, 2013. For a review of the literature, see Petersen, 2013.
20. Shantz, 2008, 798.
21. Hobsbawm, 1990, 21, cited in Obinger and Schmitt, 2011, 247.
22. Full regression results are shown in Table B.3 of Appendix B. Figure 3.4 is based on the
results in models (1) to (3). These show that the results for partnership +power, which
captures the broadest, most inclusive specification, are statistically significant.
23. In estimating these vote-weighted scores, controlling for other platform positions in
a party’s manifesto (including the party’s adjusted left-right composite of platform
positions) is important. Otherwise, one cannot be sure that the associations be-
tween social protection, geopolitical threat (below), and other explanatory variables
with vote-weighted manifesto scores (as outcome variables) reflect the influence of
a party’s position on other platform issues. Supplemental analyses (available upon
request) consider other non-foreign policy aspects of a party’s platform positioning
(e.g., welfare state provisions, environmental safety, democracy, traditional moral
values, etc.).
24. We estimate voter support by weighting a party’s platform support for international
partnership and military power by the portion of that party’s actual electoral vote
share that can be attributed to its manifesto positions on partnership and power.
These estimates are based on linear interpolation between election years for a given
party’s vote-weighted platform. See Chapter 2 for a description of the items in the
Manifesto Project Database used to create voter support estimates of partnership
and power.
25. See the discussion in Chapter 1.
26. In addition to the standard country and decade dummy variables, controls for these
models include: democratic representativeness, international openness, country’s
average vote share, unemployment rate, GDP growth, party family and party’s left-
right orientation. Controlling for party platform orientation helps zero in on how
social protection, geopolitical threat (below), and other explanatory variables cor-
relate with vote-weighted manifesto scores on partnership and power (our outcome
variables), as distinct from other party platform issues. In supplemental analyses, we
consider the “effects” of party platform positions on issues such as welfare state pro-
vision, environmental safety, democracy, and moral values. These are available upon
request.
Notes 195
27. Studies that are especially relevant to the argument here include Swank and Betz,
2003; Walter, 2010; Kersbergen and Vis, 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016; Dal
Bó et al., 2018; Fetzer, 2019; Foster and Frieden, 2019; and Gingrich, 2019.
28. Scharpf, 2000; Prasad, 2006; and Thelen, 2014.
29. Rodrik, 2011; and Subramanian and Kessler, 2013.
30. Betz, 1994; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Golder, 2003;
Swank and Betz, 2003; Jesuit and Mahler, 2004; Kessler and Freeman, 2005.
31. Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005; and Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006.
32. Hays et al., 2005; and Scheve and Slaughter, 2006.
33. This adjustment is important to make because when unemployment rises, more
people file for unemployment insurance benefits or fall into the income brackets that
make them eligible for means-tested benefits, or both. Since we are interested in meas-
uring public commitment to social protection or welfare effort, it is necessary to nor-
malize spending by the unemployment rate so that unemployment-induced increases
in social spending (that do not involve changes in policy) are not mischaracterized as
increases in welfare effort.
34. This process began during the later stages of the Cold War, but it accelerated in the
post–Cold War era. See Karns and Mingst, 2010.
35. Mathews, 1997.
36. Featherstone, 1994. In France, a referendum on the Maastricht treaty narrowly
passed. In Denmark, the treaty was initially rejected in a close vote. It passed in a
second referendum.
37. On the history of political opposition to multilateral institutions in the United States,
see Patrick, 2017.
38. See Chapter 2, Figure 2.7.
39. Lefkofridi and Michel, 2017; Roth, et al., 2018; and Michel, 2019.
40. Heinisch, 2003; and Höbelt, 2003, 99.
41. Hainsworth, 2004, 106.
42. Swank and Betz, 2003; and Hernández and Kriesi, 2016.
43. Farage also connected EU membership to the issue of immigration, arguing that the
best way to limit immigration was to leave the supranational institution.
44. Miller, 2016; Semuels, 2016.
45. Autor et al., 2020.
46. Ironically, many on the left also now saw multilateral institutions as a means to help
achieve this goal. By regulating social-welfare and labor standards across national
borders, international institutions could help protect vulnerable workers, businesses,
and communities from market-induced regional and global “races to the bottom.”
Following the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the call for a new “social Europe”
that would harmonize welfare and labor costs across Europe united most West European
parties on the left. Instead of using the European Union to shield international business
from domestic politics, they argued “federal Europe” should be repurposed to defend
working families from the vicissitudes of global market forces. See Sassoon, 2014, 721.
196 Notes
47. In West Germany, Italy, and elsewhere, ruling Christian Democrats also exploited
public fears about communism to shore up political support for their foreign and
domestic policies (Mazower, 1999, 292–293; and Corduwener, 2016). Similar tac-
tics were employed by political elites in the United States to silence progressive “one
worlders” on the political left and to keep isolationist and nationalist opposition to
American international leadership on the far right in check (Doenecke, 1979; and
Dudziak, 2012). In Japan, conservatives used various means, including legislation
(e.g., Subversive Activities Prevention Bill), to attack and marginalize socialists and
communists (Hayes, 2009, 88).
48. Gaddis, 2005.
49. Sassoon, 1992, 215.
50. Sassoon, 1992, 168–169.
51. Midford, 2011.
52. Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, 60.
53. Midford, 2011, 57.
54. Samuels, 2007, 32; and Pyle, 2018, 360–361.
55. Hughes, 2017, 82.
56. Eichenberg, 1989; and Holsti, 1992.
57. Domke et al., 1987
58. Ikenberry, 2020a.
59. Talbott, 2008, 329–330, as cited in Ikenberry, 2020a, 263.
60. Ikenberry, 2020a, 259.
61. De Spiegeleire et al., 2017, v, fi
gure 1.2; and Henke and Maher, 2021.
62. Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012; and Burgoon and
Schakel, 2022.
63. Autor et al., 2020.
64. Midford, 2011, 15–16; Hughes, 2017, 79; and Madison, 2019.
65. The country-year measures included in our baseline model are: Hensel et al.’s (2008)
ICOW-based territorial rivalries index; Dreyer and Thompson’s (2011) strategic
rivalries index; Palmer et al.’s (2021) and Gibler et al.’s (2016) binary Militarized
International Disputes (MIDs) measure; Goertz, et al.’s (2016) interstate peace scale
with neighbors; Kim’s (2018) categorical measure of hostile relations with neighbors;
and Markowitz and Fariss’s (2018) spatial lag measure of geopolitical competition.
The resulting scale is the standardized and equally weighted sum of the seven meas-
ures. In constructing the scale, we used casewise deletion where a country-year ob-
servation lacked any of the seven components, with a Cornbach’s alpha of .78 as a
threshold for internal consistency. In addition to our baseline model, we developed a
supplementary measure that also includes system-wide variation in the risk of nuclear
war based on the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ annual updating of its “Doomsday
Clock.”
66. The measures differ in how they define threats (military as opposed to economic and
political), the extent to which threats involve territorial claims, and whether the threat
entails actual hostilities.
Notes 197
67. Given that our concern is with geopolitical challenges broadly defined, aggregating
these indicators into a composite index allows us to capture the different ways inter-
national threats manifest and, importantly, to offset the substantive and methodolog-
ical limitations inherent in any particular measure.
68. Vine, 2021.
69. The analyses here start in 1960 because many of the control variables are only avail-
able from that year.
70. The regression analyses underlying these three figures, while focused on how geo-
political threat is associated with partnership and power, follow the same respective
specifications discussed above with respect to the effects of social transfers: Figure
3.8 focuses on the country-level (specification summarized in discussion of Figures
3.2 above); Figure 3.9 focuses on the party level (specification discussed for Figure 3.3
above); and Figure 3.10 focuses on the voter level (specification summarized in dis-
cussion of Figure 3.4).
71. For the full results underlying Figure 3.8, see Table B.1 in Appendix B. For the full
results underlying Figure 3.9, see Table B.4 in Appendix B.
72. See Table B.3 in Appendix B, for the full results.
73. Voters may feel better placed to pass judgment on issues like international trade
that directly impact their pocketbooks, than on “high politics” issues such as mil-
itary balances, modernization, and deployments. See McCormick et al., 1992; and
Holsti, 1978.
74. Trubowitz, 2011.
75. Nuti et al., 2015; Tompkins, 2016; Conze et al., 2017.
76. Others have recognized this too. See Broz et al., 2021.
77. See, for example, Katz and Mair, 1995; Kirshner, 2014; Hopkin and Blyth, 2019; Tooze,
2018; and Blyth, 2021.
78. See, for example, Featherstone, 1994; De Vries and McNamara, 2018; and Börzel and
Zürn, 2021.
79. Colgan and Keohane, 2017.
80. Mair, 2013, 109; Slobodian, 2018.
81. See Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2006; and Boix, 2019.
82. Przeworski, 2019, 111.
83. KOF’s de facto economic globalization index includes trade in goods and in services,
trade partner diversity, FDI, portfolio investment, international debt, international
reserves, and international income payments. The KOF de facto political globalization
index comprises number of embassies, UN peacekeeping missions, and international
non-governmental organizations operating in country. Our de facto all globaliza-
tion index includes these de facto economic and political indices, plus KOF’s de facto
socio-cultural measures (international voice traffic, international tourism, interna-
tional students, internet bandwidth, IKEA and McDonald’s stores, international
trademarks). For details, see Gygli et al., 2019.
84. Right-party government (percentage of cabinet posts) comes from Armingeon et al.,
2020. All explanatory variables are five-year lagged moving averages, to address the
198 Notes
lag in effects and also to help isolate the direction of association—to assess our causal
inferences about statistically significant predictors. For each of our measures of de
facto globalization, we consider two specifications: without any controls; and with
substantive controls and country fixed effects. See Table B.5 in Appendix B.
85. We created a country-year government-voter gap index measuring the degree to which
OECD government and public support for liberalized trade and institutionalized co-
operation were different (similar). We rely on the KOF globalization policy indices
to measure government policy support for partnership. Voter support estimates are
based on our country-level vote-weighted indices measuring the voting public’s sup-
port of partnership. The government-voter gap measure for partnership is the adjusted
value of the difference between standardized government support for partnership
and the standardized vote-weighted party support for partnership.
86. For our baseline, we recode negative government-voter gaps—i.e., situations where
the voting public wants more trade liberalization and institutionalized cooperation
than their government currently supports—as 0. We make this adjustment because
there is no reason to assume that the voting public prefers government policies that
are more supportive of international partnership than government policy, or less so. It
is the magnitude of the overreach that we are interested in.
87. See Table B.5 in Appendix B for the full results. We considered a wide range of al-
ternative specifications, including adding further measures of partnership in party
platforms and de jure globalization (indices that go into our outcome measure).
88. The results in Figure 3.11 are based on the specification with the fullest battery of
controls. See columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table B.5, Appendix B.
89. We obtain similar results using narrower measures of economic globalization, such as
financial flows or capital openness.
90. Since these de facto measures might be affected by past de jure measures that inform
our measures of government-voter gap we also considered models that include our
measures of government support for globalization (KOF index of de jure political and
economic globalization) and average vote-weighted party support for partnership.
The results also show a significant effect of de facto all globalization.
91. For a review of these debates, see Mastanduno, 1999.
Chapter 4
1. Computations by authors based on data from the Manifesto Project Database.

2. Trubowitz, 1998, 178–183.
3. Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007.
4. Young, 1996.
5. Hanrieder, 1989, 337–354; and Sassoon, 2014, 220–221.
6. Bogdanor, 2020, 14–16; and Sassoon, 2014, 184–185.
7. Samuels, 2007; and Pyle, 2018, 224.
8. Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010.
Notes 199
9. Doenecke, 1979; Griffith, 1979; and McCormick, 1995.

10. Sassoon, 1996, 167–185.
11. Sassoon, 1996, 183.
12. Pyle, 2018, 182.
13. Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, 59.
14. McCormick, 1995, 89.
15. Mochizuki, 1983, 153–154.
16. See Chapter 1 for a description of the Manifesto Project data and Chapter 2 for how
we have categorized parties.
17. See Chapter 2 for a description of our Manifesto measures of international partner-
ship and military power.
18. Following many other analysts (Huber and Inglehardt, 1995; Mair, 1997; March and
Mudde, 2005; and Rooduijn et al., 2018), we classify parties as mainstream, radical-
left, and radical-right, depending on their ideology. Mainstream parties refer to our
four center-left and center-right party families: Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian
Democrats, and Conservatives. Radical-left parties include political parties usually
associated with communist or, in the post-Cold War period, post-communist ideolo-
gies (e.g., Spain’s Podemos; Germany’s The Left; Finland’s Left Alliance). On the rad-
ical right are parties associated with nationalist and/or populist appeals to nativism,
traditionalism, and statism (e.g., France’s Front National (FN); Austria’s Freedom
Party (FPÖ); the Danish People’s Party (DPP)). See Appendix C for mainstream,
radical-left and radical-right party coding by core Western countries.
19. The number of parties each dot represents thus varies. In the case of mainstream
parties, each dot can represent multiple mainstream parties, as it was not uncommon
for European democracies to have more than one center-left and center-right and
multiple parties on the left or right in any given year.
20. The reference lines in Figure 4.1 demarcating foreign policy strategic orientations
could also be set at the zero-points, since here, too, each dimension is measuring
net partnership and net power—that is, the relative share of platforms devoted to
supporting partnership (power) minus the share of platforms opposing partnership
(power). As noted in Chapter 2, for consistency we use sample-medians as the bench-
mark here and in Figures 4.2, 4.6, and 4.7.
21. See Sassoon, 1992, 209–240.
22. Sassoon, 2014, 463.
23. The FPÖ’s coordinate position in Figure 4.2 is 1.4 on the horizontal axis and 2.3 on
the vertical axis, putting it quite solidly in the upper-right quadrant for this later Cold
War period. See also Dolezal, 2008, 111.
24. The FN’s coordinate position in Figure 4.2 is 2.1 on the horizontal axis and −.45 on the
vertical axis, putting it in the lower-right quadrant.
25. See Appendix B Table B.6a–B.6e for full results of the regression analyses.
26. This is important since government decisions to invest in military power (e.g., defense
spending) can be made simultaneously with decisions to join international organiza-
tions and other forms of international partnership. To address this, we use regression
estimators to model the outcomes of interest (partnership, power, and partnership +
200 Notes
power) for a given set of explanatory conditions. In doing so, we take into account
how those explanatory conditions affect each outcome in ways related to their effects
for other outcomes. In statistical terms, seemingly unrelated regression models factor
in such dependence, treating the error terms of the respective models as linked. For
a discussion, see Zellner, 1962; and Greene, 2012. The model coefficients are ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) with robust cluster standard errors (clustered by country),
including controls for level of democracy, unemployment rate, real GDP growth,
average party vote share, past openness, voting turnout, union density, along with
fixed effects for the twenty-four Western countries and decade dummies. To reduce
endogeneity and address delays in outcomes, we use lagged moving averages (five-
year) for the explanatory variables.
27. Again, partnership + power is the sum of the standardized measure of our KOF glob-
alization index (partnership) and the standardized measure of defense spending as a
share of GDP (power). This provides a rough approximation of liberal internation-
alism though it smooths over which of the two components—partnership or power—
account for year-to-year differences. We also considered alternative approaches to
standardize and combine our measures of partnership and power (e.g., creating cat-
egories for different combinations of partnership and power; developing scales using
principal component analysis). These yielded similar patterns to those reported using
our baseline measures.
28. See Appendix A for the summary statistics on these and all country-year and party-
year variables explored in this chapter.
29. Since the horizontal axes capture the full sample variation for our twenty-four OECD
countries, we can compare the substantive size of effects across party families and
government policy.
30. The results reported here are corroborated using other approaches to combining of
partnership and power. See, for example, the categorical specifications in Table D.2 of
Appendix D.
31. Mainstream parties benefited too from the fact that parties on the far left and far right
disagreed sharply over defense spending and military preparedness. Nuclear disar-
mament also made it difficult for them to find common ground on an alternative for-
eign policy strategy.
32. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967. For a recent discussion of the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage
model, see Ford and Jennings, 2020.
33. Clark, 2019; and Voce and Clarke, 2021. On the decline of mainstream party vote
share more generally, see Katz and Mair, 2018, chapter 7.
34. Golosov, 2010; Best, 2013; Pildes, 2021.
35. Computations by authors based on data from Swank, 2018.
36. Mettler and Leavitt, 2019, cited in Pildes, 2021, 146.
37. See, for example, Kitschelt, 1997; Mudde, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Bolleyer and
Bytzek, 2013; Inglehart and Norris, 2017; Burgoon et al., 2019; De Vries et al., 2021;
and Mutz, 2018.
38. Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Kitschelt, 1994; Clark and Lipset, 2001; Gingrich and
Häusermann, 2015; Boix, 2019; Hall, 2020; and Rennwald and Pontussen, 2021.
Notes 201
39. At the same time, Social Democratic parties pushed to reform social insurance sys-
tems and labor market regulations in ways that often disadvantaged traditional blue-
collar workers, while extending coverage to previously excluded groups, such as
female service-sector workers. See Häusermann, 2010.
40. Häusermann, 2017, cited in Boix, 2019, 9.
41. Denmark and the UK agreed to the treaty’s commitment to allow goods and people
to move freely across national borders, but not to the European Union’s common
currency.
42. Sassoon, 2014, 739. Center-left and center-right parties in Western Europe were
less enthusiastic about extending membership to the fledgling democracies of post-
Communist Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). The prevailing view
was incorporating CEEC nations into NATO should take priority over EU mem-
bership. Offering NATO membership was easier and less costly, politically as well as
economically. Already, radical-right parties like France’s FN had reversed course on
the issues of economic and political integration and were attacking the idea of EU
citizenship and a single currency (Mudde, 2007). EU enlargement would come, but
for mainstream parties, it was double-edged, politically. While the vast majority of
Western European elites supported it, mass support was considerably less enthusi-
astic. In 2005, public support for the European Union among EU citizens was only
about 50 percent. Significantly, opposition was strongest among those without
degrees and workers. See McLaren, 2005, cited in Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018, 102.
44. Clinton understood that moving in this direction would anger liberal constituencies
within the party and, to some extent, sought to soften the blow by imposing unilateral
sanctions against European and Japanese exporters accused of dumping goods in the
US market and using the Commerce Department to actively promote US manufac-
tured exports. See Trubowitz, 2011, 122.
45. Shoch, 2001, 228–230.
46. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Shoch, 2001; and Hiscox, 2020.
47. Pempel, 1998; Schoppa, 2011.
48. Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, 155, 118; Schoppa, 2011, 36–38.
49. Koizumi’s agenda was enormously popular with urban voters, but rural members of
the party attacked and sometimes defeated his policy proposals. In an effort to blunt
the political impact of those criticisms, Koizumi made annual high-profile sym-
bolic visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine that had “deep and special meaning
for rural voters” (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, 167). While these annual visits were
roundly criticized by Beijing and Seoul for being insensitive and nationalistic, the
gestures allowed Koizumi to solidify his exposed flank with conservative, rural voters.
50. Under Koizumi, Japan launched its first big surge in Economic Partnership
Agreements (FTAs) with other countries in the Pacific region. See Urata, 2009.
Historically, FTAs were considered closed-door measures. However, in the 1990s they
came to be seen as complements to WTO efforts to promote “open regionalism.” See
Drezner, 2014, 146.
51. Reid-Henry, 2019, 559–565.
202 Notes
52. Abe served briefly as prime minister in 2006–2007.

53. Davis, 2019.
54. Government policy and mainstream party platforms also diverge over defense
spending, albeit in the reverse direction. After the Cold War Western governments
sharply reduced defense spending as a share of GDP after the Cold War. However,
as Figure 4.7 makes clear, mainstream party leaders, overall, continued to run on
platforms calling for a strong national defense. This divergence likely reflects main-
stream party leaders’ lingering concerns about appearing weak on national defense,
especially given increased voter support for military spending (see Figure 2.7 in
Chapter 2).
55. And in their willingness to enter into governing coalitions with Social Democratic
and socialist parties. See Tarrow, 2005; Rooduijn et al., 2017; and Hooghe
et al., 2019b.
56. Burgoon, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2019b.
57. Kaldor, 2000.
58. On radical-left (and radical-right) parties’ stance on trade liberalization, see Rone,
2020; and Waal and de Koster, 2018.
59. See Jamitzky, 2015; Shaw, 2016; and Davis, 2019.
60. Burgoon, 2009; Rooduijn et al., 2017.
61. In some cases (e.g., Britain’s UKIP; the Netherland’s Party for Freedom)
Euroskepticism was initially the principal line of foreign policy attack against the
center. On Euroskepticism, see Judt, 2005, 742–745; Chryssogelos, 2010; Braun et al.,
2019; and Hooghe et al., 2019b.
62. FN’s position on partnership and power averaged −1.8 and 2.2, respectively, while
DPP averaged −2.4 and 1.3, respectively—both clearly in Figure 4.6’s lower-right na-
tionalist quadrant.
63. In the full post–Cold War period captured by Figure 4.6, UKIP, which formed in 1993,
averaged −2.1 and 1.03 on partnership and power, respectively, putting it squarely
in the nationalist quadrant. AfD, which formed in 2013, is located in the nationalist
quadrant, averaging −1.3 and 1.2 on partnership and power, respectively.
64. See Mudde, 2007, 187–188; Hernández and Kriesi, 2016; Bale, 2018; Eatwell and
Goodwin, 2018, 284; Boix, 2019; and Szöcsik and Polyakova, 2019.
65. See Swank and Betz, 2003; Kriesi et al., 2008; Autor, et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig,
2018; Burgoon et al., 2019; Broz et al., 2021; and De Vries et al., 2021.
66. Henley, 2017.
67. As with the party-level and voter-level analyses in Chapter 3, we rely here on the
Manifesto Project’s right-to-left scale for each party year. In our baseline models,
we use this scale to control for party families and general party platform left-right
orientations, lagged party vote, country and decade fixed effects, along with country-
year levels of democracy, globalization, and unemployment. See Appendix B, Table
B.7, for full specification and results.
68. That effect of the Cold War is apparent in models 4–6 in Appendix B, Table B.7. It
shows that the interaction term between party support for partnership and the Cold
War period dummy variable is positive and significant. This means that the negative
Notes 203
association between a party’s support for partnership and its subsequent electoral
share was less negative, or even positive, during the Cold War.
69. Social protection is based on social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. See
Chapter 3 for a discussion.
70. See Appendix B, Table B.7, for the full results. The reported panels in Figure 4.8 corre-
spond to models 2–3 in Table B.7.
71. Studies that are especially relevant to the argument here include Swank and Betz,
2003; Walter, 2010; Kersbergen and Vis, 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016; Dal
Bó et al., 2018; Fetzer, 2019; Foster and Frieden, 2019; and Gingrich, 2019.
72. The patterns hold when controlling for other economic and political conditions
(i.e., GDP per capita, economic inequality, government debt, inflation, party system,
measures of corruption). They also hold up to changes in sample size: for instance,
including the CEEC countries and other countries like Turkey and Brazil in the
models. The results also hold up to different estimators (e.g., multi-level random in-
tercept models) and alternative ways of calculating standard errors (e.g., simple ro-
bust standard errors).
73. See Appendix E for these results.
74. Well-known works in this genre include Keohane and Nye, 1971; Kindleberger, 1973;
Gilpin, 1975; Keohane, 1984; Mearsheimer, 1990; and Ikenberry, 2001.
75. Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001.
76. Cha, 2000; Mastanduno, 1997; and Ikenberry 2020a, 200–202.
77. Acheson, 1969, 97.
78. Simmons et al. (2008), cited in Ikenberry, 2020a, 265.
79. For a description of the KOF de facto globalization index, see Chapter 3.
80. See also Voeten, 2013; and Bailey et al., 2017.
81. Rae’s index is a straightforward measure of party fragmentation, ranging between 1
(maximal fractionalization) and 0 (minimal fractionalization). The index data comes
from Armingeon et al.’s (2020) CPDS database.org (variable rae_leg). The results
hold up to related measures such as the effective number of parties in party systems
(Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), as well as different methods of calculating fragmenta-
tion in party systems.
82. Table B.9 in Appendix B provides the full regression results. Model 1 shows the result
that is the basis for Figure 4.11.
83. These include the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Benelux Union, Central
Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR), European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN), Council of Europe (COE), European Economic Area
(EEA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European Space Agency (ESA),
European Union (EU), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Labor
Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Maritime
Organization (IMO), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Whaling Commission
(IWC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
204 Notes
(OECD), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), United

Nations (UN), UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), World Health
Organization (WHO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). We exclude in-
ternational governmental organizations that have less to do with the West: e.g., the
African Union (AU), ASEAN, OPEC, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We also
consider specifications for only those IOs that underwent some change in delegation.
For the full list of international governmental organizations in the dataset, see https://
besirceka.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Appendix-I-IOs_03.17.pdf.
84. The concepts and data are discussed and explored in general terms in Hooghe et al.,
2017. While the components should be analyzed separately since they are conceptu-
ally and empirically distinct, we also consider the results of measures that combine
them (Cornbach’s alpha =.71). That is worth doing to see if the results for the indi-
vidual components offset one another and wash away the general pattern suggested
by the individual components.
85. Our linking of IO data to party-system fragmentation has no panel or cross-
international authority variation. This is because our measures of average electoral
fragmentation do not vary across a given international body, but instead, only for a
given grouping of countries varying over time. We use ARIMAX models because they
take into account non-stationarity, autocorrelation, and time-wise heteroskedasticity
in both the international authority and party-system fragmentation time-series data.
Dickey-Fuller tests revealed strong evidence of unit-root in all the international au-
thority measures and party-system fragmentation summarized in Figure 4.13. The
best fit specifications of the time-series analyses include first-differencing of the out-
come and explanatory variables of interest (to address non-stationarity), one lagged
dependent variable AR-1 term of the dependent variable.
86. The full models and results are summarized in Table B.10, panel 10a in Appendix B.
87. See model 4 in Table B.10, panel 10a, Appendix B. By contrast, the effects of party-
system fragmentation are considerably weaker for international organizations that
have historically had little to do with the West (see Table B.10, panel 10b, in Appendix
B). Panel 10c focuses on those IOs of particular importance to the advanced indus-
trialized West that underwent change in the level of delegated authority. For these
IOs, party-fragmentation tends to diminish the delegation level along the lines of our
baseline specification displayed in Figure 4.13.
88. We draw here on distinctions made by Voeten et al., 2009; and Bailey et al., 2017.
89. This number is based on the average share for the twenty-four OECD countries in
our sample. We calculate the share of all votes cast by each OECD country in a given
year that are in agreement with the votes of all other countries (except for the other
twenty-three OECD countries).
90. We report the results separately for the United States, EU-15, and Japan in Appendix
F, Figure F.2. While the lack of voting with the United States is notably lower than for
the EU-15 and Japan, since the turn of the millennium non-Western agreement with
all three has leveled off.
91. For full regression results, see models 3–6 of Table B.9 in Appendix B. The specifica-
tion is summarized above in the discussion introducing Figure 4.11.
Notes 205
92. Hence, the regression analyses include lagged moving-averages not only of our
fragmentation measure, but also the same battery of controls described above (see
Figure 4.11).
93. Lincoln was referring to anti-war Democrats in the North who threatened the Union
cause against the Confederacy.
94. See, for example, Fukuyama, 1989; and Krauthammer, 1990.
Chapter 5
1. Lippmann, 1943, 9–10.

2. The phrase is Huntington’s. See Huntington, 1988.
3. Kahl and Wright, 2021; Tooze, 2021; Wondreys and Mudde, 2022.
4. See, for example, Posen, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2018; Walt, 2018; and Porter, 2020.
5. In sharp contrast to declining voter support for parties favoring partnership, sup-
port for parties advocating greater military spending and preparedness has increased
since the 1990s. Voter support fell during the Iraq War, but it rebounded after the
2008 global crash, and has been rising ever since. See Trubowitz and Burgoon, 2020.
6. See, for example, Kriesi et al., 2008; Burgoon, 2009; Colantone and Stanig, 2018;
Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Rommel and Walter, 2018; Autor et al., 2020; and
Rodrik, 2021.
8. Some stress the rise of new post-material social values and generational change that
have led political elites and voters to polarize over issues such as immigration, race,
and gender. Others emphasize the effects of rising income inequality and the loss of
high-paying jobs due to globalization and automation as reasons radical parties on the
left and right have increased their share of the national vote in one country after an-
other. Economic and social anxiety have made voters apprehensive about free trade,
European integration, and immigration, especially in hard-pressed manufacturing
regions.
9. De Vries and Hobolt, 2019.
10. See, for example, Gholtz et al., 1997; Layne, 1997; Bacevitch, 2002; Preble, 2009;
Morefield, 2014; Posen, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2018; Thrall and Friedman, 2018; Walt,
2018; Immerwahr, 2020; and Porter, 2020. There is no comparable school of strategic
thought in Europe or Asia today. The closest approximation are the calls for greater
“strategic autonomy” from the United States. In Europe, the case for greater autonomy,
and a stronger national defense, is especially popular among nationalist parties such
as France’s Front National and Germany’s AfD. In Japan, these arguments, which
harken back to the early Cold War period when conservative “Gaullist” factions in
the LDP made the case for remilitarization and greater autonomy from the United
States, have resurfaced on the far right. On the EU, see Grajewski, 2021. On Japan, see
Hughes, 2017.
11. On the restraint school’s diverse strands, see Deudney and Ikenberry, 2021.
206 Notes
12. See, for example, Mearsheimer, 2014.

13. Some advocates of strategic restraint do not favor offshore balancing. See, for ex-
ample, Gholtz et al., 1997; and Posen, 2014.
14. On the limitations of strategic restraint as an American strategy, see Brooks and
Wohlforth, 2016a; and Deudney and Ikenberry, 2021.
15. Sartori, 1976.
17. Brands, 2021; Lind, 2018; Brooks, 2019; and Beckley, 2022.
18. Galston, 2022.
19. Simmel, 1955; and Coser, 1956. For a recent statement and application to great power
politics, see Lascurettes, 2020.
20. On this point, see Westad, 2018a; Leffler, 2019; Tooze, 2020; and Christensen, 2021.
21. Westad, 2018b, 220–221; and Gerstle, 2022, 10–11.
22. Leffler, 2019.
23. Trubowitz and Seo, 2012.
24. See Silver et al., 2021, 12.
25. See, for example, Leali, 2021; and Oltermann, 2021.
26. See, for example, Colgan and Keohane, 2017; Snyder, 2019; Ikenberry, 2020a;
Katzenstein and Kirshner, 2022. Recommendations for re-embedding liberalism
range from broad welfare state interventions, including social security transfers, to
more active labor market provisions. On the latter, see Autor, Mindell, and Reynolds,
2020; and Rodrik and Sabel, 2021.
27. Trubowitz and Harris, 2019; and Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2021.
28. See Kurth, 1979; Gourevitch, 1986; and Trubowitz, 1998.
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Index
For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on
occasion, appear on only one of those pages.
Tables and figures are indicated by t and f following the page number
Abe, Shinzō, 73, 100 liberal internationalism and, 30–31,

Acheson, Dean, 1, 109–10 58f, 75f
Afghanistan, 41, 44–46, 70–71, 128 list of political parties in, 166
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37,
72, 103–4 37f, 42f, 58f
anti-globalism. See also isolationism; power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
nationalism Trans-Pacific Partnership and, 103
Cold War’s end and, 3, 68, 118–19, 121 welfare state policies in, 58f
Global Financial Crisis and, 17, 19–20, Austria
84, 123 anti-globalism in, 17
immigration policy and, 23–24, 64, 67, election (1975) in, 91
128–29, 130 European Community accession of, 36
military commitments and, liberal internationalism and, 88–89
128, 132–33 list of political parties in, 166
multilateral governance and, 23–24, partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37,
25, 121 37f, 42f, 58f
neoliberal economic reforms and, 19, power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
23–24, 25 welfare state policies in, 58f
political entrepreneurs and, 130–31
radical left parties and, 17, 19–20, 66– Belgium
67, 68, 86, 126–27, 128, 130–31 geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
radical right parties and, 17, 19–20, 25– liberal internationalism and, 69–70, 75f
26, 66–67, 68, 72, 86, 104–7, 126–27, list of political parties in, 166
128, 130–31 partnership orientation and, 33f, 37f,
solvency gap and, 123–24 42f, 58f
trade liberalization opposed in, 23–24, power orientation and, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
72, 121, 128–29 welfare state policies in, 58f
welfare state programs and, 3, 5, 25, 64, Bismarck, Otto von, 8
66–67, 72, 96–97, 121, 133 Blair, Tony, 19, 98
working-class voters and, 66–67, 72– Borah, William, 13
73, 104 Brandt, Willy, 34–35, 70–71
Arbatov, Georgi, 68–69 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 29, 31,
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 32. See also International Monetary
(APEC) forum, 36, 38, 71–72 Fund (IMF); World Bank
Australia Brexit movement (Great Britain)
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f anti-globalism and, 67–68, 104
234 Index
Brexit movement (Great Britain) (cont.) Christian Democratic parties

political party system in Britain and, decline in power and influence of, 2–3,
9–10, 67, 123 97–98, 104
solvency gap in foreign policy and, 1–2, globalism and, 72–73
17, 120 liberal internationalism and, 15–16, 61f,
working-class voters and, 104 77f, 85–88
Brodie, Bernard, 7–8 lists of, 166
Bulgaria, 40 partnership orientation and, 90f, 92f,
Bush, George W., 41, 100 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
power orientation and, 90f, 92f, 101f,
Cameron, David, 67 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 8–9 welfare state policies and, 61f
Canada Christian Democratic Party
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f (Germany), 97–98
liberal internationalism in, 75f Clinton, Bill
list of political parties in, 166 China and, 39–40, 99–100
partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37, on Cold War’s end, 71–72
37f, 42f, 58f globalism and economic liberalization
power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f policies of, 19, 53–54, 98, 99–100
trade liberalization and, 36, 38, 99–100 welfare state reform and, 19
welfare state policies in, 58f Clinton, Hillary, 67–68, 72–73
Caribbean Basin Initiative, 36 Cold War. See also Soviet Union
Carter, Jimmy, 69 civil liberties restrictions in Western
Chiang Kai-shek, 30 democracies during, 4–5
China détente policies and, 70–71, 74–75
climate change policy and, 135 end of, 1–3, 18–19, 23–24, 28, 64,
Communist Party takeover (1949) of, 30 68–69, 71–72, 83, 118–19, 123,
foreign investment in, 39–40, 134–35 128, 129–30
growing international influence of, 73, liberal internationalism facilitated by
118, 133–35 conditions of, 3, 16, 17–19, 25–26,
illiberal foreign policy of, 121, 133 29–33, 55–56, 69–73, 75–76, 122–23,
Japan and, 73, 89, 134 124–25, 127–28, 133–34
market-oriented economic reforms nuclear war threat during, 16, 17–18,
in, 39–40 50, 68–69, 70–71, 73–74, 78–79
military buildup in, 50–53, 73 welfare state policies and, 8, 56, 62, 129–
outsourcing of jobs to, 23–24, 67– 30, 133–34
68, 128–29 Western democracies’ political party
post-Cold War overconfidence systems and, 3, 16, 24, 25–26, 85–
regarding fate of, 118 92, 122
power orientation in, 33 Conference on Security Cooperation in
Sino-Soviet split and, 34–35 Europe, 71–72
Taiwan Straits missile crisis (1996) Conservative parties
and, 40 decline in power and influence of,
Western democracies’ geopolitical 2–3, 104
competition with, 24, 26, globalism and, 72–73
131, 133–35 liberal internationalism and, 15–16, 61f,
World Trade Organization accession 70, 77f, 85–88
(2000) by, 39–40 lists of, 166
Index 235
partnership orientation and, 90f, 92f, European Economic Community, 29–30,

101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t 31–32. See also European Union (EU)
power orientation and, 90f, 90, 92f, European Union (EU). See also European
100–1, 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, Union countries (“EU-15”)
157t, 159t austerity programs during 2010s
welfare state policies and, 61f and, 103
Conservative Party (Great Britain), 87–88, democratic deficit and unelected
91, 123 bureaucrats’ power in, 23–24, 65–66
COVID-19 pandemic (2020-22), 123–24 Eastern Europe expansion during 1990s
Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring of, 39–40, 71–72
(1968), 34–35 European Commission and, 23–24,
Czech Republic, 39–40 36, 128–29
Euroskepticism and, 17, 123–
Dahl, Robert, 16 24, 128–29
Danish People’s Party (DPP), 17, 103–4 globalism and, 11
Debs, Eugene Victor, 13 Maastricht Treaty (1993) and, 38,
defense spending. See power 65–66, 99, 195n.46
Democratic Party (United States), 69, 87, post-Cold War overconfidence
88–89, 98, 99–100 regarding fate of, 118
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 100 Single European Act (1986) and, 36
democratic solvency gap. See solvency gap trade liberalization and, 11
Denmark Transatlantic Trade and Investment
anti-globalism in, 17 Program and, 103
backlash against Maastricht Treaty European Union countries (“EU-15”). See
in, 65–66 also specific countries
European Economic Community anti-globalism in, 17, 72, 123
accession (1973) of, 31–32 China and, 134–35
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f geopolitical threat levels facing, 74f,
liberal internationalism and, 69–70, 75f 74–75, 75f
list of political parties in, 166 globalism approach during 1990s of,
nationalism in, 103–4 24–25, 28–29, 43–44
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, Iraq War (2003-12) and, 41
42f, 58f liberal internationalism and, 15, 16–17,
power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f 29–32, 48
welfare state policies in, 58f, 79 partnership orientation in, 27, 43–44,
44f, 46–48, 47f, 50, 51f
Eastern Europe. See also specific countries power orientation and military
European Union and NATO expansion spending in, 43–44, 44f, 46–48, 47f,
into, 39–40, 71–72, 131–32 50–53, 51f, 74–75
Soviet hegemony during Cold War in,
34–35, 69 Farage, Nigel, 67, 104, 195n.43
trade liberalization after Cold War in, far left parties. See radical left parties
19, 38–39, 71–72, 118, 128–29 far right parties. See radical right parties
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 69 Finland
embedded liberalism, 3, 18, 31, 60–61, European Community accession of, 36
133–34, 135–36. See also welfare state geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
Estonia, 40 liberal internationalism and, 75f
Euromissile deployment (1980s), 8–9 list of political parties in, 166
236 Index
Finland (cont.) election (1990) in, 97–98

partnership orientation and, 33f, 36–37, election (2021) in, 97–98
37f, 42f, 58f globalism and, 98, 100
power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f interwar era in, 56–57, 69
welfare state policies in, 58f liberal internationalism and, 4,
France 58f, 88–89
anti-globalism and, 17, 104 list of political parties in, 166
backlash against Maastricht Treaty nationalism in, 1–2, 103–4
in, 65–66 partnership orientation in, 58f
China and, 135 power orientation and military
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f spending in, 58f, 132
globalism and, 98, 100 reunification (1991) of, 40
liberal internationalism and, 4, 58f, 69– trade liberalization in, 64
70, 75f, 87–89, 123 welfare state policies in, 8, 58f, 64, 79
list of political parties in, 166 Global Financial Crisis (2008-9)
nationalism and, 1–2, 14, 103–4 anti-globalism in the wake of, 17, 19–
nuclear arsenal of, 69–70 20, 84, 123
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, bank bailouts during, 42
42f, 58f international financial institutions
power orientation and military and, 43
spending in, 30–31, 33f, 33, 37f, 41, micro-protectionist measures
42f, 58f, 71 following, 42–43
trade liberalization in, 64 unemployment levels during, 42
welfare state policies in, 58f, 64 Western democratic governments’
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated continuing commitment to globalism
military command by, 34–35 following, 24–25, 28–29, 43–46, 44f,
Freedom Party (FPÖ, Austria), 17, 66–67, 45f, 48–50, 79
72, 91–92 globalism. See also anti-globalism
Frieden, Jeffrey, 36 definition of, 10f, 11
Front National (FN, France), 17, 66–67, democratic deficit and, 55, 65–
72, 91–92, 103–4 66, 80–81
financialization and, 80, 81–83
Gaullists (French center-rightists), 69–70 humanitarian intervention and, 40–41
geopolitical slack, 3–4. See also immigration policy and, 72–73
geopolitical threat labor unions’ declining influence and,
geopolitical threat, 1, 3–4, 17–21, 24–25, 80–81, 83, 130–31
55–56, 124–25, 126, 129–30, 133–35. mainstream parties and, 98–102, 101f,
See also liberal internationalism 102f, 126, 128–29
measurement of, 73–74 military spending declines and,
politics in Western democracies and, 28, 41, 71
68–79, 74f, 76f, 77f, 78f, 142t, 146t, multilateral governance and, 11, 16, 27–
149t, 159t, 173t 28, 37–38, 40–41, 44–46, 53–54, 55,
General Agreement on Tariffs and 65–66, 71–73, 79–80, 113–14, 114f,
Trade (GATT), 19, 32, 71–72, 115f, 126, 128–29, 132–33, 164t
99–100. See also World Trade neoliberalism and, 18–20, 23–24, 37–
Organization (WTO) 38, 39, 123, 136
Germany. See also West Germany partnership orientation in, 10f, 11, 24–
China and, 135 25, 28, 37–38, 45f, 128
Index 237
political fragmentation within nationalism in, 103–4

Western democracies and, 111–19, partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37,
113f, 120–21, 126, 128–31, 162t, 37f, 42f, 58f
177t, 179f populism in, 67
power orientation in, 10f, 11, 24–25, 28, power orientation and military
37–38, 41, 45f, 50, 71, 128 spending in, 30–31, 33f, 33, 37f, 41,
trade liberalization and, 11, 16, 27–28, 42f, 58f, 71
37–39, 44–46, 53–54, 55, 72–73, 79– trade liberalization in, 35–36, 64
80, 86, 126, 128–29, 132–33 United States and, 87–88
war on terrorism and, 24–25 welfare state policies in, 58f, 64
Washington Consensus economic Greece
policies and, 39 anti-globalism in, 17, 103
welfare state reductions and, 25, 55–56, European Community accession
72, 79, 86, 96–97, 100, 129, 130– (1981) of, 36
31, 132–33 geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
Western alignment in multilateral liberal internationalism and, 75f
institutions and, 114–18, 116f, list of political parties in, 166
117f, 162t partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37,
Western democracies’ embrace after 37f, 42f, 58f
1990 of, 24–26, 37–41, 53–54, 55–56, power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
79–84, 82f, 86, 96–97, 123, 126, 130– welfare state policies in, 58f
31, 132–33 Group of 20 (G20), 43
Western voters’ increasing rejection
of, 24–25, 28–29, 46–47, 47f, 49f, Haider, Jörg, 66–67
50–54, 51f, 55–56, 79–80, 81–84, Hobsbawm, Eric, 62
82f, 123, 128–29, 132–33 (see also Hungary, 39–40
anti-globalism) Hussein, Saddam, 41
globalization, 19–21, 23–24, 31, 46, 53–54,
55, 68. See also globalism; liberal Iceland, 33
internationalism; partnership Ikenberry, John, 72
social protection and, 64–65, 65f institutionalized cooperation. See
Western policymaking and, 37–38, 72– partnership
73, 79–83, 82f international institutions. See
Goldwater, Barry, 69 partnership
government-voter gap. See solvency gap International Monetary Fund (IMF), 35–
Great Britain 36, 39, 42–43
anti-globalism and, 85–86 Iraq War (2003-12), 23, 41, 44–46,
Brexit movement in, 1–2, 9–10, 17, 67– 84, 128
68, 104, 120, 123 Ireland, Republic of
election (1974) in, 91 European Economic Community
election (1979) in, 91 accession (1973) of, 31–32
European Economic Community geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
accession (1973) of, 31–32, 87–88 liberal internationalism and, 75f
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f list of political parties in, 166
globalism and, 80–81, 98 partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37,
liberal internationalism and, 69–70, 75f, 37f, 42f, 58f
87–88, 123 power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
list of political parties in, 166 welfare state policies in, 58f, 79
238 Index
isolationism. See also anti-globalism Soviet Union and, 70, 89

Cold War’s end and, 3 Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty
definition of, 10f, 12 (TPP), 100
geopolitical threat levels and, 132 United States and, 70, 73, 88–89
international trade and, 12–13 welfare state programs in, 19, 58f
libertarianism and, 13 Japanese Communist Party (JCP), 89
nativism and, 13 Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), 70, 89
overextension and, 12–13 Johnson, Boris, 67
partnership orientation in, 10f, 12–13 Johnson, Lyndon B., 69
power orientation in, 10f, 12–13 Jospin, Lionel, 98
radical left parties and, 13, 90f, 91, 92f,
102, 103 Kagan, Robert, 27
United States during interwar period Kaldor, Mary, 103
and, 69 Kennedy, John F., 69
welfare state program commitments Kohl, Helmut, 91
and, 129 Koizumi, Junichiro, 19, 100, 201n.49
Italy Korean War, 30, 70, 74–75
anti-globalism in, 103 Kosovo, 40–41
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
interwar illiberalism in, 56–57 labor unions, 80–81, 83, 100, 130–31
liberal internationalism and, 69–70, Labour Party (Great Britain), 98–99
75f, 88–89 Latvia, 40
list of political parties in, 166 League of Nations, 11, 66
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 66–67
42f, 58f Le Pen, Marine, 14, 104
power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Japan), 70,
welfare state policies in, 58f, 79 73, 88, 89, 100
liberal internationalism
Jackson, Andrew, 14 Cold War conditions that fostered, 3,
Japan 16, 17–19, 25–26, 29–33, 55–56,
China and, 73, 89, 134 69–73, 75–76, 122–23, 124–25, 127–
geopolitical threat levels facing, 74f, 74– 28, 133–34
75, 75f, 78–79 Cold War’s end as a threat to, 3–4,
globalism and, 24–25, 43–44, 100 16, 18–20, 76–78, 83, 123, 126,
industrial conglomerates in, 30, 89 128, 129–30
interwar era and, 69 debates regarding future
liberal internationalism and, 15, 16–17, of, 26, 131–37
29–32, 48, 58f, 70, 88, 89 decline in Western popular support for,
list of political parties in, 166 1–2, 3–4, 16–17, 19–20, 23, 25–26,
North Korea and, 40, 50–53, 73 27–28, 46–50, 49f, 51f, 64–68, 83,
partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37, 120–21, 136
37f, 42f, 43–44, 44f, 47f, 48, 50, definition of, 10f, 12–13
51f, 58f developing world countries and, 4–
postwar reindustrialization in, 30 5, 15–16
power orientation and military economic crisis of 1970s and, 33–37, 91,
spending in, 33f, 37f, 40, 42f, 43–44, 123, 125
44f, 47f, 48, 50–53, 51f, 58f, 73, 74– geopolitical threat levels facing Western
75, 88–89 democracies and, 3–4, 25, 55–56,
Index 239
73–79, 74f, 75f, 76f, 77f, 78f, 124, Lippmann, Walter, 120, 135–36, 137
142t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t Lipset, Seymour, 96
immigration policy and, 64 Lithuania, 40
international democracy promotion Luxembourg
and, 5, 23 liberal internationalism and, 69–70
international security institutions list of political parties in, 166
and, 61–62 partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f,
multilateral governance and, 1–2, 12, 42f, 58f
15–16, 17, 23, 25–26, 46–47, 48, 65– power orientation and military
66, 136 spending in, 33f, 33, 37f, 42f, 58f
neoliberalism’s challenge to, 18–19, 23, welfare state policies in, 58f
91, 123, 135–36
partnership orientation in, 10f, 12, Maastricht Treaty (European Union,
24–25, 32, 33f, 46–47, 50, 58f, 59f, 1993), 38, 65–66, 99, 195n.46
59–60, 61f, 62–64, 63f, 73–74, 75f, mainstream parties. See also Christian
76f, 77f, 78f, 105f, 106f, 122–23, 157t, Democratic parties; Conservative
159t, 173t parties; Liberal parties; Social
post-Cold War overconfidence Democratic parties
regarding fate of, 23, 118–19, 127 declining influence since 1990 of, 97f,
power orientation in, 10f, 12, 13–14, 98, 108, 120–21, 126–27, 128–30
24–25, 32, 33f, 46–47, 50–53, 58f, 59f, definition of, 2–3, 21, 89–90, 166
59–60, 61f, 62–64, 63f, 71, 73–74, 75f, economic crisis of 1970s and, 125
76f, 77f, 78f, 105f, 106f, 122–23, 157t, environmental policies and, 126–27
159t, 173t globalism and, 98–102, 101f, 102f,
trade liberalization and, 1–2, 3–4, 12, 126, 128–29
15–16, 17, 18–20, 23, 25, 30–32, 46– immigration policies and, 126–27
47, 48, 57, 64, 136 liberal internationalism and, 89–98,
welfare state policies and, 3–5, 19–20, 94f, 95f, 100–1, 101f, 122, 124–25,
23–24, 25, 55–62, 58f, 59f, 61f, 63f, 152t, 156t
63–65, 65f, 83, 106f, 107–8, 120–21, partnership orientation and, 90f, 92f,
123, 125–26, 127–28, 136, 142t, 145t, 100–2, 101f, 102f, 175t
146t, 149t, 157t, 159t power orientation and, 90f, 92f, 100–2,
Western democracies’ political party 101f, 102f, 175t
systems and, 2, 6, 16–17, 21–22, 55– welfare state programs and, 125,
56, 60, 61f, 77f, 85–86, 89–98, 90f, 92f, 129, 136
94f, 95f, 104–8, 105f, 106f, 136, 152t, working-class voters and, 98–99, 125,
157t, 159t 126, 130–31
Liberal parties Mair, Peter, 18
decline in power and influence of, 2–3 Malaysia, 44
liberal internationalism and, 15–16, 61f, Manifesto Project Database (MPD), 21–
77f, 85–87 22, 47
lists of, 166 Mao Tse-tung, 30
partnership orientation and, 90f, 92f, Marshall Plan, 29
102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t Mathews, Jessica, 65–66
power orientation and, 90f, 92f, 102f, McGovern, George, 69
145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t mercantilism, 14
welfare state policies and, 61f Merkel, Angela, 100
libertarianism, 13, 131–32 Mexico, 38, 44, 67–68
240 Index
Middle East, 4–5, 23, 33–34, 70–71, New Zealand

118, 128 geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
military power. See power liberal internationalism and, 30, 58f, 75f
military preparedness. See power list of political parties in, 166
Milosevic, Slobodan, 40–41 partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37,
Mitterrand, François, 91 37f, 42f, 58f
multilateralism. See partnership power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
Trans-Pacific Partnership and, 103
nationalism. See also anti-globalism welfare state policies in, 58f
definition of, 10f, 13–14 Nixon, Richard M., 69, 70–71
Euroskepticism and, 17, 123– North American Free Trade Agreement
24, 128–29 (NAFTA), 38, 99–100
increase since Cold War’s end of, 3, 6, North Atlantic Treaty
127, 130 Organization (NATO)
interwar era and, 86–87 Eastern Europe expansion during 1990s
liberal internationalism challenged of, 39–40, 71–72, 131–32
by, 2–3 establishment (1949) of, 29, 87–88
mercantilism and, 14 France’s withdrawal from integrated
nativism and, 129 military command of, 34–35
partnership orientation and, Kosovo War (1999) and, 40–41
10f, 13–14 multilateralism and, 30–31
power orientation and, 10f, 13–14 nuclear first use doctrine and, 8–9
radical right parties and, 19–20, 90f, 91, North Korea, 40, 50–53, 73
92f, 102, 103–4 Norway, 58f, 75f, 79, 166
trade liberalization and, 13–14 Nuclear Freeze movement, 8–9
welfare state program commitments
and, 129 Obama, Barack, 67–68
nativism, 13, 19–20, 23–24, 126– oil crisis of 1973, 33–34
27, 129–30
neoliberalism partnership
anti-globalism as a response to, 19, Christian Democratic parties and,
23–24, 25 90f, 92f, 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t,
economic crisis of 1970s and, 123, 125 157t, 159t
economic inequality and, 135–36 Conservative parties and, 90f, 92f, 101f,
welfare state challenged by, 18– 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
19, 135–36 definition of, 7f, 8–10
Western democracies’ support for economic downturns and, 16
liberal internationalism challenged European Union countries and, 27, 43–
by, 18–19, 23, 91, 123, 135–36 44, 44f, 46–48, 47f, 50, 51f
Netherlands globalism and, 10f, 11, 24–25, 28, 37–
election (1972) in, 91 38, 45f, 128
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f liberal internationalism and, 10f, 12,
liberal internationalism and, 69–70, 75f 24–25, 32, 33f, 46–47, 50, 58f, 59f,
list of political parties in, 166 59–60, 61f, 62–64, 63f, 73–74, 75f,
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, 76f, 77f, 78f, 105f, 106f, 122–23, 157t,
42f, 58f 159t, 173t
power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f Liberal parties and, 90f, 92f, 102f, 145t,
welfare state policies in, 58f, 79 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
Index 241
mainstream parties and, 90f, 92f, 100–2, welfare state policies in, 58f
101f, 102f, 175t power
motivations for, 9 Christian Democratic parties and,
multilateral governance and, 9–10, 90 90f, 92f, 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t,
radical left parties and, 90f, 91–92, 92f, 157t, 159t
94f, 101f, 102f, 102–3, 126–27, 145t, common enemy and, 8
146t, 149t, 157t, 159t Conservative parties and, 90f, 90, 92f,
radical right parties and, 90f, 91, 92f, 100–1, 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t,
94f, 101f, 102f, 102, 103–4, 145t, 146t, 157t, 159t
149t, 157t, 159t definition of, 6–9, 7f
Social Democratic parties and, 90f, 92f, domestic political objectives and, 7–8
101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t globalism and, 10f, 11, 24–25, 28, 37–
“sovereignty costs” and, 9 38, 41, 45f, 50, 71, 128
trade liberalization and, 9–10, 90 isolationism and, 10f, 12–13
United States and, 33f, 37f, 42f, liberal internationalism and, 10f, 12,
43–44, 44f, 47f, 48, 50, 51f, 58f, 88– 13–14, 24–25, 32, 33f, 46–47, 50–53,
89, 131–32 58f, 59f, 59–60, 61f, 62–64, 63f, 71,
voters’ preferences regarding, 9–10, 21– 73–74, 75f, 76f, 77f, 78f, 105f, 106f,
22, 27–28, 48–50, 49f 122–23, 157t, 159t, 173t
party families Liberal parties and, 90f, 92f, 102f, 145t,
composition of, 166 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
party fragmentation. See also Western military spending and, 6–8, 20–21, 32,
democracies’ political party systems 33f, 37f, 42f
international effects of 111–18, 113f, motivations for maintaining, 7
114f, 115f, 117f, 162t, 164t–65t nationalism and, 10f, 13–14
measurement of, 111 radical left parties and, 61–62, 90f, 92f,
party systems. See Western democracies' 94f, 101f, 102f, 102–3, 126–27, 145t,
political party systems 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
permissive consensus, 46–47. See also radical right parties and, 88–89, 90f, 91,
liberal internationalism; solvency gap 92f, 94f, 101f, 102f, 102, 145t, 146t,
Philippines, 30–31, 44, 187n.9 149t, 157t, 159t
Podemos Party (Spain), 17, 103 Social Democratic parties and, 61–62,
Poland, 34–35, 39–40 90f, 90, 92f, 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t,
Polanyi, Karl, 56–57, 60–61, 64 149t, 157t, 159t
political parties. See individual party United States and, 27, 33f, 33, 35,
families and specific countries 37f, 40–41, 42f, 43–46, 44f, 47f, 48,
populism, 2–3, 6, 28, 67, 129–30. See also 50–53, 51f, 58f, 69, 71, 74–75, 87,
nationalism; radical left parties; 88–89, 131–33
radical right parties voters’ preferences regarding, 21–22,
Portugal 27–28, 48–50, 49f
European Community accession Prague Spring (Czechoslovakia,
(1986) of, 36 1968), 34–35
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f Preller, Ludwig, 8
liberal internationalism and, 75f Putin, Vladimir, 121, 131–32
list of political parties in, 166
partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37, radical left parties
37f, 42f, 58f anti-globalism and, 17, 19–20, 66–67,
power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f 68, 86, 126–27, 128, 130–31
242 Index
radical left parties (cont.) welfare state policies and, 61f,

Cold War and, 102, 125 72, 126–27
definition of, 89–90, 166 working class voters and, 19–20,
globalism and, 102f, 103 104, 126–27
immigration policy and, 68 Reagan, Ronald, 18–19, 35–36, 39, 69,
increasing power since 1990 of, 97f, 80–81, 91
123, 129–30 Republican Party (United States), 69, 87,
isolationism and, 13, 90f, 91, 92f, 88–89, 98, 99–100, 123
102, 103 Rokkan, Stein, 96
liberal internationalism and, 61f, 69–70, Romania, 40
77f, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 94f, 95f, 95–96, Roosevelt, Franklin D., 12, 15–16, 29
154t, 155t Ruggie, John, 31, 60–62, 64
lists of, 166 Russia
multilateral governance and, illiberal foreign policy of, 121
103, 126–27 power orientation in, 33
partnership orientation and, 90f, 91–92, Ukraine War (2022-) and, 4, 120,
92f, 94f, 101f, 102f, 102–3, 126–27, 121, 131–32
145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t Western democracies’ geopolitical
power orientation and, 61–62, 90f, 92f, competition with, 26, 131, 133
94f, 101f, 102f, 102–3, 126–27, 145t, Rwanda genocide (1994), 40–41
146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
trade liberalization and, 103, 126–27 Sanders, Bernie, 72–73
welfare state policies and, 61f, 61–62 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 100
radical right parties Sassoon, Donald, 99
anti-globalism and, 17, 19–20, 25–26, Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, 85
66–67, 68, 72, 86, 104–7, 126–27, Schröder, Gerhard, 19, 98
128, 130–31 Schuman Plan, 29–30
definition of, 89–90, 166 September 11 terrorist attacks (United
immigration policies and, 19–20, States, 2001), 41, 50–53, 74–75
68, 103–4 Simmons, Beth, 39
increasing power since 1990 of, 97f, Singapore, 44
120–21, 123, 129–31 Single European Act (1986), 36
liberal internationalism and, 61f, 69–70, Skybolt Crisis (1960s), 8–9
77f, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 94f, 95f, 95–96, Slovakia, 40
102, 153t, 155t Slovenia, 40–41
lists of, 166 social democracy. See welfare state
multilateral governance and, 103–7 Social Democratic parties
nationalism and, 19–20, 90f, 91, 92f, decline in power and influence of, 2–3,
102, 103–4 97–98, 104
partnership orientation and, 90f, 91, globalism and, 90, 98–99
92f, 94f, 101f, 102f, 102, 103–4, 145t, liberal internationalism and, 15–16, 61f,
146t, 149t, 157t, 159t 61–62, 69–70, 77f, 85–88, 89–90
power orientation and, 88–89, 90f, 91, lists of, 166
92f, 94f, 101f, 102f, 102, 145t, 146t, middle-class versus working-class
149t, 157t, 159t voters in the coalitions of, 98–99
trade liberalization and, 91, 102, 103– partnership orientation and, 90f, 92f,
7, 130–31 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
Index 243
power orientation and, 61–62, 90f, power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
90, 92f, 101f, 102f, 145t, 146t, 149t, welfare state policies in, 58f
157t, 159t Spengler, Oswald, 5
welfare state policies Srebrenica massacre (Bosnia,
and, 61f, 61–62 1995), 40–41
Social Democratic Party (SPD, Germany Stockholm International Peace Research
and West Germany), 69–70, 87– Institute (SIPRI), 20–21
88, 97–98 Strange, Susan, 55–56
social protection, 1, 3–4, 17–21, 24–25, Sutherland, Peter, 46
55–56, 83–84, 125–27, 129–30, 135– Sweden
36. See also welfare state European Community accession of, 36
declining Western government geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f
spending on, 64–68, 65f liberal internationalism and, 75f, 88–89
liberal internationalism’s reliance on, list of political parties in, 166
55–64, 58f, 59f, 61f, 63f, 106f, 107–8, partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f,
145t, 159t, 173t 42f, 58f
measurement of, 58–59 power orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f
Socialist Party (PSI, Italy), 69–70, 87–88 welfare state policies in, 58f, 79
solvency gap Switzerland, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f, 88–89, 166
definition of, 2–4 Syrian refugee crisis (2015), 84
measurement of, 81 Syriza Party (Greece), 17, 103
Western leaders’ failure to close, 79–83,
82f, 150t Taiwan, 30, 40
South Korea Tea Party (Republican Party faction,
China and, 134 United States), 123
geopolitical threat levels facing, 75f Thailand, 30–31, 44, 187n.9
liberal internationalism in, 30–31, Thatcher, Margaret, 18–19, 35–36, 39,
58f, 75f 80–81, 91
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, trade unions, 80–81, 83, 100, 130–31
42f, 58f Transatlantic Trade and Investment
power orientation and military Program (TTIP), 103
spending in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 58f Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 67–68,
welfare state policies in, 58f 100, 103
Soviet Union. See also Cold War Truman, Harry S., 69
collapse of, 2, 29–30, 56, 64, 74–75, 118, Trump, Donald
128, 129–30 anti-globalism and “America First”
interwar period in, 56–57 foreign policy of, 67–68, 72–73, 132
Japan and, 70, 89 nationalist orientation of, 14
Sino-Soviet split and, 34–35 solvency gap regarding foreign policy
West Germany and, 34–35 and, 1–2, 17, 120, 123–24
Spain welfare state policies and, 67–68
anti-globalism in, 17, 103
European Community accession Ukraine War (2022-), 4, 120, 121, 131–32
(1986) of, 36 United Kingdom. See Great Britain
list of political parties in, 166 United Kingdom Independence Party
partnership orientation in, 33f, 36–37, (UKIP), 67, 103–4
37f, 42f, 58f United Nations, 29
244 Index
United States globalism and, 25, 55–56, 72, 79, 86, 96–
Afghanistan War (2001-21) and, 41, 97, 100, 129, 130–31, 132–33
44–46, 128 immigrant populations and, 4–5
anti-globalism in, 72–73, 85–86, 128 liberal internationalism and, 3–5, 19–
China and, 135 20, 23–24, 25, 55–62, 58f, 59f, 61f, 63f,
election (1980) in, 91 63–65, 65f, 83, 106f, 107–8, 120–21,
geopolitical threat levels facing, 74f, 74– 123, 125–26, 127–28, 136, 142t, 145t,
75, 75f, 78–79 146t, 149t, 157t, 159t
globalism and, 24–25, 28–29, 43–44, neoliberalism’s challenge to, 18–
80–81, 98, 99–100, 132–33 19, 135–36
Iraq War (2003-12) and, 41, 44–46, 128 Western democracies
Japan and, 70, 73, 88–89 definition of, 1, 4–5
liberal internationalism and, 4, 12, 15, Western democracies’ political party
16–17, 23, 29–32, 48, 58f, 69, 87, systems
88–89, 123 Cold War and, 3, 16, 24, 25–26, 85–
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, 42f, 92, 122
43–44, 44f, 47f, 48, 50, 51f, 58f, 88– geopolitical threat levels and, 77f, 78–79
89, 131–32 global governance delegation and, 113–
political polarization since 2000 in, 98 14, 114f, 115f, 164t
power orientation and military international openness and, 111–12,
spending in, 27, 33f, 33, 35, 37f, 40– 112f, 113f, 162t
41, 42f, 43–46, 44f, 47f, 48, 50–53, 51f, liberal internationalism and, 2, 6, 16–
58f, 69, 71, 74–75, 87, 88–89, 131–33 17, 21–22, 55–56, 60, 61f, 77f, 85–86,
September 11 terrorist attacks (2001) in, 89–98, 90f, 92f, 94f, 95f, 104–8, 105f,
41, 50–53, 74–75 106f, 136, 152t, 157t, 159t
trade liberalization in, 35–36, 38, mainstream parties’ declining influence
64, 99–100 since 1990 and, 97f, 98, 108, 120–21,
welfare state policies in, 19, 58f, 64, 67– 126–27, 128–30
68, 132–33 Manifesto Project Database and, 21–22
military doctrine debates and, 8–9
Vandenberg, Arthur, 69 military spending debates and, 8–9,
Vietnam War, 4–5, 70 50, 70–71
voter support. See also partnership; power; political fragmentation within Western
solvency gap democracies and, 111–18, 113f, 119,
measurement of, 21–22 120–21, 126, 128–31, 162t, 177t, 179f
postwar coalition-building and, 15–
Washington Consensus economic 16, 18, 85
policies, 39 trade liberalization debates and, 9–10
welfare state. See also social protection welfare state policies and, 60–61
Bismarck and, 8 West Germany
Cold War and, 8, 56, 62, 129–30, 133–34 election (1972) in, 91
decline in Western democracies’ election (1983) in, 91
commitment to, 1, 3–4, 5, 19–20, 25, geopolitical threat levels facing, 78–79
56, 64–65, 65f, 67, 72, 83, 86, 96–97, liberal internationalism and, 69–70, 123
120–21, 123, 126, 128, 129–31, 132– Ostpolitik policies of rapprochement
33, 136 with Soviet Union and, 34–35, 70–71
Index 245
partnership orientation in, 33f, 37f, establishment (1995) of, 35–36, 71–
42f, 58f 72, 99–100
power orientation and military global economic integration and, 19
spending in, 30–31, 33f, 33, 37f, Global Financial Crisis (2008-9)
42f, 58f and, 43
welfare state policies in, 58f protests (1999) against, 46
Wilson, Woodrow, 11, 37–38, 66 supranational sovereignty and, 19
World Bank, 35–36, 39, 43 unelected bureaucrats’ power in, 23–24
World Trade Organization (WTO)
China’s accession to, 39–40 Yoshida, Shigeru, 73, 88

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Geopolitics and Democracy

Advance Praise for Geopolitics and

“Trubowitz and Burgoon offer a highly readable and persuasive argument

“Geopolitics and Democracy is essential reading for everyone who wants

“Geopolitics and Democracy is a thought-provoking book that studies the

“A big, grand sweeping and important argument. Geopolitics and

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

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Paperback printed by Marquis Book Printing, Canada

1. The Solvency Gap  1

1.1 Power and partnership: dimensions of international statecraft 7

3.8 Effect of geopolitical threat on Western government support for liberal

E.1 Effect of government-​voter gap over international partnership on party

In a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1950,

Union, and the spread of populist and nationalist sentiment in France,

A once virtuous cycle between party democracy and international openness,

internationalism is likely to be in Western polities.5 Conversely, the lower

Geopolitics and Democracy combines a novel theoretical framework and em-

Power and partnership

Support for economic integration

Little partner- Power over

Support for defense spending

Figure 1.1 Power and partnership: dimensions of international statecraft

achieve domestically. Political economists often describe this trade-​off as a

development. Often these distributional struggles are played out as partisan

and imagined, of international cooperation and multilateral governance.27

Foreign policy strategies

We now have a way of describing variation in the types of foreign policy

Support for defense spending

Figure 1.2 Foreign policy strategies by power and partnership

self-​sufficiency to multilateral cooperation.37 In general, political leaders

unlike isolationists who worry as much about the dangers of militarism

OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS

We now have the pieces in place to distinguish between different foreign

(combinations of partnership and power). Voters select political parties to

Party democracy and liberal order

democracies, but similar patterns emerged in America, Japan, and in most

Explaining Western insolvency

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

Geopolitics and Democracy relies on historical, aggregate, and inferential

country-​level analysis of governments’ foreign policies, we leverage widely

policy positions.52 The resulting scores can be interpreted as behavioral

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARGUMENT

hammering Western leaders for outsourcing jobs to low-​wage countries like

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

in Western democracies. The splintering of political authority in Western

international partnership and military power cross-​nationally from the

power distinguished Western democracies and liberal internationalism from

THE WESTERN LIBERAL ORDER

Cold War liberal internationalism

benefits in the emerging order and American leaders found it necessary,

did on increasing European nations’ share of the world market.8 Meanwhile,

The West versus the rest

The West’s commitment to liberal internationalism deepened during

institutionalization due to lingering resentment toward Japan after the war.

0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5

1. The Solvency Gap 1

E.1 Effect of government-voter gap over international partnership on party

achieve domestically. Political economists often describe this trade-off as a

self-sufficiency to multilateral cooperation.37 In general, political leaders

country-level analysis of governments’ foreign policies, we leverage widely

hammering Western leaders for outsourcing jobs to low-wage countries like

international partnership and military power cross-nationally from the

In the 1990s, the West’s approach to liberal order-building changed. Western

1990s, the West’s approach to liberal international order-building began to

market-oriented adjustments that Western democracies themselves had

Figure 2.5 Cross-national variation in government support for international

ever-increasing international partnership. Western voters consistently cast

large-scale social backlashes.4 Drawing on the economic history of England,